1999/198/EC: Commission Decision of 10 February 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the Treaty (IV/35.767 - Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket) (notified under document number C(1999) 239) (Only the Finnish and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)
Date: 1999-02-10
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Finland, airport, application of EU law, charges for use of infrastructure, competition law, dominant position

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Official Journal of the European Communities

16. 3. 1999

II

(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)

COMMISSION

COMMISSION DECISION

of 10 February 1999

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the Treaty

(IV/35.767 — Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket)

(notified under document number C(1999) 239)

(Only the Finnish and Swedish texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(1999/198/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February
1962, first Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 3
thereof,

Having regard to the Commission’s decision on 5 May
1997 to initiate proceedings in this case,

Having given the undertaking concerned the opportunity
to make known its views on the objections raised by the
Commission regarding the system of discounts on
landing charges in use at Finnish airports,

Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive
Practices and Dominant Positions,

Whereas:

I. THE FACTS

(a) Subject of the Decision

(1)

The Commission is currently investigating, in own-
initiative proceedings, the various methods used for
discounting
at Community
airports, following Commission Decision 95/364/
EC of 28 June 1995 relating to a proceeding

landing

charges

(2)

(3)

pursuant to Article 90(3) of the Treaty (2) on the
system of discounts on landing charges in use at
Brussels National Airport.

(b) The relevant undertaking

(the Finnish Civil
Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket
Aviation Administration, hereinafter
‘CAA') has
since 1991 been a self-financing public under-
taking operating under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Transport and Communications. It was
previously the Finnish Aviation Administration, a
centralised department of the Finnish Ministry of
Transport.

Law No 1123/90 of 14 December 1990,
laying
down the statutes of and creating the CAA, sets out
the terms of operation and objectives of the CAA.
Article 2 lists the various duties of the CAA:

‘The Civil Aviation Administration shall provide
airport and air navigation services for the require-
ments of both civil and military aircraft (...).

The task of the Civil Aviation Administration shall
be to ensure general flight safety and (...) to deal
with aviation authorisations and licences (...)'.

(4)

The CAA thus levies charges for
the services
related to the landing and take-off of the aircraft
using the airport facilities which it administers.

(1) OJ 13, 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62.

(2) OJ L 216, 12. 9. 1995, p. 8.

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(5)

(6)

(7)

(c) The relevant system — landing charges

In its Airport Economics Manual (3),
the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
recommends that its members base their charges
on the maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of the
aircraft. The landing charge is defined as follows:
‘Charges and fees collected for the use of runways,
taxiways and apron areas,
including associated
lighting, as well as for the provision of approach
and aerodrome control'.

The charge is imposed to cover all ‘operation and
maintenance costs, and administrative costs attrib-
utable to those areas and their associated vehicles
and equipment, including the expense of all labour,
maintenance materials, power and fuels'.

According to Article 6 of Law No 1123/90, landing
charges in airports administered by the CAA can if
necessary be fixed by decree. Since no such decree
has been issued, it is the CAA itself that sets the

Number of landings at Finnish airports
in the last six months for a given airline

1 001-3 000

3 001-5 000

5 001-7 000

7 001-

level of
discounts.

landing charges

and any applicable

(8)

For 1998, the landing charges set by the CAA were
calculated as follows:

— for

domestic

20
flights: FIM (4)
(depending on the weight of the aircraft) per
tonne of the aircraft’s MTOW,

17

or

— for international flights: FIM 50,50 per tonne of

the aircraft’s MTOW.

(9)

(10)

For environmental reasons, charges for landings
taking place between 22.00 and 06.00 hrs at any
airport
in Finland except Helsinki-Vantaa are
multiplied by a coefficient of 1,3.

The CAA has also instituted a discount linked to
frequency of landing, for international flights only,
calculated as follows:

Discounts to apply to all landings by that airline
over the next six months

(in 1996)

(in 1997)

(in 1998)

3 %

5 %

8 %

11 %

2 %

3 %

6 %

9 %

2 %

2 %

4 %

4 %

(11) A statement of objections was sent to the CAA on
20 May 1997. Two measures were singled out as
being possible infringements of Article 86 of the
Treaty: the progressive discount system (see point
10) and the setting of charges according to the
country of origin of the flight (see point 8).

(d) The main arguments of the CAA

(12) While it maintains that the reasons for the intro-
duction in 1977 of the frequency-based discount
system are unknown, the CAA claims that ‘large-
scale users' have the advantage of offering a guar-
antee of payment.

(13)

The CAA thus argues that:

‘As far as the owner of an airport is concerned, one
of the advantages offered by large-scale users of
airports is that of a customer payment guarantee.
The large-scale users have never experienced any
difficulties in settling their accounts, nor has it
been necessary to make provision for non-payment
of amounts outstanding.'

(14)

The CAA nevertheless points out that the discounts
in question have been reduced significantly over
recent years (from 20 % in 1989 to 4 % in 1998).

(15) Moreover, in its reply dated 19 November 1997 to a
request for information made by the Commission
on 28 October 1997,
the
discount system would be abolished on 1 January
1999.

the CAA stated that

(16)

Lastly, according to the CAA, this approach was
approved by IATA, which, at a meeting with the
CAA in April 1996, gave its ‘support to the idea of
phased changes to the system' and asked the CAA
to refrain from sudden changes to its system, which
for
would have serious
certain airlines.

financial consequences

that

(17) As regards the differentiation of charges according
to the country of origin of the flight, the CAA
points out
the technical and operational
requirements to which airports are subject (length
and durability of runways, hours of operation and
availability of airports) are different for domestic
and for international flights. The different require-
ments explain the differentiation of the charges.

(3) Document 9562-1991 ICAO.

(4) FIM 1 = 0,1681 EUR.

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II. LEGAL ASSESSMENT

(23)

(a) Legal provisions and procedural regula-

tions applicable

(18)

It should be borne in mind that Regulation No 17
was rendered inapplicable to the transport sector by
Council Regulation No 141 (5), as last amended by
Regulation No 1002/67/EEC (6), to take account of
the transport sector.
the distinctive features of
Consequently, the scope of Regulation No 141 and,
therefore, the procedural regulations specific to the
transport sector are limited to anti-competitive
practices arising in connection with the transport
market.

(19) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 (7), as last
amended by Regulation No 2410/92 (8), determines
the ways in which Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
are applied to air transport services.

(20) However, services associated with access to airport
facilities are not directly part of the air transport
services provided to passengers. These activities are
therefore not covered by the procedural regulations
instead fall
specific to the transport sector, but
under Regulation No 17 for
the purposes of
applying Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.

(b) Concept of an undertaking

(21)

that
in Community

The Court of Justice of the European Communities
has consistently held (9)
the concept of an
undertaking
competition law
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic
activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity
and the way it is financed.

(22) Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty apply to the behav-
iour of a public entity when it is established that,
through that entity, the State carries on economic
activities of an industrial or commercial nature by
offering goods and services on the market. It makes
no difference whether the State carries out such
activities directly through a body forming part of
the State administration or through a body to
which it has granted special or exclusive rights. It is
therefore necessary to examine the nature of the
activities carried out by the public undertaking or
entity granted special or exclusive rights by the
State (10).

(5) OJ 124, 28. 11. 1962, p. 2751/62.
(6) OJ 306, 16. 12. 1967, p. 1.
(7) OJ L 374, 31. 12. 1987, p. 1.
(8) OJ L 240, 24. 8. 1992, p. 18.
(9) See in particular Case C-41/90 H(cid:148)fner and Elser v. Macroton
[1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-159
and 160/91 Christian Poucet v. Assurances G(cid:130)n(cid:130)rales de
France and Caisse Mutuelle R(cid:130)gionale du Languedoc-Rous-
sillon [1993] ECR I-637, paragraph 17.

(10) See the judgments in Case 118/85 Commission v. Italy [1987]
ECR 2599, paragraphs 7 and 8, and in Case C-343/95 Diego
Cali & Figli Srl/Servizi ecologici Porto di Genova [1997] ECR
I-1547, paragraphs 16, 17 and 18.

In this connection, there is no doubt that the CAA,
whose core activity (11) is providing airlines with
access services to civil airport facilities in return for
a fee, is, according to the definition of the Court, an
undertaking within the meaning of Article 86 of
the Treaty.

(c) Relevant market

(24) As the Court of Justice has pointed out in the Port
of Genoa case (12), the organisation of port activities
for third parties in a single port can constitute a
relevant market within the meaning of Article 86.
By the same token,
in the Corsica Ferries II
case (13), the Court took the market for piloting
services in the Port of Genoa to be the relevant
market.

(25)

Transposing this line of reasoning to airports, the
in this matter is therefore the
relevant market
market in services linked to access to airport infra-
structures for which a fee is payable. The market
definition is the same as that applied in Commis-
sion Decision 95/364/EC (14).

(26) More specifically, the services in question are those
linked to the exploitation and maintenance of
runways,
taxiways and aprons, and
approach guidance for civil aircraft.

the use of

(27)

In addition, the markets for passenger and freight
transport on medium and short-haul
intra-EEA
routes constitute a neighbouring but distinct
market which is affected by the impact of an abuse
on the part of the undertaking in question on the
market for landing and take-off services. The effect
of the abuse of the dominant position held by the
CAA can therefore also be felt in this market.

(28) Of the 25 airports administered by the CAA, only
five have a significant volume of
international
Pori,
(Helsinki-Vantaa, Vaasa, Turku,
traffic
Tampere). Disregarding Helsinki, the international
traffic amounts
to
Stockholm, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Petrozavodsk
(Russia), Murmansk (Russia) and Lulea (Sweden), as
well as numerous charter flights.

scheduled flights

to several

(29)

The airports with international traffic are inter-
changeable only to a limited extent and each can
therefore be regarded as a distinct geographic
market.

(11) See points 2, 3 and 4.
(12) Case C-179/90, Merci convenzionali porto di Genova/Siderur-

gica Gabrielli [1991] ECR I-5889.

(13) Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia/Corpo dei piloti del porto

di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783.

(14) Cited in footnote 2.

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(30)

(31)

intra-EEA
The airlines operating domestic or
scheduled or charter flights to and from Finland
are obliged to use the airports administered by the
CAA (of the 29 airports in Finland, only four are
private and not under the aegis of the CAA). The
other airports are hundreds of kilometres away and
located in other Member States.

This being the case, for many passengers travelling
to and from Finland, the domestic and intra-EEA
flights that use the CAA-administered airports are
not interchangeable with the services offered at
other EEA airports.

(32) Airlines running domestic or intra-EEA flights,
either to or from Finland, have no option, there-
fore, but to use the airports administered by the
CAA, along with the airport facility access services
provided in these airports.

(33)

(34)

(35)

(36)

(d) Dominant position

The Court of Justice has held that an undertaking
benefiting from a legal monopoly in a substantial
part of the common market may be regarded as
holding a dominant position within the meaning
of Article 86 of the Treaty (15).

This is the case with the CAA, a public under-
taking which, as a result of the exclusive rights
granted to it under Law No 1123/90 in its capacity
as airport authority, holds a dominant position on
the market
for landing and take-off services in
respect of which the charge in question is levied, in
each of the five Finnish airports with international
traffic.

(e) Substantial part of the common market

The five Finnish airports operating intra-EEA
flights were used by a total of approximately 9
million passengers in 1996 and handled more than
91 000 tonnes of freight.

the common market,

The airports which operate intra-EEA services,
taken together, can therefore be regarded as a
if one
substantial part of
applies the reasoning adopted by the Court in the
Crespelle (16) and Almelo (17)
judgments. In the
Crespelle judgment, the Court stated that, ‘by thus
those undertakings, a
establishing,
territorially
contiguous

in favour of
series

of monopolies

(15) Case C-41/90 H(cid:148)fner and Elser, cited in footnote 9, para-
graph 28; Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph
31.

(16) Case C-323/93, Soci(cid:130)t(cid:130) agricole du Centre d’ins(cid:130)mination de
la Crespelle/Coop(cid:130)rative d’(cid:130)l(cid:130)vage et d’ins(cid:130)mination artifi-
cielle du d(cid:130)partement de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077.
(17) Case C-393/92 Commune d’Almelo et autres/Energiebedrijf

Ijsselmij

[1994] ECR I-1477.

limited but together covering the entire territory of
a Member State, those national provisions create a
dominant position, within the meaning of Article
86 of
the
common market.' (18).

in a substantial part of

the Treaty,

(37) A fortiori, a contiguous

series of monopolies
controlled by the same undertaking (the CAA) may
represent a substantial part of the common market.

(f) Abuse of a dominant position

The system of discounts based on frequency

(38)

In view of the announcement made by the CAA
that this system would be abolished on 1 January
1999, and taking into account the practice estab-
lished by the Commission in Decision 95/364/EC,
the discount system, which was included in the
statement of objections pursuant to Article 86 of
the Treaty against the CAA, will no longer be dealt
with in this Decision.

The differentiation of charges according to type of
flight (domestic or intra-EEA)

(39) Article 86 is intended to cover anti-competitive
practices engaged in by undertakings on their own
initiative. It prohibits undertakings that hold a
dominant position in a substantial part of
the
common market from applying dissimilar condi-
tions to equivalent transactions with other trading
thereby placing them at a competitive
parties,
disadvantage.

(40)

In this respect, the Corsica Ferries II judgment (19)
by the Court of Justice is unambiguous. The Court
held:

‘1. Article 1(1) of Council Regulation No 4055/86
of 22 December 1986, applying the principle of
freedom to provide services to maritime trans-
port between Member States and between
Member States and third countries precludes
the application in a Member State of different
tariffs for identical piloting services, depending
on whether the undertaking providing maritime
transport services between two Member States
operates a vessel which is authorised to engage
in maritime sabotage, which is reserved to
vessels flying the flag of that State.

(18) Paragraph 17.
(19) Cited in footnote 13.

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exclusive

2. Article 90, paragraph 1, and Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty prohibit a national authority from
inducing an undertaking which has been
granted the
right of providing
compulsory piloting services in a substantial
part of the common market, by approving the
tariffs adopted by it, to apply different tariffs to
maritime transport undertakings, depending on
whether they operate transport services between
Member States or between ports situated on
national
trade
between Member States is affected.'

to the extent

territory,

that

(41)

In his opinion in the same case, Advocate-General
Van Gerven stated that (20):

‘What is important is that there is no connection
between those differences in tariffs and the nature
of the piloting service offered, which is precisely
the same in both cases (...). For my part, I consider
that what is involved here is clearly an instance of
the form of abuse of a dominant position which is
covered by indent (c) of the second paragraph of
the EC Treaty, namely “applying
Article 86 of
dissimilar conditions
transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage” (*).

to equivalent

(*) Footnote 61: In this respect, a parallel may be
drawn with the situation at issue in the case of
United Brands (judgment in Case 27/76 United
Brands [1978] ECR 207): there the Court held that
the discriminatory pricing policy practised by
UBC, which invoiced distributor/ripeners at prices
which differed from one Member State to another
for identical quantities and types of bananas consti-
tuted an abuse of a dominant position on the
ground that these discriminatory practices, which
varied according to the circumstances of
the
Member States, were just so many obstacles to the
free movement of goods (paragraph 232) and that “a
rigid partitioning of national markets was thus
created at price levels which were artificially
different, placing certain distributor/ripeners at a
competitive disadvantage,
since compared with
what it should have been competition had thereby
same
been distorted”
reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis in the
present case: the differentiated tariffs charged by
the Corporation constitute an obstacle to freedom
to provide intra-EEA shipping transport services
and place persons providing such services at a
disadvantageous competitive position.'

(paragraph 233). The

(20) Paragraph 34.

that

it becomes apparent

(42) Applying this line of reasoning to the airports
sector,
the system of
differentiated landing charges (higher charges for
intra-EEA flights) established by the CAA has the
effect of applying dissimilar conditions for equi-
valent
landing and take-off services for airlines,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvan-
tage, and thus constitutes an abuse of a dominant
position within the meaning of indent (c) of the
second paragraph of Article 86.

(43)

(44)

It is obvious that such a system has the direct effect
of putting at a disadvantage companies providing
intra-Community flights by artificially altering the
cost to the undertakings, depending on whether
they operate domestic or intra-EEA services.

the Treaty,

the
Regarding this infringement of
CAA claims that the implementation of such a
system is justified on the grounds that ‘the tech-
nical and operational requirements applying to
airports, and therefore the underlying costs, are
different for internal flights and for international
flights, primarily as a result of different require-
ments regarding the following:

(i) the length of the runways;

(ii) the durability of the runways;

(iii) the hours of operation, and

(iv) the availability of the airports.'

(45) More specifically, the CAA argues as follows:

(i) Requirements as to the length of the runways

— the average distance of

flights

internal

in
Finland is between 300 km and 400 km,
whereas the average flight distance between
Finland and the other Member States varies
between 1 500 km and 2 000 km, with a
maximum of 3 000 km (Helsinki-Madrid),

— the fleet of aircraft used for domestic flights is
smaller than that used for intra-EEA flights,

— the actual weight of aircraft used for domestic
flights is less since the journeys are shorter than
international flights,

— the size of aircraft and the flight distance deter-

mine runway length,

— for domestic air traffic, runways of 2 000 m in
length are sufficient; however,
for intra-EEA
flights, runways of at least 2 400 m are required.
Thus, for traffic between Finland and the rest of
Europe,
the runways must be around 25 %
longer than those for domestic traffic,

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— airports which accommodate large air fleets are
subject to more stringent conditions regarding
security and emergency arrangements;
this
requires considerable manpower
investment
and is expensive.

By way of conclusion: the maintenance and capital
investment costs associated with intra-EEA traffic
are higher than those for domestic services.

(46)

The validity of the arguments advanced by the
CAA is debatable, for the following reasons:

— many domestic

routes

the
Helsinki-Vantaa/Ivalo, Maarianhamina/Kittil(cid:132)
and Turku/Rovaniemi routes) are of a similar
distance to intra-EEA flights,

example,

(for

— some of

the intra-EEA flights are relatively
short: Helsinki/Stockholm (approximately 405
km), Helsinki/Gothenburg (approximately 810
km), Helsinki/Oslo (approximately 810 km)
and Helsinki/Copenhagen (approximately 910
km),

— the distance of the route to be flown is not the
sole criterion on which airlines base their
choice of aircraft,

— the CAA claimed that, whereas a runway length
of 2 000 m is sufficient for domestic flights,
intra-EEA or international flights would require
an additional 400 m of runway. However, most
of Finland’s airports have already made this
investment; of the 25 administered by the CAA,
only 6 have runways that are less than 2 400 m
long (21).

(47) Moreover, according to the figures in the Commis-
sion’s possession,
the airports with
several of
runways shorter than 2 400 m nevertheless handle
the
intra-EEA traffic. They are in particular
following airports: Lappeenranta (2 000 m), Maar-
ianhamina (1 900 m), Pori
(2 000 m) and Vaasa
(2 000 m) (22). The argument based on runway
length is therefore not relevant.

(48) As regards the claim that

the aircraft used for
domestic traffic are smaller than those used for
intra-EEA traffic, the Commission notes that this is
the airline
the case. For example,
not always
Finnair uses
for
domestic routes (e.g. Helsinki-Oulu) as it does for
the intra-Community routes Helsinki-Alicante or
Helsinki-Barcelona.

(MD-80s)

aircraft

same

the

(49)

The CAA claims
to have ‘monitored product
costing, and in particular the cost of services asso-
ciated with manoeuvring areas since 1994', and that
‘based on 1995 product costs, the cost per tonne

(MTOW) of taxiway services for international traffic
has risen by around 50 % compared with the cost
of the same for domestic traffic'. According to the
CAA, this means that ‘landing charges based solely
on the MTOW are inaccurate in a system of
pricing based on real costs, and therefore the
landing charges for international traffic must be
higher'.

(50) However, the CAA itself admits that the alleged
differential in costs between those incurred by the
landing of an intra-EEA flight and those associated
with a domestic landing is less than the differential
between the landing charge for intra-EEA flights
and that for domestic flights.

(ii) Requirements as to the durability of runways

(51) According to the CAA, because heavier aircraft are
‘in order to cater for
the

used for international traffic,
the superstructure of
international
runways must be around 10 % more stable'.

traffic,

(52)

This argument does not stand, because the runway
durability factor is already taken into account, the
charge being based on the weight of the aircraft.

(53)

(54)

(55)

(iii) Requirements as to the hours of operation of

airports and their availability

The CAA claims that, in view of the fact that 90 %
of
international air traffic to and from Finland
passes through Helsinki, and that the departure and
arrival times for international flights are fixed for
both the morning and the evening, the provincial
airports are also obliged to stay open in the morn-
for connecting flights. This
ings and evenings,
means that ‘the cost of providing services must be
included when calculating the cost of passenger
charges'.

The CAA claims that ‘international traffic requires
more space for the passenger terminals and aircraft
parking areas than domestic traffic, as well as more
services. The CAA is therefore obliged to cover the
construction costs when setting the passenger
charge'.

incurred by the requirements

The last two arguments are irrelevant to the system
in question: given that, according to the CAA, the
regarding
costs
airport
are
included in the calculation of passenger charges, it
follows that it is not possible to include them in
the landing charges.

operating hours

availability

and

(21) Source: ACI Europe Airport Database.
(22) Source: Finnish Civil Aviation Statistics.

(56)

In the light of the above, the Commission holds
that none of the arguments put forward by the

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CAA justifies the implementation of a system of
charges that is discriminatory in nature, according
to the origin of
(i.e. domestic or
the flight
intra-EEA), such as that operated by the under-
taking in question.

(g) Effect on trade between Member States

(62)

(57)

(58)

In its judgment in the Corsica Ferries II case (23),
the Court of Justice recognised that discriminatory
practices which ‘affect undertakings providing
transport services between two Member States, (...)
may affect trade between Member States'.

Following a request under Article 11 of Regulation
No 17 for the CAA to provide information, it was
ascertained that there are no statistics that separate
intra-EEA traffic from the rest of the international
traffic for each airport.

(59) As regards Helsinki airport, which handled 7,7
million passengers in 1996, the effect of the system
in question on trade between Member States is
beyond doubt.

(60) As regards the other Finnish airports operating
intra-EEA services (Vaasa, Turku, Tampere and
Pori), apart from charter flights to the Mediter-
ranean Member States and the Canary Islands,
these airports operate each day to Stockholm six
flights (Vaasa and Turku), five flights (Tampere),
and two flights (Pori). The flights to Stockholm
connect with flights to Amsterdam, Billund, Brus-
sels, Copenhagen, D(cid:129)sseldorf, Frankfurt, Gothen-
burg, Hamburg, London, Manchester, Milan,
Munich, Paris and Vienna, on either Lufthansa/SAS
or Finnair (on a code-sharing basis with its part-
ners).

The table below shows the volume of international
flights as a proportion of overall passenger traffic
for the airports in question.

Airport

Domestic
traffic

International
traffic

(%)

Helsinki Vantaa

Vaasa

Turku

Pori

Tampere

30

66

51

72

49

70

34

49

28

51

Source: Finnish Civil Aviation Statistics 1996, p. 9.

(23) Cited in footnote 13.

(61)

It is thus legitimate to regard the system at issue in
those five airports as having an effect on trade
between Member States.

(h) Conclusion

The foregoing analysis establishes that the system
for calculating landing charges used by the CAA
entails the payment, for no objective reason, of
different charges, depending on the origin of the
flight (domestic or intra-EEA), in respect of the
same approach control, taxiway and apron areas
services.

(63)

The Commission therefore considers
the
system in question is discriminatory and distorts
competition on the relevant market, contrary to
indent (c) of the second paragraph of Article 86 of
the Treaty,

that

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket has infringed Article 86 of
the Treaty by using its dominant position as Finnish
airport administrator to impose discriminatory landing
charges in Finnish airports, according to the type of
flight, that is either domestic or intra-EEA.

Article 2

Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket must bring to an end the
infringement referred to in Article l and inform the
Commission within two months of
the date of noti-
fication of this Decision of the measures it has taken to
that end.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket,
PO Box 50, FIN-01531 Vantaa.

Done at Brussels, 10 February 1999.

For the Commission

Karel VAN MIERT

Member of the Commission