1999/271/EC: Commission Decision of 9 December 1998 relating to a proceeding pursant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty - (IV/34466 - Greek Ferries) - (notified under document number C(1998) 3792) - (Only the Greek and Italian texts are authentic) - (Text with EEA relevance)
Date: 1998-12-09
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Greece, ferryboat, fine, maritime transport, restriction on competition, transport price

L 109/24

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

COMMISSION DECISION

of 9 December 1998

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty

(IV/34466 — Greek Ferries)

(notified under document number C(1998) 3792)

(Only the Greek and Italian texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(1999/271/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE
COMMUNITIES,

EUROPEAN

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No
4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down detailed
rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty to maritime transport (1), as amended by the
Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and
in particular Articles 11 and 19 thereof,

Having regard to the Commission decision of 21
February 1997 to open a proceeding in this case,

Having given the parties the opportunity to make
known their views on the objections raised by the
Commission in accordance with Article 23 of
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86, and with Commission
the
Regulation
communication, complaints and applications and the
hearings provided for
in Regulation (EEC) No
4056/86, as last amended by the Act of Accession of
Austria, Finland and Sweden,

(EEC) No

4260/88 (2)

on

at

the

investigations

the offices of

23 August 1992 that
ferry prices were very
similar on routes between Greece and Italy. The
Commission, acting pursuant to Article 18(3) of
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86, carried out
investigations
six ferry
operators,
five in Greece and one in Italy.
the Commission
During
discovered documentary evidence showing that a
number of ferry operators had been agreeing on
for
prices
for
of
information,
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 were sent later to
Minoan Line, Strintzis Lines, and Anek asking
for further details concerning the documents
found
The
Commission opened formal proceedings on 21
February 1997 by sending a statement of
objections
this
Decision as well as to Med Link and Hellenic
Mediterranean Lines. An oral hearing was held
on 13 and 14 May 1997.

seven addressees of

several
pursuant

years. Requests

investigations.

to Article

to the

during

the

16

consulting

After
on
Agreements and Dominant Positions in the field of
Maritime Transport,

the Advisory Committee

B. The undertakings

Whereas:

(2)

PART I

THE FACTS

A. The background to this Decision

(1)

This Decision arises from a complaint made to
the Commission by a member of the public on

(1) OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4.
(2) OJ L 376, 31.12.1988, p. 1.

of

The undertakings involved in this procedure are
ferry operators, who provide
roll-on roll-off
passenger and freight services on a number of
routes between Greece
and Italy, namely:
Minoan Lines,
Iraklio, Crete, Greece
(hereinafter referred to as (cid:28)Minoan’) Strintzis
Lines, of Piraeus, Greece (hereinafter (cid:28)Strintzis’,
Anek Lines, of Hania, Crete, Greece (hereinafter
(cid:28)Anek’), Marlines
SA, of Piraeus, Greece
(hereinafter (cid:28)Marlines’), Karageorgis Lines, of
(cid:28)Karageorgis’),
Piraeus, Greece
Ventouris Group Enterprises SA, of Piraeus,
Greece
(cid:28)Ventouris Ferries’), and
Adriatica di Navigazione SpA, of Venice, Italy
(hereinafter (cid:28)Adriatica’).

(hereinafter

(hereinafter

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/25

(3)

(4)

(5)

C. The market

The relevant market is that for the provision of
roll-on roll-off
ferry services between Greece
and Italy.

There are three major routes between Italy and
Greece where regular services are offered for
passengers, cars and trucks. These routes are the
route between Ancona
and Patras
(Greece), the route between Brindisi (Italy) and
Patras (Greece) and the route between Bari
(Italy) and Patras (Greece). In addition Trieste,
and – more recently – Venice, are served from
Patras.

(Italy)

freight

route the respective percentages were 35 % and
26 %, with 13 % and 16 % having been
transported on the route Patras-Bari. For 1993,
figures were 1 316 003 passengers and
the
From them,
vehicles.
213 839
approximately 49 % and 38 % were transported
through the Patras-Ancona route, 35 % and
38 % on the Patras-Brindidsi one as well as
10 % and 19 % on the Patras-Bari route. A
comparable number of passengers and vehicles
is transported per year from Italy to Greece, too.

D. Evidence

(8)

The main evidence on which this Decision is
based includes:

of

origin

between
of

the
the
regarding

substitutability
points

It is clear that these routes are not operated in
isolation as separate markets, and there is a
them
degree
depending
and
on
traveller or goods, and
destination of
preferences
etc.
However, for the purposes of this procedure the
Commission does not consider it necessary to
examine in depth the degree of substitutability
between these routes, since the practices at issue
here covered all three main routes for at least
part of the period in question.

journey

time,

(6) On the Ancona-Patras route, during at least part
of the time of the suspected infringement, there
were five major operators – Minoan, Strintzis,
Marlines and Karageorgis. Of these, Karageorgis
ceased operating in 1993. At least one other
operator – Superfast Ferries – has
recently
entered the market and is not implicated in the
present procedure. On the routes between Patras
and Bari and Brindisi there are a large number
of regular operators (at least 11), and some
seasonal operators. Minoan, Anek, Strintzis,
Marlines and Karageorgis have between them
had a share of traffic which was close to 100 %
on the Patras-Ancona route during the period of
the infringement. For 1993, Ventouris Ferries,
Adriatica, Hellenic Mediterranean Lines and
Marlines had a combined share of traffic of
approximately 75 % for passengers and 60 %
for freight on the Patras-Bari/Brindisi routes (1).

(7)

1 258 000

Approximately
and
229 000 freight vehicles were transported during
1996 from Greece to Italy, of which around
38 % and 46 % respectively was carried on the
Patras-Ancona route. On the Patras-Brindisi

passengers

(1) Source: Cruise & Ferry Info.

(a) messages
various
introduction, and calculation, of prices;

sent, mostly by telex, between
the
relating
operators

to

(b) admissions made by Anek and Strintzis in
their replies to the Commission’s request for
information and in their
to the
Commission’s statement of objections.

replies

Evidence for 1987/1988/1989

(9)

From a telex sent by Minoan to Anek, dated 15
March 1989, provided by Anek upon request
for information, it appears that consultations on
prices took place in 1987 for the 1988 tariffs for
the Patras-Ancona route. An agreement on
prices was reached on 18 July 1987. Minoan
reports in that telex that (cid:28)The pricing policy for
1988, as mutually established with the other
interested parties, was decided on 18 July 1987.
This has in fact been the usual practice.’

In the

fully to accept

(10) Anek began to operate ferries between Patras
and Ancona for the first time in 1989. In 1989,
consultations took place as to the tariffs they
would apply.
telex mentioned in
paragraph 9, Minoan says (cid:28)We regret that your
refusal
the proposals we put
forward in our earlier [message] at least for the
time being prevents the conclusion of a broader
agreement
extremely
advantageous to our companies … We refer of
course
refusal of our proposals
concerning the definition of a joint pricing
policy for the Patras-Ancona route; and we ask
you to understand the positions we set out
below, which are intended as a response to your
view that you cannot accept the 1989 tariff in

to your

would

which

be

L 109/26

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

force for goods vehicles and that the pricing
policy for the forthcoming year 1990 cannot be
defined immediately’.

Consultations continued later on some minor
points, e.g. the prices for jeeps were discussed in
a telex from Strintzis to the other companies on
17 July 1989 and a telex from Anek to the other
companies on 22 September 1989.

(11) Minoan then attempted to persuade Anek to
join in the agreement on fares by informing it of
how successfully it had been applied: (cid:28)in the last
two
three months on the particular
readjustments of the fares for goods vehicles
have been agreed jointly by all the shipowners
on the Patras-Ancona route, amounting to a
total of 40 %, and have certainly caused no
driver
difficulties with
agitation
colleagues’.

route

our

or

(12) Having failed,

for the moment,

to persuade
Anek to join in the agreement, Minoan,
Karageorgis, Marlines and Strintzis decided to
charge collectively, from 26 Juni 1989, exactly
the same goods vehicle tariffs as those applied
by Anek. Very detailed tables were exchanged
between the parties, and Anek was informed of
the outcome both orally and in writing. Indeed,
Minoan sent Anek a telex on 22 June 1989,
announcing the four other companies’ intention
to apply Anek’s tariffs as from 26 June 1989.

Evidence for 1990

Strintzis

to Anek, Karageorgis,

(13) The parties began to discuss passenger fares for
1990 in June 1989. On 20 June 1989, Minoan
sent
and
Marlines detailed proposals for a common price
policy for 1990 for passengers, cars and truck
vehicles. A telex sent by Anek to Minoan,
Karageorgis, Marlines and Strintzis on 6 July
1989 says (cid:28)we agree to the establishment of a
uniform tariff
five
companies on the Patras-Ancona … we can
discuss the subject of goods vehicles in October’.

for passengers by

all

(14)

of

the

Strintzis sent a message to Minoan, Karageorgis,
Marlines and Anek on 12 June 1989 in which it
states that (cid:28)the prices were calculated on the
basis
exchanged,
following the agreement of all our companies to
stick to a common price policy’. This
fax
contains the prices and discounts for passengers
and for vehicles, and the port taxes, in drachmas
and in 10 foreign currencies.

recently

telexes

(16) A fax sent by Strintzis on 8 December 1989 to
Minoan, Anek, Karageorgis
and Hellenic
Mediterranean Lines (1) detailes the new prices,
by category of truck, to be applied from 10
December 1989 for the Patras-Ancona route and
the Patras-Bari and Brindisi routes. This fax also
indicated that the photocopy was signed (cid:28)also by
Ventouris Ferries’, and the table of tariffs bears
six signatures.

(17) Another telex shows again the common price
policy in force in 1990. This document, dated
11 April 1990, sent by Anek to Karageorgis,
to the (cid:28)telexes
Minoan and Strintzis,
exchanged
companies
regarding the price policy for the Patras-Ancona
route’ where Anek confirms that (cid:28)our agreement
concerns the passenger, passenger cars and truck
vehicles fares, but does not concern the agents’
commission and the rebates for groups’.

refers
the

between

four

(18) Consultations

1990

addressed

September

exchanged a number of

took place again to increase
commonly the truck fares during 1990. The
telexes
companies
during September and October and Strintzis
organised a meeting at its premises. In a telex of
5
to Anek,
Karageorgis and Minoan, Strintzis states that (cid:28)a
condition for the application of the proposed
increase is a proportional increase in fares for
the Bari and Brindisi routes; nevertheless, it is
necessary to reach an agreement in principle
between our four companies’. In a telex sent to
Anek, Minoan and Strintzis, Karageorgis states
that (cid:28)following our common decision … we are
obliged to readjust prices for trucks as from 20
October 1990’.
follows a detailed list of
prices. Karageorgis also states: (cid:28)Please send the
above telex as it stands to your port agents and
your clients as soon as possible’.

It

(15) Anek confirmed its agreement (cid:28)on the proposed
tariffs for the Patras-Igoumenitsa-Corfu-Ancona
route based on our decision concerning a
common tariff policy’, in a telex of 14 July 1989
companies.
four
addressed

other

the

to

(1) Although there is evidence that Hellenic Mediterranean
Lines participated in the
the present
Decision is not addressed to this undertaking because the
Commission has been unable to send it the statement of
objections.

infringement,

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/27

Ferries). This

(19) Agreement was reached and a fax was sent by
Strintzis on 30 October 1990 to eight companies
operating ferries between Greece and Italy
(Adriatica, Anek, Hellenic Mediterranean Lines,
Karageorgis, Minoan, Med Lines, Strintzis and
Ventouris
(cid:28)We
communicate the final agreement for truck fares.
Please acknowledge your agreement as to the
contents and we suggest to announce the prices
on 1 November and to put them into effect, as
it has been agreed, from 5 November 1990.’ A
table follows with prices
in drachmas and
Italian lire for various categories of trucks for
the routes Patras to Ancona, Bari and Brindisi.

states:

fax

(20) Minoan sent on 2 November 1990 a document
to its agent with the new prices, valid from 5
November 1990 where they clearly state that
these prices were agreed by the companies on all
the Greece-Italy routes.

Evidence for 1991

(21) That tariffs continued to be agreed for 1991 is
evidenced by several documents. Karageorgis
sent a letter on 10 August 1990 to Anek,
Minoan and Strintzis concerning the 1991 list
prices for the Patras-Ancona route.
It states:
(cid:28)Following the agreement by the four companies
that there should be a 5 % increase on top of
the first 5 %, please find attached the new price
schedules with the final 10 %.’

all

for

have

agreed

that we

(22) A telex was sent to Anek from Karageorgis,
Minoan and Strintzis on 22 October 1991, in
which it is stated that (cid:28)… we note that you want
to apply to the Patras-Trieste route the same
fare
the
Patras-Ancona route. You will realise that the
obscurity in the wording causes us great
concern, because it raises the prospect of a
collapse of the equilibrium in tariffs which we
have succeeded, with considerable difficulty, in
establishing for all
the Italian ports. Let us
remind you that by a joint effort – to which you
yourselves contributed – we reorganised the
could and established
tariffs
as best we
differentials on the basis of
the distances in
nautical miles to the ports of Brindisi, Bari and
Ancona … We would accordingly entreat you to
defend – as you ought to do – the agreement
between the 11 companies and the 36 vessels on
the Greece-Italy crossing because given the
intense differences which are smouldering away

under the surface the existing agreement could
well collapse. We would suggest to you that the
tariff for the Patras-Trieste trip should be put at
20 % above that
for the Patras-Ancona (as
indeed was the case in the past), so as to
harmonise fully with the differentials between
Ancona and the more southerly ports … our
companies are obliged to notify you that if you
insist on applying the same price from Trieste
and Ancona for Greece, our agreement for a
common price policy concerning the Ancona
route will
and each company will
cease
determine its own price policy’.

this

(23) The reply of Anek to this telex, dated 18
November 1991, confirms the existence of an
agreement: (cid:28)The threat to abandon the common
prices on the Ancona route cannot be based,
from our point of view, on the non-application
by Anek of
illogical and inadmissible
increase of 20 %. We will accordingly ask you
not to persist in your position, in order to avoid
disturbing the climate of cooperation between
the
have
for all of us. To
destructive consequences
conclude, we would assure you that if in the
future Anek should decide to schedule a vessel
on the Patras-Trieste route without
including
Ancona, the tariff will of course be higher than
that for the Patras-Ancona route, but not by
20 %, which on any impartial judgement is at
least unrealistic.’

companies, which would

four

Evidence for 1992

(24) The collusion continued during 1992. On 22
July 1991 Strintzis
sent a highly detailed
schedule of passenger fares to Anek, Karageorgis
and Minoan saying (cid:28)We attach the 1992
schedule as agreed at our meeting of (illegible)
July. Please confirm if you agree’. A number of
telexes were subsequently exchanged in which
ways were discussed of dealing with the
depreciation of the drachma.

(25) After a meeting held on 7 October 1991
between
and
Minoan, Strintzis sent the list prices (cid:28)as agreed’
for 1992 (Patras-Igoumenitsa-Corfou-Ancona
route) to the three other companies requesting

Strintzis, Anek, Karageorgis

L 109/28

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

their agreement. This list contained the prices
for passengers, detailed by high or low season
and cabin categories, and for all the vehicle
categories. The parties had also agreed the
periods of high and low season, and the prices
of meals. Anek sent its agreement by telex on 16
October 1991. This reply was forwarded to
Karageorgis and Minoan.

Moreover, a letter, dated 18 October 1991, was
found at the premises of Strintzis, sent by Anek
to port agents saying (cid:28)We enclose for you the
drachma tariffs for 1992 for the Patras-Ancona
route as agreed with the Strintzis, Minoan Lines
and Karageorgis companies’. A similar letter
was sent by Strintzis.

it is stated:

In this document
continued during 1992.
European Trust Agencies
(cid:28)ETA’)
(hereinafter
reports to the head office of Minoan on (cid:28)the
latest development concerning the Italy routes’.
After mentioning new ships introduced, and the
the extra tonnage is likely to
problems that
cause,
(cid:28)we are concentrating our
efforts on the tariff policy to be implemented by
the Ventouris company on the Otranto route.
We have already commenced discussions on the
matter. To make things clearer we give you
present fares for Bari, Otranto and Ancona and
our own proposed Otranto fares.’ A table of
fares for different sized goods vehicles follows.

(29) Furthermore, a telex dated 7 January 1993 from
Minoan to Strintzis, Anek and Karageorgis,
suggested an adjustment in tariffs for vehicles on
the Greece-Italy-Greece routes. It says (cid:28)We point
out that two years have passed since the vehicle
tariff was last adjusted’.

(26) The four companies also agreed on the validity
period of their commonly agreed tariffs for the
transitional year-end period. A telex sent by
Anek to Karageorgis, Minoan and Strintzis
states that (cid:28)… we agree with the extension of
the 1992 prices for the Patras-Ancona route
until 10 January 1992’. Anek informed its port
agents by telex on 21 October 1991 that (cid:28)…
following agreement with our competitors the
1991 prices for the Patras-Ancona-Patras route
are valid until 10 January 1992’.

Evidence for 1993

vehicles

importers

of motor

(27) A telex dated 7 January 1992, found at the
from Minoan to Anek,
premises of Minoan,
them that
Strintzis and Karageorgis, warns
several
are
(cid:28)endeavouring to lure our companies into tariff
competition … we propose to you that we
should stick to a common policy which will
keep us off the slippery slope’. It proposes a
price to be quoted by all the companies and
requests agreement
(cid:28)in order to reply to the
Calberson company which, as you know, has
been in contact with all of
the companies’.
Strintzis agreed to adhere to a common policy
and
all
unaccompanied cars. Anek also agreed with
Strintzis.

proposed

common

price

for

a

(30) Consultations about

the new tariff

the Patras-Ancona

for 1993
took also place in 1992. ETA informed Minoan
on 21 May 1992 that a (cid:28)conference of
representatives of
route
shipping companies is to be convened to discuss
the drafting of the new tariff for 1993’. This
document contained also the agenda of
this
meeting. A telex from ETA to the head office of
Minoan, dated 27 May 1992, says (cid:28)we inform
you concerning the proposals that we put to the
the four shipping companies and
meeting of
which, with minor differentiations
the
Karageorgis
companies, were
accepted. Anek is reserving its position and will
reply in 10 days time’. A series of specific price
increases for various types of traffic followed.

and Strintzis

for

(28) A document dated 25 February 1992, found at
the premises of Minoan,
the
agreement to maintain differentials between the
tariffs applied on the various Greece-Italy routes

indicates

that

(31) Discussions continued later. A letter from ETA
to the head office of Minoan dated 30 July
1992, stated that a meeting would take place of
representatives
(cid:28)collaborating
the
companies on the Greece-Italy route’ on 4
August 1992, at which (cid:28)all relevant matters will
be discussed’.

four

of

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/29

(32)

Strintzis sent to Anek, Karageorgis and Minoan
a telefax message on 6 August 1992 announcing
that prices in European currencies would be
drafted on the basis of the drachma tariff and
specifying the currency rate in German marks. It
proposed also to not divulge the drachma tariff
before 30 September 1992. Anek agreed by telex
on 7 August 1992. This reply was also sent to
Strintzis, Karageorgis and Minoan.

(35) A telex dated 9 December 1992 from Strintzis to
Anek, Minoan and Karageorgis, says (cid:28)regarding
the 1992 fares we remind you that it was agreed
that these should apply from 11 January 1993’.

(33) Minoan sent a letter on 29 September 1992, to
in which it
Anek, Karageorgis and Strintzis,
the fluctuations of
expressed concern about
foreign currencies in relation to the drachma,
and asked the others to reply as to whether they
should adapt the prices, otherwise the list prices
in German marks,
Italian lire and drachmas
would diverge widely. Minoan sent to Anek,
Karageorgis and Strintzis on 12 October 1992
several proposals which had already been
discussed orally or by telex exchanges. A telex
dated 15 October 1992 from Minoan to Anek,
Strintzis and Karageorgis says (cid:28)further to our
conversation concerning the final arrangement
of tariffs in DEM, ITL and GRD, we add our
decisions’. An increase of 5 % in the Italian lire
tariff was suggested. Anek replied by telex on 16
October 1992 that
it agreed as regards the
prices in German marks and Italian lire. Strintzis
also agreed on 16 October 1992. Karageorgis
replied by telex on 26 October 1992 indicating
its agreement and adding (cid:28)we insist, further, on
an increase in the vehicle rates and await your
decision’. Anek replied by telex on 6 November
1992 indicating its agreement.

(36) A telex dated 7 January 1993 (mentioned in
paragraph 29) from Minoan to Strintzis, Anek
and Karageorgis, suggested an adjustment
in
tariffs for vehicles on the Greece – Italy routes.
It says (cid:28)our decision to proceed to an agreement
with you on the readjustment without
first
consulting with the companies on the other
Italian routes is motivated by a desire to avoid
the interminable discussions that would ensue if
we were to embark on that consultation. We
believe that this joint agreement will be looked
upon positively by those companies … We await
your agreement’. A table of proposed tariffs was
attached. Karageorgis
replied by telex of 8
January 1993 stating (cid:28)we agree totally’. Minoan
sent another telex to Anek, Karageorgis and
Strintzis on 14 January 1993 which suggested
that Anek should apply an increase of 15 % to
its goods vehicle tariff on the Trieste route.
Strintzis agreed with Minoan on both issues, on
15 January 1993. Anek replied on 15 January
1993 agreeing with the proposals regarding the
Patras-Ancona route, but saying it had already
publicised an increase of 8 % on the Trieste
route from 1 February 1993 and would find it
difficult to retract this.

(34)

the

stating:

(cid:28)Because of

information
prices

from the
on Greece-Italy

In November 1992, having received a request
Commission
for
concerning
routes,
Minoan sent a telex to Anek, Karageorgis and
Strintzis
sensitive
situation brought about by the Commission’s
question concerning our price schedules on the
Greece-Italy route and after the verbal exchange
of views, we propose the following: Of the 17
categories in our schedule, “deck” should be
disregarded, since this is where none of us wants
anyone to be cheaper; as for the remaining 16,
each company should take four categories each
(to be chosen by Mr Sakellis) (Strintzis) and
reduce its schedule by 1 %.’ Minoan sent also to
Anek a copy of its reply to the abovementioned
request for information.

this meeting was to readjust

(37) On 24 November 1993 a meeting was held
which was attended by 14 companies. The
the
purpose of
prices on the routes Patras to Ancona, Brindisi
and Bari for 1994. A telex from ETA to the
head office of Minoan, dated 24 November
1993, says (cid:28)We are pleased to inform you that at
today’s meeting we achieved agreement on a
readjustment
by
approximately 15 % … to be given immediate
effect from 16 December 1993. We are very
pleased because we began with the problem of
the collapse of the previous agreement’. This last
sentence implies that an agreement was in place
concerning the differentiation between Ancona,
Bari and Brindisi earlier in the year.

vehicle

tariff

the

of

L 109/30

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

Evidence for 1994

of

the

tariff

vehicle

(38) On 24 November 1993 a meeting was held
which was attended by 14 companies. The
to achieve
this meeting was
purpose of
agreement on prices on the routes Patras to
Ancona, Brindisi and Bari. A telex from ETA to
the head office of Minoan, dated 24 November
1993, says (cid:28)We are pleased to inform you that at
today’s meeting we achieved agreement on a
readjustment
by
approximately 15 % … to be given immediate
effect from 16 December 1993. We are very
pleased because we began with the problem of
the collapse of
the previous agreement on
account of the opposition of the companies of
Kosma-Giannatou and Ventouris A., we repaired
the situation bit by bit, overcoming the 5 % to
10 % (positions of Strintzis, Ventouris G. and
Adriatica), and finally got
to the percentage
stated above. In addition we balanced out the
various conflicts which, as you know, exist
concerning the discrepancies from one port to
another. Truly, we are very pleased, given that
on 1993 throughput figures this will provide our
company with an immediate yield of new net
receipts
in the order of GRD 600 000 000
annually’. Further on, the note mentions that 14
companies were present at the meeting.

(39) The (cid:28)Kosma-Giannatou’ mentioned in paragraph
38 is interpreted by the Commission to be a
reference to the company known as Med Lines,
since both Mr Kosmas and Giannatos were
members of its board. Ventouris G. is believed
to be a reference to Ventouris Ferries, while
Ventouris A. is taken to be a reference to AK
The
different
Ventouris,
Commission has not included AK Ventouris in
this Decision as it has no evidence other than
the above note that
this company actually
infringed the competition rules. Moreover, the
Commission has not been able to identify other
small companies which eventually participated
in this meeting.

company.

a

(40) A telex from Minoan to Anek and Strintzis of
13 May 1994, mentions that a new type of
trailer was becoming common on the Ancona
route and it suggested a new category of fare
and a common implementation date. This is

followed by further telexes of 25 May 1994 and
3 June 1994 on the same subject requesting
agreement.

(41) A telex from ETA to the head office of Minoan
dated 26 May 1994 says (cid:28)We have embarked on
an initiative to get a new tariff implemented on
the Italy routes with differing rates for cash
payment and two-month cheques. The problem
is that we have to get the agreement of 16
companies. Nevertheless, we are optimistic’.

(42) The Commission investigation took place in July
1994. There is no evidence that the companies
continued their collusion after that date.

E. The arguments of the parties

General arguments of the parties

Strintzis

(43) According to Strintzis, the agreements on prices
took place under the influence of the Greek
legal and regulatory framework for coastal
shipping, in particular Law 4195 of 11 to 13
July 1929, Strintzis argues that, owing to the
following factors:

— the Greek regulatory framework,

— the practice and obligations imposed by the
the Merchant Navy

Greek Ministry for
((cid:28)YEN’),

— the need for a regular schedule,

— the uncertain length of the tourist period,

— the danger of drastic changes in cost levels as
a result of unexpected yearly devaluations of
the drachma,

— the necessary disclosure of the business plans
of Strintzis through the obligatory meetings
for the domestic part of the line Greece-Italy,

— the need to adhere to the directive of the
YEN that lays down that increases in freight
rates
the
Greece-Italy market must be within the
limits of inflation,

international part of

the

for

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/31

(44)

(45)

(46)

it had to protect
from unrestricted
itself
competition against which it would not have
been able to react by suspending or reducing its
activities.

their

fares

the parties
policy. According

In any case, all
the abovementioned factors
restricted the autonomy of
in
to
defining
Strintzis, YEN guidelines on the companies’
pricing policy should be regarded as restrictive
measures within the meaning of Greek Law
company was
4195/29.
unaware
constituted an
infringement of Community competition law.

Furthermore,
its
that

the
activities

Strintzis contends that the agreements did not
include obligations or negative clauses, that it
effectively competed with the other companies
by offering discounts, and that a significant part
its net profit derived from the on-board
of
services
the
agreements.

that were not

subject of

the

In the opinion of Strintzis, the YEN’s actions
defined all factors of competition except prices
on the international part of
the Greece-Italy
routes. Consequently, residual competition was
very limited or even unworkable. In fact, the
agreement on prices was a government-led and
supervised cartel and not a cartel of individuals
operating with the intention of maximising the
the participants. On the contrary,
profit of
prices on Greece-Italy routes were lower than
those on other international routes within the
the
Community. As
infringement,
the
Strintzis
the Greek authorities created
involvement of
confusion among the parties as to the applicable
legal
framework, and the price levels would
have been the same even without the alleged
price arrangements.

the gravity of
submits

regards

that

Ventouris Group Enterprises

of national and Community law with due
respect to the rules of competition law and to
the Greek maritime legal
framework. Also,
Ventouris alleges that it operated only on the
it
Patras-Ingoumenitsa-Corfu-Bari
faced not substantial competition and, therefore,
it had no reason to form an agreement with
companies
routes
under different conditions and with different
that any kind of
buyers. Ventouris argues
cooperation between the companies was limited
to the operations on the Patras-Ancona route.

that operated on different

line where

(48) Finally, Ventouris Ferries draws attention to the
policy of the YEN and to the Greek legal and
regulatory framework as well as the particular
situation
(transparency,
this market
competition on discounts, etc.) owing to which,
even if there had been agreement, the situation
in the market in relation to price competition
would have been the same.

in

Anek

(49) Anek

that

from 1990

acknowledges

it
to establish
participated in an agreement
common prices on certain routes, although at
the time the agreement was entered into it was
not aware that it violated any applicable law.
Anek also suggests that the Commission should
take into account, with respect to all operators,
the domestic regulatory environment in which
the companies operated, the involvement of the
national authorities in setting the stage for the
on
the
arrangements,
limited
competition
Furthermore, Anek
suggests that the Commission should take into
account Anek’s participation, Anek’s
limited
presence on the relevant market, and Anek’s
serious commitment to future compliance with
the law.

effect

issue.

and

at

(47) Ventouris Ferries argues

into

that

taking

account

it determined
independently its own commercial and price
policy
the market
conditions,
inflation and operating costs, and
the policy of the YEN which imposed important
public service obligations on the companies that
operated in Greece. The company claims in
effect that it determined its business behaviour
and practice in accordance with the provisions

(50) Anek maintains that for all the shipping routes
where cabotage applies, consultations among the
operators on price and other issues have been
mandatory for the domestic part of international
shipping routes. Although the Ministry for the
Merchant Navy has not
required the ferry
operators to agree on prices for the international
part of the route to Italy, Anek claims that the

L 109/32

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

ferry operators perceived the ministry as having
encouraged them to enter into discussions on
this topic. Moreover, Anek emphasises that its
participation was
period
1990-1994.

limited

the

to

(51) Anek argues that it did not act as the instigator
or play a leading role in the determination of
prices and that sometimes it objected to certain
acts proposed by others, notably when it
to be unfair or
considered proposed tariffs
in late 1991 Anek
excessive. For example,
resisted attempts by other ferry operators to
agree to apply a 20 % increase in fares for the
Patras-Trieste
the
Patras-Ancona route.

compared

route

to

(52) As regards price, Anek argues that fares per mile
levels
between Greece and Italy remained at
below other comparable international routes in
Europe, and significantly below domestic fares.
Moreover, Anek contends that the agreements
on prices concerned only fares and did not
extend to other areas, such as services on board,
prices on board, advertisements, and agents’
commissions. Also, Anek argues that it did not
have a significant market share on the market
between Patras and Brindisi and between Patras
and Bari, and hence that its cooperation on
those routes could not be considered to have
had a major impact on competition.

such as

the organisation of

companies,
the
commercial network, the policy of discounts and
advertising, the prices offered for on-board food
and services and the policy of upgrading.
the Commission to take into
Minoan asks
consideration the cumulative effect of all these
factors in the economic and legal context in this
case.

(54) As

the

to the

practice.

followed

relevant
implementation of
agreements, Minoan maintains that these were
never
Furthermore,
in
that ETA represented an
Minoan contends
independent company which acted as its agent.
Therefore, Minoan challenges the legality of the
investigation in the offices of ETA and of the
the
documents
Commission. the company draws attention to
the letter of 14 September 1993 that was found
during the investigation of 5 and 6 July. In the
opinion of Minoan, this letter proves that many
of the activities which are attributed to Minoan,
and especially those related to the pricing policy,
were ETA’s initiatives and were implemented
without Minoan’s approval.

that were

collected

by

(55) As to the gravity of the alleged infringement,
Minoan states that the existence of agreements
on prices would not in reality play an important
role due to the transparency of the market. As
regards the duration, Minoan submits that the
alleged agreements were not applied.

Minoan

Adriatica

for

(53) Minoan argues that the alleged agreements had
no binding character but simply confirmed the
existence of a general framework of business
practice that was in any case predefined by the
existing legislative framework for shipping and
the policy of the Ministry for the Merchant
Navy (YEN). From the YEN’s correspondence
with the Commission, Minoan concludes that
fares
the
international
the
Greece-Italy routes were
influenced by the
YEN’s decisions regarding prices for the internal
recommendations
part
regarding
In particular,
Minoan refers to the YEN’s policy as preventive
measures within the meaning of Greek Law
4195/29. In the opinion of Minoan, the alleged
agreements dealt only with the fares for the
international lines that were publicly announced
include any other parameters
and did not
the
behaviour
the
regarding

international

as YEN’s

as well

business

fares.

part

of

of

(56) Adriatica

its

that

argues

acknowledges

representative’s
participation in discussions with the companies
operating on the routes between Greece and
Italy. However, Adriatica
it
determined independently its own commercial
light of market
and price policy in the
sufficient
conditions.
competition in the market since the operators
were competing through rebates, commissions,
supplementary charges for dangerous cargoes,
etc., while market shares have never been the
subject of negotiations. As a result, Adriatica’s
market share was declining from 1990.

there was

Indeed,

(57) Finally, Adriatica argues that it did not play any
role in the determination of prices and that it
never implemented any agreement on prices.
These agreements were, according to Adriatica,
operators.
negotiated

the Greek

between

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/33

if

the Commission were

Consequently,
to
conclude that Adriatica participated in such
agreements, its participation should be regarded
as limited to 1991.

Marlines

(58) Marlines states that it is not a shipowner but an
agency company established in Liberia and
described under the Greek Law 89/67 as an
(cid:28)offshore’ company. Marlines maintains that it
always offered lower prices than its competitors
according to the instructions of its principals, as
can be concluded from its brochures of 1987,
1988 and 1989.

(62) Minoan argues that the behaviour of the other
companies towards Anek should be considered
under the Greek legal and regulatory framework
and the policy of the YEN. It also contends that
any possible readjustment of the fares was not
motivated by the desire to increase profits but
by other factors, such as inflation, the increase
in the prices of
fuel and the relationship
between the drachma and other currencies.

1990

(63)

Strintzis accepts that it agreed common prices
for passengers and goods vehicles for 1990 with
Minoan, Anek, Karageorgis
and Marlines.
However, it argues that the relevant agreements
since Strintzis applied
followed,
were never
autonomously its own pricing policy.

Arguments of the parties relating to specific
allegations

(64)

1987, 1988, 1989

(59)

that

argues

Strintzis accepts that in 1987, 1988 and 1989 it
participated in consultations on prices. However,
the meetings between the
it
companies in 1987 related exclusively to the
fares for 1988. As regards the fares for goods
vehicles
it
for 1989, Strintzis admits
followed the fared of Anek, since the companies
that
line
occasionally followed the published prices of
their competitors.

the Greece-Italy

operated

that

on

(60) As regards the attempt to persuade Anek to join
in the alleged agreement, Strintzis mentions that
under the Greek regulatory framework, Anek
could not charge prices that were significantly
lower from those available at the port of Patras.
Thus, the companies proposed a joint pricing
policy to Anek so as to avoid significant price
differences downwards and the intervention of
the Greek authorities.

(61)

the meetings for the
Strintzis maintains that
fares of 1988 and 1989 did not lead to an
agreement for a common tariff for passengers,
since its published fares for passengers differed
from those published by the other companies.

In particular, as regards the telex of 6 July 1989,
Strintzis draws attention to Anek’s explanation
that each company could freely apply its own
group policy. Anek regarded as (cid:28)group’ every
group of at least 24 people travelling with the
same ticket. On the contrary, Strintzis did not
impose such a limitation but it freely offered
group discounts to its customers, irrespective of
the number of persons. Strintzis claims that its
discounts policy and the other fidelity rebates
were never revealed to its competitors and,
therefore,
the
it did not
that
agreement on prices for 1990.

implement

(65) As regards the fax of 12 June 1989, Strintzis
argues that the exchange of information was
necessary because the YEN advised the five
companies to keep the price increases within the
limits of inflation for every currency in which
tickets were issued. It also mentions that it was
responsible for the readjustment of
the fares
within the limits of inflation for every currency,
because it had better infrastructure and logistical
methods.

(66)

informed

In relation to the fax of 8 December 1989,
Strintzis maintains that these signatures had no
obligatory force other than that the signatories
prices.
were
According to Minoan, the signatures on the fax
of 8 December 1989 did not imply that there
was a typical written agreement. The signature
the relevant
is attributed to the fact

proposed

that

the

of

L 109/34

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

(71)

the

expressed

documents, which
logical
deviations between the prices for Ancona and
Bari or Brindisi, were also taken into account by
Ventouris which operated on the southern lines.
According to Minoan, the proposed prices for
the various categories of
trucks provided an
(cid:28)ideal’ model for the calculation of the price
differences that depended on the distance in
miles, and there was not
intention to fix a
particular price for every line and every category
of trucks. In support of this argument, Minoan
claims that it did not strictly follow the relevant
prices on the line to Ancona but it followed its
own policy of discounts.

of

costs

operational

In the opinion of
Strintzis, Minoan had
confirmed by fax of 13 September 1990 that the
increase in the fares was made on the basis of
an analysis of the economic data that make up
ships. The
the
companies knew in detail the relevant economic
components, owing to the publication of their
operational licences and the necessary meetings
for the domestic lines in which they participated
under the aegis of the YEN, Strintzis argues that
the parties were
these
economic elements in order to remain in the
Greece-Italy market during the winter period.

forced to discuss

the

(67) Ventouris argues in relation to the fax of 8
December 1989, that it had already determined
its pricing policy for 1990 and that
the
signatures below the prices did not imply that
there was an agreement since the price list was
not legally binding. Indeed, this list contained
Ventouris
general
indicative prices. Nevertheless, the company had
already notified this list
to its agents on 4
December 1989.

suggestion

Ferries’

of

(72) As regards the telex of 5 September 1990 and
the telex of 10 October 1990, Minoan argues
that owing to the increase in the price of fuel,
the problems in Yugoslavia and the need to
continue to operate during the winter period,
the four companies had been forced to consider
a
the
readjustment
for
Corfu-Ancona part
to reduce the
negative effects of the costs of transport.

the
in order

fares

of

(68) Moreover, as regards the telex of 11 April 1990,
Strintzis argues that
this proves, on the one
hand, the existence of an agreement on prices,
and, on the other hand, the freedom of the
participating parties to determine independently
their policy of discounts and commission to
their agents.

(73)

In relation to the fax of 30 October 1990,
Strintzis accepts that it applied the agreed prices
for trucks. However, it argues that the relevant
prices were based on the real expenditure of the
itineraries between Greece and Italy, namely the
increase in the cost of fuel and the need to
rationalise the difference between the domestic
and international fares per mile and per metre of
transported truck.

(69) According to Minoan,

the telex of 11 April
1990 refers to an agreement on some parameters
the pricing policy that could nevertheless
of
easily become known to the competitors.

(74)

In relation to the fax of 30 October 1990,
Ventouris Ferries claims that it never received it,
and that its truck fares were included in the list
by the other companies which has probably
received them from an agent of Ventouris
Ferries.

(70)

In relation to the telex of 6 September 1990,
Strintzis states that the readjustment of the fares
can be attributed to inelastic factors, such as the
fluctuation in the prices of fuel, and to other
objective factors that relate to the policy of the
Greek Government, such as the increase in the
transport of heavy goods by road, due to the
the
problems in Yugoslavia,
Ministry of Transport in relation to the export
of goods and the need to increase the fares so as
to enable the companies
to operate in the
Greece-Italy market during the winter.

the decision of

(75) Adriatica admits that it took part in a meeting
on 25 October 1990 dealing with truck fares,
although it had already decided its fares for
1991 before this meeting. In fact, Adriatica’s
purpose was to monitor its competitor’s policy,
taking into account that the Greek operators
had already reached an agreement one year
earlier, on 10 December 1989. Adriatica also
argues that it did not follow the fares agreed in
the meeting, as can be shown from the fares it
actually charged at the end of 1990.

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/35

(76)

(77)

1991

that

stability’

and the

framework of

Strintzis argues that the (cid:28)climate of cooperation’
to which it refers in the telex of 18 November
1991,
is
(cid:28)pricing
mentioned by Karageorgis, Minoan and Strintzis
in the telex of 22 October 1991, concern the
compulsory meetings
general
between the companies and the exchange of
confidential information for the formation of a
framework agreement on prices for the next
period. Also, Strintzis claims that Anek’s wish to
time a route on the
set up for
Patras-Trieste line, offering fares of exactly the
same
route
Patras-Ancona even though the distance from
Trieste is about 20 % longer, was treated by
Karageorgis, Minoan and Strintzis as attracting
a risk of intervention by the Greek Government.

the first

amount

those

the

for

as

the relevant

fax, concerns

Strintzis draws attention to the telex of 18
November 1991 which, in its opinion, indicates
that the amount of the fares must be relevant to
the distance of every journey, a principle that
was adopted by YEN for the calculation of the
fares. According to the view of
domestic
Strintzis, the prevention of painful competition
(cid:28)with the known effects’, which is referred to at
the end of
the
prevention of
in the
consequent
Greece-Italy market
intervention of the Greek Government. Finally,
Strintzis alleges that Anek did not apply an
the
increase of 20 % to its prices
that
Patras-Brindisi
according to the Greek regulatory framework
for shipping, especially Law 4195/29, the policy
of extremely cheap prices disproportionate to
the services offered in a given international line
might lead to the imposition of fines on the
contraveners.

commercial war

claimed

route.

and

the

for

It

is

a

(78) Finally,

Strintzis

above
contends
framework agreement on prices for 1991 had
not been followed in practice, since Strintzis had
followed its own independent discount policy.

that

the

(80) Adriatica states that during 1991 it had had no
contact with the other companies and continued
to set its fares according to market conditions.
Moreover, Adriatica submits that during 1991,
its market share had declined owing to the
intense competition from the Greek operators in
the form of discounts, rebates, etc.

1992

(81) As regards the fax of 22 July 1991, and the
correspondence that is mentioned at points 26
to 32 of the statement of objections, Strintzis
claims that the relevant exchange of information
took place within the
the
framework of
compulsory meetings for the prices of 1992.

(82)

to offer

In relation to the telex of 7 January 1992,
Strintzis argues that despite the initial agreement
with Minoan not
the Calberson
company the requested discount, this agreement
was not
followed in practice, since Strintzis
finally offered a higher discount. Strintzis
contends that the relevant agreement was made
orally and that
the
relevant vehicles was transported by Marlines.
In the opinion of Strintzis, the above proves that
there was price
competition between the
participating companies at the level of discounts.
Again, Strintzis claims that the above agreement
on prices for 1992 was not followed in practice,
since Strintzis followed its own independent
discount policy.

the largest number of

(79) Minoan alleges that in the relevant period the
increase of 10 % was dictated by the increase in
inflation. It also claims that under the influence
of the YEN and on the basis of the distance in
miles, the prices for Trieste were 20 % higher
than the price
for Ancona. According to
Minoan, the correspondence between the parties
related to Anek’s decision to fix the fares for
Patras-Trieste at the same level as the fares for
Patras-Ancona and it was therefore intended to
ensure an appropriate differential and to avoid
unfair competition. Minoan also argues that it
followed its own policy of discounts.

(83) Minoan contends in relation to the similarity in
the prices for passengers and passenger vehicles
that this can be attributed to their publication in
the companies’ brochures. Also it claims that the
oligopolistic nature of the market and the policy
of the YEN led to homogeneous prices. It is the
view of Minoan that competition took place not
through the published prices but through the
policy of discounts, the offers and the other
incentives provided by the company.

L 109/36

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

(84)

In relation to Calberson, Minoan argues that it
was logical for the companies to react and to try
to ascertain whether
their competitors had
offered such excessive discounts. As regards the
document of 25 February 1992, Minoan alleges
that it is not proof of an agreement and that the
relevant prices were not applied in practice.
Also, according to Minoan, ETA’s suggested
price list for Ortona was intended to secure the
approval of Minoan, in case the latter company
decided to operate a ship on the Ancona route.

(85) As regards the telex of 7 January 1993, Minoan
claims that
it related to the price balancing
between drachmas and Italian lire and not to
any price increase in either currency.

(86) Finally, Minoan claims that there is no proof of
an agreement between itself and Ventouris,
Hellenic Mediterranean Lines and Med Link for
1992.

(87) Adriatica claims that in 1992 it had no contact
with the other companies and continued to set
its fares according to market conditions, as
it actually
could be shown from the fares
the ETA
applied. According
to Adriatica,
document of 25 February 1992 shows
that
consultations
took place between the Greek
operators but not with Adriatica. Furthermore,
Adriatica submits that during 1992, its market
share declined due to the lower prices charged
by the Greek companies.

(88) For 1992, Ventouris argues that

there is no
its participation in price

specific evidence of
agreements.

1993

(89) As regards the meetings with the companies
operating on the other lines of the Greek-Italian
there was an
market, Strintzis accepts
the
attempt
principles for the determination of domestic
fares. However, Strintzis does not know whether
the companies of the other lines applied such
fares or not.

to agree prices on the basis of

that

(90) As for the telex of 6 November 1992, Strintzis
maintains that the proposal of Minoan was not
followed in practice, since the differences in the
fares of the companies were not based on the
proposal of Minoan but on their autonomous
discount policies.

(91) Minoan admits

that

there were discussions
between the companies. As regards the telex of
6 November 1992, Minoan claims that it was
sent by ETA without the knowledge or approval
in relation to the
of Minoan. Furthermore,
meeting of 24 November 1993, Minoan claims
that
the alleged (cid:28)previous agreement’ was a
non-binding declaration by various companies
that there should be a differential between the
distance in miles and the applied fares and that
they should avoid unfair competition by any
devaluation. However,
the
above declaration was not followed in practice.

its alleged that

it

(92) As

that

regards 1993, Adriatica states

it
continued its independent policy, readjusting its
truck fares by 4,03 % in relation to 1992 fares
owing to exchange rates fluctuations. From 1
January 1993, Adriatica was also obliged, unlike
the Greek operators,
to introduce the VAT
pursuant to the relevant Community regulation.
Nevertheless, Adriatica admits
it was
represented in the meeting of 24 November
1993 between the ferry operators but argues
the proposed
that
the possible
agreement on tariffs in view of
infringement of Community competition rules.

it decided not

to enter

that

(93) As for 1992, Ventouris Ferries argues that there
is no specific evidence of its participation in
price agreements
in
relation to the fax of 24 November 1993,
Ventouris Ferries concedes that it participated in
the relevant meeting, but claims that
it had
already determined its pricing policy for that
year.

in 1993. Nevertheless,

1994

(94)

Strintzis does not know whether the relevant
fares were followed by the companies. As
regards
Strintzis
admits that the framework agreement on prices

Patras-Ancona

route,

the

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/37

was applied. However, it claims that the relevant
agreement was not followed in practice, since
Strintzis followed its own autonomous discount
policy.

(95) Again, Minoan denies

the existence of an
agreement on prices. In relation to the telex of
13 May 1994 which refers to the new category
of 12-14 metres for trailers, Minoan argues that,
as is evident from the telex of 23 June 1994, it
had modified the relevant category of trailers
from 12-14 metres to 12,5-14 metres. In its
opinion, this indicates that the trailers of 12,5
metres represented a different category of lower
fares. Finally, as regards the telex of 26 May
1994, Minoan claims that it did not approve the
it had
alleged (cid:28)initiative’ of ETA and that
applied a different policy as is shown by other
documents available to the Commission.

(96) Adriatica argues that

increase its
prices during 1994, although it had readjusted
the rate between US dollars and Italian lire by
1,22 %.

it did not

regular meetings

ferry operators in Bari/Brindisi-Greece routes
participated in the cartel at the latest from 8
December 1989, at least as regards the level of
fares for trucks. The collusion lasted from 8
December 1989, at least as regards the level of
fares for trucks. The collusion lasted at least
until July 1994. The cartel operated in the form
of
of
correspondence in order to readjust collectively
vehicles. The
prices
Commission has been able to identify seven
companies
cartel:
Minoan, Karageorgis, Marlines, Strintzis, Anek,
The
Ventouris
involvement
the
the
participation for each of these companies are
discussed at paragraphs 111 to 139.

that participated in the

Ferries
and

passengers

Adriatica.

exchange

duration

and

and

and

for

of

Assessment
parties

to the general arguments of

the

F. The Commission’s assessment of the evidence

and the parties’ arguments

Involvement of the Greek authorities

Conclusion

(98)

(99)

the

(97) The Commission concludes that ferry companies
Ancona/Bari/Brindisi-Greece
operating
routes participated in a price fixing cartel for
several years. This was an ongoing agreement
described by the
(cid:28)the usual
companies as
practice’
(telex of Minoan dated 15 March
1989). There is strong evidence to suggest a
broad agreement including a large number of
companies (such as Minoan’s document of 2
November 1990 stating that prices were agreed
by the companies on all the Greece-Italy routes,
the telex sent to Anek on 22 October 1991
stating (cid:28)the agreement between 11 companies
and 36 vessels’, the ETA telex of 24 November
1993 referring to 14 companies, the ETA telex
dated 26 May 1994 referring to (cid:28)the agreement
of 16 companies’). The Commission has been
able to prove that certain companies operating
on the Ancona-Greece route participated in the
price-fixing cartel regarding fares for passengers
from 18 July 1987 the latest.
and vehicles
Although consultations took place before that
date, there is no indication of the exact date on
which price-fixing negotiations were initiated.
Moreover, the Commission proved that certain

In their answers to the requests for information
addressed to them by the Commission, Minoan,
Strintzis and Anek, on 9 and 10 February 1995,
inter alia, that the tariff agreement in
stated,
question
the
applicable legislative framework under the aegis
of the Ministry for the Merchant Navy (YEN).

concluded within

been

had

In support of this argument, the three companies
produced a copy of the text of Law 4195/29,
relating to unfair competition, as well as a series
of decisions and recommendations of the YEN
concerning the Greece-Italy maritime lines; these
related to the public-service obligations in this
sector
connection
particular,
frequency, the priority, according to the seasons,
to be granted to the
fresh
agricultural products, the minimum number of
ships to be maintained in operation as well as
the starting schedules of the ships.

transport of

and,

the

in

L 109/38

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

(100) In a letter of 28 October 1994, the Commission
asked the Greek Ministry for the Merchant
Navy to provide certain statistics relating to
traffic on the Greece-Italy routes as well as to
clarify whether the Ministry had ever threatened
to withdraw operating licences for domestic
routes if companies failed to agree prices on
international routes.

national

(101) On 23 December 1994, the Ministry replied to
the Commission that the sea corridor between
Greece and Italy should be regarded as being of
Community
paramount
importance, while
be
should
the same time at a level
competitive but at
where transportation costs would be kept low.
Nevertheless,
any
the Ministry
connection between the revocation of operating
licences and the companies’ price agreements on
international routes.

denied

tariff

rates

and

(102) On 13 January 1995, the Commission addressed
to the Greek Permanent Representation to the
European Union a copy of
the information
forwarded by the companies, asking for the
the Greek Government on its
comments of
possible
in agreements on the
maritime lines between Greece and Italy and, in
particular, tariff fixing on these same lines.

involvement

(103) On 17 March 1995,

the Greek Permanent
Representation replied to the Commission that
the Greek Government
considered services
provided on the route in question to be services
of public interest and that consequently,
the
government’s primary concern was the viability
of the route and the avoidance of any possible
(cid:28)price war’ which could possibly hinder the
smooth promotion of export and import trade
or the transport of vehicles and passengers.
However, the involvement of the YEN in tariff
fixing concerned only internal routes (cabotage).
In the case of the maritime lines between Greece
and Italy, which include a national part (for
the
example
national part (Patras-Corfu) is covered by the
tariff policy of the YEN. For the international
part of the maritime lines, the YEN does not
intervene in any way, and prices are fixed freely
by the companies concerned, account being
taken of the fact that the fare fixed by the State
for the domestic part of
the route has an
indirect and partial impact on the total fare to
the Permanent
and from Italy. Moreover,

Patras-Corfu-Ancona),

only

the

that

the
informally,

YEN
stressed
Representation
encourages
to
companies,
maintain the tariffs at low levels and the annual
increases within the limits of inflation. Lastly,
the freedom of the companies to set their prices
is restricted by Law 4195/29 where it leads to
unfair competition. Article 2 of
that Law
prohibits any devaluation of fares for passengers
and goods in the external (international) routes
to a level which would be derisory and
disproportionate to the level of service provided,
with the object of unfair competition. According
to Article 4, if the freedom in fixing fares on
these routes degenerates into unfair competition,
the Ministry for the Merchant Navy is entitled
to impose upper and lower levels of fares.

(104) Consequently,

the
the Commission
argument of some of the Greek companies that
they did not act autonomously in the field of
tariff policy owing to the relevant regulatory
arrangements in Greece.

rejects

(105) In this case,

it is clear that Greek companies
operating on the Greece-Italy routes are subject
to a rigid legal and regulatory framework
concerning the domestic part of the routes, in
particular as regards the grant of operating
licences and the fixing of fares by the Ministry
for the Merchant Navy. This, however, has no
direct effect, as the Greek authorities confirmed,
on the tariff policy of the companies concerning
the international part of the routes. Moreover,
the Greek authorities have strongly denied that,
through their administrative practice in relation
to the application of these rules, they obliged
into price
the Greek companies
agreements for international fares. In his reply
of 23 December 1994 to a Commission letter,
the
Director Manos of
no
stated:
Merchant Navy
involvement of the Ministry in the rate-fixing
policy which is followed by the companies in
is
the international routes. Our involvement
strictly confined in the fixing of prices
in
domestic routes only … It is unthinkable and it
is out of question that the Ministry threatens to
withdraw operating licences for domestic routes
if companies fail to agree prices on international
routes.’

the Ministry

(cid:28)… there

to enter

for
is

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/39

(106) It

is also clear that Law 4195/29 does not
eliminate price competition. On the contrary, it
presupposes that price competition exists and
that companies are free to set their prices. It is
freedom is used for unfair
only when this
competition purposes that Article 4 of the Law
entitles the Ministry for the Merchant Navy to
intervene. Even in this case, the Ministry may
only define upper and lower prices and not
impose a specific level of fares. Moreover, it is
to be noted that
this Law has never been
applied.

(107) The Commission considers it significant that,
although the parties argue that many of their
discussions were motivated by a desire to satisfy
the YEN and to avoid
the requirements of
unfair competition (as with the discussions with
Anek when it opened the Trieste route for
contemporary
of
example),
documents
the
by
in
Commission makes any mention whatsoever of
the YEN or of Law 4195/29. Consequently, the
argument
the Greek companies were
obliged by the Ministry’s preventive measures to
enter into collusive practices owing to the fear
that Article 4 of the Law might be applied, is
rejected.

the
evidence

quoted

that

one

not

parties that they were merely following price
increases of which they had knowledge through
their agents’ network can similarly be rejected.
It is clear that almost all the (cid:28)price increase’
direct
correspondence was
exchanges between competitors and not from
agents.

obtained

by

Assessment of
duration of the infringement

the arguments relating to the

(110) As regards the duration of

reached

argued that

the infringement,
most of the companies on the Patras-Ancona
although a price-fixing
route
agreement was
it
exclusively concerned fares for 1988. Similarly,
Anek argues that it entered into the agreements
in 1989 but in relation to fares for 1990. The
Commission rejects this argument, since entering
into price-fixing agreements
in itself an
infringement of Article 85 of the EC Treaty.

during

1987,

is

any

relation whatsoever with

(108) It is also difficult to accept that the Ministry’s
recommendations to the companies relating to
the fare increases within the limits of inflation
had
the
abovementioned law. It is clear from Article 2 of
the Law that it applies only when fares are
derisory but not when fares are high. As the
its recommendations were
Ministry explained,
to
based on other
considerations
In
Greece’s
conclusion,
transport
companies,
activities on the
Adriatic, must be regarded, in the field of tariff
policy, as having acted autonomously.

the Greek maritime
carrying out

relating
patterns.

international

trade

Assessment of other general arguments of the
parties

(109) It is also ingenuous for certain of the parties to
contend that
the companies’ price initiatives
were the result not of collusion but of natural
market forces (for instance the impact of fuel
costs) or other specific events like the war in the
former Yugoslavia or sudden fluctuations of
foreign currencies. This assertion is wholly
against the weight of documentary evidence of
price fixing collusion. The argument of certain

Assessment of the arguments relating to specific
allegations

The involvement of individual companies

(111) It is necessary to establish in respect of each
addressee of this Decision that it participated in
the infringement. This does not, however, as
some undertakings have argued, require direct
proof that every alleged participant expressly
gave its consent to, or committed some overt act
of support for, each and every individual aspect
their
of
the
duration. The whole
infringement
the
lies
in a joint
companies, over
unlawful enterprise pursuant
to a common
design.

throughout
gravamen
of
in the association of
several years,

the price arrangements

(112) The proper approach in a case such as this one
is to demonstrate the existence, the operation
the collusion in
and the salient
features of
question and then to determine:
(a) whether
there is credible and persuasive proof to link

L 109/40

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

each individual
common
company
scheme; and (b) for what period each company
participated (1).

to the

(113) There is ample direct evidence to prove the
adherence of every addressee of this Decision to
the infringement. The (cid:28)core’ documents which
prove the existence of the overall cooperation or
individual manifestations thereof usually identify
participants by name.

(114) Evidence

of

of

the

participation

each
undertaking in the infringement is provided by:
(a) explicit references to that undertaking in the
correspondence exchanged between the parties;
(b) its participation in meetings and subsequent
concerted price initiatives; and (c) the internal
documentation of that undertaking, or another
undertaking, linking it to the collusion. In no
significant respect was any of
that evidence
contradicted or
shown to be anything but
reliable during the administrative procedure.

and

agreements

October 1990, Minoan’s letter of 2 November
1990, the fax sent to Anek on 22 October 1991,
Minoan’s document of 25 February 1992,
Minoan’s telex of 7 January 1993, ETA’s telex
indicate ongoing
of 24 November 1993)
negotiations
the
between
Ancona and the Bari/Brindisi opertors. Only
Minoan’s telex of 7 January 1993 refers to an
agreement between the Ancona operators,
expressly stating that other companies were not,
at that time, aware of it. However, even this
document refers to discussions involving the
Bari/Brindisi companies which, as the document
indicates, were to be consulted subsequently by
the Ancona operators. The Commission has not
been able to identify other companies operating
in the Bari/Brindisi
lines which eventually
participated in the collusion. In particular, this
Decision is not addressed to AK Ventouris and
Hellenic Mediterranean Lines because there is
not
actually
infringed the competition rules (both companies
are mentioned only once in other companies’
documents).

sufficient

evidence

they

that

(115) Several documents (in particular, Minoan’s fax
of 15 March 1989, Strintzis’ fax of 12 July
1989, fax sent to Anek on 22 October 1991,
Anek’s reply of 18 November 1991, Minoan’s
letter to its agents of 2 November 1990, Anek’s
to its agents of 21 October 1991,
letter
Minoan’s telex of 7 January 1993, ETA’s telex
of 24 November 1993) demonstrate
that
consultations and agreements on prices were
continuously taking place,
for several years,
between all the addressees of this Decision.

Marlines

(116) Minoan,

Strintzis

and Anek

their
participation in the alleged collusion while
Karageorgis did not submit any arguments in its
defence.

admit

(117) As regards the Bari/Brindisi operators, Adriatica
and Ventouris Ferries admit their participation
in meetings where fares have been discussed and
agreed between competing
ferry operators.
Moreover, certain documents (Strintzis’ faxes of
8 December 1989, 5 September 1990 and 30

(1) Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-1/89,
Rh(cid:244)ne-Poulenc v. Commission [1991] ECR II-867, at
paragraph 126.

in

to

to

relating

(118) Marlines’ participation in the collusion from
1987 until 1989 is proved by eight documents
(referred
the
sections
agreements for 1988 and 1989) received by
Marlines or indicating Marlines as party to the
relevant agreements. The Commission concludes
from the above that Marlines negotiated and
agreed every year with Strintzis, Minoan and
Karageorgis common prices for passengers and
goods vehicles on the route Patras-Ancona as
early as 18 July 1987 and for 1988 and 1989.
The
is
last occasion on which Marlines
mentioned in the documentary evidence is in a
telex sent by Anek to Marlines on 22 September
1989. There is no evidence that Marlines took
part
in any further consultations with other
companies nor is there conclusive evidence of its
cartel. The
subsequent
Commission
Marlines
participated in the infringement, at most, from
18 July 1987 to 8 December 1989, when the
other companies agreed to readjust their prices.

in the
that

involvement

concludes

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/41

(119) The argument of Marlines that it is an offshore
company under Greek law must be rejected. The
Commission never alleged that the infringement
was limited only to Greek companies.

Med Link

(120) Med Link argues that it has no relationship
whatsoever with the companies mentioned in
the statement of objections addressed to Med
Link Lines by the Commission as Mediterranean
Lines Inc. or Med Line. Moreover, Med Link
also claims that it did not participate in any of
the alleged infringements.
the
representative of Med Link, Mr Giannatos,
whose name is mentioned in the telex of 24
November 1993 from ETA to the head office of
Minoan, states that he did not take part in the
meeting referred to in that telex. He states that
Med Link was established in Liberia on 15 July
1993 and established its headquarters in Greece
after 31 December 1993.

In particular,

(121) The Commission accepts that there is no clear
evidence of an organic link between Med Link
and Mediterranean Line.
In particular, Med
Link cannot be regarded as the successor to
Mediterranean Line in its activities
in the
relevant market. Consequently, this Decision is
not addressed to Med Link.

Adriatica

its

competitors

(122) Adriatica admits its participation in price-fixing
in
consultations
with
Greece-Italy routes.
In particular, Adriatica
concedes that it participated in two meetings, on
25 October 1990 and 24 November 1993
respectively, where prices were agreed between
ferry operators. Nevertheless, Adriatica denies
that it had other contacts with its competitors in
the Italy – Greece routes.

(123) As regards the meeting of 25 October 1990 and
fax of 30 October 1990, Adriatica
Strintzis’
claims that did not follow the fares discussed in
the meeting and listed in Strintzis’ fax, even
though Strintzis’ fax included Adriatica’s truck
fares for the Brindisi-Greece route. Furthermore,

submits

Adriatica
approximately 10 % lower
companies’ fares on the same route.

that

its
fares were
than the Greek

(124) Upon the Commission’s

fax. However,

the second list

to the one included in that

request, Adriatica
submitted on 27 October 1992 two lists of its
truck fares for 1991. In the first list, categories
of vehicles are indeed different from those used
is
in Strintzis’
identical
fax.
Moreover, differences between Adriatica’s and
the Greek operators’ fares in the same route are
evidenced in Strintzis’ fax, too. Consequently,
the Commission rejects Adriatica’s arguments
that only Greek operators were involved in the
preparation of truck fares for 1991 and that
Adriatica did not follow the agreed fares.

it

this

that

could

(125) As regards the meeting of 24 November 1993,
its participation but
Adriatica acknowledges
argues
instructed its
subsequently
representative to avoid any collusive practice
the
be
since
Commission as a cartel arrangement. However,
an internal note is not sufficient evidence to
allow Adriatica to escape
the
infringement (1).
the
remaining
Nevertheless,
into
the Commission
account the evidence provided by Adriatica that
it did not
follow the agreed
readjustment of 15 % for 1994.

liability for

in practice

considered

period

takes

by

of

(126) According to the Commission, strong evidence
indicates an ongoing agreement between the
Ancona and the Bari/Brindisi operators. There is
direct evidence that Adriatica joined the cartel
from 30 October 1990 at the latest, by agreeing
to readjust its truck fares for 1991. There is also
sufficient direct evidence of its involvement for
1993. On 24 November 1993, Adriatica
negotiated and agreed with its competitors the
readjustment of
from
its
December 1993. As
the periods
between 30 October 1990 and 24 November
the Bari/Brindisi
1993,

truck fares
regards,

there is evidence of

as

(1) See judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case
T-141/89, Trefileurope v. Commission [1995] ECR II-791,
at paragraph 85.

L 109/42

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

operators’ participation in the ongoing collusion
and there is no evidence that Adriatica, having
joined the cartel, left it during this period. The
telex sent to Anek on 22 October 1991 refers to
the collusion between (cid:28)the 11 companies and the
36
crossing’.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that
Adriatica participated in the infringement until
July 1994.

the Greece-Italy

vessels

on

Hellenic Mediterranean Lines

(127) Hellenic Mediterranean Lines is mentioned once
in a Strintzis’ telex dated 30 October 1990. As
no other evidence of
its participation in the
collusion exists, this Decision is not addressed to
Hellenic Mediterranean Lines.

Ventouris Group Enterprises

(128) There

is

evidence

of Ventouris

Ferries’
participation in the collusion from 8 December
1989 until July 1994. The Commission rejects
it did not
Ventouris Ferries’ arguments that
receive the relevant documents or that it had
already decided on its pricing policy before
taking part in the consultations in question(see
paragraphs 47 and 48).

to one of

(129) In relation to its second argument, Ventouris
its
Ferries submitted a telex sent
agents on 4 December 1989 including the prices
listed in Strintzis’ fax of 8 December 1989 for
the Bari-Greece route. Ventouris Ferries claims
that Strintzis’ fax simply reproduced Ventouris’
established before 8 December 1989.
fares
However,
fax
simply related to an agreement between several
companies, including Ventouris. It is thus clear
that Ventouris Ferries participated in price
fixing. It is to be noted that the two documents
not only contain the same list of fares but both
explicitly mention that those fares were valid as
from 10 December 1989.

is undeniable that Strintzis’

it

(130) Furthermore, Ventouris Ferries submitted letters
addressed to its clients or agents dated 8

October 1990 and 11 October 1990 containing
the truck fares listed in Strintzis’
fax of 30
October 1990. However, these letters confirm
the evidence contained in Strintzis’ fax. Strintzis
refers to (cid:28)a final agreement for truck fares’ and
proposed to (cid:28)announce
the prices on 1
November and put them into effect, as it has
been agreed, from 5 November 1990’. In its
letters Ventouris Ferries stated that those fares
were (cid:28)indicative’ and that Ventouris intended to
put
of
effect
October/beginning of November 1990’. Indeed,
the letters confirm that the infringement was an
Ventouris
ongoing
participated in it.

(cid:28)from end

them into

agreement

that

and

between

the Ancona

(131) There is strong evidence to indicate an ongoing
the
agreement
and
Bari/Brindisi operators. Even for 1992,
for
which Ventouris Ferries argues that there is no
evidence against it, ETA’s document dated 25
February 1992 demonstrates
that Ventouris
participated in the collusion, discussing fares for
the Otrando route, too. As regards 1991, the
telex sent to Anek on 22 October 1991 refers to
the collusion between (cid:28)the 11 companies and the
36 vessels on the Greece-Italy crossing’. The
Commission concludes that Ventouris Ferries
continued to participate in the collusion during
1991, as there is sufficient direct evidence of
Ventouris’ involvement for the remaining years
of the infringement, namely the telex of Strintzis
dated 8 December 1989,
the telefax from
1990, ETA’s
30 October
dated
Strintzis
document dated 25 February 1992, telex from
ETA to the head office of Minoan dated 24
November 1993, and there is no evidence that
from the
Ventouris Ferries dissociated itself
agreement in 1991.

Strintzis

(132) Strintzis did not contest its participation in the
alleged collusion.
Its arguments refer to the
involvement of Greek authorities and to the
non-binding character of the agreements. The
Commission concludes that Strintzis participated
in the alleged price-fixing collusion from, at the
latest, 18 July 1987 up to July 1994.

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/43

Anek

(133) Anek did not contest its participation in the
alleged collusion.
Its arguments refer to the
involvement of Greek authorities and to the
non-binding character of the agreements. The
Commission concludes that Anek participated in
the alleged price-fixing collusion from 6 July
1989 to July 1994.

international authorities and organises the local
and port agents’ network of Minoan. If Minoan
so requests, ETA must use all its endeavours to
ensure Minoan’s
other
companies. Commissions payable to ETA by
Minoan and to other Minoan or tourist agents
by ETA precisely (in percentage terms or in
fixed amounts) defined by several provisions.

cooperation with

Karageorgis

(134) Karageorgis did not submit any arguments in its
that
defence. The Commission
alleged
Karageorgis
price-fixing collusion from, at latest from 18
July 1987 until 27 December 1992 when
Karageorgis definitively withdrew its vessels
from the Greece-Italy routes.

concludes
the

participated

in

Minoan

(135) Minoan did not contest its participation in the
alleged collusion.
Its arguments refer to the
involvement of Greek authorities, the market
conditions and the non-binding character of the
that
agreements. The Commission concludes
Minoan participated in the alleged price-fixing
collusion from, at latest, 18 July 1987 until July
1994.

(136) Minoan refers to its contractual relationship
with ETA, its exclusive managing agent for all
Minoan ships operating on international routes.
the activities
Minoan argues that several of
referred to in this Decision were ETA’s own
initiatives, not approved by Minoan, sometimes
outside the scope of the ETA-Minoan contracts,
and that Minoan should not be regarded as
responsible for them. The Commission does not
accept this argument. As regards the relationship
between ETA and Minoan, it is clear from all
the contracts between the two parties available
to the Commission that ETA is the exclusive
for Minoan which
central managing agent
instructions
operates
and
supervision. Under all
these contracts ETA
represents Minoan before all national and

under Minoan’s

a

as

functional unit

(137) Consequently, ETA should be described as the
longa manus of Minoan, operating
a
representative of Minoan, as an intermediary
who acts exclusively on behalf of Minoan and
does not undertake business on its own account.
In all the documentary evidence used in this
Decision, Mr Sfinias,
the legal representative
represented Minoan
and manager of ETA,
(Athens), signing all relevant documents, even a
reply dated 20 November 1992 to a request for
information addressed to Minoan by
the
Commission. Indeed, Mr Sfinias acted as the
representative of
inside
Minoan. All other companies replying to fax or
telex messages signed by Mr Sfinias addressed
their replies to (cid:28)Minoan’ or (cid:28)Minoan Athens’
and never to ETA. In all these documents, Mr
Sfinias referred to ETA only when addressing
Minoan headquarters
in Heraklion, Crete.
Nevertheless, Minoan refers to the documentary
evidence used in this Decision, arguing that only
6 out of 17 Minoan documents relate to ETA’s
informing Minoan of
in
question and that in only two of them does ETA
request Minoan’s approval of its suggestions.
However, the Commission rejects the argument
allow ETA’s
that
anti-competitive actions
imputed to
Minoan. It is clear from the Minoan documents
emanating from its headquarters in Heraklion as
well as from Mr Sfinias’ messages to Minoan
Heraklion that Minoan was aware of
the
collusion and participated in it (such as ETA
documents dated 25 February 1992, 21 May
1992, 30 July 1992 where ETA acts as Minoan’s
representative vis a` vis the other companies).

the documents do not

the arrangements

to be

(138) In the Commission’s view, Mr Sfinias’ letters to
Minoan Heraklion concerning their contractual
relationship does not prove, as Minoan argued,
that ETA acted autonomously in its own
scope of ETA-Minoan
interest, outside

the

L 109/44

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

agreements between undertakings or concerted
practices which may affect
trade between
Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition, and in particular those which
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling
prices or any other trading conditions.

contracts. On the contrary, this correspondence,
as well as Mr Sfinias’ requests for Minoan’s
approval, proves that Minoan was always kept
informed of the collusion and that it could in
any case influence the conduct of its managing
agent in a decisive manner. In conclusion, the
Commission rejects
that ETA
which was addressed as (cid:28)Minoan Athens’ or
simply as (cid:28)Minoan’ in all relevant documentary
enjoyed such a high degree of
evidence,
commercial autonomy that its conduct cannot
be imputed to its principal (1). For the purposes
of
this Decision, ETA and Minoan are
considered to form a single legal and economic
unit.

the argument

that

evidence

considers

simply (cid:28)Minoan’.

(139) As a procedural point, Minoan contends that
ETA is an independent company which acted as
its agent. Accordingly, Minoan challenges the
legality of the investigation in the offices of ETA
and of the documents that were collected by the
Commission. This argument cannot be accepted.
The Commission
is
there
sufficient documentary
that ETA,
whilst representing Minoan, described itself as
(cid:28)Minoan Athens’ or
is
significant that in ETA’s premises in Athens,
ETA used Minoan’s logo and trademarks. More
importantly, before the investigation in question,
Mr Sfinias replied to a Commission request for
information, signing a document in the name of
Minoan. At the top of the document, the ETA
premises’ address appears under the logo and
trademark of Minoan, with no mention of ETA
whatsoever. The Commission concludes that,
independently of ETA’s occupation and use of
the premises in question, Minoan permitted ETA
to use these premises as
(cid:28)Minoan Athens’
premises’, too.

It

their

commercial

(141) It is not necessary, in order for a restriction to
constitute an agreement within the meaning of
Article 85(1) for the agreement to be intended to
be legally binding on the parties. An agreement
exists if the parties reach a consensus on a plan
freedom by
which limits
their action in the
determining the lines of
market.
or
sanctions
contractual
No
enforcement procedures are required. Nor is it
necessary for such an agreement to be made in
writing. It is clear from the evidence in this case
engaged in regular, direct
that
the parties
consultations aimed at
fixing passenger fares
and freight rates between Greece and Italy.
Regular, detailed discussions took place each
year to decide the tariff levels for the following
year, and ad hoc consultations took place to
decide how the parties should react to issues
that arose during the year, such as currency
devaluation or new categories of vehicles. It is
also clear that these discussions took place at
senior levels between the parties. There can be
no doubt that this arrangement amounted to an
agreement, the object of which was to fix selling
prices and other trading conditions between the
parties thereto.

PART II

LEGAL ASSESSMENT

Article 85

(140) Article 85(1) of

incompatible with the

the EC Treaty prohibits as
common market all

(1) See judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 October 1983
in Case 107/82, AEG-Telefunken v. Commission [1983]
ECR 3151, at paragraph 49; and the judgment of 14 July
1972 in Case 48/69, ICI v. Commission [1972] ECR 619,
at paragraphs 132 and 133 as to the imputation of
subsidiaries’ conduct to their parent companies.

the

agreement or

(142) In order for Article 85 to apply, it is necessary
concerted practice
that
between the parties has the object or effect of
restricting competition. The clear object of the
agreement between the parties in this case was
to bring about the imposition of common prices,
act
thereby
independently in the market. As the Court of
Justice has consistently held, it is unnecessary to
consider the actual effects of an agreement if it
is apparent that it has the object of preventing,

restricting

ability

their

to

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/45

or

competition (1).
restricting
distorting
Moreover, in this case, the agreement does not
fall within any applicable block exemption and,
furthermore, does not fulfil the conditions for
individual exemption.

Greece. These should therefore not be regarded
as separate infringements but as aspects of a
single continuous infringement.

Effect on trade between Member States

FINES

Article 19(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86

importance

(143) The services affected by the practices in issue in
this procedure are the roll-on roll-off
ferry
services between Greece and Italy. The sea
routes between Greece and Italy have assumed
in 1992 when the
even more
beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia
effectively closed the overland routes for imports
and exports between Greece and the rest of the
European Union. In 1993, 1 316 003 passengers
and 213 839 freight vehicles were transported in
Greece-Italy routes. Of these, 49 % and 38 %
were transported via the Patras-Ancona route,
35 % and 38 % on the Patras-Brindisi one, and
10 % and 19 % on the Patras-Bari route. Five of
the undertakings covered by this procedure
accounted for almost 100 % of traffic at one
time or another on the Patras-Ancona route.
Any
agreement which affects demand for
services between two Member States (such as an
agreement fixing price levels between the major
providers of
is likely to deflect
demand both within the group of undertakings
involved in the agreement, and those outside
this group, and thus after the pattern of trade in
that service between Member States.

that service)

Conclusion

gravity

and to the duration of

(145) Under Article 19(2) of Regulation (EEC) No
the Commission may by decision
4056/86,
impose on undertakings fines of
from ECU
1 000 to ECU 1 000 000, or a sum in excess
thereof but not exceeding 10 % of the turnover
in the preceding business year of each of the
undertakings participating in the infringement,
where either intentionally or negligently they
infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty. In fixing the
amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to
the
the
infringement. In this case, the infringement has
been committed intentionally, which is to say
that
price
it was
competition. Direct
evidence
indicates that the parties were aware that the
collusion aimed to or at
least was liable to
instance
competition
price
eliminate
Minoan’s telex of 15 March 1989, Strintzis’ fax
of 12 June 1989, Minoan’s telex of 7 January
1992, Minoan’s telex of 7 January 1993). The
deliberate nature of the parties’ practice can be
seen further in the measures for monitoring the
adjustments in tariffs (for instance, Minoan’s
telex of 22 June 1989, Karageorgis’ telex of 10
October 1990, telex sent to Anek on 22 October
1991, Minoan’s telex of November 1992).

to
documentary

designed

restrict

(for

(144) On the basis of

the above,

the Commission
that Minoan, Anek, Karageorgis,
considers
Marlines
and Strintzis, participated in an
agreement contrary to Article 85 by agreeing
prices which would be applied to roll-on roll-off
ferry services between Patras and Ancona. The
Commission also considers that Minoan, Anek,
Karageorgis, Strintzis, Ventouris Ferries and
Adriatica agreed on the levels of fares for trucks
to be applied on the Patras to Bari and Brindisi
routes. These agreements
formed part of a
broader scheme of collusion in the setting of
fares for the ferry services between Italy and

(1) See, for instance, the judgement of 11 January 1990 in
Case C-277/97, Sandoz v. Commission [1990] ECR 1-45,
at paragraph 39.

Gravity

(146) In assessing the gravity of

the infringement,
account must be taken of its nature, its actual
impact on the market, where this can be
assessed, and the size of the relevant geographic
market.

(147) An agreement by which the price of transporting
passengers and freight by roll-on roll-off ferries
was agreed by some of the most important ferry
operators in the relevant market constitutes, by
its nature, a very serious breach of Community
law.

L 109/46

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

(148) However, the infringement had a limited actual
impact on the market. The Commission accepts
that the parties did not apply in full all the
specific price agreements and that they engaged,
during the period of the infringement, in price
competition through discounting. Moreover, the
Greek Government, during the period of the
infringement, encouraged the undertakings to
keep fare increases within the inflation rates.
levels
Fares were kept at one of
within the
for maritime
common market
transport from one Member State to the other.

the lowest

(149) Moreover, the infringement produced its effects
within a limited part of the common market,
namely three of the Adriatic Sea routes. Even if
all Greece-Italy routes are taken into account,
the market
is still small compared to other
markets within the Community. The following
list shows the number of passengers, cars and
trailers transported during 1996 in this market
and along other Community routes (1).

France/
Belgium-UK

Denmark-
Germany

Denmark-
Sweden

28 352 635 4 944 644

1 944 028

9 698 357 1 363 940

279 274

their

relative

size of

each of

sizes (2). Table

fines be imposed on the larger undertakings than
the considerable
on the smaller because of
between
disparity
1
indicates
the
the
undertakings concerned in 1993, the last full
year of the infringement for all undertakings
for Marlines and Karageorgis (3)), as
(except
compared to Minoan, the largest operator in the
market. The comparison is made on the basis of
roll-on roll-off
in respect of
1993 turnover
the
services
is
in the Adriatic routes. This
appropriate basis for the comparison of
the
relative size of
the undertakings because it
enables the Commission to assess the specific
weight and importance of the undertakings in
the relevant market and, therefore, to evaluate
the real impact of the offending conduct of each
undertaking on competition

Table 1

Large carriers

Minoan

Anek

1,00

0,76

0,45

0,40

0,30

Adriatica

Ventouris

Karageorgis

0,26

1996

Passengers

Cars

Trailers

Medium carriers

Strintzis

Italy-Greece

1 258 000

245 983

229 000

23 132 174 2 628 311

498 916

Small carriers

Marlines

0,12

Eurotunnel

8 399 463 2 076 954

519 003

(150) Consequently, the Commission concludes that
serious breach of
is

infringement

the
Community competition rules.

a

(151) In setting the level of fines, the Commission may
take account of
capacity of
the
offenders to cause significant damage and set
the amount of fine at a level which ensures that
effect. The
it has a sufficiently deterrent
Commission considers it appropriate that larger

effective

(1) Source: Cruise & Ferry Info.

to

the parties,

in this case, only two of

(2) It is to be noted that Marlines and probably Ventouris
may be categorised as small and medium-sized enterprises
according
the Commission’s Recommendation
96/280/EC of 3 April 1996. According to the Commission
notice on agreements of minor importance (OJ C 372,
9.12.1997, p. 13) agreements between SMEs are not, in
general, caught by the prohibition in Article 85(1).
However,
i.e.
Marlines and Ventouris, can be described as SMEs.
Moreover,
it is certain that the agreement significantly
impedes competition in a substantial part of the relevant
market (see Part III of the notice on agreements of minor
importance).
(3) Karageorgis’

size is calculated on the basis of

the
information which Karageorgis provided as
to the
number of passengers and vehicles carried by its vessels
during 1992, which according to Karageorgis was the last
full year of its activities in Greece. For Marlines, this base
is its total turnover for 1989. For the purposes of this
comparison,
is of no consequence whether one
considers Marline’s turnover for 1989 or for 1993.

it

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/47

(152) Following this grouping, the medium carriers’
fines relating to the gravity of the infringement
will amount to 65 % of the large carriers’ fines.
For Marlines, the same percentage will be 20 %.

Duration

(153) The Commission considers the agreement

the

(the

to
date from, at latest, 18 July 1987 up to July
date
1994
Commission
of
investigations),
in the case of Strintzis and
Minoan, and for Anek from 6 July 1989 to July
1994. In the case of Marlines, its participation
in the agreement is considered to have been
from, at the latest, 18 July 1987 up to at least 8
December 1989. Karageorgis appears to have
left the market during 1993. The duration of the
therefore
infringement
considered to be from, at the latest, 18 July
1987 until 27 December 1992.

that company is

for

(154) In respect of Ventouris Ferries, the Commission
considers that as from 8 December 1989 it
entered into the pricing-fixing cartel by agreeing,
with four of the companies operating on the
Patras-Ancona route, the level of fares for trucks
to be applied on the Patras to Bari and Brindisi
the
routes.
the
infringement until
Commission
Adriatica
participated in the cartel referred to above as
from 30 October 1990 at the latest until July
1994.

July 1994. Moreover,
that

participated

Ventouris

considers

in

(155) The

Commission

the
infringement was of long duration for Minoan,
Strintzis and Karageorgis, and of medium
duration for the rest of the undertakings.

concludes

that

(156) These considerations justify an increase of the
fines by 10 % for every year of the infringement
for Minoan and Strinzis, by 20 % for Marlines
and
other
55 % for
35 % to
undertakings. Table 2 indicates
the relevant
adjustments per company.

the

by

Table 2

Lage carriers

Minoan

Anek

Medium carriers

Strintzis

Adriatica

Ventouris

+ 70 %

+ 45 %

+ 70 %

+ 35 %

+ 40 %

Karageorgis

+ 55 %

Small carriers

Marlines

+ 20 %

Conclusion on the basic amount of fines

(157) The Commission concludes

that

the parties
committed a serious infringement of Article 85.
Consequently, a fine has to be imposed which
penalises this serious breach in an appropriate
way and which, by its deterrent effect, prevents
any repetitions.

(158) Table 3 sets out the calculation of the level of
fines taking into account the elements set out in
paragraphs 146 to 156. Column 1 sets out the
basic fine calculated on the basis of the gravity
of the infringement. Column 2 sets out the basic
fine per individual company taking into account
the duration of the infringement.

Table 3

Gravity
(million ECU)

Duration
(million ECU)

Minoan

Anek

Strintzis

Adriatica

Ventouris

Karageorgis

Marlines

2

2

1,3

1,3

1,3

1,3

0,4

3,4

2,9

2,21

1,75

1,82

2,01

0,48

L 109/48

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

Aggravating circumstances

(159) It is clear from the documentary evidence that
Minoan acted as the instigator of the cartel.
Minoan tried to persuade Anek to join the cartel
(Minoan’s telex of 15 March 1989), discussed
with Ventouris the latter’s tariff policy in the
Otranto route (ETA’s document of 25 February
1992) and organised and directed meetings with
the companies
involved in the infringement
(ETA’s telex of 21 May 1992, ETA’s telex of 24
November 1993). This
company not only
monitored the cartel’s operations but also tried
to
companies’
collaboration (telexes dated 15 March 1989, 7
January 1992, 25 February 1992, 7 January
1993, 24 September 1993, 26 May 1994). These
considerations justify an increase of the fine by
25 % for Minoan.

extend

scope

the

the

of

(160) In November 1992, after

the parties had
information from the
received requests
for
Commission, Minoan
each
proposed
company should differentiate its prices by 1 %
for four cabin categories. Each company would
differentiate four different categories of price.

that

(161) This fact not only demonstrates Minoan’s role
as the instigator of the cartel but also amounts
to an attempt to obstruct the Commission in
carrying
These
considerations justify an increase of the fine by
10 % for Minoan.

investigation.

out

its

to whether price fixing
domestic routes as
route did
consultation for
indeed
infringement. These
considerations justify a reduction of the fines by
15 % for all the undertakings.

the international

constitute

an

(164) Marlines, Adriatica, Anek and Ventouris played
an exclusively (cid:28)follow my leader’ role in the
justify a
infringement. These
reduction of
those
undertakings.

the fines by 15 % for

considerations

(165) Table 4 below sets out the amount of fines after

the aforementioned adjustments.

Table 4

Adjustment
(%)

Fines after
adjustment
(million ECU)

Minoan

Anek

Strintzis

Adriatica

Ventouris

Karageorgis

Marlines

+ 20

(cid:159) 30

(cid:159) 15

(cid:159) 30

(cid:159) 30

(cid:159) 15

(cid:159) 30

4,08

2,03

1,87

1,22

1,27

1,08

0,33

Mitigating circumstances

(162) The Commission accepts that the parties did not
apply in full all the specific price agreements
and that they engaged, during the period of the
infringement,
competition through
discounting. However, these considerations have
already been taken into account in assessing the
gravity of the infringement.

in price

(166) According to Article 19(2) of Regulation (EEC)
No 4056/86, the Commission may not impose
fines exceeding ECU 1 000 000 or 10 % of the
turnover in the preceding business year of each
the
of
the
infringement.
except
Karageorgis, the fines set out in the column
headed (cid:28)Fines after adjustment’ do not exceed
10 % of
the undertakings
involved in the present infringement.

undertakings
all
For

participating
undertakings

the turnover of

in

regulatory framework – of

(163) The usual practice – not directly imposed by the
legal or
fixing
domestic fares in Greece through a consultation
of all domestic operators (whereby they were
expected to submit a common proposal) and the
ex post decision of
the
Merchant Navy may have created some doubt
among the Greek companies operating also on

the Ministry for

(167) Karageorgis ceased its operations in January
1993 and subsequently closed all its branches in
Greece. The Commission has no information
regarding Karageorgis’ turnover for 1997. Under
Article 19(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86,
the Commission may by decision impose on
undertakings fines of from ECU 1 000 to ECU
1 000 000 (or a sum in excess thereof but not

27.4.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 109/49

exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding
business
for
the
Karageorgis is set at ECU 1 000 000.

year). Accordingly,

fine

(168) By virtue of

the Commission notice on the
non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
cases (1), fines imposed in cartel cases may be
significantly reduced in several cases. Such cases
include the following: (a) before a statement of
objections is sent, an enterprise provides the
Commission with information, documents or
other evidence which materially contribute to
establishing the existence of the infringement;
(b) after receiving a statement of objections, an
enterprise informs the Commission that it does
not substantially contest the facts on which the
Commission bases its allegations.

extent,

issuance of

the Commission’s

(169) In this case, the documents submitted by Anek
before
the
statement of objections have confirmed, to a
significant
the
the
infringement in question. Moreover, none of the
companies contested the factual basis of
the
Commission’s
statement of objections. These
considerations justify a reduction of the fines by
45 % for Anek and by 20 % for the other
undertakings.

existence

of

Conclusion: the final amount of fines

(170) Table 5 shows the final level of fines taking into
account the elements set out in paragraphs 146
to 169.

Table 5

Final amount of fines
(million ECU)

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1. Minoan Lines, Anek Lines, Karageorgis Lines,
Marlines SA and Strintzis Lines have infringed Article
the EC Treaty by agreeing prices to be
85(1) of
applied to roll-on roll-off ferry services between Patras
and Ancona.

The duration of these infringements is as follows:

(a) in the case of Minoan Lines and Strintzis Lines,

from 18 July 1987 until July 1994;

(b) in the case of Karageorgis Lines, from 18 July

1987 until 27 December 1992;

(c) in the case of Marlines SA, from 18 July 1987

until 8 December 1989;

(d) in the case of Anek Lines, from 6 July 1989 until

July 1994.

2. Minoan Lines, Anek Lines, Karageorgis Lines,
Adriatica di Navigazione SpA, Ventouris Group
Enterprises SA and Strintzis Lines have infringed
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty by agreeing on the
levels of fares for trucks to be applied on the Patras to
Bari and Brindisi routes.

The duration of these infringements is as follows:

(a) in the case of Minoan Lines, Ventouris Group
from 8

SA and Strintzis Lines,

Enterprises
December 1989 until July 1994;

Minoan

Anek

Strintzis

Adriatica

Ventouris

Karageorgis

Marlines

(1) OJ C 207, 18.7.1996, p. 4.

3,26

1,11

1,5

0,98

1,01

1,00

0,26

(b) in the case of Karageorgis Lines, from 8 December

1989 until 27 December 1992;

(c) in the case of Anek Lines, from 8 December 1989

until July 1994;

(d) in the case of Adriatica di Navigazione SpA, from

30 October 1990 until July 1994.

Article 2

The following fines are hereby imposed on the
following undertakings in respect of the infringement
found in Article 1:

L 109/50

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.4.1999

— Minoan Lines, a fine of ECU 3,26 million,

— Strintzis Lines, a fine of ECU 1,5 million,

— Anek Lines, a fine of ECU 1,11 million,

— Marlines SA, a fine of ECU 0,26 million,

— Karageorgis Lines, a fine of ECU 1 million,

— Ventouris Group Enterprises SA, a fine of ECU

1,01 million,

— Adriatica di Navigazione SpA, a fine of ECU 0,98

million.

Article 3

The fines shall be paid within three months of the date
of notification of
this Decision to the following
account:

Account No 310–0933000–43.
European Commission
Banque Bruxelles-Lambert
Agence Europe´enne
Rond-Point Schuman/Schumanplein 5
B-1040 Brussels.

After three months,
interest shall automatically be
payable at the rate charged by the European Central
Bank on its ecu transactions on the first working day
of the month in which this Decision was adopted, plus
3,5 percentage points, namely 7,5 %.

— Minoan Lines
25th August 17
GR-71202 Heraklion, Crete

— Strintzis Lines

26 Akti Possidonos
GR-18531 Piraeus

— Anek Lines

Nikolaou Plastira & Apokoronou
GR-Hania, Crete

— Marlines SA

38 Akti Possidonos
GR-18531 Piraeus

— Karageorgis Lines

Karageorgis Buildings
Akti Kondyli 26—28
GR-18503 Piraeus

— Ventouris Group Enterprises SA
91 Leoforos Pireos & Kithiron 2
GR-18541 Piraeus

— Adriatica di Navigazione SpA

Zattere 1411
I-30123 Venice

Done at Brussels, 9 December 1998.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to:

For the Commission

Karel VAN MIERT

Member of the Commission