WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1612/98 by Glyn FORD to the Commission. Telephone security
Date: 1998-05-25
Institutions: European Parliament, FORD
Subjects: confidentiality, fraud, protection of communications, telephone













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91998E1612

WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1612/98 by Glyn FORD to the Commission. Telephone security  


Official Journal C 118 , 29/04/1999 P. 0004 





WRITTEN QUESTION E-1612/98by Glyn Ford (PSE) to the Commission(25 May 1998)Subject: Telephone securityIs the Commission aware of the report that the "codes" protecting GSM phones have been internationally weakened to enable Government agencies to eavesdrop on conversation? While the encryption key is a 64-bit system, two graduate students have determined that the last 10 digits have been set as zeros, making the code easier to crack for interception and, in consequence, allowing "cloning", meaning that unauthorized calls can be made from another phone at the expense of the initial user.Does the Commission agree that, if this claim is true, this encouragement to electronic fraud by deliberately leaving the electronic key under the mat is wrong?Will the Commission ask the relevant companies in future to use the full potential of the system to limit fraud?Answer given by Mr Bangemann on behalf of the Commission(1 July 1998)The Commission is certainly aware of recent reports concerning the apparent effective reduction in the operational length of global system for mobile communications (GSM) encryption keys. Even if the reports are true, the work required to decrypt a message with such a reduced key length would still be substantial. It is also not clear that this is other than an original design feature of the GSM system. In any event, encryption within the GSM system is intended to provide privacy over the air link and not end-to-end confidentiality. Thus, once a message reaches the operator's base station, the message is subsequently handled "en clair" (unless it is re-transmitted to another GSM hand-set).It would be an overstatement to say that this claimed feature of GSM is an encouragement to electronic fraud. The key has not been left "under the mat" as, for example, in a key escrow system. The issue of cloning of terminals is not related to the privacy question. The authentication of terminals in a GSM network is handled through a different technical system which, unlike the message encryption system, is not part of the standard but is left to the individual operator to decide upon. Hence, several technical solutions are in use for authentication around the world.The Commission is not aware of any privacy or authentication related problems in operational GSM networks. The reports received by the Commission concern laboratory experiments which do not resemble the practical situation in real networks.The GSM memorandum of understanding (MoU) group association, which represents about 250 GSM operators around the world and is responsible for exploiting the full potential of the GSM system, will no doubt react to these claims, in the appropriate manner, if they believe it to be necessary. The GSM MoU association has a permanent secretariat which can be contacted to obtain further information (Merrion Road, Dublin 4, Ireland, fax +353 1269 5958).