Excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c of the Treaty)
Date: 1998-05-14
Institutions: Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament
Subjects: consultation procedure, interinstitutional agreement, international agreement, joint committee on EU matters, operation of the Institutions, parliamentary scrutiny, powers of the EP













EUR-Lex - 51998IP0117 - EN






Avis juridique important




|



51998IP0117

Excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c of the Treaty)  


Official Journal C 167 , 01/06/1998 P. 0211 





A4-0117/98Resolution on improvements in the functioning of the Institutions without modification of the Treaties - making EU policies more open and democraticThe European Parliament,- having regard to its resolutions on the outcomes of the Intergovernmental Conferences, in particular that of 7 April 1992 ((OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81.)), and its resolution of 19 November 1997 on the Amsterdam Treaty - CONF 4007/97 - C4-0538/97 ((Minutes of that Sitting, Part II, Item 20.)),- having regard to its resolution of 10 December 1996 on participation by citizens and social players in the Union's institutional system ((OJ C 20, 20.1.1997, p. 31.)),- having regard to its resolution of 2 April 1998 on democratic accountability during the third stage of EMU ((Minutes of that Sitting, Part II, Item 9.)),- having regard to its other resolutions in which it has called for a reinforced role for the European Parliament, including by means of interinstitutional agreements, in a number of EU policy areas where the European Parliament is not formally consulted,- having regard to the European Council meeting of 2 and 3 May 1998 in Brussels,- having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,- having regard to the report of its Committee on Institutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A4-0117/98),A. whereas the democratic deficit is one of the reasons for discontent with the Union,B. whereas democratic control is not being ensured in certain areas, either by the national parliaments or by the European Parliament,Practical action to reduce the democratic deficit after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conferences1. Considers it to be unacceptable that there are EU policy areas in which powers of democratic control have been taken away from national parliaments and have not been replaced by scrutiny by the European Parliament, especially Economic and Monetary Union, but also the common commercial policy, agreements stemming from the EURATOM Treaty, agricultural policy, fisheries policy, development cooperation policy, competition policy and Community implementation of collective agreements negotiated between the social partners;2. Regrets the failure to ensure appropriate Treaty changes in these respects at the Amsterdam IGC, and calls for this failure to be compensated, at least for the period until a future IGC, by arrangements that ensure that the European Parliament is properly informed and adequately involved in the development of these policies, with a view to strengthening democratic control in those areas and making Community action more effective and transparent;3. Believes that the conclusion of interinstitutional agreements is the most appropriate way to achieve this objective of reinforced democratic control at EU level;4. Believes that the 1998 ad hoc procedure on agricultural expenditure must be continued and argues that this procedure and its structure should be formalized by a new interinstitutional agreement, which should reflect the latest developments in the procedure;5. Considers that improvements in the political functioning of Parliament itself are needed in order to make it more open, effective and lively and to enhance the dialogue between the Institutions, and instructs its Committee on the Rules of Procedure to submit appropriate proposals;Economic and Monetary Union6. Considers that Economic and Monetary Union poses major questions of democratic accountability which have been further accentuated by the recent introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact, and have not in any way been compensated by the Amsterdam Treaty, nor by the compromises reached on employment at the Amsterdam and (special) Luxembourg European Councils, to which concrete expression must be given;7. Regrets that previous European Parliament attempts to secure an interinstitutional agreement in this area have not been followed through;8. Considers it now to be essential to tackle the twin issues of democratic accountability of the European Central Bank and of wider consultation procedures as regards EU-level coordination of national economic policies;9. Believes that the European Parliament should be fully informed to enable it to inform the Council and the European Central Bank of its analyses and preferred courses of action as regards general and strategic policy aspects of EMU and in particular as regards consistency between the broad economic policy guidelines, monetary policy and employment policies;10. Calls, in this context, for the Council to enter into negotiations for a new interinstitutional agreement providing for more systematic procedures as regards the European Parliament contribution to the setting of the broad economic policy guidelines pursuant to Article 103(2), multilateral surveillance pursuant to Article 103(3) and (4) and the excessive deficit procedure pursuant to Article 104c;11. Submits the attached draft interinstitutional agreement (see Annex) as an initial basis for discussions with the Council and Commission;International agreements12. Regrets that its role in the field of external economic policy has not been improved by the Amsterdam Treaty, notably the fact that the European Parliament is not even formally consulted on agreements based on Article 113, especially considering the role Parliament has as an arm of the budgetary authority;13. Asks the Commission and the Council to take account of the fact that any international agreement with financial implications requires at the very least prior consultation of Parliament, and its assent, as part of the budgetary authority, if the financial implications are significant;14. Calls, in consequence, for the European Parliament to be given more systematic information concerning the separate phases of preparation, adoption and implementation of negotiating guidelines for external agreements, and as to how the negotiations themselves are proceeding;15. Believes that better information also needs to be provided to the European Parliament on proceedings within the Article 113 committee;16. Again expresses its concern about the undemocratic nature of the EURATOM Treaty, and that the European Parliament is not being consulted on certain international agreements stemming from the EURATOM Treaty, such as the Accession Agreement to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO);17. Calls for an interinstitutional agreement for the European Parliament to be formally consulted on all international agreements falling under the EURATOM Treaty, and insists that, pursuant to the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budget procedure ((OJ C 331, 7.12.1993, p. 1.)), the Commission informs the Budgetary Authority prior to the conclusion of the agreement of its financial consequences for the EU budget;18. Considers that, in view of the fact that in international fisheries agreements important budgetary implications are always involved, Article 228(3), second subparagraph, of the Treaty, which requires the assent of Parliament, should always apply;Social policy: collective agreements between the social partners19. Believes that an important institutional problem is posed by the fact that decisions provided for in Articles 118a and 118b of the EC Treaty on social agreements of such significance as those on parental leave and on part-time work can be taken without the European Parliament being consulted or even informed;20. Calls for an interinstitutional agreement to redress this situation in such a way that the European Parliament is involved in consultation initiatives from the outset by providing for it to receive all the relevant texts and to be given more information by the Commission as to the progress of negotiations, and also to be given the opportunity to express its views when the Council has to take a decision pursuant to Article 118b;Competition policy21. Calls on the Commission formally to undertake to send the European Parliament all draft Commission implementing proposals in the field of Community competition policy, such as draft block exemptions pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and Commission initiatives taken pursuant to Article 90(3) of the Treaty affecting public undertakings;22. Further calls for the regular information meetings already organized by the Commissioner for Competition with the members of the European Parliament's relevant committee to become a matter of standard practice for the future;23. If a decision cannot be reached by way of the normal procedure, insists on an agreement between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council on codes of conduct in the field of fiscal policy;24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.AnnexDraft interinstitutional agreementbetween the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on provisions relating to the coordination of national economic policiesGeneral provisionsA. The purpose of this agreement is to implement the various procedures for the coordination of national economic policies in the context of economic and monetary union.B. This agreement is aimed at ensuring a proper balance as regards participation by the Community's institutions in the coordination of national economic policies.Procedure for setting out the broad guidelines of economic policy (Article 103(2) of the Treaty)C. The Commission shall forward to the European Parliament and the Council a recommendation on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States. The European Parliament shall debate the proposed broad guidelines and adopt an initial resolution, which shall be forwarded to the Council. The Council shall formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community and, taking into account the resolution of the European Parliament, shall report on its findings to the European Council.D. The President of the Council shall appear before the responsible committee of the European Parliament in order to inform it of the conclusion reached by the European Council on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community. The European Parliament may organize a second debate in order to assess the content of the recommendation in relation to its initial resolution and shall, if necessary, adopt a second resolution.Multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 103(3) and (4) of the Treaty)E. The Commission shall forward to the European Parliament and the Council reports on economic developments in each of the Member States and on the consistency of national economic policies with the broad guidelines and, where it is established that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines or that they risk jeopardizing the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, its recommendations. The European Parliament shall debate the Commission's recommendations and adopt an initial resolution, which shall be forwarded to the Council.F. If the Council establishes that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad outlines, it may, taking into account the resolution of the European Parliament, make the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned.G. The recommendations shall be made public. The President of the Council shall appear before the responsible committee of the European Parliament in order to inform it of the recommendations adopted. The European Parliament shall assess the content of the recommendations in relation to its initial resolution and shall, if necessary, adopt a second resolution.Excessive deficit procedure (Article 104c of the Treaty)H. The Commission shall forward to the European Parliament and the Council the reports drawn up as part of its monitoring of the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States as well as the opinions formulated in cases of an excessive deficit or of the risk of such a deficit. The European Parliament shall debate these reports and opinions. In cases of excessive deficits, it shall adopt an initial resolution, which it shall forward to the Council before a decision is adopted.I. The Council shall decide whether an excessive deficit exists in a Member State and, taking into account the resolution of the European Parliament, shall make recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period.J. The President of the Council shall appear before the responsible committee of the European Parliament in order to inform it of the recommendations adopted. The European Parliament shall assess the content of the recommendations in relation to its initial resolution and shall, if necessary, adopt a second resolution.K. The recommendations adopted by the Council shall be made public where no effective action has been taken in response to the recommendations within the period laid down.L. If a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, in spite of the notice given by the Council pursuant to Article 104c(9), and if the Member State concerned does not adopt measures for the reduction of the deficit, the Council may, after giving the European Parliament an opportunity to deliver its opinion on the measures envisaged, decide to apply one or more of the sanctions provided for in Article 104c(11).M. The President of the Council shall appear before the responsible committee of the European Parliament in order to inform it of the decisions taken pursuant to Article 104c(11) of the Treaty. It shall also inform it of any derogation from some or all of the decisions taken.Final provisionsN. The content of this agreement may not be amended without the consent of all the signatory institutions.