Communication from the Commission concerning the report of the standing working group on the safe transport of radioactive material in the European Union
Date: 1998-04-08
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: International Atomic Energy Agency, dangerous substance, radioactive materials, transport of dangerous goods, transport safety

P P P P8 

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels, 08.04.1998 
COM(1998) 155 final 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 

CONCERNING THE REPORT OF THE STANDING WORKING GROUP ON 
THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 

COMMUNICATION FROM THE  COMMISSION 

CONCERNING THE REPORT OF THE STANDING WORKING  GROUP ON 
THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE  MATERIAL 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 

I. 

PREAMBLE 

The Communication sent in 1996 to the Council and the European  Parliament1 
and the attached third report of the Standing Working Group on the  Safe 
Transport  of Radioactive Material (TRM) remain valid. They contain 
comprehensive information  on the situation, prospects for further  developments 
and recommendations for a study programme. 

This Commission Communication  covering the fourth  report  of the  Standing 
Working Group is mainly intended to update and supplement the  information 
presented  one and a half years ago in the previous report and now emphasises: 

- 

- 

- 

the recent changes to the IAEA transport regulations, their prospects of 
implementation  and implications for the  future; 

the latest activities conducted  or supported by the Commission; 

recent events in the Member States which have had an influence  on the 
public perception of safety in transport  operations. 

Proposals for further  Commission actions within a multi-annual framework  are 
presented  in Appendix I, taking into account the recommendations made by the 
Standing Working Group in its fourth  report. This programme is part of the 
frame work programme for actions  in the energy sector, adopted by the 
Commission in November  1997* and presently examined by the Council and the 
European Parliament. 

H. 

CHANGES TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT  REGULATIONS 

The use of radioactive material, in particular by the nuclear power industry, 
inevitably involves its transport and, over the years, national, Community and 
international regulations have been developed to ensure that such transport 
operations are carried out  safely. 

COM(96) 11 final of 03.04.1996. 
COM(97) 550 final of 18.11.1997 

The fundamental  requirement for the safety  of nuclear transport operations is 
that all transport practices meet the basic safety  standards.  Packages alone, for 
example, have to meet the same requirements under all circumstances, 
including severe accident conditions. 

To embrace this principle, and in the light of improved knowledge, technical 
progress and growing experience, international regulations have been changed 
in ways which will influence  future  transport practices. 

At European Union level, in May  1996, the Council adopted the revised basic 
safety  standards2 for the protection of the health of workers and the general 
public against the dangers arising from  ionising radiation. The provisions of 
the Directive have to be transposed into national  law by  13 May 2000 at the 
latest. 

At international  level the IAEA Board of Governors adopted and then 
published in December  1996 new Advisory Regulations for the Safe Transport 
of Radioactive Material (ST-1). The provisions of the Advisory  Regulations 
should be implemented  by the different  modal organisations and the IAEA 
Member States on  1  January 2001. 

The radioprotection aspects of the ST-1 regulations on transport practices are 
consistent with the requirements of the revised basic safety  standards Directive 
and should therefore  lead, in the Member  States of the European Union, to a 
coherent set of national regulations. 

The review of the IAEA transport regulations currently in force3 led the IAEA 
to publish, in December  1996, the revised version of ST-1.  It is structured in 
much the same way as before  but includes: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

amendments to the activity limits per consignment  (including 
exemption limits) because of the radionuclide-specific  approach; 

the introduction of a new type of package (type C) to meet more 
stringent criteria than those specified  for the existing type B packages 
to be used in particular for the transport by air of certain high activity 
shipments; 

the extension of type B category of packages to permit transport by air 
of what is termed as "Low dispersible material" (LDM); 

special provisions for packages containing uranium hexafluoride  taking 
particular account of the chemical hazard of the material; 

the extensive review of criticality  safety; 

the incorporation of a new system of UN numbers for packages and 
conveyances in line with the dangerous goods  classification. 

Council  Directive 96/29 Euratom of  13 May  1996, OJ  L159/1 of 29.6.1996 
INTERNATIONAL  ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY-Regulations  for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Materials-Safety  Series N°. 6 -  1985 edition (as amended  1990). 

The attached report of the Standing Working Group gives a more 
comprehensive account of these changes. 

There has recently been public concern over the proposed new test conditions 
for type C packages, as well as for packages of type B containing LDM, since: 
- the USA appear to impose more stringent test requirements on packages used 
in the air transport of Plutonium 
- and it was felt that the performance  characteristics for such packages should 
be similar to those imposed on Flight Data Recorders (FDRs). 

The Commission has consulted the Standing Working Group on this issue; the 
Group expressed the view that the revised regulations adopted by the IAEA 
provide substantive additional protection for the transport of radioactive 
material in EU Member  States. No evidence has been put forward  that the 
requirements of the new regulations are inadequate. 

The experts assessment is that the IAEA's proposed  ST-1 advisory  regulations 
strengthen the existing rules by adding more specific  and more stringent 
requirements and that they will enable stringent uniform  transport  regulations 
to be applied in the European Union. 

This being said, the concerns expressed and the arguments put forward  will 
continue to be carefully  considered by the IAEA's Co-ordinated  Research 
Programmes (CRP), under which air and sea accident severity assessments are 
being reviewed. The outcome of the studies undertaken by the  Commission's 
action programme on the safe transport of radioactive materials will also 
provide direct input to the abovementioned  CRP and any future  revision of the 
regulations.  It is in any case advisable to update the IAEA regulations more 
frequently  than once every ten years (as at present),.and this has been 
advocated by the Commission. 

III. 

LMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVISED  REGULATIONS 

While the basic ST-1 transport regulations are advisory  in nature (based on 
recommendations) they have, nevertheless, been fully  implemented  in the past 
via the regulations governing the transport of class 7 goods (dangerous goods) 
by the various modes of transport.  All the requirements  for the transport of 
radioactive material have been implemented via the ADR  (European 
Agreement concerning the International  Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Road), RID (Regulations concerning the International  Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Rail), ADN (European Agreement concerning the International 
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways), IMDG (International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) and ICAO-TI (International  Civil Aviation 
Organisation - Technical Instructions). 

The different  modal organisations are expected to integrate the ST-1 advisory 
regulations over the next few years, with the five abovementioned  modal 
regulations entering into force  simultaneously  on 1 January 2001. 

Through the application of the Council Directives 94/5 5/EC4 for road and 
96/49/EC5 for rail, the amended ADR and RID European  agreements 
implement the ST-1 requirements as binding requirements in the European 
Community. 

IV. 

RECENT COMMISSION  ACTIVITIES 

In  1996, the European Parliament authorised the re-opening of the "Transport 
of radioactive material" budget heading, and allocated to it ECU 2 million. 
, In  1997, the same heading was maintained but with "p.m." entered  for 
commitments. 

On the basis of the  1996 decision the Commission organised  a public call for 
proposals which was issued in May  19966 in order to implement the actions 
described in the commentary on the budget heading. 

As a result, the Commission evaluated 43 proposals, made a selection and 
asked the Standing Working Group for its opinion on the selected proposals. 

Of these 43 proposals, 24 were selected (15 first priority and 9 second 
priority).  In  1996, contracts were awarded for  18 of these proposals, granting 
them a Community financial  contribution or subsidy.  An internal budget 
transfer  of ECU 0,7  million in 1997 recently made it possible to  award 
contracts for the remaining six proposals.  Details are annexed to the  fourth 
report  of the Standing Working Group. 

The initial objective was to spread the available budget over the different  issues 
identified  in the commentary on the budget heading. This objective could not 
be achieved with complete balance. For example, no valid proposal could be 
financed in the field of the improved  safety of nuclear transport in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the New Independent  States (NIS). 
Similar difficulties  were encountered with regard to the public perception of the 
transport  of radioactive material. 

For a number of studies, only the first stage couldbe financed  in  1996/1997, 
covering an initial period of 12 months. These should be followed  by a second 
stage in order to reap the full benefit  of the initiatives undertaken,  provided an 
appropriate programme is launched and the necessary budget made available. 

OJL319of  12.12.1994, p. 7. 
OJL235of  17.09.1996, p. 25. 
OJ C136 of 8.5.1996,  p.16 

V. 

RECENT EVENTS DURING NUCLEAR TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 

In some regions of the European Union, the public opposed to the use of 
nuclear energy is also objecting in particular to the transport of nuclear 
material.  In Germany, for example, railway tracks and equipment were 
recently damaged in an attempt to disrupt the transport of spent fuel and 
vitrified waste to the Gorleben interim storage facility. Another example is a 
widespread campaign conducted in the North of England, based on the 
concerns raised by an increase in shipments of mixed-oxide fuel by air. Letters 
expressing these concerns were sent to Members of the European Parliament. 

Demonstrations and public statements of this type have attracted a lot of 
public and media attention increasing fears about these transport operations. In 
reality, the risks associated with the transport of radioactive material are low, 
and incidents/accidents are few and of little consequence.  It is therefore 
important that radioactive materials be managed and regulated according to 
their real  risk. 

Accordingly, greater efforts  should be made to inform the public and the 
emergency services on the safety of transport operations. The message should 
be that radioactive materials are transported in accordance with strict and 
internationally agreed safety regulations which are constantly being reviewed 
and updated in the light of new knowledge acquired through research and of 
experience gained world wide. 

VI. FUTURE COMMISSION ACTION 

In order to influence the strategic rather than the tactical direction of future 
international regulatory developments a longer term view has to be taken by 
the Commission and the Community. A multi-annual study programme such 
as that suggested by the Standing Working Group in its fourth report should be 
supported by the Community in application of Euratom Treaty chapter III 
(health and safety), especially by implementing the basic safety standards for 
transport practices, derived from Council Directive 80/836/Euratom as 
amended by Directive 84/467/Euratom and recently replaced by Council 
Directive 96/29/Euratom. 

There is no risk of duplication between such a programme and the Euratom 
framework research and training programmes of the Community based on 
Articles 4 and 7 of the Euratom Treaty, since the transport of radioactive 
material is not mentioned in Annex 1  to the Treaty. 

With regard to the operation of the internal market, the tendency nowadays is 
to seek harmonisation within the EU Member States on the basis of the 
existing international conventions, norms and standards and to avoid 
introducing new provisions where these might lead to unnecessary  duplication 
with existing international regulations. 

In the nuclear transport sector, this principle is largely implemented by 
following  the IAEA basic regulations and the various modal regulations 
(ADR/RID, ADN, IMDG-Code and ICAO-TI) as explained in section III 
above. Nevertheless, it is till worth harmonising design, construction, 
packages and administrative procedures in order to facilitate  shipments within 
the EU. 

Nuclear transport safety  in the CEECs and the NIS also needs to be improved, 
with specific  projects encouraging close cooperation between safety  experts in 
these countries and the Community experts. 

Special attention should also be given to public information  and 
communication projects  in order to improve the public perception of transport 
safety  in relation to the Community's and the Member States'  specific needs. 

VII.  CONCLUSIONS 

In order to implement the recommendations  set out in the fourth report of the 
Standing Working Group, and having identified  the areas for future  action by 
the Commission, a multi-annual action plan for the transport of radioactive 
material should be adopted by the Community. 

The following  topics should be addressed in such an action plan : 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

monitoring and analysis of the present situation and future  prospects 
with regard to nuclear transport practices in Member  States, giving 
particular attention to the analysis of incidents and accidents and to the 
features  of the packages; 

implementation of the IAEA's advisory transport regulations (ST-1) by 
the international  organisations responsible for the various modes of 
transport and, subsequently, by the Member States of the EU; 

continuous revision and improvement (when needed) of the 
international regulations in co-ordination with the IAEA and the 
various modal organisations; 

particular attention to be given to informing  the public and training the 
personnel involved in transport operations, as well as to emergency 
response planning and the training of emergency service personnel; 

cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries and the NIS 
in the abovementioned areas. 

Implementation of the action plan would, in particular, allow the Commission to 
study areas where further harmonisation is needed to help the Single Market 
operate smoothly in the case of class 7 dangerous goods.  The topics to be 
addressed are as follows: 

- Competent Authority approval certificates for packages; 
- documentation on the compliance of the package design with the requirements 

(for packages other than type B and C); 

- quality assurance procedures and quality control; 
- approval and authorisation of carriers and of shipments. 

Once the situation in the Member States has been studied, the action plan will 
allow for practical suggestions to be made on how to achieve the necessary 
harmonisation measures in the European Union. The possible content of such a 
multi-annual work programme is given in Appendix 1. 

Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty may serve as the legal basis for such a 
programme to be implemented by the Commission, with the support of its 
Standing Working Group of experts on the safe transport of radioactive 
materials. 

APPENDIX 1 

PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF ACTION 
ON THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE  MATERIAL 

The plan of action covers a period of five years. It runs from  1998 and will be 
reviewed year by year to remain in conformity  with the description given in the 
budget heading.  Any substantial modification  will be an integral part of a 
Commission communication to the Council and European Parliament on the  subject. 

The following  programme is rather comprehensive and priority choices will have to 
be made in accordance with the budget available year by year. 

1. 

Operation of the Single Market and Harmonisation  Measures 

1.1.  Harmonisation of the Competent Authority approval certificate  for 

packages of types A (F), B and C, covering the quality  assurance 
programmes for package design, testing, manufacturing,  use,  , 
reinspection and transportation. 

1.2.  Harmonisation of the documentation on the compliance of the package 

design with the requirement (ST-1, para. 801) for excepted packages 
and packages of type IP-1, -2, -3 and Type A. 

1.3.  Harmonisation of quality assurance procedures, and guidance on those 
procedures to be given to package designers, manufacturers,  users and 
consignors. 

1.4.  Harmonisation of,  and guidance to be given on, quality assurance and 
quality control (QA / QC) for the conditioning and characterisation of 
waste produced by LW-NPP and the reprocessing of INF. 

1.5.  Harmonisation of the Competent Authority requirements and 
procedures for the approval and authorisation of carriers and 
shipments. 

2. 

Implementation of the regulations 

2.1 
2.2 

Survey of the EU Member States' package testing  capacities 
Assessment of the EU Member States' capacity to use computer 
techniques for package safety  analysis 

3. 

Revision of the Regulations 

In-depth investigation of proposals for revising the basic transport  regulation 
(IAEA - ST-1) so as to take account  of: 

3.1 
3.2 
3.3 

new developments ; 
research and industrial experience; 
investigations into transport incidents and accidents. 

4. 

Investigation of transport events 

4.1 

Review, analysis and reporting of the radiological  consequences of 

accidents and incidents involving radioactive materials : 

updating the existing database; 

in-depth analysis and classification  of events; 

production of training material. 

4.2 

Further development of guidance and criteria for the  uniform 
reporting of incidents and accidents. 

5. 

Emergency Arrangements and Training 

5.1 

5.2 

Organising transport emergency training exercises involving  different 
EU Member States. 

Drawing up a suitable training manual for organisations involved in 
emergency situations. 

5.3 

Organising training courses. 

6. 

Assistance to the CEECs and NIS 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

Enlarging the Standing Working Group, with the voluntary 
participation of CEECs. 

Drawing up an action programme to improve radioactive  material 
transport  safety. 

Organising training courses for representatives of Competent 
Authorities and personnel involved in transport operations in the 
CEECs and NIS (shared cost action with IAEA and/or PHARE / 
TACIS programmes). 

7. 

Transport  safety  information  and  communication 

7.1 

7.2 

Improving the existing Public Information  Centres (promoting  nuclear 
energy in the Member States) by providing appropriate information  on 
the transport practices used in the different  modes of transport. 

Informing  the public and the media on the various safety  aspects of 
international transport operations in order to improve the public 
perception of such transport. 

7.3 

Developing acceptance and tolerability criteria for the risks arising 
from the transport of radioactive materials; assessing the real risk with 
reference  to these criteria. 

7.4 

Demonstrating that transport packages have inbuilt safety  margins 
which go beyond design accident conditions (graceful  failure). 

10 

APPENDIX  II 

The Members of the Standing Working Group 
on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in the European  Union 
are designated by the following Departments and/or Institutes 

Bundesministerium  fur  Ôffentliche  Wirtschaft  und Verkehr 
Ministère des Affaires  Sociales, de la Santé Publique et de 
l'Environnement 
Organisme National des Déchets Radioactifs  et des Matières Fissiles 
Enrichies (ONDRAF / NIRAS) 
National Institute of Radiation Hygiene 
Finnish Centre for Radiation & Nuclear Safety 
Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IPSN) 
Bundesministerium  fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
Bundesministerium  fur Verkeh 
Bundesamt  fur  Strahlenschutz 
Bundesanstalt  fur Materialpriifung  (BAM) 
Gesellschaft  fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit  (GRS) 
Greek Atomic Energy Commission* 
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning & Environment 
Energieonderzoek  Centrum Nederland (ECN) 
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland 
Agenzia Nationale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente  (ANPA) 
Ente per la Nuove Technologie, l'Energia  e l'Ambiente  (ENEA) 
Direction de la Santé (Div. de la Radioprotection) 
Représentation  Permanente du Portugal* 
Empresa Nacional de Residuos 
Statens Stralskyddsinstitut  (Swedish Radiation Protection Institute) 
Statens Kârnkraftinspektion  (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate) 
Department  Environment Transport Regions (Radioactive Materials 
Transport  Division) 
National Radiological Protection Board 

Ôstenreich 
Belgique 

Belgique 

Danmark 
Finland 
France 
Deutschland 
Deutschland 
Deutschland 
Deutschland 
Deutschland 
Elias 
Nederland 
Nederland 
Ireland 
Italia 
Italia 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Espana 
Sweden 
Sweden 
UK 

UK 

International Atomic Energy Agency (Division of Nuclear Safety) 

(observer) 

By correspondance 

11 

FOURTH REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 
FROM THE STANDING WORKING GROUP ON 
THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 

NOVEMBER 1997 

12. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

SUMMARY 

CONCLUSION AND STANDING WORKING  GROUP  RECOMMENDATION 

1. 
2. 

3. 

4. 

2.2 

2.3 

3.2 

INTRODUCTION 
DEVELOPMENTS  SINCE THE THIRD  REPORT 
2.1 

The Revised IAEA Transport Regulations 
2.1.1  Radiological  Protection 
2.1.2  Type C Packages 
2.1.3  Packaging Requirements for Uranium  Hexafluoride 
2.1.4  Nuclear Criticality  Safety 
2.1.5  Administrative  Arrangements 
The-IAEA Co-ordinated Research  Programmes 
2.2.1  Uranium Hexafluoride  (UF6) 
2.2.2  LSA/SCO 
2.2.3  Accident Severity at Sea 
2.2.4  Air Transport 
Developments in the European  Community 
2.3.1  Basic Safety  Standards 
2.3.2  Community Framework  Directives 
2.3.3  Directive on Controls 
2.3.4  Driver Training 
Developments  at the IMO 

2.4 
MAJOR ISSUES AND  CONCERNS 
3.1 

Regulatory  Issues 
3.1.1  Radiation Protection  Programmes 
3.1.2  Exemption Values 
3.1.3  Air Transport 
3.1.4  LSA/SCO 
Other Issues and Concerns 
3.2.1  Perceived and Actual Risks 
3.2.2  Technical Assistance and Industrial Co-operation with CEECs 

and the NIS 
3.2.3  Quality Assurance 
3.2.4 

Illicit Cross-border Movements of Nuclear Material and 
Radioactive  Sources 

ACTIVITIES  OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMISSION'S  STANDING 
WORKING  GROUP 
Past Activities 
4.1 
Current  Programme 
4.2 
Future Work 
4.3 

Appendix  1 

- 

Summary of Testing Requirements 

Type C packages 
Uranium  Hexafluoride 
Low Dispersible Material  (LDM) 

13 

SUMMARY 

1.  The Standing Working Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material was set up in 

1982 at the request of the European Parliament. 

2.  This, the fourth report of the Working Group, updates the report presented to the Council and 
Parliament on 3 April 1996.  Detail presented in that third report is not reproduced here. 

3.  A major development since the presentation of the third report has been the publication of the 

1996 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Regulations for the Safe 
Transport of Radioactive Material".  This will, in due course, be adopted world-wide for all 
modes of transport, replacing the 1985 (as amended  1990) edition currently in force. 

4.  The report describes the major changes in the regulations, the ongoing, activities of the IAEA 

and the responses and contributions of the European Union to these processes.  Where 
activities, past or future, arise from major regulatory issues or public concerns these are 
summarised. 

5.  The activities of the Standing Working Group are described in relation to these activities. 

14 

Conclusion and Standing Working Group Recommendations 

The transport of radioactive material is a safe and well-regulated  operation, and work is being 
undertaken within and outside the European Community to ensure that it remains so.  We 
acknowledge that accidents do occur and that human error cannot be entirely  removed:  there is 
no room for complacency. 

Whilst Member States will continue to support the work of the IAEA, the EU as a whole has an 
influence  through the attendance of officials  at meetings and through the Standing  Working 
Group's study programme. The Commission  will co-ordinate with Member States to ensure 
consistency  between the work going on in the Community  and at international  level, taking into 
account the new Community  legislation on the transport of dangerous goods. 

The Standing Working Group's study programme  has made a substantial  contribution  to the 
development  of the international transport  regulations, but in order to influence  the strategic 
rather than tactical direction of regulatory  development  a longer term view needs to be taken. 
The five year study programme of the Standing Working Group needs to be supported by 
continued  funding. 

15 

1 INTRODUCTION 

This report was prepared by the Standing Working Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material  set up by the Commission  in  1982 in response to Parliament's request.7 This, the fourth  report 
of the Working Group, updates the report presented to the Council and Parliament  on 3 April  1996. 
Details presented  in that third report are still valid and are therefore  not reproduced here. 

The major  development  since the presentation  of the previous report has been the publication  of the 
1996 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material"8.  This will, in due course, be adopted by the other international bodies that 
regulate the international carriage of radioactive material, such as the International  Maritime 
Organisation, the International  Civil Aviation Organisation, the United Nations Economic  Commission 
for Europe (for road transport) and the Intergovernmental  Organisation  for International  Carriage by 
Rail, and by Member States in their national  legislation. 

It looks at the changes  in radiation protection, packaging, criticality safety  and  administrative 
arrangements  introduced by the new IAEA Regulations.  It describes the parallel developments  in the 
EU and, in particular, the Basic Safety  Standards and the Framework  Directives.  It describes the  major 
issues arising from  the regulatory process and the concerns that have been raised.  Information  is 
provided on those areas requiring  further  research which are the subject  of Co-ordinated  Research 
Programmes  initiated by the IAEA and/or contracts awarded under the general budget of the  European 
Union -Energy Policy- (budget heading B4-1 0 2 0). 

The importance of the EU's work in regulatory development  and the long-term  contribution  that it can 
make through a stable research programme  is emphasised. 

2 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE THIRD REPORT 

2.1 

The Revised  IAEA Transport  Regulations 

In December  1996 the International  Atomic Energy Agency published the  1996 edition of the 
Regulations  for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material  in a document called  ST-1.  Member  States 
of the European Union (EU) and representatives of the Commission  contributed greatly to the process. 

The following  sections describe the most significant  technical and administrative  changes  introduced 
into the  1996 edition of the Regulations. 

2.1.1  Radiological protection 

General Provisions 
In the revised  IAEA Regulations (ST-1), the General Provisions on Radiation  Protection  have been 
redrafted.  Some important changes have been introduced,  including the need to establish  Radiation 
Protection  Programmes (RPPs) for the transport of radioactive material. RPPs emphasise the 
importance of the General Provisions which provide the justification  for maintaining the current 
regulatory  limits for radiation  levels around packages and conveyances. It is important to bear  in mind 
that these  limits have led, in general, to low individual  and collective doses to both workers and 
members of the public from  transport operations.  RPPs should help ensure that this remains so and 
that  individual doses are within the appropriate  limits and as low as reasonably  achievable. 

The provisions are consistent with the Basic Safety  Standards (BSS) of both the IAEA and  Euratom. 
(See 2.3.1) 

7  O J C40/44 of  15 February  1982. 
8  Regulations  for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.  1996 edition.  Vienna  1996 

16 

Exemption 
The IAEA Regulations have always contained  criteria defining  those materials which are subject to the 
requirements.  For example, the  1985 Regulations defined  radioactive material  as any material having 
a specific  activity greater than 70 Bq/g. The Basic Safety  Standards, however, use a radionuclide-
specific  approach  which  leads to exemption  values both greater and less than  70 Bq/g and  spanning 
seven orders of magnitude  in total. The BSS also present exemption values for total activity  quantities 
(Bq). This approach has been adopted by the  1996 IAEA transport regulations and they  include values 
for both exempt activity concentrations and total activity. 

Limits on Package Contents. 
New package content  limits are prescribed  based on the Basic Safety  Standards.  They  incorporate 
revised radiation protection philosophy, dosimetry and data. 

2.1.2 Type C packages 
Agreement  has been reached on requiring the use of a more robustly-designed  package type, called a 
Type C package, for certain high-activity  shipments transported by aircraft.  Type C package  designs 
will require unilateral Competent Authority approval  unless they contain fissile  material which  requires 
multilateral  approval by all the countries through or into which the consignment travels. 

2.1.3 Packaging requirements for  Uranium Hexafluoride 
Specific  regulatory provisions for the transport of uranium hexafluoride  (UF6) have been adopted. The 
decision to draft  regulations for  a specific  material reflects  the importance of UF6 within the nuclear 
fuel  cycle, the very  large quantities being shipped and the peculiar physical and chemical properties of 
the material. The testing package requirements are presented  in Appendix I. 

The hazard of unenriched  UF6 in transport  is largely chemical rather than radiological. One particular 
package  is widely used for this transport, the 48Y bare cylinder carrying about  12 tons of UF6. The 
new IAEA  Regulations contain stricter requirements for such packages, especially concerning the 
thermal behaviour of the package in order to prevent dangerous pressure build-up  in the event of 
severe fires. 

2.1.4 Nuclear criticality safety 
Changes have been made to the types of  radioactive material which are also classified  as fissile 
material, and to the way in which packages containing fissile  material are tested, assessed and  labelled. 
Specific  requirements  for the carriage of fissile  material by air and for packages containing  fissile 
uranium  hexafluoride  have also been  introduced. 

2.1.5  Administrative arrangements 

Creating two package indexes 
The transport  index (TI), previously used for both radiation protection and criticality control purposes, 
has been simplified  and is now used for radiation protection purposes only.  It continues to be based on 
the radiation  level at  1  m from  the surface  of the package. 

A new  index, the criticality  safety  index (CSI), controls the accumulation  of packages containing  fissile 
material and  is based on the allowable number of packages that can be transported together.  Separation 
of the two indices will "allow shipments to be controlled on the basis of the specific  value which  is of 
concern. The changes  introduce clarity which should improve compliance with the regulations. 

17 

New UN numbers 
The primary purpose of displaying United Nations numbers on packages, and on conveyances when 
appropriate, is to key into emergency response procedures  in a language-independent  way. It was  felt 
that an expanded set of UN numbers would help provide emergency workers with more  specific 
response guidance. 

Under the new system, a UN number is assigned to each of the  14 Schedules appended to the 
Regulations, with an additional set of numbers for packages containing fissile  material. UN numbers 
are retained  for uranium hexafluoride  because of its importance as a commercial  substance and its 
subsidiary (corrosive) risk. The new UN numbers will facilitate  more specific  emergency  response 
procedures and help with compliance checks and controls through a numerical  link with the  Schedules 
to the Regulations. 

Adoption of the IAEA regulations 
The  1996 edition of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material will be 
incorporated  into the modal agreements and conventions governing the transport of radioactive 
material  internationally  and into the national regulations of individual states. Efforts  are being made at 
international  level to have a uniform  implementation  date for this of  January  1st 2001. A number of 
changes to the way fissile  material  is dealt with, particularly, the introduction  of a criticality  safety 
index, makes it important that the date of entry into force  of the IAEA Regulations  is harmonised  for 
international movements. In addition, a single date for all transport modes has been  strongly 
recommended  since it is difficult  to see how operators undertaking multi-modal  international 
movements would cope without a simultaneous transition  from  the  1985 to the  1996 Regulations  in all 
modes. 

Transitional  arrangements will be introduced for the approval of package designs.  In particular, 
packages manufactured  to designs approved under either the  1973 or the  1985 IAEA Regulations may 
continue to be used subject to certain conditions and to the agreement of the Competent Authorities. 

All other requirements such as those related to the air transport of Type C packages or packages 
containing  fissile  material, will take effect  immediately upon  implementation. 

2.2 

The IAEA Co-ordinated Research Programmes 

In order to facilitate  information  exchange and to increase international  co-operation  in areas where 
research  is needed, the IAEA has initiated a number of co-ordinated research programmes (CRPs). 
Member states of the European Union have been actively  involved, often  with financial support  from 
the Community  budget,. 

2.2.1  Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) 
A co-ordinated  research programme has been undertaken to develop accurate, validated  analytical 
codes for calculating the thermal response of standard shipping cylinders containing UF6. The results 
of the CRP are expected to aid the determination  of whether the bare cylinders, particularly the 48Y, 
can successfully  pass the regulatory thermal test. 

The Co-ordinated  Research  Programme will probably  reach completion  in  1998. Important  progress 
has already been reported about the modelling of the thermal behaviour of UF6 and of the associated 
internal pressure build up and packaging behaviour.  Of particular  importance are the results of the 
Franco-Japanese "Tenerife" programme, being carried out in France with partial support  from  the 
European  Union and combining  large-scale experiments and analytical modelling. 

2.2.2  LSA/SCO 
The packaging and transport requirements  for Low Specific  Activity (LSA) material  and  Surface 
Contaminated  Objects  (SCO) were of great interest to a number of Member States during the  1996 
revision  cycle. 

18 

The IAEA  is initiating a Co-ordinated Research Programme entitled "development  of a radiological 
basis for the transport safety  requirements for  low specific  activity materials and surface  contaminated 
objects" in order to develop a dose-based  approach to requirements.  Member States of the'EU are 
involved and their contributions will be largely based on Community-financed  work. 

2.2.3 Accident  severity at sea 

A Co-ordinated  Research Programme entitled "Accident severity at sea during transport of radioactive 
material" has been set up to address the consistency of IAEA test requirements with real accidents. 
This arose from  concern expressed at the IMO as to whether the IAEA regulatory tests are as severe as 
real maritime accidents, and whether, therefore,  radioactive material might be released as a result of 
package failure. A number of  Member States of the EU are involved and common  studies are 
supported by the Community  budget. 

At the first research coordination  meeting, held in Vienna in November  1995, the participants 
presented existing and planned studies on this subject,  covering topics such as the probabilistic 
assessment  of accidents at sea (mainly fires and collisions), fire scenarios on board dedicated  ships, fire 
modelling, shipboard fire tests with simulated transport packages and the radiological  consequences of 
a release of radioactive material. 

A specialist meeting was held  in May  1996 in Cologne to consider in some detail several categories of 
accidents and to establish probabilities of events. 

The second research coordination meeting took place in  September  1997 at Sandia National 
Laboratories - Albuquerque. The new studies performed  by individual EU Member States as part of the 
CRP were presented and  discussed. 

The CRP should be completed by about  1998, at which time a final report should be available. 

2.2.4  Air  Transport 

Type C package tests were developed using data from  various sources on the severity and frequency  of 
aircraft  accidents. To support and update these studies, the IAEA is initiating a Co-ordinated  Research 
Programme entitled "Accident  Severity During Air Transport of Radioactive Material."  It will actively 
seek the participation  of the International  Civil Aviation Organization  and it is expected that  member 
states of the EU will play a significant  role in the programme. 

2.3 

Developments in the European  Community 

At European Community  level, the technical requirements for the safe transport of radioactive  material 
are implemented via two legislative instruments: 

• 

"• 

the Council Directive  laying down the basic safety  standards for the protection  of the health of 
workers and the general public against the.dangers arising from  ionising radiation  (The Basic 
Safety  Standards or BSS) derived  from  the Treaty establishing the European  Atomic  Energy 
Community commonly referred  to as the EURATOM  Treaty. 

the framework  Council Directives on the approximation  of the laws of the Member  States 
with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by road and rail based on Article 75 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (EC). 

2.3.1  Basic Safety  Standards 

Radiation  protection aims principally to protect the public and workers against the harmful  effects  of 
ionising radiation. The International  Commission  on Radiological  Protection (ICRP) founded  in  1928, 
lay down the primary rules and principles governing radiation protection. The recommendations  of the 
ICRP are revised  periodically to take account of scientific  progress in this  field.  The current general 
recommendations  of the ICRP were laid down in  1990 (ICRP-60). On the basis of tkese 
recommendations the European  Commission  initiated the process of revising the Basic  Safety 
Standards Directive. 

19 

On  13 May  1996, the European  Community (EC) adopted Directive 96/29/EURATOM.9 This 
Directive  is to be transposed within four years (by  13 May 2000) into national  law in each Member 
State of the European  Union. The European  Community has the general and exclusive competence to 
adopt basic safety  standards in the field of radiation protection. Member States have an executive 
power to adopt and implement the necessary measures in this field within the framework  of the 
standards laid down at Community  level. 

Title II, Article 2 (a) of Council Directive 96/29/EUR adopting the Basic Safety  Standards  stipulates 
that all practices which  involve risks from  ionising radiation as the result of the production,  handling, 
use, holding, storage, transport,  import to and export from  the Community and disposal of radioactive 
substances must be subject to a regime of reporting and prior  authorisation. 

Although the IAEA transport regulations (ST-1) are based on the IAEA's own Basic Safety  Standards10 
there are no incompatibilities with the Council Directive on Basic Safety  Standards in respect of 
transport. 

Two shipment control procedures, directly derived from  the Basic Safety  Standards, have been 
introduced  for the purpose of supervising transfers  between Member States and imports into and 
exports from  the Community.  Under these procedures, the Member States, including transit States, are 
informed,  made aware and express their prior written consent before  the movement or shipment can 
take place.  The procedures are laid down in: 

•  Council Directive 92/3/EUR" of 3 February  1992 on the supervision  and control of 
shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the 
Community supplemented  by the Commission Decision12 of  1  October  1993 establishing 
the corresponding standard document. This procedure was derived  from  the  1980 version 
of the Basic Safety  Standards and is currently being considered for  revision; 

•  Council Regulation  1493/93/EUR13 of 8 June  1993 on shipments of radioactive  substances 

between Member States. 

The Basic Safety  Standards and the shipment procedures require the Member States to adopt a strict 
regime of regulatory control.  The application  by the Member States of a uniform  control regime is 
fundamental  to the harmonisation  of transport practices in the European  Union. 

2.3.2  Community Framework Directives 
In order to harmonise the different  sets of rules on the transport of dangerous goods, and to ensure not 
only a high level of safety  in the Community but also the smooth operation of the European  Single 
market, "framework  directives" have been introduced,  implementing the same technical  safety 
standards at international  and national  level. The legal basis for this is Article 75 of the EC Treaty. 

Two  Council  directives  have  transposed  into  European  law  the  technical  annexes  of  the  ADR 
(European  Agreement  concerning  the  International  Carriage  of Dangerous  Goods by Road)  (Directive 
94/55/EC  of  21  November  199414),  and  RID  (Regulations  concerning  the  International  Carriage  of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail) (Directive  96/49/EC of 23 July  199615).  These technical annexes reflect  the 
IAEA transport regulations for radioactive material  in class 7 of the dangerous goods  classification. 

As a further  harmonisation  measure the Commission  has adopted a proposal  for  a Council Directive on 
the approximation  of the laws of the Member  States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by 
vessels on  inland waterways (COM(97) 367 final)). 

9  OJ  L  159 of 29 June  1996, p. 1 
10  IAEA-Safety  Series No.  115-1 - International  Basic Safety  Standards for the protection  against 
Ionising  Radiation  and for the Safety  of Radiation  Sources  1996 edition 
11  OJ  L 35 of  12 February  1992, p.24 
12  OJ  L 268 of 29 October  1993, p. 83 
13  OJ  L  148 of  19 June  1993, p. 1 
14  OJ  L 319 of  12 December  1994, p. 7 
15  OJ  L 235 of  17 September  1996, p. 25 

lo 

2.3.3  Directive on Controls 
Controls are no longer carried out at the internal frontiers  of the European Union, their  elimination 
being part of the process of establishing the European  internal market;  however,  compensatory 
measures are necessary.  One such led to the adoption  of Directive 95/50/EC of 6 October  1995 on 
uniform  procedures for checks on dangerous goods being transported  by road. 

The checks must be carried out in accordance with a specified  checklist and must be completed within 
a reasonable period of time.  Samples may be taken during the checks. Certain  infringements,  listed in 
an Annex to the Directive, result in the journey not being permitted to continue or the vehicle being 
refused  entry  into the European  Community. 

The authorities of the Member States are required to assist one another.  Information  on the checks is 
exchanged  and Member States send an annual report, also specified  in an Annex to the Directive, to the 
Commission. 

2.3.4  Driver Training 
The training of drivers of vehicles carrying dangerous goods, including radioactive substances, was 
improved and harmonised on  1  January  1997.  Drivers of vehicles subject to registration  now have to 
follow  a basic  18 hour training course.  Those drivers planning to transport radioactive substances in 
class 7 not in excepted packages must also attend an additional eight hour course.  (This latter 
requirement does not apply to drivers transporting radioactive substances solely in Type A packages, if 
the total number of packages containing radioactive substances  in the vehicle does not exceed  10 and 
the sum of the transport indices does not exceed three. In this case appropriate training must be 
provided by the  employer.) 

After  passing an examination drivers are issued with what is known as an ADR certificate;  this is 
mutually recognised  in all ADR States for trans-frontier  transport operations, and in Member States of 
the European Union for national transport operations. 

* 

2.4  Developments at the IMO 
The Code for the safe carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium  and high-level radioactive wastes 
in flasks  on board ships (INF Code)16 was adopted by the  18th Assembly of the International  Maritime 
Organization  (IMO) in November  1993 as a voluntary  Code of Practice,for  application  by IMO 
Member  States. The INF Code applies in addition to the applicable IAEA Transport Regulations and 
the requirements  of Class 7 of the International  Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. It covers 
principally matters of ship design, construction  and  equipment. 

The Assembly also requested the Organization's Maritime Safety  Committee and Marine  Environment 
Protection  Committee, in consultation  with  IAEA, to keep the Code under regular review  and amend it 
as necessary. These committees are currently discussing the subjects  of emergency response, 
notification  provided to coastal states, routing of ships carrying  INF materials, and liability regimes. 

The IMO is considering making both the INF Code and the IMDG Code mandatory. 

16 Resolution  A748(18):  Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear  Fuel, Plutonium  and High-
Level Radioactive  Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships. 

A 

3  MAJOR ISSUES AND CONCERNS 

3.1 Regulatory Issues arising from the 1996 edition of the IAEA  regulations 

3.1.1  Radiation Protection  Programmes 

Radiation protection programmes help optimise radiation protection. They provide a structured  and 
systematic approach to keeping the magnitude of individual doses, the numbers of persons exposed 
and the risk of exposure as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social  factors  being taken  into 
account. 

Transport comprises all operations and conditions associated with and  involved  in the movement of 
radioactive materials. Radiation protection measures need to be considered  at all stages from  design to 
final receipt of  shipments of radioactive materials. All transport operations have a potential  impact on 
the radiation  exposure of workers and members of the public. Co-operation  between  all those  involved 
will enhance safety  in the transport of radioactive materials. 

Radiation protection programmes (RPPs) will cover many areas of transport but particular attention 
must be given to package preparation  and the arrangements for moving radioactive  materials, since 
members of the public may be in close proximity to such materials during transport.  Moving  involves 
consignors, carriers and consignees:  all are required to co-operate  in ensuring the safe transport of 
radioactive materials. The type of measures to be employed  in RPPs will depend upon the magnitude 
and likelihood  of exposures involved. Many programmes will be small but operations which have the 
potential for significant  exposures can be expected to be the subject  of extensive programmes. 

The elements of a documented  RPP will include :-

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

roles and responsibilities of managers and workers, 

radiation dose evaluation  and comparison  with good practice, 

emergency response, 

training, and 

information. 

Radiation Protection Programmes have an important role to play  in keeping the radiation exposures of 
workers and members of the public as low as reasonably  achievable. 

3.1.2  Exemption  Values 

The principles and methods for establishing exemption  values have been published by the European 
Commission  17 and endorsed by the International AtomicEnergy Agency's Basic Safety  Standards and 
Euratom  96/29. These documents contain, for all practices, radionuclide-specific  activity and activity 
concentration values below which reporting is not required. 

But the BSS approach, which  leads to radionuclide-specific  exemption values, is not compatible with a 
single activity figure such as the 70 kBq/kg used  in the current transport regulations.  A preliminary 
study was therefore  undertaken to examine the relevance of the BSS exemption  values to the transport 
regulations.  Because no specific  transport scenarios were considered  in the methodology  used by the 
BSS, this study took  into account relevant transport scenarios for selected radionuclides  in order to 
derive transport-specific  exemption values using the same basic radiological  dose criteria. 

17 Principles and Methods for Establishing Concentrations and Quantities (Exemption  values) Below 
which  Reporting is not Required  in the European  Directive.  Radiation  Protection  65. M Harvey, S 
Mobbs, J Cooper, A M Chapuis, A Sugier, T Scneider, J Lochard and A Janssens.  Commission  of the 
European  Communities  1993 

Most results were close to the BSS values and all were within two orders of magnitude. Such a range 
was considered  insufficient  to establish transport-specific  exemption  values different  from  those of the 
BSS. Because of the general agreement between the transport-specific  exemption  values and those of 
the BSS, it was considered reasonable to adopt, in the  1996 edition of the Transport Regulations, the 
BSS exemption  values below which the transport regulation  would not apply. The activity 
concentration  values are applied to a package or, where the material  is unpackaged, to a conveyance: 
for operational convenience, the total activity restrictions are applied to the consignment.  Possible 
problems in the implementation  of the new exemption  values are being examined  in a Community-
financed study. 

3.1.3  Air  Transport 

One of the major  changes in the  1996 edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations was the  introduction 
of much more stringent safety  requirements for the air transport of large quantities of radioactive 
materials.  The Type C package and a new material standard, Low Dispersible  Material (LDM),  for 
material carried  in Type B packages have been  introduced. 

The Type C Package. 

The Type C package testing requirements are detailed  in Appendix I. 

One of the very stringent test conditions  for Type C packages is a 90 Ws  impact onto an unyielding 
surface.  The impact speed has been intensively  discussed  during the IAEA revision process since 
1988.  The value of 90 m/s was derived from  studies in France (1989), the UK (1980) and the USA 
(1990) on accident-impact probabilities based on the best accident data available at the time. 
Discussion  of these studies showed that a range of equivalent, perpendicular  impact velocities from  85 
m/s to  100 m/s onto an unyielding target covered approximately 90-95% of all severe  aircraft 
accidents.  Beyond this range, even large increases in impact test velocity produce relatively  small 
improvements  in safety.  In practice, it was noted that such impact velocities onto an unyielding target 
covered a much  larger range of impact airspeeds due to mitigating factors  such as: target hardness, 
impact angle, energy absorbed by the conveyance and the over-performance  and subsequent  'graceful 
failure'  of real packages designed to IAEA standards. 

During this process, note was also taken of the US domestic regulation NUREG  - 0360 and the criteria 
for aircraft  flight  data recorders. There was recognition that NUREG-0360  is more stringent  in terms of 
packaging performance  than the requirements contained  in the IAEA Regulations. However, NUREG-
0360 produces  little gain in risk reduction  above that provided by the IAEA standards.  It should  also 
be noted that NUREG-0360  applies only to plutonium  whereas the IAEA standards apply to all 
radionuclides. 

No direct comparison  of the impact speed test criteria for a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a Type C 
package can be made.  Although both testing regimes are extremely  onerous they are designed  for 
different  purposes and have different  pass/fail  criteria.  Moreover, the Type C tests establish  a standard 
which  is consistent for every size and mass of package whereas the FDR tests do not. 

Low dispersible  material  (LDM) 

Since the primary  hazards being addressed  in Type C requirements are dispersion  and radiation  levels, 
provisions  have been made for materials which exhibit limited dispersibility, solubility, and radiation 
levels. These provisions are contained  in a material category known  as "low dispersible  material" 
(LDM). For radioactive material to qualify  as LDM, the radiation  level of the unpackaged  material 
must be below a given value and the airborne release of radioactive material  in gaseous or particulate 
form  following  the same severe test conditions on the material  itself as would be applied to a Type C 
package (impact and thermal test) must also be limited. 

23 

In addition, a leaching test which takes into account the damaging effects  of the impact and thermal 
tests on the radioactive material must also lead to limited dissolved aqueous activity. Materials which 
meet these stringent LDM requirements would not require Type C packaging and could therefore  be 
transported  in a Type B package. The test requirements for LDM material are included  in the IAEA 
regulations and summarised  in Appendix  I. Multilateral Competent Authority  approval  of the design  of 
the LDM is required. 

3.1.4  LSA/SCO 

In the course of the revision of the IAEA regulations  it was recognised that the regulatory 
requirements and corresponding justifications  for the shipment of Low Specific  Activity  (LSA) 
materials and for  Surface  Contaminated  Objects (SCO) should be reviewed and possibly  modified. 
Such materials are mostly radioactive wastes and radioactive materials from  the decommissioning  of 
nuclear facilities.  The current requirements were drawn up in the  1970s, since when  substantial 
changes have taken place in the characteristics of radioactive wastes.  It was therefore  concluded that 
the radiological  considerations on which the current requirements are based needed a critical review. 

In an initial feasibility  study in  1994, funded  by the Community, a tentative new system of 
requirements for LSA/SCO materials was developed by European experts. New material classes based 
on a comprehensive radiological  consequence model were defined  with the aim of  facilitating 
compliance with regulatory requirements. 

In order to achieve further  progress and to promote a harmonised  input from  the EU to the IAEA Co 
ordinated Research Programmes, one of the Community-funded  projects  evaluates the practicability, 
benefits  and possible drawbacks of the recently-proposed  new system. The ongoing  IAEA-CRP work 
uses the radwaste data bases of three EU participating countries. 

3.2 Other Issues and Concerns 

3.2.1  Perceived and Actual Risks 
Each year several million packages containing radioactive materials are safely  transported  in Member 
States. Most of these shipments are for medical and general  industrial use, only a small fraction  being 
associated with the nuclear fuel  cycle. Transport regulations  require that packages have built-in  safety 
features  such that in the event of an accident the consequences are limited. Additionally the 
conveyance must  comply with set criteria and the driver of a road vehicle must have adequate training 
including response  in the event of an emergency. 

Accidents and incidents occur during transport, and considerable attention  is devoted to those 
involving radioactive materials, particularly nuclear fuel  cycle materials. Studies of events in Member 
States18 have shown that  releases of radioactive material are rare and the radiological  consequences are 
fairly  insignificant.  However, major  radiation exposures have been suffered  by  industrial 
radiographers who have failed  to correctly package their source prior to driving to another  location. 
Improved training has done much to reduce the number of such events. 

The routing of shipments depends upon operational and, where relevant, physical  protection 
considerations  . In some cases it is necessary to notify  and/or seek the approval  of the authorities  for 
shipments through  or into their country. 

All modes of transport are covered  by regulations and the safety  record is excellent. Accidents do 
occur but the consequences are limited by design and by operational  procedures. 

18 Review, Analysis and Report on the Radiological  Consequences Resulting from  Accidents and 
Incidents  involving Radioactive Materials during Transport  in the Period  1975-1986 by and within 
Member States of the European  Communities. J. Lombard, C Ringot, E. Tomachevsky, J. S. Hughes 
and K. B Shaw.  EUR  12768 EN. Commission  of the European Communities  1990. 

24-

However,  lessons must be learnt from  transport  incidents and accidents in order to avoid a repetition  or 
a worse event. Minor events have their significance  and may be the precursor to more serious  incidents 
or accidents. The Standing Working Group, which meets with the Competent Authorities, the IAEA 
and (on request) industry, has regular exchanges of information  on events which have occurred in 
transport. 

The Competent Authorities should periodically assess the consequences of transport accidents. 
Emergency planning by the Competent Authorities and other responsible authorities, such as the public 
health and safety  organisations, should take account of these assessments. To facilitate  this process, the 
IAEA has published recommendations on emergency response planning for transport  accidents 
involving radioactive material19. This set of recommendations  is currently under  revision. 

Emergencies will occur and it is important to obtain accurate information  on the consequences of the 
event. In order to grade the importance of such incidents and accidents, the Commission  has started 
contract work on developing an event severity scale for transport events,20 consistent with the existing 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) which  is widely accepted  and regularly applied to fixed 
installations21. 

3.2.2  Technical Assistance  and Industrial  Co-operation with CEEC and NIS 

The programme for technical assistance to the New Independent  States (NIS) involves two contracts in 
the field of nuclear transport safety  which were started in  1995: first, an engineering assessment  of the 
proposed  improvement to the container for transporting VVER spent fuel;  secondly, a general 
assessment  of the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel  in the NIS. 

The objective  is not only to make valid proposals to improve safety  but also to create a climate of 
mutual co-operation  on technical matters between highly-specialised technical support  organisations. 

Under the PHARE (Assistance for Economic Restructuring  in the Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth  of Independent  States) programmes, 
the EU continues to provide the CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) and the NIS with 
technical assistance to improve their nuclear safety.  In addition, the Commission  intends to set up a 
framework  for  industrial co-operation  with those countries. 

The scope of industrial co-operation  is very broad and covers the needs of the transport  industry 
operating  in the nuclear fuel  cycle in Eastern countries. Industrial co-operation  on the transport of 
radioactive material could  lead to the development of pilot projects  as a basis for broader  co-operation. 

With the public call for tenders  launched in May  I996,22 an official  appeal was made to the transport 
industry to make a start on the above schemes.  However, no suitable proposals were received and a 
renewed appeal should  be issued along with any future  call for tenders. 

3.2.3  Quality Assurance 

For packages requiring Competent Authority approval and certification,  approval will not be granted 
unless there are adequate quality assurance programmes for package design, testing, manufacture,  use, 
maintenance  and transport. This is a well-established  practice in all Member States and accounts  for 
the high quality performance  of the packages currently  in use.  For packages not requiring  Competent 
Authority  approval, quality assurance programmes are still necessary  and the Competent  Authority 
may check their adequacy  by carrying out periodic compliance audits or using other  appropriate 
compliance assurance methods. 

19 Safety  Series No. 87 'Emergency  Response Planning and Preparedness for Transport  Accidents 
Involving Radioactive Material' - IAEA, Vienna -  1988 
20 Contract work started by 'National  Radiological Protection  Board'  in  1997 with  financial 
contribution  of the Community. 
21 INES: The International Nuclear Event Scale IAEA Vienna  1992 
22 OJ  C  136 of 8 May  1996, p. 16 

2£ 

In principle, all aspects of the activities relating to the safe transport of radioactive material should be 
covered by a quality assurance programme. The IAEA has published two booklets23,24 to provide 
guidance on quality and compliance assurance programmes. When an incident occurs it is necessary to 
review the conclusions of the analysis together with all the documents governing the transport practice, 
including standards, rules, regulations, the quality assurance programmes and the various  operational 
procedures. 

However, even a single transport operation may  involve several different  organisations and it is 
unlikely that the operation will be covered by a single quality assurance programme. The following  are 
relevant : 

• 

• 

• 

• 

the designer(s) of the package; 

the manufacturer  of the package and the laboratory which tests it; 

the user of the package in relation to its different  applications, 

the carrier who makes use of different  transport organisations and  infrastructures. 

Quality assurance programmes are tailored to fit specific  organisational structures, and an analysis of 
an incident or accident  in relation to the different  quality assurance programmes can be extremely 
complicated.  The Commission's  Standing Working Group gives particular attention to this aspect with 
a view to sharing information  with other Member States for their mutual  benefit. 

3.2.4 Illicit Cross-border Movements of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources 
When the Commission first decided to address the issue of illicit cross-border movements, a dual 
approach was necessary: one for the illicit trafficking  of nuclear material and the other for the 
inadvertent movement  of radioactive sources. 

Competent Authorities for the safe transport of radioactive material  in the different  Member States do 
not necessarily have the major  responsibility  since this lies, in the first area, with the authorities 
concerned with physical protection/safeguards and, in the second, with those responsible  for 
authorisation.  Nevertheless, transport authorities are very often  the first to be involved  if illicit or 
inadvertent movements are discovered. Consequently, and because these activities often  affect  several 
countries, the issue is frequently  addressed at meetings of the Standing Working Group. 

With regard to the illicit trafficking  in nuclear materials, the Commission participates  in Interagency 
Co-ordination  Meetings organised by the IAEA on prevention, detection  and response measures, in 
close cooperation with the transport organisations (ICAO, IMO), the Dangerous Goods Transport (rail 
and road) Division of the UN Economic Commission  for  Europe, the World Customs  Organisations 
and Interpol and Europol.  The principal aim of the meetings  is to exchange  information  and to  identify 
any necessary  further  action.. 

The Commission  is funding  a detection and monitoring  feasibility  study, to help prevent me illicit 
trafficking  of nuclear material and radioactive sources at sea ports in the EU Member States. The 
outcome  of the study will be presented to the Ship/Shore  Interface  sub-committee of IMO which has 
shown particular  interest. 

Measures to help prevent  illicit cross-border movements of radioactive material are still on the agenda 
of the Standing  Working Group. In particular,  it is involved with  identification,  detection  and response 
measures. It will continue to support further  action where this is justified  if additional  resources 
become available  in the coming years. 

23 Safety  Practice No.  113 on  'Quality Assurances  for the Safe Transport of Radioactive  Material' 
IAEA, Vienna-  1994 
24 Safety  Practice No  112 on Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of Radioactive  Material 
IAEA Vienna  1994 

2Jo 

4. 

ACTIVITIES  OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMISSION'S 
STANDING  WORKING GROUP 

Past activities 

4.1 
A number of projects associated with the safe transport of radioactive material have been completed in 
recent years for the Commission.  In some cases they were either feasibility  studies or the initial phases 
of  more extensive  projects. 

The work covered  some of the aspects of transport from  design to final receipt of the material.  The 
depth of the projects was often  limited by the scale of the work funded.  However these studies did 
provide useful  information  to Member States, the IAEA and the Commission. 

For example, the transport events occurring in Member States over a ten year period were reviewed 
and analysed. The report concluded that the reporting of data on events was most comprehensive  in the 
nuclear industry  and that there had been no major  health consequences. In all of the accidents or 
incidents  reviewed  in the study  it was shown  that packages conforming  to regulatory  standards 
provided adequate protection. 

Another project  involved drawing up a handbook  25 of emergency arrangements  in Member States, 
including details of systems, contacts and the emergency equipment available. 

4.2  Current programme 
A plan of action for the further  development of transport studies has been established  by the 
Commission. The programme  is divided  into seven areas : 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

functioning  of the single market and the need for  harmonisation, 

assessment of the implementation  of the regulations, 

revision of transport regulations, 

investigation  of transport events, 

transport emergency  arrangements, 

assistance to the CEEC and NIS, and 

information  and communication  with the public. 

Work  is already under way on the first four of these areas.  Care needs to be taken that the other two 
are not neglected  in future  programmes. The Commission  is providing financing  for 24 projects  being 
carried out within various organisations  in the Member  States. There is extensive co-operation  between 
Member  States, and the projects  concerned are listed  in Table I. 

In  1996, with the reopening of the budget heading "Transport  of radioactive material  in the European 
Union", the Commission  organised a public invitation to tender in accordance with the budget heading ' 
description given by the European  Parliament.  As a result of this invitation to tender, the Commission 
received 43 proposals.  Once the proposals had been assessed by the Commission, the  Standing 
Working Group was asked for  its opinion on ranking of the proposals as of first and second  priority. 
Within the constraints of the budget, all  15 first priority proposals and 3 proposals of second  priority 
were the subject  of contracts awarded  in  1996 (see Table  1).  Additional funding  in the  1997 budget 
was made available to cover the remaining second priority proposals together with six additional 
projects.. 

25 Handbook  for the CEC Database on Transport Emergencies  Involving Radioactive Materials.  J S 
Hughes, 
October  1992. 

J Lombard, F Mathieu  and K B Shaw.  Commission  of the European  Communities. 

1\ 

Many of the proposals could lead to harmonisation  of the regulations within the EU based on the  1996 
edition of the IAEA transport regulations. 

At the second meeting of the IAEA's Transport  Safety  Standards Advisory Committee (TRANSSAC) 
in March  1997, the initiative to fund  the Commission's activities in the field of the safe transport of 
radioactive materials was welcomed and their valuable contribution to the ongoing process of revising 
the IAEA regulations was recognised.  However, a number of EU Member States noted that these 
efforts  will require continuous and regular funding  over the next few years to cover all areas of the 
programme and to build on the  initial phases of the longer-term  projects. 

4.3 

Future  work 

Transport arrangements reflect  developments  in many different  areas, for example materials, processes, 
conveyances and protection principles.  To take sufficient  account of such changes there must be an 
ongoing Community transport programme subject to periodic review. A number of the current  projects 
are initial phases of longer-term  studies aimed at major  improvements  in transport requirements and 
systems. 

IAEA transport regulations are adopted world-wide for all modes of transport: they have been  subject 
to periodic revision since the first edition  in  1961. The current edition of these  regulations was 
published  in  1996 : the next edition will contain  improvements developed during the new revision 
cycle. Input to the revision process must be supported by adequate justification  including relevant 
technical studies. For example, it is widely accepted that there is room for  improvement  in the 
requirements for Low Specific  Activity materials and Surface  Contaminated Objects.  To enable the 
EU to contribute fully-developed  proposals for  improving transport requirements, it is essential to have 
an adequate programme of studies covering a number of years. 

A further  example concerns the qualification  methods for Low Dispersible Material (LDM). According 
to the Regulations, approval of LDM has to be on a bilateral or multilateral basis.  It is therefore  vital 
that the parties concerned work together, economising development efforts  and promoting  co-operation 
at an early stage between various institutions of Member States of the EU, including  Competent 
Authorities and test facilities.  This has already been  initiated by the Commission through a pilot 
project to develop test procedures to qualify  radioactive materials as LDM. Because of the high  level 
of effort  required to develop and conduct the tests, it seems probable that a common approach and 
possibly a common test facility  will have to be developed within the European  Union. This is a  further 
area were the Commission could support and promote collaboration  among Member States. 

Transport studies are also important  in other respects, for example in providing  information  on  lessons 
learnt. Accidents and incidents occur during transport and  such information  may help to avoid  similar 
events elsewhere. Information  and communication  on transport safety  are important and  information 
on the consequences of transport operations can improve public perception. The periodic assessment of 
radiation  doses due to the transport of radioactive material within the EU (ST-1, para 304) should be 
encouraged.  This would produce an overall picture of the situation within the EU and justify  the 
existing regulations or, alternatively, reveal the need for further  regulatory action. 

Special attention  should be given to projects to improve transport safety  by implementing the  1996 
edition of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material  in the CEEC and NIS. 

2K 

APPENDIX I:  SUMMARY OF TESTING REQUIREMENTS 

Type C Packages. 
The appropriate tests are: 

• 

• 

• 

those applicable to Type B(U) packages and, if appropriate, packages for  fissile  materials (see 
the third report for details); 

a puncture/tearing test in which either a truncated cone-shaped probe  is dropped 3 metres onto 
the package or the package is dropped onto the probe, depending on the mass of the package 
specimen; 

an enhanced thermal test, with the same technical specifications  as the Type B package 
thermal test but lasting 60 minutes; 

• 

a 200 m water immersion test; 

and an impact speed of 90 m/s for the "drop" test onto an unyielding target, angling it in such a way as 
to cause maximum  damage to the package. 

Uranium Hexafluoride. 

Packages :-

•  must withstand an internal test pressure of at least  1.4 MPa, but cylinders with a test pressure 

less than 2.8 MPa require multilateral  approval; 

•  must withstand the "Type A" drop test, with graduated heights frorn  0.3 to  1.2 m, depending 

on package mass; 

• 

• 

designed to contain 0.1 kg or more but less than 9 000 kg of UF6 must meet the "Type B" 
thermal test of 800 C for 30 minutes; 

designed to contain 9 000 kg or more must either meet the thermal test requirements or have 
multilateral  approval; 

Furthermore, packages containing fissile UF6 must meet the test conditions applicable to  fissile 
packages ("Type  B" impact and thermal tests) with no contact between the valve and other normally 
non-contacting parts of the packaging.  There must be no leakage from  the valve, and the package must 
meet other operational requirements before the designer can assume it is watertight  for the purposes of 
the safety  analysis. 

Low Dispersible Material (LDM) 

The total amount of low dispersible material  in a package is limited so that the  radiation  level 
at 3 m from  the unshielded  radioactive material must not exceed  10 mSv/h. 

Following the Type C impact test and enhanced thermal test, the airborne release in gaseous 
and particulate  forms (up to  100 micro meter aerodynamic equivalent  diameter) must not 
exceed  100 times the radionuclide-specific  A: values. 

In addition, following  a leaching (solubility) test consisting of immersion  in water for  seven 
days, activity  in the water should not exceed  100 A;.  When applying this test, the damaging 
effects  of the tests specified  in the second paragraph above must be taken  into account. 

Furthermore, a package containing Low Dispersible radioactive Material must be so designed 
that any  features  added to the Low Dispersible radioactive  Material which are not part of it, or 
any internal components of the packaging, does not adversely affect  the performance  of the 
Low Dispersible radioactive  Material. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

1°\ 

to 
0 

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR ENERGY - DG XVII 
STUDIES ON THE TRANSPORT  OF RADIOACTIVE  MATERIALS -1996 /  1997 
Table 1 :  CURRENT PROJECTS  receiving a Community  financial  contribution / subvention 

Contract 
B4-1020/D/96-... 

001 

002 

003 

004 

005 

006 

007 

Evaluation  of the safety  of vitrified  high  level waste shipments from  the UK to continental  Europe by sea 

Assessment of the radiological  risks from  transport accidents  involving Type A Packages 

Development of evaluation  methods for the qualification  of Low Dispersible Material  (LDM) 

Safety  assessment of Leaktightness Criteria  for  Radioactive  Material Transport  Packages: studies of seal stability  and performance  under 
thermal aging processes and resulting potential  for material  leakage 

Examination  of the existing transport emergency arrangements  in the Member States and  the discussion  of the benefits  which  result 

Further development of radiological  criteria and requirements for the transport of LSA and  SCO material 

Feasibility  study on detection  and  monitoring  systems and procedures to prevent  illicit trafficking  of radioactive and  fissile  material  at sea ports 
in the EU Member  States 

008 

Practical  implication  of the adoption  of exemption  values  in transport 

u> 

DIRECTORATE  GENERAL  OF ENERGY - DG XVII 
STUDIES  ON TRANSPORT  OF RADIOACTIVE  MATERIALS  -1996 

Contract 
B4-1020/D/96 

I M LL 

009 

010 

011 

012 

013 

014 

015 

016 

017 

018 

Surveys on the events during  transport 

Development  of an event severity scale for  incidents/accidents 

Harmonisation of methods for the nuclear criticality  safety  evaluation  of transport  packages 

Qualification  experiments on the release behaviour of LSA material  in accident  conditions  with  mechanical  impact 

Evaluation  of external  radiation  levels from  transport packages to the quantities and units specified  by  ICRP and  ICRU, and  in relation  to the 
Basic Safety  Standards of the EU 

Evaluation  of the radiation  protection  options related to the Low Weight  Packages - category  III yellow 

Segregation  of packages during  transport 

Evaluation  of codes for  Analysing the Drop Test  Performance  of Radioactive  Material Transport  Containers 

Evaluation  of safety  of casks  impacting different  kinds of targets - Real Target  Impact  Studies 

Harmonisation  of the Qualification  of Procedures and  Personnel  (Guide of practice evaluation  of events) 

CM 

Contract 
B4-1020/D/97-... 

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF ENERGY - DG XVII 
STUDIES ON TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS -1997 

001 

002 

003 

004 

005 

006 

Harmonisierung der Methoden  zur Bewertung der Verpackungssicherheit  in Ubereinstimmung  mit den  Vorschriften 

Risk Assessment  for the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel  in the NIS 

Evaluation  of the Situation  in the EC as regards Safety  in the Transport of Radioactive  Material  and the Prospects for the Development  of such 
type of transport 

Emergency arrangements  in the area of transport 

Harmonisation  of the Performance  of the Packages artd the Level of intrinsic Safety  of the  Material 
"Analysis of Rail Accident  Frequencies and  Severity  for the Assessment  of Radioactive  Material  Transport  Risk" 

Accident analysis of spent  fuel  shipping casks transported  by rail 

ISSN 0254-1475 

COM(98) 155 final 

DOCUMENTS 

EN 

12  07  15  17 

Catalogue  number  :  CB-CO-98-237-EN-C 

ISBN  92-78-32953-3 

Office  for  Official  Publications  of the European  Communities 

L-2985 Luxembourg 

33»