WRITTEN QUESTION No. 663/98 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Nuclear waste at Dounreay - reliability of safeguards
Date: 1998-03-10
Institutions: BLOCH VON BLOTTNITZ, European Parliament
Subjects: EU control, United Kingdom, application of EU law, nuclear safety, plutonium, radioactive waste, sodium, storage, uranium

C 323/62

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

21. 10. 98

The Council would nevertheless point out that proceedings on the matters suggested by the Honourable Member
are not among the priorities in the area of justice and home affairs set by the Council for the period between
1 January 1998 and the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam; Parliament was consulted on those priorities
in accordance with Article K.6 of the Treaty.

(98/C 323/81)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0663/98

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(10 March 1998)

Subject: Nuclear waste at Dounreay › reliability of safeguards

In its answer to my Written Question P-3167/96 (1) the Commission explained the background to the warning
which it had to issue to the operators of the Dounreay reprocessing facility on account of faulty accounting of
radioactive materials. It stated that alone in 1995 the safeguards inspection effort invested in the Dounreay site
was 619 man/days. Except for the breaches concerning the accounting system for fissile materials in respect of
which sanctions were duly imposed, (cid:145)there were no anomalies detected with regard to safeguards(cid:146).

Having  regard  to  the  latest  revelations  in  (cid:145)The  Guardian(cid:146)  concerning  a  second  waste  shaft  on  the  site  of  the
Dounreay reprocessing facility in which at least 40 kg of uranium, plutonium and sodium in addition to other
waste  had  been  dumped  in  the  very  recent  past,  serious  doubts  arise  about  the  effectiveness  of  safeguards
inspections.

How does the Commission explain the fact that, despite its many inspection visits to Dounreay, it failed to
1.
acquire  information  about  the  disposal  of  radioactive  fissile  materials  in  a  second  shaft  on  the  site  of  the
reprocessing facility?

How does it assess the reliability of its own inspections when it fails to notice the establishment of such a

2.
waste dump in the course of such inspections?

Did it notice during its inspections that such large quantities of plutonium and uranium were missing as are

3.
now suspected to be present in the second shaft?

4. What changes will it be making to its inspection arrangements to avoid such shortcomings in the future?

(1)  OJ C 83, 14.3.1997, p. 124.

Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission

(5 May 1998)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that some of the statements made in the press are
at variance with the reality (see also the reply to the Honourable Member(cid:146)s Written Question P-0661/98 (1)).
The (cid:145)unknown  shaft(cid:146)  mentioned  in  the  press  is  a  disposal  area  named  (cid:145)intermediate  solid  waste  silo(cid:146).
The ounreay plant is under Euratom safeguards since the accession of the United Kingdom to the Community.
In line with Commission Regulation Euratom No 3227/76 of 19 October 1976 concerning the application of the
provisions  on  Euratom  safeguards (2),  the  operator  has  provided  the  Commission,  with  the  basic  technical
characteristics of this installation as well as updates thereto. In addition, the Commission is getting from the
operator all the information required to perform the safeguards verification activities foreseen by the Euratom
Treaty, including flows and inventories. As long as resources are available, the Commission will continue to
perform continual inspections at the Dounreay site, which also cover the installation in question.

Thus the Commission is not aware either of any shortcomings in its safeguarding operations or of any dumping
of safeguarded materials at the Dounreay site.

(1)  OJ C 310, 9.10.1998.
(2)  OJ L 363, 31.12.1976.