WRITTEN QUESTION No. 2903/97 by Hiltrud BREYER to the Commission. Supplies for the FRM II research reactor of highly-enriched uranium from Russia
Date: 1997-09-17
Institutions: BREYER, European Parliament
Subjects: Euratom Supply Agency, Russia, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear reactor, nuclear safety, originating product, scientific research, uranium

30. 4. 98

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 134/33

(98/C 134/39)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2903/97

by Hiltrud Breyer (V) to the Commission

(17 September 1997)

Subject: Supplies for the FRM II research reactor of highly-enriched uranium from Russia

1.
Can the Commission confirm that the Euratom Supply Agency is negotiating with Russian organizations
for  the  supply  of  highly-enriched  uranium  for  European  research  reactors?  Do  those  negotiations  involve
supplies for the controversial FRM II reactor in Munich?

2. What stage have the negotiations reached? What has been agreed, and which issues are still outstanding?
By what date are the negotiations likely to be completed?

Can the Commission confirm that the Euratom Supply Agency has drawn up the draft of an agreement for

3.
supplies for the FRM II reactor of highly-enriched uranium from Russia?

Does the Commission not have any misgivings that the involvement of the FRM II reactor will constitute a

4.
severe blow to the campaign to prevent the non-proliferation of highly-enriched uranium? If not, why not?

Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission

(3 December 1997)

1. and 2.
As at November 1997 there are no formal negotiations taking place between the Russian authorities
and  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency  on  supplying  highly  enriched  uranium  (HEU)  for  research  reactors  in  the
Community.

3.
The  Commission  and  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency,  in  consultation  with  the  Member  States  of  the
Community currently interested in using, producing or reprocessing HEU fuel, have developed a draft approach
to  be  used  in  potential  negotiations.  This  would  provide  the  government  of  the  Russian  Federation  with  the
assurances  required  under  the  multilateral  non-proliferation  regime  of  the  Treaty  on  the  non-proliferation  of
nuclear weapons (NPT) and the London guidelines for nuclear transfers. This draft approach was developed for
general application and is not plant-specific. The answer to the Honourable Member’s question is therefore no.

4.
The  transfer  of  highly  enriched  uranium  to  a  Member  State  which  does  not  have  nuclear  weapons  and
which  is  subject  to  the  strictest  safeguards,  imposed  both  by  Euratom  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy
Agency (IAEA), should not give rise to any fears in terms of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in
view of the Member States’ excellent reputation in this field.

Under the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) (Article IV.2), all the parties to the treaty (which include the Russian
Federation and all Member States of Euratom) undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. The NPT does not contain any provision restricting those rights in the case of HEU.

(98/C 134/40)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2904/97

by Hiltrud Breyer (V) to the Commission

(17 September 1997)

Subject: Toxic chemicals in foodstuffs

To what extent can the Commission confirm whether and how cases of Multi-Chemical Sensitivity (MCS)

1.
are scientifically documented in the Member States of the EU?

2.
Has an increase in the number of allergies in the EU Member States been recorded? Has a survey been
carried out to ascertain the number of sufferers from MCS and/or IEI (Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance)?
Has the number of such cases increased?