WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1640/97 by Undine-Uta BLOCH von BLOTTNITZ to the Commission. Euratom, monitoring of MOX fuel elements
Date: 1997-05-14
Institutions: BLOCH VON BLOTTNITZ, European Parliament
Subjects: nuclear fuel, nuclear safety, nuclear weapon, plutonium, uranium

10. 2. 98

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 45/69

(98/C 45/83)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1640/97

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(14 May 1997)

Subject: Euratom, monitoring of MOX fuel elements

The use of MOX fuel elements in nuclear power stations raises various problems since it involves (in line with
safeguard  categories)  weapons-grade  fissile  materials,  and  moreover  because  the  fuel  rods  cannot  be
distinguished from uranium fuel.

1.

2.

How does the Commission assess the particular problems connected with MOX-fuel safeguards?

How does the Commission ensure the monitoring of MOX fuels in the various European nuclear plants?

Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission

(2 July 1997)

1.
The Commission would recall that, regarding mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, one has to distinguish between the
fabrication,  transport  and  storage  of  fresh  fuel  elements  and  the  irradiated  spent  fuel  elements  after  use  in  a
reactor.

Spent  fuel  elements  always  contain  plutonium  regardless  whether  they  stem  from  fresh  uranium  or  MOX
elements. Thus, the Euratom verification activities are equal for both categories.

For the fabrication and storage of fresh MOX fuel elements (which are different from those containing uranium
only)  specific  safeguards  concepts  had  to  be  identified  to  implement  the  strict  safeguards  goals  defined  for
nuclear material containing such fresh plutonium.

The  increasingly  complex  and  automated  MOX  fuel  fabrication  plants  require  high  inspection  effort  for
continual inspections and the wide use of unattended measurement equipment to achieve these goals.

2.
Based  on  the  safeguards  goals,  the  Euratom  approach  for  safeguarding  MOX  fabrication  plants  in  the
Community  is  specifically  tailored  to  the  design  and  throughput  of  the  particular  installation.  Frequent  or
continual  inspections  and  a  comprehensive  system  of  measurement  equipment  which  is  specially  designed,
calibrated and optimised for the type of measurements and the materials that are handled in such plants form the
important elements of Euratom safeguards in this installation type.

The finished MOX fuel elements are routinely measured at the fabrication plant due to the optimal measurement
conditions compared to the situation at reactors.

During shipment to the reactor and storage there, the continuity of knowledge on the MOX fuel assemblies is
preserved by seals and/or safeguards surveillance systems.

(98/C 45/84)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1643/97

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(14 May 1997)

Subject: Environmental samples, Euratom-IAEA

The  IAEA  is  trying  to  ensure  that  taking  environmental  samples  at  EU  nuclear  plants  becomes  routine.
Environmental samples were already taken in Rossendorf in 1996. There are reports that Euratom is refusing to
allow the IAEA to take such samples in other European nuclear plants until detailed analysis results become
available.

Is  it  true  that  Euratom  is  allowing  no  further  environmental  samples  until  analysis  results  become

1.
available?

If so, how does Euratom justify refusing to allow such samples?