WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1645/97 by Marlies MOSIEK-URBAHN to the Commission. Public invitation to tender 228/96 of February 1996
Date: 1997-05-14
Institutions: European Parliament, MOSIEK-URBAHN
Subjects: Armenia, Azerbaijan, aid system, award of contract, citrus fruit, economic consequence, fruit juice, fruit product, pip fruit, stone fruit

25. 2. 98

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 60/33

(98/C 60/59)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1642/97

by Undine-Uta Bloch von Blottnitz (V) to the Commission

(14 May 1997)

Subject: IAEA safeguard inspections in the EU

The United Kingdom allows IAEA inspections in plants such as Urenco. In the German nuclear power station at
Unterweser comparable inspections are not wanted.

Are there are national differences within the European Union on authorization of IAEA inspections?

If so, what are those differences, what are the reasons for them and why does the Euratom authority not ensure a
uniformly cooperative approach in the treatment of IAEA inspectors?

Answer given by Mr Papoutsis on behalf of the Commission

(22 July 1997)

The  Commission  would  inform  the  Honourable  Member  that  the  Urenco  plant  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  an
installation for the enrichment of uranium, whereas the German installation Unterweser is a power reactor. This
means that, in a technical sense, the situation is different as far as safeguards verification activities are concerned.

Enrichment  plants  require  very  frequent  or  continual  inspections,  whereas  power  plants  are  subject  to  fewer
inspections but still several a year.

At Unterweser, more than 10 inspections took place in 1996, most of them together with the International atomic
energy agency (IAEA). The technical divergence with the IAEA is where mixed oxide (MOX) fuel should be
measured. Whereas the Commission applying Euratom safeguards, thinks that the controls are most efficient if
they are performed at the MOX fabrication plants (in this case in the United Kingdom), the IAEA prefers to make
such measurements in a non-nuclear weapons state, even if such measurements at reactors need to be performed
under water. The discussions on this issue are going on.

There  are  indeed  national  differences  in  the  Community  concerning  the  IAEA  safeguards  verifications,
depending on whether the country is a nuclear weapons state or not. Therefore, to implement IAEA safeguards in
the Community, three different agreements were concluded between the European atomic energy community, its
Member States and the IAEA:

› 

INFCIRC/193: agreement between the Community, its non- nuclear weapon Member States and the IAEA,
entered into force on 21 February 1977;

INFCIRC/263: voluntary agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom and the IAEA for the
application  of  IAEA  safeguards  in  the  United  Kingdom,  entered  into  force  on  14  August  1978
(a  fundamental  difference  from  INFCIRC/193  is  that  routine  IAEA  inspections  apply  only  to  facilities
designated  by  the  IAEA  from  a  facilities  list  provided  by  the  United  Kingdom,  covering  all  the  United
Kingdom civil nuclear facilities);

› 

INFCIRC/290: voluntary agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA for the application of
safeguards in France, entered into force on 12 September 1981 (its scope is limited to materials specifically
designated by France).

However, all civil nuclear material in both France and the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom safeguards
under the Euratom Treaty.

(98/C 60/60)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1645/97

by Marlies Mosiek-Urbahn (PPE) to the Commission

(14 May 1997)

Subject: Public invitation to tender 228/96 of February 1996

After  the  contract  was  awarded  to  the  Italian  company  Trentofrutta,  why  were  the  conditions  of  the

1.
invitation to tender changed (from apples to peaches), and on what legal basis?

2. Why was there not a new invitation to tender since the product group was changed, thus giving rise to an
entirely new basis?