REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES
Date: 1996-09-09
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: agricultural guidance, agricultural quota, reform of the CAP, sheep, suckler cow

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels,  09.09.1996 
COM(96) 430 final 

REPORT  FROM  THE COMMISSION  TO THE COUNCIL 

ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER  LIMITS IN 
THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM  SCHEMES 

REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL  PRODUCER 
LIMITS IN THE ANNUAL  EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES 

I. 

INTRODUCTION 

2 

II. 

THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING 

a) 
b) 

Production 
Community expenditure 

4 
5 

III. 

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL 
UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE 

The reference year and the initial allocation of rights 
The initial  national reserves 
The system of quota transfers and leasing 

a) 
b) 
c) 
d)  Management of the national reserves 
e) 

Sensitive Zones 

5 
6 
7 
7 
8 

IV. 

THE  FUNCTION  OF  THE  COMMISSION'S  DETAILED  RULES  FOR  THE 
APPLICATION  OF INDIVIDUAL  PRODUCER LIMITS 

a) 
b) 
c) 

Individual  limits 
Usage rules 
The transfer and leasing mechanisms 

9 
9 
10 

V.  EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 

a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 

Controlling production and spending 
National  reserves and their management 
Systems of quota transfer 
Sensitive Zones 
Concluding remarks 

11 
11 
12 
12 
13 

ANNEXES 

Beef  and  Sheepmeat  Production  and  Consumption  - EU15  (1986-1996) 
I. 
Suckler and  Dairy  Cow Numbers  in  EC-12 (1989-1995) 
II 
Community  Expenditure  in Ewe and  Suckler Cow  Premium  (1980-1995) 
III. 
Application  of  Individual  Producer  Limits  for  Ewe  Premium  -  EC 12 
IV. 
Application  of  Individual  Producer  Limits  lor  Suckler  Cow  Premium  - EC 12 
V. 
Individual  Producer  Limits  in the  new  Member  States -  Ewe and  Suckler  Cow  Premium 
VI 
Individual  Rights to  Ewe and  Goat  Premium  - EU15 
VII. 
Individual  Rights to  Suckler Cow  Premium  - EU15 
VIII. 
Evolution  in  Ewe and  Suckler  Cow Premium  Claims  (1992-1995) 
IX 
Operation  of the National  Reserve  in  1993 - Ewe  Premium 
X. 
Operation  of the National  Reserve  in  1993 - Suckler  Cow  Premium 
XL 
XII. 
Operation  of the National  Reserve  in  1994 - Ewe Premium 
XIII.  Operation  of the National  Reserve  in  1994 - Suckler Cow  Premium 
Calendar  for  Ewe premium  Application  in  1995 - EU 15 
XIV 

X 

I. 

INTRODUCTION 

Council Regulations (EEC) No 3013/89 and No 805/68 require that the Commission make a report, 
before  1 July  1996, on  the  application  of  the  arrangements  laid  down  in  the  individual  producer 
limits  in  the  annual  ewe  and  suckler  cow  premium  schemes  respectively,  together  with,  where 
appropriate,  any necessary proposals. This report fulfills  that  obligation.  The report  is designed  to 
look  at  the  administrative  experiences  of  applying  the  premium  quota  systems  since  the  1992 
Reform.  Its  preparation  began  before  the  current  BSE  crisis  and  it  does  not  represent  the 
Commission's  views  over  how  the  beef  regime  shall  be  adapted  following  the  crisis.  It  does, 
nevertheless, form  part of the background  which will need to be taken  into account  when  ideas  for 
changing  the  beef regime  are  assessed. 

The origins of the premium  quotas can be traced to the  1992 CAP Reform  when  solutions to two 
problems common to the Community's sheep and beef sectors were sought: the trend  of  increasing 
internal  production  coupled  with  escalating  Community  expenditure.  In  the  sheep  sector,  rising 
production  in the  1980*s, stimulated  by  readily  available  premiums,  was  undermining  Community 
prices and, owing to the price compensatory  method of calculation of the ewe premium,  causing a 
dramatic  growth  in  Community  expenditure.  In  the  beef  sector,  after  several  years  of  greater 
surpluses,  the  Reform  provided  the  opportunity  to  shift  policy,  in  the  light  of  the  necessary 
adjustments of production to internal consumption trends and export possibilities, in particular those 
relating  to  the  approaching  GATT  commitments,  away  from  beef  price  support  through  costly 
intervention  mechanisms and  more towards direct  payments to producers  as premia. 

In the sheep sector, the Commission's response to these pressures was to propose, in the context of 
the  1992  Reform,  to replace  the  stabilizer,  which  had  proved  incapable  of  controlling  production, 
with  the  requirement  that  a  producer  must  hold  a  right  to  each  Ewe  Premium  and  to  establish 
individual  producer  limits  to  the  number  of  those  rights,  a policy  more  commonly  known  as  the 
introduction of  'individual quotas'. The aim of this measure was to limit the number of animals kept 
by individual producers since stockrearing without premium, in most circumstances, is unprofitable. 

For  the  beef  sector,  the  compromise  on  the  whole  of  the  1992  Reform  extended  this  idea  of 
individual quotas to suckler cows. The reasons for this were that the Council compromise  included 
a bigger increase on the Suckler Cow Premium than the Commission had already proposed and that 
Council  wanted  to ensure that this increase did  not  lead to  an uncontrolled  increase  in the  suckler 
cow  herd.  Furthermore,  the  introduction  of  limits  on  the  eligibility  to  premia  in  the  beef  sector 
proved valuable  in the  final  stages of the negotiation  of the  GATT  agreement  which  followed  the 
1992  Reform. 

The  basic  regulations  establishing  individual  quotas  in  the  two  sectors  '  ,  similar  in  their  main 
outline,  laid down that  the quotas be allocated  to each active producer,  on the  basis of  the  number 
of premiums paid in a past "reference" year 2, particular to the sector involved. Member States were 

Articles  5a - 5d of  Regulation  (EEC) No  3013/89  for the  sheep  sector  and Articles  4e  and 4f  of  Regulation 
(EEC) No  805/68  for  the  beef  sector. 

From  1995 onwards, in the sheep sector, owing to the introduction  of individual  quotas, the Council's  former 
'headage  limit1 rule, by which  the payment  of ewe premium was made at the  full  rate  for  producers  with  no 
more than  1000 ewes  in LFA's and  500 ewes in non-LFA's, became  superfluous  and was  abolished.  The net 

also given some latitude  in choosing the reference  year. General  rules to accommodate the case of 
producers  who  did  not  claim  premium  in  the  reference  year  and  the  distribution  of  rights  within 
producer  groups were  also made. 

As a consequence, the total  sum of  all the individual  producer  limits  in each  of these two  sectors 
constitutes  a  virtual  ceiling  to  their  productive  capacities  and  sets  a  maximum  Community 
expenditure  for their support. Furthermore, fixing  a total  number of ewe and  suckler cow premium 
rights  in each  of the  new  Member  States which  entered  the  Union  in  1995, decided  as part  of the 
Accession agreements, maintained the philosophy of limiting productive capacity in the two sectors. 

Council legislation also gave producers the opportunity to adjust each year the number of rights they 
hold  to  premium  through  the  provisions  for  transfer  and,  should  the  Member  State  so  choose, 
temporary  leasing  of  quota.  Member  States  were  given  the  option  of  setting  up  a  "commercial" 
system  of  transfers  which  allows  producers  to  deal  directly  between  themselves  or  an 
"administrative" system in which rights are transferred  via the national  reserve. Only  one Member 
State, France, chose the  latter  option.  Except  for  certain  demarcated  zones in each  Member  State 
out  of  which  rights may  not transferred  because sheep or beef production  is especially  important, 
a  producer  is  allowed  to  transfer  rights  to  another  producer,  either  with  his  holding  or  without. 
However,  transfers  without  the  holding  must  surrender  up to  15%  of the transferred  rights  to  the 
national  reserve, a procedure  more commonly  known  as the  'syphon'. 

The  national  reserve of  premium  rights  in  each  Member  State was  set  up by  retaining  between 1 
and  3%  of  the  initial  individual  allocation  of  rights  and  was  used  to  reallocate  rights  amongst 
suggested  priority  categories  of  producers,  determined  according  to  each  Member  State's  own 
criteria.  In addition,  Council  agreed  to the creation  of a non-forfeitary  initial  reserve  equal to  1% 
of the  sum of  the rights in less-favoured  areas (LFA's). 

Council  subsequently  instructed  the  Commission to make  detailed  rules for  the  application  of  the 
quota  systems 3 which, due to the similarity  between the  sectors in the Council policy,  followed  a 
common  philosophy  in their  initial  conception  and  subsequent  refinement. 

This  report,  within  the  limits  already  indicated  above,  addresses  the  production  and  budgetary 
consequences of the policy and the outcomes of the main Council provisions laid down  in what has 
been  a preliminary  period  of  setting  up the system. It  is based  on the  information  supplied  to the 
Commission by  Member  States and  any  comments will  be confined  to those  items on  which  data 
are available. 4 For the most part, the measures described only affected  those Member States which 
were  part  of the  Union  before  the CAP reform.  However,  where  appropriate,  new  Member  States 
will  be  included  in  the  appraisal.  In  addition,  a  brief  review  of  the  detailed  implementing  rules, 
adopted by the  Commission, is presented. 

effect  on a producer's quotas was that those rights held above the 'headage limits' (on which the producer had 
been  able to  claim  premium  at half the  full  rate) were  converted  into full-rate  rights  at  half the  number. 

3 

Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3567/92 for the sheep sector and  Regulation (EEC) No 3886/92 for the beef 
sector. 

For example, since it is not a statutory requirement from  Member States, the Commission is not in possession 
of any  official  data  concerning  aspects of quota trading  such  as the  number of rights  leased  or the  value of 
rights  on the  open  market. 

II. 

a) 

THE NECESSARY  CONTROL  ON PRODUCTION  AND COMMUNITY  SPENDING 

Production 

Annex I shows the trends in sheepmeat and beef production in the 5 years prior to the  1992  Reform, 
and the evolution of those parameters subsequent to the introduction of the individual quota policy. 

It  can  be  seen  clearly  that  the  quota  policy  has  brought  an  effective  stabilisation  of  Community 
sheepmeat production, at around  1.15m tonnes/year, a result which would not have been achievable 
under the  stabiliser mechanism  operating  previously  for  the  same purpose. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  beef  sector,  the  data  do  not  show  the  same  degree  of  curtailment  in 
production.  The  Reform  came  into  effect  towards the  end  of  a  period  with  a downward  trend  in 
production  (1991-1994).  Production  has  now  recovered  again,  and  is  set  to  continue  upwardly 
because,  although  dairy  cow  numbers  have  fallen,  there  has  been  a  sustained  growth  in  the  EU 
suckler cow herd  in recent years (Annex II). This expansion  in suckler cow  numbers has  occurred 
because, despite the introduction of individual quotas, there have been notable increases to the total 
number  of premium  rights fixed at the outset of the  system, namely: 

i) 

ii) 

the  increase  in  the  total  claims  in  1992  witnessed  in  practically  all  Member  States  5  who 
took  the option  available  to them  of  fixing  1992 as the reference  year  (i.e. the  same year 
as  the  introduction  of  the  quotas  themselves),  as  producers  responded  to  the  fact  that 
premium rights were now in limited supply. The effect  of this decision was tc raise premium 
claims by  1.3  million,  that  is by  15%, in  1992 compared  with  1991, in the  Member  States 
concerned,  which  added  an  equivalent  number  of  rights  to  the  EU  total,  and  to  create  a 
situation where there was enough quota available across the Union to sustain an increase in 
suckler  cow numbers  of  9% between  1992 and  1995. 

the  raising  of  the  milk  ceiling  from  60.000  to  120.000  litres  per  holding  in  the  mixed 
suckler/dairy  cow  enterprises  responded  to  the  request  of  certain  Member  States,  made 
during  the  CAP  Reform,  to  extend  the  quota  scheme  to  medium-sized  mixed  herds. 
Acceptance  of  such holdings resulted  in  821.160 extra rights being  created. 

Thus, the control ('maitrise') of production and expenditure that was expected from  the  introduction 
of  individual  producer  limits for  suckler  cow premium  can only  begin to take  effect  once the  EU 
suckler  cow herd  has approached  the  limit  set by the total  number  of  rights available  (Annex  ÎI). 
Given  that  around  one  million  rights  still  remain  unused  and  that  the  other  support  mechanisms 
which operate in the beef sector may allow producers to keep more stock than they  have quota  for, 
complete  stabilization  of  the  EU  suckler cow herd,  and the  Community  budget  which  supports  it, 
is not  likely  to occur  in the near  future. 

5  Only  Greece  did  not  choose  1992 as the reference  year. 

b) 

Community  expenditure 

The  other  principal  objective  of  the  introduction  of  individual  limits  in  the  ewe  and  suckler  cow 
premium  regimes was to control  spending. 

In the sheep sector, this task was relatively  straightforward:  putting a limit to the potential  number 
of ewes in the Community would limit total expenditure, save for those fluctuations which arise due 
to changes in average  Community  market price, a parameter  used in the calculation  of the  annual 
ewe premium. 

Annex III  shows that the quota regime has indeed had the desirable result of constraining  spending 
in ewe  premium  to around  1.700  MECU. 

For the  beef  sector, the  introduction  of  individual  quotas  for  suckler cow premium  was part  of an 
overall  reform  which  brought  a  reduction  in  market  price  support  measures  (intervention), 
compensated  by increases in the level  of premiums  and a revised export refund  policy.  Therefore, 
Annex  III  shows that  expenditure  in  suckler  cow premium  has  increased  substantially  in  the past 
15 years. The increase in the cost of the suckler cow premium regime  is partly  due to the  increase 
in the level  of the premium  6 and partly  due to the  increases in the number  of  rights  available, in 
line  with  the  argument  on  cow  numbers  already  given,  but  expenditure  could  be  expected,  from 
current  information,  to  stabilise  at  a  maximum  of  1.800  MECU  per  year  once  the  unused  and 
additional  rights mentioned  in section (i) above have been taken up. 

III. 

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH 
FALL  UNDER  MEMBER  STATE  COMPETENCE 

Within  the  Council's  implementing  rules,  certain  decisions  concerning  the  application  of  the 
producer  limits were delegated  to Member States. This measure of flexibility operated  in live main 
areas: 

a) 

The  reference  year  and  the initial allocation  of rights. 

The reference  year  chosen  in each  Member  State may be found  in Annex  IV  for  the  sheep sector 
(for the most part,  1991) and Annex V for the beef sector, where  1992 was most generally adopted. 
In addition, Annex IV shows for the sheep sector a 'coefficient'  calculated  for  those Member  States 
where  the total  number of ewes decreased between  1989 and  1991 and where this coefficient  was 
used to calculate an extra number of rights to be added to the individual limit of each producer. This 
was the  case in  Spain,  France, Portugal  and the United  Kingdom. 

The suckler cow premium was programmed in  1992 to rise from  70 ECU in  1993, 90 ECU in  1994 and to 120 
ECU  per head  in  1995. 

Resulting  from  these  calculations,  Annex  VII  for  the  sheep  sector,  and  Annex  VIII  for  the  beef 
sector,  show  the  potential,  or  sum  total,  of  premium  rights  available  in  each  Member  State  for 
allocation to individual producers upon the introduction of the quota system. The figures presented 
have  been  verified  for  the  sheep  sector  7  by  the  Commission  on  the  basis  of  the  reference  year 
chosen by each Member State. The figures for suckler cow premium rights await the  Commission's 
approval. The potential rights for the new Member States are also included, these totals having been 
agreed  upon Accession and  incorporated  into each sector's base regulation. 

Aside from the problem mentioned above concerning premium claims in  1992 in the beef sector and 
the notable administrative effort  required  in the exercise, no particular difficulties  were encountered 
with this measure  in most Member  States. In general, the provisions made  for  producers who had 
not  made  claims  or  who  had  been  penalised  in  the  reference  year  were  successful  in  their 
implementation  because they  permitted  Member  States to deal equitably  with those hardship cases 
which  arose.  However,  in the  sheep  sector,  Italy  and  Greece  did  express to  Council  the  problems 
which they had experienced  in fixing  individual limits amongst producers who, for various reasons, 
had  underclaimed  in  the  reference  year  and  were  not  covered  by  the  existing  provisions. 
Consequently, in  1995, Council agreed that,  subject to verification  by the  Commission,8 Italy  and 
Greece  should be allowed to distribute up to 600.000 additional rights from  the national reserve to 
accommodate  those producers who had not received  their  correct  initial  quota. 

b) 

The  initial  national  reserves. 

Annexes  IV, V and VI again  show the approach  taken by  each Member  State, within  the limits of 
the  Council  legislation,  for  the  setting  up  of  the  initial  national  reserves  in  both  sectors.  While 
globally the measures taken supplied the national reserve in each Member State with  1  to 3% of the 
total  sum  of  the  individual  limits,  the  tables  illustrate  that  the  percentage  of  rights  forfeited  in 
relation  to  the  size  of  the  individual  producer  limit  varied  appreciably.  Annexes  VII  and  VIII 
illustrate the numbers of rights which were available to establish the national reserves, including the 
extra  rights resulting  from  the  additional  1% LFA reserve . 

In this respect, it must be noted that, from  the outset, the national reserves in the different  Member 
States  have  been  under  varying  pressure  from  the  demand  of  producers.  The  limited  United 
Kingdom national reserves, in both sectors, originally  set at  1% of the total rights, have particularly 
high  demand  and  considerable  administrative  difficulties  have  been  experienced  in  satisfying 
applications  from  producers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Netherlands,  after  fixing  a  relatively  high 
percentage  forfeit  of  rights  to  the  national  reserve  (3%)  under  circumstances  of  low  suckler  cow 
premium  demand,  had  to  refix  the  forfeit  at  1%  and  subsequently  return  the  surplus  rights  to 
producers. 

Final  verification  still  awaited  for  the  figure  for  Germany  and  Italy (Sipjly). 

In the verification  carried out in April  1996, the Commission agreed to an increase to the national  reserves in 
Italy  and  Greece  by  600.000 rights. 

c) 

The  system of quota transfers  and leasing. 

In  general  terms, the  operation  of  the  system  of  quota  transfer  is uniform  across the  Community 
with most Member States opting for the direct producer-to-producer  transfers while also permitting 
temporary  leasing  of  rights.  The  two  notable  exceptions  to  this  norm  are  to  be  found  in  France, 
which  only  allows  direct  transfers  to  occur  between  producers  when  the  entire  holding  is  also 
transferred, all other operations taking place as transfers from  a producer to the national reserve and 
the Netherlands, where  no temporary  leasing is permitted. 

No insuperable problems in the operation of the transfer  system have been experienced  by  Member 
States  and  producers  appear  to  have  adapted  well  to  the  obligations  placed  on  them  by  the 
administrative procedures put in place to effect  such transfers. The French authorities have registered 
the  difficulties  they  have  faced  due  to  the  extra  effort  and  complications  associated  with  the 
"administrative" system which they adopted. The Commission has responded to these requests with 
a  series  of  adjustments  to  the  detailed  rules  aimed  at  simplifying  as  far  as  possible  the  transfer 
procedures,  9 while  at the  same time avoiding  an excessive divergence  between the two  systems. 

The level at which the 'syphon' is applied in each Member State may be seen, in Annexes IV, V and 
VI  to  vary  between  the  1% operating  in  the  Netherlands  to  the  15%  applied  in  the  majority  of 
Member  States.  In  this  respect,  the  'syphon'  has  proven  itself  to  be  an  acceptable  and  workable 
policy  instrument  for  supplying  a  certain  number  of  right  to  the  national  reserve  which  may  be 
redistributed  to priority  groups by the Member  States (see below). 

d) 

Management  of the national  reserves. 

In  numerical  terms,  the  supply  of  rights  to  the  national  reserve  by  the  'syphon'  may  be  seen  in 
Annexes X-XIII, which show the functioning  of the national  reserves in both sectors for  1993 and 
1994. The  data for  1995 have only  been  supplied by  a few  Member  States. 

Although  the  'syphon'  was  rather  insignificant  in  the  first  year  of  the  operation  of  the  national 
reserves,  in comparison  with the initial  number  of rights, in  1994 it contributed  around  a third  of 
the  rights  available  from  the  national  reserve to  sheep  producers  each  year,  upon  request  to  the 
national  authorities. 

In the beef  sector, the contribution  of  rights from  the 'syphon' to the national  reserve remains at a 
lower  level  (4% in  1994), though  it makes an  important  contribution  to the rights available  in the 
national  reserves  in Belgium  and  Portugal. The relatively  minor  rôle of the 'syphon'  is probably  a 
reflection  of  the  smaller  number  of transfers  without  holding  which take  place  in the beef  sector, 
in comparison to the  sheep sector where transactions are, generally  speaking, more mobile. 

The same tables (Annexes X-XIII)  also illustrate the functioning  of the national  reserves  in terms 
of  the attribution  of  rights to producers. 

These  measures,  forming  part  of  the  1994  Simplification  Exercise  of  the  CAP  Reform,  are  described  in 
Chapter  IV below. 

In the sheep sector in  1993, over 90% of the initial reserve was allocated  to producers though  this 
percentage fell  to  around  38% in  1994,  with  Spain,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  having  the  lowest 
percentage  allocations. Furthermore, the data in Annex XII  suggest that,  in  1994,  several  Member 
States (in particular  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece, Ireland  and  Portugal)  withdrew  rights 
from producers as a result of transfers without holding (the 'syphon') and then 'recycled' those rights 
to other producers from the national  reserve with respect to the  same marketing  year. 

In the beef  sector, the demand on the initial national reserve was relatively low in  1993 (48%)  but 
remained  more  constant  the  following  year,  a  Community  average  of  53%  of  the  rights  being 
attributed  to  producers  in  1994.  Furthermore,  an  analysis  of  the  data  with  respect  to  the  1994 
calendar  year  indicate  that  the  practice  of  'recycling'  rights  is  much  less  widespread  in  the  beef 
sector than the sheep sector: only Belgium attributed to producers all the rights which were available 
in its 1994 national reserve. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain did not attribute any rights  from 
the national reserve in  1994 because ofdifllcultics  in making a fair allocation of rights which  would 
satisfy  the extremely  high  demand. 

In  general  terms,  the  management  of  the  national  reserves  has  not  posed  unsurmountable 
complications for national administrations, given the important extent to which decision-making was 
delegated  to  Member  States  in  this  area.  However,  in  the  United  Kingdom,  there  has  been  a 
significant  problem  with  some  producers  in  both  sectors  of  the  so-called  'developers'  priority 
category who, owing to the insufficient  number of rights available in the  1993 national reserve, were 
not initially allocated all the rights they requested. Following a judgment in a national court, the UK 
authorities decided to reallocate part of the national reserve for this category of producers which has 
caused  a delay  in closing  definitively  the allocation  exercise for  1993 and  subsequent years. 

e) 

Sensitive  Zones 

A further  measure within the competence of Member States is illustrated  in Annexes IV, V and VI 
which  indicate  the  zones  designated  as particularly  important  for  sheep  and  beef  production  and, 
therefore,  out  of  which premium  rights  may  not  be  transferred.  This  designation  has  been  more 
colloquially  known  as  'ring-fencing'. 

Most  Member  States  have  'ring-fenced'  the  LFA's  of  their  territory,  a  decision  which  is  coherent 
with  their  policy  priorities  for  such  areas.  The  two  notable  exceptions  to  this  norm  are  found  in 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Firstly, the French  authorities have  nominated  the  entire  French 
territory  a  Sensitive  Zone.  Secondly,  the  United  Kingdom  authorities  have  divided  their  whole 
territory  into seven Sensitive Zones, based on regional and LFA criteria. The only  other  exceptions 
are  Belgium,  divided  for  these  purposes  into  two  zones  according  to  land  classification,  and 
Germany  which  specified  the  dykelands, as well as the LFA's of  its territory,  as a Sensitive Zone. 

The designation of these Sensitive Zones has widespread acceptance from  all interested parties and 
the  Commission has received  no  evidence, to  date, to  suppose that  the  measure,  within  the  terms 
in which  it was originally  conceived,  has been misused or misapplied.  10 

However,  some  Member  States  have  expressed  their  concern  that  within  certain  'ring-fences'  rights  may  be 
accumulating  and  having  a  negative  impact of  an  environmental  nature  (see  Evaluation  below)  . 

8 

IV. 

THE  FUNCTION  OF  THE  COMMISSION'S  DETAILED  RULES  FOR  THE 
APPLICATION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  PRODUCER  LIMITS 

The most pertinent  rules in the Commission Regulations for applying individual  producer  limits in 
the sheep and  beef  sectors have the following  basic structure: 

a) 

Individual  limits 

In  order  to  make  the  administration  of  the  producer  limits  as  workable  as possible,  for  the  ewe 
premium,  only  those  producers  with  a  minimum  of  10 ewes  were  allocated  an  initial  quota.  In 
suckler cow premium, owing to the greater economic value of each animals, no lower limit was set. 

b) 

Usage rules 

Several  rules were introduced  in the regulations by which a producer  would  forfeit  to the  national 
reserve  a  certain  proportion  of  his  rights  if  he  did  not  claim  premium  on  those  rights  during 
determined  periods. The aim of  these rules was to increase the mobilization  of rights  by  avoiding 
an excessive number of rights staying with producers who did not use themselves and,  furthermore, 
did  not  choose to transfer  or lease those rights to another  producer. 

For  this purpose,  a general  usage rule  was defined  whereby  a producer,  who has not  made  use of 
at least  50% of his rights during  two consecutive years, would forfeit  the part  not used during  the 
last year  to  the  national  reserve. Moreover,  with  the  intention  of  deterring  speculative  acquisition 
of rights by producers who did not intend to use them immediately, a more stringent usage rule was 
placed on those producers who receive rights free of charge from  the national reserve. At the outset 
of  the  quota  system,  if  such a producer  did  not  make  use  of  all  his  rights  during  the  three  years 
following  the  receipt  of  rights  from  the  national  reserve,  he  would  forfeit  the  part  not  used  n. 
Furthermore, the same producer was not authorized to transfer  or lease any rights during that three 
year  period. 

The latest change to be made in the usage rules, which came into force  in  1996 as part of the  1994 
simplification  exercise,  unified  these two  rules  into one, such that  the  minimum  percentage  usage 
has  been  raised  to  70% each  year.  This  measure aims to  prompt  producers  to  mobilize  the  rights 
which they could retain  under the existing, relatively  lenient, general usage rule. On the other hand, 
such a  simplification  of  the  rules  was justified  because the risk posed  by  speculative  requests  for 
rights from  the national  reserve had not been  fulfilled. 

1 '  A couple of years into the system, it became evident that producers who had received rights from the national 
reserve and, in the extreme case a small number, were under an excessively heavy obligation in having to use 
all the rights they owned during the following three years: even natural fluctuations  in flock  size could cause 
them to have to surrender part  of their rights. Therefore,  it was decided to relax the rule to an average  usage 
of  90%  over  the  same  three  year  period.  This  relaxation  was  subsequently  taken  further  in  1996  by  the 
introduction  of a single  usage  rule  (70% every  year). 

c) 

The transfer  and  leasing  mechanisms 

For  clarity  and  ease  in  the  operation,  the  Commission  legislation  introduced  a  minimum  to  the 
number  of rights which  may  be transferred  or  leased  n  at any  one time, with  both  parlies  involved 
having  an  obligation  to  notify  the  competent  authorities  of  the  transfer  within  a  deadline,  two 
months  before  the  premium  claim  was  made.  However,  once  the  transfer  system  was  set  up  and 
running, Member States became aware that simplification  in some of the associated procedures was 
necessary, particularly  in France where the 'administrative' system is operated. In time for the  1995 
premium  claims,  the  minimum  number  of  rights  involved  in  a  transfer  without  holding  were 
simplified  by  rewording  the  previous  formula  which  was  based  on  percentages  of  the  producer's 
quota. 

At the same time, the deadline for notification  of a transfer  was redefined  so as to allow  producers 
to notify  the authorities up until the day on which they made their premium claim. It therefore  gives 
producers  and  administrations  more  time  to  organize  and  to  process  transfers  and  reduces  the 
confusion  between the deadline for transfer  notification  and the deadline for  premium claim  which 
had  arisen amongst producers. 

However, where the Commission legislation provided the most significant  concessions to the  rules 
on  transfers  has been  on  the  opening  of  second  trading  periods  in  both  sectors  in  both  1993 and 
1994  '\  These  derogations  were  justified  because  of  transitional  problems  at  the  outset  of  the 
regime,  in particular,  producers across the whole Community  experienced  appreciable  difficulty  in 
trading  quota or acquiring  from  the national  rights  sufficient  rights to cover  their premium  claims 
within  the deadlines originally  set. 

Finally,  as  an  example  taken  from  the  sheep  sector,  the  various  deadlines  for  applications  and 
notifications  which  have  resulted  from  the  application  of the  Commission  rules  in  each  Member 
State, are summarized  in Annex XIV  for  the  1995 marketing  year. 

12  In order to avoid a producer holding onto rights by leasing them out to another producer for an unlimited length 
of time, a  rule was  instituted  which obliges producers  to use all their rights during at  least  two  consecutive 
years over a five-year  period. Since this rule means that producers could  lease out rights from  the  beginning 
of the  quota  system  in  1993 for  three years,  1996 is, in effect,  the  first  year  of  its  application. 

A second trading period was admitted for  1995 and  1996 but does not apply to all Member States: only Italy 
and Greece  were given this provision  to assist  in the allocation  of the 600.000 extra ewe rights conceded  by 
Council Regulation  (EC) No  1265/95 and the UK may open a second period for  1995 in both  sectors (and for 
1996  in  sheep)  in  order to  accommodate those  producers  affected  by  delays  in the  distribution  of the  1993 
national  reserve. 

10 

V. 

EVALUATION  OF THE  QUOTA  REGIMES AND CONCLUDING  REMARKS 

At what is  still a relatively  early  stage in the implementation  of the policy  of individual  producer 
limits in the ewe and  suckler cow premium  schemes, the Commission has a number  of  comments 
to make on the development  of the regime  and the progress made  so  far. 

a) 

i) 

ii) 

Controlling production  and  spending 

The most important  consequence of introducing producer quotas  for ewe premium  has been 
the control  effected  on  sheepmeat  production  and  Community  expenditure  in the  sector. 

In the beef sector, for the reasons indicated above, the same degree of control  in production 
and  expenditure  has manifestly  not  been  attained. 

b) 

National  reserves and  their  management 

iii) 

The lighter pressure on the beef national reserves than on the sheep reserves, in the first two 
years  of  the  operation,  is  consistent  with  the  Commission's  concern  that,  even  before  the 
BSE  crisis,  the  current  state  of  the  suckler  cow  premium  quotas  is  failing  to  exert  the 
necessary control on production. The most important reasons why the beef national reserves 
are  not  under  pressure  is that  most Member  States  adopted  1992 as the  reference  year  for 
suckler cow quota, which meant that herd sizes did not evolve substantially by  1993 and that 
most  producers  had  sufficient  rights  in  1993  based  on  their  1992  claim.  Secondly,  the 
obligations for quota usage placed on producers who receive rights from  the national  reserve 
and  the  introduction  of  the  density  factor  in  suckler  cow  eligibility  may  have  dissuaded 
producers  initially  from  applying.  However,  since  census  data  show  that  suckler  cow 
numbers  arc  increasing  across the  Union,  information  on  the  development  of  the  national 
reserves  in  1995, not yet  made available  to the Commission  by all  Member  States, will  be 
particularly  indicative  of the  current  state of the quota policy  across the Union. 

iv)  With regard to the management of the national reserves, in general terms, the system can be 
said to operate well. However, the data available to the Commission suggest that, particularly 
in the  sheep  sector, there is some divergence  in the criteria  for  attribution  of rights  in that 
some Member States are operating a 'recycling' of rights, i.e. withdrawal and reallocation of 
rights  to  other  producers  in  the  same  year  while  others  are  not.  The  reasons  for  this 
difference  may  be  that  in  some  Member  States  there  is  a  known  lack  of  demand  from 
producers for  rights and recycling would presumably not be necessary while other Member 
States  may  have  chosen  administrative  procedures  which  result  in the  'recycling'  of  rights 
being  made in the year  following  withdrawal. 

v) 

For  reasons  of  controlling  production  and  reducing  quota  speculation,  the  Commission 
wishes  to  comment  that,  in  its  opinion,  'recycling'  of  rights  can  encourage  inflated 
applications for premiums  14. The Commission recognizes that the current Council legislation 

In  effect,  with  this  approach,  the  number  of  rights  to  'recycle'  wiil  only  be  known  after  the  end  of  the 
application period for premium.  Producers must therefore make their premium claim without knowing to what 
extent the Member State can meet their request for supplementary rights free from the national reserve. Certain 

U 

leaves the  management  of  the  national  reserves  largely  in the  hands of  the  Member  States 
and  that  there  are  no  provisions  covering  deadlines  for  the  distribution  of  the  national 
reserves.  However,  the  Commission  invites  Member  States  to  take  the  necessary 
implementing  measures  in  order  to  distribute  the  national  reserve  before  the  end  of  the 
application  period  for  premium, that  is, before  the end  of the transfer  and  leasing  period. 

c) 

Systems of quota  transfer 

vi) 

vii) 

Notwithstanding  the  comments  made  above  with  reference  to  national  reserves,  the 
Commission draws Council's attention to the fact that the second trading periods, justifiably 
conceded  to  Member  States  in  the  past,  are  related  to  this  issue  in  that  they  permitted 
producers  to  optimize,  in  effect,  their  quota  usage  in  1993  and  1994.  Consequently,  the 
Commission  announces  that,  from  now  on,  it  will  take  a  far  harder  line  against  second 
that  the  initial  problems  experienced  by  producers  and 
trading  periods,  confident 
administrations  with  the setting  up of the quota regime are now overcome. 

Concerning  the national  systems for  the transfer  of rights, the Commission emphasizes that 
major  efforts  have  been  made  to  accommodate  the  requests  of  Member  States  for  more 
llexible  transfer  procedures  but  that  measures  which  would  lead  to too  great  a divergence 
between the 'commercial' system and the 'administrative' system, have been refused.  For this 
reason, the Commission has not been prepared to admit leasing of rights through the national 
reserve  since,  under  the  'administrative'  system,  this  would  mean  that  individual  quotas 
would  tend to  operate  as regional  ceilings, with  all  the inconveniences  in terms of  control 
("maitrise") of production  that  such ceilings  incur. 

viii) 

In relation to the same question of national systems for transfers, the Commission notes the 
fact that the low monetary value attributed to rights by the French administration  is causing 
producers to retain unused rights. The Commission hopes that the changes made to the usage 
rules  from  1996 onwards will  help alleviate the problem  of  low quota  availability. 

d) 

Sensitive Zones 

ix) 

x) 

The  Commission  reaffirms  that  the  direct  consequence  of  'ring-fencing'  of premium  rights 
is to limit  the transfer  of  rights within a Member State. However,  the Commission  remarks 
that, due to the different  criteria  which  have been  used to establish  Sensitive /ones  in each 
Member State, a practical consequence of this provision is that rights may not be  transferred 
between  all zones or  all  Member  States of the Union. 

The  Commission  is  aware  that,  in  certain  instances,  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  'ring-
fencing'  of quota within a Member State is beginning to exert a negative impact on the rural 
environment,  by  accumulating  rights  within  their  boundaries,  which  is  an  undesirable 
consequence  of this provision.  Therefore,  the Commission draws Member  States'  attention 
to this topic, with a view to finding a better balance between the socio-economic  objectives 
of this provision  and  certain  objective  criteria of environmental  protection. 

producers,  in  the  hope  of  receiving  the  supplementary  rights  they  have  requested,  will  tend  to  inflate  their 
premium  claim  and  therefore  retain  more animals than  their  individual  quota. 

12 

e) 

Concluding  remarks 

In view  of the above  evaluation,  the Commission concludes that  individual  producer  limits 
have so far  been  a successful  policy  tool  for  controlling  production  and  expenditure  in the 
sheep  sector  but  not  in  the  suckler  cow  segment  of  the  beef  sector.  Therefore,  given  that 
changes in the ewe premium regime are not justified  and that the whole beef regime is under 
review  in  the  light  of  the  current  BSE  crisis, the  Commission  considers  that  it  is  not  an 
appropriate  moment to make any proposals in respect of the quota regimes in either  of the 
premium  schemes. 

&  ;t 

. j-

13 

BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION - EU15 (1986-1996) 
PRODUCTION ET CONSOMMATION DES VIANDES BOVINE ET OVINE - UE15 (1986-1996) 
ERZEUGUNG UND VERBRAUCH VON RIND- UND SCHAFFLEISCH - EUR15 (1986-1995) 

ANNEX 

1900 

4- 1800 

4- 1700 

4- 1600 

4- 1500  g 
S 
E 
¥ i4oo  r 

4- 1300 
4- 1200 

4-1100 

m 

| 

JC 
CO 

• *— Beef Production 
• & • • Consumption 

—a—Sheepmeat Production 

4-1000 

--o--Consumption 

900 

Ko 
s: 
! . 
d* 

, Q" 

- - Q. 

. . . •* 

a" 

.ET 

-•' 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 
Year 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995 

9500 

9000 

8500-f 

8000 4-

c  7500  + 
c 
o 

%  7000 4-
o 
m 

6500 

dr 

6000 

5500 4-

5000 

1986 

Source: DGVI 

SUCKLER AND DAIRY COW NUMBERS - EC12 (1989-1995) 
NOMBRES DE VACHES ALLAITANTES ET  LAITIERES - CE12 (1989-1995) 
MUTTERKUH- UND MILCHKUHBESTANDE - EUR12 (1989-95) 

ANNEX II 

-*—Total  cows 

-•— Dairy  cows 

-  -  Potential  rights 

-*•— Suckler  cows 

1996 

35000 

30000 4-

Source: EUROSTAT 

4500 

4000 

3500 4-

3000  + 

D 
U 
LU 
S 

2500 

2000 4-

1500  4-

1000 + 

500 4-

COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM (1980-1995) 
DEPENSES COMMUNAUTAIRES POUR LES PRIMES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE (1980-1995) 
GEMEINSCHAFTSAUSGABEN  FUR MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN  (1980-1995) 

ANNEX 

• Total Beef Sector Budget 
• Ewe and Goat Premium 
• Suckler Cow Premium 

Year 

ANNEX  IV 

APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR EWE PREMIUM - EC12 
APPUCATION DE LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A  LA  BREBIS - CE12 
ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR12 

Belglque/BelgIS 

Danmark 

Deutschland 

Ellas 

Espafla 

France 

Ireland 

Italia 

Luxemburg 

Nedertand 

Portugal 

United  Kingdom 

1991 

1 

1991 

1 

1991 

1991 

1990 

1989 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1989 

1990 

1 

1 

1,00239 

1,02157 

. 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1,06 

1.0116 

no 

no 

no 

no 

yes 

partially 

no 

no 

no 

no 

partially 

partially 

Globally-1% 
< 33 rights •  0% 
> 33 rights «1.5% 

< 13 right» « 0  rights 
13-60 rights «  1  right 
>60rights«2rights  • 

> 17 rights -  3% 

< 200 rights •  3% 
> 200 rights « 2% 

2% 

1% 

10-100 rights « 0% 
101-200 rights « 1% 
201-300 rights -  2% 
301-400 rights •  3% 
501-1000 rights « 4% 
> 1000 rights «5% 

< 17 rights *0 

> 

3% 

17 rights « 3S 

3% 

3% 

1% 

10% 

10% 

15% 

15% 

10% 

15% 

15% 

15% 

15% 

1% 

15% 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Via national 
reserve 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Via national 
reserve 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Not permitted 

Not 
permitted 

Between 
producers 

15% 
• 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

2 zones 

None 

LFA's; 
dykes zone 

None 

LFA's 

The whole 
country 

I 

LFA's 

Not decided 

The whole 
country 

LFA's 

LFA's 

7 zones covering 
the whole country 

Decision concerning 

a) Reference year 

b) Coefficient 

c) Supply of rights to 
National Reserve due to 
coefficient > 1 

d) Percentage of rights 
retained for the initial 
National Reserve In 
relation to the size of the 
initial producer limit 

e) Percentage of rights 
!o be surrendered to 
National Reserve in case 
of transfer without 
holding ("syphon") 

f) Method of transfer of 
rights without holding 

g) Leasing of rights 

f) Definition of Sensitive 
Zones out of which 
rights  may not be 
transferred 

SCVT~: Me"ibsr Steies 

APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR SUCKLER COWS - EC12 
APPLICATION DES LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - CE12 
ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR12 

Belglque/BelgiS 

Danmark 

Deutschland 

Ellas 

Espafla 

France 

Ireland 

Italia 

Luxemburg 

Nederiand 

Portugal 

United  Kingdom 

1992 

443.588 

1992 

1992 

1990 

1992 

1992 

1992 

1992 

1992 

1992 

1992 

1992 

135.937 

651.122 

149.778 

1.462.527 

3.886.366 

1.106.528 

787.993 

14.765 

98.006 

286.554 

1.805.323 

ANNEX V 

1% 

< 20 rights • 0  rights 
20-49 rights «1  right  > 
49 rights • 2  rights 

3% 

2% 

2% 

3% 

1% 

3% 

3% 

1% 

1% 

1% 

10% 

10% 

15% 

5% 

10% 

15% 

5-14% 

15% 

15% 

1% 

5% 

15% 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

DôtwBcn 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Via national 
reserve 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Via national 
reserve 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Not 
permitted 

Not 
permitted 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Whole 
country 

Whole country 

LFA's 

LFA's 

Decision concerning 

a) Reference year 

b) Potential rights 

c) Percentage of rights 
retained for the initial 
National Reserve in 
relation to the size of the 
initial producer limit 

0 

d) Percentage of rights to 
be surrendered to 
National Reserve in case 
of transfer without 
holding fsyphon") 

e) Method of transfer of 
rights without holding 

f) Leasing of rights 

g) Definition of Sensitive 
Zones out of whteh rights 
may not be transferred 

Sout»: Member States 

INDIVIDUAL  PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE NEW  MEMBER STATES - EWE AND SUCKLER  COW PREMIUM 1 
LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES  DANS LES NOUVEAUX  ETATS-MEMBRES  - PRIME A  LA  BREBIS ET A  LA VACHE ALLAITANTE  1 
ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHE  OBERGRENZEN IN DEN NEUEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN  - MUTTERSCHAF-  UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN  1 

Ewe Premium 

Suckler  Cow  Premium 

Ôsterreich 

Suomi/Finland 

Sverige 

Ôsterreich 

Suomi/Finland 

Sverige 

ANNEX VI 

d) Percentage of rights 
retained for the initial 
National Reserve in 
relation to the size of the 
initial producer limit 

e) Percentage of rights 
to be surrendered to 
National Reserve in 
case of transfer without 
holding ("syphon") 

Rights remaining 
after attribution of 
individual limits 
were sufficient 

1% 

Rights remaining 
after attribution of 
individual limits 
were sufficient 

Rights remaining 
after attribution of 
individual limits 
were sufficient 

1% 

Rights remaining 
after attribution of 
individual limits 
were sufficient 

15% 

10% 

15% 

f) Method of transfer of 
rights without holding 

Between 
producers 

g) Leasing of rights 

Under discussion 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

15% 

• 

Between 
producers 

i 

| 
Under discussion  j 
; 

i 

10% 

15% 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Between 
producers 

Under  discussion 

LFA's 

The whole country 

Under discussion ! 

LFA's 

The whole country 

f) Definition of Sensitive 
Zones out of which 
rights may not be 
transferred 

11nformation as received from Member States 

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO EWE AND GOAT PREMIUM - EU151 
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA CHEVRE - UE15 1 

INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERZIEGENPRÂMIE * EUR151 

ANNEX VII 

A 
Premiums paid in reference year 

B 

Extra 
LFA reserve 

C 
Additional 
rights 

D=A+B+C 
Total potential 
rights3 

E 
Initial individual 
limits 

F 
Initial National 
Reserve 

G 
Rights available 
(1993 and 1994) 

H 

I « G - (H/2) 

Of which: 
at 50% 

Conversion to 
full rights (1995)3 

0 
0 
8 
78 
161 
64 
36 
68 
0 
0 
23 
128 

566 

1 
1 
9 
1 
8 
31 
54 
0 
0 
30 
14 
109 

70 
104 
.  1.330 
10.990 
19.665 
7.850 
4.959 
9.561 
4 
866 
2.742 
20.028 

69 
101 
1.344 
9.564 
18.195 
7.100 
4.755 
7.381 
4 
839 
2.541 
18.985 

1 
3 
98 
877 
1.468 
742 
208 
1.706 
0 
92 
169 
826 

70 
104 
1.442 
10.441 
19.663 
7.842 
4.963 
9.087 
4 
931 
2.710 
19.811 

0,10 
0,50 
19,30 
7,70 
530,10 
0,14 
13,80 
193,40 
0,00 
2,40 
40,30 
639,00 

69,95 
103,75 
1.432,35 
11.037,15 
19.397,95 
7.841,93 
4.956,10 
9.590,30 
4,00 
929,80 
2.689,85 
19.491,50 

258 

78.169 

70.878 

6.190 

77.068 

1446,74 

77.544,63 

206 
80 
180 

78.635 

i 

I 

i 

i 

Rights X 1000 

Member State 

Belglque/BelglS 
Danmark 
Deutschland 4 
Ellas 
Espafla 
France 
Ireland 
Italia 
Luxemburg 
Nederiand 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 

Ewes 

Goats 

Total* 

69 
103 
1.313 
6.585 
17.004 
7.581 
4.869 
7.861 
4 
836 
2.229 
19.791 

0 
0 
0 
3.726 
2.492 
174 
0 
1.032 
0 
0 
476 
0 

69 
103 
1.313 
10.311 
19.496 
7.755 
4.869 
8.893 
4 
836 
2.705 
19.791 

Sub-total EC-12 

68.245 

7.900 

76.145 

Ôsterreich * 
Suomi/Finland * 
Sverigeb 

Total EU-15 

1 Based on information supplied by Member States 
2 Verified by the Commission with exception of Deutschland and Italy (Sicily) 
3 Including 600.000 additional rights for Italy and Greece 
4 Excluding New Lander 
5 Art 5e(1) of Reg. 3013/89 

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO SUCKLER COW PREMIUM - EU15 (1) 
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - UE15 
INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR15 

ANNEX VIII 

A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

Reference 
year total 

Additional 
rights (mixed 
herd)(3) 

Additional rights 
(non-payment) 
(4) 

Additions! fight* 
for 
oxtontfficstfon 
(*) 

Less favoured 
areas (Q1.%) 
(Addreserve) 

Total potential 
rights (A-E) 

O 
1. Wtial Individual 
ceMngs (non-less 
favoured) 

H 

I 

J 

2. Initial individual 
ceilings (less 
favoured) 

Additional rights 
sftocstod (ftibcod 
herd) (6) 

National initial 
reserve 

Total available 
rights (G+H+l+E) 

403.029 

36.080 

3.022 

1.457 

443.588 

255.495 

145.700 

36.080 

4.856 

443.588 

Belgique/ 
Belgiê 

Danmark 

121.099 

13.320 

1.518 

0 

135.937 

134.144 

0 

837 

956 

135.937 

Deutschland(2) 
Deutschland-
NBL(7) 

354.931 

111.240 

2.674 

2.277 

471.122 

119.813 

224.174 

31.378 

91.207 

468.849 

180.000 

180.000 

EHas (1990) 

137.775 

10.520 

411 

1.072 

149.778 

13.353 

107.225 

250 

27.878 

149.778 

Esparla 

1.363.610 

84.320 

2.462 

12.135 

1.462.527 

135.475 

1.192.906 

9.916 

112.095 

1.462.527 

France (8) 

3.616.219 

242.480 

3.443 

24.224 

3.886.366 

1.086.431 

2.422.477 

242.480 

110.754 

3.886.366 

Ireland 

1.024.757 

63.400 

10.247 

8.124 

1.106.528 

212.319 

812.438 

18.611 

55.036 

1.106.528 

Italia 

690.609 

90.160 

2.000 

5.224 

787.993 

163.097 

506.793 

2.968 

107.910 

785.992 

Luxembourg 

11.648 

3.000 

Nederland 

67.444 

30.560 

0 

0 

117 

14.765 

0 

11.592 

2.398 

658 

14.765 

2 

98.006 

66.587 

183 

6.829 

24.405 

98.006 

Portugal (9) 

240.099 

17.760 

26.741 

1.954 

286.554 

23.858 

240.875 

517 

20.684 

285.934 

UnHed Kingdom 

1.669.538 

118.320 

6.382 

11.083 

1.805.323 

551.639 

1.097.217 

11199 

123.776 

1.794.914 

TOTAL 

9.700.758 

821.160 

58.900 

67.669 

10.828.487 

2.762.211 

6.761.580 

363.463 

- 680.215 

10.813.184 

1 )  Except for those In column B, ad figures are provisionat; figures are besed on Information supplied by Member States (TO BE VERIFIED BY THE COMMISSION). 

2) Former Lander only. 

3) Regulation (EEC) 805/68, ArUd(6) and Annex II. 

4)  R  (EEC) 805/68, Art.4d(3) and R.(EEC) 3886/92. Art.29. 

5) Regulation (EEC) 3888/92, Art.38(3). Estimated figures (in the case of FR •/-15.000). 

6) R.(EEC) 3886/92, Art. 29. 

7) Not including rights resulting from the former German Lander switch. Régulation (EEC) 805/68 Art 4k(1 Xb). 

8) Not including add'itional rights destined to DOM (fewer than 35.000 rights). Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 Art.5(3) as amended by R.(EC) 2598/95. 

9) Not Including up to 78.740 rights for extensive livestock after collectivisation. Regulation (EC) 1017/94 Art. 2 as amended by R. (EC) 1461/95. 

I 
I 

ANNEX IX 

EVOLUTION  IN  EWE A ND  SUCKLER  C OW  PREMIA  GRANTED  -  (1992-1995) 

EVOLUTION  DES  PRIMES  OCTROYEES  A  LA  BREBIS  ET A  LA  VACHE  ALLAITANTE  -  (1992-1995) 

ENTWICKLUNG  DER  GEWAHRTEN  MUTTERSCHAF-  UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN  -  (1992-1995) 

Premfa x 1000 

EWE AND GOAT PREMIA GRANTED 

SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED 

Member State 

Potential Rights1 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995* 

MS 

Potential Rights2 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995* 

Belglque/BelgiS 
Danmark 
Deutschland 
Ettas 
Espafta 
France 
Ireland 
Italia 
Luxemburg 
Nedorland 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 

fs. 

L 

70 
104 
1.330 
10.990 
19.665 
7.850 
4.959 
9.561 
4 
866 
2.742 
20.028 

70 

• 

* 

106 
1.876 
10.972 
19.788 
7.393 
5.024 
9.737 
4 
854 

2.652 
19.543 

69 
85 
1.742 
9.640 
17.818 
7.292 
4.825 
9.541 
4 
735 
2.675 
18.526 

• 

* 
« 

• 

• 
* 

64 
81 
1.721 
11.974 
17.009 
7.306 
4.656 
10.652 
3 
715 
2.840 
20.416 

* 

• 
» 
* 

• 
• 
• 
* 
* 

64 
72 
1.753 
11.974 
19.232 
7.237 
4.674 
11.365 
4 
727 
2.695 
20.077 

BE 
DK 
DE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
IR 
IT 
LX 
NL 
PT 
UK 

AAA 
136 
651 
150 
1.463 
3.886 
1.107 
788 
15 
98 
287 
1.805 

403 
121 
447* 
132 
1.364 
3.616 
1.025 
691 
12 
67 
240 
1.670 

435 
102 
413 
126 
1.243 
3.603 
884 
674 
13 
50 
226 
1.558 

424 
104 
506 
117 
1.171 
3.492 
910 
807 
13 
52 
238 
1.552 

427 
101 
535 
120 
1.380 
3.600 
955 
783 
15 
60 
286 
1.591 

Subtotal EC-12 

78.169 

78.019 

• 

72.952 

• 

77.437 

• 

79.874 

EC-12 

10.830 

9.788 

9.327 

9.386 

9.853 

ôsterreich 
Suoml/Flnland 
Sverige 

206 
80 
180 

160 
64 
152 

OST 
SU 
SV 

325 
55 
155 

m 

Total EU-15 

78.635 

80.250 

EU-15 

11.365 

267 
26 
127 

10.273 

4 information provided by Member  States 
(figures in italics are provisional or estimated daim data) 
1 From Annex  VI 
2 From Annex VII 

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - EWE PREMIUM 
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE 

ANNEX  X 

(a) 
Transfers w/o holding 

Rights ceded to National Reserve due to 
(b) 
Insufficient usage 

(c) 
Total 

I 

Rights attributed 
free of charge 
from NR 

Of which: rights 
from supplementary 
LFA reserve* 

Balance of 
National Reserve 
(end 1993) 

Member State 

Initial 
National Reserve 

to 

Belglque/Belglô 
Danmark 
Deutschland 
Ellas 
Espafta 
France 
Ireland 
Italia 
Luxemburg 
Nederland 
Portugal 
United Kingdom » 

801 
2.576 
98.730 
876.775 
1.425.329 
742.061 
204.581 
1.533.633 
444 
58.091 
166.065 
815.137 

TOTAL EU-12 

5.924.223 

117.293 

192 
1.247 
10.264 
17.760 
46.076 
0 
6.981 
2.647 
0 
0 
4.545 
27.581 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 

192 
1.247 
10.264 
17.760 
46.076 
0 
6.981 
2.647 
0 
0 
4.545 
27.581 

972 
2.290 
88.948 
817.956 
1.462.625 
662.958 
188.464 
1.404.482 
390 
27.614 
169.132 
782.137 

99 
0 
6.650 
78.597 
152.632 

36.513 
25.222 
390 
0 

127.940 

-

-

21 
1.533 
20.046 
76.579 
8.780 
79.103 
23.098 
131.798 
54 
30.477 
1.478 
60.581 

117.293 

5.607.968 

428.043 

433.548 

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 
2 Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89 
3 Figures liable to change as a resuit of reassessment of national reserve attribution 

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES  EN 1993 - PRIME A  LA VACHE  ALLAITANTE 
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATUCHEN  RESERVEN 1993 -  MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE 

ANNEX  XI 

Member State 

Initial 
National Reserve 

Belglque/BelgIS 
Danmark 
Deutschland4 
Ellas 
Espafla 
France 
Ireland 
Italia 
Luxemburg 
Nederland 
Portugal 
United Kingdom* 

6.313 
956 
93.484 
28.950 
124.230 
134.978 
63.160 
113.134 
775 
24.407 
20.684 
134.859 

TOTAL EU-12 

745.930 

Of which: 
LFA Reserve 

-

1.457 

2.277 
1.072 
12.135 
24.224 
8.124 
5.224 
775 
2 
1.954 
11.083 

68.327 

Rights ceded to National Reserve due to 
(b) 
Insufficient 
usage' 

(a) 
Transfers w/o 
holding ("syphon") * 

(c) 
Total 

Rights attributed 
free of charge 
fromNR 

Of which:  righto 
from LFA reserve* 

Balance of 
National Reserve 
(end 1993) 

Of which: rights 
from LFA reserve 

-

-

-
-
-

376 
1.389 
379 

708 

550 

144 
1.943 

5.489 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

0 

-

-

-
-
-

376 
1.389 
379 

708 

550 

144 
1.943 

5.489 

6629 
1.372 
38.763 
25.646 
74.651 
58.925 
20.557 
54.777 
172 
7.933 
20.308 
50.127 

359.850 

-

-
-

-

1457 

480 
1.072^ 
12.135 
43.325 

172 

1954 
16.807 

77.402 

60 
973 
55.100 
3.304 
50.287 
76.053 
43.153 
58.357 
603 
16.474 
520 
66.675 

-
-

-
-
-

-
-

1.797,50 

8.124,00 
5.224,00 
602,80 
2,00 

391.559 

^_ 

15.750,30 

. 

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 
2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 
3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 
4 Former Lander only 
5 Figures liable to change follwoing reassessment of attribution 

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - EWE PREMIUM 1 
FONCTIONNEMENT DE RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 1 
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG  DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN  RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE 1 

ANNEX XII 

Balance of 

Rights ceded to National Reserve due to 

Rights  attributed 

Of which:  rights 

Balance of 

Member State 

National Reserve 

(end 1993) 

(a) 
Transfers w/o 

(b) 
Insufficient 

holding ("syphon") 

usage 

Belgique/Belglë 

l\i 

Danmark 

Deutschland 

Ellas 

Espafta 

France 

Ireland 

Italia 

Luxemburg 

Nederland 

Portugal 

United Kingdom * 

21 
1.533 
20.046 
76.579 
8.780 
79.103 
23.098 
131.798 
54 
30.477 
1.478 
60.581 

223 
10.199J 
7.594 
18.784 
86.589 
37.126 
14.751 
7.444 

1.025 
2.858 
27.184 

-

TOTAL EU-12 

433.548 

213.777 

0 
0  . 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 

0 

(c) 
Total 

free of charge 

from LFA 

National Reserve 

from NR 

reserve* 

(end 1994) 

^ 

244 
7.682 
25.758 
91.102 
6.297 
41.721 
34.741 
0 

3.574 
4.308 
27.184 

223 
10.199 
7.594 
18.784 
86.589 
37.126 
14.751 
7.444 

-

-  -

1.025 
2.858 
27.184 

0 
0 
1.308 
0 
0 

0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

-

-

0 
4.050 
1.882 
4.261 
89.072 
74.508 
3.108 
139.242 
-

27.928 
28 
60.581 

213.777 

242.611 

1.308' 

404.660 

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 
2 Derived from Art, 5c of Reg. 3013/89 
3 Figures liable to change following reassessment of the national reserve attribution 

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 
FONCTIONNEMENT  DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A  LA VACHE ALLAITANTE1 
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG  DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERKUHPRAMIE  1 

ANNEX  XIII 

Member State 

Initial 
National Reserve 

Belgique/Belgl5 
Danmark 
Deutschland4 
Ellas 
Espafta 
France 
Ireland 
Italia 
Luxemburg 
Nederland 
Portugal 
United Kingdom  ' 

N 

Of which: 
LFA Reserve 

0,00 
0,00 
1.797,50 

-

• 
-
-

0,00 

602,80 
2,00 
0,00 
0,00 

60,00 
973,00 
55.100,20 
3.304,20 
50.287,00 
76.053,00 
43.153,00 
58.357,00 
602,80 
16.474,10 
520,10 
86.675,00 

I 

Rights ceded to National Reserve due to 
(•) 
(b) 
Insufficient 
Transfers w/o 
usage1 
holding ("syphon") * 

(c) 
Total 

Rights attributed 
free of charge 
fromNR 

Of which: rights 
from LFA reserve* 

Balance of 
National Reserve 
(end 1993) 

Of which: rights 
from LFA reserve 

995,00 
58,00 
996,60 
83,60 
1.799,70 
11.326.00 
660,00 
219,60 
31,60 
31,50 
292,40 
2.339,00 

0,00 
375,00 
0,00 
385,20 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 

995,00 
433,00 
996,60 
468,80 
1.799,70 
11.326,00 
660,00 
219,60 
31,60 
31,50 
292,40 
2.339,00 

1.055,00 
822,00 
47.391,20 
3.165,00 
0.00 
68.997,00 
19.096,00 
42.480,00 
529,80 
55,30 
489,60 
32.215.00 

1.064,40 
0,00 

0,00 

-
-
-

-
-

-
-
-
-

0,00 
584,00 
8.705.60 
608,00 
52.086.70 
18.382,00 
24.717,00 
16.096,60 
104,60 
16.450,30 
322,90 
56.799,00 

-
-

-
-
-

-
-

1797.5 

8124 
5224 
602,8 
2 

TOTAL EU-12 

391.559,40 

2.402,30 

18.833,00 

760,20 

19.593,20 

216.295,90 

1.064,40 

194.856,70 

15.750 

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg.  3886/92 
2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg.  805/68 
3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 
4 Former  Lander only 
5 Figure liable to change following reassessment of 1993 attribution 

CALENDAR FOR EWE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS  IN 1995 - EU15 
CALENDRIER POUR LES DEMANDES DE PRIME A LA BREBIS EN 1995 - UE15 
ZEUPLAN FUR DIE BEANTRAGUNG DER MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR15 

ANNEX XIV 

MEMBER STATE 

Deadlina for Parmanant  Deadlina for Tamporary  Pariod for Application for 

Deadline for attributing 

Period for Premium 

Retention Period 

Period for Application 

Tranafera(a) 

Leaalng (a) 

Right, from N Reserve 

rights from N reserve 

Application (b) 

(inclualve) 

for Fattened Lamb Premium 

Balglque/BalgIS 

14 Oct 1994 

14 Oct 1994 

15 Dec-18 Jan 

15 Dec 1994-16 Jan 1995 

17 Jan-26 Apr 1995 

15 Dec-16 Jan 

Danmark 

31  Mar 1995 

31  Mar 1995 

31  Dec 1994 

1 Mar 1995 

1  - 31  Mar 1995 

1  Apr  - 9 Jul 1995 

not applicable 

Deutschland 

1  Jun - 31  Oct 1994 

1  Jun - 31  Oct 1994 

1-31 Jan 1994 

none 

1-31  Jan  1995 

1 Feb-11 May 1995 

Ellas 

Espafla 

Franca 

Ireland 

tV3 

Italia 

1  Feb 1995 

1  Feb  1995 

1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 

1 Doc 1994-15 Feb 1995 

16 Feb-26 May 1995 

1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 

31  Mar 1995 

31  Mar 1995 

before 31 Oct 1994 

15 Jan  1995 

1-31  Mar 1995 

'1  Apr - 9 Jul 1995 

1-31  Mar 1995 

8 Jan  1995 

31 Mar 1995 

before 30 Nov 1994 

6-31  Jan  1995 

31 Jan-10 May 1995 

6 - 31  Jan  1995 

23 Jan  1995 

23 Jan  1995 

before 16 Dec 1994 

31  Oct 1995 

1)  3 -23 Jan 1995 

1)  23 Jan -  2 May 1995 

not applicable 

2)  1-16  Mar 1995 (c) 

2)  16 Mar-23 Jun 1995(c) 

24 Mar 1995 

24 Mar 1995 

before 15 Feb 1995 

16 Apr 1995 

15 Feb-24 Mar 1995 

25 Mar-2 Jul 1995 

15 Feb-24 Mar 

Luxembourg 

20 Jan  1995 

20 Jan  1995 

1 Feb-15 Feb 1995 

15 Feb-25 May 1995 

not applicable 

Nederiand 

Osterreich 

Portugal 

Suoml 

Sverige 

14-DBC-94 

not applicable 

5 Dec-30 Dec 1994 

20 Feb 1995 

20 Feb -23  Mar 1995 

23 Mar • 30 Jun 1995 

not applicable 

not applicable 

not applicable 

not applicable 

not applicable 

7 - 31  Jan  1995 

1 Feb-11 May 1995 

15 Dec 1994 

15 Dec 1994 

15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 

7 Sep 1995 

15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 

1 Mar-8 Jun 19951 

15 Jan -28 Feb 1995 

not applicable 

not applicable 

not applicable 

not applicable 

13-31 Mar 1995 

1  Apr • 9 Jul 1995 

not applicable 

9 Mar 1995 

9 Mar 1995 

1  - 31  Jan 1995 

20 Feb 1995 

1  -31 Mar 1995 

1 Apr-9  Jul 1995 

1-30 Apr  1995 

United Kingdom 

- 6B 

20 Feb 1995 

20 Feb 1995 

1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 

not yet known 

1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 

1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 

15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 

2) 15 Jan-20 Feb 1995 

2)21 Feb 1995-31 May 1995 

•NI 

20 Feb  1995 

20 Feb 1995 

1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 

not yet known 

1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 

1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 

15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 

2) 15 Feb-15 Mar 1995 

2) 15 Mar 1995-23 Jun 1995 

S'-'bser'çrts: s«or unta tha date of premium application; b=or up to 20 days later, with 1%/day reduction; c=second application period only for producers failing to receive rights from NR 

ISSN 0254-1475 

COM(96) 430 final 

DOCUMENTS 

EN 

03 

Catalogue number  : CB-CO-96-430-EN-C 

ISBN 92-78-08030-6 

Office far Official  Publications of the European Communities 

L-2985 Luxembourg 

3o