COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES- Implementation of the guidelines laid down in the communication from Commission of 7 September 1994 (COM (94) 383) and in the conclusions of the Essen European Council
Date: 1996-04-19
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: fight against crime, illicit trade, nuclear fuel, nuclear safety, radioactive materials

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

Brussels,  19.04.1996 
COM(96)171 final 

COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMMISSION 
TO  THE  COUNCIL  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
AND RADIOACTIVE  SUBSTANCES 

Implementation of the guidelines laid down 
in the communication from Commission of 7 September 1994 
(COM(94)383) and in the conclusions of the Essen European Council 

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
AND RADIOACTIVE  SUBSTANCES 

Implementation of the guidelines laid down 
in the communication from Commission of 7 September  1994 
(COM(94)383) and in the conclusions of the Essen European Council 

Table of contents 

Introduction 

I. 

Nuclear trafficking  in 1995 

II. 

Controls on nuclear materials 

III. 

Radioprotection aspects 

IV.  Customs cooperation 

Conclusions 

Annex  1 

Cooperation  with the  republics  of the  former  USSR under  the  existing 

contractual  framework 

Annex 2 

Cooperation in the field  of safeguards  (Safeguards  Directorate) 

Annex 3 

Cooperation  in the framework of Technical Assistance 

yl 

INTRODUCTION 

On 7 September  1994 the Commission adopted a communication to the Council and Parliament 
on the subject of the illegal trade in radioactive substances and nuclear materials (COM(94)383). 
In it the Commission proposed that the EUs response focus on: 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

improving  the  operating  conditions  in the  nuclear  sectors  of the  countries  concerned 
(cooperation  under  the  aegis  of  Tacis,  the  Moscow-based  International  Science  and 
Technology Centre and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate); 
dialogue and cooperation with the countries concerned under the various agreements and 
in the context of the common external and security policy; 
greater cooperation within the EU (customs cooperation and tighter checks, cooperation 
in  the  context  of  justice  and  home  affairs  policy,  and  coordination  of  industrial 
assistance). 

This issue was given high priority under the German Presidency.  Five Council working parties 
plus the embassies of the countries concerned were mobilized to prepare a report for the Essen 
European  Council,  which  declared  its  concern  about  the  smuggling  of  nuclear  material  and 
approved  a number  of  measures  and  guidelines  aimed  at  tackling the problem.  It  asked  the 
Commission and the Member States to step up cooperation in this field and to give the countries 
of origin and of transit effective  support for their efforts  on the ground.  It also asked all states 
that had not yet done so to place sensitive civilian materials (plutonium and enriched uranium) 
under international control. 

The Commission and the Member States have continued work since the summit, liaising with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies.  These efforts are spurred 
by the common interest of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European and  former 
Soviet countries in this issue, and take the form of cooperation based on specific projects within 
an overall  framework. 

The European Parliament has displayed an unflagging  interest in the issue of illicit trafFicking. 
MEPS have supported the  Commission's  initiatives by taking part  in conferences  and making 
visits.  Budgetary  resources  have  been  allocated  for  operations  in  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European and former  Soviet countries. 

This  paper  describes  what  has  been  done  by  way  of  follow-up  to  the  Commission's 
communication of September 1994 and the conclusions of (he Essen Summit 

I 

NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING IN 1995 

Few  cases  of  nuclear  trafficking  have  come  to  light  since  publication  of  the  Commission's 
communication of September  1994 but illegal imports of radioactive steel scrap and of illegally 
dumped radioactive sources are on the increase, as are cases involving trafficking  of radioactive 
substances, blackmail attempts and hoaxes. 

The Commission's data bank currently contains 33 reported nuclear-related cases, most of them 
in Germany.  The Commission has been led to understand, however, through inter-institutional 
channels, that this list is not exhaustive.  A few cases have not yet been formally notified to the 
Commission, as they should have been under the Euratom Treaty.  The probable reasons for this 
are: 

a lack of awareness of this specific provision of the Treaty on the part of those making 
seizures; 
a  concern  to  maintain  confidentiality  so  that  inquiries  still  under  way  will  not  be 
jeopardized; 

1  6>> 

a desire of judicial authorities to prevent interference by the executive in cases still before 
the courts. 

The Commission has become aware of this state of affairs  only recently and, in an attempt to 
remedy the situation, has embarked on an information  campaign among the Member  States to 
encourage them to adopt a procedure for declaring cases in accordance with the requirements and 
time-limits  laid  down  in  the  Regulations,  while  receiving  an  assurance  of  the  necessary 
confidentiality. 

And while the number of new such cases is apparently dwindling in the EU and Europe generally, 
the most noteworthy case so far  was discovered  in December  1994 by the Czech police, who 
arrested smugglers in possession of nearly three kilos of uranium oxide with an isotope content 
of high strategic value (uranium 235) close on 87%.  Military quality is usually at the 93% mark. 

An important distinction must be drawn between the legal frameworks governing the 
materials in question, namely (simplifying somewhat) between: 

nuclear materials, which are materials subject to safeguaids under the Euratom 
Treaty, the IAEA or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NFI) because they 
pose a risk - great or small, depending on the material - of direct or indirect 
military use: these materials (e.g. plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) are very 
dangerous and could lead to nuclear proliferation as well as contamination; 

radioactive  substances, which are not subject to safeguaids: the risk of irradiation 
derives from the radiation emitted by the substance but the substance itself cannot 
be used as a fuel in its present state. 

IL 

1. 

CONTROL ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS 

Common foreign  and security policy 

The EU has sounded  out non-member  countries  on this  issue, notably  in connection with the 
implementation of the joint action on the preparation of the  1995 conference  on the review and 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the appeal to all states that had not yet done 
so  to  place  sensitive  materials  for  civilian  use  (plutonium  and  enriched  uranium)  under 
international control. 

In follow-up  to this joint  action, the EU is focusing  its diplomatic  efforts  on the objective  of 
achieving universal application of the NPT and strengthening the international system of nuclear 
safeguards  (the IAEA's 93+2 programme). 

2. 

Safeguards  Directorate 

Since the end of  1994 the Safeguards  Directorate has been trying to establish  links with other 
bodies working on the problem with the aim of exchanging information  and creating synergy. 
In practical terms, there have been few confiscations of nuclear materials since the Munich airport 
case and it has not proved necessary to send inspectors. 

Its  administrative  workload  has  been  heavy,  however.  The  Directorate  is  responsible  for 
transmitting all information to the national authorities and the Joint Research Centre in good time. 
Furthermore, in respect of materials seized and stored, it must also ensure that all Chapter VII 
requirements of the Euratom Treaty, which are incumbent on any holder of nuclear materials, are 
complied with. 

3. 

Cooperation between non-member countries and the Safeguards  Directorate 

The September 1994 communication described the programme of cooperation between Safeguards 
Directorate and the Russian Federation set up at the end of  1992.  The short-term aim of this 
cooperation was to devise, set up and run a modem system of nuclear material accountancy and 
control.  Parliament approved an allocation of ECU  1.8 million under this heading (B4-2001) for 
1995.  This programme has fitted  in very well with other projects run by Community, national 
and industrial bodies. 

The initial phase was successfully  completed at the end of  1994 and focused on: 

training Russian experts in accounting, supervision and control of materials for Russians; 
inspection exercises in real on-site conditions; 
courses on the use of measuring instruments and computers. 

These  basic  activities  continued  in  1995,  complemented  by  intensive  training  courses  (two 
months) for  groups of four or five in Luxembourg. 

Larger-scale projects are also being implemented: Russian specialists and Euratom inspectors join 
forces as a team to achieve a specific  goal in respect of selected groups of installations or areas 
of Russia chosen by the Russians. 

These activities and the main projects under way are described  in Annex 2.  One operation is 
particularly noteworthy since it was a "first":  in November  1995 a team of Euratom inspectors 
was invited to join  a Russian team to carry out, not an exercise, but a real  inspection  of two 
installations in the Dimitrovgrad region.  It gave rise to an extremely fruitful  exchange of know-
how. 

4. 

Role of the Joint Research Centre 

Since  1994 the JRC in the form of its Institute for  Transuranium Elements (ITU) has made a 
number of contributions to efforts  to combat trafficking  in nuclear materials: 

(a) 

It confirmed  its role as a laboratory for analysing the materials seized, in particular by: 

the isotopic analysis of the materials seized at Munich airport; 
the  comparative  analysis  of  highly  enriched  uranium  seized  in  Prague  and 
Landshut; 
the analysis of uranium seized at Mannheim; 
the analysis of suspect radioactive substances for the German authorities and for 
the Italian authorities. 

A number of courts have called on its expertise,  the most significant instances being the 
Munich,  Landshut,  Konstanz  and  Bôblingen  cases  but  there  were  also  six  others  in 
Germany. 
The German authorities have asked the ITU to organize a seminar to inform the federal 
and Land authorities about the handling and analysis of substances liable to be smuggled. 
The same authorities (Bundesloiminalamt and the Bundesamt  fur  Strahlenschutz) have 
called on the ITUs expertise to design preventive measures to deal with the packets of 
nuclear  materials  associated  with  chemical  explosives  and  in  particular  to  study 
procedures to track these packets.  It is currently working on appropriate techniques to 
do this. 
It is continuing work on setting up a data bank on the characteristics of nuclear materials. 
With  the  Commission's  help,  Russian  specialists  will  come  to  the  ITU  to  provide 
information  on the fuel  cycle and so maximize its  effectiveness. 
An international technical working party on nuclear trafficking (set up on the margins of 
the P8) has decided to launch a round robin test to improve methods of identifying the 
origin  of  the  materials  seized  and  has  drawn  up  a  work  programme  for  stepping up 
cooperation, especially as regards to the measures to be taken in situ when such materials 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

are found.  The Community and some member and non-member countries are involved 
in the working party, which last met in Karlsruhe on  1  February  1996. 

5. 

Technical assistance cooperation 

The Commission explained in its communication of September  1994 that it had decided to use some 
Phare  and  Tacis  funds  to  finance  technical  assistance  in  support  of  the  efforts  of  the  countries' 
concerned  to  improve  controls  on nuclear  materials.  This  decision,  confirmed  in  1995, won the 
unanimous support of the Member States at the meeting of the Phare-Tacis Management Committee. 
Details of the projects can be found  in Annex 3. 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

In accordance with the conclusions of the Essen Summit, the priority for Community aid has 
been training in the framework of the Russian Methodological and Training Centre (RMTC) 
of Obninsk, the setting-up of which was officially  announced by the Russian authorities in 
March 1995. 
A detailed study of the RMTC course specifications  is being drawn up with financing  from 
the  1994 Tacis budget and terms of reference have been agreed by the JRC, the Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the federal inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor) and those in charge 
of the Tacis programme. 
But without waiting for the conclusions of this study the first round of invitations of tender 
to fill five posts was launched on the basis of a feasibility  study and the first courses were 
given early this year.  More ambitious invitations to industry to tender for the  instruments 
needed by the RMTC will be published as soon as the detailed study is concluded.  The JRC 
is acting as overall project  leader, in close liaison with the appointed Russian counterparts. 

This  project  is  conceived  in  a  very  different  perspective  from  the  courses  and  seminars 
organised in the CIS and Central and Eastern European countries by the EU, the IAEA and 
other partners to serve more immediate goals.  The RMTC should be seen as a longer-term 
project to set up infrastructure  that will enable the Russians, and perhaps other countries, to 
assume responsibility for nuclear materials accountancy and control  themselves. 

If the Russian authorities and operators are to provide effective  accountancy and control of 
nuclear materials at the basic installation level, a great deal of equipment will be needed that 
can only be designed and produced by Russian industry.  To this end, a detailed study of the 
possibilities will be undertaken shortly.  The bulk of the work will be done by the Russians 
themselves but the study itself will be carried out in the framework of tripartite Russia-EU-US 
cooperation with a view to drawing on the results of the "Lab to Lab" agreements with the 
Americans. 

A detailed study will be carried out on the setting-up of a metrology centre for MINATOM 
and an analysis centre for GOSATOMNADZOR on the lines of the European centres (IRMM, 
ITU and JRC).  These two centres will be housed in the premises of the Moscow Institute of 
Inorganic Materials. 

The ITU's know-how will be made available to the Phare programme so that the authorities 
and laboratories of the Central and Eastern European countries can be  given advice on the 
handling, treatment and analysis of errant nuclear materials.  Specific requests for such help 
have been received from the Hungarian and Czech authorities.  The terms of reference  for 
technical assistance to these two countries under the Phare programme have been agreed.  The 
Bulgarian,  Polish  and  Ukrainian  authorities  have  also  expressed  great  interest  in  such 
assistance.  The Phare-Tacis management committee approved  it in principle in September 
1995. 

6. 

International  Science and Technology Center 

The Moscow Centre for  Science and Technology has been up and running since March  1994.  Its 
purpose is to convert the skills of armament specialists for use in non-military purposes.  The Centre 
draws up, approves, finances and supervises scientific and technical projects for pacific purposes,  first 
and foremost for Russian institutions and installations but also in the former Soviet republics, should 
these  countries  express  interest.  The  Centre's  projects  may  concern  measures  for  the  physical 
protection and accounting of fissile materials that draw on the know-how of scientists of the former 
Soviet Union. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  projects  (cf  annexe  3)  is  one to  combat  illicit  trafficking  in  nuclear 
materials: the TOMSK/40 project concerns system design for safeguarding nuclear materials utilized 
at complex nuclear facilities (cost USD 815 000) and involves the development of a new approach to 
safeguards  in a reprocessing plant. 

The JRC is working with the Los Alamos National Lab and JAERI of Japan in a group responsible 
for the technical  coordination of the Centre's project  40.  This covers: 

appropriate techniques for destructive and non-destructive measures; 
interaction between the accountancy system for installation materials and the regional control 
authority; 
the planning of inspections and evaluation of their  effectiveness. 

The  JRC  is  also providing  assistance  for  a project  in Kazakhstan  to  set  up  a complete  prototype 
storage facility at Baikal 1 that will include surveillance and physical protection and an NMAC system. 

A centre similar to the ICST (USTC) has been set up in Ukraine by Canada, Sweden, the US and 
Ukraine.  It began work in May last year.  Its Western partners have contributed some USD 14 million 
(the US 10 million, Canada 5 million and Sweden 1.5 million).  The EU is planning to contribute an 
amount yet to be decided (ECU 3 to 5 million). 

7. 

Cooperation from EU Member States 

All operations are the subject of detailed and regular consultations between the Member States and the 
Commission.  The  aid provided  by  some Member  States  since  1992 has  mainly  consisted  in the 
organization of seminars and exchanges of experts with the former  Soviet countries.  More concrete 
projects  are also starting up, examples being the direct cooperation between a reprocessing plant in 
the  UK  (BNFL)  and  one  in  Russia  (Mayak  RT-1)  and  between  French  (EDF)  and  Russian 
(Rosatomenergo)  nuclear  power  stations.  Sweden,  Finland  and  Germany  have  concentrated  their 
efforts  in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states, and in particular the development of a local 
accountancy system for nuclear materials. 
Finland, which has a 1200 km border with Russia, maintains close contacts with Russian federal and 
regional authorities so that it can constantly monitor the risks and strengthen border controls, both by 
helping the Russians and by developing its own installations. 

8. 

Cooperation with the United States 

A new Euratom-US Department of Energy agreement to cooperate on nuclear guarantees R&D was 
signed on 6 January  1995 by Mr Contzen of the Commission on behalf of Euratom and Mr Keliher 
for the DOE.  The agreement provides for "scientific coordination of both parties in efforts to transfer 
nuclear  safeguard  technologies  to  other  countries,  upon  their  request,  in  order  to  improve  the 
effectiveness  of their national safeguards systems".  Talks with the DOE and representatives of major 
laboratories showed that the Americans are keen to work closely with the Community and ensure that 
efforts  are complementary,  so avoiding overlaps and optimizing the use made of limited  financial 
resources.  The study on what can be offered by MINATOM and Russian industry is a good example 

of this.  Cooperation will now extend to training where there will true interaction between separate 
projects: 

use of safeguards  in a plant converting uranium and producing fuel; 
development of instruments for measuring, identifying and maintaining surveillance of nuclear 
materials; 
training operators and inspectors; 
close  technical  cooperation  concerning  analysis  procedures,  reference  materials  and  new 
methods of defining suspect consignments. 

m. 

RAPIOFROTECIION ASPECTS 

Smuggling and other illegal or uncontrolled activities with radioactive susbtances or nuclear material 
imposes considerable danger to the public and the environment. Most of the radioactive contraband 
that  has  been  confiscated  or  detected  by  Member  States  authorities  were  radioactive  sources, 
substances for industrial or medical use and contaminated metal scrap. Since the competent authorities 
of the Member  States recognized the1 seriousness of the dangers arising from illicit nuclear  traffic, 
many efforts  are being made in order to attack the problem. Many of these activities are executed in 
close cooperation with the Commission. 

1. 

Legal initiatives 

Basic Safety Standards: the performance of an effective combat against the illicit nuclear trade 
is much depending on the legal situation in the Union, in Member States as well as in third 
countries.  The  Member  States  subsume  trading  with  radioactive  substances  in  different 
legislations and consequently violations are prosecuted and punished differently. In the Central 
European and Eastern countries and countries of the CIS, most of the national legislations are 
in transitory situations, changing from old soviet-law to individual national  legislation. 
Within the EU, this  unequal  legal  consideration  of trading  in radioactive  substances  may 
change  when  the  new  Basic  Safety  Standards  will  be  in  force.  It  enlarges  the  field  of 
application of European radiation protection legislation. The new Article 2 includes import and 
export into and from the EU. It provides the advantage that national regulations in relation to 
import into the EU of radioactive substances may be harmonized. The Commission has invited 
Member States authorities to a meeting in July 1996 in order to discuss possibilities to reach 
this objective. Consequently, it will be more difficult for professional dealers to find pathways 
through different  European  legislation  in order to establish  networks for  illegal  trading in 
radioactive substances. 

Furthermore, Article 45 of the Basic Safety Standards Directive at present in force provides 
that Member  States shall  stipulate measures to be taken by the competent  authorities  with 
respect to health of the population and in particular of groups of the population who are liable 
to receive a dose in excess of the limits. 

Directive  on  Information  of the  Public:  complementary  to Article  45 of  the  Basic  Safety 
Standards, the Council enacted a Directive on the information of the public in the event of a 
radiological emergency. As defined by Article 2 of this Directive, illicit trade and  trafficking 
in radioactive susbstances and nuclear material is not directly considered as a situation where 
a nuclear emergency requires the Member States to take special initiatives and actions in order 
to safeguard the health of the population. This Directive will undergo revision when the new 
Basic  Safety  Standards  will  be  adopted  by  the  Council.  The  Commission  will  take  this 
opportunity to discuss to what extent illicit trade should be covered by this Directive. 

2. 

Cooperation with international  organizations 

The EU cooperates with the IAEA inter alia on ways of detecting radioactive substances at 
borders,  and  sends  information  to the  IAEA  database  listing  seizures  of  such  substances 
worldwide.  The  IAEA  has  worked  well  as  a  clearing  house  for  this  purpose,  and  the 
Commission for its part has often been instrumental in advancing the work there. Participants 
have on a number of occasions expressed enthusiasm for the results, which can be summarized 
as follows: 

exchange of information  on initiatives under way in related  fields; 
organization of joint activities including seminars, information packages, drafting of 
procedures to be followed  in the event of problems; 
creation of an informal  network of contacts accessible at any time. 

The last-mentioned is of particular importance given that a notable feature of the discussions 
and meetings dealing with nuclear frafficking is the sheer range of participants involved,  from 
many different  walks of life. Apart from police and other representatives dealing with these 
issues  as  a  matter  of  course  there  may  be  spokesmen  representing  corporate  interests 
concerned with protection of employees or of their particular sector. Representatives of the 
WCO (World Customs Organization), IATA (International Air Transport Association), the 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), IFALPA (International Federation of Air 
Line  Pilots  Associations),  the  EVIO (International  Maritime  Organization),  INTERPOL, 
EUROPOL and the UPU (Universal Postal Union) may be seated round a table with the UN, 
the IAEA and the Commission. 

IV. 

CUSTOMS COOPERATION 

1. 

(a) 

(b) 

On  22  November  1994  the  Directors-General  of  Customs  approved  a  twin-track  action 
programme drawn up by the Commission involving tighter controls at the external frontier and 
measures to combat actual trafficking.  A number of steps have subsequently been taken: 

At  a  meeting  on  9 and  10 February  1995 the  Community's  Deputy  Directors-General  of 
Customs approved a draft paper on general risk analysis guidelines and called for the emphasis 
to be placed on application of these techniques to nuclear materials. A section on sensitive 
products, including nuclear materials, is accordingly to be added to the guidelines and the plan 
is ultimately,  in liaison with the other Commission departments concerned, to draw up risk 
analysis sheets for this among other fields. 

As part of the MATTHEUS Programme the Commission organized a seminar in Vienna (23-
25 October 1995) on the radiological aspects of nuclear trafficking. This was attended by over 
90 participants from EU countries, 15 Central and East European countries and the CIS, and 
provided an opportunity to draw the attention of all concerned to the issue of radioprotection; 
it is to be followed up by special training courses for customs officals from EU Member States 
and the Central European countries concerned. These will take place over the next few months 
in Member States sharing borders with East European countries. Already the Commission has 
collaborated with the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety to hold two courses for 
a total of 50 customs officers,  and similar courses are to be run shortly by the Austrian and 
French authorities. Plans are also being discussed for similar projects in the UK, Denmark and 
Italy.  The aim of these  courses, which deal  with the  use of  measuring  equipment  for  the 
detection  of radioactive  substances  and other nuclear  materials,  is to upgrade the  skills of 
customs officers  responsible for controls at the  frontiers. 

(c) 

Customs have been invited to make greater use of the SCENT/CIS electronic mail network 
which links the Commission and 350 terminals throughout the Community and allows the 
direct  real-time  exchange  of  operational  information  on  known  or  suspected  cases  of 
trafficking. 

7 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

V. 

1. 

The Commission is also preparing a brochure for customs departments which will provide 
officials  directly with practical information  for use in suspicious cases. 

The Commission's technical assistance to CIS countries under the Tacis programme includes 
measures to control nuclear trafficking.  It has already supplied detection equipment  (eight 
radiation testers to Kazakhstan and five to Ukraine) and plans further operations of this type. 
Under the Phare programme the Commission approved a programme in November to facilitate 
transit  which  incorporates  technical  assistance  for  the  prevention  of  nuclear  traffficking. 
Requirements  in this and other fields are currently being assessed. 

The  customs  mutual  assistance  protocols  to  the  various  agreements  concluded  by  the 
Community (alone or jointly with the Member States) with non-member  (e.g. Central/East 
European and CIS) countries provide the authorities in the contracting parties with a basis for 
administrative cooperation in the fight against trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive 
substances. Since the entry into force of the interim agreements with Russia and Ukraine on 
1 February, the protocols can be used for cooperation with those countries on matters covered 
by the Euratom Treaty. 

The Commission is negotiating customs cooperation agreements with the Community's main 
trading  partners  (the  United  States  and  Canada)  which  include  mutual  assistance  clauses 
covering the areas governed by Community provisions, including matters coming under the 
Euratom Treaty. It also cooperates with the United States in this field, inter alia on training 
for relevant officials,  in the context of regular bilateral contacts on customs matters. 

JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 

As  proposed  in the  report  on  illicit  traffic  in radioactive  substances  and  nuclear  material 
presented to the European Council of Essen in December  1994, the mandate of the Europol 
Drugs  Unit  (Europol's  forerunner  until  the  ratification  of  the  Europol  Convention)  was 
extended to illicit trafficking  in radioactive and nuclear substances by a Joint Action of the 
Council  in March  1995. The EDU has held a workshop of law enforcement  officials  from 
Member States in which seizures have been made and has organised a European Conference 
on  illicit  trafficking  with  experts  from  the  MS,  the  Commission  and  International 
Organisations on 26/27 October  1995. At this Conference, the experts recommended several 
projects for the EDU by which the cooperation and exchange of information among Member 
States can be improved (creation of an immediate notification system on seizures, installation 
of a EU Law Enforcement Database, updated list of competent national agencies, quaterly EU 
situation Report, threat assessment analysis, comparative study of national legal instruments, 
equipment review). When the Europol Convention does come into force, illicit trafficking  in 
nuclear  and  radioactive  sustances  continues  to  be  one  of  Europol's  important  objectives. 
According  to  Article  2  §  2  Europol  shall  initially  act  to  prevent  and  combat  unlawful 
trafficking  in nuclear and radioactive susbstances. As set out in the annex to the Convention 
"crime connected with nuclear and/or radioactive materials" means the criminal offences listed 
in Article 7 (1) of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980 and 
relating to the nuclear  and/or radioactive materials defined  in Article  197 of the Euratom 
Treaty and Directive 80/836 Euratom of  15 July 1980. 

Further work among Member States in the third pillar in 1995 related to a first evaluation of 
a questionnaire on details about the fight against illicit trafficking which had been distributed 
by the  German  Presidency.  It  shows  differences  with  regard  to the  threat  assessement  in 
general, the existence of permanently installed technical equipment at land borders, seaports 
and airports  as well  with regard to bilateral  agreements  with the  CEEC and the CIS. The 
proposals for possible actions within the EU, as agreed by the Steering Group II and endorsed 

2. 

by  K4  Committee  in  November  1994,  have  partly  been  examined  and  endorsed  by  the 
European Conference  of the Europol Drug Unit. 

The Italian Presidency wishes to organize during the first semester of 1996 a seminar on the 
illicit traffic  of nuclear  material  and radioactives  susbtances  in the framework of customs 
cooperation under Title VI of the TEU. 

With regard to the cooperation with third States, the Justice and Home Affairs  Ministers of 
the EU and the CEEC met for a Conference on Combatting Drug Crime and organized Crime 
in Europe in September  1994 in Berlin. They declared to develop the cooperation inter alia 
in the fight against crimes involving radioactive and nuclear material and agreed to examine 
certain means of cooperation as preparation of joint  situation assessment,  cooperation with 
regard  to  the  protection  of  radioactive  and  nuclear  stocks,  the  setting  up  of  coordinated 
reporting  channels  and  mutual  assistance  of  the  prosecuting  authorities.  In  June  1995, a 
seminar of the EU Member Sates and the CEEC on police cooperation to combat drugs and 
organised  crime  was  held  as  part  of  the  structured  dialogue  which  specified  methods  of 
cooperation in different  fields of organised crime, including illicit trafficking  of radioactive 
and nuclear material. In the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers of the EU and the CEEC agreed at its meeting on 25 September 1995 
on an action programme to fight international organised crime which underlines, amongst other 
things, the need to sign and ratify the 1980 Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear 
Material as well as the appropriateness of the criminalization of the theft  and trafficking  in 
radioactive and nuclear material not covered by the  1980 Convention. 

With regard to the relations of the EU with Russia, combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear and 
radioactive  substances  was  identified  by the  K4  Committee  as  one  of the  matters  which 
should be fostered according to the Conclusions of the General Affairs  Council of November 
1995. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The Commission considers that the activities described above to a certain extent fulfil  the mandate 
given it by the Essen European Council. In some areas the EUs work and decision-making needs to 
be taken further  and speeded up, in conjunction with non-EC partners. The Commission is ready to 
present the necessary proposals and will continue the work already well under way. It also considers 
that these activities represent a substantial degree of implementation by the EU of the programme of 
action against nuclear trafficking  adopted at the Moscow Nuclear Summit, to whose preparation the 
EU contributed.  In the field of cooperation on justice and home affairs  the Commission will work 
closely with the EDU and international organizations to make a constructive contribution to Member 
State initiatives implementing the Essen conclusions. 

COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER USSR 
UNDER THE EXISTING CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 

Annex 1 

Partnership agreement with Russia 

Article 84 of the Agreement signed on 26 June 1994 deals with cooperation on the prevention of illicit 
activities. This is based on two-way consultations and close interaction; technical and administrative 
assistance is also provided. Implementation of cooperation activities under this article is deteirnined 
by specialist Council working parties. 

An agreement with Russia covering trade in nuclear materials is expected to be concluded by January 
next year and this might incorporate provision for measures to prevent nuclear  trafficking. 

Partnership agreement with Belarus 

The  agreement  signed  on  6  March  1995  contains  a  clause  (Article  79)  specifically  on  nuclear 
trafficking  which reads as follows: "The parties agree on the necessity to make efforts  to cooperate, 
within  the  framework  of  their  respective  powers  and  competences,  in  order  to  combat  nuclear 
smuggling. Cooperation in this area should include exchange of information,  technical  support  for 
analysing and identifying the material, administrative and technical assistance for the installation of 
efficient  customs control. Further cooperation in this field could be identified  as need arises." 

Agreements have also been concluded with Ukraine, Moldova, Kyigyzstan and Kazakhstan. 

The  first  three  make  no  mention  of  the  prevention  of  illicit  activities  but  the  agreement  with 
Kazakhstan incorporates a clause providing for cooperation in this field, i.e. the same as Article 84 
of the agreement with Russia. 

The agreements with Georgia, Amienia (initialled 15 December 1995) and with Azeibaijan (initialled 
18 December  1995) also contain provision for certain aspects of prevention of illicit activities. 

All the partnership and cooperation agreements provide: 

either for an agreement on trade in nuclear products (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, 

or for the possibility of such an agreement  if necessary, failing which the Euratom 
Treaty applies (Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). 

10 

Annex 2 

CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SAFEGUARDS 

Introduction 

1. 

The co-operation between Euratom and the Russian Federation in the field of safeguards 
was initiated in  1992 and formalised  in 1993.  Member States of the European Union, 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Commission  realised  that  immediate  efforts  were 
required to cooperate in the field of nuclear safeguards  with CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) republics, including, notably, the Russian Federation. The objectives 
were: 

• 

• 

• 

To upgrade the nuclear materials accountancy and control system in CIS republics 
to  the  same  standards  as  those  maintained  in  countries  which  have  substantial 
nuclear programmes. 
To  help  to  ensure  that  such  a  system  would  comply  with  the  safeguards 
requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and; 
As a consequence, to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and to 
the  minimisation  of  hazards  to  the public  through  the  illicit  transfer  of  nuclear 
materials. 

2.  Due  to  the  need  to  make  optimum use  of  the  limited  resources,  a first phase  of  co 
operation with the Russian Federation was carried out during  1993 and  1994, following 
the  provision  of  funds  by  the  European  Parliament  under  budget  line  B4-200T.  A 
meticulous co-ordination structure - i.e. project-oriented  - was agreed with the Russian 
authorities that proved efficient  in respect of transparency, documentation of the results, 
project  management and resource allocation. 

3. 

The permanent participants in this co-operation are: 

• 
• 

• 

Gosatomnadzor (GAN) - the Russian federal  inspectorate; 
the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia (Minatom) which is the major  nuclear 
operator in Russia; 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DCS), DG XVII-E, and 
the Community's Joint Research Centre (JRC). 

Moreover, right from the start, participation and support were requested and obtained  from 
Member  State  authorities  and,  notably,  from  operators  of  nuclear  installations  in  the 
European Union.  Without this support the training activities performed  during the first 
phase would have remained largely academic. 

4.  A first phase of the co-operation - essentially related to training and the elaboration and 
discussion  of  concepts  and  approaches  -  was  completed  at  the  end  of  1994;  three 
application projects  (see below) were initiated as a second phase of the co-operation in 
1995, in parallel with continuation of seminars and training activities. 

Results of the first phase 

5. 

The actions  carried out in  1993 and  1994 may be subdivided as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 

Training and  familiarisation; 
Nuclear materials control system design; 
Seminars; 
Inspection exercises. 

11 

The  objectives  of  these  actions  were to  familiarise  the  Russian  participants  with  the 
preparation, execution and evaluation/conclusion of inspections as carried out by Euratom. 

In December  1994 the experience  gained was evaluated  during a workshop. The main 
conclusions  were that  inspection  activities  or  exercises  provided  essential  'on the job' 
training and that they should be expanded to further  types of installations. 

6. 

The cost of the first phase of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in safeguards 
amounted to  1.5 Mo  ECU.  This expenditure was financed from the budget line, made 
available by the European Parliament. 

The Second Phase of the Co-operation 

7.  After  completion of the first phase of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in 
safeguards, the Russian side officially proposed four major projects/1) all relating to the 
practical  implementation  of  Nuclear  Material  Accountancy  and  Control  (NMAC)  in 
Russia, based on the results of the first phase described earlier.  One of the projects had 
to be abandoned.  Three are pursued with success.  These projects, usually coded MENS, 
PROCS and CISNER-project,  are described  in some detail  later  in the document.  The 
Russian  side  has  outlined  on  record  the  vital  importance  of  all  these  projects,  their 
appreciation of the work performed and the usefulness of the results achieved, which they 
described as very significant  and essential. 

8. 

9. 

The idea underlying the applications projects was that the Russian experts would achieve 
the  design  of  relevant  systems,  concepts  and approaches  through  day-to-day contacts, 
discussions and co-operation with the corresponding Euratom staff, while the necessary 
design tools (e.g. computers, documentation) and infrastructure would be made available 
by the Commission. 

Further projects have been added to this list during the meeting of the Joint Co-ordination 
Group (JCG)  in December  1995.  Amongst  these,  it  is envisaged to prepare  a  further 
"Physical Inventory-Taking and Verification Project (PITV)" in complex nuclear facilities. 
This project  is proposed to include: 

•  The utilisation of Euratom experience in methodological aspects for the development 

of the methods and procedures at the selected installations; 

•  The practical execution of physical inventory-takings and verification; 
•  Testing of Euratom safeguards  equipment and instruments during the practical part 

of the project; 

•  Training in nuclear material accounting and physical  inventory-taking of the plant 

personnel at the research centre. 

10.  The total cost is evaluated to be some six million ECU, of which the Euratom contribution 
is  estimated  at  about  3 MECU  for  1996 and  was  about  1.8  Mo  ECU  for  1995; the 
Russian side is expected to contribute at least the same amount but mainly in terms of 
manpower. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

11.  From the first 3 years of the Euratom - Russian Federation co-operation in the field of 

safeguards  it may be concluded that: 

• 

The training and design phase was completed by the end of 1994. 

(1> 

Later reduced  to 3 due to difficulties of access to data for Gosatomnadzor inspectors. 

12 

The  second-project  oriented-phase  must  be  encouraged  and  pursued  because  it 
appears  to  be  the  best  means  to  introduce  effective  modern  nuclear  material 
accountancy  and  control  be  involving  a  maximum  of  executive  staff  from  the 
beginning. 
The results are encouraging and their value has been officially  recognised by the 
Russian partners as significant  and essential; 
Some  practical  problems  are,  however,  impeding  faster  progress:  the  language 
barrier,  the  obtaining  of  visas  for  Russian  experts  at  short  notice,  problems  of 
logistics such as transport of instruments to Russia, limited manpower resources. 
Euratom safeguards has also benefited from this co-operation,  as DCS staff were 
required  to  reflect  on  and  to  describe  Euratom  safeguards  to  outsiders  who 
professionally  reviewed its methodology and practices. 
The funds  made available by Parliament were  sufficient. 

DETAILED INFORMATION 
ON THE ONGOING PROJECTS 

1.  MINATOM CENTRALISED INFORMATION SYSTEM (the NUNS project) 

1.1.  Project description 

The MINS project  (MINATOM Computerised  NMAC Information  System) was  established 
jointly  between  Minatom,  the  main  operator  of  the  Russian  Federation  and  the  Euratom 
Safeguards  Directorate.  It  comprises  the  study,  design,  specification,  realisation  and 
implementation  of  a  centralised  and  computerised  information  system  for  Minatom.  It  was 
decided that MINS should concentrate at first on a centralised headquarters system, linked to 
computerised work places at two nuclear power plants, at one Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 
fuel fabrication plant and at the controlling operator organisations). The outcome of the project 
should provide Minatom with a solid informatics and accountancy platform, which must enable 
the  various  users to  gain experience with  a computerised  system and which the  responsible 
Russian organisations can subsequently extend to a comprehensive computerised NMAC system 
for the entire fuel  cycle in the Russian Federation. 

The general objectives of the MINS project  can be summarised as follows: 

development of a regulatory framework and accompanying document 

improvement of the centralised information  (headquarters) system 

improvement of the NMAC system at facility  level (computerised work stations) 

MTNS  includes  the  following  features:  high  system  reliability,  optimum  use  of  modern 
technology for fast and secure information transmission and processing, extensive database for 
storage and management of NMAC data. 

Given the scope of the project, the following  organisations participate: 

MINATOM,  the  Ministry  of  Atomic  Energy  of  the  Russian  Federation,  which  is  the 
requesting Authority and eventually responsible for the implementation; 
TSNIIAtominforrn, which is a large research and information handling institute depending 
from  Minatom; a specially created section of Atominform has been entrusted to carry out the 
majority of the work involved in MINS; 

13 

•  ROSENERGOATOM a public organisation ('operator organisation') grouping and supervising 

most of the RF nuclear power plants; 

•  TVEL,  the  public  organisation  ('operator  organisation')  to  which  belongs  the  LEU  fuel 

fabrication plant at Novosibirsk; 

•  VNHA, scientific research institute for automation; 
•  VNIINM, scientific research institute for inorganic materials; 

•  GOSATOMNADZOR, me RF federal  safeguards Authority; 
•  EURATOM, the partner providing information and expertise. 

1.2  Project evolution and status 

The MINS project was started officially  in September  1994.  The period from September 1994 
to July 1995 allowed both sides to get to know each other's working methods, to organise fact 
finding missions and to establish a preliminary work schedule. 

The current project team comprises 21 team members (7 from Euratom) plus an additional  10 
to 15 specialists on the Russian side who get involved depending on specific tasks to be carried 
out.  The project  is expected to be completed by the end of 1999. 

As a result of intensive periods of information exchange, the Russian experts issued a substantial 
number of technical notes including a detailed feasibility report.  The system's architecture had 
been drawn up and relevant documents have been translated and discussed in technical meetings. 

Today the project has arrived at a turning point: the nuclear power plants to be included in MTNs 
were chosen to be Kalilnin (WWER1000) and Smolensk (RBMK  1000). The fuel  fabrication 
plant  will  be  the  LEU  plant  at  Novosibirsk.  Each  will  be  equipped  with  appropriate 
computerized workstations.  Also the operator organisation ROSENERGOATOM,  controlling 
the  nuclear  power  plants  and  the  central  MINATOM  office  itself  will  receive  appropriate 
workstations. 

With the initial analysis and feasibility completed, the focus  is now on equipment  acquisition 
and  installation,  specific  training  and  preparation  for  the  programming  of  the  database 
management system. A first delivery of equipment is reasonably expected for mid 1996. 

2. 

PHYSICAL INVENTORY TAKING PROCEDURES: the PROC project 

2.1. 

Project description 

The  PROC  project  was  established  between  Minatom.  Gosatomnadzor  and  the  Euratom 
Safeguards  Directorate  for  the development  of joint  recommendations  on Physical  Inventory 
Taking (PIT) PROCedures at WWER-1000 Nuclear Power Plants and a LEU Fuel Fabrication 
Plant. 

The intention was to cover the whole range of activities relating to physical inventory taking: 
accounting system arrangements, records audit, documentation, physical preparation, organisation. 

2.2. 

Project evolution and status 

The project  work started in July  1994 and was finalised in  February 1996. 

•  The specific plants chosen for the exercise were the Kalinin WWER-1000 Nuclear Power 
Plant and the NOVOSIBIRSK LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant.  Technical information  about 
plant operations, material accounting arrangements and, in particular, on physical inventory 

14 

procedures has been provided by the operators.  Both plants have been visited by the project 
team to review the information provided and examine the materials accounting and physical 
inventory arrangements. 

•  The  second  stage  was  the  production  of  the  documents.  Euratom  provided  general 
recommendations  on  physical  inventory  taking  and  this  was  translated  into  Russian, 
discussed  and  agreed.  Following  this  Euratom  produced  two  documents  providing 
recommendations on physical inventory taking in Nuclear Power Plants and in LEU Fuel 
Fabrication Plants.  Finally the operator (Minatom), on the basis of the agreed  guideline 
documents,  produced  specific  PIT  procedures  for  the  Kalinin  and  Novosibirsk  plants, 
including operational preparation, inventory methods, evaluation etc. 

• 

It was agreed that the 5 documents produced in the project ( each available in English and 
Russian) would be implemented in the following project (PITV - full PIT exercises followed 
by physical inventory verification (PIV) by Gosatomnadzor). The documents may then be 
reviewed in the light of experience. 

3. 

PHYSICAL INVENTORY TAKING AND VERIFICATION: the PITV Project 

3.1. 

Project description 

This PITV project  is a follow-up project  of the PROC project. It will offer  the opportunity to 
apply, test and evaluate in practice the documents produced during the PROC and PITV projects. 
Therefore  all three organisations involved are very interested in the results of this project. 

The PITV project was established between Mnatom. Gosatomnadzor f GAN) and the Euratom 
Safeguards  Directorate  (ESP)  for  two  consecutive  Physical  Inventory  Takings  (PIT)  with 
Euratom participation at Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Novosibirsk LEU fabrication 
plant  based  on the  recommendations  and  procedures  produced  during the  above  referred  to 
PROC project, and Physical Inventory Verifications (PIV) performed by GAN according to PIV 
recommendations and procedures to be developed during this project. 

The intention is to apply, test and if necessary revise the recommendations and procedures for 
PITs  produced  during  the  previous  PROC  project  and  to  develop  recommendations  and 
procedures for PIVs. To cover a complete Material Balance Period (MBP) two consecutive PITs 
will be performed at Kalinin NPP and the Novosibirsk LEU fabrication plant followed by PIVs 
performed  by GAN after the second PITs. 

3.2. 

Project evolution and status 

3.2.1.  The  project  has just  started  with  a  preliminary  meeting  between  the  three  above-

mentioned organisations in February 1996 in Luxembourg and is expected to be  finalised 
in 1998. 

3.2.2.  The initial PITs at the two installations chosen will be performed probably towards the 

end of 1996. 

3.2.3.  The second PITs closing the MBPs are planned for the end of  1997, followed  by the 
PIVs performed by GAN.  Use of measurement instrumentation and computers will be 
considered for PITs and PIVs. 

15 

4. 

COMPUTERISED NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING: the CISNER Project 

4.1. 

Project description 

The CISNERproject was established jointly between Gosatomnadzor (GAN). the Russian federal 
control agency, and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate for the development and implementation 
of a computerised nuclear material accounting and Control Information  System for the North-
European Region of Gosatomnadzor (GAN). 

The system to be developed will be a multi-level nuclear material accounting and control system 
involving  all  the  levels  of  information  flow  from  the  plant  operator,  over  the  local  GAN 
inspector, the GAN field office  up to the GAN Regional Headquarters  in St. Petersburg. The 
system will have following features and characteristics  : rapid transmission and processing of 
information, high reliability of the information transmitted and processed, high system reliability, 
reduction of routine work to a minimum, creation and maintenance of a database for  nuclear 
material accounting and control in the North European Region of GAN and the development of 
computerised tools to optimise decision making. 

4.2. 

Project evolution and status 

The actual project work started in November  1994 and is expected to be finalised in December 
1997. 
The project  started with the analysis of the existing nuclear material accountancy and control 
systems in the installations which are part of the project. Visits to the installations were made: 
these have shown that in most of the cases some form of local nuclear material systems existed 
and  in  some cases were being updated to  include, eventually,  requirements  for  international 
safeguards. 

The  visits  also  revealed  that  the  actual  inspection  work  of  Gosatomnadzor  is  limited  to 
accountancy  and  consistency  checks.  Physical  verifications  are  marginal  as  no  safeguards 
equipment, e.g. NDA instruments, seals or surveillance systems, is available.  It was therefore 
decided  to  enlarge  the  CISNER  project  to  include  the  procurement  and  installation  of  the 
safeguards  instrumentation necessary to control the plants and training of the Gosatomnadzor 
inspectors in the use of the equipment. 

In parallel the work on the development of the computerised data handling and treatment system 
started.  The  data  flow  related  to  nuclear  material  accountancy  and  control  involve  the 
installations themselves, the local Gosatomnadzor inspector, the Gosatomnadzor field offices in 
Sosnovy Bor,  Murmansk,  Severodinsk, Kurchatov  and Desnogorsk  and the North  European 
District Directorate of St. Petersburg. 

In order to divide the project  into manageable items, a pilot project was defined  involving one 
nuclear power plant and all levels of communication from the plant operator, via the local and 
field offices  of Gosatomnadzor, to the main regional Gosatomnadzor office  of St. Petersburg. 

The  pilot  project  has  been  defined  in  detail,  hardware  and  software  procurement  and 
development is under way.  It is expected that the first equipment will be delivered by mid 96. 
After successful testing of the pilot system, the system will be expanded to the other installations 
of the project  based on a priority list defined by Gosatomnadzor. 

16 

Projects implemented or under preparation 
in the framework of Phare and Tacis 

Annex  3 

L  Co-operation with the Russian Federation on illicit trafficking 

Co-operation in design and development of a data base system for the identification  of nuclear 
material of unknown origin 
Partner  :  Non Organic Chemistry Institute, Moscow 

a) 
b) 

c) 

d) 

e) 

Objective : 
definition  of characteristic parameters of nuclear material used in the countries of the FSU. 
establishment  of  characteristics  of  processes  and  production  facilities  (reprocessing,  fuel 
fabrication, reactors, enrichment plants) for individual plants in the FSU. 
selection of materials which should be further  characterized and kept in an archive at ITU for 
reference purposes. 
completion of the ITU data base with general data from the former  COMECON states and a 
more detailed data base at the Non-Organic Chemistry Institute. 
elaboration of a consultation scheme to analyse and interprète analytical results by means of the 
data bases at ITU and the Non-Organic Chemistry Institute. 

IL  Cooperation with the Russian Federation  on the  up-grading of  the  safeguaids  and Nuclear 

Material Accountability and Control (NMAQ system 

II-l.  Review of Needs 

As explained  in the previous  Communication, the knowledge  and assessment  of the  detailed 
technical needs for the creation of a NMAC system is fundamental  for the effectiveness  of the 
co-operation with the Russian Federation in establishing a technical  infrastructure. 
Therefore, the Commission proceeded with a re-assessment of these needs in close cooperation 
with the Russian authorities, MINATOM and GAN, taking into account the specificity and the 
extent of the nuclear fuel cycle to be safeguarded and the type of safeguards system that will be 
applied: 

at the facility  level: 
each nuclear facility must have a detailed nuclear material accountancy system for all the nuclear 
material  that  is  received,  shipped,  processed  or  stored.  Accurate  measurements  and  the 
uncertainty of these measurements are required. 
Needs: a study defining the specificity of NMAC for the different  parts of the fuel cycle has to 
be performed. Training, regulatory aspects and the establishment of facility specific rules are very 
important  at  the  initial  stage  of  implementation  of the new safeguards  system.  Furthermore, 
needs:  for  each  type  of  facility,  appropriate  material  balance  and  statistical  accountancy 
evaluation procedures, as well as a list of the most appropriate instruments and measurement 
systems has to be established. The necessary technical support and training have to be provided 
for this purpose. 

at the authority level: 
the inspectors have to verify,  in an independent way, the declarations made by the individual 
plant operators. 
Needs: this  implies training of inspectors  and facility  personnel  in charge of accounting and 
indépendant analytical capabilities, as well as a computerised data base for the collection, the 
retrieval  and  the  analysis  of  the  accountancy  data  and  for  the  collection  of  the  inspectors 
findings.  Measurement  techniques  adapted  to  each  type  of  plant  and  the  respective  proper 
instrumentation has to be made available for inspections. 

a) 

b) 

17 

II-2.  Education  Training and Development of Safeguards  Methodologies 

As mentionned in § n.-5.a) of the document, the Russian Federation has decided in March, 1995 
to create the "Russian Safeguards Methodological  and Training Centre", called RMTC, at the 
Institute  of  Physics  and  Power  Engineering  (IPPE)  at  Obninsk  in  the  Kaluga  Region,  near 
Moscow. The RMTC will be mainly oriented towards the training of inspectors and of plant 
operators depending from MINATOM and other organisations. 

The Centre will be realized modifying  existing premises, already licenced for the use of bulk 
quantities of nuclear materials (U, Pu). The structures will consist of class  rooms for theoretical 
lessons  and  of  laboratories  where  hands-on  training  will  be  given  on  nuclear  materials 
measurements.Instruments will be provided through Commission (TACIS) support, as well as 
nuclear material standards and reference materials. 

The education and training programme  is made-up of basic courses that will be common for 
techniques)  as  well  as 
inspectors  and  plant  operators  (Principles  of  NMA&C,  verification 
specific courses for separatly operator or inspectors, regarding NMA or inspection procedures. 
A study is now being performed  by the JRC, IPPE (MINATOM) and GAN to determine the 
detailed technical specifications for each of the course modules (taking account of the quite new 
Russian legislation), the required training facilities, the instrumentation, the reference materials 
and data evaluation capabilities. 

For the first phase of the implementation of the training centre, the JRC and IPPE are now co 
operating, in the framework of the TACIS programme, to create five training courses, addressing 
specific evaluation and measurement techniques of interest both to plant operators and inspectors. 
The first courses for  trainers will be organised  in the near future  at the JRC, Ispra. The first 
training courses at IPPE, Obninsk, are expected to start in June 1996. 

Furthermore,  upon  special  request  by  GAN,  measurement  techniques  oriented  courses  and 
physical  inventory verification  exercises have been and will  be organised  at the JRC. These 
courses will be transferred  to Obninsk, when the RMTC will be fully  operational. 

The RMTC is also very important as a forum and a meeting point between plant operators and 
inspectors. They would, through discussions and common seminars, understand their respective 
obligations and how these can be complied with given the present state of the Russian nuclear 
industry. An R&D programme on safeguards concepts and methodologies is also expected to be 
put in place as the RMTC develops. 

II-3.  Generic Scientific  and Technical  Support 

As the Commission stressed in its previous Communication, the setting up of a fully  reliable 
safeguards  and NMAC system needs specific installations for operators and/or inspectors. The 
modalities for the establishment of these installations are still under discussion with the Russian 
authorities. The main lines, as well as the location have already been agreed and a mission of 
Commission experts is expected in Russia soon in order to elaborate with Russian specialists the 
terms of reference  for these projects. 

The  purpose  of  the  proposed  cooperation  is  the  provision  of  consultancy  to  GAN  and 
MINATOM,  the  exchange  of  practical  experience.  It  is  also  envisaged  to  provide  some 
instrumentation  but  this  will  depend  on  the  availability  of  relevant  equipment  in  Russian 
laboratories. 

n.3.1.  Metrological Centre for Measurements of Nuclear Materials 
In co-operation with experts of different  laboratories, it should: 

18 

a) 

define  the  state  of  the practice  for  routine  applications  of  different  measurement  techniques 
applied to nuclear materials, 

b)  provide  a  basis  for  a  quality  control  programme  to  regularly  monitor  the  measurement 

capabilities in different  facilities  and in analytical laboratories. 

n.3.2.  Safeguards Analytical  Capabilities 

The samples taken by safeguards  inspectors need to be analysed with a high level of accuracy 
by  destructive  analysis techniques  and  in  some  specific  cases  also by non-destructive  assay 
methods. 
GAN  has  expressed  a  great  interest  in  establishing  the  technical  capabilities  and  required 
infrastructure to implement various approaches, according to the specific needs. Furthermore, the 
independent  analysis of  "vagabonding,, material  is also a requirement  gaining an  increasing 
interest. 

ÏÏ.3.3.  Instrument Development  and Procurement 

Very few instruments are used at present in Russian nuclear facilities for the implementation of 
NMAC system. However, several laboratories in the Russian Federation have a large experience 
in the development of instrumentation for process and quality control in production facilities and 
nuclear measurements for sensitive equipment in research centres. 
The purpose of the co-operation between Russian and European R&D laboratories and industry 
is to: 
review the existing technologies available and evaluate their possible use or adaptation to NMAC 
purposes, 

a) 

b)  define  specific  projects  aiming  at  the  development  of  new  instruments  suited  to  the 

implementation of NMAC. 

On the basis of the results obtained, relations should be established between the Russian industry 
or production laboratories and European industry, in order to develop an industrial production 
of instrumentation in Russia. 

EL  Co-operation with Phare countries on illicit frafieking 

IH-1.  FONSAFE fForensic Nuclear Analysis for Safeguards) Project with Hungary 

Partner  :  Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission 

Objective : 
a) 

improve the capacities for analysis of nuclear material seized in Hungary particularly in the  field 
of  NDA measurements of the nuclide concentrations of U and Pu and NDA  determination of 
the matrix. 

b)  organise intercomparisons of NDA measurements and equipment. 
c) 

extend the data base at ITU by all the related data and results of measurements made accessible 
by  the  Institute  of  Isotopes,  which  is  responsible  for  the  identification  and  measurement  of 
nuclear material seized in Hungary. 
establish  a  procedure  to  assist  Hungary  - upon request  -  in the  measurements  of the  seized 
nuclear material and in the definition  of its origin and intended use including: 
- measurements in ITU on sub samples provided by Hungary or on the seized material itself, in 
case of Pu, with the understanding that the remaining material will be shipped back to Hungary, 
- common analysis and interpretation of the results based on the ITU database. 
receive a Hungarian expert for  about a month, who will  study the experience acquired  in the 
above  field. 

d) 

e) 

m-2.  FONSAFE Project  with the Czech Republic 

Partner  :  State Office  for Nuclear  Safety of the Czech Republic 

Objective : 

19 

A. 
In the beginning, a supplementary analysis of nuclear material seized in the Czech Republic will 
be performed at ITU. For efficient transfer of know-how and experience, two Czech experts are to be 
involved in the following activities for twice three months and once six months: 
1) 

shipment  of  a  sample  of the highy-enriched  uranium (HEU) material  seized  in Prague from 
November  1994 to June 1995 to ITU for extended analyses covering radionuclide and chemical 
impurities; 
evaluation of analytical data for revelation of the possible origin of the material; 

2) 
3)  development of selected parts of a relational database system for nuclear material at ITU. 

B. 
In the second phase the contractor and his experts will assist NRI in the following tasks: 
1)  upgrading of laboratory equipment of Central Analytical Laboratory in order to improve the in-

house analytical capabilities; 
analysis of HEU reference  materials from the former  Soviet Union. 

2) 

C.  One or two workshops  with Czech and EU representatives  are to be  organized  to  exchange 

experience in the area of treatment and analysis of nuclear material. 

ffl-3.  Other FONSAFE Projects 

Similar  but  country  -  specific  projects  are  in  preparation  for  Bulgaria  and  Ukraine  (more 
emphasis on assistance in on-site handling and identification of radioactive materials by NDA). 
Furthermore, the other Phare countries have expressed their interest for  similar collaboration. 

IV.  Co-operation in the framework of the ISTC 

IV-1. 

ISTC project 40 

Project Purpose: to develop an upgraded approach for safeguarding complex & sensitive nuclear 
fuel  cycle facilities  at Tomsk 7. 

a) 

Expected Results of the Project will consist  of: 
development of regulatory criteria applicable for nuclear material accountancy at specific types 
of  fuel  cycle  facilities,  based  on  feasibility  studies  for  measurement  systems  development, 
application of inspectorate field equipment, application of containment and surveillance measures; 

b)  development of regulatory requirements for  inspection procedures and scope; 
c) 

development of a model approach for nuclear material data transmission and data treatment in 
regional supervising  office; 

The Russian participants are coming from GAN, Minatom, the Tomsk 7 Chemical Plant and 
several institutes. 

ISTC project  K-57 

IV-2. 
Creation of system for storage, operative control and physical protection of nuclear materials and 
ampoule  sources  of  ionizing  radiation  (ASIR)  on  "Baikal-1"  stand  complex  meeting  the 
international requirements of radioactive materials control and accounting. 
Partner  : 
Kazakhstan 

Institute  of  Atomic  Energy  of  the  National  Nuclear  Center  of  the  Republic  of 

The main objectives of the project are focused on the development of the technology for storing, 
operative  control  and  physical  protection  of  nuclear  materials  and  ASIR  as  well  as  on  the 
development and implementation of systems of control, accounting and physical protection for 
nuclear  materials  and  ampoule  sources  of  ionizing radiation  stored  on the  "Baikal-1"  Stand 
Complex 

20 

ISSN 0254-1475 

COM(96) 171 final 

DOCUMENTS 

EN 

12  05  14 

Catalogue number  : CB-CO-96-181-EN-C 

ISBN 92-78-02999-8 

Office  for Official  Publications of the European Communities 

L-2985 Luxembourg 

SLA