Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ' Green Paper: The protection of utility models in the Single Market'
Date: 1996-03-27
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: approximation of laws, competition policy, industrial property, invention, patent law













EUR-Lex - 51996AC0408 - EN






Avis juridique important




|



51996AC0408

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ' Green Paper: The protection of utility models in the Single Market'  


Official Journal C 174 , 17/06/1996 P. 0006 





Opinion of the Economic and Social  Committee on the 'Green Paper: The protection of utility models in the Single Market`(96/C  174/03)On 27  July 1995 the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social  Committee, under Article  198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the 'Green  Paper: The protection of utility models in the Single Market`. The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing the  Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 8  March 1996. The Rapporteur was Mr  Bernabei. At its 334th Plenary Session (meeting of 27  March 1996), the Economic and Social Committee adopted  the following Opinion by 84 votes to two, with two abstentions. Summary of the recommendations of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Green Paper:  The protection of utility models in the Single Market`The Committee: a) considering that the Treaty commits the Community and the Member States to ensuring that the  conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist and in particular to  fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and  technological development (Article  130 of the Treaty); b) given the importance in this context of activating any instrument which can increase the  competitiveness of Europe in terms of RTD and contribute to reversing the recent trend for Europe's  competitive position to deteriorate in relation to that of the main partners/competitors (USA and  Japan); c) given that, as pointed out repeatedly by the Committee, industrial and intellectual property  rights are one of the instruments for encouraging innovation and the patent protection occupies a  central place among those rights; d) considering that the importance of the role of industrial and intellectual property rights in  developing world trade has been underlined by the inclusion of relevant standards in the agreements  which gave rise to the World Trade Organization (agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual  property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods - TRIPS); e) considering, moreover, that the SMEs play a strategically important role in the field of  innovation and rapid response to market needs; f) considering, therefore, that the Commission study on possible harmonization of non-patent  systems for protection of technical innovations is undoubtedly timely and follows a widespread  tradition in the majority of the EU's Member States; g) considering that the legal basis for the approximation of national laws on utility models should  be sought in Article  100a and the aforementioned Article  130 of the Treaty; h) considering, moreover, that the Commission Green Paper, while containing data and arguments of  great interest, has a number of important lacunae or at any rate problematic points; recommends: 1. a further precautionary analysis of protection systems complementary to the patent, to be  described as 'utility models` (UM), together with a more complete integration of available  assessment data; special regard to be paid in this connection to weaknesses in the EU patent  system, which is still seriously incomplete and disparate compared to its main competitors, the USA  and Japan; 2. a guarantee, in case of future proposals for harmonizing the various national UM complementary  protection systems, not only of measures for the harmonization of substantive laws, but also for  procedures and timescales for obtaining and enforcing UMs; 3. the greatest attention to the need to provide firms - particularly SMEs - and research workers  with a cheap, quick and easy assessment and enforcement method, i.e. one which excludes substances  and processes from eligibility for protection; 4. a consistent, comprehensive approach to the whole range of instruments for the protection of  industrial and intellectual property; any future harmonization measures for the UM should also take  account of harmonization already carried out or planned for analogous protection rights; 5. a guarantee of eligibility for UMs for innovations which satisfy the following requirements: a)  'absolute novelty`; b) 'possibility of application in the industrial field`; c) 'inventive step`  (Art. 56 of the Convention on the European Patent) or which have a practical industrial advantage  over the previous state of the art; 6. assurance that the scope of protection must emerge clearly from a limited number of 'claims` and  that the search for earlier 'state of the art` be optional in general, and compulsory for those  wishing to enforce UM rights vis-à-vis a third party; 7. investigation into the feasibility of active assistance and advice in respect of national UM  deposit and registration procedures being provided for firms -  particularly SMEs - by a central  Community or European agency; and investigation of the scope for application of computer digital  language to the European patent system; 8. deferral of any measures for mutual recognition until substantive and interpretative  harmonization has taken place; 9. a feasibility study on creation of a Community UM covering the whole of Europe, but only when  the above-mentioned harmonization and mutual recognition are in place, and following a thorough  examination of the uniformity of practical implementation, and of the ways in which digital  language might be exploited in the European patent system. 1. Introduction - Summary of the Commission document1.1. The Green Paper on utility models is  part of the Community's action to harmonize industrial property rights and/or create Community-wide  protection schemes. (For the latter see the draft Directive and Regulation on designs and models,  COM(93) 344 final and COM(93) 342 final.)1.2. The Green Paper has three parts: the first  introductory, the second on the need for action at Community level, and a third which discusses  measures to ensure the harmonization of national laws and the possible creation of a Community-wide  protection system. 1.3. The Green Paper uses the concept of a 'utility model`, a registered right which confers  exclusive protection for technical inventions; the utility model resembles a patent in that the  invention must possess novelty and display a measure of inventive achievement - it must involve an  'inventive step`. Unlike patents, utility models are granted without a prior search to establish  novelty and inventive step. 1.4. Utility model protection systems, or something comparable, exist in twelve of the fifteen  Member States; they can be classified by their characteristics as follows: 1.4.1. A first group whose requirements are the same as those for a patent, being differentiated  only by a shorter period of validity or other characteristics (French certificat d'utilité, the  Belgian brevet de courte durée, and the Dutch zesjaarige octrooi). 1.4.2. A second group which (in simplified terms) allows protection to be extended to minor  inventions, with a requirement that an invention be embodied in three-dimensional form (Finnish,  Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish systems). 1.4.3. A third group, such as the German Gebrauchsmuster, which (again in simplified terms)  comprise a protection system for minor inventions, and also include those which cannot be embodied  in three-dimensional form but exclude process inventions. 1.5. On the basis of the available statistics (no figures are available for France and Belgium) the  Green Paper notes that the number of applications for utility model protection is particularly high  in Germany, Italy and Spain. 1.6. The Green paper analyzes the views of industrial property experts and economic operators on  the utility model form of protection in the light of studies commissioned from the IFO Institute,  which involved consultation of French, German, Spanish and British patent experts, and industrial  companies and independent inventors based in France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. 1.7. The virtues of the utility model include quick and simple registration procedures  (particularly important for small-to-medium firms) and lower costs than for a patent. 1.8. According to the Green Paper there is a fairly large demand by firms for this type of  protection. 1.9. It is stated that the type of protection offered by the utility model is appropriate to trends  in technological development, which is ever-increasingly characterized by a growing number of  relatively short-lived 'minor inventions` and ever-shorter production cycles. 1.10. According to the Green Paper, the interest shown in the utility model system by businesses  and inventors, the significant differences between the various national systems, and the barriers  to the free circulation of goods and the development of undistorted competition make  Community-level action necessary. 1.11. The document examines the various options for Community action, particularly: 1.11.1. The harmonization of existing national protection schemes and the institution of such  schemes in the countries where none is currently available (effectively Luxembourg, the UK and  Sweden). 1.11.2. Once harmonization has been achieved, mutual recognition of rights between the Member  States. 1.11.3. The creation by a regulation of a Community protection system which would not replace  national systems but, as Community law, would rank above them. 1.11.4. The combination of various possibilities, in particular (as in the case of brands, designs  and models) harmonization of national protection systems through a directive and creation of a  uniform protection system through a regulation. 1.12. Finally, the Green Paper examines possible specific characteristics for a Community utility  model, which would have to include: 1.12.1. A lower level of inventiveness than that required for a patent; 1.12.2. no requirement for the invention to have a three-dimensional form; 1.12.3. requirements for novelty and industrial applicability; 1.12.4. an optional search procedure regarding the 'state of the art`, in order to increase the  certainty of the legal position. The Community utility model would serve as a complement to patent protection for technical  inventions, and would be registered without a search to establish novelty and inventiveness. 2. The situation in the EU's main partners/competitors: the USA2.1. The question of whether a  system of protection of technical innovations is needed to complement the patent system must be  seen as part of the strategy of research and technological development policies of the European  Union. 2.2. As is well known, the Delors White Paper identifies as one of the EU's weak points in relation  to its main competitors - the United States and Japan  - its comparatively much more limited  capacity to translate scientific and technical achievements rapidly into industrial and commercial  successes. 2.2.1. The White Paper also stresses the particularly important role of the SMEs - whether  high-technology or manufacturing - as a potential source of economic growth, pointing out how in  the United States a significant proportion of emerging technologies were developed in the first  place by small undertakings, which were better able to anticipate market requirements and react  speedily (White Paper on 'Growth, Competitiveness, Employment`, Chapter 4, point 4.3, (a)(i),  second paragraph). 2.3. It should also be noted that analysis of the global technological and industrial indicators  shows that Europe's competitive position in relation to the United States and Japan has  deteriorated over the years. 2.3.1. The European Union, despite having developed a single market for goods, persons, capital and  services, is very far from forming a true unified market in the field of research and technological  innovation (see ESC Opinion on coordination of research and technological development, CES 570/95  fin. App., points 5.1 et seq.). 2.4. It therefore seems necessary to consider whether the main factors behind the competitive  advantage of the United States and Japan in relation to Europe include the ways in which technical  innovations are protected, with particular reference to protection systems which complement patents  (utility models). 2.5. Looking first and foremost at the United States, there is no doubt that the fact that the US  has formed an integrated market for some time, especially in linguistic/cultural terms, gives  innovative firms the opportunity to monitor the overall reaction of the market to an innovatory  product much more rapidly than occurs in Europe. 2.5.1. There is also no doubt that the strengthening of institutional mechanisms carried out in  recent years, and particularly the setting-up of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)  and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, under the direct control of the White House, have  been an important stimulus to innovation. 2.6. The American patent system is one of the largest in the world, with more than 191 000 patent  applications received in 1993 and more than 98 000 patents granted in the same year (). 2.6.1. In numerical terms it is exceeded only by Japan, with about 380 000 applications received  and 88 000 patents granted in 1993. 2.6.2. It is also well known that the 'patent culture` is widespread in American entrepreneurial  and professional circles. 2.7. It does not seem, moreover, that consideration has been or is being given in the United States  to complementing the system of protecting innovations through patents with a system of the 'utility  model` type; on the contrary, professional circles have repeatedly come out against the creation of  such a system, regarding it not only as unnecessary, but even as dangerous to the maintenance of a  high level of patent protection, and stressed the difficulty of basing such a system on an  inventiveness requirement lower than that for patents, which would be difficult to define and  apply. 2.8. Thus the United States' experience would not militate in favour of creating utility-model  protection alongside protection through patents, but, if anything, would underline the need to make  the patent system more efficient by reducing its known drawbacks, such as the length of time taken  to examine applications and grant patents, and the cost. 3. The situation in the EU's main partners/competitors: Japan3.1. It is known that Japan is  characterized by a highly cooperative model of society, with a high level of cohesion and 'osmosis`  among the various actors in economic life, and with extensive planning of research at government  level (Council of Science and Technology - CST - which has launched a basic plan for scientific and  technological research in the medium to long-term, based on a list of 187 RTD objectives for the  next 10  years). 3.2. The importance of the patent institute in Japan is shown by the figures quoted above. 3.2.1. As regards the utility model, the opinion of Japanese professional circles is that this  institution, which has been in existence for many years and was reformed in 1994, has made a great  contribution to the development of Japanese industry. 3.2.2. In 1993 more than 77 000 applications for utility models were lodged in Japan, and more than  53 000 registrations of models were granted (cf. OMPI statistics above) (). 3.3. The Japanese conceptual approach to such a system for protecting technical innovations,  complementing that of patents, is essentially that: 3.3.1. A protection system complementing that of patents and for a shorter duration (six years  instead of twenty) is justified in that protection by patent of 'minor` inventions could constitute  'over-protection` to the public's disadvantage. 3.3.2. Protection by utility model should cover inventions for which the protection can be defined  and implemented fairly easily - i.e. innovative solutions incorporated in three-dimensional  objects, for which an infringement can in general be easily identified (by checking the products  available on the market), whereas identifying an infringement of innovations relating to substances  and processes is much more difficult (involving for example access to laboratories and  establishments run by suspected counterfeiters). 3.4. On reflection, the Japanese predilection for the utility model and the marked disfavour with  which the Americans view it are less diametrically opposed than may appear at first sight, given  that the Japanese system provides for a utility model covering a field of inventions more  restricted than that of patents, is characterized by its 'three-dimensional` quality and is not  therefore a duplicate of the patent system at a lower level. 4. Problems and aims of a European system for stimulation and protection of technical  innovations4.1. In the Committee's view, priority should be given to actions to increase the  competitiveness of the European system, and in particular to increase its capacity to translate  scientific and technological achievements rapidly into industrial and commercial successes. 4.2. As the Committee recently stressed, 'The Commission's plan to seek to establish favourable  legal conditions for industrial and intellectual property, above all in the field of patents,  trademarks, plans, models and designations of origin, deserves support. The instruments for the  protection of intellectual and commercial property almost all already exist: the Munich Patent  Agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the EC Regulation on Trademarks, the EC Regulation on the  Community design system (being prepared), various Directives on copyright (computer programmes,  leasing and lending rights, term of protection)` (). 4.3. The institutes of industrial and intellectual property are regarded as a standard instrument  for stimulating innovation and technical/industrial development, guaranteeing the  inventor/innovator exclusive rights limited in time, in return for the communication and revelation  of his inventive/innovative idea, which thus becomes part of the fund of shared knowledge,  constituting - as long as the exclusive rights last - a stimulus to the finding of new and better  solutions and subsequently (once the exclusive rights expire) a solution available to all. 4.4. The world-wide importance of the institutes of industrial and intellectual property in  encouraging the development of innovation is confirmed by the prestige which the patent as an  institution enjoys in the industrial culture of the United States, and by the frenetic patenting  activity typical of Japanese firms. 4.4.1. Further confirmation of the importance of such institutes was recently provided by their  inclusion in the agreements giving rise to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Agreement on Trade  Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods - TRIPS). 4.5. The experience of the United States and Japan, as described above, shows how the development  of innovation and rapid transition to the phase of industrial application of research results can  be explained above all by the range of incisive instruments available to those systems, and  probably also by the homogeneous and effective system of protection of industrial property. 4.5.1. Thus the main difference between Europe on the one hand, and the United States and Japan on  the other, is that those two countries have a 'complete` patent system operating in an essentially  uniform manner in the respective territories of their countries, whereas in the European Union the  patent system is neither complete nor homogeneous. 4.6. The European patent system is incomplete because, as is well known, the EPO carries out a  centralized examination of patent applications, but grants patents with a value of 'national`  patents (moreover, the supra-national system, involving the 'Community patent`, is not yet  operating and will probably not come into being because of excessive costs); but the European  system is also disparate, since, while the national laws have been significantly harmonized as  regards basic law, considerable disparities remain as regards the procedure for granting a legal  enforcement of patents. 4.6.1. For example: - patents in the Federal Republic of Germany are granted subject to examination of novelty and  inventive step; - in France they are granted without such an examination, but with a compulsory search for  precedents (Avis documentaire); - in Italy they are granted without any real examination of novelty, inventive step or precedents. 4.6.2. The operational diversity of the various national systems is even greater when one considers  modalities, duration and cost of the legal procedures for enforcing patents, which differ,  sometimes enormously, from one country to another. 4.6.3. In the light of the above, one may wonder whether it should be a priority to harmonize one  category (utility models) which is complementary to another in practice still profoundly diverse,  category (patents). 4.7. In this context, the harmonization in the EU of 'utility models` - i.e. protection systems  which complement the patent - is desirable, particularly with a view to providing a user-friendly  instrument for SMEs, taking account of the experiences and traditions of European firms, and above  all of their priority needs; in this connection it should be pointed out that the industrial sector  for which the utility model is by far most important is that of mechanical engineering (). 4.7.1. At the same time, however, it would be entirely illusory to think that this harmonization  alone would overcome the lack of completeness and homogeneity in the main system for protecting  innovations - the patent system. 4.8. To be effective, this harmonization must, in general: 4.8.1. allow for the protection of relatively 'simple` innovations (subject to the proviso that a  simple innovation is not always or necessarily a 'minor` innovation); 4.8.2. make it possible to obtain protection in a short space of time and through simplified  procedures (the period of about two months currently required for obtaining a utility model in  Germany should become the European standard); 4.8.3. involve limited costs; 4.8.4. facilitate enforcement of the rights against third parties involved in counterfeiting; 4.8.5. correspondingly facilitate the assessment of the effective scope of someone else's utility  model by an honest competitor who does not wish to be involved in counterfeiting. 5. Some critical aspects of the Green Paper5.1. Although it deals with this complex and  difficult subject in a full and stimulating way, the Green Paper has certain weaknesses which will  be covered in the points below. 5.2. Firstly, it does not appear to give adequate consideration to the incompleteness of the EU  patent system, mentioned above, and thus runs the risk of proposing a protection system which,  while complementing a patent system which is not yet complete or fully harmonized, would inevitably  suffer from the same weaknesses. 5.2.1. By the same token, it does not take sufficient account of the harmonization of national  utility models in relation to other analogous protection rights (for example, protection of  functional designs as 'unregistered design rights` provided for in United Kingdom legislation). 5.3. Secondly, the comparison of the various national systems for the protection of technical  innovation would have benefited from a more detailed analysis of certain aspects, i.e.: 5.3.1. Given the depth of debate it warrants, there is not enough discussion of all the  implications of the fact that some of the national systems, which the Green Paper lumps together  under the label of 'utility model`, are actually none other than patent systems 'without  examination` (of novelty or inventive step), and thus essentially 'registration` (rather than merit  assessment) patents, albeit of shorter duration than normal patents (e.g. in Belgium, the  Netherlands and France). 5.3.2. The fact that some of the countries of the EU have provided, alongside the normal patent,  other protection documents (called in practice 'short-term patents`, or in France 'certificats  d'utilité`), for which the requirements for eligibility for protection are the same as for patents,  but which are granted with no examination of novelty or inventive step (and no search for  precedents), is a phenomenon which - rather than showing the need for different protection to  complement the patent - seems to stress the central importance of patents as an institution, but at  the same time the difficulties they represent in terms of high cost and lengthy procedures. 5.3.3. In other words, the lesson which must perhaps be drawn from the existence of these  'short-term` national patents is that the priority need in Europe is to make patent protection more  efficient (more rapid and less costly), rather than create complementary protection (utility model)  at the Community level. 5.4. Thirdly, in proposing a utility model based on a lower level of inventiveness than that  required for obtaining a patent, the Green Paper underestimates the difficulty and complexity of  defining different levels of inventiveness, above all in the light of a European standard (Article   56 of the Convention on the European Patent), on the basis of which: - either, according to a specialist, the innovation follows obviously from the state of the art, in  which case there is no invention; - or the innovation does not obviously follow from the state of the art, in which case there is  invention. Thus there is in principle no possibility of distinguishing different 'levels` of inventiveness. 5.4.1. If a utility model can only be granted for an 'inventive step`, then the only practical  solution would seem to be to accept the same definition of an inventive step as that used for the  invention patent. 5.4.2. It would seem, however, that the utility model should have some specific features which  distinguish it from the patent. This could be achieved by stipulating, as an alternative to the  inventive step requirement, a 'demonstration of practical/industrial advantage`; this would benefit  inventions likely to have a rapid, practical application. The aim would be to enhance the ability  to translate scientific progress and technology into industrial and commercial successes; in this  area (cf.  point  2.2 above) the European Union is lagging behind its partners/competitors, the USA  and Japan. The Commission should work out a way of formulating this requirement which could provide  the best guarantee of legal certainty both for the applicant and for the third parties concerned. 5.5. It must also be borne in mind that the Green Paper is based on studies and surveys which, to  the Commission's credit, are certainly wide-ranging and interesting, but probably not as totally  reliable as their authors appear to claim. 5.5.1. Indeed, the questionnaires drawn up by the IFO, Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, in  Munich, were sent exclusively to firms and individuals who had already lodged utility model  applications, and therefore could not record the opinion of those industrial sectors (particularly  the chemical and pharmaceutical industries) which are known to make little or no use of utility  model protection. 5.5.2. It should also be pointed out that no question in the questionnaire was designed to  ascertain 'the other side of the coin`, i.e. whether and to what extent the existence of utility  model protection could constitute a barrier or difficulty for competitors in the normal activity of  improving their products. 5.6. Even the questions raised in the Green Paper, although much broader and more well-constructed  than those sent by the IFO institute mentioned above, still fail to ask explicitly for the opinion  of the addressees on: 5.6.1. The experiences and assessments as to the possibility of effective legal enforcement of  'non-examined` protection instruments such as utility models; 5.6.2. The experiences and assessments of these protection instruments seen from the viewpoint not  of the holders but of the opposite side, i.e. the competitors, in carrying out their activities of  normal improvement and updating of products. 5.7. One of the main reasons given in the Green Paper for the urgent need to harmonize utility  models is the alleged distortions to the free movement of goods and to competition within the EU. This distorting effect, referred to many times in the Green Paper, is not, however, backed up by  any empirical data in that document. 6. Conclusions6.1. The Committee believes that the Commission must flesh out the collection of  assessment criteria available thus far, particularly regarding the shortcomings highlighted in  points 5.5 and 5.6. 6.2. The Committee feels that when considering the possible harmonization of protection systems  ('utility models`), greater account must be taken of the shortcomings of the patent system, and in  particular the fact that the EU patent system is still seriously incomplete and disparate, and  undoubtedly represents an 'Achilles heel` for Europe in relation to its main competitors, the USA  and Japan. 6.3. The Committee particularly believes that, in proposing measures for harmonizing protection  systems to complement the patent (utility model): - harmonization of substantive law should be ensured first and foremost; - harmonization of procedures and timescales should also be ensured; - a repetition of what has happened for patents should be avoided: although substantive patent law  has been harmonized, there are wide differences from one Member State to another as regards  procedures, timescales and costs for obtaining and enforcing patents; - the measures proposed should guarantee the establishment of a practicable, simply system which is  cheaper to operate than the current procedure of applying for a patent. 6.4. Proposals for such harmonization measures, should take account of the priority requirements of  SMEs (an instrument which is easy for them to assess and use): in this connection it should be laid  down that eligibility for protection through a utility model does not apply to chemical substances  and processes: this exclusion could be achieved, for instance, by laying down - following the  practice of various EU countries  - that eligibility for utility models be confined to  'three-dimensional` objects. 6.5. The Committee also believes that proposals for such harmonization measures, must take account  of harmonization already carried out or planned for analogous protection rights, particularly  industrial designs. 6.6. The Committee would emphasize the need for steps to harmonize national legislation to provide  that utility models can be granted for developments which satisfy three requirements: that they are  new, that they are likely to have a commercial/industrial application, that they are the result of  an 'inventive step`, as defined in Article  56 of the Convention on the European Patent or,  alternatively, that they are a practical or a commercial/industrial advance over the previous state  of the  art. 6.7. In particular: 6.7.1. on the first of the above three requirements, the 'novelty` must be understood as 'absolute  novelty`, i.e. unlimited in time or space, in view of the increasing globalization of the market; 6.7.2. on the second of the above three requirements, the possibility of application in the  industrial field must be understood in the broadest sense, and include agriculture; 6.7.3. the third of the three requirements must refer to: - either the 'inventive step` stipulation applied to inventor patents (cf. Art. 56 of the  Convention on the European Patent), or- a stipulation peculiar to utility models - conceptually  different from that of the above-mentioned 'inventive step`, and oriented towards rewarding  innovations whose authors demonstrate, by giving proof of a practical or commercial/industrial  advantage, that they can be rapidly applied practically and industrially. 6.8. The Committee does feel, however, that the Commission should abandon the idea of laying down  as a requirement for UM protection, a mere 'inventive step` which is less than that required for a  patent. On the one hand, this would create great uncertainties of interpretation and  implementation, particularly at the enforcement stage, with negative consequences above all for  SMEs; and on the other, it would fail to encourage innovations which, whilst not resulting from an  inventive step as such, are likely to find a rapid practical and commercial/industrial  application. 6.9. In order to ensure legal certainty and ease of assessment of others' utility models, it is  important to lay down that the scope of protection by the utility model must emerge clearly from  the 'claims`, which should be limited in number (e.g. not more than three or five). 6.10. Still with a view to legal certainty, provision should be made for an optional search in  general, and a compulsory search for anyone wishing to enforce UM rights vis-à-vis a third party. 6.11. The plan for harmonization of national rights could, following effective harmonization,  provide for a later stage of mutual recognition of national rights; here it would be necessary to  examine inter alia whether and to what extent it is possible to avoid diverging interpretations by  national courts of harmonized national rights. 6.12. In the light of discussions on its recent Green Paper on Innovation, the Commission should  look into the feasibility of giving a central agency, such as the Office for Harmonization in the  Internal Market -  Trade Marks, Designs and Models (Alicante), an active role of advice and support  for enterprises, particularly SMEs, in the national (harmonized) procedures for deposit and  registration of utility models (including the necessary translations) at no cost for general  assistance and at controlled rates for more specific services. 6.12.1. The Commission could also look into ways in which digital language could be applied to the  patent system, in the light of the outcome of similar applications for public tenders (cf. the CALS  system, TED-SIMAP system, etc.). 6.13. The Committee believes that it is only at a later stage that consideration should be given to  creation of a Community EU-wide model which does not burden users with prohibitive costs out of  line with those faced by the main global competitors; consideration of such a step should come  after the harmonization and mutual recognition referred to above, and follow the establishment of  uniform practical implementation, and the applicability of computer digital language. Done at Brussels, 27  March 1996. The Presidentof the Economic and Social CommitteeCarlos FERRER() Cf. OMPI -  Industrial property statistics, Geneva, April 1995.  () In the same year applications for utility models in Germany amounted to some 20 000, and  registration was granted for some 16 000.  () OJ No C 39, 12. 2. 1996.  () Green Paper on the protection of utility models in the Single Market, p.  16.