OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on relations between the European Union and ASEAN
Date: 1996-02-01
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: ASEAN, EU relations, economic relations, liberalisation of trade, trade relations













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51996IE0099

OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on relations between the European Union and ASEAN  


Official Journal C 097 , 01/04/1996 P. 0031 





Opinion  on relations between the European Union and ASEAN(96/C 97/11)On 30  March 1995, the  Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 23(3) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw  up an Opinion on relations between the European Union and ASEAN. The Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy, which was responsible for  preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 12  January 1996. The  Rapporteur was Mr  Pezzini. At its 332nd Plenary Session (meeting of 1  February 1996), the Economic and Social Committee  adopted the following Opinion by a majority vote with five abstentions. SUMMARYThe Committee notes that ASEAN has succeeded in its initial objective of avoiding  conflict between its members, and that the resultant stability has enabled these countries to enjoy  strong economic growth. ASEAN's objectives have changed somewhat over the years, notably with the recent decision to  establish a free trade area among its members. In this context, and in that of the accession of  former or existing Communist countries (another issue which ASEAN must address), the EU could  usefully pass on its experience, for instance by stepping up its cooperation with the ASEAN  secretariat. EU-ASEAN trade is growing considerably, and the trade balance tilts in favour of ASEAN. Trade  relations are marred by such problems as market access, respect for intellectual property rights,  and the use of anti-dumping duties. The Committee considers that the EU needs first of all to  improve its own commercial image in Asia. It hopes that the opening of European Business  Information Centres (EBICs), and their linkage with the existing national Chambers of Commerce,  will contribute to more fruitful forms of cooperation. It also advocates the setting-up of joint  ventures between EU and ASEAN countries, via the EC Investment Partners and other projects devised  by the Commission. The Committee feels that the quality of the European presence in the region is more important than  its size. It recommends that EU cooperation should focus on specific sectors such as the  environment, telecommunications, energy and vocational training. Dialogue on human rights is a delicate matter. The Committee reiterates its earlier calls for  inclusion of a social clause in the work programme of the World Trade Organization, based on ILO  Conventions. On the specific question of East Timor, the Committee considers that a Council  'troika' should hammer out a diplomatic solution based on the UN General Assembly resolutions. An EU-Asia summit is to be held in Bangkok in  March 1996, and the ASEAN countries will be taking  part alongside Japan, China and South Korea. The Committee considers that the summit will provide  an opportunity to relaunch a European presence in the region. The meeting should serve principally  to consolidate dialogue and extend its scope to such fields as the environment, social problems and  vocational training. The Committee notes the wide gap between Europe and Asia, and calls for a major commitment to  information and cultural cooperation; substantial resources should be earmarked for this. The  Committee thinks that a variety of exchanges and contacts could usefully be promoted so as to  deepen mutual understanding, including visits by civil servants, trainees and new graduates from  ASEAN countries. The Committee also calls for contacts between EU and ASEAN socio-economic  partners, and is ready to take any steps that might be useful. It also asks to be informed of the  conclusions of the Bangkok summit so that it can decide what action it should take in the future. 1. Introduction1.1. The European Union's reasons for granting Asia a higher priority than  hitherto are comprehensible and soundly based. This strategy ties in with the globalization of the  world economy, from which Europe cannot stand aside. Since the end of the Cold War, it is no longer  possible to isolate the economy from the great political questions and to subordinate international  economic relations to a higher 'political order'. The economy is now returning to the centre of the  political stage, and economic and commercial considerations, with their important place in the  foreign policy of the main countries, can be a source of conflict, e.g. the trade dispute between  the USA and Japan. 1.1.1. Alongside geopolitics, then, one must speak of geoeconomics, to denote an approach which  acknowledges the basic role of the economy in determining worldwide equilibria and defending  national interests. In this sense, the European Union, as the world's main trading power, has a  role to play. In recent times the Union, in its efforts to rethink and revamp its external  relations, has launched a strategy of action on all fronts intended to lead to 'third generation'  cooperation agreements: first and foremost towards the 'adjoining' areas (Eastern Europe, the  Mediterranean), but also towards regions which are more distant from European interests: Mercosur,  other Latin American states, ASEAN and other Asian countries, southern Africa and South Africa. It has done so not only to make economic cooperation more effective and maintain existing market  shares, but also to conquer new markets in the new arena of global competition which has opened up  among the main geoeconomic blocs. This strategy could not ignore Asia (particularly ASEAN, the  object of an 'attention-paying strategy' since 1980). However, it is worth considering whether the EU ought to fix its priorities and apportion its  interventions accordingly. The criteria for prioritization are dictated first and foremost by  political and security interests, pressing social concerns (immigration), and economic and trade  interests. On this basis, the top priority areas for the EU clearly appear to be the southern Mediterranean  rim and central and eastern Europe, as they combine all three of the above-mentioned elements. Next  comes sub-Saharan Africa, where the main motivation is the fight against poverty, hunger and  disease in order to prevent social and environmental disasters. Lastly there are the more dynamic  areas of Asia and Latin America, such as Mercosur and ASEAN, where economic and trade interests and  the conclusion of partnership agreements are the chief concern. 1.1.2. Asia has acquired such economic and political weight in the global balance that it will  certainly be a key player on the international stage in the next century. Current developments in  many areas of Asia already make it a worthy partner. South-East Asia, with the recent and less  recent NICs - Newly Industrialized Countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand,  Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia), China with its 'market socialism' and rapid economic and  commercial growth (a 9 % average annual increase in GDP over the last ten years); the reawakening  and incipient transformation of India: all these are phenomena of great interest and potential,  albeit not without dangers and threats which cannot yet be properly assessed or identified.  According to an IMF study, as early as 2010 China will be the second largest economy in the world  in terms of volume of production. The IMF estimates the Chinese per capita income in 1992 as  between $ 1 300 and $ 2 500 per annum, as against the official estimate of $ 370. 1.1.3. Europe's intention to 'strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain its  leading role in the world economy' is therefore praiseworthy. However, it is necessary to take  account of certain preconditions without which the EU's declared readiness to open a dialogue could  turn out to be not only sterile but counter-productive. 1.2. The first consideration is that Asia is not a region like others - neither in political nor in  cultural terms  - and that precisely for this reason a shared inspiration of civilization and  cultural osmosis is lacking between Europe and Asia. Even without citing Samuel Huntington's essay  [Samuel Huntington, the well-known political analyst, lecturer at Harvard University and adviser to  several Democrat administrations, is the author of the controversial study 'The Clash of  Civilizations' published in Foreign Affairs (Vol. 72, No  4, September-October 1993). This argued  that most current and future international disputes will break out along the borders between  different 'civilizations' and will have cultural rather than ideological or economic causes.  Huntington postulates a confrontation between the West and the rest of the world, and more  especially against a militant Islamic-Confucian coalition, developing on several levels, from  military to human rights and to competition for control of the major international institutions.]  it is plausible to state that Asia provides one of the most probable scenarios for a clash of  cultures. While in the West many are convinced that the salient feature of the present situation is  the strengthening of a diffuse global economic/financial culture based on modern technological,  trading and financial practices 'transmitted' through the market, the advocates of the Asian model,  in particular the so-called Singapore School [This thesis was put forward in interviews in the  American press with Kishore Mahubani, a Singapore diplomat ('The West and the Rest' in National  Interest, Spring 1992, and 'The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest can teach the West' in Foreign  Affairs, vol. 72, No 4,  September-October 1993), and the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee  Kuan Yew ('A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew' in Foreign Affairs No 2,  March-April 1994).], reject  the line that the development of South-East Asia inevitably involves standardization on the  Euro-American model and its system of values (including political democracy). This attitude,  widespread amongst the Asian intellectual and managerial elite, stresses the cultural specificity  of Asia and rejects the hypothesis that economic growth springs from the particular historical  process which has led in Europe to the emergence of the market and of the democratic nation-state.  Thus modernity is not identified with the institutions and values typical of western liberalism.  There can be 'other roads' to modernity and growth, as shown by the experience of those Asian  countries which have overcome the barrier of underdevelopment and become part of the world economy,  with a role and dynamism of their own. The countries have undergone a cultural revival generated by  the economic clout acquired by the region, but this revival is rooted in a great cultural tradition  specific to the region, different from and independent of western culture. 1.2.1. Europe is culturally distant and perhaps the first effort should be to make European  civilization better known, not only in terms of image, but as regards great artistic and  intellectual works (music, graphic art, literature, scientific discoveries). Without full  recognition of this special character, there can be neither political dialogue nor beneficial  economic cooperation. Economic relations alone are not enough to justify a new strategy of devoting  attention to Asia; it is necessary to go further and to try some kind of cultural approach, even if  the presently ruling elite in Asia appears to be culturally immune to the model of representative  democracy, and brooks no instruction or interference on human rights. Hence the need for  qualitatively significant cooperation which is not based solely on trade and investment but which  seeks to establish a relationship rooted in common rules. 1.3. When we talk of Asia it is necessary to understand exactly what we are referring to. The 26  countries covered by the Commission's communication () are not only heterogeneous but cannot be  classified on purely geographical criteria. The document states that 'European Union strategies  will have to be flexible and modular in order to anticipate changes in all three regions of Asia,  and they will have to be geared to the particular circumstances of the different countries and  regions there'. In the context of relations with the European Union, Asia can be divided into the  following geopolitical and geoeconomic areas: eastern Asia, within which we must distinguish the  six countries belonging to ASEAN; southern Asia, i.e. the Indian subcontinent; central Asia and  subregions of the Caucusus and the Gulf (which the Commission document does not cover). This area does not provide homogenous multilateral partners for the European Union, as the  countries of the area have not started processes of regional economic integration. The exception to  this general rule is ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, an associative body which,  since its foundation as an anti-Communist politico-strategic bloc, has slowly evolved into an  economic body focusing on regional cooperation and the achievement of internal synergies. 1.3.1. The Committee has decided to concentrate for the moment on ASEAN, because it is the  subregion of Asia which can be seen as a clearly defined multilateral negotiating partner, and  because it and the European Community have a formal institutional relationship dating back to 1980,  with regular meetings between the relevant foreign ministers. Additional reports with more specific  observations on other geopolitical divisions of Asia could follow this one. The early 1990s saw an acceleration of the trend towards regional groupings, particularly in the  West. A little over eighteen months saw the signings of the Treaty of Asunción (26  March 1991)  which created Mercosur, the Maastricht Treaty (7  February 1992) which drew up the guidelines for  an updated and more federally inclined European Community, which took the name European Union, and  the Treaty instituting NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Area (12  August 1992). Furthermore,  the favourable climate for regional integration was confirmed by the creation of an economic  community by the Member States of APEC and by changes in the objectives and strategy of ASEAN. 1.3.2. ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) was set up in Bangkok in 1967 by five  countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, at the very height of the  Vietnam war. Its other member countries are Brunei (1984) and Vietnam (July 1995) (). The treaty  instituting the association, although it also mentions economic cooperation, sets its primary aim  as being to maintain political stability in the face of the Communist threat posed by the Hanoi  regime and its external patrons (the USSR and China). External threat was the catalyst for the  foundation of ASEAN, and until the beginning of the 1980s, after the signing of the Geneva peace  agreements and the reunification of Vietnam, its raison d'être was primarily defensive and  anti-Vietnamese: there was a belief, the famous 'domino theory', that the fall of Vietnam would  bring the collapse of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand close on its heels. It should be noted that  during this period ASEAN helped to bring about and maintain a climate of peace between its members,  despite their long-standing and deep-rooted disputes, and that this was a major contributory factor  in the resolution of the conflicts in bordering areas (e.g. Cambodia). This was perhaps ASEAN's  most tangible achievement, without which South-East Asia would not have been able to achieve such  rapid growth. Symptomatic of this sea-change in the political climate and aims of the Association  was the accession, ratified last  July, of Vietnam, a country which has never abandoned communism  and has had no change of regime, although it has implemented various economic reforms. 1.3.3. In cultural, social and economic terms, ASEAN's member countries are extremely diverse.  Malaysia and Indonesia form part of the Malay civilization, and Islam has been the predominant  religion there since the fifteenth century. Thailand is Buddhist, and largely populated by peoples  originating in Southern China, while the population of the Philippines, ethnically Malay, were  colonized by the Spanish and partially converted to Catholicism. Singapore, where a trading post of  the British East India Company was established in 1819, was governed for many years under the  administrative arrangements which applied to the whole of peninsular Malaya. The present state of  Singapore was established when the island seceded from the independent Federation of Malaysia in  1965. Singapore is an enclave dominated by expatriate Chinese who are also present as a minority in  the other countries, and have played a dynamic and expansionist role in business affairs across the  entire area. 1.3.3.1. The member countries had a total population of 335 million in 1993, greater than that of  the 15 nation EU, while their economic power in terms of GDP is a little more than that of the  Netherlands. The accession of Vietnam has taken the population over 400 million. Per capita income  ranges from $ 19 000 in Singapore, a city-state with three million inhabitants whose income figures  outstripped those of France in 1995, to $ 700 in Indonesia, with over 180 million; or from over $  21 000 in Brunei, a small - population 300 000 - oil-rich sultanate, to $ 830 in the Philippines,  with a population of 67 million, and $ 170 in Vietnam (1993 figures). Malaysia has a population of  19 million and a per capita GDP of $ 3 160. Thailand has a population of 58 million and a per  capita GDP of $ 2 040. Over the last six years Malaysia and Thailand have been among the world's  most dynamic economies, with high GDP growth rates. Between 1988 and 1993 Malaysia's annual growth  averaged 8,5 %, while Thailand averaged 9,2 % between 1986 and 1991 with a slight drop to 7,5 % in  1992 and 1993. Following the liberalization and restructuring of the protected and semi-autarkic  economy, Indonesian growth also picked up to between 6 % and 7 % p.a. from 1988 to 1992. These  three states have already joined the ranks of newly industrialized countries (NICs), while the  Philippines and Vietnam, although they lag some way behind the leaders, are also nudging their way  into the group. The whole area is hallmarked by very low labour costs and unregulated working  conditions. On the social level, this produces wide divisions, and, from a manufacturing point of  view in general, it is not conducive to the development of a skilled workforce. Apart from the  differences in income mentioned above, a further cause for concern is the inability of the area's  development model to distribute the benefits it produces fairly amongst the population. 1.3.3.2. The ASEAN countries are particularly rich in natural resources. Indonesia and Malaysia are  oil-producers and major exporters of natural gas. Even after the collapse in oil prices the  Indonesian economy remains heavily reliant on the oil industry, despite efforts to diversify.  Indonesia has large (although as yet unquantifiable) reserves of a variety of coal and other  minerals, including tin, bauxite, copper, nickel, iron and gold. However, the predominant economic  sector is still agriculture, which contributes 20 % of GDP and employs 48 % of the workforce.  Besides the domestic sector catering for the home market, cash crops for export (rubber, palm oil,  coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar and tobacco) grown on large plantations have become very important. The  forests - two-thirds of the land area - are an important resource. Between 1985 and 1992 the  Indonesian government prohibited exports of timber to ensure that it was worked locally, thus  increasing the added value of exports. Since 1993 the export of unworked timber has been heavily  taxed, and the government is showing concern about the intensive exploitation of forestry resources  and the consequent environmental damage. In 1992 they adopted a special action plan to ensure  sustainable use of forestry resources, but many environmental organizations have condemned the  indiscriminate destruction of one of the world ecosystem's most important tropical rain forests. Malaysia is the world's foremost producer of rubber and palm oil. Although price fluctuations have  led to falling production, they are still among the most important elements of Malaysian exports;  the EC is by far the largest market for Malaysian rubber (28 % of production) and one of the  largest for palm oil (10 %). For Malaysia too the forests are a major source of exports. Since 1992  the Malaysian government has adopted a new policy of gradually introducing a 'sustainable  development' system in the forestry sector. Production of cocoa, tropical fruit and fishery  products and high-quality stockfarming are gaining in importance. In the mining sector, besides  natural gas (21  million  mª of reserves with production increasing by 18 % annually in 1992-1993)  tin is still fairly important; with 8,4 % of world production Malaysia is the fifth ranked nation. In Thailand agriculture's contribution to GDP fell from 40 % in 1960 to 11,4 % in 1993, but it  still employs two thirds of the labour force. Despite headlong growth in manufacturing industry,  agriculture is still important and Thailand, along with Vietnam, is one of Asia's two net exporters  of agricultural produce. Apart from rice (the world's leading exporter) tapioca, maize, sugar and  rubber, Thailand is specializing in the production of soya, palm oil, coffee, cotton, and a wide  variety of fruit (which has stimulated investment in the fruit juice industry). Stockfarming and  fishing are expanding and highly remunerative sectors. Mining is less significant, but tin,  antimony, lignite, iron, tungsten, manganese and zinc are to be found. In the Philippines too the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing) contributed 22,5 % of  GDP in 1992 and employed 45,7 % of the workforce in 1993. It is split between an archaic,  fragmented and labour-intensive sector producing for subsistence and the home market, and a more  modern and capital-intensive sector (agro-business plantations) producing for export. The main  products are rice, maize, coconuts, sugar, bananas, pineapples and other tropical fruit. Forests  are one of the country's main resources, but they have suffered from uncontrolled exploitation  resulting from population pressure, timber exports, illegal felling and insufficient replanting. In  1945, 15  million hectares were covered by forest; by 1988 this had been reduced to 1,2 million  hectares. Since 1988 Corazon Aquino's democratic government has set up programmes of replanting and  for protecting the remaining virgin forest, particularly on Mindanao. Following the end of the Vietnam war and the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, the  country's net material product (NMP) [Net material product is an economic variable which excludes  public administration costs. It was used in the Comecon countries until Comecon was disbanded in  1990, when it was replaced by the variables (GDP, GNP, etc.) used elsewhere.] grew by a sluggish 1  % during the second half of the 1970s. In the period 1980-1985 NMP grew by some 7 % per year. In  1987 it slowed significantly, to 2,1 % - a sign of the continuing structural problems which the  liberalization measures had not solved. Although the post-1976 Vietnamese Government did not  jettison socialist economic principles entirely, it did introduce liberalizing market-based  reforms. The public and private sector began to work in concert and generate synergies. The  reforms, known as 'doi moi' (renewal), ensured full acceptance of private enterprise and spelt the  end of state quotas and subsidies. However, the role of state planning in what is now a mixed  economy has yet to be clarified. Following the reforms, GDP at constant prices rose by 4,7 % in  1991 and 8 % in 1993. Vietnam's economic structure remains weak and signally lags behind that of  the other ASEAN countries. Agriculture continues to be a mainstay and still employs 73 % of the  workforce, although its contribution to GDP fell from 50 % in 1989 to 29,3 % in 1993. Apart from  the mining and traditional industries which were active during both the colonial period and the  conflict between North and South Vietnam, there was no real industrial sector. This only began to  develop after 1970 in North Vietnam with the emergence of a substantial heavy steel industry and  the building of power stations and infrastructure. Light industry did not appear until the  mid-1980s, mainly producing textiles, electronic components and manufactured goods with little  added value. 1.3.3.3. A characteristic shared by the ASEAN countries is the headlong growth of the industrial  sector in the last decade. In Malaysia it contributed 22,3 % of GDP in 1987, against 8,7 % in 1960.  In 1993 that figure passed 30 %, representing 65 % of export earnings. Thailand is currently East  Asia's leading recipient of foreign investment; the loss of comparative advantages, first by Japan  and then to some extent by South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, has led to these countries  relocating some production abroad, transforming Thailand into the country with East Asia's highest  level of investment in labour intensive, export-oriented industry. Thailand's main manufacturing  industry is semiconductors and electronic components, whose exports grew by 13,9 % in 1992,  matching the 14 % share of the textile industry, the traditional mainstay of the Thai economy. Both Thailand and Malaysia are switching from low-added-value industrial production to more  sophisticated products, but both countries suffer from a shortage of skilled labour, poor  infrastructure and environmental problems caused by pollution and deforestation. In Indonesia too the manufacturing sector accounted for less than 10 % of GDP in the mid-1960s. As  in other South-East Asian countries, the Indonesian government initially followed an industrial  strategy of import substitution. This enabled national industry to be set up, protected from  international competition by strong tariff barriers. However, by contrast with other countries that  changed to an export oriented strategy, Indonesia maintained this policy until the end of the  1980s, leaving its industries largely isolated from innovation and international investment, and  hence rather uncompetitive. This partially explains Indonesia's backwardness in industrial  development, which is still largely under state control. A few liberalizing reforms introduced at  the end of the 1980s have stimulated the development of a private manufacturing sector, often in  association with foreign companies. The manufacturing sector accounted for an estimated 20 % of GDP  in 1993. Singapore, which has had a solid base of export-oriented manufacturing industry for over 20 years,  is specializing increasingly in higher technology sectors, and has stimulated productivity  increases by linking them to pay rises. Having lost some of its comparative advantages, the annual  GDP growth rate has stabilized at around 4 % to 5 %, while manufacturing has concentrated on mature  and high technology products; the city-state is increasingly developing into an extremely important  financial centre. The Philippines find themselves in the converse situation; having taken the first steps towards  light industrialization, they are attracting investments in labour-intensive, low added-value  production. Overall, between 1985 and 1991, exports of manufactured products from ASEAN countries  grew from 49 % to 85 % of total exports. 1.3.3.4. Japan's economic presence looms large. 37 % of local imports are Japanese products; more  than 40 % of Japanese investment is channelled to the area, as are 60 % of Japanese cooperation  funds. The region has seen what economists term a 'flying geese' development model, which consists of a  given country producing certain goods domestically while they enjoy certain comparative advantages.  Thereafter, when these advantages are lost, production is relocated to neighbouring countries (at  first Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong; in a second wave, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the  Pacific islands, etc.) which take advantage of Japanese investment, while the leader-country, which  has invested heavily in R& D, specializes in ever more sophisticated high-tech products using very  flexible production methods. This cycle has replicated itself down the chain, and following in  Japan's wake Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are now transferring low added value, labour  intensive production to neighbouring countries. This phenomenon is most clearly demonstrated in the electronics industry. Between 1985 and 1991  ASEAN's exports of electronic products quintupled (from $ 6,6 billion to $ 32,8 billion) and their  composition changed: components dropped from 60 % to 30 % of the total, while computers rose from  15 % to 22 % and telecommunications equipment from 18 % to 35 %. All the world's major electronics  corporations, mainly Japanese, have a presence within ASEAN, where they have established an  integrated circuit of production. This means that individual components (say, of a television set)  are produced in different countries (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia) and then assembled in a third  country (e.g. Malaysia), bringing a considerable reduction in costs. A third of trade between ASEAN  members is in electronic products; this is mainly trading between multinationals. Although it is not a formally integrated area - as Japan has never aspired to being the regional  centre - in fact East Asia is integrated in terms of the globalization of production carried out by  big businesses. Indeed, more than 60 % of its trade and investment is carried out within the area  or with Japan. 2. Relations between the EU and ASEAN2.1. As mentioned earlier, the European Union concluded a  formal agreement with ASEAN in 1980 and maintains institutionalized relations involving regular  meetings of foreign ministers. A joint committee has operated since then to examine scientific and  technological cooperation programmes, to approve measures for promoting business contacts between  the two regions and to approve development projects put forward by ASEAN countries for European  Community funding. In 1983 an ASEAN-EC Business Council was set up to bring together business  people from the two sides to identify common projects. The first meeting between ASEAN and EC  economic affairs ministers took place in October 1985, and it was decided that European investment  in ASEAN (estimated 13 % of total foreign investment, compared with 28 % from Japan and 17 % from  the USA) should be stimulated. In 1986 a joint working party on trade issues examined the problems  of access to ASEAN markets and in 1987 joint committees on investment were set up in all ASEAN  capitals. In 1988 an agreement was reached on the setting-up of a Joint Management Centre based in  Brunei. In 1991 the Community adopted new guidelines on development cooperation, with an increase  on aid to Asia and a change in the aid systems for ASEAN countries, giving priority to training,  science, technology and venture capital, rather than aid for rural development. At the  June 1991 meeting of ASEAN and EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg, disagreements emerged  between the two sides for the first time over the EU's proposals to tie economic agreements and aid  programmes to human rights and environmental policies. In September 1993, the EU and ASEAN began  negotiations for an agreement on the control of drug trafficking. Lastly, at the two-yearly meeting  of EU and ASEAN foreign ministers held in Karlsruhe in September 1994, ministers confirmed the  central importance of EU-ASEAN relations and agreed to pursue mutually beneficial economic  cooperation and to foster wider involvement of the private sector. Although ASEAN has not reached a level of integration on a par with that of the European Union, it  has had and continues to have great importance for regional stability. 2.1.1. ASEAN is not yet either a free trade area or a customs union and has no intergovernmental -  let alone supranational - institutions. The highest political body is the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of  Government, which usually meets every three years. At the meeting in Singapore in  January 1992,  many changes were made to the organization to move it further in the direction of real economic  cooperation, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established, with completion scheduled by  2003. AFTA is starting to make its presence felt. The final coverage of products and the list of  tariff reductions within the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT) has led to the  harmonization of tariff nomenclature and the elimination of quantitative restrictions from  non-tariff barriers to products included within CEPT. CEPT tariff concessions are granted on a  reciprocal basis and all ASEAN members can conclude bilateral agreements. The CEPT programme also  provides for a special reduction that enables member countries which reduce their customs tariffs  to 20 % or beyond, even on the basis of the 'most favoured nation' principle, to enjoy the  preferential CEPT tariffs granted by their partners. However, the moves to create a single market are opposed by a number of entrenched interests. The ASEAN countries apply varying - but on the whole high - levels of tariff protection; for some  products they are extremely high. Non-tariff barriers (prohibitions, quotas, import monopolies,  customs checks, etc.) are widespread but difficult to quantify. Liberalization is proceeding slowly  and the governments are influenced by both the arguments of industrial pressure groups and by  customs revenue, which provides a not insignificant proportion of state resources. Under AFTA,  customs duties for goods produced within ASEAN are to be brought down to a 0 % to 5 % band by 2003.  The formalities for its application are complex. The calendar distinguishes between products  subject to a 'fast track' procedure and those which are to follow a normal process of tariff  reduction. The weak point of the agreement, however, is that countries can temporarily or  permanently exclude lists of products from it, with the lists being revised after the first eight  years of the agreement. Indonesia has listed 1,800 such products (19 % of its tariff line) and the  Philippines 1 350 (24 %). Trade between ASEAN countries rose by 41 % in 1994, from $ 79 billion to  $111 billion. Total ASEAN trade with the rest of the world, including intra-regional trade, rose by  some 30 %, from $ 419 billion in 1993 to $ 506 billion in 1994. A conference of Heads of State was held in Bangkok in  December 1995, and on 15  December  participants signed a treaty making the region a nuclear weapon-free area. Consideration was also  given to enlargement of ASEAN by the year 2000 to include Burma, Cambodia and Laos, which sent  observers to the conference. Participants stressed that the prospect of a ten-member ASEAN should  not prejudice the structure of the organization or impede the trade liberalization process. It was  decided that intra-ASEAN tariffs should be cut to 5 % by the year 2000, with a three-year  derogation for Vietnam. The idea of 'informal' summits of Heads of State between the official  conferences was also mooted. However, the real centre of power is the annual meeting of foreign  ministers, which is charged with coordinating policy among the various ministerial working groups,  of which the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) is the most important. The AEM supervises the work of  the five committees on trade and tourism, industry and energy, banking and finance, agriculture and  forestry, and transport and telecommunications. The ASEAN Standing Committee meets every two months  and is composed of the foreign minister of the country that holds the presidency (which rotates),  and the ambassadors of the other countries, and maintains continuity in the organization's  activities. Finally, there is a permanent secretariat, based in Jakarta, with a Secretary-General  elected for a five-year term at the meeting of foreign ministers. The secretariat has around a  hundred officials working on various projects of common interest. Inter alia, they have drawn up  plans of action on social development, the environment, science and technology, culture and  information and the control of drug abuse, in the form of directives to be implemented by the  individual states. Decisions are consensus-driven, being taken by informal meetings at which any  disagreements are ironed out and a unanimous decision is reached. The organization operates  primarily on the basis of consultation and conciliation. Not by chance, the only common institution  so far envisaged has been a court of law. ASEAN countries maintain strict limitations on the rights of EU companies to establish a presence  and to provide services, particularly financial and maritime services. In those countries for  example, banks have severe restrictions on their ability to set up branches and to provide banking  services. In this context, the maritime transport sector and the shipbuilding sector, which are  developing rapidly in ASEAN countries, need to be addressed by the EU with a view to achieving  liberalization in the former sector and the application of the principles of the recent OECD  agreement (on abolition of shipbuilding subsidies) in ASEAN countries. 2.1.2. ASEAN is heavily dependent on the global market. The amount of inter-member trade is very  low compared with trade with other regions, varying between 16 and 18 % of the total volume.  Exports of manufactured goods increased considerably from 49 % of total exports in 1985 to 85 % in  1991, while exports of primary products fell from 68 to 33 %. The area's development depends  largely on external - particularly Japanese - investment, which as previously mentioned, represents  28 % of the total direct investment in the area, followed by the USA (17 %) and the EU (13 %).  Member countries' economies are rarely complementary; the ASEAN countries produce similar products  and thus compete in third markets. Hence there is no vertical division of production, or  specialization in the sense that one country produces, say, cars while another makes household  electrical goods. All the countries produce essentially the same products. However, there is some  intra-sectoral and horizontal complementarity. In practice, this means that in certain sectors  (such as electronics, but also textiles) trade is taking place within single companies having  subsidiaries in different countries. This enables synergies to be created between branches of  individual industries, thus opening up greater opportunities for complementarity. The degree of  complementarity in trade between ASEAN countries shows that the trading structure is slowly  evolving from a vertical to a horizontal division of labour. ASEAN will undoubtedly have to improve  its internal complementarity, striving at the same time to expand its internal market and reduce  intra-ASEAN competition on the international market. 2.1.3. ASEAN has no natural centre or integrated axis, such as the North Sea-Rhine  Valley-Tyrrhenean Sea corridor in the European Community, functioning as a powerhouse for  development throughout the region. The existence of a central powerhouse spread across several  countries has been a very important factor in post-war European development and in the early stages  of European integration. The absence of an equivalent region of ASEAN might mean that development,  rather than proceeding in an integrated and harmonious manner, could be patchy and localized. To offset this problem, ASEAN has developed subregional cooperation 'growth triangles' between some  of its member countries in order to improve their border areas. Devised in  December 1989, the first 'growth triangle' (straddling Singapore, Indonesia and  Malaysia) is intended to maximize the growth potential of the three adjoining areas, comprising  Singapore, Jahore, the most southern state of Malaysia and the Riau islands of Indonesia,  especially the islands of Batam and Bintan. Medan represents another 'growth triangle', set up in  1993 by Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and covering the north of Sumatra, four of Malaysia's  northern states and southern Thailand. A third initiative centres on the 'Mindanao triangle',  involving Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 2.2. Furthering regionalizationIn its current state, ASEAN is not capable of providing a  counterweight to the neighbouring giants China and Japan or the economic pressure of the earlier  NICs. Hence the search for support outside Asia, with hopes being pinned on outside partners such  as the EU and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and on the United States, to whom the ASEAN  countries are looking with increasing interest on both economic and political terms. All the ASEAN  countries, despite some initial reluctance, have become members of APEC, and their willingness to  become part of an organization -  albeit unstructured - that also involves the USA is clearly  evident. 2.2.1. Although APEC is an intergovernmental forum with extremely vague and general objectives,  timetables and instruments, it is nevertheless a powerful source of attraction for the ASEAN  countries, precisely because it includes the US which, under the Clinton administration, has placed  great emphasis on the Asia-Pacific area. Together, these countries account for almost 60 % of world  trade, and it is a particular feature of APEC that industrialized, newly-industrialized and  developing countries all belong to it (). It is seriously doubtful whether the aim of  liberalization of trade can be achieved within the time limits and constraints proposed at Seattle  and at the Bagor Conference in 1994, but in time APEC may become the privileged forum for action by  the most dynamic Asian economies. 2.2.2. The European Union is at a disadvantage when competing with Japan and the US in the  Asia-Pacific area for obvious geographic and political reasons. Nonetheless, in view of the  influence exerted by the large Asian states and the US, the ASEAN states wish the EU to play a  stronger role in various fields. The EU could, therefore, help to further the process of  'regionalization' of ASEAN by offering its experience with a view to helping improve the operation  of AFTA, establish a free trade zone and, later, a customs union, set a common external tariff and  step up economic cooperation between member countries. 2.2.3. The EU could make available its know-how in these fields, providing governments with the  assistance they need to resolve the inevitable problems and resistance to implementing a free trade  agreement and an open market. All the countries' economies would feel the benefits over the medium  to long term. Forecasts predict a 25 % increase in intra-ASEAN trade once the free trade agreement  is up and running. 2.2.4. Moreover, Europe could provide support in setting up the more structured institutional  framework which will be needed once ASEAN is required to manage increasingly complex economic and  industrial cooperation. Initially, this support could take the form of reinforcement of the  Secretariat responsible for coordination, preparing documentation and the decisions taken by the  political bodies and a - perhaps  - supranational court of arbitration to settle disputes. 2.2.5. The main problem concerns the intractable question of East Timor - a former Portuguese  colony now occupied by Indonesia. Portugal has political objections to an agreement with ASEAN  because of human rights abuses by Indonesia in East Timor. A major diplomatic effort using all the  resources available is required to solve these problems clouding EU-ASEAN relations. It would  therefore be helpful if at the earliest opportunity a representative of the Presidency (the foreign  ministers of the troika) could draw up a proposal and hammer out a diplomatic solution based on the  UN General Assembly Resolutions. 3. Factors favouring closer EU-ASEAN relations3.1. The approach adopted in the Commission  document () of placing future trade, economic and development policy towards ASEAN within the  broader context of cooperation with Asia seems right. Against this backdrop, the Committee believes  that the following elements justify closer relations. 3.2. The EU's relations with ASEAN are based on Europe's assessment of the role which ASEAN has  played in the regional context since 1967 (when the Vietnam War was in progress), and is still  playing in promoting the establishment of consultation structures on security and economic  cooperation. With the collapse of the USSR and the volatile situation which has also developed in  Asia, the strategic role of ASEAN is all the more important since this group of countries could  help to contain the potential 'hegemonic' pressure from either China or Japan. Hence the European  interest in maintaining a channel of communication with these countries and supporting the aim of  establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon  Free Zone (SEANWFZ). 3.2.1. Like the EU, ASEAN is today faced with the question of enlargement to embrace formerly  communist countries, or countries which are still communist but are converting to market economies  such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, or politically unstable countries like Burma. Vietnam's  membership will be a stabilizing factor throughout the region, and could also underpin the moderate  line now espoused by the Vietnamese leadership. The same could apply to Laos, Cambodia and Burma,  which currently have observer status but are due to join ASEAN by the year 2000, taking membership  up to ten countries. These new partners, Vietnam included, are significantly less developed than  the other members. ASEAN's leaders are convinced that within ten years Vietnam will reach the  development levels of other member countries. The EU might offer ASEAN the benefit of its  experience in cooperation with countries that are trying to move from a planned to a market  economy, such as the Phare programme and support for the private and cooperative sectors. European experience in this area could help the ASEAN countries to work together on the  reconversion process. Enlargement would also increase ASEAN's economic and strategic autonomy in a  region representing a market of over 455 million people. Current ASEAN members agree that the  organization should not exceed ten members, and that one of the chief problems for the next few  years will be how to integrate the new members without slowing the integration of the six original  members. The Committee considers that it is important to encourage EU-ASEAN partnership favouring Vietnam,  in order to give effective support to the development process in a country still suffering the  consequences of a long war. ASEAN countries benefit from EU GSP tariff preferences although some ASEAN countries have grown  rapidly, have GDP per head comparable to the poorest EU Member States and have demonstrated  successful, aggressive export performance. In some cases, manufacturing employment within the EU  therefore suffers. 3.2.2. The second point of interest for the European Union is based on the realistic scope for  trade and investment between the two regions. The present volume of trade between the EU and ASEAN  amounts to some ECU 50 billion (ECU 48,5 billion (about $ 60 billion) in 1993), which is four times  the volume in 1980. The trade balance tilts markedly in favour of ASEAN with a 1993 trade surplus  of ECU 2,7 billion. A comparison of EU-CEEC and EU-ASEAN trade reveals an almost perfect symmetry  in the volume of imports and exports between the EU and these countries - see Table 5B. The EU is  ASEAN's third largest trading partner after Japan and the United States; it accounts for 15,5 % of  ASEAN exports and provides 13,7 % of goods imported into the region. In relations with the ASEAN  countries, forms of economic cooperation, with reciprocal advantages, should be favoured over  development cooperation. The recommendations in the Commission document regarding support for the  European private sector to enable it to take advantage of a favourable commercial and financial  climate should be supported and encouraged. The EU must select priority sectors for economic  cooperation in which it has a clear relative advantage, such as banking, energy, environmental  technology, means of transport and telecommunications. ASEAN is a partner with a powerful economic motor which has not yet moved into top gear. Europe can  help its development and become a privileged partner. However, as the European Parliament () has  noted, the EU needs to emphasize commercial cooperation with Asia rather than competition. To this  end, the European Union needs first of all to improve its own commercial image in Asia. The opening  of European Business Information Centres (EBICs), and linking them up with the existing national  Chambers of Commerce will contribute to more fruitful forms of economic cooperation. Of similar importance is cooperation in science and R& D. For this to happen, funding needs to be  found for cooperation in technology and innovation, as well as for travel grants and study visits  by trainees, civil servants and new graduates from ASEAN countries. The Committee feels that there  would be particular advantage in setting aside additional funding for programmes for Asian trainees  in European institutes, universities and businesses, since this will not merely improve Europe's  image, but will also foster mutual understanding and help bring together the cultures whose  differences are one of the major obstacles to open dialogue between the two regions. Another field in which there is scope for agreement with ASEAN countries is cooperation on joint  economic initiatives in both the ex-Communist CEECs and the non-member Mediterranean countries. The  major ASEAN countries have the financial and technological capacity for a tripartite EU-ASEAN-CEEC  mechanism for investment in reconstruction and modernization programmes in certain industrial  sectors, now privatized in the ex-communist countries. The same sort of arrangement would be  possible for development projects in Mediterranean countries. European-oriented development in a  predominantly Muslim, but not fundamentalist, region could convince the Arab-Mediterranean world  that modernization is compatible with the preservation of traditional values. ASEAN is certainly a major trading partner, but although representing a model for reciprocal,  profitable partnership between two regional groupings, numerous problems have clouded EU-ASEAN  relations. The ASEAN countries are critical of the EU's anti-dumping policies, the new Generalized  System of Preferences (GSP) and the farm-export subsidies. For its part, the EU can legitimately be  critical of the problems of tariffs, market access, discriminatory legislation and the absence of  environmental clauses in ASEAN countries. 3.2.3. The region's governments are not at all sensitive to western concerns over human rights, and  regard any attempt to tackle the question as interference in their internal affairs and as an  attempt to 'impose' European values. The European Union has for some time given priority to the  problem of human rights, and has deplored their violation. The Maastricht Treaty makes the signing  of new agreements conditional on respect for human rights. The Commission also intends to put  forward other conditions that will reinforce the priority given to human rights. The human rights  question in the ASEAN countries is undeniably bound up with democracy and respect for political  opponents and minority groups. It is a typical case of incompatibility between good trading  relations on the one hand, and sharp cultural and political differences on the other. The European  Parliament report questions whether the insistence on strictly linking EU relations with ASEAN  countries with respect for human rights may perhaps be hindering the development of such relations.  In the report the EP implies that a more flexible attitude by the EU might be appropriate in order  not to hinder economic relations. The issue is a tricky one because important interests and values  are at stake. However, the Committee considers that questions of principle and values should have  priority over mere economic and trade interests. 3.2.4. In view of its substantial trading surplus with the EU, ASEAN cannot adopt a 'take it or  leave it' attitude to European offers. In purely trading terms, the Community represents ASEAN's  third largest export market. The EU could bring pragmatic and gradual use of conditionality to play  on human rights, taking account of each country's level of development, history and culture in its  assessments of them in this respect. The same applies to the treatment of the workforce. 3.2.4.1. In the first place, attention must be drawn to the fundamental rights of workers, trade  unions and employers organizations enshrined in the ILO's 'human rights Conventions', and the most  important Convention on minimum employment age. It is of great importance that the European Union  convinces the governments of the ASEAN countries of the importance of ratifying and implementing  these Conventions in so far as they have not yet done so. These Conventions are embodied in the  'social clause' which the Committee wishes to be placed on the agenda of the WTO. The social clause  provides for: - a ban on forced labour (Conventions 29 and 105); - workers' right to organize and bargain collectively (Conventions 87 and 98); - minimum age for admission to employment, and abolition of child labour (Convention 138); - a ban on discrimination between workers, and equal remuneration for men and women for equivalent  work (Conventions 111 and 110). 3.2.4.2. Secondly, working conditions and treatment of workers, and especially of women workers,  often genuinely reach the level of social dumping in these countries, for instance as regards  working hours, wages, occupational safety and health, and social protection systems. Here, the  European Union should encourage the ASEAN governments to ratify and implement the relevant ILO  Conventions, which have been designed as universal mimimum standards and which can be adopted by  industrialized as well as by developing countries. The ILO has organized seminars on trade-union training and the framing of programmes to increase  awareness of social rights and promote the application of ILO Conventions. The new ILO policy  should, with the help of the European Commission, serve to promote cooperation programmes in the  field of employment, vocational training and child labour. Progress could also be ensured through  compliance with ILO Conventions, trade liberalization agreements and future WTO directives on this  question. 3.2.5. To this end, Europe should direct its development aid programmes towards improving the  working conditions of small farmers and women working in the computer chip and electronic  components industries and should demand that education facilities, basic health care and family  planning are made available. It should make an effort to help combat immediately and with great  determination at least the ugliest and most exploitative forms of child labour. The way to attain  these goals is to set up programmes with a strong social content, to be carried out by NGOs which  are in a position to carry out work in the field and establish an effective dialogue with the  beneficiaries of the project. Unfortunately, child prostitution is rife in parts of south east Asia, partly due to increasing  tourism and directly contravening UN Conventions. The Committee believes that the organization of  sex tours should be made illegal in all Member States, and nationals prosecuted at home who have  sex children abroad. 3.2.6. The employment demands of a large population mean that the governments of the region must  pursue a goal of full employment and of eliminating the still vast pockets of poverty. With this in  mind, programmes could be launched to encourage the establishment and spread of micro-enterprises  and craft activities, a field in which the EU has considerable experience which might usefully be  transferred. Similarly fundamental is the contribution the EU could make to upgrading the region's  skills basis, improving training and devising vocational training programmes and courses to  integrate young people and women into working life. To this end it would be both locally beneficial  and exemplary of European interest in the area if a multi-purpose vocational training centre and  technological research centres were to be set up in one of the ASEAN countries. 3.2.7. The Commission document () states that for countries with high growth potential, 'economic  cooperation is aimed at improving the business and regulatory environment in partner countries in  order to stimulate two-way trade and investments with the direct participation of the private  sector'. Unfortunately, the private sector is not inclined to invest in high risk countries or  those with a serious macro-economic imbalance. It has been observed that even when substantial  incentives are provided, there are problems with private sector participation. This constant  insistence in European Union documents on private sector participation, while correct in principle,  amounts to little in practice if the requisite operational instruments are not created. The  Commission document speaks of 'promoting business cooperation between European companies and their  Asian counterparts... by increasing information and creating a favourable framework for industrial  cooperation and notably for SMEs'. Numerous initiatives have been launched to stimulate greater European investment in the ASEAN  countries. EC investment in the region increased during the 1980s in volume, but shrank in relative  terms as investment from other countries grew faster. EC investment focuses on the palm oil,  chemicals, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, electrical and electronics industries, the car sector,  banking and finance. The Committee hopes that when the forthcoming EU-ASEAN global cooperation  agreement becomes operative, steps will be taken to improve the conditions contained therein for  direct investment by EU companies in these countries. A legal framework is also needed for  conciliation and arbitration procedures in case of disputes. The protection of intellectual  property is of particular importance here.3.2.8. The EC Investment Partners (ECIP), the EC's financial instrument for promoting joint  ventures, could prove the most appropriate means of fostering European investment and joint  ventures between European and ASEAN SMEs (some 20 regional projects concerning ASEAN are in the  pipeline). The ECIP is currently the main instrument for the creation of joint ventures and for  encouraging the spread of small and medium scale industry. To improve take-up, quicker and more  simpler procedures should be found for the projects that receive ECIP funding. For infrastructure  work greater involvement by the EIB (European Investment Bank) is desirable; for some years it has  been permitted to fund projects in Asia and Latin America. Prior to involvement it would be  necessary to ascertain whether the conditions exist in the ASEAN countries for the growth of the  SME sector and whether the European model is exportable. Ideally the European Commission would fund  research into the situation of SMEs in the ASEAN countries and into identifying the sectors with  scope for cooperation with European SMEs. 4. Conclusions4.1. North-South relations - as they have until recently been conceived - are  rapidly changing in Asia. Within Asia, there is now a hierarchy of economically strong countries  which are no longer developing nations and which exist alongside countries where poverty is rife,  generating the same imbalances within the continent as are found in North-South relations. The EU's  main concern in relations with Asia is linked to the economic tensions between the two regions,  given the potential impact on Europe's competitive position of accelerated growth in Asia by the  end of the century. This must be countered by a strategy to step up cooperation between the two  areas and defuse the potential for damaging the competitiveness of the EU, which has a lower growth  rate and whose market share is also threatened on third markets. 4.2. It is clear, from a number of sources, that the prospect of the world's economic powerhouse  shifting to the Pacific is regarded in ASEAN more with apprehension than anticipation, insofar as  it would confirm China and Japan's overwhelming predominance. ASEAN countries would feel squeezed  between them and obliged to align themselves with one or other. 4.3. In contrast to China and Japan, Southeast Asia has always been open to external influence: its  self-declared 'open regionalism' has deep historical roots. During the colonial period, the region  was drawn into a division of labour geared to Europe. There can, of course, be no question of  resuming a relationship which belongs to the past, not least because of the level of development  attained by the ASEAN countries. But, the opportunity - missed at the time of Taiwan and South  Korea's take-off - is now there to have a positive influence on the 'drive for maturity' of  countries which are beginning to take off with a significant, but unexceptional, average growth  rate, and to re-establish a preferential relationship with Europe. Such an objective would bring  the following advantages. 4.4. It seems difficult for the European Union to challenge the competitiveness and economic  hegemony of Japan in what can be regarded as a 'reserved Japanese market'. It must be remembered  that Eastern Asia is the third element of the capitalist 'trio' and is emerging as a competitor to  the European Union, which could seek to re-establish a certain balance by securing the support of  the Russian Federation which, as an 'Asian power' could have a certain influence on the region. However, in this area the quality of the European presence is more important than its size, and  this presence can be left up to the markets and to firms which may find it convenient either to set  up joint ventures with local firms or to relocate their own production and offices in order to reap  maximum benefit from existing comparative advantages and the high level of services and  infrastructure. 4.5. A broad-ranging European strategy, centred upon ASEAN, would not necessarily be in opposition  to US interests. By containing excessive dominance of the Pacific and Indian Ocean by China and  Japan, it would facilitate the emergence in the Asia-Pacific area of a balance capable of ensuring  sufficient leeway for stable and profitable relations with the European Union. The forthcoming Europe-Asia summit to be held in Bangkok in  March 1996, in which the ASEAN  countries will be taking part alongside Japan, China and South Korea, will be a unique opportunity  to relaunch a European presence in one of the world's most dynamic areas which has vigorous  economic and technological growth. It also offers an opportunity to set up new and advanced  cooperation programmes, for which a few broad ideas have been sketched out in these pages. The EU needs to take a more assertive and transparent approach to the forthcoming 1998 GSP  arrangements. In particular, ASEAN countries should only benefit where their overall prosperity and  export performance are weak. It is essential that the opportunity is taken to take a more assertive  position by the EU and USA jointly. This should be based on a joint strategy aimed at improving  access for goods and services and at better protection for intellectual and technical property  rights, as foreseen in the joint EU-US action plan, agreed in Madrid in  December 1995. 4.6. The meeting should serve principally to consolidate dialogue and extend its scope to such  fields as the environment, social problems and vocational training. Given the wide gap between  development levels, the Asian side is finding it difficult to establish an agenda and objectives  for the meeting. A general consensus could be obtained on a few precise guidelines (i.e. the common  vision and general approach to the problems), leaving the discussion of specific topics to a later  date. The main aim is to create the missing point of contact between the EU and Asia. As the political and social problems have been underestimated and UN General Assembly decisions  have not been implemented by some ASEAN countries, the Committee hopes that these problems will be  ironed out before the Europe-Asia summit, with the active involvement of the EU troika, so that the  full potential of EU-ASEAN economic relations can be exploited. 4.7. The gap between Europe and Asia is wide. There must be a major commitment to information and  cultural cooperation and major resources should be assigned to this purpose. A variety of exchanges  and contacts could usefully be promoted so as to deepen mutual understanding. The EU should keep in  mind the diversity of Asia and adopt different strategies in its relations with Japan, China, India  and the ASEAN countries (and there are special characteristics within the group). 4.8. The EU should adopt a qualitative approach to ASEAN cooperation and focus on such sectors as  the environment, infrastructure, telecommunications, energy and vocational training. As the EU is  already heavily committed to cooperation with central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean  countries, it lacks the means to make a large financial outlay on cooperation. It can make up for  this by providing qualitatively significant cooperation focusing on exchanges in the fields of  training, culture and improvement of mutual understanding. 4.9. The European presence in the ASEAN countries visited by an ESC delegation is far less marked  than that of Japan and the United States. Europe needs to raise its profile in the region, inter  alia by means of art exhibitions and scientific and cultural initiatives to help disseminate  Europe's vast cultural heritage. Secondly, there should be greater investment in exhibitions and  trade fairs, encouraging European firms to take part in them and familiarize their Asian partners  with European technology and goods from different production sectors. The setting-up of European  Business Information Centres could play an important role, notably in the promotion of small and  medium-sized businesses. A proper distribution of tasks between these centres and Member States'  bilateral chambers of commerce could yield worthwhile results. 4.10. Given the efficiency of the ASEAN secretariat, the EU should offer all technical assistance  it can, for instance by passing on what it has learnt when setting up an external tariff and a  common market. The ASEAN secretariat and the Commission could hold experience-swapping seminars and  meetings. Some socio-economic organizations in the ASEAN countries are government controlled, and  others are still embryonic. A two-track approach is needed involving dialogue at both ASEAN (with  the Chamber of Commerce and the Trade Union Council) and national level (with individual  organizations). The Economic and Social Committee has an important role to play in dialogue and relations with the  ASEAN countries. It represents important sectors of Europe's civil society, and has links with the  interactive networks which formed the real bedrock of European integration. It has comments to make  and experience to share with its counterparts (trade unions, non-profit organizations, trade  associations, employers) in the ASEAN countries. Its involvement in the Venice cultural forum is an  important first step here. The Committee hopes that it will be involved in the forthcoming  Europe-Asia sumit in Bangkok, or at the very least that it will be kept properly informed so that  it can decide what action it should take in the medium to long term. Done at Brussels, 1  February 1996. The Presidentof the Economic and Social CommitteeCarlos FERRER() Commission  communication to the Council, 'Towards a New Asia Strategy' (COM(94) 314 final of 13. 7. 1994).  () Vietnam joined ASEAN on 28  July 1995, at the 28th ministerial meeting of ASEAN countries in  Brunei.  () APEC has 18 member states: as well as the six ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,  Philippines, Singapore and Brunei) it includes the NAFTA (Canada, US, Mexico) plus Japan, Hong  Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Papua-New Guinea, China, Taiwan and South Korea.  () See foot-note, p. 33.  () Report on the Commission communication to the Council, 'Towards a New Asia Strategy', PE 211.248  final, 12  April 1995.  () See foot-note, p. 33.