OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the Euro- Mediterranean partnership
Date: 1995-09-14
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Mediterranean region (EU), international relations, regional cooperation













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51995IE0974

OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the Euro- Mediterranean partnership  


Official Journal C 301 , 13/11/1995 P. 0045 





Opinion on the  Euro-Mediterranean partnership(95/C 301/13)On 21  December 1994 the Economic and Social  Committee, acting under the third paragraph of Rule 23 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw  up an Opinion on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Section for External Relations, Trade and Development Policy, which was responsible for  preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 7  July 1995. The Rapporteur  was Mr  Meriano. At its 328th Plenary Session (meeting of 14  September 1995), the Economic and Social Committee  adopted the following Opinion by a majority vote with one abstention. SUMMARYForeword - reasons for, and nature of, the proposed Euro-Mediterranean  partnership0.1. Subject to concrete action being taken by the Commission and Council on its  recommendations, the Committee's Own-initiative Opinion - based on the three Commission preparatory  documents to date - approves the proposal's general approach. The Committee particularly  appreciates the linkage of economic, political and development/security aspects and the generalized  use of multilateral instruments. In its view, this approach is broadly consistent with the  guidelines set out in its previous Opinions on the Community's Mediterranean policy. It views the  proposal as a significant leap forward (in both general and financial terms) in providing a  blueprint that can produce immediate results, even if it will not be fully felt for a generation. 0.2. The Committee observes that the comprehensive nature of the partnership is confirmed by its  breakdown into political dialogue, sustainable and balanced economic and social development and  greater inter-cultural understanding, with greater emphasis on the human dimension of trade.  Without attempting to play down the difficulties involved, the Committee wholeheartedly endorses  this approach in principle and regards it as the only way of tackling the area's serious and  complex problems. 0.3. The Committee also generally agrees with the proposed institutional structure and favours a  global framework agreement to boost the potential for regional cooperation among the countries in  the individual Mediterranean sub-regions and create an area of shared prosperity. This should avert  the risks which a return to exclusively bilateral relations could entail for the balanced  development of the Mediterranean nations, not least as regards the opening-up of their mutual  relations. The political dimension0.4. Here the Committee stresses that the strictly political dimension of  the partnership presupposes the preservation of the cultural identity of the societies concerned.  There can be no question of imposing rigidly predetermined practices and institutional machinery.  Dialogue is needed with representatives of civil society as well as Governments. Reiterating yet again its concern that EU-Mediterranean cooperation must guarantee effective  protection of human rights, the Committee hopes that the planned introduction of procedures for  regular monitoring of compliance with undertakings given in this matter can provide an objective  basis to meet justified insistence that partnership aid should be conditional. Without ruling out the possibility of resorting in extreme cases to carefully considered political  sanctions, such as cutting aid or channelling it through NGOs, the Committee remains convinced that  closer involvement of civil society in the associated countries in partnership operations is the  most constructive contribution that the EU can make to safeguarding human rights and strengthening  institutions and democratic traditions. Trade liberalization, economic cooperation and related practical difficulties0.5. In the economic  sphere, the Committee first and foremost would stress the inextricable link established in the  proposal (including the timespan envisaged) between the establishment of a free trade area - to be  implemented in a gradual, selective manner and in tandem with regional integration between the  partner countries - and implementation of a concurrent structural reform programme. 0.6. On the specific subject of agriculture, where radical solutions - be they protectionist or  deregulatory - do not seem feasible, the Committee's view is that technology transfer and EU  financial support for the Mediterranean countries should first and foremost concentrate on  countries whose governments actively pursue policies for promoting sustainable agricultural  development, and on small and medium-sized food businesses, with a view to attaining a satisfactory  level of food selfsufficiency. 0.7. Bearing in mind too that the massive foreign debt strain on the economies of a number of MED  countries is clearly a key factor in their political and social instability, the Committee  considers that successive Commission documents have been wrong to ignore completely this sensitive  aspect of the problem in exploring a viable scheme for an EU-Mediterranean partnership. 0.8. Turning to the outlook for industrial cooperation, where disturbing signs of crisis are  apparent, the Committee attaches great importance to acceptance of the Commission proposal whereby  EU-MED Association Agreements should provide a framework of legal guarantees to encourage  investment by EU operators. Priority is to be given to joint ventures and industrial cooperation,  with particular emphasis on SMEs, and financial support is to be extended to capital investment  programmes. 0.9. Here the Committee also highlights the key role played by technical and scientific  cooperation, with specific reference to the proposed monitoring systems (e.g. in the energy,  environmental and fisheries sectors). The MED global aid programme0.10. The Committee attaches particular importance to the scale and  medium-term continuity and predictability of the financial resources which the EU is to make  available to its Mediterranean partners via the 1995-1999 aid programme, partly in view of the  structural nature of the problems to be tackled. Resolution of these problems is a precondition for  the establishment of an EU-Mediterranean free trade area. 0.11. Though the Committee feels that the indicative financial aid proposed by the Commission still  falls short of objective needs, it notes that the proposed appropriation, added to a similar sum  from the EIB's own resources and bilateral contributions from the Member States, could boost the  overall impact of EU aid, helped by appropriate interaction between the available aid channels. As  regards the sectoral breakdown of aid, the Committee broadly endorses the specified aims but feels  that proposals should be structured to take account of the individual partners' differing levels of  development in respect of the various sectoral priorities. 0.12. The Committee keenly endorses the Commission's suggestion that financial aid should be  deployed with greater flexibility. Elastic multi-annual programming would facilitate discretionary  use of available funds to the advantage of the countries which make the greatest effort to reform  their respective economies and liberalize trade. Here the Committee would refer specifically to its  own proposal for development agreements, concluded between the European Commission, the Governments  of the MED countries and the socio-economic interest groups, to be targeted on specific aims  forming part of a development plan, with trade-oriented contractual commitments and financial  undertakings. 0.13. The Committee also welcomes the proposed action programme to combat corruption, and calls for  funds to be made available to support such projects. Inter-regional cooperation and sub-regional associations0.14. The Committee refers to its own  recent Opinion on Mediterranean inter-regional cooperation (Appendix II lists proposals of  particular relevance from the partnership angle). It also supports the development of sub-regional  groupings of MED countries. The social and human dimension0.15. The Committee wholeheartedly endorses the Commission's view  that social spending is primarily the responsibility of the Governments concerned, but that the  social decline already to be observed in the MED countries (social cost of structural adjustment,  rapid population growth, mass exodus from rural areas) could be aggravated by worsening disparities  caused by possible temporary adverse effects of economic anchorage to Europe. The Community's help  in countering these disturbing trends would therefore seem justified on account of the damage which  any exacerbation of the situation would bring. The Committee therefore proposes to keep a close eye  on the practical progress of operations in the many social spheres specified in the Commission  documents, and shares the Commission's conviction that the social dimension of partnership is  intrinsically intertwined with the cultural dimension, especially as regards action to curb racism  and xenophobia by fostering greater mutual understanding. The Committee notes with pleasure that the key role played by women in the development process is  ascribed its true worth and that top priority is given to encouraging women to take part in  political and social activities, thereby guaranteeing the promotion of equal opportunities and  human rights. Decentralized cooperation0.16. The Committee reiterates that decentralized cooperation, the aim  pursued by the Community since the very start of its New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), presupposes  full involvement of the socio-occupational interest groups, in a constant drive to encourage small  and medium-sized businesses and the informal sector, while leaving local operators the freedom they  need to promote the initiatives best suited to their particular situations. The Committee therefore welcomes the policy emphasis which the Commission's Summary Report places  on this objective, although it is concerned that it might be stymied by bureaucratic and in some  cases contradictory administrative mechanisms. Involvement of the socio-economic interest groups0.17. The Committee stresses the importance of  work in recent years to pave the way for effective participation of the socio-economic interest  groups in the sphere of cooperation. It highlights its own specific responsibility in such matters,  especially as regards decentralized cooperation, and regrets that the relevant Commission document  makes no mention of its proposals (MED-Reg and MED-Partners) and has so far taken no action on  them. Nonetheless the Committee warmly welcomes the Spanish Government's decision to convene a  non-governmental Forum in Barcelona, immediately after the Euro-Mediterranean interministerial  Conference. It also welcomes the recent initiative by the Spanish Economic and Social Council to  arrange, in conjunction with the Forum, for its representatives to meet their counterparts from  ESCs in the EU Mediterranean countries, the EU's Economic and Social Committee and ESCs in a number  of partner countries, as well as other representatives of socio-economic interest groups. This  initiative should trigger regular contacts between all the various bodies concerned, as repeatedly  advocated by the Committee. Current negotiations and specific area problems0.18. As regards the negotiations in progress and  problems in the various areas of the Mediterranean - which are also marked by significant  development disparities between the Southern and the Eastern Mediterranean countries - the  Committee: - notes with satisfaction the decisions taken on 6  March 1995 regarding plans to initiate  procedures for the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU, but considers that these accession  negotiations must be handled separately from those with the Central and Eastern European nations,  given their completely different nature; - is seriously concerned by developments in the Turkish political situation since the conclusion of  the agreements on the establishment of a customs union, culminating in the European Parliament's  refusal to ratify these agreements. However, it reiterates its earlier stance regarding the broad  economic benefits to be reaped by both partners from a customs union and, while endorsing the firm  line taken, hopes that the pressures brought justifiably to bear will help swiftly to restore  political conditions conducive to conclusion of the above agreements, thereby helping to dispel  tensions in the region; for its part, it confirms its intention to continue to promote  socio-occupational dialogue within the framework of the joint EU-Turkey Committee; - is convinced, in the case of Albania, that transition from a centralized to a market economy will  be doomed to failure unless account is taken of the specific causes of this country's  backwardness; - formally proposes that provision be made, under a Europe agreement similar to those concluded  with the other central and eastern European countries, for Albania also to benefit both from  Community-funded operations in connection with the EU-Mediterranean partnership and corresponding  EIB operations; - feels that the agreement recently concluded with Tunisia and the one still being negotiated with  Morocco could make a significant contribution to political and general stability in the Maghreb  region; considers, however, that the peace and democracy process is a prerequisite in the medium  term for full restoration of the EU-Maghreb partnership, which is vital for the full development of  cooperation links in this geographical area; - considers that the conclusion of an Association Agreement with Israel must be seen in direct  correlation with the EU's interest in, and commitment to, the resumption and progress of the Middle  East peace process; further, considers that the EU's main negotiating partner in this area must  inevitably be the parties directly involved in the peace process (Israel, the Palestinian  authorities, Jordan and Egypt). The Committee would like to see Lebanon join their ranks soon -  partly on the grounds of its historic role as bridge between Europe and the Arab countries -  together with Syria. Lastly, as regards the decentralized regional cooperation project currently  being drawn up in this area, the Committee points out the significant role which can be played by  the MEDA budget heading for partnership purposes. Preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference0.19. In the light of the Presidency Conclusions  approved at the end of the European Council in Cannes (26-27  June 1995) the Committee: - notes that the Cannes meeting has formalized the negotiating position of the European Union for  the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference to be held in Barcelona, as initially agreed by the  Council on 12  June, and has in particular reached overall agreement on the appropriations to be  allocated between 1995 and 1999 to financial cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern  Europe and the Mediterranean countries; - welcomes the decision on the allocation of funds for the years 1997-1999 but deplores the fact  that the appropriations earmarked by the Council generally fall well short of what the Commission  has itself proposed, thereby exacerbating the inadequacy of the funds needed to meet the  partnership targets, a situation made even worse by the failure of the Council document to refer to  EIB loans of an equal amount, the reference being replaced by a simple reference to increased  support through this channel for the Mediterranean countries; - points out that the negotiating position of the EU approved by the European Council sets the  Euro-Mediterranean Conference only one objective, namely the preparation of a joint document on the  three principal aspects of partnership, leaving vague the question of the conclusion of a  multilateral agreement and so confirming the concerns expressed by the Committee; - notes that the European Council, in reaffirming that negotiations on the membership of Malta and  Cyprus will commence six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996,  appears inclined to deal with this question in conjunction with the accession of the CEEC  countries, even though the problems posed in the case of both sets of countries clearly differ in  nature and scale; the Committee is therefore concerned that this approach might lead to an  unjustified extension of negotiating periods; - endorses, within the limits of areas falling within its own sphere of competence, the main thrust  of the specific proposals contained in the Council document, welcoming in particular the emphasis  given to environmental problems, whilst at the same time reserving the right to take a more  detailed stand at a later date in the light of the outcome of the Barcelona Conference and its  subsequent developments; - notes that the concluding paragraph of the European Council document dealing with the follow-up  to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership speaks among other things of the need for 'contacts between  those active in civil society', but feels that this phrasing is clearly inadequate and totally  fails to fill the blatant gap in existing Commission and Council texts on Euro-Mediterranean  partnership, where there is no reference at all to the role of economic and social interest groups  and the institutions representing them. 1. Reference documentsIn drawing up this Own-initiative Opinion, the Economic and Social  Committee has taken account of three documents prepared by the European Commission to date: the  Communication addressed to the Council and the European Parliament on 19  October 1994 in response  to the request received from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs in  July that year (COM(94) 427 -  referred to below as the 'first Communication'), the subsequent Communication of 8  March 1995, in  response to the Essen European Council's request for specific proposals (COM(95) 72 - referred to  below as the 'second Communication'), and the summary report adopted by the Council on 10  April  1995 () as basis for the Council Trojka's talks (with Commission Vice-President Marin) with the  EU's Mediterranean partners in preparation for the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference (27 and  28  November 1995). In appraising cooperation operations to date, account has also been taken of the Commission's  Report to the Council and the European Parliament on 18  November 1994 (COM(94) 384). 2. ForewordThe Economic and Social Committee has a good claim to being the originator of the  idea of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership. This claim was made in its first Additional Opinion of 26   April 1990 on the Community's Mediterranean policy, which expressed satisfaction at the new  proposals drawn up by the Commission as an undeniable step towards a global approach because they  extended, under the New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), the fourth series of financial protocols to all  non-Mediterranean countries. The Committee's strong criticism of the failure of the Community's Mediterranean policy to curb  these countries' worsening economic and social situation () (falling per capita GDP, increased  dependency on food imports, rising debt) was widely echoed in the policy stocktaking conducted in  the first Commission Communication which concluded, on the basis of the comparative data contained  in its Annex III, that 'the resources placed at the disposal of the Mediterranean policy have  fallen well short of responding to the challenges'. 3. Reasons for, and nature of, the proposed Euro-Mediterranean partnership3.1. The renewed  political interest in the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership reflected in the Commission  documents referred to above has been prompted by the northward expansion of the EU and, above all,  by the EU's commitments to the central and eastern European countries. The move follows the  Edinburgh European Council's endorsement of the principle that 'an appropriate balance should be  maintained in the geographical distribution of the Community's commitments' (). There is also a  geo-strategic aim, namely progressive establishment of a free trade area spanning the EU and its  Mediterranean neighbours, and the related promotion of an area of stability and security on the  EU's southern flanks. Here too, it should be noted that the idea that a joint development policy  should be pursued by the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours lay, as in the past, at the heart of  the Committee's 'Mediterranean philosophy' (). 3.2. In the Committee's view, the proposal set out in the Commission's Communications appears  essentially to follow this approach and undoubtedly represents a qualitative leap forward in both  financial and general terms, calculated to have immediate effects even if it will not be fully felt  for a generation. The Communication also echoes the view of the Commission's White Paper on Growth,  Competitiveness and Employment that the end of the bipolar balance will bring new scope for  integration between different cultures and development models, built around shared political  objectives. 3.3. In short, the novelty of the latest proposal, compared with previous Mediterranean policy  initiatives, lies not just in its political motivation, which is bound up with the balance between  Member States and EU, but also in the link between economic and political aspects and between  development and security, and in the generalized recourse to multilateral intervention  instruments. The overall aim is to bolster existing ties between the EU Member States and the countries of the  south and east Mediterranean. According to reliable forecasts, current demographic trends mean that  the European Mediterranean countries will quite soon account for just over a third of the total  population of the Mediterranean region - which will have risen from the present 360  million to  almost 550 million - while the other two thirds will be in the southern and eastern Mediterranean  countries (). In such circumstances, the abovementioned Committee Opinions stressed the inadequacy  of any policy which sought to curb migratory pressure and large-scale clandestine immigration by  administrative measures alone. Alternative job prospects had to be created in the non-EU  Mediterranean countries, and the Committee suggested the conclusion of a convention between the  Community and these countries, with joint undertakings to regulate and monitor migratory flows. The  Committee's 1989 Opinion voiced concern at the worsening pollution of the Mediterranean and the  widespread deterioration of coastal areas, and noted the need to step up existing multilateral  initiatives. The constraints caused by certain EU countries' heavy reliance on Mediterranean  countries for energy supplies is another practical reason for developing and consolidating  partnership-based relations. With this in mind, direct Community investment in these countries must  not simply be motivated by attractive wage differentials; rather, the aim should be a gradual  transfer of parts of the production process. As the Committee stated in its recently adopted  Own-initiative Opinion on spatial planning and inter-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean area  (), 'complementary links could be forged between the two sides of the Mediterranean, buttressed by  trade in goods, know-how, consumption patterns and an increasingly competitive workforce'. In the Committee's view, establishment of an area of political stability calculated to eliminate  the racist tensions which threaten foreign operators - sometimes even physically - would provide  the best economic incentive for European direct investment in the Mediterranean countries.  Conversely, a sustainable development process would be bound to further their political and social  stability and, over the longer term, could help to contain demographic pressures (). 3.4. The global nature of the partnership relationship is borne out by its tripartite structure -   highlighted in the recent summary report  - which focuses firstly on political and security  aspects, then economic and financial aspects (including the planned establishment of a free trade  area) and, lastly, the social and human dimension. The desired stability and prosperity are to be  achieved through political dialogue, sustainable and balanced socio-economic development and  efforts to alleviate poverty and foster inter-cultural understanding, while boosting the human  dimension of trade. The Committee fully endorses this basic strategy and, without playing down the  difficulties involved, considers it the only way of tackling the area's serious and complex  problems. 3.5. On the institutional structure of the partnership plan, the Committee points out that - as the  summary report makes clear - a multilateral framework embracing the EU and its Mediterranean  neighbours must be regarded as complementary to closer bilateral relations, as indicated in the  Commission's first Communication and the subsequent decisions of the Essen European Council. The  two most recent documents state more precisely that a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area in line  with the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s wishes could be achieved by 2010. Here the speedy  conclusion of the bilateral agreements currently in progress is recommended along with the  negotiation of similar free trade agreements among the Mediterranean countries, with particular  reference to free movement of manufactured goods, gradual liberalization of trade in farm products  on the basis of reciprocal preferential access, the right to establish companies, cross-border  services and movement of capital. Subsequent negotiations of a similar kind are planned between the  Mediterranean and other countries associated to the Community (EFTA, central and eastern European  countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey), so as to establish in the region a system of common rules  covering all the basic aspects of a free trade area. The Committee agrees with the broad principles of this approach and is in favour of a global  framework agreement boosting the potential for regional cooperation among countries in the various  areas (). This should avert the risks which a return to exclusively bilateral relations could  entail for the balanced development of the Mediterranean nations, not least as regards the  opening-up of their mutual relations. 3.6. In the Committee's view, it must be remembered that the plan for a Euro-Mediterranean  partnership is prompted not only by the prospective further enlargement of the EU, but also by the  recognized need to upgrade economic areas that complement the Community as locomotives of  development, just as the United States and Japan are doing in their respective geographical areas.  Close regional integration and major financial aid instruments would be the hallmarks of this  region of shared prosperity. In geopolitical terms, the Euro-Mediterranean area embraces the EU,  the remaining EFTA nations, and the central and eastern European countries. 4. The political dimension of partnership4.1. The participatory approach implicit in the term  'partnership' takes on an overtly political and even cultural dimension if its objectives are to  include safeguarding of the cultural identity of the societies concerned as well as economic  modernization and promotion of social development. A partnership which extends beyond trade  relations must avoid any hint of the sort of paternalistic approach inherent in any attempt to  impose rigidly predetermined practices and institutional machinery. 4.2. The first Commission Communication explicitly states that 'a priority is to promote political  dialogue between the Union and its Mediterranean partners, based on the respect of human rights and  the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law which constitute an essential  element of their relationship'. The Committee's constant concern that Euro-Mediterranean  cooperation should be governed by effective human rights safeguards takes on key importance in a  development blueprint designed first and foremost to curb the tensions stoking the fires of  extremism and the spiral of violence. Here the second Commission Communication states unequivocally  that 'consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights (is) an essential component of the  Community's relations with the countries in question'. Also fully in tune with the Committee's  recommendations is the statement, in the same document, that 'an appropriate dialogue conducted not  only with governments but also with representatives of civil society, coupled with technical and  financial assistance for specific operations' is the best way of guaranteeing the consolidation of  democracy and human rights. This stance has subsequently been spelt out in the Commission's summary report with reference to a  declaration of principles which the governments of the signatory states will be called on to adopt,  with specific reference to freedom of expression, association, thought, conscience and religion,  and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex. In  addition, commitments are to be given regarding the organization of regular elections, independent  judiciary, balance of powers and good governance, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes,  respect for territorial integrity, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Committee trusts that the introduction of procedures for regular monitoring of compliance with  the relevant commitments will provide an objective basis to meet justified insistence that  partnership aid should be conditional. 4.3. In extreme cases the Committee would not rule out recourse to carefully considered political  sanctions such as cutting or suspending financial aid and cooperation programmes. However,  experience to date, such as the EU-AMU meeting in Tunis, suggests that the most tangible  contribution which the EU can make to the safeguarding of human rights and the development and  consolidation of democratic practices and institutions, in tandem with greater socio-economic  maturity and a related dissemination of culture, is to encourage civil society in the associated  countries to play a greater role in the initiatives promoted under the Euro-Mediterranean  partnership. 5. Trade liberalization, economic cooperation and related practical difficulties5.1. In the  light of the above, the economic strand of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership thus involves more  than establishing a free trade area designed to boost north-south trade by reciprocal, non-parallel  liberalization and to stimulate south-south trade. 5.2. The Committee would stress that the proposed trade liberalization and economic cooperation are  inextricably linked. The transitional period for establishing a free trade area should therefore be  backed by a concurrent programme of structural, economic and market reform. A Euro-Mediterranean  partnership would seem to imply the start of a new type of development process that goes beyond the  existing boost in Mediterranean countries' exports to the EU, which is so far concentrated on a  handful of sectors, so as to end the paradoxical situation in which, despite the EU's political and  financial commitment to the structural diversification of the associated countries, a highly  defensive stance is still found in some economic circles. This has not helped negotiations with the  Mediterranean countries, and it is clear that radical solutions - be they protectionist or  deregulatory  - are not feasible. There can be no doubting the need to proceed very cautiously when  opening up particularly exposed sectors of the Community markets, such as agriculture, and past  Committee Opinions have been unequivocal on this point (). However, it is equally clear that  Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation presupposes a gradual opening-up of trade, backed by an  international regulatory framework on competition, in accordance with the WTO obligations  explicitly mentioned in the first Commission Communication. At least theoretically, the Committee  feels that the most sensible solution would be to plan exports according to possible take-up on the  world market. On the specific question of Mediterranean agricultural products - exports to the  Community exceed 15% only in the case of Morocco and Tunisia - the Committee feels it helpful to  examine some of the suggestions mooted hitherto. Particular emphasis has been laid on the case for  stepping up the production of early crops which, by virtue of climate conditions, do not compete  with Community production. A case has also been made for three-way trade, based on agreements  between the Mediterranean and central and eastern European countries, possibly with temporary EU  financial support, to provide outlets in the latter for certain produce from the former (such as  tomatoes or citrus fruits). However, the Brussels meeting of 6 to 8  April 1992 on the outlook for  cooperation between the Arab Maghreb Union and the European Community as regards investment,  migration and agriculture pointed out the connection between the fierce competition exerted by  Community agricultural produce on associated country markets and the growing number of young people  moving to urban areas, which has also fuelled immigration to the Community. In such circumstances, EU technology transfer and financial support for the Mediterranean countries  should focus first and foremost on small firms in the food sector, with a view to helping these  countries to achieve a satisfactory level of food self-sufficiency. 5.3. Another paradox which cannot be overlooked here is the massive foreign debt facing some  Mediterranean countries (). Not for nothing did the Committee's first additional Opinion (1990)  call for coordinated action from the Member States and a less passive stance from the Community,  while the final declaration of the EU-AMU meeting in Tunis called for 'specific solutions to  alleviate the continuous erosion of resources caused by debt repayment and servicing'. A number of  Committee documents have cited the Tunisian proposal to convert official credit into social,  environmental and human-resource expenditure. The relative success of structural adjustment in  Morocco should not lead us to forget that, but for the agreement with the IMF in  April 1994,  Algeria's foreign debt servicing (estimated in 1993 at US$ 26 000 million) would have taken up its  entire revenue from oil exports (), and that this burden still weighs heavily on Algeria's  political and economic stability. The Committee thus feels that the Commission is wrong to  disregard completely this delicate aspect of the problem - as it has done in successive documents   - when it seeks to put forward a viable scheme for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 5.4. In recent years, these longstanding difficulties have been aggravated by new problems related  to industrial cooperation. More favourable conditions have led textile companies to relocate to  such areas as south east Asia in preference to Mediterranean countries, particularly the Maghreb.  The possibility of new joint ventures or other forms of direct investment also appears problematic,  even with the guarantees offered by the agreement founding the WTO. It must also be remembered that while the EU has increasingly clamped down on immigration from the  Mediterranean countries, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the ensuing threats to personal  safety have seriously discouraged EU direct investment in these areas, as has already been noted.  Hence the partnership plan - which rightly places great emphasis on encouraging such investment,  while respecting the areas of responsibility of the Community, the Member States and the  Mediterranean countries - will have to be implemented in a context which in many respects is  unfavourable. This must be tackled with appropriate instruments and, as far as the Committee's  remit is directly concerned, will require a rigorously professional dialogue with its non-EU  counterparts and a strong emphasis on the issues surrounding decentralized cooperation. The Committee attaches great importance to approval of the Commission proposal that association  agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries should provide a framework of legal  guarantees encouraging investment by Community operators, with priority emphasis on joint ventures  and industrial cooperation (notably small and medium-sized businesses) and extending financial  support to capital investment programmes. The planned Mediterranean Financial Institute could play  a role similar to that of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the  central and eastern European countries. 5.5. Lastly, the Committee would point to the key role that technical and scientific cooperation  can play in solving the difficulties outlined above - a role which is certainly not confined to  decentralized development. Here it refers specifically to the monitoring committee set up after the  symposium organized in  March 1995 at Sophia-Antipolis by the French Presidency of the EU,  following the Avicenna programme which, in recent years, has produced over 70 projects in the  water, health and renewable energy sectors. As in the case of cooperation in the energy sector,  joint schemes to protect the Mediterranean environment have resulted in the identification of  priority areas of action, with the introduction of monitoring arrangements, in liaison with  existing institutional structures (primarily the United Nations). In the same way the Committee  takes a special interest in the proposed observatory to monitor fishery resources, which should be  a multilateral body. 6. The MED global aid programme6.1. The Committee attaches particular importance to the scale of  the financial resources which the EU is to make available to its Mediterranean partners via the  1995-1999 aid programme. The simple fact that the sum of MECU 5 500 mentioned in the Commission  documents was decided against the yardstick of the funding package for the central and eastern  European countries confirms that the whole Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been devised with an  eye on earlier European Council decisions on economic support for central and eastern Europe.  However, the new initiative should be seen in the light of the differing historical backgrounds of  the countries concerned, which bring a need for different cooperation conditions and structures.  Neither must one underestimate the radically different socio-economic circumstances of the two  groups of countries, which are bound up with their diametrically opposite demographic trends.  However, a case-by-case comparison of the financial resources provided will give an objective  indication of the seriousness of the EU's commitment and of its credibility in the eyes of its  partners. The Committee observes that the comparative figures given in Annex III to the first  Communication are indication enough of the need for change, bearing in mind the clearly structural  nature of the problems to be tackled, unlike those of central and eastern Europe. Gradual  resolution of these problems - notably as regards scientific and technical cooperation, vocational  training and further training - is a precondition for a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area (). 6.2. Though the Committee considers that the indicative financial aid proposed by the Commission  still falls short of objective needs, it observes that the current proposals, if approved, would  increase Community aid from an average ECU 415 million per annum, under the protocols to expire in  1996, to ECU 1 100 million per annum. The proposed amount, added to the similar sum which these  countries will receive from EIB own resources and the Member States' bilateral contributions, could  boost the overall impact of Community aid, which would be further helped by appropriate interaction  between the available aid channels. This would give a clear sign of the EU's determination to step  up its commitments on this front. Here the Committee trusts that the procedure indicated in the  Commission's second Communication regarding approval of the proposed EIB-funded operations will be  set in motion without delay, and with successful results. 6.3. There are five priority sectors (environment, energy supply, migration, trade and investment).  In each case it is planned to divide aid between support for (a) economic transition towards a free  trade area (ECU 2 300 million), (b) a better socio-economic balance (ECU 2 600 million) and (c)  regional integration (ECU 600 million). The Committee broadly endorses these aims and the breakdown  of aid, though the existing documents do not seem to set out sufficiently clearly the criteria  determining this last point. It therefore advocates that proposals be structured to take account of  the individual partners' differing levels of development in respect of the various sectoral  priorities (). It would also reiterate its view that the Commission should indicate intervention  priorities for EIB-funded projects involving a Community budget contribution (interest subsidies). 6.4. In addition, the Committee warmly welcomes the confirmation in the second Commission  Communication that the main beneficiaries of financial cooperation should be those Mediterranean  countries that are striving to reform and modernize their economies, and to liberalize trade. This  statement of principle is backed by the suggestion, in the same Communication, that financial aid  be used more flexibly, with sufficiently elastic multi-annual programming to facilitate  discretionary use of funds. Here the document suggests that the cooperation councils' annual  meetings should in future be held at technical level while, at political level, the EU and all  partners involved should meet annually to discuss issues of common interest. These proposals seem to take account of the Committee's repeated calls for targeted use of  cooperation funding since they back the European Parliament's recent introduction of a new MEDA  (B7-410) budget, which is intended to replace the financial protocols to expire on 31  October 1996  and to take effect from 1997, with the requisite safeguard of the co-decision-making principle  which the first Communication's reference to the Phare programme model seemed to call into  question. Rather than referring back to experiences relating to political and economic  circumstances very different from those at issue, the Committee would here mention its own proposal  for development agreements, to be concluded between the European Commission, the governments of the  Mediterranean countries and the economic and social interest groups. The second Communication  rightly places great emphasis on the reactivation of such agreements. In the Committee's view,  financial cooperation along these lines is the only way to provide adequate guarantees on such  matters as advisory services, aid to the private sector (notably small and medium-sized businesses)  and the development of a social infrastructure. Development agreements are designed to pursue specific aims within a development plan, with  trade-oriented contractual commitments and financial undertakings. In the Committee's view, such  agreements are a prerequisite for the decentralized cooperation which the Commission considers  fundamental to partnership though its financial commitment has remained substantially unchanged  (ECU 300 million). They could serve as an effective bridge between Community action, bilateral aid  from Member States - at times heavily cut back - and aid from other international bodies. 6.5. Similarly, the Committee welcomes the proposal - set out in the fourth part of the summary  report adopted on 10  April - that 'the partners would agree to draw up a programme of action  against corruption, because of the importance, topicality and international scope of the  phenomenon'. They 'would consider amplifying the means of detection and investigation enabling  corruption to be countered more effectively'. The Committee believes that experience has shown that  a successful cooperation policy depends to a large extent on transparent use of public resources.  Here it would recall its Opinion on the mid-term review of the Lomé  IV Convention (21  October  1993) (), which advocated that the governments of the associated countries should be offered  technical assistance with the procedures for selecting projects and awarding contracts, so as to  help them curb corruption through more effective controls; the Committee calls for funds to be made  available to support such projects and programmes, and endorses the OECD recommendation for  effective measures to prevent and combat the various forms of corrupt practice connected with  international transactions (). 7. Inter-regional cooperation and sub-regional associations7.1. Inter-regional cooperation  merits special attention in this general context, not least with reference to the Committee's  recent Opinion on the subject. The Commission's first Communication also makes specific mention of  such cooperation, notably in the context of environmental protection and decentralized cooperation  programmes. Here too, it is worth reiterating the link, mentioned in the Opinion, between the  growing imbalances in development within the EU - one of the main causes of its overall loss of  competitiveness - and the non-EU Mediterranean nations' increasing reliance on trade with central  and northern rather than southern Europe. This is likely to increase the marginalization of  southern Europe and worsen the tensions in the south and east of the Mediterranean. The second  Commission Communication seems to acknowledge this, and recognizes the priority importance of  consolidating cooperation and communication links between both sides of the Mediterranean, 'seeking  synergies with cross-border and decentralized inter-regional cooperation instruments already  available to the Community'. In this context, it is worth stressing the fresh boost which  trans-European transport networks could bring to tourism, telecommunications and transport-related  activities, especially for reviving the main EU Mediterranean ports and giving back the  Mediterranean airport system its natural role in air traffic links with the southern side of the  Mediterranean (). 7.2. This topic ties in closely with that of the development of trade between the Mediterranean  countries - a matter to which the first Commission Communication rightly attributes key importance,  to the extent of proposing steps to promote the conclusion of intraregional trade agreements and  support for sub-regional associations. Given the growth of multi-lateral relations within the  region, particular importance attaches to the decentralized cooperation plan being drawn up by the  Commission for the countries most directly involved in the Middle East peace process. The plan is  consistent with the strategy which led to the establishment of systematic relations with the  countries of the Arab Maghreb Union, and bears witness to its long-term validity, despite the  present crisis in the AMU. The Committee considers that this approach merits wholehearted support.  The Committee regrets the fact that under the financial protocols, regional cooperation aid has so  far accounted for only 3% of total aid. Ittrusts that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will  accord greater importance to support for the establishment of sub-regional associations of  Mediterranean countries. Far from conflicting with the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean  partnership, such a development would be a natural feature of such a partnership, heralding  integration processes which in some ways mirror those taking place within the EU and avoiding the  distortive effects of previous cooperation ventures. 8. Social and human dimension of partnership8.1. The Committee is in full agreement with the  concern - possibly spelt out explicitly for the first time in the Commission's second Communication  - that the deterioration of living standards in the Mediterranean countries prompted by structural  adjustment, rapid population growth and the mass exodus from rural areas could be aggravated by  worsening social disparities caused by economic anchorage to Europe. On this point the document  claims with good grounds that although social spending is primarily the responsibility of the  relevant governments, the Community's help in countering these problems is justified by the damage  which any exacerbation of the social situation in the Mediterranean countries would bring. This  applies both to improvement of social services in urban areas and to the harmonious development of  rural areas. Here the Commission's summary report contains an extensive list of spheres - ranging  from education and vocational training to social development, with particular reference to  migration flows, health, youth problems, working conditions and occupational safety - which relate  directly to the Committee's remit and merit its full attention. The same applies to the development  of tourism, which is closely interlinked with environmental protection and is crucial to the  development of the partnership countries, but which is presently a source of justifiable anxiety. 8.2. The Committee too is convinced that the social and cultural dimensions are inextricably  intertwined as regards, for instance, cultural exchanges and the dissemination of foreign  languages, as well as efforts to curb racism and xenophobia by promoting mutual understanding and  cultural dialogue. This last point presupposes greater knowledge of other civilizations, including  religious precepts. More generally, such cooperation implies closer contacts between universities,  social, civic and political representatives, information bodies, research centres, local  authorities, trade unions, private and public undertakings and associations of different kinds ().  In addition to this panoply, the Commission's summary report pays full tribute to the key role  played by women in the development process. The Committee places great emphasis on this last point,  with particular reference to promoting the participation of women in political and social  activities, seen as a necessary step towards the guarantee of equal opportunities. 9. Decentralized cooperationThe Committee sees the aim of decentralized cooperation () as full  involvement of the socio-economic players. The abiding aim must be to promote the development of  small and craft businesses, farming and other cooperatives, socio-economic organizations and local  groupings. One avenue for this is the establishment of joint ventures, backed by a congruent  commitment to training and skills enhancement. The key point here is that the Euro-Mediterranean  partnership should usher in a more flexible development policy which gives local operators the  independence they need to promote the initiatives best suited to their particular situations. It is  important to remember that some 40 to 60% of the population of the Mediterranean nations still live  in rural areas. The first problem is thus how small businesses can best develop in order to meet  the growth needs of local markets, in terms of food supplies and ancillary manufacturing and  service activities, with a corresponding transfer of capital from the north to the south of the  Mediterranean (). The Committee therefore welcomes the policy emphasis which the Commission's  Summary Report places on this objective, although it is concerned that it might by stymied by  bureaucratic and in some cases contradictory administrative mechanisms. 10. Involvement of the socio-economic interest groups10.1. In the context of decentralized  cooperation in particular, the ESC clearly has a special remit to counterbalance the undeniably  technocratic and centralizing nature of traditional Community intervention and to replace this,  where possible, by a rigorously professional dialogue that takes better account of all sides of the  problems. Here the Committee highlights the key efforts made in recent years to pave the way for  effective involvement of socio-economic interest groups in cooperation. A lead has been given here  by the EU-AMU meetings, and by the cooperation bodies set up by the Committee with ACP and some  Mediterranean countries (Turkey, AMU). As long ago as 1989, the Committee called for the  establishment of a permanent contact group with national economic and social councils, where such  councils exist, and elsewhere with the relevant socio-economic organizations. In the light of the above, the Committee greatly regrets that the second Commission Communication  makes no mention, in connection with decentralized cooperation, of the proposals for inter-regional  cooperation (MED-Reg) and cooperation between partners on both sides of the Mediterranean  (MED-Partners) made in the final declaration of the Tunis Conference (8-10  September 1993), on  which the Commission has so far taken no action. 10.2. The Committee also warmly welcomes the Spanish Government's decision to follow the  Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial conference with a non-governmental forum in Barcelona on 29/30   November. This will bring together employers and unions, the relevant Non-governmental  Organizations (NGOs), chamber of commerce associations, and local authorities. The Committee also  welcomes the recent move by the Spanish Economic and Social Council to arrange, in conjunction with  the Barcelona Forum, for a meeting between its own representatives and their counterparts from  similar councils in the EU Mediterranean countries, the Economic and Social Committee, such  councils existing in certain of the partner countries and other socio-occupational representatives.  This proposal is primarily modelled on the UN proposal, reiterated by the Committee, to set up a  Mediterranean forum, as well as on the precedent of the meetings referred to above. It is also  linked with the symposium on Mediterranean problems arranged by the Italian National Economic and  Labour Council in  April 1994 and its decision to organize two-yearly meetings on the area's  problems, with the venue to rotate among the relevant councils in the various countries. In the  Committee's view, this initiative could be the starting point for regular contacts between all  bodies concerned. 11. Current negotiations and specific area problemsA) Malta and Cyprus11.1. The extraordinary  meeting of the Association Council with Turkey on 6  March 1995 the EU Ministers decided to open  accession negotiations with Malta and Cyprus within six months of the conclusion of the 1996  Intergovernmental Conference on the reform of the European institutions. 11.2. While Maltese accession does not appear to pose any major political problems, the same cannot  be said for Cyprus. The timing of the decisions on Cyprus's accession and an EU-Turkey customs  union is no coincidence. There is a clear intention to defuse the tensions which the Turkish  occupation of northern Cyprus has generated in the region; these tensions still present a latent  threat to security there, despite the peace-making efforts of the UN. The prospect of EU financial  support and development cooperation is of particular interest to the Turkish Cypriot community  because of its relative backwardness, and this could help in the achievement of political solutions  acceptable to all the parties concerned (). B) Turkey11.3. At the above meeting of the Turkey Association Council, agreements were also signed  setting out the terms for an EU-Turkey customs union, to take effect on 1  January 1996. However,  subsequent developments in the Turkish political situation have given cause for serious concern.  Worsening religious and ethnic conflict came to a head with oppressive treatment of the Alevi  minority in Istanbul and Turkish military strikes against Kurdish separatists inside Iranian  territory. Infringements of human rights - including the arrest of members of parliament because of  their views, and the taking of legal action against the president of the Turkish human rights  association - were raised by the French Presidency at the signing of the recent EU-Turkey  agreements and have sparked a vigorous response from the EU, notably over the violation of the  territory of a neighbouring State, culminating in the European Parliament's refusal to ratify the  customs union. 11.4. Events in Turkey since the conclusion of its agreements with the EU are particularly serious  when we consider the magnitude of what is at stake for the Community. The political significance of  the customs union was noted by the Committee in its Opinion of 22  December 1993 () on relations  between the European Union and Turkey, which stated that 'Turkey is the Community's only  Mediterranean neighbour which possesses population levels and an economic dynamism comparable with  those of the larger EC Member States.' Such an assessment may seem optimistic, given Turkey's  endemic problems (chronic hyperinflation, debt, structural administrative inefficiency) and the  serious social problems caused by last year's draconian increases in the prices of petrol and the  main consumer goods and services. These have undoubtedly fuelled support for the Islamic  fundamentalist groups, notwithstanding the secular nature of the State and the traditions of  tolerance inherited from the Ottoman past. The Committee feels it would be wrong to underestimate  the major economic benefits which a customs union would bring both partners, given the size of the  Turkish market and its share of the Community's overall foreign trade; financial aid from the  Community could also be of significant help to the Turkish economy. In political terms, definitive  resolution of tensions in the region is crucial for the establishment of an area of stability and  security along the EU's south eastern borders. The Committee welcomes the firm line which the EU,  like the Community in the past, has taken against the emergence of authoritarian tendencies in  countries with which it has links. It trusts that the justified pressure exerted by the EU  institutions will help to restore full civil rights and proper operation of democratic  institutions, as these could be irrevocably jeopardized by the indefinite continuation of a state  of civil war. For its part, the Committee intends to continue to promote socio-occupational dialogue within the  framework of the joint EU/Turkey Consultative Committee. This is particularly important in a  difficult, unstable period such as the present. Its overriding aim will be to give support and  encouragement to the socio-occupational groups who are fighting for democratic development in  Turkey and for a strengthening of its commitment to Europe. C) Albania11.5. The Commission documents and the European Council's deliberations to date have  excluded Albania from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. However, the fact that Albania's  transition from a centralized to a market economy will fail unless account is taken of the specific  causes of this country's economic and social backwardness, and that these problems cannot be  effectively tackled with the instruments used in ostensibly similar situations, prompts the  Committee to propose formally that - under a Europe agreement similar to those concluded with the  other central and eastern European countries - provision should be made for Albania to be declared  eligible for MEDA aid, as well as for related EIB funding (). D) Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria11.6. An association agreement with Morocco -  which should be  concluded during 1995 - would cement that country's trade links with the EU and the role which  emigration to the EU plays in its economic balance. The agreement would also further Morocco's  drive for structural adjustment, provide fitting recognition of its role in the Middle East peace  process, and strengthen its domestic situation in a politically difficult period which is making it  particularly vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism. 11.7. Similar considerations, at least as regards economic and social stability, apply to Tunisia,  which has a promising growth rate although the prospect of political liberalization seems more  remote there. The fact that the Essen European Council confirmed the importance it attaches to  continuing economic support for Algeria, while calling for a dialogue among all those who reject  violence, suggests that, in the present AMU crisis, the agreement recently concluded with Tunisia  and the one still being negotiated with Morocco could significantly improve the political stability  of the region. 11.8. The influence which an unusually high foreign debt is exerting on Algeria's present  difficulties has already been mentioned. However, it should also be noted that financial  difficulties have led industrial production to fall far below capacity and have brought widespread  unemployment. This state of affairs is clearly a factor in Algeria's worsening political and  institutional crisis and the slide towards a military clash between opposing factions. This has  been accompanied by an anti-western terrorist campaign which over the last eighteen months has  claimed over 90 lives, and by an escalation towards ever more deadly violence. On both sides, steps  to defuse the tension have been accompanied by paradoxical manifestations of intransigence.  Positive steps include the government decision to hold presidential elections before the end of  1995 - and according to recent reports, political elections would follow shortly afterwards - and  the so-called Rome platform for peaceful resolution to the conflict, drawn up following a  conference held there by Algeria's eight main parties in  November 1994 under the aegis of the  catholic community of St. Egidio. While also calling for elections, the Rome platform intends these  to be preceded by a national conference in which the government would also take part. The aim would  be to create conditions for a return to multi-party democracy and a real guarantee of human rights.  In the Committee's view, the controversy (not least, international) which has accompanied this last  step should not cloud the fact that political dialogue - probably made more difficult by recent  military developments - is now clearly the prerequisite for the full restoration of the Euro-AMU  partnership, which in turn will shape the full development of cooperation in this part of the  world. E) Israel and the Middle East peace process11.9. The prospect of early conclusion of an  association agreement with Israel is clearly related to its high level of economic development  which, as the Essen Conclusions point out, justifies the granting of 'special status in its  relations with the European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests'. Such status is  viewed as a suitable way of boosting 'regional economic development in the Middle East including in  the Palestinian areas'. This approach, backed by political and economic support for the peace  process and the satisfaction expressed by the Council at the conclusion of the Israel-Jordan Peace  Agreement, links in with the EU's interest in, and commitment to, a gradual and lasting relaxation  of the continuing tensions in the region. The process could be furthered by involving all the  relevant parties in a joint development plan, along the lines sketched out by the Committee in its  Opinion on the European Community and economic cooperation in the Middle East (28  January 1993)  (). The guidelines mapped out there were broadly reflected in the Commission Communication of 8   September 1993 on future relations between the Community and the Middle East. The Communication  stressed the growing imbalance between Israeli GDP and that of the Arab States of the southern  Mediterranean (an imbalance comparable to that between these countries and the EU), and recognized  that peace in the Middle East would depend to a large extent on the pace of economic development in  the area. It called for 'progressive institutionalization' of regional cooperation. 11.10. The Committee's External Relations Section received a practical indication of such action in  a briefing by a Commission representative on the decentralized cooperation plan to be implemented  between Israel, the Palestinian authorities, Jordan and Egypt. This will involve a multilateral  action programme and a joint monitoring committee serviced by a joint secretariat based in Amman.  The Commission and Council intend to report on the initiative at the next European Council. Also  relevant here are the recent launch of negotiations with Egypt and the forthcoming opening of  negotiations with Jordan. The concrete results of the partnership with the Mashreq countries must  obviously be seen from the angle of moving on from the present critical stage of the peace process.  The working document (20  June 1994) of the study group on EU-Middle East relationsaccurately  describes the situation as 'very promising but not irreversible' (). It would seem that the EU's  main partner in this area will be the group of parties directly involved in the peace process which  are already linked by agreements which the EU should seek to consolidate. It is to be hoped that they will shortly be joined by two countries: by Lebanon - mentioned for the  first time in connection with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in the Commission's second  Communication - which is fitted to play a valuable part in the peace process by virtue of its  historic role as bridge between Europe and the Arab countries; and by Syria, whose definitive  involvement in the process could prove crucial. In the light of Annex III of the Commission Communication, it should be noted that the EU is  already the largest donor of assistance to the Palestinian communities in the Occupied Territories,  giving some ECU 100 million in 1993 and ECU 86 million in 1994. However, the outlook for financial  cooperation with third countries, notably the USA, is still cloudy. An international task force set  up following the Casablanca summit is working on a proposal to set up a Middle East development  bank, and a decision should be taken at the second summit, to be held in Amman on 30  October and 1   November. The fact that aid for Palestine has hitherto taken the form of loans could also  jeopardize the second stage, which in this respect too appears extremely problematic. Here too, the  Committee sees the MEDA budget heading proposed in connection with the Euro-Mediterranean  partnership as making a significant contribution. 12. Preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean ConferenceIn the light of the Presidency Conclusions  approved at the end of the European Council in Cannes (26-27  June 1995) the Committee: - notes that the Cannes meeting has formalized the negotiating position of the European Union for  the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference to be held in Barcelona, as initially agreed by the  Council on 12  June, and has in particular reached overall agreement on the appropriations to be  allocated between 1995 and 1999 to financial cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern  Europe and the Mediterranean countries; - welcomes the decision on the allocation of funds for the years 1997-1999 but deplores the fact  that the appropriations earmarked by the Council generally fall well short of what the Commission  has itself proposed, thereby exacerbating the inadequacy of the funds needed to meet the  partnership targets, a situation made even worse by the failure of the Council document to refer to  EIB loans of an equal amount, the reference being replaced by a simple reference to increased  support through this channel for the Mediterranean countries; - points out that the negotiating position of the EU approved by the European Council sets the  Euro-Mediterranean Conference only one objective, namely the preparation of a joint document on the  three principal aspects of partnership, leaving vague the question of the conclusion of a  multilateral agreement and so confirming the concerns expressed by the Committee; - notes that the European Council, in reaffirming that negotiations on the membership of Malta and  Cyprus will commence six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996,  appears inclined to deal with this question in conjunction with the accession of the CEEC  countries, even though the problems posed in the case of both sets of countries clearly differ in  nature and scale; the Committee is therefore concerned that this approach might lead to an  unjustified extension of negotiating periods; - endorses, within the limits of areas falling within its own sphere of competence, the main thrust  of the specific proposals contained in the Council document, welcoming in particular the emphasis  given to environmental problems, whilst at the same time reserving the right to take a more  detailed stand at a later date in the light of the outcome of the Barcelona Conference and its  subsequent developments; - notes that the concluding paragraph of the European Council document dealing with the follow-up  to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership speaks among other things of the need for 'contacts between  those active in civil society', but feels that this phrasing is clearly inadequate and totally  fails to fill the blatant gap in existing Commission and Council texts on Euro-Mediterranean  partnership, where there is no reference at all to the role of economic and social interest groups  and the institutions representing them. Done at Brussels, 14  September 1995. The Presidentof the Economic and Social CommitteeCarlos FERRER() Published  in EUROPE Documents on 27. 4. 1995 (No  1930/31).  () In particular, see the Committee's second Additional Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the  European Community (Rapporteur: Mr Amato, OJ No C 40, 17.  2.  1992).  () According to the summary report of 10  April 1995, ambitious cooperation to the South and  opening up to the East are complementary.  () See the Committee's Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Community (Rapporteur:  Mr Amato, OJ No C 221, 28.  8.  1989) and the Additional Opinion of 1991 (Euro-Mediterranean  complementarity with a view to integration; development agreement as policy instrument and  Community coordination of Mediterranean cooperation policies).  () The second Commission Communication forecasts that the MNCs will have a population of 400   million in 2035. Other sources (Bruno Amoroso - Jean Monnet Chair, Third report on the  Mediterranean, University of Roskilde, 1995, page 36) give a figure of almost 550 million in 2025,  with an age structure which will make it necessary to create over 60 million new jobs (25 million  by the end of the century).  () In this connection, see Appendix I which gives disaggregated data on the interdependence between  EU and the Mediterranean countries.  () See the strategy adopted in relations with the MERCOSUR countries and other Latin American  regions where integration processes are under way (see chapter on inter-regional integration in the  Committee's Opinion on EU relations with Latin America, Rapporteur: Mr Vasco Cal, OJ No C 127, 7.   5.  1994). This approach would seem particularly suited to tackling the serious difficulties that  have recently arisen, e.g. in the case of the Maghreb Union.  () See, for example, point 7.2.3 of the Committee's second additional Opinion, which states that  'The Committee would emphasize its opposition to a Mediterranean policy approach which concentrates  on the opening up of Community markets without a serious effort, financial and otherwise, to  implement a real policy of co-development. The Committee has already stated on previous occasions  its objections to the total dismantling of barriers to imports of MNC agricultural products ...  Without a commitment to reshaping agriculture and industry on a Mediterranean-wide scale and  without parallel reform of the CAP, to press ahead with a purely mechanical policy of progressively  permitting the import of agricultural products from the MNC will only exacerbate the existing  competition with the Community's Mediterranean regions, while still failing to satisfy fully the  MNC's export demands'.  () See Appendix I.  () Stato del Mondo 1995, published by Mondadori, Milan 1995.  () It must, however, be remembered that, with the new protocols, Community aid came to 0,1% of  Community GDP in the case of budget resources, and 0,3% in the case of EIB loans.  () The Commission's Communications highlight the following: funding under the MEDA programme could  be extended to all the countries with which the Community has association or cooperation  agreements, apart from Israel, Cyprus and Malta which, because of their level of development, would  only be eligible for decentralized cooperation projects and projects of regional or environmental  interest. However, all the Mediterranean countries and the Palestinian Occupied Territories would  be eligible for EIB assistance. Lastly, the non-Mediterranean Arab countries, notably the Gulf  States, could also receive decentralized cooperation assistance, subject to their making a  financial contribution covering the cost of their participation. It is also envisaged that other  donors should adopt indicative financing programmes for 1995-1999 alongside the Community and  jointly agree a medium-term intervention strategy.  () Opinion on the Lomé IV Convention - Mid-term Review (Rapporteur: Mr Strauss, OJ No C 352, 30.   12.  1993).  () However, it should be noted that the simple fact of concentrating aid to the Mediterranean  countries under a single MEDA budget heading is bound to create more transparent conditions.  () The relevant proposals of the ESC Opinion OJ No C 133, 31. 5. 1995 appear in Appendix II.  () One relevant example is the initiative by the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to  promote religious dialogue in the Mediterranean area.  () This has been the Community's aim since the NMP came into being (1990), through the MED-Invest  programme.  () See B. Amoroso - Jean Monnet Chair, op. cit.  () Similarly, the EC-Cyprus Association Council in Luxembourg on 12  June 1995 asked the  Commission, pursuant to the pre-accession strategy decided on 6  March, 'to establish the necessary  contacts with the Turkish Cypriot community, in consultation with the Government of Cyprus' (EU  Council document No  7855/95, Appendix II).  () Opinion on relations between the European Union and Turkey (Rapporteur: Mrs Cassina, OJ No C 52,  19.  2.  1994).  () See the ESC Opinion on Relations between the European Union and Albania in OJ No C 236, 11. 9  1995, point 5.1.3. The Committee would also point out that it has not felt it appropriate to  propose a similar move in support of the Mediterranean countries of ex-Yugoslavia, as it does not  consider the socio-economic conditions there comparable to those which prompted its recommendation  in the case of Albania.  () Rapporteur: Mr Beale, OJ No C 73, 15. 3. 1993.  () This view seems to be broadly confirmed by the Committee's recent Opinion on the subject  (Rapporteur: Mr  Etty), wich appears in the present Official Journal.  () OJ No C 133, 31.  5.  1995. APPENDIX I to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee>TABLE> APPENDIX II to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(Opinion CES 320/95,  points 3.6 and 3.6.1)Compatible development on both sides of the Mediterranean is clearly the main  prerequisite for establishing new cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area. However, there are at  least four other intervention areas that have significant implications for Mediterranean spatial  planning and bring a need for radical revision of Community policies and for new joint development  policies. a) The problems of arid agriculture and of regions with water shortages: it is vitally important to  focus biotechnology and agronomic research on these problems, in the interests of reliability of  food supplies, desertification control, and expansion of science parks. The Committee would again  draw attention to the impact which agricultural policy measures may have on the environment and the  rural economy. Dramatic changes in Mediterranean farming regions could also further aggravate the  flight from the land and the desertification of rural areas. b) Stemming of environmental decay, and improvement of land: the specific nature of the  Mediterranean region and the growing costs of land degradation, bring a need for work on  sustainable development. In all countries, water treatment policy is important for effectively  combating the pollution of the Mediterranean. Research and training bodies must adopt a new  approach to the problem. c) Tourism: the countries on the southern flank of the Mediterranean are finding new fields in  which they can compete with the north. Cooperation in this sector, which requires efficient  agencies (such as those found in Austria, Germany and other northern European countries) would help  the Mediterranean regions to compete more effectively with the new holiday formulas being offered  elsewhere. Another aim here should be to remove the environmental risks caused by the presence of  too many tourists in ecologically delicate areas. d) Training: close two-way cooperation is needed at all levels. Basic literacy campaigns, technical  institutes, universities, refresher and further training courses in the south; training and  integration schemes for immigrant workers and new university courses in the north. The key to Mediterranean development lies in making the best possible use of human resources.  Drawing on its own experience, the Community can assist in the reinforcement of R& D capacity,  training for new technologies, and further training for workers faced with industrial change, in  order to foster the emergence of a forward-looking workforce able to adapt to changing  circumstances.