Proposal for COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) imposing amended anti- dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil
Date: 1993-10-01
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: anti-dumping duty, dumping, ferrous metal, import, third country

COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 

(  O M ( ^)  447  final 

B r u s s e l s,  1  October  1993 

Proposal  for 

COUNÇ;iL  RJEGULATJONiJEliQ 

imposing  amended  anti-dumping  measures  on  imports  of  ferro-silicon 

originating  in  Russia,  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine,  Iceland, 

Norway,  Sweden,  Venezuela  and  Brazil 

(presented  by  the  Commission) 

FXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 

1. 

In  a  notice  published  in  Official  Journal  No  C  I 15  of  6  May  l(>92,  the  Commission 

announced  a  review,  in  accordance  with  Articles  14  and  15  of  Council  Regulation 

(IIX  )  No  2423/88,  of  the  anti-dumping  measures  imposed  on  imports  of  ferro-silicon 

into  the  Community  originating  in  Norway,  Iceland,  Sweden,  Venezuela,  Brazil,  the 

Republics  of  the  former  USSR  and  the  former  Yugoslavia 

2 

The  Commission  carried  out  its investigation  in  the  period  between  I  January  1991  and 

M) April  1992. 

V 

Normal  value  has  been  constructed  for  Norway,  Iceland  and  Venezuela,  since  there 

were  not  enough  representative  sales  on  their  respective  domestic  market. 

For  Brazil,  because  of  the  endemic  inflation,  normal  value  was  determined  on  a 

monthly  basis,  either  by  reference  to  domestic  sales  or,  where  necessary,  by  reference 

to  a  constructed  value  when  domestic  puces  did  not  permit  recovery  of  all  costs 

For  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine  and  Russia,  which  are  considered  as  non-market  economy 

countries,  Norway  was  selected  as  analogous  country  No  objection  was  raised  by  the 

exporters  The  normal  value  has  been  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  Norwegian  costs 

of  production 

No  dumping  has  been  calculated  for  the  Republics  of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  since  the 

contribution  to  injury  was  minimal. 

4. 

The  comparison  between  normal  value  and  export  price  to  the  Community  showed 

dumping  margins  for  Brazil  ranging  from  9.2% to  25%, Venezuela  20.4%,  Norway  and 

Iceland  6.8%,  Sweden  7.4%,  Ukraine,  Kazakhstan  and  Russia  74%. 

j 
I 
\ 

) 

5. 

As  far  as  injury  is concerned,  investigations  sought  to determine  whether  there had  been 

any  changes  in  the  situation  of  the  Community  industry  as  a  result  of  the  behaviour  of 

the  exporters  on  the  Community  market  since  the  imposition  of  the  anti-dumping 

measures under  review  Furthermore, the Commission  also examined  whether  the  expiry 

of  existing  anti-dumpmg  measures  would  be  likely  to  lead  to  recurrence  of  injury 

The  investigation  showed  that  the present  situation  of the  Community,  falling  sales, loss 

of  market  shares  and  financial  losses  meant  that  protection  was  still  required  against 

dumped  imports  originating  in  the  abovementioned  countries  It  was  found  that  the 

measures  under  review  had  not  prevented  the  undercutting  of  Community  producer's 

price  by  the  dumped  imports.  Under  these circumstances,  the  lifting  of the  anti-dumpmg 

measures  in  force  could  not  be  justified. 

6.  With  respect  to  Community  interests,  the  removal  of  the  unfair  advantages  gained  by 

the  dumping  practices  is  designed  to  prevent  the  further  decline  of  the  Community 

industry  and  thus  helps  to  maintain  the  availability  to  the  consumer  of  widest  possible 

choice  of  producers 

There  is also  evidence,  given  the negligible  part  of  ferro-silicon  in  the  steel  production, 

that  the  consumer  prices  would  not  be  significantly  affected  by  the  continuation  of  the 

measures. 

7. 

Accordingly,  the anti-dumping  measures  should  be  maintained  and  adjusted  in the  light 

of  the  results  of  the  review. 

8. 

Since  the  injury  thresholds  were  higher  than  the dumping  margins,  the  duties  sliould  be 

based  on  the  dumping  margins  found,  which  are: 

Norway 

Iceland 

Sweden 

Venezuela 

Brazil 

6.8% 

6.8% 

7.4% 

20.4% 

9.2%  to  25% 

Russia,  Ukraine  and  Kazakhstan 

74% 

Proposal  for  a 

COUNÇIL  REGUJLAT 1 ON  {EEC) 

imposing  amended  anti-dumping  measures  on  imports  of  ferro-silicon 

originating  in  Russia,  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine,  Iceland, 

Norway,  Sweden,  Venezuela  and  Brazil 

THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community, 

Having  regard to Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88 of  I I  July  1988 on protection  against 

dumped  or  subsidized  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Economic 

Community"',  and  in  particular  Articles  14  and  15  thereof, 

Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the  Commission,  presented  after  consultations  within  the 

Advisory  Committee  as  provided  for  by  the  Regulation, 

Whereas: 

A 

PROCEDURE 

(1)  By  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2409/87'"',  the  Commission  imposed  a  provisional  anti 

dumping  duty  on 

imports  of  ferro-silicon  originating 

in  Brazil  and  accepted 

undertakings  offered  by  a  Brazilian  company  and  by  Promsyrio-Import  of  the  USSR 

(2)  By  Regulation  (EEC)  No  .1650/87"',  the  Council  imposed  a  definitive  anti-dumping 

duty  on  imports  of  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Brazil. 

« it 

(.M 

(  u 

OJ No I. 209, 2 8 1988, p I 
OJ No L 219, 8 8 1987, p. 24 
OJ No L 343, 5.12 1987, p I. 

(3) 

In  February  1990, 

the  Council,  by  Regulation 

(EEC)  No  341/90",  accepted 

undertakings  and  imposed  a  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  on  imports  of  ferro-silicon 

originating  in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and  Yugoslavia, except  ferro-silicon 

sold  for  export  to the Community  by  companies  whose  undertakings  had  been  accepted 

(4)  By  Regulation  (EEC).No  1115/91°',  the  Council  imposed  a  definitive  anti-dumping 

duty  following  the review of anti-dumping  measures  concerning  imports of  ferro-silicon 

originating  in  Brazil. 

By  Decision  91/240/EEC'"',  the  Commission  accepted  undertakings  offered  by  certain 

exporters  following  the  review  of  anti-dumping  measures  concerning  imports  of  ferro-

silicon  originating  in  Brazil  and  terminated  the  investigation  as  far  as  those  exporters 

were  concerned. 

(5) 

In  February  1992,  the  Commission  published  a notice'7'  of  the  impending  expiry  of  the 
undertaking  accepted  from  the  Soviet  company,  Promsyrio-Import,  in  accordance  with 

Article  15  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the  Basic 

Regulation"). 

(6) 

In  its  request  lodged 

in  February  1992,  the  Liaison  Committee  of  Ferro-Alloys 

Industries  in  the  European  Community  (CLIFA),  which  acts  on  behalf  of  Community 

producers  and  represents,  allegedly,  98% of  the  Community's  ferro-silicon  production, 

asked  for  a  review  of  all  the  abovementioned  measures  (recitals  I  to  4). 

(7)  Having  decided,  after  consultation, that  there was sufficient  evidence  to justify  a  review, 

the  Commission  decided  to  institute  a  review  of  the  Regulations  and  Decisions 

mentioned  in  recitals  (1)  to  (4)  in  accordance  with  Articles  14  and  15  of  the  Basic 
Regulation,  and  opened  an  investigation  by  a  notice  published  in  May  1992(8). 

(•ii 

(/) 

(K) 

OJ No L 38, 10 2 1900, p.  I 
OJ No I. ill, 3.5 1991, p. |. 
OJ No L III, 3.5.1991, p. 47. 
OJ No C 37, 15.2.1992, p. 22. 
OJ No C  115, 6.5.1992, p. 2. 

(K) 

In  August  1992,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  15(4)  of  the  Basic 

Regulation,  the  Commission  published  a  notice' '  concerning  the  continuation,  during 

the  review  proceeding,  of  the  anti-dumping  measures  in  force  against  the  former 

Soviet  Union. 

(9) 

Ihe  Commission  officially  notified  the  exporters  and  the  Community  producers  known 

to  be  concerned  of  the  opening  of  the  proceeding  and  gave  them  the  opportunity  to 

make  known  their  views  in  writing  and  to  request  a  hearing. 

(10)  Furthermore,  the  Commission,  at the  request  of  an  importer  and  in  accordance  with  the 

provisions  of  Article  7(6)  of  the  Basic  Regulation,  gave  the  parties  directly  concerned 

an  opportunity  to  meet 

(11)  The  Commission  sought  and  verified  all  information  it  considered  necessary  for  a 

determination  of  dumping  and  injury  and  carried  out  investigations  at  the  premises  of 

the  following 

(a)  Community  producers 

Sociedad  Espanola  de  Carburos  Metâlicos,  Spain 

Péchiney  Electrométallurgie,  France 

SKW  Trostberg  AG,  Germany 

(b)  Exporting  producers 

Fesil  KS,  Norway 

Elkcm  A/S,  Norway 

Icelandic  Alloys,  Iceland 

Vargon  Alloys,  Sweden 

CVG  Fesilven,  Venezuela 

Companhia  Brasileua  Carbureto  de  Câlcio  (CIJCC),  Brazil 

Companhia  de  Ferroligas  da  Bahia  Ferbasa,  Brazil 

Italmagnésio  SA,  Brazil 

Companhia  Paulista  de  Ferroligas,  Brazil 

Tovarna  Dusika  Ruse,  Slovenia 

OJ  No  C  186,  23  7  1992,  p  25. 

(c)  Unrelated  importers 

Considar,  Belgium 

S.A.  des  Minerais,  Luxembourg 

(d)  Related  importers 

Elkem  GmbH,  Germany 

Elkem  Alloys  Ltd,  UK 

Fesil  Alloys  Ltd,  UK 

Fesil  GmbH,  Germany 

(12)  The  Commission  requested  and  received  submissions  from  the  complainants,  from  the 

exporters  named  and  from  a number  of  related  and  unrelated  importers  and  verified  the 

information  provided  to  the  extent  considered  necessary 

(I  J) 

Ihe  exporters,  telated  importers,  one  unrelated  impoitei  and  the  complainant  industry 

requested  and  were  informed  of  the  essential  facts  and  considerations  on  the  basis  of 

which  it  was  planned  to  recommend  the  imposition  of  amended  anti-dumping  duties. 

Due  account  was  taken  of  the  representations  of  the  parties  concerned  in  the  findings 

of  the  Commission. 

(14) 

Ihe  investigation  into  dumping  practices  covered  the  period  from  I  January  1991  to 

30  April  1992 

B 

PRODUCT 

(15)  Product  description 

The  product  under  investigation  is  ferro-silicon  containing  between  20%  and  96%  of 

silicon  by  weight  and  exported  by  the  countries  under  review,  falling  within  CN  codes 

7202  21  90,  7202  21  10  and  ex  7202  29  00. 

(16)  An  exporter  and  an  importer  claimed  that  the  physical  characteristics  of  frequently 

traded  grades of  ferro-silicon,  namely  ferro-silicon  containing  45% of  silicon  and  ferro-

silicon  containing  75%  of  silicon,  are  substantially  different  as  far  as  chemical 

composition,  gravity,  weight,  bulk,  density,  colour,  hardness  and  chill-factor  are 

concerned  and  that  their  metallurgical  properties  are  not  the  same.  They  also  asserted 

that  the  production  process  for  the  two  types  of  products  requires  different  production 

facilities  and  therefore  leads  to  differences  in  classification,  handling,  consumption, 

supply  and  pricing. 

Furthermore,  (hose  two  parties  pointed  out  that  ferro-silicon  containing  4 5% of  silicon 

is  not  interchangeable  with  ferro-silicon  containing  75%  of  silicon.  For  all  these 

reasons, ferro-silicon  containing  45% of  silicon  should,  they  claimed,  be  excluded  from 

the  proceeding. 

(17) 

in  that  respect,  the  Commission  recalls  that  where  the  product  concerned  consists  of 

several  grades  or  qualities,  the  question  as  to  whether  those  different  types  of  product 

have  to  be  regarded  as  forming  one  product  has  to  be  answered  on  the  basis  of  the 

physical  or  chemical  characteristics  and  uses  of  those  grades  or  qualities. 

(18)  The  investigation  has  shown  that  both  ferro-silicon  containing  45% and  that  containing 

75%  of  silicon  have  the  same  basic  physical  and  chemical  characteristics.  In  addition, 

they  are  interchangeable  in  their  main  applications  as  a  deoxidiser  m  steel  manufacture 

and/or  as  an  alloying  component  for  high-temperature  steel  alloys  and  sheet  metal  and 

have  therefore  to  be regarded  as forming  one  product  for  the purpose  of this  proceeding. 

(19)  Like  product 

The  Commission  established  that  the  ferro-silicon  produced  in  the  Community  and  the 

ferro-silicon  sold  or  produced  in  Brazil,  Venezuela,  Iceland,  Norway,  Sweden  and  the 

Republics  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  are  alike  in  all  respects  to  the  product  concerned 

as  exported  from  the  countries  concerned  by  this  proceeding. 

(20)  The  Council  confirms  those  findings. 

C 

NORMAL  VALUE  AND  EXPORT  PRICE 

I. 

Norway 

(a)  Normal  value 

(21)  The  Norwegian  producers  formed  part  of  two  separate  corporate  groups  and  sold 

through  related  sales  companies  which  exported  most  of  their  merchandise  to  related 

importers  in  the  Community. 

(22) 

In  no  case  did  the  volume  of  sales  on  the  Norwegian  domestic  market  attain  5% of  the 

volume  of  exports  of  the  product  to  the  Community,  which  has  consistently  been 

considered  by  the  Commission  to  be  a minimum  representative  volume  for  comparison. 

(23)  Normal  value  for  the  Norwegian  producers  has  therefore  been  calculated  in  accordance 

with  Article  2(3)(b)(ii)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  It  has  been  constructed  on  the  basis  of 

the  fixed  and  variable  raw  material  and  manufacturing  costs  for  the  product  exported 

to  the  Community,  together  with  a  reasonable  amount  for  selling,  administrative  and 

other  general  costs, as well  as a  reasonable  margin  of  profit  As regards  each  of  the  two 

Norwegian  groups,  a  weighted  average  of  the  manufacturing  costs  of  their  producing 

subsidiaries  was  calculated. 

Since  there  were,  in  both  cases,  no  domestic  sales  in  representative  quantities  of  ferro-

silicon  or  of  products 

in 

the  same  business  sector, 

the  selling,  general  and 

administrative  costs  and  profit  were  established  on  the  basis  of  data  available  to  the 

Commission  concerning  this  product  sector  in  Norway.  This  basis  was  considered 

reasonable  and  thus  in  accordance  with  Article  2(3)(b)(ii)  of  the  Basic  Regulation. 

A  profit  margin  of  6%  was  added  to  the  full  costs  of  the  product.  That  profit  was  in 

line  with  the  profit  considered  necessary  for  the  Community  industry  to  remain  viable 

(b) 

Export  price 

(24)  Where  sales  were  made  direct  to  independent  importers  in  the  Community,  export 

prices  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  prices  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the 

product  sold  for  export  to  the  Community 

(25)  Where  exports  were  made  to  related  importers  in  the  Community,  export  prices  were 

constructed  in  accordance  with  Article  2(8)(b)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  on  the  basis  of 

resale  prices  to  the  first  independent  purchaser,  adjusted  to  take  account  of  all  costs 

incurred  between  importation  and  resale,  together  with  a  3% profit  margin  which  was 

considered  reasonable  in  view  of  the  information  available  to  the  Commission  on  the 

product  sector  concerned 

2 

Iceland. 

(a)  Normal., value 

(26)  Since  there  were  no  sales  of  ferro-silicon  on  the  domestic  Icelandic  market,  normal 

value  was  constructed 

in  accordance  with  Article  2(3)(b)(ii)  of  the  Basic  Regulation. 

As  far  as  selling,  general,  administrative  expenses  and  profit  were  concerned,  the 

situation  was  the  same  as  for  Norway  and  the  determination  was  therefore  made  on  the 

same  basis  (see  recital  23) 

(b) 

Export  price 

(27)  The  sole  producer 

in  Iceland,  Icelandic  Alloys  Ltd,  channelled 

its  sales  to  the 

Community  through  a  Norwegian  group  which  has  a  significant  shareholding  in  this 

producer  (see  recital  21 ). 

(28)  Therefore,  in order  to achieve comparability  between  the normal  value and  export  price, 

the  latter  had  to  be  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  price  at  which  the  product  concerned 

was  resold  by  the  Norwegian  company  to  independent  Community  customers,  as 

provided  for  by  Article  2(8)(b)  of  the  Basic  Regulation 

In  accordance  with  that 

provision,  allowance  was  made  for  an  estimated  margin  of  3%  arising  from  profits 

realized  on  sales  on  the  sector  concerned 

-* 

Sweden 

(a)  Normal  value 

(29)  Domestic  sales  of  the  Swedish  producer  exceeded  5% of  exports  to  the  Community  and 

therefore  represented  a  volume  sufficient  to  constitute  a  representative  market  and  an 

adequate  basis  for  calculating  the  normal  value. 

(30)  Normal  value  has  therefore  been  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  weighted  average 

domestic  prices  for  ferro-silicon  sold  on  the  domestic  market  at  prices  made  in  the 

ordinary  course  of  trade,  in  accordance  with  Article  2(3)(a)  of  the  Basic  Regulation 

(31)  The  prices  were  net  of  all  discounts  and  rebates  directly  linked  to  the  sales  under 

consideration. 

(b) 

Export  price 

(32)  Since  all  exports  were  made  direct  to  independent  importers  in  the  Community,  export 

prices  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  prices  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the 

product  sold  for  export  to  the  Community. 

4. 

Venezuela 

(a)  Normal  value 

(33)  Domestic  sales  of  the  Venezuelan  producer  exceeded  5%  of  exports  to  the  Community 

and  therefore  represented  a  volume  sufficient  to  constitute  a  representative  market  and 

an  adequate  basis  for  calculating  the  normal  value. 

(34)  70% of  the  sales  on  the  domestic  market  were  sold  to  related  companies  for  processing 

and  could  not  be  considered  reliable  and  made  m  the  ordinary  course  of  trade.  The 

remaining  sales  were  made  at  prices  which  did  not  permit  the  recovery  in  the  normal 

course  of 

trade  of  all  costs  reasonably  allocated  Normal  value  was 

therefore 

constructed  in  accordance  with  Article  2(3)(b)(ii)  of  the  Basic  Regulation. 

Given  the  volume  of  domestic  sales,  the  Commission  was  in  a  position  to  calculate  the 

selling,  general  and  administrative  expenses  by  reference  to  the  expenses  incurred  by 

the  producer  on  its  sales  on  the  domestic  market 

A  profit  margin  of  6%  on  the  total  costs  of  production  was  considered  reasonable 

(see  recital  23) 

12 

(b) 

Export  price 

(35)  Since  sales  were  made  direct  to  independent  importers  in  the  Community,  export  prices 

were  determined  on  the  basis of  the  prices  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the  product  sold 

for  export  to  the  Community. 

5 

Brazil 

(a)  Normal  value 

(36)  Domestic  sales  of  all  the  Brazilian  producers  exceeded  5%  of  export  sales  to  the 

Community  and  therefore  represented  a  volume  sufficient  to  constitute  a  representative 

market  and  an  adequate  basis  for  calculating  the  normal  value 

(37) 

In  view  of  the  significant  price  variations  which  are  the  result  of  the  high  inflation  in 

Brazil,  normal  value  was  determined  on  a  monthly  basis,  either  by  reference  to 

domestic  sales  or,  where  necessary,  by  reference  to  the  constructed  value  as  defined 

hereafter. 

(38)  The  Commission  examined  whether  the  domestic  sales  had  been  made  in  the  ordinary 

course  of  trade,  by  comparing  each  domestic  transaction  with  the  production  cost  per 

tonne  of  each  producer  during  the  same  monthly  period. 

During  the  months  when  sales  were  considered  profitable, 

normal  values  were 

determined  for  that  month,  on  the  basis  of  the  domestic  prices  in  accordance  with 

Article  2(3)(a)  of  the  Basic  Regulation 

In  all  other  cases,  normal  value  was  constructed  in  accordance  with  Article  2(3)(b)(ii) 

of  the  Basic  Regulation. 

Given  the  volume  of  domestic  sales  the  Commission  was  in  a  position  to  calculate  the 

selling,  general  and  administrative  expenses  by  reference  to  the  expenses  incurred  by 

the  producer  on  its sales on  the  dome  tic  market  A profit  margin  of  6%  was  also  added 

(see  recital  23). 

13 

(b) 

Export  price 

(39)  Since  sales  were  made  direct  to  independent  importers  in the  Community,  export  prices 

were  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  prices  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the product  sold 

for  export  to  the  Community. 

6. 

Kazakhstan,  Ukraine,  Russia 

(a)  Normal  value 

(40)  On  the  basis  of  the  information  available  to  the  Commission,  of  the  countries  of  the 

former  USSR, production  facilities  for  ferro-silicon  existed only  in Kazakhstan,  Ukraine 

and  Russia  It  was,  however,  not  possible  to  distinguish  the  products  by  origin  since 

they  were  exported  to  the  Community  by  a  Russian  trader  which  made  no  such 

distinction. 

Since  all  three  countries  are  State-trading  countries  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2(5) 

of the  Basic  Regulation,  normal  value  was based on  information  obtained  from  a  market 

economy  in  which  the  product  was  manufactured. 

For  this purpose, the  Commission  chose  Norway.  The  choice  was  not  questioned  by  the 

producers  in  the  three  countries  concerned.  The  Norwegian  ferro-silicon 

industry 

reported  high  production  volumes  and 

low  production  costs  and  appeared,  by 

comparison  with  all  other  known  producing  countnes,  to  be  an  efficient  producer  given 

the  ease  of  access  to  hydroelectrical  power,  the  most  costly  input  in  the  production  of 

ferro-silicon.  Norway  was 

therefore  considered 

to  be  an  appropriate  and  not 

unreasonable  choice  of  analogous  market. 

(41)  Normal  value  for  Norway  was  established  as  explained  in  recital  23. 

(b) 

Export  prices 

(42)  The  producers  from  Ukraine  and  Russia  did  not  cooperate,  while  the  questionnaire 

completed  by  the  producer  from  Kazakhstan  was  found  to  be  inaccurate  as far  as  export 

prices  were  concerned  and  the  information  contained  therein  could  therefore  not  be 

used. 

14 

The  Commission  verified  more  than  70% of  the  total  imports  made  through  the  trading 

organization,  Promsyrio-Import,  which  represented  producers  in  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine 

and  Russia  This  quantity  was  considered  representative  of  all  transactions  of  the 

producers  in  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine  and  Russia  during  this  period. 

Accordingly,  export  prices  were  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  prices  to  the  first 

independent  buyer. 

£>• 

COMPARISON 

(43)  For  each  country  concerned,  in  comparing  the  normal  value  with  export  prices, 

transaction  by  transaction,  the  Commission,  in  accordance  with  Article  2(9)  and  2(10) 

of  the  Basic  Regulation,  took  account,  where  warranted,  of  the  differences  directly 

affecting  price  comparability,  such  as  certain  selling  expenses,  namely  credit  terms, 

transport,  insurance  and  handling  costs,  packing  and  ancillary  costs. 

For  Kazakhstan,  Ukraine  and  Russia,  an  allowance  was  made  for  differences  in  physical 

characteristics,  in  particular  screening,  crushing  and  weighing.  Normal  value  for  all 

three  countries  was  adjusted,  since  the  alleged  difference  was  substantiated,  by  an 

amount  based  on  a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  value 

(44)  All  comparisons  were  made  at  the  same  level  of  trade 

K 

DUMPING  MARGINS 

(45)  The  margins  of  dumping  equalled  the  amount  by  which  the  normal  value  established 

exceeded  the  price  for  export  to  the  Community. 

I 

Norway 

(46)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin  for  the  companies  Elkem  and  Fesil,  expressed 

as  a percentage  of  the CIF-Commumty-frontier  prices, customs  duty  unpaid,  was  6  8% 

(17)  Since  it  was  established  that  those  two  companies  were  responsible  for  all  exports  of 

ferro-silicon  of  Norwegian  origin  to  the  Community,  it  was  considered  appropriate  that 

the  above  margin  should  be  applicable  to  Norway  as  a  whole 

15 

Iceland 

(48)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin  for  the  company  concerned,  expressed  as  a 

percentage  of  the  CIF-Community-frontier  prices,  customs  duty  unpaid,  is  6.8%. 

(49)  Since  it  was  established  that  the  company  was  responsible  for  all  exports  of  ferro-

silicon  of  Icelandic  origin  to  the  Community,  it  was  considered  appropriate  that  the 

above  margin  should  be  applicable  to  Iceland  as  a  whole. 

3. 

Sweden 

(50)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin  for  the  company  concerned,  expressed  as  a 

percentage  of  the  CIF-Community-frontier  prices,  customs  duty  unpaid,  is  7,4%. 

(51)  Since  it  was  established  that  the  company  was  responsible  for  all  exports  of  ferro-

silicon  of  Swedish  origin  to  the  Community,  it  was  considered  appropriate  that  the 

above  margin  should  be  applicable  to  Sweden  as  a  whole. 

4. 

Venezuela 

(52)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margin  for  the  company  CVG  Fesilven,  expressed  as 

a  percentage  of  the  CIF-Community-frontier  prices,  customs  duty  unpaid,  was  20.4%. 

(53) 

In  the  case of  firms  which  had  failed  to  cooperate  in  the  investigation  or  had  not  replied 

satisfactorily  to  the  Commission's  questionnaire,  the  Commission  considered  that  the 

dumping  should  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  available,  in  accordance  with 

Article  7(7)(b)  of  the  Basic  Regulation.  In  this  respect,  it  was  considered  that  the 

margin  found  for  the  company  Fesilven  would  be  the  most  appropriate. 

Brazil 

(54)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margins  for  the  companies  concerned,  expressed  as  a 

percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier  prices, customs duty  unpaid, were as  follows: 

Companhia  Brasileua  Carbureto  de  Càlcio 

9.2% 

Ferbasa 

Italmagnésio 

22.8% 

25% 

16 

(55) 

In  the  case  of  Brazilian  companies  which  cooperated  in  the  investigation  and  were 

found 

not 

to 

have 

exported 

during 

the 

investigation 

period 

(Rima 

Electrometalurgia  S.A.,  Companhia  Paulista  de Ferroligas, Companhia  Ferroligas  Minas 

Gérais  Minasligas)  the  Commission  considers  that  the  best  evidence  available  is  the 

weighted  average  dumping  margin  found  for  the  companies  which  did  export.  This  was 

found  to  be  20.5.3%. 

(56) 

In  the  case  of  firms  which  had  failed  to cooperate  in  the  investigation  or  had  not  replied 

satisfactorily  to  the  Commission's  questionnaire,  the  Commission  considered  that  the 

dumping  should  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  available  in  accordance  with 

Article  7(7)(b) of  the  Basic  Regulation.  In this respect,  the Commission  considered  that 

the  most  reasonable  facts  were  those  established  in  the  investigation  and  that,  in  order 

to  prevent  duty-circumvention  and  to  avoid  offering  a  bonus  for  non-cooperation,  the 

highest  margin  found  for  Brazil  would  be  the  most  appropriate 

6. 

Kazakhstan^  Ukraine  arid  Russia 

(57)  The  weighted  average  dumping  margins  for  the  countries  concerned,  expressed  as  a 

percentage of the CIF-Community-frontier  prices, customs duty  unpaid, were as follows: 

Kazakhstan 

Ukraine 

Russia 

74% 

74% 

74% 

7. 

The. remaining  Republics  of  the  formerJUSSR 

(58)  Since  no  ferro-silicon  originating  in  the  remaining  Republics  of  the  former  USSR  was 

imported  into  the  Community  during  the  investigation  period,  any  review  of  the 

measures,  as they  concerned  those  Republics,  was  inappropriate.  Accordingly,  the  anti 

dumping  measures  in  respect  of  those  Republics  should  not  be  maintained. 

8 

Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Maceiioniaaiid  the  Republics  of  Bpsni.a-Herzegovjnaand 

Slovenia 

(59)  For  the  producers  in  the  abovementioned  countnes,  given  that  their  contribution  to 

injury  was  de  minimis  no  dumping  calculations  were  made  (see  recital  62). 

17 

9. 

Conclusion 

(60)  The  Council  confirms  the  above  conclusions 

F 

INJURY 

1 

Cumulation 

(61)  The  effects  of  the  imports  from  the  countries  under  review  have,  in  general,  to  be 

analysed  cumulatively,  since  the  exports  originating 

in  each  of  those  countries 

comprised  significant  quantities  of  the  product  under  consideration  and  competed  with 

the  Community  production  and  with  each  other,  and  because  the  exporters'  market 

behaviour  was  similar 

(62)  However,  imports  from  the  Republics  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Slovenia  and  the 

former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  were  minimal  While  the  mere  fact  that 

imports  from  those  countries,  after  the  imposition  of  duties,  were  negligible  is  not  a 

circumstance  justifying  ipso, tac to  in  a  review  proceeding  the  lifting  of  duties  against 

those  countries  or  precluding  the  cumulation  with  other  imports,  it  was  found  that  the 

plant  located  in  the  Republic  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  has  been  seriously  damaged  and 

will  be  out  of  operation  for  a  significant  period  of  time. 

The  current  capacity  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  and  Slovenia  is 

such  that  it  is  unlikely  that  their  exports  to  the  Community  will  go  beyond  a  negligible 

volume  in  the  near  future.  It  can  therefore  be  expected  that  the  volumes  imported  from 

those  three countries, after  lifting  of  measures,  will  remain  at an  insignificant  level.  Any 

contribution  to  further  injury  or  any  threat  of  injury  cannot  therefore  be  attributed  to 

these  imports 

(63)  The  Council  confirms  these  findings 

2. 

Volume,  market  share  and  prices  of  the  dumped...imports 

Volume  of  imports 

(64)  The  volume  of  ferro-silicon  imported  from  the  countries  under  review,  as  a  percentage 

of  consumption,  increased  from  56% in  1988 to 60% in  1991  and  69% at the  beginning 

of  1992: 

the  imports  originating  in  Kazakhstan,  Russia  and  Ukraine  rose  considerably  from 

30  000  tonnes  in  1988  (6%  market  share),  72  000  tonnes  in  1991  (14%  market 

share)  to  90  000  tonnes  in  1992  (16%  market  share); 

the  volume  of  the  imports  from  Norway  (approximately  200  000  tonnes  per  year), 

from  Iceland  (approximately  20  000  tonnes  per  year), from  Sweden  (approximately 

12  000  tonnes  per  year)  remained  relatively  stable  between  1988  and  1992  with 

market  shares  of  some  40%  for  Norway,  4%  for  Iceland  and  over  2%  for  Sweden 

in  1992; 

the  imports  originating  in  Brazil  increased  from  9  000  tonnes  in  1988  (nearly  2% 

market  share),  to  16  600  tonnes  in  1991  (3.2%  market  share)  to  approximately 

28  000  tonnes  in  1992  (5.5%  market  share  calculated  on  an  annual  basis);  during 

the  same  period  Venezuelan  imports  went  up  from 

I  000  tonnes  in  1988,  to 

8  600  tonnes  in  1991  to  approximately  9  000  tonnes  (nearly  2%  market  share); 

the  imports  from  the  Republics of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Slovenia  and  the  former 

Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  the  sole  countries  of  the  former  Yugoslavia 

producing  ferro-silicon,  decreased  drastically  from  18  000  tonnes  in  1988  (nearly 

4%  market  share)  to  3  000  tonnes  for  Slovenia,  2  000  tonnes  for  the  former 

Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  and 

less 

than 

I  000 

tonnes  for  Bosnia-

Herzegovina 

in 

1992 

(less 

than 

1.2%  market 

share 

for 

those 

three 

countries  together). 

Piice  of  the  dumped  imports 

(05)  The  prices  CIF,  at  Community  frontier,  duty  paid,  to  the  first  independent  buyer  in  th 

Community  for  the  product  imported  from  the  c o u n t n es  under  review  were  lower  than 

the  Community  producers'  average  ex  works  prices,  which  were  already  depressed 

The  comparison,  earned  out  at  the  same  level  of  trade,  showed  the  following  average 

price  undercutting  margins 

9.9%  for  Norway, 

9.9%  for  Iceland, 

7.8%  for  Sweden, 

- 

2 0 . 1%  for  Brazil, 

2 0%  for  Venezuela, 

58.2%  foi  Ukraine,  Russia  and  Kazakhstan 

(66)  The  Council  confirms  these  findings 

3 

Situation  of  ihe  Community 

industry 

PïwiiictïoBi.,  c h a r i ly  sine! uiiliz-i^ion  rate 

( 6 7;  ComNiumiy  p r o d u u i on  of  feno-silicon  fell  from  nearly  190  000  tonnes  in  1989  to 

(32  000  tonnes  ir«  I 9<) J  and  !02  000  tonnes  m  J992.  Though  production  capacity  feil 

fiom  nearly  25T,  0';U  tonnes  in  I9K0  to  appioximately  200  000  tonnes  in  1.992,  the 

uîdization  ïaie  n c w i J i e l e ss  decreased  from  7 5%  in  1989  to  4 8%  in  1992. 

Sales  id'i'éïist  :s>ctî  :<•<  "*j*t ih.-.iv 

((K  ) 

J'he  '.jbantiiy  of  ïc*vo-sdicon  sold  in  the  C o m m u m iy  by  the  Community  producers  fell 

fioiu  163  000  tonnes  in  i989  to  135  000  tonnes  in  1990,  to  122  000  tonnes  in  1991  and 

lo  approximately  100  000  tonnes  in  1992. 

Between  1989  and  1902  She  Community  industry's  market  share  declined  as  follows: 

3 0%  m  1989,  2 5%  in  i990,  2 3%  in  1991  and  13%  in  1992  (four  months),  while  the 

Community's 

annual 

consumption 

increased 

between 

1988 

and 

1989 

from 

490  000  tonnes  to  53 5  000  tonnes  and  has  since  remained  at  that  level. 

20 

Price  evolution 

(69)  The  low  level  of  import  prices  over  the  investigation  period  meant  that  Community 

producers  had  to  sell  the  product  in  the  Community  at  prices  which,  in  most  cases,  did 

not cover  their  production  costs. The  low  level  of prices  not only  prevented  Community 

producers  from  raising  their  prices  in  order  to  reflect  the  rise  in  production  costs,  but 

even  forced  them  to  lower  their  prices,  although  this  did  not  stop  them  from  losing 

market  shares. 

Profits 

(70)  Due  to  the  price  depression  and  the  declining  capacity  utilization  which  negatively 

affected  the  coverage  of  fixed  costs  in  relation  to  this  highly  capital-intensive  industry, 

the Community  industry  overall  has  recorded  poor  financial  results  since  1987 (with  the 

exception  of  1989,  when  a  small  profit  was  realized)  The  situation  had  further 

deteriorated  since  1990  and  particularly  during  the  investigation  period,  with  all 

Community  producers  suffering  heavy  losses.  A  weighted  average  of  the  Community 

industry's  results  shows  a  loss  of  some  34%  on  turnover  during  that  period. 

Employment  and  investment 

(71 )  It should  be  noted  that  the  ferro-silicon  industry  is not  labour  intensive.  However,  there 

has  been  a  small,  but  steady  curtailment  in  employment  levels. 

Investments  have  been  cut,  and  in  Italy  three  companies  stopped  their  ferro-silicon 

production 

Conclusion 

(72)  Given  the  financial  losses  and  the  reduction  of  its  market  shares,  the  Community 

industry's  position  has  declined  considerably.  Ihe  Commission  concludes  accordingly 

that  the  industry  has  suffered  material  injury  within  the  meaning  of  Article  4(1)  of  the 

Basic  Regulation 

21 

(73)  The  Council  confirms  these  findings  and  conclusions 

4 

Causal  link  between  dumped  imports  and  injury 

(74)  The  Commission  examined  whether  the  material  injury  suffered  by  the  Community 

industry  was  caused  by  the  effects  of  the  dumping,  and  found  that  the  increased  influx 

of  imports  of  the  countries  under  review  coincided  with  a  significant  loss  of  market 

share  and  a  reduced  profitability  on 

the  part  of  the  Community 

industry.  The 

Community  ferro-silicon  market  is a transparent  and  price-sensitive  market  in  which  the 

price-undercutting  practised  by  the  producers  of  the  countries  under  review  had  an 

immediate  depressive  effect  on  the  prices  of  the  Community  industry  The  Community 

producers  had  to  adjust  their  prices  to  meet  this  downward  trend  in  prices. 

(75)  The  Council  confirms  these  findings. 

5 

Other  factors 

(76)  The  Commission  also  considered  whether  other  factors  than  the  dumped  imports  of 

ferro-silicon  could  have  caused  injury  to  the  Community  industry. 

(77) 

It  has  already  been  found  that  many  of  the  difficulties  encountered  by  the  Community 

ferro-silicon  industry  have  been  caused  by  the  dumped  imports  of  other  third  countries 

(like  South  Africa  and  China)  However,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  conclusion  that 

considerable  quantities  and  the  low  prices  of  the  dumped  imports  from  the  countries 

under  review  also  had  a  substantial  influence  on  the  unfavourable  situation  of  the 

Community  industry. 

(78)  The  Commission  did  not  find  any  other  factors  which  could  explain  the  precarious 

economic  situation  of  the  Community  industry.  Indeed,  there  were  neither  substantial 

imports,  other  than  those  mentioned,  nor  was  there  any  contraction  in  demand  between 

1990  and  1992. 

22 

>  I 

6 

Conclusion 

(79) 

In  those  circumstances,  and  even  allowing  for  the  fact  that  imports  from  South  Africa, 

China,  Poland  and  Egypt  have  also  contributed  to  the  poor  situation  of  the  Community 

industry,  the  Commission  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  effects  of  the  dumped 

imports  of  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Brazil,  Venezuela,  Norway,  Iceland,  Sweden, 

Ukraine,  Kazakhstan  and  Russia,  taken  in  isolation,  have  to  be  considered  as  still 

causing  material  injury  to  the  Community  industry  Any  lifting  of  the  measures  against 

these  producers  would  therefore  increase  the  existing  injury  That  being  so,  the  present 

circumstances  do  not justify  the  repeal  of  the  measures  On  the  contrary,  the  situation 

as  found  requires  the  adjustment  of  the  existing  measures  to  the  new  situation. 

Indeed,  should  the  measures  in  force  remain  unchanged,  lapse  or  be  repealed,  the  result 

would  certainly  be  further  price  decreases  in  the  imports,  causing  further  price 

depression  on  the  whole  Community  market,  and  further  loss  of  market  shares  and 

profitability  for  the  Community  industry. 

(80)  The  Council  confirms  these  findings  and  conclusions. 

G 

COMMUNITY  INTEREST 

(81) 

In  assessing  the  Community  interest,  the  Commission  took  account  of  certain  basic 

elements  The  prevention  of 

the  distortion  of  competition  arising  from  unfair 

commercial  practices,  and  hence  the  re-establishment  of  open  and  fair  competition  on 

the  Community  market, 

is  the  very  purpose  of  anti-dumping  measures  and 

is 

fundamentally 

in  the  general  Community  interest  Furthermore,  failure  to  maintain 

measures  in  force  would  aggravate  the  already  precarious  situation  of  the  Community 

industry,  especially  noticeable  from  the  lack  of  profitability  and  the shrinking  of  market 

shares,  making  its  viability  questionable  Should  the  industry  be  forced  to  cease 

production,  the Community  would  be  rendered  entirely  dependent  for  its supply  on  third 

countries. 

Without  anti-dumpmg  measures,  the  disappearance  of  certain  Community  producers  is 

quite  probable  in  the  near  future,  given  the  level  of  losses  incurred  by  certain  of  them 

over  an  extended  period  It  should  be  noted  in  this  respect  that  some  Italian  producers 

ceased  operating  at  the  beginning  of  1991  Any  further  deterioration  would  endanger 

jobs  and  investment  in  the  sector  concerned 

23 

(82)  The  Commission  recognizes  that  the  imposition  of  anti -dumping  duties  could  affect 

price  levels  of  the  exporters  concerned  in  the  Community  and  subsequently  may  have 

some 

influence  on  the  relative  competitiveness  of  their  products.  However, 

the 

competitive  advantage  that  is  being  lost  is  due  to  unfair  trade  practices  which  anti 

dumping  measures  are  designed  to  remove. 

(83) 

It  has  also  been  argued  that  anti-dumping  measures  would  reduce  the  number  of 

competitors  on  the  market.  However,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  number  of 

competitors  on  the  Community  market  will  not  be  reduced  by  the  adoption  of 

anti  dumping  measures.  On  the  contrary,  the  removal  of  the  unfair  advantages  gained 

by  the  dumping  practices  is  designed  to  arrest  the  decline  of  the  Community  industry 

and  thus  to  help  to  maintain  the  availability  of  a wide  choice  of  ferro-silicon  producers. 

(84)  As  to  the  interests  of  the  processing  industry,  namely  producers  of  speciality  steel 

which  are  end-users  of  the  product  concerned  in  the  Community,  its  short-term  price 

advantages  have  to  be  viewed  against  the  background  of  the  longer-term  effect  of  not 

retaining  fair  competition  Indeed, to  refrain  from  maintaining  measures  in  force  would 

seriously  threaten  the  viability  of  the  Community  industry,  the  disappearance  of  which 

would  in  fact  reduce  supply  and  competition  to  the  detriment  of  consumers  Moreover, 

it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  price  of  ferro-silicon  represents,  on  average,  only 

0.2%  of  the  cost  of  a  tonne  of  steel.  Any  cost  increase  of  ferro-silicon  due  to  anti 

dumping  measures  would  therefore  have  an  insignificant  impact  on  the  final  consumers. 

(85) 

Ihe  Commission  considers  that  it  is  therefore  in  the  Community's  interest  to  call  for 

the  continued  imposition  of  anti-dumping  measures  in  order  to  prevent  further  injury 

being  caused  by  the  dumped  imports. 

(86)  The  Council  confirms  these  conclusions 

H 

UNDERTAKI NOS 

(87)  Two  companies  proposed  revised  price  undertakings. 

(88)  The  prices cited  in  previous  undertakings  have  all  systematically  been  undercut  and  the 

Commission  considers  that  the  undertakings  can  no  longer  be  considered  an  appropriate 

remedy 

(89)  The Council  confirms  this  approach 

24 

1 

LEVEL  OF  THE  DUTY 

(90) 

In order  to  adapt  the  measures  to the  changed  circumstances  and  prevent  the  recurrence 

of  further  injury,  it  is  considered  that  anti-dumping  measures  should  be  established  in 

such  a  way  as  to  allow  the  Community  industry  to  make  a  reasonable  profit  in  the 

future  and  to  stem  the  fall  in  its  sales 

(91)  The  Commission  has  calculated 

the  weighted  average  production  cost  of 

the 

Community  producers,  a  profit  of  6%,  based  on  past  performance  and  considered 

reasonable  fv.r guaranteeing  the  industry's  productive  investment  on  a  long-term  basis. 

Since 

the  difference  between 

those  costs  and 

the  average  import  prices  on 

a  CIF-Community-frontier  basis,  duty  unpaid,  is  higher  than  the  dumping  margins  for 

all  companies  or  countries  concerned,  the  duties  should  be  based  on  the  dumping 

margins  recorded 

(92)  Accordingly,  the  following  anti-dumping  duties  should  be  imposed: 

Norway: 

Iceland: 

Sweden: 

Venezuela: 

Brazil: 

Companhia  Brasileira 

Carbureto  de  Câlcio 

Fer basa 

Rima  Electrometalurgia 

Companhia  Paulista  de  Ferroligas 

Companhia  Ferroligas  Minas  Cïerais 

Minasligas 

Russia: 

Ukraine: 

Kazakhstan: 

25 

6.8% 

6  8% 

7.4% 

20.4% 

25% 

9 2% 

22.8% 

20  5% 

20  5% 

20  5% 

74% 

74% 

74% 

(93) 

In  the  case  of  firms  which  failed  to  cooperate  in  the  investigation,  the  Commission 

considered  that  the  duties  should  be  established  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  available  in 

accordance  with  Article  7(7)(b)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  In  order  not  to  reward  non-

cooperation,  it  was  considered  that  the  most  reasonable  facts  were  those  established 

during  the  investigation  and  that  there  was  no  reason  to  believe  that  any  duties  lower 

than  the  highest  duties  considered  necessary  would  be  sufficient  to  remove  the  injury 

caused  by  the  imports.  Accordingly,  it  is  considered  appropriate  to  impose  the  highest 

duty  calculated  for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  each  country  under  investigation. 

(94)  The  Commission  is, as  always,  prepared  to  carry  out  a  newcomer  review  in  the  case  of 

those  companies  which  did  not  export  during  the  investigation  period,  and  are  not 

related  to  companies  which  did  export  during  that  period  and  intend  to  commence  the 

exports  to  the  Community 

(95)  The  Council  confirms  the  above. 

J 

REPE: AL  OF  REGI.!LATJ ONS_ AND_ PILCJ SIQN S 

(96)  Regulations  (EEC)  Nos  2409/87,  341/90,  1115/91  and  Decision  91/240/EEC  should 

accordingly  be  repealed, 

26 

HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION: 

Article  I 

1 

A definitive  anti-dumpmg duty  is hereby  imposed  on  imports of  ferro-silicon  containing 

between  20%  and  96%  of  silicon  by  weight  falling  within  CN  codes  7202  21  10, 

7202  21  90  and  ex  7202  29  00  (Taric  code  7202  29  00  II)  and  originating  in  Norway, 

Sweden,  Iceland,  Brazil,  Venezuela,  Kazakhstan,  Russia  and  Ukraine. 

2 

fhe  rate  of  duty,  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  free-at-Commumty-frontier  price  of  the 

product,  not  cleared  through  customs,  shall  be 

6.8% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Norway 

6  8% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Iceland 

7.4% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Sweden 

20.4% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Venezuela 

25% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Brazil  (additional  Taric  code  8731), 

with  the  exception  of  that  produced  by  the  companies  below,  to  which 

the  following  rates  shall  apply 

9.2% 

Cia  Brasileira  Carbureto  de  Calcio,  Rio  de  Janeiro 

(additional  lane  code  8729) 

22.8% 

Cia  de  Ferro  Ligas  da  Bahia  (Ferbasa),  Pojuca,  Bahia 

(additional  Taric  code  8730) 

20.5% 

Cia  Rima  Electrometalurgia  S.A.,  Belo  Honzonte 

(additional  lane  code  8734) 

20.5% 

Cia  Pauhsta  de  Ferroligas,  Sào  Paulo  (additional  Taric 

code  8734) 

20  5% 

Cia  Ferroligas  Minas  Gérais,  Mmasligas,  Contagem,  MG 

(additional  Taric  code  8734) 

74% 

for  ferro-silicon  originating  in  Russia,  Kazakhstan  and  Ukraine 

27 

3 

The  provisions  in  force  concerning  customs  duties  shall  apply 

4. 

Regulations  (EEC)  Nos  2409/87, 341/90,  1115/91  and  Decision  91/240/EEC  are  hereby 

repealed. 

Article  2 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of  its  publication  in  the 

Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities 

This  Regulation  shall  be  binding  in  its  entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  all  Member  States. 

Done  at  Brussels, 

for  the  Council 

The  President 

28 

KSN 0254-1475 

COM (93) 447 fina! 

DOCUMENT 

EN 

08 

Catalogue number : CB-CO-93-490-EN-C 

ISBN 92-77-59454-3 

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 

29