Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty
Date: 1992-07-09
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Brazil, alloy, anti-dumping duty, dumping, semi-metal

COMMISSION  OF  THE EUROPEAN  COMMLFNITIES 

C0M(92) 318  final 

Brussels,  9  JuIy  1992 

Proposal  for a 

COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EEC) 

imposlng a deflnitive anti-dumping duty on  imports of silicon metal 

origlnatlng  in Brazil  and definltively collecting  the amounts 

secured  by way of  the provisional  anti-dumping duty 

(presented  by  the Commission) 

EXPLANATORY  MEMO 

Procedure 

Commisslon  Regulation  (EEC)  No  906/92  of  30  March  1992  imposed  a 

provisional  anti-dumping  duty  of  42.1% on  imports  of  silicon  metal 

originating  in Brazil.1  The  following  rates  of  duty  were  applied  to 

the  companies  below: 

-  Ligas  de  Aluminio  SA  (LIASA) 

-  Rlma  Eletrometalurgia  SA 

-  Eletroila  SA 

-  Minasligas 

-  Camargo  Correia  Metais 

-  Companhia  Brasileira  Carboreto  de  Calcio 

42.1% 

37.7% 

33.0% 

40.1% 

28.3% 

18.5% 

After  provisional  duties  were  imposed,  those  parties  concerned  who  had 

requested  it  were  heard  by  the  Commission  and  submitted  written 

comments  on  the  investigation's  provisional  findings. 

These  oral  and/or  written  comments  were  examined  and,  where 

appropriate,  taken  into  account  in  the  Commission's  final  conclusions. 

0J  No  L  96,  10.4.1992,  p.17 

-  2 -

II.  DumpIng 

The arguments  put  forward  by  the Brazilian exporters were not 

considered  to warrant  a change  in the method  used  to make a 

provisional  assessment  of  dumping.  Certain  specific  corrections  to 

factual  errors or mistakes  in the  interpretation of  existing  data  did, 

however,  lead  the Commission  to alter  slightly  the normal  value and 

export  prlce of Brazilian  silicon metal.  Other  adjustments  were made 

to ensure  the comparabiIity  of  the prices actually  paid  at  different 

marketing  stages  in domestic and  export  transactions. 

The overall  result  of  these adjustments  was a small  change  in the 

dumping  margins established  for  the above Brazilian exporters. 

The  dumping  of Brazilian silicon metal  is therefore  confirmed. 

III.  Inlurv 

The  provisional  findings regarding  injury are confirmed  since  none of 

the arguments  presented  cast  doubt  on  their  Justification. 

IV.  Community  Interest 

Comments  by certain  industrial  users  in the Community  regarding  the 

soundness of  imposing  anti-dumping  measures were  not  considered 

sufficient  to warrant  reconsidering  the Community  interest  as 

provisionally  defined. 

—  3 -

V.  Undertafcinos 

Undertakings  QfferQd  by the Brazilian producers were not Judged an 

approprfate sotution in this  c&se  and were therefore rejected. 

VI.  peffnitfve naa^ura^ 

The CoasaTssrion concludes that a 36.S3S anti-dumplng duty should be 

imposed on silicon metal  iraports origlnating in Brazil and that tne 

foilowfng rates of duty should be appjied to compam'es beiow; 

-  Rima Eletrometalurgia SA 

-  eietroiia SA 

~  MinasTigas 

-  Canrargo Correia Uetais 

-  Companhia Brasfleira Carboreio de Calelo 

34.6% 

29.8% 

26,4% 

20*4% 

18-35* 

The Coovnission is therefore submitting to the CouncII a proposal  for a 

Council Regufatfon: 

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metai 

originating In Brazil; 

-  definrtively collecting. amounts secured by way of the provisional 

antl-duroping duty at the rates definitlveiy imposed. 

Council  Regulation  (EEC) No  .../92 

of  ... 

imposing a definitive  anti-dumping  duty on  imports of  silicon metal 

originating  in Brazil  and definitively  collecting  the amounts 

secured  by way of  the provisional  anti-dumping duty 

THE COUNCIL OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 

Having  regard  to the Treaty  establishing  the European  Economic  Community, 

Having  regard  to Council  Regulation  (EEC) No 2423/88 of  11  July  1988 on 

protection  against  dumped or  subsidized  imports originating  in countries 

not members of  the European  Economic Community,1  and  in particular 

Article  12 thereof, 

Having  regard  to the proposal  submitted  by  the Commission  after 

consultations within  the Advisory  Committee as provided  for  by  the above 

Regulation, 

Whereas: 

A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES 

(1)  Commission  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92 of  30 March  1992  imposed a 

provisional  anti-dumping  duty on  imports  into the Community  of silicon 

metal  falling within CN code 2804 69 00 originating  in Brazil.2 

1 

2 

0J  No L 209, 2.8.1988, p.1. 

0J  No L 96, 10.4.1992, p.17. 

-  2 -

B. SUBSEQUENT  PROCEEDING 

(2)  After  provisional  duties were  imposed,  those  concerned  who  had 

requested  it were  heard  by  the Commission.  They  also made  known  in 

writing  their  views on  the provisional  findings of  the  investigation. 

(3)  At  their  request,  the parties known  to be concerned  were  informed of 

the essential  facts and  considerations on which  it was  intended  to 

base  the  recommendation  to  impose  definitive duties and  def.init ively 

collect  the amounts provisionally  lodged.  They  were  then  allowed a 

period  in which  to make known  their  views. 

(4)  The parties' oral  and written  comments were examined  and,  where 

appropriate,  incorporated  in the Commission's  findings. 

C. THE PRODUCT AND LIKE  PRODUCT 

(5)  A  trade association  representing  the  interests of  the  Community 

chemical  industry  claimed  that  the definition  of  the product  given  in 

recital  8 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92 contained  inaccuracies 

regarding  the chemical  composition  of  the silicon metal  used  as a raw 

material  for  the manufacture of  silicons. 

(6)  The above  trade association  claimed  furthermore  that  silicon metal  for 

chemical  uses could  not  be considered  a  Iike product  to silicon metal 

for metallurgical  uses  for  the  reasons given  in recital  10 of 

Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92. 

- 3 -

(7)  It should  be polnted out  that  trace elements, such  as  lead, found  in 

sllicon metal  constltute  impurlties  Inasmuch as  they  prevent  the 

Rochow chemlcal  synthesis and  thus  the productlon of  chlorosllanes, a 

precursor  of  the siloxanes used  In the manufacture of  slllcones. 

Slmilarly, alumlnlum productlon  is also governed,  albelt  to a  lesser 

degree, by speciflcatlons relating  to the content  of  trace elements, 

such  as phosphorus which must  be kept  to a mlnimum. 

(8)  While  seeing  no need  to repeat  the answer  given  in the  above 

Regulation,  the Commission  thlnks  it necessary  to emphaslze  that ail 

grades of  silicon metal  are  the product  of  the  initlal  manufacturing 

process  described  in recital  6 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92.  The 

fact  that  standard-grade  silicon metal  may  subsequently  be  further 

refined  to the specifications of  a given user , especially  in the field 

of  silicon chemicals, by  the addition or  removal  of  trace  elements 

does  not make chemical-grade silicon metal  a different  product  from 

other  grades, since ail  have extremely  slmilar  physical  properties, 

come  from  the same  factories and  pass  through  the  same  distribution 

networks, differing  onIy  insignificantIy  in their  production costs. 

(9)  The  Commission  also stresses  that  the  list of  uses of  silicon metal 

given  in recital  8 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92  is not  exhaustive, 

and  that  the procedure  covers ail  grades of  silicon metal  with a 

silicon content  of  less than 99.99% by weight,  regardless  of  its 

content  in trace elements.  The Commission  confirms  that  it is 

technically  posslble  to use  the silicon metal  usually  intended  for  the 

chcni i c.i I imlu'.try  for  t h>s alumlnlum  Industry, provlded  Its phouphoruo 

content  does not  exceed  a certain  threshold. 

4 -

(10) The Council  consequently  confirms  that  all  grades of  silicon metal  are 

manufactured  by  the Community  industry  and  possess  technical 

properties  comparable  to those of  the Brazilian  industry  as  indicated 

in recital  11 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92.  The Council  likewise 

confirms  the Commission's  conclusions  in recital  7 of  Regulation  (EEC) 

No 906/92  that  all  grades of  silicon metal  should  be  regarded  as a 

single  product  for  the purposes of  this procedure  to assess  dumping 

and  the  resulting  injury  to the Community  Industry. 

D.  DUMPING 

1• 

Normal  value 

(11) For  the purposes of  the definitive conclusions, normal  vaiue  was 

generally  established  by  the same methods as  the provisional  dumping 

margin, account  being  taken, where  necessary, of  the new  circumstances 

and  arguments presented  by  the parties. 

{12} One Brazilian  producer  claimed  that  its domestic  sales did  not  reach 

the 5% threshold  for  export  sales  to the Community  in any  two 

consecutive months of  the  investigation period  and  could  not  therefore 

De aeemea a sufficient  basis  for  the calculation of  normal  value. 

The Commission  considers  that  the representativeness of  an  exporter's 

aomestic  sales  should  generally  be  tested on  the basis of  the entire 

investigation period  and  not  monthly, even  if normal  value  was 

aetermined on  a monthly  basis  to eliminate as  far  possible  the  impact 

of  infiation  in Brazil.  The sales concerned  must  therefore  be 

inciuded  in the calculation  of  normal  value  according  to  tne method 

aescribed  in recital  14 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92. 

-  5 -

The Council  confirms  these  conclusions. 

(13) Claiming  that  the Brazilian government's  economic  recovery  programme 

(the  "Collor  Plan") had  led to an abnormal  increase  in energy  costs 

and  to the US dollar  being  undervalued  against  the cruzeiro  from  March 

to June  1990, several  Brazilian producers  asked  that  production  costs 

for  those months be excluded  from  the calculation  of  constructed 

normal  value. 

The Commission,  however, sees no  reason  to exclude  the data  for  the 

period of  the  "Collor  Plan".  In the  first  place, a dumping  case must 

be based  on  real  and exhaustive data, such  as a company's  costs and 

sales during  the  investigation period  as confirmed  by examination of 

the evidence and on-site  inspections. 

Secondly,  the alleged  impact  of  the  "Collor  Plan" does not  mean  that 

the Commission's  findings regarding  such  production  cost  components  as 

energy misrepresent  Brazil's general  economic  situation  in that  period 

or  that  those components  were  not  calculated  in the course of  normal 

trading on  the Brazilian market. 

Thirdly, even  if the  "Collor  Plan" did  cause  the cruzeiro  to be 

temporarily  overvalued  in comparison with  the US dollar,  it  is not  for 

the Community  to question either  the soundness or  the  impact  of  the 

Brazilian government's monetary  policy.  The Commission  has  therefore 

followed established  practice  in the matter  and used  the official 

exchange  rates applied wherever  transactlons  involved  the conversion 

of  currency. 

The Council  confirms  these conclusions. 

6 -

(14) Several  Brazilian producers  asked  that  interest  earned  on  currency 

operations  be  fully  deductible  from  a firm's financing  costs, and  that 

any  net  financial  profit  be deducted  from  the production  costs of  the 

f irm  concerned. 

The Commission,  however,  takes  the view  that  such  profits may  be  taken 

into account  only  if connected  with  a firm's main production  activity 

and  the ensuing  sales, and  then only  to offset  financial  costs 

resulting  directly  from  that  production  and  those sales.  This net 

financial  profit  may  in no circumstances be offset  against  the  firm's 

production  costs. 

The Council  confirms  these  conclusions. 

(15) Claiming  the availability of  stocks, one Brazilian  producer  asked  that 

constructed  normal  value be based on production  costs  for  the  first 

haIf of  the  investigation period  since  transactions  in the  latter  half 

of  that  period  involved materials manufactured  earlier  at much  lower 

costs. 

The Commission  refuses  to comply  with  this  request  because  the  figures 

provided  do not  corroborate  the alleged  availability  of  stocks and 

because  the  firm  in question  failed  to support  its request  with  data 

known  to be available on  its production  costs  calculated  on  the basis 

of updated  costs. 

The Council  confirms  these concluslons. 

-  7 -

(16) Another  Brazilian producer  asked  that  the export  of  a sample  to an 

American  company, mistakenly  recorded  as a domestic  transaction,  be 

excluded  from  the calculation of  normal  value. 

The Council  confirms  the Commission's  agreement  to exclude  that 

transaction  from  the scope of  this procedure. 

(17) Yet  another  Brazilian  producer  asked  for  a review of  the method  used 

to calculate  its average profit  margin:  the margin  seemed  to have  been 

overestimated  because  the provisional  constructed  normal  value  did not 

take proper  account  of  some of  the company's  domestic  sales of  silicon 

metal. 

After  examining  the matter,  the Commission  accepted  this  request  and 

adjusted  the company's average profit  margin  accordingly. 

(18) The Council  confirms  these conclusions  and  those of  recitals  14 to 16 

of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92. 

2. 

Export  prices 

(19) For  the purposes of  the definitive conclusions,  the export  price was 

generally  established  in the same way  as  the provisional  dumping 

margin, due account  being  taken of  new circumstances and  arguments 

presented  by  the parties with  appropriate  supporting  evidence. 

(20)  In view of  the above  and  recitals  17 and  18 of  Regulation  (EEC) 

No 906/92, the Council  confirms  the Commission's  findings and 

conclusions  in the matter. 

- 8 -

3. 

Comoarison 

(21) A Brazilian producer  submitted  several  requests  regarding  adjustments 

to the  transport  and  packaging  costs of  certain  exports  to the 

Commun11 y. 

The Council  confirms  the Commission's  refusal  to accede  to  these 

requests on  the grounds  that  they were not  supported  by  evidence 

conclusive enough  to cast  doubt  on  the data  gathered  and  verified 

during  inquiries  at  the premises of  the company  concerned. 

(22) Some Brazilian  producers  claimed  there was a need  to adjust  the normal 

value based  on  domestic  sales  to take account  of  the  impact  on  price 

comparabiIity  of  differing  sales costs caused  by  differences  in the 

quantities sold on  the domestic market  and  exports  to  the  Community. 

The Council  confirms  the rejection of  this  request  on  the grounds of 

the applicants'  inability  to show  that  their  request  was,  in this 

instance, weIl-founded. 

In the absence of other  comments,  the Council  confirms  the 

Commission's conclusions as set  out  in recitals  19 and  20 of 

Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92. 

4. 

Dumpina maralns 

(23) After  the above  adjustments  to  the normal  value  and/or  export  prices, 

the weighted  average  dumplng margin, expressed  as a percentage of  the 

free-at-Community-frontier  cif  price, not  cleared  through  customs, for 

each  of  the exporters  concerned  is as  follows: 

- 9 -

-  Rima  Eletrometalurgia  SA 

-  Ligas de Aluminio SA  (LIASA) 

-  Eletroila  SA 

-  Companhia  Ferroligas Minas Gerais  (Minasligas) 

-  Camargo Correia Metais 

-  Companhia  Braslleira Carboreto  de Càlcio 

67.0% 

50.6% 

44.1% 

26.4% 

20.4% 

18.3% 

In the  Iight of  the above,  the Council  confirms  that  the  above 

exporters  are dumping  imports of  silicon metal. 

(24) Where  Braziiian  exporters  failed  to answer  the  Commission's 

questionnaire or  come  forward,  dumping  was assessed  on  the basis of 

the  information available  in accordance  with  Article 7(7)(b) of 

Regulation  (EEC) No 2423/88.  Given  that  the cooperating  exporters 

account  for  almost  all  sales of Braziiian  silicon  metal  in the 

Community,  the Commission  considers  the results of  its  investigation 

to be  the most  suitable  basis  for  assessing  the dumping  margin. 

Failure  to apply  the highest  dumping  margin  found  in the course of  the 

investigation, 67%, to those exporters which  had  not  seen  fit  to 

cooperate would  provide  loopholes and  an  incentive not  to cocperate  in 

the  future.  The Council  confirms  this approach  and  the  resulting 

consequences  for  that  group of exporters. 

E.  INJURY 

(25)  In  its preliminary  findings,  the Commission  concluded  that  the 

Community  silicon metal  industry  had  suffered  material  injury.  This 

view was  founded mainly on  the convergence of  economic  indicators  such 

as falling  sales,  loss of market  share, the erosion  of  Community 

producers' prices and  the  resulting  flnanclal  losses. 

- 10 -

(26) One Brazilian  producer  argued  that  the  trend  in the cif  price  in ecus 

of  imported  Brazilian  silicon metal  had  resulted  in the drop  in prices 

being overestimated owing  to the growing  parity  between  the US dollar 

and  the ecu.  The Commission,  however,  finds  that  the price of  imports 

from Brazil, whether  in ecus or  another  Community  currency,  did 

actually  help depress  the Community  market  from  1986  to 1990. 

(27) Several  Brazilian producers  cailed  for  account  to be  taken of  the 

different  marketing  stages at which  transactions were  carried  out, 

i.e. differences  at  the stages of  import  and end-use, when  prices were 

being  compared  to determine  undercutting  and  the margin of  injury 

attributable  to the exporters  concerned. 

Where  the  information  supplied was  full, verifiable  and  consistent, 

allowances were  systematically made  to ensure  fair  comparison  with  the 

Community  industry's  prices. 

The Council  confirms  the Commission's  approach  and  the  resulting 

findings. 

(28) The Commission  received  no  further  submissions  regarding  the 

assessment  of  injury. 

The Council  consequently  confirms  the  findings set  out  by  the 

Commission  in recitals  24 to 26, 28 and  30 to 35 of  Regulation  (EEC) 

No 906/92 and  in recitals  26  to 28 of  this Regulation. 

-  11 -

F. CAUSE AND  EFFECT 

(29) Seeking  to show a close causal  link between  dumped  silicon metal 

originating  in Brazil  and  the  injury  to the Community  industry,  the 

Commission  pointed out  in  its provisional  findings  the  correlation 

between  the decline  in the Community  industry's market  share  and a 

corresponding  increase  in that  of Brazilian exporters.  This was 

further  borne out  by  the  transparency  of  the world  silicon metal 

market, which  is extremely  sensitive  to price  fluctuations. 

(30) A Brazilian  producer  claimed  that  the Community  industry  had  lost 

market  share  because  it was unable  to meet  increased demand  for  high-

quality  silicon metal.  This  is refuted  by data  in the  Commission's 

possession on  the Community  industry's capacity  utilization and 

product  range during  the  investigation  period. 

(31) Another  producer  claimed  that  prices  for  imports  from  the  People's 

Republic of China were consistently  lower  than Brazilian exporters', 

constituting  a world  reference  price of sorts. 

The Commission  points out  that  imports of Chinese  silicon metal  are 

currently  the object  of  another  anti-dumping  proceeding  and  dismisses 

the claim  that  the price of Chinese  silicon metal  imports  could  be 

considered  a sort  of world  reference  price.  Quite apart  from  the 

-  12 -

fact  that  Chinese exporters' share of  the Community  market  is 

relatively  small  when  compared  with  that  of  their  Brazilian 

counterparts, Chinese  silicon metal  has a much  narrower  range of 

potential  uses  than  the Brazilian product  and  cannot  therefore  be 

considered  likely  to determine  prices. 

(32) Another  producer  alleged  that  the assessment  of  cause  and  effect  did 

not  take sufficient  account  of  imports  from other  non-member  countries 

such  as Argentina, Australia or  China, particularly  since  recital  17 

of  Council  Regulation  (EEC) No 2200/90  tended  to absolve  imports 

originating  in Brazil  of  responsibiIity  for  the  injury  to the 

Community  industry. 

The Commission  feels that  these  arguments do not  controvert  the 

findings of  recital  38 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92, and  that  the 

findings of  an  investigation on which  the Council  based  conclusions  in 

an earlier  proceeding concerning  imports of  the same product  from  the 

People's Republic of China  are  irrelevant  to the  facts of  the  present 

anti-dumping  proceeding.  They  certainly  do not  diminish  the  fact  that 

the dumping  in question  caused  material  injury  to  the  Community 

industry  and  that, viewed  in  isolation,  this  injury  is substantial. 

(33) Another  Brazilian  producer  claimed  that  the  injury  to the  Community 

industry  was  largely  attributable  to the actions of  Community 

producers,  to competition  between  them or  the obsolescence  of  their 

production  apparatus, but  failed  to substantiate  the allegatlons wlth 

evidence  likely  to call  into question  the Commission's  provisional 

f indings. 

-  13 -

The Council  therefore  confirms  the Commission's  findings  in 

recitals  37 and  38 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92 and  recitals  30 to 34 

of  this Regulat ion. 

G. COMMUNITY  INTEREST 

1.  General 

(34) The Commission  received no new evidence or  arguments on  this  issue. 

The Council  therefore  confirms  the Commission's  findings  in recitals 

39 and  40 of  Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92. 

2. 

The  interests of  the Community  industry 

(35)  In the absence of  any  new evidence,  the Council  likewise confirms  the 

Commission's  conclusions  in recitals  41  and  42 of  Regulation  (EEC) 

No 906/92 

3. 

The  interests of other  parties 

(36) The  trade association mentioned earlier  as representing  the  interests 

of  the Community  chemical  industry  repeated  its concern  at  the 

weakening  of  its members' ability  to compete on  the Community  market 

with  non-Community  rivals whose  inputs were  not  subject  to anti-

dumping  dut ies. 

(37) Other  trade associations  representing  the  interests of  the  secondary 

aluminium  industry  also expressed  concern  about  the  increased  costs 

facing  processing  industries downstream on  their  intermediate  inputs. 

-  14 -

RepresentatIves of  some  Internatlonal  dealers  speclallzlng  In ferro-

alloys made slmllar objectlons, argulng  that  Industrlal  consumers  In 

the Communlty  were effectlvely  loslng an attractlve  source of  cheap 

slllcon metal  outside  the  Communlty. 

(38) The Commlsslon  Is aware of  the  llkely  Impact  of  antl-dumplng  measures 

on  the  Intermedlate  Input costs of  some groups of  Communlty  consumers. 

However,  this  increase  concerns only  the sllicon metal  orlglnating  in 

Brazll, whlch  represented  less than  15% of  the Communlty  market  in 

1990. Other  supplylng  sources are also avallable  and  used, 

consequently, nothlng  indicates that  this  Increase would  be  reflected 

In the same proportlon  on  the production  costs of  the  flnlshed 

products  downstream.  In these clrcumstances,  It cannot  be  concluded 

that  the  Impositlon of  an antl-dumplng  duty on  imports of  brazillan 

sllicon metal  would  lead  the user  industries withln  the Communlty  to 

suffer  from  a comparatlve  dlsadvantage  proportlonal  to  the amount of 

the duty  imposed  vls a vls their  competltors  In the  third  countrles. 

Moreover, claims  that  Brazillan  slllcon  metal  Is  irreplaceable are 

contradicted  by  the  fact  that  the Communlty  chemlcal  Industry  carries 

out  Rochow  synthesis uslng non-BrazIIlan sllicon metal, purchasing 

chemical-grade  slllcon metal  from  both  Communlty  and  non-CommunIty 

suppllers. 

(39) The Council  therefore  confirms  the Commisslon's  remarks  in recital  43 

together  with  its flndings  in recitals  44 and  45 of  Regulation  (EEC) 

No 906/92  and  recitals  35 to 39 of  this Regulation,  whlch  show  that 

the Communlty  Interest  requlres an end  to the  injury  caused  to the 

Communlty  industry  by  the dumping  found. 

However,  If changed  clrcumstances would  occur  calllng  Into question 

the preceeding  conclusions,  the Commission  would  be  ready,  If the case 

arises,  to reconsider  the overall  sltuatlon of  the Communlty  Industry 

in view of  these new elements. 

-  15 -

H.  DUTIES 

(40) The Commission  provisionally  found  that  the  removal  of  the  injury 

caused  to  the Community  industry  and  the  restoration of  the  conditions 

for  normal  profitabiIity  required  anti-dumping  measures  that  would 

permit  the  industry  to make  sufficient  profit  and  increase  the 

proportlon  of  capacity  in use.  The  provisional  duties were  therefore 

calculated  to cover  the difference between  the price of  Brazilian 

silicon metal  and  a  reference  price allowlng  the Community  industry  to 

cover  costs  and  generate  a  reasonabie  profit  of  6.5%. 

The Council  confirms  the Commission  s approach  and  the  resulting 

conclusions. 

(41) Several  Brazilian  producers  claimed  that  the Community  reference  price 

used  to calculate  the margin of  injury  exceeded  the  level  needed  to 

offset  the  injury. 

The Commission  cannot  accept  this argument.  The  previous  recital 

shows  that  the  reference  price was based on  the Community  industry's 

production  costs plus a  reasonabie  profit  margin  guaranteeing  the 

producers  concerned  an adequate  return on  investment. 

The Council  confirms  these  findings. 

(42) For  the establishment  of  the definitive duties  to be  imposed,  the 

Commission  feels  that  the  individual  margins of  injury  specified  in 

recital s 48 and  49 of  Regulation  (El-X) No 906/92  should  also  be 

expressed  as a percentage  of  the cif  value of  imports.  An 

-  16 -

injury margin  represents  the  increase  in the price  at  Community 

frontier  needed  to end  the  injury  c?msed  by  a given  exporter.  After 

allowing  for  corrections  and other  adjustments  to the weighted  average 

cif  prices charged  by  the Brazilian exporters  concerned,  the 

individual  injury margins are as  foilows: 

-  Rima Eletrometalurgia  SA 

-  Ligas de Aluminio SA  (LIASA) 

-  Eletroila SA 

34.6% 

36.8% 

29.8% 

-  Companhia  Ferroligas Mlnas Gerais  (Minasligas)  43.8% 

-  Camargo Correia Metais 

-  Companhia  Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio 

24.2% 

51.0% 

(43) The Council  confirms the Commission's  findings  in recitals  46 to 48 of 

Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92 and  concludes on  the basis of  the  previous 

recital  of  this Regulation  that  the duty  to be  imposed  should equal 

the dumping margins established  for  the above exporters, save  where 

they exceed  the  individual  Injury margins, which  then  determine  the 

duty  applicable: 

-  Rima  Eletrometalurgia  SA 

-  Ligas de Aluminio  SA  (LIASA) 

-  Eletroila SA 

34.6% 

36.8% 

29.8% 

-  Companhia  Ferroligas Minas Gerais  (Minasligas)  26.4% 

-  Camargo Correia" Metais 

-  Companhia  Brasileira  Carboreto  de Calcio 

20.4% 

18.3% 

(44) For  reasons already  set out  in recital  24 of  this Regulation,  the 

Council  confirms  that  the maximum  rate of  duty, namely  36.8%, wiII  be 

applied  to the companies which  did  not  reply  to  the  Commission's 

questionnaire or  failed  to come  forward.  To  impose on  those  producer-

exporters  a rate of  duty  lower  than  the highest  rate of  anti-dumping 

duty  established  by  the  investigation would  be  to reward  their  failure 

to cooperate  and  create  loopholes. 

-  17 

I. COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTIES 

(45)  ln view of  the dumping margins established  and  the seriousness of  the 

injury  to the Community  industry,  the Council  considers  that  the 

amounts secured  by way of  the provisional  anti-dumping  duty  imposed 

should  be definitively  collected  in fuil. 

J. UNDERTAKING 

(46) After  provisional  anti-dumping  dutios were  imposed,  all  the Brazilian 

exporters  involved  Jointly  offered  an overall  quantitative  undertaking 

or, as an alternative,  individual  price undertakings. 

Following  consultations,  the Commission  rejected  these undertakings, 

explaining  to the producers  concerned  that  the undertakings offered 

were  not  such  as  to remove  the  injury  and  required, moreover,  frequent 

adjustments owing  to the fluctuating  price  if silicon metal  on  the 

world market.  The Council  shares  this opinion  and  considers  it 

necessary  to  impose anti-dumping  duties, 

HAS ADOPTED  THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

1. 

A definitive  anti-dumping  duty of  36-.8% of  the net  free-at-Community-

frontier  price, not  cleared  through  customs,  is hereby  imposed  on 

imports of  silicon metal  falling within  CN code  2804 69 00 and 

originating  InBrazil  (Taric additional  code:  8654). 

-  18 

2. 

The  rate of  duty  applicable  to silicon metal  produced  by  the  following 

companies shalI  be: 

Tar ic 

addit ional 

code 

Rima Eletrometalurgia  SA, 

34.6% 

8649 

Belo Horizonte 

EletroilaSA 

Belo Hor izonte 

29.8% 

8650 

Companhia  Ferroligas Minas Gerais 

26.4% 

8651 

(Minasligas) Contagem 

Camargo Correa Metals SA 

20.4% 

8652 

Sao Paolo 

Companhia  Brasilelra Carboreto  de Calcio 

18.3% 

8653 

(CBCC), Rio de  Janeiro 

3. 

The provisions  in force concerning  customs duties shall  apply. 

Artlcla  l 

The amounts secured  by way of  the provisional  antl-dumping  duty  imposed by 

Regulation  (EEC) No 906/92 shall  be defiriitIvely collected  at  the  rate 

definitively  imposed. 

Sums secured  in excess of  the definitive  rate of  duty  shall  be  released. 

-  19  -

A£llcle_.2 

This  Regulation  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day  following  its  publication 

in  the Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities. 

This  Regulation  shall  be  binding  in  its entirety  and  directly  applicable  in 

alI  Member  States. 

Done  at  Brussels 

For  the  Council 
The  President 

ISSN 0254-1475 

COM(92)318final 

DOCUMENTS 

EN 

11 02 

Catalogue number : CB-CO-92-328-EN-C 

ISBN 92-77-46422-4 

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