Evaluation of the management of JET, study annexed to the specific annual report on the 1990 accounts of the Joint Undertaking, accompanied by the reply of the Director of JET, including observations of the Commission of the European Communities
Date: 1991-11-07
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: EAEC Joint Undertaking, EU research policy, Joint European Torus, financial management, financial year, nuclear energy













EUR-Lex - 31992Y0217(01) - EN






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31992Y0217(01)

Evaluation of the management of JET, study annexed to the specific annual report on the 1990 accounts of the Joint Undertaking, accompanied by the reply of the Director of JET, including observations of the Commission of the European Communities  


Official Journal C 041 , 17/02/1992 P. 0001 - 0019 





 TABLE OF CONTENTS     Paragraph   1.Introduction 1.1  - 1.9   The world-wide fusion research effort 1.1   The European Programme 1.2   The JET Project 1.3  - 1.5   Objectives of the audit 1.6  - 1.9   2.The management of JET's scientific programme 2.1  - 2.35  Scientific background to, and objectives of, the JET Project 2.5  - 2.15  The 1992 prolongation 2.16 - 2.20  The 1996 prolongation 2.21 - 2.29  External accountability 2.30 - 2.31  Conclusions on the management of JET's scientific programme 2.33 - 2.35  3.JET and the future 3.1  - 3.6   The final phase of JET's scientific programme 3.1  - 3.4   JET and the Next Step 3.5  - 3.6   4.The administrative management of JET 4.1  - 4.20  Summary of the Court's findings arising from annual audits 4.1  - 4.5   Decommissioning of JET 4.6  - 4.7   Personnel of the Project 4.8  - 4.12  The budgetary mechanism 4.13 - 4.16  JET and the Associates - Article 14 contracts 4.17 - 4.20  5.Conclusions 5.1  - 5.6   General 5.1   Lessons for the Next Step 5.2   Key questions 5.3  - 5.6     Page   Reply of the Director of JET, including observations of the Commission of the European Communities  16 - 19   EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF JET Study annexed to the specific annual report  on the 1990 accounts of the Joint Undertaking accompanied by the reply of the Director of JET,  including observations of the Commission  of the European Communities  (92/C 41/01)   1. INTRODUCTION  The world-wide fusion research effort 1.1. Controlled thermonuclear fusion is generally considered to be potentially an important source of energy in the future. A significant world-wide research effort is being made which, if successful, may result in commercial fusion power stations  operating by the middle of the next century. The major programmes are taking place in the USA, Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union. Table 1 indicates the relative size of these programmes in terms of expenditure and scientists engaged(1) .   Table 1: Relative sizes of major fusion research programmes   Programme  1989   Expenditure (Mio ECU) Professional Staff  USA  494 2 150  Europe  431 1 750  Japan  285 1 195  USSR  254 1 225    The European Programme 1.2. The European Programme is undertaken by an Association of Euratom and public bodies in Sweden, Switzerland and in EC Member States (the Associates). The Association's activities consist of shared-cost research in Associates' laboratories and the  joint undertaking of the JET Project. The Associates and the Members of the JET Joint Undertaking are shown in Annex 1. Annex 2 shows where the Association's funds came from in 1989 and how they were applied. This joint effort commenced in 1959. The  Programme's long-term strategy for achieving the ultimate goal of a commercial prototype fusion reactor foresees three intermediate steps which extend into the next century as shown in Table 2.  (a)the Joint European Torus (JET) and other devices to demonstrate aspects of the scientific feasibility of fusion;  (b)a 'Next Step' device to complete the demonstration of scientific feasibility and to investigate aspects of the technological feasibility. This device will be in the form of either the 'Next European Torus' (NET) or an 'International Thermonuclear  Experimental Reactor' (ITER), in collaboration with Japan, the USA and the USSR;  (c)demonstration and prototype reactors to evaluate the commercial feasibility of fusion.  The JET Project 1.3. The JET Project is considered to be the flagship of the joint European effort. It is widely acknowledged to have made a significant contribution to research into controlled thermonuclear fusion. Based at Culham (UK), JET was established(2)  for a duration of twelve years commencing 1 June 1978. In 1988 the duration of the Project was extended by thirty-one months to 31 December 1992(3) . A proposal to further prolong JET until the end of 1996 was submitted to the Council of Ministers in October 1990(4) .  1.4. Euratom contributes 80 percent of the JET budget. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) acts as host to the Project and supports 10 percent of the costs. The remaining 10 percent is shared by the Associates of the European Programme.  Since its beginning the total cost of JET(5) , at December 1990 values, is in the order of magnitude of the figures shown in Table 3.  1.5. As well as participating as Members of the Joint Undertaking, the Associates have provided support to JET through research and development carried out in their own laboratories under the provisions of Article 14 of the JET Statutes(6) . Fifty-five percent of the cost of this work is met from the Associates and the remaining forty-five percent   Table 3: Indicative cost of JET at 1990 prices    Mio ECU (uprated to December 1990 values)  Estimate for 31. 5. 1990 termination  1 296*  Estimate for 31. 12. 1992 termination  1 531*  Estimate for 31. 12. 1996 termination  1 840*  * Plus additional support from the Associates - see paragraph 1.5.   from the budget of the Community's general Fusion Programme. By the end of 1990 the overall expenditure on Article 14 activities was of the order of 65 Mio ECU, at 1990 price levels, of which Euratom contributed 29 Mio ECU. Further support has been  given in the form of members of the Association's staff who are assigned to JET for variable periods, typically one year. Under this arrangement the Association pays the salaries of the assigned staff and JET pay an expatriation allowance. The scheme  has contributed over 30 man-years of effort each year since 1985.  Objectives of the audit 1.6. In accordance with Article 12 of the JET Statutes the Court undertakes an examination each year of JET's accounts, balance sheet and financial management. The resulting specific annual reports are sent to the Members of the Joint Undertaking, to  the Council of the European Communities and to the European Parliament.   Table 2: Long-term planning of the European Fusion Programme  CDA = Conceptual Design Activities EDA = Engineering Design Activities  a) JET  Operation   b) Next Step  CDA EDA Construction Operation     || || ||  c(I) Demonstration reactor   CDA EDA Construction Operation      || || ||   c(II) Commercial prototype   CDA EDA       ||   Indicative time scale 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030   1.7. The JET Project was originally due to come to an end in June 1990. In view of its prolongation to 1992 and the proposal for a further extension to the end of 1996, the Court considers that it is appropriate now to report on the evolution of the  Project and to examine related budgetary and management issues. As initial preparations are already being made for the Next Step, the Court has also sought to examine the scientific and administrative management systems of the JET Project, and to  identify lessons which can be learnt for the Next Step and any possible later stages in the European Fusion programme.  1.8. Section 2 of this report examines the scientific management systems of the JET programme. Section 3 raises questions about the future scientific programme and JET's relationship with the Next Step. In Section 4, the Project's administrative  management is examined and the conclusions and key questions are set out in Section 5.  1.9. The Court, in carrying out this task, was advised in scientific and technical matters by two independent consultants (7) . It should be emphasised that the Court has not attempted to arrive at an opinion as to the scientific merits of the JET Project or of the European Fusion Programme. In addition, the scientific or technical descriptions that may be found in the  following paragraphs have been limited to the indispensable minimum necessary for a proper understanding of the key aspects of the management of the project; these descriptions were drafted using numerous documents that had been made available to the  Court, and with the assistance of the outside consultants.   2. THE MANAGEMENT OF JET'S SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMME  2.1. The organs of JET are the JET Council and the Director of the Project.  2.2. The JET Council, which consists of representatives of each member of the Joint Undertaking, is responsible for the management of the Project. Its role is to take basic decisions for the Project's implementation, to exercise overall supervision of  its execution and to report to Members. In carrying out its functions, the JET Council is assisted by an Executive Committee which has responsibilities in financial, staffing and contractual matters. In scientific and technical matters, the JET Council  can request advice from the JET Scientific Council, a body appointed by the JET Council which is independent of the Project itself.  2.3. The Director of the Project is the chief executive and is responsible to the Council for the execution of an annually updated Project Development Plan. He is required to provide the Council and its subsidiary bodies with all the information  required for them to perform their functions.  2.4. In addition to the formal structure outlined above, the Council has from time to time established ad hoc working groups to advise it on particular matters. Similarly, the Director has set up multi-disciplinary Task Forces to identify solutions to  specific problems.  Scientific background to, and objectives of, the JET Project 2.5. The aim of any controlled thermonuclear fusion programme is to heat and contain an ionized gaseous plasma to such high temperatures (approximately 100 million degrees Celsius) that the ions fuse, releasing energy, initially in the form of 'fast  neutrons', that can be extracted. The final commercial aim, which, the Court was advised, is probably not attainable until the middle of the next century, is the economically viable production of electricity.  2.6. The most easily attainable fusion reaction occurs in a Deuterium-Tritium (D-T) plasma which produces an alpha-particle and an 'energetic' neutron. The production of D-T plasmas is the object of the final phase of JET but, as Tritium will irradiate  the machine structure and requires special handling techniques, most of the work done to date in JET has been with less reactive Deuterium plasmas.  2.7. Given the high temperatures and the densities of fusion plasmas, they must be confined away from the walls of the confinement vessels. Any contact results in the release of impurities which cool the plasma and result in energy loss.  2.8. The objectives set for the JET programme at its inception were:  'to obtain and study a plasma in conditions and dimensions approaching those needed in a thermo- nuclear reactor. These studies will be aimed at:  (i)the scaling of plasma behaviour as parameters approach the reactor range;  (ii)the plasma-wall interaction in these conditions;  (iii)the study of plasma heating; and (iv)the study of alpha-particle production, confinement and consequent plasma heating'(8) .  2.9. The prolongation of the Project to the end of 1992 did not involve any modification to the above objectives. However, the proposed prolongation to 1996 involves the introduction of a further objective, which is closely related to (ii) above. This  is:  (v)to establish the effective control of impurities in operating conditions close to those of the Next Step(9) .  2.10. The JET design, which was completed in 1975, is a torus based on the Tokamak toroidal magnetic confinement concept, originally developed in the USSR. It has the shape of a large doughnut. Confinement is achieved by large magnetic fields which, in  turn, are derived from a combination of external coils and large induced current flows around the torus.  2.11. JET was designed as the world's largest test-bed for fusion research which might operate effectively into the 1990s. Its design features were thus more flexible than, for instance, those embodied in the TFTR (Princeton, USA) machine. JET's  built-in flexibility was required for this lengthy period of experimentation and has proved to be a major asset, allowing significant modifications to be incorporated as experience grew.  2.12. The first fusion goal is that of 'plasma break-even', where the energy output from the plasma equals the energy input needed for heating and confinement. Progress towards this and further goals is usually measured using an indicator called the  'combined fusion product'. This is the product of the density, the ion temperature and the energy confinement time (a measure of how fast the plasma cools when the source of heating power is switched off). The value of the combined fusion product  achieved in the period 1980-1990 has increased by a factor of 30 or so, with the 1989 JET value being very close to that required for plasma break-even if a D-T plasma was employed. A further improvement by a factor of five or so greater than the plasma  break-even value will be required for an operational reactor.  2.13. According to the Court's consultants, the combination of scientific, technical and engineering problems posed by confining highly unstable fusion plasmas, which are briefly outlined above(10) , make JET one of the most difficult of any scientific projects yet undertaken, with each main technical area demanding solutions at the very forefront of knowledge and technique.  2.14. The results of the first two-and-a-half years of operations on JET, up to the end of 1985, were considered encouraging from a scientific and technical viewpoint. World record global energy confinement times along with good results in ion  temperatures and in the combined fusion product had been achieved. At this stage, the plasma current had already exceeded the design value of 4,8 million amps.  2.15. The phenomenon of 'confinement degradation' was observed in JET during the early experimental period. This phenomenon, which had also been noticed elsewhere, is characterised by a decrease in energy confinement time as additional heating is  applied. Given that additional heating was essential to the success of the Project, it became crucial for JET to find a solution to the problem. This was the background to the 1992 prolongation.  The 1992 prolongation 2.16. The case for prolonging the JET Project until the end of 1992 began to evolve early in 1985 and resulted in a proposal being approved by the JET Council at its 28th meeting in March 1986, following extensive study by the JET Scientific Council.  The prolongation was approved by the Council of Ministers in July 1988(11) .  2.17. Experiments on the ASDEX machine (Garching, D) from 1982 onwards had revealed that significant improvements could be achieved in confinement times, and in the combined fusion product, by operating the device in a different configuration - the  so-called H-mode plasmas and X-point magnetic fields. Exploiting this alternative configuration in JET required the study and construction of additional equipment, and modifications to the device.  2.18. The Court's consultants have said that, although there is still no universally accepted explanation for the confinement degradation phenomenon, the steps taken by the Project allowed for significant improvement in confinement, to the extent that  the constraints posed for JET and future devices by confinement degradation were clearly understood.  2.19. The extent of the confinement degradation problem was not foreseen - indeed, not foreseeable - at the time that the JET device was designed. It had to be overcome in order for JET to achieve its original objectives. It seems that the problem was  well managed, in that the full range of available data and information from both within JET and outside was taken into account and analysed. Further, the necessary modifications to the device were carried out effectively, and integrated with other  aspects of the development and experimental programme. The prolongation which was necessary to achieve this resulted - albeit unavoidably - in an increase in overall costs of the Project in the region of 235 Mio ECU at 1990 values.  2.20. The consultants have pointed to the built-in flexibility in the initial design of the device as being a significant factor in allowing the X-point configuration to be achieved, and thus in allowing JET to establish its reputation in its field.  Attempts to obtain similar enhancements in performance in other devices in the USA and Japan have necessitated significant rebuilding exercises.  The 1996 prolongation 2.21. The scientific and technical discussions concerned with the 1996 prolongation centred on the need for a pumped divertor to be installed in JET.  2.22. The scientific rationale was based on observations in 1988 and 1989 to the effect that, while at full power JET was able to achieve near break-even values, it did so only transiently for periods of a second or so. After that the build-up of  impurities caused a significant deterioration in performance. Effective 'passive' impurity control had already been achieved with good results by coating surfaces likely to come into contact with the plasma with Beryllium. However, higher power  experiments showed that its effects were short-lived. Thus it was strongly argued that 'active' impurity control was necessary both to optimize the JET plasma in preparation for the final D-T phase, and to establish solutions for the Next Step machine.   2.23. The function of a pumped divertor is to restrain or remove impurities which are released from the walls and other surfaces in contact with the hot plasma. This is achieved by arranging the magnetic fields in such a way as to direct the impurities  away from the plasma and prevent them from returning. The X-point configuration discussed above establishes the flow of particles necessary but does not prevent their re-entry.  2.24. While the debate on the pumped divertor did not reach the point of decision until the 1988-89 period, it is an option that had been under low-level review at JET since the late 1970s. It represented a more or less direct substitute for the 'pump  limiter' which had been favoured as an option since the early 1980s. The limiter/divertor debate was fuelled by results emerging from the TEXTOR device (Juelich, D) which suggested that the limiter might not have been capable of meeting the demands  placed upon it. Further evidence from D III (San Diego, USA) suggested that it would be possible for JET to design a pumped divertor to fit within the device, rather than using a separate chamber as had been the case in other machines. This requires  additional coil windings to obtain the optimum configuration, and a pump to retain impurities.  2.25. Impurities are a dominant limiting factor on the performance of Tokamak machines. According to the Court's consultants, JET had made significant progress towards achieving two of its objectives [Objectives (i) and (iii) in paragraph 2.8] and had  evidence to strongly suggest that the divertor would provide the best available solution to the impurities problem [Objective (ii)] as well as contributing towards the knowledge and experience needed for the Next Step.  2.26. The importance of plasma-wall interaction (the original second objective of the JET programme) and of studying the use of a pumped divertor in controlling impurities were recognised as being highly relevant to the Next Step. This discussion  reached the JET Council in October 1988 and prompted a full and vigorous debate in subsequent meetings. As a result the JET Council unanimously approved in October 1989 the proposal for the 1996 prolongation.  2.27. In terms of scientific management, the evolution of the proposal for the 1996 prolongation was rather more complex than the earlier one for 1992, and must be seen against a background in which the extension to 1992 was not confirmed until July  1988.  2.28. The period over which the 1996 prolongation was developed and subjected to JET Council approval was short. When action was initiated, after the Council of Ministers had approved the 1992 prolongation, the JET Council, Scientific Council and  Project - with its specially convened Divertor Task Force - moved rapidly to focus on and develop the divertor option. The divertor option had been under internal technical review for many years. At first sight it seems that public discussions of this  option started rather late. However, JET did not feel itself able to open such discussions until final approval had been given for the 1992 prolongation.  2.29. The additional cost implied by the prolongation to 1996 is in the order of 309 Mio ECU at 1990 values, of which 264 Mio ECU is attributable to new activities (pumped divertor, etc.). The balance of 45 Mio ECU is the estimated cost of adding one  year to the final D-T phase. (See Section 3 below.).  External accountability 2.30. JET is subjected, as part of overall examinations of the Fusion Programme, to periodic evaluations carried out by independent Review Boards. The most recent Review reported its conclusions in July 1990(12) . Copies of the resulting reports are forwarded to the budgetary authorities. However, the Fusion Programme, including the JET Project, poses particular problems for the budgetary authorities. These problems arise because of the complexity of the  science and technology involved and because of the extreme timescale of the research, reaching well into the next century. These are problems which the Programme, in concertation with the budgetary auth- orities, must continue to address.  2.31. One initiative that has been taken to enhance accountability is the European Parliament's Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) project. This project has provided a forum through which Parliamentarians can be informed of the scientific  and technical options open to them in formulating policy choices. As such, the activities of STOA assist the political process by providing a clear understanding of complex technological areas. The European fusion programme has been one of the areas  addressed by STOA.  Conclusions on the management of the JET's scientific programme 2.32. Four objectives were set for the JET Project in 1975, and a further one - which partially subsumes one of the original four - added when the proposal for a second prolongation was put forward in 1988.  2.33. JET's objectives are clear and well understood by all concerned, and the JET Statutes define responsibilities and internal accountability mechanisms. Taken together, this has had the effect that results have been regularly reported and assessed  against the objectives set.  2.34. Systems to identify problems in a timely manner and derive appropriate responses were in place and effective in relation to the 1992 prolongation.  2.35. For the proposed 1996 extension, there remain some doubts as to whether JET addressed the problems as promptly as for the 1992 prolongation. However, the proposal was prepared taking relevant factors into account including parallel scientific and  technological developments both within JET and outside.   3. JET AND THE FUTURE  The final phase of JET's scientific programme 3.1. The Deuterium-Tritium (D-T) phase of JET has been part of its programme since the very beginning and is considered an essential final element. From a scientific point of view, this phase represents, according to the consultants, the highlight of  the JET Project. It must come at the end of the programme as no further significant modifications or maintenance will be possible once the D-T phase gets fully under way, and the machine becomes radioactive.  3.2. Although the experimental programme for this phase has not yet been planned in detail, clear scientific priorities have been identified and the Project has the experience and mechanisms in place to manage this programme when the need arises.  However, the length of the D-T phase has been governed not by the established scientific requirements of the programme, but by the time available between the end of the preceding phase and the termination date of the Project. Throughout the life of the  Project, the time available for D-T phase has varied as the length of other parts of the programme has been adjusted. This is shown in Table 4.   Table 4: Length of D-T phase at different planning dates   Planning date  D-T Phase  Length (months)   From To  January 1981  6/88  6/90 24  June 1983  6/89 12/90 18  March 1985  9/89 12/90 15  March 1986  6/91 12/92 18  March 1989  1/92 12/92 12  June 1989  1/95 12/96 24  Source: JET Project Development Plans.    3.3. With a termination in 1992, only twelve months will be available for the D-T phase, of which four months will be needed for preparations. JET advised the Court that in this time-scale only limited investigations would be possible and that this must  be seen as the minimum worthwhile programme. The maximum programme would be determined by the machine itself, in that major faults could not easily be rectified once tritium had been introduced. JET estimate that machine reliability could be assured for  about two-and-a-half years, of which about six months would be taken up by preparations and maintenance.  3.4. There has been a considerable investment in preparation for the introduction of tritium. As well as specific equipment for D-T operations and remote handling, costing in the region of 49 Mio ECU at 1990 values, the JET machine and the building  housing it have been designed to be compatible with operations in a radioactive environment. By 1995, the cost of the JET machine itself, at 1990 values, will be in the order of 740 Mio ECU. It would cost about 5-6 Mio ECU per month to run the project  for a further few months in 1997. As this monthly cost represents less than one percent of the investment in the machine, it is perhaps surprising that the submission made by the JET Council to the Commission regarding the 1996 prolongation proposed a  fixed end-date. A more flexible approach, allowing a continuation of the experimental programme for a few extra months - providing this was scientifically justifiable given the costs involved - would probably have provided for a fuller exploitation of  the machine's potential.  JET and the 'Next Step' 3.5. Work on JET's successor was formalised in 1984 when the NET design activities started under the NET Team based at the Max-Planck Institut fuer Plasmaphysik (IPP) in Garching, Germany. This NET Team is the European focus for ITER conceptual design  activities undertaken jointly with Japan, the USA and the USSR.  3.6. The long-term European fusion strategy is designed on a step-by-step basis (as shown in Table 2) with the results of each successive step influencing the next. Knowledge, particularly the results of the JET's scientific programme, is communicated  to staff working on the Next Step through the usual media of publications, symposia, etc. However, the effective transfer of experience and skills could rely upon a number of other mechanisms, important amongst which should be direct personal contact  and involvement. A proportion of NET staff worked, at one time or another, at JET and there has been recently an exchange of two people between JET and NET for a sustained period. In addition, administrative arrangements were agreed in July 1990 which  will allow NET to fund specific work at JET in support of Next Step activities. So far this has led to one contract of 37 000 ECU being placed with JET.   4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF JET  Summary of the Court's findings arising from annual audits 4.1. JET's annual accounts are subjected each year to an examination by the Court of Auditors. Through its annual audits and Reports, the Court has taken a close interest in the administrative management of the JET Project, and through its observations  and advice it has helped the Project to improve its financial management systems.  4.2. In the area of supplies, the Court has periodically examined contract procedures. The Project strictly applies the principle of awarding contracts to the cheapest tenderer who is capable of meeting the required scientific and technical  specifications. Tenders are sought from European companies regardless of nationality. The financial participation of Members has played no role in the awarding of contracts. Ninety-eight percent of the 776,6 Mio ECU committed on contracts has gone to  European suppliers. Adequate contract management procedures have helped the Project to detect problems and to take appropriate action.  4.3. The Court has paid particular attention to the relationship between JET and the host organisation (the UKAEA). As a result of this, a clarification of the Host Support Agreement was negotiated during 1987 and endorsed by the JET Council in 1988.  Since then, a significant number of services previously supplied under the Host Support Agreement have been provided on a commercial basis following competitive tendering exercises.  4.4. A third area in which the Court has encouraged JET to bring about improvements is that of funds management. Following recommendations arising from periodic reviews by the Court, JET now has banking arrangements which meet the needs of the Project  whilst allowing a good income from interest without undue risk.  4.5. The Court draws attention to four further areas of administrative management which it considers to be significant for the future: these are the decommissioning of JET; the personnel of the Project; the budgetary mechanism, and Article 14 contracts.   Decommissioning of JET 4.6. Under the provisions of Article 21.3 of the JET Statutes(13) , the host organisation, UKAEA, is responsible for decommissioning the JET device and meeting this cost when the Joint Undertaking is wound up. The Court does not have access to estimates of the costs of this task, but understands that amounts in the  order of 150 Mio ECU have been discussed.  4.7. In July 1990 the Fusion Programme Evaluation Board published its report. One recommendation it makes is that, in the case of JET:  'decommissioning of potentially tritium-contaminated material should be regarded as part of the Programme, in order for the Community Fusion Programme to acquire experience in a key area of public concern'(14) .  In response to this recommendation the UK Department of Energy has entered into exploratory discussions with the Commission's services. The extent of the Programme's involvement in decommissioning and any related cost has yet to be determined. The  responsibility for undertaking and paying for decommissioning is clearly defined in the JET Statutes. There is thus no legal basis at present for the Community to pay costs other than those directly resulting from any additional research activities. The  Court draws this fact to the attention of the Commission, and calls upon it to defend the Community's interest in this area in order to prevent expenditure for which there is no legal basis being charged to the Community budget.  Personnel of the Project 4.8. Although, for the most part, the staff of JET are paid from the JET budget they are not employed by JET directly. Certain posts are available to be filled by staff placed at the disposal of the JET Director by the Host organisation, by the other  Members and by Directorate-General XII (Euratom). The authorised complement also includes a number of posts to be filled by contract staff provided by external companies. In addition, the Project is authorised to use contract staff to fill posts of the  first type above which remain unoccupied after recruitment procedures have been exhausted.  4.9. The staffing position at 31.12.1990 was as shown in Table 5.   Table 5: The JET staffing position at 31. 12. 1990 (1)    Authorized complement Posts occupied Shortfall  1. Staff  UKAEA  260 247 13  Temporary Euratom (i.e. from Members)  191 180 11  DG XII Euratom  19 8 11   Total   470 435 35  2.Contract Staff  219 218,5* 0,5   Overall total   689 653,5 35,5  (1) Annual Accounts of JET, 1990.   * Includes contract staff set against vacant posts.    In addition to staff in complement posts, a significant contribution is made to the Project by scientists on short-term attachments under various schemes. In 1990, this contribution amounted to:    Man- years   Assigned Associate staff 32  Visiting scientists  6  JET Fellowships 14  Others, including student assistants 40  Total   92 4.10. JET's staff requirements were established following detailed studies within the Project, and are subject to the approval of the JET Council. The staffing position and personnel policy are kept under review by the JET Council, and examination of  documents reveals that these responsibilities have been carried out effectively. For example the Project has recently - and with some success implemented a policy of encouraging regeneration of the European fusion community by actively seeking to  recruit young scientists and technicians.  4.11. Despite this control and monitoring, JET has encountered problems. One illustration of these is the difficulty that the Project has faced until recently in filling posts. Numerous explanations have been put forward to explain this and other  staffing problems, but no comprehensive effort has yet been made to analyse these.  4.12. There is a significant number of staff currently engaged in the JET project whose skills and experience will be invaluable if the operational phase of the Next Step goes ahead. There will, however, be a gap between the end of JET and the Next Step  operations. The question thus arises as to whether it will be possible to employ these skills in the intervening years. The Court therefore urges the Commission to draw upon the experience available within JET to identify the key elements for a  successful personnel policy for the Next Step.  The budgetary mechanism 4.13. The Fusion Programme, and thus JET, is funded by the Community on the basis of overlapping multi-annual Council Decisions. As well as outlining the general scientific objectives for the period concerned, these Decisions set the maximum Community  financial contribution.  4.14. The system of overlapping multi-annual programme Decisions has provided the Fusion Programme with stability and continuity. This compares well with another fusion effort outside Europe which is funded by annual decisions and is thus subject to  uncertainty. The European approach has promoted long-term planning.  4.15. Whilst the budgetary mechanism in Europe has its advantages, it is not perfect. The process by which Decisions are reached is a slow one, and on no occasion has a Decision been reached before the beginning of the Programme concerned, as  illustrated in Table 6.   Table 6: Key dates in Council Decisions on Fusion Programmes   Commencement of Programme Date of Council Decision End of Previous Programme  1. 1. 1979 13. 3. 1980 (1) 31. 12. 1980   1. 1. 1982 25. 5. 1982 (2) 31. 12. 1983   1. 1. 1985 12. 3. 1985 (3) 31. 12. 1986   1. 1. 1987 25. 7. 1988 (4) 31. 12. 1989   1. 1. 1990 awaited 31. 3. 1992  (1) Council Decision 80/318/Euratom of 13 March 1980 (OJ No L 72, 18. 3. 1980).  (2) Council Decision 82/350/Euratom of 25 May 1982 (OJ No L 157, 8. 6. 1982).  (3) Council Decision 85/201/Euratom of 12 March 1985 (OJ No L 83, 25. 3. 1985).  (4) Council Decision 88/447/Euratom of 25 July 1988 (OJ No L 222, 12. 8. 1988).    Although in all the cases to date, the overlap of Programme Decisions meant that a legal basis for the work of JET continued to exist, the delays in achieving Decisions did lead to some budgetary problems. In some cases the Project was forced to delay  entering into commitments pending the new Decision.  4.16. In its Annual Report on the financial year 1989(15)  the Court drew attention to the problems that JET will face if there is any significant delay in obtaining a Decision regarding the prolongation to 1996. The proposal was submitted to the Council of Ministers in October 1990(16)  along with the proposals for a 1990-1994 Programme Decision. The Project is currently running two parallel research programmes, a situation that it will be able to sustain for only a limited further period. By 31 December 1990, with the approval of the  JET Council, JET had committed about 9 Mio ECU on post-1992 related items.  JET and the Associates - Article 14 contracts 4.17. Contracts awarded under Article 14 of the JET Statutes (referred to earlier in paragraph 1.5) are one of the mechanisms which assist in integrating JET into the European Fusion community. They are conducted in the framework of Contracts of  Association between Euratom and their Associated Partners in the Community Fusion Programme.  4.18. The full value of Article 14 work awarded at 1990 values, including the cost to Associates, is shown in Table 7.   Table 7: Full value of Article 14 contracts by year (1990 values)   Year Full value of Art. 14 work (1990 values) Mio ECU  1980 and earlier   5,1  1981  14,9  1982   9,5  1983   8,5  1984   5,2  1985   2,6  1986   2,9  1987   4,7  1988   5,8  1989   2,31990   3,5   Total    65,0    As the Associates must find fifty-five percent of the cost of such contracts (the balance being found by the general Fusion Programme) the work must be of interest to them. If no interested partner can be found for such work, JET is empowered to award  normal contracts, meeting all of the costs from its own budget.  4.19. Whilst Article 14 contracts are attractive to JET in that they are not a burden upon the Project's budget, their negotiation is more difficult both administratively (more parties are involved in concluding the contract) and scientifically  (specifying in detail areas of common interest with Associates). Table 8 compares the values of Article 14 contracts and other contracts with the Association that were funded 100 % by JET.  4.20. Article 14 contracts have, in value terms, contributed an additional five percent to the overall JET programme up to 1990. They were relatively much more important in the early part of the programme, with two-thirds of the contribution occurring  before 1985. From 1985 onwards, their contribution has been only one-quarter greater than contracts awarded directly by JET with the Association. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Article 14 contracts have failed to foster close links between  JET and the rest of the European Programme. Many directly-awarded contracts represent further work arising from preliminary investigations carried out under Article 14 contracts.   5. CONCLUSIONS  General 5.1. The JET device was constructed on time and largely within original estimates of cost. (The actual cost of the construction phase, at 1990 price levels, was 430 Mio ECU against an estimate of 416 Mio ECU.) The Project has operated the device since  1983 and, the Court was advised, has attained for Europe a world-leading reputation in its field.  Lessons for the Next Step 5.2. The Court, with the assistance of the experts it consulted, has reached the conclusion that certain factors which have been significant in contributing to the execution of the project should be considered if the Next Step device is built:  (a)clear and generally understood objectives have helped all the parties involved to focus upon their achievement;  (b)a system of scientific management in which responsibilities were clearly defined has made it possible to monitor the progress of the project regularly and address any problems promptly;  (c)sufficient flexibility built into the JET device allowed the latest available science and technology to be used when seeking solutions to problems;  (d)the strict application of the principle of competitive tendering contributed to value for money in purchasing;  (e)the use of Article 14 arrangements stimulated collaboration between the JET and the national programmes; and (f)an appropriate budgetary mechanism promoted long-term planning and stability, despite the difficulties caused by delays in Decisions.  Key questions 5.3. As regards the decommissioning of JET, the Court underlines the need for the Commission to defend the Community's interest and to prevent expenditure being charged to the Community budget for which there is no legal base.   Table 8: Article 14 and other JET contracts with the Association (at 1990 values)  5.4. The European fusion programme is at a crossroads. Should the Next Step be built, important decisions will have to be taken regarding whether it should be an international collaboration through ITER or a continuing European effort through NET:  whilst ITER holds the prospect of the costs being shared more widely, its sound management and success will depend upon the common agreement of clear objectives.  5.5. The choice between NET and ITER is not the only one which must be resolved, another problem is that of where the Next Step device should be constructed: given its position as uncontested leader in this field, Europe has a strong case for hosting an  ITER project - but a European site for such a project has yet to be identified, and any undue delay could provide the international partners with an advantage. The choice of location raises the question of  the transition from JET to the Next Step and the transfer of the experience gained from JET.  5.6. Finally, there is a need for the Programme to address more closely the environmental issues arising out of fusion. The recent report by the Committee responsible for evaluating the 'Fusion' Programme(17)  acknowledged this need, and it remains to be seen how successful the Programme will be in this respect.  The present study was adopted by the Court of Auditors in the form of an annex to the specific annual report on the 1990 accounts of the JET Undertaking in Luxembourg at its meeting of 7 November 1991.   For the Court of Auditors Aldo ANGIOI President     REPLY OF THE JET DIRECTOR  The Project would like to thank the Court for its Study, annexed to the Annual Report on the 1990 Accounts of the JET Project.  The Study is supportive of the Project. It endorses the fact that 'JET's objectives are clear and well understood' and supports the management of JET's scientific programme, aimed at the achievement of these objectives. It highlights the fact that JET,  with the support of the Associations, is widely acknowledged to have 'established itself in a dominant position' in Magnetic Fusion Research.  The Study considers many of the challenges ahead for European Fusion Research, including the need for the successful transfer of knowledge and expertise to the Next Step.  The Project's comments on the detail of the Study are made below using the Court's paragraph numbering system.   1. INTRODUCTION  In the introduction to its Study the Court gives an historical résumé of the Project and sets JET in context. In particular the Study highlights that:  - 'Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion is generally considered to be potentially an important source of energy in the future',  - the relative size of the Fusion Research Programmes is comparable between Europe, the USA, Japan and the USSR,  - the overall cost of the Project, at 1990 prices, assuming a 1996 termination is estimated at 1 840 Mio ECU,  - the JET Project is widely acknowledged to have established itself in a dominant position in its field.  JET's dominant position in its field has resulted in the accumulation of scientific knowledge and expertise. If this is to be fully utilised then the European commitment to Fusion Research must be maintained and enhanced as necessary in the years ahead.  The Project considers that the Court's Study should have a positive influence on the decision making process of the Budgetary Authorities.  Objectives of the Audit 1.6 - 1.9. The objectives of the Audit Study involve an examination of the evolution of the Project and in particular of the reasons for the prolongation of the JET Project from 1990, the original end date, to 1992 and the further extension to 1996. The  Study also examines the Scientific and Administrative Management systems of the Project, the future scientific Programme and the relationship between JET and the Next Step. Finally it reaches a number of conclusions and considers key questions of  interest to both the Project and the European Fusion Management.  The Project is satisfied with the objectives of the Study and concurs with the Court that the Study is appropriate at this time.   2. THE MANAGEMENT OF JET'S SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMME  The Court considers the management of JET's Scientific Programme and notes that:  - JET is 'one of the most difficult of any scientific projects yet undertaken, with each main technical area de- manding solutions at the very forefront of knowledge and technique' (2.13),  - the built-in flexibility of the JET machine has allowed significant modifications to be incorporated as experience grew (2.11) while 'attempts to obtain similar enhancements in performance in other devices in the USA and Japan have necessitated  significant rebuilding exercises' (2.20),  - continuous progress has been made towards achieving breakeven conditions on JET 'with the 1989 value being very close to that required for plasma breakeven' (2.12),  - the prolongation of the Project to 1992 'was well managed' (2.19),  - while the debate on the 1996 extension was short (2.28), nevertheless the proposal for a 'pumped divertor' was prepared 'taking relevant factors into account' (2.35) and on the basis that it was 'needed for the Next Step' (2.25),  - JET is subjected to periodic and independent evaluations (2.30).  The Court, in its conclusions to this section of the Study (2.33 - 2.35), is positive with regard to the management of JET's scientific programme. It is generally accepted that well managed research projects produce results and the Project is encouraged  by the Court's support.  The Project considers that the following technical and scientific points in the Court's Study merit further comment and consideration.  2.6. The D-T plasmas achievable on JET could be qualified further, following the objective (iv) of JET. To study alpha-particle production and consequent plasma heating, D-T plasmas should be of thermonuclear grade, i.e. with temperatures, densities and  confinement time approaching those of the breakeven.   3. JET AND THE FUTURE  The final phase of JET's scientific programme 3.1 - 3.4. In this section, the Court considers the final phase of the JET scientific programme - the D-T phase. This phase, regarded as the highlight of the Project, has been part of the programme since the beginning. The Court is satisfied that clear  scientific priorities (3.2) have been identified for the D-T phase of the JET scientific programme.  The Project would like to point out that preliminary Tritium experiments are required in preparation for the D-T phase of the scientific programme. This will enable technical and scientific data to be accumulated and assessed in order that enhancements  can be carried out progressively to the machine before it becomes radioactive.  In addition to the above, the Court expresses surprise (3.4) that the proposed prolongation of the Project to 1996 envisages a fixed end date, even though a continuation of the experimental programme for a few months could 'probably have provided for a  fuller exploitation of the machine's potential'. The Project will consider whether this proposal is scientifically justifiable given the costs involved.  JET and the Next Step 3.5 - 3.6. The Court is aware that, since the preparation of its report, significant developments with regard to ITER have taken place. 'The effective transfer of experience and skills' to the Next Step is now a central question for the European and  World Fusion Programme. The Study highlights some methods, already in existence, for arranging this transfer including personal contact, exchange of staff and the funding of specific work at JET by NET for the Next Step. The Project is committed to  these and is considering some other methods to ensure that JET's assets and expertise are utilised to the fullest extent.   4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF JET  The Court in this Study and in its recent Annual Audits of the Project is generally satisfied with the level of Administrative Management within the Project. The Court's advice and help over the years in achieving this position is recognised and  appreciated by the Project.  The Court raises four additional areas of administrative management.  Decommissioning of JET 4.6 - 4.7. The Court notes that under the JET Statutes the UKAEA is responsible for decommissioning the JET Device.  Personnel of the JET Project 4.8 - 4.12. The Court outlines the development of the staffing policy of JET; points out that a significant number of JET staff will be invaluable if the operational phase of the Next Step goes ahead; notes that there will be a gap between the end of  JET and the Next Step operations and urges the Commission to 'identify the key elements for a successful personnel policy for the Next Step' (4.12).  The Budgetary Mechanism 4.13 - 4.16. The Court considers the Budgetary Mech- anism and:  - outlines the system for funding the Fusion Programme by means of overlapping multi-annual Council Decisions and considers that this approach has 'promoted long term planning' (4.14),  - notes that the above system is not perfect and refers to its Annual Report on JET for the Financial Year 1989 which pointed out that because of the delay in obtaining a decision on the prolongation to 1996 the Project was running 'two parallel  research projects' (4.16).  The Project shares many of the Court's concerns. The Court's 1989 Report was discussed at the JET Council and delays in the decision process were raised by the Chairman with the Commission. The situation has not improved and JET has continued to run two  parallel research projects. This puts a strain on JET's resources and affects its ability to maintain the JET Development Programme.  JET and the Associates - Article 14 Contracts 4.17 - 4.20. The Court notes that Article 14 Contracts have contributed an additional 5 % to the JET Programme and have fostered links between JET and the rest of the European Programme.   5. CONCLUSIONS  The Court, in its conclusions to the Study, confirms that the JET device was constructed to time, largely within original cost estimates, and has attained for Europe a world leading reputation in the field of Magnetic Fusion Research. The Court makes  two further observations.  Lessons for the Next Step 5.2. The Court outlines certain factors which it considers have contributed to the success of the Project: clear objectives, good scientific management, flexibility in the design of JET, competitive tendering, Article 14 arrangements and a budgetary  mechanism which promotes long term planning.  The Court recommends that note should be taken of the above for the Next Step.  Key questions 5.3. The Court observes that the European Fusion Programme is at a crossroads. The Court will be aware of recent developments with regard to the start of the Engineering Design Activity of ITER.  The Project notes the Court's comments that 'Europe has a strong case' for hosting the construction phase of an ITER project (5.5).  The Court's emphasis on the need for the Fusion Programme to address the environmental issues of fusion will be brought to the attention of European Fusion Management.  Finally the Project would like to thank the Court for the quality of its Study. The Project considers that it provides assurance to the Budgetary Authorities that Fusion Management and the JET Project have resolved and can continue to address the  difficulties as they arise en route to the construction of a Demonstration Fusion Reactor.   Observations by the Commission on the Special Study by the Court of Auditors Annexed to its Annual Report on the 1990 Accounts of the JET Joint Undertaking  1. The Commission welcomes the Special Study of the Court, in which the Court has sought to examine the scientific and administrative management systems of the JET Project and to identify lessons which can be learnt for the Next Step and any possible  later stages in the Fusion Programme. These are matters of immediate interest to the Commission in view of progress with the quadripartite ITER initiative (paragraph 1.7, 5.2 of the special study). The Commission has taken particular note of the Court's  conclusion that the following six factors have been significant in contributing to the execution of the Project and should be considered if the Next Step device is built:  (a)clear and generally understood objectives have helped all the parties involved to focus upon their achievement;  (b)a system of scientific management in which re- sponsibilities were clearly defined has made it pos- sible to monitor the progress of the project regularly and address any problems promptly;  (c)sufficient flexibility built into the JET device allowed the latest available science and technology to be used when seeking solutions to problems;  (d)the strict application of the principle of competitive tendering contributed to value for money in purchasing;  (e)the use of Article 14 arrangements stimulated collaboration between the JET and the national programmes; and (f)an appropriate budgetary mechanism promoted long-term planning and stability, despite the difficulties caused by delays in Decisions.  The Commission will indeed draw upon the experience available within JET to identify the key elements for a successful personnel policy for the Next Step (paragraph 4.12 of the special study).  2. The Commission submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers on 30 October 1990 to prolong to 1996 the duration of the JET Joint Undertaking. The Commission shares the views of the Court about the importance of an early decision on this proposal  (paragraphs 4.13 - 4.16 of the special study).  3. The Commission agrees that the transfer of technology and know-how from JET to the Next-Step activities is essential to the effectiveness of the Fusion Programme. The Commission continues to explore ways to facilitate and expand this transfer,  particularly in human terms (paragraphs 3.5, 3.6, 4.12, 5.5 of the special study).  4. The Commission notes the Court's opinion, concerning the decommissioning of JET, that there is no legal basis at present for the Community to pay costs other than those directly resulting from any additional research activities. The Commission  confirms that any negotiations with the UK authorities on this matter will be guided by this principle (paragraphs 4.6, 4.7,  5.3 of the special study).  5. The Commission accepts that there is a need for the Fusion Programme to address even more closely in the future the environmental issues arising out of fusion. This has already been reflected in the Commission's Proposal for the 1990-94 Fusion  Programme [Doc. COM(90) 441 final], the long-term objective of which is the joint creation of safe, environmentally sound prototype fusion reactors (paragraph 5.6 of the special study).   (1)Source: Report of the Fusion Programme Evaluation Board, CEC, July 1990, Figure 1. (2)Council Decision 78/471/Euratom of 30 May 1978 (OJ No L 151, 7. 6. 1978). (3)Council Decision 88/447/Euratom of 25 July 1988 (OJ No L 222, 12. 8. 1988).  (4)COM(90) 441 final (OJ No C 261, 16. 10. 1990) - Proposal for a Council Decision approving amendments to the Statutes of the Joint European Torus (JET), Joint Undertaking. (5)Total payments made by JET up to 31 December 1990 amounted to 1 074 Mio ECU  (actual payments, i.e. not adjusted for the effects of inflation). (6)Annex to Council Decision 78/471/Euratom of 30 May 1978 (OJ No L 151, 7. 6. 1978). (7)Mr Gordon MacKerron of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, UK and Dr Peter  Christiansen of the School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Sussex. (8)The JET Project: design proposal for the Joint European Torus. CEC, 1976 (EUR 5516e). (9)COM(90) 441 final (OJ No C 261, 16. 10. 1990) - Proposal for a Council  Decision approving amendments to the Statutes of the Joint European Torus (JET), Joint Undertaking. (10)A fuller explanation is given in the document 'STOA Background Briefing on Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion', pages 7-16, European Parliament,  Luxembourg, 7 March 1988 (PE 121.237). (11)Council Decision 88/447/Euratom of 25 July 1988 (OJ No L 222, 12. 8. 1988). (12)Source: Report of the Fusion Programme Evaluation Board, CEC, July 1990, Figure 1. (13)Annex to Council Decision 78/471/Euratom of  30 May 1978 (OJ No L 151, 7. 6. 1978). (14)Report of the Fusion Programme Evaluation Board, CEC, July 1990, page 46. (15)OJ No C 313, 12. 12. 1990, paragraphs 9.87 - 9.92. (16)COM(90) 441 final (OJ No C 261, 16. 10. 1990) - Proposal for a Council  Decision approving amendments to the Statutes of the Joint European Torus (JET), Joint Undertaking. (17)Source: Report of the Fusion Programme Evaluation Board, CEC, July 1990, Figure 1.    ANNEX 1   Associates of the European fusion association and the members of JET    The Associates Member of JET  Euratom Commission of the EC (CEC) CEC   Belgium Belgium (for its own part, and on behalf of two laboratories) Belgium   Denmark Forskningscenter Risoe (Risoe) Risoe   France Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) CEA   F.R. Germany Max-Planck Institut fuer Plasmaphysik (IPP) IPP    Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH (KFA) KFA    Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH (KfK) -   Greece - The Hellenic Republic   Ireland - Ireland   Italy Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo Sviluppo dell'Energia Nucleare e delle Energia Alternative (ENEA) ENEA   Luxembourg - The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg   Netherlands Stichting voor Fundamenteel Onderzoek der Materie (FOM) FOM   Portugal Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) Junta Nacional de Investigacao Científica e Tecnológica   Spain Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT) CIEMAT   Sweden Naturvetenskapliga Forskningsradet (NFR) NFR   Switzerland The Swiss Confederation The Swiss  Confederation   United Kingdom United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) UKAEA      ANNEX 2   European programme - Sources and application of funds (1989)   Application of funds    Sources of funds   Euratom Associates Misc. Income Total   General Fusion Programme  20,5 % 51,1 % -   71,6 %  Mobility, Visiting scientists, etc.  3,3 % -   -   3,3 %  JET Joint Undertaking  18,9 % 4,8 % 0,7 % 24,4 % Article 14 contracts (para. 1.5)  0,3 % 0,4 % -   0,7 %   Total   43,0 % 56,3 % 0,7 % 100 %