The ABC of Community law.
Date: 1984-04-11
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU institution, EU legal system, European treaties, intergovernmental legal instrument, primacy of EU law

Pe riodical 2/ 19i{4 

THE ABC 
OFCO 

LAW 

EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION 

E 

In  the same collection 

Education of migrant workers' children in  the European Community (out of print) 
The European Community and  nuclear safety  (out of print) 
The protection of workers in  multin ational com pa nies (out of print) 
The European Community's external trade (o ut of print) 
Teacher training in  th e European Community (out of prirzt) 
T he elimination of non-tariff barriers to intra-Community trade (out of print) 
The European Community's competition policy (out of print) 
The  European Community and the developing countries (out of print) 
Worker participation in  Europe (out of print) 
The consumer in the European Community  (out of print) 
25 years of European Community External Relations 
T he second enlargement of the European Community 
The Community and  its regions (third editio n) 
Cultural  action in the European Community 
The Europea n Community's resea rch  policy 
The European  Community and vocatio nal training 
The European Community's transport policy 
The economic and  monetary  union (second edition) 
The European Commun ity's financi al system (third edition ) 
The European Communi ty's legal system 
The economy of the European Community 
Freedom of movement for persons in  the European Community 
An education policy  for  Europe (second edition) 
The European  Community's industri al  strategy 
The agricultural policy of the European  Commun it y (third edition) 
The  European Community  and the energy problem (third edition) 
Wine in the European Community 
T he Court of Justice of the Europ ean Communities (third edition) 
T he social policy of the Europ ean Community (third edition ) 

(co?ttmu<llum on thrrd page of  cover) 

Originttting department: 
Division lX / C / 11  -Coordin ation and preparation of publications 

The ABC  of Community law 

By Klaus-Dieter Borchardt 
Manuscript completed in  O ctober 1983 

This publication is  also available in the following languages: 

DA 
DE 
GR 
FR 
IT 
NL 

ISBN 92-825-4295-5 
ISBN 92-825-4296-3 
ISBN 92-825-4297-1 
ISBN  92-825-4299-8 
ISBN 92-825-4300-5 
ISBN  92-825-4301-3 

F~llesskabsretten s ABC 
Das ABC des Gemeinschaftsrechts 
To Al..cpai3rrro wv KOLvonKmJ ~LKaiov 
L'ABC du droit communautaire 
L'ABC del  diritto comunitario 
Het ABC van  het gemeenschapsrecht 

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. 

Luxembourg:  Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984 

ISBN 92-825-4298-X 

Catalogue number: CB-NC-84-002-EN-C 

Reproduction  in  whole  or  in  part  of the  contents  of this  publication  is  free,  provided  the  source  is 
acknowledged. 

Printed in the FR  of Germany 

I. Contents 

I. 

Imruductiun  . .. . .. .. . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . .  5 

II.  The 'constitution' oft he European Community  .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .  7 

1. Structure of the Community  .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .  7 

Tasks- Powers- Legal  character 

2.  Fundamental values of the European Community  ........................................................  10 
Unity - Equality- Freedom -Solidarity - Economic and social security - Fundamental 
rights 

3. The institutions ofthe European Community  .............................................................  16 
Commission- Council - European Parliament - Court of Justice - Auxiliary institutions 

III.  The Community as a legal reality  .................................................................................  21 

1.  The Community is created by law  .............. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. ........ .. ............ .. .. .. ..................  21 

2.  The Community is a source oflaw  .................. .. ........................................................  21 
Primary legislation- secondary legisla tion- General principles of law- Community agree 
ments - Conventions between the Member States 

3.  The Community is a legal order  .. .. .... ..... ............ ...... . ...... .... .. ........ .... .... . .. .. .... .... . .. . . .  31 

Meaning- Legality of acts  of the institutions- Legal  redress 

IV.  The position of Community law in relation to the legal order as a whole  ............ .... ............ .. ...  37 

V.  Conclusions  ........... .. ........................... ........... ............ ........ .... ....... ................ . .. .....  45 

Table of cases ...................................... .. .... .. .......... ... .. .. .......... .... ........... ...... .................  47 

Further  reading ... ... ...... ...... ...... .............. .......... .......... ... . ............ ........................... .. .... ..  51 

I. Introduction 

Until shortly after the end of the Second World War our concept of the State and our political 
life had developed almost entirely on the basis of national constitutions and laws.  It  was on 
this  basis in our democratic States that the rules of conduct binding not only on citizens and 
parties  but  also  on the State  and  its  organs  were  created.  It  took the complete collapse of 
Europe  to  give  a  new  impetus  to  the  idea  of a  new  European  order,  at least  in Western 
Europe. The foundation stone of a European Community was laid by the then French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman in his declaration of 9 May 1950, in which he put forward the plan 
he  had  worked out with Jean  Monnet to combine  European  coal and  steel  industries  in  a 
European Community for  Coal  and Steel.  By  this means,  he declared,  an  historic initiative 
would be taken for  an organized and vital  Europe, which was indispensable for civilization 
and without which the peace of the world could not be maintained. This plan became a reality 
with  the  conclusion  of the  founding  Treaty of the European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
(ECSC) on 18 April1951 in Paris (Treaty of Paris) and its entry into force on 23 July 1952. A 
further  development  came some  years  later  with  the  Treaties  of Rome of 25  March  1957 
which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic-Energy 
Community (Euratom). The founding States of these Communities were Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  On 1 January 1973 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland acceded to 
the Community; the accession of Norway, which had been planned to take place at the same 
time, was rejected by  a referendum in October 1972. 

In  1976  and  1977  Greece,  Portugal  and Spain  submitted  applications  for  accession  to the 
Community;  the  accession  of Greece  took  effect  on  1 January  1981.  Negotiations  on the 
applications for  accession of Portugal and Spain are at present being carried on between the 
existing Member States and the applicant States. 

Since the entry into force of the Treaties of Rome on 1 January 1958 three separate Commu 
nities have existed, each based on its own instruments of foundation.  From  a legal  point of 
view this situation has remained unchanged to the present day, since no formal merger of the 
three Communities has ever taken place.  There are however good reasons for regarding these 
three Communities, different as they are in the fields they cover, as constituting one unit so far 
as their political and legal structure is concerned. They have been set up by the same Member 
States and are based on the same fundamental objectives, as expressed in the preambles to the 
three Treaties: to create 'an organized and vital Europe', 'to lay the foundations of an ever clo 
ser  union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe',  and  to  combine  their  efforts  for  'the  constant 
improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples'.  This approach was also 
adopted in  the Resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 1978, which proposed 
that the three Communities should be designated 'the European Community'. Common usage 
too, both in the media and in everyday life, has long since come to regard the three Commu-

5 

nities as one.  For these  reasons, and in order to simplify the presentation it is proposed here 
also to use  the expression 'the European Community'. 

The legal order created by  the European Community has already become an established com 
ponent of our political life. 

Each year,  on the  basis of the Community treaties, thousands of decisions  are  taken which 
crucially affect the lives of the Community's Member States and of their citizens.  The indivi 
dual has long since ceased to be merely a citizen of his town, district or State; he is also a Com 
munity citizen.  For this reason alone it is of the highest importance that the Community citi- · 
zen should be informed about the legal order which affects him personally.  Yet the complexi 
ties of the Community and its legal order are not easy for the citizen to grasp. This is partly due 
to the wording of the treaties themselves, which  is often somewhat obscure and the implica 
tions of which  are not easy to discern.  An  additional factor is  the unfamiliarity of many con 
cepts with which the treaties sought to break new ground. The following pages are an attempt 
to  clarify  the structure of the Community and the supporting pillars of the European legal 
order, and thus help to lessen  the  incomprehension prevailing among Community citizens. 

6 

II. The 'constitution' of the European Community 

Every  social organization has  a  constitution.  By  means of a  constitution the structure  of a 
political system is defined , that is to say the relationship of the various parts to each other and 
to the whole is specified, the common objectives are defined and the rules for making binding 
decisions are laid down.  The constitution of the European Community, as an association of 
States to which quite specific tasks and functions have been allotted, must thus be able to ans 
wer the same questions as the constitution of a State. 

This Community constitution is not, as in the case of most of the constitutions of its Member 
States, laid down in a comprehensive constitutional document, but arises from  the  totality of 
rules and fundamental values by which those in authority regard themselves as bound. These 
rules are to be found partly in the founding treaties or in the legal instruments produced by the 
Community institutions, but they also rest partly on custom. 

In the Member States the body politic is  shaped by two overriding principles:  the rule of law 
and democracy. All  the activities of the Community if they are to be true to the fundamental 
requirements  of law and  democracy,  must  be  both  legally  and  democratically  legitimated: 
foundation,  construction, competence, functioning,  the position of the Member States and 
their institutions and the position of the citizen. 

What answers, then, does the Community order afford to these ques.tions concerning its struc 
ture, its fundamental  values and its institutions? 

1.  Structure of the Community 

In  its  structure  the  Community  order resembles  the  constitutional order of a State.  This  is 
immediately apparent from the list of tasks entrusted to  the  Community.  These are not the 
narrowly circumscribed technical  tasks  commonly  assumed  by  international organizations, 
but  fields  of competence which,  taken  as  a  whole,  form  essential  attributes  of Statehood. 
Under the ECSC Treaty the Community is competent for the Community-wide administra 
tion  of the coal  and steel  industries,  which  play a  key  role  in  the national economies.  The 
European Atomic Energy Community has common tasks to perform in research for,  and uti 
lization of, atomic energy. Finally, the EEC does not aim, like the other two Communities, at 
the closer  interlocking  of specific  sectors  of the economy  (so-called  economic integration). 
Rather, its task is, by establishing a common market which unites the national markets of the 
Member States and on which all goods and services can be offered and sold on the same condi 
tions as on an internal  market, and  by  the gradual  approximation of the national economic 
policies in all sectors of the economy , to weld the Member States into a community. Specific 

7 

matters covered are free movement of goods, free movement of workers, freedom of establish 
ment,  freedom  to provide services and freedom of capital movements,  agriculture, transport 
policy, social policy and competition. Only a few, albeit important, aspects of State sovereign 
ty are withheld from the Community, such as defence, diplomacy, education and culture; but 
even  in  these spheres certain partial aspects are subject to Community competence. 

The similarities between the Community order and that of a State become even more striking 
if we consider the extent of the powers with which the Community institutions are endowed 
for the performance of the tasks entrusted to the Community. Generally speaking the found 
ing treaties do not confer on the Community and its institutions any general power to take all 
measures necessary to achieve  the objectives of the treaty,  but lay down in each chapter the 
extent of the powers to act (principle of specific attribution of powers). This method has been 
chosen by the Member States in order to ensure that the renunciation of their own powers can 
be more easily monitored and controlled. The range of matters covered by the specific attribu 
tions of power varies according to the nature of the tasks allotted to the Community. It is very 
far-reaching, for instance, in  the sphere of common transport policy, where any appropriate 
provisions may be enacted (Article 75 (1) (c)  EEC Treaty) ,  in the field of agricultural policy 
(Article 43 (2), Article 40 (3) EEC Treaty) and in the sphere of freedom of movement of wor 
kers (Article 48 EEC Treaty). On the other hand, in the sphere of competition law (Article 85 
et seq. EEC Treaty) the scope for discretion on the part of the Community and its institutions 
is limited by narrowly defined conditions. In addition to these special powers to act, the Com 
munity treaties also confer on the  institutions a  power to act when this proves necessary to 
attain one of the objectives of the treaty (see Articles 235 EEC Treaty, 203 Euratom Treaty, 
91  (1) ECSC Treaty- subsidiary power to act).  These articles do not however confer on the 
institutions any general power enabling them to carry out tasks which lie outside the objec 
tives laid down in the treaties. Their application is thus out of the question in connection with 
defence policy, foreign policy (apart from foreign economic policy) and most aspects of cultu 
ral policy. In practice, the possibilities afforded by this power have been used with increasing 
frequency. This is because the Community is nowadays confronted with tasks which were not 
foreseen  at the  time  the founding  Treaties  were  concluded,  and  for  which  accordingly  no 
appropriate powers are conferred in the treaties. Examples are the protection of the environ 
ment and of consumers, the establishment of a European regional fund as  a means of closing 
the gap between the developed and underdeveloped regions of the Community and the numer 
ous research programmes concluded since 1973 outside the European Atomic Energy Com 
munity.  Finally, ther~ are further powers to take such  measures as are  indispensable for the 
effective and meaningful implementation of powers which have already been expressly confer 
red  (implied  powers).  These  powers  have acquired  a  special  significance  in  the  conduct  of 
external relations.  They enable the Community to assume obligations towards non-Member 
States or other international organizations in fields covered by the list of tasks entrusted to the 
Community. An outstanding example is provided by the Kramer case decided by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities. 

This case concerned the competence of the Community to cooperate with international orga 
nizations in fixing fishing quotas and, where thought appropriate, to assume obligations on 
the matter under international law.  The Court inferred the necessary external competence of 
the Community from  its competence for  fisheries in  the context of the common agricultural 
policy. 

8 

On the  basis of the  powers thus conferred  on them,  the Community institutions can enact 
legal instruments as a Community legislature legally independent of the Member States. Some 
of these instruments take effect directly as Community law in the Member States, and thus do 
not require any transformation into national law in order to be binding, not only on the Mem 
ber States and their organs, but also on the citizen. 

These points of resemblance between the Community order and  the internal order of a State 
do not however suffice to confer on the Community the legal character of a (federal)  State. 
Sovereign  powers  have  been  conferred  on  the Community  institutions  only  in  the  limited 
spheres mentioned  above,  and those  institutions have not been  given  any power to increase 
their competence merely  by their own decisions. Thus the Community lacks both the univer 
sal competence characteristic of a State and the power to create new fields of competence. 

The European Community, a factor essential to peace 

9 

Even if the Community is not (yet) a State, it is certainly more developed than an organization 
set up under traditional international law. Its only essential point of similarity with traditional 
international organizations is  the fact that it, too, was created by treaties taking effect under 
international law. But these treaties are at the same time the foundation documents establish 
ing independent Communities endowed with their own sovereign rights and competence. The 
Member States have pooled certain  parts of their  own legislative powers in  favour  of these 
Communities and have placed them in the hands of Community institutions in  which, how 
ever, they are given in return substantial rights of participation. The Community is thus a new 
form of relationship between States, something between a State in the traditional sense and an 
international  organization.  The  concept  of 'supranationality'  has  become  accepted  among 
lawyers as a means of describing their legal nature. This is intended to indicate that the Com 
munity is an association endowed with independent authority, with its own sovereign rights 
and a legal order independent of the Member States  to  which  both the Member States and 
their citizens are subject in  matters for which the Community is  competent. It would, how 
ever,  be  wrong to  infer  that  the  European  Community  has  thus  already  achieved  its  final 
form; on the contrary it is still a developing system, the ultimate contours of which are not yet 
,predictable. The development of the system lies primarily in  the hands of the Member States. 
Above all it depends on their will whether the Community develops further in the direction of 
a European federal State or of a  European union. 

2.  Fundamental values of the European Community 

The foundations for constructing a  united Europe were formed  from fundamental ideas and 
values to which the Member States also subscribe and which are translated into practical real 
ity  by  the  Community's operational  institutions.  These  acknowledged  fundamental  values 
include the securing of a lasting peace, unity, equality, freedom, solidarity, and economic and 
social security. 

There is  no motive for  European unification which  is  surpassed  by  the desire for  peace.  In 
Europe, this century, two world wars have been waged between countries that are now Mem 
ber States of the European Community. Thus, a policy for  Europe means at the same time a 
policy for peace, and the establishment of the Community simultaneously created the centre 
piece for  a  framework  for  peace  in  Europe which  renders  a  war between  the Community's 
Member States impossible.  More than 35 years of peace in Europe are proof of this. 

Unity is the Community's leitmotiv. Present day problems can be mastered only if the Europe 
an countries move forward  along the path which leads them to unity.  Many people take the 
view that without European integration, without the European Community, it is not possible 
to secure peace both in Europe and in the world, democracy, law and justice, economic pros 
perity and social  security  and guarantee them for the future.  Unemployment,  inflation and 
inadequate growth have long ceased to be merely national problems; nor can they be resolved 
at national level.  It is only in the context of the Community that a stable economic order can 
be established and only through joint European efforts that an international economic policy 
can be secured which improves the performance of the European economy and contributes to 
strengthening  a  State  based  upon  social  justice.  Without  internal cohesion,  Europe  cannot 
assert  its  political  and  economic  independence  from  the  rest  of  the  world ,  win  back  its 
influence in  the world and retrieve its role in world politics. 

10 

Unity  can  endure only where equality  is  the rule.  This means  equality not only as  between 
citizens of the Community but also  as  between  the  Member States.  No citizen  of the Com 
munity may be placed at a disadvantage or disciminated against because of his nationality.  All 
Community citizens are equal before the law.  As  far  as the Member States are concerned, the 
principle of equality means that no State has precedence over another and natural differences 
such  as size,  the population of a  country and differing structures must  be  dealt with only in 
accordance with the principle of equality. 

Freedom  results  directly  from  peace,  unity  and equality.  Creating  a  larger  territorial  area 
through the linking up of what are now 10 States immediately affords freedom  of movement 
beyond national frontiers. This means, in particular, freedom of movement for workers, free 
dom of establishment, freedom to provide services, free  movement of goods and freedom  of 
capital movements. These fundamental freedoms under the founding treaties, as they are cal 
led,  guarantee entrepreneurs freedom  of decision  making,  workers freedom  to  choose  their 
place of work and consumers freedom of choice between the greatest possible variety of pro 
ducts.  Freedom of competition permits entrepreneurs to offer their goods and services to an 
incomparably wider circle of potential customers.  Workers can seek employment and change 
their place of employment according to their own ideas and interests throughout the entire ter 
ritory of the Community.  Consumers can select the cheapest and best products from the far 
greater wealth  of goods on offer that results from increased competition. 

Solidarity is the necessary corrective to freedom, for ruthless exercise of freedom is always at 
the expense of others. For this reason, if a Community framework is  to continue to endure, it 
must always recognize also the solidarity of its members as a fundamental principle, and share 
both the advantages, i.e. prosperity, and the burdens equally and justly amongst its members. 

Lastly, all these fundamental values are dependent upon security. In the most recent past, par 
ticularly, a period characterized by movement and change, and by the totally unknown, secur 
ity  has become  a  basic  need  which  the  Community  must  also  endeavour to  satisfy.  Every 
action by the Community institutions must pay heed to the need to render the future predict 
able  for  Community  citizens  and  firms  and  to  lend  permanence  to  the  circumstances  upon 
which they are dependent. This is  the case not only as regards job security but also as regards 
decisions taken by  entrepreneurs in reliance on the continuance of existing general economic 
conditions and, lastly, the social security of all citizens of the Community. 

Since reference has now  been  made to fundamental  values  and the  concepts which  underlie 
them,  the  question  necessarily  arises of the  fundamental  rights of individual  citizens  of the 
Community. This is particularly so, since the history of Europe has, for more than 200 years, 
been characterized by continuing efforts to strengthen  the protection of fundamental  rights. 
Starting  with  the  declarations  of human  and civil  rights  in  the  18th cenrury ,  fundamental 
rights and civil liberties are  firmly  anchored in the constitutions of most civilized States. This 
is  particularly so in the case of the Member States of the European Community whose legal 
systems are constructed on the basis of observance of the law and respect for the dignity, free 
dom and right to self-development of the individual. There are, moreover, numerous intern a 
tional  conventions concerning  the  protection  of human rights,  among which  the  European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 4 November 
1950,  is of very great significance. 

11 

A search thro ugh  the Community treaties for express provisions concerning the fundamental 
rights  of individual  Community citizens  is  disappointing.  In contrast to  the legal  systems of 
the Member States, the Community treaties contain neither a  list of fundamental  rights  nor 
any  generally  binding commitment to  respect  and  pro tect  the  fundamental  rights  and  free 
doms of Community citizens  as, for  example, was laid down in the European Defence Com 
munity Treaty  of 27 M arch  1957. The Community treaties  do  not even  mention  the  terms 
'fundamental  right' or 'human rights'. 

What is the reason for this silence in the Community treaties? 

It would certainly  by wrong to suppose that  those  who bro ught the Community into being 
had  absolutel y no  regard to the fundamental  rights and  the fundamental  freedoms of Com 
munity citizens.  They, of course, took it as self-evident that the fund amental rights of Com 
munity citizens would remain unaffected by the establishment of the Community. T hey were, 
however, convinced that it would be relatively improbable that a Community, the activities of 
which are limited to economic and social fields, would encroach upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms. They therefore considered that the creation of a list of fundamental rights, specially 
tailored to the Community, could be dispensed with.  This view, particularly in  recent years, 
when there has been increasing discussion of the protection o f human rights, no longer holds 
good.  Superior  national  as  well  as  European  courts  have  handed  down  important  judg 
ments concerning the safeguarding of fundamental  rights.  In  France, the Court of Cassation 
has  declared,  in  a  leading  judgment,  that  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  is 
applicable at national level. In the United Kingdom , the enactment of a Bill of Rights is under 
discussion  and  in  Belgium  and  the  N etherlands,  also,  consideration  is  being  given  to  the 
improvement of the protection of fundamental  rights  against encroachments  by  the legisla 
ture.  Lastly,  at the Helsinki Conference on  European Security and Cooperation, the protec 
tion of human rights was the most important demand  made by Western countries. 

Against this background it is  not surprising that the  deficiencies  in  the protection of funda 
mental  rights  in  t he  legal  system  of the  European  Community  have  become  the  subject of 
impassioned discussion, especially  in Germany and Italy. Here, particular regard must be had 
to two viewpoints.  On the one hand,  the European Community is a Community established 
by States whose constitutions are characterized by respect for the rights and freedoms of their 
citizens. The Community itself, which can, through its institutions- even if only to a limited 
extent- enact legislation and make decisions the effects of which  apply,  in  part , directly to 
the citizens of the Member States, affords , however, at first sight, no guarantee should an act 
of the Community institutions infringe one of their  fundamental rights. 

On the other hand it is by no  means  the case that t he manifold  activities of the Community 
institutions,  which  affect the lives of Community citizens to  an  increasing extent,  leave  the 
fundamental rights of those citizens untouched. 

For example, the common agricultural market embodies prohibiti ons in relation to marketing 
and processing which encroach, in certain circumstances, on the rights of ownership and free 
dom to choose and practise a profession and upon the principle of equality.  The officials and 
other staff of the  Community are also , to a large extent, subject to rules which  have a  consi 
derable infl uence on their fundamental rights. Convicing proof of this is afforded by the Prais 
case which concerned freedom of religion of the individual. The plaintiff, Mrs Prais, brought 

12 

an action 1n the Court of justice because she considered that her fundamental right to freedom 
of religion had been infringed because the date of a competition for recruitment into the Com 
munity's public service had been  fixed  on a  day that was a  holiday according to the religion 
she practised. Although this case concerns only the law governing employment with the Com 
munity, which constitutes only a limited area of Community activity, it is nevertheless charac 
teristic of possible infringements of fundamental  rights by the Community institutions, for a 
few years ago it appeared hardly conceivable that the Community could find itself in conflict 
with  freedom  of religion.  These examples,  many  more of which  could  be  adduced at will, 
show  that the  protection of fundamental  rights  constitutes  a  pressing problem  in  the legal 
order of the Community, which it was,  and still is, essential to solve. 

In the following paragraphs, therefore, a closer look is taken at the present situation regarding 
fundamental rights in the European Community as well as the prospects for further develop 
ment of the protection of fundamental rights. 

II  one gives up looking for express guarantees of fundamental rights, one finds that there arc 
provisions scattered throughout the treaty  texts whose content is intended  to protect Com 
munity citizens and which are very similar to certain of the Member States' guarantees of fun 
damental rights. 

13 

This is especially the case as far as the numerous prohibitions on discrimination are concerned 
which, in specific circumstances, express particular aspects of the general principle of equal 
ity. Examples are to be found in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty concerning the prohibition of any 
discrimination  on  grounds  of nationality,  Articles  48,  52  and  60  of EEC  Treaty on  equal 
treatment of Community citizens in regard to the right to work, freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services, Article 85 et seq. of the EEC Treaty on freedom of competition 
and Article  119 of the  EEC Treaty concerning equal pay for men and women. 

The Community  rules  which  establish  the  four  fundamental  freedoms  of the  Community, 
which guarantee the fundamental freedoms of professional life, can be regarded as constitut 
ing  a  Community  fundamental  right  to  freedom  of movement  and  freedom  to choose  and 
practise a profession. The rules in question are those relating to the freedom of movement of 
workers  (Article  48  of the  EEC  Treaty),  the right of establishment  (Article  52 of the  EEC 
Treaty) and freedom to provide services (Article 59 of the EEC Treaty) and freedom of move 
ment of goods (Article 9 et seq.  of the EEC Treaty). 

Lastly,  other  spheres  of fundamental  rights  are  recognized  in  individual  provisions  of the 
Community treaties.  Those of particular significance here are the right of association (Article 
118 (1) of the EEC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 48 of the ECSC Treaty), the right 
to submit comments (second paragraph of Article 48  of the ECSC Treaty) and the protection 
of business and  professional secrets (Article  214 of the EEC Treaty, Article  194 of the Eur 
atom Treaty and the second and fourth  paragraphs of Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty ). 

Although in the case-law of the early years, the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
did  not regard the application of fundamental  rights  within the Community as an issue with 
which it had to concern itself, since 1969 it has continually developed and added to these ini 
tial  attempts at protecting the fundamental  rights of Community citizens. The starting point 
in this case-law was the Stauder judgment, in which the point at issue was the fact that a reci 
pient of welfare benefits for war victims regarded the requirement that he give his name when 
registering for the purchase of butter at reduced prices at Christmas time as a  violation of his 
human dignity and the principle of equality. Although the Court of Justice came to the conclu 
sion, in interpreting the Community provision, that is  was not necessary for recipients to give 
their name so that, in fact, consideration of the question of a violation of a fundamental right 
was superfluous, it declared finally that the general fundamental principles of the Community 
legal  order,  which  the  Court  of Justice  has  to  safeguard,  include  respect  for  fundamental 
rights. This was the first time that the Court of Justice recognized the existence of a Commun 
ity  framework of fundamental  rights of its own.  In later judgments the Court of Justice then 
made clear  the criteria according to  which  it  intended  to ensure protection of fundamental 
rights  at Community level.  These are, firstly, the concepts that are common to the constitu 
tions of the Member States and, secondly, the international conventions concerning the pro 
tection of human rights to whose conclusion the Member States have been party or to which 
they have acceded. The Court of Justice has gradually recognized  a  number of fundamental 
rights on this basis and has incorporated them into the Community legal order. Examples are 
the  right of ownership, the general  right  of privacy,  freedom  to engage  in  business  and  to 
choose and practise a profession, freedom of association, freedom of religion, privacy of cor 
respondence, the general  principle of equality, the right to  a fair  hearing and the principle of 
proportionality as between means and ends. 

14 

With  all due  recognition of the  achievements  of the Court of Justice  in  the development of 
unwritten  fundamental  rights,  this process of deriving 'European fundamental  rights'  has  a 
serious disadvantage; the Court of Justice is confined to the particular case in point. The result 
of this can be that it is nor able to develop fundamental rights from the general legal principles 
for all  areas in which  this appears necessary or desirable. Nor will it be able to elaborate the 
scope of and the limits to the protection of fundamental rights as generally and distinctively as 
is  necessary.  As a result, the Community institutions cannot assess sufficiently precisely whe 
ther they are in danger of violating a fundamental right or not. Nor can any Community citiz 
en who is affected judge in every case whether one of his fundamental rights has been infrin 
ged. The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has availed itself 
of the legal  uncertainty inherent in this situation to declare in  its  ruling of 29 May 197 4 that 
the protection of German fundamental rights from encroachments on the part of the Europe 
an Community was a matter for the German courts for so long as the Community itself lacked 
a system for the  protection of fundamental  rights that was equivalent to the Basic Law and 

3 

_j 

15 

had  been  decided  upon  by  the  European  Parliament.  In  its  Judgment  No  183  of  18/27 
December 197 3, the Italian Constitutional Court expressed itself in similar terms on this ques 
tion, albeit it in a  much more cautious manner. 

The extent to which the national constitutional courts adhere to their own views depends not 
least on the further development of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community. A 
significant step has already been taken with the joint declaration by the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission of 5 April1977. In this , the Community institutions empha 
sized  the  importance  of fundamental  rights  to  the  Community  and  solemnly  promised  to 
respect fundamental  rights in  the exercise of their powers and in  the pursuit of the objectives 
of the Community. In their declaration on democracy at the summit meeting in  Copenhagen 
on 7 and 8 April 1978, the Heads of State and of Government of the Member States endorsed 
this  declaration  on  fundamental  rights.  Although  these  declarations  do  not  establish  any 
direct  rights for the citizens of the Community, they nevertheless  have considerable political 
importance because of the universal recognition of fundamental  rights at Community level. 

In  the  final  analysis,  it will  be  possible  to  resolve  the  problem of fundamental  rights  in  the 
European  Community only through the creation of a  list of fundamental  rights that applies 
specifically  to  the  Community.  Prerequisites  for  this,  however,  are  changes  in  the existing 
Community treaties and a consensus on the part of all Member States regarding the content of 
fundamental rights. 

3.  The institutions of the European Community 

The third question arising in connection with the constitution of the European Community is 
that  of its  organization.  What are  the  institutions  of the  European  Community?  Since  the 
Community  exercises  functions  normally  reserved  for  States, does  it  have  a  government,  a 
parliament, administrative authorities and courts like those with which we are familiar in the 
Member States? 

The institutions of the  Community are the Commission, the Council, the  European  Parlia 
ment and the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 

Of these institutions the Court of Justice and the Parliament, or Assembly as it used to be cal 
led, were from the outset common to the three Communities. This was provided for in a Con 
vention between the original six Member States which was signed in 19 57 at the same time as 
the Rome Treaties. The process of creating common institutions was completed in July 1967 
by  the 'Treaty establishing a Single Counci l and a Single Commission of the European Com 
munit.jes' (Merger Treaty). Since then all three  Communities have had the same institutional 
structure. 

(a) The Commission 

Following  the  accession  of Greece,  the  Commission  consists  of  14  members  appointed  by 
'common accord' of the Governments of the Member States for a term of four years. 

16 

The Commission's functions may be broken down as  follows: 

(i)  The Commission is first of all the motive power behind Community policy. It is the starting 
point for  every Community action, as it  is  the Commission that has to submit proposals 
and drafts for Community rules to the Council (this is termed the Commission's right of 
initiative).  The Commission is  not free to choose its own activities. It is obliged to act if 
the Community interest so  requires. The Council may also ask the Commission to draw 
up a proposal. 

Under the ECSC Treaty, however, the Commission also has law-making powers. In this 
case, the Council has a right of veto in certain circumstances which enables it to overrule 
Commission measures. 

(ii)  The Commission is also the guardian of the Community treaties. It sees to it that the treaty 
provisions and the  measures adopted by the Community institutions are properly imple 
mented.  Whenever  they  are  infringed  the  Commission  must  intervene  as  an  impartial 
body and,  if necessary, refer the matter to the Court of Justice.  The Commission has so 
far performed this role very effectively. 

(iii) Closely  connected  with the  role  of guardian  is  the  task of defending the Community's 
interests. As a matter of principle, the Commission may serve no interests other than tho 
se  of the Community.  It must constantly endeavour, in  what often  prove to be difficult 
negotiations within the Council, to make the Community interest prevail and seek com 
promise solutions which take account of that interest. In so doing, it also plays the role of 
mediator between the Member States, a role for which, by virtue of its neutrality, it is par 
ticularly suited and qualified. 

(iv ) Lastly, the Commission is- albeit to a  limited extent- an executive body. The classic 
example of this is the law on restrictive practices and the administration of the protective 
clauses contained in the treaties and derived legislation.  Much more extensive than these 
'primary' executive  powers are the 'derived' powers devolved  on the Commission by  the 
Council.  These essentially involve adopting the requisite detailed rules for  implementing 
Council  decisions.  As  a  rule,  however,  it  is  the Member States  themselves that have  to 
ensure that Community rules are applied in individual cases.  This solution chosen by the 
treaties has the advantage that citizens are brought closer to what is  still to them the 'for 
eign' reality of the European system through the workings and in the familiar form of the 
national system. 

(b)  The Council 

The Council  is  made up of representatives of the governments of the Member States.  All  10 
Member  States  send one or more representatives  -
as  a  rule,  though  not  necessarily,  the 
Minister  or Secretary  of State responsible  for  the  matters  under consideration,  such  as  the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs,  Finance, Labour, Agriculture,  Transport or 
Technology. 

It is  in  the Council  that the individual  interests of the Member  States  and the Community 
interest are balanced and reconciled.  Although  the Member States' interests are given prece 
dence  in  the Council, the members of the Council are at the same time obliged to take into 
account the objectives and needs of the European Community as  a whole.  The Council is  a 
Community institution and not a  meeting  place for  governments.  Consequently it  is  not the 

17 

lowest common denominator between the Member States that is  sought in the Council's deli 
berations, but the highest between the Community and the Member States. 

In  the case of the two more recent Communities, the Council  is the supreme legislative body. 
It takes the most important political decisions of the Community. With regard to the ECSC, 
on the other hand,  it  is  an endorsement body  which  has to deal  only with  a few,  especiall y 
impo rtant decisions. Under the Community treaties, maj ority voting in the Council is the rule. 
Where no express provision is made to the contrary, a simple majority suffices, and each State 
has one vote.  Normally, however, a 'qualified' majority  is required.  The treaties  stipulate  a 
weighting of votes so that the larger States exert a greater influence. Thus France , the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom each have 10 votes, the Netherlands and 
Greece five votes, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland three votes and Luxembourg two votes. The 
importance of majority voting lies not so much  in  the fact that it prevents small States  from 
blocking important decisions, as such members could as a rule be brought into line by politi 
cal  pressure.  What the  majority principle does  is  make it possible  to outvote  large  Member 
States wh ich would withstand political pressure. This principle thus contributes  to the equal 
ity of Member States and must therefore be regarded as a cornerstone of the Community con 
stitution. Despite this original and intrinsically well-balanced approach, the importance of the 
majority  principle  has  in  practice  remained  small.  The  reason  for  this  dates  back  to  1965 
when  France, afraid  that its vital interests in the financing of t he common agricultural policy 
were threatened blocked decision-making in th e Council for more than 6 months by a 'policy 
of the empty chair' until finally,  fo llowing the so-called Luxembourg compromise of J anuary 
1966, the way was opened for decisions to be taken, except for the annual preparation of the 
budget, in practice only on a unanimous basis. 

A stir  was  caused  in  this connection by the Council  meeting  held  between  17  and  19  May 
1982 in Luxembourg, at which among other things agricultural prices in the Community were 
fixed for the  year 1982/ 83. 

The prices were fixed,  as  the Treaty permits,  by a  majority of votes  despite stiff opposition 
from  the United Kingdom. Although this- and a number of subsequent instances- offers a 
gleam of hope that the Council will  return to a voting practice in  keeping with the treaties, a 
general move away from  the unanimity principle can hardly be expected to take place in the 
near future. 

(c}  The European Parliament 

The  European  parliament,  which  gave  itself this  name in  195 8 after  its  establishment  and 
appears in the Community treaties under the title 'Assembly',  is  elected by the citizens of the 
Member States by direct universal suffrage, as a  result of a Council Decision of 20 September 
1976, which entered into force on 1 July 1978. 

The mere existence of a parliament cannot, however, satisfy the fundamental requirement of a 
democratic constitution that all public authority must emanate from the people. That calls not 
only  for  the  transparency  of the  decision-making  process  but  also  for  the  representative 
character of the decision-taking institutions and the involvement of those concerned.  In  this 
respect the present organization of the Community leaves something to be desired. It is  there-

18 

fore  rightly  described as a  still 'underdeveloped democracy'.  The European Parliament exer 
cises  only  symbolically  the  functions  of a  true  parliament such  as exists in a  parliamentary 
democracy.  Firstly,  the  European  Parliament  does  not  elect  a  government.  This  is  simply 
because no government in  the normal  sense exists in  the European Community. Instead,  the 
functions analogous to government provided for in the treaties are performed by the Council 
and  the  Commission  according  to  the  division  of  work  described  above.  Parliament  has 
powers of supervision only over the  Commission, and not over the Council.  The Council is 
subject to parliamentary control only in so far as each of its members is,  as a national minis 
ter, subject to the control of his national parliament. The Commission is supervised mainly by 
means of its accountability to Parliament and the need for it report annually to the latter.  Its 
conduct has to be defended in open session and it can be compelled to resign following a vote 
of no  confidence.  However,  Parliament  has no influence  over  the  new  composition  of the 
Commission, so that the governments of the Member States could in theory reappoint the old 
Commission with the same membership.  The European Parliament has direct decision-mak 
ing powers in the legislative process only to a limited extent. It is  consulted, however, by the 
legislative decision-making organ, i.e.  the Council, on all  important matters, even where the 
treaties do not so provide, but the outcome of the consultations is not binding on the Council. 
They often have an impact only if the Commission successfully advocates Parliament's views 
in the Council. 

The position is different in the fields of budget law. Parliament's influence has increased in this 
area owing to the fact  that, since 1975, it  has  drawn up the  budget in  conjunction with  the 
Council and under certain conditions has had the power to make amendments which even the 
Council  may not oppose.  This extension of Parliament's powers gives grounds for  hope that 
the  European  Parliament  will  in  future  be  able  to  acquire  further  true  decision-making 
powers. The history of the parliamentary system of government shows that in the 19th centu 
ry  parliaments were  first  vested  with  budgetary powers  before becoming, sometimes after a 
hard struggle, the legislative organ. 

(d)  The Court of Justice of the European Communities 

A system system will endure only if its rules are supervised by an independent authority. What 
is  more, in a community of States the common rules- if they  are  subject to control by the 
national courts- are interpreted and applied differently from one State to another. The uni 
form application of Community law in  all  Member States would thus be jeopardized.  These 
considerations led to the establishment of a Community Court of Justice as soon as the ECSC 
was created. 

Since Greece became a member of the European Communties, the Court of Justice has consis 
ted of 11  judges, appointed b y common accord of the governments of the Member States for a 
term of six years. The Court is  assisted by five advocates-general whose term of office corres 
ponds to that of the  judges. 

The court has to deal with a wide variety of Community issues ranging from questions relat 
ing  to the  steel industry,  agricultural  and social  matters, customs duties and taxation, com 
petition matters and patents to personnel matters. 

19 

Community law lives only in the judgments of the Court. hs judgments convey a feeling of the 
justness of European law and hence give it the necessary authority vis-a-vis governments, auth 
orities, parliaments and citizens. 

(e) The auxiliary institutions of the European Community 

In  addition to the above-mentioned constitutional institutions there are a number of auxiliary 
institutions. The most important of these, because it is vested with general powers, is the Eco 
nomic and Social Committee.  The Economic and Social  Committee advises the Council and 
Commission on economic matters.  It  is  a  forum  for  such  economic and social  categories  as 
manufacturers,  farmers,  carriers,  employees,  businessmen,  small  tradesmen  and  the  self 
employed.  As  a  result of its composition and its political  and technical  mandate , it exerts a 
strong influence on the Community's decision-making process. Through its opinions , not only 
does it provide valuable assistance to those responsible for formulating Community policies, 
but it also forms a link between the various occupational groups, which ultimately feel direct 
ly the practical effects of Community measures, and the European reality. 

As  financing  agency  for  a  'balanced  and  smooth development' of the common  market, the 
Community has at its disposal the European Investment Bank. This provides loans and gua 
rantees  in  all  economic  sectors  to  promote the  development  of less-developed  regions,  to 
modernize or convert undertakings or create new jobs and to assist projects of common inter 
est to several· Member States. 

Lastly, mention must  be made of the European  Court of Auditors,  which  was  set up by  the 
Treaty of 22 July  1975 and started work in  Luxembourg in October 1977. It consists- in 
line with the present number of Member States- of 10 members appointed for six years by 
the Council  following consultations with  the  European Parliament.  The  Court of Auditors 
performs  the  task of examining  whether all  revenue  has  been  received  and  all  expenditure 
incurred  in  a  lawful  and  regular  manner  and  whether  the  financial  management has  been 
sound. The results of its activity are summarized after the close  of each financial  year  in  an 
annual report and published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 

20 

III. The Community as a legal reality 

The constitution of the European Community described  above,  and particularly the funda 
mental values it establishes,  can be brought to life  and given  substance only through  Com 
munity law. This makes the Community a legal reality in three different senses: it is created by 
law, it is a source of law, and it forms a legal order. 

1.  The Community is created by law 

This is what is entirely new about the Community, what distinguishes it from earlier efforts to 
unite Europe. It works not by means of force or domination but simply by means of law.  Law 
is to do what 'blood and iron' have for centuries failed to do . For only unity based on a freely 
taken decision can be expected to last: unity founded on the fundamental values such as free 
dom  and  equality,  and  protected  and  translated  into  reality  by  law.  That  is  the  insight 
underlying the treaties which created the Community. 

2.  The Community is a source of law 

When we speak of a 'source of law' we may mean one of two things. In its fundamental sense 
the term means the original cause of the law, the grounds on which the law is created. In this 
sense the source of Community law would be international solidarity, and the desire to pre 
serve  peace  and  to build  a  better Europe through  economic integration:  these  are the two 
motive forces to which the Community owes its existence. However, the expression 'source of 
law' more commonly refers to the way the law is made, the formal  foundation it rests on. 

The first source of Community law in this sense is provided by the three treaties, with the vari 
ous annexes and protocols attached to them, and their later additions and amendments: these 
are the founding acts which we have already looked  at when we discussed the Community's 
constitution.  Because the law contained in the  treaties was created directly  by the Member 
States themselves,  it has come to be known in legal language as primary legislation. 

This founding  chaner  is  mainly  confined  to  setting  out  the objectives  of the  Community, 
establishing its mechanisms, and laying down a timetable within which the objectives are to be 
achieved. It sets up institutions with the task of filling out the constitutional skeleton, in the 
interest of the Community  as  a  whole, and  confers  on them  legislative  and administrative 
powers to do so. 

21 

I I 

National rules are replaced by Community rules 

Law made by the Community institutions in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by 
the treaties is referred to as secondary legislation, the second great source of Community law. 
It covers a range of types of legislative act which had to be devised afresh when the Commun 
ity  was  set  up.  It had to be  decided  first  and  foremost  what forms  Community legislation 
should take and what effects these forms should have. The institutions had to be able to align 
the disparate economic, social and not least environmental conditions in the various Member 
States, and do so effectively, thus without depending on the goodwill of the Member States, so 
that the best possible living conditions could be created for all  the citizens of the Community; 
but on the other hand they were not to interfere in the domestic systems of law any more than 
necessary.  The Community legislative  system  is therefore  based on the principle  that where 
the same  arrangement, even  on points of detail,  must apply  in  all  Member States, national 
arrangements must be replaced by Community legislation; but where this is not necessary due 
account must be taken of the existing legal  orders in  the Member States. 

22 

Against  this  background  a  range  of tools  was  developed  which  allowed  the  Community 
institutions  to  work on  the  national  legal  systems  in  varying  measures.  The  most  drastic 
action is the replacement of national rules by Community rules.  Then there are Community 
rules by which the Community institutions act on the Member States' legal systems only indi 
rectly. Thirdly, measures may be taken which affect only a defined or identifiable addressee, 
in order to deal  with  a  particular case.  Lastly,  provision was also made for legal acts which 
have  no  binding force,  either on  the Member  States  or on  the citizens  of the  Community. 
These basic categories of legal act are to be found  in all three Community treaties. There are 
differences  in  the actual form they take, and in their titles, between the coal and steel Treaty 
on the one hand and the EEC and the Euratom Treaties on the other. The coal and steel Trea 
ty makes provision for only three types of legal  act - decisions, recommendations and opin 
ions (Article 14 ECSC); the EEC and Euratom Treaties provide for five forms- regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions (Article 189 EEC and  Artide 161  Eur 
atom). The changes in the pattern arose because it was recognized that the forms developed 
for the ECSC would not adequately meet the needs of the EEC and Euratom.  The new titles 
were intended to avoid the conceptual shortcomings in the legal acts provided for in the earlier 
treaty. It was felt that the distinctions between the two sets of concepts would simply have to 
be tolerated  until  the  merger of the three  Communities which  it  was  intended should take 
place at a later date. 

But if we look at the range of Community legal  instruments in terms of the person to whom 
they are addressed and their practical  effects in the Member States, we can  break them down 
as follows: 

ECSC 
(Article 14) 
decisions 
(general) 
recommendations 
decisions 
(individual) 

opmwns 

EEC 
(Article 189) 

Euratom 
(Article 161 ) 

= 
= 

= 

regulations 
directives 
decisions 

recommendations 
opinions 

= 
= 

= 

regulations 
directives 
decisions 

recommendations 
opinions 

The legal acts which enable the Community institutions to encroach furthest on the domestic 
legal systems are regulations in  the EEC and Euratom Treaties, and general decisions in the 
ECSC Treaty. This makes them by far the most important legal acts in the Community.  Two 
features very unusual in international law mark them out: their Community character, which 
means that they lay down the same law throughout the Community, regardless of State bor 
ders, and apply in full  in all  Member States; and their direct applicability, which means  that 
they  do  not have  to  be  transformed  into  domestic  law,  but confer  rights  or impose  duties 
directly on the citizens of the Community in the same way as domestic law; the Member States 
and their governing institutions and courts are bound directly by Community law and have to 
comply with it as they have to comply with domestic law.  But in spite of all their similarities 
with the statute law passed in  individual Member States they cannot strictly speaking be des 
cribed as the equivalent at European level, as they are not passed by the European Parliament 
and thus from a formal point of view at least they lack the essential characteristics of legisla 
tion of this kind. 

23 

The purpose and  effects of a  regulation, or a  general  ECSC  decision,  can be illustrated  by 
means of two examples. For the regulation we can take the fields  which has from  the beginn 
ing been dealt with mainly by means of regulations, namely agriculture . The common market 
extends  to agriculture  and  trade  in  agriculture  products  (Article  38  ( 1)  EEC),  as  we  have 
already seen. In the Community agricultural market goods have to be traded not just inside one 
country in  which  the same rules apply, but between buyers and sellers in different countries, 
so that the market can operate smoothly only if common rules are in force throughout the ter 
ritory of the Community. This requires joint management centrally for  the Community  as a 
whole, and the measures needed for the operation of the market have to have direct fo rce in all 
Member States.  Only a  regulation  has  these effects.  The purpose  and  effect  of the  general 
ECSC  decision  is  dearly illustrated  in  the  way  in  which  the Commission  intervenes  in  the 
Community steel  market.  The crisis which  had been smouldering in  the European iron and 
steel industry since 1975 grew in 1980 into the worst crisis since the war. There was a collapse 
in demand for steel on the Community market, and the world market, which led to a substan 
tial fall in prices in  the Community, even though production costs were rising. European steel 
producers' financial position worsened so far that it was feared there would be lasting damage 
to the steel industry. This would have been a major blow to the attainment of the objectives of 
the ECSC  Treaty, set out in  Article  3, particularly  the  improvement of workers' living and 
working conditions and the achievement of an orderly Community market. 

This dangerous situation required direct adjustment of steel output, binding on all steel firms, 
in order to restore  the  balance  between  supply  and  demand on the steel  market.  The only 
suitable  instrument is  the general  ECSC  decision,  as  it  is  the only  instrument which ensures 
that the necessary measures are binding and actually applied in  all Member States and by all 
steel  firms  alike. 

The  second  form  of binding  Community  legislation  is  the  directive,  which  appears in  the 
ECSC Treaty as  the recommendation. Directives are addressed to Member States, sometimes 
to all Member States and sometimes only to specified ones; ECSC recommendations may also 
be addressed to firms in the Community. Unlike the regulation or general ECSC decision, this 
form does not create new uniform Community law binding throughout the whole Commun 
ity; it requires the addressees to take such measures as may be necessary in order to achieve an 
aim  desired  by  the Community.  The directive or ECSC recommendation states an objective 
which the addressee must realize within a stated period. How this is to be done is a matter for 
the addressee.  The reasoning behind this form  of legislation is  th at it allows  intervention in 
domestic legal and economic structures to take a milder form, and in particular enables Mem 
ber States  implementing  the Community rules  to take account  of special  domestic  circum 
stances. The draftsmen of the Treaty here proceeded on the assumption, surely correct, that 
the  far-reaching  changes  in  national  arrangements  needed  to  implement  the treaties  often 
made it advisable to leave it to each State, which is  naturally in  the best position to know its 
own  circumstances,  to  judge  how  its  own  requirements  could  best  be  reconciled  with  the 
needs of the Community. 

A second guiding  principle is  also  reflected  here,  namely the desire to achieve the necessary 
measure of unity while preserving the multiplicity of national characteristics. 

When  they implement a  directive  or an  ECSC  recommendation the Member States have to 
introduce new domestic law, or recast or repeal their existing domestic legal  and administra-

24 

The  Community is both a creation of law and a source of law 

25 

t1ve rules so as to bring them into line with the objectives set in the directive or recommenda 
tion.  This form  of Community legislation  therefore provides  the chief method used  for  the 
'harmonization' process ('approximation  of laws':  see Article 100 EEC), in  which  inconsis 
tencies between the various national legal or administrative rules are removed or differences 
gradually ironed out, and for aligning the economic policy of the Member States. Apart from 
cases  in  which  an ECSC recommendation is  addressed directly to a  Community firm,  direc 
tives and ECSC recommendations do not confer direct rights and duties on Community citiz 
ens, as they are addressed solely to the Member States. Citizens acquire the relevant rights and 
duties only when the directive or recommendation is incorporated into domestic law by  the 
responsible authorities in the Member State.  This point is of no importance to the citizens as 
long as the Member States comply with their obligations.  But there would be disadvantages 
for the citizen where a  Member State does not take the necessary implementing measures to 
achieve an objective set in a directive or ECSC recommendation which would benefit him, or 
where the measures taken are inadequate. The Court of Justice has refused to accept these dis 
advantages, and has ruled that in such cases Community citizens can invoke the directive or 
recommendation directly. 

This is true only  after the time the directive  allows for  incorporation  into national law  has 
expired, and provided the relevant provision is worded clearly enough  to leave the Member 
States no discretion to determine the effect of the measures to be taken.  These tests would be 
satisfied  for example where a directive required  a  Member State to abolish a  particular tax, 
and the Member State failed to comply with its obligation within the time allowed. A citizen 
who would benefit from the abolition of the tax could invoke the directive and refuse to pay, 
once the time allowed for implementation had expired. 

As  a  rule  both regulations and directives are issued at the end of a  legislative process which 
begins with a proposal.  This process rests on a  division of labour between  the  Commission 
and the Council.  Put very  briefly,  the  Commission  proposes and the Council disposes .  But 
before  the Council  actually  reaches  a  decision  there  are  various  stages  to be  completed  in 
which, depending on the subject of the measure, it may also come before the European Parlia 
ment and the Economic and Social Committee.  The machinery  is set in motion by the Com 
mission, which must take the initiative by drawing up a proposal for the Community measure 
in  question  (we therefore speak of the Commission's right of initiative).  A proposal is prepa 
red  on the responsibility  of a  Member of the Commission  by  the  Commission department 
dealing with the particular field; frequently the department will  also consult national experts 
at this stage. The draft drawn  up here, which is a complete text, setting out the content and 
form of the measure to the last detail, goes before the Commission as a whole when  a simple 
majority  is  enough to have it adopted.  It is  now a 'Commission proposal', and is sent to the 
Council with a detailed explanation of the grounds for it . The Council  first checks whether it 
must consult other Community bodies before deciding on the proposal. The treaties give the 
European  Parliament the  right to be consulted on all  politically  important measures ('com 
pulsory consultation'). Parliament here speaks on behalf of all the citizens of the Community; 
its function is to look after their interest in the development of the Community. Failure to con 
sult Parliament in such cases is a serious irregularity and an infringement of the treaties. Apart 
from  compulsory consultation  of this  kind,  Parliament is  in  practice also  consulted  on  all 
other draft legislation ('optional consultation'). Parliament's part in the process ends with the 
adoption of a  formal  written  opinion,  which  the  President  of Parliament  forwards  to  the 
Council  and the Commission, and which may recommend amendments to the proposal. But 

26 

the Council is not legally obliged to take account of the opinions or amendments put forward 
by Parliament. Even the political will to do so has so far been somewhat grudging. With the 
greater political weight direct elections have given it Parliament intends to build its right to be 
consulted into a genuine role in the legislative process, of the kind which should be played by a 
parliament in a democratic system. 

As well as the European Parliament the treaties in some cases also oblige the Council to con 
sult the Economic and Social Committee. Consultation of the Committee is  explicitly requi 
red, for example, for  Council measures relating to the freedom of establishment (see  Article 
54 (2) EEC). But the Council is free to consult the Committee in other cases too. This is done 
very  frequently,  although it is not the general  rule as it is  with  Parliament.  As in the case of 

27 

Parliament,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee's  opinion  on  the proposal  is  sent to  the 
Council  and the Commission, and this ends its part in the process. After Parliament and the 
Committee have been consulted, the Commission proposal is once more put before the Council, 
perhaps amended by the Commission in the light of the opinions of Parliament and the Econo 
mic and Social Committee (see Article 149 (2)  EEC). It will  first  be discussed by specialized 
working parties and then by the Permanent Representatives Committee, (known as 'Coreper', 
from its French title Comite des Representants Permanents).  The importance of this Commit 
tee in the workings of the Community can  hardly be exaggerated. It is  in  permanent session, 
and coordinates the preparatory work for Council meetings, so that it is enabled to determine 
the priorities and urgency of the items on the Ministers' agenda when they meet in the Coun 
cil.  It can also reach agreement on technical points, with the Ministers merely rubber-stamp 
ing measures adopted unanimously by  the Permanent Representatives. Adoption of the pro 
posal by the Council is the final  stage in the legislative process.  The final  text, 'in the official 
languages of the Community' (Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek and Italian) is 
adopted by the Council, signed by the President of the Council, and published in the Officiail 
Journal of the European  Communities or notified to the person to whom it is  addressed. 

The procedure is different in the case of the binding legal instruments of the ECSC, the gene 
ral decision and the ECSC recommendation. The main difference from the scheme laid down 
in the  Rome Treaties lies  in the role of the Commission and the Council.  The ECSC Treaty 
gives the power to adopt these instruments not to the Council but to the Commission. In cer 
tain  specified cases they require the Council's assent, and of course this does  then enable the 
Council to block Commission measures. Before the Commission finally adopts a text it must, 
in  certain  cases  laid down  by  the ECSC  Treaty,  consult  Parliament and  the  'Consultative 
Committee' which that Treaty establishes. 

A third category of Community legal  acts consists of EEC or Euratom decisions and indivi 
dual ECSC decisions. In some cases the Community institutions may themselves be responsi 
ble for implementing the treaties, or regulations and general ECSC decisions, and this will be 
possible only if they are in a position to take measures binding on particular individuals, firms 
or Member States.  The situation in the Member States' own systems is  the same.  An  Act of 
Parliament, for example, will be applied by the authorities in  an  individual case by  means of 
an administrative measure. In the Community legal order this function is served by the indivi 
dual  decision.  The individual  decision  is  the  means  normally  available  to the  Community 
institutions to order something to be done in an individual case. The Community institutions 
can thus require a Member State or an individual to perform or to refrain from  some action, 
or can confer rights or impose duties on them. 

Lastly  there  are opinions and EEC and Euratom recommendations.  This category  of legal 
measures  is  the  last  one  explicitly  provided for  in  the  treaties;  it  enables  the  Community 
institutions  to express  a  view  to  Member  States,  and in  some  cases  to individual  citizens, 
which is not binding and does not place any legal obligations on the addressees. In the EEC and 
Euratom Treaties these non-binding legal measures are called recommendations or opinions, 
but under the ECSC Treaty only the term opinions is  used. Unhappily, in the coal  and steel 
system a 'recommendation' is  a binding legal  act, corresponding to the directives provided for 
in  the EEC  and Euratom Treaties.  In any event, while EEC and Euratom recommendations 
urge  the  addressees  to  adopt a  particular  form  of behaviour, opinions are used where  the 

28 

The European Parliament is spokesman for the citizens of the Community 

Community institutions  are called  upon  to state a  view  on a current situation or particular 
event in the Community or the Member State. 

The real significance of these recommendations and opinions is political and moral. In provid 
ing for legal acts of this kind the draftsmen of the Treaty proceeded on the expectation that, 
given the prestige of the Community institutions, and their broader view and wide knowledge 
of conditions  beyond the narrower national framework,  those concerned would voluntarily 
comply with recommendations made to them and would draw the appropriate consequences 
from  the Community institutions' assessment of a particular situation. 

These non-binding legal acts are not adopted by the legislative procedure described above, but 
are simply issued by a single Community institution. 

29 

A third source of Community law has to do with  its role at international level.  As one of the 
focal  points of the world Europe cannot confine itself to managing its own internal affairs: it 
has to concern itself with its economic, social and political relations with the world outside. 
The  Community  therefore  concludes  agreements  in  international  law,  with  non-member 
countries and with other international organizations; these range from treaties providing for 
extensive cooperation in trade or in the industrial, technical and socio-political fields to agree 
ments on trade in particular products. With the Community's economic significance growing, 
and its activities in  the field  of trade expanding, the number of agreements it  has concluded 
with non-member countries has increased substantially in the last few  years. 

The sources of Community law described so far share a common feature in that they all pro 
duce written law.  Like all  systems of law, however, the Community legal order cannot con 
sist entirely of written rules, because there will  always be gaps which have to be filled  by un 
written law.  The sources of unwritten Community law  are provided by the general princip 
les of law. These are rules reflecting the elementary concepts of law and justice which must be 
respected  by  any  system  of law. Written Community law for  the most part deals only with 
economic and social matters, and is  only to a limited extent capable of laying down rules of 
this kind, so that the general principles of law are one of the most important sources of law in 
the Community.  They allow gaps to be  filled  and questions of the interpretation of existing 
law to be settled in the fairest way. These principles are given effect when the law is  applied, 
particularly  in  the  judgments of the  Court of Justice:  under  Article  164  EEC, Article  136 
Euratom and Article 31  ECSC 'the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty the law is observed.' The main points of reference for determining 
the general principles  of law  are  the principles  common  to  the  legal  orders of the  Member 
States.  They provide the background against  which  the rule needed to resolve a  problem at 
Community level  can be developed.  So  far  the following principles have been formulated  by 
the  Court in  this way,  and thus recognized  as  unwritten sources  of law  in  the Community 
legal order: 
(i) 

aspects  of the Community's liability  for  damage sustained as  a  result  of action  by  its 
institutions or staff; 

the principle of legality in administration; 

(ii) 
(iii)  the principle of proportionality (that action must be in proportion to the end it pursues); 

(iv) 

the principle of legal certainty; 

(v) 
(vi) 

the principle that legitimate expectations must be protected; 
the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of equality of treatment; 

(vii)  the principle of entitlement to a legal hearing; 

(viii) the fundamental human rights. 

The final  source of Community law is  provided by agreements between the Member States. 
Agreements of this kind may be concluded when questions have to be settled which are closely 
linked to the Community's activities, but no powers have been transferred to the Community 
institutions; there are also full-scale international agreements  (treaties and conventions) bet 
ween the Member States aimed especially at overcoming the drawbacks of territorially limited 
arrangements  and  creating  laws  which  apply  uniformly  throughout  the  Community  (see 
Article 220 EEC).  This is  important primarily in the field  of private international law; thus 
agreements have been concluded on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments 

30 

THE COMMUNITY'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Legal act 

Enactment 

Consultation 

Dnhing of pm""'all 

~------------------------------ -----------------------------J 

in civil and commercial matters (1968) and on the mutual recognition of companies and legal 
persons (1968). 

3.  The Community is a legal order 

Finally, the Community is  a legal order, since it is  not merely a creation of law but also pur 
sues its objectives purely by  means of law. To put it briefly, it is  a Community based on law. 
The common economic and social life of the peoples of the Member States is governed not by 
the  threat of force  but by  the law of the Community. We  have already in previous chapters 
made the acquaintance of this Community law, which  in all its ramifications shapes the legal 
order. 

It is the basis of the institutional system. Community law lays down the procedure for decision 
making by  the Community institutions and regulates their relationship to each  other.  It pro 
vides  the institutions with  possibilities of action,  in the shape  of regulations,  general  ECSC 
decisions,  directives,  ECSC  recommendations  and  individual  decisions,  for  enacting  legal 
instruments binding on the Member States and their citizens. 

31 

Thus the  individual  himself becomes  a  king-pin  of the  Community.  Its legal  order  directly 
affects his  daily life to an ever-increasing extent. It accords him  rights  and imposes  on him 
duties, so that as both a citizen of his State and a subject of the Community he is governed by a 
a  phenomenon familiar from  federal constitutions.  Community 
hierarchy of legal  orders -
law also defines the relationship between the Community and the Member States.  The Mem 
ber States must take all  appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment  of the obligations arising 
out of the treaties or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They 
must  facilitate  the  achievement  of  the  Community's  tasks  and  abstain  from  any  measure 
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the treaties (see the similar wording 
on these points of Anicle 5  EEC Treaty, Article  192 Euratom Treaty and Article  86 ECSC 
Treaty). 

Apart from this, two fundamental principles govern the Community legal order: the legality 
of the acts of the Community organs and the legal protection of those subject to Community 
rules. 

The Community treaties attach great importance to the principle that the acts of the institu 
tions must be in accordance with the provisions of the Community Treaties. This principle is 
expressed in numerous provisions of the treaties: for example the three treaties, in connection 
with  the tasks of the Community and its institutions, use the expressions 'in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty', 'on the conditions provided for in this Treaty' and 'pursuant to 
this Treaty'. Just as the Community institutions are bound by the law laid down in the treaties 
when exercising their legislative and executive  authority, so they must observe Community 
secondary law  when enacting implementing provisions and dealing with  particular cases by 
means of individual decisions. The comprehensive rules of Community law , sometimes quite 
specific even on points of detail,  would have little point if the Community institutions were 
not bound to observe them scrupulously. 

Like  every  true legal  order,  the Community  legal  order provides a  self-contained system of 
legal  protection  to deal  with  disputes  concerning Community law and  to  ensure  its imple 
mentation. The focal point of this system is the Court of Justice of the European Communiti 
es. It is the supreme and at the same time the only judicial authority empowered to determine 
all questions of Community law . lts general task is described in the founding treaties as being 
to 'ensure that in the interpretation and  application of this Treaty the law is  observed'. (See 
Anicle 164 EEC Treaty, Article 136 Euratom Treaty, Article 31  ECSC Treaty.) The Court's 
duties are extremely wide-ranging. First, it acts in an advisory capacity: it can deliver opinions 
on conventions which the Community intends to conclude with States or international orga 
nizations. These opinions are legally binding.  Of increasingly  greater importance, however, 
are its functions as a judicial body. They embrace the following types of proceedings: 

(i)  Actions  against  States  which  fail  to fulfil  their  obligations  under  the  treaties  or under 
Community law. Such  actions may be initiated either by the Commission or by a  Mem 
ber State;  in practice it is  usually the Commission that  takes  the initiative.  The Court 
examines the case and decides  whether there is an infringement of the treaty. If it finds 
that an infringement to the treaty has occurred the State is bound to take immediate steps 
to comply with the Court's judgment. 

In the context of the Coun's jurisdiction to examine the validity of the acts of the Com 
munity institutions, an action may be brought on the ground of failure  to act or for the 
annulment of action taken by  those institutions. Actions on the ground of failure to act 

(ii) 

32 

Agreements between Member States are also sources of law 

may be brought against the Council and the Commission if those institutions have failed 
to  take  decisions  which  are  mandatory  under  the  treaty  or  under  a  legal  instrument 
based on the treaty. 

(iii)  Actions concerning disputes involving the non-contractual liability of the Community. 
(iv)  Proceedings seeking a review of the fines which  the Commission is permitted to impose 
in the case of certain infringements of Community law. In these cases the Court acts as a 
Court of Appeal  which  has the right either to annul  the fines  or to  increase or reduce 
them. 

(v)  Actions concerning disputes between the Community and its officials or their successors 

in title. 

{vi)  Finally, the Court acts in some cases as a Court of Arbitration when this jurisdiction is 

expressly conferred on it by  the particular contract concerned. 

The Court has, however,  a  further  very  important field  of jurisdicition.  Since its duty is  to 
ensure  the  uniform  interpretation of Community  law,  national  courts,  in  cases  where  any 
question of Community law arises, can request the Court to clarify any such points by means 
of a preliminary ruling. By these preliminary rulings the supreme European Court exercises a 
form of advisory function which is legally binding. The following are examples of matters on 
which preliminary  rulings  may be given: 

33 

!,;.> 
-f:>. 

SOURCES OF COMMUNITY LAW 

I 
THE COMMUNI  LEGAL ORDER 

Principol ~"~ 

Sources of written law 

Sources of unwritten law 

Sol»idT '""'tt' 

Conventions between the 
Member States 

Primary legislation 

Th e three Treaties 
Annexes a nd Protocols 

Amendments to 
the Trea tie> 
Accessio n 

Ge neral 
principles of law 

Customary law 

I 

Decisions o f the  representatives 
of the  Member Sta tes meeting 
within the Council 

Conventions of a  European 
character 

Internation al  agreements entered 
into  by  the EC 

General  rules of 
interna ti onal  law 

Secondary  legislation 
I 

Regulation 
Implementing 
regulatton 

Otrcctin: 

' 
Dn :"'"n 

"'--

"'--

/ 

g<:llcral 

individual 

(i) 

(ii) 

clarification of the meaning and scope of the provisions of the treaties or the regulations 
of the Council and the Commission; 

identification of the national law referred to in any  particular provision of Community 
law; 

(iii)  determination of the period of validity of a Community rule; 

(iv)  decisions on the legal acts or legal measures falling respectively under Community law or 

under national law; 

(v)  determination of the question whether Community rules are self-sufficient or require to 

be clarified or supplemented by provisions of national law; 

(vi)  examination of the validity of Community legal  acts. 

35 

The range of duties imposed on the Court shows that it performs functions which in the legal 
orders of the  Member States  are  divided  among different  types  of court -
constitutional 
courts, administrative courts, civil courts and labour courts. The Court may be regarded as a 
constitutional court in cases where is  has to decide on actions brought by the Council or the 
Commission, or by one Member State against another Member State (on account of breaches 
of obligations under the Community treaties), or when it decides on the interpretation of the 
Community treaties, particularly in the case of questions on interpretation of Community law 
referred by national courts. The Court exercises the functions of an administrative court when 
it examines the validity of decisions taken in individual cases by the Community institutions. 
Finally, in actions for damages and actions by officials arising from their service relationship 
the Court exhibits features  of a  civil  court or a  labour court.  The Court cannot,  however, 
exercise any of the functions of a criminal court in  the traditional sense,  although it has the 
power to review the fines imposed by the Commission and to reduce them where it thinks fit. 

36 

IV.  The position of Community law in relation to the legal 

order as a whole 

After all that we have learnt about the structure of the Community and its legal order, it is not 
easy to assign Community law its rightful place in the legal order as a whole and to define the 
boundaries between it and other legal orders. Two possible approaches to classifying it must 
be rejected from  the outset. Community law must not be conceived of as a mere collection of 
international agreements,  nor can it be  viewed  as  a  part or an appendage of national legal 
systems.  On the contrary, through  the establishment of the Community, the Member States 
have limited their legislative sovereignty and in so doing have created a self-sufficient body of 
law which is binding on them and on their subjects. 

How then, should the relationship between Community law and national law be described ? 

Even if Community law constitutes a legal order which is self-sufficient in relation to the legal 
orders of the Member States,  this situation must not be regarded as one in which  the Com 
munity legal order and the legal orders of the Member States are superimposed on one another 
like layers of bedrock. The fact that they are applicable to the same people, who thus become 
citizens of a national State and citizens of the Community in one person, negates such a rigid 
demarcation of these legal orders. Secondly, such an approach disregards the fact that Com 
munity law can become operational only if it becomes part of the legal orders of the Member 
States.  The truth  is  that the Community legal order  and the national legal  orders are inter 
locked and mutually dependent on one another. 

In the first  place, the relationship between these legal orders is characterized by the fact that 
Community law and  national law work in concert with one another, assist one another and 
supplement each other. On its own, the. Community legal order is not able to fully achieve the 
objectives pursued by the establishment of the European Communities.  For this,  it requires 
the  assistance and the sub-structure of national law.  Thus, the Community treaties and the 
legal  provisions  adopted  by the  Community institutions  for  their  implementation  must not 
only be observed by the Member States' institutions- the legislature, the government (includ 
ing government departments) and the judiciary, but must also be put into effect and rendered 
operational.  The  Community  legal  order must not  confront  them  as  if it  were  something 
'external' or 'foreign'; the Member States and the Community institu.tions are, on the contra 
ry,  called  upon jointly to make their contribution tu achieving the common objectives.  The 
close link and the supplementing interrelationship between  the Community legal  order and 
the national legal orders show up most clearly in the way in which directives operate, for in 
order to attain the objective laid down in a directive the latter is dependent upon national law. 
The interdependence of the Community legal order and the national legal orders is also illus 
trated by the fact that in order to remedy its own deficiencies, Community law frequently has 
recourse to the national legal orders. A final example is the enforcement of pecuniary claims 
of the European Communities against Community citizens or firms.  Although, here , the pro-

37 

cedure is governed by the law of the Member State in whose territory enforcement is effected, 
the basis for the claim and the scope for contesting it are governed solely by Community law. 

However, the relationship between Community law and national law is also characterized by 
an  occasional  'hostility'  between  the Community legal  order and the national  legal  orders. 
Here one  speaks of a  conflict between  Community law and  national  law.  Such  a  situation 
always  arises  when  a  provision of Community  law  confers  rights  and  imposes  obligations 
directly upon Community citizens while its content conflicts with a rule of national law. Con 
cealed behind this apparently simple problem area are two fundamental questions underlying 
the construction of the Community, the answers to which  were destined to become the acid 
test for the existence of the Community legal order, namely: 

(i) 
(ii) 

the direct applicability of Community law, and 
the primacy of Community law over conflicting national law. 

Firstly, the direct applicability of Community law simply means that the latter confers rights 
and  imposes obligations directly not  only  on the Community  institutions  and  the  Member 
States but also on the Community's citizens.  That bald  statement does  not, however,  get us 
very  far since the question remains of which provisions of Community law  have that effect. 
The Community treaties enlighten us in this regard only by reference to what is referred to as 
secondary legislation (enacted by  the institutions).  For example, Article 189 (2)  of the EEC 
Treaty states that a Regulation is 'directly applicable in all Member States'. 

One of the outstanding achievements of the Court of Justice of the European Communities is 
that is has enforced the direct applicability of the provisions of Community law despite the ini 
tial resistance of certain Member States and has thus guaranteed the existence of the Commun 
ity legal  order. Its case-law on this point started with  a perfectly run-of-the-mill case which, 
however, was destined to go down in the annals of the Court's case-law. In this case, a Dutch 
transport undertaking,  Van  Gend  &  Loos,  brought an action  in  a  Dutch  court against  the 
Dutch customs authorities who had charged increased customs duties on a chemical product 
imported  from  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany.  The  firm  regarded  this  practice  as  an 
infringement  of Article  12 of the  EEC  Treaty,  which  prohibited  the  Member States  from 
introducing new customs duties or increasing those which they already applied in the common 
market. In the final analysis, the outcome of these proceedings depended on the question whe 
ther individuals, also, can rely on Article 12 of the EEC Treaty against customs duties levied 
in breach of the Treaty.  As  the answer to  this  question necessitated  an interpretation of the 
EEC Treaty, the Dutch court suspended the proceedings and referred the matter to the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities. Despite the advice of numerous governments and its 
Advocate-General, the Court decided that all the rules of the founding treaties which are wor 
ded  unconditionally,  are self-sufficient and legally complete so  that their implementation or 
validity do not require any further intervention by the Member States or the Commission, can 
apply directly to individuals.  This was stated to be the case with Article 12 of the EEC Treaty 
so that the Van Gend & Loos company could also derive rights from that provision which the 
Dutch court had  to protect.  The logical  consequence  was that the  customs duties levied  in 
breach of the Treaty were declared void. In the grounds for its judgment, the Court stated that 
'the Community constitutes a new legal order  ... the subjects of which comprise not only the 
Member States  but also their nationals.  Independently  of the legislation of Member States, 
Community  law  not only imposes  obligations on individuals  but  is  also  intended  to confer 
upon them rights. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, 

38 

Community law takes precede11ce over national law;  the two are interdepende11t 

but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon indi 
viduals as well  as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community'. 

Subsequently, the Court continued to apply this case-law in regard to provisions of the EEC 
Treaty which are  of far  greater importance  to citizens  of the Community than  Article  12. 
Three judgments are noteworthy here covering the direct application of Article 48 (freedom of 
movement), Article 52 (freedom of establishment) and Article 59 (freedom to provide servic 
es). 

Freedom of movement (Article. 48 of the EEC Treaty) 

Freedom of movement means the right of all workers in the Member States of the Community 
to take up employment in any other Member State under the same conditions as national wor-

39 

kers (Article 48 (2) of the EEC Treaty). Express mention is made of the right to accept offers 
of employment  and  to stay and move  freely  in  the host country (Article 48  (3) of the  EEC 
Treaty).  The details of these rights were elaborated in Regulation (EEC) No 1612/ 68 of 15 
October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, which hence con 
fers on Community citizens rights on which they may rely before national courts. With regard 
to the guarantees afforded by Article 48 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice delivered a 
judgment to this effect in the van Duyn case. The facts of this case were as follows: a Miss van 
Duyn, a Dutch national, was in May 1973 refused leave to enter the United Kingdom in order 
to cake up employment as a secretary with the 'Church of Scientology', an organization consi 
dered by the Home Office to be 'socially harmful'. Relying on the Community rules on free 
dom of movement for workers, in particular Article 48 of the EEC Treaty, Miss van  Duyn 
brought an action before the High Court. She sought a declaration from the High Court that 
she was entitled to stay in the United Kingdom for the purpose of employment and to be given 
leave to enter the United Kingdom.  In answer to a question referred by  the High Court, the 
Court of Justice held that Article 48 of the EEC Treaty has direct effect and hence confers on 
individuals rights which are enforceable before the courts of a Member State. 

Freedom of establishment (Article 52 of the EEC Treaty) 

Freedom of establishment comprises the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed 
persons in another Member State and co set up and manage undertakings, in particular com 
panies or firms  (second paragraph of Article 52 of th_e EEC Treacy). All  existing restrictions 
on freedom  of establishment  based  on nationality  were  to be  lifted during the transitional 
period, which expired on 31  December 1969 (cf.  Article  8 (7) of the EEC Treacy)  and  for 
eigners were to be granted the right of establishment under the same conditions as nationals. 

The Court of justice was asked by the Belgian  Conseil d'Etat to  give  a  ruling on the direct 
effect of Article 52 of the EEC Treaty. The Conseil d'Etat had to decide an action brought by 
a Dutch lawyer,].  Reyners,  who wished  to assert his  rights arising out of Article  52 of the 
EEC Treaty. Mr Reyners felt obliged to bring the action after he had been denied admission to 
the profession of lawyer in Belgium because of his foreign nationality, despite the fact that he 
had passed the necessary  Belgian examinations.  In its judgment of 21  july 1974, the Court 
held chat unequal treatment of nationals and foreigners as regards establishment could no lon 
ger be maintained, as Article 52 of the EEC Treaty was directly applicable since the end of the 
transitional  period  and  hence  entitled  Community  citizens  to  take  up  and  pursue  gainful 
employment in another Member State in the same way as a national.  As  a result of chis  judg 
ment Mr Reyners had to be admitted to the legal profession in Belgium. 

Despite chis case-law of the Court of justice which favours the  Community citizen,  a  Com 
munity citizen who wishes co establish himself still  frequently encounters obstacles which he 
has difficulty in surmounting. This is because a foreigner is still allowed to establish himself in 
another Member State only if he fulfils the same conditions as are required of nationals of the 
hose country. For example, he muse have received the required domestic professional training 
or have passed the necessary examinations and obtained certificates or diplomas issued by the 
host country,  which  as a  rule is not the  case. With  a  view co  removing these obstacles, the 

40 

Freedom  of movement, a fundamental freedom 

EEC Treaty provides for the adoption of measures to coordinate Member States' rules on the 
taking up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons (Article 57 (2) of the EEC Treaty) 
and on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifica 
tions (Article 57 (1) ofthe ECC Treaty). 

Freedom to provide services (Article 59 of the EEC Treaty) 

Freedom to provide services encompasses the  self-employed  activities for which only a  tem 
porary stay in another Member State is necessary. The right of establishment is therefore not 
involved. Examples are the activities of doctors, lawyers, architects and engineers, as well as 
those of banks and insurance companies or of brokers, intermediaries and advertising agenci 
es  and technical,  craft and  artistic activities.  As  in  the case of freedom of establishment,  all 
restrictions  on  freedom  to  provide  services  should  have  been  abolished  by  the  end  of  the 
transitional period, i.e. 31  December 1969, and foreigners should have been granted the right 
to provide services under the same conditions as nationals. 

The Court of Justice was._piven an opportunity in the van Bins bergen case to establish express 
ly the direct effect of Amcle 59 of the EEC Treaty. These proceedings involved inter alia the 
question whether a Dutch legal provision to the effect that only persons habitually resident in 
the Netherlands could act as legal  representatives before an appeal court is compatible with 
the Community rules on freedom to provide services. The Court answered this question in the 

41 

negative on the ground that all restrictions to which Community citizens might be subject by 
reason of their nationality or place of residence infringe Article 59 of the EEC Treaty and are 
therefore void. 

Of the many other Treaty provisions whose direct effect within a Member State the Court has 
confirmed, the following may be singled out: Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, which guarantees 
freedom of movement for goods, and Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, ~hich guarantees equal 
pay for men and women. 

Since 1970 the Court has extended its principles concerning direct effect to provisions in direc 
tives  and in  decisions  addressed  to States.  This seems  logical  if everi  ~reaty law  can apply 
directly to Community citizens despite the fact that it is addressed to the Member States. 

The practical importance of the direct effect of Community law in the form  in  which it has 
been developed and brought to fruition by the Court of Justice can scarcely be overemphasi 
zed. It improves the position of the individual by turning the freedoms of the common market 
into rights which  may be enforced in a  court of law. The direct effect of Community law is 
therefore one of the pillars, as it were, of the Community legal order. 

The direct  effect of a provision of Community law leads to a  second, equally fundamental 
question: what happens if a provision of Community law gives rise to direct rights and obliga 
tions for the Community citizen and conflicts in substance with a  rule of national law? 

Such a conflict between Community law and national law can be settled only if one gives way 
to the other. Community legislation contains no express provision on the question.  None of 
the Community treaties contains a provision stating, for example, that Community law over 
rides national law or that it is inferior to national law. Nevertheless, the only way of settling 
conflicts between Community law and national law is to grant Community law primacy over 
national law and allow it to supersede all national provisions which diverge from a Commun 
ity rule and take their place in the national legal orders. After all, what would remain of the 
Community legal order if Community law were to be subordinated to national law?  Hardly 
anything!  Community rules could be abolished by any national law. There would no longer 
be any question of a uniform and equal application of Community law in all Member States. 
Nor would the Community be able to perform the tasks entrusted to it by the Member States. 
The ability  of the Community to function would  be  jeopardized, and the construction of a 
united Europe on which so many hopes rest would never be achieved. 

Once again it fell  to the Court of Justice of the Community, in view of these consequences, to 
establish- despite opposition from several Member States- the principle of the primacy of 
Community law which is essential to the existence of the Community legal order. In so doing, 
it erected the second pillar of the Community legal order after direct effect, which was to turn 
that legal  order at last into  a sound edifice.  Barely two years after the abovementioned Van 
Gend &  Loos judgment, questions on the interpretation of the EEC Treaty were  referred to 
the Court of Justice by a Milan justice of the peace which enabled it to clarify the principles 
underlying the conflict of laws question. In 19621taly nationalized the production and supply 
of electricity and transferred its administration to the ENEL. A shareholder of Edison Volta 
felt that his interests were adversely affected by this nationalization and refused to pay an elec· 
tricity bill of a few hundred lire. He justified his conduct before the Milan justice of the peace 

42 

mter alia  by  claiming that  the  law  nationalizing the  electricity  industry  infringed  the EEC 
Treaty. Since the outcome of this action depended on the interpretation of several articles of 
the EEC Treaty, the justice of the peace turned to the Court of Justice. In its  judgment, the 
Court made two important observations regarding the relationship between Community law 
and national law: 
Firstly: the Member States have definitively transferred sovereign rights to a Community crea 
ted by  them.  They  cannot reverse  this  process by means of subsequent unilateral  measures 
inconsistent with the Community concept. 
Secondly: it is a principle of the Treaty that no Member State may call into question the status 
of Community law as a system uniformly and generally applicable throughout the Commun 
ity. 
It follows  from this that Community law, which was enacted in accordance with  the powers 
laid down in the Treaties, has priority over any conflicting law of the Member States.  Not 
only is it stronger than earlier national law,  but it also  has a limiting effect on laws adopted 
subsequently. 

Ultimately, the Court did not in its judgment call into question the nationalization of the Itali 
an electricity industry,  but it quite emphatically established the primacy of Community law 
over national law. 

The Court has since adhered to this finding in case after case. It has, in fact, devdoped it fur 
ther in one respect.  Whereas in  the judgment just mentioned it was concerned only with the 
question of the primacy of Community law over ordinary national laws, it confirmed the prin 
ciple of primacy with regard  also  to  the relationship  between Community law and national 
constitutional law. After initial hesitation, national courts in principle accepted the interpreta 
tion of the Court of Justice. In the Netherlands no difficulties could arise in any case as the 
primacy of treaty law over national statute law is expressly laid down in the Netherlands con 
stitution (Articles 65 to 67). In the other Member States the principle of the primacy of Com 
munity law over national law has likewise been recognized by national courts. The constitu 
tional courts of the Federal Republic of Germany and the  Italian Republic depart from this 
rule,  however,  where Community law  conflicts with  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed  by 
their constitutions. In such cases, which have so far remained theoretical, a conflict should, in 
the view of those courts, be settled in favour of the national fundamental rights. 

43-11 

V.  Conclusions 

What overall picture emerges of the construction of the European Community and its legal 
order? 

The European Communities have a  relatively uniform  system of rules -
their constitution. 
Crucial factors in its creation were the comparable state of economic development of the origi 
nal Member States and their broad consensus on the means and objectives of the unification of 
Europe. The similarity of Member States' values and the existence of a  model  were decisive 
when it came to choosing a constitutional system. 

4.5 

The legal order is the true foundation of the Community and confers on it the nature of a com 
munity based on law.  Only by creating new law and upholding it can the objectives pursued 
by  setting up the Community be achieved.  The Community  legal  order has  already  accom 
plished a great deal in this respect. It is thanks not least to this new legal order that the, by  and 
large, open frontiers, the substantial exchange of goods and services , the migration of workers 
and the large number of transnational links between companies have already made the com 
mon market pan of every-day life for approximately 260 million people.  Another feature of 
the Community legal order which has already attained historic importance is its peace-making 
role. With its objective of maintaining peace and liberty, it replaces force as a means of settling 
conflicts  by  rules of law which  bind  both  individuals  and the  Member States  into  a  single 
Community.  As  a  result the Community legal order is  an imponam instrument for  the pre 
servation and creation of peace. 

The Community legal order and the Community which is based on it can survive only if obser 
vance and protection of the legal order are guaranteed. This is ensured by the two cornerston 
es of the Community legal order: the direct effect of Community law and the primacy of Com 
munity law over national law . These two principles, the existence and maintenance of which 
are  defended  with  great determination  by  the Court of Justice,  guarantee  the  uniform  and 
prior application of Community law in all  Member States. 

For all  its imperfections,  the contribution which  the Community legal order makes towards 
. solving the political, economic and social problems of the Member States of the Community is 

of inestimable value . 

46 

Table of cases 

(1) Nature and primacy of Community law 

-Case 26/62 Van Gend  &  Loos (1963) ECR 1 (Nature of Community  law; rights and obligations of 
individuals) 

-Case 6/ 64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585 (Nature of Community law; direct applicability; primacy 
of Community law) 

-Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others (1969) ECR 1 (Nature of Community law; primacy of Com 
munity law) 

- Case 106177 Simmenthal ( 1978) ECR 629 (Community  law; direct applicability; primacy). 

(2) Powers  of the Community 

-Case 8 /55 Fedechar (1954 to 1956 ) ECR 245 (Implied powers;  official fixing of prices) 

- Case 22170 ERT A ( 1971) ECR 263 (Legal personality and treaty-making powers of the Community) 

- Case 6176 Kramer (1976) ECR 1279 (External relations; international commitments; authority of the 
Community ) 

-Opinion 1/76 (1977)  ECR  760  (External  relations;  international  commitments;  authority  of the 
Community) 

(3)  Effects of legal acts 

- Case 43/71  Politi (1971 ) ECR 1039 (Regulations; direct effects) 

- Case 34/73 Variola (1973) ECR 981  (Regulations; direct effects) 

- Case 65/75 Tasca (1976) ECR 291  (Regulations; direct effects) 

-Case 31178 Bussone (1978) ECR 2429 (Regulations; direct effects) 

- Case 177/78 Pigs  and bacon ( 1979) ECR 2161  (Regulations;  direct effects) 

- Case 2174 Reyners ( 1974) ECR 631  (Direct applicability; freedom of establishment ) 

- Case 11177 Hugh Patrick (1 977) ECR 1199 (Direct applicability; right of establishment) 

47 

Case 33/74 van Binsbergen (1974) ECR 1299 (Direct applicability; freedom  to provide services) 

-Case 167173 Commission v  France (1974} ECR 359 (Direct applicability; freedom of movement} 

- Case 41174 VanDuyn ( 1974) ECR 1337 (Direct applicability; freedom of movement) 

- Case 9170 Grad (1970) ECR 825 (Decisions; direct applicability) 

- Case 20/70 T ransports Lesage  &  Cie (1970) ECR 861  (Decisions; direct applicability) 

-Case 33170 SACE  (1970) ECR 1213 (Directives; direct applicability) 

- Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (1977) ECR 11 3 (Directives; direct applica-
bility} 

-Case 38177 Enka BV (1977) ECR 2203 (Directives; direct applicability} 

-Case 21178 Delkvist (1978) ECR 2327 (Directi ves; direct applicability) 

-Case 148/78 Ratti (1979) ECR 1629 (Directives; direct applicability} 

(4) Fundamental rights 

-Case 29 / 69  Stauder (1969) ECR 419 (Fundamental rights; general principles oflaw) 

-Case 11170 lntcrnationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125 (Fundamental rights; general prin-
ciples of law) 

- Case  4/73 Nold (1974) ECR 491  (Fundamental rights; general  principles of law; common consti tu 
tional  traditions) 

- Case 36175 Rutili (1975) ECR 1219 (Equal treatment; reference to the ECHR) 

-Case 175/73 Amalgamated European Public Service Union (1974) ECR 917 (Freedom to form  asso-
ciations) 

-Case 130/75 Prais (1976) ECR 1589 (Freedom of religion) 

- Case 117176 Quellmehl (1977) ECR 1753 (Principle of equal ity} 

- Case  48175  Royer (1976) ECR 497 (Freedom of movement; right of residence; protection of public 
policy, public security and public health} 

-Case 8/77 Sagulo (1977) ECR 1495 (Freedom of movement; right of entry and residence; right flow 
ing directly from  Community law) 

-Cases  166173, 146/73 Rheinmuhlen I,  II  (1974) ECR 33 and  139 (Extent to which national  courts 
are bound by  rulings of superior courts) 

- Case 44/79 Hauer (1979 ) ECR 3727 (Fundamental  rights;  right  to property} 

-Case 85 /79  Hoffmann-La  Roche (1979) ECR 461  (Fundamental  rights;  principle of the right to be 
heard) 

-Joined Cases 41179, 121179 and 796179 Testa, Maggio and Vitale (1980 ) ECR 1979 (Fundamental 
rights; right flowing  directly  from  Comm unity law; principle of proportionality) 

48 

( 5) General principles of law (selection) 

(a) Legal certainty 

-Joined Cases 18 and 35 / 65 Gunnann (1966) ECR 103 

-Case 78/74 Deuka (1975 ) ECR 421 

-Case 265/78 Ferwerda (1980) ECR 617 

- Case 61/79 Denkavit (1980) ECR 1205 

-Joined Cases 66, 127 and 128 /79 Salumi (1980) ECR 1237 

-Case 826/79 Mireco (1980) ECR 2559 

(b) Proportionality 

-Case 8/77 Sagulo (1977) ECR 1495 

-Case 122 /78 Buitoni (1979) ECR 677 

-Case 154/78 Valsabbia (1980) ECR 907 

- Case 808/79 Pardini (1980) ECR 2103 

(c)  Protection of legitimate expectations 

-Case 74/ 74 CNTA (1975 ) ECR 533 

-Case 126/76 Gebriider Dietz (1977) ECR 2431 

-Case 68/77 IFG (1978) ECR 353 

- Case 146 /77 British Beef (1978) ECR 1347 

- Case 96/77 Bauche ( 1978) ECR 383 

-Joined Cases 12/77, 18/77 and 21 177 Debayser (1978 ) ECR 553 

-Case 103/77 Scholten-Honig (1978 ) ECR 2037 

-Case 88 /78 Kenderma nn (1978) ECR 2477 

-Case 95/78 Dulciora (1979) ECR 1549 

- Case 730/79 Philip  Morris (1980) ECR 2671 

-Case 108/81 Amylum (1982) ECR 3107 

49  -)D 

Further reading 

EEC Publications 

Community law.  Extract from the 17th General report on the activities of the Communities in  1983 
(Offprint). ECSC, ECC, EAEC, Commission.  Lu xembourg:  EC 1967 (1968) -1982 (1983) 

LOUIS, Jean-Victor- The  Community  legal order.  EC, Commission.  Luxembourg:  EC  1980.  144 p. 

European perspectives 

Other publications 

AUDRETSCH, H. A.  H.- Supervision in European Community law.  Observance by the Member States of 
their treaty obligations. A treatise on international and supra-national supervision. Amsterdam (etc.): 
North Holland 1978. XIV, 304 p. 

BEUTLERIBIEBER/PJPKORN/STEIL  - Die  Europiiische  Gemeinschaft  - Rechtsordnung  und  Politik. 

2. Auf!., 1982. 477 S. 

BLECKMANN, Albert- Europarecht.  Das Recht der Europiiischen  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.  3. neubearb. 
und erw.  Auf!.  Kiiln  (etc.) Heymann 1980. XV, 458 S.  Academia  juris.  Lehrbiicher  der Rechtswis 
senschaft 

BORSANI,  Franco E.  - Diritto  d'Europa.  lntroduzione  al  diritto delle  Comunita europee.  Milano:  Fag 

1981. 215 p. 

BRED!MAS,  Anna- Methods  of interpretation and Community law.  Amsterdam (etc.):  North Holland 

1978. XVIII, 219 p.  European Studies in law.  6 

CARTOU, Louis- Organisations europeennes. Paris, 5' ed. 1975 

CoNSTANTINEsco,  Leontin-Jean- Das Recht der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften. Baden-Baden:  Nomos 

1977. Vol.  I. Das institutionelle Recht 

DENtAU,jean Fran~ois- Le Marc he Commun . Paris, 11' ed. 1974 

(Die)  Europiiische  Gemeinschaft.  Rechtsordnung  und Politik.  Bengt  Beutler,  Roland  Bieber, Jiirn Pip 

korn, Jochen Streil. 2. Auf!. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1982. 537 S. 

VON DER GROEBENIVON BoECKHITHIESING- Kommentar zum EWG- Vertrag.  2  Bde., 3. Auf!.  1983 

HARTLEY, T.  C.  -The foundations of European Community law: an introduction to the constitutional 
and  administrative  law  of the  European  Community.  Oxford:  Clarendon  1981.  XXXIV,  551  p. 
Bibliogr. 

51 

IPSEN,  Hans Peter- Europiiise'lies Gemeinschaftsrecht. 1972. 1092 S. 

KAPTEYN,  P. J. G.; VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,  P.- Handboek voor de Europese Gemeenschappen.  3de, 
geheel herz. dr. Vol. 1A: Inleiding tot het recht van de Europese Gemeenschappen. Deventer: Kluwer 
1980 

Karnovs EF-samling.  Med kommentarer under red.  a f Ole Due, Ole Lando og WE von  Eyben.  2. udg. 

K"'benh avn:  Karnov.  1978. X I, 1090 s. 

KAPTEYN/VERLOREN VAN  THEMAAT- lnleiding tot het recht van de  Europese Gemeenschappen.  2. A. 

1974 

LASOK,  D.; BRIDGE, J. W.- Introduction to the law and institutions of the European Communities.  3rd 

ed. London:  Butterworth  1982. LVI, 453 p . 

LIPSTEIN- The Law of the European Economic Community.  1974 

MARE~CEAU, M arc- De directe werking van het Europese gemeenschapsrecht.  Deventer:  Kluwer 1978. 

X Ill, 330 biz. Europese monografieen. 24 

MATHIJSEN, P. S.  R. F.- A guide to European Community law. Pref. by J.  D. B. Mitchell. 3rd ed. Lon 

don:  Sweet and Maxwell1980.  XXXIII, 256 p. 

MEGRET/LOUISIVIGNES/WAELBROECK- Le droit de Ia  Communaute Economique Europeenne.  7  vol., 

Bruxelles, 1970 

MONACO, Riccardo- Lineamenti di diritto pubb/ico europeo. 2e ed., Milano  1975 

NICOLAYSEN, Gert- Europiiisches Gemeinschaftsrecht.  1979. 216 S. 

PANEBIANCO,  Massimo -

Introduzione  a/ diritto  del  Mercato  comune europeo.  Norme  comunitarie, 

nazionali e regionali. Salerno: Edisud 1980. 216 p. 

PARRY, Anthony; HARDY, Stephen- EEC law.  2nd ed. with James Dinnage. London: Sweet &  M axwell 

1981. LVI, 531  p. 

PLENDER,  Richard- A practical introduction to European Community law.  London: Sweet &  Maxwell 

1980. XXIII, 166 p. 

PocAR, Fausto- Lezioni di diritto delle Comunita europee.  2a ed. Milano: Giuffre 1979. XXIV, 282 p. 

QUADRI/MONACO/TRABUCCHI- Trattato istitutivo della Comunita economica europea.  Commemario, 

Milano 1965 

Q UADRI/ MONAco/TRABUCCHI - Trattato istitutivo della  Comunita europea del carbone e dell'acciaio. 

Commentario, Milano 1970 

Simmonds (ed.), Encyclopedia of European Community Law.  9  vol., London-Edinburgh 1973 

SMITIHERZOG- The Law of the European Community.  A Commentary on the EEC-Treaty, Vol.  1-5, 

Losebl.  New York 1976 

WOHLFARTH/EVERLING/GLAESNERISPRUNG- Kommentar zum EWG- Vertrag.  1960 

WYATT,  Derrick;  DASHWOOD,  Alan- The  substantive  law of the  EEC.  London:  Sweet  &  Maxwell 

1980. XXVI, 386 p. 

52 

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Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 

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EN 

The  legal  order  created  by  the  European  Com 
munity has become a permanent feature  of politi 
cal  reality  in  the  10 Member States of the  Euro 
pean Community. 

I '  

On the basis of the  European Treaties (European 
Coal and Steel Community,  European Economic 
Community and European Atomic Energy  Com 
munity (Euratom)), which were signed in Paris in 
1951  and  Rome  in  1957, thousands  of decisions 
are taken each year which have a major impact on 
the running of the Member States and on the lives 
of European citizens.  The individual  ceased  long 
ago to be a  citizen merely of his town, locality or 
State: he is  now a Community citizen too. 

The purpose  of this  publication is  to  explain the 
European  legal  order  to  those  citizens.  It is  ad 
dressed primarily to non-lawyers and tries to des 
cribe  the  Treaties  in  terms  intelligible  to  the  lay 
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