 Although the PVA 13th Army had a nominal strength of 230,000 men, its actual strength during the battle could be as low as 150,000 men. The PVA 66th Corps, for example, had only 6,600 men per division at the start of the battle, as opposed to the expected 10,000 men per division. There were also only one firearm available for every three Chinese soldiers, and the rest were employed as grenade throwers. Because most of the Chinese howitzers and guns were left behind in Manchuria, mortars were the only artillery support available for the Chinese. For the counteroffensive, the average Chinese soldier were issued with only five days worth of rations and ammunition, and resupply could only be obtained by scavenging on the battlefield. To compensate for its shortcomings, the Chinese relied extensively on night attacks and infiltrations in order to avoid the UN firepower. The primitive logistics system had also allowed the Chinese to maneuver over the rough hilly terrains, thus enabled them to by-pass the UN defenses and to surround the isolated UN positions. Because the Chinese had captured large numbers of Nationalist weapons during the Chinese Civil War, most of the Chinese weapons were composed of US made small arms such as the Thompson submachine gun, the M1 Garand rifle, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, the bazooka and the M2 mortar.
