text:
 18.11.2006
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 281/41
 Prasība, kas celta 2006. gada 25. septembrī — Grieķijas Republika pret Komisiju
 (Lieta T-263/06)
 (2006/C 281/72)
 Tiesvedības valoda — grieķu
 Lietas dalībnieki
 Prasītāja: Grieķijas Republika (pārstāvji — I. Chalkias, G. Kanellopoulos)
 Atbildētāja: Eiropas Kopienu Komisija
 Prasītājas prasījumi:
 —
 atcelt Komisijas 2006. gada 27. jūlija lēmumu, ar ko no Kopienas finansējuma izslēdz atsevišķus dalībvalstu izdevumus, kurs tās attiecinājušas uz Eiropas Lauksaimniecības virzības un garantiju fonda (ELVGF) Garantiju nodaļu, izziņots ar dokumenta numuru K (2006)3331, galīgais, un publicēts ar Nr. 2006/554/EK (1);
 —
 pakārtotā veidā, grozīt to zemāk norādītajā veidā;
 —
 piespriest Eiropas Kopienu Komisijai atlīdzināt tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 Pamati un galvenie argumenti
 Komisija ar apstrīdēto lēmumu neiekļāva, veicot grāmatojumu noskaidrošanu atbilstoši Regulai Nr. 729/70 (2) neiekļauj Kopienas finansējumā inter alia atsevišķus izdevumus, kas Grieķijas Republikai radušies saistībā ar lauku attīstības pasākumiem, kas tika deklarēti ELVGF Garantiju nodaļā.
 Prasītāja apgalvo, ka vispārējs pamatojums, Komisijas Lēmuma K (2006)3331, galīgais, atcelšanai ir būtisks procesuālo noteikumu pārkāpums, kas attiecināms uz grāmatojumu noskaidrošanu, ko paredz Regulas Nr. 1663/95 (3) 8. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunkta trešā daļa. It īpaši tā norāda, ka Komisija nav veikusi divpusējas sarunas ar Grieķijas iestādēm attiecībā uz pārkāpuma, kas tika attiecinātas uz to smaguma un finansiālo zaudējumu novērtēšanu, kas radās Eiropas Kopienai; pakārtoti tā norāda uz Komisijas nepietiekošo ratione temporis, lai uzliktu par pienākumu veikt attiecīgās finanšu korekcijas.
 (1) OV L 218, 12. lpp.
 (2) Padomes 1970. gada 21. aprīļa Regula (EEK) Nr. 729, par kopējās lauksaimniecības politikas finansēšanu (OV L 94, 13. lpp.).
 (3) Komisijas 1995. gada 7. jūlija Regula (EEK) Nr. 1663/95, ar ko nosaka sīki izstrādātus noteikumus par to, kā piemērot Padomes Regulu (EEK) Nr. 729/70 attiecībā uz ELVGF Garantiju nodaļas grāmatojumu noskaidrošanas procedūru (OV L 158 6. lpp.).


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 4.8.2016
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 L 211/31
 DECYZJA WSPÓLNEGO KOMITETU EOG
 NR 93/2015
 z dnia 30 kwietnia 2015 r.
 zmieniająca załącznik II (Przepisy techniczne, normy, badania i certyfikacja) do Porozumienia EOG [2016/1276]
 WSPÓLNY KOMITET EOG,
 uwzględniając Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym (zwane dalej „Porozumieniem EOG”), w szczególności jego art. 98,
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)
 W Porozumieniu EOG należy uwzględnić rozporządzenie wykonawcze Komisji (UE) 2015/415 z dnia 12 marca 2015 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie wykonawcze (UE) nr 540/2011 w odniesieniu do przedłużenia okresu zatwierdzenia substancji czynnych etefon i fenamifos (1).
 (2)
 Należy zatem odpowiednio zmienić załącznik II do Porozumienia EOG,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZĄ DECYZJĘ:
 Artykuł 1
 W pkt 13a (rozporządzenie wykonawcze Komisji (UE) nr 540/2011) w rozdziale XV w załączniku II do Porozumienia EOG dodaje się tiret w brzmieniu:
 „—
 32015 R 0415: rozporządzeniem wykonawczym Komisji (UE) 2015/415 z dnia 12 marca 2015 r. (Dz.U. L 68 z 13.3.2015, s. 28).”.
 Artykuł 2
 Teksty rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) 2015/415 w języku islandzkim i norweskim, które zostaną opublikowane w Suplemencie EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej, są autentyczne.
 Artykuł 3
 Niniejsza decyzja wchodzi w życie z dniem 1 maja 2015 r., pod warunkiem dokonania wszystkich notyfikacji przewidzianych w art. 103 ust. 1 Porozumienia EOG (*) lub z dniem wejścia w życie decyzji Wspólnego Komitetu EOG nr 203/2014 z dnia 30 września 2014 r. (2), w zależności od tego, która z tych dat jest późniejsza.
 Artykuł 4
 Niniejsza decyzja zostaje opublikowana w sekcji EOG i w Suplemencie EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 30 kwietnia 2015 r.
 W imieniu Wspólnego Komitetu EOG
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 Przewodniczący
 (1) Dz.U. L 68 z 13.3.2015, s. 28.
 (*) Nie wskazano wymogów konstytucyjnych.
 (2) Dz.U. L 202 z 30.7.2015, s. 57.


type: wikipedia

text:
Mount Mitchell kan syfta på följande platser:
 Antarktis
 Mount Mitchell, Antarktis,
 Australien
 Mount Mitchell, Queensland, berg,
 Kanada
 Mount Mitchell, Alberta, berg,
 Mount Mitchell, British Columbia, berg,
 Sydafrika
 Mount Mitchell (berg i Sydafrika), Östra Kapprovinsen, Amathole District Municipality,
 USA
 Mount Mitchell, berg, North Carolina, Yancey County,
 Mount Mitchell (berg i USA, Oregon), Clackamas County,
 Mount Mitchell (berg i USA, Washington), Skamania County,
 Robotskapade Australienförgreningar
 Robotskapade Kanadaförgreningar
 Robotskapade Sydafrikaförgreningar
 Robotskapade USAförgreningar


type: legislation

text:
 17.7.2014
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 210/13
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) Nr. 777/2014
 af 16. juli 2014
 om faste importværdier med henblik på fastsættelse af indgangsprisen for visse frugter og grøntsager
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1234/2007 af 22. oktober 2007 om en fælles markedsordning for landbrugsprodukter og om særlige bestemmelser for visse landbrugsprodukter (fusionsmarkedsordningen) (1),
 under henvisning til Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 af 7. juni 2011 om gennemførelsesbestemmelser til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1234/2007 for så vidt angår frugt og grøntsager og forarbejdede frugter og grøntsager (2), særlig artikel 136, stk. 1, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Ved gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 fastsættes der på basis af resultatet af de multilaterale handelsforhandlinger under Uruguayrunden kriterier for Kommissionens fastsættelse af faste importværdier for tredjelande for de produkter og perioder, der er anført i del A i bilag XVI til nævnte forordning.
 (2)
 Der beregnes hver arbejdsdag en fast importværdi i henhold til artikel 136, stk. 1, i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 under hensyntagen til varierende daglige data. Derfor bør nærværende forordning træde i kraft på dagen for offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 De faste importværdier som omhandlet i artikel 136 i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 fastsættes i bilaget til nærværende forordning.
 Artikel 2
 Denne forordning træder i kraft på dagen for offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 16. juli 2014.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 For formanden
 Jerzy PLEWA
 Generaldirektør for landbrug og udvikling af landdistrikter
 (1) EUT L 299 af 16.11.2007, s. 1.
 (2) EUT L 157 af 15.6.2011, s. 1.
 BILAG
 Faste importværdier med henblik på fastsættelse af indgangsprisen for visse frugter og grøntsager
 (EUR/100 kg)
 KN-kode
 Tredjelandskode (1)
 Fast importværdi
 0702 00 00
 MK
 69,6
 TR
 67,1
 ZZ
 68,4
 0707 00 05
 AL
 74,4
 MK
 27,7
 TR
 76,0
 ZZ
 59,4
 0709 93 10
 TR
 90,3
 ZZ
 90,3
 0805 50 10
 AR
 119,4
 BO
 89,3
 CL
 123,3
 EG
 75,0
 TR
 155,1
 UY
 124,0
 ZA
 100,9
 ZZ
 112,4
 0808 10 80
 AR
 213,3
 BR
 115,4
 CL
 115,0
 NZ
 131,0
 US
 143,9
 ZA
 142,3
 ZZ
 143,5
 0808 30 90
 AR
 163,1
 CL
 132,2
 NZ
 191,9
 ZA
 92,2
 ZZ
 144,9
 0809 10 00
 BA
 82,8
 TR
 226,4
 XS
 87,6
 ZZ
 132,3
 0809 29 00
 TR
 340,2
 ZZ
 340,2
 0809 30
 MK
 70,6
 TR
 148,2
 XS
 50,2
 ZZ
 89,7
 0809 40 05
 BA
 71,9
 ZZ
 71,9
 (1) Landefortegnelse fastsat ved Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1833/2006 (EUT L 354 af 14.12.2006, s. 19). Koden »ZZ« = »anden oprindelse«.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
William Holmes, of Baltimore county, died in the year 1881, leaving a will, executed ten years previously, which created an estate in favor of the testator's widow during her life or widowhood in a designated lot of ground in Baltimore City, upon which it was recited that he was about to erect a dwelling, together with the household furniture of *Page 212
 which the testator should die possessed, with remainder to his sons successively for life in the order of their ages, and with provision for the ultimate sale of the property and division of the proceeds equally among all the testator's grandchildren. It was provided that all of the children should have a home in the dwelling mentioned until their marriage. The will then proceeds as follows:
 "I also order and direct that the sum of one hundred thousand dollars be invested by my executors, in good and safe ground rents in the City of Baltimore, the income and rents derivable therefrom to be paid to my said wife, Anna P. Holmes, so long as she remains my widow, and in case she marries again, one-third of said rents and income to be paid to her from the time of said marriage until her death."
 "All the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed, I order and direct to be divided in as many parts as I may leave children living at the time of my death, each child to have one of the said parts, to be held by them for and during the term of their natural lives, respectively, and from and immediately after the death of each one of said children, then the said share or portion to go to the child or children of the said deceased child then living, and to their heirs and assigns absolutely, but in the event of the death of any one of my said children without leaving lawful issue living at the time of his or her death, then the share or portion of the one so dying to go to such of my children that may then be living, to be held as the share or portion herein devised to each of my children is held, with the same limitation over to the children of such child or children, and in order that the rest and residue of my estate may be equally divided among all my children and their descendants, as herein provided, I direct that all sums of money that may be given by me to my children upon their marriage, and in case my life insurance policy in the New York Mutual Life Insurance Company shall be payable to any one or two of my children, then in that event, I direct that all such sums of money shall be charged to said children, respectively." *Page 213
 The testator was survived by his wife, named in the will, and by seven children, two of whom were adult daughters born of a former marriage. The widow continued to occupy with her children the home described in the will until her death, which occurred in 1884. Her stepdaughter had been married for a number of years and resided elsewhere. The estate remained unsettled during the lifetime of the widow, and the separate investment of $100,000.00 directed by the will was not made, but she received the whole income of the estate until the time of her death. The home property was subsequently sold under proceedings in equity upon allegation and proof that a sale and investment of the proceeds under the limitations of the will would be for the benefit of all parties interested. Independently of this property the estate consisted principally of a ground rent having a redeemable value of about $127,000.00 and securities appraised at approximately $33,000.00. This portion of the estate has been held and administered by successive trustees appointed by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County as an entire trust without any division of the corpus, the income being paid since the death of the widow to the life beneficiaries mentioned in the residuary clause of the will. The groundrent was eventually redeemed, and a considerable increase in value over the appraisment was realized from the sale of certain shares of stock. The estate as now invested amounts to about $178,000.00.
 The testator's eldest son, Edward Abbott Holmes, died intestate and without issue on June 24th, 1911. He was survived by a widow to whom letters of administration on his estate were issued. The other children of the testator are all living, and there are a number of grandchildren. The administratrix of the estate of the deceased son filed a petition in the equity cause in which the trust has been administered naming the present trustee and all the testator's children and grandchildren in being as parties, praying for a construction of the will, and asserting, as the correct theory *Page 214
 of interpretation, that the fund of $100,000.00, directed to be invested for the benefit of the widow of the testator during her life or widowhood, did not pass by way of remainder under the residuary clause of the will, but was distributable as in case of intestacy, and that in any event, under the limitations governing the disposition of the residuary estate, the entire title was vested in the testator's children by virtue of the Rule in Shelley's Case. Upon this theory the contention is made that Edward Abbott Holmes was entitled, in his separate and absolute right, from the time of his mother's death, to one-seventh of the whole estate which has since been held and administered upon the assumption that it was subject to a continuing trust. This contention was not sustained by the learned judge who decided the case below, and from his order dismissing the petition the administratrix has appealed.
 It is argued that the words "rest and residue" were not used in this instance by the testator in the general sense of comprehending every interest in his estate of which he had not made previous disposition in his will, but that they were intended to indicate only the residue in the hands of the executor after the investment of $100,000.00 in groundrents, and that even if the interest in remainder in that fund is properly to be included in the residuary estate, the Rule in Shelley's Case is effective, directly or by analogy, to vest a complete title in the children of the testator to that portion of the estate, because, as it is asserted, the property is made to pass after the life estates to the same classes of persons who would take if the respective life tenants were the absolute owners and died intestate.
 In support of the first of these propositions it is pointed out that after providing for the investment of the $100,000.00 fund the testator directed that all the rest and residue of his estate be divided into as many parts as he might have children living at the time of his death and that, after due equalization on account of marriage gifts and life insurance payments, each child should have one of the shares, "to *Page 215
 be held by them during the term of their natural lives respectively," and it is urged that the testator could not have intended the interests in remainder in a fund which was to be invested for the benefit of his widow for her life or widowhood to be included in a residuary estate which was made subject to division among his children as of the time of his death.
 The principle is elementary that a general residuary clause will be held to preclude intestacy as to any part of the estate, unless the clear intent of the will prevents such a construction. As the words "rest and residue" are in themselves comprehensive enough to include any interest in the estate of the testator not previously devised or bequeathed, "the safest course," to use the language of LORD ELDON, "is to abide by the words unless upon the whole will there is something amounting almost to demonstration that the plain meaning of the words is not the meaning of the testator." Crooke v. De Vandes, 9 Vesey, 197; Hambleton v.Darrington, 36 Md. 445.
 In Lavender v. Rosenheim, 110 Md. 153, it was said: "The abhorrence of Courts to intestacy, under a will, may be likened to the abhorrence of nature to a vacuum," and that such a result will "never be reached if it can be avoided without violation of clearly controlling legal principles." The opinion of JUDGE PEARCE in that case quoted with approval the language of LORD ALVANLEY, M.R., in Booth v. Booth, 4 Vesey, 407, as previously quoted by JUDGE ALVEY in Dulany v. Middleton,72 Md. 75, that: "Every intendent is to be made against holding a man to die intestate, who sits down to dispose of the residue of his property." In Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 311, it is declared that there is "always a strong disposition in the Courts to construe a residuary clause so as to prevent an intestacy with regard to any part of the testator's estate, unless there is an apparent intention to the contrary," and it was held to be "immaterial how it happens that any part of the property is undisposed of — whether by the death of a legatee, or by the failure *Page 216
 of the testator to provide for all the events that may happen upon which the bequest may depend for its complete effect." In that connection the statement of SIR WILLIAM GRANT, in Leake v.Robinson, 2 Meriv. 392, is quoted, that: "* * * it must be a very peculiar case indeed in which there can at once be a residuary clause and a partial intestacy, unless some part of the residue itself be not well given."
 In the case before us the terms of the will do not, in our judgment, require the construction for which the appellant contends and which would result in an intestacy as to more than half of the testator's estate. We fully concur in the opinion expressed by JUDGE BURKE below, that there is "no good reason why a partial intestacy should be forced upon the testator by giving to the words `all the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed' used in the third item, the restrictive meaning which would work that result." When we consider that the provision referring to the $100,000.00 fund did not merely limit the widow to a life interest, but contemplated that in the event of her re-marriage she was to receive but one-third of the income for life, it is evident that we should have to resort to a much narrower construction than the settled rule we have stated would permit, in order to hold that the testator did not intend the residuary clause to include the substantial interest in the fund remaining for the disposition after the primary and partial bequests were satisfied. While the direction as to the residue, requires that it be divided into as many shares as there were children of the testator living at the time of his death, it does not necessarily restrict the division to that particular period, or prevent the gratification of the general intent, clearly apparent from the whole will, that, except as to the home property, the entire estate of the testator should go eventually to his children equally for life with the remainders indicated.
 The question raised as to the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case to the limitations of the residuary clause has given us no difficulty. This rule is not favored in the law *Page 217
 as it disregards the testator's expressed intent. Hall v.Gradwohl, 113 Md. 297; Reilly v. Bristow, 105 Md. 332. It has been abrogated by statute as to instruments executed after May 31, 1912. (Acts of 1912, Chapter 144.) It is never applied except when the manifest purpose of the disposition is to vest the title, after the termination of the life estate, in precisely the same classes of persons to whom it would pass if the life tenant, dying intestate, were the owner of the entire interest. This condition existed in the case of Cook v. Councilman,109 Md. 622, on which the appellant mainly relies. In that case the devise was to one for life and upon the death to his child or children and their heirs, and in the event of the death of the life tenant without leaving a child or children or descendant, then to such persons as would, under the laws of Maryland, inherit the property as his heirs, if he had died intestate and seized in fee. The limitations in the present case are essentially different. The gift as to each of the testators children is to the child for life and after his death to his child or children then living, and to their heirs absolutely, but in the event of the death of the life tenant without issue living at the time of his death, then to those of the testator'schildren who may then be living, to be held under the samelimitations as the respective shares devised and bequeathed to them in the first instance. It is plain that, under the provisions as to the remainder at the expiration of any particular life estate, the property is not made to take the same course of descent and distribution it would follow if the life beneficiary held the absolute estate and died intestate. He is not made the "terminus or ancestor by reference to whom the succession is to be regulated." Hall v. Gradwohl, supra;Fulton v. Harman, 44 Md. 263. Upon his death without issue the estate is not given to those who may be his heirs, or even to the heirs of the testator generally, but the remainder is expressly limited to the testator's children then surviving. To such a limitation it is clear the Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply. *Page 218
 The appellant's intestate, as a life beneficiary under the residuary clause of his father's will, was entitled to a due proportion of the income of the entire estate from the time of his mother's death in 1884 until his own death in 1911, and this he appears to have regularly received; but according to the plain purpose of the will, he was not entitled absolutely to any part of the corpus of the estate, and the petition of his personal representative asserting such a right was properly dismissed.
 Order affirmed, the costs to be paid out of the trust estate.


text:
Frydrichas Vilhelmas Jozefas fon Šelingas (1775 m. sausio 27 d. – 1854 m. rugpjūčio 20 d.) – vokiečių filosofas.
 Gyvenimas
 Friedrichas Wilhelmas Josephas Schellingas buvo labai anksti subrendusio proto mąstytojas: būdamas septyniolikos metų jaunuolis įgijo magistro laipsnį, o dvidešimties buvo pakviestas užimti katedrą Jenoje; jau tada jis buvo vertinamas kaip daugelio darbų autorius, jį rėmė Fichte ir Goethe. Kaip tik tuo metu Jenoje gimė „romantinė mokykla“, kuriai, be kitų, priklausė Schlegeliai, Novalis, Tieckas ir kurios filosofu tapo Schellingas. Jau tada jis nutolo nuo Fichte‘s, kuris pirmasis jį patraukė į filosofiją, ir nuo Hegelio, su kuriuo buvo kolegos ir kartu dirbo universitete. Viurcburge, kur nuo 1803 metų ėmė vadovauti katedrai, jo pažiūros toliau kito, domėjimasis religija, ypač estetika. Meną dabar jis laikė aukščiausiąja žmogaus kūryba, tad nieko nuostabaus, jog metė universitetą, kad užimtų sekretoriaus vietą Dailiųjų menų akademijoje Miunchene (1806–1820). Vis dėlto vėliau grįžo į darbą universitete, pirmiausia Erlangene, o nuo 1827 metų Miunchene. Tai buvo Hegelio triumfo laikai, Schellingas buvo beveik visiškai užmirštas. Tačiau jį prisiminė Prūsijos karalius Frydrichas Vilhelmas IV, kuris vis dar simpatizavo tuomet jau atgyvenusioms romantinėms pažiūroms, ir 1841 m. Pakvietė seną mąstytoją į Berlyną su ta ypatinga intencija, kad šis sudarytų priešpriešą ateistiniams hegelininkų polinkiams. Schellingą karštai sveikino Berlyne; puiki, daug žadanti pradžia jaunystėje, o vėliau ilga tyla žadino smalsumą. Tačiau jis vilčių nepateisino ir trumpai padirbęs nusišalino nuo universiteto veiklos.
 Ankstyva branda, ilgas gyvenimas, darbas penkiuose universitetuose ir poroje akademijų–tokia buvo Schellingo dalia. Įžvalgus ir sumanus, bet perdėm stokojantis tikslumo, neturintis mokslinio metodo, jis buvo pusiau filosofas, pusiau poetas. Ir pats filosofiją laikė greičiau įkvėpimo ir genialumo nei tyrinėjimo dalyku; tai buvo tipiškas romantizmo požiūris, ir Schellingas labiau nei kas kitas nusipelno romantinio filosofo vardo.
 Filosofinės idėjos
 Veikaluose „Apie pasaulinę dvasią“ ir „Natūrfilosofijos sistema“ F. W.J. Schellingas grąžino gamtai tą ontologinį turtą, kurį iš jos buvo atėmęs J. G. Fichte. Sekdamas G. W. Leibnizu, jis suteikia gamtai dinamišką pradą. Remdamasis J. G.Fichte‘s idėja, kad bet kurį veiksmą sukelia priešinimasis, gamtoje jis įžvelgė dinamiškąjį pradą. Joje esančias priešingas jėgas gamta priverčia sąveikauti vienybės principas būdingas cheminiams procesams (jų metu vyksta oksidacija ir regeneracija, taip pat deguonies aplinkoje), optiniam spinduliavimui, šiluminei energijai, elektrai ir magnetizmui; Schellingo sistemą Novalis pavadino „universalia oksidacija“. Šiandien „Natūrfilosofijos sistema“ atrodo ypač įžvalgi, lyginant su vėliau sekusiu gamtos mokslo nuosmūkiu ir susmulkėjimu. Tačiau natūrfilosofija mokslo laimėjimų neaiškina paprastai: tai sugrįžimas prie J. G. Fichte‘s schemų, kuriose Aš ir Ne-Aš pakeičiami priešpriešinėmis gamtoje veikiančiomis jėgomis. Pavyzdžiui, ta gyva jėga, nesąmoningu dvasiniu pradu Schellingas aiškina traukos ir stūmos sąveiką, kurią Immanuelis Kantas, sekdamas Isaacu Newtonu, laikė jėgomis: F. W.J. Schellingo manymu, šios priešingų krypčių jėgos ir yra tas dvasinis pradas, kurio veikimas sukuria bet kurį gamtos kūną.
 F. W.J. Schellingas, remdamasis sąvaja tapatumo filosofija, kurią plėtojo Spinozos veikale „Etika“ pateiktu metodu, veikale „Mano filosofijos sistemos išdėstymas“ naujai išdėstė savo mokymą. Gamta– tai emanacija Absoliuto, kuriame susilieja visos priešingybės: dvasia–gamta, begalybė–baigtinumas, būtis–pažinimas, subjektas–objektas, idealu–materialu. Už šio Absoliutaus Proto ribų iš tikro niekas neegzistuoja; egzistuoja tik vienas vienintelis pradas, Būtis, Absoliuti tapatybė, iš kurios pasaulis neatsiranda, nes ji pati ir yra pasaulis (štai kodėl gamta nėra negyva materija, priešingai, ji gyva, dieviška kaip pats Absoliutas), atsirandantis iš Absoliuto laipsniško judėjimo. Taigi F. W.J. Schellingas ne racionaliu būdu, o intuityviai priartėja prie Spinozos monizmo: Absoliutas– tai pirminis Dievo pavidalas, kurio antrinė reiškimosi forma–gamta, trikdanti realybės ir idealo pusiausvyrą; šios priešingybės analogiškos Aristotelio dualizmui: galimybė–realizacija; potencija–veiksmas; svoris–materija; šviesa–judėjimas; organizmas–gyvybė; tiesa–mokslas; gėris–religija; grožis–menas.
 Žmogus (mikrokosmas) ir jo istorija yra visatos atspindžiai. Remdamasis šiomis idėjomis ir ne kiekvienam lengvai suvokiamomis genialiomis analogijomis, dialoge „Bruno‘as, arba apie daiktų dieviškąjį ir gamtinį pradus“ F. W.J. Schellingas išdėstė savąją dorybės filosofiją–panašiai kaip Spinoza pagrindiniame savo kūrinyje „Etika“, siedamas ją su būtinybe.
 Šios idėjos plėtojamos jo meno filosofijoje: menininkas, kurio kūrybinės jėgos veikia panašiai kaip gamtinės, savo meninėje kūryboje gali pasiekti begalybę, įveikdamas teorinę ir dorovinę-praktinę priešpriešą, užfiksavęs ją baigtiniame meninės kūrybos procese; o mitologija–tai simbolinių konstrukcijų visuma, kur dievų poveikis vaizduotei toks pat kaip sąvokų minčiai.
 Raida ir veikalai
 Schellingo proto savybės leidžia paaiškinti, kodėl jis nepajėgė sukurti užsimotos sistemos, kodėl jo užmojai baigdavosi paraiškomis ir metmenimis. Tai vienas originaliausių mąstytojų, ir šis gebėjimas nuolat pradėti iš naujo daro jį vienu iškiliausių mąstytojų. Proto gyvumas ir nepastovumas, polinkis pasiduoti svetimoms įtakoms, susižavėti naujomis idėjomis padarė tai, kad jo pažūros perėjo daugybę etapų, kad kone kiekvienas naujas rašinys būdavo naujo požiūrio įžanga; šiuo atžvilgiu jis buvo unikumas filosofijos istorijoje.
 Svarbiausi jo filosofijos etapai buvo šie:
 1. Priklausomybės nuo Fichte‘s laikotarpis nuo 1794 m.
 2. Gamtos filosofijos laikotarpis nuo 1795 m.
 3. „Tapatumo sistemos“ laikotarpis nuo 1801 m. Tuo metu Schellingo interesai buvo patys universaliausi, buvo didžiausia tikimybė sukurti sistemą; tačiau dėl tos sistemos jis visą laiką svyravo, pirmiausia ji buvo estetinė, paskui–etinė.
 4. Teosofinis laikotarpis nuo 1813 m. „Über die Gottheiten von Samothrace“ (1815)–tai paskaita, kurioje alegorine forma išdėstė savo teosofines pažiūras. Vėlesni jo tyrinėjimai daugiausia skirti mitologijai ir apreiškimui; šių tyrinėjimų rezultatus jis išdėstė savo paskaitose, kurios –prieš jo valią–klausytojų buvo paskelbtos 1842–1843 metais.
 Schellingo filosofijos esmė
 Metafizikai, nutraukusiai ryšius su natūralizmu, atsivėrė du keliai: arba ji galėjo būtį suprasti kaip Aš – taip padarė Fichte; arba kaip absoliutą, esantį virš Aš ir gamtos priešstatos – tuo keliu nuėjo Schellingas. Absoliutą jis suprato kaip organišką ir evoliucionuojantį ir ieško jame iracionalių veiksnių, kuriuos meninė intuicija ir religinis tikėjimas suvoktų lengviau nei loginė dedukcija.
 Veikalai
 "Gamtos filosofijos idėjos“ (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797)
 "Apie pasaulio sielą“ (Von der Weltseele, 1798)
 "Transcendentalinio idealizmo sistema“ (System des transcendentalen Idealismus, 1800)
 "Mano filosofijos sistemos pateikimas" (Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, 1800-1802)
 "Bruno‘as, arba apie daiktų dieviškąjį ir gamtinį pradus" (Bruno, oder über das natürliche und göttliche Prinzip der Dinge, 1802)
 "Meno filosofija“ (Philosophie der Kunst, 1802/1803)
 "Filosofija ir religija" (1804)
 "Filosofinis empirizmas"(1836)
 "Žmogaus laisvės esmės ir su ja susijusių dalykų filosofiniai tyrimai“ (Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände, 1809)
 "Pasaulio amžiai“ (Weltalter, 1811)
 "Mitologijos filosofija“ (Philosophie der Mythologie, 1842)
 "Apreiškimo filosofija“ (Philosophie der Offenbarung, 1854)
 Vertimai į lietuvių kalbą
 F. W.J. von Schelling „Žmogaus laisvės esmės ir su ja susijusių dalykų filosofiniai tyrimai“ (vertė A. Tekorius; įvadą parašė A. Šliogeris). – Vilnius, Pradai, 1995, ISBN 9986-405-36-X
 Naudota literatūra
 1. Roger Caratini „Filosofijos įvadas“, „Kronta“, 2007.
 2. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz „Filosofijos istorija II“ (Naujųjų amžių filosofija), „Alma littera“, 2002.
 3. http://www.mintysposakiai.lt/?id=filo1
 Šelingas, Frydrichas


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Mila Kupfer-Berger, geborene Ludmilla Berger (* 6. September 1852 in Wien; † 12. Mai 1905 in Neuwaldegg) war eine österreichische Opernsängerin (dramatischer Sopran) und Gesangspädagogin.
 Leben
 Ludmilla Berger, von frühester Kindheit an Mila genannt, entdeckte schon in früher Kindheit ihre Liebe für die klassische Musik. Die Eltern, der Vater war Fabrikant, förderten ihre talentierte Tochter, die sehr gut Klavier und Geige spielte; auch durfte das Mädchen in jungen Jahren private Gesangsstunden nehmen.
 Ihre Bühnenlaufbahn begann Mila Berger mit 18 Jahren. Sie debütierte am Stadttheater von Linz/Donau als Marguerite (Margarete) in der Oper Faust von Charles Gounod. Dies war der Anfang einer kometenhaften Karriere, die sie noch im gleichen Jahr (1871) an die Berliner Hofoper führte, an der sie vier Jahre wirkte.
 1875 gab die Künstlerin ein Gastspiel an der Wiener Hofoper. Der Erfolg war enorm und sie wurde von der Stelle weg an das Opernhaus engagiert. Die Sopranistin war zehn Jahre der frenetisch gefeierte Liebling der Wiener Opernfreunde (und weit darüber hinaus). Man bewunderte die musikalische Schönheit und technisch brillant geführte Stimme ebenso ihr darstellerisches Talent.
 Trotz ihres glänzenden Erfolges verließ die Sängerin Wien. Nachfolgend sang sie mit nicht minder triumphalem Erfolg an allen großen Opernbühnen Italiens, in Mailand, Rom, Venedig, Florenz, Turin, Neapel. Ferner gab sie Gastspiele am Liceotheater in Barcelona, am Realetheater in Madrid, am Drury-Lane-Theater in London, in Prag, am Colontheater in Buenos Aires, am Don-Pedro-Theater in Rio de Janeiro u. a. großen europäischen und außereuropäischen Städten.
 1897 zog sich die Künstlerin, die mit dem Kaufmann Ernst Kupfer verheiratet war, von der aktiven Bühnenlaufbahn zurück. Sie war aber weiterhin als Liedsängerin von höchstem Rang tätig. In ihrer Geburtsstadt gab die Sopranistin bis zu ihrem Tod Gesangsunterricht.
 Der bedeutende Porträt-, Historien- und Genremaler Franz Xaver Gaul hat zu ihrem Erfolg wesentlich beigetragen.
 Rollenrepertoire (Auswahl)
 Agathe (Der Freischütz)
 Rezia (Oberon)
 Euryanthe von Savoyen (Euryanthe)
 Elsa (Lohengrin)
 Fricka (Der Ring des Nibelungen)
 Elisabeth (Tannhäuser)
 Senta (Der Fliegende Holländer)
 Susanne (Die Hochzeit des Figaro)
 Valentine (Die Hugenotten)
 Marie (Zar und Zimmermann)
 Aida (Aida)
 Literatur
 Karl-Josef Kutsch, Leo Riemens: Großes Sängerlexikon. Erster Band: A-L. Bern/Stuttgart 1987, Sp. 1599
 Felix Czeike: Historisches Lexikon Wien. Band 3. Wien 1994, S. 646
 W. Kosch: Das katholische Deutschland. Biographisch-bibliographisches Lexikon. 2. Band: John–Rehbach. Augsburg o. J., Sp. 2423–2424
 Lexikon der Frau in zwei Bänden. Band II I–Z. Zürich 1954, Sp. 329
 Weblinks
 Mila Kupfer-Berger Bild in der Sammlung Manskopf der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
 Opernsänger
 Sopran
 Gesangspädagoge
 Person (Cisleithanien)
 Geboren 1852
 Gestorben 1905
 Frau