type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 31.3.2011
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 85/17
 BESCHLUSS DES GEMEINSAMEN EWR-AUSSCHUSSES
 Nr. 133/2010
 vom 10. Dezember 2010
 zur Änderung von Anhang XIII (Verkehr) des EWR-Abkommens
 DER GEMEINSAME EWR-AUSSCHUSS —
 gestützt auf das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, geändert durch das Anpassungsprotokoll zum Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, nachstehend „Abkommen“ genannt, insbesondere auf Artikel 98,
 in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
 (1)
 Anhang XIII des Abkommens wurde durch den Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 123/2010 vom 10. November 2010 (1) geändert.
 (2)
 Die Entscheidung 2010/79/EG der Kommission vom 19. Oktober 2009 zur Änderung der Entscheidungen 2006/679/EG und 2006/860/EG über die technischen Spezifikationen für die Interoperabilität von Teilsystemen des konventionellen transeuropäischen Eisenbahnsystems und des transeuropäischen Hochgeschwindigkeitsbahnsystems (2) ist in das Abkommen aufzunehmen —
 BESCHLIESST:
 Artikel 1
 In Anhang XIII des Abkommens wird unter den Nummern 37i (Entscheidung 2006/679/EG der Kommission) und 37j (Entscheidung 2006/860/EG der Kommission) folgender Gedankenstrich angefügt:
 „—
 32010 D 0079: Entscheidung 2010/79/EG der Kommission vom 19. Oktober 2009 (ABl. L 37 vom 10.2.2010, S. 74)“
 Artikel 2
 Der Wortlaut der Entscheidung 2010/79/EG in isländischer und norwegischer Sprache, der in der EWR-Beilage des Amtsblatts der Europäischen Union veröffentlicht wird, ist verbindlich.
 Artikel 3
 Dieser Beschluss tritt am 11. Dezember 2010 in Kraft, sofern dem Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuss alle Mitteilungen nach Artikel 103 Absatz 1 des Abkommens vorliegen (3).
 Artikel 4
 Dieser Beschluss wird im EWR-Abschnitt und in der EWR-Beilage des Amtsblatts der Europäischen Union veröffentlicht.
 Geschehen zu Brüssel am 10. Dezember 2010.
 Für den Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuss
 Der Vorsitzende
 Stefán Haukur JÓHANNESSON
 (1) ABl. L 58, vom 3.3.2011, S. 81.
 (2) ABl. L 37 vom 10.2.2010, S. 74.
 (3) Ein Bestehen verfassungsrechtlicher Anforderungen wurde nicht mitgeteilt


type: wikipedia

text:
Orestes Quércia (Pedregulho, - São Paulo, ) est un homme d'affaires et homme politique brésilien, affilié au Parti du mouvement démocratique brésilien (PMDB). Il était le gouverneur de l'État de São Paulo.
 Orestes Quércia s'installe très jeune avec sa famille à Campinas, où il obtient un diplôme en journalisme. Il était également avocat et administrateur d'entreprises, diplômé en 1962 de l' Université pontificale catholique de Campinas.
 D'une enfance modeste à Pedregulho en tant que livreur de lait et vendeur de bonbons à la gare, Quércia a laissé un patrimoine évalué à à ses héritiers. Selon Elio Gaspari, il a été le premier homme politique milliardaire brésilien.
 Début de vie et formation
 Fils du maçon Octávio Quércia et de agricultrice Isaura Roque Quércia, Orestes Quércia a vécu à Pedregulho puis à Campinas, où il s'est installé avec sa famille et où il a été élu vice-président du syndicat étudiant de l'Escola Normal Livre. À l'époque, il entre comme reporter au Diário do Povo et réussit le concours d'entrée à la Faculté de droit de l'Université catholique pontificale de Campinas, où il dirige le journal du Centro Acadêmico 16 de Abril et fonde l'Université de Culture populaire, liée à l'université. Intervenant (1959 - 1963) à Rádio Cultura et Rádio Brasil, il a travaillé au Jornal de Campinas et à la filiale de l'Ultima Hora. Il a ensuite présidé l' et a travaillé au Département des autoroutes en tant qu'assistant de production.
 Carrière politique
 Orestes Quércia a essentiellement construit sa carrière politique sous le régime militaire (1964-1985). Il a commencé sa vie publique lorsqu'il a été élu conseiller de Campinas par le Parti libérateur en 1962. Le multipartisme éteint, il opte pour le MDB, après avoir été élu député d'État en 1966 et maire de Campinas en 1968.
 Après avoir élu son successeur Lauro Gonçalves au bureau du maire en décembre 1972, Quércia a commencé à organiser des répertoires MDB dans tout l'intérieur de São Paulo et a contesté la convention du parti en tant que candidat au Sénat fédéral en 1974, remportant le différend avec Lino de Matos et Samir Achôa. Lors de cette élection, Quércia a fait son grand saut politico-électoral lorsqu'il a été élu sénateur avec exprimées (73,19 % des voix valables à l'époque) en battant le sénateur areniste de l'époque et candidat à la réélection nommé favori Carvalho Pinto – qui n'a obtenu que (26,81 % des valides). À la tribune, Quércia critique la politique économique du gouvernement d'Ernesto Geisel et des cas de corruption sont signalés en 1977 lors de son passage à la mairie de Campinas, mais de telles affirmations ne sont pas prouvées.
 Avec le retour au multipartisme, il rejoint le PMDB en 1980 et se déclare candidat à la succession du gouverneur Paulo Maluf en février 1981, poste qu'il conservera jusqu'à ce qu'un accord de dernière minute fasse de lui un candidat au poste de vice-gouverneur sur le projet de Franco Montoro en 1982. Il a été élu vice-gouverneur, mais contrairement à l'image d'unité du parti présentée pendant la campagne, il a été un adversaire constant des politiciens du PMDB liés au gouverneur, échouant cependant à empêcher la nomination du député fédéral Mário Covas au poste de maire de São Paulo en 1983 et l'élection du sénateur Fernando Henrique Cardoso à la présidence du directoire d'État du PMDB la même année. Il était un partisan de Diretas Já et de la campagne présidentielle réussie de Tancredo Neves en 1985, l'année où il épousa le docteur Alaíde Cristina Barbosa Ulson. À ce moment-là, sa candidature au poste de gouverneur en 1986 était en cours.
 Lorsque l'amendement constitutionnel Dante de Oliveira a été rejeté à la Chambre des députés, il a été l'un des hommes politiques qui a déposé un mandat de mandamus auprès du Tribunal suprême fédéral pour tenter de forcer le Sénat fédéral à examiner la proposition, qui n'a obtenu aucun résultat pratique.
 Après la victoire de l'ancien président Jânio Quadros (PTB) sur Fernando Henrique Cardoso en novembre de cette année-là, Quércia a vu son contrôle sur le PMDB augmenter dans un mouvement appelé « quercisme » qui a garanti sa nomination comme candidat au poste de gouverneur malgré la dissidence interne. Candidat à une élection initialement polarisée entre le député fédéral de l'époque Paulo Maluf et l'homme d'affaires Antônio Ermírio de Morais et à laquelle le député Eduardo Suplicy participait, il a commencé la course avec des faibles scores dans les sondages d'opinion, cependant il a maintenu sa candidature et à la fin, il l'a finalement emportée lors d'un seul tour de scrutin avec (40,78 % de votes valides à l'époque). Son gouvernement a été responsable de la privatisation de la VASP en 1990, année où il fait élire aux élections générales au Brésil en 1990, Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho comme son successeur.
 Gouvernement de l'État
 En 1987, Orestes Quércia crée le Secrétariat aux mineurs, une attitude pionnière qui a précédé la promulgation du Statut de l'enfant et de l'adolescent promulgué au niveau fédéral en 1990. Il a retiré des rues des enfants nécessiteux et abandonnés et les a employés comme apprentis dans des entreprises publiques telles que la Sabesp.
 Dans le domaine des transports, il a investi dans le dédoublement d'autoroutes comme Anhangüera et D. Pedro I et dans la rénovation de routes secondaires. Ensuite, il a élargi la ligne de métro est-ouest, ouvrant les stations Barra Funda, Marechal Deodoro et l'extension est de Vila Matilde à Corinthians-Itaquera. Il a également commencé les travaux sur la branche Paulista du métro, des stations Paraíso à Consolação.
 Dans le secteur de l'assainissement de base, en 1988, à travers la SABESP, la station d'épuration de Barueri a été mise en service, augmentant le taux de traitement des eaux usées dans la région métropolitaine de 5 à 25 %. En 1990, SABESP a conclu les travaux de production et de traitement de l'eau à la station de traitement de Taiaçupeba, située dans le réservoir de Taiaçupeba, à Mogi das Cruzes, améliorant l'approvisionnement en eau dans la région est du Grand São Paulo.
 Dans la sécurité publique, il a inventé la Radio de patrouille standard, une initiative visant à rapprocher la police de la communauté. Il a construit sans ouvrir d'appel d'offres le controversé Mémorial de l'Amérique latine situé à Barra Funda, dont le projet était d'Oscar Niemeyer. On estime qu'il a coûté aux caisses publiques environ 74 millions de dollars, soit quinze fois plus que prévu initialement.
 Défenseur du municipalisme, il développe des actions de renforcement de l'intérieur, comme la régionalisation de la production.
 Le 16 septembre 1988, le secrétaire d'État à l'industrie et au commerce de l'époque, Otávio Ceccato, a démissionné après avoir tenté de soudoyer un délégué de la police fédérale avec un million de dollars américains pour éviter d'être inculpé dans le scandale « Banespa/Cecatto », où la banque a perdu environ 55 millions de dollars US d'opérations financières.
 Président du PMDB
 Quércia a été l'un des fondateurs du PMDB, l'ayant présidé au niveau national entre le 24 mars 1991 et le 26 avril 1993, date à laquelle il a démissionné de la présidence face aux allégations successives de corruption et au reflux de son soutien politique. Durant sa période à la présidence du parti, il s'est opposé au gouvernement de Fernando Collor – ayant même soutenu le processus de destitution du président de l'époque en 1992 –il a vu mourir Ulysses Guimarães et a soutenu le régime présidentiel lors du plébiscite organisé le 21 avril 1993. Après avoir quitté le commandement de la légende, il a été remplacé par intérim par le sénateur José Fogaça et plus tard par Luiz Henrique da Silveira.
 En 1994, il fait face à l'opposition des partisans du gouvernement d'Itamar Franco et bat Roberto Requião lors de la convention qui désigne le candidat du PMDB à la présidence de la République dans une campagne marquée par des discours en faveur du nationalisme, du municipalisme et de la critique du Plan Réal. Au final, il a occupé la place du différend, ayant même été dépassé par Enéas Carneiro (du PRONA).
 Il a été président du diréctoire du PMDB de São Paulo de 2001 à 2003. Réélu en 2006, il a de nouveau été récompensé comme président du PMDB de São Paulo le 13 décembre 2009, lorsqu'il a été élu pour la fois comme président sur la liste de l'Unidade do PMDB, battant le député fédéral Francisco Rossi (liste Candidatura Própria Já) avec 597 voix contre 73 (88 % des voix contre 12 %) lors d'un congrès du parti tenu à l'ALESP.
 Candidatures
 Depuis que Quércia a quitté le gouvernement de São Paulo en 1991, il n'a pu réussi à gagner d'autres scrutins électoraux - il a été le candidat du PMDB à la présidence de la République en 1994, au gouvernement de l'État en 1998/2006 et au Sénat fédéral en 2002 (il allait être à nouveau candidat au Sénat en 2010, mais a renoncé en raison d'un traitement contre le cancer de la prostate).
 Quércia a occupé la place aux élections de 1994 avec (4,38 % des votes valides) – après avoir été derrière le vainqueur Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), qui a obtenu (54,3 % des votes valides) ; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT), la place avec (27 % des votes valides) et Enéas Ferreira Carneiro (PRONA), la place avec (7,4 % des votes valides).
 Il s'est classé au tour des élections de 1998 avec (4,30 % des suffrages valides) – derrière la place de Paulo Maluf (PPB), qui a obtenu (32,21 % des suffrages valides) ; le gouverneur de l'époque, Mário Covas (PSDB), à la place avec (22,95 % des suffrages valables) ; de la députée fédérale d'alors Marta Suplicy (PT), la place avec (22,51 % des suffrages valides) et Francisco Rossi (PDT), la place avec (17,12 % des suffrages valides).
 Il s'est classé aux élections de 2002 avec (15,8 % des suffrages valides) – derrière le député fédéral PT d'alors Aloízio Mercadante, élu sénateur à la place avec (29,9 % des suffrages valides) et du sénateur pefeliste Romeu Tuma, réélu à la place avec (20,7 % des voix valides).
 Il s'est classé aux élections de 2006 avec (4,57 % des voix valides) - derrière le vainqueur José Serra (PSDB), qui a obtenu (57,93 % des voix valides) et le sénateur petiste Aloízio Mercadante, qui a obtenu (31,68 % des votes valides).
 Élections 2010
 Après avoir soutenu la campagne réussie de Gilberto Kassab (DEM) à la mairie de São Paulo en 2008, Quércia a été approché par plusieurs dirigeants politiques pour un soutien lors des élections de 2010. Selon un article publié dans Folha Online, le PSDB a conclu des partenariats avec le PMDB de São Paulo, présidé par Quércia, pour soutenir José Serra, Geraldo Alckmin et Aloysio Nunes. Le PT, en revanche, comptait sur le mouvement du président de l'époque, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, pour détenir le PMDB comme vice-président sur la liste du gouvernement.
 Pour renforcer le PMDB à São Paulo, Quércia s'est rendu dans plusieurs régions de l'intérieur pour unir les chefs de parti pour les élections de 2010. Mais, en raison d'un cancer de la prostate, il abandonne la candidature au Sénat de São Paulo le 6 septembre 2010 pour soigner sa maladie.
 Allégations de corruption
 La carrière politique de Quércia a été marquée par des scandales et des accusations de corruption et d'enrichissement illicite, tant à la mairie de Campinas qu'au gouvernement de São Paulo. Malgré cela, il n'a jamais reçu de condamnation définitive. Il a été accusé d'avoir détourné des piquets de clôture du Département des autoroutes (DER) pour construire des clôtures sur sa ferme à Pedregulho (SP), d'avoir importé du matériel électronique d'Israël sans appel d'offres, d'avoir surfacturé les travaux du métro et d'avoir commis des irrégularités dans la privatisation de la VASP.
 En 1991, le gouverneur du Paraná de l'époque, Roberto Requião, un partisan rival de Quércia, crée le service , un numéro de téléphone que les Brésiliens peuvent appeler pour dénoncer leur collègue de São Paulo. Plus tard, les deux adversaires sont devenus des alliés.
 Le 16 septembre 1988, le secrétaire d'État à l'industrie et au commerce de l'époque, Otávio Ceccato, a démissionné après avoir tenté de soudoyer un délégué de la police fédérale avec 1 million de dollars américains pour éviter d'être inculpé dans le scandale Banespa/Cecatto, dans lequel la banque a perdu environ US$ 55 millions d'opérations financières.
 Le gouvernement de Quércia a également été accusé d'avoir acheté du matériel israélien sans appel d'offres pour les universités d'État et la police civile et militaire pour un montant de 310 millions de dollars, l'État ayant perdu eniron 40 millions de dollars. En juillet 1990, les travaux du Train léger de Campinas ont été lancés, pour un coût d'environ 50 millions de dollars.
 Sa domination au sein du PMDB et son plaidoyer en faveur d'un mandat de cinq ans du président de l'époque José Sarney conduisent ses opposants internes à quitter le parti et à fonder le PSDB le 24 juin 1988. La même année, il perd les élections municipales à São Paulo et Campinas. Malgré ce revers, son nom a été envisagé pour les élections présidentielles de 1989, cependant le candidat choisi par le parti fut Ulysses Guimarães.
 A la fin de son mandat, 50 % de la population de São Paulo jugeait son administration comme excellente ou bonne, contre 12 % qui la jugeait mauvaise ou très mauvaise - de bons taux d'appréciation - il parvient à faire élire son successeur, Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho, qui, jusqu'à récemment, était le secrétaire semi-inconnu de la sécurité publique du gouvernement de Quércia.
 Mais les nombreuses accusations de corruption liées à la direction de Quércia qui ont émergé par la suite (la plainte la plus célèbre étant la mauvaise gestion de la BANESPA), le mandat insatisfaisant exercé par Fleury et la remise en cause de certaines mesures prises dans son ancien poste ont fini par compromettre son image de manière apparemment irrémédiable.
 Entrepreneur
 Quércia a travaillé dans les secteurs immobilier et des communications - il était propriétaire du groupe d'entreprises Solpanamby, qui contrôle la station de radio NovaBrasil FM, le journal financier DCI, deux chaînes de télévision régionales, TVB Campinas et TVB Litoral, et plusieurs centres commerciaux tels que la Serra Azul d'Itupeva et plusieurs fermes. Le patrimoine de Quércia était évalué à plus de 117 millions de réaux pendant cette campagne et à 1,5 milliard de réaux à sa mort.
 Vie personnelle et mort
 Il a été marié à Alaíde Cristina Barbosa Ulson des années 80 jusqu'à sa mort le avec qui il a eu quatre enfants, Cristiane, Andreia, Rodrigo et Pedro. Orestes a également eu deux enfants lorsqu'il était célibataire, Sidney et Fernando.
 Quércia est décédé lors du réveillon de Noël 2010 à l'âge de 72 ans d'un cancer de la prostate, selon l'hôpital Sírio-Libanês. Quercia avait soigné la maladie en 1999, mais la tumeur a récidivé, le conduisant à se retirer de sa candidature au Sénat en 2010.
 Notes et références
 Liens externes
 « O blog oficial de Orestes Quércia »
 Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Consulté le 24 août 2010.
 Personnalité du Parti du mouvement démocratique brésilien
 Candidat à une élection présidentielle au Brésil
 Personnalité de la franc-maçonnerie brésilienne
 Gouverneur de l'État de São Paulo
 Naissance en août 1938
 Décès en décembre 2010
 Mort d'un cancer de la prostate
 Pages avec des traductions non relues
 Décès à 72 ans


text:
Sexuálna orientácia (iné názvy: pohlavná orientácia, sexuálna/pohlavná preferencia, sexuálna/pohlavná inklinácia, ďalšie synonymá pozri v článku sexuálna preferencia) je skutočná (alebo prisudzovaná) emocionálna (afektívna) a/alebo erotická náklonnosť jedinca k osobám opačného alebo toho istého pohlavia. Termíny ...preferencia, ...inklinácia, ...sklon a pod. uprednostňujú vedci, ktorí tvrdia, že sexuálna orientácia je do istej miery možnosť individuálnej voľby.
 Rozoznávame sexuálnu orientáciu:
 heterosexuálnu – nasmerovanú k ľuďom iného pohlavia,
 homosexuálnu – nasmerovanú k ľudom rovnakého pohlavia,
 bisexuálnu – nasmerovanú k ľuďom oboch pohlaví.
 Najnovšie sa niekedy pridáva ako štvrtá "položka" ešte asexualita.
 Väčšina ľudí má heterosexuálnu orientáciu, majú teda výlučné alebo prevažné erotické zameranie na osoby opačného pohlavia. Proces akceptácie svojej menšinovej sexuálnej orientácie sa nazýva coming out.
 Jedinec si svoju skutočnú sexuálnu orientáciu vôbec nemusí uvedomovať alebo sa podľa svojej skutočnej sexuálnej orientácie vôbec nemusí správať. Ľudia s akoukoľvek sexuálnou orientáciou si tiež môžu zvoliť sexuálnu abstinenciu.
 Sexuálna orientácia sa nesmie zamieňať so sexuálnou identitou a sexuálnym správaním.


text:
je mednarodni Morsejev znak za stisko. Sestavljen je ''pika pika pika črta črta črta pika pika pika(· · · – – – · · ·); treh kratkih, treh dolgih in treh kratkih znakov, ki v telegrafiji pomenijo različno dolge piske. To je enako kot črke S, O in S s to razliko, da črta zgoraj nakazuje telegrafski zapis, da se odpošlje vse skupaj kot en znak, tj. brez premorov, ki se navadno naredijo med črkami.
 Znak se najpogosteje pošlje preko radijske postaje ali s pomočjo svetlobnih signalov. Možno jih je tudi ustvariti z udarjanjem v trde predmete, ki lahko ustvarijo zvok.
 Čeprav nekateri trdijo, da je to kratica za »Save Our Souls«, »Save Our Ship« ali »Send Our Savior« (slovensko Rešite naše duše, Rešite našo ladjo, Pošljite rešitelja) so to le izpeljanke iz kratice. V resnici je to dogovorjen signal in to tak, da je njegovo oddajanje in prepoznavanje razumljivo tudi za amaterje na tem področju, celo pri zunanjih motnjah. Tudi dejstvo, da ga oddajamo kot eno črko namesto treh kaže na to, da to ni kratica.
 Glej tudi
 May Day - mednarodni govorni znak za stisko
 Kratice


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21996D0725(01)
 Afgørelse truffet af Det Blandede EØS-Udvalg nr. 22/96 af den 26. april 1996 om ændring af bilag XIII (Transport) til EØS-aftalen
 EF-Tidende nr. L 186 af 25/07/1996 s. 0073 - 0074
 AFGØRELSE TRUFFET AF DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG Nr. 22/96 af den 26. april 1996 om ændring af bilag XIII (Transport) til EØS-aftalen DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG HAR -under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde, som ændret ved protokollen om tilpasning af aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde, i det følgende benævnt »aftalen«, særlig artikel 98, ogud fra følgende betragtninger:Bilag XIII til aftalen blev sidst ændret ved afgørelse nr. 19/96 truffet af Det Blandede EØS-Udvalg (1);Rådets direktiv 94/55/EF af 21. november 1994 om indbyrdes tilnærmelse af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om transport af farligt gods ad vej (2) bør indarbejdes i aftalen -TRUFFET FØLGENDE AFGØRELSE:Artikel 1 I bilag XIII til aftalen indføres følgende efter punkt 17d (Rådets direktiv 95/50/EF):»17e. 394 L 0055: Rådets direktiv 94/55/EF af 21. november 1994 om indbyrdes tilnærmelse af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om transport af farligt gods ad vej (EFT nr. L 319 af 12. 12. 1994, s. 7), berigtiget ved EFT nr. L 301 af 14. 12. 1995, s. 47.«Artikel 2 Den islandske og norske udgave af direktiv 94/55/EF, som er vedlagt som bilag til de pågældende sprogs versioner af denne afgørelse, er autentisk.Artikel 3 Denne afgørelse træder i kraft den 1. maj 1996, forudsat at de i aftalens artikel 103, stk. 1, omhandlede notifikationer er blevet meddelt Det Blandede EØS-Udvalg.Artikel 4 Denne afgørelse offentliggøres i EØS-afsnittet og i EØS-tillægget til De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende.Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 26. april 1996.På Det Blandede EØS-Udvalgs vegneP. BENAVIDESFormand(1) EFT nr. L 124 af 23. 5. 1996, s. 27.(2) EFT nr. L 319 af 12. 12. 1994, s. 7.


text:
Trinitrotoluen (často označovaný jako TNT nebo tritol, chemicky názvem 2,4,6-trinitrotoluen) je velmi silná, relativně bezpečná a hojně používaná trhavina.
 Historie
 Poprvé jej připravil roku 1863 německý chemik Julius Wilbrand a původně se používal jako žluté barvivo. Jeho výbušný potenciál nebyl řadu let doceněn, zejména proto, že bylo tak obtížné jej odpálit a že byl o zlomek méně účinný než jiné výbušniny. Je-li v tekutém stavu, lze TNT plnit do dělostřeleckých granátů. V tekutém stavu je citlivost TNT oproti pevnému TNT větší, nikoliv však výrazně. V pevném stavu je citlivost TNT nízká a je obtížné jej iniciovat, proto byl v roce 1910 vyřazen z britského oficiálního seznamu výbušnin.
 Německé ozbrojené síly začaly TNT používat jako náplně dělostřeleckých granátů v roce 1902. Protipancéřové granáty plněné TNT vybuchovaly až poté, co prorazily pancéřování britských bojových plavidel, zatímco britské granáty plněné lydditem vybuchovaly často již při nárazu na pancíř, čímž vydaly většinu energie mimo loď. Britové začali nahrazovat lyddit trinitrotoluenem až v roce 1907.
 Americké námořnictvo dál používalo granáty plněné dunnitem (pikrát amonný) i poté, co jiné národy přešly na TNT, ale začaly trinitrotoluenem plnit námořní miny, hlubinné pumy a hlavice torpéd.
 Základní fyzikální a chemické vlastnosti
 Chemicky je TNT aromatický uhlovodík toluen, jehož 3 uhlíkové atomy aromatického jádra nesou namísto vodíkového atomu nitroskupinu (-NO2), funkční chemický vzorec této sloučeniny je C6H2(NO2)3CH3.
 Je to nažloutlá krystalická látka o hustotě 1,663 g/cm3 a teplotě tání 80,7 °C. Lze jej snadno bezpečně roztavit a vzniklá kapalina má teplotu varu 210–212 °C. Jako pevná látka se chová pouze do teploty 35 °C, při zvýšení teploty se postupně stává plastickou a může proto docházet i k vytékání ze střeliva.
 Ve vodě je prakticky nerozpustný, dobře se však rozpouští ve většině běžných organických rozpouštědel kromě ethanolu a sirouhlíku. Je zajímavé, že je velmi dobře rozpustný v kyselině sírové, vůči níž je stálý až do teplot nad 150 °C. Působením bazických sloučenin však přechází do nestabilních forem, (tzv. trytololáty), které se vyznačují velmi snadnou výbušností. Při manipulaci s TNT je proto nutno zabezpečit, aby se nedostal do styku s alkalickými látkami za zvýšené teploty.
 Pyrotechnické vlastnosti a využití
 Jako výbušnina vykazuje mimořádně dobré vlastnosti – je velmi stabilní a málo citlivá vůči vnějším vlivům a přitom se vyznačuje velmi vysokou brizancí a razancí výbuchu. Je proto ideální látkou pro přípravu jak průmyslových tak vojenských trhavin. Často se přitom v různém poměru mísí s jinými explozivními látkami a setkáme se s ním mimo jiné pod obchodním názvem Permonit, Permonex, Karpatit, známé jsou i vojensky využívané Amatoly a řada dalších.
 Vzhledem k tomu, že jeho explozivní vlastnosti jsou velmi dobře prozkoumány, uvádí se pro vyjádření síly jaderného nebo termojaderného výbuchu ekvivalentní množství TNT v kilotunách (kt) či megatunách (Mt). Toto je ovšem zavádějící, neboť množství TNT nad 100 tun jsou schopna výrazného sekundárního zapálení sazí vzniklých po výbuchu, to znamená že 100 tun TNT má reálně ekvivalent uvolněné energie jako 130 tunových náloží (např).
 Jak již bylo zmíněno, typickou vlastností výbuchu TNT je tvorba mraku sazí po explozi v důsledku relativně nízké a záporné kyslíkové bilance. Díky tomu se ale i malá množství chovají jako slabá termobarická výbušnina, např. 200 g TNT může mít při detonaci reálný vývin energie jako 225 g (tedy oproti teoretické hodnotě 8,2 MJ vznikne rapidně kolem 9 MJ energie TNT. Proto TNT překvapivě generuje i v malých množstvích tlakové vlny srovnatelné se Semtexem, ačkoliv naivně by se dala očekávat 20 % výhoda Semtexu (toto však závisí na dané studii a některé vykazují impulzy tlakové vlny konzistentní s nulovou rychlou oxidací sazí).
 1 kg TNT má 50% úmrtnost v důsledku tlakové vlny ve vzdálenosti kolem 1,4 m (vzdálenost mezi náloží a horní polovinou těla, bez ohledu na orientaci osoby). 4,5 kg má na vzdálenost 2,5 m úmrtnost kolem 99 %. Avšak ani při použití 10 kg není smrtelná zóna větší než přibližně 4-5 m. Moderní 155mm granáty obsahují necelých 11 kg TNT, 60mm minometný granát má kolem 200 g a rozšířené ruční granáty kolem 100 g. V běžných bombách se 30-70 % energie spotřebuje na fragmentaci a nikoliv na generování tlakové vlny. Tlaková vlna tedy obecně není vhodným účinným mechanismem likvidace živé síly a tak hlavním cílem TNT je urychlování střepin.
 Základní vlastnosti výbušniny
 Energie výbuchu: 4 100 – 4 220 kJ/kg, tj. 980–1010 kcal/kg (bez sekundární oxidace sazí)
 Detonační rychlost: 6 900 m/s
 Objem spalných plynů: 730 l/kg
 Teplota exploze: 3 100 °C
 Specifické spalné teplo: 4,184 MJ/kg
 Detonační tlak Pcj : 190 - 220 kbar dle výpočetní nebo experimentální metody, obvykle u spodní hranice rozpětí
 Výroba
 Základem výroby je postupná nitrace aromatického uhlovodíku toluenu směsí kyseliny dusičné a kyseliny sírové. Zatímco nitrace do 2. stupně (směs různých izomerů dinitrotoluenů) probíhá za relativně mírných podmínek, je pro poslední nitrační stupeň nutno použít značně drastických reakčních podmínek – nitrace probíhá obvykle ve 20% oleu (roztok oxidu sírového v koncentrované kyselině sírové) za teplot kolem 80 °C.
 Během přípravy TNT přitom vzniká pestrá směs různých vedlejších produktů a pro docílení kvalitního produktu je třeba co nejlépe izolovat právě požadovaný 2,4,6-trinitromethylbenzen. Způsob jak toho docílit s minimálními výrobními náklady, maximálním reakčním výtěžkem a co největším bezpečím pro obsluhující personál je předmětem pečlivě chráněných výrobních tajemství každé firmy, zabývající se průmyslovou výrobou této užitečné výbušniny.
 Bezpečnost
 TNT je jedovatý, styk s kůží může vyvolat její podráždění a zbarvení do žlutooranžova. Během první světové války se pracovnicím nakládajícím s TNT při výrobě munice zbarvovala kůže do jasné žluté, proto získaly přezdívku „kanárkové dívky“ nebo jednoduše „kanárci“.
 Lidé vystaveni po delší čas expozici TNT mohou trpět anémií nebo poruchami funkce jater. Účinky na krev a játra, zvětšování sleziny a další škodlivé účinky na imunitní systém se objevily také u zvířat, která požila nebo vdechovala TNT. Je prokázáno, že TNT nepříznivě ovlivňuje reprodukční schopnosti u mužů. TNT je také uveden na seznamu možných karcinogenů. Konzumace TNT vyvolává červené zbarvení moči. Nikoli ovšem kvůli přítomnosti krve, jak je občas chybně uváděno, ale kvůli zbarvení produktů rozkladu TNT. Dlouhodobá expozice způsobuje zákaly čočky v ekvatoriální oblasti (konsekutivní katarakta). Je uznávána jako nemoc z povolání.
 Některé vojenské zkušební oblasti jsou kontaminovány TNT. Odpadní vody z výroby munice, kontaminované povrchy a podpovrchové vody mohou být vzhledem k přítomnosti TNT zbarveny do růžova. Odstranění takové kontaminace, zvané též „růžová voda“, je obtížné a drahé.
 TNT je relativně necitlivý na náraz, statickou elektřinu, tření a zvýšenou teplotu. Běžné údery kladivem, běžné elektrostatické výboje a obvyklé tření ho nedetonují. Ani malá množství TNT po zapálení (bez pevného obalu) nedetonují.
 TNT je náchylný k vylučování dinitrotoluenů a dalších látek. Tento efekt mohou vyvolat i malá množství takových nečistot. Projevuje se zvláště u střel s obsahem TNT uložených při vyšších teplotách, např. v létě. Vylučování nečistot vede k tvorbě pórů a prasklin, které mohou vést ke zvýšení citlivosti na náraz. Migrací takto vyloučené kapaliny k zapalovači vznikají ohňové kanály, které zvyšují riziko náhodné detonace; kvůli těmto kapalinám může také selhat zapalovač.
 Reference
 Externí odkazy
 Aromatické nitrosloučeniny
 Výbušniny


text:
Kendra Appleton (born 1995) is an Australian actress known for her roles in the television series In Your Dreams and the film Terminus.
 Early life
 The daughter of Graham and Debra Appleton, Appleton grew up on a farm at Conjola in Shoalhaven, on the south coast of New South Wales. As a teenager, Appleton attended St John the Evangelist Catholic High School in Nowra until June 2012 before landing the role of Sophie in In Your Dreams. While filming this series in Germany, Appleton studied for her higher school certificate by distance education and sat for her examinations within 48 hours of returning to Australia, achieving 72.45 for her Australian Tertiary Admission Rank.
 Personal life
 Appleton holds a firearm licence and has won junior competitions in target shooting.
 Appleton is currently studying a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Creative Writing & English Literature.
 Career
 Appleton got her first taste of acting on screen when she was 14, in the 2009 US fan film Horrible Turn. Appleton had a number of small roles in various television series before landing a major role at 17 in the teen drama In Your Dreams, screened on the Seven Network (Australia) in 2013. At 20, Appleton made her major film debut in the 2015 science-fiction film Terminus. Appleton was to portray the character Clare in the science-fiction film Blue World Order scheduled for release in 2016.
 Appleton is represented by Kermond Management.
 Filmography
 References
 External links
 Kendra Appleton at Facebook
 Kermond Management - Kermond Organization Pty Ltd (Aust)
 Blue World Order Home
 In Your Dreams Home
 Terminus Home
 21st-century Australian actresses
 Living people
 1995 births
 People from New South Wales


type: caselaw

text:
 30.8.2008
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 223/19
 Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja (It-Tielet Awla) tal-11 ta' Lulju 2008 (talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari tal-Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas — Ir-Repubblika tal-Litwanja) — Proċeduri mibdija minn Inga Rinau
 (Kawża C-195/08 PPU) (1)
 (Kooperazzjoni ġudizzjarja f'materji ċivili - Ġurisdizzjoni u eżekuzzjoni ta' sentenzi - Eżekuzzjoni fi kwistjonijiet matrimonjali u fi kwistjonijiet ta' responsabbiltà tal-ġenituri - Regolament (KE) Nru 2201/2003 - Talba għal nuqqas ta' rikonoxximent ta' sentenza ta' ritorn ta' minuri miżmum illegalment fi Stat Membru ieħor - Proċedura ta' deċiżjoni preliminari b'urġenza)
 (2008/C 223/30)
 Lingwa tal-kawża: Il-Litwan
 Qorti tar-rinviju
 Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas
 Parti fil-kawża prinċipali
 Inga Rinau
 Suġġett
 Talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari — Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas — Interpretazzjoni ta' l-Artikoli 21, 23, 24, 31(1), 40(2) u 42 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2201/2003, tas-27 ta' Novembru 2003, dwar il-ġurisdizzjoni u r-rikonoxximent u l-infurzar ta' sentenzi fi kwistjonijiet matrimonjali u kwistjonijiet ta' responsabbiltà tal-ġenituri, u li jirrevoka r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1347/2000 (ĠU L 338, p. 1) — Talba għal nuqqas ta' rikonoxximent fi Stat Membru A ta' sentenza mogħtija minn qorti ta' Stat Membru B li tordna r-ritorn ta' minuri, meqjus li huwa miżmum illegalment minn ommu fl-Istat Membru A, lil missieru li jirrisjedi fl-Istat Membru B u li lilu ngħatat il-kura u l-kustodja tal-minuri
 Dispożittiv
 1)
 Ladarba sentenza kontra r-ritorn ittieħdet u nġiebet għall-konoxxenza tal-qorti ta' l-oriġini, huwa irrilevanti, għall-finijiet tal-ħruġ taċ-ċertifikat previst fl-Artikolu 42 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2201/2003 tas-27 ta' Novembru 2003 dwar il-ġurisdizzjoni u r-rikonoxximent u l-infurzar ta' sentenzi fi kwistjonijiet matrimonjali u kwistjonijiet ta' responsabbilità tal-ġenituri, u li jirrevoka r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1347/2000, li din is-sentenza tkun ġiet sospiża, inbidlet, ġiet annullata jew, jekk kien il-każ, tkun saret res judicata jew ġiet issostitwita minn sentenza ta' ritorn, sakemm ir-ritorn tal-minuri kien għadu ma seħħx effettivament. Peress li l-awtentiċità ta' l-imsemmi ċertifikat ma kinitx ikkontestata u peress li dan inħareġ skond il-formularju li l-mudell tiegħu jinsab fl-Anness IV ta' l-imsemmi regolament, l-oppożizzjoni għar-rikonoxximent tas-sentenza ta' ritorn hija pprojbita u l-qorti mitluba tista' biss tikkonstata l-infurzabbiltà tas-sentenza ċċertifikata u tordna r-ritorn immedjat tal-minuri.
 2)
 B'eċċezzjoni ta' kazijiet fejn il-proċedura tirrigwarda sentenza ċċertifikata skond l-Artikoli 11(8) u 40 sa 42 tar-Regolament Nru 2201/2003, kull parti interessata tista' titlob in-nuqqas ta' rikonoxximent ta' sentenza ġudizzjarja, anki jekk ma jkunx ġie ppreżentat rikors għal rikonoxximent tas-sentenza qabel.
 3)
 L-Artikolu 31(1) tar-Regolament Nru 2201/2003, fejn dan jipprovdi li la l-persuna li kontriha qed jintalab l-infurzar u lanqas il-minuri ma jistgħu, f'dan l-istadju tal-proċeduri, jippreżentaw osservazzjonijiet, mhuwiex applikabbli għal proċedura ta' nuqqas ta' rikonoxximent ta' deċiżjoni ġudizzjarja, magħmula mingħajr ma jkun tressaq rikors għal rikonoxximent qabel fir-rigward ta' l-istess deċiżjoni. F'tali sitwazzjoni, il-konvenut, li jkun qed jitlob ir-rikonoxximent, jista' jippreżenta osservazzjonijiet.
 (1) ĠU C 171, 5.7.2008.


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b"OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\nAUDIT OF USAID/UGANDA\xe2\x80\x99S\nPEPFAR-FUNDED ACTIVITIES\nFOR THE PREVENTION OF\nTRANSMISSION OF HIV\nAUDIT REPORT NO. 9-000-10-008-P\nJune 15, 2010\n\n\n\n\nWASHINGTON, DC\n\x0cOffice of Inspector General\n\n\nJune 15, 2010\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nTO: USAID/Uganda Mission Director, David Eckerson\n\nFROM: IG/A/PA Director, Steven H. Bernstein [Michael W. Clinebell for] /s/\n\nSUBJECT: Audit of USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s PEPFAR-Funded Activities for the Prevention of\n Transmission of HIV (Report No. 9-000-10-008-P)\n\nThis memorandum transmits our final report on the subject audit. We have considered your\ncomments on the draft report in finalizing the audit report and have included your response in\nappendix II of the report.\n\nThe report contains four recommendations for your action. Based on an evaluation of\nmanagement comments, management decisions have been reached for all four\nrecommendations. Determination of final action for these recommendations will be made by the\nAudit, Performance and Compliance Division upon completion of the planned corrective actions.\n\nI appreciate the cooperation and courtesy extended to my staff during this audit.\n\n\n\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development\n1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nWashington, DC 20523\nwww.usaid.gov/oig\n\x0cCONTENTS\nSummary of Results.\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..1\n\nBackground\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.3\n\nAudit Objective\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa65\n\nAudit Findings\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6....\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa66\n\n USAID/Uganda Cannot Track or Report Progress Toward Prevention\n Goals\xe2\x80\xa6....\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.....\xe2\x80\xa6.7\n\n USAID/Uganda Is Not Consistently Setting Performance Targets for\n Partners..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.9\n\n USAID/Uganda Is Not Validating Partner Reporting Through Data Quality\n Assessments.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6......10\n\nEvaluation of Management Comments\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6...12\n\nAppendix I \xe2\x80\x93 Scope and Methodology\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.\xe2\x80\xa6..14\n\nAppendix II \xe2\x80\x93 Management Comments\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.....16\n\nAppendix III \xe2\x80\x93 Indicator Results\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6..\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa618\n\x0cSUMMARY OF RESULTS\nThe President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, was signed into law on\nMay 27, 2003, under the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and\nMalaria Act and committed $15 billion over 5 years for combating human\nimmunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) in the\ndeveloping world. The Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership\nAgainst HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act, signed on July 30,\n2008, extended PEPFAR for 5 more years and committed another $48 billion (page 3).\n\nDuring the first phase of PEPFAR, the U.S. State Department\xe2\x80\x99s Office of the Global\nAIDS Coordinator recommended that the 15 focus country teams 1 devote 20 percent of\ntotal PEPFAR funding to prevention efforts, with the goal of 7 million infections\nprevented by 2010. USAID/Uganda's budget for prevention was $24.7 million in fiscal\nyear (FY) 2008 and $25.4 million in FY 2009, with the country goal of preventing\n165,000 infections during the first 5 years of PEPFAR (page 3).\n\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities for preventing sexual transmission of HIV have contributed to\nPEPFAR goals. USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s programs have reached millions of individuals with\nmessages promoting abstinence, being faithful, and other methods of preventing\nHIV/AIDS transmission, such as condom usage. Additionally, in accordance with a key\nPEPFAR principle, USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s program to prevent sexual transmission of HIV\naligns with Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s national HIV/AIDS strategy (page 6).\n\nHowever, after 6 years and $116.4 million spent since the start of PEPFAR, 2\nUSAID/Uganda cannot demonstrate how much progress it has made in preventing\ninfections and reducing the incidence of HIV. Thus, the mission has not been able to\nreliably demonstrate progress toward achieving assistance objectives, as required by\nUSAID policy. This inability is attributable to several causes:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator is responsible for estimating the\n number of infections prevented in each country toward the total PEPFAR goal of\n 7 million; however, results will not be available until 2012\xe2\x80\x942 years after the end\n of PEPFAR.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Ugandan Ministry of Health carries out population-based surveys with\n assistance from USAID/Uganda and the PEPFAR country team. These surveys,\n a reliable way to measure change in preventive behaviors, depend on the\n cooperation of the Ugandan Government, and the last survey was conducted in\n 2005.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Limited definitive research exists to support which interventions are most\n effective in preventing sexual transmission of HIV.\n\n1\n PEPFAR\xe2\x80\x99s 15 focus countries are Botswana, C\xc3\xb4te d\xe2\x80\x99Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya,\nMozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.\n2\n The amount $116.4 million reflects field and central funding for the prevention program areas of\n\xe2\x80\x9cabstinence,\xe2\x80\x9d \xe2\x80\x9cbe faithful,\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cother sexual prevention\xe2\x80\x9d across FY 2004\xe2\x80\x939.\n\n\n\n 1\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator sets output-level indicators on which\n the PEPFAR country team reports, however, infections prevented cannot be\n determined based on the achievement of output targets.\n\nThough these circumstances are outside USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s control, in order to better\ndemonstrate impact, the mission needs to devote more time and attention to the\nmonitoring, oversight, and reporting of its sexual transmission prevention activities than it\nhas done in the past (pages 6 and 7). Specifically:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Performance management indicators are not being reported frequently enough to\n track incremental progress toward long-term goals (page 7).\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Inconsistent target setting for implementing partners makes it difficult to evaluate\n performance (page 9).\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Data quality assessments for sexual transmission prevention activities are not\n being performed (page 10).\n\nThe report recommends that USAID/Uganda:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop and implement a strategy, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease\n Control and Prevention and the PEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office, to support and\n encourage the Ugandan Ministry of Health to produce regular reporting of clinical\n and surveillance data (page 8).\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Document a plan to collect data in key regions of the country with significant\n sexual transmission prevention activity, in the absence of host country data\n (page 8).\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Work closely with the PEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office and other U.S. Government\n implementing agencies to finalize and implement a terms of reference document\n with guidelines to improve target setting within the PEPFAR Prevention Working\n Group (page 10).\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop and implement a data quality assessment schedule for each\n implementing partner reporting on sexual transmission prevention indicators that\n are reported annually or externally (page 11).\n\nUSAID/Uganda agreed with all four recommendations and presented plans to implement\nthe recommendations by October 30, 2010. Based on an evaluation of management\xe2\x80\x99s\nresponse to the draft report, management decisions have been reached on these\nrecommendations (page 12).\n\nManagement comments are presented in their entirety in appendix II (pages 16-17).\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\x0cBACKGROUND\nThe President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched 6 years ago\nin response to the epidemic engulfing many parts of the developing world. Its\nauthorizing legislation, the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,\nand Malaria Act, was signed into law on May 27, 2003, and committed $15 billion for\nprevention, treatment, and care for people afflicted or affected by human\nimmunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). On July 30,\n2008, Congress signed into law the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global\nLeadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008,\nwhich extended PEPFAR for 5 more years and committed another $48 billion.\n\nThe Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, which reports directly to the U.S. Secretary\nof State as part of the U.S. Department of State, sets overall goals for the 15 PEPFAR\nfocus countries. 3 For the first 5 years, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator set an\noverall PEPFAR goal of 7 million infections prevented by 2010. Uganda specifically had\nthe goal of 165,000 infections prevented in the first 5 years. Additionally, the Office of\nthe Global AIDS Coordinator gives guidance on the use of PEPFAR funds. During the\nfirst 5 years, the office recommended that focus country teams devote 20 percent of total\nPEPFAR funding to prevention, with a required allocation of 33 percent of prevention\nfunding to abstinence and being faithful programs and the remaining amount,\napproximately 66 percent, to other prevention programs.\n\nThe U.S. Government agencies that make up the PEPFAR country team are then\ncollectively responsible for meeting performance targets and reporting aggregated\nindicator data twice a year to the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. The PEPFAR\ncountry team in Uganda is made up of U.S. Government agencies including USAID; the\nDepartments of State, Defense, and Health and Human Services (including the Centers\nfor Disease Control and Prevention); and the Peace Corps. However, USAID and the\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention specifically carry out the bulk of the sexual\ntransmission prevention activity in Uganda.\n\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s prevention portfolio comprises bilateral and centrally funded and\nmanaged activities that are linked to treatment and care activities to provide a continuum\nof care. USAID/Uganda received $24.7 million in 2008 and $25.4 million in 2009,\nrepresenting 81 percent of the PEPFAR country team\xe2\x80\x99s total funding for sexual\ntransmission prevention during this period. (See figure 1 for USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s PEPFAR\nActivities from 2004 to 2009.)\n\n\n\n\n3\n PEPFAR\xe2\x80\x99s 15 focus countries are Botswana, C\xc3\xb4te d\xe2\x80\x99Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya,\nMozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0c Figure 1. PEPFAR Funding for USAID's Sexual Transmission\n Prevention Activities in Uganda, 2004-09\n ($ millions)\n 30\n 25\n 20 10.2 10.4\n 8.8\n $M M\n\n\n\n\n 15 6.6\n 6.1\n 10 4.1\n 12.5 14.5 15.0\n 5 8.3 9.6 10.3\n 0\n 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009\n Abstinence, Be Faithful Other Sexual Prevention\n\n\n\nUganda has been hailed as a global model in AIDS strategy because of its initial\nsuccesses in reducing the HIV prevalence rate. 4 Studies credit a combination of factors\nthat enabled this result, particularly Government leadership and political openness\ninitiated by President Museveni\xe2\x80\x99s arrival in 1986 and a multisectoral approach that\nincluded community and faith-based organizations. Another factor was the widespread\ndissemination of behavior-change communications that raised awareness and fought\ndiscrimination and stigma while advocating abstinence, faithfulness, and condom use.\nAccording to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Joint United Nations\nProgramme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), in the early 1990s, the national HIV prevalence rate\npeaked at 15 percent and fell to 6.5 percent by 2004.\n\nHowever, in recent years, progress in reducing HIV prevalence has reversed or slowed\ndue in part to people with HIV living longer, owing to the increased use of antiretroviral\ndrugs and better care and support for patients. Mission officials expect that the\nprevalence rate will continue to rise in 2010, by 0.5 to 0.55 percent. Representatives\nfrom USAID/Uganda, the PEPFAR country team, and Ugandan Government officials\nalso believe that infection rates in Uganda are increasing. 5 Regional studies, such as a\n March 2009 study released by\n Prevention is an essential component of PEPFAR the Uganda AIDS Commission\n and an increasingly critical priority. While treatment is\n using data over a 16-year period\n incredibly important, treatment will not end the\n pandemic. In the absence of an HIV vaccine or cure, from the rural Masaka district,\n without effective prevention, the world will continue to also support this trend. The\n face an ever-growing number of people requiring study shows that the HIV\n treatment, and inevitably, more death.\xe2\x80\xa6 Globally, prevalence rate in the district\n sexual transmission remains the primary driver of the rose from 6.2 percent (1999) to\n epidemic, thus, prevention in this area is essential. 7.7 percent (2004) to 8.0 percent\n (2005). The study attributed the\n Dr. Eric Goosby, Global AIDS Coordinator rise in HIV prevalence to\n\n4\n The prevalence rate indicates the percentage of the population infected with HIV at a point in\ntime.\n5\n Infection rates, also known as incidence rates, reflect the number of new HIV infections.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0cincreased risk-taking behaviors and decreased condom use. Although the results of a\nregional study cannot be extrapolated to the entire country, they can be considered\nstrong indicators of larger trends.\n\nAUDIT OBJECTIVE\nThis audit was included in the Office of Inspector General\xe2\x80\x99s fiscal year 2009 annual plan\nand was conducted to answer the following question:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Have USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities for preventing sexual transmission of HIV\n contributed to overall PEPFAR goals?\n\n Appendix I contains a discussion of the audit\xe2\x80\x99s scope and methodology.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\x0cAUDIT FINDINGS\nThe audit found that USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities are contributing to the goals of the\nPresident\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) for preventing transmission of\nhuman immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS).\nHowever, USAID/Uganda cannot demonstrate how much progress it has made in\npreventing HIV infections.\n\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s portfolio of activities for preventing sexual transmission promotes the\n\xe2\x80\x9cABC\xe2\x80\x9d approach, which is advocated by PEPFAR in all focus countries, and is supported\nby studies. For example, a January 2009 study based on data from demographic and\nhealth surveys in four African countries concluded that reducing the number of sexual\npartners reduces the risk of HIV transmission. 6 The \xe2\x80\x9cABC\xe2\x80\x9d approach is the balanced\npromotion of three behaviors that can prevent or reduce the likelihood of sexual\ntransmission of HIV: \xe2\x80\x9cA\xe2\x80\x9d for abstinence (or delayed sexual initiation among youth), \xe2\x80\x9cB\xe2\x80\x9d for\nbeing faithful (or reduction in number of sexual partners), and \xe2\x80\x9cC\xe2\x80\x9d for correct and\nconsistent condom use. This approach includes programs aimed specifically at high-risk\ngroups such as out-of-school youth, displaced postconflict populations, and fishing\ncommunities.\n\nUSAID/Uganda reached more than 4 million individuals in 2008 and 6.4 million in 2009\nwith messages promoting prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission through abstinence\nand/or being faithful. Another 1.8 million were reached in 2008 and 2009 with messages\npromoting prevention through means other than abstinence or being faithful, such as\ncondom usage. Additionally, in accordance with a key PEPFAR principle,\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s program to prevent sexual transmission of HIV aligns with Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s\nnational HIV/AIDS strategy.\n\nHowever, after 6 years and $116.4 million spent since the start of PEPFAR, 7\nUSAID/Uganda cannot demonstrate how much progress it has made in preventing\ninfections\xe2\x80\x94explicitly, reducing the incidence of HIV. Thus, USAID/Uganda has not been\nable to reliably demonstrate progress toward achieving assistance objectives, as\nrequired by USAID policy. This is attributable to several causes, which are outside the\nmission\xe2\x80\x99s control:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator is responsible for estimating the\n number of infections prevented in each country toward the total PEPFAR goal of\n 7 million; however, results will not be available until 2012\xe2\x80\x942 years after the end\n of PEPFAR.\n\n\n\n\n6\n Vinod Mishra et al., \xe2\x80\x9cThe Role of Partner Reduction and Faithfulness in HIV Prevention in Sub-\nSaharan Africa: Evidence from Cameroon, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe,\xe2\x80\x9d DHS Working\nPapers No. 61, Macro International Inc., Calverton, MD, 2009.\n7\n The amount $116.4 million reflects field and central funding for the prevention program areas of\n\xe2\x80\x9cabstinence,\xe2\x80\x9d \xe2\x80\x9cbe faithful,\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cother sexual prevention\xe2\x80\x9d across FY 2004\xe2\x80\x939.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 The Ugandan Ministry of Health carries out population-based surveys with\n assistance from USAID/Uganda and the PEPFAR country team. These surveys,\n a reliable way to measure change in preventive behaviors, depend on the\n cooperation of the Ugandan Government, and the last survey was conducted in\n 2005.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Limited definitive research exists to support which interventions are most\n effective in preventing sexual transmission of HIV.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator sets output-level indicators on which\n the PEPFAR country team reports, however, infections prevented cannot be\n determined based on the achievement of output targets.\n\nFurthermore, representatives from both USAID/Uganda and the Ugandan Government\nagree that prevention was not a high priority during the first 5 years of PEPFAR. Rather,\nthe focus was on the emergency response to the epidemic and delivering antiretroviral\ndrugs to people afflicted with AIDS. Accordingly, USAID/Uganda needs to devote more\ntime and attention to its prevention activities than it has done in the past. In an effort to\ndo this, Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s PEPFAR country team has already established a task force to\ndetermine how Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s prevention portfolio can better support the reduction of sexual\ntransmission of HIV. The task force is chartered with reviewing Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s epidemic,\nPEPFAR\xe2\x80\x99s response to the epidemic, and best practices and lessons learned in the\ncountry. This analysis will lead to recommendations for the PEPFAR country team.\n\nHowever, the audit found three additional areas, discussed in detail below, related to\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s monitoring, oversight, and reporting of its sexual transmission\nprevention activities where improvements are needed.\n\n\nUSAID/Uganda Cannot Track or Report\nProgress Toward Prevention Goals\n\nSummary: USAID policy states that missions are responsible for measuring progress\ntoward foreign assistance objectives. Further, the indicators selected should be practical\nand timely. However, the sole milestone indicator for tracking the progress of\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s prevention efforts (HIV prevalence among 15- to 19- and 20- to 24-\nyear-old antenatal clients) could not be reliably reported because the mission could not\nobtain the needed data from the Ugandan Ministry of Health for 4 years. This is\nbecause USAID/Uganda is dependent on the Ugandan Ministry of Health for clinical and\nsurveillance data and did not consider other methods of data collection. The lack of\ntimely data in the latter stages of an assistance objective leaves the mission without\nimportant performance information for tracking and reporting results making decisions,\nand allocating resources.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\x0cUSAID policy, under Automated Directives System (ADS) 203.3.2 on performance\nmanagement, states that USAID missions and their assistance objective teams are\nresponsible for measuring progress toward the results identified in the planning stage to\nachieve foreign assistance objectives. Further, ADS states that collecting and analyzing\nperformance information is a principal step in performance management, and missions\nshould be reporting on results in addition to outputs in the later years of an assistance\nobjective. Finally, ADS 203.3.4.2 calls for indicators that are practical and timely.\n\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s performance management plan (strategic objective 8: \xe2\x80\x9cImproved\nHuman Capacity,\xe2\x80\x9d finalized in May 2009) established three indicators that measure\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s progress in preventing new HIV infections. Two of the indicators\nestablished under this plan, \xe2\x80\x9cReported condom use with a non-regular sexual partner\xe2\x80\x9d\nand \xe2\x80\x9cHIV incidence,\xe2\x80\x9d are longer-term indicators that are not reported frequently enough\nto be useful for tracking progress toward goals. To measure progress toward a desired\noutcome over a shorter period, milestone indicators need to be used. According to the\nplan, milestone indicator data should be collected and available every year. However,\nUSAID/Uganda was unable to collect and report data for the sole milestone indicator,\n\xe2\x80\x9cHIV prevalence among 15-19 and 20-24 year old antenatal clients,\xe2\x80\x9d on an annual basis.\n\nThis occurred because USAID/Uganda is dependent on the Ugandan Ministry of Health\nfor the clinical and surveillance data needed to report on this indicator. The mission\nstated that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has a contractual agreement\nwith the Ministry of Health and is responsible for managing surveys collaboratively with\nthe other U.S. Government agencies on the PEPFAR country team. However, the\nUgandan Government had not released sexual transmission prevention indicator data of\nany kind since 2004\xe2\x80\x94until it released the \xe2\x80\x9cHIV/AIDS Epidemiological Surveillance\nReport 2005-07\xe2\x80\x9d in November 2009, which still showed no definitive trend in HIV\nprevalence rates over the 3-year period studied (2005-2007). In spite of this limitation,\nUSAID/Uganda did not gather relevant data through other methods, such as lot quality\nassurance sampling, a cost-effective tool used to rapidly gather information for\nmonitoring and evaluation. This sampling method entails administering interviewer-led\nquestionnaires to randomly selected households in each district until a 95-percent\nconfidence level has been achieved. This method assists in measuring coverage of key\nprevention indicators, can identify gaps in performance, and can also help to enhance\nthe capabilities of staff in the use of information for planning and decision making.\n\nWithout timely data to track progress, it becomes difficult to determine how effective\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities are. According to an HIV/AIDS specialist at the mission, in\neffect, HIV/AIDS prevention programming in the country was based on anecdotal data.\n\nTo address this matter, this audit makes the following recommendations:\n\n Recommendation 1: We recommend that USAID/Uganda develop and\n implement a strategy, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and\n Prevention and the PEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office, to support and encourage the\n Ugandan Ministry of Health to produce regular reporting of clinical and\n surveillance data.\n\n Recommendation 2: We recommend that USAID/Uganda, in the absence of\n host country data, document a plan to collect data in key regions of the country\n with significant sexual transmission prevention activity.\n\n\n 8\n\x0cUSAID/Uganda Is Not Consistently Setting\nPerformance Targets for Partners\nSummary: According to USAID policy, missions are accountable for their targets, which\nshould be ambitious but achievable. However, USAID/Uganda cannot explain how the\ntarget for its sole milestone indicator was set, and results for the six sexual transmission\nprevention indicators reported to the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator in 2008 and\n2009 were either significantly over or significantly under targets. This is due to a lack of\nguidance and focus on target setting. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate performance\nand assess reported results, impeding the mission\xe2\x80\x99s ability to make decisions and\nallocate resources based on performance data.\n\nPerformance targets are a critical part of managing for results. ADS 203.3.4.5 states\nthat missions should be willing to be held accountable for targets, and that targets\nshould be ambitious but achievable given USAID and other donor inputs. As stated in\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS No. 8, \xe2\x80\x9cEstablishing Performance\nTargets,\xe2\x80\x9d once a program is underway, targets serve as guideposts for judging whether\nprogress is being made on schedule and at the levels originally envisioned.\n\nImplementing partners propose targets for sexual transmission prevention programs\nduring the annual country operational planning process. USAID/Uganda, through the\ninteragency PEPFAR Prevention Working Group, approves these indicator targets.\nHowever, in fiscal year (FY) 2008 results for USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s programs reporting on\nsexual transmission prevention indicators were mixed. (See appendix III for indicator\ntargets and results.) Although the variances between results and targets were smaller\nin FY 2009 than they were in the previous year, two indicators still had a greater than 20\npercent variance. Officials provided several reasons why results may differ greatly from\ntargets, 8 but this pattern suggests that USAID/Uganda is not setting consistent targets\nfor implementing partners.\n\nMission officials affirmed that the target-setting process can be so time-consuming and\nthe working groups that oversee the process so short-staffed that a close review of\ntargets proposed by partners is not always possible under the current structure. In\naddition, mission officials stated that the target for HIV prevalence in their performance\nmanagement plan was inaccurate, but they could not explain why this occurred. These\nobservations are corroborated by the April 2009 prevention portfolio review in which\nUSAID/Uganda cited target setting as a challenge in multiple program areas.\n\nTo address these challenges, USAID/Uganda drafted a terms of reference document\nthat included guidance to the interagency PEPFAR Prevention Working Group, which is\ncochaired by USAID, to oversee target setting for implementing partners every year\nduring preparation of the country operational plan. This document outlined the roles,\nresponsibilities, and operations of the PEPFAR country team. However, this document\nwas drafted over 3 years ago and never finalized.\n\n8\n Officials cited several reasons why indicator results may differ from indicator targets: new\npartners often underestimate the time needed to start a program, and they propose overly\nambitious first-year targets; sometimes targets are based on inaccurate or incomplete\ninformation; or a change in methodology for computing indicator data may have occurred.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cWith inconsistent target setting, it becomes difficult to interpret results to evaluate\nperformance, thereby impeding the mission\xe2\x80\x99s ability to make decisions and allocate\nresources based on performance data. For example, USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s 2008 sexual\ntransmission prevention results were subpar for key indicators that measured the\nnumber of individuals reached with prevention messages. (See appendix III.) However,\nthe inconsistently set targets hampered USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s ability to make effective\nperformance-based decisions and to adjust sexual transmission prevention\nprogramming.\n\nTo address this matter, this audit makes the following recommendation:\n\n Recommendation 3: We recommend that USAID/Uganda work closely with the\n PEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office and other U.S. Government implementing\n agencies to finalize and implement a terms of reference document that includes\n operational guidelines for target setting within the PEPFAR Prevention Working\n Group.\n\n\nUSAID/Uganda Is Not Validating\nPartner Reporting Through\nData Quality Assessments\nSummary: USAID/Uganda did not conduct data quality assessments on reported\nindicator data relevant to sexual transmission prevention of HIV, contrary to USAID\npolicy and Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator guidance. Data quality assessments\nwere not performed because of limited resources and other priorities. As a result,\nUSAID/Uganda lacked reliable data to monitor partner performance, which impeded the\nmission\xe2\x80\x99s ability to carry out its sexual transmission prevention activities effectively.\n\nFor performance data to be useful in managing for results and credible reporting,\nADS 203.3.5.1 states that USAID missions should ensure that performance data for\neach assistance objective meet the data quality standards of validity, integrity, precision,\nreliability, and timeliness. Additionally, ADS 203.3.5.2 states that data reported to\nWashington, DC, or externally on agency performance must have had a data quality\nassessment within the 3 years before submission.\n\nAdditionally, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator provided country teams with\nguidance addressing the importance of data quality that stated, \xe2\x80\x9cQuality data are needed\nto inform the design of country operational plan activities, to monitor partner\nperformance, and to set reasonable and achievable targets. In order for targets to be\nmeaningful and realistic, the quality of the data on which they are based must meet\nminimum standards of acceptability.\xe2\x80\x9d In addition, the guidance cautions that prevention\ndata are particularly prone to double counting and advises added oversight.\n\nHowever, of the 11 bilateral implementing partners working with USAID/Uganda in the\narea of sexual transmission prevention, 3 are overdue for a data quality assessment.\nFurther, data quality assessments that USAID/Uganda did conduct within the last 3\nyears were incomplete. USAID/Uganda assessed indicator data for palliative care,\ntreatment, counseling and testing services, and prevention of mother-to-child\ntransmission; however, the mission did not include a review of the six sexual\n\n\n 10\n\x0ctransmission prevention indicators. For example, during FY 2008\xe2\x80\x939, USAID/Uganda\nassessed of the quality of data quality from an implementing partner working in sexual\ntransmission prevention, but excluded relevant sexual transmission prevention data\nrelated to the partner\xe2\x80\x99s behavior-change activities.\n\nWhen a mission does not allocate time and resources to data quality during the planning\nprocess, in an environment where priorities compete for limited resources, data quality\nwill often be overlooked. According to the mission, data quality assessments were not\nperformed on sexual transmission prevention data because of limited resources.\nAlthough the PEPFAR country team has contracted with a partner to carry out\nmonitoring and evaluation activities for PEPFAR data, two assessments scheduled for\n2009 were rescheduled so that staff could perform other tasks.\n\nMonitoring and oversight of partner performance is critical to strengthen the reliability of\nreported data, particularly in prevention. Without data quality assessments, the mission\ndoes not have reliable data to monitor partner performance. The lack of reliable data\nimpedes the mission\xe2\x80\x99s ability to carry out its activities effectively.\n\nTo address this matter, this audit makes the following recommendation:\n\n Recommendation 4: We recommend that USAID/Uganda develop and\n implement a data quality assessment schedule for each implementing partner\n reporting on sexual transmission prevention indicators that are reported annually\n or externally.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0cEVALUATION OF\nMANAGEMENT COMMENTS\nIn response to our draft report, USAID/Uganda agreed with the four audit\nrecommendations. Based on an evaluation of management\xe2\x80\x99s comments, a\nmanagement decision has been reached on each recommendation, and a determination\nof final action is pending.\n\nRecommendation 1: The mission agrees with the recommendation to develop and\nimplement a strategy to support and encourage the Ugandan Ministry of Health to\nproduce regular reporting of clinical and surveillance data. Specifically, the mission will\nwork closely with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the PEPFAR\nCoordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office and use existing interagency coordination, planning, and\nmanagement structures for this effort. Although management\xe2\x80\x99s response indicates that\nthe implementation of this strategy is effective immediately, a subsequent review of\ndocumentation indicated that the mission has not yet implemented its strategy. The\nmission\xe2\x80\x99s revised target date for final action is July 31, 2010. A management decision\nhas been reached on this recommendation.\n\nIn response to management comments, we have updated the report to make explicit\nreference to both clinical and surveillance data.\n\nRecommendation 2: The mission agrees with the recommendation to document a plan\nto collect data in key regions with significant prevention activity. Specifically,\nUSAID/Uganda, in conjunction with an interagency working group, will develop an\noperational strategy that includes result-based objectives, activities, and a monitoring\nand evaluation plan for all implementing partners. A management decision has been\nreached, and the target date for final action is October 30, 2010.\n\nRecommendation 3: The mission agrees with this recommendation, which was\nmodified by the audit team to incorporate management\xe2\x80\x99s proposed changes.\nUSAID/Uganda will work closely with the PEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office and other U.S.\nGovernment implementing agencies to finalize and implement a terms of reference\ndocument that includes operational guidelines for target setting within the PEPFAR\nPrevention Working Group. Although management\xe2\x80\x99s response indicates that the terms\nof reference document would be finalized by April 30, 2010, a subsequent review of\ndocumentation indicated that target setting procedures for all PEPFAR working groups\nhad not yet been incorporated into the terms of reference document. The mission\xe2\x80\x99s\nrevised target date for final action is July 31, 2010. A management decision has been\nreached on this recommendation.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\x0cRecommendation 4: The mission agrees with this recommendation. USAID/Uganda is\nin the process of awarding a new monitoring and evaluation contract for data\nmanagement and reporting, and will approve a detailed work plan with required data\nquality assessment schedules. Although management\xe2\x80\x99s response indicates that the\ntarget date for final action is August 15, 2010, based on subsequent discussion, the\nmission revised its target date to July 31, 2010. A management decision has been\nreached on this recommendation.\n\nThe mission\xe2\x80\x99s written comments on the draft report are included in their entirety as\nappendix II in this report (see pages 16-17).\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0c APPENDIX I\n\n\n\nSCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\nScope\nThe Office of Inspector General conducted this performance audit in accordance with\ngenerally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that the\naudit team plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to\nprovide a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.\nThe objective of the audit was to determine whether USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities for\npreventing sexual transmission of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired\nimmunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) have contributed to the goals of the President\xe2\x80\x99s\nEmergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).\n\nThe audit fieldwork was performed from August 2009 to February 2010 at\nUSAID/Uganda and USAID/Washington. The audit examined activities performed\nduring fiscal year (FY) 2008 and FY 2009. We analyzed USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2008 and\nFY 2009 prevention targets and results for bilateral partners that report on sexual\ntransmission prevention indicators. The partners received a total of nearly $31 million in\nfunding for the 2 years.\n\nCriteria used to assess USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s prevention activities included guidance from\nthe Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, the Government of Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s National HIV\nand AIDS Strategic Plan, the PEPFAR Five-Year Strategy for Uganda, USAID\xe2\x80\x99s\nAutomated Directives System, mission orders, various studies and reports on the AIDS\nepidemic in Uganda, and Government Accountability Office reports. We also reviewed\nprevious Office of Inspector General reports, including the 2005 Office of Inspector\nGeneral audit of USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of PEPFAR, noting that the one\nrelated recommendation had been implemented. 9 We visited and observed 4 of the\nmission\xe2\x80\x99s 11 bilateral implementing partner projects to help us determine whether\nUSAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s activities for sexual transmission prevention of HIV/AIDS have\ncontributed to PEPFAR goals. However, because of our limited review, activity results\ncannot be projected to the entire population of USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s sexual transmission\nprevention activities.\n\nFinally, we performed a risk assessment based on a recent Federal Managers\xe2\x80\x99 Financial\nIntegrity Act report, a review of reporting documentation, and interviews with mission\nstaff. We also considered and reviewed USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s system of internal controls as\nit pertained to sexual transmission prevention activities.\n\nMethodology\nTo answer the audit objective, we considered USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s demonstrable\ncontribution toward the PEPFAR Uganda goal of 165,000 infections prevented by 2010.\nWe also examined target setting and performance reporting, monitoring and oversight of\n\n\n9\n Office of Inspector General audit report number 4-617-05-006-P, issued on August 1, 2005.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0c APPENDIX I\n\n\nimplementing partners, and USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s adherence to and support of the national\nstrategy for combating HIV/AIDS.\n\nIn Uganda, we interviewed personnel from USAID/Uganda and the PEPFAR country\nteam. We also met with the head of the Uganda AIDS Commission, the Ugandan\nGovernment agency responsible for coordinating the HIV/AIDS response. In addition,\nwe interviewed representatives of 4 of the mission\xe2\x80\x99s 11 bilateral implementing partners\nand selected the following activities for detailed review. The four partners received $18\nmillion in 2008 and accounted for 59 percent of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s bilateral funding for sexual\ntransmission prevention activities.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Northern Uganda Malaria AIDS Tuberculosis Programme, implemented by John\n Snow, Inc.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ugandan Initiative for TDMS and PIASCY, 10 implemented by Creative Associates\n International, Inc.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 AFFORD, implemented by Johns Hopkins University\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Health Initiatives in the Private Sector, implemented by Emerging Markets\n\nWe visited project sites in the Gulu, Nakasongola, and Wakiso districts to support\nreported results. At these sites we reviewed participant lists for training and outreach, as\nwell as records management at various levels. Additionally, we interviewed officials from\nthe Monitoring and Evaluation of Emergency Plan Progress project, which collects,\nreports, and validates data from HIV/AIDS activities and partners funded under PEPFAR\nfor the country team.\n\nWe reviewed relevant documents, including the PEPFAR country team\xe2\x80\x99s 5-year strategic\nplan and Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s national strategic plan. The mission provided country operational\nplans and indicator reporting documents. We also reviewed reports and studies on the\nHIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda issued by U.S. Government agencies, the Ugandan\nGovernment, and other organizations, such as UNAIDS.\n\nIn Washington, we interviewed subject matter experts from the Office of the Global AIDS\nCoordinator; U.S. Census Bureau; USAID Bureau of Global Health, Office of HIV/AIDS;\nand USAID Bureau of Management, Office of Management Policy, Budget and\nPerformance.\n\n\n\n\n10\n Teacher Development and Management System and Presidential Initiative on AIDS Strategy\nfor Communication to Youth.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0c APPENDIX II\n\n\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMENTS\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDATE: April 9, 2010\n\nTO: Steven H. Bernstein, IG/A/PA\n\nFROM: Elise Ayers, SO8 Team Leader (AOO) /s/\n\nTHRU: Amr H. Elattar, Mission Controller (AMO) /s/\n\n\nSUBJECT: Comments on IG/A/PA\xe2\x80\x99s Draft Audit of USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s PEPFAR-\nFunded Activities for the Prevention of Transmission of HIV (Report No. 9-000-10-00X-\nP)\n\nDear Steven,\n\nThe purpose of this transmission is to communicate USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s general comments\nregarding the recommendations for the subject report.\n\nRecommendation No. 1: We recommend that USAID/Uganda develop and implement a\nstrategy, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the\nPEPFAR Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office, to support and encourage the Ugandan Ministry of Health\nto produce regular reporting of clinical data.\n\nComment: The Mission agrees with this recommendation. Please note that the reference\nto clinical data should include clinical and surveillance data. The MOH reports regularly\non clinical service delivery data through the Health Management Information System.\nThe challenge in this case is the routine reporting of surveillance data from antenatal\nclinic (ANC) surveys. USAID/Uganda will work closely with CDC and the PEPFAR\nCoordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office to support the MOH to develop routine ANC surveillance reports\nfor USAID and other HIV/AIDS partner reporting requirements. U.S. Government\n(USG)/Uganda PEPFAR interagency coordination, planning and management structures\nwill be used specifically for this purpose effective immediately.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\x0c APPENDIX II\n\n\nRecommendation No. 2: We recommend that USAID/Uganda, in the absence of host\ncountry data, document a plan to collect data in key regions of the country with\nsignificant sexual transmission prevention activity.\n\nComment: The Mission agrees with this recommendation. The USG/Uganda interagency\nTransmission Working Group (TWG) recently developed recommendations for\nimproving the sexual transmission prevention portfolio. A key component of our\nresponse to TWG recommendations is to develop an operational strategy that reflects\nchanges in the USG prevention portfolio. The strategy will include result-based\nobjectives, activities and a monitoring and evaluation plan for all implementing partners.\nAn operational strategy is expected no later than October 30, 2010.\n\nRecommendation No. 3: We recommend that USAID/Uganda finalize and implement a\nTerms of Reference document that includes operational guidelines for target setting\nwithin the PEPFAR Prevention Working Group.\n\nComment: The Mission agrees with this recommendation with modification.\nRecommendation should read: \xe2\x80\xa6.USAID/Uganda work closely with the PEPFAR\nCoordinator\xe2\x80\x99s Office and other implementing USG agencies to finalize and implement\xe2\x80\xa6.\nThe final vetting process is currently underway and will be completed by April 30, 2010.\n\nRecommendation No. 4: We recommend that USAID/Uganda develop and implement a\ndata quality assessment schedule for each implementing partner reporting on sexual\ntransmission prevention indicators that are reported annually or externally.\n\nComment: The Mission agrees with this recommendation. The award of a new\nmonitoring and evaluation contractor for management of interagency PEPFAR data\nmanagement and reporting requirements is currently under procurement. A detailed work\nplan with required DQA schedules will be approved no later than August 15, 2010.\n\n\n\n\ncc. Ortencia Nichols, D/Controller\n Ivan Ddungu, S/Financial Analyst\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0c APPENDIX III\n\n\n\nINDICATOR RESULTS\nThe table below presents (1) the six output indicators established by the Office of the\nGlobal AIDS Coordinator; (2) the targets established by USAID/Uganda in 2009; (3) the\nresults reported by USAID/Uganda in 2009; (3) a comparison of the 2009 targets and\nresults, expressed as a percentage; and (4) a comparison of the 2008 targets and\nresults, expressed as a percentage.\n\nThese figures are based on the unadjusted totals reported by USAID/Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s\nimplementing partners. Aggregated results are unaudited, but limited review was\nperformed without exception in selected regions for selected programs, as described in\nthe Scope and Methodology section.\n\n USAID Targets and Results\n (Bilateral Programs Only)\n\nIndicators 2009 2009 2009 2008\n Target Result Percent Percent\nNumber of individuals reached through 6,897,675 6,356,956 92.2% 50.6%\ncommunity outreach that promotes HIV/AIDS\nprevention through abstinence and/or being\nfaithful\nNumber of individuals reached through 4,289,530 5,461,099 127.3% 50.4%\ncommunity outreach that promotes HIV/AIDS\nprevention through abstinence\nNumber of individuals trained to promote 52,236 48,730 93.3% 131.2%\nHIV/AIDS prevention programs through\nabstinence and/or being faithful\nNumber of individuals reached through 2,175,200 1,832,884 84.3% 57.2%\ncommunity outreach that promotes HIV/AIDS\nprevention through other behavior change\nbeyond abstinence and/or being faithful\nNumber of individuals trained to promote 15,560 17,677 113.6% 42.7%\nHIV/AIDS prevention programs through other\nbehavior change beyond abstinence and/or\nbeing faithful\nNumber of targeted condom service outlets 51,098 61,617 120.6% 203.2%\n\nNote: \xe2\x80\x9cNumber of individuals reached through community outreach that promotes\nHIV/AIDS prevention through abstinence\xe2\x80\x9d is a subset of \xe2\x80\x9cnumber of individuals\nreached through community outreach that promotes HIV/AIDS prevention through\nabstinence and/or being faithful.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0cU.S. Agency for International Development\n Office of Inspector General\n 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW\n Washington, DC 20523\n Tel: (202) 712-1150\n Fax: (202) 216-3047\n www.usaid.gov/oig\n\x0c"