type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b'D2009-085 June 8, 2009\n\n\n\n\n Contracting for Nontactical Vehicles in Support\n of Operation Enduring Freedom\n\x0cAdditional Information and Copies\nTo obtain additional copies of this report, visit the Web site of the Department of Defense\nInspector General at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports or contact the Secondary Reports\nDistribution Unit at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932.\n\nSuggestions for Audits\nTo suggest or request audits, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for\nAuditing by phone (703) 604-9142 (DSN 664-9142), by fax (703) 604-8932, or by mail:\n\n ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions)\n Department of Defense Inspector General\n 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)\n Arlington, VA 22202-4704\n\n\n\n\nAcronyms and Abbreviations\nCG Commanding General\nCJTF-101 Combined Joint Task Force-101\nCOR Contracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative\nCSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\nFAR Federal Acquisition Regulation\nIG Inspector General\nJCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\nJCCS Joint Contingency Contracting System\nNTV Nontactical Vehicle\nPARC-A Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan\nRCC Regional Contracting Center\n\x0c INSPECTOR GENERAL\n DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\n 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE\n ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704\n June 8,2009\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND\n COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-\n IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN\n PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTRACTING-\n AFGHANISTAN\n COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-1OI\n COMMANDER, COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-\n AFGHANISTAN\n CHIEF, REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTER BAGRAM\n CHIEF, REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTER KABUL\n\n\nSUBJECT: Contracting for Nontactical Vehicles in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom\n (Report No. D2009-085)\n\nWe are providing this report for review and comment. We considered management comments on a\ndraft of this report in preparing the final report.\n\nDoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. While the Joint\nContracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan did not comment on Recommendation B.2., its actions were\nresponsive. The comments from the Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan in\nresponse to Recommendation B.3. and the comments from the Combined Security Transition\nCommand-Afghanistan in response to Recommendation A.4. were responsive. The remaining\ncomments were partially responsive. The Regional Contracting Center Bagram did not comment on\nthe draft report. In response to management comments, we revised Recommendations A.I ., A.2.,\nA.3., A.4., and B.l.b. We request additional comments on the revised recommendations, as well as\non Recommendations B.l.a., B.l.c., and B.l.d., by July 8, 2009. Please see the recommendations\ntable on page ii.\n\nPlease provide comments that confonn to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible,\nsend your comments in electronic fonnat (Adobe Acrobat file only) to audros@dodig.mil. Copies of\nyour comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We\nare unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send\nclassified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET internet Protocol Router\nNetwork (SIPRNET).\n\nWe appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905\n(DSN 664-8905).\n\n\n Paul 1. Granetto\n\n\n\n C~:!:::e:::\n Readiness, Operations, and Support\n\x0c\x0cReport No. D-2009-085 (Project No. D2008-D000LH-0235.001) June 8, 2009\n\n\n Results in Brief: Contracting for Nontactical\n Vehicles in Support of Operation Enduring\n Freedom\n We determined that these deficiencies in\nWhat We Did management of NTVs and contract documentation\n constitute material weaknesses in the internal\nOur overall audit objective was to determine\n controls over the contracting for NTVs. Commands\nwhether contracting for nontactical vehicles (NTVs)\n can improve these deficiencies by implementing our\nin support of Operation Enduring Freedom was\n recommendations.\neffective. Specifically, we examined unit\njustification for NTVs and contract award and\nadministration processes for NTV contracts awarded What We Recommend\nin Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring We recommend that the Commander, CJTF-101 and\nFreedom. Commander, CSTC-A determine the quantity of\n NTVs needed to meet recurring NTV requirements,\nWhat We Found establish or expand motor pools at sites throughout\n Afghanistan, and review all NTV leases to\nWhile the Combined Joint Task Force-101\n determine necessity.\n(CJTF-101) and the Combined Security Transition\nCommand-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) have recently\n We also recommend that the Chiefs, Regional\nimproved controls over the NTV acquisition\n Contracting Centers (RCCs) Bagram and Kabul\nprocess, there is more that can be done to improve\n require contracting officers to maintain contract files\nthe management of recurring NTV requirements.\n that can fully reconstruct the history of the contract,\nWe estimate that 68 percent of NTV contract files\n review lease-versus-purchase analyses to ensure best\ndid not contain adequate justification for the NTVs\n value for the Government, and appoint contracting\nand 85 percent did not contain documentation to\n officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives to oversee NTV contracts.\nshow that contracting officers appointed contracting\nofficer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives to oversee contracts.\nTherefore, DoD did not have reasonable assurance Management Comments and\nthat 795 vehicles at a cost of more than $14 million Our Response\nwere mission-essential, complied with the contract CJTF-101 and CSTC-A agreed or partially agreed,\nrequirements, or represented the best value to the but did not provide actions planned or taken to\nGovernment. In addition, we identified more than identify recurring NTV requirements or establish\n$1.4 million paid for NTV leases that were later motor pools. RCC Kabul stated that it will\ndisapproved by the NTV Review Board. Additional emphasize the requirement to maintain complete\noversight and centralized management of NTVs contract files during training, even though it is in\ncould increase the efficiency of acquiring the NTVs place at all RCCs. We acknowledge RCC Kabul\xe2\x80\x99s\nnecessary to support Operation Enduring Freedom. effort to appoint contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives\n for lease contracts with a large number of vehicles,\nDespite these issues, we commend the Joint but emphasize the importance of performing and\nContracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan for documenting acceptance for all vehicles. RCC\nupdating its Acquisition Instruction to include Bagram did not provide comments.\nguidance for maintaining contract files.\nImplementation of this guidance will help ensure We request that the parties referenced in the\ncontracting officers maintain contract files that recommendations table on the back of this page\nprovide an adequate history of the transaction. provide comments by July 8, 2009.\n\n\n\n i\n\x0cReport No. D-2009-085 (Project No. D2008-D000LH-0235.001) June 8, 2009\n\nRecommendations Table\n\nManagement Recommendations No Additional Comments\n Requiring Comment Required\nCommander, Joint Contracting B.2.\nCommand-Iraq/Afghanistan\n\nPrincipal Assistant Responsible B.3.\nfor Contracting-Afghanistan\n\nCommander, Combined Joint A.1., A.2., A.4. A.3.\nTask Force-101\n\nCommander, Combined Security A.1., A.2., A.3. A.4.\nTransition Command-\nAfghanistan\nCommander, RCC Bagram B.1.\nCommander, RCC Kabul B.1.c. B.1.a., B.1.b., B.1.d.\n\nPlease provide comments by July 8, 2009.\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\x0cTable of Contents\n\nResults in Brief i\n\nIntroduction 1\n\n Objective 1\n Background 1\n Review of Internal Controls 3\n\nFinding A. Centralizing the Management of Nontactical Vehicles\n in Afghanistan 4\n\n Management Comments on the Findings and Our Response 7\n Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 7\n\nFinding B. Contracting for Nontactical Vehicles in Support of Operation\n Enduring Freedom 11\n\n Management Actions and Conclusions 15\n Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 16\n\nAppendices\n\n A. Scope and Methodology 21\n Prior Coverage 23\n B. Management Comments on the Findings and Our Response 24\n\nManagement Comments\n\n U.S. Central Command 27\n Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and Principal Assistant\n Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan 28\n Combined Joint Task Force-101 30\n Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and Regional\n Contracting Center Kabul 36\n\x0cIntroduction\nObjective\nOur overall audit objective was to determine whether contracting for nontactical vehicles\n(NTVs) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom was effective. Specifically for this\naudit, we looked at the need justification, contract award, and administration processes\nfor NTV contracts awarded in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.\nSee Appendix A for a discussion of the scope, methodology, and prior coverage.\n\nBackground\nWe performed this audit as required by Public Law 110-181, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Defense\nAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Section 842 requires thorough investigation and\nauditing in order to identify potential waste, fraud, and abuse in the performance of DoD\ncontracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the logistical support of coalition\nforces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, Section 842 requires thorough investigation and\nauditing of Federal agency contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the\nperformance of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq and Afghanistan.\n\nIn response to the Act, we collaborated with the Inspectors General of the Department of\nState and U.S. Agency for International Development, Special Inspector General for Iraq\nReconstruction, Auditors General of the U.S. Army Audit Agency and U.S. Air Force\nAudit Agency, and Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency to develop a\ncomprehensive audit plan for Southwest Asia. The audit plan includes key issue areas,\nsuch as financial management, systems contracts, and human capital for contract\nadministration. This plan highlighted ongoing and planned work for each of these\nagencies, and identified the purchasing and leasing of vehicles in support of Operation\nEnduring Freedom as our audit issue area.\n\nThe Department of the Army is the executive agent for contracting for Operation\nEnduring Freedom. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and\nTechnology) delegated the authority as head of contracting activity to the Commander,\nJoint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). This authority applies to all\ncontracting activities assigned or attached to U.S. Central Command, with the exception\nof the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.\n\nJCC-I/A provides operational contracting support in Iraq and Afghanistan for the\ncoalition forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is done\nvia two Principal Assistants Responsible for Contracting (PARCs), one for Afghanistan\nand one for Iraq. JCC-I/A operates Regional Contracting Centers (RCCs) throughout\nIraq and Afghanistan. RCCs carry out the JCC-I/A mission by supporting the contracting\nrequirements of local commands.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\x0cThe Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101) and the Combined Security Transition\nCommand-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) are commands in Afghanistan. The mission of\nCJTF-101 is to aid in battling insurgent forces, develop Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s national security,\nand support the development of a stable Afghani government. The mission of CSTC-A is\nto plan, program, and implement structural, organizational, institutional, and management\nreforms of the Afghanistan National Security Forces in order to develop a stable\nAfghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter and defeat terrorism. The figure\ndepicts the command and coordination structure.\n\n Figure. JCC-I/A Theater Support\n\n\n\n\nFederal and DoD Guidance\nDoD guidance defines NTVs as any commercial vehicle or trailer acquired and assigned\nbased on authorization documents and used for providing administrative, direct mission,\nor operational transportation support of military functions. For purposes of this audit, we\nconsidered NTVs to include sedans, trucks, vans, and sport utility vehicles (armored and\nunarmored). Acquiring NTVs for use in theater requires due diligence in identifying and\njustifying the need, documenting decisions for leasing or purchasing, and documenting\naward decisions. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\x0cAcquisition Regulation Supplement, Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement,\nDoD regulations, and Army regulations provide guidance for acquiring NTVs. The\nFederal and DoD guidance collectively requires:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 contract files to contain sufficient documentation to provide an adequate audit\n trail to document decisions throughout the acquisition process, including\n justifications, approvals, and source selection documentation;\n \xef\x82\xb7 consideration of leasing versus purchasing (cost benefit to the Government);\n \xef\x82\xb7 contracting officers and contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives (CORs) to ensure\n that the goods and services delivered comply with the contract requirements; and\n \xef\x82\xb7 internal policy, guidance, and standard operating procedures developed by heads\n of DoD components to ensure effective and efficient administration of the\n procurement, operation, maintenance, and use of motor vehicles.\n\nReview of Nontactical Vehicle Contracts\nWe examined a statistical sample of contract actions from the Joint Contingency\nContracting System dated October 1, 2005, through July 15, 2008. We examined a\nsample of 38 contract actions from RCC Bagram and 28 contract actions from RCC\nKabul (see Appendix A). These 66 contract actions totaled $14,076,189 for 795 NTVs.\nThe types of contract actions in the audit sample included individual contracts; task\norders on indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts; and orders against blanket\npurchase agreements. Table 1 identifies the number of vehicles, by type, included in the\nreview of 66 contract actions at RCCs Bagram and Kabul.\n\n Table 1. Vehicles Included in Scope of Statistical Sample\n Armored\n RCC Sedans Trucks Vans SUVs Total Total Value\n Vehicles\nBagram 0 43 3 42 0 88 $ 1,315,440\nKabul 393 29 3 252 30 707 12,760,749\n Total 393 72 6 294 30 795 $14,076,189\n\nReview of Internal Controls\nWe identified material internal control weaknesses with the management of NTVs as\ndefined by DoD Instruction 5010.40, \xe2\x80\x9cManagers\xe2\x80\x99 Internal Control Program (MIC)\nProcedures,\xe2\x80\x9d January 4, 2006. DoD Instruction 5010.40 states that internal controls are\nthe organization, policies, and procedures that help program and financial managers\nachieve results and safeguard the integrity of their programs.\n\nInternal controls for the acquisition of NTVs were generally in place; however, we saw\nthat contracting officers at RCCs Bagram and Kabul did not comply with key contracting\ncontrols and that some of those controls needed improvement. We describe these issues\nof noncompliance and controls needing improvement in our report findings.\nImplementing Recommendations B.1., B.2., and B.3. will improve the internal controls\nover NTV contracting and management procedures. We will provide a copy of the report\nto the senior JCC-I/A official responsible for management controls.\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0cFinding A. Centralizing the Management of\nNontactical Vehicles in Afghanistan\nPARC-A, CJTF-101, and CSTC-A have recently improved controls over the NTV\nacquisition process; however, there is more that can be done to improve the management\nof recurring requirements to ensure effective contracting for NTVs. Specifically,\nimproving the oversight and centralized management of leased NTVs and mission\nrequirements should provide DoD assurance that it is acquiring the vehicles necessary to\nsupport mission requirements while mitigating the risks of potential waste of Government\nfunds.\n\nStrengthening Controls Over Vehicle Acquisition\nand Usage\nCJTF-101, CSTC-A, and PARC-A have recently strengthened controls over the NTV\nacquisition process and usage of NTVs by implementing vehicle registration procedures,\nestablishing an NTV Review Board, and issuing policy regarding requests for NTVs.\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Justification and Vehicle Registration. CJTF-101 issued a fragmentary order in\n August 2008 establishing a vehicle registration process that required units to\n submit a justification memorandum for all NTVs, signed by an O-6 level officer,\n stating that the requirement is mission-essential before vehicle registration. This\n order required all units at Bagram Air Field to register all NTVs no later than\n September 30, 2008.\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 CSTC-A Leased Vehicle Standard Operating Procedures. CSTC-A published\n guidance in August 2008 to establish standards and procedures for CSTC-A\n leased vehicles.\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 NTV Review Board. CJTF-101 established the NTV Review Board in\n August 2008 to review and approve new and recurring NTV lease requests.\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 PARC May 2008 Policy Letter. PARC-A issued guidance in May 2008 that\n requires a cost-benefit analysis of lease versus purchase before executing any\n lease or purchase for more than 60 days.\n\nImproving Oversight of Nontactical Vehicles\nin Afghanistan\nCJTF-101 established the NTV Review Board after the CJTF-101 Red Team conducted\nan analysis of NTV usage at Bagram Air Field in June 2008. The Red Team study\nidentified the following:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 The total number of NTVs at Bagram Air Field was unknown and CJTF-101 had\n limited oversight of new NTVs brought onto the base for military use;\n\n\n 4\n\x0c \xef\x82\xb7 A lack of policies and a written NTV justification standard resulted in NTVs\n being issued to units or individuals that may not need them; and\n \xef\x82\xb7 Buses at the base had few occupants while the number of NTVs with only one\n occupant was high. The study noted that this may have contributed to the\n perception noted in a June 2008 CJTF-101 report that NTVs at Bagram Air Field\n were being used for personal convenience and not military necessity.\n\nThe desired results of corrective action from this analysis would allow CJTF-101 and the\nbase commanders to track all NTVs in their respective operating areas.\n\nA fragmentary order dated August 19, 2008, established and assigned responsibilities to\nthe NTV Review Board. Specifically, it was to review requirements and usage of NTVs\nand transportation motor pools. According to NTV Review Board officials, units\nrequested registration of 1,813 existing NTVs at Bagram as of February 19, 2009. The\nNTV Review Board approved registration for 1,499 vehicles and disapproved registration\nfor 314 vehicles. Of the 314 disapproved vehicles, the NTV Review Board, in\nconjunction with legal counsel, determined that it would not be in the best interest of the\nGovernment to terminate the contracts for 145 leased NTVs, and approved registration\nfor these vehicles only until the leases expired. Documentation provided by the audit\nclient showed that, on average, it costs $850 per month, or $10,200 per year, to lease one\nNTV. Using this rate, the 145 leased vehicles cost the Government more than\n$1.4 million that could have been put to better use had the leases not been approved when\ninitially submitted.\n\nThe registration process and NTV Review Board at Bagram Air Field are examples of\ncontrols over the acquisition of NTVs. Although it may not be necessary to establish\nreview boards at all locations throughout Afghanistan, CJTF-101 and CSTC-A should\nreview all current leases to determine their necessity based on operational requirements\nand usage and disapprove or terminate leases that are not justified. This would help\nensure that units are leasing only mission-essential vehicles. CJTF-101 and CSTC-A\nshould also implement registration processes on bases throughout Afghanistan to aid in\ntracking NTVs brought on base that are not assets of the motor pools. Furthermore,\ncentralized management of NTVs in transportation motor pools would help give\nCJTF-101 and base commanders increased oversight of NTVs throughout Afghanistan\nand on bases.\n\nCentralized Management of NTVs\nCentralized management of NTVs would ensure that they are used to efficiently and\neffectively fill mission requirements, and increase the oversight of the NTVs in the\noperating area while decreasing the workload for contracting officers. DoD policies for\npooling vehicles state that vehicles are a limited, essential, and costly resource that must\nbe managed carefully and that pooling vehicles should help ensure the highest effective\nlevel of use for DoD vehicles.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\x0cCJTF-101 and CSTC-A did not have oversight of NTV requirements. The results of a\nJune 2008 CJTF-101 study indicated that CJTF-101 did not know the number of NTVs at\nBagram Air Field and had limited ability to track new NTVs brought onto the base for\nmilitary use. Having a centralized location for NTVs would increase the ability of\nCJTF-101 and base commanders to track the number of vehicles in the operating area.\nUsing motor pools would also provide increased opportunities to conduct regular\nmaintenance and track usage to ensure that an NTV\xe2\x80\x99s useful life is maximized and that\nunits use the vehicles appropriately.\n\nCentralized management of NTVs could also help fill recurring mission requirements\nmore efficiently. We identified that our audit sample included 153 leased vehicles at\nRCCs Bagram and Kabul. At least 44 of these vehicles were renewals of previous leases,\nat a total cost of more than $1.3 million. By identifying recurring NTV requirements,\nCJTF-101 and CSTC-A could establish new or expand existing motor pools to fill these\nrequirements instead of awarding new or renewing current NTV leases.\n\nCentralized management of NTVs and NTV requirements would decrease the workload\non contracting officers. Current policy allows units to request the acquisition of NTVs in\nsupport of mission requirements, which increases the workload for contracting officers.\nFor example, our sample identified 66 contract actions for 795 vehicles, which is an\naverage of 12 vehicles per contract. Centralizing the management of NTVs should\nreduce the number of contract actions necessary to obtain vehicles. Using motor pools\nwould negate the need for units to request new NTV leases, except where motor pools\ncannot meet their needs. This would decrease the need for NTV contracts and the\nworkload on contracting officers.\n\nConclusion\nWe commend PARC-A, CJTF-101, and CSTC-A and for taking actions to improve\ncontrols over the NTV acquisition process. However, additional activities, such as\nreview of leased vehicles and establishment or expansion of motor pools would help\nincrease the effectiveness of contracting as well as the oversight of vehicles. Reviewing\nleased vehicles and taking appropriate action to disapprove or terminate leases that may\nnot be justified would help increase oversight of NTVs and ensure that only the most\ncritical mission requirements are filled with costly NTV leases. Furthermore, the\nbenefits of establishing motor pools at sites throughout Afghanistan include improved\nNTV tracking and regular maintenance, which would extend the life of the vehicles. It\nwould also decrease the workload on contracting officers in theater. Establishing motor\npools in Afghanistan to support mission transportation requirements and requiring units\nto use motor pool services would help ensure that DoD is using vehicles most effectively\nand leasing only those vehicles needed to support the most critical transportation\nrequirements.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\x0cManagement Comments on the Findings and Our\nResponse\nSummaries of managements comments on the findings of this report and our responses\nare in Appendix B.\n\nRecommendations, Management Comments, and Our\nResponse\nRevised Recommendations\nRCC Kabul, through the Deputy CG, CSTC-A, commented that it was not the role of the\ncontracting center to identify mission requirements, and that it has no authority to direct\ncommanders to create or renovate existing motor pools, establish vehicle registration\nprocesses, or review all NTV leases. Therefore, we have revised Recommendations A.1.,\nA.2., A.3., and A.4. to remove the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-\nAfghanistan and Chiefs, Regional Contracting Centers from this Recommendation.\n\nA. We recommend that the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-101 and the\nCommander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan require\ncommanders at all bases in Afghanistan to:\n\n 1. Identify recurring missions at each location and determine the number\nand type of nontactical vehicles needed to support those missions annually.\n\n 2. Establish new or expand existing motor pools at bases in Afghanistan\nbased on past and projected nontactical vehicle requirements to adequately support\nunits needing nontactical vehicles for mission requirements.\n\n 3. Establish or maintain nontactical vehicle registration processes at each\nbase to track the number of vehicles brought on base outside the motor pools.\n\n 4. Review all nontactical vehicle leases to determine necessity based on\noperational requirements and usage, taking appropriate action to disapprove or\nterminate leases that are not justified.\n\nCombined Joint Task Force-101 Comments\nThe Chief of Staff, Combined Joint Task Force-101 partially agreed with\nRecommendation A.1., stating that mission requirements are not constant and that each\nrequirement is validated separately. The chief of staff stated that when recurring\nrequirements are identified, the optimum solution is to work toward providing\nGovernment-owned vehicles.\n\nThe Chief of Staff, Combined Joint Task Force-101 agreed with Recommendations A.2.,\nA.3., and A.4. The chief of staff noted that establishing motor pools would require\nadditional resources and current deployed units do not have the structure to manage\n\n\n 7\n\x0cmotor pools. The chief of staff also noted that CJTF-101 is currently implementing a\nregistration process at Bagram Air Field, and the next phase is to establish registration\nprocesses at other bases. Finally, the chief of staff stated that the process to review all\nNTV leases had been initiated at Bagram Air Field, and that the NTV Review Board and\nthe Joint Acquisition Review Board will review all new NTV requirements for approval\nor disapproval.\n\nOur Response\nCombined Joint Task Force-101 comments are partially responsive. In response to\nRecommendation A.1., we agree that providing Government-owned vehicles is an\noptimal solution to fill recurring NTV requirements. However, evaluating all NTV\nrequirements separately does not facilitate the identification of recurring NTV\nrequirements. As noted in our report, we identified more than $1.3 million spent to\nrenew vehicle leases. Identifying lease renewals, which can indicate recurring\nrequirements, and building a fleet of Government-owned vehicles or vehicles leased from\nthe General Services Administration based on these recurring requirements will provide\nmore centralized management of vehicles and allow redistribution of vehicles based on\npriority. The chief of staff did not identify actions planned or taken to identify recurring\nrequirements or fill those requirements with Government-owned vehicles.\n\nWhile the chief of staff agreed with Recommendations A.2. and A.4., he did not provide\nactions planned or taken to address the recommendations. In response to\nRecommendation A.2., the chief of staff stated that an installation management team is\nrequired to provide adequate oversight of larger bases; however, the chief of staff did not\nprovide planned actions for obtaining additional resources to establish this function.\nFurthermore, in response to Recommendation A.4., the comments from chief of staff did\nnot address existing NTV leases or specific actions regarding disapproving or terminating\nleases at bases other than Bagram Air Field. The comments provided in response to\nRecommendation A.3. were responsive. We request the Commander, CJTF-101 provide\nadditional comments in response to the final report to address Recommendations A.1.,\nA.2., and A.4.\n\nCombined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\nComments\nThe Deputy Commanding General (CG), CSTC-A agreed with Recommendation A.3.,\nand partially agreed with Recommendations A.1., A.2., and A.4. The Deputy CG\ndisagreed with the finding, stating that was inconsistent with the audit team\xe2\x80\x99s briefing to\nthe chief of staff and that CSTC-A has a very active NTV program. The Deputy CG\nstated that CSTC-A provides effective oversight of new and existing leased vehicle\nrequirements through review boards and a leased vehicle program manager.\nAdditionally, the Deputy CG noted that while the Command maintains overall visibility\nof the leased vehicle program, organizations are responsible for identifying their vehicle\nneeds. The Deputy CG stated that when leases approach expiration, units are alerted to\nresubmit a requirement for renewal or turn in the vehicles.\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\x0cThe Deputy CG stated that transitioning to a central transportation motor pool in the near\nterm was not feasible due to a lack of sufficient space and personnel; however, he stated\nthat it is possible for the future, and that it is a long-term goal of CSTC-A. The Deputy\nCG stated that establishing motor pools would shift property accountability and contract\nmanagement responsibilities from units to motor pool managers, and maintained that the\ncurrent organizational controls within the Command provide adequate accountability and\nallow the Command to exercise due diligence and fiscal responsibility. The Deputy CG\nalso identified space and personnel restrictions as obstacles to implementing vehicle\nregistration processes at each base.\n\nThe Deputy CG stated that requests for new leases and lease renewals from all\norganizations undergo several reviews, and requests are disapproved or leases are\nterminated if requested requirements are insufficient or no longer valid. The Deputy CG\nstated that CSTC-A is exercising due diligence in limiting the number of leased vehicles\nwhile still meeting mission requirements. The Deputy CG also noted that in 2007, they\nsubmitted a request for 109 Government-owned vehicles, but it has not yet been\napproved.\n\nOur Response\nComments from the Deputy CG, CSTC-A were partially responsive. We agree that\nCSTC-A has improved controls over the NTV acquisition process by implementing\nmultiple review boards and establishing a leased vehicle program manager to approve\nand oversee acquisition of NTVs. We also agree that establishing motor pools would\nrequire a shift in responsibilities. However, our report specifically linked a large number\nof lease renewals to the need for Commands to identify and plan for recurring NTV\nmission requirements. Furthermore, we also maintain that establishing motor pools\nwould allow more centralized oversight and better management of NTVs, specifically\nthose acquired to fill recurring requirements. We commend CSTC-A for requesting\nGovernment-owned vehicles, and encourage Commands to continue this practice when a\nlease-versus-purchase analysis shows this is in the best interest of the Government.\nFinally, we appreciate the comment by the Deputy CG that our report finding is\ninconsistent with the briefing to the chief of staff, but we emphasized during the briefing\nthat the results were preliminary and depended on further analysis.\n\nAlthough the Deputy CG only partially agreed with Recommendation A.4., we consider\nthe comments responsive. We agree that the review processes described will provide\nassurance that only NTV requests for valid mission requirements are approved.\n\nWhile the Deputy CG agreed or partially agreed with Recommendations A.1., A.2., and\nA.3., he did not identify specific actions planned or taken to identify recurring NTV\nrequirements, establish motor pools, or implement a vehicle registration process. We\nrequest the Commander, CSTC-A provide additional comments in response to the final\nreport to address these recommendations.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cRegional Contracting Center Kabul Comments\nRCC Kabul, through the Deputy CG, CSTC-A, did not agree that it was the responsible\norganization for these recommendations. RCC Kabul stated that the role of the\ncontracting center is to procure the assets to fill mission requirements, and that it tracks\nservice contracts, such as vehicle leases, to monitor contracting processes and ensure\noptions are executed in a timely manner. RCC Kabul stated that it is not the role of the\ncontracting center to identify mission requirements, and that it has no authority to direct\ncommanders to create or renovate existing motor pools, establish vehicle registration\nprocesses, or review all NTV leases. However, RCC Kabul noted that it can advise on\nprocurement methods and provide commanders information on past procurements.\n\nOur Response\nWe agree with the comments from RCC Kabul, through the Deputy CG, CSTC-A, and as\na result, we revised the recommendations to exclude RCC Kabul. No additional\ncomments are required on these recommendations.\n\nRegional Contracting Center Bagram\nThe Chief, RCC Bagram did not comment on the recommendations. However, based on\ncomments we received from RCC Kabul, we revised the recommendations to exclude\nRCC Bagram so no comments are needed.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\x0cFinding B. Contracting for Nontactical\nVehicles in Support of Operation Enduring\nFreedom\nContracting for NTVs in support of Operation Enduring Freedom needs improvement.\nContracting officers at RCCs Bagram and Kabul did not maintain a complete contract\nhistory of pre-award, award, or administration documentation, and they did not appoint\ncontracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives to oversee the contracts. As a result, DoD could not\nhave reasonable assurance that vehicle acquisitions valued at more than $14 million:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 were mission-essential,\n \xef\x82\xb7 complied with contract requirements, or\n \xef\x82\xb7 represented the best value to the Government.\n\nContracting officers must fully implement policy and controls governing the contracting\nof NTVs to help improve the effectiveness of contracting processes for NTVs.\n\nIn the draft of this report, we recommended that the Joint Contracting Command-\nIraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) update its Acquisition Instruction to include detailed\nguidelines about the documentation to maintain in contract files and continue to monitor\nthe contracting processes of RCCs in Afghanistan. In response to this recommendation,\nJCC-I/A provided an updated Acquisition Instruction and standard operating procedures\nthat addressed these issues.\n\nContract Documentation\nContracting officers did not maintain adequate documentation to provide a history that\nsupported contract actions. FAR Subpart 4.8, \xe2\x80\x9cGovernment Contract Files,\xe2\x80\x9d states the\ndocumentation in the contract file is to be sufficient to provide background and support\nfor decisions throughout the acquisition process and provide information for reviews,\ninvestigations, and congressional inquiries. Documents normally in official contracting\nfiles are to include:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 presolicitation documents, including justifications and approvals;\n \xef\x82\xb7 award documentation, including a list of sources solicited, the solicitation, and a\n copy of each offer or quotation received; and\n \xef\x82\xb7 contract administration documents.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0cTable 2 identifies the number of contract files at RCCs Bagram and Kabul that did not\ncontain adequate documentation to support decisions throughout the history of the\ncontract.\n\n Table 2. Number of Contract Files That Did Not Support Contracting Decisions\n RCC Bagram RCC Kabul Total\n Contract Documents\n (38 contracts) (28 contracts) (66 contracts)\nJustification 25 25 50\nRequirement approval 13 23 36\nAward 8 23 31\nLease-versus-purchase 38 27 65\nVehicle usage 38 28 66\nCOR delegation letter 38 16 54\n\nPre-Award Documentation\nContracting officers did not always maintain documentation in official contract files for\npre-award decisions. As shown in Table 2, contract files lacked pre-award\ndocumentation, such as justification for NTVs and lease-versus-purchase analyses.\n\nNontactical Vehicle Justifications\nWe estimate that 68 percent of 215 contract files did not contain adequate justifications\nfor requested NTVs. Where justifications were documented, they generally did not fully\nexplain the need for the NTVs requested. A June 2008 CJTF-101 report on the use of\nNTVs stated that \xe2\x80\x9cthere is a widely held perception that NTVs are being used for\npersonal convenience, not military necessity.\xe2\x80\x9d Without justification for NTVs, we could\nnot determine whether units acquired vehicles for critical missions or for convenience.\n\nIn August 2008, CJTF-101 issued policy for the management of NTVs at Bagram Air\nField. This policy states that justification requests for NTVs must indicate that the NTV\nrequirement is mission-essential. The request must address the need for the vehicle, the\nnumber of personnel assigned to the unit and the number of vehicles on hand, the time\nperiod for which the vehicle is requested, and why bus transportation or temporary\nvehicles cannot support the mission. Maintaining copies of these requests as part of the\nofficial contract file would provide sufficient documentation to determine why units\nrequested NTVs.\n\nPARC-A did not identify issues with justifications in contract files during semiannual\nprocurement management reviews.* Recent procurement management review reports for\nRCCs Bagram and Kabul stated that contract files contained strong requirement\ndefinitions. However, our audit results were inconsistent with this finding.\n\n\n\n\n*\n The procurement management reviews are not solely for NTV contracts. However, PARC-A conducts\nthese reviews to assess implementation of policies and procedures; therefore we assume that the results of\nthese reviews are representative of the contract processes implemented at the RCC.\n\n\n 12\n\x0cLease-Versus-Purchase Analyses\nOf the 66 contract files we reviewed, only one contract file contained a lease-versus-\npurchase analysis for NTVs. FAR 7.401, \xe2\x80\x9cAcquisition Considerations,\xe2\x80\x9d states that\nagencies should consider whether to lease or purchase equipment on a case-by-case\nevaluation of comparative costs, estimated period of use, extent of use within that period,\npurchase price, and potential for use of the equipment by other agencies after its use by\nthe acquiring agency ends. JCC-I/A personnel and contracting officers stated that they\nwould not be able to purchase vehicles because the procurement funds were limited and\noperations and maintenance funds could not be used to purchase NTVs. Therefore, they\ndid not complete the analyses or they completed the analyses only to record the best\nvalue, not to ensure it.\n\nWe estimate that 22 percent of the 215 Afghanistan contracts were lease renewals. For\n16 of the 66 contracts in our sample, contracting officers either renewed leases through\nnew contract actions or extended existing lease contracts at a cost of more than\n$1.3 million. For example, the RCCs extended leases for 14 vehicles beyond 18 months,\nfor a total cost of more than $523,000. For each of these lease renewals, the contract files\nhad no evidence of lease-versus-purchase analyses conducted during the life of the\ncontract. Reviewing lease-versus-purchase analyses should help ensure that contracting\ndecisions are in the best interest of DoD.\n\nAward Decision\nWe estimate that 34 percent of the 215 Afghanistan contract files for NTVs did not\ncontain any documentation to determine why the contract was awarded to the selected\ncontractor. In addition, 14 of the 66 contract files we reviewed in our sample did not\ncontain any type of solicitation or award information in the contract file, such as the\nsolicitation document, vendor quotes, or an abstract of offers. FAR Subpart 4.8 requires\ncontract file documentation to provide a complete background as a basis for informed\ndecisions at each step in the acquisition process.\n\nContract Administration\nContracting officers at RCCs Bagram and Kabul did not routinely appoint CORs to\nadminister and oversee contracts as required by DoD policy. We estimate that CORs\nwere not appointed for 85 percent of the 215 Afghanistan contracts. Contracting officers\nat RCC Bagram stated that they did not appoint CORs because it was an administrative\nburden or because the procurement contracting officer conducts an initial inspection\nbefore turning the vehicle over to the customer. In addition, one RCC Kabul contract for\nmore than $6 million contained documentation in the contract file stating that assigning a\nCOR to accept vehicles or provide quality assurance reviews was not cost-effective.\n\nDoD guidance states that contracting officers must designate, in writing, a properly\ntrained COR for service contracts and include a copy of the written delegation in the\nofficial contract file. The Deputy Secretary of Defense stated in an August 22, 2008,\nmemorandum that CORs are critical to ensuring that contractors comply with all contract\nrequirements and that overall performance is commensurate with the level of payments\nmade throughout the life of the contract. In a February 9, 2007, memorandum, the\n\n\n 13\n\x0cDeputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) stressed the\nimportance of making this appointment before contract performance begins. JCC-I/A,\nPARC-A, and CJTF-101 have also supplemented DoD regulations and policy with\nadditional requirements for appointing CORs. However, contracting officers generally\ndid not assign CORs to administer and monitor NTV contracts.\n\nAccording to Army guidance, a key function of a COR is to accept vehicles and ensure\nthey comply with contract terms and requirements. However, 58 of the 66 contract files\nwe reviewed did not contain any vehicle acceptance documentation that clearly identified\nwhether the delivered vehicles met contract requirements. Without such documentation,\nwe could not determine whether 776 vehicles complied with contract delivery date and\nother contract specifications, such as make, model, year, mileage, and condition.\n\nWe identified acceptance documentation in 8 of the 66 contract files; however, it revealed\nthat Government representatives accepted at least 15 vehicles, at a cost of more than\n$1.1 million, even though they did not meet the terms of the contracts. For example, one\ncontract to lease a Toyota Land Cruiser stated that the vehicle should not have more than\n10,000 kilometers; however, the vehicle inspection report showed that the odometer read\nmore than 24,500. Another contract to lease one van and two pickup trucks stated that\nthe trucks should not be older than 2006 and should have fewer than 10,000 kilometers.\nThe vehicle inspection reports, however, showed that one truck was a 2005 model with\n38,383 and another had an odometer reading of 70,061. The van included on the contract\ndid not have a vehicle inspection report; therefore, we could not determine whether the\nvan complied with the terms of the contract.\n\nContract Documentation Guidelines\nIn response to Recommendation B.2., JCC-I/A provided an updated Acquisition\nInstruction, which included guidance for maintaining contract files. In a draft of this\nreport, we identified that turnover of contracting personnel as units rotate had contributed\nto inconsistent documentation in the contract files. During our audit, contracting officers\noften could not answer questions about gaps in contract documentation, stating the\nprevious contracting officers had awarded the contracts. Furthermore, the draft of this\nreport identified that the January 2006 JCC-I/A Acquisition Instruction identified clear\nguidelines and checklists for the contents of contract files, but the July 2008 Acquisition\nInstruction did not provide sufficient guidance for contract files. It also highlighted the\nimportance of developing and implementing strong contracting policy and oversight of\ncontracting activities, especially in a dynamic environment.\n\nThe JCC-I/A Acquisition Instruction, dated April 1, 2009, includes guidance for\nmaintaining contract files and specifically references the Army File Index. This index\nprovides a comprehensive list of documents related to solicitation, proposal review,\ncontract award, and administration. Specific documents include a purchase request,\ndetermination for equipment lease versus purchase, a solicitation list, source selection\ndocumentation, and COR nomination. We believe that following this list will ensure\ncontracting officers maintain contract files that provide an adequate history of the\ntransaction in accordance with FAR requirements.\n\n\n 14\n\x0cJCC-I/A also provided standard operating procedures for procurement management\nreviews to evaluate contract files for documentation regarding solicitation, basis of\naward, and inspection and acceptance. The standard operating procedures also require\nRCC Chiefs to conduct self-assessments and perform self-oversight in addition to formal\nprocurement management reviews. We believe that implementation of these procedures\nwill ensure more thorough oversight of contracting processes at RCCs.\n\nManagement Actions and Conclusions\nWe commend CJTF-101, CSTC-A, and PARC-A for actions taken to address issues\nrelated to NTVs and contracting. PARC-A and CJTF-101 have issued policy that\noutlines the process for requesting and approving NTVs. CJTF-101 has established an\nNTV Review Board to review new and ongoing NTV leases based on mission\nrequirements, and CSTC-A has identified a program manager for NTVs to monitor lease\nterms, provide oversight of CORs on NTV contracts, approve new NTV leases, and track\nall NTVs in the Kabul area.\n\nHowever, contracting for NTVs could be improved. DoD did not have assurance that\nmore than $14 million in NTVs were justified or met contract requirements.\nFurthermore, in the absence of lease-versus-purchase analyses, DoD did not have\nassurance that leasing vehicles represented the best value to the Government. Federal\nguidance provides many flexibilities for contracting operations in a contingency or\nemergency environment. However, these flexibilities do not provide a blanket waiver of\nrequirements for contracting procedures.\n\nThe turnover of contracting personnel has contributed to inconsistent contract file\ndocumentation at RCCs Bagram and Kabul. In April 2009, JCC-I/A updated its\nAcquisition Instruction, and following this guidance will help ensure that contracting\nofficers maintain sufficient documentation in contract files to reconstruct the history of\nthe contract, and it will facilitate a more seamless transition between unit rotations. In\naddition, contracting officers should appoint CORs to oversee contracts for leased NTVs.\nFinally, more thorough procurement management reviews at the PARC-A level would\nhelp ensure that contracting problems are identified and addressed in a timely manner.\nThese actions should improve the effectiveness of contracting processes for NTVs.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0cRecommendations, Management Comments, and Our\nResponse\nRevised Recommendation\nAs a result of management comments, we revised Recommendation B.1.b. to ensure\ncontracting officers review the lease-versus-purchase analysis prepared by the requesting\norganizations.\n\nB.1. We recommend that the Chiefs, Regional Contracting Centers Bagram and\nKabul require contracting officers to:\n\n a. Maintain contract files that can reconstruct the history of the contract,\nincluding justification for the contract, award decisions, and contract\nadministration;\n\n b. Review lease-versus-purchase analyses for vehicles to ensure the\nGovernment is getting the best value;\n\n c. Appoint contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives to ensure oversight of\ncontracts for leased nontactical vehicles; and\n\n d. Ensure completion of vehicle inspection reports when documenting\nacceptance of NTVs and reject noncompliant vehicles, or delegate this responsibility\nto a contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative.\n\nRegional Contracting Center Kabul Comments\nRCC Kabul, through the Deputy CG, CSTC-A, agreed with Recommendations B.1.a. and\nB.1.d. RCC Kabul stated that the requirement to maintain complete contract files,\nincluding NTV justifications, a lease-versus-purchase analysis, and vehicle inspection\nreports, is in place at all the RCCs, and that the documentation should be in the contract\nfiles for all current and future contracts. RCC Kabul stated that it will also emphasize the\nneed for complete contract file documentation during weekly training sessions and staff\nmeetings. RCC Kabul noted that the JCC-I/A Acquisition Instruction requires the use of\nindexes for contract file documentation and that, as of September 30, 2008, PARC-A\nrequires a peer review on all contracts, regardless of dollar value.\n\nRCC Kabul partially agreed with Recommendation B.1.b. and stated that a preliminary\nlease-versus-purchase analysis is required for any lease longer than 60 days, and that,\ndepending on the dollar value, should have been included in the files we reviewed.\nHowever, RCC Kabul noted that requesting organizations are responsible for conducting\nthe lease-versus-purchase analysis and submitting it to the contracting office. RCC\nKabul stated that it will continue to review the analyses, and that it is required to obtain a\nlegal review by PARC-A prior to solicitation and award for contract actions exceeding\n$750,000.\n\n\n\n 16\n\x0cRCC Kabul partially agreed with Recommendation B.1.c., stating that JCC-I/A requires\nCORs to be appointed for all contracts with significant technical requirements. However,\nRCC Kabul stated that NTV contracts are generally considered simplified acquisitions\nand do not require ongoing surveillance or warrant a COR. RCC Kabul also stated that it\nis often unable to obtain CORs from requiring organizations, and is currently\nexperiencing a shortage of CORs for all acquisitions that should have a COR. However,\nRCC Kabul stated that it often appoints CORs on NTV contracts with large dollar values\nto ensure proper accountability, and it will make an effort to appoint CORs for lease\ncontracts with a large number of vehicles.\n\nOur Response\nWe consider comments from RCC Kabul to Recommendations B.1.a. and B.1.d.\nresponsive. We commend RCC Kabul for its actions taken to address these issues. We\nagree that maintaining complete contract file documentation and stressing the importance\nof this during training sessions will help improve contracting for NTVs in support of\nOperation Enduring Freedom.\n\nBased on management comments, we revised Recommendation B.1.b. As a result, the\ncomments from RCC Kabul are responsive, and no additional comments are required.\n\nWe consider comments from RCC Kabul to Recommendation B.1.c. generally\nresponsive. We acknowledge that RCC Kabul is making an effort to appoint CORs for\ncontracts to lease a large number of vehicles, and we also understand that there is a\nshortage of CORs. However, our report highlighted policy issued by the Deputy\nSecretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and\nProcurement) that emphasizes the need for effective surveillance of service contracts and\nrequires that CORs be appointed prior to contract award. The memorandum from the\nDeputy Secretary of Defense notes that COR duties should be tailored to dollar value and\ncomplexity of the requirements.\n\nOur report identified that the Government accepted vehicles at a cost of more than\n$1.1 million even though they did not meet the terms of the contracts. While NTV\ncontracts do not have significant technical requirements to require ongoing surveillance,\nthis point emphasizes the importance of contractor surveillance as it relates to performing\nand documenting vehicle acceptance to ensure NTVs comply with contract requirements.\nIf RCC Kabul is going to appoint CORs to those contracts with a large number of\nvehicles, it should clearly identify how many vehicles constitute a large number to ensure\nthose contracts have CORs appointed. We request that the Chief, RCC Kabul provide\nadditional comments on this recommendation.\n\nRegional Contracting Center Bagram\nThe Chief, RCC Bagram did not provide comments to Recommendation B.1. We request\nthat the Chief provide comments in response to the final report.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0cPrincipal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan\nComments\nAlthough not required to comment on this recommendation, the Chief of Staff, U.S.\nCentral Command endorsed and forwarded comments from the Director of Operations,\nJCC-I/A on behalf of PARC-A.\n\nThe director stated that RCCs maintain individual files for NTV contracts, including\ndocumentation for the justification of the NTV requirement and award decision. The\ndirector also stated that Army guidance requires all RCCs to appoint CORs for all service\ncontracts, including NTV contracts. The director stressed that PARC-A checks\ncompliance with these requirements via semi-annual procurement management reviews.\nThe director also noted that joint inspections with the customer and the contractor are\nconducted before the Government accepts any vehicle. If vehicles do not meet contract\nrequirements, the Government will reject the vehicle or ensure the contractor corrects the\nproblem.\n\nThe director stated that contracting officers and activities conduct lease-versus-purchase\nanalyses and submit them to the Joint Acquisition Review Board. The director identified\nthat the report did not address Army regulations or Government Accountability Office\ndecisions regarding the acquisition and management of NTVs. Specifically, the director\nidentified that the Government Accountability Office lifted the fiscal law restrictions for\npurchasing passenger motor vehicles in relation to 4-door passenger cab pickup trucks.\nThe director also pointed out that our report did not address the option to obtain vehicles\nat a lower cost through the General Services Administration, or the requirement that\npassenger bus service must be determined impractical prior to leasing or purchasing\nNTVs.\n\nOur Response\nAs discussed in our report, we identified that 68 percent of contract files did not contain\nadequate NTV justifications, 34 percent of contract files did not contain any\ndocumentation to support the award decision, and 85 percent of contract files did not\nhave documentation of a COR appointment. We acknowledge that our findings are based\non a data set ranging from October 2005 to July 2008, and that JCC-I/A, PARC-A, and\nthe RCCs have made improvements to contracting processes since the time of our review.\n\nRecent procurement management reviews at RCCs Bagram and Kabul identified\ndeficiencies regarding COR appointment and contract file documentation, but stated that\nthese deficiencies are being corrected through training and peer reviews. We obtained\nand reviewed the updated JCC-I/A Acquisition Instruction, and agree that following this\npolicy, in conjunction with training and peer reviews, will help ensure contracting\nofficers maintain more complete contract files.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0cThe director commented on lease-versus-purchase analyses and the option to lease\nvehicles through the General Services Administration. Our report identified that only\n1 of the 66 contract files we reviewed contained documentation of a lease-versus-\npurchase analysis, which compared the costs of local leases and purchases. We agree that\nthe option to lease vehicles through the General Services Administration should be\nevaluated whenever possible. Our methodology for this audit was not to evaluate actual\ncontracting decisions or the method for obtaining vehicles. Therefore, we did not address\nthe option of acquiring vehicles through the General Services Administration, nor did we\nevaluate the practicality of utilizing bus service versus leasing NTVs. Rather, we\nevaluated whether the contracting decisions were supported by documentation in the\ncontract files. Furthermore, we do not dispute the decision of the Government\nAccountability Office Comptroller to lift the fiscal law restrictions on specific pickup\ntrucks, and the ability of contracting officers to compare these pickups to sport utility\nvehicles in the lease-versus-purchase analyses. Rather, we emphasize that lease-versus-\npurchase analyses should document a consideration of all acquisition options prior to\nawarding contracts to ensure the Government is receiving the best value.\n\nThe director\xe2\x80\x99s comments on vehicle inspection and acceptance confirm the requirements\nfor these processes. However, he did not specify actions the RCCs have planned or\nimplemented to ensure that inspections are performed and documented, and that\nnoncompliant vehicles are rejected. As we identified in our report, 58 of the 66 contract\nfiles we reviewed did not contain any vehicle acceptance documentation, while the files\nthat contained documentation revealed that the Government accepted at least 15 vehicles,\ntotaling more than $1.1 million, that did not comply with contract requirements. This\npoint emphasizes the need for vehicle inspections to be completed and documented to\nensure that vehicles the Government receives adequately meet the mission requirements.\n\nB.2. We recommend the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-\nIraq/Afghanistan update the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\nAcquisition Instruction to include additional guidelines on maintaining contract files\nin a standard format for pre-award, award, and contract administration activities to\nmeet Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements.\n\nJoint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\nThe Commander, JCC-I/A did not provide comments. However, we obtained and\nevaluated the April 2009 Acquisition Instruction and determined that it meets the intent\nof our recommendation by referencing a list of documentation regarding solicitation,\ncontract award, and administration that should be included in the contract file. We\nbelieve that using this list will allow contracting officers to maintain contract files that\nprovide an adequate history of the transaction in accordance with FAR requirements. We\nmodified the \xe2\x80\x9cContract Documentation Guidelines\xe2\x80\x9d section of the report to include our\nanalysis of the April 2009 Acquisition Instruction. No additional comments are required.\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\x0cB.3. We recommend the Commander, Principal Assistant Responsible for\nContracting-Afghanistan conduct more thorough procurement management\nreviews to ensure that contracting problems are identified and addressed in a timely\nmanner.\n\nPrincipal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan\nComments\nThe Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command endorsed and forwarded comments from the\nJCC-I/A on behalf of the PARC-A. The PARC-A partially agreed with the\nrecommendation, stating that RCCs are inspected twice per year, and that JCC-I/A\nguidance was recently updated to increase the rigor of the inspections, emphasize the\nimportance of routine self-evaluations, and update the evaluation checklists.\n\nOur Response\nAlthough PARC-A only partially agreed, we consider the comments responsive.\nJCC-I/A provided standard operating procedures for inspecting contracting processes and\nreporting deficiencies. We updated the report to include discussion on these procedures\n(pages 14-15). We believe that implementation of these procedures will ensure more\nthorough oversight of the contracting processes at RCCs. No additional comments are\nrequired.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\x0cAppendix A. Scope and Methodology\nWe conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through February 2009 in\naccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards\nrequire that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to\nprovide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.\nWe believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and\nconclusions based on our audit objectives.\n\nOur audit scope encompasses NTV contract actions from October 1, 2005, through\nJuly 15, 2008. We limited our scope to contracts awarded at RCCs Bagram and Kabul,\nAfghanistan. We reviewed official contract files and resource management files for\ndocumentation of justification of need or requirement; lease-versus-purchase analysis;\ncontract award; COR appointment; and vehicle acceptance, compliance, and use. We\nreviewed the FAR as well as published guidance from DoD, Joint Contracting Command,\nCombined Joint Task Force-101, and Combined Security Transition Command-\nAfghanistan. We also reviewed local RCC policies and standard operating procedures\nfor contracting processes. We interviewed personnel from the following organizations:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,\n Defense Procurement, Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing;\n \xef\x82\xb7 U.S. Central Command;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Afghanistan;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Combined Joint Task Force-101;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Regional Contracting Center Bagram;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Regional Contracting Center Kabul;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Bagram Air Field Resource Management Office;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Bagram Air Field Base Operations;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Bagram Air Field Nontactical Vehicle Review Board;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Bagram Air Field Nontactical Vehicle Working Group;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Kabul Resource Management Office;\n \xef\x82\xb7 Camp Eggers Base Operations; and\n \xef\x82\xb7 Camp Eggers Transportation Motor Pool.\n\nUse of Computer-Processed Data\nWe relied on computer-processed data from the Joint Contingency Contracting System\n(JCCS), which is a computer database that allows the posting of contract opportunities,\ncaptures vendor proposals, and documents contract awards. Once a contracting officer\nawards a contract, contracting personnel enter specific data associated with the contract\naward into JCCS. We extracted from JCCS 387 NTV contracts awarded at 6 RCCs in\nAfghanistan between October 1, 2005, and July 15, 2008. We used these data to develop\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\x0ca statistical sample of NTV contracts in Afghanistan to assess the effectiveness of various\naspects of NTV contracting. See the Use of Technical Assistance for additional\ninformation about the statistical sample.\n\nThe computer-processed data from JCCS were sufficiently reliable, given our use of them\nto develop a statistical sample of NTV contracts. However, we identified several errors\nin the computer-processed data, none of which significantly impacted our audit results.\nSpecifically, JCCS award amounts and dates were sometimes inaccurate when compared\nto official contract files. We mitigated JCCS errors by relying on the official contract\nfiles, interviews, and other types of evidence to perform our analysis.\n\nWe could not review four contracts in our sample because, upon review of the official\ncontract files, we determined that two contracts were not for NTVs, one was awarded at a\ndifferent RCC, and one was canceled after award. Even though we could only audit\n66 NTV contracts in the sample, we projected our results against a sample of 70 contracts\nto provide a conservative result.\n\nUse of Technical Assistance\nThe Quantitative Methods and Analysis Division developed the statistical sample of NTV\ncontracts awarded in Afghanistan. It used a stratified sample design to ensure that RCCs\nBagram and Kabul were appropriately represented in the sample. The other four RCCs\nwere not considered for the sample because RCCs Bagram and Kabul had the largest\nnumber of contract actions with the highest dollar values. Specifically, of the 387 NTV\ncontracts awarded in Afghanistan (the universe), 215 were awarded at RCCs Bagram and\nKabul (the subpopulation). Table A-1 shows the scope of Afghanistan NTV contracts.\n\n Table A-1. Scope of NTV Contracts Reviewed for Afghanistan\n Subpopulation Sample Audited Sample\n RCC Contract Value1 Contract Value1 Contract Value2\n Actions Actions Actions\nBagram 163 $ 6,261,414 40 $ 1,136,436 38 $ 1,315,440\nKabul 52 $23,054,384 30 $14,165,689 28 $12,760,749\n1\n Dollar value according to JCCS.\n2\n Dollar value based on official contract files.\n\nThe Quantitative Methods and Analysis Division selected random samples from RCCs\nBagram and Kabul and performed calculations to estimate conditions for the\nsubpopulations based on the audited sample results. In general, the estimates quantified\nweaknesses in performing effective NTV contracting. The estimates are based on a\n90 percent confidence level, which means there is a 10 percent risk that the interval does\nnot encompass the true subpopulation value.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\x0cThe statistical estimates are in Table A-2. The first row in the table shows that between\n57.3 and 77.8 percent of the 215 contracts contained inadequate justification for obtaining\nan NTV. The point estimate was 67.5 percent. The corresponding number of NTV\ncontracts with no NTV justification lies in a range from 123 to 167 with a point estimate\nof 145. The other three estimates can be interpreted the same way.\n\n Table A-2. Detailed Statistical Estimates Assessing the\n Effectiveness of NTV Contracting in Afghanistan\n Measure of NTV Lower Bound Point Estimate* Upper Bound\n Contracting Effectiveness (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)\nInadequate or lack of 123 145 167\n justification (57.3) (67.5) (77.8)\nNo award decision rationale 53 72 92\n (24.8) (33.7) (42.6)\nNTV lease renewals 27 46 66\n (12.6) (21.6) (30.6)\nCOR not appointed 169 183 196\n (78.7) (84.9) (91.1)\n* The point estimate is a single numerical value halfway between the upper and lower bounds.\n\nPrior Coverage\nDuring the last 5 years, DoD Inspector General (IG), Army Audit Agency, and Air Force\nAudit Agency have issued three reports addressing issues related to NTV contracting\nprocesses and tracking in Southwest Asia. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed\nat http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be\naccessed at https://www.aaa.army.mil/reports.htm. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency\nreports can be accessed at https://www.afaa.hq.af.mil.\n\nDoD IG\nDoD IG Report No. D-2009-007, \xe2\x80\x9cProcurement and Use of Nontactical Vehicles at\nBagram Air Field, Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d October 31, 2008\n\nArmy\nArmy Audit Agency Report A2007-0011-ALL, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit of Nontactical Vehicle Usage in\nthe Iraq Area of Operations, Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operations\nin Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,\xe2\x80\x9d November 16, 2006\n\nAir Force\nAir Force Audit Agency Report F2007-0004-FC4000, \xe2\x80\x9cDeployed Assets,\xe2\x80\x9d\nJanuary 26, 2007\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\x0cAppendix B. Management Comments on the\nFindings and Our Response\nOur detailed response to the comments from U.S. Central Command and the Combined\nJoint Task Force-101 on the report findings follow. The complete text of these comments\ncan be found in the Management Comments section of this report.\n\nU.S. Central Command Comments\nAlthough not required to comment, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command did not\nbelieve the report accurately reflected current acquisition processes for establishing\ncontracts for NTVs in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the chief of staff stated that the data set\nupon which the audit team drew conclusions did not reflect the effort and procedures to\nimprove NTV oversight.\n\nOur Response\nOur report commended PARC-A, CJTF-101, and CSTC-A for recent improvements in\nthe controls over the NTV acquisition process. Specifically, we highlighted that\nCJTF-101 established a vehicle registration processes and an NTV Review Board. We\nalso noted that CSTC-A published standard operating procedures for leased vehicles in\nAugust 2008. We concluded that these actions strengthened controls over the NTV\nacquisition process (page 4).\n\nCombined Joint Task Force-101 Comments\nThe Chief of Staff, CJTF-101 disagreed with the finding, stating that CJTF-101 and\nCSTC-A have made great strides in improving the management of leased vehicles at\nBagram Air Field and vehicles leased through CSTC-A. He noted that the Combined\nJoint Task Force headquarters transitioned several times between October 2005 and July\n2008, with CJTF-101 assuming command in April 2008. The chief of staff stated that at\nthis time, CJTF-101 maintained strict validation procedures for all new NTVs, initiated\nreviews of existing NTVs, and implemented a registration process at Bagram Air Field.\nIn light of these actions, the chief of staff requested that the audit team revise the report\nlanguage to note that, while CJTF-101 and CSTC-A have improved controls, there is\nmore that can be done to improve the management of recurring requirements to ensure\neffective contracting for NTVs. The chief of staff also commented on the Results in\nBrief page, stating that the audit team should revise the results to state that CJTF-101 and\nCSTC-A took steps to improve management and oversight of NTVs.\n\nThe Chief of Staff, CJTF-101 also disagreed with the statement that $1.4 million in funds\ncould have been put to better use. The chief of staff stated that the savings may never\nhave been fully realized, and allowing the use of vehicles through the end of the lease\nterms facilitated ongoing missions. Further, the chief of staff stated that our report did\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\x0cnot mention cost savings associated with 169 vehicles that were disapproved. The chief\nof staff also suggested revised language to identify that the NTV Review Board reduced\nthe number of vehicles on base by 20 percent, with an associated cost savings of\n$1.1 million for vehicles that were immediately turned in.\n\nThe chief of staff commented on improving oversight of NTVs in Afghanistan, stating\nthat the information presented in the report regarding a study of NTV usage at Bagram\nAir Field was subjective and misleading. He referenced a June 2008 study by the\nCJTF-101 Red Team, and stated that the NTV Review Board was implemented at\nBagram Air Field as a result of that review. The chief of staff cited language from the\naudit report related to the total number of NTVs at Bagram, lack of polices and NTV\njustification standards, and bus usage, specifically requesting the source information.\nThe chief of staff also noted that bus route support was increased in 2008, and that bus\nusage increased by almost 40 percent from August 2008 to February 2009. The chief of\nstaff requested that the audit team delete the information in the report, and provided\nsuggested language to replace it.\n\nThe chief of staff noted that Task Force Warrior implemented a centralized NTV\nmanagement process in July 2008, but that Task Force Warrior is not solely focused on\ninstallation management. He stated that large installations need a dedicated installation\nmanagement team to establish and maintain oversight, and requested that the DoD IG\nemphasize this in the audit report.\n\nThe chief of staff suggested additional recommendations for the audit report to ensure\nsupport from higher headquarters in the management of NTVs. These recommendations\nincluded guidance from U.S. Army Central Command on increased NTV acquisition\nthrough the General Services Administration to reduce the number of leased vehicles in\ntheater, and guidance from U.S. Central Command on NTV utilization and standards for\nsupport and authorizations.\n\nThe chief of staff also indicated that the audit team\xe2\x80\x99s review of contract files did not\ninclude any resource management files or documentation from the Joint Acquisition\nReview Board, and requested that the audit team qualify its conclusions to note that they\ndid not include this documentation in its review.\n\nFinally, the Chief of Staff, CJTF-101 commented that the caption to the photo in the\nResults in Brief was not relevant to the associated discussion.\n\nOur Response\nWe appreciate the comments submitted by the Chief of Staff, CJTF-101, and we agree\nthat they have taken steps to improve the controls over the NTV acquisition process. We\ncommend CJTF-101 and CSTC-A for these actions, and our report highlighted them\n(page 4). In addition, we agree with the suggested language provided by the chief of staff\nand have revised the finding to reflect that language. However, we maintain that the\nCommands did not proactively identify recurring NTV requirements and acquire or\nmanage NTVs to fill those requirements.\n\n\n 25\n\x0cOur report identified costs of approximately $1.4 million for leased vehicles that were\ndisapproved by the NTV Review Board. We commend CJTF-101 for establishing the\nNTV Review Board, and commend the Board for validating all vehicles on the base.\nHowever, this point emphasizes that $1.4 million could have been put to better use had\nthose leases not been approved when initially submitted. We clarified this point in the\nreport (page 5). We did not show cost savings for the 169 disapproved vehicles because\nwe could not determine from the information provided whether these vehicles were\nleased or Government-owned. In addition, we could not substantiate that the NTV\nReview Board reduced the number of vehicles on base by 20 percent, with an associated\ncost savings of $1.1 million; therefore we did not include these numbers in the report.\n\nOur report also identified the results of a June 2008 study conducted by the CJTF-101\nRed Team (pages 4-5). Specifically, this study identified issues related to the total\nnumber of NTVs at Bagram Air Field, lack of policies and written NTV justification\nstandards, and a low usage rate of buses. The Red Team study also stated that there is a\nwidely held perception that NTVs were being used for personal convenience and not\nmilitary necessity. We revised this part of the report to clearly identify that the source of\nthis information was the CJTF-101 Red Team study.\n\nWe appreciate the resource constraints noted by the chief of staff, and understand that a\ndedicated installation management team would be helpful in establishing and maintaining\noversight at large installations. However, decisions regarding prioritization of resources\nand requests for additional resources should be directed to higher headquarters for review\nand consideration.\n\nWe also appreciate the suggested recommendations provided by the chief of staff. Our\nreport identified the recommendations we believe can improve the management of\ncontracting for NTVs in Afghanistan. We considered the suggested recommendations,\nbut determined that they should be directed through the chain of command for\nconsideration and action by U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Central Command.\n\nOur methodology for conducting this audit included a review of all documentation for the\ncontracts and task orders in our sample. We interviewed contracting and resource\nmanagement personnel and reviewed all available documentation that was relevant to our\ncontract sample. This documentation included contract files and resource management\nfiles. We revised our scope and methodology in Appendix A to identify all\ndocumentation we reviewed for this audit.\n\nWe considered the suggestions made by the chief of staff in regards to the Results in\nBrief presented in the report. We reflected changes to the finding paragraph in the\nResults in Brief, and we deleted the photo from the Results in Brief to accommodate\ndiscussion of management comments.\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\x0cU.S. Central Command Comments\n\n\n\n\n Click to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 27\n\x0cJoint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and\nPrincipal Assistant Responsible for Contracting-\nAfghanistan Comments\n\n\n\n\n Click to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 28\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 15\n\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 29\n\x0cCombined Joint Task Force-101 Comments\n\n\n\n\n Click to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 30\n\x0cClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 31\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page i\n\n\n\n\n 32\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 21\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 5\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n Deleted\n\n\n\n\n 33\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 4\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Pages 4-5\n\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 34\n\x0cClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\x0cCombined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and\nRegional Contracting Center Kabul Comments\n\n\n\n\n Click to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 36\n\x0cClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 37\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\nClick to add JPEG file\n Revised\n Recommendation\n A.1.\n\n\n\n\n 38\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Recommendation\n A.2.\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Recommendation\n A.3.\n\n\n\n\n 39\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Recommendation\n A.4.\n\n\nClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 40\n\x0c Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Recommendation\nClick to add JPEG file B.1.b.\n\n\n\n\n 41\n\x0cClick to add JPEG file\n\n\n\n\n 42\n\x0c\x0c'


type: wikipedia

text:
Tugadh an Iúgslaiv ar thrí aonad éagsúla polaitiúla sa bhfichiú haois. Tír na Slavach ó Dheas is ciall leis an ainm i dteangacha Slavacha na mBalcán.
 Stair
 1918-1941
 Ba í Ríocht na hIúgslaive an chéad tír ar tugadh an t-ainm uirthi, agus d'eascair sí as Ríocht na Seirbiach, na gCróiteach agus na Slóivéineach a bunaíodh ar an i Nollaig 1918, nuair a cruthaíodh aontas idir stáit na Slóivéineach, na gCróiteach agus na Seirbiach agus ríocht na Seirbe.
 Athraíodh ainm na tíre go Ríocht na hIúgslaive ar an 3 Deireadh Fómhair 1929. Ba é Rí Alexander I, ceannaire na ríochta.
 Tito 1942
 1941-1991
 Rinne an Iodáil agus an Ghearmáin ionradh ar an tír sa bhliain 1941 . Mar gheall ar na heachtraí a tharla le linn an Dara Cogadh Domhanda cuireadh an ríocht ar ceal sa bhliain 1945.
 D'fhógair treallchogaithe cumannach (na Páirtínigh) An Iúgslaiv Dhaonlathach Fheidearálach sa bhliain 1943.
 D'athraíodh an t-ainm go Daonphoblacht Fheidearálach na hIúgslaive sa bhliain 1946 agus rialtas comhchumannach i gceannas.
 Athraíodh an t-ainm arís sa bhliain 1963, go Poblacht Shóisialach Fheidearálach na hIúgslaive.
 Bhí an tír comhdhéanta de shé phoblacht shóisialach: an tSlóivéin, An Chróit, An Bhoisnia-Heirseagaivéin, Montainéagró, An tSeirbia agus An Mhacadóin.
 Dúradh le Colm Doyle sa leabhar Witness to War Crimes gur eascair an nimh sa bhfeoil idir na náisiúin éagsúla as eachtraí an Dara Cogadh Domhanda. Cuireadh faoi ndeara do na dreamanna éagsúla a tháinig le chéile san Iúgslaiv faoi cheannas an Ghinearáil Tito tarraingt le chéile. Ní hé sin le rá go ndearna siad dearmad ar naimhdeas na staire agus rinneadh seanchairteacha a thochailt tar éis titim an Aontais Shóivéadaigh agus imeachtaí 1991/1992.
 1991-2006
 Thit an Iúgslaiv as a chéile sna cogaí a lean bás Tito.
 Bunaíodh Poblacht Fheidearálach na hIúgslaive i mí Mhárta 1992 agus í comhdhéanta den dá thír nár fhág an Chónaidhm, an tSeirbia agus Montainéagró,
 Ba é Slobodan Milošević Uachtarán na Seirbia idir 1989 agus 1997 agus Uachtarán Iúgslavach idir 1997 agus 2000.
 Ar an 1 Aibreán 2001 gabhadh Milošević sa Bhéalgrád. Cúisíodh é as coireanna cogaidh a dhéanamh.
 Cuireadh deireadh go hoifigiúil leis an Iúgsláiv nuair a d'fhógair an dá thír sin a neamhspleáchas i mí Mheithimh, 2006.
 Tagairtí
 Iugslaiv, An
 Iugslaiv, An


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 |
 52013PC0736
 Ettepanek: NÕUKOGU OTSUS, mis käsitleb liikmesriikide Euroopa Arengufondi osamaksusid, kaasa arvatud 2015. aasta ülemmäär, 2014. aasta osamaks ja 2014. aasta osamaksu esimene osa /* COM/2013/0736 final - 2013/0352 (NLE) */
 SELETUSKIRI
 1. ETTEPANEKU TAUST
 Kümnenda Euroopa Arengufondi (edaspidi „EAF”)
 sisekokkuleppe ja kümnenda EAFi finantsmäärusega nähakse ette osamaksunõudeid
 käsitlev menetlus, mille alusel liikmesriigid rahastavad EAFi. 10. EAFi
 finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 2 kohaselt käsitletakse käesolevas ettepanekus
 järgmisi küsimusi:
 –
 aastase osamaksu ülemmäär 2015. aastaks;
 –
 aastane osamaks 2014. aastaks;
 –
 2014. aasta osamaksu esimese osa suurus.
 2. ETTEPANEKU ÕIGUSLIK KÜLG
 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 2
 kohaselt peab nõukogu käesoleva ettepaneku kohta otsuse tegema 15. novembriks
 2013 ning liikmesriigid peavad osamaksu esimese osa maksma hiljemalt 21.
 jaanuariks 2014.
 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 7
 kohaselt on täpsustatud komisjoni ja Euroopa Investeerimispanga (EIP)
 hallatavad summad.
 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 58 lõikes 2 on
 sätestatud, et osamaksunõuetega kustutatakse kõigepealt järjestikku varasemate
 EAFide jaoks ette nähtud summad. Võttes arvesse, et EIP ei nõua sisse osamaksu
 esimest osa, käsitleb käesolev ettepanek ainult komisjonile määratud 10. EAFi
 summasid.
 EIP on edastanud komisjonile oma hallatavate
 rahastamisvahendite kohta kulukohustuste ja maksete ajakohastatud prognoosi
 vastavalt 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artiklile 145.
 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artiklis 60 on sätestatud,
 et kui liikmesriik ei tasu tasumisele kuuluvat osamaksu ettenähtud tähtajaks,
 tasub ta maksmata jäänud summalt viivist vastavalt samas artiklis sätestatud
 viivise maksmise korrale.
 2013/0352 (NLE)
 Ettepanek:
 NÕUKOGU OTSUS,
 mis käsitleb liikmesriikide Euroopa
 Arengufondi osamaksusid, kaasa arvatud 2015. aasta ülemmäär, 2014. aasta
 osamaks ja 2014. aasta osamaksu esimene osa
 EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise
 lepingut,
 võttes arvesse nõukogus kokku tulnud
 liikmesriikide valitsuste esindajate sisekokkulepet ühenduse abi rahastamise
 kohta mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku (2008–2013) alusel vastavalt AKV–EÜ
 koostöölepingule ning finantsabi eraldamise kohta nendele ülemeremaadele ja
 -territooriumidele, mille suhtes kohaldatakse EÜ asutamislepingu neljandat osa,
 eriti selle artiklit 7,
 võttes arvesse nõukogu 18. veebruari 2008.
 aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 215/2008, mis käsitleb kümnenda Euroopa Arengufondi
 suhtes kohaldatavat finantsmäärust (edaspidi „10. EAFi finantsmäärus”), eriti
 selle artikli 57 lõiget 5,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Komisjoni ettepanekut
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1) Vastavalt 10. EAFi
 finantsmääruse artiklites 57–61 sätestatud menetlusele peaks komisjon 15.
 oktoobriks 2013 esitama ettepaneku, milles täpsustatakse liikmesriikide poolt
 Euroopa Arengufondi (EAF) tehtava aastase osamaksu ülemmäär 2015. aastaks,
 aastane osamaks 2014. aastaks ja 2014. aasta osamaksu esimese osa suurus.
 (2) Euroopa Investeerimispank on
 edastanud 10. EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 145 esimese lõigu kohaselt
 komisjonile oma hallatavate rahastamisvahendite kohta kulukohustuste ja maksete
 ajakohastatud prognoosi.
 (3) 10. EAFi finantsmääruse
 artikli 58 lõikes 2 on sätestatud, et osamaksunõuetega kustutatakse kõigepealt
 järjestikku varasemate EAFide jaoks ette nähtud summad. Võttes arvesse, et EIP
 ei nõua sisse osamaksu esimest osa, käsitleb käesolev ettepanek ainult
 komisjonile määratud 10. EAFi summasid.
 (4) 19. novembril 2012 võttis
 nõukogu komisjoni tehtud ettepaneku alusel vastu otsuse määrata liikmesriikide
 2014. aasta EAFi osamaksu ülemmäärast komisjoni osa suuruseks
 3 250 000 000 eurot ja EIP osa suuruseks 360 000 000
 eurot,
 ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Liikmesriikide Euroopa Arengufondi makstava
 aastase osamaksu ülemmäär 2015. aastaks on komisjoni puhul
 3 300 000 000 eurot ja Euroopa Investeerimispanga puhul
 300 000 000 eurot.
 Artikkel 2
 2014. aasta EAFi osamaks, mille liikmesriigid
 maksavad Euroopa Komisjonile ja Euroopa Investeerimispangale, on vastavalt
 3 100 000 000 eurot ja 150 000 000 eurot.
 Artikkel 3
 EAFi osamaksude summad, mille liikmesriigid
 maksavad komisjonile ja Euroopa Investeerimispangale 2014. aasta osamaksu
 esimese osana, on esitatud lisas asuvas tabelis.
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus on adresseeritud
 liikmesriikidele.
 Brüssel,
 Nõukogu
 nimel
 eesistuja
 LISA
 EAFi 2014. aasta osamaksude esimene osa
 (tuhandetes eurodes)
 || || Osakaal || Osakaal || Osamaksu 1. osa
 || || 9. || 10. || tasutud || tasutud
 || LIIKMESRIIGID || EAFis || EAFis || EIP-le || Komisjonile
 || || % || % || 9. EAFi raames || 10. EAFi raames
 || BELGIA || 3,92 || 3,53 || 0 || 70 600
 || TAANI || 2,14 || 2,00 || 0 || 40 000
 || SAKSAMAA || 23,36 || 20,50 || 0 || 410 000
 || KREEKA || 1,25 || 1,47 || 0 || 29 400
 || HISPAANIA || 5,84 || 7,85 || 0 || 157 000
 || PRANTSUSMAA || 24,30 || 19,55 || 0 || 391 000
 || IIRIMAA || 0,62 || 0,91 || 0 || 18 200
 || ITAALIA || 12,54 || 12,86 || 0 || 257 200
 || LUKSEMBURG || 0,29 || 0,27 || 0 || 5 400
 || MADALMAAD || 5,22 || 4,85 || 0 || 97 000
 || AUSTRIA || 2,65 || 2,41 || 0 || 48 200
 || PORTUGAL || 0,97 || 1,15 || 0 || 23 000
 || SOOME || 1,48 || 1,47 || 0 || 29 400
 || ROOTSI || 2,73 || 2,74 || 0 || 54 800
 || ÜHENDKUNINGRIIK || 12,69 || 14,82 || 0 || 296 400
 || Vahesumma EL 15 || 100 || 96,38 || 0 || 1 927 600
 || BULGAARIA || || 0,14 || || 2 800
 || TŠEHHI VABARIIK || || 0,51 || || 10 200
 || EESTI || || 0,05 || || 1 000
 || KÜPROS || || 0,09 || || 1 800
 || LÄTI || || 0,07 || || 1 400
 || LEEDU || || 0,12 || || 2 400
 || UNGARI || || 0,55 || || 11 000
 || MALTA || || 0,03 || || 600
 || POOLA || || 1,30 || || 26 000
 || RUMEENIA || || 0,37 || || 7 400
 || SLOVEENIA || || 0,18 || || 3 600
 || SLOVAKKIA || || 0,21 || || 4 200
 || Vahesumma EL 12 || || 3,62 || || 72 400
 || EL 27 KOKKU || 100 || 100 || || 2 000 000


text:
17 . 1 . 78 Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen Nr. L 13 / 15
 VERORDENING ( EEG) Nr. 79/ 78 VAN DE COMMISSIE
 van 16 januari 1978
 tot wijziging van Verordening ( EEG ) nr. 2963 / 77 betreffende de verkoop voor
 uitvoer van olijfolie in het bezit van het Italiaanse interventiebureau
 DE COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE administratief beheer, gewenst voorkomt de hoeveel
 GEMEENSCHAPPEN , heid olie voor verlichting die bij Verordening ( EEG )
 nr. 2963 / 77 te koop wordt gesteld te verhogen ;
 Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese
 Economische Gemeenschap, Overwegende dat de in deze verordening vervatte
 maatregelen in overeenstemming zijn met het advies
 Gelet op Verordening nr. 136/66/ EEG van de Raad van het Comité van beheer voor oliën en vetten ,
 van 22 september 1966 houdende de totstandbrenging
 van een gemeenschappelijke ordening der markten in
 de sector oliën en vetten ('), laatstelijk gewijzigd bij HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING
 Verordening ( EEG) nr. 2560/ 77 (-), en met name op VASTGESTELD :
 artikel 11 , lid 5 ,
 Artikel 1
 Overwegende dat Verordening ( EEG ) nr. 2963/ 77 van
 de Commissie van 23 december 1977 betreffende de Artikel 1 , lid 1 , tweede streepje, van Verordening
 verkoop voor uitvoer van olijfolie in het bezit van het ( EEG ) nr. 2963 / 77 komt als volgt te luiden :
 Italiaanse interventiebureau (3 ) voorziet in de verkoop
 van onder meer 1 500 ton olijfolie verkregen bij eerste „— ongeveer 2 500 ton olijfolie verkregen bij eer
 persing, voor verlichting, afkomstig van de interventie ste persing, voor verlichting".
 aankoop in het verkoopseizoen 1975/ 1976 ;
 Artikel 2
 Overwegende dat het op grond van de thans voorhan
 den zijnde inlichtingen , mogelijk lijkt een grotere Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag van
 hoeveelheid olie voor verlichting voor uitvoer te ver haar bekendmaking in het Publikatieblad van de
 kopen ; dat het derhalve, met het oog op een goed Europese Gemeenschappen.
 Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk
 in elke Lid-Staat .
 Gedaan te Brussel , 16 januari 1978 .
 Voor de Co ni ni issie
 De Vice - Voorzitter '
 Finn GUNDELACH
 (') PB nr . 1 / 2 van 30 . 9 . 1966 , blz . 302 S / 66 .
 (-') PB nr. L 303 van 28 . II . 1977 , blz . I.
 (-• PB nr. L 348 van 30 . 12 . 1977 , blz . 54 .