jurisdiction: US

text:
HEADNOTE: R.J.REYNOLDS v. STIDHAM (NO. 77, SEPT TERM. 2015)
 FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER FILING SUIT AGAINST ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS,
 AFTER MOST OF THE DEADLINES SET IN A SCHEDULING ORDER FOR
 COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY AND NAMING OF WITNESSES HAD PASSED,
 PLAINTIFFS FILED AN AMENDED COMPLAINT JOINING SEVERAL TOBACCO
 COMPANIES ON A THEORY OF SYNERGY – THAT THEIR LUNG CANCER WAS
 CAUSED BOTH BY SMOKING AND EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS. THE CIRCUIT
 COURT DISMISSED THEM AS BEING IMPROPERLY JOINED ON THE SPECIAL
 ASBESTOS DOCKET BUT WITH LEAVE TO REFILE THE CASE ON THE
 GENERAL CIVIL DOCKET; SIXTEEN MONTHS LATER AFTER ALL CLAIMS
 AGAINST ALL OF THE ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN RESOLVED,
 PLAINTIFFS MOVED TO REINSTATE THE TOBACCO COMPANIES IN THE
 ASBESTOS CASE. THE COURT DENIED THE MOTION, AND PLAINTIFFS
 APPEALED. THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS DISMISSED THE APPEAL AS
 MOOT, BUT DECIDED TO DISCUSS THE MERITS ANYWAY.
 COURT OF APPEALS HELD:
 (1) THERE WAS A FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE CASE;
 (2) THE APPEAL WAS MOOT, AS THERE WERE NO LONGER ANY ASBESTOS
 DEFENDANTS LEFT TO BE JOINED WITH.
 (3) THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ADDRESSING THE
 MERITS FOR GUIDANCE IN FUTURE CASES, BUT THE COURT OF
 APPEALS, HAVING TAKEN THE CASE, GAVE ITS OWN GUIDANCE
 REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF JOINING ASBESTOS AND TOBACCO
 COMPANIES IN A SINGLE ACTION.
 .
 Circuit Court for IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 Baltimore City
 Case No. 24X08000326
 Argued 5/9/16 OF MARYLAND
 No. 77
 September Term, 2015
 R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., et al.
 vs.
 DOUGLAS A. STIDHAM, etc., et al.
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 McDonald
 Harrell, Glenn T. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
 Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
 Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
 Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
 JJ.
 Opinion by Wilner, J.
 McDonald, J., dissents in part
 Filed: July 5, 2016
 This case is another attempt by plaintiffs with lung cancer to join in one action
 claims against both asbestos and tobacco defendants on the premise that their cancers
 arose from exposure to the products of both sets of defendants – that the cancers were
 caused by both smoking cigarettes and exposure to asbestos. As it had done before in
 other cases, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City refused to permit the joinder of the two
 sets of defendants on the special asbestos docket maintained by the court.
 The issues in this appeal are largely procedural ones: whether there is a final
 judgment in the case; whether the plaintiff’s appeal, in any event, is moot and should be
 dismissed on that ground; if the appeal is not moot, whether the Circuit Court erred or
 abused its discretion under Md. Rule 2-212 in denying joinder of the two sets of
 defendants; and, even if the appeal is moot, whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in
 addressing the joinder argument made by the plaintiff for guidance of the Circuit Court in
 other pending cases where joinder may be sought. We shall conclude:
 (1) There is a final judgment in the case;
 (2) The appeal, however, is moot and should be dismissed on that ground; and
 (3) The Court of Special Appeals did not err in expressing its views on the joinder
 issue for the guidance of the lower court in other cases, but, now that the case
 is before us, we shall do so.
 BACKGROUND
 The Asbestos Docket in Baltimore City
 Much has been written about the avalanche of asbestos cases that began
 overwhelming courts throughout the country in the 1970s, and there is no need for us to
 repeat it all.1 Suffice it to say that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was, and
 continues to be, especially hard hit, in large part because of the shipbuilding industry that
 flourished in and around the City during and after World War II, in which asbestos
 products were stockpiled and commonly used.2 In ACandS v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 342,
 667 A.2d 116, 119 (1995), this Court noted that, in September 1987, 1,000 asbestos cases
 had already been filed in that court, that by 1990, more than 4,900 such cases had been
 filed, and it was expected that 50 additional cases would be filed each week. This
 Court’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure heard testimony in 1995
 1
 See Stephen J. Carroll, et al., Asbestos Litigation 22 (2005), available at
 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005RASND_MGI162; Paul D.
 Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 Rev. Litig.
 583, 589 (2007); Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After
 Amchem and Ortiz 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1899 (2002); Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
 Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 Wm. and
 Mary L. Rev. 475 (1991), all cited in Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product
 Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm, 23 Widener
 L. Rev. 97 (2013). By 1991, it was estimated that 715,000 asbestos cases were pending
 in the State and Federal courts throughout the country. Id. Robreno, supra at 106.
 2
 During the war, the Navy became the country’s largest consumer of asbestos. It is
 estimated that approximately 4.5 million shipyard workers may have been exposed to
 asbestos fibers. Eduardo Robreno, supra, n.1 at 102.
 2
 that 10,000 cases were then pending. It is currently estimated that approximately 30,000
 asbestos cases are pending in the Circuit Court for the City.
 These cases presented at least three major problems. First, of course, was the
 sheer volume. They are almost always jury cases; how can one court, with ever-
 increasing criminal, juvenile, and domestic dockets, deal in a proper and timely manner
 with such a volume? Second, they are complex product liability cases, with myriads of
 derivative claims – cross-claims, counter-claims, and third-party claims – presenting
 issues not just of liability to the plaintiffs but of contribution and indemnity. They can
 take, and have taken, weeks or months to try. As we pointed out in Godwin, supra, 340
 Md. at 342, 667 A.2d at 119-20, if, as anticipated in the Circuit Court’s 1990 case
 management plan, two judges would be designated to try ten consolidated plaintiffs’
 actions at a time, one batch per judge each month, by the end of the century new filings
 would be ten times greater than the number of cases tried.
 The third problem was that, in the great majority of these cases, the plaintiff,
 though perhaps able to demonstrate some biological effect from exposure to asbestos
 products, had yet to suffer any symptoms, any serious illness.3 In order to avoid a
 problem with the statute of limitations, the cases needed to be filed because some injury
 had occurred, but they might not be ready to try for many years and there remained the
 3
 Mesothelioma reportedly has a long latency period. Symptoms may not become
 diagnosable for 30 years or more. See Asbestos Injury Litigation, 60 Am.Jur.Trials 73 §6
 (1996).
 3
 real prospect of dismissal under Md. Rule 2-507 for inactivity. The combination of these
 problems tended to make these cases unique.
 Like courts elsewhere, the Circuit Court tried a number of innovative techniques
 in an attempt to break the logjam, including an effort at global settlements through court-
 annexed mediation. None of those techniques cured the problem, or even made much of
 a dent in it. In 1990, the court made plans to consolidate 8,555 pending actions for trial
 on certain common issues – whether the defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, or
 installed defective products, whether they violated a duty to warn of dangers inherent in
 the products, and whether they could be liable for punitive damages. The cases of six of
 those plaintiffs would be tried on all issues except derivative claims, which were reserved
 for a later consolidated trial. With respect to the other 8,549 plaintiffs, if the verdicts on
 the common issues permitted a finding of liability, absent settlements, further trials would
 be necessary in each of those cases to resolve issues personal to the particular plaintiffs.
 The major consolidated trial lasted six months. The judgments entered in that case were
 appealed and resolved by this Court in Godwin. So-called “mini-trials” on the individual
 issues then ensued.
 In the meanwhile, new cases were pouring in. Between 1990 and 1993, an
 additional 1,300 new asbestos cases were filed. Those cases were consolidated for trial
 on common liability issues arising from them and on the derivative claims that had been
 severed from the first consolidated trial. The second consolidated trial lasted eight
 months. The appeal took another seven years. See ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590,
 4
 710 A.2d 944 (1998) and Crane v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d 727 (2002). In the
 meanwhile, for cases that were not settled, the “mini-trials” continued. See Keene Corp.
 v. Levin, 330 Md. 287, 623 A.2d 662 (1993). The device of major consolidated trials on
 common issues was abandoned in favor of trying clusters of smaller groups, mostly of
 mesothelioma and lung cancer cases.4
 In 1987, while contemplating the consolidation approach and through a
 comprehensive master pre-trial order, the court created a special asbestos docket and
 special procedures that would govern asbestos cases. The order applied only to personal
 injury and wrongful death actions based on exposure to asbestos. Among other things, it
 (1) appointed named individuals as liaison counsel with authority to speak for the
 respective parties in matters relating to discovery and pre-trial proceedings, call meetings
 for the purpose of coordinating responses to questions from the court, and for initiating
 proposals for joint briefs and schedules, (2) created in the clerk’s office five separate
 master files for the filing of papers (trades cases, Bethlehem Steel cases, railroad cases,
 other asbestos cases, and shipyard cases) and directed in some detail how cases were to
 be allocated to those master files, (3) created special discovery procedures, including
 4
 In March 2014, the judge assigned to the asbestos docket, responding to a request to re-
 commence large consolidated trials, noted in a Memorandum Opinion the difficulty of
 dealing with the derivative issues that would arise in a massive consolidated trial,
 observing that “[w]e cannot begin to speculate about the number of derivative claims that
 would arise from a Consolidation III involving some sixty defendants” and that
 “[i]mplementing such a massive project, with large numbers of parties and diverse
 interests, would take an enormous amount of time and resources.” See Memorandum
 Opinion in In re: Asbestos Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Litigation Global (Circ.
 Ct. Balt. City, Global Case No. 24-X-87-048500) at 22.
 5
 requirements for master sets of interrogatories, procedures for document requests and
 requests for admissions, procedures to govern depositions, including videotaped
 depositions, and limitations on medical examinations of plaintiffs, and (4) created master
 pre-trial schedules. Although the 1987 order has been amended from time to time – the
 latest being in 2013 – those kinds of special procedures, including electronic filing of
 documents, applicable only to asbestos cases, still exist.
 Those orders dealt with cases that were headed for trial. They did not address the
 third problem noted above, of cases filed but not ready to be tried because the plaintiff
 was still symptom-free. That problem was dealt with through the adoption of Md. Rule
 1211A (later renumbered as Rule 16-203 and recently renumbered again as Rule 16-306)
 in 1992. That Rule, expressly limited to actions seeking money damages for personal
 injury or death allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos or products containing asbestos,
 permits the administrative judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to establish a
 special inactive docket for asbestos cases filed in or transferred to that court. The Rule
 permits the order to specify the criteria for placement of asbestos cases on that inactive
 docket and for the removal of such cases from the docket and to stay the time for filing
 responses to the complaint, discovery, and other proceedings in cases on the docket. The
 Rule further exempts cases on the inactive docket from Rule 2-507.
 Directly on the heels of the adoption of that Rule, the administrative judge of the
 Circuit Court adopted an administrative order that (1) required all future asbestos cases to
 be placed initially on the inactive docket, (2) established medical criteria for removal of
 6
 cases from that docket, and (3) established procedures for seeking to have a case removed
 from the inactive docket and either placed on the court’s active civil docket or, if the case
 had initially been transferred from another county, sent back to that county. See In re:
 Asbestos Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Asbestos Cases, No. 92344501 (1992 WL
 12019620).5 That order also has been amended from time to time, but not in any way
 relevant to this case. It thus appears that asbestos cases in Baltimore City are governed
 by the two administrative orders – one dealing with the inactive docket and the other
 controlling pre-trial procedure after a case is removed from that docket.
 Joinder of Tobacco and Asbestos Cases
 As noted, this is not the first attempt on the part of plaintiffs suffering from lung
 cancer to join tobacco and asbestos companies in a single action in the Circuit Court for
 Baltimore City, in an effort to establish joint and several liability on their part for
 contributing to the development of the cancer. According to the second amended
 complaint filed in this case, medical evidence regarding what later came to be called
 “synergy” was published in the 1950s and the tobacco industry was aware of it in the
 1960s. The appellate courts in Maryland first became aware of the attempt to join the
 two sets of defendants in 2003, in Gress v. ACandS, 150 Md. App. 369, 820 A.2d 616
 5
 Rule 16-203 expressly permits asbestos cases filed in any of the other Circuit Courts in
 the State to be transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, provided venue would
 lie in Baltimore City.
 7
 (2003) (Gress), reversed sub nom Brown v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 838 A.2d 362 (2003)
 (Brown).
 In Gress/Brown, four plaintiffs, separately, had filed suit against eleven asbestos
 defendants based on the plaintiffs’ occupational exposure to asbestos products. Those
 actions, which were consolidated for trial, were filed between 1991 and 1997. In 2001,
 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding six tobacco companies as defendants.
 The gravamen of their action against the two sets of defendants, as it is here, was that,
 “because the combination of asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking acted in ‘synergy’
 and multiplied the risk of developing lung cancer, cigarette smokers who were exposed to
 asbestos had a much greater chance of developing lung cancer and other disease than
 non-smokers who were exposed solely to asbestos.” Gress, 150 Md. App. at 375, 820
 A.2d at 619.
 The tobacco companies moved to dismiss or sever the claims against them,
 arguing that joinder was inappropriate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally
 granted the motion, explaining that (1) the cases involve “two different kinds of products,
 two different methods of distribution, two different uses,” (2) the objective of the joinder
 Rule (Md. Rule 2-212) is to facilitate the attainment of a just, speedy, and inexpensive
 determination of all disputes between the parties, (3) joining asbestos defendants with
 tobacco companies would not accomplish those goals, (4) such joinder “will cause
 confusion to the jury because a unique set of practices and procedures had developed
 under the asbestos docket which would be, in fact, in this Court’s view, prejudicial to the
 8
 cigarette defendants” if they were, at that late date, joined in the action, and (5) the
 addition of the tobacco defendants would “disrupt the orderly procedures that the
 asbestos docket [then had] in place.” Upon those findings, the court announced that it
 would “dismiss without prejudice with the right to refile.”
 The appellate issues dealt with how the trial court actually implemented its
 decision to deny joinder. Immediately following the hearing on March 22, the court
 entered an order granting the motion “to dismiss or sever.” Five days later, March 27, the
 plaintiffs noted an appeal from that order. That same day, the tobacco companies
 requested an amendment to the March 22 order to clarify that the asbestos defendants had
 not been dismissed. On March 28 and April 17, the court entered amended orders in
 three of the four cases dismissing without prejudice only the claims against the tobacco
 companies. No amended order was entered in the fourth case. Gress, 150 Md. App. at
 376, n.3, 820 A.2d at 620, n.3. The plaintiffs moved to strike the March 28 and April 17
 orders or, in the alternative, to enter judgment under Md. Rule 2-602(b)(1), which the
 court denied.
 The plaintiffs’ appeal was met with a motion to dismiss for want of a final
 judgment. The Court of Special Appeals agreed that there was no final judgment and that
 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter judgment under Rule 2-
 602, but it concluded that it had the authority to enter such a judgment on its own
 initiative, and it did so. It then proceeded to determine that joinder of the tobacco
 companies was proper, believing that the cases against the two sets of defendants
 9
 involved common questions of law and fact, including whether there is scientific merit in
 the plaintiffs’ synergy theory and what the defendants knew or should have known about
 the synergistic effect of cigarette smoking and exposure to asbestos. This Court granted
 certiorari and concluded that the Court of Special Appeals had no authority to enter
 judgment under Rule 2-602 when the trial court had expressly declined to do so. We
 reversed the intermediate appellate court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to
 dismiss the appeal.
 The appealability issue returned to us in Silbersack v. ACandS, 402 Md. 673, 938
 A.2d 855 (2008). That too involved an attempt to join tobacco and asbestos companies in
 a lung cancer case under a synergy theory of liability. As in Gress and here, the action,
 filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, initially was against just the asbestos
 companies, but five years later, in December 2001, an amended complaint was filed that
 joined a number of tobacco companies, which objected to the joinder and moved to
 dismiss the claims against them. The Circuit Court granted the motion, for the same
 reasons it had expressed in Gress. Presumably accepting that there was no final
 judgment, the plaintiffs, in lieu of an appeal, sought a writ of mandamus from this Court
 directing the trial judge to vacate the dismissal orders or, in the alternative, directing her
 to enter final judgment under Rule 2-602. We denied the petition. Allen v. The
 Honorable M. Brooke Murdock, Misc. No. 11, Sept. Term 2002.
 The case then took another turn. In July 2005 – eight years after the action was
 filed – the case was consolidated with ten other lung cancer asbestos cases for trial.
 10
 Unfortunately, nine of the defendants had filed bankruptcy and the cases against them
 were automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs had
 dismissed their claims against the remaining defendants. They then moved (1) to
 reinstate their claims against the tobacco companies, (2) to enter final judgment under
 Rule 2-602 and (3) to “administratively dismiss” the asbestos defendants in bankruptcy
 subject to reinstatement upon their emergence from bankruptcy, all of which were denied.
 The plaintiffs then appealed those denials, claiming that they were the equivalent
 of a final judgment. We disagreed with that assertion and dismissed the appeal. We
 confessed our ignorance of any procedure of administrative dismissal subject to
 reinstatement but we did observe that “if the dismissal is for the purpose of allowing a
 final judgment to be entered, there would be no case left to which the dismissed
 defendants could be rejoined or reinstated.” Id. at 687, 938 A.2d at 863. See also Brown
 v. Culbertson, 387 Md. 501, 876 A.2d 78 (2005), directing the Court of Special Appeals
 to dismiss a similar appeal based on Gress.
 This Case
 With this contextual history, we look at what happened here. In January 2008,
 Jack Stidham filed a short form complaint on the Circuit Court’s asbestos docket against
 38 asbestos companies, alleging causes of action for strict liability, breach of warranty,
 negligence, fraud, conspiracy, and market share liability. At his request, the case was
 removed from the inactive docket, answers and crossclaims were filed, and discovery
 11
 ensued. His case was consolidated with nine other asbestos cases, and, on July 2, 2008, a
 scheduling order was entered that, among other things:
 (1) required plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories and requests for documents to
 be made by December 24, 2008;
 (2) required any challenge to the adequacy of those responses to be made within
 15 days thereafter;
 (3) required the defendants to identify parties against whom contribution, set-off,
 and indemnity claims will be filed by January 28, 2009;
 (4) set February 11, 2009 as the deadline for serving third-party complaints;
 (5) required identification of fact witnesses by plaintiffs by March 9, 2009 and
 identification of expert witnesses by March 19, 2009;
 (6) required all depositions of plaintiffs’ fact witnesses by July 20, 2009;
 (7) required all defendants and third-party defendants to identify all witnesses who
 may testify at trial by August 9, 2009;
 (8) scheduled a pre-trial conference for September 28, 2009; and
 (9) scheduled trial to commence on October 20, 2009.
 Fifteen months later, on April 29, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended
 complaint that added three tobacco companies as defendants. Fifty-six pages of the
 amended complaint, comprising 206 paragraphs, were taken up with allegations
 regarding misconduct by those companies, which formed the basis for charges of strict
 12
 liability for failure to warn, fraud by affirmative misrepresentation, fraud by concealment,
 strict liability for defective design, and civil battery.
 The tobacco companies moved to dismiss, without prejudice, the claims against
 them on the ground of misjoinder for the reasons asserted in and found meritorious in the
 Gress case, noting that the court had “repeatedly ruled in the ‘synergy’ cases [that] the
 attempt to join newly-asserted claims against Cigarette Defendants with previously filed
 claims in asbestos cases is inappropriate under Rules 2-212 and 2-213.” No hearing was
 requested on the motion and none was held. On June 30, 2009, the court entered an order
 dismissing “without prejudice” the three tobacco companies. No time was stated within
 which the plaintiffs might file a new action against those companies. No request was
 made to enter judgment with respect to those defendants under Rule 2-602(b)(1), and no
 such judgment was entered.
 On October 29, 2010 – sixteen months later – the plaintiffs filed a motion, in the
 asbestos case, to “reinstate” the tobacco companies as defendants. They alleged in their
 motion that, with one exception, the case had been “fully resolved as to the Asbestos
 Defendants, including bankrupt Defendants, by summary judgment, settlement and/or
 dismissal.” The one exception involved claims against Wallace and Gale Settlement
 Trust, which the plaintiffs said they “expect to dismiss in the near future.” In fact, they
 had filed a separate motion to dismiss that defendant but asked that the court rule on their
 motion for reinstatement before granting the motion to dismiss Wallace and Gale. The
 tobacco companies objected to that request, arguing that it was an attempt to circumvent
 the improper joinder order entered 16 months earlier and create appellate jurisdiction that
 13
 otherwise would not exist. In separate orders, the court denied the motion for
 reinstatement and granted the voluntary dismissal of Wallace and Gale.
 The plaintiffs appealed from the 2009 order dismissing the complaint as to the
 tobacco companies and the two October 2011 orders. In an unreported Opinion, the
 Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that the record reflected
 many outstanding claims that had not been dismissed by the Circuit Court or for which
 judgment had not been entered on the docket and that there was therefore no final
 judgment in the action. Stidham v. Brown & Williamson Holdings (Sept. Term 2011, No.
 1922, Opinion filed March 11, 2013). When the case returned to the Circuit Court, the
 plaintiffs filed a motion for an order entering final judgment, which, following a hearing,
 the court signed. The order, filed on April 2, 2014, stated that, “[f]or the purpose of
 clarifying the record that all claims and all parties have been adjudicated in this case,” it
 set forth the manner of disposition of every claim against every defendant. The claims
 against the tobacco companies were characterized as dismissed “without prejudice with
 the right to refile.” In addition to that listing, the order stated that “[a]ll other claims,
 cross-claims or third party claims are dismissed with prejudice.” This appeal was then
 filed.
 In a reported Opinion, the Court of Special Appeals concluded, first, that, because
 all claims against all of the asbestos defendants had been finally adjudicated, there was a
 final judgment in the case. In a classic example of “Catch-22,”6 however, the Court
 6
 The term “Catch-22,” now a popular expression in the English language, but probably in
 no other one, comes from the 1961 novel of the same name by Joseph Heller. The term
 14
 concluded that, precisely because there were no asbestos defendants left in the case, it
 was impossible for the tobacco defendants to be joined with them, and the issue they
 raised was therefore moot because what they sought to do can no longer be done.
 Ordinarily, when an appeal is moot the appropriate disposition is to dismiss the
 appeal and not address the merits of the issues raised (other than mootness). The Court
 of Special Appeals correctly noted, however, that when a case “presents a recurring
 matter of public concern which, unless decided, will continue to evade review,” the
 appellate court may address the merits. Stidham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 224 Md. App.
 459, 469, 121 A.3d 156, 162 (2015), quoting in part from LaValle v. LaValle, 432 Md.
 343. 352, 69 A.3d 1, 7 (2013). Recognizing that there were approximately 700 other
 cases pending in which plaintiffs have sought to join claims against tobacco companies
 with claims against asbestos defendants, that the Circuit Court consistently has not
 allowed the joinder of those claims, and that every effort at seeking appellate review of
 those decisions on the merits has been thwarted, the Court decided to reach the issue.
 In doing so, it concluded that the Circuit Court had not given proper consideration
 to the purpose of Rule 2-212 and to the various ways in which any perceived problems
 with joining the two sets of defendants could be dealt with short of simply denying the
 joinder. In the end, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot but at least implicitly
 suggested that the Circuit Court rethink its policy.
 has been defined as a paradoxical situation from which an individual cannot escape
 because of contradictory rules.
 15
 Neither side was entirely happy with what the intermediate appellate court did.
 We granted cross-petitions for certiorari to review whether there was a final judgment,
 whether the appeal really is moot, and, if it is, whether the Court erred in addressing the
 merits.
 DISCUSSION
 Final Judgment
 The question of whether there is a final judgment in the case was raised by the
 tobacco companies. They find no error in the Circuit Court’s final order documenting the
 disposition of the claims against all of the defendants and entering judgment on all
 crossclaims, counterclaims, and third-party claims. Their sole argument is that the
 dismissal of the tobacco companies without prejudice and with the right to refile
 somehow either keeps them in the case or allows them to be added back, apparently
 whenever the plaintiffs may choose to do so. They construe the two orders – the 2009
 order dismissing them from the case and the 2011 order denying the motion for
 reinstatement -- as little more than a ruling that the action against them cannot proceed on
 the asbestos docket.
 That is not what the court said, however. If that is all it meant, it would simply
 have transferred the action against them to the general civil docket. It did not do so. It
 expressly dismissed the action against them with the right of the plaintiffs to refile it,
 which necessarily means to refile it as a new case. The plaintiffs did not refile it. Both
 sides, and the court, treated the order for what it said – dismissal. The tobacco
 16
 defendants were out of that case. If that were not so, the plaintiffs would not have
 needed to seek “reinstatement.”
 The general, overarching rule is that an order that has the effect of terminating an
 action in a circuit court is a final, appealable judgment. Hariri v. Dahne, 412 Md. 674,
 680, 990 A.2d 1037, 1040 (2010). Dismissals are a category of orders that may have that
 effect. Whether they do may depend on what they say. Dismissals can be outright,
 without any qualifying language, or they can be accompanied by some qualifying
 language – with prejudice, without prejudice, with the right to file amendments to the
 complaint or an amended complaint (with or without a limitation on when such a filing
 must be made), or, as here, with the right to refile a new complaint. That language can
 have significance in terms of what a party can then do.
 An outright dismissal of an entire complaint (or of all claims left in the complaint),
 without granting leave to amend, puts the plaintiff out of court and terminates the
 particular action in the trial court, at least as to that plaintiff. That is so whether the
 dismissal is with or without prejudice. Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 431, 620 A.2d
 323, 325 (1993); Metro Maintenance Sys. v. Milburn, 442 Md. 289, 112 A.3d 429 (2015).
 If there are no claims by or against any other parties remaining in the action, it constitutes
 a final and appealable judgment (assuming the other requirements for entering a
 judgment are satisfied). If there still are one or more claims pending, it will not constitute
 a final, appealable judgment but may be subject to an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
 Md. Code, §12-303 of the Courts Article, the entry of judgment under Rule 2-602, or an
 appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The relevant distinction between “with” or
 17
 “without” prejudice concerns whether the party is free to pursue the claim in any new
 litigation.
 The issue presented here is whether there is an affinity between a dismissal with
 leave to amend and a dismissal with leave to refile. The tobacco companies note that
 there are no Maryland decisions directly on point and ask us to follow an Illinois decision
 concluding that a dismissal with the right to refile “manifests the intent of the court that
 the order not be considered final and appealable.” See Flores v. Dugan, 435 N.E.2d 480
 (Ill. 1982).
 Because the Illinois law defining final judgment is quite different than the
 Maryland law on that subject, the Flores case is not on point. The action there was
 dismissed for want of prosecution. Illinois law defined a final judgment as a
 determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings, i.e., a decision on the
 merits. An Illinois Rule provided that, unless a statute specified otherwise, an
 involuntary dismissal of an action operates as an adjudication on the merits. The Flores
 Court noted that an Illinois statute specifically allowed a party to refile within one year
 after dismissal of an action for want of prosecution, which, in its view, was inconsistent
 with regarding a dismissal for lack of prosecution as a decision on the merits. That is
 why the dismissal was not regarded as a final judgment.
 In the context presented here, a dismissal with leave to amend is not the
 equivalent of a dismissal with leave to refile. A dismissal with leave to amend the
 complaint or file an amended complaint does not terminate the action. It is not a final
 judgment and is therefore not appealable under Md. Code, §12-301 of the Courts Article.
 18
 Moore v. Pomory, supra. As the Moore Court explained, the express grant of leave to
 amend indicates an intent not to finally dispose of the case, which remains open whether
 or not an amendment is filed, until another order is entered disposing of the case. Id.
 Metro Maintenance Sys. v. Milburn, supra confirmed that principle but added the
 statement that “when an order anticipates additional proceedings in the same court during
 which the parties may continue to litigate their rights in the particular matter, the order
 does not terminate the proceedings in that court, and is not a final judgment.” Id. at 300-
 01, 112 A.3d at 436. Metro Maintenance was a judicial review action in which, at the
 request of a party and the agency, the court remanded the case to the agency for a further
 proceeding without reaching the merits of the dispute but with the expectation that the
 case would then return to the court. That language, and the ultimate conclusion that the
 order was not a final, appealable judgment, were entirely appropriate in that context.
 The language regarding whether the court anticipated further proceedings in the
 same court may be a bit too broad in the context of what is before us here, however.
 Any dismissal without prejudice may produce a new filing in the same court, but that
 prospect does not deprive the order of finality. The question here is whether, in
 dismissing the tobacco companies with the right to refile and refusing to reinstate them,
 the court had any anticipation that further proceedings may be instituted in that action,
 and the answer to that is “no.” The court had a standing policy that tobacco companies
 should not be joined with asbestos defendants on the asbestos docket because of the
 procedural problems and ambiguities that would produce. That is why there was no leave
 19
 to amend. The court had no reason to foreclose the plaintiffs from pursuing an action
 against the tobacco companies, but not in that case.
 The 2009 order dismissing the tobacco companies from the pending case was
 intended as a final decision regarding joinder, but, because the claims against the asbestos
 defendants were still pending, it did not constitute a final judgment in the case. The
 2011 order denying the motion for reinstatement, coupled with the entry of judgment as
 to all of the remaining asbestos claims, constituted the final judgment. All claims against
 all defendants were resolved; nothing more was left for the court to do in that case.
 Mootness
 An appeal is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case
 comes before the Court or when there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could
 grant. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219, 935 A.2d 731, 736 (2007); Potomac
 Abatement v. Sanchez, 424 Md. 701, 710, 37 A.3d 972, 977 (2012). The predominant
 issue sought to be raised in this appeal, to which all others are subordinate, is whether the
 Circuit Court erred in denying joinder of the claims against the tobacco companies in the
 pending action against the asbestos defendants. The plaintiffs asserted the right to try
 their case against both sets of defendants in one case, on the asbestos docket. The Court
 of Special Appeals concluded that because there were no longer any asbestos defendants
 left in the case, there were no such defendants with which the tobacco companies can be
 joined and therefore no effective remedy that the appellate court could provide even if it
 20
 believed that the denial of joinder was erroneous. All of the horses had left the barn,
 indeed, thrown out of the barn by the plaintiffs.
 The plaintiffs do not challenge the underlying fact that joinder – the sole thing
 they sought – is no longer possible, but they offer as an effective remedy allowing them
 “to proceed against the [tobacco companies] in the case in which they were properly sued
 but dismissed in error by the Circuit Court.” That is not, however, a permissible remedy.
 The case in question was on the special asbestos docket that was designed, and has been
 exclusively reserved, for asbestos cases. It does not appear that any non-asbestos case
 has ever been placed on that docket or been subject to the many special procedures
 unique to that docket; nor have the plaintiffs offered any analysis of whether or how
 those special procedures might apply to an action against tobacco companies.
 We garner from the briefs that the problem for the plaintiffs is that, by not refiling
 their action against the tobacco companies in 2009, limitations may have run on their
 claims, which is why they want to be reinstated in a case that no longer exists. To the
 extent that is true, it is a self-inflicted wound that does not justify this Court in creating a
 new and special exception to the well-established definition and impact of mootness. We
 expressly warned the Bar of this prospect in 2008 in Silbersack v. ACandS, supra, 402
 Md. at 687, 938 A.2d at 862-63 -- also a case in which lung cancer plaintiffs sought to
 join tobacco and asbestos companies on a synergy theory – in which we noted that, if
 dismissal of remaining defendants “is for the purpose of allowing a final judgment to be
 entered, there would be no case left to which the dismissed defendants could be rejoined
 or reinstated.” This appeal clearly is moot and must be dismissed for that reason.
 21
 Addressing the Merits Anyway
 In its decision in this case, the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted that, even
 when an appeal is moot, the appellate court may reach, or at least comment on, the merits
 when the case “presents a recurring matter of public concern which, unless decided, will
 continue to evade review” and concluded that this was a case justifying such comment.
 Stidham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, supra, 224 Md. App. at 469, 121 A.3d at 162. We
 agree.
 It appears that the Circuit Court, commencing at least with the Gress plaintiffs in
 2002, has adopted a firm policy of not allowing the joinder of tobacco and asbestos
 defendants in personal injury/wrongful death cases, that, in part due to the court’s
 unwillingness to enter judgment under Rule 2-602 when asked to do so, the correctness
 of that policy has evaded appellate review on at least five occasions, and that there are
 approximately 700 other lung cancer cases currently pending in that court in which this
 issue can and may be raised. This is a “recurring matter of public concern which, unless
 decided, will continue to evade review.”
 On two occasions – this case and in Gress – the intermediate appellate court
 expressed reasons why it believed the Circuit Court’s policy was wrong. We shall
 comment on those reasons shortly but will add first our concern as to whether, if that
 policy is a general one that the court intends to apply in every synergy case, without
 regard to particular circumstances of the case, it very well may constitute an unauthorized
 local Rule and be invalid for that reason. See Md. Rule 1-102 and Sumpter v. Sumpter,
 427 Md. 668, 671, 50 A.3d 1098, 1100, n.2 (2012), See also Sumpter v. Sumpter, 436
 22
 Md. 74, 86, 80 A.3d 1045, 1052 (2013), pointing out that “[a] judge presiding over a
 particular case may not blindly apply an administrative policy . . . without considering the
 particular circumstances at hand.”
 Permissive joinder is governed by Md. Rule 2-212. Section (a) provides, in
 relevant part, that “[a]ll persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
 asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect
 to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
 occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
 action.” The Rule continues that “[a] plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in
 obtaining or defending against all relief demanded” and that “[j]udgment may be given
 for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief and against
 one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.”
 Section (b) of the Rule permits the court to “make such orders as will prevent a
 party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of another who
 asserts no claim against the party and against whom the party asserts no claim, and may
 order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.”
 The joinder of parties was looked on favorably by this Court even before there was
 a general Rule on the subject. See Northwest’n Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rosoff, 195 Md. 421, 425-
 27, 73 A.2d 461, 462-63 (1950). In A & P Co. v. Crown, 243 Md. 280, 287, 220 A.2d
 598, 601-02 (1966), the Court explained that the purpose of Rules permitting the joinder
 of multiple parties and claims “was to remedy the procedural and substantive defects in
 the law which prevented the resolution in one action of the rights and obligations of all
 23
 parties whose connection with the case arose out of the same source and occurrence” and
 that “[c]ourts have been liberal in utilizing such rules to permit the trial of connected
 issues in one action.” More recently, we confirmed that “[t]he purpose behind the joinder
 of parties is ‘to simplify and expedite proceedings and to avoid the useless duplication,
 expense, and possible uncertainty of more than one trial.” Carter v. Wallace & Gale, 439
 Md. 333, 349, 96 A.3d 147, 156 (2014), n.7, quoting from Allen & Whalen v. Grimberg
 Co., 229 Md. 585, 588, 185 A.2d 337, 339 (1962).
 As noted above, the Circuit Court, beginning in Gress, has denied the joinder of
 claims against tobacco and asbestos defendants because (1) those claims involve different
 kinds of products, methods of distribution, and uses, (2) the case against the asbestos
 defendants is governed by the special procedures that are reserved for asbestos cases, and
 (3) significant problems would arise either in subjecting tobacco companies to those
 procedures or having separate procedures for the two sets of defendants. In that last
 regard, the court noted that applying those procedures would be prejudicial to the tobacco
 companies if they were added “now to these cases.”
 In Gress, having assumed jurisdiction over the appeal by entering its own
 judgment under Rule 2-602, the Court of Special Appeals gave little consideration to the
 reasons expressed by the Circuit Court but determined that joinder was appropriate
 because (1) the claims against the two sets of defendants were related and arose out of the
 same series of occurrences – exposure to both asbestos products and cigarette smoke at
 the same location during the same period of time, (2) the case involved numerous
 common questions of law and fact, including whether there is scientific merit in the
 24
 synergy theory, and (3) of concern that, if the cases were severed, “it is open to each
 defendant to prove that the other was solely responsible or responsible for the greater part
 of the damage, and so defeat or minimize recovery.” Gress, 150 Md. App. at 388, 820
 A.2d at 627, n.10. In this case, the intermediate appellate court more or less confirmed
 what it had said in Gress,
 Those are valid points, and it is not at all clear that they were given any
 consideration by the Circuit Court in this case. Instead, as noted, the court seemed to rely
 solely on the reasons (and the decision) expressed by the trial judge in Gress. On the
 other hand, the concerns expressed by that judge in Gress also are legitimate but were
 given little consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.
 Because we are dealing here with lung cancer cases that have been removed from
 the inactive asbestos docket, there is no real prospect of tobacco claims being placed on
 that docket. There are, however, at least two other legitimate concerns that the Court of
 Special Appeals has not fully addressed. The first – certainly in this case as well as in
 Gress – is that the plaintiffs did not attempt to join the tobacco defendants at the outset
 but waited years in Gress and 15 months in this case to join them. They do not suggest
 that they were unaware of the synergy theory earlier – indeed, their second amended
 complaint indicates that this theory was publicized more than 50 years ago and they
 raised the synergy issue in Gress in 2001.
 By the time they decided to join the tobacco companies in this case, discovery was
 virtually complete, most of the deadlines set in the scheduling order had passed, all fact
 witnesses and experts had been identified, trial was to commence in five months when
 25
 everything was thrown into disarray – not only new defendants, but new theories of
 liability against all defendants requiring expanded or wholly new expert testimony,
 reopening of discovery, really starting over. Quite apart from where the balance should
 be drawn in other situations, we would be hard pressed to find an abuse of discretion in
 refusing to permit joinder under these circumstances. Taking this case back nearly to
 square one after 15 months would have been wholly inconsistent with everything the
 court has been trying to do since the 1980s to expedite the disposition of asbestos cases.
 More generally, joinder of asbestos and tobacco defendants raises the issue of the
 extent to which, if at all, the special procedures applicable to asbestos cases should
 extend to tobacco companies. The trial judge in Gress obviously was concerned about
 that, but there has yet to be any recorded analysis of how, or whether, the two different
 pre-trial procedures could be effectively and efficiently meshed. Rule 2-212(b) tacitly
 recognizes that problems such as this can arise from a joinder. This case is over, but in
 any future cases – at least those in which the proposed joinder is a timely one -- it will be
 incumbent on plaintiffs seeking to join tobacco and asbestos defendants to address these
 issues objectively and in detail and for the court to give fair consideration to all proposals
 and objections.
 JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS DISMISSING
 APPEAL AFFIRMED; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF
 SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN
 PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
 26
 Circuit Court for IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 Baltimore City
 Case No. 24X08000326
 Argued 5/9/16 OF MARYLAND
 No. 77
 September Term, 2015
 R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO., et al.
 vs.
 DOUGLAS A. STIDHAM, etc., et al.
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 McDonald
 Harrell, Glenn T. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
 Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned
 Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
 Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
 JJ.
 Opinion by McDonald, J., Dissenting in Part
 Filed: July 5, 2016
 I agree with the Majority opinion that there was a final judgment in this case. I also
 agree with the considerations suggested in the Majority opinion – and in the opinion of the
 Court of Special Appeals – for determining whether tobacco defendants should be joined
 as co-defendants with asbestos defendants when a complaint alleges that synergistic effects
 of tobacco and asbestos exposure harmed the plaintiff.
 I differ with the Majority opinion on the question of mootness. In my view, the
 Majority opinion fails to distinguish between a case or controversy being moot and a
 particular issue being moot. A case is moot when there is no longer controversy between
 the parties or when the court can no longer provide a remedy. Green v. Nassif, 401 Md.
 649, 654, 934 A.2d 22 (2007). However, a particular issue may become moot without
 resolving the controversy between the parties or depriving the court of the power to provide
 relief.
 As the Majority opinion recounts, the Stidhams joined causes of action against
 asbestos defendants and tobacco defendants in a single complaint. The tobacco defendants
 moved to dismiss the claims against them on the ground that the joinder of defendants was
 not proper under Maryland Rules 2-212 and 2-213. The Circuit Court granted that motion.
 This appeal concerns the merits of the Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss the tobacco
 defendants.
 Now that the causes of action against all of the asbestos defendants have been
 resolved, the basis for the Circuit Court’s order of dismissal is moot. But the controversy
 between the Stidhams and the tobacco defendants set forth in the causes of action pled in
 their complaint is not moot. The Majority opinion states that the “sole thing” sought by
 the Stidhams was joinder. That is not quite right. The Stidhams were not pursuing joinder
 in the abstract, but rather sought to prosecute in this case claims concerning the allegedly
 synergistic effects of asbestos and tobacco against both asbestos and tobacco defendants.
 They are still interested in pursuing such claims against the tobacco defendants, even
 though the claims against the asbestos defendants have been resolved. But, as the Majority
 opinion accurately describes, the Circuit Court did not just sever the claims against the
 tobacco companies; it dismissed them. Majority slip op. at 13, 16-18.
 Assume for the moment that it was legal error for the Circuit Court to dismiss the
 tobacco defendants.1 It cannot be the case that a party whose claims are dismissed in error
 and who dutifully waits for a final judgment in order to seek relief in an appellate court
 loses the opportunity to pursue its claims because the rationale for the dismissal is not only
 erroneous, but has also become moot. That makes no sense.
 The Majority states that the Stidhams seek to have the tobacco defendants reinstated
 “in a case that no longer exists.” Majority slip op. at 21. However, this case “no longer
 exists” in the same sense that any case in which the claims against the defendants are
 dismissed and the plaintiffs appeal “no longer exists.” For example, in Litz v. Maryland
 Department of the Environment, 434 Md. 623, 76 A.3d 1076 (2013), the lower courts
 dismissed the claims brought against all of the various co-defendants on a variety of
 1
 The Court of Special Appeals opinion suggests that the Circuit Court did err. The
 Majority opinion does not appear to reach a conclusion on that question.
 2
 grounds and the plaintiff appealed. In a sense, that case “no longer existed” in the Circuit
 Court, as no claims remained pending there, but that did not prevent this Court from
 ultimately returning the case to the Circuit Court after determining that the lower courts
 had erred as to some of the bases for dismissal. See 446 Md. 254, 280, 131 A.3d 923
 (2016).
 Along the same lines, the Majority opinion quotes a statement in Silbersack v.
 ACandS, Inc, 402 Md. 673, 687, 938 A.2d 855 (2008), that, if dismissal of the remaining
 defendants in that case was “for the purpose of allowing a final judgment to be entered,
 there would be no case left to which the dismissed defendants could be rejoined or
 reinstated.” However, that statement meant something quite different in the context of that
 case. In Silbersack, the proposal before this court was to “administratively” dismiss
 bankrupt asbestos defendants in order to obtain a final judgment, subject to reinstatement
 of those defendants later if the bankrupt defendants ever emerged from bankruptcy. Thus,
 in that case, the future reinstatement would involve the same defendants that the plaintiff
 had voluntarily dismissed from the case, not defendants as to which the plaintiff had
 opposed dismissal. In Silbersack, the Court was saying that, if a plaintiff voluntarily
 dismisses all defendants, the case is over and there is no provision for “administratively”
 resurrecting it. By contrast, in this case, the Stidhams have voluntarily dismissed some
 defendants and the Circuit Court (in their view) improperly dismissed the other defendants
 – a quite different situation.
 3
 It may be, for the reasons suggested in the Majority opinion, that the case against
 the tobacco defendants should not be retained on the “asbestos docket”2 or perhaps should
 be dismissed because these defendants were added too late – or for any of a multitude of
 reasons – but not because the case against the tobacco defendants is “moot.” It is not the
 case against those defendants that is moot, but rather the rationale for dismissing them
 from this action that is moot.
 I would remand the case to the Circuit Court to determine, in light of the
 considerations set forth in the Majority opinion and the opinion of the Court of Special
 Appeals, whether to retain this action on the asbestos docket, transfer it to the regular civil
 docket, or dismiss it for some other reason.
 2
 The Majority opinion appears to characterize this action, in its current form, as a
 “non-asbestos case.” Majority slip op. at 21. However, the allegations of the counts of the
 complaint that were dismissed – and that would be restored once the order of dismissal is
 reversed – allege synergistic effects of asbestos and tobacco exposure. It is not entirely
 clear why one would label a case that consists of causes of action based in part on the
 effects of asbestos exposure a “non-asbestos case.”
 4


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 23.6.2007
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 140/28
 Prasība, kas celta 2007. gada 18. aprīlī — Areva u.c./Komisija
 (lieta T-117/07)
 (2007/C 140/49)
 Tiesvedības valoda — franču
 Lietas dalībnieki
 Prasītājas: AREVA SA, AREVA T&D HOLDING SA, AREVA T&D SA, Parīze (Francija), un AREVA T&D AG, Oberentfelden (Šveice) (pārstāvji — A. Schild, Rechtsanwältin, un J.-M. Cot, avocat)
 Atbildētāja: Eiropas Kopienu Komisija
 Prasītāju prasījumi:
 —
 atcelt Komisijas 2007. gada 24. janvāra lēmuma 1. punktu daļā, kurā, pirmkārt, noteikta AREVA T&D SA un ALSTOM SA solidāra atbildība par konkurenci deformējošām darbībām, kas veiktas laikā no 1992. gada 7. decembra līdz 2004. gada 8. janvārim, un, otrkārt, kurā noteikta AREVA T&D SA, AREVA T&D AG, AREVA T&D HOLDING SA un AREVA SA solidāra atbildība par konkurenci deformējošām darbībām, kas veiktas laikā no 2004. gada 9. janvāra līdz 2004. gada 11. maijam;
 —
 pakārtoti — atcelt vai būtiski samazināt AREVA T&D SA, AREVA T&D AG, AREVA T&D HOLDING SA un AREVA SA uzlikto naudas sodus;
 —
 piespriest Komisijai atlīdzināt tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 Pamati un galvenie argumenti
 Prasītājas ar šo prasību lūdz daļēji atcelt Komisijas 2007. gada 24. janvāra lēmumu C(2006) 6762, galīgā redakcija, par EKL 81. panta un EEZ līguma 53. panta piemērošanu (lieta COMP/F/38.899 — Komutāciju aparatūra gāzveida izolācijai) par aizliegto vienošanos projektu jomā attiecībā uz komutāciju aparatūru gāzveida izolācijai saistībā ar manipulāciju ar uzaicinājumu iesniegt piedāvājumu publiskā iepirkuma procedūrā attiecībā uz šiem projektiem, minimālās cenas noteikšanu publiskā iepirkuma procedūrā, kvotu piešķiršanu un informācijas apmaiņu. Pakārtoti prasītājas lūdz samazināt viņām ar apstrīdēto lēmumu uzlikto naudas sodu apmēru.
 Savu prasību pamatojumam prasītājas izvirza septiņus pamatus.
 Pirmais pamats ir EKL 253. pantā paredzētā Komisijas pienākuma norādīt pamatojumu pārkāpums, ciktāl pamatojums esot pretrunīgs un nepietiekams attiecībā uz apstākļiem, kas it īpaši skar apsūdzību konkurenci deformējošās darbībās, solidāra soda uzlikšanu kopā ar ALSTOM SA un naudas soda pamata summas palielināšanu sakarā ar AREVA T&D SA vadošo lomu pārkāpumā.
 Izvirzot otro pamatu, prasītājas pārmet Komisijai EKL 81. panta pārkāpumu un, it īpaši, juridisko normu pārkāpumu saistībā ar atbildības noteikšanu par pārkāpumu, nosakot AREVA T&D SA, AREVA T&D AG atbildību par konkurenci deformējošām darbībām pirms šo sabiedrību nodošanas, ko veica ALSTOM SA, tādēļ, ka Komisija uzskatīja, ka šīs sabiedrības pirms to nodošanas nebija neatkarīgas no ALSTOM SA.
 Prasītāju izvirzītais trešais pamats attiecas uz EKL 81. panta pārkāpumu, jo Komisija esot noteikusi AREVA SA un AREVA T&D HOLDING SA atbildību par konkurenci deformējošām darbībām, kas attiecināmas uz to tiešiem vai netiešiem meitas uzņēmumiem AREVA T&D SA un AREVA T&D AG, lai gan prasītājas uzskata, ka Komisija nav pierādījusi, ka pārkāpuma laikā AREVA SA un AREVA T&D HOLDING SA patiešām kontrolētu šos meitas uzņēmumus.
 Ceturtais un piektais pamats attiecas uz EKL 7. un 81. panta pārkāpumu, it īpaši, saistībā ar tiesību normām attiecībā uz solidāru atbildību par pārkāpumu. Prasītājas norāda, ka Komisija nevar solidāri sodīt AREVA T&D SA un ALSTOM SA tādēļ, ka tās neveido ekonomisku vienību un šāda solidāra sodīšana esot Komisijas sodu uzlikšanas pilnvaru prettiesiska deleģēšana, kā arī vispārējo vienlīdzīgas attieksmes principa, tiesiskās drošības principa un efektīvas tiesiskās aizsardzības principa pārkāpums.
 Izvirzot sesto pamatu, prasītājas pārmet, ka apstrīdētajā lēmumā ir kļūdaini piemērots vadošās lomas jēdziens, kā arī pārkāpts EKL 81. pants un Pamatnostādnes par naudas sodu aprēķināšanu, (1)un vairāki vispārējie tiesību principi.
 Ar pēdējo pamatu prasītājas norāda, ka Komisija esot pieļāvusi kļūdu vērtējumā attiecībā uz sadarbības apjomu, ko prasītājas sniedza izmeklēšanas procesā, pārkāpjot EKL 81. pantu un Pamatnostādnes par sadarbību, kas noteiktas paziņojumā par imunitāti attiecība uz naudas sodiem un to apmēra samazināšanu aizliegto vienošanos lietās (2).
 (1) OV C 9, 14.01.1998., 3. lpp.
 (2) OV C 45, 19.02.2002., 3. lpp.


type: wikipedia

text:
Bezgalība (simbols: ∞) ir jēdziens, kas apzīmē kaut ko nebeidzamu, neierobežotu. Bezgalības jēdzienu lieto matemātikā, filozofijā un loģikā, kas saistīti ar idejām par kaut ko neizmērāmu un nesasniedzamu. Matemātikā bezgalība ir lielums, kas pārsniedz jebkuru reālu skaitli. Filozofijā bezgalību attiecina uz absolūto, telpu un laiku. Bezgalības jēdziens tiek lietots arī teoloģijā (tiek saistīts ar dievu), psiholoģijā un fizikā.
 Bezgalība matemātikā
 Matemātikā bezgalība ir lielums, kas pārsniedz jebkuru reālu skaitli un to apzīmē ar simbolu "∞". Bieži, piemēram, matemātiskajā analīzē, ir nepieciešamība pierakstīt faktu, ka kāds lielums tiecas uz bezgalību (neierobežoti pieaug). To pieraksta šādi: . Piemēram, skaitļu virkne 1, 2, 3, ... tiecas uz bezgalību. Savukārt skaitļu virkne −1, −2, −3, ... tiecas nevis uz bezgalību, bet uz mīnus bezgalību, tāpēc noteiktības pēc pirmās virknes robežu apzīmē ar +∞, bet otrās ar −∞.
 Robežas
 Apskatīsim robežas, kurās parādās bezgalība.
 Piezīme. Robeža eksistē un ir + bezgalība, ja a > 0, bet - bezgalība, ja a < 0.
 Fraktāļi
 Neregulāru līkni vai virsmu, ko iegūst, veicot atkārtotu dalīšanu sīkākās daļās, sauc par fraktāli. Būtībā tā sastāv no bezgalīgi daudzām daļām. Plašākā nozīmē fraktāļi ir punktu kopas Eiklīda telpā, kurām dimensiju skaits nav vesels skaitlis. Zināmi fraktāļi ir Mandelbrota kopa, Kantora putekļi.
 Bezgalība loģikā
 Zēnona paradoksi ir vieni no pirmajiem loģiskās sarežģītības piemēriem, darbojoties ar bezgalīgiem objektiem. To izveidoja Zēnons Elejietis, bet izklāstīja sengrieķu filozofs Aristotelis. Viens no Zēnona piedāvātajiem piemēriem ir Ahillejs un bruņurupucis, kurā tiek apskatīta situācija, ka Ahilejs nekādi nevar apsteigt bruņurupuci, ja tas atrodas mazliet tālāk par viņu, un abi pārvietojas vienā virzienā.
 Papildu literatūra
 Andžāns Agnis, Ramāna Līga, Čakste Jānis, Larfelds Tomass, Mārīte Seile, "Vidējās vērtības metode", 5.5. Dažādas bezgalības izpratnes un to salīdzināšana.
 Atsauces
 Ārējās saites


type: legislation

text:
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 11.8.2017
 COM(2017) 430 final
 2017/0196(NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à celebração do Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA)
 EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS
 1.CONTEXTO DA PROPOSTA
 •Justificação e objetivos da proposta
 Em 30 de maio de 2017, o Conselho autorizou a Comissão a iniciar negociações, em nome da União, com a República Árabe do Egito («Egito») sobre um acordo internacional entre a União Europeia e o Egito que estabeleça os termos e as condições de participação do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica («PRIMA»).
 De acordo com a decisão de autorização do Conselho, as negociações só podiam ter início após a adoção de uma Decisão do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa à participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros.
 As negociações tiveram início em 26 de junho de 2017 e foram concluídas com êxito em 27 de julho de 2017, data em que os representantes das futuras Partes rubricaram o texto do projeto de Acordo. O projeto de Acordo anexo à presente proposta está em conformidade com as diretrizes de negociação emitidas pelo Conselho. Estabelece, em especial, que os termos e as condições da participação do Egito na Parceria PRIMA são os definidos na Decisão (UE) 2017/1324
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 , fazendo uma referência direta ao ato legislativo da União.
 A fim de garantir a proteção dos interesses financeiros da União, nomeadamente os poderes da Comissão, do Organismo Europeu de Luta Antifraude, do Tribunal de Contas e da Estrutura de Execução PRIMA (EE-PRIMA) para procederem a auditorias e inquéritos em conformidade com a legislação da União aplicável, o Acordo faz uma referência específica às disposições relevantes da Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 e obriga as Partes a prestar toda a assistência necessária para garantir a sua execução. Além disso, o futuro Acordo estabelece que as Partes devem acordar modalidades pormenorizadas de assistência, as quais são essenciais para a sua cooperação no âmbito do Acordo. Mediante solicitação do Egito e conforme acordado durante as negociações, foi aditado um considerando no preâmbulo do Acordo a fim de salientar que a plena cooperação e coordenação entre as autoridades competentes de ambas as futuras Partes são essenciais para a aplicação do futuro Acordo.
 •Coerência com as disposições em vigor no domínio em questão
 Tal como apresentado também no Relatório de Avaliação de Impacto da Parceria PRIMA
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 , a abertura à participação na Parceria de países terceiros como o Egito está em consonância com os objetivos da cooperação internacional em matéria de investigação e inovação, conforme descrita na Comunicação da Comissão de 2012 «Reforçar e centrar a cooperação internacional no domínio da investigação e da inovação: Uma abordagem estratégica»
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 e no Programa-Quadro Horizonte 2020, que promove a cooperação com países terceiros em matéria de ciência, tecnologia e inovação, a fim de enfrentar desafios societais globais e de apoiar as políticas externas da União. O presente Acordo está também em consonância com o atual Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma Associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República Árabe do Egito, por outro
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 , e com o Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a Comunidade Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito
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 , o qual estabelece a cooperação entre a União e o Egito em matéria de investigação e desenvolvimento tecnológico e promove as atividades de investigação e desenvolvimento em domínios de interesse comum.
 •Coerência com outras políticas da União
 A implementação da Parceria PRIMA em estreita cooperação com países terceiros como o Egito está também em consonância com — e é também relevante para — outras políticas da União como, por exemplo, a política de migração, a política de desenvolvimento e a política de vizinhança.
 2.ELEMENTOS jurídicos da proposta
 A proposta de Decisão do Conselho tem por base o artigo 186.o e o artigo 218.o, n.o 6, alínea a), do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.
 À luz do que precede, a Comissão propõe ao Conselho que celebre o Acordo em nome da União Europeia.
 2017/0196 (NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à celebração do Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA)
 O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 Tendo em conta o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, nomeadamente o artigo 186.o em conjugação com o artigo 218.o, n.o 6, alínea a),
 Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão Europeia,
 Tendo em conta a aprovação do Parlamento Europeu,
 Considerando o seguinte:
 (1)A Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho
 6
 estabelece a participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros.
 (2)A República Árabe do Egito («Egito») manifestou o seu desejo de aderir à Parceria PRIMA como Estado participante e em condições de igualdade com os Estados-Membros e países associados ao Programa-Quadro Horizonte 2020 que participam na Parceria.
 (3)Em conformidade com o artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Decisão (UE) 2017/1324, o Egito aderirá à Parceria PRIMA como Estado participante, sob reserva da celebração de um acordo internacional de cooperação científica e tecnológica com a União que estabeleça os termos e as condições de participação do Egito na Parceria.
 (4)Em conformidade com a Decisão do Conselho<XXX>
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 , o Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) foi assinado em nome da União em XX de 20XX, sob reserva da sua celebração em data ulterior.
 (5)O Acordo deve ser aprovado em nome da União Europeia,
 ADOTOU A PRESENTE DECISÃO:
 Artigo 1.o
 O Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) é aprovado em nome da União.
 O texto do Acordo acompanha a presente Decisão.
 Artigo 2.o
 O Presidente do Conselho designa a(s) pessoa(s) com poderes para proceder, em nome da União, à notificação prevista no artigo 4.°, n.o 2, do Acordo, a fim de expressar o consentimento da União em ficar vinculada pelo Acordo.
 Artigo 3.o
 A presente decisão entra em vigor na [data da sua adoção].
 Feito em Bruxelas, em
 Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 (1)
 Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 4 de julho de 2017, relativa à participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros (JO L 185 de 18.7.2017, p.1).
 (2)
 SWD(2016) 332 final de 18.10.2016.
 (3)
 COM(2012) 497 final.
 (4)
 JO L 304 de 30.9.2004, p. 39.
 (5)
 JO L 182 de 13.7.2005, p. 12.
 (6)
 Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 4 de julho de 2017, relativa à participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros (JO L 185 de 18.7.2017, p.1).
 ---documentbreak---
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 11.8.2017
 COM(2017) 430 final
 ANEXO
 da
 Proposta de DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à celebração do Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA)
 Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a União Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito que estabelece os termos e as condições de participação da República Árabe do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA)
 A União Europeia (seguidamente designada «a União»),
 por um lado,
 e
 a República Árabe do Egito (seguidamente designada «Egito»),
 por outro lado,
 (seguidamente designadas «as Partes»),
 Considerando que o Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma Associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República Árabe do Egito, por outro, que entrou em vigor em 1 de junho de 2004, prevê a cooperação científica, técnica e tecnológica.
 Considerando que o Acordo de Cooperação Científica e Tecnológica entre a Comunidade Europeia e a República Árabe do Egito, que entrou em vigor em 27 de fevereiro de 2008, estabelece um quadro formal de cooperação entre as Partes em matéria de investigação científica e tecnológica;
 Considerando que a Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa à participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros regulamenta os termos e as condições de participação dos Estados-Membros da UE e países associados ao Programa-Quadro Horizonte 2020 que são Estados participantes na iniciativa, em especial as suas obrigações financeiras e a participação nas estruturas de governação da iniciativa.
 Considerando que, nos termos da Decisão (UE) 2017/1324, o Egito aderirá à Parceria PRIMA como Estado participante, sob reserva da celebração de um acordo internacional de cooperação científica e tecnológica com a União que estabeleça os termos e as condições de participação do Egito na Parceria.
 Considerando que o Egito manifestou o seu desejo de aderir à Parceria PRIMA como Estado participante e em condições de igualdade com os Estados-Membros e países associados ao Programa-Quadro Horizonte 2020 que participam na Parceria.
 Considerando que é necessária a celebração de um acordo internacional entre a União e o Egito para regulamentar os direitos e as obrigações do Egito enquanto Estado participante na Parceria PRIMA.
 Considerando que a plena cooperação e coordenação entre as autoridades competentes de ambas as Partes são essenciais para a aplicação do presente Acordo,
 ACORDARAM NO SEGUINTE:
 Artigo 1.o
 Objetivo
 O objetivo do presente Acordo é estabelecer os termos e as condições de participação do Egito na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA).
 Artigo 2.o
 Termos e condições da participação do Egito na Parceria PRIMA
 Os termos e as condições de participação do Egito na Parceria PRIMA são os estabelecidos na Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa à participação da União na Parceria para a Investigação e a Inovação na Região Mediterrânica (PRIMA) empreendida conjuntamente por vários Estados-Membros. As Partes devem cumprir as obrigações estabelecidas na referida decisão e tomar as medidas adequadas, em especial mediante a prestação de toda a assistência técnica necessária para garantir a aplicação dos seus artigos 10,o, n.o 2, e 11.o, n.os 3 e 4. As modalidades pormenorizadas da assistência são acordadas entre as Partes, sendo essas modalidades essenciais para a sua cooperação ao abrigo do presente Acordo.
 Artigo 3.o
 Âmbito de aplicação territorial
 O presente Acordo é aplicável, por um lado, aos territórios em que o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e o Tratado da União Europeia são aplicados e, por outro, ao território do Egito.
 Artigo 4.o
 Aplicação provisória, entrada em vigor e vigência
 1. O presente Acordo é aprovado pelas Partes em conformidade com os respetivos procedimentos internos.
 2. O presente Acordo entra em vigor na data em que as Partes se notificarem reciprocamente, por via diplomática, da conclusão dos procedimentos referidos no n.o 1. Na sequência da sua assinatura e enquanto se aguarda a sua entrada em vigor, as Partes aplicam provisoriamente o presente Acordo a partir da data em que a UE receba a notificação relativa à conclusão pelo Egito dos procedimentos referidos no n.o 1.
 3. O presente Acordo mantém-se em vigor enquanto a Decisão (UE) 2017/1324 estiver em vigor, salvo denúncia por uma das Partes em conformidade com o disposto no artigo 5.o.
 Artigo 5.o
 Denúncia
 1. Qualquer das Partes pode denunciar o presente Acordo em qualquer momento mediante notificação escrita que informe da sua intenção de o denunciar.
 A denúncia produz efeitos seis meses após a data em que a notificação escrita chega ao seu destinatário.
 2. Os projetos e atividades em curso no momento da denúncia do presente Acordo prosseguirão até à respetiva conclusão nas condições estabelecidas no mesmo.
 3. As Partes definem, de comum acordo, outras eventuais consequências da denúncia do Acordo.
 Artigo 6.o
 Resolução de litígios
 O procedimento de resolução de litígios previsto no artigo 82.o do Acordo Euro-Mediterrânico que cria uma Associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República Árabe do Egito, por outro, é aplicável a todos os litígios relacionados com a aplicação ou interpretação do presente Acordo.
 O presente Acordo é redigido em duplo exemplar nas línguas alemã, búlgara, checa, croata, dinamarquesa, eslovaca, eslovena, espanhola, estónia, finlandesa, francesa, grega, húngara, inglesa, italiana, letã, lituana, maltesa, neerlandesa, polaca, portuguesa, romena, sueca e árabe, fazendo igualmente fé todos os textos.


text:
Popor turcic este oricare dintre diversele popoare ai căror membri vorbesc o limbă din familia de limbi turcice. Aceste popoare, numărând aproximativ 150 milioane de oameni, sunt probabil descendenții unui mare grup de triburi originare din Asia centrală.
 Denumirea
 Prima atestare a etnonimului „turc” a fost menționarea kök türk („turcii albaștri”, la singular) într-o scrisoare trimisă în 585 de împăratului Chinei lui Isbara, hanul tribului göktürk. În misiva respectivă, monarhul i se adresează destinatarului cu apelativul „Mare Han Turc”. În inscripțiile Orhon, datate cam în aceeași perioadă, este folosită varianta „turuk”.
 Utilizări mai vechi ale unor termeni similari, precum acelea pe o tabliță din secolul 20 î.Hr găsită în orașul Mari lângă Tell Hariri în nordul Irakului (menționând poporul turukku, sosit în ținuturile Tiguranim și Hirbazanim); cea chinezească din 1328 î.Hr, (care numea un popor vecin tu-kiu); cea din Zend-Avesta, în care unul dintre nepoții lui Noe este numit Turk - au o semnificație necunoscută, însă
 O explicație populară în Turcia contemporană este că sensul primar al cuvântului türk ar fi „tare; puternic”. În secolul al XVI-lea turcii otomani credeau că türk însemna "Cel care a atins cea mai înaltă treaptă a perfecțiunii" ('kemâle ermiș')
 Cuvântul "turcic/turcică" este în zilele noastre folosit în principal pentru a denumi popoarele și limbile întregii zone, în vreme ce "turc/turcă" este folosit în mod obișnuit pentru a denumi poporul și limba Turciei, cât și unele dintre particularitățile etnice și culturale ale acestui popor și ale minorităților etnice din țările vecine.
 Unii consideră aceasta drept distincție artificială și afirmă că limbile turcice nu fac între ele asemenea diferențieri, ele fiind în fapt dialecte ale unei singure limbi. În limba turcă modernă (din Turcia), termenul "türk" se referă la poporul și limba turcă în timp ce termenul "türki" se referă la popoarele și limbile turcice.
 Se mai afirmă că cele mai multe separări sunt produsul stalinismului și că, înainte de formarea Uniunii Sovietice, termenul turcesc era folosit pentru a descrie toate popoarele turcice care, prin similaritățile de limbă și cultură, erau văzute ca părți ale unei mari familii de popoare, ale unui „Türkistan”. Există îngrijorări că cea mai mare parte a acestei dezbateri este folosită ca suport al teoriei rasiale a panturcismului, pretinzând că diferențele culturale, religioase, istorice, politice, chiar și rasiale sunt prea mari pentru a vorbi despre unitate.
 Istorie
 Se crede că toate popoarele turcice sunt originare din Asia Centrală. Unii istorici pretind că turcii sunt originari din Asia de vest și au migrat în timpuri preistorice în Asia Centrală, în timp ce alții cred că migrația către Asia de vest și interacțiunile turcilor în diferite parți ale lumii în perioada antică, (înainte de apariția hunilor), au apărut via Asia Centrală.
 Comparații ale limbii sumeriene antice, (pe care ei o numesc limba uralo-altaică), cu limbile turcice moderne arată similarități de vocabular. Se afirmă, având ca bază această comparație, ca sumerienii sunt cel mai vechi popor turcic menționat în documente, că ei își au originile în estul Mării Caspice dar și-au clădit o civilizație în Mesopotamia. Alții resping aceasta ca pe o expresie a ideologiei pan-turcice, arătând că majoritatea lingviștilor consideră sumeriana ca o limbă izolată, în timp ce alții o leagă de limbile dravidene. Mai mult, clasificarea limbilor într-un grup uralo-altaic este deseori criticată, datorită lipsei de dovezi și a lipsei de similarități evidente dintre limbile clasificate astfel.
 Unii savanți consideră hunii, ale căror origini merg până spre anul 1200 î.Hr, ca unul dintre primele popoare turcice.
 Lăsând aceste controverse [[deoparte]], data precisă a expansiunii inițiale din țara mamă rămâne neștiută. Primul stat cunoscut ca "turc" , care mai apoi a dat numele multor state și popoare după aceea, a fost acela al gokturcilor din secolul al VI-lea (gog = 'albastru' sau 'ceresc'). Acest stat pare să apară în urma răscoalei unui popor de origine turcică, cel pe care chinezii îl numeau tu-kiu, împotriva juan-juanilor (Jou-jou). Căpetenia lor Bumin își va lua numele de Kagan, fiind urmat de fratele său Istemi-Kagan. Începând cu anul 581 î.e.n, confederațiile statale de la est și vest de Altai se despart, turcii numindu-se astfel occindentali și orientali.
 Popoarele turcice mai târzii includ karlucii (mai ales în secolul al XVIII-lea), uighurii, turcii oghuz sau turcii Ğuz și turkmenii. Cum aceste popoare au fondat state într-o zona cuprinsă între Mongolia și Transoxiana, au venit în contact cu popoarele musulmane și au adoptat treptat islamismul. Totuși, au fost și mai sunt încă popoare turcice de alte religii, cum sunt: creștinism, iudaism (vezi khazarii), budism și zoroastrism.
 Soldații turcici din armata califilor Abbasizi au ajuns conducătorii de facto ai Orientului Mijlociu musulman (exceptând Siria și Egiptul), în mod deosebit după secolul al X-lea. Oghuzii și alte triburi au ocupat diferite țări sub conducerea dinastiei turcilor selgiucizi și până în cele din urmă au cucerit teritoriile dinastiei Abaside și ale Imperiului Bizantin.
 În acest timp, kirghizii și uigurii se luptau între ei și cu puternicul Imperiu Chinez. Kirghizii s-au așezat în final în regiunea cunoscută acum ca Kârgâzstan. Tătarii au cucerit teritoriul bulgarilor de pe Volga care astăzi este Tatarstanul, urmând invazia mongolă spre vest a lui Ginghis Han din secolul al XIII-lea. Bulgarii au fost numiți de ruși tătari din greșeală. Adevărații tătari trăiesc numai în Asia. Tătarii europeni sunt de fapt bulgari. (Bulgarii au venit în Europa în secolele al VII-lea și al VIII-lea). Peste tot, populațiile turcice s-au amestecat într-o oarecare măsură cu alte populații locale.
 În vreme ce statul selgiucid a intrat în declin după invazia mongolă, Imperiul Otoman s-a ridicat ca noul stat turcic care a juns să domine nu numai Orientul Mijlociu, dar și Europa de sud-est și părți ale Rusiei sudice și ale Africii de nord. În același timp, alte grupuri turcice au fondat dinastii în Iran sau în nordul Indiei (Imperiul Mogul).
 Imperiul Otoman a slăbit datorită repetatelor războaie cu Rusia și Austria, ca și datorită creșterii mișcărilor de eliberare națională din Balcani și mai apoi a dispărut dupa primul război mondial, în locul lui apărând republica Turcia din zilele noastre.
 Răspândirea geografică și diviziunile etnice
 În ziua de azi, cea mai mare populație turcică trăiește în Turcia. Alte populații turcice numeroase trăiesc în Azerbaijan, Cipru, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kârgâzstan, Rusia, Turkmenistan și Uzbekistan. De asemenea, mai trăiesc populații turcice în China, în nordul Irakului, Afghanistan, Republica Moldova, și în Balcani (în special în Grecia, Bulgaria, România și în fosta Iugoslavia). Un număr mic de persoane turcice trăiesc de asemenea în Vilnius, capitala Lituaniei.
 O graniță exactă între diferitele popoare turcice nu poate fi trasată cu exactitate. Unii oameni de știință divid aceste popoare în șase ramuri: oghuzii, kipchacii, kurlucii, siberienii, ciuvașii, și yakuții.
 Una dintre cele mai mari dificultăți întâmpinate în încercarea de clasificare a diferitelor limbi, dialecte, popoare și grupuri etnice turcice este impactul avut de Uniunea Sovietică (și în mod particular de politica națională a lui Stalin, de crearea unor noi granițe naționale și de deportarile în masă), asupra amestecurilor etnice în regiunile care fuseseră mai înainte zone multiculturale precum Khiva/Khwarezmia, valea Fergana și Caucaz. Clasificarea menționată mai sus nu este de aceea nici în detaliu, nici în general suficient de exactă. Un alt aspect dezbătut este influența pan-turcismului și naționalismului în creștere asupra percepțiilor diviziunilor etnice din republicile din Asia Centrală care și-au câștigat de puțină vreme independența.
 Înfățișare fizică
 Popoarele turcice diferă de multe ori în ceea ce privește înfățișarea fizică. Majoritatea popoarelor turcice, din vestul Chinei până în răsăritul Europei, se pare că au caracteristici ale rasei albe (caucazian). Unii au caracteristici ale rasei albe precum ochii albaștri și părul blond sau roșcat, deși cei mai mulți reprezentanți ai popoarelor turcice au o înfățișare mediteraniană, cu părul și ochii negri, cu piele măslinie până la tuciurie. În unele zone turcice, este comună existența oamenilor care au pielea albă, părul și ochii deschiși la culoare dar care au o față cu structură mongoloidă (precum e cazul unor uzbeci sau tătari). Majoritatea persoanelor turcice au pomeții ridicați, capete rotunde și părul drept.
 Sunt multe discuții pe seama originii rasiale a popoarelor turcice, unii considerând că există o rasă ural-altaică compusă din unguri, finlandezi, estoni, popoare turcice, mongoli și tunguși; alții considerând că exista o rasă turcică separată, parțial amestecată cu mongoli. Alții atrag atenția din nou că multe limbi au fost adoptate fie benevol fie silit de alte popoare diferite rasial. Teoria acceptată curent este aceea a moștenirii lingvistice și rasiale separate, bazate pe o multitudine de invazii, războaie, imperii și migrații ale populației.
 Religia
 Cele mai multe popoare turcice sunt musulmane sunnite. Dar mulți oameni din estul Turciei sunt aleviți și cea mai mare parte a locuitorilor Iranului și Azerbaijanului sunt musulmani șiiți.
 Ciuvașii din Rusia și găgăuzii din Republica Moldova sunt în mare parte creștini.
 Unele popoare turcice (în mod special în regiunile autonome rusești Altai, Hakas, și Tiva) sunt adepți ai șamanismului. Șamanismul a fost religia predominantă a diverselor ramuri turcice până prin secolul al VIII-lea, când cei mai mulți au trecut la islam.
 Mai sunt unele popoare turcice de religie budistă, mozaică, zoroastrică și bahá'í
 Lumea turcă și pan-turcismul
 Unii se referă la țările, regiunile și popoarele turcice ca la o parte a „lumii turce”. Alții sunt îngrijorați că aceasta este un rezultat și un exemplu al panturcismului, creat să încurajeze dorințele hegemonice sau chiar imperiale ale Turciei moderne.
 Susținătorii acestui termen arată că, în același fel, arabii cred despre ei că fac parte dintr-o mai mare „lume arabă”.
 Este de asemenea spus că încurajarea acestor afinități lingvistice poate fi utilizată ca un vector pentru dezvoltarea regională și mărirea securității în zonă.
 Oponenții indică naționalismul și trecutul imperial al Turciei, rolul mișcărilor panturcice în războiul civil din Rusia și diversitatea culturală, religioasă și politică a popoarelor și grupurilor etnice turcice; ei cred că o mișcare pentru o mai mare unitate pan-turcică poate avea o influență negativă în zonă.
 Vezi și
 Limbi turcice
 State și imperii turcice
 Panturcism
 Akbar
 Turci în Bulgaria
 Legături externe
 Journal of Turkology
 Istanbul Kültür University
 A Comparison Between the Turkey and Turkmenistan Turkishes
 A General Look at the History of the Uyghur Turkish
 International Turcology and Turkish History Research Symposium
 Türkçekent Orientaal's links for Turkish Language Learning
 Türkçestan Orientaal's links to Turkic languages
 SOTA Research Centre for Turkestan and Azerbaijan
 Ural-Altaic-Sumerian Etymological Dictionary