text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21997A0627(01)
 Acordo sob forma de troca de cartas entre a Comunidade Europeia e a Confederação Suíça que adita um protocolo complementar relativo à assistência administrativa mútua em matéria aduaneira ao Acordo entre a Comunidade Económica Europeia e a Confederação Suíça - Declaraçào comum
 Jornal Oficial no L 169 de 27/06/1997 p. 0077 - 0084
 ACORDO SOB FORMA DE TROCA DE CARTAS entre a Comunidade Europeia e a Confederação Suíça que adita um protocolo complementar relativo à assistência administrativa mútua em matéria aduaneira ao Acordo entre a Comunidade Económica Europeia e a Confederação SuíçaA. Carta da Comunidade Europeia Bruxelas, 9 de Junho de 1997Excelentíssimo Senhor,Tenho a honra de me referir às negociações entre os representantes da Comunidade Europeia e da Confederação Suíça com vista à conclusão de um Acordo sobre a assistência administrativa mútua em matéria aduaneira que adita ao Acordo de 22 de Julho de 1972 um protocolo complementar relativo a este acordo.O protocolo complementar, cujo texto acompanha a presente carta, fará parte integrante do Acordo de 22 de Julho de 1972 e entrará em vigor no primeiro dia do segundo mês seguinte à data de notificação do cumprimento dessas formalidades necessárias para esse efeito. Enquanto se aguarda o cumprimento dessas formalidades, o protocolo será aplicado provisoriamente a partir de 1 de Julho de 1997.Muito agradeceria a Vossa Excelência se dignasse confirmar o acordo da Confederação Suíça sobre o que precede.Queira aceitar, Excelentíssimo Senhor, os protestos da minha elevada consideração.Em nome da Comunidade EuropeiaB. Carta da Confederação Suíça Berna, 9 de Junho de 1997Excelentíssimo Senhor,Tenho a honra de acusar a recepção da carta de hoje de Vossa Excelência do seguinte teor:«Tenho a honra de me referir às negociações entre os representantes da Comunidade Europeia e da Confederação Suíça com vista à conclusão de um Acordo sobre assistência administrativa mútua em matéria aduaneira que adita ao Acordo de 22 de Julho de 1972 um protocolo complementar relativo a este acordo.O protocolo complementar, cujo texto acompanha a presente carta, fará parte integrante do Acordo de 22 de Julho de 1972 e entrará em vigor no primeiro dia do segundo mês seguinte à data de notificação do cumprimento de formalidades necessárias para esse efeito. Enquanto se aguarda o cumprimento dessas formalidades, o protocolo será aplicado provisoriamente a partir de 1 de Julho de 1997.Muito agradeceria a Vossa Excelência se dignasse confirmar o acordo da Confederação Suíça sobre o que precede.».Tenho a honra de confirmar o acordo da Confederação Suíça sobre o que precede.Queira aceitar, Excelentíssimo Senhor, os protestos da minha elevada consideração.Pela Confederação SuíçaHecho en Luxemburgo, el nueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y siete.Udfærdiget i Luxembourg den niende juni nitten hundrede og syvoghalvfems.Geschehen zu Luxemburg am neunten Juni neunzehnhundertsiebenundneunzig. ̧ãéíå óôï Ëïõîåìâïýñãï, óôéò åííÝá Éïõíßïõ ÷ßëéá åííéáêüóéá åíåíÞíôá åðôÜ.Done at Luxembourg on the ninth day of June in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven.Fait à Luxembourg, le neuf juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-sept.Fatto a Lussemburgo, addì nove giugno millenovecentonovantasette.Gedaan te Luxemburg, de negende juni negentienhonderd zevenennegentig.Feito no Luxemburgo, em nove de Junho de mil novecentos e noventa e sete.Tehty Luxemburgissa yhdeksäntenä päivänä kesäkuuta vuonna tuhatyhdeksänsataayhdeksänkymmentäseitsemän.Som skedde i Luxemburg den nionde juni nittonhundranittiosju.En nombre de la Comunidad EuropeaPå vegne af Det Europæiske FællesskabIm Namen der Europäischen GemeinschaftÅî ïíüìáôïò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ÊïéíüôçôáòOn behalf of the European CommunityAu nom de la Communauté européenneA nome della Comunità europeaNamens de Europese GemeenschapEm nome da Comunidade EuropeiaEuroopan yhteisön puolestaPå Europeiska gemenskapens vägnar>REFERÊNCIA A UMA IMAGEN>Für die Schweizerische EidgenossenschaftPour la Confédération suissePer la Confederazione svizzera>REFERÊNCIA A UMA IMAGEN>PROTOCOLO ADICIONAL relativo à assistência administrativa mútua em matéria aduaneira Artigo 1o Definições Para efeitos do presente protocolo, entende-se por:a) «Mercadorias», as mercadorias classificadas nos capítulos 1 a 97 do Sistema Harmonizado, independentemente do âmbito de aplicação do Acordo de 22 de Julho de 1972;b) «Legislação aduaneira», as disposições legislativas ou regulamentares, adoptadas pela Comunidade Europeia ou pela Confederação Suíça, que regulam a importação, exportação e trânsito de mercadorias e a sua sujeição a qualquer regime aduaneiro, incluindo as medidas de proibição, restrição e controlo;c) «Autoridade requerente», a autoridade administrativa competente que para o efeito tenha sido designada por uma parte contratante e que apresente um pedido de assistência em matéria aduaneira;d) «Autoridade requerida», a autoridade administrativa competente que para o efeito tenha sido designada por uma parte contratante e que receba um pedido de assistência em matéria aduaneira;e) «Operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira», qualquer violação ou tentativa de violação da legislação aduaneira.Artigo 2o Âmbito 1. As partes contratantes prestar-se-ão assistência mútua, nos domínios da sua competência, segundo as regras e condições previstas no presente protocolo, tendo em vista assegurar a correcta aplicação da legislação aduaneira, nomeadamente pela prevenção, detecção e investigação de operações contrárias a essa legislação.2. A assistência em matéria aduaneira prevista no presente protocolo diz respeito a qualquer autoridade administrativa das partes contratantes competentes para a aplicação do presente protocolo. Essa assistência não obsta à aplicação das disposições que regulam a assistência mútua em questões penais. Não se aplica de igual modo às informações obtidas no âmbito de poderes exercidos a pedido de autoridades judiciais, salvo acordo destas autoridades.Artigo 3o Assistência mediante pedido 1. A pedido da autoridade requerente, a autoridade requerida prestará todos os esclarecimentos úteis para permitir que aquela assegure a correcta aplicação da legislação aduaneira, incluindo os esclarecimentos relativos a operações conhecidas ou previstas que sejam ou possam ser contrárias a essa legislação.2. A pedido da autoridade requerente, a autoridade requerida informá-la-á se as mercadorias exportadas do território de uma das partes contratantes foram correctamente importadas no território da outra parte, especificando, se necessário, o regime aduaneiro a que foram sujeitas.3. A pedido da autoridade requerente, a autoridade requerida tomará, no âmbito da sua legislação, as medidas necessárias para assegurar uma vigilância especial:a) Das pessoas singulares ou colectivas relativamente às quais existam motivos razoáveis para supor que efectuam ou efectuaram operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira;b) Dos locais em que tenham sido armazenadas mercadorias em condições tais que existam motivos para supor que se destinam a ser utilizados em operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira;c) Dos movimentos de mercadorias considerados como podendo ser objecto de operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira;d) Dos meios de transporte em relação aos quais existam motivos razoáveis para supor que foram, são ou podem ser utilizados para efectuar operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira.Artigo 4o Assistência espontânea As partes contratantes prestar-se-ão assistência mútua, por sua própria iniciativa, nos termos da sua respectiva legislação, regulamentação e outros instrumentos legais, se considerarem que tal é necessário para a correcta aplicação da legislação aduaneira, nomeadamente quando obtenham informações relativas a:- operações que sejam ou pareçam contrárias a essa legislação e que se possam revestir de interesse para a outra parte contratante,- novos meios ou métodos utilizados para efectuar essas operações,- mercadorias que se verificou serem objecto de operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira,- pessoas singulares ou colectivas relativamente às quais existam motivos razoáveis para supor que efectuam ou efectuaram operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira,- meios de transporte em relação aos quais existam razoáveis para supor que foram, são ou podem ser utilizados para efectuar operações contrárias à legislação aduaneira.Artigo 5o Comunicação/Notificação A pedido da autoridade requerente, a autoridade requerida tomará, nos termos da sua legislação, todas as medidas necessárias para:- comunicar todos os documentos,- notificar de todas as decisões, bem como qualquer outro acto pertinente que faça parte do procedimento em causa, abrangidos pelo presente protocolo,um destinatário que resida ou esteja estabelecido no seu território. Nesse caso, aplicar-se-á o disposto no no 3 do artigo 6o ao pedido de comunicação ou de notificação.Artigo 6o Forma e conteúdo dos pedidos de assistência 1. Os pedidos apresentados nos termos do presente protocolo devem ser apresentados por escrito. Devem ser apensos ao pedido os documentos considerados necessários para permitir a respectiva execução. Sempre que o carácter urgente da situação o exigir, podem ser aceites pedidos orais, que devem, no entanto, ser imediatamente confirmados por escrito.2. Os pedidos apresentados nos termos do no 1 devem incluir os seguintes elementos:a) A autoridade requerente que apresenta o pedido;b) A medida requerida;c) O objecto e a razão do pedido;d) A legislação, regulamentação e outros instrumentos jurídicos em causa;e) Informações o mais exactas e completas possível sobre as pessoas singulares ou colectivas objecto das investigações;f) Um resumo dos factos pertinentes e dos inquéritos já realizados, com excepção dos casos previstos no artigo 5o3. Os pedidos devem ser apresentados numa língua oficial da autoridade requerida ou numa língua aceite por essa autoridade.4. No caso de um pedido não satisfazer os requisitos formais, pode solicitar-se que seja corrigido ou completado; no entanto, podem ser ordenadas medidas cautelares.Artigo 7o Execução dos pedidos 1. A fim de dar seguimento a um pedido de assistência, a autoridade requerida agirá, no âmbito das sua competência e dos recursos de que dispõe, como se o fizesse por iniciativa própria ou a pedido de outras autoridades dessa parte contratante, prestando as informações de que disponha, efectuando as investigações adequadas ou tomando medidas para que essas investigações sejam efectuadas. Esta disposição aplica-se também ao serviço administrativo ao qual foi dirigido o pedido pela autoridade requerida, sempre que esta última não possa agir por si própria.2. Os pedidos de assistência serão executados de acordo com a legislação, regulamentação e outros instrumentos legais da parte contratante requerida.3. Os funcionários devidamente autorizados de uma parte contratante podem, com o acordo da outra parte contratante em causa e nas condições por ela previstas, obter dos serviços da autoridade requerida, ou de outra autoridade pela qual aquela é responsável, informações relativas a operações contrárias ou que possam ser contrárias à legislação aduaneira de que a autoridade requerente necessite, no âmbito de um inquérito, para efeitos do presente protocolo.4. Os funcionários de uma parte contratante podem, com o acordo da outra parte contratante em causa e nas condições por ela previstas, estar presentes aquando das investigações efectuadas no território desta última.Artigo 8o Forma de comunicação das informações 1. A autoridade requerida comunicará os resultados das investigações à autoridade requerente sob a forma de documentos, cópias autenticadas de documentos, relatórios e outros documentos semelhantes.2. Os documentos previstos no no 1 podem ser substituídos por informações apresentadas em qualquer tipo de suporte informático destinadas ao mesmo efeito.Artigo 9o Derrogações à obrigação de prestar assistência 1. As partes contratantes podem recusar-se a prestar a assistência prevista no presente protocolo, sempre que essa assistência:a) Possa comprometer a soberania da Confederação Suíça ou de um Estado-membro da Comunidade ao qual tenha sido solicitada assistência ao abrigo do presente protocolo;b) Possa comprometer a ordem pública, a segurança pública ou outros interesses fundamentais, designadamente nos casos referidos no no 2 do artigo 10o;c) Envolva regulamentação cambial ou fiscal não aduaneira;d) Viole o sigilo industrial, comercial ou profissional.2. Sempre que a autoridade requerente solicitar assistência que ela própria não poderia prestar se tal lhe fosse solicitado, deve chamar a atenção para esse facto no respectivo pedido. Caberá, então, à autoridade requerida decidir o modo de dar seguimento a esse pedido.3. Se a assistência for recusada, a autoridade requerente deve ser imediatamente notificada da decisão e dos motivos que a justificam.Artigo 10o Confidencialidade 1. As informações comunicadas sob qualquer forma nos termos do presente protocolo têm carácter confidencial ou restrito, consoante as regras aplicáveis em cada parte contratante. Essas informações são abrangidas pela obrigação de sigilo profissional e beneficiam da protecção concedida a informações semelhantes prevista na legislação aplicável na matéria na parte contratante que as recebeu, bem como nas disposições correspondentes aplicáveis às instâncias comunitárias.2. Os dados pessoais, ou seja, todas as informações respeitantes a uma pessoa singular identificada ou identificável, só podem ser transmitidos quando a parte contratante destinatária se comprometer a conceder a esses dados um grau de protecção no mínimo equivalente ao aplicável nesse caso particular pela parte contratante que os comunicou.Artigo 11o Utilização das informações 1. As informações obtidas só devem ser utilizadas para efeitos do presente protocolo. Quando uma parte contratante solicitar a sua utilização para outros fins, deve solicitar previamente por escrito a autorização da autoridade que as forneceu, ficando essa utilização sujeita às restrições impostas por essa autoridade.2. O no 1 não obsta à utilização das informações em acções judiciais ou administrativas posteriormente intentadas por inobservância da legislação aduaneira. A autoridade competente que forneceu as informações será imediatamente notificada dessa utilização.3. As partes contratantes podem utilizar como elemento de prova, nos autos de notícia, relatórios e testemunhos de que disponham, bem como nas acções e acusações deduzidas em tribunal, as informações obtidas e os documentos consultados nos termos do presente protocolo.Artigo 12o Peritos e testemunhas Um funcionário da autoridade requerida pode ser autorizado a comparecer, nos limites da autorização concedida, como perito ou testemunha em acções judiciais ou administrativas, relativas a questões abrangidas pelo presente protocolo, num órgão jurisdicional da outra parte contratante, e a apresentar os objectos, documentos ou respectivas cópias autenticadas eventualmente necessários a essas acções. O pedido de comparência deve indicar especificamente sobre que assunto e a que título ou em que qualidade o funcionário será interrogado.Artigo 13o Despesas de assistência As partes contratantes renunciam a exigir à outra parte o reembolso de despesas efectuadas no âmbito da aplicação do presente protocolo, excepto, se for caso disso, no que se refere a despesas incorridas com peritos e testemunhas, bem como com intérpretes e tradutores que não dependam dos serviços públicos.Artigo 14o Aplicação 1. A aplicação do presente protocolo incumbirá às autoridades aduaneiras da Confederação Suíça, por um lado, e aos serviços competentes da Comissão das Comunidades Europeias e, se for caso disso, às autoridades aduaneiras dos Estados-membros da Comunidade Europeia, por outro. Estas autoridades decidirão de todas as medidas e disposições práticas necessárias para a sua aplicação, tomando devidamente em consideração a regulamentação em matéria de protecção de dados.2. As partes contratantes consultar-se-ão mutuamente e manter-se-ão informadas sobre as normas de execução adoptadas nos termos do presente protocolo. As partes comunicarão, designadamente, a lista das autoridades competentes habilitadas para intervirem a título do presente protocolo.DECLARAÇÃO COMUM As partes acordam em que deve ser criado um grupo de trabalho pelo Comité misto, a fim de o assistir na gestão do protocolo relativo à assistência administrativa mútua.


type: other

text:
Affidamenti in house: le Linee guida ANAC per l'iscrizione nell'elenco previsto dall'art. 192 del Codice dei contratti pubblici | | Promo P.A.
 L’art.192 del D.Lgs. 50/2016 prevede l’istituzione presso l’ANAC dell’elenco delle amministrazioni aggiudicatrici e degli enti aggiudicatori che operano mediante affidamenti diretti nei confronti di proprie società in house, secondo quanto previsto all’art. 5 di tale decreto. L’iscrizione nell’elenco avviene in seguito a domanda presentata dall’amministrazione aggiudicatrice e dopo che sia stata riscontrata l’esistenza dei requisiti richiesti dalla normativa vigente.
 Per tale motivo, il 5 dicembre scorso l’ANAC ha avviato la procedura di consultazione del documento prodromico alla predisposizione delle Linee guida che disciplinano la procedura di iscrizione, i requisiti necessari, le modalità e i criteri per la verifica degli stessi. Il termine per la presentazione delle osservazioni è scaduto il 20/12/2016.
 Una volta che saranno pubblicate le linee guida in forma definitiva, le amministrazioni pubbliche che intendono affidare un servizio direttamente a una società controllata “in house” dovranno preventivamente presentare domanda d’iscrizione al suddetto elenco.
 Il documento in consultazione prevede che vengano forniti all’ANAC non solo gli elementi identificativi degli enti affidanti, ma anche tutti i dati relativi alla società affidataria, compresa la sussistenza dei requisiti in materia di “in house providing” previsti all’art. 16 del D.Lgs 175/2016 e all’art. 5 del D.Lgs. 50/2016.
 In particolare, l’istruttoria dell’ANAC sarà finalizzata ad accertare:
 la sussistenza dei requisiti richiesti dall’art. 5 del Codice dei contratti pubblici e dagli artt. 4 e 16 del D.lgs. 175/2016;
 che la società abbia come oggetto sociale esclusivo una o più delle attività di cui all’art. 4, comma 2, lettere a), b) d) ed e) del D.Lgs. 175/2016 (mediante l’esame dell’atto costitutivo e dello statuto della società);
 la sussistenza in capo all’amministrazione aggiudicatrice di poteri di controllo, di ingerenza e di condizionamento superiori a quelli tipici del diritto societario, previsti in specifiche disposizioni dell’atto costitutivo, dello statuto o di appositi patti parasociali. Il “controllo analogo” dovrà avere ad oggetto sia gli organi che gli atti della società partecipata e dovrà riguardare gli aspetti economici, patrimoniali, finanziari, di qualità dei servizi e della gestione. La sussistenza di tale requisito sarà accertata dall’Autorità attraverso una valutazione complessiva di tutte le circostanze del caso, mediante l’esame degli atti costituitivi, degli statuti e dei patti parasociali. L’onere della prova sarà posto a carico dell’amministrazione aggiudicatrice che, al momento della presentazione della domanda di iscrizione nell’elenco, deve indicare gli elementi da cui si desume la sussistenza del controllo analogo e la relativa documentazione probatoria;
 l’assenza di partecipazione di capitali privati, ad eccezione di quella prescritta da norme di legge, mediante l’esame dell’atto costitutivo della società partecipata;
 che lo statuto della società partecipata preveda che oltre l’80% del proprio fatturato sia effettuato nello svolgimento dei compiti ad essa affidati dall’ente pubblico o dagli enti pubblici soci e che la produzione ulteriore rispetto al suddetto limite di fatturato sia consentita solo a condizione che la stessa permetta di conseguire economie di scala o altri recuperi di efficienza sul complesso dell’attività principale della società.
 La domanda dovrà essere presentata in modalità telematica da soggetti deputati a esprimere all’esterno la volontà dell’amministrazione e, in caso di più soggetti pubblici soci, sarà sufficiente la presentazione di una sola domanda da parte di uno dei soci.
 L’ANAC avrà 90 giorni per completare il procedimento; tuttavia, in fase di prima applicazione, l’Autorità si riserva la possibilità di dare avvio ai procedimenti di verifica del possesso dei requisiti per l’iscrizione nell’elenco con modalità e tempi che saranno resi noti con successive comunicazioni, in modo da consentire lo svolgimento delle attività compatibilmente con le risorse umane e strumentali disponibili.
 Il suddetto termine potrà essere sospeso nel caso di approfondimenti istruttori o richieste di integrazione documentale. La sospensione potrà essere disposta una sola volta e per un periodo che complessivamente non potrà superare i 30 giorni.
 La presentazione della domanda di iscrizione consentirà alle amministrazioni aggiudicatrici di effettuare, sotto la propria responsabilità, gli affidamenti diretti dei contratti alla società “in house”, ancorché il procedimento sia ancora in corso.


type: wikipedia

text:
Graikų mitologijoje, Tichė (sėkmė) Hermio ir Afroditės duktė.
 Tichė buvo globojanti dievybė, kuri valdė fortūną, miestų gerovę ir jų likimą. Helenistiniu periodu dauguma miestų turėjo savitą Tichės ikoninę versiją, dėvinčią karūną, kuri primena sienas supančias miestą.
 Pagal kitus šaltinius minima, kad ji buvo viena iš okeanidžių Okeano ir Tetijos dukterų. Ji buvo siejama su Nemezide ir Agatos Daimonu („geroji dvasia“, žr. Agatodemonas).
 Romėnų mitologijoje Tichės atitikmuo – Fortūna.
 Graikų dievai
 Nimfos
 Laiko ir likimo dievybės


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21996D1114(03)
 Beschluß des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 43/96 vom 28. Juni 1996 über die Änderung des Anhangs XVIII (Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz am Arbeitsplatz, Arbeitsrecht und Gleichbehandlung von Männern und Frauen) des EWR-Abkommens
 Amtsblatt Nr. L 291 vom 14/11/1996 S. 0033 - 0033
 BESCHLUSS DES GEMEINSAMEN EWR-AUSSCHUSSES Nr. 43/96 vom 28. Juni 1996 über die Änderung des Anhangs XVIII (Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz am Arbeitsplatz, Arbeitsrecht und Gleichbehandlung von Männern und Frauen) des EWR-Abkommens DER GEMEINSAME EWR-AUSSCHUSS -gestützt auf das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, geändert durch das Anpassungsprotokoll zum Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, nachstehend "Abkommen" genannt, insbesondere auf Artikel 98,in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:Anhang XVIII des Abkommens wurde durch den Beschluß des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 29/96 vom 26. April 1996 (1) geändert.Die Richtlinie 94/33/EG des Rates vom 22. Juni 1994 über den Jugendarbeitsschutz (2) ist in das Abkommen aufzunehmen -BESCHLIESST:Artikel 1 In Anhang XVIII des Abkommens wird nach Nummer 28 (Richtlinie 93/104/EG des Rates) folgende neue Nummer eingefügt:"29. 394 L 0033: Richtlinie 94/33/EG des Rates vom 22. Juni 1994 über den Jugendarbeitsschutz (ABl. Nr. L 216 vom 20. 8. 1994, S. 12)."Artikel 2 Der Wortlaut der Richtlinie 94/33/EG in isländischer und norwegischer Sprache, der den jeweiligen Sprachfassungen dieses Beschlusses beigefügt ist, ist verbindlich.Artikel 3 Dieser Beschluß tritt am 1. Dezember 1996 in Kraft, sofern dem Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuß alle Mitteilungen nach Artikel 103 Absatz 1 des Abkommens übermittelt worden sind.Artikel 4 Dieser Beschluß wird im EWR-Abschnitt und im EWR-Supplement des Amtsblatts der Europäischen Gemeinschaften veröffentlicht.Brüssel, den 28. Juni 1996Für den Gemeinsamen EWR-AusschußDer VorsitzendeP. BENAVIDES(1) ABl. Nr. L 186 vom 25. 7. 1996, S. 82.(2) ABl. Nr. L 216 vom 20. 8. 1994, S. 12.


type: caselaw

text:
 5.6.2010
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 148/28
 2010 m. balandžio 21 d. Bendrojo Teismo sprendimas byloje Peek & Cloppenburg ir van Graaf prieš VRDT — Queen Sirikit Institute of Sericulture (Thai Silk)
 (Byla T-361/08) (1)
 (Bendrijos prekių ženklas - Protesto procedūra - Vaizdinio Bendrijos prekių ženklo „Thai Silk“ paraiška - Ankstesnis vaizdinis nacionalinis prekių ženklas, vaizduojantis paukštį - Ieškinio priimtinumas - Santykinis atmetimo pagrindas - Galimybė supainioti - Reglamento (EB) Nr. 40/94 8 straipsnio 1 dalies b punktas (dabar — Reglamento (EB) Nr. 207/2009 8 straipsnio 1 dalies b punktas))
 2010/C 148/50
 Proceso kalba: vokiečių
 Šalys
 Ieškovės: Peek & Cloppenburg (Hamburgas, Vokietija) ir van Graaf GmbH & Co. KG (Viena, Austrija), atstovaujamos advokatų V. von Bomhard, A. Renck, T. Dolde ir J. Pause
 Atsakovė: Vidaus rinkos derinimo tarnyba (prekių ženklams ir pramoniniam dizainui), atstovaujama S. Schäffner
 Kita procedūros VRDT Apeliacinėje taryboje šalis, įstojusi į bylą teisme: The Queen Sirikit Institute of Sericulture, Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand (Tailandas) (Bankokas, Tailandas), kuriai leista dalyvauti vietoj Office of the Permanent Secretary, The Prime Minister’s Office, Thailand (Tailandas), atstovaujamas advokato A. Kockläuner
 Dalykas
 Ieškinys, pareikštas dėl 2008 m. birželio 10 d. VRDT ketvirtosios apeliacinės tarybos sprendimo (byla R 1677/2007-4), susijusio su protesto procedūra tarp Peek & Cloppenburg ir Office of the Permanent Secretary, The Prime Minister’s Office, Thailand
 Rezoliucinė dalis
 1.
 Atmesti ieškinį.
 2.
 Priteisti iš Peek & Cloppenburg van Graaf GmbH & Co. KG bylinėjimosi išlaidas.
 (1) OL C 301, 2008 11 22.


text:
Trafarets (no ) jeb agrāk arī stensils () ir plāksnes veida palīgierīce ar izgriezumiem, kuru izmanto liela skaita identisku simbolu (ciparu, burtu, dažādu figūru) uzkrāsošanai uz dažādām virsmām.
 Trafarets ir neliela lapa no caurspīdīgas plēves vai papīra, kurā izgriezti vairāki segmenti, kas veido attēlu. Trafareta izgatavošanā attēls tiek sadalīts segmentos, lai trafarets turētos kopā.
 Pielietojums
 Uz ielas
 Trafaretus izmanto stensils zīmējuma formu piešķiršanai vai ātrai attēla dublēšanai vairākas reizes.
 Trafareti-stensili () pārsvarā sevī ietver kādu jēgu, piemēram "Pilsoņi! Apšaudes gadījumā, šī ielas puse ir īpaši bīstama.", tātad liek aizdomāties, bet grafiti lielākoties vienkārši priecē ar izskatu.
 Lielākoties, šādus trafaretus izgriež ar skalpeli no papīra vai kartona un uzkrāso ar aerosola krāsas baloniņu palīdzību.
 Korporatīvi
 Rūpniecībā un bruņotajos spēkos izmanto liela izmēra trafaretus. Tos izmanto ātrai lielu atzīmju, marķējumu un numerācijas uzkrāsošanai. Trafaretam uzkrāso krāsu ar krāsotāja rullīti 2—3 reizes vai arī to dara automatizēta sistēma.
 Rasēšanā metāliskie vai plastmasas trafareti atvieglo uzrakstu un standarta ģeometrisko figūru rasēšanu.
 Mājās
 Trafaretus izmanto dzīvojamo platību izrotāšanai. Trafareti ir arī bērnu rotaļlietas.
 Cits lietojums
 20. gadsimta 70. un 80. gados ar trafaretu palīdzību zīmēja uzrakstus uz plakātiem. Ir zināmi vairāki speciāli izstrādāti trafaretu burti.
 Trafaretus var izmantot dažādu brīdinājumu un ieteikumu uzkrāsošanai.
 Dažreiz trafaretus izmanto poligrāfijā, piemēram, rotatorā.
 Skatīt arī
 Stensils
 Ārējās saites
 Trafareta izgatavošana mājas apstākļos
 Grafiti


jurisdiction: US

text:
This is the second appeal in this case. The first case is reported in 111 Md. 175. As the record now before us shows that the pleadings are the same and that the plaintiff offered substantially the same evidence to support its case as it did at the former trial, it is unnecessary again to notice the pleadings or to discuss at any great length the plaintiff's evidence. The opinion in the former case, in which the facts relied on by the plaintiff are set out by JUDGE BRISCOE, dispenses with the necessity of re-stating them. We need only say that the evidence in the present record tends to support the declaration, and, therefore, under the principles announced in the first appeal the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, unless there be found in this record some new facts to take the case out of the principle of the former decision. The appellant insists that this record does disclose such facts, and that the legal effect of the new evidence is to bar the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit.
 The record presents for review eight bills of exceptions. Six relate to the ruling of the trial Court on questions of evidence; the seventh to the action of the Court in sustaining the plaintiff's special exceptions to the appellant's eleventh prayer; and the eighth to the action of the Court upon *Page 410
 certain prayers submitted by the parties at the conclusion of the whole case.
 The first and sixth exceptions are abandoned. There was no error in the rulings on the second and third exceptions. In these the Court allowed the plaintiff to prove by James E. Hobbs, the condition of the bridge on the Howard County side just before the railroad began its improvements, and the condition existing at the approach to that bridge after the railroad had finished its work. This evidence bore directly upon one of the material issues raised by the pleadings, to wit, the unsafe condition at that point and who created it, and was properly admitted. The fourth exception was taken to the action of the Court in permitting the plaintiff to prove that it had paid the judgment recovered against it because of the death of Doctor Hill. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff had paid this judgment, and we see no possible reason why it should not have been permitted to prove that fact. In cases of this character it is always competent to prove the earning capacity of the deceased, as reflecting upon the question of damages, and the amount actually earned is always evidence. There was, therefore, no error in the ruling on the fifth exception permitting Mrs. Hill to be examined as to her husband's income from his practice.
 This brings us to the rulings on the prayers wherein the real questions in the case arise. The plaintiff offered four prayers. The Court granted its first and second prayers, rejected its third and granted its fourth prayer as modified. The defendant offered twenty-eight prayers. The Court refused its first, second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth prayers. The Court modified and granted as modified the defendant's fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth and twenty-first prayers, and granted as offered the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth prayers. The legal propositions upon which the appellant *Page 411
 relies for a reversal of the judgment are really presented in its first, second, third, fourth, tenth, eleventh, twenty-second and twenty-seventh prayers.
 The jury were instructed by the plaintiff's first prayer that if they found that the location of the public highway in Howard County as it approaches the County bridge, mentioned in the evidence, was altered by the defendant in making the alterations and improvements to its road bed mentioned in the evidence, and that such change in the location of said highway rendered the approach to said bridge unsafe and dangerous for travel, and should further find that a certain Alexander Scott Hill while approaching said bridge in 1906 and using due care on his part was killed by reason of said unsafe condition of the approach to said bridge, and that the widow of the said Alexander Scott Hill brought suit in the name of the State of Maryland against the County Commissioners for damages suffered by her by the death of the said Alexander Scott Hill, and recovered judgment, and that said judgment had been paid by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover. By its second prayer the jury were told that if they found that the public highway mentioned in the evidence as it approached the bridge over the Patapsco river, at Ilchester, in Howard County, was reasonably safe to all persons travelling thereon while using due care before the defendant re-located its road, and should further find that the defendant in making the changes and relocation of its tracks and railroad bed at Ilchester, as testified to by the witnesses, caused said highway to be so filled in with earth and stone as to make the approach to said bridge no longer reasonably safe for all persons travelling on said highway while using due care, and should find that the defendant negligently permitted the approach to said bridge on said highway to be unsale and unguarded and unprotected, and should find that by reason of this unsafe, unguarded and unprotected condition a certain Alexander Scott Hill, while traveling on said highway and using due care, was killed as *Page 412
 testified to in the evidence, and should further find that his widow a certain Agnes Hill brought suit against the plaintiff in the name of the State of Maryland for her use, and recovered a judgment against the plaintiff for damages suffered and sustained by her, by reason of the death of her husband, and should further find that said judgment had been satisfied and paid by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the verdict of the jury must be for it, although the jury might find that the place where said accident occurred was outside of the travel portion of the County road as it existed prior to the alterations thereof and made therein by the defendant. The plaintiff's fourth prayer is upon the measure of damages. By this prayer the Court limited the amount of recovery to such damages as were sustained by Mrs. Hill as the direct consequence of the death of her husband, not exceeding however the amount paid by the plaintiff on account of the judgment against it offered in evidence and interest on such judgment to the date of payment. This being a suit for indemnity, and the defendant not having been notified of the suit in which the judgment was recovered and requested to come in and defend, and not having participated in that suit, the limitation placed by the Court upon the extent of recovery was proper. The prayer was not seriously objected to by the appellant, nor do we see any reason why upon the facts it should not have been granted. It would certainly not have been proper to have permitted the plaintiff to have profited by the death of Doctor Hill.
 The plaintiff's first and second prayers are identical with those approved in the former case, and were properly granted, unless the new evidence, to which we will presently allude, leads to a different conclusion of law.
 The defendant by its first, second, third and fourth prayers sought to withdraw the case from the jury, and in their support relies upon the additional evidence found in this record, which it is claimed differentiates this from the former *Page 413
 case and makes it the duty of the Court to declare as a matter of law that the plaintiff cannot recover.
 The defendant completed its work at Ilchester in 1903, and according to the evidence of the plaintiff created an unsafe and dangerous condition at the approach to the bridge across the Patapsco river in consequence of which Doctor Hill lost his life on the 22nd of January, 1906. Its evidence tended to prove that the approach to this bridge at the place of the accident was safe before the defendant began its work, and that by reason of certain changes made by it at that point it rendered the place dangerous and that it left it in an unsafe and dangerous condition. The new evidence introduced by the defendant tended to show that the plaintiff first created the dangerous place where Doctor Hill was killed, and that the changes made by the railroad company but slightly increased the existing danger. The jury was properly instructed as to the legal effect of this evidence, the truth of which was denied by the plaintiff, by the ninth prayer granted on behalf of the defendant. That prayer told the jury that they could not find for the plaintiff, unless they found that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company or its servants or agents in making the changes in the approach to the county bridge in question created a condition dangerous to the public travel to those using due care and caution, and should further find that the accident to Doctor Hill was caused by such dangerous condition so created, and that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant or its agents or servants created such a dangerous condition at the approach to said county bridge, and that such dangerous condition so created (if the jury found the same) caused the death of Doctor Hill. This prayer gave the defendant all the benefit on this point to which it was entitled, if the jury found its testimony to be true.
 The other additional evidence is that during the period from 1903, the date when the railroad completed its improvements, *Page 414
 to Doctor Hill's death, in January, 1906, the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the road at the place where the accident occurred and failed to repair it. This evidence is uncontradicted, and the proposition asserted by the appellant is that this actual knowledge and failure to dischargeits duty of repairing the highway, constitute the plaintiff ajoint tort feasor with the defendant with respect to the death of Doctor Hill, and, therefore, there can be no recovery in this case. This is really the only substantial question to be decided, and the briefs of the learned counsel give evidence of much labor and diligent search and examination of the cases bearing upon the question. But we cannot give our assent to the contention of the appellant. In our opinion, the facts do not bring the case within the rule which denies indemnity or contribution among tortfeasors. Actual knowledge and failure of duty are not sufficient to invoke the application of the rule. There must be joint participation in the tort and the parties must be in equal degree guilty in a case of this nature.
 The general rule is that wherever the wrongful act of one person results in liability being imposed on another, the latter may have indemnity from the person actually guilty of the wrong.Pearson v. Skelton, 1 M. W. 504; Wooley v. Batte, 2 C. P. 419; Baily v. Bussing, 22 Conn. 455. This rule is, however, subject to an important qualification or exception, viz, that as between actual tort feasors the law will not enforce contribution or indemnity. This doctrine was first formulated inMerryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, where contribution was denied where it appeared that both parties actually participated in an act of conversion. The general principle is that which allows contribution, and the doctrine of Merryweather v.Nixan, supra, is an exception to the rule, and is limited to cases where the party seeking contribution or indemnity is inpari delicto with the other. The Courts do not favor the extension of this rule, and have shown a decided disposition to confine the exception to cases clearly *Page 415
 falling within it. LORD HERSCHELL, in Palmer v. Wick, etc. (1894), A.C. 318, referred to Merryweather v. Nixan, and said: "It is now too late to question that decision in this country; but when I am asked to hold it to be a part of the law of Scotland, I am bound to say that it does not appear to me to be founded on any principle of justice or equity, or even a public policy which justifies its application to other countries." And in Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. and Els. 57, DENMAN, C.J., said: "The case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, seems to me to be strained beyond what the decision will bear." The cases where municipal corporations have sued the primary wrongdoer and have recovered may be found in the text books and reported cases in great numbers. We have found no case, nor have we been referred to any, in which the right of recovery has been denied under the exceptional rule invoked by the appellant, unless it appeared that as between the corporation and and the author of the wrong the parties were in pari delicto. The rule to be applied to the many conditions of fact arising in such cases is stated as follows, with accuracy and clearness, inGray v. Boston Gas Light Company, 114 Mass. 152: "When two parties, acting together, commit an illegal or wrongful act, the party who is held responsible in damages for the act cannot have indemnity or contribution from the other, because both are equally culpable, or particeps criminis, and the damages result from their joint offense. This rule does not apply when one does the act or creates the nuisance, and the other does not join therein, but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage. He may recover from the party whose wrongful act has thus exposed him. In such case the parties are not in pari delicto as to each other, though as to third persons either may be held liable. The numerous cases in our own reports are analogous, where towns, having been held liable for an unsafe condition of the highway, have recovered from the persons whose acts caused the unsafe condition. The reasons given in these cases are conclusive on this point. In *Page 416 Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Company, 23 Pick. 24, the authorities were fully considered, and upon general principles it was held the town could recover, the parties not being in pari delicto. No distinction is there made, that the liability is cast upon the town by statute, and not by the common law, and no such distinction is noticed in any of the cases which follow it. Lowell v. Short, 4 Cush. 275; Swansey v.Chance, 16 Gray, 303; Milford v. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17;West Boylston v. Mason, 102 Mass. 341. In the last case, it was said the only fault of the town was the failure to remedy a nuisance which the defendant had created. Nor can there be any such distinction in principle. The ground of the action is that the defendant has by his own unauthorized act exposed the plaintiff to a liability, and it is immaterial whether the liability is imposed by force of a statute or by the rule of the common law. In either case the plaintiff is held liable by inference of law, and not by reason of his active participation in the act which was the occasion of the injury. Pearson v.Skelton, 1 M. W. 504. See also Chicago City v. Robins, 2 Blck. 418; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455." 2 Dillon onMunc. Corp., sec. 1035, and cases referred to in note.
 Tested by this rule, we cannot hold upon the evidence in this record as a matter of law that the parties, as between themselves, were equally culpable, or particeps criminis, with respect to the nuisance or dangerous condition of the road which resulted in the death of Doctor Hill. Upon the case made by the plaintiff the road was safe at the time the defendant began work and that the defendant was the sole actual wrongdoer and creator of the dangerous condition in the highway. Of course the plaintiff under the circumstances was greatly negligent in not repairing the road, and was liable for the unfortunate result which followed; but the Court could not say as a matter of law upon the facts before it that it participated with the defendant in the creation of this *Page 417
 dangerous nuisance or that it was equally guilty with it with respect to the consequences which ensued.
 The cases of Hartley v. Mayor, etc., of Rockdale, 2 King's Bench Div. 594, and the City of Galveston v. Gonzales, 6 Texas Civ. App. 538[6 Tex. Civ. App. 538][6 Tex. Civ. App. 538] [6 Tex. Civ. App. 538][6 Tex. Civ. App. 538][6 Tex. Civ. App. 538] [6 Tex. Civ. App. 538], do not support the defendant's position. The first was not an indemnity case, and nothing is there said in conflict with the views we have expressed. In the latter case the evidence showed that the parties jointly participated in the unlawful act, and hence a recovery was denied.
 The defendant's first, second, third and fourth prayers, by which the Court was asked to direct a verdict for the defendant, were properly refused. The defendant's seventh prayer as offered asked the Court to instruct the jury that under the pleadings the jury were not at liberty to consider the abutment or the position of the abutment of the railroad bridge in the county road as mentioned in the evidence as an element or condition rendering the approach to said bridge unsafe or dangerous to public travel. The Court modified this prayer so as to read as follows: "That under the pleadings in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover because of the placing of the abutment of the railroad bridge in the old county road as mentioned in the evidence." It is manifest that the defendant was not injured by the rejection of its seventh prayer, as the one granted gave the defendant all the benefit upon the subject-matter of the prayer to which it was entitled.
 The defendant's eighth prayer was properly rejected. It asked the Court to say that the plaintiff could not recover unless the jury found that the defendant "was solely responsible by its negligence for the accident and death of Dr. Hill." Such a rule as this would prevent a recovery in every indemnity case growing out of negligence, because as to third parties the negligence of the plaintiff is either admitted or established by judgment. For the same reason the tenth. *Page 418
 twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth prayers which embodied the same proposition, were rightly refused.
 As the defendant's sixteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth prayers are based upon theories of the case in conflict with the views we have expressed in discussing the first, second, third and fourth prayers, we approve the action of the trial Court in rejecting them. By the granted ninth prayer, the defendant got the full benefit of the defense it intended to present by its twenty-second prayer, and for this reason it suffered no injury by its rejection.
 The rejection of its eleventh prayer is the only other matter of which the defendant complains. That prayer is here transcribed: "If the jury shall find from the evidence that in 1903, or prior thereto, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company in constructing an overhead railroad crossing at Ilchester changed and diverted the old county road to the location of the present roadway between the railroad's overhead bridge at Ilchester and the Howard County entrance to the county bridge over the Patapsco at Ilchester; and that said new roadway and approaches to the Howard County entrance to said bridge remained, within the knowledge of the County Commissioners of Howard County, in the same condition from 1903, until the happening of the accident resulting in the death of Doctor Hill, and during the said period were used by the traveling public with the knowledge of the said County Commissioners; and shall further find from all the evidence in the case that prior to the happening of the accident resulting in the death of Doctor Hill, the County Commissioners of Howard County had accepted said roadway as changed and diverted by the defendant between the overhead railroad bridge and the entrance to the Howard County side of said bridge over the Patapsco River at Ilchester as the completed part of the public highway in Howard County, if the jury so find, then the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant in this case." *Page 419
 The plaintiff specially excepted to this prayer, first, because, under the pleadings in the case, there was no evidence to show that the defendant accepted said road and the approach to said bridge; and secondly, because there is no evidence in the case legally sufficient to show that the plaintiff accepted the said roadway as changed or diverted by the defendant. The Court sustained this exception.
 The record shows that on the 29th of May, 1906, the parties entered into the following agreement: "Whereas, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, hereafter called the party of the first part, made certain changes in the line of their tracks at Ilchester Station, Maryland, which necessitated certain changes in the wagon roads at that point; and whereas, the necessary changes in the wagon roads at this point have not, up to this time, been properly completed to the satisfaction of the County Commissioners of Howard County. It is hereby agreed that the party of the first part will widen the wagon road, passing under its bridge at Ilchester Station, to a width of thirty feet on top from the north side of the bridge to a distance of 210 feet south. It is further agreed that the County Commissioners will, when this work is completed, give to the party of the first part a formal acceptance, relieving the party of the first part from further expense, in connection with the construction or maintenance of the county roads in that vicinity."
 On the 11th of February, 1908, they entered into another agreement, as follows: "This agreement, made this 11th day of February, in the year 1908, by and between the County Commissioners of Howard County, as the first part, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the second part Witnesseth, that in consideration of the widening of the road way of the first party which runs under the railroad bridge of the second party just East of Ilchester Station, said road way having been widened for a distance 210 feet South of said bridge by the second party, and which widening the first party accepts as being satisfactory, the first party hereby *Page 420
 releases the second party from any further responsibility covering the construction or maintenance of said roadway whatsoever, and agrees that any agreement, either verbally or written, which may have been made in the past and that require the second party to assume any cost of maintenance or construction shall be null and void."
 This first agreement was before the Court in the former case. The record in that case shows that it was offered by the plaintiff and was admitted over the objection of the defendant. It was contended before this Court in that case that the admission of the agreement constituted reversible error. In disposing of the exception the Court said: "While the agreement was subsequent to the alleged negligence of the appellant corporation, and did not reflect light upon the controversy between the parties, its admission did not injure or prejudice the defendant's case." In this case both agreements were offered by the defendant. The reason why neither agreement has anything to do with the subject-matter of the suit is evident from the language employed and the testimony offered by the defendant in relation to them.
 Mr. Hess testified that the part of the county road referred to in the first agreement was under the railroad bridge; that work was done in connection with that agreement about a year afterwards; that the road under the bridge was 21 feet; the 210 feet back was on the Howard County side up to the old station; and that the agreement did not refer to the county road between the railroad bridge and the county bridge. He further testified that the first agreement referred to that part of the road commencing right underneath the railroad bridge, and running 210 feet in Howard County; that it had no relation with the road between the railroad abutment and the county bridge; that the second agreement was made a year afterwards, and related to the same stretch of road from the railroad bridge back into Howard County.
 Both agreements were made after the death of Doctor Hill, and the last one after the judgment against the plaintiff had *Page 421
 been recovered by his widow. The first provided that if the defendant would do certain things, it should be relieved from further expense, "in connection with the construction or maintenance of public roads in that vicinity;" and the second provided that in consideration of the defendant having widened the road under the railroad bridge, the plaintiff released it "from any further responsibility covering the construction or maintenance of said roadway."
 By no fair construction of these agreements, executed under the circumstances mentioned, can it be said that it was intended by the parties to release or affect in any manner the right of recovery on any claim which the plaintiff may have had against the defendant growing out of its prior defaults or negligence. They do not purport to be executed with any such purpose, and to give the agreement such an effect would impute a meaning to the instruments not expressed therein and which the parties evidently never contemplated.
 The nine prayers granted by the Court on behalf of the defendant placed its case fairly before the jury, and gave it the benefit of all the defenses to which it was entitled. Finding no reversible errors in any of the rulings, the judgment will be affirmed.
 Judgment affirmed with costs. *Page 422


type: legislation

text:
 8.8.2014
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 L 235/1
 ROZPORZĄDZENIE WYKONAWCZE KOMISJI (UE) NR 858/2014
 z dnia 4 sierpnia 2014 r.
 dotyczące klasyfikacji niektórych towarów według Nomenklatury scalonej
 KOMISJA EUROPEJSKA,
 uwzględniając Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej,
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie Rady (EWG) nr 2658/87 z dnia 23 lipca 1987 r. w sprawie nomenklatury taryfowej i statystycznej oraz w sprawie wspólnej taryfy celnej (1), w szczególności jego art. 9 ust. 1 lit. a),
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)
 W celu zapewnienia jednolitego stosowania Nomenklatury scalonej, stanowiącej załącznik do rozporządzenia (EWG) nr 2658/87, konieczne jest przyjęcie środków dotyczących klasyfikacji towaru określonego w załączniku do niniejszego rozporządzenia.
 (2)
 Rozporządzeniem (EWG) nr 2658/87 ustanowiono Ogólne reguły interpretacji Nomenklatury scalonej. Reguły te stosuje się także do każdej innej nomenklatury, która jest w całości lub w części oparta na Nomenklaturze scalonej bądź która dodaje do niej jakikolwiek dodatkowy podpodział i która została ustanowiona szczególnymi przepisami unijnymi, w celu stosowania środków taryfowych i innych środków odnoszących się do obrotu towarowego.
 (3)
 Stosownie do wymienionych wyżej ogólnych reguł, towary opisane w kolumnie 1 tabeli zamieszczonej w załączniku należy klasyfikować do kodu CN wskazanego w kolumnie 2, na mocy uzasadnień określonych w kolumnie 3 tej tabeli.
 (4)
 Należy zagwarantować, aby wiążąca informacja taryfowa wydana odnośnie do towarów, o których mowa w niniejszym rozporządzeniu, która nie jest zgodna z niniejszym rozporządzeniem, mogła być nadal przywoływana przez osobę, której udzielono tej informacji, przez pewien okres, zgodnie z art. 12 ust. 6 rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 2913/92 (2). Okres ten powinien wynosić trzy miesiące.
 (5)
 Środki przewidziane w niniejszym rozporządzeniu są zgodne z opinią Komitetu Kodeksu Celnego,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZE ROZPORZĄDZENIE:
 Artykuł 1
 Towar opisany w kolumnie 1 tabeli zamieszczonej w załączniku klasyfikuje się w Nomenklaturze scalonej do kodu CN wskazanego w kolumnie 2 tej tabeli.
 Artykuł 2
 Wiążąca informacja taryfowa, która nie jest zgodna z niniejszym rozporządzeniem, może być nadal przywoływana, zgodnie z art. 12 ust. 6 rozporządzenia (EWG) nr 2913/92, przez okres trzech miesięcy od daty wejścia w życie niniejszego rozporządzenia.
 Artykuł 3
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wchodzi w życie dwudziestego dnia po jego opublikowaniu w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wiąże w całości i jest bezpośrednio stosowane we wszystkich państwach członkowskich.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 4 sierpnia 2014 r.
 W imieniu Komisji,
 za Przewodniczącego,
 Martine REICHERTS
 Członek Komisji
 (1) Dz.U. L 256 z 7.9.1987, s. 1.
 (2) Rozporządzenie Rady (EWG) nr 2913/92 z dnia 12 października 1992 r. ustanawiające Wspólnotowy kodeks celny (Dz.U. L 302 z 19.10.1992, s. 1).
 ZAŁĄCZNIK
 Opis towarów
 Klasyfikacja
 (kod CN)
 Uzasadnienie
 (1)
 (2)
 (3)
 Artykuł (tzw. ręczna ostrzarka do noży) o wymiarach w przybliżeniu 27 × 14 × 19 cm, składa się z uchwytu oraz podparcia zawierającego dwuetapowy (ostrzenia i polerowania) system rozdrabniania z diamentowych materiałów ściernych o wielkości mikronów.
 Zob. ilustracja (1).
 8205 51 00
 Klasyfikacja wyznaczona jest przez reguły 1 i 6 Ogólnych reguł interpretacji Nomenklatury scalonej oraz brzmienia kodów CN 8205 i 8205 51 00.
 Biorąc pod uwagę jego cechy charakterystyczne, artykuł przeznaczony jest do użytku domowego do ręcznego ostrzenia noży i ostrzy. Nawet jeśli artykuł ten przeznaczony jest do stosowania na płaskiej powierzchni, może być tylko w pełni sprawny, kiedy jest trzymany w ręku. W związku z tym klasyfikacja do pozycji 8205 jako narzędzia ręczne jest uzasadniona.
 Zatem zestaw należy klasyfikować do kodu CN 8205 51 00 jako narzędzia ręczne.
 (1) Ilustracja ma charakter wyłącznie informacyjny.


text:
 1.8.2009
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 180/28
 2009 m. gegužės 8 d. pareikštas ieškinys byloje Europos Bendrijų Komisija prieš Italijos Respubliką
 (Byla C-164/09)
 2009/C 180/48
 Proceso kalba: italų
 Šalys
 Ieškovė: Europos Bendrijų Komisija, atstovaujama C. Zadra ir D. Recchia
 Atsakovė: Italijos Respublika
 Ieškovės reikalavimai
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 Pripažinti, kad Veneto regionui priėmus ir taikant Direktyvos 79/409/EEB (1) 9 straipsnyje numatytų sąlygų neatitinkančias taisykles, susijusias su nuostatomis, kuriomis leidžiama nukrypti nuo laukinių paukščių apsaugos sistemos, Italijos Respublika neįvykdė įsipareigojimų pagal Direktyvos 79/409 9 straipsnį.
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 Priteisti iš Italijos Respublikos bylinėjimosi išlaidas.
 Ieškinio pagrindai ir pagrindiniai argumentai
 Komisija tvirtina, kad Veneto regiono priimtos teisės nuostatos neatitinka Direktyvos 79/409 9 straipsnyje nustatytų reikalavimų.
 2005 m. Įstatymu Nr. 13, galiojusiu baigiantis pagrįstoje nuomonėje nurodytam terminui, nesilaikyta direktyvos 9 straipsnio reikalavimų, nes jame
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 rūšys ir kiekiai, kurių atžvilgiu numatytos nukrypti leidžiančios nuostatos, nurodyti bendrai ir abstrakčiai, neapibrėžiant jokio šių nuostatų taikymo laikotarpio;
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 konkrečioms paukščių rūšims taikomos išimtys numatytos nediferencijuojant, bendrai nurodant visus 9 straipsnio a ir c punktuose numatytus atvejus ir nepateikiant tinkamų konkrečių motyvų;
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 nenumatytas nei reikalavimas įsitikinti, kad nėra jokių kitų tinkamų alternatyvų, nei reikalavimas individualiose nukrypti leidžiančiose priemonėse būtinai nurodyti rizikos sąlygas, vietos aplinkybes ir teisę taikyti nukrypti leidžiančias nuostatas turinčius subjektus;
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 leidžiama nedidelius kiekius apibrėžti be tinkamo mokslinio pagrindimo.
 Komisija tvirtina, kad pasibaigus pagrįstoje nuomonėje nurodytam terminui priimti teisės aktai ne tik nepašalino išdėstytų trūkumų, bet juos iš esmės pakartojo. Ji konkrečiai nurodo 2006 m. birželio 20 d. Regiono tarybos pirmininko dekretą Nr. 140, 2006 m. spalio 18 d. Regiono tarybos pirmininko dekretą Nr. 230, 2007 m. rugpjūčio 16 d Regiono įstatymą Nr. 24, 2007 m. rugsėjo 4 d. Regiono tarybos pirmininko dekretą Nr. 167 ir 2008 m. rugpjūčio 14 d. Regiono įstatymą Nr. 13.
 (1) 1979 m. balandžio 2 d. Tarybos direktyva 79/409/EEB dėl laukinių paukščių apsaugos, OL L 103, p. 1; 2004 m. specialus leidimas lietuvių k., 15 sk., 1 t., p. 98.


text:
France, Conseil d'État, 1 / 4 ssr, 06 octobre 1999, 203343
 Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche France, Conseil d'État, 1 / 4 ssr, 06 octobre 1999, 203343
 Sens de l'arrêt : Annulation rejetType d'affaire : AdministrativeType de recours : Recours pour excès de pouvoirNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 203343Numéro NOR : CETATEXT000008082953 Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;fr;conseil.etat;arret;1999-10-06;203343 Analyses : DROITS CIVILS ET INDIVIDUELS - LIBERTES PUBLIQUES - DROITS DE LA PERSONNE - Droit au respect de la vie privée et obligation de communauté de vie des époux (articles 9 et 215 du code civil) - Méconnaissance - Absence - Mesure de reconduite à la frontière prise dans le respect des dispositions qui la régissent.26-03-11, 335-03-02 Si l'arrêté ordonnant la reconduite à la frontière d'un étranger est susceptible d'avoir une incidence aussi bien sur le droit au respect de sa vie privée, garanti par l'article 9 du code civil, que sur les conditions dans lesquelles s'exerce l'obligation de communauté de vie à laquelle l'article 215 du code civil astreint les époux, l'atteinte qui pourrait être portée à ces dispositions législatives trouve son fondement dans la nature même de la procédure de reconduite à la frontière, également prévue par le législateur, qui est de permettre, dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public et sous les conditions fixées par les dispositions qui la régissent, l'éloignement du territoire français de ceux des ressortissants étrangers auxquels l'autorité publique refuse l'admission au séjour. Dès lors que la mesure de reconduite a été prise dans le respect des exigences ainsi définies, l'intéressé ne saurait valablement soutenir qu'elle méconnaîtrait les dispositions des articles 9 et 215 du code civil.ETRANGERS - RECONDUITE A LA FRONTIERE - LEGALITE INTERNE - Mesure de reconduite à la frontière prise dans le respect des dispositions qui la régissent - Méconnaissance des articles 9 et 215 du code civil relatifs au droit au respect de la vie privée et à l'obligation de communauté de vie des époux - Absence.Texte : Vu la requête, enregistrée le 7 janvier 1999 au secrétariat du contentieux du Conseil d'Etat, présentée par le PREFET DE L'ESSONNE ; le PREFET DE L'ESSONNE demande au Conseil d'Etat :
 1°) d'annuler le jugement du 26 novembre 1998 par lequel le conseiller délégué par le président du tribunal administratif de Versailles a annulé l'arrêté du 18 novembre 1998 ordonnant la reconduite à la frontière de M. Mohammed X... ;
 - les conclusions de Mme Maugüé, Commissaire du gouvernement ;Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 22 de l'ordonnance du 2 novembre 1945 modifiée : "I. Le représentant de l'Etat dans le département et, à Paris, le préfet de police, peuvent, par arrêté motivé, décider qu'un étranger sera reconduit à la frontière ( ...) 3° Si l'étranger, auquel la délivrance ou le renouvellement d'un titre de séjour temporaire a été refusé, s'est maintenu sur le territoire au-delà du délai d'un mois à compter de la date de notification ou de refus ou du retrait" ;
 Considérant qu'il est constant que M. Mohammed X..., de nationalité algérienne, s'est maintenu sur le territoire français plus d'un mois à compter du 19 février 1998, date à laquelle il a reçu notification de la décision du 13 février 1998 par laquelle le PREFET DE L'ESSONNE a refusé de lui délivrer un titre de séjour ; qu'ainsi, il se trouvait dans le champ d'application des dispositions précitées ;
 Considérant que M. X... fait valoir qu'il s'est marié le 11 avril 1998 avec une ressortissante française avec laquelle il vivait en concubinage depuis mars 1994 ; qu'il est constant que ce mariage datait de moins d'un an lorsque l'arrêté ordonnant sa reconduite à la frontière a été pris ; qu'il ressort des pièces du dossier que, compte tenu de la durée et des conditions de séjour en France de M. X..., qui s'est maintenu irrégulièrement sur le territoire depuis 1993, l'arrêté en date du 18 novembre 1998 n'a pas porté au respect dû à sa vie familiale une atteinte disproportionnée aux buts en vue desquels il a été pris et n'a donc pas méconnu les stipulations de l'article 8 de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales ; qu'ainsi, le PREFET DE L'ESSONNE est fondé à soutenir que c'est à tort que le conseiller délégué par le président du tribunal administratif de Versailles s'est fondé sur ce motif pour annuler l'arrêté du 18 novembre 1998 ordonnant la reconduite à la frontière de M. X... ;
 Considérant qu'il appartient au Conseil d'Etat, saisi de l'ensemble du litige par l'effet dévolutif de l'appel, d'examiner les autres moyens présentées par M. X... devant le tribunal administratif ;
 Considérant que, si M. X... soutient que l'arrêté du 18 novembre 1998 serait entaché d'une erreur manifeste d'appréciation, il n'apporte à l'appui de ce moyen aucune précision permettant d'en apprécier le bien-fondé ;
 Considérant que M. X... ne peut utilement soutenir à l'encontre de l'arrêté ordonnant sa reconduite à la frontière que cette décision porterait atteinte à la liberté d'aller etvenir de son épouse ;Considérant, enfin, que, si l'arrêté ordonnant la reconduite à la fontière de l'intéressé est susceptible d'avoir une incidence aussi bien sur le droit au respect de sa vie privée, lequel est garanti par l'article 9 du code civil, que sur les conditions dans lesquelles s'exerce l'obligation de communauté de vie à laquelle l'article 215 du code civil astreint les époux, l'atteinte qui pourrait être portée à ces dispositions législatives trouve son fondement dans la nature même de la procédure de reconduite à la frontière, également prévue par le législateur, et qui est de permettre, dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public et sous les conditions fixées par les dispositions qui la régissent, l'éloignement du territoire français de ceux des ressortissants étrangers auxquels l'autorité publique refuse l'admission au séjour ; que, dès lors que la mesure de reconduite à la frontière le concernant a été prise dans le respect des exigences ainsi définies, l'intéressé ne saurait valablement soutenir qu'elle méconnaîtrait les dispositions des articles 9 et 215 du code civil ;
 Considérant qu'il résulte de tout ce qui précède que le PREFET DE L'ESSONNE est fondé à soutenir que c'est à tort que, par le jugement attaqué, le conseiller délégué par le président du tribunal administratif de Versailles a annulé l'arrêté du 18 novembre 1998 ordonnant la reconduite à la frontière de M. X... ;
 Article 1er : Le jugement du conseiller délégué par le président du tribunal administratif de Versailles du 26 novembre 1998 est annulé.
 Articlle 3 : La présente décision sera notifiée au PREFET DE L'ESSONNE, à M. Mohammed X... et au ministre de l'intérieur.Références : Arrêté 1998-11-18Code civil 9, 215Loi 91-647 1991-07-10 art. 75Ordonnance 45-2658 1945-11-02 art. 22Publications :Proposition de citation: CE, 06 octobre 1999, n° 203343Mentionné aux tables du recueil LebonTélécharger au format RTFComposition du Tribunal :Président : M. GenevoisRapporteur : M. DonnatRapporteur public : Mme MaugüéOrigine de la décision Pays : FranceJuridiction : Conseil d'ÉtatFormation : 1 / 4 ssrDate de la décision : 06/10/1999Fonds documentaire : Legifrance Haut de page


text:
Alempois oli muinasaja lõpul praegusel Eestil alal eksisteerinud ühest muinaskihelkonnast koosnenud väikemaakond, üks nn Kesk-Eesti väikemaakondadest.
 Ajalooallikates esinevad nimekujud Alumbus (1224), Alenboys (1232), Alempos (1241), Alembeys (1251), Alempois (1282). Matthias Johann Eiseni arvates tulenes maakonna nimi sõnadest alembus, alemmus 'alamal olev maa'. August Osvald Westrèn-Doll on nimekuju Alenboys põhjal järeldanud, et nimi on olnud kahesõnaline ja b-le eelnev n on muutunud m-iks. Alates Westrèn-Dollist on oletatud, et nime algusosa pärineb sõnast alo (soome keeles alho) 'soo'. Nime tagumist osa on Villem Reiman tõlgendanud kui -poolse. Wolfgang Heinrich Julius Schlüter ja Westrèn-Doll on selle algupäraks pidanud -põhise (sõnast põhi:põhja 'maapind').
 Alempois paiknes peamiselt hilisema Türi kirikukihelkonna maadel, hõlmates ida pool ka hilisema Paide kirikukihelkonna lääneosa. Samuti on oletatud edelas asunud hilisema Vändra kirikukihelkonna ala kuulumist Alempoisi juurde, ehkki selle staatus on ebaselgem. Kultuuriliselt ja keeleliselt on Vändra ümbrus pigem olnud lähemal Lääne-Eesti rahvastikule. Vändra piirkond, mis oli kuni 16. sajandi keskpaigani hõredalt asustatud ja mida lahutasid naaberaladest suured sood, rabad ja metsad, ei pruukinud olla seotud ühegi kihelkonnaga ega moodustada ka ise selget territoriaalset piirkonda. Alempoisi ja Järvamaa vaheline piir kulges arvatavasti Paide juurest, kuhu põhja poolt ulatub soine vöönd. On oletatud, et seal Pärnu jõkke suubuv Järvajõgi oli piirijõeks ja et kahe maakonna piiril, Paide Vallimäel, asus linnus, mis võiks näidata maakondadevahelise liidu olemasolu.
 Alempoisi asustus oli koondunud eelkõige Türi väikevoorestiku alale, Türi-Alliku-Kirna-Poaka-Väätsa piirkonda. Maakonna põhjaosas oli asustuskeskus Lõõla-Vissuvere ümbruses. Alempoisi põllumajandusliku maa suurus oli Taani hindamisraamatu kohaselt 400 adramaad. Arvatakse, et adramaade arv vastas üldjoontes ka majapidamiste arvule ja et igas majapidamises elas keskmiselt 6–9 inimest.
 Keskmisel rauaajal ja noorema rauaaja algupoole oli Alempoisi alal kasutusel Vändra lähistel paiknenud Mädara linnus (juhul kui see piirkond kuulus Alempoisi). Maakonna põhjaosas, Kuimetsale ja Keavale suunduvate teede ristis Vahastul asus oletatavalt Vahastu muinaslinnus, mis on aga täpsemalt dateerimata. Mingi keskus võis olla ka Türil hilisema kihelkonnakiriku asupaigas.
 Pärast Liivimaa ristisõda kuulus Türi kihelkonna ala aastani 1560 Viljandi komtuurkonda, pärast seda liideti Järva foogtkonnaga.
 Viited
 Eesti muinasmaakonnad
 Eesti muinaskihelkonnad


text:
 28.8.2010
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 C 234/4
 Arrêt de la Cour (troisième chambre) du 1 juillet 2010 (demande de décision préjudicielle du Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Autriche) — Susanne Gassmayr/Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und Forschung
 (Affaire C-194/08) (1)
 (Politique sociale - Directive 92/85/CEE - Mise en œuvre des mesures visant à promouvoir l’amélioration de la sécurité et de la santé des travailleuses enceintes, accouchées ou allaitantes au travail - Articles 5, paragraphe 3, et 11, points 1 à 3 - Effet direct - Travailleuse enceinte dispensée de travailler pendant sa grossesse - Travailleuse en congé de maternité - Droit au paiement d’une indemnité pour astreinte sur le lieu de travail)
 2010/C 234/06
 Langue de procédure: l'allemand
 Juridiction de renvoi
 Verwaltungsgerichtshof
 Parties dans la procédure au principal
 Partie requérante: Susanne Gassmayr
 Partie défenderesse: Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und Forschung
 Objet
 Demande de décision préjudicielle — Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Interprétation de l'art. 11, points 1, 2 et 3, de la directive 92/85/CEE du Conseil, du 19 octobre 1992, concernant la mise en oeuvre de mesures visant à promouvoir l'amélioration de la sécurité et de la santé des travailleuses enceintes, accouchées ou allaitantes au travail (JO L 348, p. 1) — Effet direct — Droit d'une travailleuse au paiement, pendant la période d'interdiction d'emploi des travailleuses enceintes et/ou pendant le congé de maternité, d'une prime non forfaitaire pour l'assurance du service de permanence en dehors des heures de travail normales («Journaldienstzulage»)
 Dispositif
 1)
 L’article 11, points 1 à 3, de la directive 92/85/CEE du Conseil, du 19 octobre 1992, concernant la mise en œuvre de mesures visant à promouvoir l’amélioration de la sécurité et de la santé des travailleuses enceintes, accouchées ou allaitantes au travail (dixième directive particulière au sens de l’article 16 paragraphe 1 de la directive 89/391/CEE), a un effet direct et engendre, au profit des particuliers, des droits que ceux-ci peuvent faire valoir à l’encontre d’un État membre qui n’a pas transposé cette directive en droit national ou qui l’a transposée de manière incorrecte, droits que les juridictions nationales sont tenues de sauvegarder.
 2)
 L’article 11, point 1, de la directive 92/85 doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale prévoyant qu’une travailleuse enceinte dispensée provisoirement de travailler en raison de sa grossesse a droit à une rémunération équivalente au salaire moyen qu’elle a perçu au cours d’une période de référence antérieure au début de sa grossesse, à l’exclusion de l’indemnité pour astreinte sur le lieu de travail.
 3)
 L’article 11, points 2 et 3, de la directive 92/85 doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale prévoyant qu’une travailleuse en congé de maternité a droit à une rémunération équivalente au salaire moyen qu’elle a perçu au cours d’une période de référence antérieure au début dudit congé, à l’exclusion de l’indemnité pour astreinte sur le lieu de travail.
 (1) JO C 197 du 02.08.2008


text:
Scoláire agus scríbhneoir Éireannach é Brian Ó Catháin. Léachtóir le Nua‐Ghaeilge in Ollscoil na hÉireann, Má Nuad is ea é. Tá go leor taighde déanta aige maidir leis an gcanúneolaíocht, leis an sochtheangeolaíocht agus leis an mbéaloideas. Is mór an díol suime dó Gaeilge Inis Oírr. Tá go leor scríofa aige. Ba iad Brian Ó Catháin agus Ruairí Uí Uiginn comheagarthóirí Béalra: aistí ar theangeolaíocht na Gaeilge (Má Nuad 2001).
 Naisc sheachtracha
 Béalra: aistí ar theangeolaíocht na Gaeilge
 Catháin, Brian Ó
 Catháin, Brian Ó