type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21995D1230(09)
 Decision No 6/95 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 20 December 1995 on the transitional measures to be applied from 1 January 1996
 Official Journal L 327 , 30/12/1995 P. 0032 - 0032
 DECISION No 6/95 OF THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS of 20 December 1995 on the transitional measures to be applied from 1 January 1996 (95/584/EC)THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,Having regard to the Fourth ACP-EC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989, hereinafter referred to as 'the Convention`, and in particular Article 366 (1) and (2) thereof,Whereas the said Convention was concluded for a period of ten years, starting from 1 March 1990; whereas, however, provision was made for amending it through a mid-term review;Whereas, in application of that provision, an Agreement amending the said Convention was signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995;Whereas transitional measures applicable until the entry into force of the said Agreement should be adopted in order to give effect in advance to some of these amendments to the Convention,HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:Article 1The following provisions of the Agreement amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention shall be applied in advance from 1 January 1996:(a) the general provisions on ACP-EC cooperation, namely those concerning the objectives, principles and institutions of cooperation in Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Part One;(b) the provisions on the areas of cooperation in Part Two;(c) the provisions on trade cooperation in Title I of Part Three;(d) the provisions on the stabilization of export earnings in Chapter 1 of Title II of Part Three, and in Annex XLVI;(e) the provisions on programming in Articles 281, 282, 283 and 284;(f) Article 364 on the accession of South Africa;(g) Article 364a on the accession of Somalia;(h) Article 366a on the procedures to be set in train in the case of a violation of an essential element of the Convention;(i) the provisions on the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation in Protocol 1 and relevant annexes, taking into account the amendments to the tariff nomenclature applicable from 1 January 1996;(j) the provisions on beef and veal in Protocol 7;(k) the provisions on the sustainable management of forest resources in Protocol 10.Article 2The ACP States, the Member States of the Community and the Community shall each take whatever measures are necessary to implement this Decision.Article 3The implementation of financial and technical cooperation under the first Financial Protocol to the Fourth ACP-EC Convention shall continue to be governed by the conditions laid down in the Convention prior to its revision.Implementation of the system for stabilizing export earnings in respect of the 1994 application year and previous application years under the first Financial Protocol to the Fourth ACP-EC Convention shall continue to be governed by the conditions laid down in the Convention prior to its revision.Article 4This Decision shall enter into force on 1 January 1996.It shall apply until the entry into force of the new provisions governing these areas.However, it shall continue to apply after this date to signatories to the revised Convention which have not yet lodged their instruments of ratification on that date until such time as the revised Convention becomes applicable to them by virtue of Article 360 (3) thereof.Done at Brussels, 20 December 1995.For the ACP-EC Council of MinistersThe PresidentJ. L. DICENTA BALLESTER


type: wikipedia

text:
All About Trans (Todo Sobre las Personas Trans) es un proyecto que tiene como objetivo mejorar la forma en que los medios entienden y retratan a las personas transgénero. Su objetivo es "promover las voces trans en los medios" e involucrar a periodistas, presentadores/as y editores/as y otros profesionales del sector con temas trans de manera creativa.
 El proyecto está gestionado por On Road Media, una organización benéfica que "aborda los problemas sociales mejorando la cobertura mediática de grupos y temas tergiversados". All About Trans cuenta con el apoyo y la dirección de un grupo asesor formado por personas y organizaciones de la comunidad trans y consultores, entre ellos la periodista Paris Lees, el cineasta Fox Fisher y la piloto Ayla Holdom.
 Está financiado y apoyado por la Fundación Esmée Fairbairn y la Fundación Paul Hamlyn. Los patrocinadores anteriores incluyen la BBC y Channel 4.
 Historia
 All About Trans, originalmente llamado Trans Media Action, comenzó en octubre de 2011. Fue impulsado por la directora de On Road, Nathalie McDermott, al presenciar la muerte de la abogada de derechos humanos y mujer trans Sonia Burgess, al ser empujada desde una plataforma en la estación de tren Kings Cross de Londres en hora punta. La subsiguiente cobertura mediática de su muerte alertó a On Road sobre el terrible trato que reciben las personas trans en los medios. Al darse cuenta de la escasa cobertura de temas sobre personas transgénero, McDermott se acercó a los miembros de la organización voluntaria de supervisión Trans Media Watch, una organización benéfica enfocada a cambiar y mejorar la representación y la manera de informar en los medios sobre las personas trans.
 Actividades
 Interacciones
 All About Trans establece interacciones entre profesionales de los medios y personas trans y no binarias. Una interacción es un encuentro social distendido entre profesionales senior del sector y alguien que comparte sus experiencias personales. Están diseñadas para fomentar una mayor comprensión de la comunidad, lo que lleva a representaciones mejores y más empáticas de las personas trans en los medios.
 A la altura de 2015, All About Trans había trabajado ya con más de 200 personas trans y variantes de género de todas las edades y con más de 350 profesionales de diversas organizaciones y medios en todo el Reino Unido. Esta lista incluye a The Observer, The Independent, The Sun, Daily Mail, Channel 4, la BBC, la Press Complaints Commission y la Asociación de la Prensa. Más recientemente, All About Trans se ha reunido con el New Statesman, y The Mail on Sunday.
 Campamento Trans
 Trans Camp (Campamento Trans) se celebró en enero de 2012. La jornada se dedicó a explorar soluciones creativas a los principales obstáculos en la representación de los medios de comunicación de esta comunidad, a menudo distorsionada e incomprendida.
 Realizado en Channel 4, Trans Camp reunió a más de 60 innovadores, desarrolladores, empresarios, diseñadores, profesionales de los medios y personas trans de diversos orígenes para generar ideas para abordar cómo los medios retratan a las personas trans.
 Logros
 Hollyoaks
 All About Trans se ha reunido más de una vez con el equipo de la teleserie Hollyoaks. Tras una gran interacción en 2014, el elenco y el equipo pidieron a los miembros de la comunidad trans que los asesoraran en su trama sobre los personajes de Blessing y Dennis. All About Trans los apoyó con talleres de reparto, lo que llevó a una nueva trama en 2015 con el nuevo personaje de la señora St. Claire, interpretado por Annie Wallace. El cineasta Lewis Hancox produjo dos vídeos entre bastidores sobre experiencias trans para el sitio web de Channel 4. Paris Lees hizo un cameo junto al personaje de Blessing en noviembre de 2014.
 Negociaciones de prensa de la Dra. Kate Stone
 Sarah Lennox, asesora de All About Trans, trabajó con la Dra. Kate Stone en una negociación con la Press Complaints Commission (ahora Independent Press Standards Organization) y varios periódicos importantes del Reino Unido en 2014. Sucedió después de que se revelara su condición trans en diversos artículos, en los que se utilizaban términos como "cambio de sexo". Seis diarios enmendaron sus artículos y aceptaron que infringían la Cláusula 12 del Código de Buenas Prácticas del Editor de la Press Complaints Commission (PCC). Estos fueron el Daily Mirror, la edición escocesa de The Sun, el Daily Record, el Daily Mail y The Daily Telegraph. Las declaraciones de cada periódico fueron recogidas por la PCC.
 Yvonne Roberts describió los antecedentes y el contexto de la negociación de Stone en The Observer, mientras que la historia fue recogida por varios medios de comunicación, como BBC News, Press Gazette, The Guardian, el programa de Radio 4 The Media Show y Channel 4 News.
 Chico conoce a chica
 Uno de los resultados de Trans Camp fue el Trans Comedy Award. Este concepto fue desarrollado durante el día por los participantes, algunos de los cuales trabajaron en asociación con la Sala de Redacción de la BBC en una nueva iniciativa para fomentar representaciones sensibles y precisas de personajes trans en guiones de comedia. El guion ganador, Boy Meets Girl (Chico conoce a chica), escrito por Elliott Kerrigan, fue convertido en un episodio piloto realizado por Tiger Aspect y encargado por el canal BBC Two en el verano de 2014. Antes de su lanzamiento en televisión, fue uno de los cuatro episodios pilotos que se exhibieron en el Festival de Comedia de Salford. Posteriormene, se transmitió en BBC Two, el jueves 3 de septiembre de 2015.
 Boy Meets Girl estaba formado por seis episodios de 30 minutos; se emitió en BBC Two del 3 de septiembre al 10 de octubre de 2015. Estaba ambientada en Newcastle y protagonizada por Rebecca Root como Judy y Harry Hepple como Leo. Tanto Root como su personaje Judy son transgénero, siendo la primera comedia de la BBC con un personaje transgénero en un papel principal, además de la primera comedia de situación que presenta a una actriz transgénero interpretando a un personaje transgénero. La serie se centraba en la relación de Judy y Leo, la diferencia de edad entre los dos y sus "familias entrañablemente excéntricas".
 En los Premios Stonewall de 2015, el programa recibió el Premio Trans Media por llevar temas trans a la televisión británica en horario de máxima audiencia. Elliot Kerrigan ganó un Premio Estrella Emergente de la Royal Television Society por Boy Meets Girl en febrero de 2016. Rebecca Root recibió el premio Breakthrough Performance Award en los Attitude Awards en octubre de 2015 por su papel en esta serie.
 En octubre de 2015, se anunció que Boy Meets Girl regresaría para una segunda temporada. Consistió en seis episodios, emitidos del 6 de julio al 4 de agosto de 2016. Rebecca Root, que interpreta el papel de Judy, se ha convertido desde entonces en patrocinadora de All About Trans.
 Mi historia trans / Patchwork: personas reales
 Patchwork: Real People es el proyecto paralelo de narración digital de All About Trans. Se trata de una colección de historias en medios digitales de personas trans de todo el Reino Unido. Todas ellas se centran en los temas de "apoyo" y "celebración".
 En diciembre de 2013, All About Trans se unió a Lucky Tooth Films (con su proyecto paralelo My Genderation) para crear una colección de películas con el apoyo de Channel 4. A lo largo del año siguiente, Fox Fisher y Lewis Hancox filmaron con 25 personas trans y variantes de género de todo el Reino Unido. Cada cortometraje documental presenta a una persona trans que habla sobre su vida, sus experiencias, pasiones y esperanzas.
 Los cortos fueron producidos por All About Trans y estuvieron disponibles bajo el título 'My Trans Story' en octubre de 2015 en All Four, el servicio bajo demanda de Channel 4, y 'Am I Normal', el proyecto de Channel 4 que explora la idea de que no existe la "no normalidad" a través de películas, clips y consejos.
 Personajes de telenovelas transgénero
 A All About Trans se le atribuye la introducción en 2015 de dos nuevos personajes transgénero interpretados por personas transgénero en las telenovelas británicas, tras las interacciones mantenidas con los guionistas de ambas. Hollyoaks incorporó a la 'señora Sally St. Claire', interpretada por la actriz transgénero Annie Wallace. EastEnders presentó a 'Kyle', el hermano de 'Stacey Branning', interpretado por la actriz transgénero Riley Carter Millington. Este mérito se vio reforzado por el hecho de que Riley Carter Millington encabezara la Lista Arcoíris de The Independent On Sunday en 2015. El artículo principal que acompañaba al anuncio afirmaba que "el mar de cambios en la representación de las personas transgénero en los medios [fue] resultado de la incansable campaña de grupos como All About Trans".
 Yo soy Leo
 Después de la interacción de All About Trans con CBBC, se rodó I Am Leo, un documental ganador del BAFTA centrado en un niño trans llamado Leo.
 Proyecto de escucha
 En 2015, cuatro voluntarios trabajaron con All About Trans y BBC Radio 4 para grabar varios clips para Listening Project (Proyecto de Escucha) y la Biblioteca Británica. El primero de ellos se emitió en BBC Radio 4 los días 18 y 22 de noviembre. Paris Lees también presentó tres documentales de BBC Radio 1 después de la reunión de All About Trans con el editor comisionado de la emisora, Piers Bradford. Los documentales se titularon Staying Out, My Transgender Punk Rock Story y The Hate Debate.
 Infografía para medios
 La voluntaria y artista Sophie Green trabajó con All About Trans junto con Robin Esser, editora jefe del Daily Mail, y All About Trans Advisory Group para crear una infografía que brinde consejos a los profesionales de los medios al escribir sobre temas trans. Esta infografía ha sido difundida y mencionada en los principales medios de comunicación.
 Prensa
 Sobre el trabajo de All About Trans han escrito periodistas como Cathy Newman, Radhika Sanghani y Owen Jones. Sus artículos y los de otros periodistas se han publicado en periódicos y medios de comunicación como el Bournemouth Echo y el Glasgow Herald. Paris Lees también escribe para diversos medios que se reunieron con All About Trans, entre ellos The Guardian y The Telegraph.
 Algunos participantes de All About Trans han escrito o sido blogueros para el Glasgow Herald, el Dorset Echo, y The Observer después de celebrar interacciones con esos periódicos.
 Referencias
 Enlaces externos
 Transgénero
 LGBT en 2011


text:
Irina Lenskiy (; born 12 June 1971) is a Ukrainian-born Israeli athlete who specializes in the 100 metres hurdles.
 Personal life
 She is of Jewish background, and was a Ukrainian citizen, known as Irina Lenskaya, until 1999 when she emigrated to Israel. She also held the surname Omelchenko for a period.
 In Israel she represents the sports club Maccabi Rishon LeZion. She stands tall and weighed about during her active career. Her daughter Olga Lenskiy (born 1992) competed in sprints at the 2009 World Youth Championships.
 Career
 By the time of migrating to Israel she had already taken part in the 1995 and 1997 World Championships, both in the 400 metres hurdles. Her personal best time was 55.69 seconds, achieved in June 1996 in Kyiv, and she also had 52.60 seconds in the 400 metres, achieved in 1997.
 In the short hurdles distances (100 and 60 metres) she competed at the 2001 World Indoor Championships, the 2001 World Championships, the 2002 European Indoor Championships, the 2002 European Championships, the 2003 World Championships, the 2004 Olympic Games, the 2006 European Championships and the 2009 World Championships without reaching the final. In the 4 x 400 metres relay she competed at the 2003 World Championships without reaching the final.
 Her personal best times are 8.03 seconds in the 60 metres hurdles, achieved in January 2002 in Moscow; and 12.80 seconds in the 100 metres hurdles, achieved in July 2002 in Rethimno. She also has 11.59 seconds in the 100 metres, achieved in May 2003 in Tel Aviv; and 23.15 seconds in the 200 metres, achieved in June 2002 in Belgrade.
 See also
 List of Israeli records in athletics
 List of Maccabiah records in athletics
 References
 External links
 1971 births
 Living people
 Ukrainian female hurdlers
 Ukrainian female sprinters
 Israeli female hurdlers
 Israeli female sprinters
 Olympic athletes of Israel
 Athletes (track and field) at the 2004 Summer Olympics
 World Athletics Championships athletes for Israel
 World Athletics Championships athletes for Ukraine
 Ukrainian emigrants to Israel
 Jewish Israeli sportspeople
 Ukrainian Jews
 Jewish female athletes (track and field)


type: legislation

text:
 21.7.2017
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 L 190/7
 REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (UE) 2017/1354 AL COMISIEI
 din 20 iulie 2017
 de specificare a modului în care trebuie prezentate informațiile prevăzute la articolul 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului
 (Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)
 COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,
 având în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,
 având în vedere Directiva 2014/53/UE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 16 aprilie 2014 privind armonizarea legislației statelor membre referitoare la punerea la dispoziție pe piață a echipamentelor radio și de abrogare a Directivei 1999/5/CE (1), în special articolul 10 alineatul (10) și articolul 45 alineatul (2),
 întrucât:
 (1)
 Articolul 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE prevede că, în cazul unor restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau în cazul cerințelor de autorizare a utilizării, informațiile disponibile pe ambalaj permit identificarea statelor membre sau a zonei geografice dintr-un stat membru unde există restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau cerințe privind autorizarea utilizării și că astfel de informații sunt completate în instrucțiunile care însoțesc echipamentele radio.
 (2)
 Conform articolului 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE, Comisia poate adopta acte de punere în aplicare în care se specifică modul în care trebuie prezentate informațiile prevăzute la articolul 10 alineatul (10).
 (3)
 Respectivele acte de punere în aplicare se adoptă în conformitate cu procedura de consultare menționată la articolul 45 alineatul (2) din Directiva 2014/53/UE.
 (4)
 Măsurile prevăzute în prezentul regulament sunt în conformitate cu avizul Comitetului pentru evaluarea conformității și supravegherea pieței telecomunicațiilor, instituit în baza articolului 45 din Directiva 2014/53/UE,
 ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:
 Articolul 1
 Prezentul regulament specifică modul în care trebuie prezentate informațiile prevăzute la articolul 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE și se aplică numai echipamentelor radio care fac obiectul unor restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau al cerințelor de autorizare a utilizării în cel puțin un stat membru.
 Articolul 2
 (1) În cazul în care echipamentele radio fac obiectul unor restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau al cerințelor de autorizare a utilizării, conform articolului 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE, ambalajul echipamentelor radio trebuie să indice în mod vizibil și lizibil:
 (a)
 o pictogramă, astfel cum se prevede în anexa I; sau
 (b)
 cuvintele „Restricții sau Cerințe în”, într-o limbă ușor de înțeles de către utilizatorii finali, astfel cum se stabilește de statul membru în cauză, urmate de abrevierile statelor membre, astfel cum se prevede în anexa II, în cazul în care există astfel de restricții sau cerințe.
 (2) În cazul în care echipamentele radio fac obiectul unor restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau al cerințelor de autorizare a utilizării, conform articolului 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE, instrucțiunile care însoțesc echipamentele radio trebuie să indice, într-o limbă ușor de înțeles de către consumatorii finali, după cum se stabilește de către statul membru în cauză, lista statelor membre și a zonelor geografice din statele membre în care există astfel de restricții sau cerințe, precum și tipurile de restricții sau cerințe aplicabile în fiecare stat membru și în fiecare zonă geografică dintr-un stat membru.
 Articolul 3
 Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare în a douăzecea zi de la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene și devine aplicabil începând de la 9 august 2018.
 Se consideră că echipamentele radio care sunt introduse pe piață după 8 august 2017 și sunt în conformitate cu prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu articolul 10 alineatul (10) din Directiva 2014/53/UE.
 Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.
 Adoptat la Bruxelles, 20 iulie 2017.
 Pentru Comisie
 Președintele
 Jean-Claude JUNCKER
 (1) JO L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62.
 ANEXA I
 Pictogramă
 1.
 Pictograma trebuie să fie sub formă de tabel.
 2.
 Pictograma trebuie să includă următorul semn:
 3.
 Pictograma trebuie să menționeze, de asemenea, dedesubtul sau lângă semnul menționat la punctul 2, abrevierile statelor membre, astfel cum se prevede în anexa II, în cazul în care există orice restricții privind punerea în funcțiune sau orice cerințe privind autorizarea utilizării.
 4.
 Pictograma și conținutul acesteia pot înregistra diferite variații (de exemplu, culoare, solid sau transparent, grosimea liniei), cu condiția ca acestea să rămână vizibile și lizibile.
 5.
 Exemple de pictograme:
 ES
 LU
 RO
 CZ
 FR
 HU
 SI
 DK
 HR
 BG
 EE
 BE
 ANEXA II
 Abrevieri
 Abrevierile pentru statele membre sunt următoarele:
 Belgia (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Republica Cehă (CZ), Danemarca (DK), Germania (DE), Estonia (EE), Irlanda (IE), Grecia (EL), Spania (ES), Franța (FR), Croația (HR), Italia (IT), Cipru (CY), Letonia (LV), Lituania (LT), Luxemburg (LU), Ungaria (HU), Malta (MT), Țările de Jos (NL), Austria (AT), Polonia (PL), Portugalia (PT), România (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovacia (SK), Finlanda (FI), Suedia (SE) și Regatul Unit (UK).


text:
 Tähtis õiguslik teade
 |
 22004D0055
 EMP ühiskomitee otsus nr 55/2004, 23. aprill 2004, millega muudetakse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingu XXI lisa (statistika) — Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 2150/2002 (jäätmestatistika)
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja L 277 , 26/08/2004 Lk 0026 - 0026
 EMP ühiskomitee otsusnr 55/2004,23. aprill 2004,millega muudetakse EMP lepingu XXI lisa (statistika)EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, nagu seda on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi "leping", eriti selle artiklit 98ning arvestades järgmist:(1) Lepingu XXI lisa on muudetud EMP ühiskomitee 19. märtsi 2004. aasta otsusega nr 33/2004. [1](2) Lepingusse tuleb lisada Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 25. novembri 2002. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 2150/2002 jäätmestatistika kohta, [2]ON VASTU VÕTNUD JÄRGMISE OTSUSE:Artikkel 1Lepingu XXI lisa punkti 26 (nõukogu direktiiv 90/377/EMÜ) järele lisatakse:"KESKKONNASTATISTIKA27. Käesolevas lepingus loetakse selle määruse sätteid järgmises kohanduses:32002 R 2150: Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 2150/2002, 25. november 2002, jäätmestatistika kohta (EÜT L 332, 9.12.2002, lk 1).a) Liechtenstein on vabastatud II lisaga nõutavate andmete esitamisest.b) Liechtenstein esitab andmed esmakordselt 2008. aastal 2006. vaatlusaasta kohta."Artikkel 2Määruse (EÜ) nr 2150/2002 islandi- ja norrakeelne tekst, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentne.Artikkel 3Käesolev otsus jõustub 24. aprillil 2004, tingimusel et EMP ühiskomiteele on esitatud kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõikele 1 vastavad teatised. [3]Artikkel 4Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osa EMP kaasandes.Brüssel, 23. aprill 2004EMP ühiskomitee nimeleesistujaP. Westerlund[1] ELT L 127, 29.4.2004, lk 144.[2] EÜT L 332, 9.12.2002, lk 1.[3] Põhiseadusest tulenevatest nõuetest ei ole teatatud.--------------------------------------------------


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 993 A.2d 25 (2010)
 413 Md. 360
 STATE of Maryland
 v.
 Terris Terrell LUCKETT.
 No. 122 September Term, 2009.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 14, 2010.
 *26 Glen F. Ivey, State's Atty. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland and Carrie J. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on brief for Petitioner.
 Paul W. Schmidt (M. Alexia dePottere-Smith and Kimberly Olvey Branscome of Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC; Harry J. Trainor, Jr. of Trainor, Billman, Bennett, Milko & McCabe, LLP, Annapolis, MD), on brief for Respondent.
 ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
 BARBERA, Judge.
 We decide in this case whether a confession that Respondent Terris Terrell Luckett gave to the police complied with the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The Circuit Court for Prince George's County ruled that the police did not comply with the requirement of Miranda that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel that attends custodial interrogation. The Circuit Court granted Respondent's motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police following what the court ruled was a constitutionally defective advisement.
 The State challenged the Circuit Court's ruling by filing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Maryland Code (2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial *27 Proceedings Article. Upon its independent review of the suppression ruling, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that the police had violated Miranda and affirmed the suppression order. State v. Luckett, 188 Md.App. 399, 981 A.2d 835 (2009).
 We granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. We now affirm that judgment.
 I.
 Respondent stands charged by indictment with two counts each of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He filed a motion to suppress three statements he had made to the police, only the last of which is the subject of this appeal. The four-day hearing on the suppression motion was followed by the Circuit Court's issuance of a written opinion denying the motion as to the first and second statements and granting the motion with respect to the third statement. We adopt portions of the Court of Special Appeals' recitation of the facts underlying the crimes, the suppression motion, and the Circuit Court's decision:[1]
 On August 2, 2007, Tunja Luckett, Respondent's wife, was found dead of a gunshot wound at the couple's Fort Washington home. On that same day, John Scales was shot to death at his barbershop in Clinton. On August 3, charges were filed against Respondent, charging him with both murders. Respondent himself, however, was not yet apprehended. On August 4, Prince George's County Police Officer Stephen Fox responded to the Southern Avenue Metro Station, where Respondent had reportedly leaped backward from the Metro platform directly into the path of an oncoming train.
 Respondent was pulled from the tracks and rushed by helicopter to the Prince George's County Hospital. Both legs were crushed and, in the course of two operations over the next two days, both of Respondent's legs were amputated. In his meticulously thorough 14-page Opinion of the Court, [the suppression hearing judge] began with a summary that made this bizarre string of events comprehensible.
 The state essentially alleges that Mr. Luckett believed that his wife was having an affair with his son's football coach. Mr. Luckett is alleged to have killed his wife and after doing so, gone to the football coach's place of business, a barber shop, and proceeded to kill the football coach on August 2, 2007. On August 4, 2007 having what can best be described as "shooter's remorse," Mr. Luckett attempted to take his life in two ways. First, he slit his wrists. Failing in that attempt, Mr. Luckett went to a Metro station a little after two in the afternoon and threw himself in front of a moving Metro train.
 The First Statement to Officer Fox
 When he first arrived at the hospital, Respondent spontaneously spoke to Officer Fox, who had accompanied him to the hospital from the Metro station. Respondent volunteered to Officer Fox that he had not meant to kill his wife but that he had meant to kill Scales, because he believed that Scales was having an affair with his (Respondent's) wife. Respondent referred to Scales as his "enemy" and said that he had wanted to kill *28 Scales for eight and a half months. Respondent further stated that after he shot Scales, he threw the gun out of the car window. He also stated that after the shootings, he tried to slit his wrists because he did not want to go to jail.
 [The Circuit Court] ruled that Respondent's statements to Officer Fox were totally spontaneous and were not in response to any interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, therefore, did not apply. Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 520-22, 974 A.2d 991 (2009). The judge ruled:
 There is no evidence that either officer interrogated or came close to interrogating Mr. Luckett in any way. These statements were volunteered by Mr. Luckett. "Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694.
 The correctness of that ruling is not before us on this appeal.
 The Second Series of Statements to Detective Selway
 On the next day, August 5, Detective Brian Selway, of the Homicide Division, took over the duty of being posted as guard at Respondent's hospital room. He came on duty at 7 A.M. Respondent awoke between 10:15 and 10:20 A.M. and immediately started talking. [The] Opinion of Court again well summarized Detective Selway's initial concern and his observations with respect thereto[:]
 Det. Selway was concerned with Mr. Luckett's level of alertness and asked him questions such as who the President of the United States was and what the Detective's first name was. Answering correctly, Det. Selway observed Mr. Luckett to be alert and responsive. Mr. Luckett also answered questions of hospital personnel and was aware of his surroundings. Selway watched as Mr. Luckett joked with the hospital staff when they came into the room to monitor his medicines. Through the conversation Mr. Luckett revealed that he was aware an arrest warrant had been issued for him.
 At 10:33 A.M. Detective Selway read Respondent his Miranda warnings from the small business card he carried in his wallet. . . .
 You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before a statement is taken, if you wish. If you decide to give a statement, you still have the right to stop at any time so you may talk to a lawyer.
 Respondent waived those rights by saying, "I understand." From then until 2:20 P.M., Detective Selway simply listened as Respondent talked. Respondent reaffirmed that he believed that his wife had been having an affair with their son's football coach. He repeated his earlier statements to Officer Fox that he did not mean to kill his wife and that he threw the gun away after shooting Scales at the barbershop. He also told Detective Selway that he kept a journal under the mattress in his bedroom, and he asked Detective Selway to retrieve it. At approximately 2:15 P.M. a District Court Commissioner arrived at Respondent's intensive care room. Respondent, in Detective Selway's presence, told the Commissioner, "I know what I did was wrong." Respondent then asked, "Is there any way I can get off the death penalty?" The Commissioner *29 responded that she could not give legal advice.
 [The Circuit Court's] primary concern with respect to those statements was whether Respondent was in a sufficiently lucid state 1) to make a free and voluntary confession and 2) to make a free and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. [The court] found that Respondent was lucid and rational and ruled that the motion to suppress those statements would, therefore, be denied[:]
 [T]he Court finds Detective Selway to be believable and places great weight on his testimony. Although Det. Selway was initially concerned about Mr. Luckett's state of mind, he concluded [that] Mr. Luckett was lucid after asking him non-interrogational questions. The Court finds that Mr. Luckett understood what he was saying and was not improperly coerced by Detective Selway into giving these statements. The Court concludes that the statements made to Detective Selway and the statement made in the presence of the Commissioner, Detective Selway and Detective Codero was made freely and voluntarily.
 The Third Statement to Detective Barba
 This appeal by the State is taken only from [the Circuit Court's] decision to suppress a third statement, given by Respondent to Detective Matthew Barba on August 13, 2007. Detective Barba briefly visited Respondent in his hospital room on August 8, identified himself as the lead investigator in the two homicides with which Respondent was charged, dropped off a business card, and said that he would be back on another day. Detective Barba returned on August 13 with audio/video equipment and a technician with the hope of conducting a videotaped interview with Respondent.
 Luckett, 188 Md.App. at 405-09, 981 A.2d at 838-41.
 The Circuit Court recited in its written opinion what happened next:
 On August 13, 2007, at 12:35 p.m. Detective Barba along with Michael Coatley, an audio technician, arrived at Mr. Luckett's hospital room. After identifying himself Detective Barba stated that Mr. Luckett immediately engaged in conversation with him asking him if he had found the tapes. Detective Barba was unsure as to what Mr. Luckett was asking. Barba indicated that he would "help him out" but that he needed to get a waiver first. Barba advised Luckett that he had certain rights. Mr. Luckett asked about his kids, his mother and grandmother.
 With equipment set up, at approximately 12:52 p.m. Detective Barba began reading Mr. Luckett his rights under Miranda v. Arizona[:]
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Like, like I said, I'm not here, I'm here to help.
 MR. LUCKETT: Whatever you need.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. I'm going to explain everything to you okay, um, I'm Detective Barba, okay, I introduced myself last week. I'm Detective Barba of the Prince George's County Police Department, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm going to read you your rights for this particular interview
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA:that we're going to have, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: You do have rights. I'll also explain that we have *30 audio and video on right now, you do understand that?
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Right? Okay. Now I'll read everything just like were, just call [sic] like Miranda rights. Okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: If you don't understand anything that I'm saying to you, stop me.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, I have no problem with that all right. Now I'm going to read everything verbatim, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: And we'll go from there. All right, this is an advice of rights and waivers form, right here okay.
 MR. LUCKETT:
 DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm going to show it to you afterward. You want to move your thing up a little bit?
 MR. LUCKETT: Yeah, let me see that.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. This isrights and waivers form.
 MR. LUCKETT: I understand[.]
 DETECTIVE BARBA: For our Prince George's County Police Department. Today's date is August 13, 2007 and the time is 12:52, okay. Um, I am now going to read you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, please stop me and I'll explain them to you, okay?
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: You have the right to remain silent, if you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court.
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions to have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned, that's about this case specifically.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Like I said, if we want to talk about the Redskins, you don't need a lawyer for that because it does not concernokay. Uh, if you want a lawyer and cannot afford, uh, a lawyer will be provided with you at not [sic] cost, in a public defender, things [sic]or you can get a private attorney. If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any given time.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Now, you understand that? Do you understand these rights?
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okaythat's you understand just check yes and then initial if you understand those rights.
 MR. LUCKETT: Just check yes?
 DETECTIVE BARBA: If you understand the rights that I'm giving you.
 MR. LUCKETT: Yeah.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: And then initial. Okay. Have you been, uh, do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer present? And that could be the verbal one. We're not [background noise] written, normally I would take a written one, part of it will be a verbal that would be us discussing the incident back and forth, do you want to do that[?]
 [Crosstalk]
 *31 MR. LUCKETT: I'm sorry, if I say yes, we're going to discuss the incident right?
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Mm-hmm.
 MR. LUCKETT: Would I be setting myself up?
 MALE VOICE: Huh?
 MR. LUCKETT: Would I set, would I be setting myself up?
 MALE VOICE: You
 MR. LUCKETT: I mean I'm, I'm looking toward you for answer you know what I'm saying?
 MALE VOICE: Now which iswould he be asking you.[2]
 DETECTIVE BARBA:
 MR. LUCKETT:we're, we're going to discuss the case
 DETECTIVE BARBA: You
 MR. LUCKETT:without my lawyer.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don't need a lawyer present at all period, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: So
 DETECTIVE BARBA: We can talk about anything but the case
 MR. LUCKETT: So I won't be hurting myself.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: If we talk about anything but the case, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Mmhmm.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm just letting you know that you do have rights okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: When we are discussing matters of the case, when I ask you something specifically
 MR. LUCKETT: Mmhmm.
 DETECTIVE BARBA:or if you tell me something specifically, you have a right to have a lawyer present here, okay?
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: What you're doing here is that you are giving up a right to having a lawyer present to tell me your side, okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: You don't have to do that, Okay.
 MR. LUCKETT: Right.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: But for me to be able to present your side
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA:along with everything else that I'll be presenting
 MR. LUCKETT: Mmhmm.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay, then that goes on my integrity.
 MR. LUCKETT: All right, I know what you're saying.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm going to give the full version of what's going on.
 MR. LUCKETT: Okay.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. Do you understand that?
 MR. LUCKETT: Correct.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. So you understand that you do have rights.
 MR. LUCKETT: Right.
 *32 DETECTIVE BARBA: You don't have to talk to me.
 MR. LUCKETT: Correct.
 DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. Do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer present?
 MR. LUCKETT: Yes.
 At the end of that discussion, Respondent gave a lengthy statement describing his belief that his wife had been having an affair with Mr. Scales, his activities during the months leading up to the murders, and the murders themselves. Respondent repeated his earlier statements to the police that he did not mean to kill his wife but he did intend to kill Mr. Scales. Respondent said that he knew what he had done was wrong, and he was willing to "accept my punishment and be accountable for my actions." He stated that he hoped Detective Barba would not "throw the book at me."
 In its written opinion, the Circuit Court set forth Respondent's arguments for why the videotaped statement to Detective Barba should be suppressed:
 Mr. Luckett's counsel argues that Detective Barba's advice is defective in two respects: 1. The five-word statement of "you don't need a lawyer" is false and not a correct statement of the law. 2. The offer to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate are violation[s] of Hillard v. State, 141 Md.App. 199, 784 A.2d 1134 (2001).
 The Circuit Court addressed the "you don't need a lawyer" argument first:
 Detective Barba's statement "you don't need a lawyer" is not a correct recitation of the law and should never be spoken by any law enforcement officer to a person in custody under any circumstances. These words were related to Mr. Luckett two times in the videotape and according to Detective Barba, stated at least two other times. It appears from Detective Barba's statement that he may have stated the same words before the tape was turned on as well. Any statement that could possibly lead the defendant to misconstrue his rights under Miranda is contrary to the law requiring a knowing and voluntary waiver.
 The Circuit Court also noted that Detective Barba should have known that anything Respondent might say during interrogation could compromise his defense:
 By the ninth day of investigating this matter, Detective Barba, a seasoned Prince George's County Officer, either knew or should have known that the defense would allege that Mr. Luckett was not criminally responsible for his actions, or that his sanity would be questioned. Any statement shedding light on his mental capacity or understanding, regardless of whether it was about this case or not, could be relevant and Mr. Luckett would have greatly benefitted from a counsel. Mr. Luckett's entire life was more or less in question at this time. This was not simply a "domestic" case as the State believes. Much more was riding on the questioning of Mr. Luckett at this stage of the investigation of "the case."
 The Circuit Court ruled that the exchange between Detective Barba and Respondent, considered in its entirety, failed to convey to Respondent his right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation: "The Detective's offer to help was not harmful by itself, but his statement, `you don't need a lawyer,' combined with the Detective's other statement, without further explanatory statements from the Detective to Mr. Luckett make this advice of rights invalid." Consequently, the court granted the motion to suppress the statement that Respondent gave to Detective *33 Barba on August 13, 2007, on the basis that it was given in violation of Miranda.
 The Circuit Court did not decide Respondent's allegation that Detective Barba's "offer to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate" was the product of one or more improper promises and thereby involuntary under Maryland's common law. The court explained that there was no need to do so because "[t]he State has not asked that the Court make a determination of whether the statement was voluntary."
 The State noted an appeal from the grant of Respondent's motion to suppress the statement he gave to Detective Barba. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court, holding: "[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, the unnecessarily lengthy and rambling discussion about the nature of the Miranda rights not only included specifically questionable statements of the law but utterly failed effectively to communicate the message mandated by Miranda." Luckett, 188 Md. App. at 410, 981 A.2d at 841.
 We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the following question:
 Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Luckett's August 13, 2007 statement must be suppressed where that holding: 1) expands the concept of "improper inducement" to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promises in exchange for a statement; 2) is based upon a flatly incorrect interpretation of the record; and 3) erroneously concludes that Luckett did not knowingly waive his right to counsel[?]
 Upon our independent review of the facts developed at the suppression hearing,[3] we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals that Respondent's statement to Detective Barba was obtained in violation of Miranda's requirement that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel. We therefore need not address the State's assertion that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly interpreted the record. We also need not address the State's claim that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly "expand[ed] the concept of `improper inducement' to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promises in exchange for a statement." To the extent that the intermediate appellate court's opinion can be construed as addressing the common law voluntariness of Respondent's statement, it is dicta not necessary to the judgment affirming the Circuit Court's order suppressing Respondent's statement solely because it was obtained in violation of Miranda.[4]
 *34 II.
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 659 (1964), provides in relevant part that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "To give force to the Constitution's protection against compelled self-incrimination, the Court established in Miranda `certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.'" Florida v. Powell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009, 1018 (2010) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166, 177 (1989)). Accord Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 230, 849 A.2d 410, 417 (2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 546 U.S. 72, 126 S. Ct. 602, 163 L. Ed. 2d 406 (2005).
 The Supreme Court, "intent on `giv[ing] concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,'" Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42, 86 S. Ct. at 1611, 16 L.Ed.2d at 705), "adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the `inherently compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation," *35 Maryland v. Shatzer, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1052 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d at 719). The measures adopted in Miranda stemmed from the Court's recognition that "incommunicado interrogation" in a "police-dominated atmosphere," involves psychological pressures that "work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. at 445, 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707, 719.
 The prophylactic measures developed in Miranda took the form of the now-familiar warnings that law enforcement personnel must deliver to a suspect before undertaking any custodial interrogation:
 [A] suspect must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
 The third of those warnings, at issue in the present case, addresses the "particular concern that `[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] by his interrogators.'" Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S. Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721). "[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any [custodial] questioning[.]" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S. Ct. at 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at 721. And, "[a]s with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.. . . Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right." 384 U.S. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 722.
 Although the warnings are "invariable," the Supreme Court has "not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed." Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1204, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696, 701 (1981) (per curiam) ("This Court has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 305 (1980) (safeguards against compelled self-incrimination include Miranda warnings "or their equivalent"); Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 84-89, 939 A.2d 689, 698-701(2008) (discussing same). Nevertheless, the warnings must "reasonably `conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.'" Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1204, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1019 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203, 109 S. Ct. at 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d at 177).
 Of course, the rights accorded by Miranda can be waived. See 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724; Blake, 381 Md. at 236, 849 A.2d at 421 ("The law is clear that a suspect may validly waive Miranda rights[.]"). The State has a "heavy burden," however, to establish that a suspect has waived those rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. The State "must show that the waiver was knowing, *36 intelligent, and voluntary under the `high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).'" Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1052 (citation omitted); White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 251, 821 A.2d 459, 470 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 904, 124 S. Ct. 262, 157 L. Ed. 2d 189 (2003). By this is meant that:
 First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.
 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986) (citation omitted). Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 292 (1979); McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 614-15, 526 A.2d 30, 33-34 (1987).
 In determining the constitutional adequacy of a suspect's waiver of the Miranda rights, the totality of the warnings must be examined. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421 ("Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, "[i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell's right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times"); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205, 109 S. Ct. at 2881, 106 L.Ed.2d at 178 (holding that the warnings, "in their totality, satisfied Miranda"); Rush, 403 Md. at 89-90, 939 A.2d at 701-02 (concluding that "the totality of the advisements, both oral and written," communicated all rights afforded by Miranda). But if the warnings, viewed in the totality, in any way misstate the suspect's rights to silence and counsel, or mislead or confuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then the warnings are constitutionally infirm, rendering any purported waiver of those rights constitutionally defective and requiring suppression of any subsequent statement. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725 (stating that "the warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement by a defendant").
 We bear these principles in mind as we consider the Miranda warnings given to Respondent.
 III.
 Respondent successfully argued before the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals that the Miranda warnings were incorrect and misleading, rendering his Miranda waiver "unknowing" and therefore invalid. The State disagrees. The State points out that Detective Barba correctly informed Respondent of all of his Miranda rights at the outset of the exchange between the two. The State directs us to the following advisements by Detective Barba. He advised Respondent: "You have the right to remain silent, if you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court." Detective Barba added: "You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions[,] to have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned. . . ." He further advised: "[I]f you want a lawyer and cannot afford [one], a lawyer will be *37 provided with [sic] you at no cost[,]" and, "If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any given time." Detective Barbara also asked Respondent if he understood those rights, and Respondent replied that he did.
 We agree with the State that those advisements comport with Miranda. The problem, however, does not lie in Detective Barba's recitation of the Miranda warnings we have just quoted. The problem instead lies in the detective's further "clarifications" and "explanations" of the rights covered by those warnings. As we shall see, it is those comments that nullified what otherwise were proper warnings, and rendered the Miranda advisement constitutionally defective.
 When advising Respondent that he had "the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions [and] to have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned," Detective Barba added, "that's about this case, specifically." Detective Barba followed that statement with an example of the type of exchange that would not be considered interrogation accorded protection under Miranda: "Like I said, if we want to talk about the Redskins, you don't need a lawyer for that because it does not concernokay." Following that, Respondent asked whether, in discussing "the incident" without a lawyer, he would be "setting [himself] up" in "discuss[ing] the case without my lawyer." Respondent sought an answer to that concern from either Detective Barba or the unknown male in the room. In answer to Respondent's concern, Detective Barba simply repeated the words that conveyed, in effect, that not all that he and Respondent might discuss during the interrogation was covered by the right to counsel: "Okay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don't need a lawyer present at all period. Okay." Then, when Respondent sought confirmation that he would not "be hurting" himself, Detective Barba again repeated that Respondent did "have rights" but only "[w]hen we are discussing matters of the case." Detective Barba re-emphasized, moreover, that not everything Respondent might say during interrogation was covered by the right to counsel: "When or if you tell me something specifically, you have a right to have a lawyer present here." The detective ended these "advisements" with the following: "What you're doing here is that you are giving up a right to having a lawyer present to tell me your side, okay." Shortly thereafter, Respondent purported to waive his Miranda rights by signing the form declaring that he "understood" the rights he was waiving.
 Detective Barba did not inform Respondent, as the detective should have done in answer to Respondent's query about incriminating himself, that anything Respondent said during interrogation could incriminate him. To the contrary, Detective Barba repeatedly advised Respondent that any of his statements that were not directly related to "the case" (whatever the detective meant by "the case") were outside the purview of the right to counsel and, impliedly at least, not subject to being used against Respondent at trial. Detective Barba's repeated "explanations" of what Miranda does and does not protect during interrogation were incorrect as a matter of law.
 Miranda covers any custodial exchange that occurs between interrogator and suspect, other than routine booking questions and the like.[5] In other words, *38 the protections afforded by Miranda extend to the entirety of the interrogation, from beginning to end, without limitation on the matters discussed. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 684, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2099, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 715 (1988) (stating that "[a]suspect's request for counsel should apply to any questions the police wish to pose").
 Therefore, no police officer advising a suspect of his rights under Miranda should intimate, much less declare affirmatively, a limitation upon the right to counsel. Detective Barba's statements that the right to counsel applied only to discussion of the specifics of "the case," being wrong as a matter of law, rendered the advisements constitutionally infirm.[6] The constitutional infirmity of the warnings rendered similarly infirm Respondent's subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights, because his purported waiver was not "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2611, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 656 (2004) (commenting that "[b]ewilderment [is] an unpromising frame of mind for knowledgeable decision").
 Accordingly, we reject the State's central theme of the present appeal, which is essentially that, so long as correct Miranda warnings are given, the inclusion of other misleading or, as in this case, flatly incorrect advisements concerning those warnings has no adverse effect on the adequacy of the warnings. The State's thesis defies common sense, runs directly afoul of the requirement that Miranda advisements be analyzed in their totality, and is contrary to the dictates of Miranda and its progeny.
 We hold that a suspect is not properly informed of his or her Miranda rights when a statement of those rights, however correct the statement may be, is *39 nullified by other incorrect statements concerning those rights. In that event, the Miranda advisements are constitutionally infirm, a purported "waiver" of those rights is constitutionally invalid, and any statement the police obtain from the suspect during the ensuing interrogation violates Miranda. Here, Detective Barba misadvised Respondent of his right to counsel under Miranda, rendering invalid his purported Miranda waiver and requiring suppression of Respondent's post-"waiver" statement to the detective. The Circuit Court's suppression ruling was correct, as was the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming that order.
 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY.
 NOTES
 [1] We have modified the recitation to substitute the term "Respondent" for the Court of Special Appeals' use of the term "the appellee," when referring to Mr. Luckett.
 [2] The record on appeal includes the videotape recording of the exchange between Detective Barba and Respondent. It is apparent from the videotape that the "Male Voice" is that of a person who was positioned out of range of the camera. It is also apparent that Respondent's statements, "Would I set, would I be setting myself up?" and "I mean I'm, I'm looking toward you for answer you know what I'm saying?" are directed to that off-camera "male voice."
 [3] In reviewing the Circuit Court's ruling on the motion, we "consider only the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing." Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007). "`[W]e view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion,'" here, Respondent. Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 403, 924 A.2d 1072, 1080 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1144, 128 S. Ct. 1064, 169 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2008) (quoting State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003)). We defer to the motions court's factual findings and uphold them unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. We, however, make our "`own independent constitutional appraisal,'" by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case. Longshore, 399 Md. at 499, 924 A.2d at 1136 (quoting Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457, 682 A.2d 248, 253 (1996)).
 [4] Our holding in this case affirming suppression of the confession on the basis of the Miranda violation means that the State may not use the confession in its case-in-chief. Should Respondent testify on his own behalf at trial in a manner that contradicts that confession, the State may want to impeach Respondent with that confession. The State would be permitted to employ the statement for impeachment purposes if, and only if, the Circuit Court first rules the confession was voluntary as a matter of federal and state constitutional law and Maryland common law. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 3-5 (1971) (declaring that statements inadmissible under Miranda in the prosecution's case-in-chief are not barred for all purposes, provided that "the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards," and holding that the prosecution properly impeached the defendant on cross-examination with use of a Miranda-violative statement, not challenged as involuntary, that contradicted the defendant's direct testimony); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1220, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 577 (1975) (applying the rule of Harris to permit the prosecution to use a Miranda-violative statement during its rebuttal case to impeach the defendant's direct testimony that contradicted the statement); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 40-43, 50-51, 375 A.2d 1105, 1110-12, 1115-16 (1977) (recognizing the rule of Harris and Hass, but holding that the rule did not apply in that case because the Miranda-violative statement did not contradict the defendant's direct testimony); State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 60-61, 375 A.2d 1116, 1121-22 (1977) (applying Harris and Hass to hold that the State properly impeached the defendant with what this Court "assumed" was a Miranda-violative statement, not challenged as involuntary, that contradicted the defendant's direct testimony), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S. Ct. 739, 54 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1978); Hall v. State, 292 Md. 683, 688-89, 441 A.2d 708, 711 (1982) (applying Harris and Hass to uphold the prosecution's use of the defendant's Miranda-violative statement to impeach the defendant's direct testimony that contradicted the statement).
 We have mentioned that the Circuit Court did not rule on Respondent's voluntariness claim because the State did not press for a ruling on the issue. Presumably the court was of the view that, unless and until the State sought to use the statement for impeachment purposes, there was no need to decide the matter. Ordinarily, however, when a motion to suppress a statement raises both Miranda and voluntariness concerns, the court should rule at the suppression stage on the voluntariness of the statement, even if the court also rules that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. A voluntariness ruling at that time has obvious benefits. The evidence that was developed on the issue is fresh in the minds of counsel and the court, the issue is fully ripe for decision, and a ruling at that time makes clear to both parties before trial the extent to which, if at all, the State may use the defendant's statement at trial.
 [5] See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528, 552 (1990). Note also the exceptions to Miranda that the Supreme Court announced in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 251 (1990) (conversations between suspects and undercover agents admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 557 (1984) (recognizing a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspect's statement as evidence against him at trial).
 [6] Detective Barba's legally incorrect advisements concerning the scope of the right to counsel were enough to render the advisements constitutionally defective, and our conclusion in that regard provides the basis for our disposition in this case. We therefore need not consider the effect of other comments that Detective Barba made during the Miranda advisements, and which caught the attention of the Court of Special Appeals. We refer here to Detective Barba's comment at the beginning of the recorded colloquy, "Like, like I said, I'm not here, I'm here to help[,]" and to his comment much later during the colloquy that "But for me to be able to present your sidealong with everything else that I'll be presenting, . . . then that goes on my integrity." The Court of Special Appeals noted: "The inevitably seductive effect of repeated assurances that the interrogator is there `to help' the defendant is that the officer is presented as an alternative source of `help.' Such a choice is an unspoken inducement to waive the right to counsel." Luckett, 188 Md.App. at 419, 981 A.2d at 846.
 Any statement on the part of a police officer that attempts to mislead, or has the effect of misleading, a suspect as to the scope of the rights afforded by Miranda renders the advisement defective. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.9(c) (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]here is an absolute prohibition upon any trickery which misleads the suspect as to the. . . dimensions of any of the applicable rights."). We caution the police, and those advising them, that this Court will not tolerate any attempt to mislead a suspect about the full scope of the rights afforded by Miranda.


text:
N? C 199/36 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 28 . 6 . 97
 Recurso interposto, em 25 de Abril de 1997, pela socie na medida em que esse procedimento não permitiu à
 dade Kesko Oy contra a Comissão das Comunidades recorrente propor, dentro de um período de tempo ra
 Europeias zoável, medidas apropriadas para restabelecer as con
 ( Processo T-134/97 )
 dições de concorrência efectiva . Deste modo, a Comis
 são violou os princípios da não discriminação, propor
 ( 97/C 199/84 cionalidade e boa administração. Além disso, o não
 apresentar motivos para alterar essa prática, a Comis
 são infringiu o artigo 190? do Tratado CE.
 (Língua do processo: inglês)
 3 . O artigo 8 ?, n? 4, da decisão, impõe o restabelecimen
 to da situação anterior à concentração e ao fazê-lo vai
 Deu entrada, em 25 de Abril de 1997, no Tribunal de Pri além do que é previsto para o restabelecimento das
 meira Instância das Comunidades Europeias, um recurso condições de concorrência efectiva . Excluindo soluções
 contra a Comissão das Comunidades Europeias, interposto a priori que não restabelecem o status quo ante, a Co
 pela sociedade Kesko Oy, representada por Gerwin Van missão excedeu os poderes que lhe são conferidos nos
 Gerven, advogado do foro de Bruxelas, e Sarah Beeston da termos do artigo 8 ?, n? 4, do regulamento de concen
 Law Society of England and Wales, com domicílio escolhi tração de empresas e violou os princípios da propor
 do no Luxemburgo no escritório da Loesch & Wolter, 11 , cionalidade e boa administração.
 rue Goethe .
 O Regulamento ( CEE ) n? 4064/89 do Conselho, de 21 de De
 zembro de 1989, relativo ao controlo das operações de con
 A recorrente conclui pedindo que o Tribunal se digne : centração de empresas (JO n? L 395 de 30 . 12 . 1989, p . 1 ).
 ( 2 ) JO n? C 131 de 26 . 4 . 1997, p . 17.
 — anular a decisão da Comissão de 19 de Fevereiro de
 1997, Kesko/Tuko (IV/M.748 ),
 — condenar a Comissão no pagamento das despesas da Recurso interposto, em 29 de Abril de 1997, por
 recorrente .
 Eugénio Branco Lda contra a Comissão das Comunidades
 Europeias
 ( Processo T-142/97 )
 Fundamentos e principais argumentos
 ( 97/C 199/85 )
 Em 20 de Novembro de 1996, a Comissão declarou, nos (Língua do processo: português)
 termos do artigo 8 ?, n? 3 , do regulamento de concentração
 de empresas (*), incompatível com o mercado comum e o Deu entrada, em 29 de Abril de 1997, no Tribunal de Pri
 funcionamento do acordo EEE a concentração entre a re
 meira Instância das Comunidades Europeias um recurso
 corrente e a Tuko Oy, empresa de direito finlandês. Em se
 contra a Comissão das Comunidades Europeias, interposto
 guida, em 19 de Fevereiro de 1997, a Comissão adoptou
 outra decisão com medidas destinadas a restabelecer uma por Eugénio Branco, Lda, sociedade comercial por quotas
 de responsabilidade limitada, com sede na Rua ^Rodrigo
 concorrência efectiva na acepção do artigo 8 ?, n? 4, do re
 da Fonseca, n? 9, em Lisboa, representada pelo Dr. Bolota
 gulamento de concentração de empresas .
 Belchior, advogado no foro de Vila Nova de Gaia, inscrito
 na Ordem dos Advogados do Conselho distrital do Porto,
 e com domicílio escolhido no escritório da sociedade de
 Por petição que deu entrada na Secretaria do Tribunal de advogados « Faltz & Associés », Dr. Jacques Schroeder, 6,
 Justiça em 31 de Janeiro de 1997 e registrada sob o n? rue Heine, Luxemburgo .
 T-22/97 (2 ), a recorrente interpôs um recurso, nos termos
 do artigo 173 ? do Tratado CE, para anulação do artigo 8 ?,
 n? 3 da decisão . Com o presente recurso, a recorrente O recorrente conclui pedindo que o Tribunal se digne :
 pede a anulação do artigo 8 ?, n? 4, da decisão .
 — anular a decisão da Comissão comunicada à recorren
 te, por carta do DAFSE de 24 de Fevereiro de 1997,
 1 . O artigo 8 ?, n? 4, da decisão, deve ser anulado na me que aprovou o pedido de pagamento de saldo relativo
 dia em que depende da validade do artigo 8 ?, n? 3 , da a processo de contribuição do Fundo Social Europeu,
 decisão. A partir do momento em que o artigo 8?, n? 3 , considerando não elegíveis despesas apresentadas pela
 da decisão for anulado, como foi pedido pela recorren recorrente, e que lhe impôs a restituição da quantia de
 te no seu recurso de 31 de Janeiro de 1997, o artigo 8 ?, 17 565 320 escudos portugueses, sendo 423 507 escu
 n? 4, da decisão, deve ser anulado automaticamente . dos portugueses, que recebera a título de adiantamen
 tos concedidos pelo Fundo Social Europeu, e da quan
 tia de 17 141 813 escudos portugueses, que recebera a
 2 . O procedimento seguido para a adopção do artigo 8 ?, título de adiantamentos da contribuição pública nacio
 n? 4, da decisão, está em contradição com a anterior nal do Estado português, reduzindo a contribuição do
 prática da Comissão relativamente às concentrações, FSE para 30 672 242 escudos portugueses,


text:
 28.10.2006
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 261/4
 Tiesas (pirmā palāta) spriedums 2006. gada 7. septembrī (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León (Spānija) lūgums sniegt prejudiciālu nolēmumu) — Anacleto Cordero Alonso pret Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa)
 (Lieta C-81/05) (1)
 (Sociālā politika - Darba ņēmēju aizsardzība darba devēja maksātnespējas gadījumā - Direktīva 80/987/EEK - Grozošā Direktīva 2002/74/EK - Atlaišanas kompensācija, par kuru panākta vienošanās samierināšanas laikā - Garantiju iestādes nodrošināta izmaksāšana - No tiesas nolēmuma pieņemšanas atkarīga izmaksāšana)
 (2006/C 261/07)
 Tiesvedības valoda — spāņu
 Iesniedzējtiesa
 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León
 Lietas dalībnieki pamata procesā
 Prasītājs: Anacleto Cordero Alonso
 Atbildētājs: Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa)
 Priekšmets
 Lūgums sniegt prejudiciālu nolēmumu — Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León — Padomes 1980. gada 20. oktobra Direktīvas 80/987/EEK par dalībvalstu normatīvo aktu tuvināšanu attiecībā uz darbinieku aizsardzību to darba devēja maksātnespējas gadījumā (OV L 283, 2. lpp.), kas grozīta ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2002. gada 23. septembra Direktīvu 2002/74/EK (OV L 270, 10. lpp.) — 1. un 3. pants — Kopienu tiesību piemērošana — Pārākums — Valsts tiesību aktos jau atzītā darbinieku aizsardzība — Direktīva, kuras transponēšanas termiņš vēl nav iestājies — Atšķirīga Kopienu tiesas un Tribunal Constitucional espagnol interpretācija — Vienlīdzīga attieksme.
 Rezolutīvā daļa:
 1)
 ja dalībvalsts pirms Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2002. gada 23. septembra Direktīvas 2002/74/EK, ar ko groza Direktīvu 80/987/EEK, stāšanās spēkā tās iekšējos tiesību aktos atzinusi darba ņēmēja tiesības uz garantiju iestādes aizsardzību, darba devēja maksātnespējas gadījumā saņemot kompensāciju par līguma izbeigšanu, šo tiesību aktu piemērošana gadījumos, kad darba devēja maksātnespēja ir iestājusies pēc šīs direktīvas spēkā stāšanās dienas, ietilpst Padomes 1980. gada 20. oktobra Direktīvas 80/987/EEK par dalībvalstu normatīvo aktu tuvināšanu attiecībā uz darbinieku aizsardzību to darba devēja maksātnespējas gadījumā, kas grozīta ar Direktīvu 2002/74, piemērošanas jomā;
 2)
 Direktīvas 80/987, kas grozīta ar Direktīvu 2002/74, piemērošanas jomā vispārīgais vienlīdzības princips, kas atzīts Kopienu tiesiskajā kārtībā, paredz — ja saskaņā ar tādu valsts tiesisko regulējumu, par kādu ir runa pamata lietā, likumā noteiktās un spriedumā atzītās kompensācijas par darba līguma izbeigšanu garantiju iestādei ir jāizmaksā darba devēja maksātnespējas gadījumā, tad tāda paša veida kompensācijām, par kurām darba ņēmējs un darba devējs ir panākuši vienošanos, kas noslēgta tiesneša klātbūtnē un ko ir apstiprinājusi tiesa, ir jāpiemēro tādi paši noteikumi;
 3)
 valsts tiesai ir pienākums nepiemērot valsts tiesisko regulējumu, kas, pārkāpjot Kopienu tiesiskajā kārtībā atzīto vienlīdzības principu, paredz, ka kompetentajai garantiju iestādei nav jāizmaksā kompensācijas par līguma izbeigšanu, par kurām panākta vienošanās starp darba ņēmēju un darba devēju, kas noslēgta tiesneša klātbūtnē un ko ir apstiprinājusi tiesa.
 (1) OV C 93, 16.04.2005.


text:
 11.5.2015
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 C 155/24
 Rozsudek Tribunálu ze dne 25. března 2015 – Sea Handling v. Komise
 (Věc T-456/13) (1)
 („Přístup k dokumentům - Nařízení (ES) č. 1049/2001 - Dokumenty týkající se řízení o přezkumu státních podpor - Odepření přístupu - Výjimka týkající se ochrany cílů inspekce, vyšetřování a auditu - Výjimka týkající se ochrany obchodních zájmů třetích osob - Povinnost provést konkrétní a individuální přezkum - Převažující veřejný zájem - Částečný přístup“)
 (2015/C 155/27)
 Jednací jazyk: italština
 Účastnice řízení
 Žalobkyně: Sea Handling SpA (Somma Lombardo, Itálie) (zástupci: B. Nascimbene a M. Merola, advokáti)
 Žalovaná: Evropská komise (zástupci: původně D. Grespan a C. Zadra, poté D. Grespan a F. Clotuche-Duvieusart, zmocněnci)
 Předmět věci
 Návrh na zrušení rozhodnutí Komise ze dne 12. června 2013, kterým se společnosti Sea Handling odpírá přístup k dokumentům týkajícím se řízení o přezkumu státních podpor.
 Výrok rozsudku
 1)
 Žaloba se zamítá.
 2)
 Společnost Sea Handling SpA ponese vlastní náklady řízení a uhradí náklady řízení vynaložené Evropskou komisí.
 (1) Úř. věst. C 298, 12.10.2013.


text:
 |
 52012PC0697
 Návrh ROZHODNUTÍ EVROPSKÉHO PARLAMENTU A RADY, kterým se stanoví dočasná odchylka od směrnice 2003/87/ES Evropského parlamentu a Rady o vytvoření systému pro obchodování s povolenkami na emise skleníkových plynů ve Společenství /* COM/2012/0697 final - 2012/0328 (COD) */
 DŮVODOVÁ ZPRÁVA
 Na zasedání Rady Mezinárodní organizace pro
 civilní letectví (ICAO) dne 9. listopadu 2012 byl učiněn významný pokrok směrem
 k cíli globální právní úpravy emisí z letectví.
 Tento návrh rozhodnutí má poskytnout další
 pozitivní impuls a zlepšit vyhlídky na úspěšný výsledek shromáždění ICAO v roce
 2013, pokud jde o vytvoření celosvětového tržního opatření a přijetí rámce,
 který členským státům usnadní uplatňování tržních opatření na mezinárodní
 leteckou dopravu.
 Rozhodnutí by „pozastavilo čas“ tím, že
 dočasně odloží uplatňování povinností v rámci systému Evropské unie pro
 obchodování s emisemi (EU ETS) na provozovatele letadel u příletů a odletů.
 Tento návrh tak ukazuje silný politický závazek EU usnadnit a urychlit úspěšné
 zakončení uvedených postupů ICAO.
 Rozhodnutí, jímž se stanoví dočasná odchylka
 od směrnice o systému pro obchodování s emisemi, má zajistit, že proti
 provozovatelům letadel, kteří nesplňují požadavky směrnice na vykazování a
 dodržování povinností, které vznikly před dnem 1. ledna 2014 a vztahují se na
 přílety a odlety, nebudou přijata žádná opatření. Podmínkou je, že tito
 provozovatelé buď neobdrželi, nebo vrátili bezplatné povolenky přidělené v roce
 2012 na takovéto činnosti směřující na letiště nebo z letišť mimo EU a oblasti
 úzce spojené s EU sdílející společný závazek k boji proti změně klimatu. Řádné
 monitorování, vykazování a ověřování emisí z těchto letů je vítáno, avšak v
 případě nevykazování těchto emisí se neuplatní žádné sankce za nedodržování
 požadavků.
 Směrnice se nadále vztahuje v plném rozsahu na
 lety mezi letišti v EU a oblastech úzce spojených s EU se společným závazkem k
 boji proti změně klimatu. Proto jsou všichni provozovatelé letadel, kteří v
 letech 2011 a 2012 prováděli mezi těmito letišti činnosti v oblasti letectví
 spadající do oblasti působnosti směrnice, povinni dodržovat požadavky
 monitorování, vykazování a ověřování. Všichni provozovatelé letadel, kteří v
 roce 2012 takové lety provozovali, jsou povinni do 30. dubna 2013 vyřadit
 povolenky nebo mezinárodní kredity na emise z výše uvedených letů.
 Toto rozhodnutí nechává prostor pro dosažení
 pokroku na shromáždění ICAO, které proběhne v září 2013. Pokud bude na
 shromáždění ICAO jasný a dostatečný pokrok učiněn, Komise navrhne další vhodné
 legislativní opatření. Článek 25a směrnice umožňuje změny činností v oblasti
 letectví, na které se uplatní požadavky vzniklé po dni 1. ledna 2014.
 Provozovatelé letadel, kteří mají v úmyslu provozovat lety na letiště a z
 letišť v EU, by si měli být vědomi toho, že pokud k takovým změnám nedojde,
 budou od roku 2013 odpovědní za emise z letů na tato letiště a z nich. Pokud
 budou opatření podle článku 25a přijata, mohou být předmětem změny i bezplatné
 povolenky přidělené do února 2013 na emise pro rok 2013.
 Další povinnosti u těchto letů zůstávají
 nedotčeny a procentní podíl povolenek, které se vydraží, je i nadále 15 %,
 jak je stanoveno ve směrnici. V důsledku toho bude za rok 2012 vydraženo nižší
 množství povolenek v oblasti letectví, což odráží v poměru nižší celkové množství
 povolenek v oběhu.
 V zájmu urychlení mezinárodních diskusí a
 setrvání EU ve vedoucí pozici v tomto procesu je důležité, aby tento návrh
 rychle schválily Evropský parlament a Rada, v ideálním případě do března 2013. Komise
 potvrzuje, že dokud nebude legislativní proces ukončen, provozovatelé letadel,
 kteří buď neobdrželi bezplatné povolenky na rok 2012, nebo tyto bezplatně
 přidělené povolenky vrátili na příslušný účet, mohou počítat s tím, že Komise
 nebude požadovat od členských států, aby vůči nim přijaly donucovací opatření v
 souvislosti s emisemi z letů na letiště nebo z letišť mimo EU a oblasti úzce
 spojené s EU.
 2012/0328 (COD)
 Návrh
 ROZHODNUTÍ EVROPSKÉHO PARLAMENTU A RADY,
 kterým se stanoví dočasná odchylka od
 směrnice 2003/87/ES Evropského parlamentu a Rady o vytvoření systému pro
 obchodování s povolenkami na emise skleníkových plynů ve Společenství
 (Text s významem pro EHP)
 EVROPSKÝ PARLAMENT A RADA EVROPSKÉ
 UNIE,
 s ohledem na Smlouvu o fungování
 Evropské unie, a zejména na čl. 192 odst. 1 této smlouvy,
 s ohledem na návrh Evropské komise,
 po postoupení návrhu legislativního aktu
 vnitrostátním parlamentům,
 s ohledem na stanovisko Evropského
 hospodářského a sociálního výboru,
 s ohledem na stanovisko Výboru regionů,
 v souladu s řádným legislativním
 postupem,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1) Mezinárodní organizace pro
 civilní letectví dosáhla značného pokroku, aby mohl být v roce 2013 na
 shromáždění ICAO přijat rámec, který státům usnadní uplatňování tržních
 opatření na emise z mezinárodní letecké dopravy, a aby bylo vytvořeno
 celosvětové tržní opatření.
 (2) K usnadnění tohoto pokroku a
 urychlení postupu je vhodné před shromážděním ICAO v roce 2013 odložit
 uplatňování existujících požadavků týkajících se letů na letiště a z letišť
 mimo Unii a oblasti s úzkými hospodářskými vazbami na Unii a společným závazkem
 k boji proti změně klimatu[1].
 Proti provozovatelům letadel by se proto neměla přijímat žádná opatření
 týkající se požadavků na vykazování ověřených emisí a odpovídající vyřazení
 povolenek z letů přilétajících na taková letiště a z nich odlétajících, které
 vyplývají ze směrnice 2003/87/ES Evropského parlamentu a Rady ze dne 13. října
 2003 o vytvoření systému pro obchodování s povolenkami na emise skleníkových
 plynů ve Společenství[2]
 a které vznikly před dnem 1. ledna 2014. Provozovatelé letadel, kteří chtějí
 tyto požadavky i nadále splňovat, by měli mít možnost v plnění pokračovat.
 (3) Aby nedošlo k narušení
 hospodářské soutěže, měla by se tato odchylka vztahovat pouze na provozovatele
 letadel, kteří buď neobdrželi, nebo vrátili všechny bezplatné povolenky, které
 jim byly na takové činnosti přiděleny v roce 2012. Ze stejného důvodu by tyto
 povolenky neměly být brány v úvahu pro účely výpočtu práv na použití
 mezinárodních kreditů v rámci směrnice 2003/87/ES.
 (4) Povolenky, které takovým
 provozovatelům nejsou vydány nebo které jsou vráceny, by měly být zrušeny.
 Počet povolenek v oblasti letectví, které jsou draženy, bude v souladu s čl. 3d
 odst. 1 směrnice 2003/87/ES,
 PŘIJALY TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 Odchylně od článku 16 směrnice 2003/87/ES
 členské státy neučiní žádné opatření proti provozovatelům letadel týkající se
 požadavků uvedených v čl. 12 odst. 2a a čl. 14 odst. 3 směrnice 2003/87/ES,
 které vznikly před dnem 1. ledna 2014 a vztahují se na činnost směřující na
 letiště nebo z letišť v zemích mimo Evropskou unii, které nejsou členy ESVO,
 závislými územími a územími členských států EHP ani zeměmi, jež podepsaly s
 Unií smlouvu o přistoupení, pokud těmto provozovatelům letadel nebyly v roce
 2012 na takovou činnost vydány bezplatné povolenky nebo v případě, že jim
 takové povolenky vydány byly, vrátili odpovídající počet povolenek členským
 státům ke zrušení.
 Článek 2
 Členské státy zruší všechny povolenky pro rok
 2012 na lety směřující na letiště uvedená v článku 1 nebo z těchto letišť,
 které buď nebyly vydány, nebo které jim byly v případě, že vydány byly,
 vráceny.
 Článek 3
 Povolenky zrušené podle článku 2 se neberou v
 úvahu pro účely výpočtu práv na použití mezinárodních kreditů v rámci směrnice
 2003/87/ES.
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí je určeno členským státům.
 Ve Bruselu dne
 Za Evropský parlament Za
 Radu
 předseda předseda
 [1] Včetně
 států ESVO, zemí, které s Unií podepsaly smlouvu o přistoupení, a závislých
 území a území členských států EHP.
 [2] Úř. věst.
 L 275, 25.10.2003, s. 32.