text:
 21.12.2020
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 L 431/32
 REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (EU) 2020/2158 AL COMISIEI
 din 14 decembrie 2020
 de aprobare a unei modificări care nu este minoră a caietului de sarcini al unei denumiri înregistrate în Registrul denumirilor de origine protejate și al indicațiilor geografice protejate „Chabichou du Poitou” (DOP)
 COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,
 având în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,
 având în vedere Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 21 noiembrie 2012 privind sistemele din domeniul calității produselor agricole și alimentare (1), în special articolul 52 alineatul (2),
 întrucât:
 (1)
 În conformitate cu articolul 53 alineatul (1) primul paragraf din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012, Comisia a examinat cererea Franței de aprobare a unei modificări a caietului de sarcini al denumirii de origine protejate „Chabichou du Poitou”, înregistrată în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1107/96 al Comisiei (2), astfel cum a fost modificat prin Regulamentul (CE) nr. 159/2009 al Comisiei (3).
 (2)
 Prin scrisoarea din 4 decembrie 2018, autoritățile franceze au comunicat Comisiei că, în temeiul articolului 15 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012, s-au acordat perioade de tranziție cu o durată limitată cuprinsă între doi și cinci ani pentru operatori care sunt stabiliți pe teritoriul francez și care îndeplinesc condițiile prevăzute la articolul menționat, în conformitate cu Decretul din 7 noiembrie 2018 privind modificarea caietului de sarcini al denumirii de origine protejate „Chabichou du Poitou”, publicat la 14 noiembrie 2018 în Jurnalul Oficial al Republicii Franceze (4). Prin scrisoarea din 28 ianuarie 2020, autoritățile respective au comunicat textul unui nou Decret, din 24 decembrie 2019, publicat la 10 ianuarie 2020 în Jurnalul Oficial al Republicii Franceze (5), de modificare a Decretului din 7 noiembrie 2018 și numele operatorilor care beneficiază de această perioadă de tranziție. Lista acestor operatori este anexată la caietul de sarcini. În cursul procedurii naționale de opoziție, acești operatori, care au comercializat în mod legal produsul „Chabichou du Poitou” în mod continuu timp de cel puțin cinci ani înainte de depunerea cererii, au prezentat declarații de opoziție. Doi operatori au depus o declarație de opoziție cu privire la următoarea dispoziție: Rubrica „Metoda de obținere”: „Prescurgerea cașului este interzisă.” Doi operatori au depus o declarație de opoziție cu privire la următoarea dispoziție: Rubrica „Descrierea produsului”: „«Chabichou du Poitou» este o brânză fabricată în mod exclusiv din lapte [de capră] crud [și integral]” și rubrica „Metoda de obținere”: „Laptele utilizat este lapte de capră crud.” O sută de operatori au depus o declarație de opoziție cu privire la următoarea dispoziție: Rubrica „Metoda de obținere”: „Minimum 75 % din rația anuală a caprelor din turmă provine din aria geografică, și anume 825 kg de substanță uscată per capră anual.” Optsprezece operatori au depus o declarație de opoziție cu privire la următoarea dispoziție: Rubrica „Metoda de obținere”: „Rația este compusă din minimum 55 % furaje, și anume 605 kilograme de substanță uscată per capră anual;”. Optzeci și șase de operatori au depus o declarație de opoziție cu privire la următoarele dispoziții din rubrica „Metoda de obținere”: „Ea [rația suplimentară] conține minimum 150 de kilograme sau 30 % cereale și/sau oleaginoase și/sau proteaginoase care provin din aria geografică.”, „Rația anuală per capră conține minimum 200 de kilograme de substanță uscată sub formă de lucernă sau de leguminoase, originare din aria geografică.” și „Furajele sunt produse integral în aria geografică.”
 (3)
 Deoarece modificarea respectivă nu este minoră în sensul articolului 53 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012, Comisia a publicat cererea de modificare în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene (6), în conformitate cu articolul 50 alineatul (2) litera (a) din regulamentul respectiv.
 (4)
 Deoarece Comisiei nu i s-a comunicat nicio declarație de opoziție în conformitate cu articolul 51 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012, modificarea caietului de sarcini trebuie aprobată,
 ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:
 Articolul 1
 Se aprobă modificarea caietului de sarcini publicată în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene cu privire la denumirea „Chabichou du Poitou” (DOP).
 Articolul 2
 Protecția acordată în temeiul articolului 1 face obiectul perioadei de tranziție acordate de Franța, în temeiul articolului 15 alineatul (4) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1151/2012, operatorilor care îndeplinesc condițiile prevăzute la articolul respectiv, în conformitate cu Decretele din 7 noiembrie 2018 și din 24 decembrie 2019 privind modificarea caietului de sarcini al denumirii de origine protejate „Chabichou du Poitou”, publicate la 14 noiembrie 2018 și, respectiv, la 10 ianuarie 2020 în Jurnalul Oficial al Republicii Franceze.
 Articolul 3
 Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare în a douăzecea zi de la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.
 Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.
 Adoptat la Bruxelles, 14 decembrie 2020.
 Pentru Comisie,
 Pentru Președinte,
 Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI
 Membru al Comisiei
 (1) JO L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.
 (2) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1107/96 al Comisiei din 12 iunie 1996 privind înregistrarea indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine în conformitate cu procedura prevăzută la articolul 17 din Regulamentul (CEE) nr. 2081/92 al Consiliului (JO L 148, 21.6.1996, p. 1).
 (3) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 159/2009 al Comisiei din 25 februarie 2009 de aprobare a unor modificări minore ale caietului de sarcini al unei denumiri înregistrate în Registrul denumirilor de origine protejate și al indicațiilor geografice protejate [Chabichou du Poitou (DOP)] (JO L 53, 26.2.2009, p. 8).
 (4) JORF nr. 0263, 14 noiembrie 2018, textul nr. 36.
 (5) JORF nr. 0008, 10 ianuarie 2020, textul nr. 35.
 (6) JO C 251, 31.7.2020, p. 22.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 23.2.2006
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 53/51
 ROZHODNUTIE SPOLOČNÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 151/2005
 z 2. decembra 2005,
 ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa príloha XIII (Doprava) k Dohode o EHP
 SPOLOČNÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 so zreteľom na Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, zmenenú a doplnenú Protokolom, ktorým sa upravuje Dohoda o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, ďalej len „dohoda“, a najmä na jej článok 98,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Príloha XIII k dohode bola zmenená a doplnená rozhodnutím Spoločného výboru EHP č. 122/2005 (1).
 (2)
 Nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 2320/2002 zo 16. decembra 2002 o ustanovení spoločných pravidiel v oblasti bezpečnostnej ochrany civilného letectva (2) bolo rozhodnutím Spoločného výboru EHP č. 61/2004 so špecifickými úpravami pre určité krajiny začlenené do dohody.
 (3)
 Nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 781/2005 z 24. mája 2005, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa nariadenie (ES) č. 622/2003 o ustanovení opatrení na vykonávanie spoločných základných noriem bezpečnostnej ochrany civilného letectva (3), sa má začleniť do dohody.
 (4)
 Nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 857/2005 zo 6. júna 2005, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa nariadenie (ES) č. 622/2003 o ustanovení opatrení na vykonávanie spoločných základných noriem bezpečnostnej ochrany civilného letectva (4), sa má začleniť do dohody,
 ROZHODOL TAKTO:
 Článok 1
 V bode 66i [nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 622/2003] prílohy XIII k dohode sa dopĺňajú tieto zarážky:
 „—
 32005 R 0781: nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 781/2005 (Ú. v. EÚ L 131, 25.5.2005, s. 24),
 —
 32005 R 0857: nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 857/2005 (Ú. v. EÚ L 143, 7.6.2005, s. 9).“
 Článok 2
 Znenia nariadení (ES) č. 781/2005 a (ES) č. 857/2005 v islandskom a nórskom jazyku, ktoré budú uverejnené v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie, sú autentické.
 Článok 3
 Toto rozhodnutie nadobúda účinnosť 3. decembra 2005 pod podmienkou, že Spoločnému výboru EHP budú zaslané všetky oznámenia podľa článku 103 ods. 1 dohody (5).
 Článok 4
 Toto rozhodnutie sa uverejní v oddiele EHP Úradného vestníka Európskej únie a v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie.
 V Bruseli 2. decembra 2005
 Za Spoločný výbor EHP
 predseda
 HSH Prinz Nikolaus von LIECHTENSTEIN
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 339, 22.12.2005, s. 30.
 (2) Ú. v. ES L 355, 30.12.2002, s. 1. Nariadenie zmenené a doplnené nariadením (ES) č. 849/2004 (Ú. v. EÚ L 158, 30.4.2004, s. 1).
 (3) Ú. v. EÚ L 131, 25.5.2005, s. 24.
 (4) Ú. v. EÚ L 143, 7.6.2005, s. 9.
 (5) Nie sú uvedené žiadne ústavné požiadavky.


type: legislation

text:
 COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS
 Bruxelas, 06.03.1998
 COM(1998) 109 final
 Proposta de
 REGULAMENTO (CE) DO CONSELHO
 que altera o Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 que determina as medidas e compensações
 relativas às reavaliações sensíveis que afectam os rendimentos agrícolas
 (apresentada pela Comissão)
 ---pagebreak--- ---pagebreak--- KXI'OSIÇÂO DOS MOTIVOS
 1. O Regulamento (CEE) n° 724/97 do Conselho, de 22 de Abril de 1997, determina as
 medidas e as compensações relativas às reavaliações sensíveis da taxa de conversão
 agrícola que afectam os rendimentos agrícolas.
 O texto baseia-se no artigo 9o do Regulamento (CEE) n° 3813/92 do Conselho, de
 28 de Dezembro de 1992, que prevê, nomeadamente, que em caso de reavaliação
 sensível, o Conselho, deliberando por maioria qualificada sob proposta da
 Comissão, adoptará Iodas as medidas necessárias, podendo inclusivamente
 estabelecer derrogações às disposições relativas às ajudas.
 2. O Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 apenas se aplica às reavaliações sensíveis
 verificadas entre I de Janeiro de 1997 e o fim do décimo segundo mês seguinte à
 sua publicação, ou seja, até 30 de Abril de 1998.
 É a razão porque a Comissão considera necessário apresentar ao Conselho uma
 proposta de regulamento destinada a cobrir o período que decorre até 31 de
 Dezembro de 1998, último dia antes da introdução do EURO.
 Esta proposta consiste, não na recondução pura e simples do Regulamento (CE) n°
 724/97, prolongando o prazo de validade, mas em introduzir os melhoramentos
 necessários à luz da experiência do ano de 1997.
 O objectivo principal das alterações é, não deixando de manter o essencial do
 sistema em vigor, avaliar mais correctamente a incidência dos movimentos
 agrimonetários sobre às perdas de rendimento, com vista a limitar, na medida do
 possível, as sobrecompensações.
 3. São as seguintes as alterações propostas:
 3.1. A duração do período de observação, no fim do qual o montante máximo da
 ajuda compensatória pode ser anulado ou reduzido, deve ser adaptada pelas
 razões que se seguem.
 ---pagebreak--- No caso dos Estados-membros que participam na moeda única, os
 movimentos monetários cessarão definitivamente em 31 de Dezembro de
 1998. Assim, propõe-se que os períodos de observação terminem nessa data.
 No caso dos Estados-membros que não participarão na moeda única (em I
 de Janeiro de 1999), o período de observação pode ser prolongado para além
 dessa data.
 Dado que esta operação introduz a tomada em consideração da situação de
 mercado e já não apenas da evolução das taxas verdes (ver ponto seguinte), é
 conveniente prolongar o período de observação, que é actualmente de seis
 meses. Seria mais adequado um período de um ano, visto que permitiria
 abranger um ciclo de produção completo. No entanto, é conveniente não
 diferir excessivamente a concessão da ajuda aos produtores que sofrem
 perdas de rendimento. Por conseguinte, propõe-se um meio termo, de 9
 meses.
 No caso de se verificar uma reavaliação sensível durante o período de
 observação de uma reavaliação sensível anterior, o conjunto do período de
 observação não poderá terminar antes de findo o terceiro mês seguinte ao da
 última reavaliação.
 3.2. O sistema regido pelo Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 compreende um modo
 de cálculo do montante máximo das compensações em função da
 percentagem de reavaliação sensível. Não se propõe a alteração desse modo
 de cálculo, a fim de manter a continuidade entre a regulamentação actual e a
 alteração proposta. Em contrapartida, deverão ser introduzidos
 melhoramentos no nível das reduções ou das anulações do montante máximo
 da ajuda, quer se trate do montante inicial, quer das duas fracções seguintes.
 Actualmente, as reduções ou anulações de fracções só podem ser decididas
 em função das consequências, sobre o rendimento, da evolução das taxas de
 conversão agrícolas verificadas durante um determinado período.
 ---pagebreak--- Na prática, isso significa que um aumento da taxa verde subsequente a uma
 reavaliação sensível pode dar origem a uma redução do montante da ajuda,
 ou mesmo a uma supressão de uma ou mais fracções.
 A proposta de regulamento prevê que as reduções ou anulações do montante
 máximo da ajuda ou das segunda ou terceira fracções sejam efectuadas, não
 só em função das laxas de conversão agrícolas, mas também da situação do
 mercado.
 Trata-se de um melhoramento notável: as repercussões reais das alterações
 das taxas verdes sobre os rendimentos dos agricultores são difíceis de
 apreciar, dado que a taxa verde é apenas um elemento que intervém na
 formação dos preços, longe de ser o elemento predominante. Apenas
 raramente existe uma ligação directa e mensurável entre a taxa verde e o
 preço de mercado num dado Estado-membro. Tais situações podem existir,
 por exemplo, quando o preço de mercado segue de muito perto o preço de
 intervenção ou quando ocorre uma reavaliação num momento-chave do ciclo
 de produção ou de comercialização do produto. Mas pode acontecer que, em
 relação a certos sectores da agricultura, o movimento monetário não tenha
 qualquer incidência visível ou demonstrável sobre os preços de mercado. A
 regulamentação deve prever, para tais casos, a possibilidade de reduzir a
 ajuda de maneira selectiva, em função do sector em causa.
 Não se trata de quantificar a perda de rendimento com uma precisão e uma
 exactidão totais, exercício que seria impossível, mas de incluir na
 regulamentação critérios suficientemente simples que criem uma base
 jurídica que permita que não se pague uma compensação nos casos em que
 há uma forte probabilidade de o impacto do movimento agrimonetário sobre
 os rendimentos ser nulo. Trata-se de casos em que, ou a perda de rendimento
 não é revelada de todo pelas estatísticas de mercado, ou é impossível
 explicar através de que mecanismo a reavaliação, na data em que se
 verificou, pôde ter consequências sobre o rendimento agrícola.
 ---pagebreak--- Segundo esta abordagem, a tomada em consideração da situação de mercado
 deverá ser efectuada dos dois modos seguintes:
 3.2.1. Numa primeira análise, quando uma taxa verde baixa num
 Estado-membro na sequência de uma reavaliação sensível, os
 preços de mercado nesse Estado-membro devem baixar
 relativamente aos preços de mercado observados nos Estados-
 membros que não sofreram nenhuma reavaliação. Mas se, num
 dado sector, a comparação entre o preço de mercado do Estado-
 membro em causa e o preço de mercado nos outros Estados-
 membros não revela qualquer baixa relativa, será então muito
 difícil sustentar ter havido uma perda de rendimentos devida ao
 movimento agrimonetário. Nesse caso, uma compensação,
 baseada apenas nas evoluções da taxa verde, conduziria, com toda
 a probabilidade, a uma sobrecompensaçâo que implicaria não só
 despesas orçamentais, mas também possíveis distorções de
 concorrência.
 Para suavizar este inconveniente, o montante da ajuda poderia ser
 diminuído, relativamente a um dado sector, se o preço médio de
 mercado no Estado-membro em causa, durante o período de
 observação ou entre o início da fracção anterior e o início do mês
 anterior ao primeiro mês da fracção em causa for igual ou
 superior à média dos preços de mercado dos Estados-membros
 que não sofreram uma reavaliação sensível durante o mesmo
 período.
 ---pagebreak--- 3.2.2. A abordagem descrita no ponto anterior baseia-sc na observação
 estatística do preço de mercado. Todavia, será útil que não nos
 limitemos a uma abordagem estatística do preço, mas que
 tenhamos igualmente em conta os mecanismos através dos quais
 uma reavaliação que ocorra num dado momento pode ter ou não
 consequências sobre os mercados agrícolas. Isso implica que
 consideremos a situação da data da reavaliação sensível no ciclo
 de produção ou de comercialização nos diferentes sectores. Mais
 precisamente, o facto de se afigurar que, para um regime de
 ajuda, o conjunto dos factos geradores já se tinha verificado
 quando o movimento agrimonetário se concretizou não permite
 concluir que a reavaliação teve um impacto negativo sobre os
 preços de mercado, nem tão pouco sobre o rendimento. Em tal
 caso, deve ser suprimida a ajuda relativa ao sector em causa. Essa
 supressão pode ser limitada à produção de determinados meses
 do período considerado.
 E óbvio que, se uma tal supressão ou redução for aplicada à
 primeira fracção, a redução automática de um terço relativamente
 à segunda fracção e de dois terços relativamente à terceira fracção
 deverá ser calculada abstraindo-nos da citada supressão ou
 redução. Com efeito, se ocorrer uma reavaliação sensível no
 momento em que ela não pode ter efeitos sobre a campanha em
 curso, é muito possível que o venha a ter sobre as campanhas
 seguintes. A redução ou a supressão aplicada à primeira fracção
 em execução do critério "do facto gerador" não deve, pois, ter
 uma repercussão automática sobre as fracções seguintes.
 3.3. A regulamentação actual prevê que não se pague nenhuma ajuda
 relativamente às reavaliações sensíveis cuja percentagem de sensibilidade for
 inferior a 0,5%.
 ---pagebreak--- Propõe-se aumentar essa percentagem, de modo a evitar o desencadeamento
 do sistema das compensações em relação a movimentos monetários
 excessivamente fracos.
 A diminuição do desvio monetário de uma moeda na sequência de uma
 reavaliação sensível é de pelo menos 2,5%, devido à franquia de 5% que
 desencadeia, após os períodos de confirmação, a divisão do desvio monetário
 em dois. A percentagem de sensibilidade máxima que corresponde a uma
 redução do desvio monetário de metade (2,5 pontos) é 2,56%. Esta ligeira
 diferença explica-se pelo facto de a percentagem de sensibilidade ser
 expressa em relação a uma taxa verde e não em pontos de redução do desvio.
 Como a regulamentação admite que uma sobrevalorização dos preços
 garantidos pode ir até 5% sem consequências, pode haver razões para
 considerar, a contrario, que um reajustamento da taxa verde devido a
 superação dessa franquia não deve dar origem à compensação pela parte
 correspondente da reavaliação sensível.
 Assim, a Comissão propõe ao Conselho que não se tenham em conta as
 reavaliações sensíveis cuja percentagem de sensibilidade não excede 2,6%
 (arredondado).
 Na regulamentação actual, trata-se de um adiamento (de apenas 0,5%) até à
 reavaliação seguinte e não de uma franquia. A formulação da disposição em
 causa deve ser adaptada, de maneira a que a parte da reavaliação que não
 excede 2,6% não seja reportada, mas sim anulada. A noção de reporte de
 imputação de uma reavaliação sensível perde grande parte do significado no
 caso de um sistema que apenas estará em vigor até 31 de Dezembro de 1998.
 No entanto, se se verificarem várias reavaliações sensíveis e sucessivas entre
 a entrada em vigor do presente regulamento e 31 de Dezembro de 1998, a
 franquia de 2,6% aplicar-se-á à reavaliação acumulada e não a cada uma
 delas tomada separadamente.
 4. Dado que o Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 se aplica apenas às reavaliações
 verificadas até 30 de Abril de 1998, é conveniente que a presente alteração entre em
 vigor o mais tardar no dia 1 de Maio de 1998.
 ils
 ---pagebreak--- Proposta de
 IM:<;IILAMKNTO(CK)IN" IH> CONSELHO
 de
 que altera o Regulamento (CE) n" 724/97 que determina as medidas e compensações
 relativas às reavaliações sensíveis que afectam os rendimentos agrícolas
 O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 fendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia,
 fendo em conta o Regulamento (CEE) n° 3813/92 do Conselho, de 28 de Dezembro de
 1992, relativo à unidade de conta e às taxas de conversão a aplicar no âmbito da política
 agrícola comum1, e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 9°,
 fendo em conta a proposta da Comissão,
 Considerando que Q Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 do Conselho, de 22 de Abril de 19972,
 determina as medidas e compensa9Ões relativas às reavalia9ões sensíveis que afectam os
 rendimentos agrícolas; que este regulamento não se aplica às reavalia9Ões sensíveis que
 possam verificar-se depois de 30 de Abril de 1998; que, por conseguinte, é conveniente
 alterar esse regulamento para que fiquem cobertas as reavalia9ões que possam ocorrer até
 à introdu9ão da moeda única;
 Considerando que o n° 3 do artigo 4° do Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 prevê que o
 montante máximo da ajuda pode ser reduzido ou anulado em fun9ão do efeito sobre o
 rendimento da evolu9ão das taxas de conversão registadas durante um certo período de
 observa9ão; que, a fim de evitar eventuais compensa9ões excessivas das perdas de
 rendimento efectivamente incorridas, é também necessário ter em conta a situa9ão de
 mercado;
 1
 JO n° L 387 de 31.12.1992, p. 1. Regulamento com a última alteração que lhe foi dada pelo
 Regulamento (CE) n° 150/95.
 2
 JOn°l. 108 de 25.4.1997, p. 9.
 ---pagebreak--- Considerando que a introdução da moeda única cm I de Janeiro de 1999 acabará com as
 llutuaçõcs das taxas de conversão agrícolas no que se refere aos Estados-membros que
 nela participarão; que, por conseguinte, é apropriado fixar em 31 de Dezembro de 1998 o
 termo do período de observação em re!a9ão a esses Estados-membros;
 Considerando que, em rela9ão aos outros Estados-membros, o período de observa9ão
 pode ser prolongado para além de 31 de Dezembro de 1998; que, com vista a ter em
 conta a situação de mercado, é conveniente aumentar o citado período para nove meses,
 em vez de seis, prevendo um prolongamento suplementar em caso de ocorrência de nova
 reavaliação sensível durante o período de observação da anterior;
 Considerando que do artigo 4o do Regulamento (CEE) n° 3813/92 decorre que nenhuma
 baixa de laxa de conversão agrícola pode ser inferior a 2,56%; que, a fim de limitar o
 risco de compensações excessivas em caso de pequenas reavaliações sensíveis, é
 apropriado não conceder a ajuda em relação à parte do montante que corresponde a
 menos de 2,6% de reavaliação sensível;
 Considerando que as reduções ou supressões das segunda e terceira fracções devem
 também ser decididas de acordo com a situação do mercado;
 Considerando que é conveniente definir o modo como será tida em conta a situação de
 mercado; que para esse efeito pode, por um lado, comparar-se a evolução dos preços de
 mercado no Estado-membro que sofreu uma reavaliação sensível com a verificada nos
 Estados-membros que não a sofreram durante o período de observação e, por outro,
 atender-se à situação da data de reavaliação sensível em relação aos factos geradores nos
 vários sectores,
 ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO:
 10
 ---pagebreak--- Artigo J "
 O Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97 é alterado do seguinte modo:
 1. No artigo Io, o n° 1 passa a ter a seguinte redac9ão:
 " 1 . 0 presente regulamento aplica-se em caso de reavalia9ão sensível ocorrida a
 partir de 1 de Janeiro de 1997 e antes de 1 de Janeiro de 1999."
 2. O artigo 4° é alterado do seguinte modo:
 a) No n° 3, são aditados ao primeiro parágrafo os termos "e tendo em conta,
 no que se refere ao montante calculado em conformidade com o primeiro
 parágrafo do n° 2, a situa9ão do mercado verificada durante o citado
 período" e os segundo e terceiros parágrafos passam a ter a seguinte
 redacção:
 "Em relação às moedas dos Estados-membros que adoptarem a moeda
 única em conformidade com o Tratado, o período de observa9ão termina
 em 31 de Dezembro de 1998. Em rela9ão às outras moedas, o período de
 observação termina no íim do nono mês seguinte ao da reavaliação
 sensível. Todavia, quando ocorrer uma reavaliação sensível durante o
 período de observação de uma reavaliação sensível anterior, o conjunto do
 período de observação não pode terminar antes do fim do terceiro mês
 seguinte ao da última reavaliação.
 Contudo, não será concedida qualquer ajuda em relação à parte do
 montante calculado em conformidade com o primeiro parágrafo do n° 2 e
 o primeiro parágrafo do presente número que não exceda 2,6% da
 reavaliação sensível entre a entrada em vigor do presente regulamento e o
 dia 31 de Dezembro de 1998."
 11
 ---pagebreak--- b) No n° 4, é aditada a seguinte frase ao primeiro parágrafo: "Todavia, em
 caso de aplicação do segundo parágrafo, alínea b), do n° 4-A, para efeitos
 de cálculo do montante da primeira fracção da ajuda, a redução de pelo
 menos um terço c calculada com base no montante da primeira fracção
 que teria sido concedida se não tivesse sido aplicado o segundo parágrafo,
 alínea b), do n°4-A."
 c) No n° 4, são aditados ao segundo parágrafo os lermos "e tendo em conta,
 no que se refere ao montante calculado em conformidade com o primeiro
 parágrafo do n° 2, a situação do mercado verificada durante o mesmo
 período."
 d) É inserido o seguinte n° 4-A:
 "Para efeitos do primeiro parágrafo do n° 3 e do segundo parágrafo do n°
 4, a situação de mercado será tida em conta de acordo com o método
 seguinte:
 Um ou mais sectores podem dar origem à redução do montante de uma ou
 mais fracções se se verificar:
 a) Que o preço médio de mercado do Estado-membro em causa, durante o
 período de observação referido no n° 3, ou entre o início da fracção
 anterior e o início do mês que precede o primeiro mês da fracção em
 causa, é igual ou superior à média dos preços de mercado dos Estados-
 membros que não sofreram reavaliação sensível durante o mesmo período;
 ou
 b) Que a situação da data de reavaliação sensível, relativamente aos factos
 geradores do sector considerado, não permite concluir que a citada
 reavaliação teve consequências sobre a totalidade do período considerado.
 Para efeitos de aplicação da alínea a), a comparação dos preços de
 mercado é efectuada com base num índice 100 em moeda nacional no dia
 da reavaliação sensível."
 12
 ---pagebreak--- Artigo 2"
 O presente regulamento entra em vigor no sétimo dia seguinte ao da sua publica9ão no
 Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias.
 O presente regulamento é aplicável às reavalia9Ões sensíveis ocorridas a partir de 1 de
 Maio de 1998.
 O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente
 aplicável em todos os Estados-membros.
 Feito em Bruxelas, em Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 13
 ---pagebreak--- FICHA FINANCEIRA
 1. RUBRICA ORÇAMENTAL : 390 DOTAÇÕES : 505 milhões'de ecus
 2. DESIGNAÇÃO DA ACÇÃO : Proposta de regulamento do Conselho que altera o Regulamento (CE) n° 724/97
 que determina medidas e compensações relativas às revalorizações sensíveis que afectam os rendimentos agrícolas
 3. BASE JURÍDICA : artigo 9 o do Regulamento (CEE) n° 3813/92 do Conselho
 OBJECTIVOS DA ACÇÃO :
 1) Prorrogação do Reg. 724/97 de modo a abranger o período compreendido entre 1.5.1998 e 31.12.1998
 2) Introdução de determinadas alterações, conservando simultaneamente em vigor o ssencial do sistema, com
 vista a uma melhor avaliação da incidência dos movimentos agrimonetários sobre as perdas de rendimento e
 limitar, assim, na medida do possível, as sobrecompensações
 PERÍODO DE EXERCÍCIO EM EXERCÍCIO
 5. CONSEQUÊNCIAS FINANCEIRAS 12 MESES CURSO (98) SEGUINTE (99)
 milhões de ecus milhões de ecus milhões de ecus
 5.0 DESPESAS A CARGO
 - DO ORÇAMENTO DA CE (D (D
 (RESTITUIÇÕES/INTERVENÇÕES)
 5.1 RECEITAS
 2000 2001 2002 2003
 milhões de ecus milhões de ecus milhões de ecus milhões de ecus
 (D (D
 5.0.1 PREVISÃO DAS DESPESAS
 5.1.1 PREVISÃO DAS RECEITAS
 5.2 MODO DE CALCULO
 6.0 FINANCIAMENTO POSSÍVEL POR DOTAÇÕES INSCRITAS NO CAPÍTULO
 CORRESPONDENTE DO ORÇAMENTO EM EXECUÇÃO SIM/NÃO
 6.1 FINANCIAMENTO POSSÍVEL POR TRANSFERÊNCIA ENTRE CAPÍTULOS
 DO ORÇAMENTO EM EXECUÇÃO SIM/NÃO
 6.2 NECESSIDADE DE UM ORÇAMENTO SUPLEMENTAR SIM/NÃO
 6.3 DOTAÇÕES A INSCREVER NOS ORÇAMENTOS FUTUROS SIM/NÃO
 OBSERVAÇÕES :
 (1) O eventual impacto orçamental desta proposta depende da evolução futura das moedas, pelo que, neste momento,
 é impossível prevê-lo ou quantificá-lo. Contudo, a proposta deverá conduzir a economias em comparação com
 uma simples prorrogação do Reg. 724/97, dado que torna mais restritivas as condições de concessão de uma ajuda
 compensatória em caso de revalorização sensível de uma ou mais taxas de conversão agrícolas.
 ---pagebreak--- ---pagebreak--- ISSN 0257-9553
 COM(98) 109 final
 DOCUMENTOS
 PT 03 04 17
 N. ' de catálogo : CB-C0-98-111-PT-C
 ISBN 92-78-31376-9
 Serviço das Publicações Oficiais das Comunidades Europeias
 L-2985 Luxemburgo
 \t>


text:
 31.12.2014
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 L 373/3
 PROTOKOLS
 Partnerības un sadarbības nolīgumam, ar ko izveido partnerību starp Eiropas Kopienām un to dalībvalstīm, no vienas puses, un Krievijas Federāciju, no otras puses, lai ņemtu vērā Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanos Eiropas Savienībai
 BEĻĢIJAS KARALISTE,
 BULGĀRIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 ČEHIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 DĀNIJAS KARALISTE,
 VĀCIJAS FEDERATĪVĀ REPUBLIKA,
 IGAUNIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 ĪRIJA,
 GRIEĶIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 SPĀNIJAS KARALISTE,
 FRANCIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 HORVĀTIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 ITĀLIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 KIPRAS REPUBLIKA,
 LATVIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 LIETUVAS REPUBLIKA,
 LUKSEMBURGAS LIELHERCOGISTE,
 UNGĀRIJA,
 MALTAS REPUBLIKA,
 NĪDERLANDES KARALISTE,
 AUSTRIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 POLIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 PORTUGĀLES REPUBLIKA,
 RUMĀNIJA,
 SLOVĒNIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 SLOVĀKIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 SOMIJAS REPUBLIKA,
 ZVIEDRIJAS KARALISTE,
 LIELBRITĀNIJAS UN ZIEMEĻĪRIJAS APVIENOTĀ KARALISTE,
 Līguma par Eiropas Savienību, Līguma par Eiropas Savienības darbību un Eiropas Atomenerģijas kopienas dibināšanas līguma līgumslēdzējas puses, turpmāk “dalībvalstis”,
 EIROPAS SAVIENĪBA, turpmāk “Savienība”, un
 EIROPAS ATOMENERĢIJAS KOPIENA,
 no vienas puses, un
 KRIEVIJAS FEDERĀCIJA,
 no otras puses,
 abas kopā turpmāk “puses”,
 TĀ KĀ Partnerības un sadarbības nolīgums, ar ko izveido partnerību starp Eiropas Kopienām un to dalībvalstīm, no vienas puses, un Krievijas Federāciju, no otras puses, turpmāk “nolīgums”, tika parakstīts 1994. gada 24. jūnijā Korfu;
 TĀ KĀ Līgums par Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanos Eiropas Savienībai tika parakstīts 2011. gada 9. decembrī Briselē;
 TĀ KĀ, ievērojot 6. panta 2. punktu Aktā par Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanās nosacījumiem un pielāgojumus Līgumā par Eiropas Savienību, Līgumā par Eiropas Savienības darbību un Eiropas Atomenerģijas kopienas dibināšanas līgumā, par Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanos nolīgumam ir jāvienojas, noslēdzot nolīguma protokolu;
 ŅEMOT VĒRĀ Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanos Eiropas Savienībai 2013. gada 1. jūlijā,
 IR VIENOJUŠĀS PAR TURPMĀKO.
 1. pants
 Ar šo Horvātijas Republika kļūst par nolīguma līgumslēdzēju pusi. Horvātijas Republika tāpat kā pārējās dalībvalstis pieņem un ievēro nolīgumu, tajā pašā dienā parakstītajam Nobeiguma aktam pievienotās kopīgās deklarācijas, deklarācijas un vēstuļu apmaiņu, kā arī 1997. gada 21. maija nolīguma protokolu, kurš stājās spēkā 2000. gada 1. decembrī, 2004. gada 27. aprīļa nolīguma protokolu, kurš stājās spēkā 2005. gada 1. martā, un 2007. gada 23. aprīļa nolīguma protokolu, kurš stājās spēkā 2008. gada 1. maijā.
 2. pants
 Pēc šā protokola parakstīšanas Savienība paziņo nolīguma, Nobeiguma akta un visu tam pievienoto dokumentu, kā arī 1997. gada 21. maija, 2004. gada 27. aprīļa un 2007. gada 23. aprīļa nolīgumu protokolu horvātu valodas versiju dalībvalstīm un Krievijas Federācijai. Horvātu valodas versija no šā protokola provizoriskās piemērošanas dienas kļūst autentiska saskaņā ar tādiem pašiem nosacījumiem kā nolīguma versijas, kas sastādītas angļu, bulgāru, čehu, dāņu, franču, grieķu, holandiešu, igauņu, itāļu, latviešu, lietuviešu, maltiešu, poļu, portugāļu, rumāņu, slovāku, slovēņu, somu, spāņu, ungāru, vācu, zviedru un krievu valodā.
 3. pants
 Šis protokols ir nolīguma sastāvdaļa.
 4. pants
 1. Šo protokolu katra puse apstiprina saskaņā ar savām procedūrām. Puses paziņo viena otrai par šim nolūkam vajadzīgo procedūru pabeigšanu. Apstiprināšanas dokumentus deponē Eiropas Savienības Padomes Ģenerālsekretariātā.
 2. Šis protokols stājas spēkā nākamā mēneša pirmajā dienā pēc tam, kad deponēts pēdējais apstiprināšanas dokuments.
 3. Šo protokolu provizoriski piemēro pēc 15 dienām no tā parakstīšanas brīža.
 4. Šo protokolu piemēro pušu attiecībām nolīguma satvarā no Horvātijas Republikas pievienošanās dienas Eiropas Savienībai.
 5. pants
 Šis protokols ir sagatavots divos eksemplāros angļu, bulgāru, čehu, dāņu, franču, grieķu, holandiešu, horvātu, igauņu, itāļu, latviešu, lietuviešu, maltiešu, poļu, portugāļu, rumāņu, slovāku, slovēņu, somu, spāņu, ungāru, vācu, zviedru un krievu valodā, un visi teksti ir vienlīdz autentiski.
 TO APLIECINOT, attiecīgie pilnvarotie ir parakstījuši šo protokolu.
 Съставено в Брюксел на седемнадесети декември две хиляди и четиринадесета година.
 Hecho en Bruselas, el diecisiete de diciembre de dos mil catorce.
 V Bruselu dne sedmnáctého prosince dva tisíce čtrnáct.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles den syttende december to tusind og fjorten.
 Geschehen zu Brüssel am siebzehnten Dezember zweitausendvierzehn.
 Kahe tuhande neljateistkümnenda aasta detsembrikuu seitsmeteistkümnendal päeval Brüsselis.
 Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις δέκα εφτά Δεκεμβρίου δύο χιλιάδες δεκατέσσερα.
 Done at Brussels on the seventeenth day of December in the year two thousand and fourteen.
 Fait à Bruxelles, le dix-sept décembre deux mille quatorze.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu sedamnaestog prosinca dvije tisuće četrnaeste.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, addì diciassette dicembre duemilaquattordici.
 Briselē, divi tūkstoši četrpadsmitā gada septiņpadsmitajā decembrī.
 Priimta du tūkstančiai keturioliktų metų gruodžio septynioliktą dieną Briuselyje.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, a kétezer-tizennegyedik év december havának tizenhetedik napján.
 Magħmul fi Brussell, fis-sbatax-il jum ta’ Diċembru tas-sena elfejn u erbatax.
 Gedaan te Brussel, de zeventiende december tweeduizend veertien.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia siedemnastego grudnia roku dwa tysiące czternastego.
 Feito em Bruxelas, em dezassete de dezembro de dois mil e catorze.
 Întocmit la Bruxelles la șaptesprezece decembrie două mii paisprezece.
 V Bruseli sedemnásteho decembra dvetisícštrnásť.
 V Bruslju, dne sedemnajstega decembra leta dva tisoč štirinajst.
 Tehty Brysselissä seitsemäntenätoista päivänä joulukuuta vuonna kaksituhattaneljätoista.
 Som skedde i Bryssel den sjuttonde december tjugohundrafjorton.
 Совершено в г. Брюсселе семнадцатого декабря две тысячи четырнадцатого года.
 За държавите-членки
 Por los Estados miembros
 Za členské státy
 For medlemsstaterne
 Für die Mitgliedstaaten
 Liikmesriikide nimel
 Για τα κράτη μέλη
 For the Member States
 Pour les États membres
 Za države članice
 Per gli Stati membri
 Dalībvalstu vārdā –
 Valstybių narių vardu
 A tagállamok részéről
 Għall-Istati Membri
 Voor de lidstaten
 W imieniu Państw Członkowskich
 Pelos Estados-Membros
 Pentru statele membre
 Za členské štáty
 Za države članice
 Jäsenvaltioiden puolesta
 För medlemsstaterna
 За государства-члень
 За Европейския съюз
 Рог la Unión Europea
 Za Evropskou unii
 For Den Europæiske Union
 Für die Europäische Union
 Euroopa Liidu nimel
 Για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
 For the European Union
 Pour l'Union européenne
 Za Europsku uniju
 Per l'Unione europea
 Eiropas Savienības vārdā –
 Europos Sąjungos vardu
 Az Európai Unió részéről
 Għall-Unjoni Ewropea
 Voor de Europese Unie
 W imieniu Unii Europejskiej
 Pela União Europeia
 Pentru Uniunea Europeană
 Za Európsku úniu
 Za Evropsko unijo
 Euroopan unionin puolesta
 För Europeiska unionen
 За Евроиейский союз
 За Европейската общност за атомна енергия
 Por la Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica
 Za Evropské společenství pro atomovou energii
 For Det Europæiske Atomenergifællesskab
 Für die Europäische Atomgemeinschaft
 Euroopa Aatomienergiaühenduse nimel
 Για την Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα Ατομικής Ενέργειας
 For the European Atomic Energy Community
 Pour la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique
 Za Europsku zajednicu za atomsku energiju
 Per la Comunità europea dell'energia atomica
 Eiropas Atomenerģijas Kopienas vārdā –
 Europos atominės energijos bendrijos vardu
 az Európai Atomenergia-közösség részéről
 F'isem il-Komunità Ewropea tal-Enerġija Atomika
 Voor de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie
 W imieniu Europejskiej Wspólnoty Energii Atomowej
 Pela Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atómica
 Pentru Comunitatea Europeană a Energiei Atomice
 za Európske spoločenstvo pre atómovú energiu
 Za Evropsko skupnost za atomsko energijo
 Euroopan atomienergiajärjestön puolesta
 För Europeiska atomenergigemenskapen
 За Европейское сообщество по атомной знергии
 За Руската Федерация
 Por la Federación de Rusia
 Za Ruskou Federaci
 For Den Russiske Føderation
 Für die Russische Föderation
 Venemaa Föderatsiooni nimel
 Για τη Ρωσική Ομοσπονδία
 For the Russian Federation
 Pour la Fédération de Russie
 Per la Federazione Russa
 Krievijas Federācijas vārdā –
 Rusijos Federacijos vardu
 Az Orosz Föderáció részéről
 Għall-Federazzjoni Russa
 Voor de Russische Federatie
 W imieniu Federacji Rosyjskiej
 Pela Federação da Rússia
 Pentru Federația Rusă
 Za Ruskú Federáciu
 Za Rusko Federacijo
 Venäjän Federaation puolesta
 För Ryska Federationen
 За Pоссийскую Федерацию


type: other

text:
Obsah stanov SVJ dle nového občanského zákoníku (NOZ 89/2012 Sb.) - BEKR partners, s.r.o.BEKR partners, s.r.o.
 Obsah stanov SVJ dle nového občanského zákoníku (NOZ 89/2012 Sb.)
 Společenství vlastníků jednotek, dále jen „SVJ“ jsou povinna ve lhůtě 3 let přizpůsobit své stanovy donucujícím ustanovením NOZ a jejich úplné znění ve formě notářského zápis doručit rejstříkovému soudu k založení do sbírky listin, přičemž každá změna stanov musí být vyhotovena ve formě notářského zápisu a v úplném znění doručena do sbírky listin. V § 1200 odst. 2 NOZ obsahuje povinné náležitosti stanov, které musí být v uvedené lhůtě zapracovány.
 Název SVJ, který musí nově obsahovat sousloví „společenství vlastníků“ a označení domu, pro který SVJ vzniklo. Řada SVJ tak bude nucena měnit svůj název, neboť stará právní úprava stanovila pouze povinné slovo „společenství“. Ve smyslu § 3042 NOZ je však povinností svůj název změnit ve lhůtě 2 let. Ke změně názvu bude nutná změna stanov za přítomnosti notáře na shromáždění a zápis nového názvu do rejstříku společenství vlastníků jednotek.
 Sídlo určené v domě, pro který SVJ vzniklo. Dřívější právní úprava žádné omezení ohledně sídla SVJ neobsahovala. Pokud je tedy sídlo SVJ umístěno jinde, bude nutné jej změnit, a to prostřednictvím stanov a zápisem do rejstříku SVJ.
 Členská práva a povinnosti vlastníků jednotek, jakož i způsob jejich uplatňování. Práva a povinnosti členů SVJ obsahují i stanovy dle staré právní úpravy, novinkou však je povinnost upravit i způsob jejich uplatňování. Práva a povinnosti vlastníků jednotek upravuje NOZ zejména v § 1175 – § 1184, přičemž ve stanovách je možno tato práva a povinnosti upravit podrobněji nebo je doplnit o nová ustanovení, která ovšem nesmí odporovat NOZ. Jako příklad členského práva lze uvést právo být volen do orgánů SVJ jako jejich člen. Způsob uplatňování práv a povinností lze pak spatřovat např. v ustanovení o možnosti výkonu hlasovacího práva na shromáždění prostřednictvím zplnomocněného zástupce, nebo právo podávat námitky výboru elektronickou cestou apod.
 Určení orgánů, jejich působnosti, počtu členů volených orgánů a jejich funkční období, jakož i způsobu svolávání, jednání a usnášení. Ustanovení NOZ určuje základní orgány SVJ, a to shromáždění jako nejvyšší orgán a výbor nebo předsedu SVJ jako orgán statutární, přičemž tyto orgány jsou povinné. Ve stanovách je pak možnost určit i další orgány, jako je např. kontrolní komise, revizor, stavební výbor apod. Stanovy pak určují i působnost všech orgánů, počet členů orgánu a jeho funkční období, a to jednoznačným číslem. Na rozdíl od ostatních pravidel, určení počtu členů a funkčního období orgánu se bude týkat jen orgánů volených. Pravidla pro způsob svolávání, jednání a usnášení pak bude nutné stanovit opět pro orgány všechny, tedy pro ty volené i pro shromáždění. Podrobněji se orgánům SVJ budeme věnovat ve zvláštním článku.
 Určení prvních členů statutárního orgánu. Půjde o jmenovité určení členů výboru nebo osoby předsedy, kteří zastávali své funkce jako první po vzniku SVJ. Uvede se jméno a příjmení, rodné číslo nebo datum narození a bydliště, u právnické osoby pak firma, sídlo a IČ.
 Pravidla pro správu domu a pozemku a užívání společných částí. Tato pravidla nebyla dříve ve stanovách obligatorně upravena, nicméně řada stanov je obsahuje. Podle staré právní úpravy bylo tyto skutečnosti nutné uvést v tzv. prohlášení vlastníka. V současné době prohlášení vlastníka pravidla pro správu rovněž obsahovat musí, a to prostřednictvím stanov v případě vzniku SVJ, které musí být součástí prohlášení vlastníka. Když SVJ při rozdělení domu na jednotky nevzniká, obsahuje tato pravidla prohlášení vlastníka přímo. Některá pravidla pro správu domu i pravidla pro užívání společných částí jsou již v NOZ obsažena (např. § 1183 a násl. NOZ), stanovy je pak mohou upravit podrobněji, případně se od nich odchýlit, pokud to je umožněno. Jde např. o problematiku užívání společných částí domu výlučně některými z vlastníků jednotek, určení rozdílného hlasovacího kvora shromáždění než které udává NOZ, pravidla pro předkládání výsledku hospodaření apod. Realizace pravidel je pak svěřena do rukou výboru i shromáždění, které např. může určit osobu, která bude pověřena některými činnostmi správy domu.
 Pravidla pro tvorbu rozpočtu SVJ, pro příspěvky na správu domu a úhradu cen služeb a pro způsob určení jejich výše placené jednotlivými vlastníky jednotek. Rozhodování v oblasti hospodaření je svěřeno do výlučné působnosti shromáždění, přičemž stanovy SVJ určí pravidla pro tvorbu rozpočtu a klíč k určení výše jednotlivých plateb, jejich splatnost, vyúčtování, pravidla pro řešení neplatičů atd. Je ovšem nutné pamatovat na to, že vše musí být v souladu s NOZ, kde jsou některá pravidla již stanovena (např. § 1180 a násl.). K této problematice rovněž podrobněji v samostatném článku.
 Stanovy SVJ je nutné upravit ve lhůtě 3 let od 1.1.2014 a zapracovat do nich obligatorní náležitosti dle NOZ. Ve lhůtě 2 let je nutné upravit název SVJ, který musí nově obsahovat sousloví „společenství vlastníků“. Dalšími obligatorními náležitostmi stanov je úprava členských práv a povinností, problematika orgánů SVJ a určení prvních členů orgánu statutárního, dále pravidla pro správu domu a pravidla pro hospodaření SVJ, jakož i povinné umístění sídla SVJ v domě, pro které SVJ vzniklo.


text:
Bundesfinanzhof, Beschluss vom 26.10.1998 mit dem Az.: I B 30/98 /* Banner Ads */
 Beschluss verkündet am 26.10.1998
 Aktenzeichen: I B 30/98
 Rechtsgebiete: KStG, FGO
 KStG § 47 Abs. 1
 FGO § 115
 I. Die Klägerin und Beschwerdeführerin (Klägerin) ist eine GmbH, deren Gesellschaftsanteile je zur Hälfte von den Eheleuten A gehalten werden. Beide Gesellschafter sind zugleich Geschäftsführer der Klägerin.
 Nachdem die Klägerin zunächst Steuererklärungen für das Streitjahr 1990 nicht abgegeben hatte, erließ der Beklagte und Beschwerdegegner (das Finanzamt --FA--) ihr gegenüber einen Körperschaftsteuerbescheid, einen Gewerbesteuermeßbescheid und einen Feststellungsbescheid gemäß § 47 Abs. 1 des Körperschaftsteuergesetzes (KStG), in denen er die Besteuerungsgrundlagen schätzte. Hierbei setzte er das zu versteuernde Einkommen der Klägerin mit 35 000 DM und den Gewerbeertrag mit 36 500 DM an. Im Verlauf des deswegen eingeleiteten Klageverfahrens gab die Klägerin Steuererklärungen für das Streitjahr ab, aus denen sich ein Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte in Höhe von 213 DM und unter Berücksichtigung eines Verlustabzugs aus dem Vorjahr (745 DM) ein verbleibender Verlustabzug in Höhe von 532 DM ergab. Dieser Betrag wurde zugleich als gewerbesteuerlicher Gewinn erklärt. Ein Begleitschreiben zu den Erklärungen enthält u.a. die Angabe, daß "die Daten ... zutreffend ermittelt" worden seien, mit dem Zusatz "Beweis: Sachverständigengutachten".
 Im weiteren Verlauf des Verfahrens reichte die Klägerin beim FA einen Jahresabschluß für das Streitjahr ein, aus dem sich ebenfalls die genannten Werte ergeben. Hierauf wies sie das Finanzgericht (FG) mit Schreiben vom 25. November 1996 hin, wobei sie zugleich ihr Beweisangebot wiederholte. Daraufhin erließ das FG einen Beschluß des Inhalts, daß zum Beweis der inhaltlichen Richtigkeit des Jahresabschlusses ein Gutachten des Wirtschaftsprüfers und Steuerberaters P eingeholt werden solle.
 P forderte in der Folge die Klägerin zur Vorlage bestimmter Unterlagen (u.a. Gesellschaftsvertrag, Mietverträge, Vereinbarungen mit den Geschäftsführern, Aufschlüsselung mehrerer Buchführungskonten) auf. Dem kam die Klägerin trotz Erinnerung durch das FG nicht nach; sie begründete dies dem FG gegenüber im wesentlichen damit, daß P ihr gegenüber unzumutbare Anforderungen gestellt habe. Nachdem daraufhin das FA und das FG insbesondere die Richtigkeit der im Jahresabschluß enthaltenen Positionen "sonstige Forderungen" (169 577,91 DM), "sonstige Rückstellungen" (102 000 DM) und "Raumkosten" (35 000 DM) in Zweifel gezogen hatten, führte sie hierzu schriftsätzlich sowie in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor dem FG folgendes aus:
 Bei den Raumkosten handele es sich um die anteiligen Kosten des Einfamilienhauses der Eheleute A, das von ihr --der Klägerin-- zu betrieblichen Zwecken mitbenutzt worden sei. Eine entsprechende Kostenverteilung sei bereits abgesprochen und praktiziert worden, als Herr A ein Einzelunternehmen betrieben habe; an dieser Handhabung habe man festgehalten, nachdem sie --die Klägerin-- den Geschäftsbetrieb des Einzelunternehmens übernommen und fortgeführt habe. Da die Kosten noch nicht abgerechnet gewesen seien, sei der Betrag unter "sonstige Rückstellungen" passiviert worden. In dieselbe Bilanzposition seien Verbindlichkeiten im Zusammenhang mit noch nicht abgerechneten Fremdleistungen eingegangen; diese Leistungen seien u.a. von Herrn A sowie von dessen Sohn und seinem Bruder erbracht worden. Die Bilanzposition "sonstige Forderungen" erfasse im wesentlichen Anzahlungen für die noch nicht abgerechneten Subunternehmerleistungen und Raumkosten. Im Bestreitensfall könne hierzu der Prozeßbevollmächtigte der Klägerin --Steuerberater S-- als Zeuge vernommen werden.
 Das FG wies die Klage ab, ohne die Revision zuzulassen. Hiergegen wendet sich die Klägerin mit ihrer Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde, mit der sie Verfahrensmängel des FG rügt.
 II. Die Beschwerde ist unbegründet. Die von der Klägerin geltend gemachten Verfahrensmängel sind, soweit sie überhaupt in zulässiger Form gerügt worden sind, nicht gegeben:
 1. Die Rüge der Klägerin, das FG habe ihren Antrag auf Vernehmung des Steuerberaters S unterlassen, ist nicht in schlüssiger Form erhoben worden. Denn hierfür wäre erforderlich, daß die Klägerin dargelegt hätte, zu welchem Ergebnis die von ihr vermißte Beweiserhebung geführt und was sich hieraus für die Entscheidung des FG ergeben hätte (Beschlüsse des Bundesfinanzhofs --BFH-- vom 19. März 1997 X B 262/96, BFH/NV 1997, 514; vom 21. Juli 1997 III B 146/95, BFH/NV 1998, 970). Dazu reicht die allgemeine Angabe, der Zeuge hätte die Absprachen zwischen der Klägerin und ihren Gesellschaftern "nachvollziehbar darlegen" sowie "Art, Umfang und ungefähre Höhe der den Rückstellungen zugrundeliegenden Sachverhalte" bestätigen können, nicht aus:
 a) Das FG ist in rechtlicher Hinsicht davon ausgegangen, daß Vereinbarungen zwischen der Klägerin und den Eheleuten A an denjenigen Vorgaben zu messen sind, die nach der Rechtsprechung des Senats im Verhältnis zwischen einer Kapitalgesellschaft und ihrem beherrschenden Gesellschafter gelten. Es hat deshalb angenommen, daß im Streitfall die von der Klägerin geltend gemachten Raumkosten deshalb nicht steuermindernd berücksichtigt werden könnten, weil es an einer im vorhinein klar und eindeutig getroffenen Absprache über die Kostenerstattung fehle und zudem weder entsprechende Abrechnungen zeitnah erstellt noch laufende Zahlungen geleistet worden seien. Dasselbe gelte in bezug auf die Aufwendungen für nicht näher spezifizierte Subunternehmerleistungen, die angeblich an A und dessen Sohn und seinen Bruder erbracht worden seien. Von dieser materiell-rechtlichen Einschätzung des FG ist bei der Frage nach dem Vorliegen eines Verfahrensfehlers auszugehen (BFH-Beschlüsse vom 2. August 1996 VIII B 74/95, BFH/NV 1997, 133, 134; vom 7. Juli 1997 X B 229/96 und 230/96, BFH/NV 1997, 886; Gräber/Ruban, Finanzgerichtsordnung, 4. Aufl., § 115 Rz. 24, m.w.N.).
 Eine auf unterlassene Sachaufklärung gestützte Verfahrensrüge könnte deshalb nur dann Erfolg haben, wenn die Klägerin dargelegt hätte, was ihrer Einschätzung nach der benannte Zeuge zum Zustandekommen und zur Abwicklung der geltend gemachten Vereinbarungen hätte bekunden können. So hätte sie zur Frage der Aufwendungen für Fremdleistungen insbesondere vortragen müssen, was sich zu Art und vertraglicher Grundlage der genannten Leistungen aus einer Zeugenaussage voraussichtlich im einzelnen ergeben hätte. In bezug auf die geltend gemachten Raumkosten wäre vor allem eine Angabe dazu erforderlich gewesen, wie durch die Aussage des Zeugen die Annahme des FG hätte erschüttert werden können, daß insoweit weder fortlaufende Zahlungen geleistet noch zeitnahe Abrechnungen erstellt worden sind. Schließlich hätte die Klägerin darlegen müssen, inwieweit das von ihr dargestellte Ergebnis der Beweisaufnahme zu einer abweichenden Entscheidung des FG hätte führen können (BFH-Beschlüsse vom 19. August 1994 X B 124/94, BFH/NV 1995, 238; in BFH/NV 1997, 514). Nur ein in diesem Sinne spezifizierter Vortrag würde dem Senat eine Prüfung der Frage ermöglichen, ob --auf der Basis der Rechtsauffassung des FG-- das Unterlassen der Beweiserhebung entscheidungserheblich war. Eine dahingehende Überprüfungsmöglichkeit ist im Nichtzulassungsbeschwerdeverfahren deshalb unerläßlich, weil ein Verfahrensmangel nur bei Entscheidungserheblichkeit die Zulassung der Revision rechtfertigt (BFH-Beschlüsse vom 14. Juni 1988 V B 38/88, BFH/NV 1989, 373; vom 12. Dezember 1997 V B 46/97, BFH/NV 1998, 861; Gräber/ Ruban, a.a.O., § 115 Rz. 34, m.w.N.).
 Demgegenüber hat sich die Klägerin in der Sache letztlich auf die allgemeine Erklärung beschränkt, daß durch die Zeugenvernehmung die Richtigkeit ihres erstinstanzlichen Tatsachenvortrags bestätigt worden wäre. Damit ist gerade vor dem Hintergrund, daß es sowohl in bezug auf die Abwicklung des von der Klägerin behaupteten Mietvertrags als auch hinsichtlich der Fremdleistungen an jeglichem (substantiiertem) Tatsachenvortrag fehlt, dem Erfordernis der Darlegung eines entscheidungserheblichen Verfahrensmangels nicht genügt. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt kann die Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde mithin keinen Erfolg haben.
 b) Abgesehen davon wäre die genannte Rüge der Klägerin, selbst wenn man sie für zulässig erachten würde, jedenfalls unbegründet. Denn das FG hätte eine Beweiserhebung in dem jetzt von der Klägerin geforderten Sinne allenfalls dann durchführen müssen, wenn die Klägerin bereits in der ersten Instanz eindeutig einen entsprechenden Beweisantrag gestellt hätte. Das ist nicht geschehen:
 Ausweislich der dem Senat vorliegenden Akten hat die Klägerin sich zunächst mit Schriftsatz vom 25. Juni 1997 zu der hier interessierenden Frage wie folgt geäußert:
 "Zu den Fremdleistungen wurde ... ausgeführt, daß es sich neben dem Geschäftsführer auch um den Sohn ... gehandelt habe, ... und auch um einen Bruder des Geschäftsführers ...
 Wiederum auf Befragen und Diskussion wurde auch der Zusammenhang zwischen den Rückstellungen und den 'sonstigen Forderungen' hergestellt; die sonstigen Forderungen bestünden im wesentlichen aus Anzahlungen, die für die noch nicht abgerechneten Subunternehmerleistungen und ... Gebäudekosten gezahlt worden seien.
 Beweis (im Bestreitensfall): Zeugnis des S"
 Mit Schriftsatz vom 4. Dezember 1997 hat sie sodann ausgeführt:
 "Im Gegensatz dazu hat der Kläger ... substantiiert vorgetragen und den Vortrag zur Bilanz mit G+V insgesamt wie auch zu den streitigen Punkten insbesondere unter Beweis gestellt durch
 a) Sachverständigengutachten
 b) Zeugnis des S."
 Diese Ausführungen lassen nicht --zumindest aber nicht eindeutig-- erkennen, daß nach den Vorstellungen der Klägerin Steuerberater S zu tatsächlichen Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit dem Abschluß oder der Abwicklung der Verträge mit den Gesellschaftern vernommen werden sollte. Näher liegt vielmehr die Deutung, daß die Klägerin eine Aussage des S dazu herbeiführen wollte, wie die vom FA beanstandeten Bilanzpositionen zu verstehen seien. Darum ging es aber erkennbar nicht; auf der Basis der Rechtsauffassung des FG war vielmehr entscheidend, daß das Bestehen eindeutiger Absprachen und deren vereinbarungsgemäße Durchführung nicht nachgewiesen worden waren. Daß S hierzu etwas bekunden könne, hat die Klägerin erstmals in der Beschwerdebegründung mit einer gewissen Deutlichkeit vorgebracht. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann aus dem Umstand, daß das FG die beantragte Vernehmung des S unterlassen hat, ein Verfahrensfehler nicht abgeleitet werden.
 2. Mit ihrer Rüge, das FG habe die von ihr beantragte Einholung eines Sachverständigengutachtens unterlassen, kann die Klägerin ebenfalls keinen Erfolg haben. In diesem Zusammenhang kann dahingestellt bleiben, ob das FG überhaupt gehalten war, die Richtigkeit des von der Klägerin vorgelegten Jahresabschlusses zum Gegenstand eines Sachverständigenbeweises zu machen. Ebenso muß nicht erörtert werden, ob es nicht auch in diesem Punkt an einer spezifizierten Erläuterung der Klägerin dazu fehlt, was sich bei Durchführung der Beweiserhebung ergeben hätte und inwieweit die Erkenntnisse des Sachverständigen zu einer abweichenden Entscheidung des FG geführt hätten. Denn unabhängig hiervon ist die genannte Rüge bereits deshalb unbegründet, weil das FG einen Sachverständigen tatsächlich beauftragt hat und es gerade die Klägerin war, die ein Tätigwerden des Sachverständigen letztlich verhindert hat.
 Die Klägerin macht in dieser Hinsicht zwar geltend, daß sie ihre Mitwirkung lediglich deshalb verweigert habe, weil der Sachverständige ihr unzumutbar kurze Fristen für die Vorlage von Unterlagen gesetzt habe und die Aufforderung zur Aufschlüsselung von Konten rechtswidrig gewesen sei. Selbst wenn man dieser Bewertung jedoch in der Sache folgen wollte, ergab sich hieraus jedenfalls keine Befugnis der Klägerin, ihrerseits jede weitere Mitwirkung an der Aufklärung des Sachverhalts einzustellen. Falls sie bestimmte Aufforderungen des Sachverständigen für unzumutbar oder überzogen hielt, konnte sie dies mit dem Sachverständigen oder mit dem FG erörtern, um beispielsweise eine Fristverlängerung oder eine Änderung der gestellten Anforderungen zu erreichen. Sofern ihr das aus --aus ihrer Sicht-- sachwidrigen Gründen verweigert worden wäre, hätte sie ggf. ein darauf gestütztes Befangenheitsgesuch anbringen können. Ihre prozessuale Mitwirkungspflicht blieb hiervon jedoch unberührt. Deshalb kann sie, nachdem sie unter Mißachtung dieser Pflicht die Beweiserhebung durch das FG verhindert hat, nicht nunmehr das Unterbleiben der Beweiserhebung als Verfahrensfehler des FG geltend machen.
 3. Die Rüge der Klägerin, ihr sei die beantragte Akteneinsicht verweigert worden, widerspricht dem klaren Inhalt der Akten. Hiernach hat das FG dem Bevollmächtigten der Klägerin mit Schreiben vom 31. Juli 1997 eine Akteneinsicht angeboten; dieses Schreiben hat der Bevollmächtigte ausweislich seines Antwortschreibens vom 8. August 1997 zeitnah erhalten. Damit war die Möglichkeit der Einsichtnahme in ausreichendem Maße gegeben. Wenn die Klägerin --aus welchen Gründen auch immer-- diese Möglichkeit nicht wahrgenommen hat, so wird hierdurch ein Verfahrensfehler des FG nicht begründet. Von weiteren Ausführungen zu diesem Punkt wird gemäß Art. 1 Nr. 6 des Gesetzes zur Entlastung des Bundesfinanzhofs abgesehen.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
Edward McIntyre, late of Baltimore City, died intestate on or about March 6th, 1927. He had been twice married, and was survived by four children by his first wife, and by his second wife and two children by her. He had been at one time a tug boat engineer, and later, with J. Edward Henderson, engaged in the business of repairing boats. In 1922 Henderson bought out his interest in that business, and McIntyre found himself in the possession of a considerable fortune, which was largely invested in bonds. He was a skilled mechanic, thrifty and industrious, but without any knowledge or experience in matters of business or finance, and he turned over all of his personal property, including his securities, to Margaret M. McIntyre, Marie C. McIntyre, and Robert E. McIntyre, children of his first marriage, and they kept them and had them in their possession at the time of his death.
 Upon his death letters of administration were granted to Charles P. Coady and Samuel K. Smith, who demanded of the three children named all securities delivered to them by their father, but they turned over only such securities as could not be passed by delivery, and refused to surrender to the administrators bonds valued at $86,500 which would pass by delivery. The administrators then filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City the bill of complaint in this case to compel the three children to deliver to them the bonds which they had received from their father.
 In addition to the facts to which we have referred the appellees in their bill alleged that Edward McIntyre, their *Page 663
 decedent, who was at the time of his death seventy-one years old, "knew little or nothing about the handling of even his own finances; that he was untrained in and unfamiliar with the making of investments * * * that the defendants acted as his confidential agents, and that he placed in their hands all of his personal property, and that they placed the evidences of said property and the securities in a safe deposit box or boxes controlled absolutely by them; and that the said Edward McIntyre had every faith and confidence and trust in them, and that their possession and custody of said property were upon trust for him, and that he and his said property were entirely in their hands; and that, having such confidence in them, it never occurred to him that they would betray his trust; * * * that your orators aver that after the death of the said Edward McIntyre, the said defendants turned over to them only such securities as could not be passed by delivery and retained all bonds that could pass without endorsement, and among the bonds so retained were fifty-four thousand dollars ($54,000) Federal Land Bank bonds, thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) United States Liberty bonds and twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) foreign bonds (French, Belgium and Denmark), and that these bonds and others they concealed from your orators and refused to turn over the same as property of their deceased father," and that they, "in utter violation of the trust reposed in them in their reversed confidential relationship, had withheld and retained from your orators unregistered negotiable coupon bonds of the value of approximately ninety thousand dollars. * * * That when your orators demanded the delivery to them of said bonds, the defendants frankly admitted that they had such bonds in their possession, but they absolutely refused to turn them over to your orators," and that "although the defendants received all of the securities from their father to be kept by them as his confidential agents and trustees, and to be delivered by them to him in his lifetime or, upon his death, to his personal representatives, nevertheless, in absolute disregard of the trust so reposed in them, the said defendants accounted with your orators for only the nonnegotiable securities and kept in their possession said unregistered *Page 664
 bonds of the value of approximately ninety thousand dollars ($90,000); * * * that such unconscionable action on the part of the said defendants was a part of a scheme conceived by said defendants to obtain a greater share of their father's estate than they were entitled to under the law; * * * that there was and could be no devolution of title to said bonds upon the defendants, because they held said bonds as the confidential agents, trustees and custodians of their said father; * * * that the effect of the retention of said bonds by the said defendants will be the consummation of a fraudulent scheme on the part of the defendants to acquire a greater portion of the estate of their father than they would be entitled to by virtue of a legal distribution of his entire estate; * * * that relations of the utmost confidence existed between the said Edward McIntyre and his agents and trustees, the said defendants; and the securities which they are fraudulently and unlawfully withholding from your orators are impressed with a trust as aforesaid in favor of your orators and belong to the estate of the said Edward McIntyre." Upon these allegations the appellees asked the court to declare that the bonds were their property and were held by the appellants in trust for them, to decree their delivery to them, to restrain the defendants from selling or disposing of them or "retaining" them from the appellees, to decree that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the bonds and collect the income "therefrom" pending the suit, and for such other and further relief "as the nature of their cause" might require.
 The defendants demurred to the bill, but their demurrer was overruled, and from that order they have appealed.
 From the facts alleged in the bill the parties draw different conclusions, the contention of the appellees being that the appellants hold the securities involved in the appeal upon a trust which a court of equity should enforce, while the appellants contend that the facts alleged are not sufficient to raise a trust in favor of appellees, but that they hold the securities under a claim of ownership, which a court of equity has no jurisdiction to decide, but that appellees must assert their claim in some appropriate action in a court of law, and *Page 665
 the issue of law raised by these conflicting theories is whether upon the facts stated the action of the appellants in retaining possession of the securities is a breach of trust, or a breach of a contract of bailment for which they have an adequate remedy at law. Although appellants in their brief assert title to the bonds, that question is not in issue, for there is nothing in the bill to support the inference that appellants hold the bonds under a claim of title, or that they contend that they were given to them by their father during his life, the allegation being merely that they received the bonds in trust to be delivered to the decedent during his life or to his personal representatives upon his death, and that, in violation of that trust, they refused to deliver them to the appellees.
 The jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel a surrender of specific securities may, in such a case as this, rest upon either of two grounds: (1) That because of the nature and character of the property a court of equity is the natural and appropriate forum in which to obtain such relief, because no adequate remedy is available at law, and (2) that the property is held under a constructive trust enforceable in a court of equity.
 (1) In Scarborough v. Scotten, 69 Md. 137, it appears that Hugh F. Scarborough endorsed and delivered certain promissory notes and single bills to William Scotten and directed him to collect them and deliver the proceeds to Francina Scarborough, the wife of Hugh F. Scarborough, but Scotten died before the notes were collected, and his executors took possession of them. Francina Scarborough then assigned her interest in the notes to Hugh her husband, and he demanded them of the executors of Scotten, and, upon their refusal to surrender them, he filed a bill in equity against them, praying that they be compelled to surrender the notes to him. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the bill on the ground that the appellant had an adequate remedy at law. But this court reversed that ruling on the ground that there was no adequate or complete remedy at law, and in its opinion, after citing Story on Equity in support of the rule that equity will decree "the delivery up of *Page 666
 deeds and other writings to those who are entitled to them," it quotes with apparent approval parts of the following passage from the same author: "But where the title to the possession of deeds and other writings depends upon the validity of the title to the property to which they relate, and he is not in possession of that property, and the evidence of his title to it is in his own power, or it does not depend upon the production of the deeds or writings, of which he prays the delivery, — in such cases he must first establish his title to the property at law before he can come into a court of equity for a delivery of the deeds. * * * The same doctrine applies to other instruments and securities, such as bonds, negotiable instruments and other evidence of property which are improperly withheld from the persons who have an equitable or legal interest in them, or who have a right to have them preserved. This redress a court of common law is for the most part incapable of affording, since the prescribed forms of its remedies rarely enable it to pronounce a judgment in rem
 in such cases, which is or can be made effectual. It is true that an action of detinue or even of replevin might in some few cases lie and give the proper remedy if the thing could be found; but generally in actions at law damages only are recoverable, and such a remedy must in many cases be wholly inadequate. This constitutes the true ground for the prompt interposition of courts of equity for the recovery of the specific deeds or other instruments." Story Eq. Jur. (14th ed.), par. 951. That the primary ground for equitable jurisdiction in such cases is the absence of any adequate, complete, or satisfactory legal remedy is pointed out not only in the quotation from Story to which we have referred, but in Scarborough v. Scotten, supra, where the court said: "There can be no doubt that the ground of interference by a court of equity, is the inadequacy of any legal remedy to give relief." And exemplifying that inadequacy in that case it adverted to the fact that the nature of the property was such that it could not be seized under a writ of replevin against the will of the defendants, and since the defendants had already refused to surrender *Page 667
 it upon demand, that remedy would be useless, and to the further fact that the adequacy of an action of trover could not be established without an inquiry into the solvency of the persons liable on the notes.
 Even more in point is Safe Deposit Trust Company v. Coyle,133 Md. 343, where the facts were that Dr. Terence Coyle died leaving an estate which consisted in part of stocks and bonds valued at $86,000; that the distributees of his estate were his widow and certain collateral relatives; that she "unlawfully, wrongfully and fraudulently" seized and took possession of the bonds and converted the same to her use without taking out letters on her husband's estate; that she falsely and fraudulently stated that Dr. Coyle had left "practically nothing"; that at her death the administrator of the estate of Dr. Coyle learned from the inventory filed in her estate that she had died possessed of stocks and bonds which she had concealed and withheld from the estate of Dr. Coyle, but which rightfully belonged to that estate, and the complainant prayed the court to administer the estate, to compel the executor of Mrs. Coyle to deliver the securities in controversy to the administrator of Dr. Coyle, that an account be taken of all interest and dividends collected by Mrs. Coyle or her executor from said bonds, and that it be required to pay to the complainant all sums due on account of such collections. The defendant demurred to that bill on a number of grounds, among which was this, "that if the plaintiffs had any remedy it is at law and not in equity and the court had no jurisdiction in the premises." The demurrer was overruled, and, in considering the propriety of that ruling, the court treated Mrs. Coyle as an executor de son tort of the estate of Dr. Coyle and held that on that ground alone the court had jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed. Hagthorpe v. Hook, 1 G. J. 277. But it went further and decided that absence of any adequate legal remedy was sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the court, and in that connection, after referring to Judge Irving's statement in Scarborough v. Scotten, supra, it said, speaking through Judge Boyd: "Judge Irving then went on to refer *Page 668
 to cases where trover or replevin would lie and might be sufficient, but sustained the right to proceed in equity because the legal remedy was inadequate to give full relief. Trover in some cases might be deemed sufficient, but the rule in Maryland is that the damages allowed in that action are for the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with interest up to the date of the verdict. If a judgment for damages in such cases cannot for any reason be collected, then the plaintiff might lose his property and his money, if he is to be confined to an action of trover, and at any rate if the property becomes more valuable, he is confined in trover to the value at the time of the conversion. So in replevin there are difficulties which may be avoided in equity. In case of this kind, where the defendants' testatrix was entitled to a distribution of one-half of her husband's estate, and according to the bill the original securities, or many of them, have been sold and others substituted for them, it would seem to be peculiarly appropriate for a court of equity to take jurisdiction."
 Those cases cannot in our opinion be distinguished from this. Manifestly replevin would be futile and inadequate, because the property is of such a character that it could not be taken under the writ unless exhibited by the defendants, which, in view of their attitude, is too remote a contingency to merit serious consideration. Nor would trover be either adequate or complete, first, because in such an action the measure of damages would be the value of the property at the time of the conversion, while in this case the securities may be much more valuable now than they were at that time, and, second, because there is no reason why the estate should be compelled to take the risk of collecting any judgment which might be recovered in such a case.
 A contrary view is expressed in 21 C.J. 62, where it is said: "The rule applicable to ordinary chattels applies to municipal and corporate bonds and stocks, which cannot be recovered in equity, unless for some reason such stock or bonds have a special value apart from market value, or unless there are special equities to support the bill, as where defendant *Page 669
 is insolvent." And that view is supported by such cases as Conev. East Haddam Bank, 39 Conn. 88, and Friedman v. Fraser,157 Ala. 191, but other cases cited are not in point as Lamb KnitGoods Co. v. Lamb, 119 Mich. 568, and Edelman v. Latshaw,159 Pa. 644, where the securities had been sold, or do not support the text, as Equitable Trust Company v. Garis, 190 Pa. 542, where it is said: "A bill in equity will lie, in appropriate circumstances, for discovery and delivery of possession of deeds and other muniments of title, certificates of stock, negotiable securities, and other personal property having special and peculiar value, which is not adequately represented by market price. The committee of a lunatic is the proper party to bring and maintain such bill for the lunatic's property. Such bill may be maintained by the committee against the husband of the lunatic, where he denies her title, or there is reason to apprehend that he will deal with the property in any way adversely to her interest." In the case last cited the court did not decide that a bill in equity would not lie to recover securities which had no special value apart from market value, but that where they did have such value it would lie to recover them.
 But whatever the law may be elsewhere, in this state at least, upon the facts stated in the bill, we regard the question as settled by Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Coyle, supra.
 (2) Appellees contend that appellants held the securities under a trust enforceable in a court of equity. To that appellants answer (1) that the allegations of the bill are mere opinions or conclusions based upon undisclosed facts, and are too vague and general to support the hypothesis of a trust, but that (2), if they can be treated as allegations of fact, nevertheless, no such inference can properly be drawn from them.
 In respect to the first contention it may be conceded that the pleader must allege with certainty and precision facts sufficient to show the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief prayed, and that mere conclusions, opinions, or inferences, without the facts upon which they are based, are not sufficient (Lamm v.Burrell, 69 Md. 274; Miller's Equity *Page 670 Proc., par. 92, 93), and in charging fraud the particular acts relied upon as constituting the fraud must be stated, and while it is not necessary to set out the evidence by which the fraud is to be proved (Ibid, par. 93), yet no mere general allegation of fraud, no matter how vehement or forcible the charge may be or how often it is repeated, is sufficient unless accompanied by the particular facts upon which the allegation is based. Ibid.
 In substance the bill of complaint states that Edward McIntyre, after having spent his life as a tugboat engineer and mechanic, retired from business when he was about sixty years old; that at that time he had an estate large enough to require the attention of one having some knowledge of financial matters and some judgment and experience in making investments; that he himself had no such knowledge, and that in that situation he turned to his three children, who acted as his "confidential agents," and in whom he had "every faith and confidence," and he placed in their custody all of his personal property, and "he and his property were entirely in their hands"; that they received that property from their father "to be kept by them as his confidential agents and trustees, and to be delivered by them to him in his lifetime or, upon his death, to his personal representatives; but that upon his death they refused to deliver the property thus entrusted to him to his personal representatives, although requested by them so to do.
 It must be admitted that these allegations are neither as complete or as specific as the rules of good pleading would demand, but that at most they state in effect that the securities were delivered to the appellants in trust to hold them for the decedent, and to surrender them to him upon demand during his life and to his estate at his death, and that they obtained possession of them while acting as confidential agents of their father. The question then is, Are these allegations sufficient to support the conclusion that appellants hold the securities involved in this appeal under a trust enforceable in equity? Personal property may of course be the subject of a trust (Perryon Trusts, secs. 67, 80), but to establish an *Page 671
 express trust it is essential that the legal title be transferred to the trustee (39 Cyc. 76), for if the legal and the equitable title remain in the same person there can be no trust, and the mere delivery of personal property by the owner to another to hold for him, without any intention on the part of the owner to divest himself of the legal title thereto, cannot possibly create a trust, but is a mere bailment. For manifestly the same person cannot at the same time possess as trustee the entire legal title and as cestui que trust the entire equitable title. 26 R.C.L. 1186. For that reason the facts alleged by the appellees are not sufficient to create an express trust, for while it is alleged that the bonds were delivered to the appellant "in trust" to be delivered to the owner or his personal representatives on demand, it is nowhere alleged that the owner intended to or did divest himself of the legal title thereto, or that the appellants intended to or did acquire the legal title to the property, or that they were authorized to do anything but keep them as custodians safely for the true owner. Such a transaction does not constitute a trust but is a bailment, and calling it a trust cannot make it one. It is also alleged in the bill that, when the property was given to appellants, the owner had confidence and trust in them, and that they were his confidential agents. But while that may be true, it has no special significance, for it applies to most bailments, for ordinarily reasonable persons do not entrust valuable property to those in whom they have no confidence. And when we come to consider the allegations relating to confidential relationship, we are unable to find any facts upon which those allegations rest. It is not alleged by the appellants that the owner was senile, dominated by them, that he relied upon them for direction in the management of his estate, or that he entrusted his estate to them to manage and administer, nor is it even directly alleged, although it is a possible inference, that he delivered the property to them because of any confidential relation.
 Nor is the allegation that the appellants hold the securities, as trustees, custodians, and confidential agents sufficient, because those several offices are separate and distinct, and *Page 672
 each possesses incidents, obligations, and responsibilities different from the others. In our opinion, therefore, the allegations of the bill are too indefinite and uncertain to show the existence of an express trust. Nor in our opinion are its allegations sufficient to raise a trust ex maleficio It is true that where property is delivered to a person upon his express promise to hold it for another in trust, and the delivery is induced by fraud, or by a confidential relationship between the parties, a trust ex maleficio will be raised where the express trust fails, and the promisor repudiates his promises. 26R.C.L. 1232 et seq. But the fraud must be shown and it must appear that it was perpetrated at the inception of the transaction, and the existence and character of the alleged confidential relationship must be alleged, as well as the fact that the delivery was induced by it. 35 A.L.R. 314. For the mere failure of a promisor to perform his oral promise to hold property in trust is not sufficient (Ibid 288, 45 A.L.R. 851), where such failure does not involve fraud actual or constructive or the abuse of a confidential relationship. But, as we have already stated, while the bill alleges the existence of a confidential relationship, it does not state the facts upon which that allegation is based. Nor is it any more specific in its allegations of fraud. In alleging fraud in an equity proceeding, it is indispensable that the particular facts relied upon as its constituent elements should be definitely and specifically stated. Miller's Equity Proc., sec. 93. But the bill in this case contains no such statements, and it is therefore not sufficient to support any conclusion based upon the existence either of fraud or of a confidential relationship.
 There was no separate demurrer to so much of the bill as prayed the appointment of a receiver, and the power of the court to appoint a receiver in such a case is not therefore before us, and since, as we have already stated, the bill does show that the appellees have suffered a wrong for which they have no adequate remedy at law, it follows that the demurrer, which was to the whole bill, was properly overruled, and the decree appealed from will be affirmed.
 Decree affirmed, with costs. *Page 673


text:
 18.5.2013
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 C 141/25
 Recours introduit le 20 mars 2013 — Selo Medical/OHMI — biosyn Arzneimittel (SELOGYN)
 (Affaire T-173/13)
 2013/C 141/46
 Langue de dépôt du recours: l'allemand
 Parties
 Partie requérante: Selo Medical GmbH (Unternberg, Autriche) (représentant: T. Schneider, avocat)
 Partie défenderesse: Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins et modèles)
 Autre partie devant la chambre de recours: biosyn Arzneimittel GmbH (Fellbach, Allemagne)
 Conclusions
 La partie requérante conclut à ce qu’il plaise au Tribunal:
 —
 annuler la décision de la quatrième chambre de recours de l’Office du 21 janvier 2013 dans l’affaire R 2601/2011-4 et rejeter l’opposition formée à l’encontre de la demande de marque communautaire;
 —
 condamner l’Office et, le cas échéant, l’autre partie à la procédure devant la chambre de recours aux dépens, conformément à l’article 87, paragraphe 2, du règlement de procédure du Tribunal.
 Moyens et principaux arguments
 Demandeur de la marque communautaire: Selo Medical GmbH
 Marque communautaire concernée: marque verbale «SELOGYN» pour des produits de la classe 5 — demande de marque communautaire no9 049 016
 Titulaire de la marque ou du signe invoqué à l'appui de l'opposition: biosyn Arzneimittel GmbH
 Marque ou signe invoqué: marque verbale nationale «SELESYN» pour des produits et services des classes 5, 29 et 44
 Décision de la division d'opposition: a fait droit à l’opposition
 Décision de la chambre de recours: a rejeté le recours
 Moyens invoqués: violation de l’article 8, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (CE) no 207/2009


type: wikipedia

text:
Arturs Alberings ( — ) bija Latvijas agronoms, politiķis un sabiedriskais darbinieks. Latviešu zemnieku savienības biedrs. Latvijas Ministru prezidents no 1926. gada maija līdz decembrim. Bijis arī Latvijas zemkopības ministrs.
 Biogrāfija
 Pirms Latvijas proklamēšanas
 Dzimis Valmieras apriņķa Virķēnu "Klāvās" lauksaimnieka ģimenē. Pabeidzis Viļķenes pamatskolu un Harkovas lauksaimniecības vidusskolu, Norvēģijā studējis agronomiju, turpat un Vācijā papildinājis arī zināšanas zivkopībā. Krievijā strādājis par zemkopības un zivkopības skolas direktoru, kā arī muižu pārvaldnieku. Pēc atgriešanās Latvijā sācis vadīt kursus Rīgas Lauksaimniecības centrālbiedrībā, dibināja un vadīja lopu pārraudzības biedrības Rūjienas un Valmieras apkārtnē. Pēc Februāra revolūcijas 1917. gadā iesaistījies politikā. Augustā ievēlēts par Vidzemes Zemes padomes locekli. 1918. gada novembrī kā Latviešu zemnieku savienības pārstāvis kļuva par Tautas padomes locekli.
 Politiskā darbība
 Alberings tika ievēlēts Satversmes sapulcē. Darbojās agrārlietu un valsts nodevību lietu izmeklēšanas komisijās. 1922. gadā ievēlēts 1. Saeimā, bija tās priekšsēdētāja Frīdriha Vesmaņa pirmais biedrs. Arī 2. Saeimā bija priekšsēdētāja (šoreiz — P. Kalniņš) pirmais biedrs.
 1926. gada maijā, pēc tam, kad nepieņemtā budžeta dēļ demisionēja Kārļa Ulmaņa vadītā valdība, izveidojās Alberinga Ministru kabinets. Septembrī Alberings sāka pildīt arī finanšu ministra pienākumus, sakarā ar līdzšinējā ministra Jāņa Blumberga demisiju. Decembrī Saeimā premjerministram Alberingam tika jautāts, kādēļ joprojām nav atrasts jauns finanšu ministrs, uz ko viņš atbildēja, ka viņš pats ir uzņēmies finanšu ministra amatu, nevis pilda pienākumus. Parlamenta vairākums šo skaidrojumu atzina par neapmierinošu, un valdība demisionēja.
 Alberings kandidēja un tika ievēlēts arī 3. Saeimas vēlēšanās. Bija zemkopības ministrs Celmiņa otrajā (1928—1930) un Ulmaņa trešajā valdībā (1931).
 Apbalvots ar 2. šķiras Triju Zvaigžņu ordeni 1926. gadā. No 1926. gada rudens semestra ir studentu biedrības "Fraternitas Rusticana" goda filistrs.
 Nāve
 Arturs Alberings nomira pēc neilgas cīņas ar plaušu karsoni.
 Atsauces
 1877. gadā dzimušie
 1934. gadā mirušie
 Valmieras novadā dzimušie
 Latviešu zemnieku savienības politiķi
 Latvijas Ministru prezidenti
 Latvijas finanšu ministri
 Latvijas zemkopības ministri
 Tautas padomes locekļi
 Satversmes sapulces deputāti
 1. Saeimas deputāti
 2. Saeimas deputāti
 3. Saeimas deputāti
 Triju Zvaigžņu ordeņa lielvirsnieki