type: wikipedia

text:
Catherine Johns (born 1941) is a British archaeologist and museum curator. She is a specialist in Roman jewellery, Romano-British provincial art, and erotic art.
 Career
 Johns worked for many years, until 2002, as the Curator of Roman Britain at the British Museum. She was elected as a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries of London in January 1973.
 Johns has published numerous articles and books on archaeological subjects including the Snettisham Jeweller's Hoard, the Hoxne Hoard, and the Barber Cup.
 From 2003 to 2011 she was appointed by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport as a member of the reviewing committee on the 'Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest'. She served three terms as a member of this Reviewing Committee. As part of this body, in 2009, she helped block the export of a unique Viking mount from North Yorkshire valued at over £50,000.
 Johns has also served on the committees of the Society of Antiquaries of London, the Roman Society, and the British Archaeological Association. She is a former Chair of the Society of Jewellery Historians and a former trustee of the Roman Research Trust. In 2010 she was elected as a Corresponding Member of the Archaeological Institute of America.
 Personal life
 Johns was married to fellow archaeologist and British Museum curator Donald Bailey. In 2005, the contributions of both Johns and Bailey to the world of archaeology was recognised with the publication of a festschrift in their honour, titled Image, Craft and the Classical World: Essays in honour of Donald Bailey and Catherine Johns. Johns wrote an obituary for her husband for The Guardian following his death in September 2014.
 Select bibliography
 Johns, C. 1982. Sex or Symbol? Erotic Images of Greece and Rome. London, British Museum.
 Potter, T. W. and Johns, C. 1992. Roman Britain (Exploring the Roman World). University of California Press.
 Johns, C. 1996. The jewellery of Roman Britain : Celtic and classical traditions. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
 Johns, C. and Burnett, A. 1997. 'The Snettisham Roman jeweller's hoard. London, British Museum.
 Johns, C. 2005. Little Book of Erotica. London, British Museum.
 Johns, C. 2006. Horses : history, myth, art. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
 Johns, C. 2008. Dogs : history, myth, art''. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
 External links
 Bibliography of Catherine Johns
 References
 Employees of the British Museum
 British curators
 Fellows of the Society of Antiquaries of London
 Living people
 British women archaeologists
 Classical archaeologists
 British archaeologists
 Women classical scholars
 British women curators
 1935 births
 British women historians


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' October 7, 2003\n\n\n\n\nTestimony\n Statement\n of\n Shelton Young\n Director\n Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate\n Office of the Inspector General\n Department of Defense\n before the\n Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging\n Threats and International Relations\n House Committee on Government Reform\n on\n \xe2\x80\x9cEmerging Threats: Assessing DoD\n Controls of Critical Chemical and\n Biological Equipment and Material\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n\n\n D-2004-005-T\n\n\n Department of Defense\n Office of the Inspector General\n Quality Integrity Accountability\n\x0c 1\n\n\n\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:\n\nThank you for the opportunity to appear before your Committee today and address your\nquestions regarding controls over disposal of DoD surplus equipment and controls over\nselect biological agents. I share your concerns that terrorists or extremist groups might\nuse surplus DoD biological equipment and agents to produce weapons of mass\ndestruction against United States citizens. Today I want to present the results of an\n\xe2\x80\x9cInteragency Summary Report on Security Controls Over Biological Agents\xe2\x80\x9d (Report\nNo. D-2003-126).\n\nThe August 27, 2003, report consolidates issues identified in 27 reports published by the\nOffices of the Inspectors General of the Departments of Agriculture, Army, Defense,\nEnergy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs. The summary report\nidentified nine systemic problems: physical security, personnel access controls,\ninventory accountability and controls, contingency plans, registration with the Centers for\nDisease Control and Prevention (CDC), import and export of agents, safety and security\ntraining, management oversight, and policies and procedures. We are pleased to report\nthat corrective actions, as recommended in the 27 reports, were initiated by those\nagencies.\n\nI will also discuss the problems that we, the Office of the Inspector General, Department\nof Defense, like the General Accounting Office, have identified with controls over the\ndisposal of DoD surplus equipment.\n\nInteragency Summary Report\n\nDeficiencies in security controls have serious implications for the health of United States\xe2\x80\x99\ncitizens, should those controls be breached and biological agents removed from the\nfacility. Subsequent misuse of the biological agents could have serious health\nconsequences and disrupt the country\xe2\x80\x99s agriculture, commerce, economy and, industry.\n\nBiological Agents\n\nBiological agents are micro-organisms, or their toxins, that cause or may cause human,\nanimal, or plant diseases. Such disease-causing biological agents are termed pathogens.\nSelect agents are pathogenic biological agents specifically described as having the potential\nto pose a severe threat to public or agricultural health and safety. For instance, anthrax\n(Bacillus anthracis1), smallpox (Variola major), and the Ebola viruses are considered select\nagents by the CDC, while foot-and-mouth disease virus and classical swine fever virus are\nconsidered select agents by the Department of Agriculture. The CDC has identified\n36 biological agents as select agents due to their potentially devastating effect on human\npopulations. Correspondingly, the Department of Agriculture has identified an additional\n\n1\n Spore-forming bacterium that causes anthrax.\n\x0c 2\n\n\n33 biological agents as posing a threat to U.S. agricultural livestock or crop commodities.\nBecause various Federal agencies, contractors, and universities maintain laboratories with\nbiological agents to support biological defense programs, medical research, and clinical\ndiagnostic testing, the CDC\xe2\x80\x94in conjunction with the National Institutes of Health\xe2\x80\x94\nprovides guidelines for categorizing laboratory safety risks into four biosafety levels\n(BSLs), with BSL-4 being the highest risk. As of March 2002, there were more than\n275 facilities registered with the CDC to transfer or receive biological select agents.\n\nPhysical Security\n\nOf the 27 reports, 24 addressed the adequacy of physical security controls over biological\nagents, 23 of which cited one or more weaknesses in the controls. Physical security\ncontrols include the use of physical barriers; the use of video camera surveillance,\nintrusion detection systems, and security guards; and controlling physical access to\nfacilities and laboratories where agents are used or stored. For example, 17 of the\n23 reports cited the lack of adequate controls over freezers or units used to store\nbiological select agents, and 14 reports identified that facilities where laboratories were\nlocated either did not have intrusion detection systems or had physical barriers that were\neasily bypassed. In addition, several reports cited facility entry systems that could\npotentially allowed unauthorized personnel to enter by simply following behind\nauthorized personnel.\n\nFigure 1 shows an open and accessible biological agent storage room located in a hallway\noutside the laboratory.\n\n\n\n\n Figure 1. Open and Accessible Biological Agent Storage Room\n\x0c 3\n\n\nFigure 2 shows a BSL-3 laboratory inside an aging trailer that is equipped with a hitch\nand wheels, but not with adequate security devices.\n\n\n\n\n Figure 2. BSL-3 Research Laboratory Housed in Mobile Trailer\n\nFigure 3 shows open access to two different research facilities.\n\n\n\n\n Figure 3. Open Access to Research Facilities\n\nPersonnel Access Controls\n\nPersonnel access controls were addressed in 25 of the 27 reports, 23 of which identified\nweaknesses in the controls. Personnel access controls include the use of identification\nbadges, keys, logbooks, and background investigations. Personnel access controls are\nnecessary to preclude unauthorized personnel, including restricted persons identified in\nthe USA PATRIOT Act,2 from obtaining access to or possession of biological select\nagents. Access weaknesses found included lack of access restrictions for maintenance\nand repair personnel and foreign nationals (researchers and students).\n\n2\n Restricted persons include felons or those indicted for felonies, unlawful users of a controlled substance, those\ndishonorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces, individuals adjudicated as mentally defective, illegal aliens,\nand non-resident foreign nationals of countries supporting international terrorism. As of May 21, 2002, the\nSecretary of State had designated the governments of seven countries as state sponsors of international terrorism:\nCuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.\n\x0c 4\n\n\nSome laboratories gave employees access to biological agents pending the results of\nbackground investigations, and other laboratories allowed access by personnel with no\nbackground investigation at all.\n\nInventory Accountability and Controls\n\nOf the 27 reports, 24 addressed inventory accountability and controls, with 23 of the\nreports identifying weaknesses in the inventory controls. Inventory controls include\nstorage, transfer, record keeping, and destruction of biological agents. The most frequent\ninventory control weaknesses were poor record keeping and the lack of inventory control\nsystems. For example, an agency report stated that of 62 locations required to keep\ninventories of chemical and biological agents, only 39 did, and only 22 updated their\ninventories annually. As a result, one laboratory unknowingly continued to maintain\nSalmonella, and an inaccurate inventory at another location resulted in the Secretary of\nthe agency misreporting to the Department of Homeland Security that the location was\nnot using BSL-3 agents, when in fact it was storing and experimenting with Bluetongue\nvirus and Vesicular stomatitis virus, both classified as BSL-3 agents by the Department\nof Agriculture.\n\nAnother agency\xe2\x80\x99s inventories were not reliable because of the various ways researchers\nintroduced biological agents into facilities, including the purchase of biological agents\nfrom private vendors over the telephone using personal or Government credit cards.\nVendors generally sent the agents directly to the individual researcher. In addition,\nresearchers could independently reproduce cultures, and records showing such culture\nincreases did not always exist. The report also stated that it was a common practice to\ninformally share specimens with colleagues at other facilities and that such exchanges\nwere not always documented. For example, at one facility, a researcher purchased\n17 containers of virulent anthrax in 1993 from a private vendor, then later gave the\nanthrax to a colleague at another facility because his own project was canceled. He and\nhis colleague decided not to register the purchase or the transfer with CDC because they\nheld academic appointments at affiliated universities.\n\nContingency Plans\n\nOf the 27 reports, 9 reviewed and addressed weaknesses in contingency plans that relate\nto security controls over biological agents and the facilities that house the agents.\nContingency plans document rapid responses and special procedures to ensure the safety\nand readiness of personnel, equipment, and facilities in response to major emergencies\ncaused by natural disasters, terrorists, or subversives. The following are some examples\nof the problems cited in the reports.\n\nOne agency could not perform a vulnerability assessment because the agency lacked a\nconsolidated database to track the types and locations of agents stored and used.\n\x0c 5\n\n\nSeveral reports cited the lack of up-to-date contingency plans, contingency plans for\nmissing agents, or contingency plans for power disruptions. For example, a laboratory\nexperienced regular power outages and critical system problems, including swipe card\naccess disruptions. Thus, during power disruptions, the doors would remain unsecured\nuntil power was restored, resulting in the security of the facility being compromised.\n\nCDC Registration\n\nNine of the 27 reports addressed CDC registration, of which five identified weaknesses.\nFacilities that ship or receive biological select agents are required to register with the\nCDC, in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Title 42,\nSection 72.6. The purpose of the registration process is to ensure that biological agents\nare shipped only to facilities with laboratories designed to handle the select agents and\nwith a legitimate reason for possessing the agents. Problems with CDC registration\nincluded laboratories that did not know which agents, such as non-virulent agents,\nrequired CDC registration, and one laboratory did not comply with CDC transfer\nrequirements because it was unaware of the existence of biological select agents in its\nfacility. In December 2002, 42 C.F.R. Section 72.6 was augmented by 42 C.F.R. Part 73,\n\xe2\x80\x9cPossession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins.\xe2\x80\x9d Part 73 adds the\nrequirement that facilities that already possess biological select agents but have never\nregistered with the CDC to do so.\n\nImport and Export of Agents\n\nOf the 27 reports, 3 reviewed and addressed concerns with the import and export of\npathogens and select agents. Imported plants, plant products, and animals are regulated\nthrough U.S. Department of Agricultural permits to protect the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s population and\nfood supply. Concerns about the import of pathogens was addressed by one agency,\nwhich stated in its report that its components lacked a system to track the number of\nshipments entering the country under any individual import permit or to ensure that any\nincoming shipment is actually associated with a valid import permit.\n\nCertain biological agents and related technology are export-controlled in support of\nU.S. foreign policy opposing the proliferation and illegal use of biological weapons. The\nDepartment of Commerce maintains a listing of export-controlled biological agents and\nexport licensing requirements in its Export Administration Regulations. Concerns about\nthe export of biological select agents included shipping biological agents without\ndetermining whether an export license was required and inadequate documentation and\nreporting of biological agent shipments, as required by the Export Administration\nRegulations.\n\nSafety and Security Training\n\nOf the 27 reports, 9 reviewed and identified training weaknesses. Training is essential\nnot only to remind employees of routine day-to-day preventative measures they can take,\n\x0c 6\n\n\nbut also to reinforce management emphasis on security. For example, personnel\ncontrolling access to one facility had received no security response training. At another\nlocation, security personnel were not aware that biological agent material was being\nstored at the facility. Personnel at other facilities were not trained on which biological\nagents were export-controlled.\n\nManagement Oversight\n\nOf the 27 reports, 14 addressed the adequacy of management oversight, 13 of which\nidentified management oversight as a contributing factor to the inadequate controls over\nbiological agents. Management oversight is key to ensuring that employees are aware of\nand are taking responsibility for the security of biological agents and the facilities that\nuse, store, maintain, or transfer the agents. The areas of management oversight\nweaknesses identified included accountability, biosecurity, and development of\ncontingency plans. For example, at one laboratory, management emphasis and oversight\nfocused on bio-safety for laboratory personnel rather than on bio-security. At another\nlocation, senior safety, security, and management officials were unaware that\nexperiments with biological agents were conducted at their laboratories.\n\nPolicies and Procedures\n\nThe major contributing factor for inadequate controls, according to 25 of the 27 reports,\nwas the lack of or need for improved policies and procedures in the areas of physical\nsecurity, personnel access, inventory management and training. The most-mentioned\ndeficiency related to the need to improve policies and procedures to control personnel\naccess and to preclude access by restricted persons.\n\nManagement Corrective Actions Initiated\n\nSenior management at each of the six agencies have initiated corrective actions to\nimprove security controls over biological agents in response to the individual agency\nreports. For example, the Secretary of one agency initiated a task force to develop\npolicies and procedures addressing four key controls: physical security, personnel\nsecurity, inventory control, and biosecurity incident response. In another agency, senior\nofficials assigned a full-time staff officer to establish a biological agent security program\nand issued interim guidance on safeguarding select agents and on export controls over\nbiological agents. Another agency established an informational Web site, which includes\nstandardized procedures; another initiated followup actions to determine the status of\nactions taken on the agency\xe2\x80\x99s report recommendations.\n\x0c 7\n\n\nControls Over Disposal of Surplus Equipment\n\nLike the General Accounting Office has reported, we, the Inspector General of the\nDepartment of Defense, have identified problems with controls over the disposal of DoD\nsurplus equipment.\n\nReport No. D-2003-101, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw Enforcement Support Office Excess Property Program,\xe2\x80\x9d\nJune 2003, states that the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) was\ndistributing DoD excess property to law enforcement agencies without the accountability\nnecessary to ensure that the property was properly and appropriately transferred. We\nreviewed 148 DRMS excess property transactions related to the Law Enforcement\nSupport Office Excess Property Program and found that 45 percent (66 transactions) had\nundocumented differences between the quantities of property approved for release and\nthe quantities issued to the law enforcement agency by DRMS; 21 percent\n(31 transactions) had missing approval records; and 8 percent (12 transactions) had data\nentry errors in the approval records. For example, office furniture issued by a DRMS\noffice located in New Mexico to a law enforcement agency had an acquisition value of\n$5,400. The approved request was for office furniture valued at $600. There was no\ndocumentation available to support the reason for the increased quantity. Both the Law\nEnforcement Support Office and DRMS have ongoing initiatives to improve visibility\nand accountability of DoD excess property. The Law Enforcement Support Office,\nworking with DRMS, planned to fully implement an automated requisition, approval, and\nissuance process by October 2003. DRMS was in the process of developing digital\nstorage of source documentation to improve visibility and accountability of property\ntransfers.\n\nSummary\n\nFederal agencies, contractors, and universities, as holders of biological agents, have a\nresponsibility to ensure the security of biological agents. We recognize that\nimplementing security controls over biological agents will impact the open nature of the\nresearch community and careful consideration is necessary before any such controls are\nimplemented. However, appropriate security controls over biological agents are\nimperative in today\xe2\x80\x99s environment. Without security controls and sufficient emphasis on\nsecurity, biological agents at Federal, contractor, and university laboratories are\nvulnerable to theft or misuse. Senior officials at each agency have taken actions to\nimprove security controls over biological agents in response to the published reports, but\ncontinued vigilance is needed.\n\nThank you for considering the views of the various Inspectors General on these critical\nissues. This concludes my testimony.\n\x0c'


text:
Брàкница е село в Североизточна България. То се намира в община Попово, област Търговище.
 География
 Селото се намира на около 17 км югозападно от град Попово, на 300 – 500 м надморска височина. Разположено е на два ската от двете страни на река Голяма река и има полупланински характер. Околната местност е също хълмиста. Землището му граничи с това на селата: Горица, Баба Тонка, Иванча, Долна Златица, Любенци и Ново Градище. Река Голяма река се намира западно от селото. Асфалтиран път го свързва с Попово и селата Славяново и Горица.
 Образувано е от следните четири махали: Кършовската махала, Араплъка, Горната махала и Долната махала.
 Кратка историческа справка
 Най-ранното споменаване на името на селото в османо-турски данъчен документ е от 1573 г. В далечното минало селото е било застроено в местността Ак базигрян (Черниците). Няколко предания говорят за преместването на селото, общото в които е че то е било изгорено и разпръснато. От това „бракувано“, „изоставено“ село дошло и името му – Бракница (Брак кьой). След това събитие оцелелите жители на селото се заселили на мястото, където то се намира и днес. Пак според друго предание новото село се наричало първоначално Ени махле (Новата махала), но това име не е успяло да се наложи.
 Преди Освобождението селото било изцяло турско, но след руско-турската война от 1877 г. жителите му се изселили в Анадола. През 1878 – 1879 г. дошли първите нови заселници – балканджии в селото. Повечето от тях идвали от село Миндя, Еленско, Къпиново и Мерданя, Великотърновско, Стражица, Горнооряховско и от селцата около Трявна. Църквата е построена и осветена през 1901 г., посветена на свети Архангел Михаил. Преди това селото е имало параклис от 1884 г.
 Старите турски жители на селото имали и джамия, която впоследствие била съборена.
 Старите родове на преселниците балканджии в селото били: Бараците, Даняците, Денчовци, Зурльовци, Кафите, Киноолар, Кършовци, Миндьовчани, Пейкооларите, Сополкоолар, Чукундур Продановци и др.
 Днес в селото живеят само българи, почти всички пенсионери, потомци на някогашните преселници от Балкана.
 Религии
 Изцяло християнска (източноправославна);
 Обществени институции
 Кметско наместничество;
 Народно читалище „Св. Климент Охридски“;
 Църква;
 Културни и природни забележителности
 В селото все още има запазени къщи със старинна и интересна архитектура;
 Църковен храм „Св. Архангел Михаил“ от 1901 г.
 Руини на късноримска и средновековна крепост, известна под името „Къс кале“ (Момино кале, Малкото кале), намиращи се на около 2,5 км югозападно от селото на възвишение над десния бряг на Голяма река (Биюк дере);
 До селото има слабо минерализиран извор „Хисар“ с много хубава и лековита вода, помагаща при бъбречни и стомашно-чревни заболявания;
 Вековни широколистни (дъбови) гори;
 В местността Пирамидата (Керим сърт) в землището на селото расте огромен летен дъб на възраст около 430 години;
 Редовни събития
 Събор на селото – провежда се на първата неделя след 28 август.
 Личности
 Хаджи Йордан Денчев Петков-Комитата (1853 – 1933) (от Денчовския род) – четник на Филип Тотю и Христо Ботев, участник и в Сръбско-турската война. На 1 май 1878 г. се записва като доброволец в първия български набор. Участва в Сръбско-българската война. Произведен в чин старши подофицер и награден с кръст за храброст. Общественик; Първи кмет на селото след Освобождението; Дарява средства за построяване на църквата; Основател и дарител на местното читалище и потребителска кооперация. Умира на 14 декември 1933 г. Като израз на дълбоката си почит към него съселяните му го погребват в черковния двор.
 Литература
 Попов, А., Н. Кънев. Попово – градът и околията му. Историко-географски очерк. Попово, 1929.
 Димитрова-Тодорова, Лиляна. Местните имена в Поповско. С., 2006.
 Сборници „Попово в миналото“ (1 – 4);
 Бележки
 Села в област Търговище
 Населени места в община Попово


type: caselaw

text:
 996 A.2d 382 (2010)
 414 Md. 556
 Joseph M. DELLA RATTA, et al.
 v.
 Edward J. DYAS, Jr.
 No. 23, September Term, 2009.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 June 9, 2010.
 *384 James E. Carbine (James E. Carbine, P.C. of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioners.
 David M. Sheehan (Michael E. Blumenfeld of Brown & Sheehan, LLP of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.
 Argued before BELL,[*] C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
 ADKINS, J.
 This case requires us to determine whether, with respect to the dissolution and winding up of a LLC and the winding up of a partnership, the "principal office" clause in Sections 4A-903, 4A-904(b) and 9A-803(a) of the Corporations and Associations Article ("CA") restricts subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the business entity is located. Specifically, Petitioner *385 Della Ratta argues that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County's orders dissolving his partnership and LLC are invalid because the original petition for dissolution was filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, a tribunal that lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue. We hold that the statutes limit subject matter jurisdiction for ordering dissolution to the particular county where the principal office is located. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County had jurisdiction over the other counts in the complaint filed by Respondent Dyas, and jurisdictional problems with the claim for dissolution were avoided when the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County before entry of judgment on the dissolution and winding up claims.
 Della Ratta also appeals the trial court's decision to dissociate him from his partnership with Dyas, its exclusion of an accounting exhibit during the winding up phase of the action, and its finding that the parties entered into a fixed price contract for the construction of a hotel. The Court of Special Appeals ("CSA") held that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's conclusions, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. We agree, and therefore affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
 FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
 This dispute follows the disintegration of a twenty-year business relationship between Joseph M. Della Ratta and Edward J. Dyas. Dyas alleges that Della Ratta swindled him throughout the course of their collaboration to build three Ocean City resorts: the Best Western Sea Bay Inn, completed in 1988 ("Sea Bay"); the Maresol Condominiums, in 2004 ("Maresol"); and the Best Western Hotel and Suites, finished in 2006 ("the New Hotel"). Dyas further alleges that in 2004, Della Ratta attempted to "wrongfully squeeze out" Dyas from the partnership by maliciously calling in Dyas' indebtedness to the entities that the two developers formed for the projects.
 Dyas and Della Ratta formed both a partnershipSpa Motel General Partnership[1] ("Spa GP")in 1987 and a limited liability companyBay View Condominiums, LLC ("Bay View")in 2002. The two men utilized the partnership for the construction of both Sea Bay and the New Hotel, while opting for the LLC when commencing Maresol.[2]
 Marked differences between the accounting practices of both men contributed to the downfall of their partnership. Dyas always created a new LLC for each of his projects in order to protect himself from liability if the job went bad. Also, Dyas preferred bank financing as much as that was possible. Della Ratta, on the other hand, had a more "loose" accounting practice whereby "he freely transferred money back and forth between [his own two corporate entities] to meet construction costs, overrun, et cetera." One of his corporate entities, a construction company called Della Ratta, Inc. ("DRI"), provided construction for all three projects. Moreover, *386 the two hotels were managed by Commercial Management Company ("CMC"), also solely owned by Della Ratta. When Sea Bay's opening was delayed because it could not acquire financing for furniture, fixtures, and equipment, Della Ratta provided a loan from CMC to cover the leasing of those items. The terms of that loan were very favorable to CMC, and Dyas cites this as the first in a series of instances in which Della Ratta (in favoring his own interests) systematically fleeced him.
 Later, in the Maresol project, Dyas and Della Ratta could not agree as to how to spend Bay View's newly acquired revenue following the sale of forty condominiums. Dyas disagreed with Della Ratta's desire to use the money to pay off a bank loan because the loan was not yet in default. Dyas alleges that Della Ratta then deceptively and unilaterally disposed of Bay View's funds to repay the loan and then attempted to force Dyas out of the partnership by seeking an assignment of the loan documents in order to foreclose on Dyas.
 The last straw for Dyas came during the construction of the New Hotel in December 2004, when Della Ratta issued three "capital call letters" to Dyas, demanding repayment of costs associated with Sea Bay and the New Hotel, as well as other cash advances purportedly made by Della Ratta. On January, 10, 2005, Dyas filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, seeking a temporary restraining order invalidating Della Ratta's three capital call letters. On February 9, 2005, Dyas amended his complaint, requesting judicially supervised dissolution of Spa GP.
 On November 3, 2005, Della Ratta moved to transfer the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, arguing that Section 9A-803(a) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act[3] conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the dissolution action on Montgomery County because Spa GP's principal office was located in that county. See Md.Code (1975, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 9A-803(a) of the Corporations and Associations Article ("CA").[4] Dyas responded by filing a third amended complaint, in which he requested judicial dissolution of Bay View under CA Section 4A-903. Della Ratta also challenged the court's ability to hear this dissolution matter, articulating the same subject matter jurisdiction argument he presented in defense against the dissolution of Spa GP.
 Despite Della Ratta's protests, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County held a ten-day trial on the merits. After a bench trial, Judge Caroom ruled in favor of Dyas, enjoining Della Ratta's capital calls and appointing an auditor to inspect the accounts of Dyas and Della Ratta with respect to Spa GP and Bay View. The judge determined that Della Ratta's conduct prevented the partnership from continuing in a reasonably practicable manner, and therefore ordered Della Ratta dissociated from Spa GP pursuant to CA Section 9A-601(5)(iii), but reserved the actual order for dissolution of Spa GP and Bay View LLC pending the transfer of the case to Montgomery County. On June 23, 2006, Chief Judge Bell, pursuant to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution of Maryland,[5] specially designated Judge Caroom *387 to sit as a Judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in this case and thereafter to render a verdict. Sitting in that capacity, Judge Caroom officially ordered the dissolution of Spa GP and Bay View and instructed Della Ratta to return over three million dollars to Bay View before the dissolution.
 Following the trial on the merits, the dispute crossed into its accounting phase, during which the auditor prepared a statement of the accounts of both entities. During this phase, on April 17, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on all open motions. At the hearing, Della Ratta sought to introduce into evidence Defendant's Exhibit L26, which comprised twelve checks made payable to Spa GP and signed by Della Ratta. The trial court declined to reopen the evidence for the admission of L26, finding that Della Ratta's accounting practices rendered "the records [ ] woefully incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable." After two interim accounts and distributions, the auditor submitted his final report, which was approved by final judgment.
 Della Ratta appealed the trial court's final judgment, and, in Della Ratta v. Dyas, 183 Md.App. 344, 961 A.2d 629 (2008), the CSA affirmed. Della Ratta then filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, and we granted his petition to consider the following issues:
 I. Did the Trial Court have the subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve Bay View and judicially supervise the winding up of Spa GP?
 II. Did the Trial Court err in dissociating Della Ratta as a general partner of Spa GP based on his conduct in Bay View?
 III. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to allow Della Ratta the opportunity to introduce proffered exhibit L26 into the record before the court appointed auditor during the accounting phase of the case?
 IV. Did the lower courts err when they found that the parties formed an enforceable agreement to construct the Maresol Condominiums on a firm, fixed price basis?
 DISCUSSION
 I. Standard of Review
 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(c), where, as here, an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. We will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous. Md. Rule 8-131(c). "The appellate court must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party...." Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392, 347 A.2d 834, 835 (1975). "If there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous." Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202, 857 A.2d 1109, 1123 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are not entitled to the deference of the clearly erroneous standard. See Clancy v. King, 405 Md. 541, 554, 954 A.2d 1092, 1099 (2008).
 II. Analysis
 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Venue
 Della Ratta argues that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County did not *388 have the subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve Bay View and to supervise the winding up of Spa GP. Specifically, Della Ratta focuses on language found in three sections of the Corporations and Associations Article describing the appropriate arbiter for such matters, i.e., "the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located[.]"[6] He argues that Dyas's claims for dissolution and wind up of both Spa GP and Bay View were inappropriately submitted to and heard by the wrong court because Montgomery County is, indisputably, the location of the principal place of business for both entities.
 1. Statutory Interpretation
 The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2d 439, 445 (2005). "The first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court may supplement its analysis by turning to legislative materials, such as "related statutes, pertinent legislative history and other material that fairly bears on the ... fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal...." Id. at 12, 874 A.2d at 446 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Throughout this process, this Court "must always be cognizant of the fundamental principle that statutory construction is approached from a `commonsensical' perspective. Thus, we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense." Frost v. *389 State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (citations omitted).
 2. Dissolution and Wind Up of Spa GP
 Della Ratta concedes that any court can order the dissolution of a partnership. CA Section 9A-801 provides in pertinent part:
 A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, only upon the occurrence of any of the following events: ... (5) On application by a partner, a judicial determination that: ... [it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the partnership].
 (emphasis added). Here, there is no question that the General Assembly did not restrict which court could make the "judicial determination" of whether dissolution of a partnership is appropriate and render an order accordingly. Thus, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County possessed the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dissolution count for Spa GP and would have been able to issue the final order of dissolution rather than transfer the matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
 Della Ratta instead challenges the validity of the order for the wind up of Spa GP on grounds that the application requesting wind up was made in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County when it should have been made in Montgomery County. There is no dispute that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County supervised the wind up of Spa GP, but Della Ratta asserts that the language of CA Section 9A-803 ("on application of any partner, ... the circuit court for the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located ... may order judicial supervision of the winding up") required Dyas to file his application for wind up in Montgomery County. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the CSA, rejected this argument, stating that the use of "application" in the statute was meant to refer to the class of persons who can request judicial supervision of the winding up process, rather than to limit the filing of an application to a specific court. Della Ratta v. Dyas, 183 Md.App. 344, 363, 961 A.2d 629, 640 (2008). We agree.
 The statute permits an order for judicial supervision of winding up of a partnership "on application of any partner, partner's legal representative, or transferee...." CA § 9A-803 (emphasis added). The General Assembly could have, but did not, describe the petition for judicial supervision as an "application to the circuit court for the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located." Instead, the General Assembly coupled the word "application" with "of a partner, [etc.]," indicating its intention to regulate who would have standing to make such an application, not the place where persons with standing could file such an application.
 The CSA also rejected Della Ratta's challenge to the order for wind up of Spa GP on the grounds that requiring severance of Dyas's dissolution actions from his other twelve claims would not be a commonsense application of the statute. Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 364, 961 A.2d at 641. It noted that actions for involuntary dissolution are often linked to claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and possibly fraud. Id. As Dyas did not seek dissolution of Spa GP until after he had filed his other claims in Anne Arundel County, Della Ratta's theory would require Dyas to file a separate claim for dissolution in Montgomery County rather than attaching the count onto his third amended complaint in Anne Arundel County. Id. at 364, 961 A.2d at 640 ("Ordinarily, Dyas would have been entitled to a stay of the dissolution action, pending resolution of his claims in Anne Arundel County."). If Dyas had been successful on his *390 other claims (as he was here), collateral estoppel would lead to an order of dissolution in Montgomery County. "By trying the issues in Anne Arundel County, and transferring the entire action to Montgomery County prior to the order of dissolution, Dyas has achieved the same result." Id. at 364, 961 A.2d at 641.
 Again, we agree with the CSA.
 3. Dissolution and Wind Up of Bay View, LLC
 To contest both the dissolution and the winding up of Bay View,[7] Della Ratta focuses on the General Assembly's authorization of "the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the limited liability company is located" both to decree the dissolution of an LLC (under CA Section 4A-903) and to wind up the affairs of the LLC (under CA Section 4A-904(b)).[8] Della Ratta claims that the statute is unambiguous and requires any adjudication of dissolution to be in the county described. The CSA disagreed, reasoning that the statute was ambiguous because it was unclear as to whether the language restricted jurisdiction to a specific county or simply indicated a non-binding preference for a particular county. We disagree with the CSA, however, because, in our view, such a holding contravenes the statutory interpretation canon that a court should read a statute "as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory." Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251, 275, 983 A.2d 138, 153 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Reading the language as a mere preference for a particular county would render it surplusage because, pursuant to the "carries on a regular business" clause in the Maryland's general venue statute,[9] venue would exist in the county where the principal office is located regardless of the existence of the "principal office" provision. Furthermore, such a reading would render the provision nugatory because a plaintiff could ignore the preference and bring a dissolution action in any county permitted by the general venue statute. See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Accordingly, because this Court should not read any portion of the statute as ineffectual, we do not interpret Section 4A-903 as signaling simply a "legislative preference." Thus, we conclude that the statute confers exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for ordering dissolution of an LLC on the county where the principal office of the LLC is located.
 Even if this Court were to agree with the CSA that Section 4A-903 is ambiguous, we would still interpret the statute as *391 we did above because of its legislative and statutory history. Again, we disagree with the CSA on this point. The CSA explored the legislative history of the Maryland Limited Liability Company Act ("MLLCA") (CA Title 4A), the Maryland Uniform Partnership Act ("MUPA") (CA Title 9), the Maryland Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("MRUPA") (CA Title 9A), and the Maryland Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("MRULPA") (CA Title 10). According to a special Joint Committee of the Sections of Taxation and Business Law of the Maryland State Bar Association ("the Committee"), which drafted the legislative bill that became the MLLCA, CA Section 4A-903 was derived from MRULPA's Section 10-802, and it was "intended that all circumstances which justify judicial dissolution under [MRULPA] will justify judicial dissolution of a limited liability company." Draft of Third Report of the Special Joint Committee on the Maryland Limited Liability Company Act 84 (1992).
 Both CA Sections 4A-903 and 10-802[10] contain the "principal office" provision, and the CSA relied on the Committee's statement in holding that the MLLCA dissolution section contained the provision simply because it was in the MRULPA. See Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 360, 961 A.2d at 638-39. The comment to CA Section 10-802 (found in Chapter 801 of the Acts of 1981) explains that the Section is derived from CA Section 9-603(a)(4) of MUPA and "is not intended to modify existing law." 1981 Md. Laws 3047. Section 9-603(a)(4) does not contain the "principal office" provision.[11] Therefore, the CSA reasoned, the language in Section 4A-903 does not limit subject matter jurisdiction because its statutory genesis did not restrict which courts could order the dissolution of a partnership.
 We agree with Della Ratta's challenge to the CSA's reliance on the Committee's stated intention not to modify the law as it existed before the adoption of CA Section 10-802. Relying on the Third Report of the Special Joint Committee on the Maryland Limited Liability Company Act (June 1, 1992), Della Ratta asserts that the intent was only to "borrow the `circumstances which justify judicial dissolution' from the [MRULPA,]" not the law on subject matter jurisdiction. We believe this is the best reading of the comment. The General Assembly's insertion of language restricting the court that may order dissolution in the MLLCA and the MRULPA, while omitting the same language in MRUPA's dissolution statute, indicates that Maryland's legislative body intended to impose an additional limitation. There is no question that the General Assembly considered such language when it promulgated the MRUPA because the clause is present in the MRUPA's winding up statute. Thus, we conclude that the deviation is intentional and a more substantive restriction on subject matter jurisdiction.
 *392 Ultimately, the plain language of CA Section 4A-903 as well as a logical examination of legislative and statutory history persuades us that the MLLCA accords subject matter jurisdiction exclusively in the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the LLC is located.[12] We also read the same restriction in the plain language of CA Sections 4A-904(b) and 9A-803.
 4. Transfer of the Action
 Although, as we explained above, the MLLC and the MRUPA restrict subject matter jurisdiction of this action to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the trial court's transfer of the case to that circuit court and Judge Caroom's special designation as a judge of that court cured the jurisdictional problem. Judge Caroom, sitting as a judge for the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, made findings regarding the appropriate relief on all fourteen counts presented by Dyas. At that time, he found that the evidence indicated that Dyas and Della Ratta could not reasonably carry on with Bay View LLC and thus dissolution was warranted. Judge Caroom, however, was very careful to explain that the judgement of dissolution was not final because Anne Arundel County did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter:
 I find that the facts are sufficient for the Court to grant the dissolution but that I don't have the subject matter jurisdiction so the Court will transfer it to Montgomery County.
 And the Circuit Court there, unless there is something else presented to persuade it otherwise, in all likelihood would find that it might be appropriate to grant that relief.
 Through an order dated June 23, 2006, Chief Judge Bell specially assigned Judge Caroom to sit as a Judge for the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. In his Amended Interlocutory Judgment issued from Anne Arundel County, Judge Caroom transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, effective August 7, 2006. On March 12, 2007, Judge Caroom, sitting specially as a judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, ordered the dissolution of Spa GP and Bay View LLC.
 To be sure, the mere transfer of a case for the formality of issuing an order will not comply with the dictates of CA Section 4A-903. Yet in this case, Judge Caroom did not close the dissolution matter before transferring it to Montgomery County.[13] As the judge's statement indicates, Della Ratta would have had the opportunity to *393 persuade him, when sitting as a judge of the Montgomery County Circuit Court, that the facts did not justify dissolution. According to the orders dissolving Spa GP and Bay View, the parties were able to advance their arguments during a February 28, 2007 telephone conference, and those arguments along with the applicable law and the record in the case prompted Judge Caroom to order dissolution.[14] During oral argument, Dyas conceded that no additional evidence was presented on dissolution once the case was transferred. Absent some proffer of additional evidence by Della Ratta, however, it was appropriate for Judge Caroom to rely on his findings regarding the other twelve counts in the Anne Arundel County case. Indeed, once the Anne Arundel County judgment became final, Della Ratta would be collaterally estopped from disputing the findings on the other twelve counts, and those issues could provide the necessary support for dissolution. The exercise of subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the parties' decisions to submit additional evidence, but rather on whether the matter was adjudicated by the appropriate court. Thus, by providing the parties the chance to convince the Montgomery County court that dissolution was not necessary, Judge Caroom ensured that the order for dissolution did not violate the statutory restriction on subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Circuit Court made no error with respect to the dissolution and winding up of Spa GP and Bay View.
 B. Dissociation
 Della Ratta also takes issue with the trial court's decision to dissociate him from Spa GP. He does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, but claims that the trial court erred by ordering his dissociation from the partnership based on his management of Bay View. He contends that the court inappropriately "pierce[d] the corporate veil" because it was
 obvious that the trial judge was extremely upset about Mr. Della Ratta's diversion of Bay View cash to DR Palm Beach,[[15]] CMC, DRI and himself in repayment for advances they made to cover cost overruns on the construction of the Maresol condominiums ... [as well as] Mr. Della Ratta's refusal to put Maresol's top floor units on the market.
 As this is conduct associated with Bay View, Della Ratta asserts that it cannot serve as the basis for the trial court's decision and must be disregarded. The third ground for dissolution, according to Della Ratta, was his sloppy bookkeeping, which he insists is cancelled out by Dyas's neglect of his own duties. Della Ratta concludes that the nullification of these three reasons removes any grounds that could support the order of dissolution.
 The trial court ordered Della Ratta's dissociation from Spa GP pursuant to CA Section 9A-601(5)(iii)[16] because it determined *394 that Della Ratta's actions made it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him. Della Ratta's wholly owned company, CMC, managed both the Sea Bay and the New Hotel, and CMC's vice president testified that the management company loaned $520,262 from the Sea Bay Operating Account to the New Hotel construction, in contravention of the management agreement between CMC and Spa GP. An additional violation of the agreement came in the form of numerous checks issued by CMC to Spa GP that "bore no notation of purpose, or merely noted `loan' or `advance.'" Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 365, 961 A.2d at 641. Finally, the parties stipulated that CMC violated its management contract when it improperly paid itself $580,000 for executive office expenses.
 Even if the aforementioned incidents constituted nothing more than negligence, Della Ratta's capital calls of December 10, 2004 were, in fact, malicious. The CSA succinctly summarized the substance of the capital calls as follows:
 Writing to Spa as President of CMC, Della Ratta claimed $1,485,650.04 in cash advances to Spa, including interest, for operating losses and CMC claimed $640,920, including interest, to be due on lease financing for furniture, fixtures, and equipment for [Sea Bay]. Writing to Spa as president of DRI, Della Ratta claimed $1,439,110, including interest, for cash advances. Writing to Spa for his own account, Della Ratta claimed $1,967,030.97, including interest, for cash advances. Each claim demanded payment on or before January 14, 2005. Then, writing as general partner of Spa, Della Ratta called for capital by January 14, 2005, of $5,532,711, of which Dyas's share would be $ 2,766,355.50.... In addition, Della Ratta claimed on behalf of Spa, payment by Dyas, by January 14, 2005, of $798,047.50, representing fifty percent of $1,596,095, the projected cost overrun on the New Hotel. Dyas was also requested to pay a total of $225,146.50 in monthly payments from December 2004 through April 2005 for projected cash requirements of the two hotels. [One of these New Hotel capital calls was issued when the hotel was still under construction and had a stop work order due to DRI's failure to cure various defects found by the inspectors.]
 Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 365-66, 961 A.2d at 641-42. The trial court found that the issuance of these capital calls occurred after Della Ratta had taken steps to deprive Bay View, and thus Dyas, of funds that would have been necessary to meet those obligations. Thus, the trial court concluded, the call letters were issued in bad faith. While Della Ratta surreptitiously emptied Bay View's accounts, it was to Spa GP that he issued the call letters at a time when he knew they could not be satisfied, in an attempt to squeeze out Dyas without following the proper legal procedures.[17]
 *395 In sum, the trial court's evidentiary support for dissociation related to Della Ratta's activities while a partner in Spa GP. The record contains sufficient evidence of Della Ratta's inappropriate conduct to support the trial court's conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable for Spa GP to continue with Della Ratta as a partner. Thus, the trial court did not err in ordering Della Ratta's dissociation from Spa GP.
 C. Accounting Exhibit
 Della Ratta also seeks reversal of Judge Caroom's exclusion of an accounting exhibit ("L26") proffered by Della Ratta after the conclusion of the trial on the merits. After entering its Interlocutory Judgment, the trial court ordered an accounting of Della Ratta and Dyas's finances with respect to Spa Motel and Bay View and appointed an auditor. In its August 4, 2006 Amended Interlocutory Judgment, the court set forth the parameters by which the auditor was to conduct the accounting. One such guideline was that "the auditor shall perform the accounting herein based solely limited [sic] on the documents and exhibits which were provided by the parties at trial and which constitute the record of this case[.]" The trial court articulated two reasons for this restriction:
 1) the parties to such complex litigation are entitled reasonably to rely upon the discovery process and, after the day of trial has come and gone, they generally should not be required to reopen the process when one party desires to offer new evidence with the benefit of the trial-date's and the judgment's education; and
 2) the parties should be required to present all evidence to a single fact-finder, particularly where, as here, witness credibility and a pattern of conduct are involved.
 The August 4, 2006 order did allow for the auditor to consider "other books and records" if the trial court determined that additional evidence or findings of fact were "needed to properly state and settle the accounts between the parties[.]" Maryland Rule 2-543(b) provides in relevant part that "[w]hen an matter is referred to an auditor, the order shall state the purpose and scope of the audit. The order may prescribe the manner in which the audit is to be conducted...." In accordance with Judge Caroom's directions in his referral to an auditor, the admission of additional evidence was within his discretion.
 Under the parties's central management agreement, CMC was tasked with keeping the accounts. The agreement required CMC to, among other things, comport with the Uniform System of Accounts for Hotels and to furnish monthly reports of all transactions occurring within the month. Despite these guidelines, CMC and Della Ratta's actual accounting practices "constituted an accountant's nightmare[.]" For example, CMC ignored corporate boundaries when it used partnership hotel funds "to pay for dental insurance and HMO costs on the payroll of [DRI] with a note commenting `CyndyPlease adjust however you need to.'" CMC also used Spa GP's hotel funds to satisfy "thousands of dollars of payroll expenses and taxes for a separate hotel owned by Della Ratta, which had no legal connection to the partnership." Not surprisingly, an expert witness as to financial management practices for hotels testified that CMC's records were "grossly inadequate and failed to comply with the `UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR HOTELS.'" The trial court articulated the legal implications for a party who is responsible for managing the books and who fails to do so properly, in that it must "suffer from the inaccuracies and uncertainties in the evidence by *396 having presumptions and inferences drawn against him or her for the failure to properly account." It was against this backdrop that the trial court supervised the accounting phase of the trial.
 The CSA described the events of the accounting phase of the litigation:
 In his report, the auditor included a balance sheet for Spa as of December 31, 2005. It included among long-term liabilities two items to which [Della Ratta's] argument is directed. These were "CMC Investment Loan/Suites $193,297.13" and "CMC Investment Loan/Sea Bay $330,913.66." These two amounts appeared on an unaudited financial statement of Spa, as of that date, that had been maintained among the business records of Spa. It had been introduced as Defendants' Exhibit H18 at trial. There was no other evidence before the court-appointed auditor explaining these "liabilities."
 In his report, the auditor included a section of "ACCOUNTS AS TO WHICH INSUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTIONS." Among these were "all advances made by CMC to the Sea Bay Inn, the New Hotel and/or the Partnership."
 Dyas excepted to the inclusion, inter alia, of the two amounts as liabilities of Spa to CMC. On January 18, 2007, [Della Ratta] responded, asserting that supporting evidence was found in Exhibits H4-H18. That same day [Della Ratta] also moved to reopen the evidence, without proffering any particular evidence.
 A hearing was held by the trial court on April 17, 2007, on all open motions. That day, [Della Ratta] served on Dyas and presented to the court [his] proffer that certain checks be accepted in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit L26. Six of the checks comprising proffered Exhibit L26 totaled $330,913.66, and the other six checks totaled $193,297.13[.]
 At the hearing on the motion, [Della Ratta] submitted that the account on which the twelve checks had been drawn was shown by uncontradicted testimony to be Della Ratta's personal checking account. [He] pointed out that the checks in proffered Exhibit L26 were part of a larger bundle of checks that had been produced in discovery and that had been pre-marked for trial as Exhibit C3. [Della Ratta] represented that when the court held that the construction contract for the New Hotel was a fixed price contract, counsel concluded that
 "the checks that Joe Della Ratta wrote to fund in [sic] cost overruns thereby became [in]admissible. The problem I had in trial was that I didn't know how to pull the checks apart. I didn't know what checks were construction and what checks were[,] I'll call[,] hotel operations checks."
 Della Ratta, 183 Md.App. at 370-71, 961 A.2d at 644-45.[18]
 *397 The trial court refused Della Ratta's request to reopen the evidence for the admission of L26. The court questioned the purposes of the advances documented by the checks, which themselves gave no explanation for the amounts:
 For example, items 5 & 8 refer to "capital" and/or "construction" of the Sea Bay Inn; in fact, there was no evidence of ongoing construction or capital improvement to the older, Sea Bay hotel in this period. Thus, these checks may have been intended for construction of the [New Hotel], for non-capital items (operating expenses?) at [Sea Bay], or a combination of each. Without any backup documentation, it is impossible for the Court to know and the Court properly cannot speculate. The same problems arise with items 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11 & 12 which are Delphically opaque as to their purposes. Again, the inferences must be drawn against the Defendants who had the obligation properly to keep the books.
 These twelve checks were reminiscent of CMC's and Della Ratta's other accounting records, which the trial court characterized as "woefully incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable." The trial court acted within its discretion when it elected to exclude such untrustworthy evidence.[19] In sum, we see no error in the trial court's exclusion of L26.
 D. Fixed Price Contracts
 Finally, Della Ratta appeals the trial court's finding that DRI entered into a verbal agreement with Bay View to construct Maresol on a fixed price basis. He argues that the evidence indicates that the contract was actually a cost-plus contract. The absence of a written agreement required the trial court to construct the terms using letters between Dyas and Della Ratta, the testimony of both men, and various other company documents. The trial court found that the parties originally agreed upon a fixed price of $4,585,825, but increased that amount to $5,613,438 through authorized change orders. The trial court also found that the defendants received $3,163,517.13 in excess of the contract and ordered them to return that amount to Bay View.
 Della Ratta first challenges the trial court's conclusions by zeroing in on a misstatement made by the judge as he rendered his opinion from the bench. When examining an August 6, 2002 letter *398 authored by Della Ratta, the trial court read part of one sentence as: "We started with a fixed-price contract ...." (emphasis added). The language Della Ratta actually used was: "We started with a fixed contract price ...." (emphasis added). We do not view the judge's inversion of "contract" and "price" as indicative of an inappropriate reading of the substance of the letter. Either version could reasonably lead a trier of fact to read Della Ratta's letter as acknowledging the existence of a contract that fixed a price at which DRI was to construct Bay View. Della Ratta's own testimony supports this interpretation. When asked about the letter, he did not attempt to deny that the statement referred to a fixed price contract, but rather simply characterized it as a clerical error. This supposed error extended to the next sentence in the letter, which explained that the increase in costs from $4,585,825 to 5,613,438 "are the responsibility of Della Ratta, Inc.[,]" instead of Bay View, as Della Ratta contends.[20]
 The 2002 letter did not contain the sole clerical error in this case, as conceded by Della Ratta. During the construction of Maresol, Bay View obtained a loan from Severn Bank. Thereafter, DRI and Bay View executed twelve change orders, all of which were signed by Della Ratta and an agent of DRI. Each of these change orders listed $4,585,825.56 as the guaranteed maximum price, for example:
 The original (Contract Sum)(Guaranteed Maximum Price) was $4,585,825.56.
 The net change by previously authorized Change Orders $966,180.34
 The (Contract Sum)(Guaranteed Maximum Price) prior to this Change Order was $5,552,005.90
 The (Contract Sum)(Guaranteed Maximum Price) will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged) by this Change Order in the amount of $23,668.20
 The new (Contract Sum) (Guaranteed Maximum Price) including this Change Order will be $5,575,674.10
 The Contract Time will be (increased) (decreased) (unchanged) by ZERO (0) days.
 The alleged error in the language was authorized by Della Ratta a dozen times, yet it never came to his attention until trial. Ultimately, the trial court did not accept Della Ratta's argument and concluded that "references to fixed price contracts were not clerical errors, but they were actual expressions of the parties' understanding." The CSA supplemented the trial court's finding by observing that it was consistent with the parties's contemporaneous course of conduct where, after constructing Maresol, DRI also agreed to construct the New Hotel under a fixed price contract. See Della Ratta, 183 Md. App. at 369, 961 A.2d at 644.
 Della Ratta extensively quotes from his attorney's cross-examination of Dyas, arguing that Dyas's testimony conflicts with his argument for a fixed price contract. The trial court also considered this, but "[did not] find that the trial testimony or any other evidence overcame [the admission in the 2002 letter]." "Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder." State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533-34, 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). As an appellate court, we do not re-weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's judgment. Id. at *399 534, 823 A.2d at 668. We believe that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the parties entered into a fixed price contract and thus the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous.
 CONCLUSION
 We hold that, with respect to the dissolution and winding up of a LLC and the winding up of a partnership, the "principal office" clause in CA Sections 4A-903, 4A-904(b) and 9A-803(a) restricts subject matter jurisdiction to the county in which the principal office of the business entity is located. The Circuit Court complied with those statutes when, after adjudication of the multi-count action, it transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to adjudicate finally the requests for dissolution and winding up. Therefore, we affirm the court's final orders of dissolution and the winding up of Spa GP and Bay View. Additionally, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dissociated Della Ratta from the partnership or when it excluded exhibit L26 from consideration by the appointed accountant, and thus also affirm those decisions. Finally, we hold that the trial court's finding that the parties had entered into a fixed price contract to construct Maresol was supported by the evidence and thus is not a reversible error.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.
 NOTES
 [*] Bell, C.J., participated in the hearing and conference of this case, but recused himself prior to the adoption of this opinion.
 [1] Spa GP originally consisted of three partners, but during the course of the Sea Bay project, Dyas bought out the third partner. Thereafter, Dyas and Della Ratta each held a fifty percent interest in the partnership.
 [2] The parties' choices of business entities dictate which statutory regime is implicated in analyzing the judicially supervised dissolution of their business relationship. Sections 4A-903 and 4A-904(b) of the Corporations and Associations Article govern Bay View, while Sections 9A-801 and 9A-803(a) of that same article govern Spa GP. See Md.Code (1975, 1999 Repl. Vol.) §§ 4A-903 & 9A-803 of the Corporations and Associations Article ("CA").
 [3] CA's Title 9A is designated as the Maryland Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
 [4] Unless otherwise specified, all citations to the Corporations and Associations Article are to the 1999 Replacement Volume, which was controlling law during the events of this case.
 [5] Article IV, Section 18(b)(2) of the Constitution of Maryland provides in relevant part:
 [T]he Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may, in case of a vacancy, or of the illness, disqualification or other absence of a judge or for the purpose of relieving an accumulation of business in any court assign any judge except a judge of the Orphans' Court to sit temporarily in any court except an Orphans' Court.
 [6] CA Section 4A-903 (judicial dissolution of LLC) provides:
 On application by or on behalf of a member, the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the limited liability company is located may decree the dissolution of the limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or the operating agreement.
 CA Section 4A-904 (winding up of LLC) provides:
 (a) In general.Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, the remaining members of a limited liability company may wind up the affairs of the limited liability company.
 (b) Judicial winding up.Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the limited liability company is located, on cause shown after dissolution, may wind up the limited liability company's affairs on application of any member.
 CA Section 9A-803 (winding up of partnership) provides:
 (a) Participation and supervision.After dissolution, a partner who has not wrongfully dissociated may participate in winding up the partnership's business, but on application of any partner, partner's legal representative, or transferee, the circuit court for the county in which the principal office of the partnership is located, for good cause shown, may order judicial supervision of the winding up.
 (b) Legal representative may participate. The legal representative of the last surviving partner may wind up a partnership's business.
 (c) Authority of person winding up.A person winding up a partnership's business may preserve the partnership business or property as a going concern for a reasonable time, prosecute and defend actions and proceedings, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, settle and close the partnership's business, dispose of and transfer the partnership's property, discharge the partnership's liabilities, distribute the assets of the partnership pursuant to § 9A-807 of this subtitle, settle disputes by mediation or arbitration, and perform other necessary acts.
 [7] Della Ratta also presents the same "application" argument that he advanced in support of his interpretation of the partnership statute. This is refuted by the logic articulated in the Section II.A.2., and thus, we do not address it here anew.
 [8] Although Della Ratta claims that the judicial wind up of Bay View LLC was erroneous, he does not put forth any argument as to why. He claims that "[t]he trial court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to ... supervise the winding up of the partnership [and Bay View LLC,]" even though it was the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that supervised the winding up. His discussion of Bay View LLC centers on its dissolution. Thus, we will focus on subject matter jurisdiction as it relates to CA Section 4A-903.
 [9] Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides in relevant part:
 (a) Civil Actions.... [A] civil action shall be brought in a county where the defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is employed, or habitually engages in a vocation. In addition, a corporation also may be sued where it maintains its principal offices in the State.
 [10] CA Section 10-802 provides: "On application by or for a partner, the circuit court of the county in which the principal office of the limited partnership is located may decree dissolution of a limited partnership whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership agreement."
 [11] CA Section 9-603 reads in part:
 Dissolution by decree of court.
 (a) Application by or for a partner.On application by or for a partner, the court shall decree a dissolution whenever:
 * * *
 (4) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him[.]
 [12] At least one other state has interpreted an almost identical statute as limiting subject matter jurisdiction to a specific court. In Andrews v. Andrews, 895 So. 2d 898, 900 (Ala. 2004), the Supreme Court of Alabama interpreted Section 10-12-38 of the Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, which provides:
 On application by or for a member, the circuit court for the county in which the articles of organization are filed may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.
 Without providing an in-depth analysis of the statute, the court simply stated that the court in the county where the articles of organization were filed had exclusive jurisdiction to hear any dissolution action. Id. Thus, it concluded that the trial court, which was located in a separate county, was correct in dismissing the defendant's claim seeking dissolution. Id.
 [13] Litigants are strongly advised not to assume that a circuit court judge will be willing to follow the procedure that Judge Caroom adopted, including a request to be specially designated by the Chief Judge to sit in another county. Such decisions are purely discretionary.
 [14] This Court was not provided with a transcript of the February 28, 2007 telephone conference. Thus we are in the dark as to what arguments the parties actually presented during that hearing. We base our holding on Judge Caroom's verbal statement at trial that "something else [could be] presented to persuade [the Circuit Court for Montgomery County not to order dissolution]" along with his March 12, 2007 dissolution orders, which were issued "[u]pon consideration of ... the arguments advanced by counsel during the February 28, 2007 telephone conference[.]"
 [15] The record does not make clear the exact nature of the relationship between the parties and DR Palm Beach.
 [16] CA Section 9A-601 provides, in relevant part, that a partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of any of the following events:
 (5) On application by the partnership or another partner, the partner's expulsion by judicial determination because:
 * * *
 (iii) The partner engaged in conduct relating to the partnership business which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with the partner[.]
 [17] The trial court analogized Della Ratta's conduct to
 the scenario of a dysfunctional family or a John Wayne western in which the angry father might say to the son "I brought you into this world and I can take you out of it." In effect, that's what Mr. Della Ratta was saying to Mr. Dyas: "I brought you into these construction projects and I can squeeze you out of them."
 [18] The court provided the contents of the twelve checks as follows:
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 Check Number Date Memo Amount
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 1) 1326 11/08/04 Loan $ 30,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 2) 1329 11/15/04 Loan  Sea Bay Inn $120,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 3) 1330 11/15/04 Loan  BW Suites $ 45,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 4) 1337 12/29/04 Capital Constr.  BW Suites $ 34,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 5) 1336 12/24/04 Capital Constr.  Sea Bay Inn $ 76,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 6) 1349 02/04/05 Fund Oper. Losses  Sea Bay $ 54,721.66
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 7) 1350 02/04/05 Fund BW Suites  Operations $ 21,889.13
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 8) 1356 03/11/05 Capital Call  Sea Bay Inn $ 28,192
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 9) 1357 03/04/05 Capital Call  BW Suites Hotel $ 23,608
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 10) 1360 03/25/05 Sea Bay Inn $ 22,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 11) 1361 03/25/05 BW Suites $ 16,800
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 12) 136? 04/27/05 Capital $ 52,000
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 See Della Ratta v. Dyas, 183 Md.App. 344, 372 n. 10, 961 A.2d 629, 645 n. 10 (2008).
 [19] To challenge the trial court's exclusion of L26, Della Ratta relies on Golub v. Cohen, 138 Md.App., 508, 772 A.2d 880, cert. denied, 365 Md. 474, 781 A.2d 779 (2001). Golub has no bearing on the trial court's decision to exclude additional evidence on the issue. It was a one-count suit for an accounting, and involved a dispute over whether a party could obtain discovery of financial information about the other party before the court determined that an account was due. See id. at 511, 772 A.2d at 882.
 [20] These two sentences read: "We started with a fixed contract price of $4,585,825 and approved changes that have increased our cost to an estimated final of $5,613,438. These are costs that are the responsibility of Della Ratta, Inc."


text:
Lineoz.net :: Transport & mobilité urbaine • Afficher le sujet - [Horaires] été 2019
 [Horaires] été 2019
 par Train-Corail » 28 Mai 2019 14:47
 Les horaires estivaux sont sortis.
 T2/T3: 16 min
 M1: 16 min
 M3: 15 min (13 min l'année dernière)
 M4: 20 min
 M5: 20 min (30 min l'année dernière)
 M6: 16 min
 M7: 20 min du lundi au samedi
 08: 18/19 min, 25 min le samedi
 09: 28 min du lundi au samedi
 10: 18 min et un dernier départ de Jean Jaurès à 21h
 Re: [Horaires] été 2019
 par SETRA S415 NF » 29 Mai 2019 21:35
 Incroyable qu’il n’y ait aucun changement ... la conférence de début d’année en septembre m’avais convaincu que les horaires aller être bien améliorés dans les mois à venir mais non rien de tout cela
 par SETRA S415 NF » 29 Mai 2019 22:29
 Petit rectificatif de ce qui a été dit plus haut :
 T1 - 5/6 minutes
 T2 et T3 : 10 mn HP, 12 mn HC
 M1 - 16 minutes
 M2 - 23 minutes, 20 minutes l’après-midi
 M3 - 15 minutes
 M4 - 21 minutes
 M5 - 20 minutes
 M6 - 16 minutes
 M7 - 20 minutes
 8 - 18/19 minutes
 10 - 18 minutes HP, 24 a 28 minutes HC matin
 12 - 35 minutes
 13 - 30 minutes, 45 minutes HC Matin
 14 - 60 minutes
 16 - 23 minutes, 30 minutes HC
 17 - 35 minutes
 20 - 45 minutes, 30 minutes sur quelques passages
 21 - 75 minutes
 23 - 60 minutes
 24 - 3 passages
 25 - 8 passages
 27 - 5 passages
 29 - 6 passages
 32 - 60 minutes
 33 - 7 passages
 34 - 2 passages
 36 - du 7 juillet au 1er septembre (en espérant que la baignade soit autorisée tout l’été) : pas de changement d’itinéraire ni d’horaires.
 38 - 60 minutes
 40 - 30 minutes
 41 - 60 minutes
 47 - 6 passages
 71 - 5 passages
 Je pense que ce seront les lignes qui rouleront cet été avec les lignes de soirée. Je ne pense pas qu’il y aie d’autres lignes qui roulent en plus de celles-ci. Travaux T1/T2 ne circulent pas du 2/7 au 26/8 !!
 par stéphatram » 30 Mai 2019 6:06
 Savez-vous pourquoi les T1 et T2 ne circuleront pas cet été? Est-ce en lien avec les travaux de la T3?
 par SETRA S415 NF » 30 Mai 2019 7:45
 Je me rappelle plus mais c’est marqué sur la fiche horaire de la ligne 36 ils font des travaux sur les voies T1-T2
 par Train-Corail » 30 Mai 2019 12:13
 Les dates correspondent à l'an dernier, la fiche horaire de la 36 est de 2018
 Sinon les fréquences des lignes de tram que j'ai annoncées sont correctes, il y a toujours un décalage d'une semaine pour le tram en période estivale. Ainsi, les horqaires estivaux s'appliquent à compter du 22/07
 par SETRA S415 NF » 20 Juil 2019 14:38
 Déplorables les horaires du samedi cet été !! Beaucoup de lignes ont des fréquences similaires à celles du dimanche !!!! Exemple la ligne M6 une ligne qui charge énormément (encore vu le départ 19h50 hier était bondé depuis square violette!) a une fréquence 24 minutes le samedi, c’est pareil le dimanche ! Seule différence le service commence plutôt le samedi !
 par chris42 » 28 Juil 2019 7:06
 Erreur sur la fiche horaires de la ligne 17, les horaires du dimanche sont faux, ils ne tiennent pas compte des travaux à St-Priest (passage toutes les 1h05 au lieu de 1h en temps normal).
 En revanche sur le site ils sont corrects.
 par Train-Corail » 28 Juil 2019 16:21
 En revanche pour la T2 les horaires affichés sur le site sont ceux des petites vacances scolaires...
 par SETRA S415 NF » 16 Aoû 2019 11:57
 Franchement je ne sais pas ce qu’il lui est passé par la tête celui qui a fait les horaires d’été ! Surtout le samedi ça n’a aucun rapport avec la fréquentation des lignes !
 Fréquences le samedi :
 T2 et T3 : 16’
 M1 : 20’
 M2 : 28’
 M3 : 18’
 M4 : 30’
 M5 : 30’
 M6 : 24’
 M7 : 20’
 8 : 25’
 9 : 30’
 10 : 20/25 ́
 11 : 20’
 12 : 35’
 13 : 45’
 14 : 60’
 16 : 30’
 17 : 35’
 37 : 45’
 38 : 60’
 40 : 35’
 J’ai résumé avec les lignes les plus importantes mais si on voit M2/M3/M6 qui sont des lignes très chargées sur le réseau e qui sont moins fréquentes que la 11 ou la 8 ! Que la 11 est 3 fois plus fréquente que la 38 ou la 14 et qu’elle est 1,5 fois plus fréquente que la 5 où la 16 ... c’est une des lignes qui a la plus haute fréquence le samedi alors que sur d’autres lignes ca en vaudrait vraiment la peine une fréquence 15/20’ sur les Lignes Métropoles notamment. Je viens de croiser la 3 bus bien bondé venant de Terrenoire, sur la 9 c’est pareil environ une quarantaine de personnes à bord après le passage à la Gare Châteaucreux ! Incroyable !
 ÉDIT : la 10 aussi je suis à bord on est plein à craquer entre 50 et 60 personnes à bord
 par mm » 16 Aoû 2019 14:31
 la 11 est plus frėquente car assurėe en midibus, alors que M6 est en articulė, c'est donc pour cela que la STAS a favorisė les articulės sur M1, M4 et M6, pour faire des ėconomie avec moins de bus et donc fréquences plus faible. Aujourd'hui il y a un peu plus de monde car les horaires du samedi s'applique ce vendredi avec le pont du 15 août.
 par SETRA S415 NF » 16 Aoû 2019 14:46
 Oui mais ça ne veut absolument rien dire, le samedi d’ailleurs aucune ligne est exploitée en articulés, la 11 elle absorbe que trop peu de monde même avec les midibus, en standard le bus paraîtrait vide. Et puis même la 11 l’année dernière roulait en standards, c’était exactement les mêmes fréquences !
 par mm » 16 Aoû 2019 19:42
 SETRA S415 NF a écrit: Oui mais ça ne veut absolument rien dire, le samedi d’ailleurs aucune ligne est exploitée en articulés, la 11 elle absorbe que trop peu de monde même avec les midibus, en standard le bus paraîtrait vide. Et puis même la 11 l’année dernière roulait en standards, c’était exactement les mêmes fréquences !
 Bus blindės ? Mais ce n'est pas toute la journėe, et si la ligne charge, ce n'est que pour une très faible distance, ex la 10 entre Soleil et Carnot. Seul la M3 mėriterait un renfort ponctuel.
 par SETRA S415 NF » 16 Aoû 2019 19:49
 La M2 c'est la même voire pire, je l'ai prise à 17h43 à Jean Moulin direction Métare le bus était aussi chargé que la 10 que j'ai prise 3 heures plutôt ! Heureusement qu'il y avait la clim à bord du 1310. Sinon on était environ une soixantaine à bord .... A l'arrivée à Jean Moulin, le bus était déjà bondé et ce n'est pas la vingtaine de personnes à l'arrêt qui sont montées qui ont arrangé ça ! Ni les personnes qui sont montées aux arrêts suivants (Conservatoire, Résidence Guinard, Pierre Blachon, 40 LE CORBUSIER, Marandinière et Sembat des personnes sont montées).
 Sinon j'ai pu avoir une 16 très calme à 15h49 à Monthieu Montat, seulement une petite quinzaine de personnes à bord. J'ai pu également prendre la 3, fréquentation comme d'hab monstrueuse, même dans le sens Terrenoire, quand on voit qu'à l'arrêt Gaspard Monge plus d'une dizaine de personnes sont montées, c'est pas rien, pourtant cet arrêt n'est pas, à mon sens, un des arrêts les plus importants de la ligne ...
 par mm » 16 Aoû 2019 20:35
 SETRA S415 NF a écrit: La M2 c'est la même voire pire, je l'ai prise à 17h43 à Jean Moulin direction Métare le bus était aussi chargé que la 10 que j'ai prise 3 heures plutôt ! Heureusement qu'il y avait la clim à bord du 1310. Sinon on était environ une soixantaine à bord .... A l'arrivée à Jean Moulin, le bus était déjà bondé et ce n'est pas la vingtaine de personnes à l'arrêt qui sont montées qui ont arrangé ça ! Ni les personnes qui sont montées aux arrêts suivants (Conservatoire, Résidence Guinard, Pierre Blachon, 40 LE CORBUSIER, Marandinière et Sembat des personnes sont montées).
 La charge maxi d'un Urbanway 12 est entre 96 et 102 personnes maxi, donc il y avait encore de la marge et comme je l'ai signifié, c'est en pėriode de pointe et sur quelques services, il n'y a pas de saturation de ligne au mois d' août, n' exagère pas tout de même , même si il y a un peu plus de monde que d'habitude, ce vendredi en horaire samedi.
 par SETRA S415 NF » 17 Aoû 2019 16:18
 C’est sur mais 96 personnes cest impossible à faire monter, parlons de cette ligne 36 que j’ai pu prendre aujourd’hui, il n’y a plus aucun doublon comme avant. Là on était 60 au départ de Jean Jaurès 14h35 bus 1313 le CR à l’arrivée à Arcole à dis aux 7 personnes qui attendaient à l’arrêt le bus qu’il était complet ! Alors qu’un Setra s 415 nf c’est 27+75 sans PMR ... mais ils ont quand même forcé à entrer le CR a commencé a dire s’il y a un malaise je ne serai pas responsable d’un ton très énervé ! Au retour autant de monde sur le 17h15 Base Nautique
 Dans les deux cas (m2 et 36) l’arrière du véhicule était plein de monde debout, le milieu n’en parlons pas et lavant aussi, c’est juste que le nombre de personnes indiquées c’est quand tout le monde se colle, sauf que personne se Colle chacun aime laisser une petite zone de confort autour de soi. Du coup dans ce cas en nombre de personnes debout possible dans le véhicule on atteint difficilement 45/50 personnes debout


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 30.10.2014
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 310/67
 DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE
 No 99/2014
 of 16 May 2014
 amending Annex XVI (Procurement) to the EEA Agreement
 THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,
 Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), and in particular Article 98 thereof,
 Whereas:
 (1)
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 of 13 December 2013 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of the application thresholds for the procedures for the awards of contract (1) is to be incorporated into the EEA Agreement.
 (2)
 Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly,
 HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
 Article 1
 The following indent is added in points 2 (Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council), 4 (Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) and 5c (Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council) of Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement:
 ‘—
 32013 R 1336: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 of 13 December 2013 (OJ L 335, 14.12.2013, p. 17).’
 Article 2
 The text of Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, to be published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be authentic.
 Article 3
 This Decision shall enter into force on 17 May 2014, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the EEA Agreement have been made (2).
 Article 4
 This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of, and in the EEA Supplement to, the Official Journal of the European Union.
 Done at Brussels, 16 May 2014.
 For the EEA Joint Committee
 The President
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) OJ L 335, 14.12.2013, p. 17.
 (2) No constitutional requirements indicated.


text:
Karčiuotasis vilkas (Chrysocyon brachyurus) – šuninių (Canidae) šeimos žinduolis. Gyvena iki 15 metų. Įrašytas į Tarptautinę raudonąją knygą. Medžioja puldamas staiga. Visaėdis – minta beveik viskuo ką randa – nuo smulkių gyvūnų iki vaisių. Aktyviausias naktimis. Gyvena P. Amerikos (Brazilijos, Paragvajaus, Bolivijos, Urugvajaus, Šiaurės Argentinos) miškinguose rajonuose, savanose, pelkių pakraščiuose, apaugusiuose aukšta žole.
 Išvaizda
 Sveria 20-23 kg. Nuo kitų šuninių skiriasi trumpa uodega ir ilgesnėmis už kūną kojomis, atrodančiomis, tarsi gyvūnas avėtų kojines. Kailis rausvai geltonas. Turi dideles ausis ir puikią klausą. Snukis tamsus. Ant sprando ir nugaros yra trumpi statūs tamsesnio plauko karčiai. Pūkuotos uodegos galas dažniausiai būna baltas. Tai nei šuo, nei lapė, bet kartais jis vadinamas ilgakoje lape.
 Dauginimasis
 Karčiuotieji vilkai gyvena pavieniui, išskyrus poravimosi laikotarpį. Po 60-65 dienas trukusio nėštumo, gimsta 2-3 jaunikliai, kurie subręsta 2-aisiais gyvenimo metais.
 Šaltiniai
 Šuniniai


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21977A0712(01)
 Accordo tra la Comunità economica europea, la Confederazione svizzera e la Repubblica d'Austria sull'estensione del campo d'applicazione della normativa in materia di transito comunitario
 Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 142 del 09/06/1977 pag. 0003 - 0004 edizione speciale greca: capitolo 11 tomo 9 pag. 0051 edizione speciale spagnola: capitolo 02 tomo 3 pag. 0193 edizione speciale portoghese: capitolo 02 tomo 3 pag. 0193
 ACCORDO tra la Comunità economica europea, la Confederazione svizzera e la Repubblica d'Austria sull'estensione del campo d'applicazione della normativa in materia di transito comunitario LA COMUNITÀ ECONOMICA EUROPEA, LA CONFEDERAZIONE SVIZZERA e LA REPUBBLICA D'AUSTRIA DESIDEROSE di semplificare le formalità doganali al passaggio delle frontiere dei trasporti di merci che attraversino sia il territorio svizzero che quello austriaco, CONSIDERANDO che è pertanto opportuno estendere a questi trasporti il campo d'applicazione delle disposizioni degli accordi di transito conclusi tra la Comunità economica europea, da una parte, la Confederazione svizzera e la Repubblica d'Austria, dall'altra parte, HANNO CONVENUTO QUANTO SEGUE: Articolo 1 Ai sensi del presente accordo si intende: a) per «accordo di transito CEE-Svizzera»: l'accordo tra la Comunità economica europea e la Confederazione svizzera sull'applicazione della normativa in materia di transito comunitario, firmato il 23 novembre 1972, compresi gli emendamenti presenti o futuri; b) per «accordo di transito CEE-Austria»: l'accordo tra la Comunità economica europea e la Repubblica d'Austria sull'applicazione della normativa in materia di transito comunitario, firmato il 30 novembre 1972, compresi gli emendamenti presenti o futuri; c) per «Comunità»: la Comunità economica europea; d) per «Stato membro»: uno Stato membro della Comunità. Articolo 2 L'applicazione delle disposizioni degli accordi di transito CEE-Svizzera e CEE-Austria è estesa ai trasporti di merci, tra due punti situati nella Comunità, che attraversino sia il territorio svizzero che quello austriaco. Tali disposizioni possono altresì applicarsi a qualsiasi altro trasporto di merci che attraversi sia il territorio svizzero che quello austriaco. Articolo 3 1. Nei limiti dell'articolo 2 del presente accordo, e fatte salve le disposizioni di cui all'articolo 13, paragrafo 1, degli accordi di transito CEE-Svizzera e CEE-Austria: - la Confederazione svizzera ha gli stessi diritti e gli stessi obblighi di uno Stato membro nei confronti della Repubblica d'Austria, - la Repubblica d'Austria ha gli stessi diritti e gli stessi obblighi di uno Stato membro nei confronti della Confederazione svizzera. 2. Per l'applicazione del presente accordo, gli atti costitutivi della garanzia redatti sulla base dei modelli allegati agli accordi di transito CEE-Svizzera e CEE-Austria devono essere debitamente completati. 3. Nelle relazioni tra la Confederazione svizzera e la Repubblica d'Austria sono inoltre applicabili le seguenti disposizioni, non contenute nell'accordo di transito CEE-Austria: a) Le indagini penali che risultino necessarie per l'applicazione dell'articolo 4, paragrafi 1 e 2, degli accordi di transito CEE-Svizzera e CEE-Austria sono effettuate, in ogni Stato, conformemente alle disposizioni legislative nazionali relative all'accertamento delle infrazioni doganali. b) Nei casi di cui all'articolo 4 degli accordi di transito CEE-Svizzera e CEE-Austria, le amministrazioni doganali della Confederazione svizzera e della Repubblica d'Austria forniscono ogni informazione in loro possesso, eventualmente dopo indagini effettuate su richiesta dell'amministrazione doganale della Repubblica d'Austria o della Confederazione svizzera, in merito alle merci stesse o alle persone alle quali si contestino infrazioni, accertate o presunte, alla normativa in materia di transito comunitario. Tuttavia, ove si tratti di persone nei cui confronti non siano state accertate, né si presumano infrazioni alla normativa anzidetta, l'assistenza amministrativa di cui all'articolo 4, tenuto conto delle disposizioni legislative nazionali in materia di tutela del segreto industriale, commerciale o professionale, potrà limitarsi agli elementi che non pregiudichino tale tutela. c) Non possono essere rilasciati documenti di transito comunitario interno per merci rispedite dalla Svizzera dopo essere state poste in un deposito privato ai sensi della legge federale svizzera sulle dogane. Articolo 4 Il presente accordo estende i suoi effetti al Principato di Liechtenstein fino a quando quest'ultimo sarà vincolato alla Confederazione svizzera da un trattato di unione doganale. Articolo 5 Il presente accordo entra in vigore il primo giorno del secondo mese successivo a quello in cui le parti contraenti si sono notificate l'espletamento delle procedure all'uopo necessarie. Articolo 6 Il presente accordo può essere denunciato da ciascuna delle parti contraenti con un preavviso di sei mesi. Articolo 7 Il presente accordo è redatto in triplice esemplare in lingua danese, francese, inglese, italiana, olandese e tedesca; i sei testi fanno tutti ugualmente fede.


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Fra Danijel Ban (Kreševo, 21. listopada 1857. – 14. rujna 1939.), ljetopisac, franjevac i provincijal Bosne Srebrene.
 Osnovnu školu, niže razrede gimnazije i novicijat završio u Kreševu, VII i VIII godinu gimnazije, te prvu godinu bogoslovije u Đakovu, ostatak u Ostrogonu. U Franjevački red stupio je 24. rujna 1872. Za svećenika je zaređen 1880. Kratko vrijeme pučki učitelj u Kreševu, zatim kateheta na Djevojačkoj školi sestara milosrdnica i Realnoj gimnaziji u Sarajevu, te istodobno kapelan u Čemernu, u Stupu i Sarajevskom Polju (1880–1882).
 Postdiplomski studij nastavlja u Beču (1882–1887) gdje se upoznaje s utemeljiteljem Hrvatskog Radiše Lukom Senjakom. Doktorirao je s biblijskom temom Evangelium quartum, ejus auctor, argumentum et scopus. Poslije je bio profesor bogoslovije u Kreševu i Livnu (1887–1890), duhovnik u središnjem zatvoru u Zenici, odgojitelj bosanske bogoslovske mladeži u Pečuhu (1897–1898), definitor (1898–1900), kreševski gvardijan (1900–1903, 1910–1916), provincijal (1903–1906), župnik u Podhumu (1906–1910) i Kiseljaku (1918–1921) te direktor Franjevačke klasične gimnazije u Visokom (1917–1918). Od 1921. do smrti živio je u Kreševu.
 Ban je 1898. osnovao u Kreševu Narodnu čitaonicu (1901. nazvana Hrvatska čitaonica) kojoj je bio i predsjednik (1900–1903, 1911–1915). Njegovim zalaganjem izgrađen je 1912. u Kreševu Hrvatski dom. God. 1918. izabran je za predsjednika Narodnog vijeća u Kiseljaku. S fra Dobroslavom Ostojićem skupljao je ženske narodne pjesme za ediciju Matice hrvatske. Priloge iz narodne i franjevačke prošlosti, posebno o liku fra Grge Martića, objavljivao je u publikacijama: Srce Isusovo (1882), Vrhbosna (1887, 1905), Franjevački glasnik (1900), Serafinski perivoj (1903–1905), Kalendar Fra Grga Martić (1908), Nedjelja (1922), Franjevački vijesnik (1928, 1930, 1937, 1938), Kalendar sv. Ante (1929), Hrvatska straža (1930), Glasnik sv. Ante (1931, 1938), Spomenica Franjevačke gimnazije u Visokom (1932); te prema Drljiću, u Bosiljku, Srijemskom glasniku, Obzoru, Osvitu, Hrvatskom braniku i Riječi Božjoj. U rukopisu je ostala njegova Kronika koja sadrži vrijedne podatke povijesnog, etnografskog i kulturnog značenja (čuva se u franjevačkom samostanu u Kreševu).
 Godine 1900. zajedno s učiteljem Anićem u Kreševu osniva Hrvatsku narodnu čitaonicu.
 Djela:
 "Žepče" (monografija, 1877.),
 "Kronika" (rukopis u arhivu Franjevačkog samostana u Kreševu).
 Izvori
 Ban, Danijela
 Ban, Danijel
 Životopisi, Kreševo