text:
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gregory Allen Slate, Misc. Docket AG No. 5, September
 Term, 2017
 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Court of Appeals
 disbarred lawyer who knowingly failed to disclose during bar application process that, in
 civil case to which lawyer was party, trial court found that lawyer had engaged in
 dishonesty and misconduct, and lawyer falsely stated to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed
 all required information during bar application process. Such conduct violated Maryland
 Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.1(a), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
 Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d)
 (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
 Circuit Court for Baltimore City
 Case No. 24-C-17-001903
 Argued: February 1, 2018
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 Misc. Docket AG No. 5
 September Term, 2017
 ______________________________________
 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
 OF MARYLAND
 v.
 GREGORY ALLEN SLATE
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Opinion by Watts, J.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: March 2, 2018
 This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who knowingly failed to
 disclose during the bar application process that, in a civil case to which the lawyer was a
 party, a trial court found that the lawyer had engaged in dishonesty and misconduct, and
 the lawyer falsely stated to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information
 during the bar application process.
 Before becoming a member of the Bar of Maryland, Gregory Allen Slate,
 Respondent, initiated a civil case concerning alleged copyright infringement, claiming that
 hidden camera footage that he had recorded was used without his authorization. The trial
 court dismissed the case on the ground that Slate had engaged in bad-faith litigation
 conduct. The trial court found that Slate: fabricated a letter and submitted it to the trial
 court in bad faith; gave deposition testimony that was either perjurious or, at least,
 intentionally misleading; and repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process through
 such actions as attempting to fraudulently collect evidence, providing discovery materials
 in a soiled envelope that strongly smelled of excrement, improperly videotaping his own
 deposition testimony, and providing voluminous irrelevant and misleading materials. Slate
 filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion, and found that Slate’s
 filings in connection with the motion showed a continuing pattern of omissions and
 obfuscations.
 Slate did not attach copies of the trial court’s opinions to his bar application or
 provide any information about the findings therein. In response to Question 11 on the bar
 application, which called for information about cases to which an applicant had been a
 party, Slate disclosed basic facts about the case, such as the circumstance that an appeal
 was pending at the time. Slate, however, did not disclose the trial court’s opinions or the
 findings therein. Significantly, Slate responded “No” to Question 18—a “catchall
 question” that calls for any negative information that was not requested by, or given in the
 responses to, any of the other questions.1
 After submitting his bar application, Slate falsely affirmed under oath that all of the
 facts in his bar application remained correct. Slate did not supplement his bar application
 with the trial court’s opinions or the findings therein. Nor did Slate disclose the trial court’s
 opinions or the findings therein during the character interview. Nor did Slate disclose the
 information during a meeting with the co-chairs of the Character Committee for the Fourth
 Appellate Judicial Circuit (“the Character Committee”).2 Consistent with the Character
 Committee’s co-chairs’ recommendation, the State Board of Law Examiners (“the SBLE”)
 cleared Slate for admission without a hearing. This Court, unaware of the trial court’s
 findings of dishonesty and misconduct, admitted Slate to the Bar of Maryland.
 Within a year, a Maryland lawyer became aware of the trial court’s opinions, and
 filed a complaint against Slate with Bar Counsel. Subsequently, Bar Counsel requested
 from Slate a response to the complaint. In a written response, Slate stated that he had
 disclosed all required information during the bar application process.
 1
 See, e.g., Memorandum from Bedford T. Bentley, Jr., Secretary, State Board of
 Law Examiners, to First-Year Law Students at University of Baltimore School of Law
 (May 18, 2009), available at http://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/
 Admiss_MSBE_Bar_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/62NS-LNVK] (“There is a catchall
 question on the [bar] application requiring disclosure of any matter [that] reflects adversely
 on character and [is] not called for specifically by other questions on the [bar]
 application.”).
 2
 The Fourth Appellate Judicial Circuit is comprised of Prince George’s County.
 -2-
 On March 30, 2017, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, Petitioner,
 Bar Counsel filed in this Court a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against
 Slate, charging him with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct
 (“MLRPC”) 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud,
 Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of
 Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC).3
 On April 4, 2017, this Court designated the Honorable Jeannie Jinkyung Hong (“the
 hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear this attorney discipline
 proceeding. On October 11 through 13, 2017, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On
 November 16, 2017, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of
 fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Slate had violated MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b),
 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a).
 On February 1, 2018, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we disbar
 Slate.
 BACKGROUND
 The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.
 The ABC Case
 Before attending law school, Slate worked as a freelance investigative journalist. In
 Fall 2007, Slate recorded footage as part of a hidden-camera investigation in Chicago. On
 3
 Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules
 of Professional Conduct, or MARPC, and renumbered. We will refer to the MLRPC
 because most of the misconduct at issue occurred before this change.
 -3-
 September 16, 2009, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Slate
 sued ABC News, Inc., ABC News Interactive, Inc., and Disney/ABC International
 Television, Inc. (together, “ABC”), initiating Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. (“the ABC
 Case”). In the complaint, Slate alleged that ABC had committed copyright infringement
 by using his hidden camera footage without his authorization.
 ABC filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss for bad-faith
 conduct of litigation. In an Order and a separate Memorandum Opinion dated April 23,
 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion for
 summary judgment, and, in an alternative ruling, granted the motion to dismiss “as a
 sanction for [Slate]’s persistent course of bad-faith litigation conduct.” Slate v. Am. Broad.
 Cos., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2013). The Court found that a letter4 that Slate
 had submitted was “not authentic and ha[d] been presented to [the] Court in bad faith.”
 Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 47. The Court found that the letter included a “glaring historical
 inconsistency” and was “fabricated after the fact[.]” Id. The Court found that Slate’s
 testimony at a deposition “was likely perjurious, or[,] at the very least[,] intentionally
 4
 The letter was dated August 21, 2006, and was purportedly sent by Slate to an ABC
 News producer. See Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31. In the letter, Slate stated that he “was
 confused when” ABC produced a story with his footage because it was his “understanding
 . . . that ABC and its affiliates were not interested in his footage[,] and he accepted [the
 producer’s] reimbursement proposal because he believed that his footage would retain its
 exclusivity and value.” Id. at 31 (ellipsis in original) (brackets omitted). Slate stated that
 he was “an independent freelance journalist[,]” and that he and ABC “should craft an
 explicit licensing agreement, ratified by both of [them], before [his] footage is broadcast[.]”
 Id. Slate also stated: “In terms of compensation, I do not work for free or for expenses
 only [because] my recent success, including receiving an Emmy Award for Investigative
 Journalism, ha[s] substantially elevated the value of my work.” Id.
 -4-
 misleading.” Id. at 48 n.22. The Court stated:
 [Slate] engaged in a course of conduct, which demonstrates that he does not
 take seriously his obligation to litigate in good faith. Most notably, [] Slate
 has repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process, and his persistent
 course of conduct in this regard strongly suggests that he acted willfully.
 This conduct includes, but is not limited to: (1) attempting to fraudulently
 collect evidence; (2) producing discovery documents in a soiled envelope
 that had the strong odor of excrement; (3) improperly videotaping his own
 deposition testimony; and (4) producing voluminous amounts of irrelevant
 and misleading materials.
 Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted). The Court also found that Slate “lack[ed] respect for the
 federal judicial process.” Id. at 51.
 Slate filed a motion for reconsideration, as well as two other motions in which he
 requested that the Court alter or amend the April 23, 2013 Order. In an Order and a separate
 Memorandum Opinion dated December 20, 2013, the Court denied the motions. See Slate
 v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013). The Court stated that
 Slate’s “briefing in connection with his pending motion for reconsideration continue[d] to
 exhibit the clear and convincing pattern of omissions and obfuscations that warranted
 granting [ABC’s] motion to dismiss for bad-faith litigation conduct in the first place.” Id.
 at 42 (citations omitted).
 Slate noted an appeal. In an amended notice of appeal dated January 3, 2014, Slate
 stated: “Notice is also given, that [Slate] hereby appeals to the United States Court of
 Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from the judgment (Dkt. 102 and Dkt. 103) of
 this Court entered on the 23rd day of April, 2013 in favor of [ABC] against [Slate].”
 -5-
 In a per curiam opinion dated November 18, 2014,5 the United States Court of
 Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the ABC Case for
 bad-faith conduct of litigation, concluding:
 The [D]istrict [C]ourt’s factual findings of misconduct were not clearly
 erroneous; and the [D]istrict [C]ourt did not abuse its discretion in
 determining that dismissal was warranted in light of the numerous instances
 of misconduct it cited and the materiality of some of that misconduct to
 adjudication of central issues in the case.
 Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 584 F. App’x 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citations
 omitted).
 Websites About Slate
 While working as a freelance investigative journalist, Slate became associated with
 a man named Diop Kamau.6 Slate and Kamau had a falling-out, after which Kamau began
 maintaining multiple websites that included information about Slate’s personal and
 professional life.7 Such information included the Memorandum Opinions in the ABC Case
 (“the Opinions”). At the disciplinary hearing, Slate testified that, because of Kamau’s
 websites about him, he knew that he could never conceal the Opinions.
 Discussions Before Slate Submitted His Bar Application
 In August 2012, Slate began attending the University of Baltimore School of Law.
 5
 In providing the date of the opinion, the hearing judge inadvertently referred to
 November 18, 2017.
 6
 Kamau is a principal of a nonprofit organization called the Police Complaint
 Center. See Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 29. Slate worked with the Police Complaint Center
 during the hidden-camera investigation that gave rise to the ABC Case. See id.
 7
 The hearing judge found that Kamau’s websites made clear “the sheer animosity
 between” Kamau and Slate.
 -6-
 In his third year, Slate became concerned about the impact of his litigation history on his
 bar application. In April 2014, Slate told Jeffrey Shipley, the SBLE’s Secretary, that he
 had been involved in “contentious” litigation. Slate, however, did not inform Shipley of
 the Opinions or the findings therein. Slate asked about the impact of his litigation history
 on his bar application. Shipley advised Slate to disclose his entire litigation history, and
 “to read and follow the directions” on the bar application.
 Also during his third year, Slate told Claudia Diamond, the Assistant Dean of
 Academic and Writing Support at the University of Baltimore School of Law, that he had
 been involved in “contentious” litigation. Slate e-mailed Diamond regarding certain
 disclosures on his bar application. Slate, however, did not inform Diamond of the Opinions
 or the findings therein.
 At the disciplinary hearing, Slate testified that Shipley, Diamond, and various other
 individuals advised him not to disclose the Opinions in his bar application. Slate blamed
 these individuals for his failure to disclose the Opinions in his bar application. The hearing
 judge found: “Perhaps the individuals did, in fact, navigate [Slate] toward nondisclosure
 on his bar application; nevertheless, [Slate]’s attempt to shift the blame does not absolve
 him of his responsibility to prove his character to practice law, and to do so without
 knowingly omitting material facts[.]” (Citations omitted).
 Slate’s Bar Application
 On May 16, 2014, Slate signed his bar application, which included his responses to
 the Character Questionnaire. At the time, Question 11(a) of the Character Questionnaire
 stated:
 -7-
 The following is a complete list of all suits in equity, action[s] at law,
 administrative proceedings, suits in bankruptcy or other statutory
 proceedings, civil citations, matters in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and
 every other judicial proceeding of every nature and kind, except divorce or
 criminal proceedings, to which I am or have been a party (If “None,” so
 state)[.]
 Question 11(a) also required the applicant to provide details regarding each civil case to
 which the applicant had been a party, including the case number, the filing date, the court’s
 name and address, the date of trial, the date of disposition, and the disposition.8
 In his bar application, Slate disclosed that he had been involved in thirty-three
 criminal cases, and had been a party to forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case.
 Slate disclosed the ABC Case’s name, the filing date, the court’s name and address, the
 date of trial, and the date of disposition. Next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed
 pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]”
 Slate responded “No” to the question “Are you [the] subject of any continuing court
 order?” Slate also responded “No” to the question “Was the judgment entered against
 you?” Slate responded “No” to Question 11(b), which stated: “Have any judgments ever
 been entered against you?” Slate also responded “No” to Question 11(c), which stated: “I
 have attached to this Application certified copies of all judgments listed in 11(b), whether
 satisfied or unsatisfied, and listed below the names and present addresses (with zip codes)
 of the holders.”
 8
 At the disciplinary hearing, Shipley testified that, as a result of the events that arose
 from Slate’s bar application, Question 11 was modified, such that it now expressly requires
 an applicant to attach any court document that may bear on his or her character and fitness
 to practice law.
 -8-
 Slate responded “No” to Question 18, the catchall question, which stated as follows:
 Have there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your life,
 whether at school, college, law school, business or otherwise, which may
 have a bearing upon your character or your fitness to practice law, not called
 for by the questionnaire or disclosed in your answers?
 If so, give details, including any assertions or implication of dishonesty,
 misconduct, misrepresentation, financial irresponsibility, and disciplinary
 measures imposed (if any) by attaching a supplemental statement. You are
 not required to disclose, in response to this question, any juvenile proceeding
 or any criminal proceeding expunged pursuant to Maryland law. Maryland
 law does not permit expungement of convictions.[9]
 Slate signed Question 20, which stated:
 Affirmation of Applicant’s Duty of Full, Candid Disclosure and
 Applicant’s Continuing Duty to Submit Written Notice of Changes to
 Information Sought by the Application: I understand that the required
 disclosures in this questionnaire are of a continuing nature. I hereby
 acknowledge my duty to respond fully and candidly to each question or
 required disclosure and to ensure that my responses are accurate and current
 at all times until I am formally admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland.
 I will advise the [SBLE] immediately and in writing of any changes in the
 information disclosed in or sought by this questionnaire, including any
 pertinent facts developed after the initial filing of this application and the
 facts of any incident occurring subsequent to the initial filing of this
 application.
 I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury, that the
 matters and facts set forth in the foregoing application are true and accurate.
 I have made and retained a copy of this entire application for my records and
 for use in the event that the original is lost in the mail or during the character
 investigation.
 (Emphasis in original). Slate did not attach the Opinions to his bar application or
 summarize the Opinions in his bar application. Nor did Slate ever supplement his bar
 9
 At the disciplinary hearing, Shipley testified that Question 18 has not been
 substantively modified since Slate took the Bar Examination.
 -9-
 application with the Opinions.
 The hearing judge found that, while testifying at the disciplinary hearing, Slate
 “distinguished mandatory disclosures and attachments on the bar application from the ABC
 Case.” Slate disputed that any part of the bar application required him to attach the
 Opinions. Slate opined that, in light of Question 11(b), the word “judgments,” as used in
 Question 11(c), refers only to money judgments, and thus did not apply to the Opinions.
 The hearing judge observed that, in the notice of appeal in the ABC Case, Slate
 referred to one of the Opinions as a “judgment.” In any event, the hearing judge did not
 address whether Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions. Instead, the hearing
 judge concluded that Question 18—the catchall question—required Slate to disclose the
 Opinions. The hearing judge determined that, by responding “No” to Question 18, Slate
 intentionally failed to disclose material information that reflected adversely on his
 character.
 Character Interview and Meeting with Character Committee’s Co-Chairs
 On May 19, 2014, the SBLE received Slate’s bar application, and, on the same date,
 Slate graduated from the University of Baltimore School of Law. Slate passed the July
 2014 Bar Examination. On November 2, 2014,10 Slate signed an Affirmation by General
 Bar Applicant, in which he affirmed under oath that all of the facts in his bar application
 remained correct. The hearing judge found that Slate’s affirmation was false.
 Slate’s bar application was sent to the Character Committee for the Fourth Appellate
 10
 The hearing judge inadvertently referred to November 2, 2017.
 - 10 -
 Judicial Circuit. On November 18, 2014, as part of the character and fitness investigation,
 Joseph A. Compofelice, a member of the Character Committee, interviewed Slate. The
 hearing judge noted that Compofelice is responsible for following up on moral and ethical
 issues identified by the SBLE. If an applicant’s character and fitness is called into question,
 Compofelice is responsible for recommending that the Character Committee’s co-chairs,
 William C. Brennan, Jr. and Roger C. Thomas, schedule a hearing before a three-member
 panel.
 At the disciplinary hearing, Compofelice testified that, at the character interview, he
 questioned Slate about all forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case, that he had
 disclosed in his bar application. Compofelice testified that Slate disclosed the ABC Case
 and its disposition. Specifically, Slate disclosed that the United States District Court for
 the District of Columbia had granted summary judgment and dismissed the ABC Case due
 to discovery violations, and that an appeal was pending. During the character interview,
 however, Slate did not disclose the Opinions or the findings therein. Compofelice testified
 that, had he known of the Opinions and the findings therein, “at a minimum[,]” he would
 have recommended a hearing. Compofelice testified that he “absolutely believe[d]” that
 Slate should have disclosed the Opinions in his bar application.
 Based on the information in Slate’s bar application and his representations during
 the character interview, Compofelice conditionally recommended his admission to the Bar
 of Maryland. Compofelice recommended, however, that Brennan and Thomas review
 Slate’s bar application and conduct a follow-up meeting regarding his litigation history.
 On November 20, 2014, pursuant to Compofelice’s recommendation, Brennan and
 - 11 -
 Thomas conducted an informal meeting with Slate. The meeting’s purpose was to
 determine whether to hold a hearing, or recommend Slate’s admission without a hearing.
 At the disciplinary hearing, Brennan and Thomas testified that they questioned Slate about
 all forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case, that he had disclosed in his bar
 application. Brennan and Thomas testified, however, that there was no discussion of the
 Opinions or the findings therein. Slate discussed the disposition of the ABC Case in
 general, without disclosing the substance of the findings in the Opinions. Slate also
 indicated that an appeal was pending in the ABC Case. 11 Brennan and Thomas testified
 that Slate’s failure to disclose the Opinions or the findings therein in his bar application
 and during the meeting inhibited the Character Committee’s and the SBLE’s efforts to
 investigate Slate’s character and fitness. Brennan and Thomas testified that, had Slate
 disclosed the Opinions or the findings therein, the decision-making process would have
 significantly differed.
 Concerned with the volume of civil cases to which Slate had been a party, Brennan
 asked Shipley whether litigiousness alone was a basis for denying admission. According
 to the hearing judge, Shipley responded that litigiousness alone does not warrant a hearing.
 Based on Shipley’s response, as well as Slate’s representations in his bar application and
 at the meeting, Brennan and Thomas recommended that Slate be admitted to the Bar of
 Maryland without a hearing. Shipley cleared Slate for admission without a hearing. On
 11
 Contrary to Slate’s assertion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
 of Columbia Circuit had disposed of the appeal two days earlier, on November 18, 2014.
 See Slate, 584 F. App’x 2.
 - 12 -
 December 18, 2014, this Court admitted Slate to the Bar of Maryland.
 Slate testified that he was under the impression that the Character Committee and
 the SBLE would investigate the ABC Case. The hearing judge found that, while testifying,
 Slate attempted to shift to the Character Committee and the SBLE the burden of verifying
 the facts in his bar application, including the ABC Case. While testifying, Slate referred
 to Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B), which states in pertinent part: “On receipt of an
 application forwarded by the [SBLE], the Character Committee shall . . . verify the facts
 stated in the questionnaire[.]”
 Slate testified that he was under the impression that Kamau’s websites about him
 would be investigated, as he told Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about Kamau’s
 websites about him. In summarizing Slate’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing, the
 hearing judge stated that Slate believed that, by telling Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas
 about Kamau’s websites about him, he constructively disclosed the Opinions to the
 Character Committee and the SBLE. The hearing judge found that Slate “distracted the
 SBLE and the Character Committee with extraneous information concerning . . . Kamau,
 his career as an investigative journalist, and his landlord-tenant litigation.”12
 The hearing judge found that Slate had multiple opportunities to disclose and/or
 discuss the Opinions and the findings therein before, during, and after completing his bar
 12
 The hearing judge did not make any other findings of fact regarding Slate’s
 landlord-tenant litigation.
 - 13 -
 application.13 The hearing judge found, however, that, throughout the bar application
 process, Slate knowingly omitted the Opinions and the findings therein. The hearing judge
 found that Slate “used benign terms to describe” the ABC Case’s disposition and the
 findings in the Opinions. The hearing judge found that Slate “concealed” the Opinions “in
 an attempt to deceive” the Character Committee and the SBLE so that he would get
 admitted to the Bar of Maryland.
 Complaint Against Slate and His Response to Bar Counsel
 George A. Weiss, a member of the Bar of Maryland, assisted another lawyer who
 represented someone whom Slate had sued as a pro se plaintiff. Weiss visited one of
 Kamau’s websites about Slate. Weiss used Public Access to Court Electronic Records, or
 PACER—the federal courts’ e-filing system—to confirm information about Slate,
 including the existence of the ABC Case, the Opinions, and the findings therein.
 On November 9, 2015, Bar Counsel received from Weiss a complaint against
 Slate.14 In the complaint, Weiss raised various concerns about Slate’s character and fitness
 prior to his admission to the Bar of Maryland, including the findings in the Opinions.
 On December 16, 2015, Bar Counsel sent Slate a letter advising him of the
 13
 The hearing judge stated that Slate had multiple opportunities to disclose and/or
 discuss the Opinions and the findings therein “before, during, and after the [bar] application
 process.” In a footnote, the hearing judge specified that these opportunities were his
 discussion with Shipley, his communications with Diamond, his bar application, the
 character interview, the meeting with Brennan and Thomas, and the supplements that he
 submitted to the SBLE. Accordingly, in the above quotation, the hearing judge was
 referring to opportunities before, during, and after completing his bar application, as all
 such opportunities occurred during the bar application process.
 14
 Before then, Weiss had never met, or directly communicated with, Slate.
 - 14 -
 complaint, and stating that Bar Counsel had “not yet determined whether this matter should
 be classified as a formal docketed complaint[,] or is one [that] is not disciplinary in
 nature[.]” Bar Counsel stated that a “written response” would help “make this decision.”
 Nearly a year later, on December 5, 2016, Slate sent a written response to Bar
 Counsel’s letter, stating in pertinent part: “[T]he [complaint] speculates that I may have
 failed to disclose relevant information in connection with my application to the bar in
 violation of [MLRPC] 8.1. . . . I complied fully with [MLRPC] 8.1 because I disclosed
 everything necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review process.”
 Aggravating Factors and Mitigating Factors
 The hearing judge found that Slate’s misconduct was aggravated by a dishonest or
 selfish motive, as Slate concealed material information to get admitted to the Bar of
 Maryland. The hearing judge also found that Slate’s misconduct was aggravated by a
 refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature. The hearing judge stated that
 Slate “does not believe he was required to disclose, discuss, or [provide a] supplement”
 with, the Opinions and the findings therein. Subsequently, the hearing judge found: “This
 clearly shows [Slate]’s impenitence and lack of respect for the SBLE, the Character
 Committee, and” the hearing judge.
 The hearing judge found that Slate had not established any mitigating factors.15
 15
 At the disciplinary hearing, as a witness for Slate, Barmak Naraghi, a recent
 graduate of the George Washington University Law School who is not a lawyer, testified
 that he assisted Slate with the bar application process. Naraghi testified that Slate was
 “anxious” during the bar application process. The hearing judge found, however, that
 Naraghi “did not proffer any substantive evidence regarding the merits of this” attorney
 discipline proceeding.
 - 15 -
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing
 judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of
 law. See Md. R. 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the
 opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney
 Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588, 133 A.3d 1034, 1041 (2016) (“This
 Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.” (Citations omitted)); Md.
 R. 19-741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s
 conclusions of law.”). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence
 establishes that a lawyer violated an MLRPC. See Md. R. 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has
 the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by
 clear and convincing evidence.”).
 DISCUSSION
 (A) Findings of Fact
 Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Slate
 raises eight exceptions as to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. We overrule all of Slate’s
 exceptions, most of which pertain to factual allegations that are immaterial to this attorney
 discipline proceeding.
 First, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that” he disclosed his
 appeal of the Opinions in Question 11 on his bar application. Slate is mistaken. The
 hearing judge found that, in his response to Question 11(a), with regard to the ABC Case,
 next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed pending appeal in the United States Court
 - 16 -
 of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]”
 Second, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that” he disclosed six
 civil cases that were related to the ABC Case. Slate contends that the other civil cases were
 relevant because they “involve[d] and disclose[d] matters concerning the material
 allegations in the” Opinions. Slate’s contention is a red herring. In the Petition for
 Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Bar Counsel did not allege that Slate improperly failed
 to disclose information about a civil case other than the ABC Case. Instead, Bar Counsel’s
 charges against Slate arose entirely from his failure to disclose the Opinions and the
 findings therein. This attorney discipline proceeding turns on whether Slate improperly
 failed to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, regardless of whether the ABC
 Case was related to other civil cases that Slate disclosed. Slate’s alleged disclosure of other
 civil cases is immaterial.
 Third, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not attach the Opinions
 to his bar application, or supplement his bar application with the Opinions. Slate alleges
 that, in letters to the SBLE, he disclosed the existence of two civil cases in which copies of
 the Opinions were filed with trial courts. Even if true, Slate’s allegations are completely
 consistent with the hearing judge’s finding that he failed to attach, or supplement his bar
 application with, the Opinions.
 Fourth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not disclose the
 Opinions to Diamond. Slate notes that Diamond did not testify at the disciplinary hearing,
 and that his own testimony was the only evidence of in-person communications between
 himself and Diamond. Slate contends that, accordingly, there was no evidence that he did
 - 17 -
 not disclose the Opinions to Diamond. Slate completely ignores Respondent’s Exhibits 7
 through 12, which was a series of e-mails that Slate and Diamond exchanged regarding
 certain disclosures on his bar application. The hearing judge found that, in his e-mails to
 Diamond, Slate did not disclose the Opinions or the findings therein. In any event, it does
 not matter whether Slate disclosed the Opinions or the findings therein to Diamond, who
 was not a member of the Character Committee or the SBLE.
 Fifth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, after he told Shipley that he
 had been involved in “contentious” litigation and asked about the impact of his litigation
 history on his bar application, Shipley simply advised him to disclose his entire litigation
 history, and “to read and follow the directions” on the bar application. Slate alleges that
 Shipley advised him to submit only the documents that the bar application directed
 applicants to submit, and told him that a member of the Character Committee would
 investigate his disclosures in his bar application. Slate notes that Shipley testified with
 regard to Slate’s litigation history: “I told [Slate] that[,] certainly[,] his history would be
 investigated by his character investigator, that he needed to disclose his history, that his
 history would be investigated.” Slate observes that Shipley also testified: “I think that we
 had a discussion about what documents needed to be attached[,] and[,] in that context[,]
 we talked about attaching the documents that the instructions printed in the bar application
 told you to attach.” Slate notes that, when asked whether he told Slate not to submit
 documents that the bar application did not direct applicants to submit, Shipley responded:
 “I think that’s part and parcel of the gist of the conversation that we had, that you need to
 answer the questions in the [bar] application.”
 - 18 -
 We overrule Slate’s exception. The portions of Shipley’s testimony that Slate
 quotes are completely consistent with the hearing judge’s finding that Shipley told Slate to
 follow the directions in the bar application. This attorney discipline proceeding turns on
 which documents the bar application required Slate to submit, and the evidence
 demonstrates that Shipley advised Slate to follow the instructions on the bar application.
 The core issue in this attorney discipline proceeding is whether the bar application required
 Slate to submit the Opinions or the findings therein. As discussed below, it did.
 Sixth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “finding concerning ‘[t]he
 [i]nvestigation’ of the facts asserted in” his bar application. Slate contends that
 Compofelice was unaware that he had been assigned as Slate’s character investigator, and
 that the Character Committee was obligated to “verif[y] the facts stated in the
 questionnaire” in Slate’s bar application under Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B). Slate
 alleges that Compofelice testified that, if anyone was assigned as Slate’s character
 investigator, he was not so assigned. Slate notes that, when asked: “[Y]ou didn’t do
 anything to verify the [ABC Case’s] disposition[,] as described on [Slate’s] bar
 application[,] that it had been dismissed pending appeal, correct?”, Compofelice
 responded: “No, nor am I required to.”
 We overrule this exception. Even if Slate’s characterization of Compofelice’s
 testimony is accurate, it does not matter whether Compofelice was aware that he had been
 assigned as Slate’s character investigator. What matters is that Compofelice interviewed
 Slate as part of the character and fitness investigation. Nor is it material whether
 Compofelice believed that he was obligated to verify the ABC Case’s disposition. What
 - 19 -
 is material is that, during the character interview, Slate failed to disclose or discuss the
 Opinions or the findings therein.
 Seventh, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s findings “regarding the [b]ar
 [a]pplication’s questions and directives concerning ‘judgments’ and [Slate]’s responses
 thereto.” Slate contends that the hearing judge implied that the Opinions were
 “judgments,” as that word is used in Question 11(a), which stated in pertinent part: “Was
 the judgment entered against you?” Slate argues that, if the Opinions were not
 “judgments,” then Question 11(a) is irrelevant to this attorney discipline proceeding. Slate
 notes that, when he completed his bar application, there was no express requirement for an
 applicant to attach any court document that may bear on his or her character and fitness to
 practice law. Slate asserts that an e-mail that he sent to Diamond while he was completing
 his bar application demonstrates that he did not believe that the Opinions were “judgments”
 against him.
 Slate’s arguments are beside the point. In a footnote, the hearing judge observed
 that, in the notice of appeal in the ABC Case, Slate referred to one of the Opinions as a
 “judgment.” At no point, however, did the hearing judge find that the Opinions constituted
 “judgments,” or determine that Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions or the
 findings therein. In other words, the hearing judge did not resolve Slate’s contention that
 the Opinions did not constitute “judgments” because they were not “money judgments.”
 Instead, the hearing judge concluded that Question 18—the catchall question—required
 Slate to disclose the Opinions. As discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge’s
 conclusion. Accordingly, whether Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions or
 - 20 -
 the findings therein is not at issue.
 Finally, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that[,] when asked[,]”
 he provided copies of the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions whose
 applications requested such documents.16 At the risk of pointing out the obvious, in this
 attorney discipline proceeding, Slate has not been charged with failing to be candid in his
 applications for admission to bars of other jurisdictions. To the extent that Slate contends
 that, because he provided the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions
 whose applications requested such information, this circumstance establishes he was not
 withholding the Opinions in his application for admission to the Bar of Maryland, Slate is
 wrong. Although Question 18 did not specifically require that the Opinions be attached to
 a bar application, Question 18 asked that an applicant give the “details, including any
 assertions or implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[.]” Question
 18 plainly required disclosure of the Opinions or the information contained therein. That
 Slate may have disclosed the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions
 does not affect the outcome of this case.
 (B) Conclusions of Law
 Slate excepts to all of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Bar Counsel excepts
 to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by misrepresenting to
 Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information during the bar application
 16
 The hearing judge’s opinion does not indicate whether Slate is a member of any
 bar other than the Bar of Maryland. At oral argument, in response to a question from the
 Court, Slate stated that he is not barred in any other jurisdiction.
 - 21 -
 process. Bar Counsel contends that Slate’s misrepresentation about having disclosed all
 required information constituted a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a) instead of MLRPC 8.1(b).
 Bar Counsel argues that, in addition to the violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to supplement his bar application with, or tell the Character
 Committee about, the Opinions or the findings therein. Bar Counsel also excepts to the
 hearing judge’s failure to conclude that, in addition to violating MLRPC 8.4(c) by
 concealing the Opinions and the findings therein, Slate separately violated MLRPC 8.4(c)
 by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information during
 the bar application process. For the below reasons, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions
 and overrule Slate’s exceptions.
 MLRPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)
 MLRPC 8.1 states:
 An applicant for admission . . . to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a
 bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall
 not:
 (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
 (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
 known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to
 respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or
 disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
 information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
 The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No”
 to Question 18, the catchall question. Immediately after quoting MLRPC 8.1(b), the
 hearing judge stated:
 As discussed above, [Slate] did not supplement his bar application or his
 - 22 -
 discussions with the Character Committee with the [] Opinions or the
 findings therein. [Slate] then knowingly made a false statement of material
 fact by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he “disclosed everything
 necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review process.”
 Thus, [the hearing judge concludes] by clear and convincing evidence that
 [Slate] violated MLRPC 8.1(b).
 Bar Counsel does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question. But, Bar Counsel
 contends that, by making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, Slate violated MLRPC
 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b), as the hearing judge concluded. Bar Counsel argues that Slate
 also violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to disclose the Opinions or the findings therein in a
 supplement to his bar application or during the character interview. We agree with Bar
 Counsel on both counts.
 Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate
 violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question.
 Question 18 stated in pertinent part:
 Have there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your life,
 whether at school, college, law school, business or otherwise, which may
 have a bearing upon your character or your fitness to practice law, not called
 for by the questionnaire or disclosed in your answers? If so, give details,
 including any assertions or implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and]
 misrepresentation . . . by attaching a supplemental statement.
 (Emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted). By its plain language, Question 18 is
 designed to be broad. Its express purpose is to require an applicant to disclose “any”
 information that “may having a bearing upon” the applicant’s character or fitness, where
 that information is not called for by, or disclosed in the applicant’s responses to, the
 character questionnaire’s other questions. For example, if information about an applicant’s
 - 23 -
 litigation history may having a bearing upon the applicant’s character or fitness, and that
 information is not called for by, or disclosed in the applicant’s answer to, Question 11, then
 Question 18 unequivocally requires that information. Additionally, Question 18
 specifically requires an applicant to disclose information related to “any assertions or
 implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[.]”
 Here, unquestionably, the Opinions and the findings therein would have had a
 bearing upon Slate’s character or his fitness to practice law, and constituted information
 that was related to dishonesty and misconduct. Clearly, the Opinions included
 “implication[s] of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[,]” which Question 18
 specifically called for. Slate’s response of “No” to Question 18 plainly constituted a “false
 statement material fact” under MLRPC 8.1(a). In the Memorandum Opinion dated April
 23, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the ABC
 Case “as a sanction for [Slate]’s persistent course of bad-faith litigation conduct.” Slate,
 941 F. Supp. 2d at 53. The Court found that Slate had “fabricated” a letter and submitted it
 to the Court “in bad faith.” Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 48, 47. The Court found that Slate’s
 testimony at a deposition “was likely perjurious, or[,] at the very least[,] intentionally
 misleading.” Id. at 48 n.22. The Court found that Slate’s conduct “demonstrate[d] that he
 d[id] not take seriously his obligation to litigate in good faith.” Id. at 50. The Court found
 that Slate “repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process[,]” and that “his persistent
 course of conduct in this regard strongly suggests that he acted willfully.” Id. The Court
 stated that Slate’s misconduct during discovery included “(1) attempting to fraudulently
 collect evidence; (2) producing discovery documents in a soiled envelope that had the
 - 24 -
 strong odor of excrement; (3) improperly videotaping his own deposition testimony; and
 (4) producing voluminous amounts of irrelevant and misleading materials.” Id. (footnotes
 omitted). The Court found that Slate “lack[ed] respect for the federal judicial process.” Id.
 at 51. In the Memorandum Opinion dated December 20, 2013, the Court stated that Slate’s
 “briefing in connection with his pending motion for reconsideration continue[d] to exhibit
 the clear and convincing pattern of omissions and obfuscations that warranted granting
 [ABC’s] motion to dismiss for bad-faith litigation conduct in the first place.” Slate, 12 F.
 Supp. 3d at 42.
 The hearing judge’s opinion conclusively demonstrates that Slate’s response of
 “No” to Question 18—i.e., his false statement of material fact—was knowing, as required
 for a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a). The hearing judge found that Slate “knowingly omitted
 the [] Opinions and the findings therein throughout the entirety of the bar application
 process”; that, “[b]y indicating ‘No’ to Question 18, [the catchall question, Slate]
 knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose material information reflecting adversely
 on his character at the time he submitted his bar application and throughout the pendency
 of the application process”; and that Slate “knowingly concealed material information
 from the SBLE and the Character Committee.” (Emphasis added).
 Slate’s response to Question 11 did not obviate the need for him to disclose the
 Opinions and the findings therein in response to Question 18. In response to Question 11,
 Slate disclosed the ABC Case’s name, the filing date, the court’s name and address, the
 date of trial, and the date of disposition. Next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed
 pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]”
 - 25 -
 Without more, these circumstances—i.e., that Slate was a party to the ABC Case, that the
 ABC Case was dismissed, and that an appeal was pending in the ABC Case—did not reveal
 anything about Slate’s character. The salient circumstance was that the United States
 District Court for the District of Columbia had found that Slate had engaged in various
 instances of dishonesty and misconduct, including fabrication of evidence, attempted abuse
 of the discovery process, and possible perjury. Slate was obligated to disclose these
 findings in response to Question 18.
 Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas, i.e., members of the Character Committee, and
 the SBLE, were not obligated to independently locate copies of the Opinions. “The
 applicant bears the burden of proving to the Character Committee, the [SBLE], and [this]
 Court the applicant’s good moral character and fitness for the practice of law.” Md. R. 19-
 203(d). With regard to Question 18, the burden is on the applicant to provide all
 information that may have any bearing on the applicant’s character or fitness, and that was
 not called for, or disclosed in the responses to, the other questions. The applicant does not
 meet this burden by merely having disclosed, in response to Question 11, the existence of,
 and basic facts about, a case to which the applicant was a party, where a court has issued
 an opinion in which the court finds that the applicant engaged in misconduct. This is
 especially true where, as here, the case in question is merely one of dozens of cases to
 which the applicant was a party, thus making it less likely that the Character Committee
 and the SBLE will focus on any particular case if the applicant does not provide any
 substantive information about the case.
 Contrary to Slate’s contention, the applicant’s burden under Maryland Rule 19-
 - 26 -
 203(d) is unaffected by Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B), which states in pertinent part: “On
 receipt of an application forwarded by the [SBLE], the Character Committee shall . . .
 verify the facts stated in the questionnaire[.]” In other words, Maryland Rule 19-
 203(a)(1)(B) does not relieve the applicant of his or her burden to provide all required
 information in his or her bar application. Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B)’s use of the
 phrase “verify the facts stated in the questionnaire” merely refers to the Character
 Committee’s obligation to investigate a bar application to the extent that “it finds necessary
 or desirable[.]” Such an investigation must at least include “personally interview[ing] the
 applicant[,]” Md. R. 19-203(a)(1)(A), and “contact[ing] the applicant’s references[,]” Md.
 R. 19-203(a)(1)(B). Under no circumstance is the Character Committee obligated to go on
 a fishing expedition for evidence of an applicant’s misconduct, especially where, as here,
 in the bar application and the character interview, the applicant furnishes no reason to
 suspect that such evidence exists. Under Maryland Rule 19-203(d), throughout the entire
 bar application process, the burden remains on the applicant to prove his or her character
 and fitness, and to provide all required information.
 Slate mistakenly relies on Application of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107
 (1982), for the proposition that he provided sufficient information in his bar application.
 In G.L.S., id. at 397, 439 A.2d at 1117, this Court determined that, in a bar application, an
 applicant “provided sufficient information to alert the [Character] Committee to the need
 for further investigation and inquiry.” Before attending law school, the applicant was the
 driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery, pled guilty to armed robbery, and was
 imprisoned. See id. at 379, 439 A.2d at 1108. In his bar application, the applicant did not
 - 27 -
 list a residence for the years during which he was imprisoned. See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at
 1109. In response to Question 11, the applicant listed the month and year of his guilty plea
 and the name of the court in which he pled guilty, but he did not provide any information
 next to “Nature of Proceedings” and “Disposition[.]” Id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110. During
 the character interview, the applicant disclosed that he had been convicted of a felony and
 had been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110. This
 Court admitted the applicant to the Bar of Maryland, explaining:
 We recognize that the applicant failed to provide complete
 information on his [bar] application . . . . We note, however, that he made
 full disclosure of his criminal conviction and incarceration on his application
 to law school. On his [bar] application . . . , he provided sufficient
 information to alert the [Character] Committee to the need for further
 investigation and inquiry. When his alleged failure to fully disclose was
 called to his attention, he conceded that the information he provided was
 incomplete[,] and then voluntarily provided the requisite information.
 Throughout the proceedings[,] he repeatedly asserted that he did not
 consciously intend to conceal information regarding his criminal activity.
 Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the applicant did not
 possess a sufficient degree of candor to qualify for admission to the Bar.
 Id. at 398, 397, 439 A.2d at 1118, 1117 (emphasis added).
 G.L.S. is materially distinguishable because its circumstances demonstrate that the
 omissions in the applicant’s bar application were the result of an oversight, not a deliberate
 attempt to conceal information. In G.L.S., id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110, in his bar
 application, the applicant indicated that he had been a party to a case in a certain court in a
 specified month and year, but did not fill in the blanks regarding the nature of the case or
 the disposition. When asked about the case at the character interview, the applicant
 disclosed his guilty plea and sentence. See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110. Before the SBLE,
 - 28 -
 the applicant testified that the omission in his bar application “was an oversight” that
 occurred because he was in a hurry to complete the application by the filing deadline, not
 because he intended to conceal his guilty plea. Id. at 383-84, 439 A.2d at 1110-11.
 By contrast, here, the hearing judge expressly found that Slate “conceal[ed] material
 information [] to gain admission to the” Bar of Maryland. Unlike the applicant in G.L.S.,
 Slate did not leave any part of his bar application blank with regard to the ABC Case, which
 may have prompted further investigation by the Character Committee and/or the SBLE.
 Instead, with regard to the ABC Case, Slate completely filled in every blank, and then
 responded “No” to the catchall question, thus indicating that he had provided all required
 information—when, in fact, he had not. Additionally, unlike the applicant in G.L.S., Slate
 did not disclose the required information at the character interview. The hearing judge’s
 findings indicate that, in his bar application and discussions with Compofelice, Brennan,
 and Thomas, Slate refrained from disclosing the Opinions and the findings therein in an
 attempt to fly under the radar and keep the Character Committee and the SBLE in the dark
 regarding the findings of his dishonesty and misconduct in the ABC Case.
 Slate also mistakenly relies on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dee, 306 Md. 799,
 511 A.2d 516 (1986), for the proposition that he effectively disclosed the Opinions. In
 Dee, id. at 808, 511 A.2d at 520, this Court concluded that an applicant “effectively
 disclosed any drug involvement in her past” in her bar application and her character
 interview. Over a two-year period, the applicant bought illegal drugs for her own use and
 for resale. See id. at 801, 511 A.2d at 516. In her bar application, the applicant responded
 “No” to the catchall question. Id. at 801, 511 A.2d at 516. In response to a question
 - 29 -
 regarding whether she had ever been addicted to drugs, the applicant stated “Yes”; the
 applicant also submitted to the Character Committee a letter that described her drug use.
 Id. at 807-08, 511 A.2d at 519-20. Additionally, during the character interview, the
 applicant disclosed that she had received probation before judgment for possession of
 heroin, and submitted a report from a psychiatrist who had treated her while she was
 addicted to drugs. See id. at 802, 511 A.2d at 517.
 This Court concluded that, by responding “No” to the catchall question, the
 applicant did not violate MLRPC 8.1’s predecessor, which stated: “A lawyer is subject to
 discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to
 disclose a material fact requested in connection with his application for admission to the
 bar.” Id. at 808, 805, 511 A.2d at 520, 519. This Court explained: “Through her
 discussions . . . in her character interview and her revelations made pursuant to [the
 q]uestion [] of the bar application[ that pertained to drug use], we believe [that the
 applicant] has effectively disclosed any drug involvement in her past.” Id. at 808, 511 A.2d
 at 520.
 Dee is materially distinguishable from this case because the lawyer in Dee disclosed
 her drug use not only in her bar application, but also in her character interview. By contrast,
 in neither his bar application, nor the character interview, nor the meeting with Brennan
 and Thomas, did Slate disclose the Opinions or the findings therein. Unlike the lawyer in
 Dee, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to the catchall question and
 providing no additional information.
 We reject Slate’s contention that he did not violate MLRPC 8.1(a) because the
 - 30 -
 hearing judge stated that Slate “believed” that he constructively disclosed the Opinions by
 telling Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about Kamau’s websites about Slate, and that
 he “to this day does not believe he was required to disclose, discuss, or supplement” the
 Opinions or the findings therein. Slate argues that these are findings by the hearing judge
 that demonstrate that he did not knowingly fail to disclose material information in his bar
 application.
 Slate takes the hearing judge’s statements out of context. With regard to both of the
 statements on which Slate relies, the hearing judge did not determine that Slate had a good-
 faith, albeit mistaken, belief that he did not need to disclose the Opinions or the findings
 therein, or that he had constructively done so. In the first instance, the hearing judge merely
 summarized Slate’s contention regarding his alleged constructive disclosure of the
 Opinions. In the second instance, the hearing judge found that Slate’s misconduct was
 aggravated by a refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature, as demonstrated
 by his arguments that he had done nothing wrong.
 Significantly, the hearing judge’s statement that Slate “believed” that he
 constructively disclosed the Opinions appears under a heading labeled “Respondent.”
 Under that heading, the hearing judge merely summarized Slate’s testimony, without
 finding any part of it credible or not credible. The hearing judge’s statement about
 constructive disclosure appears at the end of the following paragraph:
 [Slate] then engaged in a lengthy monologue which divulged into
 his pre-law endeavors, including his contentious relationship with [] Kamau.
 [] Kamau maintains multiple websites for the purpose of publishing
 information about [Slate]. The websites make pellucid the sheer animosity
 between [] Kamau and [Slate]. Nevertheless, the content on [] Kamau’s
 - 31 -
 websites include[s] the [] Opinions and the findings therein. Based on the
 continuous publication by [] Kamau, [Slate] testified that he knew the []
 Opinions and the findings therein could never be concealed. [Slate] further
 testified that he informed [] Compofelice, [] Brennan, and [] Thomas about
 [] Kamau’s websites, and was under the impression that the websites would
 be investigated. Thus, [Slate] believed the [] Opinions were disclosed, at
 least constructively, to the SBLE and the Character Committee.
 (Emphasis added). In context, it is clear that the hearing judge did not find that Slate
 believed that he constructively disclosed the Opinions. Instead, the hearing judge was
 simply summarizing one part of Slate’s testimony, without assessing its credibility.
 The hearing judge’s statement regarding Slate’s belief that he did not need to
 disclose the Opinions appears under a heading labeled “Mitigation and Aggravating
 Factors[.]” Under that heading, the hearing judge discussed both mitigating factors and
 aggravating factors. The hearing judge’s statement regarding Slate’s belief that he did not
 need to disclose the Opinions appears toward the end of the first of the following two
 paragraphs:
 [The hearing judge] does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that
 [Slate] established any mitigating factors. Notwithstanding the disclosure
 requirement of “judgments” on Question 11, Question 18 unequivocally
 required [Slate] to disclose the [] Opinions and the findings therein. A review
 of the [] Opinions reveal[s] the following: bad faith litigation, perjurious
 testimony, fabrication of evidence, and lack of respect for the federal judicial
 process. [Slate] failed to disclose, discuss, or supplement the [] Opinions and
 the findings therein throughout the pendency of the bar application process.
 In fact, [Slate] to this day does not believe he was required to disclose,
 discuss, or supplement the [] Opinions and the findings therein to his bar
 application. This clearly shows [Slate]’s impenitence and lack of respect
 for the SBLE, the Character Committee, and [the hearing judge].
 The Court of Appeals also delineated certain aggravating factors to
 consider in determining sanctions. By clear and convincing evidence, [the
 hearing judge] finds that [Slate] acted with a dishonest or selfish motive by
 concealing material information in order to gain admission to the Maryland
 Bar. [Slate] also refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
 - 32 -
 misconduct, which only exacerbates the serious nature of his MLRPC
 violations.
 (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). As this context makes clear, the hearing judge did
 not find that Slate had a good-faith belief that he did not need to disclose the Opinions or
 the findings therein. Instead, the hearing judge simply referred to Slate’s contention that
 he did not need to disclose the Opinions, and determined that Slate’s contention
 demonstrated a lack of remorse and a refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful
 nature.
 Having determined that the hearing judge correctly concluded that Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question, we turn to Bar
 Counsel’s contention that, by making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b). MLRPC 8.1(a) applies where a lawyer “knowingly
 make[s] a false statement of material fact[.]” Meanwhile, MLRPC 8.1(b) applies where a
 lawyer “fail[s] to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
 [lawyer] to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail[s] to respond to a lawful demand
 for information from” Bar Counsel.
 We agree with Bar Counsel that, contrary to the hearing judge’s conclusion, Slate’s
 misrepresentation to Bar Counsel that he had fully disclosed all that was required by the
 bar application constituted a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b). In his letter
 to Bar Counsel, Slate stated: “I complied fully with [MLRPC] 8.1 because I disclosed
 everything necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review process.” In
 her analysis as to MLRPC 8.1(b), the hearing judge found that Slate’s statement was a
 - 33 -
 “knowing[,] false statement of material fact[.]” A knowing, false statement of material fact
 to Bar Counsel is a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b).17 Thus, we sustain
 Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated MLRPC
 8.1(b).
 That said, we agree with Bar Counsel that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing
 to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein in a supplement to his bar application, or
 during the character interview, and thereby failing to correct the misapprehension that he
 had fully disclosed all relevant information about the ABC Case. In his bar application,
 Slate did not disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, despite the circumstance that
 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that Slate engaged in
 multiple instances of dishonesty and misconduct. Despite his failure to disclose the
 Opinions and the findings therein, Slate answered “No” to Question 18, the catchall
 question, which called for “circumstances or unfavorable incidents[,]” “including any . . .
 implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [or] misrepresentation[.]” By failing to disclose the
 Opinions or the findings therein, and answering the catchall question in the negative, Slate
 failed to correct, and indeed created or caused, a misapprehension with the Character
 Committee and the SBLE that the ABC Case contained no information bearing on his
 character and fitness for admission to the Bar. Despite disclosing the existence of the ABC
 Case on his bar application, Slate never supplemented his bar application with the Opinions
 and the findings therein. Nor did Slate disclose the Opinions and the findings therein
 17
 In discussing the violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) below, we explain that Slate’s
 statement to Bar Counsel was, indeed, false.
 - 34 -
 during the character interview, or during his meeting with Brennan and Thomas. In light
 of the hearing judge’s finding that Slate “knowingly concealed material information from
 the SBLE and the Character Committee[,]” it is clear that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by
 “fail[ing] to disclose a fact necessary to correct [the] misapprehension” that he had created.
 MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation)
 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
 dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]” MLRPC 8.4(c).
 The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the
 Opinions and the findings therein. Bar Counsel does not except to the hearing judge’s
 conclusion, but contends that Slate committed an additional violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) by
 making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel. We agree.
 Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate
 violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the Opinions and the findings therein. Question 18,
 the catchall question, required Slate to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein.
 Slate, however, responded “No” to the catchall question. Additionally, Slate never
 disclosed the Opinions and the findings therein in a supplement to his bar application,
 during the character interview, or during his meeting with Brennan and Thomas. Both
 Slate’s response to the catchall question, as well as his silence with regard to required
 information after he submitted his bar application, constituted acts that involved
 dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation, and violated MLRPC 8.4(c).
 Upon our review of the record, we agree with Bar Counsel that Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.4(c) by making a false statement to Bar Counsel. The hearing judge found that
 - 35 -
 Slate’s statement to Bar Counsel—namely, that he fully complied with MLRPC 8.1 by
 “disclos[ing] everything necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review
 process”—was a “knowing[,] false statement of material fact[.]” Even a cursory reading
 of Question 18 shows that the question requests information that is related to dishonesty,
 misconduct, and misrepresentation. The hearing judge specifically found that Slate “used
 benign terms to describe” the Opinions and the disposition of the ABC Case. The hearing
 judge found that Slate concealed the Opinions “in an attempt to deceive” the Character
 Committee and the SBLE. These determinations support the conclusion that, in advising
 Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all that was necessary during the bar application process,
 Slate was untruthful. Stated otherwise, Slate knew at the time that he responded to Bar
 Counsel that he had been required to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, but
 that he had not.
 We reject Slate’s contention that he did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c) because MLRPC
 8.4(c) applies only to conduct in which a lawyer engages after having been admitted to the
 Bar of Maryland. Insofar as the claim that a lawyer cannot violate MLRPC 8.4(c) by
 conduct that occurs before the lawyer is admitted to the Bar of Maryland, this Court has
 held that a lawyer’s failure to disclose, or concealment of, material information on the
 lawyer’s bar application constitutes a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). See Attorney Grievance
 Comm’n v. Van Dusen, 443 Md. 413, 430, 116 A.3d 1013, 1023 (2015) (This Court
 concluded that a lawyer violated MLRPC 8.4(c) where, after being admitted to the Bar of
 Maryland, the lawyer “continued to conceal his criminal conduct from [the] SBLE, the
 [Attorney Grievance] Commission, and this Court.” This Court stated that the lawyer’s
 - 36 -
 “deliberate and continued failure to disclose his misconduct in order to protect his
 Maryland [law] license [was] conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation.”);
 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hunt, 435 Md. 133, 142-43, 76 A.3d 1214, 1219-20 (2013)
 (This Court upheld a hearing judge’s conclusion that a lawyer violated MLRPC 8.4(c)
 where the lawyer “deliberate[ly and] continual[ly] failed to disclose his criminal activities
 [that he had engaged in prior to his admission to the Bar of Maryland] to the admissions
 authority” either during or after the bar admissions process. The hearing judge noted that
 the lawyer’s “omission of such material information was purposeful and calculating with
 the intent to deceive the admissions authority in their admissions process to avoid the
 possibility of being denied admission to the Bar.”).
 In any event, this contention is without merit with respect to the allegation that Slate
 made a false statement to Bar Counsel. To the extent that Slate contends that he cannot be
 sanctioned for conduct occurring before he was admitted to the Bar, Slate’s statement to
 Bar Counsel, i.e., the alleged false statement that he provided all information, was made in
 response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry to Slate regarding the complaint. Slate was obviously a
 member of the Bar at the time that he made this statement.
 MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice)
 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
 prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MLRPC 8.4(d). “Generally, a lawyer
 violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would negatively impact the
 perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.” Chanthunya, 446
 Md. at 602, 133 A.3d at 1049 (cleaned up).
 - 37 -
 The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by knowingly
 concealing material information from the Character Committee and the SBLE, falsely
 declaring under oath in the Affirmation by General Bar Applicant that the facts in his bar
 application remained accurate, and misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed
 all required information. We agree. We are satisfied that clear and convincing evidence
 supports the conclusion that, with his conduct in violating MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), and
 8.4(c), Slate also violated MLRPC 8.4(d). In sum, Slate’s conduct was such that it would
 negatively affect a reasonable person’s perception of the legal profession.
 The hearing judge’s findings undermine Slate’s contention that he did not violate
 MLRPC 8.4(d) because he merely made a “mistake.” As noted above, the hearing judge
 repeatedly and unequivocally found that Slate’s concealment of the Opinions and the
 findings therein was knowing.
 MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC)
 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC. MLRPC
 8.4(a). Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate
 violated MLRPC 8.4(a). As discussed above, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(c),
 and 8.4(d).
 (C) Sanction
 Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Slate, who asks us to dismiss this attorney
 discipline proceeding.
 In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277-78, 148 A.3d 300,
 316-17 (2016), this Court stated:
 - 38 -
 This Court sanctions a lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but instead to protect
 the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession. This Court
 accomplishes these goals by: (1) deterring other lawyers from engaging in
 similar misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer who is unfit
 to continue to practice law.
 In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court
 considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental
 state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have
 caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors.
 Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or
 selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the
 MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by
 intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
 (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
 practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to
 acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s
 vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10)
 indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s
 consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of
 controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.
 Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2)
 the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional
 problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the
 misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a
 cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6)
 inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical
 disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including
 alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the
 lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the
 chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the
 lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is
 demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
 rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the
 misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline
 proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse;
 (13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of
 repetition of the misconduct.
 (Cleaned up).
 - 39 -
 In Van Dusen, 443 Md. at 416, 116 A.3d at 1015, this Court unequivocally stated:
 A lawyer must, at a minimum, be trustworthy. One who wants to be
 a lawyer in Maryland must disclose to the . . . SBLE[] and this Court
 information that bears on that trait. Failure to satisfy those requirements may
 prevent admission to the bar or, when discovered, result in disbarment.
 This Court further explained that disbarment is the appropriate sanction where a lawyer
 conceals material information during the bar admission process, stating:
 This Court has also found disbarment appropriate when it is learned
 that a lawyer concealed material information during the bar admission
 process. The Court has reasoned that disbarment is warranted because the
 deliberate failure to disclose material information plainly reflects on the
 truthfulness and candor of the applicant and no character qualification to
 practice law is more important than truthfulness and candor. [Attorney
 Grievance Comm’n v.] Keehan, 311 Md. [161,] 169, 533 A.2d 278 [(1987)]
 (disbarring lawyer who withheld material information relating to his prior
 employment experience); Hunt, 435 Md. at 143-44, 76 A.3d 1214 (disbarring
 attorney who failed to disclose past criminal conduct); [Attorney Grievance
 Comm’n v.] Gilbert, 307 Md. [481,] 496-497, 515 A.2d 454 [(1986)]
 (disbarring an attorney who failed to disclose involvement in a civil suit).
 Van Dusen, 443 Md. at 432, 116 A.3d at 1024-25.
 Here, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall
 question, when he should have disclosed the Opinions and the findings therein. Slate also
 violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by mispresenting to Bar Counsel that he had provided all required
 information during the bar application process. Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to
 supplement his bar application with, or tell Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about, the
 Opinions and the findings therein. Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the
 Opinions and the findings therein throughout the bar application process. Slate also
 violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by making a false statement to Bar Counsel. Slate violated
 MLRPC 8.4(d) through his knowing concealment of required information in the bar
 - 40 -
 application process and misrepresentation to Bar Counsel. All of these circumstances have
 the potential to undermine the public’s confidence in the legal profession.
 We note five aggravating factors. First, the hearing judge found that Slate had a
 dishonest or selfish motive, as he concealed material information to get admitted to the Bar
 of Maryland. Second, the instant circumstances make clear that Slate has engaged in a
 pattern of dishonesty. Slate engaged in dishonesty by responding “No” to the catchall
 question; falsely stating under oath that the facts in his bar application remained true;
 concealing required information during the character interview, as well as the meeting with
 Brennan and Thomas; failing to supplement his bar application with the required
 information; and then falsely stating to Bar Counsel that he had provided all required
 information. Third, Slate committed multiple violations of the MLRPC. Fourth, the
 hearing judge found that Slate refused to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature,
 and demonstrated “impenitence[.]” Fifth, Slate’s pattern of dishonesty demonstrates that
 he is likely to repeat his misconduct—i.e., engage in dishonesty.
 The hearing judge stated that she did not find any mitigating factors. Upon our
 independent review of the record, we discern only two. First, Slate has not received prior
 attorney discipline. Second, Slate lacked experience in the practice of law at the time of
 his misconduct. He was not yet a lawyer during the bar application process; and, when he
 made the misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, he had been a lawyer for approximately two
 years.
 We fully agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate sanction for Slate’s
 misconduct is disbarment. Slate knowingly engaged in dishonesty in multiple instances.
 - 41 -
 He deliberately concealed the Opinions and the findings therein by: responding “No” to
 the catchall question in his bar application; falsely stating under oath that the
 representations in his bar application remained accurate; withholding the required
 information during the character interview and the meeting with Brennan and Thomas; and
 failing to supplement his bar application. Additionally, Slate misrepresented to Bar
 Counsel that he had provided all required information. There is little doubt that, had Slate’s
 dishonesty come to light during the bar application process, we would have determined
 that he lacked the character and fitness necessary for admission to the Bar of Maryland.18
 At oral argument, when asked about the appropriate sanction, Slate responded that
 “this is an all-or-nothing scenario.” We agree. “[A]bsent compelling extenuating
 circumstances, disbarment is ordinarily the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct[.]”
 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 46, 150 A.3d 870, 883 (2016)
 (cleaned up). Here, Slate does not contend that there are any compelling extenuating
 circumstances. Upon our independent review, the hearing judge’s opinion is devoid of any
 facts that could possibly constitute compelling extenuating circumstances.
 18
 In our assessment of the appropriate sanction, we do not consider the misconduct
 that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found to have occurred in
 the ABC Case. The hearing judge did not address whether Slate violated any MLRPC in
 the ABC Case, and neither do we. Slate’s violations of the MLRPC at issue arise solely
 from his failure to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, as well as his
 misrepresentation to Bar Counsel about having provided all required information. In other
 words, our focus is solely on Slate’s concealment of his past actions, rather than the past
 actions themselves.
 - 42 -
 For the above reasons, we disbar Slate.
 IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
 ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF
 THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
 TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
 RULE 19-709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT
 IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
 GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
 GREGORY ALLEN SLATE.
 - 43 -


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 17.11.2012
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 355/19
 Hotărârea Tribunalului din 27 septembrie 2012 — Guardian Industries și Guardian Europe/Comisia
 (Cauza T-82/08) (1)
 (Concurență - Înțelegeri - Piața sticlei plate în SEE - Decizie de constatare a unei încălcări a articolului 81 CE - Stabilirea prețurilor - Dovada încălcării - Calculul cuantumului amenzilor - Excluderea vânzărilor captive - Obligația de motivare - Egalitate de tratament - Circumstanțe atenuante)
 2012/C 355/39
 Limba de procedură: engleza
 Părțile
 Reclamante: Guardian Industries Corp (Dover, Delaware, Statele Unite) și Guardian Europe Sàrl (Dudelange, Luxemburg) (reprezentanți: S. Völcker, F. Louis, A. Vallery, C. Eggers și H.-G. Kamann, avocați)
 Pârâtă: Comisia Europeană (reprezentanți: F. Castillo de la Torre și R. Sauer, agenți)
 Obiectul
 Cerere de anulare a Deciziei C(2007) 5791 final a Comisiei din 28 noiembrie 2007 privind o procedură de aplicare a articolului 81 [CE] și a articolului 53 din Acordul privind SEE (cauza COMP/39165 — Sticlă plată), în măsura în care le privește pe reclamante, și reducerea cuantumului amenzii aplicate acestora prin decizia menționată.
 Dispozitivul
 1.
 Respinge acțiunea.
 2.
 Obligă Guardian Industries Corp. și Guardian Europe Sàrl la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 (1) JO C 107, 26.4.2008.


type: wikipedia

text:
Villa Viletta is een pand aan de Van Lenneplaan 55 en is een gemeentelijk monument in Baarn in de provincie Utrecht. Het huis staat in het Wilhelminapark dat onderdeel is van rijksbeschermd dorpsgezicht Prins Hendrikpark e.o..
 Oorsprong
 Deze villa op het Eemnesser Hoog is vermoedelijk gebouwd in de periode 1870-1880, voordat de spoorlijn Amsterdam-Amersfoort werd aangelegd. De Van Lenneplaan was toen nog een zandpad over de hei, zodat er een ruim uitzicht was. Er is sprake is van een eclectische stijl waarvan de meeste stijlelementen aan het classicisme zijn ontleend. De lange zijde van de villa is gericht naar de Jacob van Lenneplaan, de voorzijde is gericht naar de Dillenburglaan, het huis kreeg in het verleden ook wel het adres Dillenburglaan 36. In 1992 werd het pand ingrijpend verbouwd, waarbij ook het witte uiterlijk van het huis werd gewijzigd in Habsburgs geel.
 Lodewijk van Deyssel
 Het huis werd waarschijnlijk gebouwd tussen 1870 en 1880, dus voor de aanleg van de spoorlijn naar Amsterdam. Er stonden in die tijd dus nog niet veel andere villa's in de buurt. Het pand met zes kamers staat op een perceel van 610 m2.
 Van 1893 - 1901 werd Villetta bewoond door schrijver Lodewijk van Deyssel (1864-1952, pseudoniem: Alberdingk Thijm). Hij beschouwde het huis als een 'kleine villa' en kwam zo tot de naam Villetta. In 1901 verhuisde Van Deyssel naar De Bremstruik aan de overzijde van de straat op nummer 26.
 Zie ook
 Lijst van gemeentelijke monumenten in Baarn
 Villa in Baarn
 Gemeentelijk monument in Baarn


type: legislation

text:
 EIROPAS KOMISIJA
 Briselē, 14.10.2015
 COM(2015) 501 final
 2015/0240(NLE)
 Priekšlikums
 PADOMES LĒMUMS,
 ar ko nosaka nostāju, kas Eiropas Savienības vārdā jāieņem Pasaules Tirdzniecības organizācijas Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomē, tiekties iegūt apstiprinājumu attiecībā uz preferenciālo režīmu, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, ko, pamatojoties uz LDC pakalpojumu atbrīvojumu, Eiropas Savienība plāno vienpusēji piešķirt vismazāk attīstīto valstu izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem
 PASKAIDROJUMA RAKSTS
 1.PRIEKŠLIKUMA KONTEKSTS
 Priekšlikuma pamatojums un mērķi
 Padomes lēmuma priekšlikums iesniegts sakarībā ar PTO pakalpojumu atbrīvojumu vismazāk attīstītajām valstīm (LDC). Pakalpojumu atbrīvojums
 1
 ļauj PTO dalībniekiem piešķirt LDC vienpusējas preferences attiecībā uz pakalpojumiem, un ir nepieciešama Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomes (CTS) piekrišana paziņotajām preferencēm, kas piešķirtas attiecībā uz pasākumiem, kuri nav aprakstīti GATS XVI pantā (piekļuve tirgum).
 Komisija 2015. gada 23. jūlijā pieņēma priekšlikumu padomes lēmumam
 2
 , ar ko nosaka nostāju, kas Savienības vārdā jāieņem PTO Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomē saistībā ar to preferenču pieņemšanu, kuras paziņojuši PTO dalībnieki attiecībā uz vismazāk attīstīto valstu izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem, izņemot tos, kas aprakstīti GATS XVI pantā (tirgus piekļuve)
 Ar ierosināto Padomes lēmumu nosaka Eiropas Savienības nostāju CTS, proti, tiecas iegūt apstiprinājumu attiecībā uz preferenciālo režīmu, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, ko Eiropas Savienība grasās piešķirt LDC vienpusēji.
 Paredzētais režīms, ko grasās piemērot LDC, tika sagatavots, pamatojoties uz tādu pieeju, kas izteikta PTO dalībnieku CTS augsta līmeņa sanāksmē 2015. gada 5. februārī, un 2015. gada 30. jūlijā PTO tika pausts nodoms par to.
 Atbilstība pašreizējiem noteikumiem konkrētajā politikas jomā un citām Savienības politikām
 Devītajā PTO Ministru konferencē Bali (2013. gada 3.–6. decembris) Eiropas Savienība pievienojās konsensam par lēmuma pieņemšanu par pakalpojumu atbrīvojuma darbību attiecībā uz LDC
 3
 . ES vēlas, lai izdotos 2015. gada decembrī gaidāmā desmitā PTO Ministru konference Nairobi un lai pārliecinoši virzītos uz priekšu Dohas attīstības kārtas sarunas un Bali rezultātu paketes īstenošana, tostarp elementi saistībā ar LDC. Ierosinātais Padomes lēmums ir daļa no šā Bali paketes īstenošanas procesa.
 Atbalstot LDC ekonomikas attīstību ar preferencēm, ko piešķirs saskaņā ar atbrīvojumu, ES veicinās to Līgumā noteikto mērķu sasniegšanu, saskaņā ar kuriem ES sekmēs pasaules tirdzniecības līdzsvarotu attīstību un definēs un īstenos kopēju politiku, lai veicinātu jaunattīstības valstu ilgtspējīgu attīstību
 4
 . Šis ierosinātais paziņojums arī veicinās Dohas attīstības programmas sarunu noslēgšanu pakalpojumu sadaļā.
 2.JURIDISKAIS PAMATS, SUBSIDIARITĀTE UN PROPORCIONALITĀTE
 Juridiskais pamats
 Ierosinātā Padomes lēmuma juridiskais pamats ir Līguma par Eiropas Savienības darbību (LESD) 91. pants, 100. pants un 207. panta 4. punkta pirmā daļa saistībā ar tā 218. panta 9. punktu.
 LESD 218. panta 9. punktā ir noteikts, ka gadījumā, kad ar starptautisku nolīgumu izveidotā struktūrā jāpieņem tiesību akts ar juridiskām sekām, Padome pēc Komisijas vai Savienības Augstā pārstāvja ārlietās un drošības politikas jautājumos priekšlikuma pieņem lēmumu, ar ko nosaka nostāju, kura Savienības vārdā jāieņem attiecībā uz šāda akta pieņemšanu minētajā struktūrā. Lai gan paziņojumam par preferencēm, ko Savienība grasās piešķirt LDC, nav juridiska spēka, tas ietvertu saistības, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, kam vajadzīgs tāds apstiprinājums CTS, kuram atbilst 218. panta 9. punkts. Paredzētās preferences attiecas uz visām saistībām, kuras izriet no Vispārējās vienošanās par pakalpojumu tirdzniecību, un var skart visas pakalpojumu nozares, ieskaitot transporta pakalpojumus. Tādēļ ierosinātais lēmums ietilpst LESD 91. panta, 100. panta un 207. panta 4. punkta pirmās daļas darbības jomā.
 3.IETEKME UZ BUDŽETU
 Priekšlikums neietekmē budžetu.
 2015/0240 (NLE)
 Priekšlikums
 PADOMES LĒMUMS,
 ar ko nosaka nostāju, kas Eiropas Savienības vārdā jāieņem Pasaules Tirdzniecības organizācijas Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomē, tiekties iegūt apstiprinājumu attiecībā uz preferenciālo režīmu, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, ko, pamatojoties uz LDC pakalpojumu atbrīvojumu, Eiropas Savienība plāno vienpusēji piešķirt vismazāk attīstīto valstu izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem
 EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS PADOME,
 ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Savienības darbību un jo īpaši tā 91. pantu, 100. pantu un 207. panta 4. punkta pirmo daļu saistībā ar tā 218. panta 9. punktu,
 ņemot vērā Eiropas Komisijas priekšlikumu,
 tā kā:
 (1)Marrākešas nolīguma, ar ko izveido Pasaules Tirdzniecības organizāciju (PTO), IX pantā noteiktas procedūras, saskaņā ar kurām piešķir atbrīvojumus attiecībā uz daudzpusējiem tirdzniecības nolīgumiem minētā nolīguma 1.A, 1.B vai 1.C pielikumā un to pielikumos.
 (2)Ir pieprasīts atbrīvojums, saskaņā ar kuru PTO dalībnieki varētu noteikt preferenču režīmu vismazāk attīstīto valstu (PTO dalībnieču) izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem, vienlaikus nepiešķirot tādu pašu režīmu līdzīgiem visu pārējo PTO dalībnieku pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem, tādējādi izņēmuma kārtā atkāpjoties no Vispārējās vienošanās par pakalpojumu tirdzniecību (GATS) II. panta 1. punkta saistībām. Padome ar 2011. gada 14. decembra Padomes lēmumu (2012/8/ES) pieņēma Savienības nostāju, atbalstot atbrīvojumu.
 (3)PTO Ministru 2011. gada 17. decembra lēmumā, ar ko PTO dalībniekiem atļauj piešķirt šādu preferenciālu režīmu vismazāk attīstīto valstu (PTO dalībnieču) izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem 15 gadus, 1. un 2. punktā ir noteikts, ka i) dalībnieki, kuri piešķir preferenciālu režīmu atbilstīgi šim atbrīvojumam iesniedz paziņojumu Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomē un ka ii) preferenciāls režīms attiecībā uz pasākumu piemērošanu, kuri nav aprakstīti GATS XVI pantā, jāapstiprina Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomei saskaņā ar tās procedūrām. Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomes piekrišanas nepieciešamība attiecībā uz šiem pasākumiem tika norādīta arī 2013. gada 7. decembra PTO Ministru lēmuma 1.3. punktā.
 (4)Ar Padomes 2015. gada [] [] lēmumu noteica Savienības nostāju pieņemt preferences, kas pārsniedz GATS XVI pantu un kuras pārējie PTO dalībnieki piešķīruši vismazāk attīstīto valstu (PTO dalībnieču) izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem.
 (5)Eiropas Savienības attīstības mērķu interesēs ir pieņemt preferences, ko piešķīruši pārējie PTO dalībnieki, un veicināt Dohas attīstības programmas sarunu noslēgšanu sadaļā par pakalpojumiem, kurus Eiropas Savienība grasās apstiprināt preferenciālajam režīmam, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, ko tā grasās piešķirt vismazāk attīstīto valstu izcelsmes pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem, īpašu uzmanību pievēršot piešķirtajām preferencēm attiecībā uz fizisku personu pagaidu uzturēšanos pakalpojumu sniegšanas nolūkā, lai radītu stimulus atpakaļuzņemšanas saistību izpildei saskaņā ar starptautiskajām tiesībām, īstenotu spēkā esošos atpakaļuzņemšanas nolīgumus un noslēgtu jaunus nolīgumus ar nosacījumu, ka vismazāk attīstītās valsis (PTO dalībnieces) sadarbojas ar Eiropas Savienību migrācijas pārvaldības jautājumā,
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 Eiropas Savienība PTO Pakalpojumu tirdzniecības padomē tiecas apstiprināt preferenciālo režīmu, ko Savienība grasās piešķirt vismazāk attīstīto valstu pakalpojumiem un pakalpojumu sniedzējiem, konkrēti attiecībā uz tām preferencēm, kas pārsniedz tirgus piekļuvi, kura paredzēta šā lēmuma papildinājumā, un ir saskaņā ar PTO ministru lēmumiem 2011. gada 17. decembrī (WT/L/847) un 2013. gada 7. decembrī (WT/L/918).
 Šo nostāju pauž Eiropas Komisija.
 2. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā tā pieņemšanas dienā.
 Briselē,
 Padomes vārdā —
 priekšsēdētājs
 (1)
 Atbrīvojumi ir atļaujas, ko piešķir PTO Ģenerālpadome/Ministru konference, ļaujot uz laiku atkāpties no konkrētām PTO saistībām, kas citādi būtu piemērojamas.
 (2)
 COM(2015) 356.
 (3)
 WT/L/918.
 (4)
 LESD 205. un 206. pants un LES 21. pants.


text:
 25.11.2009
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 310/26
 A BIZOTTSÁG 1133/2009/EK RENDELETE
 (2009. november 24.)
 a gabonaágazatban 2009. november 16-tól alkalmazandó behozatali vámok megállapításáról szóló 1090/2009/EK rendelet módosításáról
 AZ EURÓPAI KÖZÖSSÉGEK BIZOTTSÁGA,
 tekintettel az Európai Közösséget létrehozó szerződésre,
 tekintettel a mezőgazdasági piacok közös szervezésének létrehozásáról, valamint egyes mezőgazdasági termékekre vonatkozó egyedi rendelkezésekről szóló, 2007. október 22-i 1234/2007/EK tanácsi rendeletre (1) (az egységes közös piacszervezésről szóló rendelet),
 tekintettel az 1766/92/EGK tanácsi rendelet alkalmazásának szabályairól (importvámok a gabonaágazatban) szóló, 1996. június 28-i 1249/96/EK bizottsági rendeletre (2) és különösen annak 2. cikke (1) bekezdésére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A gabonaágazatban 2009. november 16-tól alkalmazandó behozatali vámokat a 1090/2009/EK bizottsági rendelet (3) rögzítette.
 (2)
 A behozatali vámok kiszámított átlaga tonnánként 5 euróval eltér a megállapított vámtól, helyénvaló tehát megfelelő módon kiigazítani a 1090/2009/EK rendeletben rögzített behozatali vámokat.
 (3)
 A 1090/2009/EK rendeletet ennek megfelelően módosítani kell,
 ELFOGADTA EZT A RENDELETET:
 1. cikk
 A 1090/2009/EK rendelet I. és II. mellékletének helyébe e rendelet mellékletének szövege lép.
 2. cikk
 Ez a rendelet az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában való kihirdetésének napján lép hatályba.
 Rendelkezéseit 2009. november 25-től kell alkalmazni.
 Ez a rendelet teljes egészében kötelező és közvetlenül alkalmazandó valamennyi tagállamban.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2009. november 24-én.
 a Bizottság részéről
 Jean-Luc DEMARTY
 mezőgazdasági és vidékfejlesztési főigazgató
 (1) HL L 299., 2007.11.16., 1. o.
 (2) HL L 161., 1996.6.29., 125. o.
 (3) HL L 299., 2009.11.14., 3. o.
 I. MELLÉKLET
 Az 1234/2007/EK rendelet 136. cikkének (1) bekezdésében említett termékek 2009. november 25-től alkalmazandó behozatali vámjai
 KN-kódszám
 Áru megnevezése
 Behozatali vám (1)
 (EUR/t)
 1001 10 00
 DURUMBÚZA, kiváló minőségű
 0,00
 közepes minőségű
 0,00
 gyenge minőségű
 15,26
 1001 90 91
 KÖZÖNSÉGES BÚZA, vetőmag
 0,00
 ex 1001 90 99
 KÖZÖNSÉGES BÚZA, kiváló minőségű, a vetőmag kivételével
 0,00
 1002 00 00
 ROZS
 38,58
 1005 10 90
 KUKORICA, vetőmag, a hibrid kivételével
 15,68
 1005 90 00
 KUKORICA, a vetőmag kivételével (2)
 15,68
 1007 00 90
 CIROKMAG, a vetésre szánt hibrid kivételével
 38,58
 (1) A Közösségbe az Atlanti-óceánon vagy a Szuezi-csatornán keresztül érkező árukra az 1249/96/EK rendelet 2. cikkének (4) bekezdése értelmében az importőr a következő vámcsökkentésben részesülhet:
 —
 3 EUR/t, ha a kirakodási kikötő a Földközi-tengeren van,
 —
 2 EUR/t, ha a kirakodási kikötő Dániában, Észtországban, Írországban, Lettországban, Litvániában, Lengyelországban, Finnországban, Svédországban, az Egyesült Királyságban vagy az Ibériai-félsziget atlanti-óceáni partján van.
 (2) Az importőr 24 EUR/t átalány-vámcsökkentésben részesülhet, amennyiben az 1249/96/EK rendelet 2. cikkének (5) bekezdésében megállapított feltételek teljesülnek.
 II. MELLÉKLET
 Az I. mellékletben rögzített vámok kiszámításánál figyelembe vett adatok
 13.11.2009-23.11.2009
 1.
 Az 1249/96/EK rendelet 2. cikkének (2) bekezdésében említett referencia-időszakra vonatkozó átlagértékek:
 (EUR/t)
 Közönséges búza (1)
 Kukorica
 Durumbúza, kiváló minőségű
 Durumbúza, közepes minőségű (2)
 Durumbúza, gyenge minőségű (3)
 Árpa
 Tőzsde
 Minnéapolis
 Chicago
 —
 —
 —
 —
 Tőzsdei jegyzés
 146,67
 105,00
 —
 —
 —
 —
 FOB-ár, USA
 —
 —
 127,27
 117,27
 97,27
 74,77
 Öböl-beli árnövelés
 —
 14,72
 —
 —
 —
 —
 Nagy-tavaki árnövelés
 12,65
 —
 —
 —
 —
 —
 2.
 Az 1249/96/EK rendelet 2. cikkének (2) bekezdésében említett referencia-időszakra vonatkozó átlagértékek:
 Szállítási költség: Mexikói-öböl–Rotterdam
 22,58 EUR/t
 Szállítási költség: Nagy-tavak–Rotterdam
 44,51 EUR/t
 (1) 14 EUR/t árnövelés együtt (az 1249/96/EK rendelet 4. cikkének (3) bekezdése).
 (2) 10 EUR/t árcsökkentés (az 1249/96/EK rendelet 4. cikkének (3) bekezdése).
 (3) 30 EUR/t árcsökkentés (az 1249/96/EK rendelet 4. cikkének (3) bekezdése).