type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Tähtis õiguslik teade
 |
 52009PC0575
 [pic] | EUROOPA ÜHENDUSTE KOMISJON |Brüssel 19.10.2009KOM(2009)575 lõplikEttepanek:NÕUKOGU OTSUSliikmesriikide osamaksude kohta Euroopa Arengufondi (2009. aasta osamaksu 3. osa)SELETUSKIRIKümnenda EAFi sisekokkuleppe ja finantsmäärusega nähakse ette uus liikmesriikide osamaksusid käsitlev menetlus, mille alusel liikmesriigid rahastavad EAFi. Finantsmääruse artikli 157 kohaselt kohaldatakse kõnealust uut menetlust esimest korda 2009. aasta (aasta „n+2” nimetatud sätte tähenduses) osamaksude suhtes.Finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 5 kohaselt käsitleb käesolev ettepanek:- aasta (aasta „n+1” nimetatud artiklis sätestatud püsimenetluste tähenduses) osamaksu kolmanda osa suurust.Finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 7 kohaselt on täpsustatud, milliseid summasid haldab komisjon ja milliseid Euroopa Investeerimispank.Finantsmääruse artikli 145 kohaselt edastas Euroopa Investeerimispank komisjonile tema hallatavate vahendite kohustuste ja maksete prognoosi ajakohastatud versiooni.Finantsmääruse artikli 57 lõike 5 kohaselt peab nõukogu tegema otsuse nimetatud ettepaneku kohta hiljemalt 21 kalendripäeva pärast seda, kui komisjon on esitanud oma ettepaneku, ja liikmesriigid peavad tasuma osamaksu kolmanda osa hiljemalt 21 päeva pärast päeva, mil neid nõukogu otsusest teavitatakse.Finantsmääruse artikli 58 lõikes 2 on sätestatud, et osamaksunõuetega kustutatakse kõigepealt järjestikku varasemate EAFide jaoks ette nähtud summad. Käesolevas ettepanekus nimetatud osamaksunõuded hõlmavad seetõttu üheksanda EAFi summasid.Tuletame meelde, et finantsmääruse artikli 60 lõikes 1 on sätestatud, et juhul kui liikmesriik ei tasu tasumisele kuuluvat osamaksu sätestatud tähtajaks, peab asjaomane liikmesriik tasuma maksmata jäänud summalt viivist vastavalt samas artiklis sätestatud viivise maksmist käsitlevale korrale.Ettepanek:NÕUKOGU OTSUSliikmesriikide osamaksude kohta Euroopa Arengufondi (2009. aasta osamaksu 3. osa)EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,võttes arvesse Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingut,võttes arvesse nõukogus kokku tulnud liikmesriikide valitsuste esindajate sisekokkulepet ühenduse abi rahastamise ja haldamise kohta vastavalt 23. juunil 2000. aastal Cotonous (Beninis) allkirjastatud Aafrika, Kariibi mere ja Vaikse ookeani riikide ning Euroopa Ühenduse ja selle liikmesriikide vahelise partnerluslepingu finantsprotokollile ning finantsabi eraldamise kohta nendele ülemeremaadele ja -territooriumidele, mille suhtes kohaldataks EÜ asutamislepingu neljandat osa,[1] eriti selle artikli 10 lõiget 1,võttes arvese sisekokkulepet nõukogus kokku tulnud liikmesriikide valitsuste esindajate vahel ühenduse abi rahastamise kohta mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku (2008–2013) alusel vastavalt AKV–EÜ koostöölepingule ning finantsabi eraldamise kohta nendele ülemeremaadele ja -territooriumidele, mille suhtes kohaldatakse EÜ asutamislepingu neljandat osa,[2] eriti selle artiklit 7,võttes arvesse kümnenda Euroopa Arengufondi suhtes kohaldatavat 18. veebruari 2008. aasta finantsmäärust (edaspidi „kümnenda EAFi finantsmäärus”),[3] eriti selle artiklit 57 ja artikli 58 lõiget 2,võttes arvesse komisjoni ettepanekut[4]ning arvestades järgmist:(1) Kümnenda Euroopa Arengufondi (edaspidi „EAF”) suhtes kohaldatava finantsmääruse artikli 58 lõikes 2 on sätestatud, et osamaksunõuetega kustutatakse kõigepealt varasemate EAFide jaoks ette nähtud summad. Seetõttu tuleks esitada üheksanda EAFi rahastamisnõue.(2) Kümnenda EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 145 esimese lõigu kohaselt edastas Euroopa Investeerimispank komisjonile tema hallatavate vahendite kohustuste ja maksete prognoosi ajakohastatud versiooni.(3) Kümnenda EAFi finantsmääruse artikli 157 kohaselt kohaldatakse artiklites 57–61 sätestatud menetlust esimest korda 2009. aastal. Nimetatud menetluse kohaselt esitab komisjon ettepaneku, milles on täpsustatud 2009. aasta osamaksu kolmanda osa suurus. Nõukogu peab tegema otsuse hiljemalt 21 kalendripäeva pärast seda, kui komisjon on esitanud oma ettepaneku, ja liikmesriigid peavad tasuma osamaksu kolmanda osa hiljemalt 21 päeva pärast päeva, mil neid nõukogu otsusest teavitatakse,ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:Artikkel 12009. aasta osamaksu kolmas osa, mida liikmesriigid maksavad komisjonile ja Euroopa Investeerimispangale EAFi rahastamiseks, on esitatud käesoleva otsuse lisas asuvas tabelis.Artikkel 2Käesolev otsus jõustub selle vastuvõtmise päeval.Artikkel 3Käesolev otsus on adresseeritud liikmesriikidele, kes tasuvad üheksanda EAFi osamaksu.Brüssel,Nõukogu nimeleesistujaLISA2009. aasta osamaksu kolmas osa (eurodes)[pic]---[1] EÜT L 317, 15.12.2000, lk 355.[2] ELT L 247, 09.09.2006, lk 32.[3] ELT L 78, 19.03.2008, lk 1.[4] ELT C ..., ..., lk ....


type: caselaw

text:
 25.7.2016
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 270/33
 Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki ga je vložilo High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) (Združeno kraljestvo) 30. maja 2016 – American Express Co./The Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury
 (Zadeva C-304/16)
 (2016/C 270/37)
 Jezik postopka: angleščina
 Predložitveno sodišče
 High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
 Stranki v postopku v glavni stvari
 Tožeča stranka: American Express Co.
 Nasprotne stranke: The Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury, Diners Club International Limited, MasterCard Europe S.A.
 Vprašanji za predhodno odločanje
 1.
 Ali zahteva iz členov 1(5) in 2(18) Uredbe (EU) 2015/751 (1) (v nadaljevanju: uredba IFR), da se tristranska shema plačilnih kartic pri izdaji kartičnih plačilnih instrumentov s partnerjem, ki souporablja blagovno znamko, ali prek posrednika šteje za štiristransko shemo plačilnih kartic, velja le, če partner, ki souporablja blagovno znamko, ali posrednik deluje kot „izdajatelj“ v smislu člena 2(2) in uvodne izjave 29 uredbe IFR (in sicer kadar je navedeni partner ali posrednik v pogodbenem razmerju s plačnikom, da bi zagotovil plačilni instrument, s katerim se odrejajo in obdelujejo kartične plačilne transakcije plačnika)?
 2.
 Če je odgovor na prvo vprašanje nikalen, ali sta člena 1(5) in 2(18) uredbe IFR neveljavna, kolikor določata, da se taki sporazumi štejejo za štiristransko shemo plačilnih kartic, na podlagi:
 (a)
 neobstoja obrazložitve v skladu s členom 296 PDEU;
 (b)
 očitne napake pri presoji in/ali
 (c)
 kršitve načela sorazmernosti?
 (1) Uredba (EU) 2015/751 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 29. aprila 2015 o medbančnih provizijah za kartične plačilne transakcije (UL L 123, str. 1).


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b'Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure\nSubcommittee on Aviation\nUnited States House of Representatives\n\n\n\n Update on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Progress\nFor Release on Delivery\nExpected at\n10:00 a.m. EDT\nWednesday\nSeptember 12, 2012 and Challenges in\n Advancing the Next\nCC-2012-027\n\n\n\n Generation Air\n Transportation System\n\n\n Statement of\n The Honorable Calvin L. Scovel III\n Inspector General\n U.S. Department of Transportation\n\x0cMr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:\n\nThank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Federal Aviation Administration\xe2\x80\x99s\n(FAA) progress in developing the Next Generation Air Transportation System\n(NextGen)\xe2\x80\x94a system that is expected to provide safer and more efficient air traffic\nmanagement. As you know, NextGen is FAA\xe2\x80\x99s most complex effort to date and will\nrequire multibillion-dollar investments from both the Federal Government and airspace\nusers.\n\nSince the effort began in fiscal year 2004, we have reported on cost and schedule risks as\nwell as challenges that FAA must address to successfully transition from legacy air traffic\nsystems to NextGen. In September 2009, a Federal Government-industry task force\xe2\x80\x94\nestablished at FAA\xe2\x80\x99s request\xe2\x80\x94recommended several strategies for accelerating\nNextGen\xe2\x80\x99s benefits in the near term. However, last October, we testified that delivering\nnear-term benefits and resolving problems with ongoing projects continue to challenge\nFAA. 1 While FAA has taken important steps over the past year to improve the\nmanagement of NextGen, such as establishing a new program management office, the\nAgency has made limited progress in shifting from planning to actual implementation and\ndelivering benefits to airspace users.\n\nToday, I will focus on three key challenges that continue to impact FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\nrealize NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s benefits: (1) implementing NextGen capabilities at congested airports,\n(2) resolving technical and program management problems with the En Route\nAutomation Modernization (ERAM) program, and (3) managing program costs and\nschedules in developing and implementing NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s transformational programs.\n\nIN SUMMARY\nFAA has made progress in improving air traffic management at congested airports in\nmajor cities\xe2\x80\x94one of the task force\xe2\x80\x99s most critical recommendations. For example, FAA\nhas completed studies to identify recommended changes for seven metroplex locations\nand is performing airspace and procedures design work at six of them. However, industry\nrepresentatives are concerned that the effort may not deliver all desired benefits and that\nFAA has not yet integrated metroplex with other related initiatives, such as better\nmanaging surface operations. Additionally, FAA has not fully resolved key\norganizational, policy, and training barriers to implementing NextGen capabilities in the\nnear term. Central to realizing benefits from the task force recommendations and other\nNextGen initiatives is the successful deployment of ERAM\xe2\x80\x94a multibillion dollar\nprogram for processing flight data. However, extensive software-related problems have\nsignificantly delayed ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s nationwide deployment, resulting in hundreds of millions\nof dollars in increased costs. FAA is taking steps to address our concerns about a number\nof ERAM programmatic and contract management issues, such as modifying its contract\n\n1\n OIG Testimony Number CC-2011-036, \xe2\x80\x9cProgress and Challenges in Developing to the Next Generation Air Transportation\n System,\xe2\x80\x9d October 5, 2011. OIG reports and testimonies are available on our Web site at http://www.oig.dot.gov/.\n\n\n 1\n\x0cto better track costs, but considerable risks remain to complete the effort within the\nAgency\xe2\x80\x99s revised cost and schedule parameters. FAA faces similar cost and schedule\nrisks with its NextGen transformational programs, as the Agency has not approved total\ncost, schedule, or performance baselines for any of the programs or developed an\nintegrated master schedule for managing and executing NextGen.\n\nBACKGROUND\nNextGen involves a significant overhaul of the National Airspace System (NAS) to shift\nfrom ground- to satellite-based air traffic management. This effort includes several\ncomponents, such as:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Redesigning airspace and deploying new performance-based flight procedures,\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Developing systems to help controllers better manage air traffic, and\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Providing critical technologies and infrastructure for NextGen.\n\nAs shown in the following table, FAA has several NextGen initiatives and programs\nunder way that are expected to deliver benefits to the NAS.\n\nTable. Examples of Key NextGen-Related Initiatives and Programs\n\n Initiative/Program Expected Benefits\nMetroplex Airspace Improve the efficiency of airspace that affects multiple airports near\n large metropolitan areas.\nAirport Surface Operations Improve the management of airport taxiways, gates, and parking\n areas.\nData Communications Provide 2-way data communication between controllers and flight\n(DataComm) crews for improved cruise and transition operations to enable more\n efficient use of available or forecast capacity in the NAS.\nERAM Replace and significantly enhance existing software at the 20 FAA\n Centers that manage high-altitude air traffic. ERAM is FAA\xe2\x80\x99s key\n platform for NextGen to process flight data across the NAS.\nAutomatic Dependent Enhance information about aircraft location for pilots and air traffic\nSurveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) controllers using satellite-based surveillance technology.\nSystem Wide Information Provide a more agile exchange of information through a secure,\nManagement (SWIM) NAS-wide information web that will connect FAA systems with other\n agencies and airspace users.\nSource: OIG analysis\n\nIn 2009, FAA asked an RTCA 2 task force to reach consensus on the NextGen operational\nimprovements planned for 2012 to 2018, help develop plans to maximize NextGen\nbenefits, and justify investment in mid-term capabilities. The task force made\n\n2\n Organized in 1935 as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA, Inc., is a private, not-for-profit corporation\n that develops consensus-based recommendations regarding communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic\n management (CNS/ATM) system issues. It functions as a Federal advisory committee.\n\n\n 2\n\x0c32 recommendations and stated that focusing on delivering near-term operational\nbenefits, rather than major infrastructure programs, would help gain industry confidence\nin FAA\xe2\x80\x99s plans and encourage users to invest in NextGen. The task force also\nemphasized the need to assign responsibility, accountability, authority, and funding\nwithin the Agency to accomplish all required non-infrastructure tasks, such as developing\nneeded policies and procedures.\n\nRecently, we reported that FAA is facing challenges with implementing near-term\nNextGen capabilities, which could delay benefits, 3 and that FAA has not yet established\ntotal program costs, schedules, or performance baselines for any of the six NextGen\ntransformational programs, which limits visibility into the total costs and timelines\nrequired to achieve benefits. 4\n\nCHALLENGES REMAIN FOR FAA IMPLEMENTATION OF NEXTGEN\nCAPABILITIES IN THE NEAR TERM AT CONGESTED AIRPORTS\nFAA has made important progress in responding to the task force recommendations to\nimprove air traffic management at congested airports by aligning budgets and plans,\ncompleting airspace and procedure studies at specific airports, and performing design\nwork. However, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s efforts have been delayed in several critical areas, including\nairspace affecting multiple airports near large metropolitan areas, airport surface\noperations, and data communications. In addition, FAA has not fully addressed key\nbarriers to implementing task force recommendations, which could further delay the\ndelivery of much needed benefits at congested airports.\n\nFAA Has Responded to Task Force Recommendations by Aligning Budgets\nand Plans and Performing Study and Design Work at Specific Airports\nWithin 4 months of the RTCA report, FAA issued a plan to implement all\nrecommendations and incorporated its response in its NextGen Implementation Plan, 5 as\nrecommended by the task force. In addition, FAA allocated over $600 million in funding\nfor fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to fund task force-related activities. Further, FAA\nestablished the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC) 6 to address the task force\xe2\x80\x99s\nrecommendation for providing a mechanism for continued industry collaboration.\n\nFAA has made progress in improving airspace around congested airports in major\ncities\xe2\x80\x94one of the task force\xe2\x80\x99s most critical recommendations. The task force and FAA\n\n3\n OIG Report Number AV-2012-167, \xe2\x80\x9cChallenges With Implementing Near-Term NextGen Capabilities at Congested Airports\n Could Delay Benefits,\xe2\x80\x9d August 1, 2012.\n4\n OIG Report Number AV-2012-094, \xe2\x80\x9cStatus of Transformational Programs and Risks to Achieving NextGen Goals,\xe2\x80\x9d April 23,\n 2012.\n5\n FAA\xe2\x80\x99s NextGen Implementation Plan is an annual plan that sets out FAA\xe2\x80\x99s vision for NextGen, now and into the midterm.\n The plan further identifies the goals FAA has set for technology and program deployment and the commitments FAA has\n made in support of that vision.\n6\n The NAC is a Federal advisory committee that will develop recommendations for NextGen priorities with an emphasis on the\n midterm (through 2018). The NAC includes representation from affected user groups, including operators, manufacturers, air\n traffic management, aviation safety, airports, and environmental experts.\n\n\n 3\n\x0cidentified the metroplex initiative as a key area that could provide the most near-term\nbenefits by improving traffic flow and reducing delays at congested airports in 13 major\nmetropolitan areas. 7 Work at each of these 13 sites will consist of study8 and design\nphases 9 that will take about 3 years at each location. FAA has completed initial studies at\n7 of the 13 locations and is performing design work at 6 of these locations. 10 Since we\ntestified last October, FAA developed an operational plan with milestones for this effort\nand began one additional study\xe2\x80\x94the South Florida metroplex.\n\nWork Remains in Areas Critical for Improving NAS Performance\nDespite FAA\xe2\x80\x99s progress, significant work remains on the metroplex initiative as well as\nother critical areas, such as airport surface operations and data communications.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Metroplex Airspace (Improve airspace affecting multiple airports near large\n metropolitan areas). The expected completion date for all metroplex sites is\n 15 months later than previously planned. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s early plans were to complete work at\n all metroplex sites by June 2016; however, the Agency postponed completion to\n September 2017 because it determined the initial schedule was too aggressive. FAA\n also reduced the number of metroplex sites from 21 to 13. 11 For example, a critical\n site with systemwide impacts, such as New York, is not included in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s current\n metroplex effort due to a major ongoing airspace and procedures project. This project\n has been ongoing for several years due to public concerns about the environmental\n impact on the area.\n\n Additionally, industry representatives are concerned that the metroplex effort may not\n deliver all planned or desired benefits because FAA has focused solely on limited\n airspace and procedure improvements, rather than implementing advanced\n procedures, as recommended by the task force. For example, of the 136 solutions\n proposed for the first 7 metroplex sites, only 3 involve more advanced procedures that\n allow aircraft to fly more precise routes and curved approaches to airports. Further,\n FAA has not yet integrated efforts from other related initiatives, such as better\n managing surface operations, into its metroplex initiative. In October 2010, over\n 1 year after the task force report, FAA tasked the NAC to develop recommendations\n on how FAA can better integrate its efforts. FAA expects recommendations from the\n\n7\n Washington, DC; North Texas (Dallas); Charlotte; Atlanta; Northern California; Houston; Southern California; Chicago; South\n Florida; Boston; Cleveland/Detroit; Memphis; Phoenix.\n8\n Study teams are the first step in the metroplex process to provide a front-end strategic look at each major metroplex. These\n teams analyze the operational challenges, assess current/planed airspace and procedures efforts, explore new solution\n opportunities, and issue a study report with recommended procedure and airspace solutions.\n9\n Design and implementation teams are responsible for executing the design, evaluation, and implementation portions at each\n metroplex site.\n10\n The seven locations are Washington, DC; North Texas (Dallas); Charlotte; Northern California; Houston, Atlanta, and\n Southern California. Design work has begun at Washington, DC; North Texas; Charlotte; Houston; Atlanta; and Northern\n California.\n11\n FAA reduced the number of metroplex projects from 21 to 13 by combining some and dropping others because of other\n ongoing airspace and performance-based navigation initiatives. The sites dropped were: New York/Philadelphia, Minneapolis-\n St. Paul, Seattle, and Las Vegas Valley.\n\n\n 4\n\x0c NAC in September 2012 on the committee\xe2\x80\x99s recently completed work to map\n NextGen capabilities to specific metroplex sites.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Airport Surface Operations (Improve management of airport taxiways, gates, and\n parking areas). FAA did not designate an office director with responsibility for\n implementing surface initiatives until March 2011\xe2\x80\x9418 months after the task force\n recommended it as a high priority. Currently, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing surface management\n projects span multiple air traffic organizations without a coordinated plan.\n Representatives in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s surface operations office are working to coordinate their\n efforts within the air traffic organizations responsible for these projects, but it is not\n yet clear how or if they will integrate their efforts with the metroplex initiative.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Data Communications (DataComm) (Enable more efficient use of available or\n forecast capacity). Due to delays in modernizing automation that controllers use to\n manage high-altitude air traffic, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s timeline for developing this capability slipped\n by 2 years, from 2016 to 2018. Industry representatives stated that they need\n assurance that FAA\xe2\x80\x99s revised implementation date for high altitude traffic\n management is attainable. They view DataComm as the key building block for\n improved communications needed to shift to NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s concept of more precisely\n managing aircraft from departure to arrival, with the benefits of reduced fuel\n consumption, lower operating costs, and reduced emissions.\n\nFor recommendations related to runway access and high-altitude cruise, FAA is not\nplanning to follow the timelines and locations recommended by the task force, because\nthe Agency determined it needed to perform its own cost-benefit analysis before\naccepting the recommendations.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Runway Access (Improve the use of converging or closely spaced runways during\n low visibility conditions). Making better use of existing runways, as RTCA\n recommended, requires updated safety studies for new, complex runway\n configurations\xe2\x80\x94such as closely spaced parallel runways 12 and converging or\n intersecting runways\xe2\x80\x94at several busy airports. While the Agency adopted the task\n force\xe2\x80\x99s recommended dates and locations for closely spaced parallel runway projects,\n it has not defined locations and dates for implementing other key recommendations,\n such as a precision surveillance system for runways and a new automated tool to\n maximize benefits of routes. FAA stated this is due to the need to perform cost-\n benefit analysis and further safety studies.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 High-Altitude Cruise (Improve high-altitude flight by better using available\n airspace to increase capacity and reduce delays). The task force recommended that\n FAA take action in 2011 to expand the use of an existing high-altitude automated\n controller tool for managing aircraft. Instead, FAA focused its actions on\n\n12\n Closely spaced parallel runways are those in which the centerlines are separated by less than 4,300 feet.\n\n\n 5\n\x0c implementing a longer-term solution called Time-Based Flow Management. 13 FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\n target implementation date for this system is November 2014, about 3 years beyond\n the timeframes recommended by the task force.\n\nGiven these delays, task force representatives remain concerned with the Agency\xe2\x80\x99s\noverall timelines for NextGen. For example, the task force stated that if some DataComm\ncapabilities are delayed to 2018, as FAA has currently proposed, airspace users will need\nto revisit their business cases and commitment to advance NextGen. Task force industry\nrepresentatives have also emphasized the need for FAA to shift from planning to\nimplementation, as meeting implementation milestones will be critical to securing\noperator investment.\n\nFAA Has Not Fully Resolved Key Organizational, Policy, and Training\nBarriers To Implementing Task Force Recommendations\nFAA has not yet resolved many of the barriers that will impede the implementation of the\ntask force recommendations. These barriers include working across diverse Agency lines\nof business, streamlining the process for implementing new flight procedures, updating\npolicies, and training controllers on new advanced procedures. While FAA has plans to\naddress these barriers, progress has been slow, and none of these initiatives have been\nfully implemented.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Working across diverse lines of business. To complete the task force\xe2\x80\x99s\n recommendations, FAA will have to coordinate with various organizations within the\n Agency\xe2\x80\x94including its Aircraft Certification Service, Flight Standards Service, and\n Air Traffic Organization (ATO). Such coordination has been a challenge for FAA in\n the past. For example, as we testified in July 2009, organizational barriers and\n fragmented efforts hindered FAA\xe2\x80\x99s process for approving new flight procedures. 14 To\n address these concerns and other NextGen-related problems that we have reported, in\n September 2011, FAA began making significant organizational changes in how it\n manages NextGen. However, given the scope of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s effort, the Agency needs a\n reasonable amount of time before it can fully implement these organizational changes\n and ensure it achieves the desired outcome of working effectively across different\n lines of business.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Implementing new flight procedures. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s process for developing and\n implementing new flight procedures is time-consuming and fragmented. In September\n 2010, 15 FAA reported that it planned to implement 21 recommendations made by\n 6 internal work groups for streamlining its process to develop and deploy these\n procedures. However, FAA has yet to implement the majority of the\n\n13\n Time Based Flow Management enhances system efficiency and improves the traffic flow by leveraging the capabilities of\n controller decision support tools designed to optimize the flow of aircraft into capacity constrained areas.\n14\n OIG Testimony Number CC-2009-086, \xe2\x80\x9cChallenges in Implementing Performance-Based Navigation in the U.S. Air\n Transportation System,\xe2\x80\x9d July 29, 2009.\n15\n FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Navigation Procedures (NAV Lean) Instrument Flight Procedures Final Report, September 2010.\n\n\n 6\n\x0c recommendations and estimates it may take as long as 4 years to implement all of\n them. FAA has recently begun to determine flight procedure utilization rates and\n examine causes for a lack or drop in usage for advanced performance-based flight\n procedures\xe2\x80\x94an issue we raised in December 2010. 16 We recently initiated an audit to\n update our prior work on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of new flight procedures and the\n Agency\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to streamline the process. 17 We will continue to monitor the\n Agency\xe2\x80\x99s progress in this critical area.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Updating key policies. The task force encouraged FAA to continue to develop a\n \xe2\x80\x9cbest-equipped, best-served policy\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x94that is, prioritize air traffic control services for\n those users equipped with new systems\xe2\x80\x94and revamp information sharing systems to\n better manage airport surfaces. FAA recognizes the importance of these issues and\n continues to work with industry to reach consensus on strategies concerning equipage\n for NextGen and to identify processes and standards for data sharing. However, FAA\n does not yet have a clear plan for transitioning to the new policies.\n\n Additionally, many air traffic control policies and procedures have not been updated\n to incorporate the increased capabilities of satellite-based technologies. For example,\n FAA has not updated the controller handbook to provide guidance on phraseology,\n separation, and other requirements to safely manage performance-based operations in\n a mixed equipage environment.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Training controllers on new advanced procedures. While FAA has begun training\n controllers on NextGen initiatives, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s training on existing and emerging advanced\n procedures has been limited. National Air Traffic Controllers Association officials\n stated that training on new performance-based flight procedures should be timely and\n include simulator training to be effective. Yet, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s recent NextGen-related training\n often consisted solely of high-level briefings. Without comprehensive training and\n familiarity with the new instrument flight procedures, controllers are reluctant to\n allow pilots to use these procedures\xe2\x80\x94especially in a mixed equipage environment,\n where many aircraft are not equipped or approved to use the new procedures.\n\nIf FAA does not resolve these issues, its metroplex effort and implementation of other\nrecommendations will likely face delays, and benefits may not be realized within\nrecommended timeframes. In an August 2012 report, we made recommendations to\nimprove FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to effectively implement the task force\xe2\x80\x99s recommendations and\nresolve barriers in a timely manner. 18 FAA agreed to integrate other NextGen capabilities\ninto its metroplex initiative when they mature, streamline its metroplex process where\n\n\n16\n OIG Report Number AV-2011-025, \xe2\x80\x9cFAA Needs To Implement More Efficient Performance-Based Navigation Procedures\n and Clarify the Role of Third Parties,\xe2\x80\x9d December 10, 2010.\n17\n OIG Audit Announcement Number 12A3007A000, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit Initiated of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Efforts to Streamline its Processes for\n Implementing New Performance-Based Flight Procedures,\xe2\x80\x9d May 09, 2012.\n18\n OIG Report Number AV-2012-167, \xe2\x80\x9cChallenges With Implementing Near-Term NextGen Capabilities at Congested Airports\n Could Delay Benefits,\xe2\x80\x9d August 1, 2012.\n\n\n 7\n\x0cpossible, and report barriers identified at each metroplex site to appropriate offices for\nresolution.\n\nUNRESOLVED PROBLEMS WITH ERAM CONTINUE TO IMPACT THE\nCOST AND PACE OF NEXTGEN\nCentral to realizing benefits from FAA\xe2\x80\x99s NextGen efforts is the successful\nimplementation of ERAM\xe2\x80\x94a multibillion dollar enabling program for processing flight\ndata. However, extensive software-related problems have significantly delayed ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s\nnationwide implementation, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in increased\ncosts. While FAA is making progress in using ERAM to manage air traffic at several\nlocations, it has not fully resolved critical software-related issues that impact the system\xe2\x80\x99s\nability to separate and control aircraft. These problems raise significant concerns about\nthe Agency\xe2\x80\x99s program management and contract oversight. Prolonged problems with\nERAM also pose risks to other NextGen initiatives.\n\nERAM Software-Related Problems Have Caused Cost Overruns and\nSchedule Delays\nERAM is up and running at nine sites\xe2\x80\x94full-time at five sites 19\xe2\x80\x94a significant step\nforward since testing at the two key initial sites in Salt Lake City and Seattle revealed\nextensive software problems with the system\xe2\x80\x99s core capabilities to safely manage aircraft.\nRecent progress at the two initial sites has also allowed FAA to decommission legacy\nsystems at these locations. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s progress with ERAM is largely due to a sustained\ncommitment by senior leadership to resolve problems, improve risk mitigation, and work\nclosely with controllers. However, the facilities using ERAM continue to identify\nsoftware problems, such as errors that display flight data to the wrong aircraft and aircraft\nhandoff problems among facilities, which distract controllers from their primary task of\nsafely managing aircraft. As a result, FAA is currently spending about $24 million a\nmonth in deploying ERAM, integrating other systems, and fixing identified problems. In\nJune 2011, FAA rebaselined ERAM, estimating that the cost to complete the program\nwould increase by an additional $330 million. FAA now believes that it can deploy\nERAM at the remaining 11 sites by the end of fiscal year 2013, completing deployment\nand declaring the system operationally ready nationwide by 2014\xe2\x80\x94a delay of nearly\n4 years from the original schedule of December 2010. However, our work and a study by\nthe MITRE Corporation show that if problems persist, cost increases could exceed\n$500 million and further delay implementation.\n\nInput from controllers and technicians at the nine sites currently using ERAM, along with\nthe national user work group, have identified and reported in excess of 900 new\nhigh-priority software issues that need to be addressed. Until FAA is able to assess these\nnew issues and determine the nature and extent of corrective actions needed, the impact\nto the ERAM cost and schedule is unknown. Moreover, in the fall of 2012, FAA will\n\n19\n The five sites are Albuquerque, Denver, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and Seattle.\n\n\n 8\n\x0cresume deployment of the remaining sites, such as New York and Boston\xe2\x80\x94several of\nwhich are even more complex than any of the previous locations. The addition of all the\nremaining sites will likely result in the identification of new problems, which raises the\nrisk that program costs will grow.\n\nIn March 2012, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Joint Resources Council (JRC) 20 approved funds for ERAM\nsoftware release 4 that will add additional NextGen capabilities and address software\nproblems. This new ERAM software package is projected to cost in excess of\n$400 million in capital costs alone and will include work that will extend past fiscal year\n2016. However, FAA documentation shows that a portion of those funds\xe2\x80\x94in addition to\nthe $330 million already added to the program baseline\xe2\x80\x94will be used to address ERAM\nmaintenance problems and other software changes.\n\nProblems With ERAM Exposed Fundamental Weaknesses in Program\nManagement and Contract Oversight\nOur ongoing work shows that initial problems with ERAM were directly traceable to\nweaknesses in program management and contract oversight. During ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s planning\nand deployment stages, FAA did not establish program management controls that would\nput FAA in a position to address significant problems as they occurred. For example:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 FAA and its contractor significantly underestimated the complexity in fielding\n ERAM. They were overly optimistic that ERAM could be fielded to all 20 sites\n within 1 year, and did not consider the impact of early problems during initial site\n deployment.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Software testing at FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Technical Center was too limited to allow FAA to fully\n understand the maturity and stability of the software prior to deployment. As a result,\n the software was released to the key sites with significant defects.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 FAA did not implement required program management tools to ensure ERAM would\n achieve performance and schedule goals. First, the program office did not review the\n ERAM budget when major increases in contract value occurred (those over\n $100 million). FAA will now conduct detailed budget reviews for all major contract\n modifications. Second, FAA did not correctly implement earned value management\n (EVM), which OMB and FAA require for all major information technology\n investments. EVM is a management tool intended to forecast performance trends and\n help managers identify cost and schedule problems early on. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s EVM\n measurement baseline was based on the contract\xe2\x80\x99s structure, rather than the overall\n program structure and milestones, as required by EVM standards. As a result, the\n EVM system did not detect significant schedule and cost variances, which began to\n occur when the program experienced software problems at the initial key test site.\n Third, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s risk management process did not begin to detect and mitigate\n\n20\n The JRC is an FAA executive governance board responsible for the approval and oversight of major systems acquisitions.\n\n\n 9\n\x0c significant risks, such as not achieving deployment milestones for ERAM at key sites\n due to core functionality software issues, until almost 2 years after software problems\n surfaced at a key test site. Recently, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s new program manager significantly\n improved ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s risk management process by providing a more accurate portrayal\n of active ERAM risks.\n\nIn addition to lacking critical program management controls, FAA did not structure or\nadminister its ERAM contract to effectively manage costs and achieve desired outcomes.\nFor example:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 FAA did not fully adopt best practices for major information technology acquisitions\n when designing ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s contract structure. Specifically, FAA did not fully apply\n modular contracting concepts, which call for dividing a large contract into\n manageable contract segments delivered in shorter increments. Instead, FAA designed\n larger contract segments that could span several years, an approach that does not offer\n as much flexibility. In May 2012, in response to our draft audit report on ERAM,\n FAA modified the ERAM contract to implement a more modular structure for\n contract segments related to software development. However, other line items in the\n contract could also benefit from a modular approach.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 ERAM\xe2\x80\x99s cost incentive fee did not motivate the contractor to stay below predefined\n cost targets because FAA simply increased the target costs as requirements grew. At\n the time of our review, FAA paid the contractor over $150 million in cost incentives\n for meeting target costs even though ERAM costs exceeded the budget by at least\n $330 million. In May 2012, FAA modified the ERAM contract to revise its incentive\n fee structure related to new ERAM software releases. A significant portion of the cost\n incentive is now being allocated to five performance targets for new software\n releases.\n\nProlonged Problems With ERAM Pose Risks to NextGen Initiatives\nERAM\xe2\x80\x99s implementation is central to realizing the key benefits of several other\nprograms, such as new satellite-based surveillance systems and data communications for\ncontrollers and pilots. Continued problems with ERAM have already had implications for\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s NextGen transformational programs, such as DataComm and ADS-B. FAA plans\nto allocate almost $500 million to integrate and align these systems with ERAM. In\naddition to the transformational programs, delays with ERAM will impact other NextGen\nefforts, including the following:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Implementing FAA\xe2\x80\x99s new performance-based navigation routes and procedures that\n allow aircraft to fly more flexible routes, based on aircraft avionics and satellite-based\n navigation. New performance-based navigation routes are an important stepping stone\n for near-term NextGen initiatives and boosting capacity at already congested airports.\n\n\n\n 10\n\x0c New automated systems for controllers, such as ERAM, are key to maximizing the\n benefits of new routes.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Managing aircraft strategically through all phases of flight through trajectory-based\n operations. This capability is expected to predict the path of each aircraft in time and\n space and thereby facilitate the transition from today\xe2\x80\x99s ground-based radar to more\n accurate satellite-based systems and reduce fuel consumption by the airlines and\n aircraft emissions. Progress with ERAM is important because this new way of\n managing traffic will require many other systems to use flight information from\n ERAM.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Introducing new capabilities at facilities that manage high-altitude traffic, such as\n flexible and dynamic airspace that will allow controllers to shift airspace segments to\n other controllers based on weather and traffic pattern changes. However, FAA must\n fix core capabilities for managing aircraft before the new capabilities can be\n implemented.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Combining both terminal and en route operations into a common automation system.\n Currently, FAA operates and maintains diverse automation systems with unique\n displays, software, and hardware. FAA believes that a common automation platform\n will reduce costs, improve air traffic and airspace management, and allow the Agency\n to consolidate and realign its facilities. Problems with ERAM contribute significantly\n to FAA\xe2\x80\x99s inability to determine when it can begin to develop and transition to a\n common automation platform.\n\nSchedule delays and corresponding cost growth with ERAM have forced FAA to\nreprogram funds from other FAA capital programs. According to Agency officials\nresponsible for capital planning and budgeting, FAA thus far has reallocated funds from\ndevelopment efforts for NextGen capabilities and procedures, tower replacement,\nelectrical power systems for air traffic control facilities, and planned technical\nimprovements to communications and oceanic automation systems. Continuing cost\ngrowth with ERAM, especially in the current budget environment, will crowd out other\ncapital programs.\n\nThroughout the course of our work, we communicated our views to FAA officials on\nactions needed to reduce programmatic risk and strengthen contract oversight. In\nresponse, FAA is taking steps to address our concerns. For example, FAA has made\nstrides toward improving the way it tracks ERAM costs by modifying the contract to\nbegin definitizing its implementation efforts. However, achieving NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s goal of\nmore efficient airspace for the future will ultimately depend on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\neffectively manage, within cost and schedule, large-scale acquisitions such as ERAM to\nsupport its NextGen portfolio.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0cCOSTS, SCHEDULES, AND BENEFITS ARE UNCERTAIN FOR\nNEXTGEN\xe2\x80\x99S TRANSFORMATIONAL PROGRAMS\nBetween fiscal years 2013 and 2017, FAA plans to spend $2.4 billion on NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s six\ntransformational programs. While FAA is making some progress implementing these\nprograms, their costs, schedules, and performance remain uncertain because FAA has yet\nto baseline the total programs or develop an integrated master schedule to manage and\ncoordinate NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s implementation. Three programs in particular\xe2\x80\x94ADS-B, SWIM,\nand DataComm\xe2\x80\x94will provide critical technologies and infrastructure for NextGen and\nallow for more efficient data sharing among airspace users, a key NextGen goal.\n\nFAA Has Not Fully Addressed ADS-B Requirements and System Risks\nSuccessful implementation of ADS-B\xe2\x80\x94a satellite-based surveillance technology that\ncombines the use of aircraft avionics and ground-based systems\xe2\x80\x94will require resolving\ncritical issues related to system requirements and security risks. FAA plans to implement\nADS-B in four segments and has approved approximately $2.7 billion through 2020 for\nthe initial three segments to deploy the system\xe2\x80\x99s ground infrastructure, develop baseline\nservices and applications, and expand services in the Gulf of Mexico.\n\nAs of July 2012, FAA has deployed 400 of the planned 730 radio ground stations, and the\nAgency published a final rule mandating airspace users to equip ADS-B avionics by\n2020. However, as we have previously reported, 21 FAA faces a number of challenges to\nrealize the full range of ADS-B benefits. These include (1) finalizing requirements for\ncapabilities to display traffic information in the cockpit, (2) modifying the systems\ncontrollers rely on to manage traffic, (3) addressing broadcast frequency congestion\nconcerns, (4) implementing procedures for separating aircraft, and (5) assessing security\nvulnerabilities. We recently initiated an audit to update our prior work on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nimplementation of ADS-B and will continue to monitor the Agency\xe2\x80\x99s progress in these\ncritical areas. 22\n\nFAA Faces Challenges in Establishing Clear Lines of Accountability for\nManaging and Implementing SWIM\nWhile FAA recently revised its implementation strategy for the SWIM program, key\nchallenges remain in stabilizing requirements and establishing firm timelines. SWIM is\nexpected to form the basis for a secure network that manages and shares information\nmore efficiently among the air traffic systems that will comprise NextGen. Key benefits\nexpected from SWIM are streamlined data communications and real-time information\nthat will improve air traffic management, enhance airspace capacity, reduce flight delays,\n\n\n\n21\n OIG Report Number AV-2011-002, \xe2\x80\x9cFAA Faces Significant Risks in Implementing Automatic Dependent Surveillance-\n Broadcast System and Realizing Benefits,\xe2\x80\x9d October 12, 2010.\n22\n OIG Audit Announcement Number 12A3004A000, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit Initiated of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Automatic Dependent Surveillance \xe2\x80\x93 Broadcast\n (ADS-B) Program,\xe2\x80\x9d May 14, 2012.\n\n\n 12\n\x0cand decrease costs for FAA and aviation users. In June 2011, 23 we reported that FAA had\nyet to establish clear lines of accountability for overseeing SWIM\xe2\x80\x99s development and\nmanagement, making it difficult to implement requirements and control the program\xe2\x80\x99s\ncost and schedule. As a result, FAA increased costs for SWIM\xe2\x80\x99s first segment by more\nthan $100 million (original estimate was $179 million) and delayed its completion by at\nleast 2 years.\n\nSince our 2011 report, FAA has revised its implementation approach, due in part to cost\nand schedule issues with ERAM. FAA now plans to develop and deploy a new system to\nprovide SWIM en route flight plan services without impacting ERAM. Additionally,\nFAA has approved an additional $120 million to support the first phase of the second\nsegment, which will assist FAA in transitioning to a new common infrastructure for\nSWIM air traffic systems. This is a critical first step in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s goal of moving from a\ndecentralized to a centralized process where all NAS data are managed and shared over a\ncommon infrastructure to support NextGen improvements. However, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s previous\nmanagement challenges remain. Without stable and consistent requirements and clearly\ndefined program priorities, the true cost and timeline to deploy SWIM and the realization\nof expected benefits will continue to be unknown.\n\nFAA Faces Industry Concerns With DataComm Plans\nDeveloping and implementing DataComm will be a complex, high-risk effort, and\nindustry officials have expressed skepticism about FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to deliver the program.\nDataComm will provide two-way data communications between controllers and pilots,\nsimilar to wireless e-mail. Like ADS-B, FAA faces challenges with integrating\nDataComm with multiple FAA automation systems. Total acquisition costs for\nDataComm are uncertain, but FAA estimates that they could be as much as $3 billion.\n\nFAA plans to implement DataComm in two segments. In May 2012, the Agency\napproved approximately $741.5 million through 2019 for the first phase of segment one\nto implement departure clearance services in the tower environment. However, this phase\nrelies on using a data link capability that already exists, which the Agency acknowledges\nprovides limited benefits. The majority of NextGen benefits from DataComm will\nemerge from the second phase of segment one, which will support the development of en\nroute services. However, FAA has already delayed plans to deploy DataComm\xe2\x80\x99s en route\ncapabilities from 2016 to 2018, and the Agency has yet to schedule a final investment\ndecision for this phase to approve the effort\xe2\x80\x99s cost and schedule.\n\nUntil FAA makes a final investment decision on when the majority of the benefits for the\nen route services (e.g., routine data communications) will be provided, users are likely to\nremain skeptical and reluctant to equip\xe2\x80\x94especially since the Agency abandoned a similar\n\n\n23\n OIG Report Number AV-2011-131, \xe2\x80\x9cFAA\xe2\x80\x99s Approach to SWIM Has Led to Cost and Schedule Uncertainty and No Clear Path\n for Achieving NextGen Goals,\xe2\x80\x9d June 15, 2011.\n\n\n 13\n\x0ccommunications program 24 in 2005 due to concerns about cost growth and schedule\ndelays. These concerns resulted from unplanned, additional integration requirements that\nposed a risk to the program as well as concerns over how quickly airlines would equip\nwith the avionics. 25\n\nFAA Lacks an Integrated Master Schedule To Manage NextGen\nDividing larger programs into smaller more manageable segments\xe2\x80\x94as FAA has done for\nADS-B, SWIM, and DataComm\xe2\x80\x94can reduce some risks in the short-term. However, this\napproach also obscures visibility into the true total timelines and costs of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s overall\nNextGen efforts. As requirements continue to evolve, programs are left with no clear\nend-state, and decisionmakers lack sufficient information to assess progress. Moreover,\ndelays with one program can significantly slow another, since the programs have\ncomplex interdependencies with FAA\xe2\x80\x99s existing automation and communications\nsystems.\n\nIn an April 2012 report, we recommended that FAA establish firm costs and schedules\nand an integrated master schedule to manage the implementation of all NextGen\nprograms. 26 Since our report, FAA has begun developing an integrated schedule and\npopulating it with some of the transformational programs\xe2\x80\x99 planned capabilities. However,\nthe Agency continues to identify the additional type of data required, such as key system\ndependencies, to fully populate the schedule. Without a complete master schedule, FAA\nwill continue to be challenged to fully mitigate operational, technical, and programmatic\nrisks, and prioritize trade-offs among its NextGen programs.\n\nCONCLUSION\nWhile FAA has demonstrated its commitment to improve the management of NextGen\nand its major acquisitions, the Agency continues to face significant challenges and risks\nwith developing and implementing NextGen initiatives and delivering the benefits\nenvisioned by the RTCA task force. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to reorganize to better manage\nNextGen are in the early stages, and must be done in concert with effectively improving\nairspace efficiency at congested airports, resolving problems with ERAM, and addressing\nuncertainty with the NextGen transformational programs. These challenges are\nsignificant and will require sustained management attention and action to safeguard\ntaxpayers\xe2\x80\x99 investment while improving NAS efficiency and safety. We will continue to\nmonitor the results of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s organizational changes and efforts to improve the\nmanagement of NextGen.\n\n\n24\n Controller-Pilot Data Link is a method by which air traffic controllers can communicate with pilots over a datalink system,\n similar to wireless email.\n25\n OIG Report Number AV-2004-101, \xe2\x80\x9cObservations on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications Program,\xe2\x80\x9d\n September 30, 2004.\n26\n OIG Report Number AV-2012-094, \xe2\x80\x9cStatus of Transformational Programs and Risks to Achieving NextGen Goals,\xe2\x80\x9d April 23,\n 2012.\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0c'