type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 707 A.2d 829 (1998)
 349 Md. 190
 HOLIDAY POINT MARINA PARTNERS
 v.
 ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, Maryland et al.
 No. 4, Sept. Term, 1996.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 3, 1998.
 *831 Charles R. Schaller (Marian C. Hwang, Thomas E. Lynch, III, Miles & Stockbridge, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
 Patricia A. Logan, Senior Asst. County Atty. (Phillip F. Scheibe, County Atty., Anne Arundel County Office of Law), for respondent.
 Thomas J. Wohlgemuth, of Annapolis, argued on behalf of Selby Community Assoc., respondent.
 Argued before MURPHY,[*] C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI[*] BELL and RAKER, JJ.
 *830 ELDRIDGE, Judge.
 The issue in this case concerns Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code. Section 5-108 is a zoning ordinance applicable to the location of marina facilities along the shoreline of rivers, the Chesapeake Bay, and other waters of Anne Arundel County. Subsection (e) of the ordinance imposes minimum distance restrictions between the situs of marina facilities and shellfish beds. The issue presented by the petitioner is whether an ordinance limiting the number of boat slips and the situs of marine facilities, for the purpose of protecting shellfish beds which lie beneath the tidal waters of the State, is within the zoning authority of Anne Arundel County. The issue presented by one of the respondents is whether the petitioner pursued the appropriate action.
 I.
 The facts in this case are not in dispute, although its procedural history is somewhat unusual. The case arises from the pursuit by Holiday Point Marina Partners of the required permits to enable it to extend its existing piers to create approximately 100 additional boat slips, resulting in more than 260 boat slips in all. The marina fronts Selby Bay in Anne Arundel County, is spread over 18 acres of fast land, and is zoned MB-1 and MC-1, permitting the operation of a commercial marina. Holiday Point successfully obtained approvals and permits to construct the proposed expansion of its facilities from the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, the Maryland Department of the Environment, and the Maryland Board of Public Works. Holiday Point then applied to Anne Arundel County for a building permit. The expansion, however, violated § 5-108(e) of the Anne Arundel County Code unless a zoning variance was obtained.[1] The County informed Holiday Point that, prior to the issuance of a building permit, a variance was required because the proposed slips were closer than one-half mile to an oyster bed.
 Holiday Point applied for and was denied a variance by the Zoning Hearing Officer. A timely appeal to the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals was then filed. Prior to the decision of the Board of Appeals, however, Holiday Point, on January 11, 1994, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against the County in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, requesting a declaratory judgment that § 5-108(e) was invalid.
 Thus, in early 1994, Holiday Point was pursuing both a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court and an administrative appeal before the Board of Appeals. In March 1994, the Selby Community Association, *832 Inc., filed a motion to intervene in the circuit court declaratory judgment action; the motion was opposed by the County and Holiday Point. The circuit court denied the motion to intervene, and the Community Association appealed that denial to the Court of Special Appeals. While this appeal was pending, the parties to the declaratory judgment action consented to the intervention of the Community Association, and the Community Association voluntarily dismissed its appeal.
 Throughout the Spring and Fall of 1994 Holiday Point also actively pursued its administrative appeal of the Hearing Officer's denial of the variance. Holiday Point argued before the Board of Appeals that the variance should be granted because the oyster bed was not viable. Holiday Point also attacked the validity of § 5-108(e), arguing before the Board of Appeals that the County did not have the power to enact such an ordinance. On January 4, 1995, the Board of Appeals affirmed the denial of the variance. The Board found that the oyster bed was viable, but the Board refused to consider Holiday Point's challenge to the validity of § 5-108(e), stating that
 "[t]he Board does not believe that this is an issue that is appropriate for it to consider. This Board looks to the county code and attempts to apply the code provisions when it decides cases: if the code provisions are for some reason inapplicable, it is for a body other that this Board to make that determination."
 Holiday Point immediately filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County an action for judicial review of the Board of Appeals' decision. The judicial review action was not consolidated in any manner with the declaratory judgment action.
 Meanwhile, the parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment case, and a hearing was held on January 11, 1995. Holiday Point argued that the County did not have the authority, under Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5, to enact § 5-108(e). Holiday Point maintained that (1) the authority to regulate oyster beds was not expressly delegated to the County, (2) regulation of oyster beds was outside of the traditional area of zoning concerns, (3) the County had no authority to regulate the land beneath the waters of the State, and (4) § 5-108(e) must yield to state and federal law under the doctrine of preemption.
 In response, the County asserted that (1) express delegation by the State to local subdivisions to regulate oyster beds is not the proper standard to determine the validity of a local zoning ordinance, (2) environmental protection is a valid basis for the exercise of local zoning authority, (3) the County had authority to regulate the land beneath the waters of the State under the principles set forth in Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738 (1979), and (4) Holiday Point failed to identify any specific legislation or pervasive statutory scheme that preempted § 5-108(e).
 Additionally, the Community Association contended that no declaratory judgment should be rendered because the administrative and judicial review remedies had not been exhausted. The Community Association noted that, at the time of the filing of the declaratory judgment complaint and the cross motions for summary judgment, the Board of Appeals had not issued its decision. At the time of the hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment, however, the Board of Appeals had decided that Holiday Point was not entitled to a variance. Nevertheless, the Community Association argued that Holiday Point should not be permitted to pursue the case on two different tracks. The Community Association asserted that the issue should be resolved in the judicial review action and that a declaratory judgment cause of action did not lie.
 On January 20, 1995, the circuit court granted the County's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Holiday Point's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court filed a declaratory judgment declaring as follows: (1) exhaustion of the administrative and judicial review remedy was not required because Holiday Point directly attacked the authority of the County to adopt § 5-108(e); (2) the "general grant of authority" in Art. 25A, § 5, "is broad enough to encompass the exercise by the County of [this] zoning authority;" *833 and (3) § 5-108(e) was not preempted because it neither conflicted with state and federal legislation nor was there evidence of a comprehensive legislative scheme implying an intent to preempt. The circuit court made no rulings in the pending judicial review action.
 Holiday Point appealed the declaratory judgment, and the Court of Special Appeals, in November 1995, affirmed, holding that (1) the County was empowered to enact zoning laws for the purpose of protecting the environment, and (2) § 5-108(e) was not preempted by federal or state law. Holiday Point v. Anne Arundel Cty., 107 Md.App. 160, 666 A.2d 1332 (1995). At the time of the Court of Special Appeals' decision Holiday Point's action for judicial review of the zoning variance denial was still pending in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The judicial review action was "withdrawn" by Holiday Point on December 11, 1995.
 Holiday Point filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decisions below in the declaratory judgment action, and this Court granted the petition. Holiday Point v. Anne Arundel County, 341 Md. 719, 672 A.2d 659 (1996). Holiday Point presents the following two issues:
 "I. Whether Anne Arundel County exceeded its authority under the Maryland Express Powers Act by enacting Article 28, § 5-108(e) of the Anne Arundel county Code, which prohibits the location of marinas in state tidal wetlands in proximity to shellfish beds on purported concerns for water quality, shellfish and consumers of shellfish?
 "II. Whether the general public laws and regulations of Maryland that protect water quality, shellfish and consumers of shellfish, and govern the location and construction of marinas in state wetlands preempt Article 28, § 5-108(e) of the Anne Arundel County Code?"
 The Community Association presents the additional question of whether the declaratory judgment action should be dismissed because of Holiday Point's failure to exhaust the administrative and judicial review remedies. We shall first address the issue raised by the Community Association.
 II.
 Anne Arundel County is a charter county and, therefore, is subject to the Express Powers Act, Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 25A. That statute, in §§ 5(U) and 5(X), provides the zoning authority for all charter counties except Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.[2] Art. 25A, § 5(U), authorizes a charter county to establish a Board of Appeals and provides that such Board of Appeals have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia, a variety of adjudicatory zoning matters.[3]See United Parcel *834 v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 587-590, 650 A.2d 226, 235-237 (1994), and cases there discussed. Section 5(U) further provides for judicial review of the Board of Appeals' decisions.
 Holiday Point did invoke the administrative procedures mandated by Art. 25A, § 5(U). Although the administrative and judicial review proceeding is not directly before us, it is important to point out that the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals clearly erred in holding that it would not consider Holiday Point's challenge to the validity of § 5-108(e). This Court has consistently held over the past fifty years that the question of a zoning ordinance's validity, as applied to the property involved, is an appropriate issue for an administrative zoning agency. We have held that, if a restriction under a zoning ordinance cannot constitutionally or validly be applied, this is a proper ground for the administrative zoning agency to grant an exception or a variance. See, e.g., Md. Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476, 491-492, 677 A.2d 567, 575 (1996) ("under Maryland law, the Harford County Board of Appeals would be authorized and required to consider any of the constitutional and other issues raised by Maryland Reclamation to the extent that those issues would be pertinent in the particular proceeding before the Board"); Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 617-624, 664 A.2d 862, 873-876 (1995) ("The modern cases make it clear that the constitutionality of a statute as a whole can be initially decided in the administrative proceedings"); Arnold v. Prince George's Co., 270 Md. 285, 294-299, 311 A.2d 223, 227-231 (1973) (requiring a property owner, asserting that a zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to his property, to exhaust his administrative remedy); Hartman v. Prince George's Co., 264 Md. 320, 323-325, 286 A.2d 88, 89-90 (1972) (reviewing numerous cases holding that constitutional arguments must be made in the statutorily prescribed administrative proceedings); Gingell v. County Commissioners, 249 Md. 374, 376, 239 A.2d 903, 904 (1968) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that she need not exhaust her administrative remedy on the theory that only a court may declare the statute unconstitutional); Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 307-308, 216 A.2d 707, 709 (1966) (finding that "[i]t is particularly within the expertise of an administrative body such as the Board to marshal and sift the evidence presented in a hearing upon an application for a special exception and to make an administrative finding as to whether ... the application of the ordinance to the property involved deprives the owner of any reasonable use of it"); Baltimore v. Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 207, 123 A.2d 207, 210 (1956) (zoning appeals board was authorized to grant "`"exceptions"... by holding the [zoning] ordinance pro tanto invalid'"); Hoffman v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 294, 305-306, 79 A.2d 367, 372 (1951) ("Application for an `exception' is an appropriate way to raise" the issue of whether a zoning ordinance is invalid).
 Consequently, the Board of Appeals should have ruled on Holiday Point's challenge to the validity of § 5-108(e). Furthermore, since the Board of Appeals erroneously failed to rule on this issue, Holiday Point, in its judicial review action, could have obtained a reversal of the Board of Appeals' decision because of that error.
 Holiday Point, however, withdrew its judicial review action and sought a final ruling on the validity of § 5-108(e) in the declaratory judgment action. The Community Association insists that Holiday Point erred by pursuing the wrong action in the circuit court. We agree.
 This Court has consistently held that, where there exists a remedy before a charter county's board of appeals under Art. 25A, § 5(U), an aggrieved party must invoke and exhaust the administrative and judicial review remedy provided by § 5(U). Md. Reclamation *835 v. Harford Cty., supra, 342 Md. at 494, 677 A.2d at 576; United Parcel v. People's Counsel, supra, 336 Md. at 588-589, 650 A.2d at 236; Hope v. Baltimore County, 288 Md. 656, 657-658, 421 A.2d 576, 577 (1980); Klein v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 285 Md. 76, 83, 400 A.2d 768, 772 (1979). This requirement is based on the plain language of Art. 25A, § 5(U), which states that "[t]he review proceedings provided by this subsection shall be exclusive."
 Holiday Point, however, invokes an asserted exception to the requirement that the administrative and judicial review remedies under § 5(U) must be invoked and exhausted. Relying on this Court's decision in Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., supra, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738, Holiday Point contends that, because it requested the court to declare the County's enactment of 5-108(e) invalid, it was not required to exhaust the administrative and judicial review procedures under Art. 25A, § 5(U).
 In cases where an administrative agency has primary jurisdiction, we have recognized a limited "constitutional" or "validity" exception to the normal requirement that administrative and judicial review remedies be invoked and exhausted. See Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, supra, 339 Md. at 620-624, 664 A.2d at 874-876, for a discussion of this narrow exception. The very few cases applying this exception, however, were not ones where the administrative and judicial review remedy was the exclusive remedy.
 The principal case relied upon by Holiday Point and by the circuit court is Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., supra, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738. We held in Harbor Island that, because the plaintiff had mounted a direct attack on the power of the County Commissioners of Calvert County to enact the disputed zoning ordinance, a judicial determination of the validity issue was permissible even though administrative remedies had not been exhausted. This Court stated that, because the constitutional attack was made upon the "validity of a general enactment as a whole," exhaustion was not required. 286 Md. at 308, 407 A.2d at 741.
 Harbor Island, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant case. That case involved Calvert County, a non-charter county which is not subject to the Express Powers Act, Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 25A. Rather, the applicable administrative and judicial review procedures for zoning matters in non-charter counties are set forth in Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 66B, §§ 4.044.08. The relevant sections of Art. 66B do not contain any language that makes the administrative and judicial review remedy exclusive.
 We are aware of only one other zoning or land-use case where this Court applied the so-called "constitutional" or "validity" exception. In Richmark Realty v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A.2d 196 (1961), residents of Baltimore City filed a suit in equity requesting that a Baltimore City zoning ordinance be declared illegal and void and that a building permit issued pursuant to the ordinance be revoked. The defendants raised the issue of exhaustion because the local residents had not availed themselves of the available administrative remedy. Again, Baltimore City is not subject to Art. 25A and the exclusivity language of § 5(U). Instead, the administrative and judicial review zoning procedures applicable to Baltimore City are contained in Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 66B, §§ 2.06-2.09, which do not contain any language of exclusivity.
 The General Assembly in Art. 25A, § 5(U), has expressly stated that the administrative and judicial review remedy applicable to the present case is "exclusive." The effect of such language is to abrogate any alternative legal or equitable remedies that might otherwise have existed. As explained in numerous cases, where the administrative and judicial review procedures are exclusive, neither a declaratory judgment action nor a common law or equitable action will lie. See Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998); Bowman v. Goad, 348 Md. 199, 703 A.2d 144 (1997); Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, supra, 339 Md. at 623, 664 A.2d at 876; Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 529, 597 A.2d 972, 977 (1991); Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462, 480-481, 545 A.2d 1321, 1330 (1988); *836 Nordheimer v. Montgomery County, 307 Md. 85, 96-98, 512 A.2d 379, 384-386 (1986); Potomac Elec. Power v. P.G. County, 298 Md. 185, 189-191, 468 A.2d 325, 327 (1983); Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, 288 Md. 667, 672-673, 421 A.2d 582, 585-586 (1980); White v. Prince George's Co., 282 Md. 641, 649-653, 387 A.2d 260, 265-267 (1978). This is true even though the validity of a statute on its face is being challenged. The so-called "constitutional" or "validity" exception to the requirement that a primary administrative remedy be first invoked and exhausted ordinarily has no application when the administrative and judicial review remedy is exclusive. Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, supra, 339 Md. at 623, 664 A.2d at 876 ("where the only avenue for relief is the statutorily prescribed administrative and judicial review proceedings, a constitutional challenge to a statute, whether on its face or as applied, must be ... litigated in [that] proceeding"); Potomac Elec. Power v. P.G. County, supra, 298 Md. at 189-191, 468 A.2d at 327-328; Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 288 Md. at 674-675, 421 A.2d at 586 ("Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., [supra, and similar] cases were not concerned with a situation where the only relief available is the special administrative and judicial review remedy provided by statute").[4]
 Consequently, the Community Association correctly argued, both before the circuit court and on appeal, that no declaratory judgment action could be maintained in this case.
 III.
 Alternatively, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the Board of Appeals had ruled on the question of § 5-108(e)'s validity and that the circuit court's judgment could be viewed as an affirmance of the administrative decision, Holiday Point would still not be entitled to relief. The circuit court correctly held that the County's zoning power extended to the regulation of the situs of piers and the number of boat slips, and that the local ordinance was not preempted by state law.
 A.
 There is no dispute that the County has the power, derived from Art. 25A, § 5(X), to enact zoning and planning laws. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926); Hope v. Baltimore County, supra, 288 Md. at 665, 421 A.2d at 581; Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 337, 46 A.2d 684, 687 (1946). Furthermore, a county's zoning authority ordinarily encompasses piers and wharves that are attached to the land. People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, 316 Md. 491, 498, 560 A.2d 32, 35 (1989); Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert County, supra, 286 Md. at 317-323, 407 A.2d at 746-749.
 The question raised by Holiday Point, however, is whether Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code, which zones improvements attached to riparian land, is invalid because the ordinance takes into account the health of shellfish beds. The concern is that the shellfish beds in question are on land beneath tidal waters and, therefore, are generally owned by the State. People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, supra, 316 Md. at 502, 560 A.2d at 37; Potomac Sand & Gravel v. Governor, 266 Md. 358, 364, 293 A.2d 241, 244, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040, 93 S. Ct. 525, 34 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1972); Hirsch v. Md. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 288 Md. 95, 98, 416 A.2d 10, 12 (1980); Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 5, 332 A.2d 630, 633 (1975); Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380, 387, 243 A.2d 575, 581 (1968); Green v. Eldridge, 230 Md. 441, 447, 187 A.2d 674, 677 (1963); Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 492, 64 A.2d 547, 549 (1949); Cahill v. Baltimore, 173 Md. 450, *837 455, 196 A. 305, 308 (1938); Adams v. Carey, 172 Md. 173, 182, 190 A. 815, 820 (1937); Hodson v. Nelson, 122 Md. 330, 338, 89 A. 934, 937 (1914). See also State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293, 299, 31 A. 961, 962 (1895) ("oyster beds are the property of the State"). It is well settled that a county is not entirely free to zone State property. People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, supra, 316 Md. at 499, 560 A.2d at 36; City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 222-224, 378 A.2d 1326, 1329-1330 (1977).
 Two cases decided by this Court provide guidance regarding the zoning power of local governments when land under tidal waters is affected. In Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert County, supra, 286 Md. at 316-323, 407 A.2d at 745-749, a commercial marina filed a declaratory judgment action against Calvert County, challenging the County's power to enact ordinances for the purpose of providing orderly development of waterfront areas within the County. The marina asserted that the ordinances' regulation of tidal waters, the lands beneath the waters, and wetlands, was invalid. Judge J. Dudley Digges, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Calvert County had not exceeded its local zoning power. After reviewing numerous prior cases concerning riparian rights and governmental authority over them, the Court reaffirmed that improvements made and attached to riparian land were additions to the land and subject to a county's zoning power. The Court concluded (286 Md. at 322, 407 A.2d at 748):
 "Reverting to a consideration of the present case, what we have before us is a policy decision which has existed for over two centurieswhen improvements are made into the navigable waters by a riparian proprietor, the land utilized in their construction, which prior to completion belonged to the State, for all practical purposes becomes a part of his fast land. Thus, any limitation upon the county's ability to zone which arises because the land in question belongs to the State does not apply to improvements attached to riparian land."
 The Harbor Island opinion went on to note that in the Wetlands Act, Ch. 241 of the Acts of 1970, Code (1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.), § 9-201 of the Natural Resources Article, the General Assembly provided that a riparian owner "`may make improvements into the water in front of the land to preserve that person's access to the navigable water or protect the shore of that person against erosion'" and that such an improvement "`is the property of the owner of the land to which it is attached.'" 286 Md. at 322, 407 A.2d at 748-749. The Court then stated (286 Md. at 323, 407 A.2d. at 749):
 "Therefore, improvements erected pursuant to the grant contained in section 9-201 are extensions of the dry land to the same extent as those built under its predecessors, and are accorded the same protections and are subject to the same restrictions as developed in our prior cases. In the final analysis, we hold that Calvert County has the authority to reasonably regulate through zoning the exercise of the riparian right to wharf out because, under law dating back for more than 200 years, this right, when exercised, is nothing more than an extension of the shore land."
 The scope of a local government's power to zone riparian improvements was further examined in People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, supra, 316 Md. 491, 560 A.2d 32. At issue in Maryland Marine was the determination by the Baltimore County Zoning Commissioner, the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, that the County, through its zoning authority, had the power to permit the construction of "a restaurant on top of piers and pilings over the tidal waters of Frog Mortar Creek." 316 Md. at 494, 560 A.2d at 33. This Court, again relying on the language of the Wetlands Act, § 9-201, stated that a riparian owner's right to construct improvements in the adjacent tidal waters was normally limited to those improvements that provide access to the waters or protect the shore against erosion. The Court also indicated that a County's zoning authority with regard to improvements in tidal waters, and a riparian owner's rights with regard to such improvements, are generally coextensive. The Court said that a "county's power to zone extends only to those improvements which the riparian owner has a right to build *838 into the water bounding its property, because it is only in relation to these improvements that the riparian has the right to the use of the submerged land upon which the improvement is constructed." 316 Md. at 500, 560 A.2d at 36. We took the position that the proposed construction of the restaurant, out in the creek, neither preserved access to the waters nor prevented erosion. Consequently, because the riparian owner did not have the right to construct the restaurant, Baltimore County did not have the power under its zoning authority to permit the construction. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court added an important caveat, saying (316 Md. at 506, 560 A.2d at 39):
 "That construction of the proposed restaurant would not, within the contemplation of § 9-201, constitute an improvement to preserve access to navigable water or to protect the shore against erosion is, of course, equally clear. Thus, even though Baltimore County may have authority to zone permitted riparian improvements, it is not presently empowered to permit construction of the restaurant in this case. Nevertheless, in furtherance of its plan, Maryland Marine may seek to acquire, by purchase or lease from the State Board of Public Works, that part of the State's submerged land upon which the restaurant is planned to be erected. Section 9-201 of the Wetlands Act provides that `[a] right covered in this subtitle does not preclude the [riparian] owner from developing any other use approved by the Board [of Public Works].'"
 The Harbor Island and Maryland Marine opinions clearly support Anne Arundel County's contention that its zoning authority encompasses the extension of Holiday Point's piers for the purpose of creating additional boat slips. We first note that, because the Harbor Island and Maryland Marine opinions indicated that a county's zoning authority over improvements in the State's tidal waters, and a riparian owner's right to construct such improvements, were generally coextensive, any doubts concerning the County's zoning authority in this case might raise similar doubts concerning Holiday Point's right to wharf out. Nevertheless, the construction or extension of piers to create boat slips is obviously for the purpose of access to the water. Under the Harbor Island and Maryland Marine opinions, this is both within an adjacent owner's riparian rights and within a county's zoning authority. Moreover, even if there could be any doubt about the matter, the record shows that Holiday Point has received a license from the Board of Public Works for the extension of its marina facilities. As suggested in Maryland Marine, such license from the Board of Public Works may operate to extend both the rights of riparian landowners and the zoning authority of local governments.
 Furthermore, as long as a zoning ordinance is otherwise within a county's zoning authority, the fact that a purpose of the regulation was to protect shellfish beds does not render the ordinance invalid. Protection of the environment and of natural resources has long been recognized as a valid purpose of local zoning and land use regulations. See, e.g., Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 20, 432 A.2d 1319, 1329 (1981) ("The various purposes of zoning regulations ... are ... `to promote the conservation of natural resources; to prevent environmental pollution ...,'" quoting in part Code (1957, 1978 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 4.03); Annapolis v. Annap. Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 392-393, 396 A.2d 1080, 1085-1086 (1979) (holding that the City could consider the environmental effects of a proposed pier extension to create additional boat slips); Norbeck v. Montgomery County, 254 Md. 59, 63, 254 A.2d 700, 704 (1969) (upholding zoning regulations for the protection of open space and watershed); Ketchel v. Bainbridge Twp., 52 Ohio St. 3d 239, 242-243, 557 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ohio 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S. Ct. 1073, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1991) (holding that conservation of ground water and the maintenance of a pollution-free water supply were proper objects of zoning); 1 Anderson's American Law of Zoning, § 7.33, at 822-824 (4th ed. 1996) ("Conservation of resources is, of course, an objective within" the zoning power. "[Z]oning has been approved where it undertook to prevent water pollution, to protect wetlands or other ecologically sensitive areas, to preserve shoreline ecological values, to preserve agricultural land, to prevent environmental *839 damage due to quarrying, and to preserve energy"). See also Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, §§ 3.02.07, 25.01.01, 31.03.12 (4th ed.1997).
 B.
 Holiday Point alternatively contends that state legislation concerning shellfish, water quality, wetlands, and tidal waters has preempted the County's right to legislate in these areas.
 "Under our decisions, state law may preempt local law in one of three ways: 1) preemption by conflict, 2) express preemption, or 3) implied preemption." Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-488, 620 A.2d 880, 883 (1993) (footnotes omitted). See Allied Vending v. Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 297-298, 631 A.2d 77, 86 (1993); Howard County v. PEPCO, 319 Md. 511, 522, 573 A.2d 821, 827 (1990); Board v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 697, 561 A.2d 219, 226 (1989). In the present case, Holiday point urges both preemption by conflict and implied preemption.
 (1)
 In arguing that Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code conflicts with state law, Holiday Point asserts that, under state law, "a marina with greater than 100 slips need only be separated by 200 feet from a shellfish bed compared to the County's separation standard of 2,640 feet. Accordingly, on its face there is a clear conflict." (Holiday Point's Reply Brief at 15-16).
 Under Maryland law, with regard to asserted conflicts of the type claimed by Holiday Point, the controlling principle is as follows (Talbot County v. Skipper, supra, 329 Md. at 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d at 882-883 n. 4):
 "A local ordinance is pre-empted by conflict when it prohibits an activity which is intended to be permitted by state law, or permits an activity which is intended to be prohibited by state law."
 See Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 380, 635 A.2d 412, 422 (1994); Allied Vending v. Bowie, supra, 332 Md. at 297 n. 12, 631 A.2d at 86 n. 12.
 The principal alleged conflicting "state law" invoked by Holiday Point is neither a statute nor a regulation. Instead, Holiday Point relies on a document published by the Maryland Department of the Environment entitled "Assessment Guidelines For Determining Shellfish Growing Area Classifications In And Around Marinas." In the document, there is a reference to a 1987 letter from the Secretary of the Environment in which the Secretary stated that
 "the minimum restricted areas around a marina are established as:
 11-50 slips: 100 feet
 51-100 slips: 150 feet
 > 100 slips: 200 feet."
 The purpose of the document containing guidelines, as well as the 1987 letter incorporated by reference therein, was clearly not to prescribe the location of marina facilities. Instead, as stated in the "Introduction" to the document, the guidelines relate to "restrictions on shellfish harvesting in and around marinas" because of "sewage discharge from the marina[s]...." Furthermore, the "General Policy Specifications" of the document begin by stating: "This policy defines the restrictions on shellfish harvesting in and around marinas." The document was published pursuant to Code (1974, 1997 Repl.Vol.), § 4-742 of the Natural Resources Article. That entire section, as its heading indicates, relates to restrictions on the taking of shellfish because of possible sources of pollution. It does not deal with restrictions upon the possible sources of the pollution, such as restrictions on the location of marinas.[5]
 *840 Assuming arguendo that the document relied on by Holiday Point can properly be viewed as "state law" for the purpose of the doctrine of preemption by conflict, there is no conflict between Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code and the state document. The local ordinance restricts the location of marina facilities, whereas the state document restricts the harvesting of shellfish. While both may be designed to further the ultimate public policy of protecting consumers from shellfish that may be dangerous to health, the local ordinance and the state document employ wholly different means to further such public policy. They regulate entirely separate and distinct activities.[6] Both courts below correctly held that there was no preemption by conflict.[7]
 (2)
 Finally Holiday Point relies upon the doctrine of implied preemption, or, as it is sometimes called, preemption by occupation. The case-law dealing with this doctrine was recently summarized in Talbot County v. Skipper, supra, 329 Md. at 488-489, 620 A.2d at 883-884, as follows:
 "Generally, state law preempts by implication local law where the local law `deal[s] with an area in which the [State] Legislature has acted with such force that an intent by the State to occupy the entire field must be implied,' County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 59, 333 A.2d 596, 600 (1975). There is no particular formula for determining whether the General Assembly intended to preempt an entire area, Howard County v. Pepco [PEPCO], 319 Md. 511, 523, 573 A.2d 821, 828 (1990), and several factors have been considered in our cases. See, e.g., Board v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 698, 561 A.2d 219, 226-227 (1989); National Asphalt v. Prince Geo's Co., 292 Md. 75, 78-80, 437 A.2d 651, 653-654 (1981); Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v. Mont. Co., 289 Md. 74, 92-93, 422 A.2d 353, 363 (1980); County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, supra, 274 Md. at 60-64, 333 A.2d at 601-603.
 "Nevertheless, we have stated that `"[t]he primary indicia of a legislative purpose to preempt an entire field of law is the comprehensiveness with which the General Assembly has legislated in the field."' Howard County v. Pepco [PEPCO], supra, 319 Md. at 523, 573 A.2d at *841 828, quoting Board v. Harker, supra, 316 Md. at 696-697, 561 A.2d at 226. See Ad+Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs, 307 Md. 307, 328, 513 A.2d 893, 904 (1986); National Asphalt v. Prince Geo's Co., supra, 292 Md. at 78-79, 437 A.2d at 653; County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, supra, 274 Md. at 61, 333 A.2d at 601."
 Furthermore, even where the General Assembly so comprehensively covers an area that an intent to occupy the field generally is implied, the General Assembly may also intend to leave some specific matters in that field open to local legislation. In this situation, local legislation regarding those specific matters is obviously not preempted. See Talbot County v. Skipper, supra, 329 Md. at 492, 620 A.2d at 885.
 In arguing that Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code is invalid under the doctrine of implied preemption, Holiday Point asserts that "the State's regulation over tidal wetlands, water quality and shellfish is so pervasive that the State legislature clearly intended to occupy the field, thereby preempting Anne Arundel County Code § 5-108(e)." (Holiday Point's brief at 33). Holiday Point's characterization of the relevant "field" of legislation, however, is overly broad. It is similar to an argument that, because there is so much state legislation pertaining to the environment, all local legislation pertaining to the environment is impliedly preempted.
 As discussed in part (1) above, state regulation of the harvesting of shellfish is quite distinct from the regulation of the situs of piers. Likewise, state legislation in various fields to insure healthful water quality is distinguishable from local zoning regulations restricting the length of piers.
 The only comprehensive state statute which is applicable to all pier extensions into the tidal waters of the State, and which requires a state permit for every such pier extension, is the Wetlands Act of 1970. As earlier discussed, this Court has made it clear that local zoning regulations can properly apply to piers as extensions of the land even though the construction and extension of piers are also regulated by the state Wetlands Act. See People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, supra, 316 Md. 491, 560 A.2d 32; Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert County, supra, 286 Md. at 316-323, 407 A.2d at 745-749. Moreover, as previously noted, supra n. 7, the administrative regulations under the Wetlands Act specifically authorize more "stringent" local regulations with respect to the "location of all new marinas or expansion of an existing marina." COMAR 26.24.04.03.F.
 Consequently, there is no merit in Holiday Point's argument that Article 28, § 5-108(e), of the Anne Arundel County Code is impliedly preempted.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION. PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
 NOTES
 [*] Murphy, C.J., and Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while active members of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the decision and the adoption of the opinion.
 [1] Section 5-108(e) states as follows:
 "(e) Maritime Group Districts and Marina Facilities may not be located, as measured in a straight line through the water, closer than the following distances to shellfish beds:
 (1) one-eighth of a mile for a marina with 50 or fewer slips;
 (2) one-fourth of a mile for a marine with 51 to 100 slips, inclusive; and
 (3) one half of a mile for a marina with more than 100 slips."
 [2] The zoning authority for Montgomery and Prince George's Counties is set forth in the Regional District Act, Code (1957, 1997 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 28, § 7-101 et seq. See Montgomery County v. Revere Nat. Corp., Inc., 341 Md. 366, 383, 671 A.2d 1, 9 (1996); Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 329 Md. 494, 502-503, 620 A.2d 886, 890 (1993); Chevy Chase View v. Rothman, 323 Md. 674, 685, 594 A.2d 1131, 1136 (1991).
 [3] Art. 25A, § 5(U) states as follows:
 "(U) County Board of Appeals
 "To enact local laws providing (1) for the establishment of a county board of appeals whose members shall be appointed by the county council; (2) for the number, qualifications, terms, and compensation of the members; (3) for the adoption by the board of rules of practice governing its proceedings; and (4) for the decision by the board on petition by any interested person and after notice and opportunity for hearing and on the basis of the record before the board, of such of the following matters arising (either originally or on review of the action of an administrative officer or agency) under any law, ordinance, or regulation of, or subject to amendment or repeal by, the county council, as shall be specified from time to time by such local laws enacted under this subsection: An application for a zoning variation or exception or amendment of a zoning ordinance map; the issuance, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, or modification of any license, permit, approval, exemption, waiver, certificate, registration, or other form of permission or of any adjudicatory order; and the assessment of any special benefit tax: Provided, that upon any decision by a county board of appeals it shall file an opinion which shall include a statement of the facts found and the grounds for its decision. Any person aggrieved by the decision of the board and a party to the proceeding before it may appeal to the circuit court for the county which shall have power to affirm the decision of the board, or if such decision is not in accordance with law, to modify or reverse such decision, with or without remanding the case for rehearing as justice may require. Any party to the proceeding in the circuit court aggrieved by the decision of the said court may appeal from such decision to the Court of Special Appeals. The review proceedings provided by this subsection shall be exclusive."
 [4] Despite some contrary language in a few earlier Maryland cases, this Court has consistently, for the last half-century, taken the position that the Legislature may properly require that an issue of validity or constitutionality be raised through the administrative process, and, as long as judicial review is available, there is no violation of the separation of powers principle set forth in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 617-624, 664 A.2d 862, 873-876 (1995). See also Maryland Aggregates v. State, 337 Md. 658, 675-679, 655 A.2d 886, 896, cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1111, 115 S. Ct. 1965, 131 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1995), and cases there cited.
 [5] Section 4-742 of the Natural Resources Article begins as follows (emphasis added):
 "§ 4-742. Restrictions on taking of shellfish from polluted waters.
 (a) Department of the Environment authorized to restrict area.If the Department of the Environment determines by appropriate investigation that any area of waters of the State devoted to the production of storage of shellfish is polluted so that shellfish produced or stored in the area are a hazard to public health, it shall restrict the area for the catching or storing of shellfish. If the Department of the Environment finds it necessary to restrict an area of water for the taking and storing of shellfish because of the proximity of the area to the point of discharge of a sewage treatment plant or a point of overflow of a sewage pumping station, the Department of the Environment may increase or decrease the size of a restricted area in relation to the operational effectiveness of the sewage treatment plant or sewage pumping station."
 * * *
 [6] It should be noted that, even if the state law had regulated the situs of marina facilities, and had provided that no such facilities could be constructed within 200 feet of a shellfish bed, it would not necessarily follow that the state law and the local ordinance would be in conflict. When state law simply regulates a matter to a limited extent, our cases have not ordinarily attributed to the General Assembly an intent to preempt local law regulating the matter to a greater extent. Coalition v. Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 380-383, 635 A.2d 412, 422-424 (1994), and cases there discussed. Since, however, the "state law" invoked by Holiday Point does not regulate the situs of marina facilities, we need not explore this issue in the present case.
 [7] While chiefly relying upon the state document restricting the harvesting of shellfish, Holiday Point also lists several state regulations which are claimed to conflict with the Anne Arundel County ordinance. Like the document, however, these regulations deal with matters which are separate and distinct from the requirements of the local zoning ordinance. All of the regulations relied upon are criteria for guiding state officials in granting or denying state wetlands permits. The co-existent relationship between such wetlands permits and local zoning was dealt with by us in Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert County, 286 Md. 303, 316-323, 407 A.2d 738, 745-749 (1979), and People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, 316 Md. 491, 506-507, 560 A.2d 32, 39-40 (1989). Furthermore, several of these criteria concern dredging and filling operations. One of the regulations, COMAR 08.05.05.16, recodified as COMAR 26.24.04.03 in 1996, does set forth criteria for the grant or denial of a wetlands permit "for a new marina or marina expansion." This regulation contains no criteria specifying distances between piers and shellfish beds. More significantly, the regulation states that new marinas or the expansion of an existing marina shall be consistent with a local government's marina management plan and that "[i]f there is a conflict between a local marina management plan and this subtitle, the more stringent regulation takes priority."


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 9.11.2016
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 301/5
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) 2016/1956
 af 4. november 2016
 om ændring af bilag I til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87 om told- og statistiknomenklaturen og Den Fælles Toldtarif
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87 af 23. juli 1987 om told- og statistiknomenklaturen og Den Fælles Toldtarif (1), særlig artikel 9, stk. 1, litra e), og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Ved Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87 blev der fastlagt en varenomenklatur (i det følgende benævnt »den kombinerede nomenklatur« eller »KN«), der fremgår af bilag I til samme forordning.
 (2)
 Pos. 9404 omfatter sengeudstyr og lign. (fx madrasser, vattæpper, dyner og puder), forsynet med fjedre eller med stopning, fyld eller indlæg af ethvert materiale eller fremstillet af cellegummi (skumgummi og lign.) eller celleplast, med eller uden overtræk.
 (3)
 Der findes forskellige holdninger til, hvordan ordlyden af pos. 9404 bør fortolkes, for så vidt angår udtrykket »med stopning, fyld eller indlæg af ethvert materiale«.
 (4)
 Af hensyn til retssikkerheden er det derfor nødvendigt at indsætte en ny supplerende bestemmelse i den kombinerede nomenklaturs kapitel 94 for at sikre en ensartet fortolkning af denne KN-kode i hele Unionen.
 (5)
 Bilag I til forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87 bør derfor ændres.
 (6)
 Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Toldkodeksudvalget —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 I del II, kapitel 94, i den kombinerede nomenklatur, der er knyttet som bilag I til forordning (EØF) nr. 2658/87, indsættes følgende supplerende bestemmelse 1:
 »1.
 Udtrykket »med stopning, fyld eller indlæg af ethvert materiale« (pos. 9404) omfatter materiale af enhver tykkelse.«
 Artikel 2
 Denne forordning træder i kraft på tyvendedagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 4. november 2016.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 For formanden
 Stephen QUEST
 Generaldirektør for beskatning og toldunion
 (1) EFT L 256 af 7.9.1987, s. 1.


text:
Αριθ. C 137/18 PÊL Επίσημη Εφημερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων 3 . 6 . 95
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΔΙΚΕΙΟΥ διαδικασία του άρθρον 85 της σννθήκης ΕΟΚ (IV/31.553
 6ης Απριλίου 1995 — Δομικά πλέγματα), καθόσον δέχεται τη σνμμετοχή της
 προσφεύγουσας σε σύμπραξη η οποία είχε ως αντικείμενο
 στην υπόθεση Τ-143/89: Ferriere Nord SpA κατά Επιτροπής τον περιορισμό των γερμανικών εξαγωγών προς τις χώρες
 των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (') της Bénélux.
 (Ανταγωνισμός — Παράβαση τον άρθρον 85 της συνθήκης
 ΕΟΚ) 2. Καθορίζει σε 252 000 Ecu το ποσό τον προστίμον πον
 (95/C 137/42 ) επιβλήθηκε στην προσφεύγονσα με το άρθρο 3 της
 αποφάσεως αυτής.
 (Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η ιταλική)
 3 . Απορρίπτει την προσφνγή κατά τα λοιπά.
 Στην υπόθεση Τ-143/89, Ferriere Nord SpA, εταιρεία ιταλικού 4. H προσφεύγουσα φέρει τα δικαστικά της έξοδα και τα
 δικαίου , εγκατεστημένη στο Osoppo ( Ιταλία), εκπροσωπού τρία πέμπτα των εξόδων της Επιτροπής.
 μενη από τη Wilma Viscardini-Donà , δικηγόρο Πάδουας, και
 τον Giuseppe Campeis, δικηγόρο Udine , με αντίκλητο στο 5 . H Επιτροπή φέρει τα δύο πέμπτα των δικαστικών της
 Λουξεμβούργο τον δικηγόρο Ernest Arendt , 8-10, rue Math εξόδων.
 ias Hardt, κατά Επιτροπής των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων,
 ( εκπρόσωποι: E. Traversa, J. Currall και A. Dal Ferro ), που C ) ΕΕ αριθ . C 306 της 5 . 12 . 1989 .
 είχε ως αντικείμενο την ακύρωση της αποφάσεως 89/515/
 ΕΟΚ της Επιτροπής της 2ας Αυγούστου 1989 σχετικά με
 διαδικασία εφαρμογής του άρθρου 85 της συνθήκης ΕΟΚ
 (I V/3 1 .553 — Δομικά πλέγματα , ΕΕ αριθ . L 260 1989 , σ. 1 ), το
 Πρωτοδικείο ( πρώτο τμήμα), συγκείμενο από τους H. Kirsc ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΔΙΚΕΙΟΥ
 hner, Πρόεδρο, C. W. Bellamy, B. Vesterdorf, R. Garcia- της 6ης Απριλίου 1995
 Valdecasas και K. Lenaerts, δικαστές, γραμματέας: H. Jung,
 εξέδωσε στις 6 Απριλίου 1995 απόφαση με το ακόλουθο στην υπόθεση Τ-145/89: Baustahlgewerbe GmbH κατά Επι
 διατακτικό : τροπής των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (')
 (Ανταγωνισμός — Παράβαση τον άρθρον 85 της σννθήκης
 1 . Απορρίπτει την προσφυγή. ΕΟΚ)
 2 . Καταδικάζει την προσφεύγουσα στα δικαστικά έξοδα. (95/C 137/44)
 (') ΕΕ αριθ . C 306 της 5 . 12 . 1989. (Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η γερμανική)
 Στην υπόθεση Τ-145/89, Baustahlgewebe GmbH , εγκατεστη
 μένη στο Ντύσσελντορφ (Γερμανία), εκπροσωπούμενη από
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΔΙΚΕΙΟΥ τους Arved Deringer, Claus Tessin, Hans Jürgen Herrmann,
 της 6ης Απριλίου 1995 Joachim Sedemund και Frank Montag, δικηγόρους Κολωνί
 ας, με αντίκλητο στο Λουξεμβούργο τον δικηγόρο Aloyse
 στην υπόθεση Τ-144/89: Cockerill Sambre κατά Επιτροπής May, 31 , Grand-rue , κατά Επιτροπής των Ευρωπαϊκών
 των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (') Κοινοτήτων, (εκπρόσωποι: N. Koch , B. Langeheine , J. Currall
 (Ανταγωνισμός — Παράβαση τον άρθρον 85 της σννθήκης και A. Böhlke ), που είχε ως αντικείμενο την ακύρωση της
 ΕΟΚ) αποφάσεως 89/515/ΕΟΚ της Επιτροπής της 2ας Αυγούστου
 (95/C 137/43 ) 1989 σχετικά με μια διαδικασία εφαρμογής του άρθρου 85 της
 συνθήκης ΕΟΚ (IV/31 .553 — Δομικά πλέγματα, ΕΕ αριθ .
 (Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η γαλλική) L 260 1989, σ. 1 ), το Πρωτοδικείο (πρώτο τμήμα), συγκείμενο
 από τους H. Kirschner, Πρόεδρο, C. W. Bellamy , B. Vester
 Στην υπόθεση Τ-144/89, Cockerill Sambre , πρώην Steelinter dorf, R. García-Valdecasas και K. Lenaerts , δικαστές, γραμ
 SA , με έδρα τις Βρυξέλλες, εκπροσωπούμενη από τους ματέας: H. Jung, εξέδωσε στις 6 Απριλίου 1 995 απόφαση με το
 Michel Waelbroeck και Alexandre Vandencasteele , δικηγό ακόλουθο διατακτικό :
 ρους Βρυξελλών, με αντίκλητο στο Λουξεμβούργο τον δικη
 γόρο Ernest Arendt, 8-10, rue Mathias Hardt, κατά Επιτρο 1 . Ακυρώνει το άρθρο 1 της Αποφάσεως 89/515/ΕΟΚ της
 πής των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (εκπρόσωποι: N. Koch, E. Επιτροπής, της 2ας Αυγούστου 1989, σχετικά με διαδικα
 Traversa, J. Currall , N. Coutrelis και A. Coutrelis), που είχε ως σία εφαρμογής τον άρθρον 85 της σννθήκης ΕΟΚ
 αντικείμενο την ακύρωση της αποφάσεως 89/515/ΕΟΚ της (IV/31.553 — Δομικά πλέγμάτa), καθόσον καταλογίζει
 Επιτροπής της 2ας Αυγούστου 1989 σχετικά με μια διαδικα στην προσφεύγονσα τη σνμμετοχή της σε σύμπραξη με τη
 σία εφαρμογής του άρθρου 85 της συνθήκης ΕΟΚ (IV/31.553 Sotralenz SA η οποία είχε ως αντικείμενο την ποσόστωση
 — Δομικά πλέγματα, ΕΕ αριθ . L 260 1989 , σ. 1 ), το των εξαγωγών της τελενταίας προς τη γερμανική αγορά
 Πρωτοδικείο (πρώτο τμήμα), συγκείμενο από τους H. Kirsc και καθόσον δέχεται ότι μεταξύ της προσφεύγονσας και
 hner, Πρόεδρο , C. W. Bellamy, B. Vesterdorf, R. Garcia- της Tréfilunion SA νπήρχε σνμφωνία κατά την οποία οι
 Valdecasas και K. Lenaerts, δικαστές, γραμματέας: H. Jung, μελλοντικές εξαγωγές τονς θα εξαρτώνται από τον καθο
 εξέδωσε στις 6 Απριλίου 1995 απόφαση με το ακόλουθο ρισμό ποσοστώσεων.
 διατακτικό :
 2. Καθορίζει σε 3 εκατομμύρια Ecu το ποσό τον προστίμον
 1 . Ακνρώνει το άρθρο 1 της αποφάσεως 89/515/ΕΟΚ της πον επιβλήθηκε στην προσφεύγονσα με το άρθρο 3 της
 Επιτροπής, της 2ας Ανγούστον 1989, σχετικά με μια αποφάσεως αντής.


text:
11.1.2003 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 7/23
 Os recorrentes concluem pedindo que o Tribunal se digne: Pede-se, ainda, subsidiariamente, a aplicação do artigo 8.o,
 n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CEE) n.o 2144/87 do
 — anular a decisão impugnada da Comissão das Comunida- Conselho, de 13 de Julho de 1987, relativo à dívida adua-
 des Europeias, datada de 28 de Junho de 2002 (processo neira ( 2), que exclui o pagamento dos direitos aduaneiros sobre
 REM 14/01), notificada em 2 de Setembro de 2002, que a parte da mercadoria que foi confiscada.
 considerou injustificada a dispensa do pagamento dos
 direitos de importação por uma importação de
 256 983,63 EUR; (1 ) JO L 175 de 12.7.1979, p. 1; EE 02 F6 p. 36.
 (2 ) JO L 201 de 22.7.1987, p. 15.
 — subsidiariamente e com toda a reserva, declarar, de
 qualquer forma que, na acepção do artigo 8.o, n.o 1,
 alínea b), do Regulamento (CEE) n.o 2144/87, os recorren-
 tes devem, no caso em apreço, ser dispensados do
 pagamento em relação aos 8 010 Kg. de T.L.E. confisca-
 dos em relação a todos os acusados no processo penal;
 — por último, condenar a recorrida nas despesas.
 Recurso interposto em 6 de Novembro de 2002 por Susan
 Christensen contra Comissão das Comunidades Europeias
 Fundamentos e principais argumentos
 (Processo T-336/02)
 O presente recurso dirige-se contra a decisão da recorrida que (2003/C 7/46)
 considerou injustificada a dispensa do pagamento dos direitos
 de importação em relação a uma importação de 256 983 EUR,
 dispensa que havia sido pedida pela República Italiana em 4 de (Língua do processo: francês)
 Junho de 2001 (processo REM 14/01; proposta CEE C(2002)
 2384 final).
 Na verdade, foi pedido aos recorrentes o pagamento dos Deu entrada em 6 de Novembro de 2002, no Tribunal de
 direitos aduaneiros sobre dois carregamentos de cigarros no Primeira Instância das Comunidades Europeias, um recurso
 valor de mais de dois milhões e meio de liras italianas, desde o contra a Comissão das Comunidades Europeias, interposto por
 ano de 1992. Os recorrentes manifestaram a sua oposição a Susan Christensen, residente em Ispra (Itália), representada
 este pedido perante a justiça italiana e pediram a dispensa à pelos advogados Georges Vandersanden e Laure Levi.
 Comissão, que veio a indeferir tal pretensão.
 A recorrente conclui pedindo que o Tribunal se digne:
 O recurso ora interposto baseia-se no artigo 13.o do Regula-
 mento (CEE) n.o 1430/79 do Conselho, de 2 de Julho de 1979, — anular a decisão do comité de selecção COM/R/A/2000,
 relativo ao reembolso ou à dispensa do pagamento dos direitos de 3 de Dezembro de 2001, que não a inscreveu na lista
 de importação ou de exportação (1). Os recorrentes consideram de reserva por esta não ter obtido, na prova oral, o
 que não podem suportar os direitos aduaneiros enquanto mínimo de pontos exigidos para constar da mesma e, na
 subsistirem no caso em apreço «circunstâncias específicas» medida do necessário, a decisão da autoridade competente
 susceptíveis de excluir que o pagamento possa ser estar a seu para celebrar os contratos (ACCC), de 23 de Julho de
 cargo, tendo os mesmos depositado uma confiança legítima 2002, que indeferiu a reclamação da recorrente, notifi-
 nos documentos comerciais e de transporte que lhes foram cada em 30 de Julho de 2002;
 apresentados no momento da declaração alfandegária, dos
 quais resultava tratarem-se de pacotes de embalagem.
 — anular todas as operações e actos do concurso posteriores
 às ilegalidades contidas na decisão de 3 de Dezembro de
 A especificidade da situação que permite a dispensa do 2001 e, designadamente, a lista de reserva e as decisões
 pagamento deve-se ao facto de o declarante alfandegário não de nomeação com base nessa lista;
 ter a possibilidade de verificar o conteúdo do camião na
 fronteira e que, além disso, a documentação parece, no caso — condenar a recorrida, em qualquer hipótese, a adoptar
 em análise, regular, de tal modo que a carga foi despachada pelo todas as medidas necessárias para reintegrar a recorrente
 serviço alfandegário através do procedimento do «considerado nos seus direitos;
 conforme».
 — condenar a recorrida, se o Tribunal não entender de outra
 Além disso, no presente caso, não existe o outro requisito forma, no pagamento da indemnização calculada à
 relativo à «negligência» ou à «simulação» do interessado, data do recurso em 22 088,34 euros, sem prejuízo de
 exigido pelo artigo 13.o, na medida em que os recorrentes posterior correcção;
 efectuaram uma declaração regular da mercadoria, como
 resultava da documentação comercial e de transporte. — condenar a recorrida na totalidade das despesas.
 ---pagebreak--- C 7/24 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 11.1.2003
 Fundamentos e principais argumentos — Condenar a demandada nas despesas.
 A recorrente pede a anulação da decisão do comité de selecção
 COM/R/A/2000 de a não inscrever na lista de reserva.
 Fundamentos e principais argumentos
 Em apoio do recurso a recorrente invoca quatro fundamentos.
 Em primeiro lugar violação do princípio de não discriminação, O presente recurso tem por objecto a anulação da decisão com
 violação de formalidades essenciais, violação das disposições que se comunicou à recorrente a recusa em admiti-la às provas
 que regem a organização das provas e violação do artigo 3.o do concurso COM/A/10/01, por aquela ultrapassar o limite de
 do Anexo III do Estatuto. No entender da recorrente o comité idade previsto no aviso do mesmo.
 de selecção não foi constituído de forma estável e não actuou
 com imparcialidade.
 Os fundamentos e principais argumentos são os já invocados
 no processo T-219/02, Lutz Herrera/Comissão ( 1).
 A recorrente invoca como segundo fundamento violação do
 aviso de concurso.
 (1 ) JOCE C 233, de 28.9.2002, p. 30.
 Em terceiro lugar invoca violação do interesse do serviço, do
 artigo 12.o do RAA e erro manifesto de apreciação.
 A recorrente invoca, finalmente, violação do princípio da
 igualdade de tratamento entre mulheres e homens, da política
 que visa garantir a igualdade de oportunidades, de acções
 positivas e do princípio segundo o qual a administração está Acção proposta em 13 de Novembro de 2002 pela
 vinculada pelos actos que adopta. associação SEGI, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga e Ariza Ga-
 larraga contra Conselho da União Europeia
 (Processo T-338/02)
 (2003/C 7/48)
 Recurso interposto em 11 de Novembro de 2002, por
 Olga Lutz Herrera contra a Comissão das Comunidades (Língua do processo: francês)
 Europeias
 (Processo T-337/02)
 Deu entrada em 13 de Novembro de 2002, no Tribunal de
 Primeira Instância das Comunidades Europeias, uma acção
 (2003/C 7/47) proposta contra o Conselho da União Europeia pela associação
 SEGI, com sede em Baiona (França) e em Donostia (Espanha),
 (Língua do processo: espanhol) Araitz Zubimendi Izaga, residente em Hernani (Espanha) e
 Ariza Galarraga, residente em Senpere (França), representados
 por Didier Rouget, avocat.
 Deu entrada, em 11 de Novembro de 2002, no Tribunal de
 Primeira Instância das Comunidades Europeias, um recurso Os demandantes concluem pedindo que o Tribunal se digne:
 contra a Comissão das Comunidades Europeias, interposto por
 Olga Lutz Herrera, com domicílio em Bruxelas, representada — condenar o demandado a pagar à associação SEGI
 por Ramón García-Gallardo e Javier Guillem Carrau, advo- uma indemnização de 1 000 000 de euros e aos dois
 gados. demandantes Araitz Zubimendi Izaga e Ariza Galarraga
 uma indemnização de 100 000 euros a cada um;
 A recorrente conclui pedindo que o Tribunal se digne: — declarar que os referidos montantes vencem juros de
 mora à taxa de 4,5 % ao ano a contar da data do
 — Anular a decisão da Comissão de não admitir a candida- acórdão do Tribunal de Primeira Instância e até efectivo
 tura de Olga Lutz ao concurso COM/A/10/01; e pagamento;


text:
 4.2.2012
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 32/14
 Lūgums sniegt prejudiciālu nolēmumu, ko 2011. gada 21. novembrī iesniedza cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Beļģija) — DKV Belgium/Association belge des consommateurs test-achats ASBL
 (Lieta C-577/11)
 2012/C 32/25
 Tiesvedības valoda — franču
 Iesniedzējtiesa
 Cour d'appel de Bruxelles
 Lietas dalībnieki pamata procesā
 Prasītāja: DKV Belgium
 Atbildētāja: Association belge des consommateurs test-achats ASBL
 Prejudiciālie jautājumi
 “Vai, pirmkārt, Direktīvas 92/49/EEK (1) 29. panta [otrā daļa] un 39. panta 3. [punkts] un Direktīvas 73/239/EEK (2) 8. panta 3. punkta [trešā daļa] un, otrkārt, LESD 49. un 56. pants ir interpretējami tādējādi, ka tajos dalībvalstīm tādu veselības apdrošināšanas līgumu, kas nav saistīti profesionālo darbību, ietvaros ir aizliegts paredzēt tiesību normas, saskaņā ar kurām apdrošināšanas prēmija, pašrisks un pakalpojuma apmērs var tikt pielāgots tikai ikgadējās prēmijas [maksājuma] laikā:
 —
 pamatojoties uz patēriņa cenu indeksu;
 —
 pamatojoties uz vienu vai vairākiem īpašiem indeksiem, to pakalpojumu izmaksām, kas aptverti ar privātās veselības apdrosināšanas līgumiem [saistībā ar medicīnisko indeksu], ja un tiktāl, ciktāl šī vai šo indeksu palielināšanās pārsniedz to palielināšanos, kāda ir patēriņa cenu indeksam;
 pamatojoties uz administratīvās iestādes, kas atbildīga par apdrošināšanas uzņēmumu pārraudzību un kurai attiecīgais apdrošināšanas uzņēmums iesniedzis pieteikumu, atļauju, ja šī iestāde konstatē, ka šī izņēmuma prēmiju likmes piemērošana, neraugoties uz pielāgojumiem, kas aprēķināti, pamatojoties uz iepriekšējos punktos paredzētajiem indeksiem, rada vai var radīt zaudējumus, kas tam tādējādi ļauj veikt pasākumus savu prēmiju likmju līdzsvarošanai, kuri var aptvert apdrošināšanas nosacījumu pielāgošanu?”
 (1) Padomes 1992. gada 18. jūnija Direktīva 92/49/EEK par normatīvo un administratīvo aktu koordinēšanu attiecībā uz tiešo apdrošināšanu, kas nav dzīvības apdrošināšana, ar kuru groza Direktīvu 73/239/EEK un Direktīvu 88/357/EEK (Trešā nedzīvības apdrošināšanas direktīva) (OV L 228, 1. lpp.).
 (2) Padomes 1973. gada 24. jūlija Pirmās direktīvas 73/239/EEK par normatīvo un administratīvo aktu koordināciju attiecībā uz uzņēmējdarbības sākšanu un veikšanu tiešās apdrošināšanas nozarē, kas nav dzīvības apdrošināšana (OV L 228, 3. lpp.).


text:
Nr C 133/ 18 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 4.5.96
 Begäran om förhandsavgörande enligt beslut av Tribunale Talan mot Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission väckt
 civile e penale di Trento — Sezione civile — av den den 19 mars 1996 av Konungariket Nederländerna
 15 februari 1996 i målet mellan Grundig Italiana Spa och ( mål C-84/96 )
 Ministero delle Finanze dello Stato
 ( 96/C 133/39 )
 ( mål C-68/96 )
 ( 96/C 133/37 )
 Konungariket Nederländerna har den 19 mars 1996 väckt
 talan vid Europeiska gemenskapernas domstol mot Euro
 Tribunale civile e penale di Trento — Sezione civile — begär peiska gemenskapernas kommission . Sökanden företräds av
 genom beslut av den 15 februari 1996 , vilket inkommit till J. S. van den Oosterkamp och Drs M. jA. Fierstra , båda i
 domstolens kansli den 14 mars 1996 , att Europeiska egenskap av ombud, och har uppgivit följande adress för
 gemenskapernas domstol skall meddela ett förhandsavgö delgivning: Nederländernas ambassad, 5 rue C. M. Spoo,
 rande i målet mellan Grundig Italiana Spa och Ministero Luxemburg.
 delle Finanze dello Stato beträffande följande fråga :
 Skall artikel 95 i EEG-fördraget tolkas på så sätt att det är Sökanden yrkar att domstolen skall
 förbjudet för en medlemsstat att införa och uppta en
 konsumtionsskatt av den art som föreskrivs i artikel 4 i
 — ogiltigförklara debetnotan av den 15 januari 1996 och
 förordning [decreto legge] av den 30 december 1982 , vilken kommissionens beslut av den 16 februari 1996 om
 ändrats till lag genom lag nr 53 av den 28 februari 1983 och avslutande av projekt ERUF nr 80.07.03.002 (Veen
 för vilken tillämpningsformerna har bestämts genom finans dam-Musselkanaal ) och ERUF nr 84.07.03.004 (Weg
 ministeriets förordning [decreto] av den 23 mars 1983 , när Veendam ), som före år 1989 delfinansierades av Euro
 beskattningsunderlaget är olika för inhemska produkter peiska regionala utvecklingsfonden,
 och sådana som importeras från andra medlemsstater och
 olika förfaranden föreskrivs för uttaget av skatten på
 samma produkter ? — förplikta svaranden att ersätta rättegångskostnaderna .
 Grunder och huvudargument
 Grunder och huvudargument motsvarar dem som har
 åberopats i mål C-308/95 ( 1 ).
 Begäran om förhandsavgörande från Nederlandse Raad van
 State av den 12 mars 1996 i målet mellan, å ena sidan,
 borgmästaren och de förtroendevalda i Haarlemmerliede (') EGT nr C 299 , 11.11.1995 , s . 13 .
 och Spaarnwoude m. f. och, å andra sidan, Gedeputeerde
 Staten van Noord-Holland
 ( mål C-81/96 )
 ( 96/C 133/38 )
 Nederlandse Raad van State begär genom beslut av den
 12 mars 1 996 , vilket inkommit till domstolens kansli den Begäran om förhandsavgörande enligt beslut av den 1 feb
 18 mars 1 996 , att Europeiska gemenskapernas domstol ruari 1996 och den 7 mars 1996 av Tribunale di Genova —
 skall meddela ett förhandsavgörande i målet mellan, å ena Sezione I Civile ) i målen 1 ) Palmera SpA, 2 ) Cesare Rognoli
 sidan, borgmästaren och de förtroendevalda i Haarlemmer & Figlio Srl och 3 ) Igino Mazzola mot Ministero delle
 liede och Spaarnwoude m . fl . och, å andra sidan, Gedepu Finanze dello Stato
 teerde Staten van Noord-Holland beträffande följande ( Mål C-86/96, C-87/96 och C-88/96 )
 fråga : ( 96/C 133/40 )
 Är det enligt rådets direktiv 85/337/EEG av den 27 juni
 1985 om bedömning av inverkan på miljön av vissa Genom beslut av den 1 februari 1996 och den 7 mars 1996 ,
 offentliga och privata projekt ^) tillåtet att anslå medel för som inkom till domstolens kansli den 21 mars 1996 , har
 ett projekt som nämns i bilaga I till samma direktiv, om Tribunale di Genova — Sezione I Civile — i inför den
 anslaget — i ett fall där beslutet avser ett projekt för vilket nationella domstolen anhängiga målen 1 ) Palmera SpA, 2 )
 medel anslogs före den 3 juli 1988 , dock utan att anslaget Cesare kognoli & Figlio Sri och 3 ) Igino Mazzola mot
 utnyttjades , och detta anslag inte föregicks av någon Ministero delle Finanze dello Stato till Europeiska gemen
 bedömning av projektets inverkan på miljön som uppfyllde skapernas domstol i en begäran om förhandsavgörande
 direktivets krav — inte föregåtts av en bedömning av ställt samma frågor som i de förenade målen C-47/95
 projektets inverkan på miljön i den mening som avses i m . fl . ( M.
 direktivet ?
 (•) EGT nr C 119 , 13.5.1995 , s . 5 .
 (M EGT nr L 175 , 1985 , s . 40 .


text:
C 118/22 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 18.5.2002
 GERICHT ERSTER INSTANZ
 URTEIL DES GERICHTS ERSTER INSTANZ tung während des von dem betreffenden Mitgliedstaat gewählten
 Referenzjahres keine Milch geliefert hatten.
 vom 7. Februar 2002
 2. Der Klägerin sind die Schäden zu ersetzen, die sie aufgrund der
 Anwendung der Verordnung Nr. 857/84 in der Zeit vom
 in der Rechtssache T-187/94: Theresia Rudolph gegen Rat
 5. August 1987 bis zum 28. März 1989 erlitten hat.
 der Europäischen Union und Kommission der Euro-
 päischen Gemeinschaften(1) 3. Den Parteien wird aufgegeben, dem Gericht binnen sechs
 Monaten nach dem Erlass dieses Urteils mitzuteilen, auf welche
 (Schadensersatzklage — Außervertragliche Haftung — zu zahlenden Beträge sie sich geeinigt haben.
 Milch — Zusatzabgabe — Referenzmenge — Verordnung
 (EG) Nr. 2187/93 — Entschädigung der Erzeuger — Unter- 4. Wird keine Einigung erzielt, so legen sie dem Gericht binnen
 brechung der Verjährung) derselben Frist ihre bezifferten Anträge vor.
 (2002/C 118/34) 5. Die Kostenentscheidung bleibt vorbehalten.
 (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch) (1) ABl. C 174 vom 25.6.1994.
 In der Rechtssache T-187/94, Theresia Rudolph, wohnhaft in
 Rasdorf-Grüsselbach (Deutschland) (Prozessbevollmächtigte:
 Rechtsanwälte B. Meisterernst, M. Düsing, D. Manstetten,
 F. Schulze und C.-H. Husemann, Zustellungsanschrift in Lu- URTEIL DES GERICHTS ERSTER INSTANZ
 xemburg) gegen Rat der Europäischen Union (Bevollmächtigte:
 A.-M. Colaert) und Kommission der Europäischen Gemein-
 vom 7. Februar 2002
 schaften (Bevollmächtigte: D. Booß, M. Niejahr, H.-J. Rabe und
 M. Núñez-Müller) wegen Ersatzes des Schadens gemäß den
 Artikeln 178 und 215 Absatz 2 EG-Vertrag (jetzt Artikel 235 in der Rechtssache T-199/94: Hans-Walter Gosch gegen
 EG und 288 Absatz 2 EG), der der Klägerin angeblich dadurch Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften(1)
 entstanden ist, dass sie aufgrund der Verordnung (EWG)
 Nr. 857/84 des Rates vom 31. März 1984 über Grundregeln (Schadensersatzklage — Außervertragliche Haftung —
 für die Anwendung der Abgabe gemäß Artikel 5c der Verord- Milch — Zusatzabgabe — Referenzmenge — Erzeuger, der
 nung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 im Sektor Milch und Milcherzeugnisse eine Nichtvermarktungsverpflichtung eingegangen ist —
 (ABl. L 90, S. 13) in der durch die Verordnung (EWG) Keine Wiederaufnahme der Erzeugung nach Ablauf der
 Nr. 1371/84 der Kommission vom 16. Mai 1984 mit den Verpflichtung)
 Durchführungsbestimmungen für die Zusatzabgabe nach Arti-
 kel 5c der Verordnung Nr. 804/68 (ABl. L 132, S. 11) (2002/C 118/35)
 ergänzten Fassung an der Vermarktung von Milch gehindert
 war, hat das Gericht (Vierte Kammer) unter Mitwirkung des (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch)
 Präsidenten P. Mengozzi sowie der Richterin V. Tiili und des
 Richters R. M. Moura Ramos — Kanzler: D. Christensen,
 Verwaltungsrätin — am 7. Februar 2002 ein Urteil mit In der Rechtssache T-199/94, Hans-Walter Gosch, wohnhaft
 folgendem Tenor erlassen: in Högersdorf (Deutschland) (Prozessbevollmächtigte: Rechts-
 anwälte D. Hansen und S. Vieregge, Zustellungsanschrift in
 1. Die Beklagten sind verpflichtet, den Schaden zu ersetzen, den Luxemburg), gegen Kommission der Europäischen Gemein-
 die Klägerin durch die Anwendung der Verordnung (EWG) schaften (Bevollmächtigte: D. Booß, M. Niejahr und M. Núñez-
 Nr. 857/84 des Rates vom 31. März 1984 über Grundregeln Müller) wegen Ersatzes des Schadens gemäß den Artikeln 178
 für die Anwendung der Abgabe gemäß Artikel 5c der Verord- und 215 Absatz 2 EG-Vertrag (jetzt Artikel 235 EG und 288
 nung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 im Sektor Milch und Milcherzeug- Absatz 2 EG), der dem Kläger angeblich dadurch entstanden
 nisse in der durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1371/84 der ist, dass er aufgrund der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 857/84 des
 Kommission vom 16. Mai 1984 mit den Durchführungs- Rates vom 31. März 1984 über Grundregeln für die Anwen-
 bestimmungen für die Zusatzabgabe nach Artikel 5c der dung der Abgabe gemäß Artikel 5c der Verordnung (EWG)
 Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 ergänzten Fassung insoweit Nr. 804/68 im Sektor Milch und Milcherzeugnisse (ABl. L 90,
 erlitten hat, als diese Verordnungen keine Zuteilung einer S. 13) in der durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1371/84 der
 Referenzmenge an Erzeuger vorsahen, die in Erfüllung einer im Kommission vom 16. Mai 1984 mit den Durchführungs-
 Rahmen der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1078/77 des Rates vom bestimmungen für die Zusatzabgabe nach Artikel 5c der
 17. Mai 1977 zur Einführung einer Prämienregelung für die Verordnung Nr. 804/68 (ABl. L 132, S. 11) ergänzten Fassung
 Nichtvermarktung von Milch und Milcherzeugnissen und die an der Vermarktung von Milch gehindert war, hat das Gericht
 Umstellung der Milchkuhbestände eingegangenen Verpflich- (Vierte Kammer) unter Mitwirkung des Präsidenten P. Men-
 ---pagebreak--- 18.5.2002 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften C 118/23
 gozzi sowie der Richterin V. Tiili und des Richters R. M. Moura 1. Die Beklagten sind verpflichtet, den Schaden zu ersetzen, den
 Ramos — Kanzler: D. Christensen, Verwaltungsrätin — am der Kläger durch die Anwendung der Verordnung (EWG)
 7. Februar 2002 ein Urteil mit folgendem Tenor erlassen: Nr. 857/84 des Rates vom 31. März 1984 über Grundregeln
 für die Anwendung der Abgabe gemäß Artikel 5c der Verord-
 nung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 im Sektor Milch und Milcherzeug-
 1. Die Klage wird abgewiesen. nisse in der durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1371/84 der
 Kommission vom 16. Mai 1984 mit den Durchführungs-
 2. Der Kläger trägt die Kosten des Verfahrens. bestimmungen für die Zusatzabgabe nach Artikel 5c der
 Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 ergänzten Fassung insoweit
 erlitten hat, als diese Verordnungen keine Zuteilung einer
 (1) ABl. C 218 vom 6.8.1994. Referenzmenge an Erzeuger vorsahen, die in Erfüllung einer im
 Rahmen der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1078/77 des Rates vom
 17. Mai 1977 zur Einführung einer Prämienregelung für die
 Nichtvermarktung von Milch und Milcherzeugnissen und die
 Umstellung der Milchkuhbestände eingegangenen Verpflich-
 tung während des von dem betreffenden Mitgliedstaat gewählten
 Referenzjahres keine Milch geliefert hatten.
 2. Dem Kläger sind die Schäden zu ersetzen, die er aufgrund der
 URTEIL DES GERICHTS ERSTER INSTANZ Anwendung der Verordnung Nr. 857/84 in der Zeit vom
 5. August 1987 bis zum 28. März 1989 erlitten hat.
 vom 7. Februar 2002 3. Den Parteien wird aufgegeben, dem Gericht binnen sechs
 Monaten nach dem Erlass dieses Urteils mitzuteilen, auf welche
 zu zahlenden Beträge sie sich geeinigt haben.
 in der Rechtssache T-201/94: Erwin Kustermann gegen
 Rat der Europäischen Union und Kommission der Euro- 4. Wird keine Einigung erzielt, so legen sie dem Gericht binnen
 päischen Gemeinschaften(1) derselben Frist ihre bezifferten Anträge vor.
 5. Die Kostenentscheidung bleibt vorbehalten.
 (Schadensersatzklage — Außervertragliche Haftung —
 Milch — Zusatzabgabe — Referenzmenge — Verordnung
 (EG) Nr. 2187/93 — Entschädigung der Erzeuger — Unter- (1) ABl. C 218 vom 6.8.1994.
 brechung der Verjährung)
 (2002/C 118/36)
 (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch) URTEIL DES GERICHTS ERSTER INSTANZ
 vom 7. Februar 2002
 In der Rechtssache T-201/94, Erwin Kustermann, wohnhaft in in der Rechtssache T-261/94: Bernhard Schulte gegen Rat
 Eggenthal (Deutschland) (Prozessbevollmächtigte: Rechts- der Europäischen Union und Kommission der Euro-
 anwälte H.-P. Ried, Y. Schur und R. Burkhardt, Zustellungs- päischen Gemeinschaften(1)
 anschrift in Luxemburg), gegen Rat der Europäischen Union
 (Bevollmächtigte: A.-M. Colaert) und Kommission der Euro-
 (Schadensersatzklage — Außervertragliche Haftung —
 päischen Gemeinschaften (Bevollmächtigte: D. Booß, M. Nie-
 Milch — Zusatzabgabe — Referenzmenge — Verordnung
 jahr, H.-J. Rabe und M. Núñez-Müller) wegen Ersatzes des
 [EG] Nr. 2187/93 — Entschädigung der Erzeuger — Maß-
 Schadens gemäß den Artikeln 178 und 215 Absatz 2 EG-
 nahme der nationalen Behörden — Verjährung)
 Vertrag (jetzt Artikel 235 EG und 288 Absatz 2 EG), der dem
 Kläger angeblich dadurch entstanden ist, dass er aufgrund der
 Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 857/84 des Rates vom 31. März 1984 (2002/C 118/37)
 über Grundregeln für die Anwendung der Abgabe gemäß
 Artikel 5c der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 im Sektor Milch (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch)
 und Milcherzeugnisse (ABl. L 90, S. 13) in der durch die
 Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1371/84 der Kommission vom 16. Mai
 1984 mit den Durchführungsbestimmungen für die Zusatzab- In der Rechtssache T-261/94, Bernhard Schulte, wohnhaft in
 gabe nach Artikel 5c der Verordnung Nr. 804/68 (ABl. L 132, Delbrück (Deutschland) (Prozessbevollmächtigter: Rechtsan-
 S. 11) ergänzten Fassung an der Vermarktung von Milch walt R. Freise), gegen Rat der Europäischen Union (Bevollmäch-
 gehindert war, hat das Gericht (Vierte Kammer) unter Mitwir- tigte: A.-M. Colaert und M. Núñez-Müller) und Kommission
 kung des Präsidenten P. Mengozzi sowie der Richterin V. Tiili der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Bevollmächtigte: D. Booß,
 und des Richters R. M. Moura Ramos — Kanzler: D. Christen- M. Niejahr und M. Núñez-Müller) wegen Ersatzes des Schadens
 sen, Verwaltungsrätin — am 7. Februar 2002 ein Urteil mit gemäß den Artikeln 178 und 215 Absatz 2 EG-Vertrag (jetzt
 folgendem Tenor erlassen: Artikel 235 EG und 288 Absatz 2 EG), der dem Kläger


text:
 116 HR 6473 IH: Patriot Retention Act
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2020-04-07
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 I116th CONGRESS2d SessionH. R. 6473IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESApril 7, 2020Mr. Wenstrup introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed ServicesA BILLTo amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize certain retired members of the Armed Forces to be placed in the Ready Reserve and to receive retired pay and the pay and allowances for duty that member performs.1.Short titleThis Act may be cited as the Patriot Retention Act.2.Authority to place certain retired members of the Armed Forces in the Ready Reserve; pay(a)Placement of certain members in the Ready ReserveSection 10145 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:(e)(1)Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, a retired member of a regular component entitled to retired pay may be placed in the Ready Reserve if the Secretary concerned—(A)determines that the retired member has more than 20 years of creditable service in that regular component; and(B)makes a special finding that the member possesses a skill in which the Ready Reserve of the armed force concerned has a critical shortage of personnel.(2)The authority of the Secretary concerned under paragraph (1) may not be delegated—(A)to a civilian officer or employee of the military department concerned below the level of Assistant Secretary; or(B)to a member of the armed forces below the level of the lieutenant general or vice admiral in an armed force with responsibility for military personnel policy in that armed force..(b)Pay for duties performed in the Ready Reserve in addition to retired paySection 12316 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—(1)by adding at the end the following new subsection:(c)A member placed in the Ready Reserve pursuant to section 10145(e) of this title may receive—(1)retired pay; and(2)the pay and allowances authorized by law for duty that member performs.; and(2)in subsection (a), by striking subsection (b) and inserting subsections (b) and (c).


text:
 31.7.2013
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 204/40
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) Nr. 740/2013
 af 30. juli 2013
 om undtagelser fra oprindelsesreglerne i bilag II til handelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side, der gælder for kontingenter for visse produkter fra Colombia
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Rådets afgørelse 2012/735/EU af 31. maj 2012 om undertegnelse på Den Europæiske Unions vegne og midlertidig anvendelse af handelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side (1), særlig artikel 6, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Ved afgørelse 2012/735/EU bemyndigede Rådet undertegnelse på Den Europæiske Unions vegne af handelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side (i det følgende benævnt »aftalen«). I medfør af afgørelse 2012/735/EU bør aftalen anvendes midlertidigt indtil afslutningen af procedurerne for aftalens indgåelse. Aftalen anvendes midlertidigt fra den 1. august 2013.
 (2)
 Bilag II til aftalen vedrører definitionen af begrebet »produkter med oprindelsesstatus« og metoder for administrativt samarbejde. For så vidt angår en række produkter fastsætter tillæg 2A til nævnte bilag undtagelser fra de oprindelsesregler, der er fastsat i samme bilag, inden for rammerne af de årlige kontingenter. Det er derfor nødvendigt at fastsætte betingelser for anvendelsen af disse undtagelser til import fra Colombia.
 (3)
 De kontingenter, der er fastsat i tillæg 2A til bilag II, bør forvaltes af Kommissionen efter først til mølle-princippet i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens forordning (EØF) nr. 2454/93 af 2. juli 1993 om visse gennemførelsesbestemmelser til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2913/92 om indførelse af en EF-toldkodeks (2).
 (4)
 Toldindrømmelser bør gives på betingelse af, at det relevante oprindelsesbevis forelægges for toldmyndighederne i henhold til aftalen.
 (5)
 Da aftalen får virkning den 1. august 2013, bør nærværende forordning anvendes fra samme dato.
 (6)
 Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Toldkodeksudvalget —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 Oprindelsesreglerne i tillæg 2A til bilag II til handelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side (i det følgende benævnt »aftalen«) gælder for de kontingenter, der er opført i bilaget til denne forordning.
 Artikel 2
 For at være omfattet af undtagelsen i artikel 1 skal de varer, der er opført i bilaget, være ledsaget af et oprindelsesbevis, jf. bilag II til aftalen.
 Artikel 3
 De kontingenter, der er anført i bilaget, forvaltes af Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i artikel 308a-308c i forordning (EØF) nr. 2454/93.
 Artikel 4
 Denne forordning træder i kraft på tredjedagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Den anvendes fra den 1. august 2013.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 30. juli 2013.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 José Manuel BARROSO
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 354 af 21.12.2012, s. 1.
 (2) EFT L 253 af 11.10.1993, s. 1.
 BILAG
 Colombia
 Uanset tariferingsbestemmelserne vedrørende den kombinerede nomenklatur anses ordlyden af varebeskrivelserne kun for vejledende, idet præferenceordningens anvendelsesområde inden for rammerne af dette bilag bestemmes på grundlag af KN-koderne på tidspunktet for vedtagelsen af denne forordning.
 Løbenummer
 KN-kode
 Varebeskrivelse
 Kontingentperiode
 Årlig kontingentmængde
 (i tons nettovægt, medmindre andet er fastsat)
 09.7140
 3920
 Andre plader, ark, film, folier, bånd og strimler, af plast undtagen celleplast, uden underlag og ikke forstærket, lamineret eller på lignende måde i forbindelse med andre materialer
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 15 000
 09.7141
 6108 22 00
 Trusser og underbenklæder, af trikotage, til kvinder eller piger, af kemofibre
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 200
 09.7142
 6112 31
 Badebeklædning til mænd eller drenge, af trikotage, af syntetiske fibre
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 25
 09.7143
 6112 41
 Badebeklædning til kvinder eller piger, af trikotage, af syntetiske fibre
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 100
 09.7144
 6115 10
 Graduerede kompressionsstrømper og -strømpebenklæder (f.eks. mod åreknuder), af trikotage
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 25
 09.7145
 6115 21 00
 Andre strømpebenklæder, af syntetiske fibre, af finhed pr. enkeltgarn under 67 decitex, af trikotage
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 40
 09.7146
 6115 22 00
 Andre strømpebenklæder, af syntetiske fibre, af finhed pr. enkeltgarn 67 decitex eller derover, af trikotage
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 15
 09.7147
 6115 30
 Andre strømper og knæstrømper til kvinder, af finhed pr. enkeltgarn under 67 decitex, af trikotage
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 25
 09.7148
 6115 96
 Andre, af syntetiske fibre, af trikotage
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 175
 09.7161
 7321
 Komfurer, kogeapparater, bageovne, kaminer (herunder sådanne, der tillige kan anvendes til centralopvarmning), grillapparater, fyrfade, gasapparater, varmeplader med brænder og lignende ikke-elektrisk udstyr til husholdningsbrug, samt dele dertil, af jern og stål
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 20 000 stk.
 09.7162
 7323
 Bord-, køkken- og andre husholdningsartikler og dele dertil, af jern og stål; jern- og ståluld; gryderensere, svampe, handsker og lignende varer til rensning eller polering, af jern og stål
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 50 000
 09.7163
 7325
 Andre støbte varer, af jern og stål
 Fra 1. august til 31. juli
 50 000


type: contracts

text:
Svarbus teisinis pranešimas
 |
 21999D0513(03)
 Oficialusis leidinys L 123 , 13/05/1999 p. 0062 - 0063
 EEE jungtinio komiteto sprendimasNr. 67/981998 m. liepos 4 d.iš dalies keičiantis EEE susitarimo VI priedą (Socialinė apsauga)EEE JUNGTINIS KOMITETAS,atsižvelgdamas į Europos ekonominės erdvės susitarimą, patikslintą Protokolu, patikslinančiu Europos ekonominės erdvės susitarimą, toliau — Susitarimas, ypač į jo 98 straipsnį,kadangi Susitarimo VI priedas buvo iš dalies pakeistas 1998 m. kovo 27 d. EEE jungtinio komiteto sprendimu Nr. 24/98 [1],kadangi 1997 m. birželio 27 d. Tarybos reglamentas (EB) Nr. 1290/97, iš dalies keičiantis Reglamentą (EEB) Nr. 1408/71 dėl socialinės apsaugos sistemų taikymo pagal darbo sutartį dirbantiems asmenims, savarankiškai dirbantiems asmenims ir jų šeimos nariams, judantiems Bendrijoje, ir Reglamentą (EEB) Nr. 574/72, nustatantį Reglamento (EEB) Nr. 1408/71 įgyvendinimo tvarką [2], turi būti įtrauktas į Susitarimą,kadangi reikia atnaujinti keletą Tarybos reglamento (EEB) Nr. 574/72 adaptacijų,NUSPRENDĖ:1 straipsnisSusitarimo VI priedo 1 punkte (Tarybos reglamentas (EEB) Nr. 1408/71) prieš adaptacijas įterpiama:"ir su vėlesniais pakeitimais, padarytais:- 397 R 1290: 1997 m. birželio 27 d. Tarybos reglamentas (EB) Nr. 1290/97 (OL L 176, 1997 7 4, p. 1)."2 straipsnisSusitarimo VI priedo 2 punktas (Tarybos reglamentas (EEB) Nr. 574/72) iš dalies keičiamas taip:1. Prieš adaptacijas įterpiama:"ir su vėlesniais pakeitimais, padarytais:- 397 R 1290: 1997 m. birželio 27 d. Tarybos reglamentas (EB) Nr. 1290/97 (OL L 176, 1997 7 4, p. 1)."2. g adaptacijoje antraštės"153. NORVEGIJA — JUNGTINĖ KARALYSTĖ"tekstas pakeičiamas taip:"Pasikeitimas 1997 m. kovo 20 d. ir 1997 m. balandžio 3 d. raštais dėl reglamento 36 straipsnio 3 dalies ir 63 straipsnio 3 dalies (kompensavimas arba atsisakymas kompensuoti išmokų natūra išlaidas), ir įgyvendinimo reglamento 105 straipsnio (administracinio patikrinimo ir medicininio patikrinimo išlaidų atsisakymas)."3. m adaptacijoje antraštės"P. ISLANDIJA"tekstas pakeičiamas taip:"1. Taikant reglamento 13 straipsnio 2 dalies d punktą, 14 straipsnio 1 dalies a punktą, 14 straipsnio 2 dalies b punktą, 14a straipsnio 1 dalies a punktą, 14a straipsnio 2 dalį, 14a straipsnio 4 dalį, 14b straipsnio 1 dalį, 14b straipsnio 2 dalį, 14b straipsnio 4 dalį ir 14c straipsnio a dalį bei įgyvendinimo reglamento 11, 11a straipsnius, 12a straipsnio 2 dalies a punktą, 12a straipsnio 5 dalies c punktą ir 12a straipsnio 7 dalies a punktą:AlÞjóðadeild Tryggingastofnunar ríkisins (International Division of the State Social Security Institute), Reykjavik2. Taikant reglamento 17 straipsnį:Heilbrigðis- og tryggingamálaráðuneytið (the Ministry of Health and Social Security), Reykjavik3. Taikant reglamento III antraštinės dalies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ir 8 skyrių nuostatas ir įgyvendinimo reglamento nuostatas, susijusias su minėtomis nuostatomis:Tryggingastofnun ríkisins (the State Social Security Institute), Reykjavik.4. Taikant reglamento III antraštinės dalies 6 skyriaus nuostatas ir įgyvendinimo reglamento nuostatas, susijusias su minėtomis nuostatomis:Atvinnuleysistryggingasjoður, vinnumálaskrifstofan (the Unemployment Insurance Fund), Reykjavik5. Taikant reglamento III antraštinės dalies 7 skyriaus nuostatas ir įgyvendinimo reglamento nuostatas, susijusias su minėtomis nuostatomis:Ríkisskattstjóri (the Directorate of Internal Revenue), Reykjavik."3 straipsnisTarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1290/97 tekstai islandų ir norvegų kalbomis, kurie pridedami prie šio sprendimo teksto atitinkamomis kalbomis, yra autentiški.4 straipsnisŠis sprendimas įsigalioja 1998 m. liepos 5 d., jei EEE jungtiniam komitetui buvo pateikti visi pranešimai pagal Susitarimo 103 straipsnio 1 dalį.5 straipsnisŠis sprendimas skelbiamas Europos Bendrijų oficialiojo leidinio EEE dalyje ir EEE priede.Priimta Briuselyje, 1998 m. liepos 4 d.EEE jungtinio komiteto varduPirmininkasF. Barbaso[1] OL L 310, 1998 11 19, p. 4.[2] OL L 176, 1997 7 4, p. 1.--------------------------------------------------