jurisdiction: US

text: b' SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE\n AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\nISP-I-14-19 Office of Inspections July 2014\n\n\n\n\n Inspection of\n the Bureau of International Security and\n Nonproliferation\n\n\n\n\nIMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the\nBroadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of\nInspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or\nthe Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior authorization by\nthe Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the\nU.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.\n\n\n\n\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY\n OF THE INSPECTION\n\n This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection\nand Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and\nEfficiency, and the Inspector\xe2\x80\x99s Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the\nU.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).\n\nPURPOSE AND SCOPE\n\n The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and\nCongress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and\nthe BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service\nAct of 1980:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively\n achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and\n whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum\n efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts\n are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the\n requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls\n have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of\n mismanagement; whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate\n steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.\n\nMETHODOLOGY\n\n In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate,\ncirculated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews;\nand reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices,\nindividuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.\n\n\n\n\n i\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n United States Department of State\n and the Broadcasting Board of Governors\n\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\n This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the\nInspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980,\nas amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared\nby OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management,\naccountability, and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of\nGovernors.\n\n This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office,\npost, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant\nagencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.\n\n The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge\navailable to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for\nimplementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient,\nand/or economical operations.\n\n I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.\n\n\n\n\n Robert B. Peterson\n Assistant Inspector General for Inspections\n\n\n\n\n ii\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n Table of Contents\nKey Findings 1\nContext 3\nLeadership 5\nProgram Implementation 8\n Foreign Assistance 8\n Program and Financial Management 8\nPolicy 14\n Policy Planning and Implementation 14\nResource Management 16\n Financial and Human Resources 16\n Executive Office Role in Bureau Operations and Planning 16\n Executive Office Structure 17\n Executive Customer Service and Outreach 17\n Workforce Planning and Employee Development 18\n Contractors and Inherently Governmental Functions 19\n Equal Employment Opportunity Program 21\n General Services 21\nManagement Controls 23\n Assistant Secretary Statement of Assurance 23\n Property Management and Purchase Card Program 23\nInformation Management 24\nSecurity Management 27\nList of Recommendations 30\nPrincipal Officials 33\nAbbreviations 34\n\n\n\n\n iii\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nKey Findings\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation staff members are mission oriented\n and proud of their work. They appreciate the roles played by the Assistant Secretary and\n deputy assistant secretaries as subject matter experts, skilled negotiators, and advocates\n of the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s interests.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Colleagues in the Department of State and the interagency community acknowledge that\n the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation is effective in the foreign\n policy area. Its expertise, flexibility, and experience have been on full display during the\n ongoing international campaign to remove Syria\xe2\x80\x99s chemical weapons.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The bureau\xe2\x80\x99s legacy responsibilities for a variety of treaties, regimes, and agreements,\n along with current and world-events-driven tasks, pose a challenge to the small\n leadership team, which has not paid sufficient attention to managing bureau resources.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The bureau is giving short shrift to policy planning and resource management and should\n reestablish a formal strategic planning function.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Bureau leadership does not give sufficient importance to workforce planning,\n professional development, and training. Upward mobility is limited, and a significant\n number of employees are eligible to retire. Dependence on contractors creates\n vulnerabilities and represents a potential control risk. These issues are not exclusive to\n the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; nevertheless, the bureau must\n address them.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The bureau has nearly $600 million under active management. To provide proper\n management, oversight, and stewardship of the significant foreign assistance funds under\n its purview, the bureau needs a comptroller\xe2\x80\x99s office, better program and financial\n information management tools, and program officers qualified to manage multimillion-\n dollar project portfolios.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In 2012, an independent auditor, under the direction of OIG, audited the controls\n surrounding funds handled by the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which has\n requested a followup OIG review. Funds for programs in other offices have not been\n audited. At the suggestion of the inspection team, the Bureau of International Security\n and Nonproliferation leadership agreed to assist OIG with its plan to audit those offices.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The executive director is underutilized. Although bureau staff is generally satisfied with\n routine executive office services, the director plays no role in bureau resource\n management or strategic planning.\n\n\nAll findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-\nsite review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length\non areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected.\n\n 1\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nThe inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 3 and March 21, 2014.\nAmbassador Maura Harty (team leader), Charles Silver (deputy team leader), Michael Boorstein,\nMary Daly, Ambassador Cynthia Efird, Deborah Graze, Dolores Hylander, Christopher Mack,\nMonica O\xe2\x80\x99Keefe, Ambassador Peter Prahar, Iris Rosenfeld, and Moosa Valli conducted the\ninspection.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nContext\n The principal mission of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)\nis to prevent, disrupt, and roll back, where possible, the proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction (WMD) such as nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons; their\ndelivery systems; and destabilizing conventional weapons. 1 The bureau proudly notes President\nObama\xe2\x80\x99s 2009 Prague speech in which he stated \xe2\x80\x9cclearly and with conviction America\xe2\x80\x99s\ncommitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.\xe2\x80\x9d 2 That is ISN\xe2\x80\x99s\ninbox. It would be difficult to pick up a newspaper over the past year and not see a role for the\nbureau in some of the most important issues of the day. Mission orientation and subject matter\nexpertise define the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s workforce. OIG questionnaires and interviews with staff indicate\nthat morale is good.\n\n ISN is one of three bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and\nInternational Security (Under Secretary). In 2004, a single team of OIG inspectors carried out a\nsequential inspection of three former bureaus: the Bureaus of Nonproliferation, Arms Control,\nand Verification. The team\xe2\x80\x99s key recommendation was that the three bureaus be merged into\ntwo. This time, two different OIG teams conducted concurrent inspections of ISN and its sister\nBureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC). The two bureaus, plus the\nBureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), share a joint executive office housed administratively\nin ISN.\n\n Since the previous inspection, ISN has undergone continuous change, most recently in\n2010, when the current structure went into effect. ISN derives its authority from 65 separate\nsources, including constitutional, executive, and legislative authorities; treaties, conventions, and\nagreements; multilateral nonproliferation regimes; United Nations agreements; and other\nauthorities. 3 The bureau also derives authority from the National Security Presidential Directive\n17, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and the President\xe2\x80\x99s 2009 Prague\nspeech. Together, these encompass a complex and wide-ranging array of responsibilities. ISN\nbrings considerable human and financial resources to bear in carrying out these responsibilities.\n\n Foreign assistance funding plays an important role; in FY 2013, the bureau received\napproximately $270 million and, with unliquidated obligations from prior years, is managing\nclose to $600 million, including funds from other agencies and other countries. Effective\nmanagement and oversight of these financial resources are key to achieving the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s\nmission.\n\n ISN\xe2\x80\x99s recent work on such high-profile matters as Syria\xe2\x80\x99s chemical weapons, the Arms\nTrade Treaty, and peaceful nuclear cooperation (\xe2\x80\x9c1-2-3\xe2\x80\x9d) agreements speak to the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s\nexpertise, flexibility, and ever-evolving mission. However, a 2005 name change from the Bureau\nof Nonproliferation to the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation may have\nblurred the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s (Department) and the interagency community\xe2\x80\x99s understanding\nof ISN\xe2\x80\x99s broad role and capabilities. For instance, several in-house and interagency interlocutors\n\n1\n FY 2015 Bureau Resource Request, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, p. 3.\n2\n Remarks by President Barack Obama; Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.\n3\n 1 Foreign Affairs Manual 451.4.\n\n 3\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nexpressed confusion about the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s mission, as well as possible overlapping responsibilities\nwith AVC. These points need to be clarified and communicated within the Department and\nbeyond. ISN must also adjust to the changing priorities and capabilities of its Departmental and\noutside partners and regularly review its role in that context. Leadership must address the\nfollowing fundamental questions: Can ISN effectively cover all the turf it has staked out? What\ndoes ISN do best? Where can ISN most effectively add value in support of U.S. Government\npolicies?\n\n\n\n\n 4\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nLeadership\n The President\xe2\x80\x99s Prague speech determined ISN\xe2\x80\x99s overarching strategic goals: (1) a\nstronger global nuclear nonproliferation regime; (2) better controls to deny access to WMD, their\ndelivery systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons; and (3) a reduced risk of WMD\nterrorism. These goals require technical expertise, diplomacy, and an ability to work with\npartners in the Department, internationally, and within the interagency community. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s\nleadership team, comprising an Assistant Secretary and three deputy assistant secretaries, desires\nto become more fully integrated in the policy formulation process at the Department and seeks\nopportunities to expand its already key role.\n\n OIG questionnaires and interviews indicate that ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Assistant Secretary is well-\nregarded. He works on some of the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s highest profile efforts. Despite the heavy demands\nmade by his personal involvement in Arms Trade Treaty negotiations and Syria\xe2\x80\x99s chemical\nweapons disposal, he still managed to develop relationships with key interlocutors in China,\nPakistan, and South Korea; led the most recent preparatory meetings for the 2015 Nuclear\nNonproliferation Treaty Review Conference; and maintained a punishing travel schedule to\naddress a myriad of other issues. He speaks forcefully and authoritatively and seeks opportunities\nfor outreach through the media and with Congress. Personnel within the bureau, the Department,\nand the interagency community like and respect him.\n\n ISN\xe2\x80\x99s principal deputy assistant secretary, a 30-year veteran of the arms control and\nnonproliferation community, is consistently described as brilliant by colleagues and\nsubordinates. His portfolio includes day-to-day bureau operations, as well as non-nuclear and\ncounterproliferation issues. He supervises four offices. He is responsible for developing and\noverseeing U.S. policy related to the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, missile, and\ndestabilizing conventional weapons; counterproliferation in all of these areas; and nuclear\nweapons. The portfolio also includes export controls, nonproliferation regimes, interdiction,\nsanctions, the Proliferation Security Initiative, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,\nand counterproliferation dialogues with key countries.\n\n The deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Affairs supervises the work of three offices\nand is responsible for the diplomatic, technical, and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation.\nThis portfolio includes responsibility for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; relations with the\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency, including administration of a $90 million program; nuclear\nsafety and security; peaceful nuclear cooperation (\xe2\x80\x9c1-2-3\xe2\x80\x9d) agreements; and broad bilateral\ndialogues.\n\n The deputy assistant secretary for Nonproliferation Programs oversees four of the\nbureau\xe2\x80\x99s five foreign assistance program offices as well as the Office of Strategic\nCommunications and Outreach.\n\n Three years ago, the bureau refocused its Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach to\nemphasize its public diplomacy activities, renaming it the Office of Strategic Communication\nand Outreach. The office director enhanced the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s public diplomacy profile; however,\nelements of the strategic planning function appear to have been lost.\n\n\n 5\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n ISN\xe2\x80\x99s leadership team focuses heavily on policy but less so on managing the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s\nhuman and financial resources. Two bureau principals are engaged in an egregious interpersonal\nconflict that should not be tolerated. Although leadership has counseled both individuals, the\nissue remains unresolved, allowing tension and inefficiency to affect daily bureau operations as\nwell as interagency and international meetings. In addition, there are several examples of poor\nmanagers in need of counseling. Although upper management is aware of some leadership issues\nwithin individual offices, it has not resolved these problems.\n\n The bureau delegates authority for managerial oversight to the individual office level. An\nunfortunate consequence of this approach is that management controls and resource management\nare not getting the top-level attention they require. This deficiency is particularly acute in the\nadministration of foreign assistance funds, where hard work and obvious good intentions are no\nsubstitute for standardized procedures and best practices.\n\n ISN leadership agreed to the OIG team\xe2\x80\x99s recommendation to audit the program offices\nthat have never been audited. A previous audit 4 of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund\n(ISN/NDF) found that the Fund\xe2\x80\x99s controls over the contracting process were sufficient to meet\nmany objectives but needed improvement to ensure compliance with all Federal and Department\nrequirements. The audit resulted in 18 recommendations, including 5 for improving controls over\ncontracting, 5 for developing formal controls over project management so that key aspects of\nproject management were consistently executed across contracts, and 8 for improving financial\nmanagement.\n\n The bureau\xe2\x80\x99s executive director serves ISN, AVC, and PM. Her performance is\nnominally reviewed by ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Assistant Secretary, with whom she has only infrequent, periodic\nmeetings. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s principal deputy assistant secretary, the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s day-to-day manager, sees the\nexecutive director on an \xe2\x80\x9cas-needed\xe2\x80\x9d basis. Because the executive office operates relatively\nindependently of senior leadership, the bureau is not making effective use of this office.\n\n Some of the most acute questions facing the bureau revolve around long-term workforce\nplanning. ISN employs 412 people: 215 Civil Service; 23 Foreign Service; and the remainder\nvia contract, detail, or other hiring mechanisms. Approximately 34 percent of the Civil Service\nworkforce is now, or will be in the next 5 years, eligible to retire. Furthermore, one-fourth of the\n42 Civil Service employees who are at their highest pay grade (GS-15) are also at their top step,\nleaving little room for advancement. Staff interviews and responses to personal questionnaires\nindicate that a lack of upward mobility at all grades is a factor in their search for new\nopportunities. In addition, approximately half of the employees in ISN\xe2\x80\x99s foreign assistance\nprogram offices are on personal services or other contracting mechanisms, raising concerns\nabout their conducting inherently governmental work.\n\n These conditions highlight the need for immediate workforce planning to address issues\nsuch as a better balance among Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contractor workforces;\nrecruitment; retention; and training. In anticipation of the retirement of its most experienced and\nsenior experts, ISN needs to focus its efforts on recruitment and retention of the next generation\n\n\n4\n Audit of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund Controls Over Contracting and Project Management and\nIntegrity of Financial Data, Report No. AUD-FM-13-17, December 2012.\n 6\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nof employees to replace the talent and expertise ISN is losing through retirement. Employees\nneed to be sufficiently trained to carry out their assigned tasks as permitted under the law.\n\n The larger question, which the OIG inspectors raised, is whether ISN should grapple with\nthese workforce planning issues alone, or whether the Under Secretary for Arms Control and\nInternational Security should pursue a common approach among the bureaus under her authority\nto ensure a more effective response to these challenges.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nProgram Implementation\nForeign Assistance\n\n The OIG team examined ISN\xe2\x80\x99s strategic planning, budgeting, financial and performance\nmanagement, and program evaluation processes to assess how the bureau manages its foreign\nassistance portfolio. Responsibility for implementing foreign assistance programs and projects\nfalls to five bureau offices.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (ISN/MNSA) is responsible for\n managing the U.S. Government\xe2\x80\x99s extra-budgetary contribution to the International\n Atomic Energy Agency. FYs 2009\xe2\x80\x932013: $458 million in foreign assistance funding\n plus $71 million from other U.S. Government agencies.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of Export Control Cooperation (ISN/ECC) is responsible for the Export\n Control and Related Border Security program to establish effective strategic trade\n controls. FYs 2009\xe2\x80\x932013: $338 million in foreign assistance funding plus $3.8 million in\n non-U.S. Government contributions.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) is responsible for programs to\n enhance nuclear, chemical, and biological security. FYs 2009\xe2\x80\x932013: $336 million in\n foreign assistance funding plus $3.7 million in other U.S. Government funding and $5.8\n million in non-U.S. Government contributions.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (ISN/WMDT) is responsible for\n helping partner governments prevent, detect, and respond to WMD terrorism. FYs 2009\xe2\x80\x93\n 2013: $12 million in foreign assistance funding.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ISN/NDF is responsible for implementing specific nonproliferation projects. ISN/NDF\n receives \xe2\x80\x9cno-year\xe2\x80\x9d funds, which do not expire and are available until expended, and\n currently has 30 active projects with a budgeted amount of $381 million.\n\n ISN program officers are working to refine broad strategies and country plans to direct\ntheir efforts better. They are making impressive efforts to obtain useful performance information\nfrom their implementers, who include public international organizations, other U.S. Government\nagencies, contractors, and grantees. Program managers are continuing to develop objectives,\nmeasurable evaluation criteria, and evaluation mechanisms to judge the impact of their projects\nand programs.\n\nProgram and Financial Management\n\nComptroller\n\n ISN has nearly $600 million under active management, including current and prior-year\nforeign assistance funding, other U.S. Government funding, and contributions from foreign\ncountries. As described previously, a multiplicity of actors and offices share responsibility for\nmanaging these funds; however, no one monitors funding flows from start to finish.\n 8\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n The resource management division in the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s executive office works with four of\nthe bureau\xe2\x80\x99s five program offices (ISN/ECC, ISN/MNSA, ISN/CTR, and ISN/WMDT) and\nexternally with the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Bureau of Budget and Planning, the Office of Acquisitions\nManagement, and the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources to formulate and execute\nbudgets and to maintain and monitor ISN\xe2\x80\x99s foreign assistance funding for a broad array of\ncontracts, grants, and interagency agreements. The fifth office, ISN/NDF, has its own\nappropriation 5 and financial management specialist with the organizational designation of\ncomptroller.\n\n There is little standardization of processes or controls among the offices; they have not\npursued best practices. Given the large amounts of money flowing into and out of the bureau, the\ncurrent structure creates a vulnerability that funds will not be used efficiently and effectively.\nEach office has unique internal systems, including spreadsheets, for tracking its programs,\nbudgets, and spending. Employees manually reconcile these informal \xe2\x80\x9ccuff\xe2\x80\x9d records with reports\nthe executive office\xe2\x80\x99s resource management division prepares, using the Departmentwide Global\nFinancial Management System (GFMS). Many staff members with various levels of expertise\nand engagement are involved in this effort. The quality of required coordination with other\noffices in the Department is uneven.\n\n By contrast, several other Department bureaus with significant foreign assistance\nprograms have developed business structures that maximize standards and controls for all\nbureau-managed foreign assistance programs. For example, the Bureau of Population, Refugees,\nand Migration has an Office of the Comptroller that is independent of the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s executive\noffice and that reports to the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s principal deputy assistant secretary.\n\n The current structure in ISN does not facilitate the efficient and effective use of the large\namounts of money under bureau management. A comptroller office would establish uniform\nstandards, improve accountability, increase transparency, and monitor performance to promote\nthe effective utilization of funds.\n\nRecommendation 1: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in coordination\nwith the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish a comptroller\xe2\x80\x99s office to oversee\nmanagement of all bureau foreign assistance funding. (Action: ISN, in coordination with\nDGHR)\n\nUnliquidated Obligations\n\n Management of prior-year unliquidated obligations in ISN, and in ISN/ECC in particular,\nis inadequate. ISN has routinely failed to use foreign assistance funding by the end of the 5-year\nperiod of availability. Inspectors compiled information from the GFMS Data Warehouse\nindicating that a minimum of approximately $2 million in ISN foreign assistance funds were\ncanceled at the end of FY 2013, $2.2 million at the end of FY 2012, $3.8 million at the end of\nFY 2011, and $2.6 million at the end of FY 2009. FY 2010 results were modest: $50,000.\nProject managers and financial management staff in most program offices do not have direct\naccess to GFMS data. Instead, they must request information from the financial management\n\n5\n U.S. Department of State memo 9411334, May 13, 1994, Subject: First Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and\nDisarmament Fund (NDF) Review Panel.\n 9\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nteam in the executive office\xe2\x80\x99s resource management division every time they need to track and\nreconcile obligations and expenditures.\n\nRecommendation 2: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should request,\nand the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services should grant, read-only access\nto the Global Financial Management System to financial management staff in the program\noffices. (Action: ISN, in coordination with CGFS)\n\n ISN is currently at risk of failing to use FY 2014 funds by the allotted time period,\nparticularly for funds managed by ISN/ECC. At the time of the inspection, a new office director\nwas trying to reconcile 108 unliquidated obligations involving approximately $4.3 million in\nforeign assistance funding that will expire on September 30, 2014. Many obligations showed\nlong and unexplained periods of inactivity: 15 obligations totaling $311,623 had no activity for\n2 to 3 years; 26 obligations totaling $358,498 had no activity for 3 to 4 years; and 25 obligations\ntotaling $424,141 had no activity for 4 to 5 years.\n\n ISN/ECC staff claimed it reviewed unliquidated obligations regularly but was unable to\nprovide documentation to justify keeping these funds tied up in long-inactive agreements. In\nsome cases, it may have been impossible to proceed with projects. In others, project activity\nappeared to have ended, but closeout procedures had not been completed. In one case, nearly\n$2 million has languished on the books, owing to a failure of communication between program\noffices. Nineteen obligations, totaling $765,065, had been inactive since the date they were\nestablished\xe2\x80\x94a red flag that should have been evident from even a cursory review. Failure to\nreconcile these and other prior-year balances has precluded their use for other purposes and\nreflects a lack of attention to financial management at the office and bureau levels.\n\nRecommendation 3: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should institute\na monitoring regime for unliquidated balances, supervised by senior leadership, to deobligate\nunnecessary balances and to document justifications for continuing obligations that are not\nshowing quarterly activity. (Action: ISN)\n\nSystem Standardization\n\n ISN program and project portfolio managers lack standardized tools to manage foreign\nassistance programs. Instead, they struggle with a range of systems, including GFMS, the State\nAssistance Management System, the Integrated Logistics Management System, and others. Staff\ncannot integrate or readily retrieve the information in these systems in order to respond to routine\ninquiries from stakeholders. Program officers struggle to locate the information they need to\nprovide continuity and direction and to execute tasks properly. For any given project, there are a\nmultitude of associated documents: statements of work, action memos, status reports, email\nexchanges, meeting minutes, trip reports, and decision papers. The current practice of searching\nfor a specific document on a shared drive is difficult at best and not always successful in locating\nup-to-date and complete information.\n\n Absent a Departmentwide tool to address these challenges, ISN program offices have\nindependently developed systems to track their respective workloads. It is a challenge to capture\nprogram and financial information generated by interagency agreements; grants and cooperative\nagreements; contracts; and voluntary contributions with many types of project implementers\n 10\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nsuch as grantees, contractors, other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments, and public\ninternational organizations. In addition, GFMS cannot interface automatically with any of the\noffice-level tracking systems. As a result, program officers manually and laboriously extract\nfinancial information from GFMS reports, reconcile discrepancies, and attribute charges to\nspecific programs and projects. Examples of the disparate approaches taken to gathering\nessential information include the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ISN/NDF has developed a $2.5 million cloud-based Financial Information Management\n System to provide its program officers up-to-date information. This system and GFMS do\n not interface.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ISN/ECC has invested $200,000 in a project that, if successful, would create a financial\n management dashboard with financial and program information for its global programs\n and bilateral programs in more than 60 countries.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ISN/CTR has created an Excel-based spreadsheet, informally named \xe2\x80\x9cThe Big Dog,\xe2\x80\x9d to\n track financial and program performance of its ongoing projects. Users of this system\n report, not surprisingly, that it has grown unwieldy and, in any case, does not colocate\n financial and program data or provide a search capability.\n\n Program officers say an effective system would provide access to all information related\nto ISN programs and projects, including strategic planning documents, budgeting information,\nprogram designs, agreements, financial data, performance reports, evaluations, and memoranda.\nSuch a system would include the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Web-based, user-friendly interfaces and templates for collecting information (populating\n the database) from implementers, including templates that force performance reporting to\n refer to the statements of work and agreed-upon goals of a project;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 A document management warehouse for storing and retrieving information;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 A system of triggers to flag new proposals, requests for amendments and extensions, and\n overdue reports and missed milestones;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 An automatic feed of financial information from the GFMS with flags for data that will\n need to be reconciled.\n\nRecommendation 4: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in coordination\nwith the Bureau of Information Resource Management, the Bureau of the Comptroller and\nGlobal Financial Services, and the Bureau of Administration, should develop a single, searchable\ndatabase that interfaces with the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Global Financial Management System. (Action:\nISN, in coordination with IRM, CGFS, and A)\n\nRecommendation 5: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in coordination\nwith the Bureau of Information Resource Management, the Bureau of the Comptroller and\nGlobal Financial Services, and the Bureau of Administration, should proceed with development\nof an interface between the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund\xe2\x80\x99s Financial Information\n\n\n 11\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nManagement System and the Global Financial Management System. (Action: ISN, in\ncoordination with IRM, CGFS, and A)\n\nProfessional Development\n\n The 2004 OIG inspection report noted that, \xe2\x80\x9cprogram management skills are paramount\nrequirements.\xe2\x80\x9d 6 They still are. ISN lacks a stable cadre of employees to manage professionally\nthe multimillion-dollar program and project portfolios involving a multiplicity of obligation\nmechanisms (interagency agreements, grants and cooperative agreements, contracts, and\nvoluntary contributions to public international organizations) and a broad range of implementers\n(grantees, contractors, other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments, and public\ninternational organizations).\n\n The bureau was unable to provide comprehensive training records for its employees. A\nreview of training records submitted by the five program offices indicate that some long-serving\nprogram and project managers have not taken the introductory Foreign Service Institute courses\nin grants and contracts, despite having considerable responsibility for the funds under their\ncontrol. Many others have just completed these introductory courses or recently have signed up\nto do so.\n\n Grants officer representative certifications are valid for 3 years; contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s\nrepresentative certificates are valid for 2 years. These representatives are expected to maintain\nand further develop their skills during their certification period. The Office of the Procurement\nExecutive has established standards and recommended courses and other activities that satisfy\ncontinuing education requirements.\n\n In addition to not making use of all training available at the Foreign Service Institute,\nproject portfolio officers have not taken advantage of additional professional training available in\nthe private sector. For example, only one program manager in the bureau has received a Project\nManager Professional certificate\xe2\x80\x94the industry-recognized standard\xe2\x80\x94from the Project\nManagement Institute. Only this individual and a handful of others participate in the\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s Program and Project Management Community of Practice.\n\n The absence of professional development programs in ISN/CTR is of special concern.\nThe office is highly dependent on contractors and American Academy for the Advancement of\nScience Fellows, who are subject matter experts but are also ineligible for program management\ntraining through the Foreign Service Institute or other U.S. Government institutions. At the time\nof this inspection, 15 of 18 program and project portfolio managers fell into these ineligible\ncategories. However, ISN has not secured program and project management training for them\nfrom private sources recommended by the Office of the Procurement Executive. Lack of training\nprevents managers from performing their duties adequately and places funds and projects at risk.\n\nRecommendation 6: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should require\nthat all eligible program and project management personnel complete contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s\nrepresentative and grants officer representative training and obtain certification. (Action: ISN)\n\n\n6\n Inspection of the Bureau of Nonproliferation, Report No. ISP-I-05-50, December 2004, p. 20.\n 12\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 7: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should provide\nprogram and project management training, contracting with private providers for such training\nwhen necessary. (Action: ISN)\n\n\n\n\n 13\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nPolicy\nPolicy Planning and Implementation\n\n Senior U.S. Government officials commend the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s flexibility, technical expertise,\ntenacity, and ability to work well within the Department and the interagency community. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s\nrecent role in helping to negotiate the plan to destroy Syria\xe2\x80\x99s chemical weapons; the successful\nnegotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty; the implementation of numerous peaceful nuclear\ncooperation (\xe2\x80\x9c1-2-3\xe2\x80\x9d) agreements; its ongoing daily support of a host of nonproliferation regimes\nand treaties; and access to funds to respond to such issues help make ISN, as someone called it,\n\xe2\x80\x9cthe Department\xe2\x80\x99s Swiss army knife.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n Department and interagency colleagues praised ISN\xe2\x80\x99s role in the ongoing Syria chemical\nweapons process as an example of ISN\xe2\x80\x99s ability to address emerging threats successfully. Among\nthe factors that led to ISN\xe2\x80\x99s high-impact role were forward planning, technical expertise,\nnegotiating skill, and productive relationships with other bureaus and agencies. ISN worked\nclosely with National Security Council staff, the interagency community, and the Department\xe2\x80\x99s\nregional bureaus, and assembled experienced staff from throughout the bureau. For example,\narea experts from the Office of Regional Affairs worked with ISN\xe2\x80\x99s chemical weapons experts,\nand the bureau sent staffers with negotiating experience temporarily to the Organization for the\nProhibition of Chemical Weapons. Leadership now should take the time to review this\nexperience, apply lessons learned, and strengthen the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s institutional ability to replicate\nthis strong performance.\n\n ISN\xe2\x80\x99s tool kit is varied, including diplomatic engagement, sanctions, export licensing,\ninterdiction, and support of the visa process: so too are the tasks that it has set for itself. The 65\nauthorities that govern ISN\xe2\x80\x99s work entail improving, expanding, and updating dozens of\nconventions, treaties, agreements, and regimes affecting almost every country worldwide.\nAdditionally, ISN has the mandate to support the President\xe2\x80\x99s Nuclear Security Summit process\nand the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference.\n\n ISN has failed to examine systematically the key question, Can ISN do all that it has\nstaked out? Related to that question is how the bureau matches resources to priorities. Although\nthe bureau\xe2\x80\x99s 2014\xe2\x80\x932016 Strategic Plan addresses some of these issues, critical top-level\nassessments, with occasional course corrections, such as matching programs to policy, measuring\nresults of efforts, reassessing priorities, and coordinating bureauwide efforts have taken a back\nseat to the many pressing issues of the day.\n\n Meaningful strategic planning must be reinstated. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Strategic Planning and\nOutreach, known since 2010 as the Office of Strategic Communication and Outreach, was\n\xe2\x80\x9ccreated to address a perceived gap in the ability of [bureaus reporing to the Under Secretary for\nArms Control and International Security] to address future threats innovatively, identify\nemerging proliferation threats, and develop a coordinated and strategic counterproliferation\nresponse.\xe2\x80\x9d 7 One employee serves as a \xe2\x80\x9cstrategic planner,\xe2\x80\x9d with near exclusive responsibility for\nformulating ISN\xe2\x80\x99s resource requests. Although that employee communicates regularly with the\n\n7\n Key Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in Restructuring Arms Control, Government Accountability\nOffice Report No. GAO-09-738, June 2009, p. 11.\n 14\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nbureau\xe2\x80\x99s principal deputy assistant secretary when preparing resource requests and reports, no\nbureauwide process or structure exists, and many ISN offices feel that they could contribute but\nare left out. A mechanism is missing, per 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214, for action\nofficers and senior-level experts to plan strategically, communicate effectively, learn, innovate,\nand collaborate.\n\n According to ISN\xe2\x80\x99s 2014\xe2\x80\x932016 Strategic Plan, \xe2\x80\x9cInnovation is a measure of performance:\nthreats evolve, and if we do not adapt, we will fail to meet our policy objectives. We will\ncontinue to develop new mechanisms, approaches, tools, and partnerships to address emerging\nthreats and overcome challenges.\xe2\x80\x9d ISN lacks a bureau strategic planning entity. If reinstated,\nsuch a plan could keep abreast of bureauwide efforts, promote priorities as established by bureau\nand Department leadership, and recommend ways to coordinate the two effectively. According to\ninterviews with bureau personnel, the lack of such an entity has allowed some offices to feel\nisolated, devoting efforts to tasks viewed on occasion as mere ends in themselves, with little\nconnection to bureau priorities. ISN may, as a result of not having such an entity, be missing\nopportunities to leverage its collective skills and expertise as it did so well in the recent Syria\nchemical weapons example.\n\nRecommendation 8: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nformalize a strategic planning function, reporting to the Assistant Secretary, with responsibility\nfor establishing priorities, identifying emerging issues, and recommending appropriate\ndeployment of bureau resources. (Action: ISN)\n\nBiological Weapons Policy\n\n By and large, the 2010 reorganization achieved its objective of delineating the\nresponsibilities of AVC and ISN and reducing duplication and overlap. However,\ncounterproductive overlap remains in the area of biological weapons policy. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Biological\nPolicy Staff and AVC\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons have intersecting\nresponsibilities, especially with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention. The views of the\ntwo bureaus on policy differ. Complicating matters, the FAM assigns the two bureaus similar, if\nnot overlapping, responsibilities,8 sometimes resulting in disagreements between the two staffs.\nAs a result, the United States is less effective in advancing its biological weapons policy agenda,\nand the Department is less effective in the interagency community.\n\nRecommendation 9: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, should develop a\npolicy paper, cleared at the deputy assistant secretary level, outlining the policy parameters of\nbureau activities involving the Biological Weapons Convention. (Action: AVC, in coordination\nwith ISN)\n\n\n\n\n8\n The text of 1 FAM 453.3(2) states that ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation\n\xe2\x80\x9cdevelops and implements policies and programs to impede, roll back, and eliminate the proliferation of chemical\nand biological weapons,\xe2\x80\x9d whereas 1 FAM 444.1(1) states that AVC\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons\nAffairs \xe2\x80\x9cimplements efforts to impede and roll back the threat of chemical and biological weapons.\xe2\x80\x9d\n 15\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nResource Management\nFinancial and Human Resources\n\n Bureau Resource Management Chart\n Foreign Civil Contractors* When Detailees Students/ Total\n Service Service Actually Interns\n Employed\nU.S. Staff\nDomestic 23 215 141 5 12 16 412\nU.S. Staff\nOverseas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1\n*Includes information technology contractors, consultants, subject matter experts, and personal\nservices contractors. 9\n\n Resources Controlled by Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation\n Funding Description Amount\n (Diplomatic and Consular Programs and Public Diplomacy) (in thousands)\nFY 2012 Actual Resources Allotted to the Bureau 18,553\nFY 2013 Actual Resources Allotted to the Bureau 17,628\nFY 2014 Actual Resources to be Allotted to the Bureau 17,806\n\nForeign Assistance\nFY 2012 Actual Resources Allotted to the Bureau 277,169\nFY 2013 Actual Resources Allotted to the Bureau Estimate 268,456\nFY 2014 Actual Resources to be Allotted to the Bureau** 266,421\n**FY 2014 is based on the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources\xe2\x80\x99 anticipated release.\n\nExecutive Office Role in Bureau Operations and Planning\n\n The executive office provides common support services to ISN, AVC, and PM. These\nservices include budgeting, human resources, general services, information technology, and\nsecurity. The consolidated staffing of these bureaus is approximately 600 U.S. direct-hire\nemployees. PM is the largest bureau by staffing and funding.\n\n The executive office received average scores for customer service and routine operational\nfunctions on OIG questionnaires; however, strategic resource management and management\ncontrols in ISN do not get the level of attention they require. The executive office operates\nrelatively independently of senior leadership and plays little role in either the administration or\nallocation of foreign assistance funds.\n\n The structure of the executive office contributes to its shrinking role. Although the\nexecutive office\xe2\x80\x99s major client is PM, the office resides administratively within and is supervised\nby ISN. Further complicating the arrangement, the principal deputy assistant secretary of AVC is\nthe executive director\xe2\x80\x99s rating official, and the reviewing official is ISN\xe2\x80\x99s Assistant Secretary.\nDepartment regulations 1 FAM 441 and 1 FAM 451 and work requirements of the rating and\n\n9\n Personal services contract authority is granted in 22 U.S. Code, Section 2349bb Part IX\xe2\x80\x93Nonproliferation and\nExport Control Assistance.\n 16\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nreviewing officials do not include oversight of the executive office. The executive director\xe2\x80\x99s\nparticipation in regular discussions is limited by the fact that ISN, AVC, and PM hold their\nsenior staff meetings at the same time. Moreover, some traditional executive office functions,\nsuch as oversight of the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s management controls program, have been delegated to ISN\xe2\x80\x99s\nchief of staff.\n\nRecommendation 10: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and the Bureau of\nPolitical-Military Affairs, should establish a rating, reviewing, and reporting chain for the\nexecutive director and update the Foreign Affairs Manual accordingly. (Action: ISN, in\ncoordination with AVC and PM)\n\nExecutive Office Structure\n\n The structure of the executive office is a legacy of the 1999 Arms Control and\nDisarmament Agency integration. Since then, staffing, funding, and programs have expanded in\nsize and complexity, increasing the executive director\xe2\x80\x99s span of control. According to the\nexecutive director, the needs of PM consume the majority of her time, thus increasing the\nlikelihood that the two other bureaus may receive short shrift. The 15-year old model may not\nmeet today\xe2\x80\x99s needs.\n\n Four deputy executive directors support the executive director; each manages one\nfunctional area. Unlike the other executive offices in the Department, here there is no one deputy\nwho is familiar with and engaged in the full range of executive office functions and crosscutting\nissues or who can relieve the executive director of some burdens, act in her absence, or speak\nauthoritatively with senior leadership.\n\nRecommendation 11: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should designate one of the four deputy\ndirectors as the primary backstop for the executive director and reallocate responsibilities\naccordingly. (Action: ISN, in coordination with DGHR)\n\nExecutive Customer Service and Outreach\n\n Responses to OIG inspection questionnaires and interviews indicate employees need one-\nstop guidance on topics such as telework, travel, performance management, and ISN Blackberry\npolicy. New employees note that the lack of an orientation program beyond basic in-processing\ntranslates to a steeper learning curve in gaining an understanding of the entire bureau. Although\nthe bureau has made an effort both to educate and listen to customers, the executive office has\nnot conducted customer satisfaction surveys, which would help identify customer needs.\n\nRecommendation 12: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nconduct a customer service survey. (Action: ISN)\n\n\n\n\n 17\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nWorkforce Planning and Employee Development\n\nWorkforce Planning\n\n Both the 2004 OIG inspection report 10 and the 2009 Government Accountability Office\n 11\nreport addressed a number of workforce management and planning issues. Several problems\nnoted in those reports remain.\n\n Succession planning is one of the lingering issues. ISN\xe2\x80\x99s workforce includes experts in\nthe areas of nonproliferation, negotiation, and science and technology, among others. Civil\nService employees represent approximately 90 percent of ISN\xe2\x80\x99s workforce. Twenty-one percent\nof these employees are eligible to retire now, which is higher than the Department average of 16\npercent. Within the next 5 years, 34 percent of these employees will be eligible to retire, creating\na skills gap that could jeopardize the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s ability to carry out its functions. The OIG\ninspectors discussed these issues with both the Assistant Secretary and the Under Secretary, who\nare both aware of and concerned about these matters. The Bureau of Human Resources has\nissued a 5-year workforce and leadership planning paper 12 that might assist ISN leadership in\naddressing these issues.\n\n A paradox of the workforce in ISN is that although there is concern about the loss of\ndecades of expertise when senior officials leave, there is, at the same time, rapid turnover in the\nprogram offices at the working level. In ISN/ECC, a 26-person office that managed $338 million\nfrom FYs 2009 to 2013 in the Export Control and Related Border Security program, only 3 of the\n11 project managers had 6 or more years of experience; 5 had fewer than 3 years of experience.\nIn the past 5 years, 15 Civil Service employees and 12 contractors have left the office.\n\n This situation also exists in other ISN offices. At the time of the inspection, ISN/CTR had\n25 employees: 5 full-time U.S. Government employees, 1 personal services contractor, 14\ncontractors, 4 American Academy for the Advancement of Science Fellows, and 1 detailee from\nanother agency. Records indicate that a total of 71 employees have rotated through this office\nsince 2007.\n\n There is a relationship between the need for and lack of a staff development path and the\nhigh turnover at the mid-level ranks of the bureau. Office management and staff attribute the\nhigh turnover of personnel in part to ISN\xe2\x80\x99s inability to offer identifiable career paths. One\npossible alternative would be to bring staff in at lower grades in positions with a career ladder.\n\n The bureau competes with other workforce sectors to recruit and retain highly expert\nemployees. ISN has not conducted an analysis to determine how this competition affects the\nbureau\xe2\x80\x99s ability to maintain a qualified and experienced workforce. The Office of Personnel\nManagement issued a rule, effective September 2013, which changes the way agencies evaluate\nand award recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses. This rule is intended to help agencies\ncompete for talent to meet critical mission needs and, in the Department, is typically granted to\n\n10\n Compliance Review \xe2\x80\x93 Inspection of the Bureau of Nonproliferation, Report No. ISP-I-05-50, December 2004.\n11\n Government Accountability Office Report No. GAO-09-738, June 2009.\n12\n Five Year Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan: Fiscal Years 2013\xe2\x80\x932017, Office of Resource Management\nand Organization Analysis (HR/RMA), June 2013.\n 18\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\ninformation technology specialists and health care professionals. ISN officials have not met with\nthe Department\xe2\x80\x99s Director General to explore whether this option is suitable for ISN.\n\n The bureau faces the challenge of expanding the development of junior and mid-level\nstaff. ISN has few career-ladder positions. ISN has arranged for a few rotational and temporary\nassignments, and some mid-level staff have accompanied delegations overseas. A proposed\nrotational program within ISN, AVC, and PM failed. It is time to try again.\n\n The Assistant Secretary stated that attracting, retaining, and developing the capabilities of\nstaff is one of the critical challenges facing the bureau; however, neither the front office nor the\nexecutive office has developed a strategic plan to address the human capital challenge. The OIG\nteam counseled ISN leadership to meet with the Director General\xe2\x80\x99s office and discuss the skills\nincentive program.\n\nRecommendation 13: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,\nshould draft a comprehensive, multiyear workforce plan. (Action: ISN, in coordination with T)\n\nContractors and Inherently Governmental Functions\n\n Dependence on contractors creates vulnerability and represents a potential control risk.\nISN employs approximately 111 contactors who perform many different functions throughout\nthe bureau. Approximately half of the contractors work in ISN\xe2\x80\x99s five program offices. Interviews\nwith more than a dozen contractors involved in managing foreign assistance programs raised\nconcern that their work may involve inherently governmental functions.\n\n The Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 7.5 states that the conduct of foreign\nrelations, the determination of foreign policy, and the determination of agency policy are\ninherently governmental functions and may not be performed by contractors. Additionally, the\nregulation describes functions that are not considered inherently governmental but \xe2\x80\x9cmay\napproach\xe2\x80\x9d that status. These functions include services that relate to budget preparation, policy\nanalysis, or participation in any situation where a contractor may be perceived as an agency\nemployee or representative. In those cases, the Office of Management and Budget\xe2\x80\x99s procurement\npolicy states that agencies should provide a greater degree of scrutiny of contactors performing\nservices in these gray areas.\n\n The Department uses workforce studies to determine the appropriate balance of\nemployees and contractors and the appropriate functions of each. Per 3 FAM 2164, each bureau\nis responsible for managing its contractor and Federal employee resources appropriately and for\nensuring that only Federal employees perform inherently governmental functions. The FAM\nstipulates that Federal employees receive consideration to perform new functions and functions\nperformed by contractors to implement Section 736 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of\n2009 13 and Office of Management and Budget guidance. 14 The Act stipulates that agencies have\n\xe2\x80\x9csafeguards and monitoring systems in place to ensure that work performed by contractors has\nnot changed or been expanded to become an inherently governmental function.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n13\n Pub. L. No. 111-8; Division D.\n14\n Managing the Multi-sector Workforce, M-09-26.\n 19\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 14: The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of\nInternational Security and Nonproliferation, should conduct a workforce study of the program\noffices so that only Federal employees perform inherently governmental functions. (Action: A,\nin coordination with ISN)\n\nPerformance Management\n\n Personal questionnaires from ISN employees raised concerns about leadership\nperformance at the director and deputy director levels in several offices. Interviews confirmed\nthat in several instances, mid-level managers were not setting clear objectives, organizing the\nworkload efficiently, communicating with staff, holding staff members accountable for their\nperformance, managing conflicts, or allowing employees to take on new responsibilities and\ndevelop their skills. In one office, for example, many of the management issues the inspectors\nidentified in the 2004 OIG report persist. The office director still does not communicate specific\nassignments clearly. Workloads are uneven. Communication within the office remains poor, and\nthere are no staff meetings.\n\n Department regulation 13 FAM 311.2 mandates that mid-level personnel take prescribed\nleadership courses according to their grade to build leadership and management skills\nprogressively over a career. Department regulation 3 FAM 1214 provides leadership and\nmanagement principles for Department employees. Interviews revealed that several long-serving\nmid-level management employees had not taken the required leadership training courses. The\nbureau was not monitoring staff compliance with leadership training requirements. During the\ninspection, ISN polled staff to determine who had not attended the mandatory training, a\nnecessary first step to addressing these leadership deficiencies and their consequences.\n\nRecommendation 15: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should require\nall management staff to complete obligatory leadership training and should monitor compliance\nwith this requirement. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 16: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should include\nleadership and management principles in the work requirements and performance plans of\nleaders from deputy office director to Assistant Secretary. (Action: ISN)\n\nTraining\n\n There is no bureauwide training plan or prioritized training budget. As a result, bureau\nemployees may not receive training or other opportunities essential for job performance or\nprofessional development. The executive office\xe2\x80\x99s human resources division does not know\nwhether employees have individual development plans. Department regulation 3 Foreign Affairs\nHandbook (FAH)-1 H-2821.3 a. (3) recommends that supervisors and employees prepare an\nannual plan; bureaus may require them, and ISN should. The Bureau of Human Resources offers\nsessions on how to prepare these plans. Development opportunities could include intra-\nDepartment and interagency rotations, possible rotations to staff assistant positions, and more\nopportunities to work on delegations. ISN and PM could explore whether rotations overseas\nmight be expanded to allow Civil Service employees to serve as political advisors to the\nDepartment of Defense.\n\n 20\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 17: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should require\nthat each employee have an individual development plan. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 18: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndevelop and implement an action plan for mid-level Civil Service staff, including rotational\nassignments and overseas opportunities. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 19: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndevelop a bureauwide, prioritized training budget. (Action: ISN)\n\n The bureau has no training coordinator; the executive office\xe2\x80\x99s human resources division\nperforms training-related administrative processes only. In 2010, the Under Secretary and the\nAssistant Secretaries for ISN, AVC, and PM identified the need for a full-time, professional\ncoordinator to enhance career development opportunities for all employees in the three bureaus.\nISN\xe2\x80\x99s FYs 2014 and 2015 Bureau Resource Requests listed the creation of this position as a\nbureau priority. The Department denied the request. The OIG inspectors suggested that the\nUnder Secretary consider creating a position in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms\nControl and International Security front office to address recruitment, training, and career-\ndevelopment issues across the bureaus.\n\nEqual Employment Opportunity Program\n\n ISN does not have an active Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program; for many\nyears, there have been no trained and certified EEO counselors. Department guidance suggests\nthat employees have a trained colleague within their own bureau from whom to seek EEO\ninformation and guidance. Additionally, 13 FAM 312 states it is mandatory that managers and\nsupervisors attend EEO/diversity training (for example, Foreign Service Institute course PT 107).\nThe executive office\xe2\x80\x99s human resources office does not have the ability to track attendance and\nidentify delinquent employees.\n\nRecommendation 20: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nimplement an Equal Employment Opportunity program, including a front office statement of\ncommitment to program principles, appointment and announcement of certified counselors, and\na link to the Office of Civil Rights Web site on the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s home page. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 21: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should require\nthat managers and supervisors attend mandatory Equal Employment Opportunity/diversity\ntraining. (Action: ISN)\n\nGeneral Services\n\n Among its responsibilities, the executive office\xe2\x80\x99s general services office performs travel,\nproperty management, and procurement functions. During FY 2013, ISN submitted 607\nprocurement actions through the Ariba procurement system, with a total value of approximately\n$38 million. AVC submitted 148 actions worth approximately $5 million. The inspectors spot-\nchecked transactions from November and December 2013 and did not find any irregularities.\n\n\n 21\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nTravel\n\n Employees are satisfied with the executive office travel services but are dissatisfied with\nthe Department\xe2\x80\x99s travel provider, Carlson Wagonlit, citing poor service and inconsistency in\ninterpreting travel rules and regulations. They also expressed dissatisfaction with travel\nregulations governing classes of travel, contract fares, and permissible upgrades. To address\nthese concerns and to educate employees, the travel section organized a well-attended,\nbureauwide meeting with transportation and travel management officials from the Bureau of\nAdministration.\n\n The FY 2013 ISN and AVC travel budgets totaled approximately $3 million and $2\nmillion, respectively. Both bureaus authorize business class travel in accordance with 14 FAM\n567.2-4. The principal deputy assistant secretary in ISN and the AVC chief of staff approve\nbusiness class travel, and the executive director has approval authority in their absence. During\nFY 2013, ISN approved 62 business class travel requests. All approvals were readily available\nand contained sufficient justification for premium travel. Vouchers are processed and travelers\nreimbursed with minimal delay.\n\n During the inspection, the OIG team heard complaints about insufficient travel funds. Of\nthe 62 approved requests for business class travel, 45 trips were actually taken. Some trips were\ncanceled or converted to economy class. The OIG team reviewed justifications and vouchers for\nthe 45 business class trips, which cost a combined total of approximately $401,000. Had the\nbureau used economy class, the cost would have been approximately $144,000, a savings of\napproximately $257,000, which the bureau could have used to meet other needs. The calculation\nof the economy fare travel includes the cost of a 1-day rest stop as permitted by Department\ntravel policies in 14 FAM 567.\n\n The principal deputy assistant secretary in ISN controls the bureaus\xe2\x80\x99 travel budgets. He\nmakes initial allocations to offices at the beginning of each fiscal year, based on travel requests\nfrom each office, and uses monthly travel statements provided by the travel section to make\nadjustments to the office totals. However, it is not evident that individual offices rigorously\nreview participation or consider using the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s videoconferencing capabilities to conduct\nmeetings instead of more costly travel options. An occasional top-level strategic review of\nbureauwide travel would be useful.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nManagement Controls\nAssistant Secretary Statement of Assurance\n\n The process to evaluate the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s management controls is flawed and unreliable. The\nFY 2013 Assistant Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s management controls statement of assurance, prepared as a\nrequirement of 2 FAM 20 and the Federal Managers\xe2\x80\x99 Financial Integrity Act of 1982, identified\nno material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s management controls system.\nAmong other requirements, the regulations state that the Assistant Secretary must attest that\nprograms are carried out efficiently and effectively and in accordance with law and that funds are\naccounted for and recorded properly. The ISN chief of staff, who is also the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s\nmanagement controls officer, was unfamiliar with the subject of management controls when he\ninitially assumed responsibility for preparing the statement of assurance for the Assistant\nSecretary\xe2\x80\x99s signature. In addition, the executive office plays only an administrative role in the\nprocess. According to ISN leadership, the letter is considered little more than a \xe2\x80\x9crote document.\xe2\x80\x9d\nThis approach lacks rigor and may fail to identify inadequate controls and lead to an inaccurate\nAssistant Secretary statement.\n\nRecommendation 22: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should develop\nand implement a system of bureauwide management controls. (Action: ISN, in coordination\nwith CGFS)\n\nRecommendation 23: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndesignate the executive director as the bureau management controls officer. (Action: ISN)\n\nProperty Management and Purchase Card Program\n\n ISN\xe2\x80\x99s general services office manages and controls bureau reportable property, including\ninformation technology equipment. The total amount of accountable property, located in multiple\ndomestic locations, is $7 million. ISN completes annual inventory certifications and\nreconciliations, as required by 14 FAM 426, and a random check of inventory records showed no\ndiscrepancies. The FY 2013 property reconciliation certification showed a missing property rate\nof 0.58 percent, well below the Department\xe2\x80\x99s 1 percent threshold for reporting missing property\nto the Bureau of Administration.\n\n The general services office also manages the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s purchase and payment card\nsystem, with 435 transactions for ISN in FY 2013 valued at $381,739 and 134 transactions for\nAVC valued at $60,311. The office reviews credit card purchase statements monthly and\nforwards them to the executive office for approval. The FY 2013 annual program review,\nrequired by 4 FAM 455.3, identified no problems.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nInformation Management\n The technology division (TD) faces challenges with internal and external communication\narising from the out-of-scope information technology support requirements of ISN, AVC, and\nPM, the complexity of systems, and the size and geographic separation of division staff.\n\n TD manages a complex information technology network composed of 800 end users, 93\napplications, and 8 separate networks that support ISN, AVC, and PM. TD has 12 direct-hire\nstaff members and 70 contractors. Many of TD\xe2\x80\x99s projects are reactive in nature, including\nresponding to congressional mandates.\n\n TD employees work in three separate locations and receive service and support from\nthree help desks, each with its own support software. The Bureau of Information Resource\nManagement handles all ISN, AVC, and PM OpenNet and ClassNet support requests. In OIG\nsurveys, customers expressed dissatisfaction with Bureau of Information Resource Management\nservice and support. TD\xe2\x80\x99s computer operations section spends considerable time resolving\ntechnical issues that are in the Bureau of Information Resource Management\xe2\x80\x99s scope of work, as\nspecified in the memorandum of understanding. TD plans to address these issues in monthly\nmeetings with the Bureau of Information Resource Management\xe2\x80\x99s customer liaison office.\n\nInitiatives\n\n To address the challenges their division faces, TD seeks to transform its operating\nenvironment. The division adopted new software development best practices and began\nimplementing a management tool known as Serena Business Manager. This new tool is\nimproving the division\xe2\x80\x99s internal communication, standardizing processes, and improving\noversight of key programs such as the modernization and migration of the Defense Trade and\nApplication System.\n\n PM, the largest of the three bureaus reporting to the the Office of the Under Secretary for\nArms Control and International Security, garners most of TD\xe2\x80\x99s support. This situation arises\nfrom the different business requirements of the three bureaus, PM\xe2\x80\x99s larger budget, as well as\nPM\xe2\x80\x99s physical proximity to TD. ISN and AVC have to work harder to communicate their\ninformation technology requirements. TD has taken steps to address communication deficiencies\nand has assigned an employee to liaise with ISN and AVC on a regular basis.\n\nCommunication\n\n In preinspection surveys, respondents indicated they were unaware of the division\xe2\x80\x99s long-\nterm and strategic goals. The OIG team\xe2\x80\x99s review of TD\xe2\x80\x99s goals, objectives, and project\ninformation that leadership provided found this information satisfactory but not available to the\nentire TD team. As a result, employees do not understand how their work contributes to the\nlarger picture, leading to frustration and poor morale among lower level employees. This\nsituation could be addressed through proactive communication throughout TD.\n\n\n\n\n 24\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nCollaboration Tools\n\n OIG survey respondents commented, and the OIG team confirmed, that the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s Web\nsites and collaboration tools are difficult to navigate and contain outdated information. TD has\nmore than 40 SharePoint and Web sites. Individual offices provide content for these sites.\nDepartment regulation 5 FAM 776.2 b. requires that content managers ensure the information\npublished on Web sites is current, relevant, and accurate. Poor content management practices can\nprevent employees from adopting potentially useful collaboration tools. For example, the bureau\nlacks a centralized process to issue and create a repository of management notices. Instead, the\nexecutive office or the chief of staff disseminates information via ad hoc emails. The bureau\xe2\x80\x99s\nSharePoint administrator could help the executive office update and expand the content of its\nSharePoint site.\n\nRecommendation 24: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nincorporate and update its SharePoint and Web sites with content provided by the executive\noffice and other offices. (Action: ISN)\n\nAuthorization to Operate\n\n The authorization to operate for the Defense Trade and Application System, which\nsupports export licensing and compliance activities, has expired. The last authorization to operate\nwas signed on June 11, 2011, and expired on November 30, 2012. The bureau has not initiated a\nprocess to renew the authorization to operate. PM, the system owner, does not want to pay for\nthe full assessment and authorization of this system, because it believes that the system will fail\nthe assessment and that PM will be required to make security upgrades that are already planned\nor underway. In addition, while the system is offline for the assessment, users would be unable to\nprocess and adjudicate U.S. export licenses on the classified network. The bureau currently\nadjudicates approximately 300 licenses a day. Department regulation 5 FAM 1065.4 states all\nDepartment information systems that are reportable under the Federal Information Security\nManagement Act must complete the Department\xe2\x80\x99s system authorization process and receive a\ndesignated approving authority before being permitted to operate. Systems that do not undergo\nperiodic reassessment and reauthorization to operate create security vulnerabilities on the\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s networks.\n\nRecommendation 25: The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau\nof International Security and Nonproliferation and the Bureau of Information Resource\nManagement, should obtain a valid authorization to operate for the Defense Trade and\nApplication System. (Action: PM, in coordination with ISN and IRM)\n\nEnvironmental Controls\n\n TD\xe2\x80\x99s data centers do not have the appropriate environmental controls in place to sustain\ncurrent network operations. The data centers are unable to provide the required airflow and air-\nconditioning needed for their network hardware to operate at optimal levels. TD had to purchase\nportable air-conditioning units to keep temperatures at necessary levels. Employees said that\nduring the summer months they must often shut down lower priority production servers to\nprevent the higher priority servers from overheating. TD leadership has worked with the facility\nmaintenance managers to install new air-conditioning units, but with no success. Department\n 25\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nregulation 12 FAM 629.4-4 requires data center managers to ensure that air-conditioning and\nhumidity controls are installed as appropriate. Improper or nonexistent environmental controls\ncan result in disruptions in network and system availability.\n\nRecommendation 26: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should install\nenvironmental controls that provide the appropriate airflow and air-conditioning to their data\ncenters. (Action: ISN)\n\n\n\n\n 26\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nSecurity Management\n According to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), ISN had eight security infractions\nand one security violation since January 2012. This number is average for a bureau. During the\nsame time period, DS reported no security infractions or violations for AVC.\n\nExecutive Office Accountability for the Bureaus\xe2\x80\x99 Security Program\n\n The executive office is not exercising appropriate oversight of the ISN, AVC, and PM\nbureau security programs. According to 12 FAM 512.2, the executive director is responsible for\nmaintaining the security program of the bureau(s), ensuring that the bureau(s) comply with\nsecurity requirements, and designating principal and unit security officers. In 2005, the DS\napplications and programs division acted on a request by ISN\xe2\x80\x99s executive office and assigned a\nbureau security officer to the executive director to oversee the AVC and ISN security programs.\nThe bureau security officer implements security regulations and provides advice and assistance\non the protection of classified information; however, since his assignment, he has overseen\nsecurity only of ISN and PM. Simultaneously, AVC has become an almost entirely sensitive\ncompartmented information facility. An AVC direct-hire primary and an alternate special\nsecurity representative currently have complete security responsibility and authority, including\nall other collateral security duties for AVC. This ambiguous and at times fractious relationship\nbetween the special security representative and the bureau security officer has existed since\nAVC\xe2\x80\x99s conception in 2005.\n\n DS proposed a solution to this problem by creating a task-specific memorandum of\nagreement between the DS and ISN executive offices that will specifically define bureau security\nofficer support services for ISN, AVC, and PM. This agreement is currently in draft form.\n\nRecommendation 27: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should complete and sign the\nmemorandum of agreement on bureau security officer support. (Action: ISN, in coordination\nwith DS)\n\n Upon completion of the memorandum of agreement clarifying DS and ISN\nresponsibilities, ISN\xe2\x80\x99s executive office will also need to define the roles, responsibilities, chain\nof reporting, and accountability between the bureau principal and the unit security officers,\nspecial security representatives, and the bureau security officer. In accordance with 12 FAM\n512.1-5, \xe2\x80\x9cEmployees assigned as regional, post, bureau, or unit security officers have the\nsupervisory and/or the oversight responsibility to ensure that classified material entrusted to their\norganizational unit is handled in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this volume.\xe2\x80\x9d This\ninitiative will allow the executive office to forge a leadership role for the security program.\n\nRecommendation 28: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should define\nspecific duties and responsibilities and clarify chain of reporting for all security officers within\nthe bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.\n(Action: ISN)\n\n\n\n 27\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nUnit Security Officer Roles and Responsibilities\n\n Unit security officers for the individual AVC and ISN offices execute their\nresponsibilities in accordance with 12 FAM 563.2. The bureau security officer provides periodic\ntraining for unit security officers and informs them of any changes in policy. However, the\nmajority of security officers interviewed were unaware of the DS guidebook on Principal Duties\nof a Unit Security Officer, dated July 2011. This valuable tool is located on the DS applications\nand programs division Web site and can assist security personnel in the performance of their\nduties. All security officers, except for the AVC and ISN principals assigned in ISN\xe2\x80\x99s executive\noffice, have received DS unit security officer training.\n\nRecommendation 29: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should have\nall principal unit security officers complete unit security officer training. (Action: ISN)\n\nSecurity Awareness Refresher Training\n\n Interviews revealed that DS has conducted neither security awareness training nor annual\nrefresher briefings for AVC and ISN personnel. The bureau security officer was unaware of this\nrequirement and has not requested such briefings. In accordance with 12 FAM 564.2, DS is\nresponsible for directing the establishment of a program \xe2\x80\x9cto provide, at a minimum, annual\nsecurity training for personnel having continued access to classified information.\xe2\x80\x9d Lapses in such\ntraining can lead to security incidents and compromise of classified information.\n\nRecommendation 30: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequest, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide, assistance in establishing a\nsecurity awareness training program that includes annual refresher briefings for personnel in the\nBureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and the Bureau of International Security\nand Nonproliferation. (Action: ISN, in coordination with DS)\n\nBureau Emergency Action Plans\n\n AVC and ISN are current on all emergency action drills and coordinate these activities as\npart of the Harry S Truman facility emergency action plan. The mission critical teams\nsuccessfully participated in the April 2013 Eagle Horizon national exercise program. Both\nbureaus\xe2\x80\x99 emergency action plans conform to the Department\xe2\x80\x99s revised template as overseen by\nthe Bureau of Administration, Office of Emergency Management. However, AVC\xe2\x80\x99s and ISN\xe2\x80\x99s\nemergency action plans are not accessible on either the executive office Web site or the\nindividual bureaus\xe2\x80\x99 Intranet sites. In accordance with 6 FAM 416.1-1 (10), the executive director\nis responsible for \xe2\x80\x9censuring the [bureau emergency action plan] is posted on the bureau Web site\nand all bureau personnel are aware of the plan and its related procedures\xe2\x80\x9d so that bureau\npersonnel have immediate access to and knowledge of the plan\xe2\x80\x99s contents.\n\n In addition, 6 FAM 416.1-1 (12) requires the executive office to provide a link to the\nBureau of Administration, Office of Emergency Management SharePoint site for both bureau\nand facility emergency action plans from the bureau/office Web site (i.e., OpenNet and\nClassNet). This link allows bureau/office personnel easy access to a full range of emergency\npreparedness information as well as information on the bureau plan.\n\n 28\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 31: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, should post their\nemergency actions plans on their respective Intranet sites and establish a link to the Bureau of\nAdministration\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Emergency Management SharePoint site. (Action: ISN, in\ncoordination AVC)\n\n\n\n\n 29\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nList of Recommendations\nRecommendation 1: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish a comptroller\xe2\x80\x99s office to\noversee management of all bureau foreign assistance funding. (Action: ISN, in coordination\nwith DGHR)\n\nRecommendation 2: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequest, and the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services should grant, read-only\naccess to the Global Financial Management System to financial management staff in the program\noffices. (Action: ISN, in coordination with CGFS)\n\nRecommendation 3: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ninstitute a monitoring regime for unliquidated balances, supervised by senior leadership, to\ndeobligate unnecessary balances and to document justifications for continuing obligations that\nare not showing quarterly activity. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 4: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management, the Bureau of the\nComptroller and Global Financial Services, and the Bureau of Administration, should develop a\nsingle, searchable database that interfaces with the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Global Financial Management\nSystem. (Action: ISN, in coordination with IRM, CGFS, and A)\n\nRecommendation 5: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management, the Bureau of the\nComptroller and Global Financial Services, and the Bureau of Administration, should proceed\nwith development of an interface between the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund\xe2\x80\x99s\nFinancial Information Management System and the Global Financial Management System.\n(Action: ISN, in coordination with IRM, CGFS, and A)\n\nRecommendation 6: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should require\nthat all eligible program and project management personnel complete contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s\nrepresentative and grants officer representative training and obtain certification. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 7: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nprovide program and project management training, contracting with private providers for such\ntraining when necessary. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 8: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nformalize a strategic planning function, reporting to the Assistant Secretary, with responsibility\nfor establishing priorities, identifying emerging issues, and recommending appropriate\ndeployment of bureau resources. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 9: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, should develop a\npolicy paper, cleared at the deputy assistant secretary level, outlining the policy parameters of\nbreau activities involving the Biological Weapons Convention. (Action: AVC, in coordination\nwith ISN)\n\n 30\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 10: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and the Bureau of\nPolitical-Military Affairs, should establish a rating, reviewing, and reporting chain for the\nexecutive director and update the Foreign Affairs Manual accordingly. (Action: ISN, in\ncoordination with AVC and PM)\n\nRecommendation 11: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should designate one of the four deputy\ndirectors as the primary backstop for the executive director and reallocate responsibilities\naccordingly. (Action: ISN, in coordination with DGHR)\n\nRecommendation 12: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nconduct a customer service survey. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 13: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,\nshould draft a comprehensive, multiyear workforce plan. (Action: ISN, in coordination with T)\n\nRecommendation 14: The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of\nInternational Security and Nonproliferation, should conduct a workforce study of the program\noffices so that only Federal employees perform inherently governmental functions. (Action: A,\nin coordination with ISN)\n\nRecommendation 15: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequire all management staff to complete obligatory leadership training and should monitor\ncompliance with this requirement. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 16: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ninclude leadership and management principles in the work requirements and performance plans\nof leaders from deputy office director to Assistant Secretary. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 17: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequire that each employee have an individual development plan. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 18: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndevelop and implement an action plan for mid-level Civil Service staff, including rotational\nassignments and overseas opportunities. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 19: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndevelop a bureauwide, prioritized training budget. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 20: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nimplement an Equal Employment Opportunity program, including a front office statement of\ncommitment to program principles, appointment and announcement of certified counselors, and\na link to the Office of Civil Rights Web site on the bureau\xe2\x80\x99s home page. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 21: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequire that managers and supervisors attend mandatory Equal Employment\nOpportunity/diversity training. (Action: ISN)\n\n 31\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\nRecommendation 22: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services, should develop\nand implement a system of bureauwide management controls. (Action: ISN, in coordination\nwith CGFS)\n\nRecommendation 23: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndesignate the executive director as the bureau management controls officer. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 24: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nincorporate and update its SharePoint and Web sites with content provided by the executive\noffice and other offices. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 25: The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with the\nBureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the Bureau of Information Resource\nManagement, should obtain a valid authorization to operate for the Defense Trade and\nApplication System. (Action: PM, in coordination with ISN and IRM)\n\nRecommendation 26: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should install\nenvironmental controls that provide the appropriate airflow and air-conditioning to their data\ncenters. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 27: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should complete and sign the\nmemorandum of agreement on bureau security officer support. (Action: ISN, in coordination\nwith DS)\n\nRecommendation 28: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\ndefine specific duties and responsibilities and clarify chain of reporting for all security officers\nwithin the bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International\nSecurity. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 29: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should have\nall principal unit security officers complete unit security officer training. (Action: ISN)\n\nRecommendation 30: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation should\nrequest, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide, assistance in establishing a\nsecurity awareness training program that includes annual refresher briefings for personnel in the\nBureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance and the Bureau of International Security\nand Nonproliferation. (Action: ISN, in coordination with DS)\n\nRecommendation 31: The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, in\ncoordination with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, should post their\nemergency actions plans on their respective Intranet sites and establish a link to the Bureau of\nAdministration\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Emergency Management SharePoint site. (Action: ISN, in\ncoordination AVC)\n\n\n\n\n 32\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nPrincipal Officials\n Name Arrival Date\nAssistant Secretary Thomas M. Countryman 08/2012\nExecutive Director Sonna Stampone 08/2012\nPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretaryfor Non-Nuclear Vann H. Van Diepen 06/2009\n and Counterproliferation\nOffice of Missile, Biological and Chemical Pamela Durham 01/2008\n Nonproliferation\nOffice of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Ann Ganzer 09/2008\nOffice of Counterproliferation Initiatives Philip Foley 10/2006\nBiological Policy Staff Christopher Park 10/2010\nDeputy Assistant Secretary For Nuclear Affairs C.S. Eliot Kang 09/2011\nOffice of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs John Fox 07/2012\nOffice of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security Richard Stratford 06/2006\n Affairs\nOffice of Regional Affairs Robert Gromoll 04/1999\nDeputy Assistant Secretary For Non-proliferation Simon G. Limage 08/2012\n Programs\nOffice of Cooperative Threat Reduction Phillip Dolliff 08/2011\nOffice of Export Control Cooperation Nan Fife 08/2013\nNonproliferation and Disarmament Fund Steven Saboe 04/2006\nOffice of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Geoffrey Odlum 06/2013\nOffice of Strategic Communications and Outreach Margo Squire 06/2011\nFissile Material Coordinator Michael Guhin 06/2008\nCoordinator for Threat Reduction Programs Bonnie Jenkins 07/2009\n\n\n\n\n 33\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nAbbreviations\nAVC Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance\n\nDepartment U.S. Department of State\n\nDS Bureau of Diplomatic Security\n\nEEO Equal Employment Opportunity\n\nFAH Foreign Affairs Handbook\n\nFAM Foreign Affairs Manual\n\nGFMS Global Financial Management System\n\nISN Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation\n\nISN/CTR Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction\n\nISN/ECC Office of Export Control Cooperation\n\nISN/MNSA Office of Multilateral and Security Affairs\n\nISN/NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund\n\nISN/WDMT Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism\n\nPM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs\n\nTD Technology division\n\nWMD Weapons of mass destruction\n\n\n\n\n 34\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE,\n OR MISMANAGEMENT\nOF FEDERAL PROGRAMS\n HURTS EVERYONE.\n\n CONTACT THE\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n HOTLINE\n TO REPORT ILLEGAL\n OR WASTEFUL ACTIVITIES:\n\n\n 202-647-3320\n 800-409-9926\n oighotline@state.gov\n oig.state.gov\n\n Office of Inspector General\n U.S. Department of State\n P.O. Box 9778\n Arlington, VA 22219\n\n\n\n\n SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c'