text:
 18.12.2008
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 339/103
 SKLEP SKUPNEGA ODBORA EGP
 št. 114/2008
 z dne 7. novembra 2008
 o spremembi Priloge IX (Finančne storitve) in Priloge XIX (Varstvo potrošnikov) k Sporazumu EGP
 SKUPNI ODBOR EGP JE –
 ob upoštevanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, kakor je bil spremenjen s Protokolom o prilagoditvi Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum), in zlasti člena 98 Sporazuma,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 (1)
 Priloga IX k Sporazumu je bila spremenjena s Sklepom Skupnega odbora EGP št. 81/2008 z dne 4. julija 2008 (1).
 (2)
 Priloga XIX k Sporazumu je bila spremenjena s Sklepom Skupnega odbora EGP št. 88/2008 z dne 4. julija 2008 (2).
 (3)
 Direktivo 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (3) je treba vključiti v Sporazum.
 (4)
 Direktiva 2007/64/ES z učinkom od 1. novembra 2009 razveljavlja Direktivo 97/5/ES (4), ki je vključena v Sporazum in jo je zato treba v okviru Sporazuma razveljaviti z učinkom od 1. novembra 2009 –
 SKLENIL:
 Člen 1
 Priloga IX k Sporazumu se spremeni:
 1.
 Za točko 16d (Sklep Komisije 2004/10/ES) Priloge IX k Sporazumu se vstavi naslednja točka:
 „16e.
 32007 L 0064: Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1).“
 2.
 V točki 23b (Direktiva 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) se doda:
 „, kakor jo spreminja:
 —
 32007 L 0064: Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1).“
 3.
 V točkah 14 (Direktiva 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) in 31e (Direktiva 2002/65/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) se doda naslednja alinea:
 „—
 32007 L 0064: Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1).“
 4.
 Besedilo točke 16a (Direktiva 97/5/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) se črta z učinkom od 1. novembra 2009.
 Člen 2
 Priloga XIX k Sporazumu se spremeni:
 1.
 V točki 3a (Direktiva 97/7/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) se doda naslednja alinea:
 „—
 32007 L 0064: Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1).“
 2.
 Besedilo točke 7c (Direktiva 97/5/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta) se črta z učinkom od 1. novembra 2009.
 Člen 3
 Besedilo Direktive 2007/64/ES v islandskem in norveškem jeziku, ki se objavi v Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije, je verodostojno.
 Člen 4
 Ta sklep začne veljati 8. novembra 2008 pod pogojem, da so bila Skupnemu odboru EGP predložena vsa uradna obvestila v skladu s členom 103(1) Sporazuma (5).
 Člen 5
 Ta sklep se objavi v sklopu EGP Uradnega lista Evropske unije in Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije.
 V Bruslju, 7. novembra 2008
 Za Skupni odbor EGP
 Predsednik
 Njegova presvetla visokost princ Nikolaus von LIECHTENSTEIN
 (1) UL L 280, 23.10.2008, str. 12.
 (2) UL L 280, 23.10.2008, str. 25.
 (3) UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1.
 (4) UL L 43, 14.2.1997, str. 25.
 (5) Navedene so ustavne zahteve.
 Skupna izjava pogodbenic o Sklepu št. 114/2008 o vključitvi Direktive 2007/64/ES v Sporazum
 „Pogodbenici priznavata posebni položaj Lihtenštajna, zlasti dejstvo, da sta leta 1980 Lihtenštajn in Švica sklenila pogodbo o skupni valuti, po kateri Lihtenštajn spada v valutno območje Švice. Zato se plačilne transakcije obdelujejo prek švicarskih plačilnih sistemov. Ta splošni okvir je treba ustrezno upoštevati.“


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 28.12.2013
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 353/40
 VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE KOMISIE (EÚ) č. 1418/2013
 zo 17. decembra 2013,
 ktoré sa týka plánov produkcie a uvádzania na trh podľa nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 o spoločnej organizácii trhov s produktmi rybolovu a akvakultúry
 EURÓPSKA KOMISIA,
 so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
 so zreteľom na nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 z 11. decembra 2013 o spoločnej organizácii trhov s produktmi rybolovu a akvakultúry (1), a najmä na článok 29,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Organizácie výrobcov v oblasti rybolovu a akvakultúry by mali prispievať k dosiahnutiu cieľov spoločnej rybárskej politiky a spoločnej organizácie trhov s produktmi rybolovu a akvakultúry.
 (2)
 Konkrétne sa v nariadení (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 stanovuje, že organizácie výrobcov v oblasti rybolovu sú povinné zaviesť opatrenia na podporu udržateľných rybárskych činností, zmiernenie objemu nechcených úlovkov, zlepšenie sledovateľnosti produktov rybolovu a elimináciu nezákonného, nenahláseného a neregulovaného rybolovu a že organizácie výrobcov v oblasti akvakultúry sú povinné zaviesť opatrenia na podporu udržateľnej akvakultúry, posúdiť súlad s národnými strategickými plánmi a zabezpečiť udržateľné postupy v akvakultúre.
 (3)
 Ďalej sa v nariadení (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 stanovuje, že organizácie výrobcov v oblasti rybolovu a akvakultúry sú povinné zaviesť opatrenia na zlepšenie uvádzania produktov na trh a na zlepšenie hospodárskych výnosov výrobcov, stabilizáciu trhov a zníženie vplyvu rybolovu na životné prostredie.
 (4)
 Plány produkcie a uvádzania na trh, ktoré organizácie výrobcov predkladajú svojim príslušným vnútroštátnym orgánom, by mali byť zamerané na dosiahnutie cieľov spoločnej organizácie trhov s produktmi rybolovu a akvakultúry.
 (5)
 S cieľom umožniť, aby všetky organizácie výrobcov vykonávali plány produkcie a uvádzania na trh jednotným spôsobom, a zaistiť, aby štruktúra plánov odrážala prínos k dosahovaniu cieľov uvedených v článkoch 3 a 7 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 by Komisia mala vymedziť spoločný formát.
 (6)
 Mali by sa určiť jednotné lehoty na predloženie plánov produkcie a uvádzania na trh s cieľom umožniť ich včasné schválenie vzhľadom na potrebu vypracovať primerané finančné rozvrhy finančnej podpory, ktorá by bola dostupná na vykonávanie týchto plánov podľa budúceho právneho aktu Únie, v ktorom sa stanovia podmienky finančnej podpory námornej a rybárskej politiky na obdobie 2014 – 2020.
 (7)
 Opatrenia stanovené v tomto nariadení sú v súlade so stanoviskom výboru pre preskúmanie produktov rybolovu a akvakultúry,
 PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
 Článok 1
 Formát a štruktúry plánov produkcie a uvádzania na trh
 Formát a štruktúra plánov produkcie a uvádzania na trh uvedených v článku 28 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 (ďalej len „plány“) zodpovedá formátu a štruktúre stanoveným v prílohe k tomuto nariadeniu.
 Článok 2
 Lehoty a postupy predkladania plánov
 1. Organizácie výrobcov predkladajú svoje prvé plány svojim príslušným vnútroštátnym orgánom najneskôr do konca februára 2014. Organizácie výrobcov uznané po 1. januári 2014 predkladajú svoje prvé plány príslušným vnútroštátnym orgánom osem týždňov po svojom uznaní. Nasledujúce plány predkladajú osem týždňov pred ukončením platnosti aktuálnych plánov.
 2. Ak sa príslušný vnútroštátny orgán domnieva, že plán, ktorý predložila organizácia výrobcov je zameraný na dosiahnutie cieľov uvedených v článkoch 3 a 7 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013, v takom prípade predmetný plán schváli do šiestich týždňov po tom, ako mu bol doručený, a okamžite informuje organizáciu výrobcov.
 3. Ak príslušný vnútroštátny orgán zistí, že ciele uvedené v článkoch 3 a 7 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 nemožno dosiahnuť prostredníctvom predloženého plánu, informuje o tom organizáciu výrobcov v lehote uvedenej v odseku 2 tohto článku. Organizácia výrobcov do dvoch týždňov predloží zmenený plán.
 4. Konečný termín na schválenie zmeneného plánu je štyri týždne po jeho doručení.
 5. Ak príslušný vnútroštátny orgán neschváli alebo nezamietne plán podľa článkov 2 alebo 4, predmetný plán sa považuje za schválený.
 Článok 3
 Revízia plánov
 1. Ak sa príslušný vnútroštátny orgán domnieva, že revidovaný plán, ktorý predložila organizácia výrobcov podľa článku 28 ods. 4 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013, je zameraný na dosiahnutie cieľov uvedených v článkoch 3 a 7 v danom nariadení, v takom prípade predmetný plán schváli do štyroch týždňov po tom, ako mu bol doručený, a okamžite informuje organizáciu výrobcov.
 2. Ak príslušný vnútroštátny orgán zistí, že ciele uvedené v článkoch 3 a 7 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013 nemožno dosiahnuť prostredníctvom revidovaného plánu, informuje o tom organizáciu výrobcov v lehote uvedenej v odseku 1 tohto článku. Organizácia výrobcov do dvoch týždňov predloží zmenený plán.
 3. Konečný termín na schválenie zmeneného plánu je štyri týždne po jeho doručení.
 4. Ak príslušný vnútroštátny orgán neschváli alebo nezamietne plán podľa článkov 1 alebo 3, predmetný plán sa považuje za schválený.
 Článok 4
 Nadobudnutie účinnosti
 Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dvadsiatym dňom po jeho uverejnení v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
 Uplatňuje sa od 1. januára 2014.
 Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
 V Bruseli 17. decembra 2013
 Za Komisiu
 predseda
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) Pozri stranu 1 tohto úradného vestníka.
 PRÍLOHA
 PODROBNÁ ŠTRUKTÚRA PLÁNOV PRODUKCIE A UVÁDZANIA NA TRH
 ČASŤ 1
 Všeobecné informácie o organizácii výrobcov
 —
 Názov
 —
 Typ
 —
 Identifikačný kód
 —
 Miesto
 —
 Počet členov
 —
 Obrat (podrobne podľa druhov)
 —
 Objem výlovu alebo zberu (podrobne podľa druhov)
 ČASŤ 2
 Program produkcie a uvádzania na trh
 Túto časť tvorí orientačný harmonogram dodávok a opisuje sa v nej, ako sa zabezpečí, aby dodávky zodpovedali požiadavkám trhu z hľadiska kvality, množstva a obchodnej úpravy, predovšetkým pri hlavných predávaných druhoch.
 ČASŤ 3
 Opatrenia na dosiahnutie cieľov stanovených v článku 7 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013
 V tejto časti sa okrem iného opisujú primerané opatrenia stanovené v článku 8 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013, ktoré organizácie výrobcov plánujú zaviesť s cieľom dosiahnuť rozličné ciele stanovené v článku 7 uvedeného nariadenia.
 ČASŤ 4
 Opatrenia na prispôsobenie dodávok určitých druhov
 V tejto časti sa okrem iného opisujú primerané opatrenia stanovené v článku 8 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013, ktoré organizácie výrobcov plánujú zaviesť s cieľom prispôsobiť dodávky druhov, ktoré sú zvyčajne počas roka spojené s problémami pri predaji.
 ČASŤ 5
 Sankcie a kontrolné opatrenia
 V tejto časti sa uvádza opis sankcií uplatniteľných pri rôznych typoch porušení predpisov, ku ktorým by mohlo dôjsť pri realizácii plánu produkcie a uvádzania na trh. Navyše sa v nej môže uviesť opis primeraných opatrení stanovených v článku 8 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 1379/2013, ktoré organizácia výrobcov plánuje zaviesť s cieľom zabezpečiť kontrolu a dodržiavanie zavedených pravidiel pri činnostiach jej členov.


type: other

text:
java - Ar „Java“ yra „praeiti pagal nuorodą“ arba „pagal vertę“? - ngn-wiki.ru
 Visada maniau, kad java yra perduodanti nuoroda .
 Tačiau mačiau keletą dienoraščio įrašų (pvz., Šio dienoraščio ), teigdamas, kad taip nėra.
 Nemanau, kad suprantu skirtumą, kurį jie daro.
 Kas yra paaiškinimas?
 02 сент. user4315 yra nustatytas 02 sept. 2008-09-02 23:14 '08 at 23:14 pm 2008-09-02 23:14
 „Java“ visada perduodama pagal vertę . Deja, kai perduodame objekto vertę, mes perduodame nuorodą. Tai painioti pradedantiesiems.
 public static void main(String[] args) { Dog aDog = new Dog("Max"); Dog oldDog = aDog; // we pass the object to foo foo(aDog); // aDog variable is still pointing to the "Max" dog when foo(...) returns aDog.getName().equals("Max"); // true aDog.getName().equals("Fifi"); // false aDog == oldDog; // true } public static void foo(Dog d) { d.getName().equals("Max"); // true // change d inside of foo() to point to a new Dog instance "Fifi" d = new Dog("Fifi"); d.getName().equals("Fifi"); // true }
 Pirmiau pateiktame pavyzdyje aDog.getName() vis tiek grąžins "Max" . Pagrindinė „ aDog reikšmė foo funkcijoje nesikeičia su "Fifi" Dog , nes nuoroda į objektą yra perduodama pagal vertę. Jei jis buvo priimtas pagal nuorodą, tada aDog.getName() iš main sugrįš "Fifi" po to, kai paskambinsite foo .
 public static void main(String[] args) { Dog aDog = new Dog("Max"); Dog oldDog = aDog; foo(aDog); // when foo(...) returns, the name of the dog has been changed to "Fifi" aDog.getName().equals("Fifi"); // true // but it is still the same dog: aDog == oldDog; // true } public static void foo(Dog d) { d.getName().equals("Max"); // true // this changes the name of d to be "Fifi" d.setName("Fifi"); }
 Pirmiau pateiktame pavyzdyje Fifi yra šuns vardas, kai jis vadinamas foo(aDog) nes objekto pavadinimas buvo nustatytas foo(...) . Bet kokie veiksmai, kuriuos atlieka d yra tokie, kad visais praktiniais tikslais jie atliekami su aDog , bet neįmanoma pakeisti aDog kintamojo vertės.
 02 сент. atsakymas duotas erlando 02 Sep 2008-09-02 23:25 '08, 23:25, 2008-09-02 23:25
 Aš tik pastebėjau, kad paminėjote mano straipsnį .
 „Java Spec“ sako, kad viskas „Java“ yra perduodama pagal vertę. Nėra tokio dalyko, kaip Java.
 Svarbiausia suprasti tai, kad kažkas panašaus
 nėra šuo; tai iš tikrųjų yra rodyklė šuniui.
 Ką tai reiškia, kai turite
 Dog myDog = new Dog("Rover"); foo(myDog);
 jūs iš esmės perduodate sukurto Dog objekto adresą į foo metodą.
 (Iš tiesų sakau, nes „Java“ rodyklės nėra tiesioginiai adresai, bet paprasčiausias būdas tai mąstyti)
 Tarkime, kad Dog objektas yra atminties adresu 42. Tai reiškia, kad mes išlaikome 42 metodą.
 jei metodas buvo apibrėžtas kaip
 public void foo(Dog someDog) { someDog.setName("Max"); // AAA someDog = new Dog("Fifi"); // BBB someDog.setName("Rowlf"); // CCC }
 pamatyti, kas vyksta.
 parametras someDog nustatytas kaip 42
 eilutėje „AAA“
 someDog taikomas Dog , kuris nurodo ( Dog objektas adresu 42)
 į Dog (42 adresas) paprašė pakeisti savo vardą į Max
 eilutėje „BBB“
 Sukuriamas naujas Dog . Tarkime, tai yra 74
 parametrą someDog į 74
 „CCC“ eilutėje
 someDog seka Dog , kuris rodo ( Dog objektas 74)
 į Dog (74 adresas), paprašė pakeisti savo vardą į Rowlf
 tada sugrįšime
 Dabar pagalvokite, kas vyksta už metodo ribų:
 Ar myDog pasikeitė?
 Čia yra raktas.
 Turint omenyje, kad myDog yra rodyklė, o ne tikrasis Dog , atsakymas yra NE. myDog vis dar yra 42; jis vis tiek nurodo pradinį Dog (tačiau atkreipkite dėmesį, kad dėl eilutės „AAA“ jo vardas dabar yra „Max“ - tas pats šuo, „ myDog nepasikeitė.)
 Tiksliai sekti adresą ir pakeisti, kas yra jo pabaigoje; tačiau nekeičia kintamojo.
 „Java“ veikia taip pat, kaip ir C. Galite priskirti žymeklį, perkelti žymeklį prie metodo, sekti rodyklę metode ir pakeisti nurodytus duomenis. Tačiau negalite keisti, kur šis žymeklis nurodo.
 C ++, Ada, Pascal ir kitomis kalbomis, kurios palaiko nuorodą, galite iš tikrųjų keisti perduotą rodiklį.
 Jei „Java“ turi myDog nuorodos semantiką, pirmiau apibrėžtas „ foo metodas pasikeistų, kai „ myDog rodoma, kai someDog linijoje priskyrė tam someDog “.
 Pagalvokite apie pamatinius parametrus kaip perduodamo kintamojo slapyvardžius. Kai priskiriamas šis slapyvardis, taip pat kintamasis, kuris buvo perduotas.
 16 сент. Scott Stanchfield atsakymas, pateiktas rugsėjo 16 d 2008-09-16 17:37 '08 at 17:37 pm 2008-09-16 17:37
 Java visada perduoda argumentus pagal vertę, o ne pagal nuorodą.
 Leiskite paaiškinti pavyzdžiu :
 public class Main{ public static void main(String[] args){ Foo f = new Foo("f"); changeReference(f); // It won't change the reference! modifyReference(f); // It will modify the object that the reference variable "f" refers to! } public static void changeReference(Foo a){ Foo b = new Foo("b"); a = b; } public static void modifyReference(Foo c){ c.setAttribute("c"); } }
 Aš tai paaiškinsiu:
 Nuorodos su Foo tipo f pavadinimu deklaravimas ir jam priskiriamas naujas Foo tipo objektas su atributu "f" .
 14 сент. atsakymas pateikiamas Eng.Fouad 14 sep . 2012-09-14 21:22 '12 at 9:22 pm 2012-09-14 21:22
 Tai suteiks jums idėją, kaip „Java“ iš tikrųjų veikia tokiu mastu, kad kitoje diskusijoje apie „Java“ persiuntimą pagal nuorodą arba pagal vertę, jūs tiesiog šypsotės: -)
 Pirmas žingsnis, pašalinkite iš savo proto šį žodį, kuris prasideda „p“ „_ _ _ _ _ _ _“, ypač jei esate iš kitų programavimo kalbų. „Java“ ir „p“ negali būti parašytos toje pačioje knygoje, forume ar net txt.
 2 žingsnis: nepamirškite, kad perduodant objektą prie metodo, jūs perduodate objekto nuorodą, o ne patį objektą.
 Studentas: Mokytojas, ar tai reiškia, kad „Java“ praeina pagal nuorodą?
 Meistras: žiogas, ne.
 Dabar pagalvokite apie tai, kuri nuoroda / Objekto kintamasis turi:
 Kintamasis apima bitus, kurie nurodo JVM, kaip eiti į nurodytą objektą atmintyje (krūvose).
 Kai perduodate metodui argumentus, NESKYRUS referencinio kintamojo, bet atskaitos kintamojo bitų kopija . Kažkas panašaus: 3bad086a. 3bad086a yra būdas pasiekti perduotą objektą.
 Taigi, jūs tiesiog pereinate 3bad086a, tai yra nuorodos vertė.
 Jūs perduodate nuorodos vertę, o ne nuorodą (o ne objektą).
 Ši vertė iš tikrųjų yra COPED ir suteikta metodui .
 Toliau (nebandykite surinkti / vykdyti ...):
 1. Person person; 2. person = new Person("Tom"); 3. changeName(person); 4. 5. //I didn't use Person person below as an argument to be nice 6. static void changeName(Person anotherReferenceToTheSamePersonObject) { 7. anotherReferenceToTheSamePersonObject.setName("Jerry"); 8. }
 Kintamojo vartotojas sukuriamas eilutėje # 1, o pradžioje yra nulinis.
 Naujas Asmuo objektas sukurtas eilutėje # 2, saugomas atmintyje, ir kintamajam priskiriama nuoroda į Asmenį, kuris prieštarauja kintamajam. Tai yra jo adresas. Pasakykite 3bad086a.
 Kintamojo, kuriame yra objekto adresas, veidas perduodamas funkcijai # 3 eilutėje.
 # 4 eilutėje galite klausytis tylos garso.
 Pažymėkite komentarą # 5 eilutėje
 Sukurtas vietinio kintamojo metodas -anotherReferenceToTameSamePersonObject- ir tada magija pasirodo eilutėje 6:
 Kintamojo / nuorodos vartotojas kopijuojamas bitais ir perduodamas kitam „ReferenceToTameSamePersonObject“ funkcijai.
 Nėra naujų Asmens atvejų.
 Tiek „asmuo“, tiek „kitasReferenceToTameSamePersonObject“ išsaugo tą pačią vertę 3bad086a.
 Nebandykite to padaryti, bet žmogus == anotherReferenceToTamePersonObject bus teisingas.
 Abu kintamieji turi nuorodos IDENTIFIKAVIMO KOPIJUS, ir abu yra susiję su tuo pačiu asmeniu objektu, pačiu objektu ant krūvos ir NE KOPIJU.
 Vaizdas yra tūkstantis žodžių:
 12 авг. Gevorgui pateiktas atsakymas rugpjūčio 12 d 2011-08-12 04:22 '11 at 4:22 2011-08-12 04:22
 „Java“ visada pasiekia vertę, jokių išimčių.
 Taigi, kaip visa tai gali būti supainioti, ir jie mano, kad „Java“ seka nuorodą, arba mano, kad jie turi „Java“ pavyzdį, veikiantį kaip nuorodą? Svarbiausias dalykas yra tai, kad „Java“ jokiomis aplinkybėmis niekada nesuteikia tiesioginės prieigos prie pačių objektų vertybių. Vienintelė prieiga prie objektų yra nuoroda į šį objektą. Kadangi „Java“ objektai visada pasiekiami per nuorodą, o ne tiesiogiai, paprastai sakoma, kad metodo laukai, kintamieji ir argumentai yra objektai, kai pedantiškai jie yra tik nuorodos į objektus. Sumišimas kyla dėl šio (griežtai kalbant, neteisingo) nomenklatūros pakeitimo.
 Taigi, kai skambinate metodu
 Primityviems argumentams ( int , long ir pan.) Praleidžiant pagal vertę yra tikroji primityvioji vertė (pvz., 3).
 Objektams objektų nuorodos reikšmė perduodama pagal vertę.
 Taigi, jei turite doSomething(foo) ir public void doSomething(Foo foo) { .. } , du „Foos“ nukopijavo nuorodas į tuos pačius objektus.
 Natūralu, kad, perduodant objekto nuorodą, praktiškai labai panašus (ir neatskiriamas) nuo objekto perdavimo.
 02 сент. Atsakymas pateikiamas SCdF 02 Sep. 2008-09-02 23:19 '08 at 11:19 pm 2008-09-02 23:19
 „Java“ perduoda nuorodas pagal vertę.
 Taigi negalite keisti perduodamos nuorodos.
 02 сент. Atsakymas pateikiamas ScArcher2 02 Sep. 2008-09-02 23:20 '08, 23:20, 2008-09-02 23:20
 Man atrodo, kad argumentas apie „praeities ir pasyvumo vertę“ nėra labai naudingas.
 Jei sakote: „„ Java “yra perduodama bet kokiu būdu (nuoroda / vertė), bet kuriuo atveju, jūs nepateikiate išsamaus atsakymo. Štai keletas papildomos informacijos, kuri, tikiuosi, padės jums suprasti, kas vyksta atmintyje.
 „Crash“ kursas kamino / krūvos metu prieš pradedant „Java“ diegimą: vertybės pakyla į krūvą ir sukrauti taip gerai, kaip valgomojo lėkštės krūva. Heap atmintis (taip pat žinoma kaip dinamiška atmintis) yra nepatogus ir nesuderinamas. JVM tiesiog suranda vietą, kur ji gali, ir ją atleidžia, nes kintamieji, kurie ją naudoja, nebėra reikalingi.
 Geras Pirma, vietiniai primityvai eina į steką. Taigi šis kodas:
 int x = 3; float y = 101.1f; boolean amIAwesome = true;
 11 сент. atsakymas suteiktas cutmancometh 11 sept. 2013-09-11 14:34 '13, 14:34, 2013-09-11 14:34
 Jei norite parodyti kontrastą, palyginkite šiuos „ C ++“ ir „ Java“ fragmentus:
 C ++: Pastaba. Blogas kodas - atminties nutekėjimas! Tačiau tai rodo tašką.
 void cppMethod(int val, int Dog obj, Dog Dog *objPtr, Dog * { val = 7; // Modifies the copy ref = 7; // Modifies the original variable obj.SetName("obj"); // Modifies the copy of Dog passed objRef.SetName("objRef"); // Modifies the original Dog passed objPtr->SetName("objPtr"); // Modifies the original Dog pointed to // by the copy of the pointer passed. objPtr = new Dog("newObjPtr"); // Modifies the copy of the pointer, // leaving the original object alone. objPtrRef->SetName("objRefPtr"); // Modifies the original Dog pointed to // by the original pointer passed. objPtrRef = new Dog("newObjPtrRef"); // Modifies the original pointer passed } int main() { int a = 0; int b = 0; Dog d0 = Dog("d0"); Dog d1 = Dog("d1"); Dog *d2 = new Dog("d2"); Dog *d3 = new Dog("d3"); cppMethod(a, b, d0, d1, d2, d3); // a is still set to 0 // b is now set to 7 // d0 still have name "d0" // d1 now has name "objRef" // d2 now has name "objPtr" // d3 now has name "newObjPtrRef" }
 public static void javaMethod(int val, Dog objPtr) { val = 7; // Modifies the copy objPtr.SetName("objPtr") // Modifies the original Dog pointed to // by the copy of the pointer passed. objPtr = new Dog("newObjPtr"); // Modifies the copy of the pointer, // leaving the original object alone. } public static void main() { int a = 0; Dog d0 = new Dog("d0"); javaMethod(a, d0); // a is still set to 0 // d0 now has name "objPtr" }
 „Java“ turi tik dviejų tipų perkėlimus: pagal vertę, skirtą įmontuotiems tipams, ir rodyklės reikšmę objektų tipams.
 17 сент. atsakymą pateikė „ Eclipse 17 sep“. 2008-09-17 20:38 '08 8:38 pm 2008-09-17 20:38
 „Java“ perduoda objektų nuorodas pagal vertę.
 02 сент. Atsakymą pateikė John Channing 02 Sep. 2008-09-02 23:23 '08, 23:23, 2008-09-02 23:23
 Iš esmės, perkeliant objekto parametrus, argumentas, pavyzdžiui, neturi įtakos.
 private void foo(Object bar) { bar = null; } public static void main(String[] args) { String baz = "Hah!"; foo(baz); System.out.println(baz); }
 bus spausdinti "Hah!" vietoj null . Priežastis, kodėl tai veikia, yra ta, kad bar yra bazinės vertės kopija, kuri yra tiesiog nuoroda į "Hah!" Jei tai būtų tikra nuoroda, tada foo iš naujo apibrėžtų baz į null .
 02 сент. Hank Gay paskelbė 02 Sep 2008-09-02 23:21 '08, 11:21 val. 2008-09-02 23:21
 Negaliu patikėti, kad niekas paminėjo Barbarą Liškovą. Kai ji 1974 m. Sukūrė CLU, ji susidūrė su ta pačia terminologijos problema, ir ji sukūrė terminą „iššūkis“ dalydamiesi (taip pat vadinamu skambučiu, dalydamasis objektais ir skambindama objektu) šiam konkrečiam atvejui „skambinti pagal vertę, kur nuoroda ".
 08 сент. Atsakymą pateikė Jörg W Mittag 08 Sep. 2010-09-08 01:07 '10, 1:07, 2010-09-08 01:07
 Esmė yra ta, kad frazės „sekti nuorodą“ žodinė nuoroda reiškia kažką, kas visiškai skiriasi nuo įprastos „Java“ nuorodos reikšmės.
 Paprastai „Java“ nuoroda reiškia objekto nuorodą. Tačiau techniniai terminai, perduodami pagal programavimo kalbos teoriją, yra nuorodos į atminties elementą, kuriame yra kintamasis, kuris yra visiškai kitoks.
 12 янв. atsakymą pateikė JacquesB 12 sausis 2009-01-12 23:50 '09, 11:50 pm 2009-01-12 23:50
 „Java“ sistemoje viskas yra nuoroda, taigi, kai turite kažką panašaus: Point pnt1 = new Point(0,0); „Java“ atlieka šiuos veiksmus:
 Sukuria naują taško objektą.
 Sukuria naują nuorodą į tašką ir inicijuoja šią nuorodą į anksčiau sukurto taško objekto tašką (žr.).
 Iš čia, per „Point“ objekto gyvenimą, šį objektą galėsite pasiekti naudodami „pnt1“ žinyną. Todėl galime pasakyti, kad „Java“ manipuliuoja objektu per savo nuorodą.
 21 нояб. atsakymas pateikiamas Srle, lapkričio 21 d. 2013-11-21 19:04 '13, 19:04, 2013-11-21 19:04
 Java visada eina pagal vertę, o ne pagal nuorodą.
 Visų pirma, mes turime suprasti, kas praeina pagal vertę ir eina pagal nuorodą.
 Reikšmės perdavimas reiškia, kad kopijuojate tikrosios perduodamo parametro vertės atmintyje. Tai faktinio parametro turinio kopija .
 Perdavimas pagal nuorodą (taip pat vadinamas praeiti adresu) reiškia, kad išsaugomas faktinio parametro adreso kopija .
 Kartais „Java“ gali duoti iliuziją, kad bus perduota nuoroda. Žiūrėkite, kaip tai veikia toliau pateiktu pavyzdžiu:
 public class PassByValue { public static void main(String[] args) { Test t = new Test(); t.name = "initialvalue"; new PassByValue().changeValue(t); System.out.println(t.name); } public void changeValue(Test f) { f.name = "changevalue"; } } class Test { String name; }
 Šios programos rezultatas yra:
 Kaip mes visi žinome, jis sukurs objektą krūvoje ir grąžins pradinę vertę atgal į t. Например, предположим, что значение t равно 0x100234 (мы не знаем фактического внутреннего значения JVM, это просто пример).
 При прохождении ссылочного т к функции не будет непосредственно передавать фактическое значение задания теста объекта, но это создаст копию т, а затем передать его в функцию. Поскольку он передается по значению , он передает копию переменной, а не фактическую ссылку на нее. Поскольку мы сказали, что значение t 0x100234 , оба t и f будут иметь одинаковое значение и, следовательно, они будут указывать на один и тот же объект.
 Если вы измените что-либо в функции с помощью ссылки f, оно изменит существующее содержимое объекта. Вот почему мы получили значение changevalue , которое обновляется в функции.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 42 A.3d 596 (2012)
 425 Md. 629
 Johnette COSBY
 v.
 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Allegany County Department of Social Services.
 No. 74, September Term, 2011.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 25, 2012.
 *598 Ramon Rozas, III (Friend & Rozas, LLC, Cumberland, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
 Sandra Barnes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondents.
 Argued before BELL, C.J. HARRELL, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA, WILNER, ALAN M. (Retired, Specially Assigned), CATHELL, DALE R. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
 GREENE, J.
 Johnette Cosby ("Ms. Cosby" or "Petitioner") requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Allegany County Department of Social Services ("the Department" or "Respondent") that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect," a finding which would result in her placement into the Department's central registry of child neglectors. Prior to the hearing, her son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Ms. Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Ms. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 5-706.1 of the Family Law Article precluded application of the common law defense. The Circuit Court for Allegany County agreed and reinstated Ms. Cosby's administrative appeal, however, the Court of Special Appeals reversed that determination. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Cosby, 200 Md.App. 54, 24 A.3d 199 (2011). Upon review of the applicable statutory provision and prior appellate case law, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the provision was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied. Petitioner concedes that the required elements of collateral estoppel are present in the instant case. Therefore, we shall hold that the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper.
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 On October 7, 2008, the Department notified Ms. Cosby that, following a Child Protective Services investigation, it had found her responsible for "indicated child neglect." As a result, Ms. Cosby's name would be placed into a central registry of child neglectors pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 5-714(e) of *599 the Family Law Article.[1] The underlying basis of the finding according to the Department's report, was that on September 23, 2008, Ms. Cosby had refused to allow Michael, her 17 year-old adoptive son, who was paralyzed from the waist down, to return home after he and Ms. Cosby's live-in paramour "got into a verbal altercation... [that] became physical in nature." Ms. Cosby further refused to allow the Department to coordinate a voluntary placement and instead insisted that Michael be placed in foster care "as a punishment." Due to her refusal to either allow Michael to return home or to grant permission for him to live with a voluntary caregiver, the Department placed Michael into shelter care and filed a CINA petition in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. On December 15, 2008, the Circuit Court granted the petition, adjudicated Michael to be a CINA[2] based on Ms. Cosby's neglect, and placed him in the care of the Department for transfer into foster care.[3]
 Meanwhile, on December 1, 2008, Ms. Cosby challenged the Department's finding that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect," by filing a timely request for a contested case hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") pursuant to § 5-706.1(b) of the Family Law Article. Following the CINA determination, Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative hearing on grounds of collateral estoppel, arguing that the Circuit Court's finding of neglect precluded Petitioner from challenging the Department's determination of "indicated child neglect" based upon the same facts.[4] Ms. Cosby *600 filed an untimely opposition, arguing that amendments to § 5-706.1 of the Family Law Article made clear that a CINA finding does not bar a subsequent administrative appeal. The administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the motion based on collateral estoppel and dismissed the appeal in an order dated March 25, 2009.[5] In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the intermediate appellate court's decision in Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services v. Tamara A., 178 Md.App. 686, 943 A.2d 653 (2008) [Tamara A. I] which, as explained infra, held that CINA determinations do, in fact, preclude the re-litigation of issues presented in contested case hearings where the elements of common-law collateral estoppel are satisfied. Tamara I, 178 Md.App. at 700-01, 943 A.2d at 660-61. The ALJ stated that "[t]he Court [in Tamara A. I] specifically noted that the definition of child neglect used in the CINA hearing was identical to the definition of child neglect applicable in neglect cases such as the present matter." The ALJ concluded, therefore, that collateral estoppel barred the contested case hearing because Ms. Cosby had the opportunity "at the CINA hearing to fully litigate the issues in question," as the CINA conclusion "was based on the same events giving rise to the child neglect investigation in the present case, i.e. the incident of September 23, 2008 wherein [Ms. Cosby] refused reentry of the [c]hild into [her] home."
 On April 2, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the ALJ's decision was incorrect because the Court of Appeals had reversed Tamara A. I prior to the administrative hearing in Tamara A. v. Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, 407 Md. 180, 963 A.2d 773 (2009) [Tamara A. II]. The Department responded that, despite the reversal, Tamara A. I remained persuasive because this Court had specifically declined to review the merits of the decision, but, rather, vacated it as an improper interlocutory appeal. The ALJ agreed with the Department and reaffirmed its decision that Ms. Cosby's administrative action was barred as a matter of law by collateral estoppel.
 Ms. Cosby then filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's decision with the Circuit Court for Allegany County.[6] On March 5, 2010, after a hearing, the Circuit *601 Court reversed the ALJ's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings on the contested case based on its reading of both § 5-706.1 and Tamara A. II. While it recognized that this Court in Tamara A. II "declined to address the merits of the case," it interpreted certain dicta to suggest that Ms. Cosby "was entitled to further proceedings on her appeal." Therefore, according to the Circuit Court, "the ALJ's reliance upon the analysis and holding of Tamara A. [I] ... was inappropriate in light of the Court of Appeals['s] reversal."
 Following this decision, Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court reversed and held that dismissal was the appropriate disposition because collateral estoppel did, in fact, bar Cosby's administrative appeal. Dep't of Human Res. v. Cosby, 200 Md.App. 54, 24 A.3d 199 (2011). The intermediate appellate court based this conclusion on its interpretation of the legislative history surrounding the amendments to § 5-706.1, and its review of the Tamara A. decisions. The court made clear that Tamara A. II "did not determine whether collateral estoppel would preclude [an] appeal from [an] indicated neglect finding," but that dicta within the opinion was consistent with such a holding. Cosby, 200 Md.App. at 71-72, 24 A.3d at 209-10. We granted Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari, Cosby v. Soc. Servs., 422 Md. 352, 30 A.3d 193 (2011), to resolve the issues surrounding the interpretation of § 5-706.1 and the Tamara A. decisions, and now address the following question, as restated by the intermediate appellate court:
 Where there was a prior finding of child neglect in a CINA case to which Cosby was a party, did the ALJ err in a subsequent administrative proceeding when he granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's appeal of the Department's finding of indicated child neglect based on collateral estoppel?
 We answer that question in the negative, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, as the administrative appeal was properly dismissed on grounds of collateral estoppel.
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 The instant case presents an action for judicial review of an administrative decision. In such cases, the Court of Appeals "take[s] the same posture as the circuit court or the intermediate appellate court, and [we] limit our review to the agency's decision." Anderson v. General Casualty, 402 Md. 236, 244, 935 A.2d 746, 751 (2007) (citation omitted); accord MVA v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 17, 997 A.2d 768, 777 (2010) ("[O]ur role is not to review the [c]ircuit [c]ourt's judgment, but rather to review the decision of the ALJ...."); Charles County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 294, 855 A.2d 313, 318 (2004) (noting that this Court "reevaluate[s] the decision of the agency under the same statutory standards as would the circuit court, and we do not employ those standards to reevaluate the decision of the circuit or intermediate appellate court" (citations omitted)). As we explained in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68, 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999):
 A court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.
 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
 *602 Indeed, we have said that "[i]f there is a need to articulate a `standard' for judicial review of an agency's legal rulings, it is sufficient to say that a reviewing court must determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law." Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 574 n. 3, 873 A.2d 1145, 1156 n. 3 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). We recently explained in People's Insurance v. Allstate, 424 Md. 443, 36 A.3d 464 (2012), that "[w]hether [a] statute applies and, if so, how it should be interpreted, are questions of law, and, although an agency's interpretation and application of a statute that it administers ordinarily is given considerable weight by reviewing courts, the court must make the ultimate legal determination." People's Insurance, 424 Md. at 457, 36 A.3d at 472; accord Bayly Crossing, LLC v. Consumer Prot. Div., 417 Md. 128, 137, 9 A.3d 4, 9 (2010) ("Interpreting the pure meaning of a statute is deemed a question of law ... however, we frequently give weight to an agency's experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 196-97, 991 A.2d 1251, 1254 (2010) ("Although... an administrative agency's interpretation and application of [a] statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight ... the correct interpretation of the applicable statutes presents a question of law that this Court must decide by applying the... principles of statutory construction...." (internal quotation omitted)); Anderson, 402 Md. at 244-245, 935 A.2d at 751 ("As to conclusions of law, we give significant weight to an agency's experience in interpreting a statute the agency administers. Nonetheless, if an agency has made an erroneous conclusion of law, it is our duty to correct that conclusion." (internal citation omitted)).
 In the instant case, the ALJ granted the Department's motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel, implicitly interpreting § 5-706.1, a statute that the Department administers, as not precluding the common law defense. We now review this determination for legal error, giving appropriate weight to the Department's interpretation of the statute. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Aiken, 418 Md. 11, 27, 12 A.3d 656, 665 (2011).
 DISCUSSION
 We have commented that "[c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, began life and retains life as a common law doctrine." Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n, 361 Md. 371, 387, 761 A.2d 899, 907 (2000) (quotation omitted). Under the doctrine, "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Murray Int'l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547, 555 A.2d 502, 504 (1989) (quotation omitted). Maryland adheres to a four-part test for the application of collateral estoppel, which we explained in Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Association:
 1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
 2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
 3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
 4. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?
 Colandrea, 361 Md. at 391, 761 A.2d at 909.
 *603 I.
 The Court of Special Appeals's holding in Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. 686, 943 A.2d 653 (2008) and this Court's subsequent reversal in Tamara A. II, 407 Md. 180, 963 A.2d 773 (2009) provide a background for the question that is now squarely before this Court, namely, the proper construction of § 5-706.1 of the Family Law Article as it applies to collateral estoppel and CINA proceedings.
 Tamara A. I involved facts relatively similar to those at bar. In that case, the Department notified Tamara A. that it had found her to be responsible for indicated neglect of her newborn, based on the same untreated psychological condition that had led to previous CINA adjudications regarding her older children. Tamara A. appealed the Department's finding by requesting a contested case hearing before the OAH. Meanwhile, the newborn was adjudicated to be a CINA by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County based on Tamara A.'s neglect. See Md.Code 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Following the CINA determination, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the administrative proceeding, arguing that the issue of neglect had been fully litigated during the CINA proceeding and that Tamara A. was, therefore, collaterally estopped from challenging the Department's finding based upon the same facts. The ALJ denied the motion to dismiss.[7] The Department filed a petition for judicial review, which the Circuit Court, and subsequently, the intermediate appellate court granted. On the merits, the Circuit Court affirmed the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss; however, the Court of Special Appeals reversed.
 The intermediate appellate court concluded that because the issue of neglect was fully litigated and resolved in the CINA proceeding, the ALJ should have granted the motion to dismiss the administrative action based on collateral estoppel. Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 697-701, 943 A.2d at 659-61. The only element of the doctrine that was in dispute was whether the finding of neglect in the CINA proceeding was identical to the finding of neglect required in the administrative appeal. Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 698, 943 A.2d at 659. The court made clear that "neglect" was "defined in precisely the same terms," under both the CINA statute, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 3-801(s) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and the child abuse and neglect statute, § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article.[8]Tamara A. I, 178 Md. *604 App. at 699-700, 943 A.2d at 660. Therefore, according to the court, the determination of neglect in the CINA case was "identical to the Department's finding that Ms. A. [was] responsible for indicated neglect...." Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 700, 943 A.2d at 660. Although the statutes and proceedings differed in some respects, the court noted that:
 Collateral estoppel does not require that the prior and present proceedings have the same purpose, nor does it mandate that the statutes upon which the proceedings are based have the same goals. The relevant question is whether the fact or issue was actually litigated and decided in a prior proceeding, regardless of the cause of action or claim. If the answer to that question is yes, then, assuming that the remaining factors of the doctrine have been met, collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of the issue.
 Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 701, 943 A.2d at 661 (footnote omitted) (internal citation omitted).[9] Thus, the court concluded that "[t]hough the law grants Ms. A. the right to a contested case hearing to have the ALJ decide whether [the] standard has been satisfied, Ms. A. is not entitled to have the finding of neglect decided anew." Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 700, 943 A.2d at 660.
 This Court reversed Tamara A. I in Tamara A. II, 407 Md. 180, 963 A.2d 773 (2009), on the grounds that it was an improper interlocutory appeal, unauthorized by Maryland Code, § 10-222(b) of the State Government Article. Tamara A. II, 407 Md. at 194-95, 963 A.2d at 781 ("The ruling here did not determine any rights or liabilities of the parties ... nor did it have any immediate legal consequences."). Indeed, the sole issue presented in Tamara A. II was whether the denial of the motion to dismiss was subject to immediate judicial review and we explicitly declined to address whether the ALJ's decision was correct. Tamara A. II, 407 Md. at 187, 963 A.2d at 777. Both parties in the instant case, however, point to a particular section of the opinion, which commented on § 5-706.1, as supporting their respective arguments regarding its proper construction. We stated in Tamara A. II:
 Indeed, although the correctness of the ALJ's decision is not presently before us, the statutory construct itself suggests that an appeal of a finding of indicated child abuse or neglect is not necessarily precluded by a CINA determination. FL § 5-706.1(a) requires *605 DHHS to notify the individual alleged to have abused or neglected a child of its finding and of the opportunity to appeal the finding.
 FL §§ 5-706.1(b)(3) and (4) require OAH to stay a hearing in such an appeal if either criminal charges based on the alleged abuse or neglect or a CINA proceeding is pending, until any such proceeding is concluded. If the individual is found guilty of criminal charges arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, OAH must dismiss the administrative appeal. FL § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii). Conviction, in other words, does act as an absolute statutory bar to further prosecution of the administrative appeal. That is not the case with respect to a CINA proceeding, however. In sharp contrast, § 5-706. 1(b)(4)(ii) provides that "[a]fter the conclusion of the CINA case, the [OAH] shall vacate the stay and schedule further proceedings in accordance with this section." Although that provision does not necessarily preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a proper case, it certainly does not support DHHS's argument that the administrative proceeding must be put on indefinite hold in favor of immediate judicial review if such a defense is rejected by the ALJ.
 Tamara A. II, 407 Md. at 194-95, 963 A.2d at 781 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Of course, from this language Petitioner emphasizes the words "the statutory construct [of § 5-706.1] itself suggests that an appeal of a finding of indicated child abuse or neglect is not necessarily precluded by a CINA determination." 407 Md. at 194, 963 A.2d at 781. Respondent, by contrast, quotes the subsequent line, which states that § 5-706.1 "does not necessarily preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a proper case...." Id.
 These arguments regarding the proper construction of § 5-706.1 are now squarely before this Court because, unlike the situation presented in Tamara A. I, the disposition on the motion to dismiss in the instant case was immediately appealable. See Miller & Smith v. Casey PMN, 412 Md. 230, 243, 987 A.2d 1, 8 (2010) ("We have held that an unqualified order granting a motion to dismiss ... puts the plaintiffs out of court, and terminates the particular action in the trial court, is final and appealable." (citations omitted)).
 II.
 As a preliminary matter, Petitioner concedes that if § 5-706.1 does not prevent the assertion of collateral estoppel based on a previous CINA finding, then Ms. Cosby was properly precluded from re-litigating the issue of neglect before the OAH because all of the elements of the doctrine would be satisfied.
 In interpreting a statute, our goal is always to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 286, 26 A.3d 878, 891 (2011) (quotation omitted). In attempting to discern that intent, courts "look first to the plain language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning." Id. (quotation omitted). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner." Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571, 880 A.2d 343, 349 (2005). Where, however, "the meaning of the plain language of the statute, or the language itself, is unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior caselaw, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based." CWA v. Public Service Commission, 424 Md. 418, 440, 36 A.3d 449, 462 (2012) (quotation omitted); *606 accord Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9, 20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011) ("Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation... a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process." (quotation omitted)).
 Additionally, and particularly applicable in the instant case, "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the [L]egislature by creating statutory assaults intended to make any alteration in the common law other than what has been specified and plainly pronounced." Breslin, 421 Md. at 287, 26 A.3d at 891 (quotation omitted); see Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 533, 801 A.2d 160, 169 ("Most statutes, of course, change the common law, so that principle necessarily bends when there is a clear legislative intent to make a change.").
 The statute at issue, Md.Code § 5-706.1 of the Family Law Article, as currently enacted, reads in pertinent part:
 (a) Within 30 days after the completion of an investigation in which there has been a finding of indicated or unsubstantiated abuse or neglect, the local department shall notify in writing the individual alleged to have abused or neglected a child:
 (1) of the finding;
 (2) of the opportunity to appeal the finding in accordance with this section; and
 (3) if the individual has been found responsible for indicated abuse or neglect, that the individual may be identified in a central registry as responsible for abuse or neglect under the circumstances specified in § 5-714(e) of this subtitle.
 (b)(1) In the case of a finding of indicated abuse or neglect, an individual may request a contested case hearing to appeal the finding in accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article by responding to the notice of the local department in writing within 60 days.
 * * *
 (3)(i) If a criminal proceeding is pending on charges arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall stay the hearing until a final disposition is made, (ii) If after final disposition of the criminal charge, the individual requesting the hearing is found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall dismiss the administrative appeal.
 (4)(i) If a CINA case is pending concerning a child who has been allegedly abused or neglected by the appellant or a child in the care, custody, or household of the appellant, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall stay the hearing until the CINA case is concluded.
 (ii) After the conclusion of the CINA case, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall vacate the stay and schedule further proceedings in accordance with this section.
 Under the statute, an individual may appeal the Department's determination of indicated child neglect by requesting a hearing before the OAH in accordance with the contested case subtitle of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.) §§ 10-201 to 227 of the State Government Article. Also, a pending CINA case involving the child requires the OAH to stay the hearing until the CINA case is concluded, and *607 thereafter "schedule further proceedings." Beyond this procedural directive, however, the statute does not explain whether a CINA finding of neglect may have a preclusive effect on appellant's administrative appeal. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the statute's legislative history in order to ascertain the legislative intent.
 The statute was originally enacted in 1993, and read in pertinent part:
 (a) Within 30 days after the completion of an investigation in which there has been a finding of indicated or unsubstantiated abuse or neglect, the local department shall notify in writing the person alleged to have abused or neglected a child:
 (1) of the finding; and
 (2) except when a CINA petition has been filed involving the child alleged to be abused or neglected, that the person may request an administrative hearing to appeal the finding.
 (b) Within 30 days of a dismissal of a CINA petition, the local department of social services shall notify in writing the person alleged to have abused or neglected a child that the person may request an administrative hearing to appeal the finding.
 * * *
 (g) If a criminal proceeding is pending on charges arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative hearings shall stay the hearing until a final disposition is made.
 (h) If after final disposition of the criminal charge, the person requesting the hearing is found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall dismiss the administrative appeal.
 Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1993 Supp.) § 5-706.1 of the Family Law Article. (emphasis added). It is clear that, under the original language there was no right to appeal from an indicated or unsubstantiated abuse or neglect finding if a CINA petition had been filed regarding the alleged abused or neglected child, unless and until that petition was dismissed. In other words, the filing of a CINA petition functioned as an absolute bar to an appeal of an abuse or neglect finding.
 The General Assembly amended the statute in 1995 "[f]or the purpose of altering the procedures applicable to child abuse and neglect hearings that involve a Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) proceeding...." Chapter 570 of the Acts of 1995. The pertinent portion of the amendments read[10] as follows:
 (a) Within 30 days after the completion of an investigation in which there has been a finding of indicated or unsubstantiated abuse or neglect, the local department shall notify in writing the person alleged to have abused or neglected a child:
 (1) of the finding; and
 (2) [except when a CINA petition has been filed involving the child alleged to be abused or neglected,] that the person may request an administrative hearing to appeal the finding.
 [(b) Within 30 days of a dismissal of a CINA petition, the local department of social services shall notify in writing the person alleged to have abused or neglected a child that the person may request an administrative hearing to appeal an indicated or unsubstantiated finding.]
 * * *
 *608 (H)(1) IF A CINA PROCEEDING IS PENDING CONCERNING A CHILD WHO HAS BEEN ALLEGEDLY ABUSED OR NEGLECTED BY THE APPELLANT OR A CHILD IN THE CARE, CUSTODY, OR HOUSEHOLD OF THE APPELLANT, THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SHALL STAY THE HEARING UNTIL THE CINA PROCEEDING IS CONCLUDED.
 (2) AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE CINA PROCEEDING, THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SHALL VACATE THE STAY AND SCHEDULE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION AND § 5-706.2 OF THIS SUBTITLE.
 The amendments make clear that the filing of a CINA petition regarding the child allegedly abused or neglected no longer functions to bar an appeal of an abuse or neglect finding. There are no indicia in the legislative history, however, of an intent to abrogate common law collateral estoppel in cases where the doctrine would otherwise be satisfied.
 The General Assembly's Department of Fiscal Services' fiscal note for the bill reads:
 This amended bill allows a person involved in a Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) proceeding to appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) a finding of indicated or unsubstantiated child abuse or neglect after the CINA proceeding has concluded. At present, a person involved in a CINA proceeding may only appeal a finding of child abuse or neglect if the CINA proceeding was dismissed.
 Dep't of Fiscal Servs., Revised Fiscal Note, H.B. 791 (1995).
 The Bill Analysis prepared by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee of the General Assembly provides:
 SUMMARY OF BILL:
 This bill allows a person who is alleged to have abused or neglected a child who is the subject of a child in need of assistance (CINA) proceeding to immediately appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) a finding made by the local department of social services of indicated or unsubstantiated child abuse or neglect and allows the OAH to stay the hearing on the appeal until after the CINA proceeding is concluded.
 BACKGROUND:
 Under current law, a person alleged to have abused or neglected a child may appeal a finding of indicated or unsubstantiated child abuse or neglect. However, if a CINA petition has been filed involving the child alleged to be abused or neglected, the person may appeal to the OAH only if the CINA proceeding is dismissed.
 The bill provides a person alleged to have abused or neglected a child with the ability to appeal a finding regardless of whether the CINA proceeding is dismissed or otherwise concluded, unless the person is convicted of a criminal offense arising from the alleged abuse or neglect.
 Senate Judicial Proceedings Comm., Bill Analysis, H.B. 791 (1995).
 Also included in the bill file is a letter from thenChief Administrative Law Judge John W. Hardwicke, dated March 24, 1995, to Senator Walter M. Baker, Chair of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. The letter communicates OAH's support for the bill, characterizing it in the following manner:
 HB 791 corrects an oversight in the existing law governing child abuse and neglect hearings. Current law permits *609 the [child abuse and neglect] hearing to proceed only if the CINA proceeding is dismissed. If a child is adjudicated CINA, OAH has no authority to proceed with the hearing. This has caused some difficulties, particularly when the appellant for the [child abuse and neglect] hearing is not involved in the CINA proceeding or when the matters at issue in the [child abuse and neglect] hearing are not adjudicated or resolved during the CINA proceeding.
 For example, a child is adjudicated CINA due to the neglect of the mother, but the mother's boyfriend has appealed the local department's identification of him as an alleged abuser in an indicated or unsubstantiated sex abuse finding. Under existing law, the boyfriend's [child abuse and neglect] hearing cannot proceed because the CINA proceeding was not dismissed even though the sex abuse issue may never have been discussed during the CINA proceeding. With the passage of HB 791, OAH would be able to proceed with the boyfriend's [child abuse and neglect] hearing after the CINA proceeding concludes.
 (emphasis added).
 The intermediate appellate court concluded from this legislative history that the purpose of the 1995 amendments "was to address the inequity created by FL § 5-706.1 when an individual was denied the right to appeal the Department's finding of indicated or unsubstantiated abuse or neglect, because the child ... was determined to be [a] CINA, even though the specific issue of abuse or neglect involving the individual was not litigated in the CINA proceeding or the individual was not a party to the CINA proceeding." Dep't of Human Res. v. Cosby, 200 Md.App. 54, 68-69, 24 A.3d 199, 207-08 (2011). Petitioner, however, disagrees with this analysis and argues that the amendments to § 5-706.1 precluded the defense of collateral estoppel based on a previous CINA finding because, the "removal [of the requirement that a CINA proceeding be dismissed prior to an administrative hearing] was not limited to parties, types of cases, or any other qualifiers ... no exception was inserted for `common law collateral estoppel.'" Petitioner urges that "[h]ad the legislature intended to allow administrative hearings only for non-parties, a simple clause would have sufficed."
 Contrary to Petitioner's position, under our reading of the statutory amendments and legislative history, it is clear that the amendments did, in fact, work to correct an inherent inequity in the original legislation. Prior to the amendments, if a CINA petition had been filed involving the child victim, the alleged maltreator could not appeal unless and until the CINA petition was dismissed, irrespective of the possibility that he or she may not have been a party to the CINA proceeding or that the facts presented in the CINA petition may have differed from those supporting the Department's finding. Therefore, as Respondent points out, "the prior statute exceeded the contours of collateral estoppel to bar appeals that would not be precluded under the common law doctrine," due either to a lack of identity of the parties or of the issues. The amendments removed this overreach in order to comport with, rather than prohibit, the common law defense, allowing an ALJ to apply the doctrine in a proper case. See Cosby, 200 Md.App. at 69-70, 24 A.3d at 208-09 (reasoning that "the General Assembly has not `specified and plainly pronounced' a derogation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel" in § 5-706.1 proceedings); Breslin, 421 Md. at 287, 26 A.3d at 891 (noting that "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the [L]egislature by creating statutory assaults intended to make any alteration in the common law other *610 than what has been specified and plainly pronounced." (quotation omitted)).
 Petitioner asserts that the ALJ's dismissal and the intermediate appellate court's decision in the instant case are inconsistent with this Court's decision in Tamara A. II, 407 Md. 180, 963 A.2d 773 (2009). As previously noted, however, we did not reach the question of collateral estoppel in that case, but instead limited our holding to making clear that the appeal itself was premature. Tamara II, 407 Md. at 187, 963 A.2d at 777. Therefore, the administrative law judge was properly persuaded by the Tamara A. I commentary on collateral estoppel, because our decision in Tamara A. II did not reach the issue. See West v. State, 369 Md. 150, 157, 797 A.2d 1278, 1282 (2002) (explaining that an intermediate appellate opinion underlying a judgment, which is later vacated on another ground, may still constitute persuasive authority). Further, our comment in Tamara A. II that "the statutory construction itself suggests that an appeal of a finding of indicated child abuse or neglect is not necessarily precluded by a CINA determination," Tamara A. II, 407 Md. at 194, 963 A.2d at 781, is consistent with our holding today, namely, that while a CINA finding does not act as a per se bar to an administrative appeal, it can be preclusive where the elements of collateral estoppel are met. As we also suggested in Tamara A. II, § 5-706.1 "does not necessarily preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a proper case." Id. The instant case is a proper case.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
 NOTES
 [1] The section provides:
 (e)(1) The Department or a local department may identify an individual as responsible for abuse or neglect in a central registry only if the individual:
 (i) has been found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect; or
 (ii) has been found responsible for indicated abuse or neglect and has:
 1. unsuccessfully appealed the finding in accordance with the procedures established under § 5-706.1 of this subtitle; or
 2. failed to exercise the individual's appeal rights within the time frames specified in § 5-706.1 of this subtitle, Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article, or the Maryland Rules.
 (2) The Department without the necessity of a request shall remove from the name of an individual described in paragraph (1) of this subsection the identification of that individual as responsible for abuse or neglect if no entry has been made for that individual for 7 years after the entry of the individual's name in a registry.
 § 5-714(e) of the Family Law Article.
 [2] Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that a child may be deemed a CINA if the Court finds that "(1) [t]he child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder, and (2)[t]he child's parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child's needs." After reviewing supplemental briefings from the parties following the hearing, the Circuit Court judge determined that, although Michael had turned 18 in the time since the CINA petition was filed, Ms. Cosby had a continuing obligation to care for him due to his disability, and therefore, he could properly be labeled a CINA. See Md.Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article (providing that "[i]f a destitute adult child is in this State and has a parent who has or is able to earn sufficient means, the parent may not neglect or refuse to provide the destitute adult child with food, shelter, care, and clothing"); § 13-101(b) of the Family Law Article (defining "destitute adult child" as "an adult child who: (1) has no means of subsistence; and (2) cannot be self-supporting, due to mental or physical infirmity"). As the propriety of this decision is not directly before us, we need not address it here.
 [3] Ms. Cosby did not appeal the CINA determination.
 [4] As the intermediate appellate court noted, the Department asserted that the elements of collateral estoppel, explained infra, were met in the instant case because:
 (1) it was a necessary condition precedent to a finding of CINA that the court find that the child had been neglected; (2) the court adjudicated Michael CINA and thus the issue of neglect was decided in the prior CINA litigation; (3) Cosby was properly before the court, had the benefit of counsel, and the opportunity to be heard on the issue during the CINA proceeding; (4) the finding of CINA was a final judgment; and (5) the CINA case involved the same parties as in the appeal before the OAH.
 Cosby, 200 Md.App. at 59, 24 A.3d at 202.
 [5] As the ALJ explained, the effect of the dismissal of the hearing "automatically affirm[ed] the finding of indicated neglect...." See COMAR 07.02.26.13(C) ("Dismissal or voluntary withdrawal of an appeal or request for an appeal automatically affirms the local department's finding and, in the case of a finding of indicated abuse or neglect, the local department's right to identify the individual as responsible for child abuse or neglect in a central registry.").
 [6] Section 10-222(a) of the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act "provides, generally, that a party aggrieved by the final decision of a covered agency in a contested case is entitled to judicial review." Tamara A. II, 407 Md. at 183, 963 A.2d at 774 (citing Md.Code. (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article); see also Charles County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 294-95, 855 A.2d 313, 318 (2004) ("[A] challenge to the entry of one's name in a central registry as an `indicated child abuser'... is a contested case within the meaning of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act....").
 [7] As the intermediate appellate court explained in Tamara A. I, the ALJ did not base the decision on a determination that collateral estoppel was abrogated under § 5-706.1, but, rather, on the fact that the CINA determination was founded on past conduct towards older children rather than "actual neglect" of the newborn. The ALJ evidently reasoned that a finding of indicated child neglect required actual harm to that child, and therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply to the administrative appeal because the Department had not established that the neglect issue had, in fact, been established in the CINA proceeding. See Tamara A. I, 178 Md.App. at 694-95, 943 A.2d at 657. As we stated in Tamara A. II, "notwithstanding that the definition of `neglect' for purposes of the instant proceeding was the same as for the CINA case, [the ALJ] found that entry into the registry had to be based on some actual abuse or neglect, not merely the potential for it." 407 Md. at 186, 963 A.2d at 776.
 [8] It is true that "neglect," carries a nearly identical definition in the statutes. The CINA provision defines "neglect" in the following manner:
 (s) "Neglect" means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or individual who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate:
 (1) That the child's health and welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or
 (2) That the child has suffered mental injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.
 Md.Code § 3-801(s) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The definition of "neglect" under the child abuse and neglect provision contains only nearly imperceptible stylistic differences:
 (s) "Neglect" means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate:
 (1) that the child's health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or
 (2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury.
 Md.Code § -701(s) of the Family Law Article. A determination that abuse or neglect is "indicated" means "a finding that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse did occur." Md.Code § 5-701(m) of the Family Law Article.
 [9] As the Circuit Court in the instant case noted, the Court of Special Appeals did not specifically interpret § 5-706.1 in Tamara A. I.
 [10] As the intermediate appellate court pointed out, the brackets denote deletion, while capital letters indicate language that was added to the statute.


text:
§ 22 Instituut ja keskus
 § 26 Liikmeskond
 § 27 Õppejõud ja teadustöötajad
 § 28 Teised töötajad
 § 29 Töötajate õigused ja kohustused
 § 30 Üliõpilased
 § 31 Üliõpilase õigused ja kohustused
 § 32 Üliõpilaskond
 § 33 Üliõpilasesindus
 § 34 Üliõpilaskonna põhikiri
 § 38 Kontroll
 § 40 Kõrgkooli õigusaktide põhimäärusega vastavusse viimine
 RT I, 15.06.2017, 2
 Vastu võetud 05.01.2015 nr 2
 RT I, 07.01.2015, 2
 08.06.2017 RT I, 15.06.2017, 1 18.06.2017
 (1) Tallinna Tehnikakõrgkool (edaspidi kõrgkool) on rakenduskõrgkool, kes tegutseb rakenduskõrgkooli seaduse, oma põhimääruse ja teiste õigusaktide alusel.
 Kõrgkooli eesmärk on pakkuda rakenduskõrgharidusõppes teaduse ja tehnoloogia arengule tuginevat rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud konkurentsivõimelist kõrgharidust tehnika, tootmise ja ehituse õppevaldkonnas ning teeninduse õppevaldkonnas transporditeenuste õppesuunal ja osutada õppe-, rakendusteadus- ning muul loometegevusel põhinevaid avalikke teenuseid.
 8) tegeleda nõustamisega tehnika, tootmise ja ehituse ning teeninduse õppevaldkonnas, sealhulgas transporditeenuste õppesuunal;
 31) kehtestab rektori asendamise korra;
 [RT I, 15.06.2017, 1 - jõust. 18.06.2017]
 15) käsutab kõrgkooli eelarvevahendeid rakenduskõrgkooli seaduse ja teiste õigusaktidega antud volituste ulatuses;
 (4) Prorektori töökohustustest vabanemise järel on prorektoril õigus asuda kõrgkoolis samaväärsele ametikohale, kus ta töötas enne prorektoriks nimetamist.
 (3) Professorite kogu juhib professorite kogu vanem, kelle valib professorite kogu lihthäälte enamusega korraliste professorite seast.
 (4) Professorite kogu koosseisu ja töökorra kinnitab rektor käskkirjaga.
 (1) Nõukogusse kuuluvad rektor, prorektorid, finants- ja haldusdirektor, akadeemiliste struktuuriüksuste juhid, kolm õppejõudude esindajat, rektori poolt väljastpoolt õppeasutust määratud isik ja üliõpilaskonna esindajad, kes moodustavad vähemalt ühe viiendiku nõukogu koosseisust.
 3) kinnitab kõrgkooli arengukavast lähtuvalt kõrgkooli põhitegevuste pikemaajalised arengusuunad;
 4) otsustab kõrgkooli rahvusvahelise suhtlusega seonduvaid küsimusi;
 5) kehtestab kõrgkooli sümbolid (lipp, logo, rektori ametikett, märk, medal jms) ja nende kasutamise korra;
 6) võib avaldada rektorile umbusaldust;
 7) kinnitab üliõpilaskonna põhikirja;
 8) kiidab heaks õppekavad ja nende muudatused;
 9) kiidab heaks ühisõppekava ja ühisõppekava koostöölepingu sõlmimise;
 10) kinnitab õppekorralduse eeskirja;
 11) kehtestab üliõpilaste vastuvõtutingimused ja -korra, sealhulgas õppekeele taseme miinimumnõuded välismaalase õppekeele oskuse piisavuse hindamiseks vastavalt välismaalaste seaduse § 168 lõikele 2;
 12) kehtestab üliõpilaste kõrgkoolist väljaarvamise tingimused ja korra;
 13) nimetab vajaduse korral õppekavad, mille alusel võib toimuda ainult täiskoormusega õpe, ning õppekavad, mille alusel toimuvale täiskoormusega õppele esitatakse kõrgemad nõuded;
 14) kehtestab üliõpilaste varasemate õpingute ja töökogemuse arvestamise tingimused ja korra;
 16) kehtestab enne 2002/2003. õppeaastat kõrgkooli lõpetanud isikutele ingliskeelse akadeemilise õiendi (Diploma Supplement) väljastamise korra;
 19) kinnitab lõputööde kaitsmise korra ja kaitsmiskomisjonide koosseisud;
 20) kinnitab õppekava statuudi;
 21) kehtestab õppejõudude kvalifikatsiooninõuded ning nendele vastavuse hindamise tingimused ja korra;
 22) kehtestab õppejõudude ja teadustöötajate atesteerimise tingimused ja korra;
 23) kehtestab korralisele õppejõule loometööks või kutseoskuste täiendamiseks tööülesannetest vaba semestri andmise ja selle tasustamise tingimused ja korra;
 24) valib korralised õppejõud ja teadustöötajad;
 25) kehtestab tingimused selle kohta, millal on rektoril õigus kutsuda ilma konkurssi välja kuulutamata kuni viieks aastaks külalisõppejõuks teadlasi või teisi oma eriala silmapaistvaid loomeisikuid või praktikuid;
 26) võib nimetada kõrgkoolis vähemalt kümme aastat professorina töötanud ja vanaduspensioniealiseks saanud õppejõu emeriitprofessoriks;
 27) kehtestab emeriitprofessori tasu saamise korra;
 28) [kehtetu - RT I, 15.06.2017, 1 - jõust. 18.06.2017]
 29) kehtestab kõrgkoolis korraldatava täiendus- ja ümberõppe vormid ning täiendus- ja ümberõppe läbiviimise korra;
 30) kehtestab põhitegevusega seotud tasuliste teenuste tasu määramise alused ja korra;
 31) kinnitab riigieelarve vahendite ja majandustegevusest laekunud tulu kasutamise korra;
 32) kinnitab kõrgkooli eelarve täitmise ja majandusaasta aruande;
 33) otsustab õigusaktidega sätestatud ulatuses ja korras kõrgkooli kasutusse antud riigivaraga seotud küsimusi;
 34) kuulab ära rektori ja prorektorite tegevuse aruanded ning nõunike kogu ettepanekud ja hinnangud kõrgkooli, sealhulgas õppekavade arengut puudutavates küsimustes;
 35) võib moodustada komisjone ja toimkondi;
 36) lahendab teisi küsimusi, mis kuuluvad tema pädevusse vastavalt rakenduskõrgkooli seadusele, põhimäärusele ja teistele õigusaktidele.
 (6) Nõukogu võtab oma pädevuse piires vastu otsuseid. Nõukogu otsused võetakse vastu kohalolijate häälteenamusega. Paragrahvi 15 punktides 1, 2, 5, 6, 31 ja 32 sätestatud juhtudel on vajalik kahe kolmandiku nõukogu liikmete häälteenamus. Nõukogu otsusele kirjutab alla nõukogu esimees, tema äraolekul nõukogu vanim liige.
 (3) Struktuuriüksuste eesmärk on täita kõrgkooli ülesandeid oma valdkonnas, tegutsedes nõukoguga kooskõlastatud ja rektori käskkirjaga kinnitatud põhimääruse alusel rektori või tema poolt määratud töötaja vastutusalas.
 1) instituudid;
 2) keskused.
 [Kehtetu - RT I, 15.06.2017, 1 - jõust. 18.06.2017]
 § 22. Instituut ja keskus
 (1) Instituut on kõrgkooli akadeemilise struktuuri üksus, mis lähtub oma tegevuses kõrgkooli põhimäärusest, oma põhimäärusest ja teistest õigusaktidest.
 (2) Instituudi tegevusvaldkonnad, ülesanded ja struktuuri, juhtimise, õppe-, teadus- ja arendustegevuse alused, aruandluse ja kontrolli sätestab instituudi põhimäärus, mille kooskõlastab nõukogu ja kinnitab rektor.
 (3) Instituuti juhib instituudi direktor instituudi põhimääruses ettenähtud korras.
 (4) Keskus on üldaineid õpetav kõrgkooli akadeemilise sturkuuri üksus, mis täidab oma põhimäärusega sätestatud ülesandeid. Keskuse põhimääruse kooskõlastab nõukogu ja kinnitab rektor.
 (5) Keskuse tööd juhib keskuse juhataja keskuse põhimääruses ettenähtud korras.
 Kõrgkoolis toimub kõrghariduse tasemel õppetöö rakenduskõrghariduse õppekavade alusel, mis vastavad rakenduskõrgkooli seadusele ning Eesti Vabariigi haridusseaduse § 5 lõike 2 punkti 7 alusel Vabariigi Valitsuse määrusega kehtestatud kõrgharidusstandardile.
 § 26. Liikmeskond
 § 27. Õppejõud ja teadustöötajad
 (4) Kõrgkooli teadustöötajatele kohaldatakse teadus- ja arendustegevuse korralduse seadusega kehtestatud nõudeid. Kõrgkooli teadustöötajad võivad osaleda õppetöö läbiviimises.
 § 28. Teised töötajad
 § 29. Töötajate õigused ja kohustused
 § 30. Üliõpilased
 § 31. Üliõpilase õigused ja kohustused
 4) õigus läbida ühisõppekava alusel õppides oluline osa sellest teise ühisõppekavas osaleva õppeasutuse juures, kusjuures ühisõppekavas osaleva teise õppeasutuse juures õppimiseks loetakse õppimist igas õppevormis;
 6) õigus kasutada õppetööks tasuta kõrgkooli auditooriume, laboratooriume, arvutiklasse, raamatukogusid, inventari, seadmeid ja muid vahendeid rektori kehtestatud korras;
 7) õigus valida oma esindajaid ja olla valitud üliõpilasesindusse;
 10) õigus esitada rektorile üliõpilasesinduse kaudu põhjendatud esildis õppejõu sobimatuse kohta õppeaine õpetamiseks;
 11) õigus nõuda kõrgkooli õppekorralduseeskirja ja motiveeritud taotluse alusel eksami või arvestuse uuesti sooritamist eksamikomisjonile;
 14) õigus saada üks kord rakenduskõrgharidusõppes akadeemilist puhkust üldjuhul kuni üks aasta, lisaks tervislikel põhjustel kuni kaks aastat, aja- või asendusteenistuse puhul kuni üks aasta ning lapse hooldamiseks kuni lapse kolmeaastaseks saamiseni;
 15) õigus saada üliõpilaspilet rakenduskõrgkooli seaduse § 24 lõike 1 punkti 9 alusel valdkonna eest vastutava ministri määrusega kehtestatud korras;
 17) õigus jätkata õppekava sulgemise või kõrgkooli tegevuse lõpetamise korral õpinguid samas või teises õppeasutuses samal või lähedasel erialal;
 18) kohustus kasutada kõrgkooli kasutusse antud riigivara heaperemehelikult ning järgida kõrgkooli õppekorraldus- ja sisekorraeeskirju;
 § 32. Üliõpilaskond
 § 33. Üliõpilasesindus
 (3) Üliõpilasesinduse liikmed valitakse instituutide proportsionaalse esindatuse põhimõttel. Üliõpilasesinduse valimise õigus on kõikidel kõrgkooli üliõpilastel. Üliõpilasesinduse valimise kord sätestatakse üliõpilaskonna põhikirjas.
 § 34. Üliõpilaskonna põhikiri
 (3) Kõrgkoolil on õigus osutada nii juriidilistele kui ka füüsilistele isikutele oma põhitegevusega seotud tasulisi teenuseid järgmistel juhtudel: täiendus-, ümber- ja tasemeõpe, sealhulgas eksternõpe, rakendusuuringud, lepingulised arendustööd, erialane nõustamine ja kirjastamine tehnika, tootmise ja ehituse õppevaldkonnas ning teeninduse õppevaldkonnas transporditeenuste õppesuunal. Teenuste tasu määramise alused ja korra kehtestab nõukogu.
 § 38. Kontroll
 § 40. Kõrgkooli õigusaktide põhimäärusega vastavusse viimine


text:
 10.6.2015
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 L 144/10
 ROZPORZĄDZENIE WYKONAWCZE KOMISJI (UE) 2015/885
 z dnia 9 czerwca 2015 r.
 ustanawiające standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 KOMISJA EUROPEJSKA,
 uwzględniając Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej,
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1308/2013 z dnia 17 grudnia 2013 r. ustanawiające wspólną organizację rynków produktów rolnych oraz uchylające rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 922/72, (EWG) nr 234/79, (WE) nr 1037/2001 i (WE) nr 1234/2007 (1),
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie wykonawcze Komisji (UE) nr 543/2011 z dnia 7 czerwca 2011 r. ustanawiające szczegółowe zasady stosowania rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1234/2007 w odniesieniu do sektorów owoców i warzyw oraz przetworzonych owoców i warzyw (2), w szczególności jego art. 136 ust. 1,
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)
 Rozporządzenie wykonawcze (UE) nr 543/2011 przewiduje – zgodnie z wynikami wielostronnych negocjacji handlowych Rundy Urugwajskiej – kryteria, na których podstawie Komisja ustala standardowe wartości dla przywozu z państw trzecich, w odniesieniu do produktów i okresów określonych w części A załącznika XVI do wspomnianego rozporządzenia.
 (2)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie jest obliczana każdego dnia roboczego, zgodnie z art. 136 ust. 1 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, przy uwzględnieniu podlegających zmianom danych dziennych. Niniejsze rozporządzenie powinno zatem wejść w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZE ROZPORZĄDZENIE:
 Artykuł 1
 Standardowe wartości celne w przywozie, o których mowa w art. 136 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, są ustalone w załączniku do niniejszego rozporządzenia.
 Artykuł 2
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wchodzi w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wiąże w całości i jest bezpośrednio stosowane we wszystkich państwach członkowskich.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 9 czerwca 2015 r.
 W imieniu Komisji,
 za Przewodniczącego,
 Jerzy PLEWA
 Dyrektor Generalny ds. Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich
 (1) Dz.U. L 347 z 20.12.2013, s. 671.
 (2) Dz.U. L 157 z 15.6.2011, s. 1.
 ZAŁĄCZNIK
 Standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 (EUR/100 kg)
 Kod CN
 Kod państw trzecich (1)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie
 0702 00 00
 MA
 128,2
 MK
 79,9
 TN
 138,3
 TR
 72,2
 ZZ
 104,7
 0707 00 05
 MK
 39,4
 TR
 121,3
 ZZ
 80,4
 0709 93 10
 TR
 121,6
 ZZ
 121,6
 0805 50 10
 AR
 111,5
 BO
 147,7
 TR
 67,0
 ZA
 137,7
 ZZ
 116,0
 0808 10 80
 AR
 104,6
 BR
 94,4
 CL
 154,9
 NZ
 140,2
 US
 124,3
 ZA
 128,9
 ZZ
 124,6
 0809 10 00
 TR
 266,2
 ZZ
 266,2
 0809 29 00
 TR
 451,2
 US
 525,9
 ZZ
 488,6
 (1) Nomenklatura krajów ustalona w rozporządzeniu Komisji (UE) nr 1106/2012 z dnia 27 listopada 2012 r. w sprawie wykonania rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 471/2009 w sprawie statystyk Wspólnoty dotyczących handlu zagranicznego z państwami trzecimi, w odniesieniu do aktualizacji nazewnictwa państw i terytoriów (Dz.U. L 328 z 28.11.2012, s. 7). Kod „ZZ” odpowiada „innym pochodzeniom”.


text:
 ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ
 Βρυξέλλες, 27.7.2017
 COM(2017) 399 final
 2017/0177(NLE)
 Πρόταση
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ
 σχετικά με τη θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί, εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ της συμφωνίας οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, όσον αφορά την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών
 ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΕΚΘΕΣΗ
 1.Αντικείμενο της πρότασης
 Η παρούσα πρόταση αφορά την απόφαση για τον καθορισμό της θέσης που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ της συμφωνίας οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, ενόψει της προβλεπόμενης έγκρισης απόφασης σχετικά με την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών.
 2.Πλαίσιο της πρότασης
 2.1.Η συμφωνία οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου
 Η συμφωνία οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, («συμφωνία») έχει ως στόχο να συμβάλει στη μείωση και, ενδεχομένως, την εξάλειψη της φτώχειας μέσω της θέσπισης μιας εμπορικής εταιρικής σχέσης σύμφωνης με τον στόχο της αειφόρου ανάπτυξης, τους Αναπτυξιακούς Στόχους της Χιλιετίας και τη συμφωνία του Κοτονού.
 Η συμφωνία υπογράφηκε στις 15 Οκτωβρίου 2008 και εφαρμόζεται προσωρινά από τις 29 Δεκεμβρίου 2008.
 2.2.Το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ
 Το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ είναι γενικά υπεύθυνο για τη λειτουργία και την εφαρμογή της συμφωνίας και παρακολουθεί την επίτευξη των στόχων της. Συνέρχεται σε υπουργικό επίπεδο σε τακτά διαστήματα που δεν υπερβαίνουν τη διετία. Για την επίτευξη των στόχων της εν λόγω συμφωνίας, το κοινό συμβούλιο έχει την εξουσία να λαμβάνει αποφάσεις για όλα τα θέματα που καλύπτονται από τη συμφωνία. Οι αποφάσεις που λαμβάνονται είναι δεσμευτικές για τα μέρη και τα υπογράφοντα κράτη CARIFORUM, τα οποία λαμβάνουν όλα τα απαιτούμενα μέτρα για την εφαρμογή τους σύμφωνα με την εσωτερική νομοθεσία κάθε μέρους και υπογράφοντος κράτους CARIFORUM.
 2.3.Η σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ
 Το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ, κατά την τέταρτη συνεδρίασή του στις 17 Νοεμβρίου 2017, πρόκειται να εγκρίνει απόφαση σχετικά με την κατάρτιση του καταλόγου διαιτητών που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας («σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη»).
 Στόχος της σχεδιαζόμενης πράξης είναι να καταρτιστεί κατάλογος δεκαπέντε ατόμων τα οποία διαθέτουν εξειδικευμένες γνώσεις ή σχετική πείρα στους τομείς του διεθνούς εμπορικού δικαίου, και είναι πρόθυμα να εργαστούν ως διαιτητές, όπως προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας. Αυτό το στάδιο είναι αναγκαίο προκειμένου να τεθούν σε εφαρμογή οι διατάξεις της συμφωνίας σχετικά με την επίλυση διαφορών.
 Η σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη καθίσταται δεσμευτική για τα μέρη σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 221 της συμφωνίας, το οποίο προβλέπει ότι: «Η επιτροπή εμπορίου και ανάπτυξης CARIFORUM-EE, το αργότερο εντός τριών μηνών από την έναρξη προσωρινής εφαρμογής της παρούσας συμφωνίας, καταρτίζει κατάλογο δεκαπέντε (15) ατόμων που είναι πρόθυμα και ικανά να εργασθούν ως διαιτητές. Καθένα από τα μέρη, επιλέγει πέντε άτομα ως διαιτητές. Τα δύο μέρη συμφωνούν επίσης ως προς πέντε πρόσωπα που δεν είναι υπήκοοι κανενός από τα μέρη που θα εκτελέσουν χρέη προέδρου της ειδικής ομάδας διαιτησίας. Η επιτροπή εμπορίου και ανάπτυξης CARIFORUM-ΕΕ μεριμνά ώστε ο κατάλογος να διατηρείται πάντα σε αυτό το επίπεδο.»
 3.Η θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης
 Στο άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας προβλέπεται η κατάρτιση καταλόγου δεκαπέντε ατόμων τα οποία διαθέτουν εξειδικευμένες γνώσεις ή σχετική πείρα στους τομείς του διεθνούς εμπορικού δικαίου, και είναι πρόθυμα να εργαστούν ως διαιτητές. Καθένα από τα μέρη επέλεξε πέντε άτομα και τα δύο μέρη συμφώνησαν επίσης ως προς πέντε πρόσωπα που δεν είναι υπήκοοι κανενός από τα μέρη και που θα εκτελέσουν χρέη προέδρου της ειδικής ομάδας διαιτησίας.
 Το παράρτημα του συνημμένου σχεδίου απόφασης του Συμβουλίου και ο κατάλογος διαιτητών συμφωνήθηκαν με την πλευρά του CARIFORUM κατά την έκτη συνεδρίαση της επιτροπής εμπορίου και ανάπτυξης, η οποία πραγματοποιήθηκε στην Τζαμάικα στις 25 Νοεμβρίου 2016.
 Η προτεινόμενη θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης αποσκοπεί στο να καταστεί δεσμευτική η σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη.
 4.Νομική βάση
 4.1.Διαδικαστική νομική βάση
 4.1.1.Αρχές
 Το άρθρο 218 παράγραφος 9 της Συνθήκης για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ) προβλέπει τη λήψη αποφάσεων για τον καθορισμό «των θέσεων που θα πρέπει να ληφθούν, εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης, σε όργανο που συνιστάται από δεδομένη συμφωνία, όταν το εν λόγω όργανο καλείται να θεσπίσει πράξεις που παράγουν έννομα αποτελέσματα, με εξαίρεση τις πράξεις που συμπληρώνουν ή τροποποιούν το θεσμικό πλαίσιο της συμφωνίας.»
 4.1.2.Εφαρμογή εν προκειμένω
 Το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ είναι όργανο που έχει συσταθεί με τη συμφωνία.
 Η πράξη την οποία καλείται να θεσπίσει το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ συνιστά πράξη που παράγει έννομα αποτελέσματα. Η σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη θα είναι δεσμευτική βάσει του διεθνούς δικαίου σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 221 της συμφωνίας.
 Η σχεδιαζόμενη πράξη δεν συμπληρώνει ή τροποποιεί το θεσμικό πλαίσιο της συμφωνίας.
 Ως εκ τούτου, η διαδικαστική νομική βάση για την προτεινόμενη απόφαση είναι το άρθρο 218 παράγραφος 9 της ΣΛΕΕ.
 4.2.Ουσιαστική νομική βάση
 4.2.1.Αρχές
 Η ουσιαστική νομική βάση για απόφαση σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 218 παράγραφος 9 της ΣΛΕΕ εξαρτάται κυρίως από τον στόχο και το περιεχόμενο της σχεδιαζόμενης πράξης για την οποία λαμβάνεται μια θέση εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης.
 4.2.2.Εφαρμογή εν προκειμένω
 Ο κύριος στόχος και το περιεχόμενο της σχεδιαζόμενης πράξης αφορούν την κοινή εμπορική πολιτική.
 Ως εκ τούτου, η ουσιαστική νομική βάση για την προτεινόμενη απόφαση είναι το άρθρο 207 της ΣΛΕΕ.
 4.3.Συμπέρασμα
 Το άρθρο 207 σε συνδυασμό με το άρθρο 218 παράγραφος 9 της ΣΛΕΕ θα πρέπει να αποτελέσουν τη νομική βάση της προτεινόμενης απόφασης.
 2017/0177 (NLE)
 Πρόταση
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ
 σχετικά με τη θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί, εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ της συμφωνίας οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, όσον αφορά την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών
 ΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ,
 Έχοντας υπόψη τη Συνθήκη για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, και ιδίως το άρθρο 207, σε συνδυασμό με το άρθρο 218 παράγραφος 9,
 Έχοντας υπόψη την πρόταση της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής,
 Εκτιμώντας τα ακόλουθα:
 (1)Η συμφωνία οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου
 1
 («συμφωνία»), υπογράφηκε στις 15 Οκτωβρίου 2008 και εφαρμόζεται προσωρινά από τις 29 Δεκεμβρίου 2008.
 (2)Το κοινό συμβούλιο CARIFORUM-ΕΕ, κατά την τέταρτη συνεδρίασή του στις 17 Νοεμβρίου 2017, πρόκειται να εκδώσει απόφαση σχετικά με την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών.
 (3)Κρίνεται σκόπιμο να καθοριστεί η θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ, καθώς η απόφαση θα είναι δεσμευτική για την Ένωση.
 (4)Η επισυναπτόμενη πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου συνιστά το νομικό μέσο για την κατάρτιση καταλόγου δεκαπέντε ατόμων τα οποία διαθέτουν εξειδικευμένες γνώσεις ή σχετική πείρα στους τομείς του διεθνούς εμπορικού δικαίου, και είναι διατεθειμένα να εργαστούν ως διαιτητές, όπως προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας. Αυτό είναι αναγκαίο προκειμένου να τεθούν σε εφαρμογή οι διατάξεις της συμφωνίας σχετικά με την επίλυση διαφορών.
 (5)Στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ, η Ένωση εκπροσωπείται από την Επιτροπή σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 17 παράγραφος 1 της ΣΕΕ. Τα κράτη μέλη θα πρέπει να υποστηρίξουν τη θέση της Ένωσης σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 4 παράγραφος 3 της ΣΕΕ,
 ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ:
 Άρθρο 1
 Η θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί, εξ ονόματος της Ένωσης, στο πλαίσιο της τέταρτης συνεδρίασης του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ στις 17 Νοεμβρίου 2017, βασίζεται στο σχέδιο απόφασης του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ που επισυνάπτεται στην παρούσα απόφαση.
 Άρθρο 2
 Η παρούσα απόφαση απευθύνεται στην Επιτροπή και στα κράτη μέλη.
 Βρυξέλλες,
 Για το Συμβούλιο
 Ο Πρόεδρος
 (1)
 ΕΕ L 289 της 30.10.2008, σ. 3.
 ---documentbreak---
 ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ
 Βρυξέλλες, 27.7.2017
 COM(2017) 399 final
 ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ
 της
 πρότασης απόφασης του Συμβουλίου
 σχετικά με τη θέση που θα πρέπει να ληφθεί, εξ ονόματος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, στο πλαίσιο του κοινού συμβουλίου CARIFORUM-ΕΕ της συμφωνίας οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, όσον αφορά την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών
 ΠΡΟΣΑΡΤΗΜΑ
 ΣΧΕΔΙΟ
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ αριθ. .../2017 ΤΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ CARIFORUM-ΕΕ
 της...
 που θεσπίστηκε με τη συμφωνία οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, σχετικά με την κατάρτιση καταλόγου διαιτητών
 ΤΟ ΚΟΙΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ CARIFORUM-ΕΕ,
 Έχοντας υπόψη τη συμφωνία οικονομικής εταιρικής σχέσης μεταξύ των κρατών CARIFORUM, αφενός, και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της, αφετέρου, («συμφωνία»), και ιδίως το άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 αυτής,
 ΕΞΕΔΩΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ:
 Άρθρο 1
 Ο κατάλογος δεκαπέντε διαιτητών που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1 που επισυνάπτεται στην παρούσα απόφαση εγκρίνεται από τα μέρη.
 Άρθρο 2
 Η επιτροπή εμπορίου και ανάπτυξης CARIFORUM-EE μπορεί να τροποποιήσει τον κατάλογο των διαιτητών που επισυνάπτεται στην παρούσα απόφαση.
 Άρθρο 3
 Η παρούσα απόφαση αρχίζει να ισχύει στις ...
 (τόπος) ...
 Για τα κράτη CARIFORUM
 Για την ΕΕ
 ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ
 Κατάλογος διαιτητών (άρθρο 221 παράγραφος 1)
 Διαιτητές που επιλέχθηκαν από τα κράτη CARIFORUM:
 Κα Tracy BENN-ROBERTS – Αντίγκουα και Μπαρμπούντα
 Κα Nicole FOSTER – Μπαρμπάντος
 Κα Bertha COOPER – ROSSEAU – Μπαχάμες
 Κα Michelle A. BROWN – Τζαμάικα
 Κα Fabiola MEDINA GARNES – Δομινικανή Δημοκρατία
 Διαιτητές που επιλέχθηκαν από την ΕΕ:
 Κ. Jacques BOURGEOIS – Βέλγιο
 Κ. Claus – Dieter EHLERMANN – Γερμανία
 Κ. Pieter Jan KUIJPER – Κάτω Χώρες
 Κ. Giorgio SACERDOTI – Ιταλία
 Κ. Ramon TORRENT – Ισπανία
 Διαιτητές που επιλέχθηκαν από κοινού από τα μέρη:
 Κ. Frederick ABBOTT – Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής
 Κ. James BACCHUS – Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής
 Κ. Armand DE MESTRAL – Καναδάς
 Κα. Claudia OROZCO – Κολομβία
 Κ. Helge SELAND – Νορβηγία