type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant (appellee) in an action of trespass quare clausumfregit, brought by the appellant. The narr. alleges that the defendant "wrongfully entered upon and cut down and carried away trees from all that part of a tract or parcel of land, called `Fair Dealing' and commonly known as the `Henry D. Wright Mill Property,' owned by the plaintiff in fee simple, lying and being in Hurlock District of Dorchester County, which is bounded on the north and east by the old mill stream and branch, and on the south and west by the lands of John P. Harper, W. Marion Pitts, Lizzie Barber and Benjamin F. Merrick, as said lands stood in the year 1902." The defendant pleaded that he did not commit the wrongs alleged, and the trial of the case was begun. There then appears in the record: "Jury empanelled and sworn, April 28, 1914. On motion, leave granted plaintiff for warrant *Page 330
 of resurvey and to withdraw a juror. Juror withdrawn." In the docket entries a similar entry appears, and on May 20th a warrant of resurvey was issued. The appellant contends that the warrant was issued by the direction of the Court, and not on his motion. The resurvey was made and the certificates, plats, etc., were returned by the surveyor and sheriff in pursuance of the requirements of the warrant. On November 11th, 1914, another jury was empanelled which rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. On that verdict there was a judgment for defendant for costs from which this appeal was taken.
 At the trial of the case the plaintiff offered the patent for "Fair Dealing" and certain deeds in support of his title. He then offered the plat and certificate made by the surveyor and his testimony to explain the plat and objects thereon. "Counsel for defendant then began a cross-examination of the witness by asking him what he did on the first day he went to the land to make his survey. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the question as tending to impeach the plaintiff's survey and location; there being no defense on warrant and the survey having been made by direction of the Court, and the correctness of the location being admitted by the plea, but the question was admitted by the Court, subject to the objection, wherefore plaintiff's counsel stated to the Court that he objected to any testimony being taken by the defendant attacking or in any way impeaching the location of the alleged trespasses of the defendant, alleged in the declaration, and made by the plaintiff under direction of the Court"; but the evidence was admitted subject to exception. The defendant's attorney then continued to cross-examine the surveyor and he (his testimony being still subject to exception) explained to the jury the survey made for the defendant and the objects pointed out by his witnesses. The plaintiff moved to exclude the testimony admitted subject to exception, and that motion being overruled the plaintiff excepted. The action of the Court is presented by the first bill of exceptions. *Page 331
 1. The theory of the appellant is, as stated in his brief, that "When the defendant pleads not guilty of the wrongs alleged, and does not take defense on warrant, the location, as alleged, is admitted by the plea, and the plaintiff is not required to prove it, nor is the defendant allowed to gainsay it." As the record shows that there was a motion by, and leave granted to, the plaintiff for a warrant of resurvey, we do not understand how the mere statement in the first bill of exceptions that the survey was made by "direction of the Court" can in any way affect defendant's right to dispute the correctness of the locations made by the plaintiff, unless it be, as seems to be contended by the appellant, that the defendant cannot have the benefit of the survey made by direction of the Court, if he had not taken defense on warrant. If that be appellant's contention we cannot agree with him, as we have no doubt about the right of the Court to order a warrant of resurvey when satisfied that it is necessary "for the better information of the said Court and the jury in the truth of the premises," that the lands be carefully resurveyed and laid out, etc., as stated in the form given in 2Harr. Ent. 785. Until about 1700 the practice in the provincial Court of Maryland was to issue a warrant to the surveyor to lay out the land in dispute in the presence of the sheriff, who was commanded to summon and empanel a jury to go upon the land, and the surveyor was directed "to run the lines according to the patent and the direction of the jury, 2 Poe 470; McHenry onEject. 60, and cases reported in early part of 1 H. McH. If the jury agreed as to the proper mode of laying out the land, the Court sometimes entered up a judgment on its verdict. In the note to Shaw v. Lynes, 1 H. McH. 18, Mr. Brantly gives a list of over twenty cases in each of which the warrant of resurvey was executed by a surveyor in the presence of the sheriff "under the direction of a jury of the neighborhood." In Watkinson v.Collins, Ibid. 12, after several attempts a jury was finally empanneled which agreed upon a verdict, which was signed and sealed by *Page 332
 the surveyor, sheriff and jurors, and the report of the case then states: "Which being read and heard, the defendant, by his attorney, pleaded not guilty, and issue was joined," — the survey being thus made before a plea was filed. The record does not show whether defense on warrant was entered, but if it was, it was not regarded as part of the pleadings. Somewhere about the beginning of the 18th century, or towards the end of the previous one, the practice of having a jury go upon the land and directing the surveyor how the location should be made was abandoned. After that the warrant was executed by the surveyor in conjunction with the sheriff, as is still the practice. In 2 Poe, sec. 470, it is said: "It seems probable, too, that what was at first allowed by the Court upon application, and, perhaps, only after cause shown, came soon to be recognized as a right, and that in order to entitle himself to a resurvey of the land, the defendant, after pleading not guilty, simply gave a direction to the clerk to enter on the docket the words "defense on warrant"; and thereupon, without any formal application to the Court, and without any special order from it, the plaintiff was required to issue his warrant of resurvey, and prove his title and possessory right to the land described in the declaration by establishing its boundaries, courses and distances." Under such circumstances it was very properly said by JUDGE DORSEY in Addison v. Hack,
 2 Gill, 221, that: "In an action relating to lands, if the defendant does not see fit to take defense on warrant, the plaintiff is under no obligation to ask for a warrant to locate his land, or any of the matters in controversy between the parties." The plaintiff had burdens enough on him when defense on warrant was entered, and if he received no notice that the defendant would take "defense according to his pretensions as they shall appear to be laid down on return of a warrant of resurvey" (2 Harr. Ent. 55), he had the right to assume that the defense was simply one of title and not of location.
 But the abuse of the privileges of defendants under the practice as it became established was so oppressive that the *Page 333
 Act of 1852, Chapter 177, was passed. That made radical changes in the practice, and it seems to us that there can now be no question about the right of the Court, when it is satisfied that there is a dispute about the boundaries, to order a warrant of re-survey to be issued, although the defendant has not taken defense on warrant, and when a warrant is so issued, the rules of practice applicable to surveys made after defense on warrant is taken, apply. The defendant can no longer take defense on warrantas matter of right, and have a re-survey of the disputed land. Section 80 of Article 75 of the Code provides that "No warrant of re-survey shall issue in any action of ejectment unless the Court shall be satisfied that there is a dispute about the location of the lands claimed in said action; nor shall any issue in other actions unless there is a dispute about the location of the lands for the injury of which damages are claimed, or unless the Court shall be satisfied that plats are necessary for illustration," and section 81 is, "any action where the parties hold or claim under the same title the lands in dispute, no warrant of re-survey shall issue, except in cases where the parties claim different parcels under the same title, and it appears to the Court there is a dispute about the location of the divisional line or lines."
 Application must therefore be made to the Court, and the warrant can only issue on its order, or by agreement of the parties. Section 82 shows clearly that the warrant can be taken out at the instance of either party. It says, "Where a warrant of re-survey shall be issued in any action of ejectment or other action, the party applying for such warrant shall first make the location of his claim and pretension, and such other location as he may think necessary to bring the cause fairly to trial." But if the Court becomes satisfied that the ends of justice require a warrant of resurvey to be issued, there can be no reason why it can not of its own motion direct it to be done, and if the warrant is ordered on motion of the plaintiff, or at the instance of the Court, there can be no possible reason why there should not be the same rules as to *Page 334
 locations as if it was taken out by the defendant. We have been speaking as if this was an action of ejectment, but there is as much, if not more, reason why what we have said should apply to an action of trespasss quare clausum fregit. In Funk v.Hughes, 5 Gill. 315, which was an action of trespass, the warrant was taken out by the plaintiff, as is shown by an examination of the record, and that was before the Act of 1852 was passed. It was there held, quoting from the syllabus for convenience, that: "Under issue joined in an action of trespass upon the plea of not guilty, the plaintiff may recover damages for any trespass by the defendant of the nature described in the declaration, and committed anywhere within the lines of the tract of land mentioned in it. But where plats are deemed requisite, it is necessary for the plaintiff to locate correctly, not only the tract of land claimed, but the spots within the lines of such tract, whereon the trespass was committed, and of which the plaintiff complains, and to such spots his proof must be confined. Places of trespass, of which the explanations are silent, can not be proved." See also what was said in Parker v.Wallis, 60 Md. 15, about the importance of a survey under the order of Court in such cases.
 2. The appellant contends that "when no re-survey is required by the pleadings, if one is made and offered in evidence, it is inferred that it was authorized for illustration only," and citesN.Y.P. N.R. Co. v. Jones, 94 Md. 24, in support of that contention. But that was a wholly different case from this. There was no dispute there as to the location of the lands for the injury of which damages were claimed, and hence the Court said that, "It must be considered that the plat was authorized for illustration only." JUDGE PEARCE, after quoting from Addison v.Hack, 2 Gill. 221, was careful to refer to the fact that since that case was decided, the Act of 1852 was passed, by which it was provided that "In no action shall plats be considered as pleadings or evidence per se," sec. 85 of Art. 75. The clear inference to be drawn from that decision is that where the title involved depends *Page 335
 upon conflicting pretensions or disputed lines and a warrant of re-survey is issued the evidence must be restricted to such objects, etc., as are located on the plats. Moreover, in Peters
 v. Tilghman, 111 Md. 227, which was an action of trespassquare clausum fregit, the defendant first took defense on warrant, but that was countermanded, and a warrant of re-survey was granted to the plaintiff and a survey and plat filed. JUDGE PEARCE delivered the opinion in that case, and distinctly recognized the necessity for locating objects on the plat, in order to have them considered by the jury, where the warrant was taken out by the plaintiff and the defense on warrant had been countermanded. But the description of the property in the narr. in this case, as shown above, suggests the necessity for a warrant of re-survey. It would have been impossible for a jury to have properly determined where the lands of the defendant and other parties named "stood in the year 1902" without a survey, even if the other lines of plaintiff's lands were conceded to have been correctly located.
 In addition to what we have said above we can not understand upon what theory the plaintiff could be permitted to prove by the surveyor, lines located on the plat which he relied on to show where his property was situated, but the defendant could not be permitted to cross-examine the surveyor, or attempt to show that those lines were not correctly located. Even if the failure of the defendant to take defense on warrant did have the effect the plaintiff claims — that is to say, that he admits, by merely filing the general issue plea, the location of the trespasses — still as the plaintiff did call the surveyor and other witnesses for the purpose of proving it, surely the defendant could not be penalized for not taking defense on warrant to the extent of not being permitted to meet the evidence offered by the plaintiff, if the plat was only intended to be used for purposes of illustration.
 We are then of opinion that there was no error in the ruling on the first exception, and the ruling in the second *Page 336
 exception is equally free from error and practically presents the same question as the first.
 3. The plaintiff offered seven prayers, all of which were granted, except the fourth, which was rejected because it was covered by the first, and no exception was taken to its rejection. The appellant has no reason to complain of the Court's action on his prayers, but he does complain of the ruling on the defendant's first, second and fifth prayers, which were granted, and alleges that they are inconsistent with those granted at his instance. We will first consider the defendant's fifth prayer, which instructed the jury, "that there is no evidence in this case tending to prove that the stone at `B' on the plat, returned by the surveyor in the sheriff's return," is at the end of the 18th course or at the beginning of the 19th course on the tract of land, mentioned in the evidence, and described in the patent as `Fair Dealing.'" It is peculiarly expressed — no evidence "tending to prove" — but we suppose it meant that there was "no evidence legally sufficient to prove," etc., and as we are of the opinion that such was the case, there was no reversible error in granting that prayer. There is no evidence that that stone was at the end of the 18th or the beginning of the 19th line of the tract. No stone is called for at that point, either in the patent for "Fair Dealing," or in the descriptions in the deed from William Dines to Lockwood and Wright for the Mill Site property.
 H. Martin Wright testified that, "He was born and brought up on that part of `Fair Dealing' which was always known as the old Henry D. Wright mill property within 100 yards of the stone marked on the plat as letter `B.' It was in their front yard * * *. It is part of an old mill stone, and a very heavy stone, being about 18 inches in diameter, and firmly sunk in the ground. His father pointed it out to him as a boundary stone of the mill site property bought from Dines and Lockwood. He had not been there for over thirty years until that morning of the survey, when, after he had located the spot where the dwelling house had stood by the remains *Page 337
 of a chimney, he knew at once where the stone was and walked straight to the spot. The stone was in a little patch of weeds and briars and covered over by the light, sandy soil, but upon scratching around with his foot he soon found and uncovered it, and pointed it out to the surveyor." There is another stone located at what the appellant claims is at the end of that line. Mr. Wright testified as to that: "The next stone, down the hill and in the branch, he knew was there because his father one day pointed out the spot, and said another boundary stone of the property was there in a patch of briars. Witness did not go to look at it, and never saw it until the day of survey, but knew it was there and after locating the first stone at letter `B', he had no difficulty in walking down and find this second stone, and he pointed it out to the surveyor." Rink Phillips, another witness for appellant, said: "The stone at letter `B' on the plat was there when he lived as tenant on the farm in Mrs. Stafford's time, as also were the stones down the hill in the branch at the end of the first line. He saw them often." That was all the testimony on the subject of stone "B", excepting Frank T. Turpin testified "that he has lived a mile and a half from the Henry D. Wright mill property since 1871. Knew Henry D. Wright from that time on. For several years he was around the home place at the mill. He never saw any stone there where the one was found marked letter `B' on the plat. There used to be a stone about one hundred yards from the mill, and a road running by it about here (indicating a spot on the plat not located, and in a different direction from letter `B')." Thomas J. Hackett testified "that in a practical way he has known this Henry D. Wright farm all his life." About a year and a half before, he and another bought the Henry D. Wright mill property, excepting the part across the mill stream in dispute. He was asked by Mr. Martin Wright if he could show him where the old mill site was and he did show him. Mr. Wright then found the stone, but Mr. Hackett said he had never seen it before. That is all the evidence in the record on the subject. *Page 338
 It will be observed that none of the witnesses pretended to say what boundary, or at the end of what line, stone "B" was. Nor is it shown who put the stone there, or by what authority it was done. As we have seen, no stone is called for, and the only evidence by which it is attempted to show it was connected with this property is that the then owner said it was "a boundary
 stone of the mill site property." None of the lines of "Fair Dealing" prior to the 19th or of the mill site property prior to the 38th were run, nor were any of the previous corners established. We cannot give our sanction to the method adopted on this survey in locating the divisional lines in dispute. Of course if a corner or boundary is established at a point before the lines in dispute are reached, a survey may begin at such point, instead of going back to the beginning of the tract, but to assume that a stone, not called for in any of the descriptions, and not explained beyond what we have shown above, is the beginning of a certain line of a tract, without any proof as to that, and then run the lines in dispute based on that assumption would be a dangerous rule of location to adopt. It would enable the owner of a property to fix the boundaries of his own property for the benefit of himself or his heirs, if he could plant a stone where he pleased, call it "a boundary" of a tract, and then when he is dead have his son testify to such facts as we have in this case, without any explanation as to who planted the stone, or by what authority it was done. Of course we do not mean to intimate that either the deceased Mr. Wright or his son did or said anything improper, but we only refer to what might be done by those willing to do wrong or to adopt their own ideas about their corners regardless of whether they were right or what others said or thought. If the survey of this tract had been started at some established point, and in running the lines one of them passed this stone, it might have been located for what it was worth, but to start a survey by assuming that a stone simply said to be a boundary of a tract was the beginning of aparticular line of that tract, without any other proof, is going too far and cannot be *Page 339
 permitted. These stones are not in fact the exact distance or direction from each other that the 19th line calls for in the patent, but as they are not so very far out of the way we will not discuss that phase of the question; but we hold that a party cannot take two uncalled for, and unexplained stones, which happen nearly to correspond, in distance and direction, with a line of a patent, or other conveyance, and thereby establish the line. Inasmuch as there was no call at the end of the line, or proof of where the end was, of course it was error to correct the survey to that second stone, for, in the absence of a call or some proof of the point, the courses and distance must govern. If the second stone had been proven to be at the end of the 19th line, and the course and distance of that line had been reversed in order to find the beginning of it, it would not have been permissible to correct to stone "B", because there was no call or proof to authorize the correction, and there is no rule applicable to locations in these cases, which we are aware of, that would permit a party to a suit to start the running of the tract at stone "B" as the beginning of the 19th, or any other particular line, under such evidence as we have quoted above.
 We are also of the opinion that there was no reversible error in granting the defendant's first and second prayers. They might have been made clearer — might have more definitely referred tothe part of "Fair Dealing," known as the Henry D. Wright Mill property, instead of saying, as was done in the first prayer, "that if they shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff has not so located or proved the lines of `Fair Dealing,' or the Henry D. Wright Mill property, as mentioned in the narr., or that part of the said lines which are the division lines," etc. The second speaks of "the lines of the tract of land called `Fair Dealing,' commonly known as the Henry D. Wright Mill property, as described in the narr," etc., instead of saying "that part ofthe line of the tract," etc. But no injury was done the appellant, as what was meant was evidently understood, and in our judgment an instruction could properly have been granted *Page 340
 that neither of those tracts nor the divisional lines were properly located.
 A prayer to the effect that the plaintiff had not so located the tract described in the narr. as to entitle him to recover might properly have been presented to test the sufficiency of the survey made by the plaintiff, for even if it could be conceded that the survey for the plaintiff did properly locate the lines of "Fair Dealing," and the Mill Site property (which lines are the same, with different numbers, along the disputed territory), it would not necessarily follow that the defendant's lines stop at the lines of "Fair Dealing." The narr. described the land as bounded "on the south and west by the lands of John P. Harper, W. Marion Pitts," et al., "as said lands stood in the year 1902." It is not shown by the survey where the lines of defendant stood in the year 1902. or even when this survey was made. His deed was not located. So taking the whole case into consideration, we find nothing in the rulings of the Court that the appellant can complain of, and we will affirm the judgment.
 Judgment affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs above andbelow. *Page 341


type: other

text:
5A_676/2014 (18.05.2015)
 5A_676/2014 Sentenza del 18 maggio 2015
 patrocinata dall'avv. Michela Ferrari-Testa,
 modifica della sentenza di divorzio,
 ricorso contro la sentenza emanata il 3 luglio 2014
 A.a. Con decisione 14 settembre 2011 il Pretore del Distretto di Lugano ha pronunciato il divorzio tra A.________ (1967) e B.________ (1968), ponendo il mantenimento del figlio C.________ (2003) interamente a carico della madre ed accertando il diritto di ogni coniuge alla metà della prestazione d'uscita accumulata dall'altro in costanza di matrimonio. Laureato in scienza biologiche con indirizzo fisiopatologico, l'ex marito non esercita alcuna attività lucrativa; l'ex moglie lavora invece come insegnante di scuola per l'infanzia.
 A.b. Il 27 dicembre 2012 B.________ ha chiesto la modifica della sentenza di divorzio al medesimo Pretore, nel senso di obbligare A.________ a versare un contributo alimentare per il figlio e di bloccare in garanzia del pagamento dei contributi l'importo di fr. 66'900.-- (pari a metà dell'avere previdenziale accumulato dall'ex moglie durante il matrimonio) depositato in favore dell'ex marito presso la Fondazione istituto collettore LPP.
 Con decreto supercautelare 28 dicembre 2012 il Pretore ha ordinato alla Fondazione istituto collettore LPP il blocco del predetto importo.
 Con decisione 2 agosto 2013 il Pretore ha respinto la petizione (revocando al passaggio in giudicato della sua decisione il blocco cautelare), ha posto le spese processuali di complessivi fr. 1'000.-- a carico delle parti in ragione di un mezzo ciascuno, ha compensato le ripetibili e ha respinto la domanda di gratuito patrocinio dell'ex marito.
 B. Entrambe le parti hanno impugnato la decisione pretorile del 2 agosto 2013 dinanzi alla I Camera civile del Tribunale d'appello del Cantone Ticino. In parziale accoglimento dell'appello presentato dall'ex moglie, con sentenza 3 luglio 2014 la Corte cantonale ha condannato A.________ a versare dal 1° gennaio 2013 a B.________ un contributo alimentare mensile di fr. 200.-- per il figlio e ad aprire a proprio nome un conto versamento capitale ("conto bloccato") presso una banca svizzera, su cui la Fondazione istituto collettore LPP dovrà versare su ordine del titolare fr. 36'000.-- e da cui il solo figlio, anche tramite il suo rappresentante, potrà prelevare il menzionato contributo di mantenimento. Il Tribunale d'appello ha inoltre precisato che, avvenuto il versamento di fr. 36'000.--, l'ordine di blocco cautelare impartito il 28 dicembre 2012 si considererà revocato. L'appello dell'ex marito è invece stato respinto, così come la sua domanda di gratuito patrocinio.
 C. Con ricorso in materia civile 8 settembre 2014 A.________ ha impugnato la sentenza cantonale dinanzi al Tribunale federale, postulandone la riforma nel senso di accogliere il proprio appello (revocando immediatamente il blocco cautelare del 28 dicembre 2012 ed addossando spese processuali e ripetibili di prima istanza all'opponente), di respingere integralmente l'appello dell'ex moglie e di essere posto al beneficio dell'assistenza giudiziaria per la seconda istanza. Il ricorrente chiede inoltre la concessione del gratuito patrocinio anche per la procedura dinanzi al Tribunale federale.
 Con decreto presidenziale 2 ottobre 2014 al ricorso è stato conferito il postulato effetto sospensivo con riferimento all'obbligo di apertura di un conto versamento capitale.
 1.1. Il gravame è stato presentato tempestivamente (art. 46 cpv. 1 lett. b e 100 cpv. 1 LTF) dalla parte parzialmente soccombente nella sede cantonale (art. 76 cpv. 1 LTF) contro una decisione finale (art. 90 LTF) pronunciata su ricorso dall'autorità giudiziaria ticinese di ultima istanza (art. 75 LTF) in una causa civile (art. 72 cpv. 1 LTF) con un valore di lite superiore al limite di fr. 30'000.-- previsto dall'art. 74 cpv. 1 lett. b LTF. Il ricorso in materia civile risulta pertanto in linea di principio ammissibile.
 1.2. Il Tribunale federale applica il diritto d'ufficio (art. 106 cpv. 1 LTF). Nondimeno, tenuto conto dell'onere di allegazione e motivazione posto dall'art. 42 cpv. 1 e 2 LTF, la cui mancata ottemperanza conduce all'inammissibilità del gravame, il Tribunale federale esamina in linea di principio solo le censure sollevate (DTF 140 III 86 consid. 2; 137 III 580 consid. 1.3; 134 III 102 consid. 1.1). Il ricorrente deve pertanto spiegare nei motivi del ricorso, in modo conciso e confrontandosi con i considerandi della sentenza impugnata, perché l'atto impugnato viola il diritto (DTF 134 II 244 consid. 2.1). Le esigenze di motivazione sono più rigorose quando è fatta valere la violazione di diritti fondamentali. II Tribunale federale esamina queste censure solo se la parte ricorrente le ha debitamente sollevate e motivate, come prescritto dall'art. 106 cpv. 2 LTF. Ciò significa che il ricorrente deve indicare in modo chiaro e dettagliato con riferimento ai motivi della decisione impugnata in che modo sarebbero stati violati i suoi diritti costituzionali (DTF 134 II 244 consid. 2.2). Critiche appellatorie non sono ammesse (DTF 133 III 589 consid. 2).
 Il Tribunale federale fonda il suo ragionamento giuridico sull'accertamento dei fatti svolto dall'autorità inferiore (art. 105 cpv. 1 LTF); può scostarsene o completarlo solo se è stato svolto in violazione del diritto ai sensi dell'art. 95 LTF o in modo manifestamente inesatto (art. 105 cpv. 2 LTF). L'accertamento dei fatti contenuto nella sentenza impugnata può essere censurato alle stesse condizioni; occorre inoltre che l'eliminazione dell'asserito vizio possa influire in maniera determinante sull'esito della causa (art. 97 cpv. 1 LTF). Se rimprovera all'autorità inferiore un accertamento dei fatti manifestamente inesatto - ossia arbitrario (DTF 137 III 226 consid. 4.2 con rinvii; 133 II 249 consid. 1.2.2) - il ricorrente deve sollevare la censura e motivarla in modo preciso, come esige l'art. 106 cpv. 2 LTF.
 2. In questa sede sono ancora litigiose l'ammissibilità dell'appello dell'opponente (infra consid. 3), la modifica dell'obbligo contributivo del ricorrente fissato nella sentenza di divorzio (infra consid. 4), la ripartizione delle spese processuali e ripetibili di prima istanza (infra consid. 5) e la concessione al ricorrente del gratuito patrocinio per la seconda istanza (infra consid. 6).
 3.1. Secondo l'art. 311 cpv. 1 CPC (RS 272) l'appello, scritto e motivato, deve essere proposto all'autorità giudiziaria superiore. L'appello deve contenere delle conclusioni precise e, se queste hanno per oggetto una somma di denaro, quantificate. Questo obbligo sussiste anche nelle cause rette dalla massima inquisitoria e dalla massima ufficiale (v. art. 296 cpv. 1 e 3 CPC). Eccezionalmente, è possibile entrare nel merito di un appello che presenta conclusioni formalmente viziate se dalla sua motivazione, eventualmente letta in relazione con la decisione impugnata, emerge che cosa e quanto l'appellante voglia ottenere (DTF 137 III 617 consid. 4-6).
 3.2. L'autorità inferiore ha considerato che, malgrado l'appello dell'ex moglie contenesse soltanto una conclusione cassatoria, dalla sua motivazione si poteva desumere che ella perseguiva la condanna dell'ex marito al versamento di un contributo alimentare per il figlio per un importo annuo di fr. 7'200.--, ovvero di fr. 600.-- mensili. La Corte cantonale ha pertanto considerato che i requisiti dell'art. 311 cpv. 1 CPC fossero adempiuti.
 3.3. Il ricorrente rimprovera all'autorità inferiore la violazione degli art. 311 cpv. 1 e 296 CPC e 29 Cost. per aver ammesso l'appello dell'ex moglie, peraltro redatto da un legale, anche se sprovvisto di conclusioni riformatorie precise e quantificate.
 3.4. Contrariamente a quanto sostiene il ricorrente, la Corte cantonale non ha adottato un trattamento di favore nei confronti dell'opponente, bensì ha correttamente applicato i principi giurisprudenziali suesposti. Dalla motivazione dell'appello appare infatti evidente che l'ex moglie volesse ottenere il versamento di un contributo di mantenimento per il figlio. L'importo annuo di tale contributo (fr. 7'200.--) risulta pure dalla motivazione del gravame, non importando che esso figuri nella parte dell'appello nella quale l'opponente discute la sua richiesta di blocco del capitale destinato al ricorrente. Il Tribunale d'appello ha poi giustamente tenuto conto del fatto che il versamento di un contributo alimentare in favore del figlio per un importo di fr. 600.-- mensili era già stato rivendicato dinanzi al Giudice di prime cure. La critica di violazione degl i art. 311 cpv. 1 e 296 CPC si rivela quindi infondata. La censura di lesione dell'art. 29 Cost. appare invece di primo acchito inammissibile, poiché priva di una motivaz ione conforme alle esigenze poste dall'art. 106 cpv. 2 LTF.
 4.1. La modifica o la soppressione del contributo di mantenimento del figlio, fissato in una sentenza di divorzio, è retta dall'art. 286 cpv. 2 CC, applicabile su rinvio dell'art. 134 cpv. 2 CC. Tale modifica presuppone che intervengano fatti nuovi, importanti e duraturi, tali da esigere una regolamentazione diversa dell'obbligo contributivo. La procedura di modifica non ha infatti lo scopo di correggere la sentenza di divorzio, ma di adattarla alle nuove circostanze. Il momento determinante per apprezzare se siano intervenute nuove circostanze è la data di inoltro dell'istanza di modifica (DTF 137 III 604 consid. 4.1.1 con rinvii).
 Per decidere se si è in presenza di una situazione che si è modificata in modo notevole e duraturo ci si deve fondare sugli accertamenti di fatto e sul pronostico effettuati nella sentenza di divorzio, da un lato, e sulle circostanze attuali e future prevedibili, dall'altro. Una fattispecie futura incerta e ipotetica non costituisce una causa di modifica del contributo. Possono per contro essere tenuti in considerazione elementi concreti relativi ad un prossimo cambiamento delle circostanze, in modo da evitare, per quanto possibile, una nuova ulteriore procedura di modifica (DTF 120 II 285 consid. 4b; sentenze 5A_186/2012 del 28 giugno 2012 consid. 5.2.2; 5A_487/2010 del 3 marzo 2011 consid. 2.1.1; 5A_352/2010 del 29 ottobre 2010 consid. 5.2, in FamPra.ch 2011 pag. 230).
 Non ogni fatto nuovo, quand'anche importante e duraturo, ha quale conseguenza automatica una modifica del contributo. Una siffatta modifica entra in considerazione unicamente se l'onere di mantenimento diventa squilibrato fra i genitori, alla luce delle circostanze prese in considerazione nel precedente giudizio, in particolare se l'onere contributivo diventa eccessivamente pesante per il genitore debitore di condizione modesta. Il giudice non può dunque limitarsi a constatare una modifica della situazione di uno dei genitori, bensì deve procedere ad una ponderazione degli interessi del figlio da un lato e di ogni genitore dall'altro tale da permettergli di apprezzare correttamente la necessità di modificare il contributo di mantenimento nel caso concreto. Accertate tali condizioni, il giudice deve ricalcolare il contributo, attualizzando tutti i criteri di calcolo adottati nel precedente giudizio (DTF 137 III 604 consid. 4.1.1 e 4.1.2 con rinvio).
 4.2. In concreto, nella sentenza di divorzio il Pretore aveva valutato che la situazione economica dell'ex marito non gli consentisse di versare alcun contributo di mantenimento per il figlio. Quanto al capitale di sua spettanza risultante dalla ripartizione dell'avere previdenziale accumulato dall'ex moglie durante il matrimonio, il Pretore aveva previsto che, anche se fosse stato pagato in contanti, sarebbe comunque rimasto destinato a garantire la previdenza dell'ex marito.
 Nel giudizio qui impugnato la Corte cantonale ha accertato che il pronostico del giudice del divorzio non si è avverato. L'ex marito, la cui richiesta di ottenere il pagamento in contanti della prestazione d'uscita in virtù dell'art. 5 cpv. 1 lett. a LFLP (RS 831.42) è nel frattempo stata accolta, intende infatti adoperare il capitale per "fare fronte a debiti contratti con i fratelli, per la manutenzione dei propri immobili e semplicemente per arrivare alla fine del mese". Il Tribunale d'appello ha pertanto considerato che la situazione dell'ex marito fosse mutata in modo rilevante e duraturo, potendo egli disporre liberamente della liquidazione di fr. 66'900.--, non destinata ad alimentare una nuova forma di previdenza nel nuovo Stato di residenza. Ponderati i vari interessi e ricalcolate le risorse (reddito e sostanza) dei genitori, la Corte cantonale ha reputato che si giustificasse modificare la sentenza di divorzio, imponendo all'ex marito di versare un contributo alimentare per il figlio pari a fr. 200.-- mensili dal 1° gennaio 2013 (fino alla sua maggiore età o fino al termine della sua formazione scolastica o professionale se al compimento della maggiore età questa non fosse ancora normalmente conclusa).
 4.3. Il ricorrente lamenta un accertamento dei fatti arbitrario e la violazione dell'art. 286 cpv. 2 CC.
 Sostiene che, al momento dell'inoltro dell'istanza di modifica della sentenza di divorzio, non vi era stato alcun cambiamento rilevante delle circostanze rispetto alla sentenza di divorzio: la ricezione della quota riconosciutagli in esito alla ripartizione dell'avere previdenziale maturato dall'ex moglie in costanza di matrimonio ed il suo utilizzo per scopi estranei alla previdenza non si sono ancora verificati, ed erano comunque già prevedibili in sede di divorzio. L'accertamento dell'utilizzo della liquidazione di fr. 66'900.-- a fini non previdenziali si fonderebbe del resto unicamente su un'affermazione generica del ricorrente, "persona non cognita in materia previdenziale".
 Egli considera inoltre che, in ogni modo, il futuro utilizzo della liquidazione di fr. 66'900.-- a scopi non previdenziali non dovrebbe avere quale conseguenza la modifica del contributo alimentare. Il Tribunale di appello avrebbe omesso di verificare se l'onere di mantenimento tra i genitori ne risulta squilibrato e di ponderare gli interessi delle varie parti coinvolte: prima di intaccare l'eventuale e modesta eccedenza di reddito e la sostanza dell'ex marito si sarebbe dovuto chiedere all'ex moglie un contributo più significativo.
 4.4. Se si può ammettere che la commisurazione del contributo alimentare per il figlio in sede di divorzio tenesse già in considerazione un possibile pagamento in contanti all'ex marito del capitale riconosciutogli in esito alla ripartizione dell'avere previdenziale accumulato dall'ex moglie durante il matrimonio, è errato sostenere che prendesse pure in considerazione un possibile impiego della liquidazione per finalità non previdenziali: il giudice del divorzio aveva al contrario pronosticato che tale capitale, anche se versato in contanti, sarebbe rimasto destinato a garantire la previdenza dell'ex marito.
 Nella sua risposta del 7 febbraio 2013 all'istanza di modifica della sentenza di divorzio, così come all'udienza del 19 aprile 2013, l'ex marito, patrocinato da un legale, ha ammesso che con la liquidazione in contanti della prestazione d'uscita intende rimborsare i debiti verso i fratelli, effettuare la manutenzione dei propri immobili ed "arrivare alla fine del mese". In tali condizioni, l'accertamento dell'autorità inferiore secondo cui la liquidazione di fr. 66'900.-- non è destinata ad alimentare una nuova forma di previdenza nel nuovo Stato di residenza del ricorrente non appare manifestamente inesatto, considerato inoltre che nella procedura di modifica di una sentenza di divorzio si può tenere conto di fatti futuri, se prevedibili al momento dell'inoltro dell'istanza (v. supra consid. 4.1).
 Il mancato avverarsi del pronostico formulato nella sentenza di divorzio modifica la situazione dell'ex marito in modo importante e duraturo, potendo egli disporre di un capitale di fr. 66'900.-- non legato a finalità previdenziali. Il ricorrente non contesta che tale capitale possa quindi rientrare tra i mezzi economici da prendere in considerazione per calcolare il contributo alimentare per il figlio, ma considera che il miglioramento della sua situazione economica ancora non giustifichi una regolamentazione diversa del suo obbligo contributivo. La ponderazione degli interessi delle parti coinvolte proposta nel ricorso non riesce però ad indebolire quella effettuata nel giudizio impugnato: malgrado la capacità economica dell'ex moglie rimanga maggiore di quella dell'ex marito e basti a coprire il fabbisogno del figlio, ciò non significa che il ricorrente possa essere esonerato dal versamento di un contributo di mantenimento.
 Il giudizio impugnato, conforme alla giurisprudenza in materia, resiste quindi alle censure di arbitrio nell'accertamento dei fatti e di violazione dell'art. 286 cpv. 2 CC.
 5. Il ricorrente chiede, qualora il giudizio impugnato fosse rovesciato, di modificare la ripartizione delle spese processuali e ripetibili di prima istanza - confermata dal Tribunale d'appello- in quanto violerebbe in tal caso gli art. 106 seg. CPC, poiché l'ex moglie risulterebbe interamente soccombente. Sennonché, come visto ai considerandi precedenti, la sentenza di appello va confermata. Non occorre pertanto esaminare oltre l'argomentazione ricorsuale.
 6.1. Secondo l'art. 117 CPC, ha diritto al gratuito patrocinio chiunque sia sprovvisto dei mezzi necessari (lett. a) e la cui domanda non appaia priva di probabilità di successo (lett. b).
 6.2. L'autorità inferiore non ha concesso il gratuito patrocinio all'ex marito, considerando che nessuna delle due condizioni cumulative dell'art. 117 CPC fosse adempiuta: ha ritenuto che la sua incapacità di far fronte ai costi dell'appello fosse dubbia, disponendo egli di sostanza immobiliare in Italia, e che il suo rimedio appariva in ogni modo senza possibilità di buon esito fin dall'inizio.
 6.3. Il ricorrente lamenta la violazione dell'art. 117 lett. b CPC, sostenendo che il Tribunale d'appello avrebbe in realtà valutato tale requisito dopo aver statuito sul suo appello e non al momento dell'inoltro della domanda di gratuito patrocinio, quando le probabilità di successo non potevano essere escluse a priori.
 6.4. La critica non basta ad avversare il rifiuto del gratuito patrocinio in sede di appello. Il ricorrente si limita infatti a sostenere che la condizione dell'art. 117 lett. b CPC sarebbe stata soddisfatta, senza nemmeno tentare di dimostrare che la Corte cantonale avrebbe anche a torto considerato inadempiuta la condizione - cumulativa - dell'art. 117 lett. a CPC. La censura non può pertanto essere accolta.
 7. Da quanto precede discende che il ricorso va respinto nella misura in cui è ammissibile.
 La domanda di gratuito patrocinio presentata dal ricorrente non può essere accolta già per mancanza di possibilità di esito favorevole del suo gravame (art. 64 cpv. 1 LTF).
 Le spese giudiziarie sono poste a carico del ricorrente (art. 66 cpv. 1 LTF). Non si giustifica assegnare ripetibili all'opponente, la quale non si è espressa sull'istanza di effetto sospensivo al ricorso e non è stata invitata a presentare una risposta al gravame (art. 68 cpv. 1 LTF).
 3. Le spese giudiziarie di fr. 2'500.-- sono poste a carico del ricorrente.
 4. Comunicazione ai patrocinatori delle parti e alla I Camera civile del Tribunale d'appello del Cantone Ticino.
 Losanna, 18 maggio 2015


text:
An welchem Ort ist die Arbeitsleistung zu erbringen? von Hans Georg Rumke A. Die Arbeitsleistung
 Der Arbeitnehmer ist verpflichtet, seine Arbeitsleistung zu erbringen.
 Der Arbeitgeber muss die vereinbarte Vergütung zahlen.
 Beide Pflichten sind die sogenannten Hauptleistungspflichten im Arbeitsverhältnis.
 In der Regel schließen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer einen Arbeitsvertrag, aus dem sich die näheren Einzelheiten ergeben.
 Daneben gelten aber auch Gesetze, Tarifverträge und Betriebsvereinbarungen, soweit sie einschlägig sind.
 Der Arbeitsvertrag muss nicht schriftlich geschlossen werden. Wenn A den B beauftragt, für EUR 30 seine Hecke zu schneiden, ist dies auch ein Arbeitsvertrag.
 Gibt es keinen schriftlichen Arbeitsvertrag, kann ein Arbeitnehmer vom Arbeitgeber dennoch verlangen, dass dieser die wesentlichen Arbeitsbedingungen aufschreibt und ihm aushändigt. Dies ist im Nachweisgesetz geregelt (§ 2 NachwG).
 B. Ort der Arbeitsleistung
 Der Arbeitgeber bestimmt, wo die Arbeitsleistung zu erbringen ist. Dies ist i.d.R. der Sitz des Betriebes. Das muss aber nicht immer so sein, etwa bei Außendienstmitarbeitern oder Montagemitarbeitern.
 In der Regel wird der Arbeitsort im Arbeitsvertrag geregelt. Der Arbeitnehmer kann sich darauf einstellen und den Weg zur Arbeit einkalkulieren.
 Wenn die Betriebsstätte aber wechselt, wird es komplizierter. Der Arbeitgeber könnte sich etwa entschließen, seine Betriebsstätte im Ort A zu schließen und eine neue Betriebsstätte im Ort B zu eröffnen.
 Ist der Arbeitnehmer dann verpflichtet, zukünftig im Ort B zu arbeiten?
 Wenn im Arbeitsvertrag geregelt ist, dass der Arbeitnehmer seine Arbeitsleistung im Betrieb des Ortes A zu leisten hat -ohne weiteren Zusatz- dann muss er nicht zukünftig im Ort B arbeiten.
 Wenn der Arbeitsvertrag aber eine Versetzungsklausel enthält, wonach der Arbeitnehmer verpflichtet ist, bei gleichen Arbeitsbedingungen und gleicher Bezahlung auch im Ort B zu arbeiten, wird es schon spannender. Denn es kommt darauf an, ob die Versetzung von Ort A zum Ort B für den Arbeitnehmer zumutbar ist.
 Das Weisungsrecht des Arbeitgebers kann nämlich auf seine Zulässigkeit hin überprüft werden (§§ 305 ff BGB, Inhaltskontrolle und § 106 GewO, § 315 BGB Ausübungskontrolle).
 Eine Versetzungsklausel ist jedenfalls dann unangemessen, wenn der Arbeitgeber durch die einseitige Gestaltung eigene Interessen auf Kosten des Arbeitnehmers durchzusetzen versucht, ohne dessen Belange hinreichend zu berücksichtigen.
 Grundsätzlich gilt: Die neue Tätigkeit muss mit der arbeitsvertraglich vereinbarten Tätigkeit inhaltlich gleichwertig sein.
 Ist die Versetzung vertraglich zulässig, muss sie aber auch noch billigem Ermessen entsprechen (§106 GewO, § 315 BGB). Hierfür muss der Arbeitgeber die wesentlichen Umstände des Einzelfalles abwägen und die beiderseitigen Interessen berücksichtigen. Er hat auf die schutzwürdigen familiären Belange des Arbeitnehmers Rücksicht zu nehmen und diese mit betrieblichen Gründen oder ebenfalls schutzwürdigen Belangen anderer Arbeitnehmer abzuwägen.
 Bei der Änderung des Arbeitsortes muss der Arbeitgeber sogar alternative Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten prüfen, auf die sich der Arbeitnehmer beruft.
 C. Rechtsfolgen der Versetzung:
 Bei einer wirksamen Versetzung ist der Arbeitnehmer verpflichtet, auf dem neuen Arbeitsplatz weiterzuarbeiten.
 Weigert er sich zu Unrecht, ist dies eine arbeitsvertragliche Pflichtverletzung, die nach einer Abmahnung auch eine Kündigung rechtfertigen kann.
 Ist die Versetzung unwirksam, braucht der Arbeitnehmer ihr nicht nachzukommen. Er hat weiterhin Anspruch auf seine vereinbarte Arbeitsvergütung.
 Ist die Rechtslage nicht eindeutig, empfiehlt es sich für den Arbeitnehmer, zunächst auf dem neuen Arbeitsplatz weiterzuarbeiten aber durch das Arbeitsgericht im Wege der Einstweiligen Verfügung im Eilverfahren klären zu lassen, ob die Versetzung rechtmäßig ist oder nicht.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 |
 52014PC0443
 Togra le haghaidh RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS ÓN gCOMHAIRLE maidir le nósanna imeachta áirithe chun an Comhaontú Cobhsaíochta agus Comhlachais idir na Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a mBallstáit, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú agus chun an Comhaontú Eatramhach ar thrádáil agus ar ábhair a bhaineann le trádáil idir an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú (códú) /* COM/2014/0443 final - 2014/0206 (COD) */
 MEABHRÁN MÍNIÚCHÁIN
 1. I gcomhthéacs Eoraip na ndaoine,
 cuireann an Coimisiún an‐bhéim ar shimpliú agus ar shoiléiriú dhlí an
 Aontais ionas go mbeidh sé níos soiléire agus níos so-aimsithe do na saoránaigh
 agus dá réir sin, go gcruthófar deiseanna nua dóibh agus seans chun úsáid a
 bhaint as na cearta sonracha a bhronntar orthu.
 Ní féidir an aidhm sin a bhaint amach fad is atá
 líon mór forálacha a leasaíodh roinnt uaireanta, agus leasuithe suntasacha a
 bheith i gceist go minic, scaipthe anseo agus ansiúd, rud a fhágann go mbíonn
 gá le cuardach a dhéanamh ar roinnt de na forálacha sin san ionstraim bhunaidh
 agus ar roinnt eile acu in ionstraimí leasaitheacha níos déanaí. Is gá, dá bhrí
 sin, mórobair thaighde a dhéanamh, i bhfoirm comparáide idir cuid mhór ionstraimí
 éagsúla, chun na rialacha atá i bhfeidhm faoi láthair a shainaithint.
 Ar an gcúis sin, tá gá freisin le códú a dhéanamh ar
 rialacha a leasaíodh go minic má tá an dlí le bheith soiléir agus trédhearcach.
 2. Chinn an Coimisiún, dá bhrí sin, ar
 an 1 Aibreán 1987[1],
 treoir a thabhairt dá fhoireann á rá gur cheart gach gníomh a chódú i
 ndiaidh deich leasú ar a mhéad, agus cuireadh i bhfios dóibh gur
 bunriachtanas é seo agus gur cheart féachaint le códú a dhéanamh ag eatraimh is
 giorra ná sin ar na téacsanna a bhfuil siad freagrach astu lena chinntiú go
 bhfuil na forálacha atá iontu soiléir agus sothuigthe.
 3. Dearbhaíodh an méid sin i gConclúidí
 Uachtaránacht na Comhairle Eorpaí i nDún Éideann (Nollaig 1992)[2], agus cuireadh i bhfios
 an tábhacht a bhaineann le códú mar go dtugann sé cinnteacht faoin dlí
 is infheidhme maidir le hábhar ar leith tráth ar leith.
 Ní foláir an nós imeachta coitianta a bhaineann le
 glacadh ghníomhartha an Aontais a chomhlíonadh go huile agus go hiomlán le linn
 an códú á dhéanamh.
 Ós rud é nach ceadmhach athruithe a dhéanamh ar
 shubstaint na n‐ionstraimí lena mbaineann an códúchán, tháinig
 Parlaimint na hEorpa, an Chomhairle agus an Coimisiún ar chomhaontú, trí chomhaontú
 idirinstitiúideach dar data an 20 Nollaig 1994, go bhféadfar nós
 imeachta luathaithe a úsáid chun ionstraimí códaithe a ghlacadh go mear.
 4. Is é is cuspóir don togra seo códú a
 dhéanamh ar Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008 ón gComhairle an
 16 Meitheamh 2008 maidir le nósanna imeachta áirithe chun an
 Chomhaontú Cobhsaíochta agus Comhlachais idir na Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a
 mBallstáit, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den
 pháirt eile, a chur i bhfeidhm agus chun an Comhaontú Eatramhach ar thrádáil
 agus ar ábhair a bhaineann le trádáil idir an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt
 amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a chur i
 bhfeidhm[3].
 Glacfaidh an Rialachán nua ionad na ngníomhartha éagsúla a chuimsítear ann[4]; caomhnaítear go huile
 agus go hiomlán inneachar na ngníomhartha atá á gcódú agus, dá bhrí sin, ní
 dhéantar ach iad a thabhairt le chéile agus na leasuithe foirmiúla sin
 amháin a bhfuil gá leo don phróiseas códúcháin féin a dhéanamh.
 5. Rinneadh an togra códúcháin a
 tharraingt suas ar bhonn réamh‐chomhdhlúthú, i 22 teanga
 oifigiúil, ar Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008 agus ar an ionstraim lena
 leasaítear é. Is í Oifig Foilseachán an Aontais Eorpaigh a rinne an comhdhlúthú
 sin trí chóras próiseála sonraí. I gcás uimhreacha nua a bheith tugtha
 do na hAirteagail, taispeántar an comhghaol idir an tseanuimhir agus an uimhir
 nua i dtábla atá leagtha amach in Iarscríbhinn II a ghabhann leis an Rialachán códaithe.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 2014/0206 (COD)
 Togra le haghaidh
 RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS
 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE
 maidir le nósanna imeachta áirithe chun an
 Comhaontú Cobhsaíochta agus Comhlachais idir na Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a
 mBallstáit, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den
 pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú agus chun an Comhaontú Eatramhach ar thrádáil agus ar
 ábhair a bhaineann le trádáil idir an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt amháin,
 agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú (códú)
 TÁ PARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS
 COMHAIRLE AN AONTAIS EORPAIGH,
 Ag féachaint don Chonradh Ö ar Fheidhmiú an
 Aontais Eorpaigh Õ, agus go háirithe
 Airteagal Ö 207(2) Õ de,
 Ag féachaint don togra ón gCoimisiún Eorpach,
 Tar éis dóibh an dréachtghníomh reachtach a
 chur chuig na parlaimintí náisiúnta,
 Ag féachaint don tuairim ó Choiste Eacnamaíoch
 agus Sóisialta na hEorpa[5],
 Ag gníomhú dóibh i gcomhréir leis an ngnáthnós
 imeachta reachtach,
 De bharr an méid seo a leanas:
 ê
 (1) Rinneadh Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008
 ón gComhairle[6]
 a leasú go substaintiúil[7].
 Ar mhaithe le soiléireacht agus le réasúntacht, ba cheart an Rialachán sin a
 chódú.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 (2) An 16 Meitheamh 2008,
 síníodh Comhaontú Cobhsaíochta agus Comhlachais i Lucsamburg idir na
 Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a mBallstáit, de pháirt amháin agus an Bhoisnia agus
 an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile ('an CCC').
 (3) An 16 Meitheamh 2008
 thug an Chomhairle chun críche Comhaontú Eatramhach ar thrádáil agus ar ábhair
 a bhaineann le trádáil idir an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt amháin, agus an
 Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile[8]
 ('an Comhaontú Eatramhach') ina ndearnadh Ö foráil Õ maidir le teacht i
 bhfeidhm luath fhorálacha an CCC maidir le trádáil agus le hábhair a bhaineann
 le trádáil. Ö Tháinig Õ an Comhaontú
 Eatramhach i bhfeidhm an Ö 1 Iúil 2008 Õ.
 (4) Is gá na nósanna imeachta a leagan
 síos maidir le forálacha áirithe den Chomhaontú Eatramhach a chur i bhfeidhm.
 Ós rud é gurb ionann den chuid is mó na forálacha maidir le trádáil agus a
 bhaineann le trádáil sna hionstraimí Ö sin Õ, ba cheart feidhm a
 bheith ag an Rialachán seo maidir le cur chun feidhme an CCC tar éis dó teacht
 i bhfeidhm.
 (5) Ordaítear sa CCC agus sa
 Chomhaontú Eatramhach go bhféadfar táirgí iascaigh de thionscnamh na Boisnia nó
 na Heirseagaivéine a allmhairiú isteach san Ö Aontas Õ ar dhleacht chustaim
 laghdaithe, laistigh de theorainneacha na dtaraif‐chuótaí. Is gá, dá bhrí
 sin, forálacha a leagan síos lena rialaítear bainistiú na dtaraif‐chuótaí
 Ö sin Õ.
 (6) I gcás ina bhfuil gá le
 bearta cosanta trádála, ba cheart iad a ghlacadh i gcomhréir le Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 260/2009
 ón gComhairle[9],
 Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1061/2009 ón gComhairle[10], Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009
 ón gComhairle[11]
 nó Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 597/2009 ón gComhairle[12], de réir mar a bheidh.
 (7) I gcás ina dtugann Ballstát
 faisnéis don Choimisiún faoi chalaois a d'fhéadfadh a bheith ann nó faoi
 mhainneachtain comhar riaracháin a sholáthar, beidh feidhm ag an reachtaíocht
 ábhartha Ö Aontais Õ, go háirithe
 Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 515/97 ón gComhairle[13].
 (8) Chun na forálacha iomchuí den
 Rialachán seo a chur chun feidhme, ba cheart don Choiste um an gCód Custaim a
 bunaíodh le hAirteagal 285 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 952/2013 ó
 Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle[14]
 cúnamh a thabhairt don Choimisiún.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17 (oiriúnaithe)
 (9) Is gá coinníollacha
 aonfhoirmeacha chun bearta cosanta agus bearta eile nach iad a ghlacadh chun
 clásail dhéthaobhacha chosanta an Chomhaontaithe Eatramhaigh agus an Ö CCC Õ a chur chun feidhme.
 Ba cheart na bearta sin a ghlacadh i gcomhréir le Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011
 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle[15].
 (10) Ba cheart don Choimisiún
 gníomhartha cur chun feidhme atá infheidhme láithreach a ghlacadh más rud é, i
 gcásanna a bhfuil údar cuí leo a bhaineann le himthosca eisceachtúla agus
 géibheannacha a thagann chun cinn de réir bhrí Airteagal 24(5)(b) agus
 Airteagal 25(4) den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus Airteagal 39(5)(b)
 agus Airteagal 40(4) den Ö CCC Õ ina dhiaidh sin, go
 n‐éilítear amhlaidh ar mhórchúiseanna práinne,
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 TAR ÉIS AN RIALACHÁN SEO A GHLACADH:
 Airteagal 1
 Ábhar
 Sa Rialachán seo leagtar síos nósanna imeachta
 áirithe chun rialacha mionsonraithe a ghlacadh chun forálacha áirithe den
 Chomhaontú Cobhsaíochta agus Comhlachais idir na Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a
 mBallstáit, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den
 pháirt eile ('an CCC'), a chur chun feidhme agus chun forálacha áirithe den
 Chomhaontú Eatramhaigh ar thrádáil agus ar ábhair a bhaineann le trádáil idir
 an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an
 Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, ('an Comhaontú Eatramhach') a chur chun
 feidhme.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(1)
 Airteagal 2
 Lamháltais d'iasc agus do tháirgí
 iascaigh
 Déanfaidh an Coimisiún rialacha mionsonraithe
 maidir le cur chun feidhme Airteagal 13 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus
 Airteagal 28 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, i ndáil leis na taraif‐chuótaí
 d'iasc agus do tháirgí iascaigh, a ghlacadh i gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta
 scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 9(3) den Rialachán seo.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 3
 Laghduithe taraife
 1. Faoi réir mhír 2, déanfar rátaí
 dleachta fabhraí a shlánú síos go dtí an chéad ionad deachúlach.
 2. Más rud é gurb ionann toradh ríomh an ráta
 dleachta fabhraí de bhun mhír 1 agus ceann díobh seo a leanas, measfar an ráta
 fabhrach mar dhíolúine iomlán:
 (a) 1 % nó níos lú i gcás
 dleachtanna ad valorem; nó
 (b) EUR 1 nó níos lú in aghaidh an
 méid aonair i Ö gcás Õ dleachtanna
 sonracha.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(2) (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 4
 Oiriúnuithe teicniúla
 I gcás leasuithe agus oiriúnuithe teicniúla ar
 na forálacha arna nglacadh de bhun an Rialacháin seo a bhfuil gá leo tar éis
 athruithe ar chóid na hAinmníochta Comhcheangailte agus ar fhorannta TARIC nó a
 thig as comhaontuithe, prótacail, malartuithe litreacha nó gníomhartha eile,
 idir nua agus mhodhnaithe, a thabhairt i gcrích idir an tAontas agus an
 Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, glacfar iad i gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta
 scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 9(3).
 Airteagal 5
 Clásal cosanta ginearálta
 I gcás inar gá don Aontas beart a dhéanamh mar
 a fhoráiltear in Airteagal 24 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal
 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, glacfar an beart sin i gcomhréir leis an nós
 imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 9(3) den Rialachán seo,
 mura sonraítear a mhalairt in Airteagal 24 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus
 in Airteagal 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin.
 Airteagal 6
 Clásal ganntanais
 I gcás inar gá don Aontas beart a dhéanamh mar
 a fhoráiltear in Airteagal 25 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal
 40 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, glacfar an beart sin i gcomhréir leis an nós
 imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 9(3) den Rialachán seo.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1
 Airteagal 7
 Imthosca eisceachtúla agus
 géibheannacha
 I gcás ina dtagann imthosca eisceachtúla agus
 géibheannacha chun cinn de réir bhrí Airteagal 24(5)(b) agus Airteagal 25(4)
 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus Airteagal 39(5)(b) agus Airteagal 40(4)
 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, féadfaidh an Coimisiún bearta atá infheidhme
 láithreach a dhéanamh mar a fhoráiltear in Airteagal 24 agus in Airteagal 25
 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus Airteagal 39 agus Airteagal 40 den
 CCC ina dhiaidh sin.
 Má fhaigheann an Coimisiún iarraidh ó
 Bhallstát, glacfaidh sé cinneadh ina thaobh laistigh de chúig lá oibre tar éis
 an iarraidh a fháil.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(3) (oiriúnaithe)
 Ö Glacfaidh Õ an Coimisiún na
 bearta sin i gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in
 Airteagal 9(3) Ö den Rialachán
 seo Õ, nó i gcásanna
 práinne, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 9(4) Ö den Rialachán
 seo Õ.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 8
 Clásal cosanta do tháirgí talmhaíochta
 agus iascaigh
 1. D'ainneoin na nósanna imeachta dá
 bhforáiltear in Airteagal 5 agus in Airteagal 6 den Rialachán seo, i
 gcás inar gá don Ö Aontas Õ beart cosanta a
 dhéanamh dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 24 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus
 in Airteagal 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, maidir le táirgí talmhaíochta agus
 iascaigh, déanfaidh an Coimisiún, arna iarraidh sin ag Ballstát nó ar a
 thionscnamh féin, na bearta is gá a chinneadh tar éis dó, más infheidhme, dul
 ar iontaoibh an nós imeachta atreorúcháin dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 24
 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin.
 Má fhaigheann an Coimisiún iarraidh ó
 Bhallstát, déanfaidh sé cinneadh fúithi:
 (a) laistigh de thrí lá oibre tar éis an
 iarraidh sin a fháil, i gcás nach bhfuil feidhm ag an nós imeachta atreorúcháin
 dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 24 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in
 Airteagal 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin; nó
 (b) laistigh de thrí lá roimh dheireadh
 na tréimhse 30 lá dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 24(5)(a) den Chomhaontú
 Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 39(5)(a) den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, i gcás ina
 bhfuil feidhm ag an nós imeachta atreorúcháin dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 24
 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 39 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin.
 Cuirfidh an Coimisiún na bearta a cinneadh in
 iúl don Chomhairle.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(4) (oiriúnaithe)
 2. Ö Glacfaidh Õ an Coimisiún na
 bearta sin i gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in
 Airteagal 9(3), nó i gcásanna práinne, i gcomhréir le
 hAirteagal 9(4).
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(5)
 Airteagal 9
 Nós imeachta coiste
 1. Chun críche Airteagal 2, Airteagal 4
 agus Airteagal 11, déanfaidh an Coiste um an gCód Custaim a bunaíodh le hAirteagal 285
 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 952/2013 cúnamh a thabhairt don Choimisiún. Coiste
 de réir bhrí Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011 a bheidh sa Choiste sin.
 2. Chun críche Airteagal 5, Airteagal 6, Airteagal
 7 agus Airteagal 8, déanfaidh an Coiste um Choimircí a bunaíodh le hAirteagal 4(1)
 de Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 260/2009 cúnamh a thabhairt don Choimisiún. Coiste
 de réir bhrí Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011 a bheidh sa Choiste sin.
 3. I gcás ina ndéantar tagairt don mhír seo,
 beidh feidhm ag Airteagal 5 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011.
 4. I gcás ina ndéantar tagairt don mhír seo,
 beidh feidhm ag Airteagal 8 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011 i
 dteannta Airteagal 5 den Rialachán sin.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 10
 Dumpáil agus fóirdheontas
 I gcás cleachtais ar dóchúil gur gá don Ö Aontas Õ na bearta dá
 bhforáiltear in Airteagal 23(2) den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in
 Airteagal 38(2) den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, a chur i bhfeidhm ina leith, déanfar
 tabhairt isteach beart frithdhumpála agus/nó frithchúitimh a chinneadh i
 gcomhréir leis na forálacha a leagtar síos i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009
 agus/nó i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 597/2009 Ö faoi seach Õ.
 Airteagal 11
 Iomaíocht
 1. I gcás cleachtais a d'fhéadfadh údar cuí a
 thabhairt do chur i bhfeidhm na mbeart dá bhforáiltear in Airteagal 36 den
 Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 71 den CCC ina dhiaidh sin, ag an
 Ö Aontas Õ, déanfaidh an Coimisiún
 cinneadh, tar éis dó an cás a scrúdú, ar a thionscnamh féin nó arna iarraidh
 sin ag Ballstát, an bhfuil an cleachtas ag luí leis na Comhaontuithe Ö sin Õ.
 Na bearta dá bhforáiltear in
 Airteagal 36(10) agus in Airteagal 71(10) den CCC ina dhiaidh sin,
 glacfar iad i gcásanna cabhrach i gcomhréir leis na nósanna imeachta a leagtar
 síos i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 597/2009 agus, i gcásanna eile nach iad, i
 gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta a leagtar síos in Airteagal Ö 207 Õ den Chonradh.
 2. I gcás cleachtais lena bhféadfadh an
 Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin bearta a chur i bhfeidhm maidir leis an Ö Aontas Õ ar bhonn
 Airteagal 36 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach agus Airteagal 71 den CCC ina
 dhiaidh sin, cinnfidh an Coimisiún, tar éis dó an cás a scrúdú, an bhfuil an
 cleachtas ag luí leis na prionsabail a leagtar síos sa Chomhaontú Eatramhach,
 agus sa CCC ina dhiaidh sin. I gcás inar gá, déanfaidh Ö an Coimisiún Õ na cinntí iomchuí ar
 bhonn critéar a thig as cur i bhfeidhm Airteagal 101, Airteagal 102
 agus Airteagal 107 den Chonradh.
 Airteagal 12
 Calaois
 nó mainneachtain comhar riaracháin a sholáthar
 I gcás ina
 gcinnfidh an Coimisiún, ar bhonn faisnéise arna soláthar ag Ballstát nó ar a
 thionscnamh féin, gur comhlíonadh na coinníollacha a leagtar síos in
 Airteagal 29 den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 44 den CCC ina
 dhiaidh sin, déanfaidh sé an méid seo a leanas gan mhoill:
 (a) an
 Chomhairle a chur ar an eolas; agus
 (b) fógra faoi na torthaí a thabhairt
 don Choiste Eatramhach, agus don Choiste um Chobhsaíocht agus Comhlachas ina
 dhiaidh sin, mar aon leis an bhfaisnéis oibiachtúil, agus rachaidh sé i mbun
 comhairliúcháin laistigh den Choiste Eatramhach agus laistigh den Choiste um
 Chobhsaíocht agus Comhlachas ina dhiaidh sin.
 Aon rud a fhoilseofar faoi
 Airteagal 29(5) den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus Airteagal 44(5) den
 CCC ina dhiaidh sin, foilseoidh an Coimisiún in Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais
 Eorpaigh é.
 ê 37/2014
 Airteagal 1 agus Iarscríbhinn 17(6)
 Féadfaidh an Coimisiún a chinneadh, i
 gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 9(3)
 den Rialachán seo, cóir fhabhrach ábhartha na dtáirgí dá bhforáiltear in
 Airteagal 29(4) den Chomhaontú Eatramhach, agus in Airteagal 44(4) den CCC
 ina dhiaidh sin, a chur ar fionraí go sealadach.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 13
 Fógra a thabhairt
 Ag gníomhú dó thar ceann an Ö Aontais Õ, beidh an Coimisiún
 freagrach as fógra a thabhairt don Choiste Eatramhach, agus don Chomhairle um
 Chobhsaíocht agus Comhlachais agus don Choiste um Chobhsaíocht agus Comhlachas
 ina dhiaidh sin, faoi seach, mar a cheanglaítear faoin gComhaontú Eatramhach nó
 faoin CCC.
 ê
 Airteagal 14
 Aisghairm
 Aisghairtear Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008.
 Déanfar tagairtí don Rialachán aisghairthe a
 fhorléiriú mar thagairtí don Rialachán seo agus léifear iad i gcomhréir leis an
 tábla comhghaoil in Iarscríbhinn II.
 ê Ceartúchán, IO
 L 233, 30.8.2008, lch. 1 (oiriúnaithe)
 Airteagal 15
 Teacht i bhfeidhm
 Tiocfaidh an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm an Ö fichiú Õ lá Ö tar éis lá Õ a fhoilsithe in Iris Oifigiúil
 an Aontais Eorpaigh.
 Beidh an Rialachán
 seo ina cheangal go huile agus go hiomlán agus beidh sé infheidhme go díreach
 i ngach Ballstát.
 Arna dhéanamh sa Bhruiséil,
 Thar ceann Pharlaimint na hEorpa Thar
 ceann na Comhairle
 An tUachtarán An
 tUachtarán
 [1] COM(87) 868 miontuairiscí.
 [2] Féach Iarscríbhinn 3 a ghabhann le Cuid A de na
 Conclúidí.
 [3] Códú a cuireadh ar chlár reachtaíochta 2014.
 [4] Féach Iarscríbhinn I a ghabhann leis an togra seo.
 [5] IO C [...], [...], lch. [...].
 [6] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008 ón gComhairle an
 16 2008 maidir le nósanna imeachta áirithe chun an Comhaontú Cobhsaíochta
 agus Comhlachais idir na Comhphobail Eorpacha agus a mBallstáit, de pháirt
 amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú
 agus chun an Comhaontú Eatramhach ar thrádáil agus ar ábhair a bhaineann le
 trádáil idir an Comhphobal Eorpach, de pháirt amháin, agus an Bhoisnia agus an
 Heirseagaivéin, den pháirt eile, a fheidhmiú. (IO L 169, 30.6.2008, lch. 1).
 [7] Féach Iarscríbhinn I.
 [8] IO L 169, 30.6.2008, lch. 1.
 [9] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 260/2009 an 26 Feabhra 2009 ón
 gComhairle maidir le comhrialacha le haghaidh allmhairí (IO L 84, 31.3.2009,
 lch. 1).
 [10] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1061/2009 ón gComhairle an
 19 Deireadh Fómhair 2009 lena mbunaítear comhrialacha le
 haghaidh onnmhairí (IO L 291, 7.11.2009, lch. 1).
 [11] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1225/2009 ón gComhairle an 30
 Samhain 2009 maidir le cosaint i gcoinne allmhairí dumpáilte ó thíortha nach
 baill den Chomhphobal Eorpach iad (IO L 343, 22.12.2009, lch. 51).
 [12] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 597/2009 ón gComhairle an 11
 Meitheamh 2009 maidir le cosaint i gcoinne allmhairí fóirdheontais ó thíortha
 nach baill den Chomhphobal Eorpach iad (IO L 188, 18.7.2009,
 lch. 93).
 [13] Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 515/97 ón gComhairle an 13 Márta
 1997 maidir le cúnamh frithpháirteach idir údaráis riaracháin na mBallstát agus
 maidir le comhar idir na Ballstáit agus an Coimisiún chun a áirithiú go
 gcuirfear an dlí ar ábhair chustaim agus ar ábhair thalmhaíochta i bhfeidhm i
 gceart (IO L 82, 22.3.1997, lch. 1).
 [14] Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 952/2013 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus
 ón gComhairle an 9 Deireadh Fómhair 2013 lena leagtar síos Cód Custaim an
 Aontais (IO L 69, 10.10.2013, lch. 1).
 [15] Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa
 agus ón gComhairle an 16 Feabhra 2011 lena leagtar síos na rialacha agus na
 prionsabail ghinearálta a bhaineann leis na sásraí maidir le rialú ag na
 Ballstáit ar fheidhmiú cumhachtaí cur chun feidhme ag an gCoimisiún (IO L 55,
 28.2.2011, lch. 13).
 é
 IARSCRÍBHINN I
 An
 Rialachán aisghairthe mar aon leis an leasú a rinneadh air
 Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008 ón gComhairle (IO L 169, 30.6.2008, lch. 1) || ||
 || Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 37/2014 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle (IO L 18, 21.1.2014, lch. 1) || Iarscríbhinn, pointe 17 amháin
 _____________
 IARSCRÍBHINN II
 Tábla
 Comhghaoil
 Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 594/2008 || An Rialachán seo
 Airteagail 1 go 8 || Airteagail 1 go 8
 Airteagal 8a || Airteagal 9
 Airteagal 9 || Airteagal 10
 Airteagal 10 || Airteagal 11
 Airteagal 11 || Airteagal 12
 Airteagal 13 || Airteagal 13
 - || Airteagal 14
 Airteagal 14 || Airteagal 15
 - || Iarscríbhinn I
 - || Iarscríbhinn II
 _____________


text:
Datum:2017-02-16
 Organisationsrummer: 875700-8977
 § 1 Val av ordförande för årsmötet: Valdemar Andersson valdes till ordförande.
 § 3 Val av två justerare att justera årsmötesprotokollet: Rune Eriksson och Ove Åkesson valdes till justerare.
 § 5 Styrelsens verksamhetsberättelse och redovisning av räkenskaperna: Verksamhetsberättelsen fanns tillhanda för årsmötesdeltagarna. Kent Halttunen berättade om föreningens livaktiga verksamhet, bl.a. 74 olika aktiviteter under året i form av erxkursioner, möten, resor, studiecirklar och utbildningar. Halttunen lade extra fokus på föreningens tre ben fågelintresse, fågelskydd och fågelforskning. Fågelintresset är vår allra bästa gren. Fågelskyddet är vår näst bästa gren och vi har jobbat upp en ställning där myndigheter och intressenter naturligt vänder sig till NOF när det gäller fågelskyddsfrågor. Gällande fågelforskingen arbetar NOF med att bli bättre och är på god väg, bl.a. genom Atlasinventeringen och den kommande boken och utökat samarbete med andra intressenter.
 Räkenskaperna fanns likaledes tillhanda och redovisades av kassör Åsa Bengtsson. Föreningen gick med vinst under året med 21 585 kr och av det har en summa av 20 000 kr avsatts till NOF-fonden, vilket medför att årets resultat blir 1 585 kr. Verksamhetsberättelsen och räkenskaperna godkändes av årsmötesdeltagarna och lades till handlingarna.
 § 6 Föredragning av revisionsberättelsen: Revisor Jan-Olof Ragnarsson läste upp revisionsberättelsen, där han och revisor Marie Johansson funnit att räkenskaperna för år 2016 upprättats i enlighet med god redovisningssed och att styrelsens medlemmar inte har handlat i strid med föreningens stadgar. De föreslog att årsmötet fastställer resultat- och balansräkning och att styrelsen beviljas ansvarsfrihet för år 2016.
 § 7 Fråga om ansvarsfrihet för styrelsen för år 2016: Styrelsen beviljades ansvarsfrihet.
 § 8 Val av föreningens ordförande och ledamöter i styrelsen (ett fyllnadsval, 3 ordinarie ledamöter för 2 år och två suppleanter för 1 år):
 Ordförande Ulf Jorner återkopplade till en fråga som ställdes vid förra årsmötet om att det inte står något om antal suppleanter i NOF:s stadgar och styrelsen fick då i uppdrag att se över denna fråga. Styrelsen har sett över frågan och lämnade vid dagens årsmöte besked att det bör ändras i stadgarna, men att de har sett att det finns behov av att se över flera av stadgarna. Därför kommer styrelsen att återkomma i ärendet.
 Val av föreningens ordförande: Ulf Jorner omvaldes som ordförande för 2 år.
 Fyllnadsval ordinarie ledamot 1 år: Lars Johansson valdes (nyval).
 Tre ordinarie ledamöter på 2 år: Ronnie Lindqvist (omval), Åsa Bengtsson (omval) och Bengt Andersson (nyval) valdes för 2 år vardera.
 Två suppleanter på 1 år: Gunnar Bergeå (nyval) och Kjell Johansson (nyval) valdes för 1 år vardera.
 Styrelsen år 2017 består enligt följande: Ordförande Ulf Jorner (2 år kvar), Kent Halttunen (1 år kvar), Lars Johansson (1 år kvar), Anna-Karin Törnblom (1 år kvar), Åsa Bengtsson (2 år kvar), Bengt Andersson (2 år kvar), Ronnie Lindqvist (2 år kvar) och suppleanterna Gunnar Bergeå och Kjell Johansson (vardera 1 år).
 § 9 Val av två revisorer för 2017 samt två revisorssuppleanter (vardera 1 år): Jan-Olov Ragnarsson (omval) och Marie Johansson (omval) valdes som revisorer. Som revisorssuppleanter valdes Tord Larsson (omval) och Åke Lorin (omval).
 § 10 Val av valberedning (sammankallande och två ledamöter): Som sammankallande valdes Hans Waern (omval), som ledamöter valdes Bengt Jalsborn (nyval) och Ami Sundén (nyval).
 § 11 Fastställande av budget för år 2017: Budgeten fastställdes enligt föreliggande förslag till summa inkomster 188 900 kr och summa utgifter 193 900 kr, alltså en planerad förlust på 5 000 kr.
 § 12 Bestämmande av årsavgiften för år 2018: Styrelsen lade fram förslag på höjning av årsavgiften med 50 kr för vuxen medlem, med bibehållen årsavgift för ungdommar och familjemedlem. Ordförande Ulf Jorner framförde argumenten att föreningen budgeterar för en förlust nästa år och att troliga kostnadsökningar väntar gällande nytt medlemsregister och medlemstidningen. Årsmötet godkände förslaget och årsavgiften fastställdes enligt följande:
 250 kr för vuxen medlem, 100 kr för ungdom 13-20 år, 50 kr för familjemedlem (erhåller ej medlemstidning) samt 50 kr för barn t.o.m. 12 år.
 § 13 Ärenden som styrelsen förelägger årsmötet: Det fanns inga förelagda ärenden.
 § 14 Av medlem skriftligt framställt, motiverat förslag som kommit styrelsen tillhanda före den 15 januari 2017: Inga förslag från medlem har inkommit.
 § 15 Övrigt av medlem framställt förslag som styrelsen tagit ställning till: Inga övriga förslag har inkommit.
 § 16 Årets Gulsparv: NOF:s gulsparvspris tilldelades i år en person som är starkt förknippad med NOF:s 40-åriga historia och som bidragit till en öppen förening som välkomnat nya fågelskådare, först som föreningens ordförande och sedan som redaktör för medlemstidningen i flera decennier, nämligen Åke Lorin! Vinnaren erhöll en prischeck på 5 000 kr och en vacker tavla av konstnären Stefan Gustafsson.
 Vid de två senaste årsmötena har frågan om etiskt förhållningssätt inom fågelskådningen lyfts. Styrelseledamot Kent Halttunen återkopplade till detta och informerade om att BirdLife Sverige har kommit med ett förslag på etiska regler, vilka kommer att publiceras snart.
 Styrelsen efterlyste fler personer som hjälper till med guidningen vid svanrasten i Tysslingen vecka 10-13. Intresserade ombads att ta kontakt med Åsa Bengtsson.
 Årsmötesdeltagarna informerades om föreningens nyhet ”Skådarpub” med premiär 23 februari kl 18.00 på Harry ́s pub i Örebro. Kl 19.00 börjar ett fågelquiz.
 Ur styrelsen avgick i år Per Karlsson-Linderum, Bengt Jalsborn, Håkan Carlestam och Krister Håkansson. De närvarande avtackades med varsitt presentkort.
 Ur redaktionskommittén avgick redaktör Åke Lorin och Ann-Margret Elmroth. Även de avtackades med varsitt presentkort. Information gavs att Kent Halttunen blir ny redaktör.
 § 18 Mötets avslutande: Årsmötets ordförande och sekreterare tackades och mötet avslutades. Sedan bjöds på bildvisning av Torbjörn Arvidson.
 Rune Eriksson Ove Åkesson


text:
 31.7.2010
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 C 209/47
 Recours introduit le 24 mai 2010 — Pologne/Commission
 (Affaire T-241/10)
 ()
 2010/C 209/71
 Langue de procédure: le polonais
 Parties
 Partie requérante: République de Pologne (représentant: M. Szpunar, agent)
 Partie défenderesse: Commission européenne
 Conclusions de la partie requérante
 —
 annuler la décision 2010/152/UE de la Commission, du 11 mars 2010 [notifiée sous le numéro C(2010) 1317], écartant du financement de l’Union européenne certaines dépenses effectuées par les États membres au titre du Fonds européen d’orientation et de garantie agricole (FEOGA), section «Garantie», du Fonds européen agricole de garantie (FEAGA) et du Fonds européen agricole pour le développement rural (Feader) (1), dans la mesure où les sommes de 279 794 442,15 PLN et de 25 583 996,81 EUR qu'a dépensé l'organisme payeur agréé par la République de Pologne y sont écartées du financement communautaire;
 —
 condamner la Commission aux dépens.
 Moyens et principaux arguments
 La décision attaquée prévoit une correction financière fondée sur de prétendus manquements dans le système d’identification et de contrôle des parcelles agricoles en 2005 et 2006 concernant: le système d'identification des parcelles non entièrement vectorisé, l’admission de terres inéligibles au bénéfice des paiements, le nombre trop faible de contrôles sur place dans les régions présentant des taux d'erreur élevés [voïvodie d’Opole (opolskie)] et l’application erronée des dispositions concernant les cas de non-respect intentionnel.
 La partie requérante conteste l'existence de tous les manquements qui lui sont reprochés et soulève les moyens suivants à l'encontre de la décision attaquée.
 En premier lieu, elle fait grief à la Commission d'avoir violé l'article 7, paragraphe 4, premier alinéa, du règlement (CE) no 1258/1999 (2) et l'article 31, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 1290/2005 (3), ainsi que d'avoir violé les lignes directrices no VI/5330/97, au motif qu'elle a appliqué la correction financière sur la base de constatations factuelles inexactes et d'une interprétation juridique erronée, même si les dépenses des autorités polonaises ont été effectuées conformément au droit de l’Union.
 Selon la partie requérante, aucun des prétendus manquements ayant motivé la correction financière n'est constitué, et les dépenses qui ont été écartées du financement de l’Union européenne sur la base de la décision attaquée ont été effectuées conformément au droit de l’Union.
 La partie requérante fait valoir que le système d’identification des parcelles agricoles appliqué en Pologne en 2005 et 2006 était pleinement conforme aux exigences de l’article 20 du règlement (CE) no 1782/2003 (4) et de l’article 6 du règlement (CE) no 796/2004 (5), car, par de nombreux aspects, il dépassait significativement ces exigences et garantissait une protection stricte des intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne.
 Elle soutient également qu’en prévoyant dans les cas litigieux l’intervention d’une décision judiciaire et en respectant le principe de la présomption d’innocence, les procédures nationales appliquées en 2005 et 2006 permettaient de déterminer de manière efficace et objective si le demandeur avait agi intentionnellement ou par négligence en effectuant une surdéclaration de la superficie des parcelles ayant fait l’objet d’une demande de paiement.
 En outre, la requérante indique que l’admission des parcelles au bénéfice des paiements était conforme aux conditions d’éligibilité, étant donné que, selon l’acte d’adhésion, le maintien des parcelles dans de bonnes conditions agricoles (BCA) constituait une condition d’éligibilité au 30 juin 2003, tandis que le maintien des parcelles dans de bonnes conditions agricoles et environnementales (BCAE) à la date du contrôle ne constituait pas une condition d’éligibilité de ces parcelles, mais une condition de réduction du montant des paiements.
 Elle estime également que le nombre de contrôles sur place en 2005 dans la voïvodie d’Opole a atteint un niveau conforme aux exigences de l’article 26 du règlement (CE) no 796/2004 de la Commission.
 En second lieu, la requérante fait grief à la Commission d'avoir violé l'article 7, paragraphe 4, quatrième alinéa, du règlement (CE) no 1258/1999 et l'article 31, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 1290/2005, ainsi que d'avoir violé les lignes directrices no VI/5330/97 et le principe de proportionnalité, au motif qu'elle a appliqué une correction forfaitaire tout à fait excessive au regard du risque éventuel de pertes financières que courait le budget de l’Union.
 Selon la requérante, à supposer même que certains manquements existent dans le système de contrôle et le régime de sanctions établis par les autorités polonaises, quod non, ces manquements seraient si minimes que le risque éventuel de pertes que courrait le budget de l’Union serait plusieurs fois inférieur au montant de la correction financière prévue par la Commission dans la décision attaquée. Cela concerne en particulier le montant de la correction appliquée par la Commission au motif de l’absence de finalisation de la vectorisation du système d’identification des parcelles agricoles et du nombre prétendument insuffisant de contrôles sur place dans la voïvodie d’Opole en 2005.
 (1) JO L 63, p. 7.
 (2) Règlement (CE) no 1258/1999 du Conseil du 17 mai 1999 relatif au financement de la politique agricole commune, JO L 160, p. 103.
 (3) Règlement (CE) no 1290/2005 du Conseil du 21 juin 2005 relatif au financement de la politique agricole commune, JO L 209, p. 1.
 (4) Règlement (CE) no 1782/2003 du Conseil du 29 septembre 2003 établissant des règles communes pour les régimes de soutien direct dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune et établissant certains régimes de soutien en faveur des agriculteurs et modifiant les règlements (CEE) no 2019/93, (CE) no 1452/2001, (CE) no 1453/2001, (CE) no 1454/2001, (CE) no 1868/94, (CE) no 1251/1999, (CE) no 1254/1999, (CE) no 1673/2000, (CEE) no 2358/71 et (CE) no 2529/2001, JO L 270, p. 1.
 (5) Règlement (CE) no 796/2004 de la Commission du 21 avril 2004 portant modalités d’application de la conditionnalité, de la modulation et du système intégré de gestion et de contrôle prévus par le règlement (CE) no 1782/2003 du Conseil établissant des règles communes pour les régimes de soutien direct dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune et établissant certains régimes de soutien en faveur des agriculteurs, JO L 141, p. 18.


type: contracts

text:
 15.7.2010
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 L 181/13
 DECISIONE DEL COMITATO MISTO SEE
 N. 45/2010
 del 30 aprile 2010
 che modifica l’allegato II (Regolamentazioni tecniche, norme, prove e certificazioni) dell’accordo SEE
 IL COMITATO MISTO SEE,
 visto l’accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo, modificato dal protocollo che adegua l’accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo, in seguito denominato «l’accordo», in particolare l’articolo 98,
 considerando quanto segue:
 (1)
 L’allegato II dell’accordo è stato modificato dalla decisione del Comitato misto SEE n. 132/2007 del 26 ottobre 2007 (1).
 (2)
 Occorre integrare nell’accordo il regolamento (CE) n. 1107/2008 della Commissione, del 7 novembre 2008, che modifica il regolamento (CE) n. 2003/2003 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo ai concimi al fine di adeguarne gli allegati I e IV al progresso tecnico (2),
 DECIDE:
 Articolo 1
 Al punto 1 [regolamento (CE) n. 2003/2003 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio] del capitolo XIV dell’allegato II dell’accordo è aggiunto il seguente trattino:
 «—
 32008 R 1107: regolamento (CE) n. 1107/2008 della Commissione, del 7 novembre 2008 (GU L 299 dell’8.11.2008, pag. 13).»
 Articolo 2
 I testi del regolamento (CE) n. 1107/2008 nelle lingue islandese e norvegese, da pubblicare nel supplemento SEE della Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea, fanno fede.
 Articolo 3
 La presente decisione entra in vigore il 1o maggio 2010, a condizione che al Comitato misto SEE siano pervenute tutte le notifiche previste dall’articolo 103, paragrafo 1, dell’accordo (3).
 Articolo 4
 La presente decisione è pubblicata nella sezione SEE e nel supplemento SEE della Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 30 aprile 2010.
 Per il Comitato misto SEE
 Il presidente
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) GU L 100 del 10.4.2008, pag. 1.
 (2) GU L 299 dell’8.11.2008, pag. 13.
 (3) Non è stata comunicata l’esistenza di obblighi costituzionali.


text:
 15.9.2014
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 315/65
 Klage, eingereicht am 28. Mai 2014 — Best-Lock (Europe)/HABM -– Lego Juris (Form einer Spielzeugfigur)
 (Rechtssache T-395/14)
 2014/C 315/109
 Sprache der Klageschrift: Deutsch
 Verfahrensbeteiligte Parteien
 Klägerin: Best-Lock (Europe) Ltd (Colne, Vereinigtes Königreich) (Prozessbevollmächtigter: Rechtsanwalt J. Becker)
 Beklagter: Harmonisierungsamt für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle)
 Andere Beteiligte im Verfahren vor der Beschwerdekammer: Lego Juris A/S (Billund, Dänemark)
 Anträge
 Die Klägerin beantragt,
 —
 die Entscheidung der Vierten Beschwerdekammer des Harmonisierungsamts für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle) vom 26. März 2014 in der Sache R 1695/2013-4 aufzuheben und die Gemeinschaftsmarke Nr. 50 518 hinsichtlich der Klasse 28 für nichtig zu erklären;
 —
 der Beklagten die Kosten aufzuerlegen
 Klagegründe und wesentliche Argumente
 Eingetragene Gemeinschaftsmarke, deren Nichtigerklärung beantragt wurde: Dreidimensionale Marke in Form einer Spielzeugfigur für Waren der Klassen 9, 25 und 28 — Gemeinschaftsmarke Nr. 50 518
 Inhaberin der Gemeinschaftsmarke: Lego Juris A/S
 Antragstellerin im Nichtigkeitsverfahren: Klägerin
 Begründung des Antrags auf Nichtigerklärung: Absolute Nichtigkeitsgründe und Bösgläubigkeit
 Entscheidung der Nichtigkeitsabteilung: Zurückweisung des Antrags auf Nichtigerklärung
 Entscheidung der Beschwerdekammer: Zurückweisung der Beschwerde
 Klagegründe: Verstoß gegen Artikel 52 i.V.m. Artikel 7 Abs. 1 Buchst. e (i) und (ii) und i.V.m. Artikel 7 Abs. 1 Buchst. b der Verordnung Nr. 207/2009


type: wikipedia

text:
Beižionys – kaimas Elektrėnų savivaldybėje, prie kelio Kietaviškės–Kalviai, 14 km į pietvakarius nuo Elektrėnų, į vakarus nuo Semeliškių. Seniūnijos ir seniūnaitijos centras. Stovi Beižionių Šv. Kryžiaus Išaukštinimo bažnyčia (nuo 1926 m.), veikia Beižionių mokykla-daugiafunkcis centras, biblioteka, vaikų globos namai, medicinos punktas, paštas (LT-21046).
 Beižionys įsikūrę kalvotoje vietovėje, Beižionių moreniniame masyve (Dzūkų aukštuma). Kaimo pietvakariuose stūkso Beižionių piliakalnis (Birutės kalnas). Kaimo prieigose iš rytų pusės stovi Beižionių akmuo.
 Etimologija
 Beižionys – asmenvardinis vietovardis, kilęs iš asmenvardžio Beižionis.
 Istorija
 Beižionių apylinkėse gyventa nuo senovės, 1 km į pietvakarius nuo kaimo yra Beižionių piliakalnis ir VI a. – VIII a. Beižionių pilkapynas, kuriame apie 50 pilkapių. Apylinkių pilys buvo dalis Trakų ir Vilniaus gynybiniam žiedui.
 XIX a. įsikūrė Beižionių dvaras. 1812 m. čia praėjusi Napoleono I kariuomenė. 1903 m. įsteigta pradžios mokykla. 1926 m. pastatyta medinė Beižionių Šv. Kryžiaus Išaukštinimo bažnyčia, įkurta parapija. 1950–1992 m. kolūkio centrinė gyvenvietė. 1958 m. įsteigti kultūros namai.
 2006 m. patvirtintas Beižionių herbas.
 |}
 Gyventojai
 Šaltiniai
 Literatūra
 Elektrėnai: Beižionys, Gilučiai, Kazokiškės, Kietaviškės, Pastrėvys, Semeliškės, Vievis: fotografijų albumas / sud. Jonas Endrijaitis, fotogr. Vytautas Suslavičius. – Vilnius: Jandrija, 2002. – 64 p.: iliustr. – ISBN 9955-431-11-3
 Elektrėnai: Vievis, Semeliškės, Kietaviškės, Pastrėvys, Beižionys, Kazokiškės, Gilučiai / Vytautas Mizeras, Augustinas Ickevičius, Danutė Gudelienė, Laima Tidikienė, Vilmantas Palčiauskas, Elvyra Valiukienė, Veronika Tamošiūnienė, sud. Jonas Endrijaitis. – Vilnius: Jandrija, 2006. – 498 p.: iliustr. – ISBN 9955-431-28-8