jurisdiction: US

text:
 216 Md. 94 (1958)
 140 A.2d 173
 STATE, USE OF TAYLOR ET AL.
 v.
 BARLLY
 [No. 167, September Term, 1957.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 24, 1958.
 The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and HENDERSON, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ., and CARTER, J., Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit, specially assigned.
 W. Albert Menchine, with whom was Sidney Blum on the, brief, for the appellants.
 W. Lee Harrison for the appellee.
 PRESCOTT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County rendered verdicts in favor of the defendant in two cases that were tried together; one was an action under Lord Campbell's Act for negligence causing the death of Keith Taylor, aged 5 years and 10 months, and the other was by the administratrix of the deceased child. From judgments entered upon these verdicts, the plaintiffs below have appealed.
 *98 In the early afternoon of March 10, 1955, a clear, sunny day, the appellee was operating his automobile in a westerly direction on Edmondson Avenue, in Baltimore. At the location of the accident, this avenue is 60 feet, 3 inches wide, and is traversed by two street-car tracks. The two tracks are 6 feet apart and the distance between the individual rails of each track is 5 feet, 10 inches. The distance from the south curb of Edmondson Avenue to the southernmost street-car rail and from the north curb to the northernmost rail is, in each case, a little over 21 feet. A playground entrance on the north side of said avenue is 98 feet west from the west curb of Evergreen Avenue at its intersection with Edmondson Avenue. The deceased child, with other children, was on the south side of Edmondson Avenue, and, intending to cross the avenue to the playground, they walked from said south side to the southern car track, when the deceased started to run for the playground entrance. At that time, the appellee, who had his wife as a passenger, was operating his automobile on Edmondson Avenue in a westerly direction a few inches to the north of the northernmost street-car rail. The car collided with the child, who died as a result of the injuries received. The plaintiffs' witness, Turner, stated the left front bumper of the appellee's automobile struck the child, while the appellee and his wife testified the child came into the left side of the car.
 I
 The appellants first contend that the trial court's charge was incomplete with respect to the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' decedent under the circumstances of this case. They argue that if the death had been that of an adult, the instructions on primary negligence probably were proper; but, in the instant case, the charge wholly ignored the well-established legal principle that the caution owed by an operator of a motor vehicle to a child of tender years is greater than that owed to an adult, whose age, experience and training reasonably can be expected to be utilized to avoid danger.
 In this regard, there was testimony, although some of it was disputed, from which the jury could have found the following facts; when the deceased boy had walked from the *99 curb to the south street-car track and started to run toward the playground, the appellee was some 140 feet to the east, operating his car between 30 and 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile zone; the street was straight, with no moving traffic thereon; and, without at any time observing the child or slowing his car, the appellee struck the child with the front of his car when the child was just a few inches north of the northern car track.
 The court instructed the jury concerning the burden of proof, defined negligence, and then stated:
 "that if you believe from the evidence that the defendant, Mr. Barlly, was operating his automobile as an ordinarily prudent person would operate an automobile under the same or similar circumstances as existed in this case, and if you believe from the evidence that the accident complained of was not due to any failure on the part of the defendant, Mr. Barlly, to use reasonable and ordinary care as any other reasonable person would have used in the operation of his automobile, then, of course, your verdict should be for the defendant, Mr. Barlly."
 As an abstract statement of law, there is little, if anything, to be found wrong with this quotation. However, the court had not mentioned the fact that the deceased was a child of tender years, and did not do so until he instructed on contributory negligence. The judge did not inform the jury that it was the defendant's duty, even between intersections, to keep a proper lookout for children who may suddenly come out into the street in front of him; nor that the defendant was required by law to recognize that children of tender years do not use the same degree of care and caution for their own safety as do adults. The appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed upon their theory of the case. The deceased was under six years of age. The law requires greater caution from the operator of a motor vehicle who observes a child in the middle of the street than one who sees an adult; and, if his vision were unobscured for 100 feet, or more, it places a duty upon him to see the child. From the above evidence, *100 the jury, if they so desired, were at liberty to conclude that the appellee, having an unobstructed view for some distance, could have avoided striking the child, if he had been driving at a rate of speed that was reasonable under the circumstances and had used proper care to look out for the boy. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609, 616, 619, 78 A.2d 220; Ottenheimer v. Molohan, 146 Md. 175, 184, 185, 126 A. 97; 2 Rest., Torts, sec. 290 (j); cf. 30 A.L.R. 2d p. 9, p. 46 sec. 12, p. 97 sec. 89, p. 91 sec. 83; Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 385, 191 A. 575; Stafford v. Zake, 179 Md. 460, 463, 20 A.2d 144; Lenehan v. Nicholson, 214 Md. 414, 135 A.2d 447. Of course, we are not attempting to evaluate the evidence in this case and hold that the defendant was negligent, but are pointing out that there was evidence from which the jury could have found negligence on his part if they were so inclined, after being properly instructed. However, the trial judge failed to instruct them, except in very general terms which probably were not fully understood, that they were at liberty to find negligence on the defendant's part if they found as facts the matters above enumerated.
 This Court has held that we cannot put the "trial judge in a strait-jacket and prescribe or adopt a formula to be used and followed by him," with reference to his charge to the jury. Feinglos v. Weiner, 181 Md. 38, 48, 28 A.2d 577; Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 313, 314, 121 A.2d 218. We have also held that there is no obligation upon the trial judge to point out, in minute detail, all of the reciprocal duties and obligations of the respective parties to a case, provided the subject under discussion by the judge is fully and comprehensively covered in his charge to the jury. Ager v. Baltimore Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 425, 132 A.2d 469. We are unable to conclude that the subject of primary negligence was fully and comprehensively covered in the charge, under the circumstances of this case; and we believe this failure resulted in prejudice to the appellants. Cf. Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 642, 161 A. 9.
 What we have said does not, in any way, alter the previous rulings of this Court in such cases as Cocco v. Lissau, 202 Md. 196, 202, 95 A.2d 857, wherein it was held that if *101 a child darts out in front of an approaching automobile when the driver is traveling at a reasonable rate of speed and obeying the rules of the road, so that with the exercise of reasonable care he is unable to avoid running into the child, he is not liable for any injuries the child may sustain.
 II
 The appellants requested the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs' decedent could not, under any circumstances, be guilty of contributory negligence, because he was a child of only 5 years and 10 months of age. They cite to us the cases of Miller v. Graff, supra; Bozman v. State, 177 Md. 151, 155, 9 A.2d 60; and Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 385, 191 A. 575, as authorities supporting such a request. In the Miller case, this Court held that a child four years of age could not be guilty of contributory negligence, and stated: "We have definitely held that a child four years old cannot be guilty of contributory negligence under any circumstances." The Bozman and Mahan cases were named as authorities for this statement. A reading of these cases fails to disclose such a ruling. In the Bozman case, there was no ruling on the point; the child was 8 years old, but the opinion (p. 155) said, "a child four years of age cannot be guilty of contributory negligence under any circumstances," and cited the Mahan case. In the Mahan case, the child involved was 3 years of age, and this Court specifically stated, 172 Md. at page 385, that a child of tender years may be guilty of contributory negligence in this State, although the great weight of authority is opposed to the "proposition that a child a little over four years of age can be guilty of contributory negligence." This Court has on many other occasions ruled that a child of tender years may be guilty of contributory negligence. Among the cases so holding, see United Rys. Co. v. Carneal, 110 Md. 211, 231, 72 A. 771, (child 3 years old); State v. Wash., B. & A.R. Co., 149 Md. 443, 459, 131 A. 822, (child a little over 4 years old); York Ice Machinery Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 123, 173 A. 240, (child 6 years of age); Ottenheimer v. Molohan, supra, (child 6 1/2 years old); B. & O.R.R. Co. v. State, 30 Md. 47, 51, (child 5 *102 years old); Stafford v. Zake, supra, 179 Md. 463, (child 7 years old); Balt. City Pass. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534, 551, (child 2 years and 2 months old). See also Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 161 A. 9, wherein this Court stated:
 "The first contention in respect to the court's ruling on the prayers is that a boy seven years of age, as a matter of law, cannot be charged with contributory negligence. It seems clear that the weight of authority in this country outside of our state supports such a contention, some of the courts holding that children under the age of six are incapable of contributory negligence, while the apparent majority fix seven as the age below which they are conclusively presumed to be incapable. This, however, is not the rule of this jurisdiction, it being here held that the question is one to be submitted to the jury under proper instructions."
 The only ruling of this Court, prior to the Miller case, as to the minimum age below which a child cannot as a matter of law be held guilty of contributory negligence seems to be Caroline County v. Beulah, 153 Md. 221, 226, 138 A. 25, wherein it was stated that a child 6 months of age "takes no care for its own safety."
 In view of these previous decisions, we are not inclined to enlarge the ruling in the Miller case, i.e., that a child four years of age cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. We, therefore, hold that a child, 5 years of age or over, may be guilty of contributory negligence; but a child of tender years is bound only to use that degree of care which ordinarily prudent children of the same age, experience and intelligence are accustomed to use under the same circumstances, and they assume the risk only of dangers, the existence of which they know, or which, in the exercise of this degree of care, they should have known. No question was raised concerning the doctrine of the imputability of the negligence of parents of children of tender years, as the same is applicable under some circumstances. There was no error in the trial court's refusal to rule as a matter of law that the deceased child could not be guilty of contributory negligence.
 *103 III
 As their final argument, the appellants claim they were entitled to an instruction from the trial court upon the theory of the doctrine of last clear chance. This Court has so frequently and recently set forth the factors that are essential to bring this doctrine into play that it would serve no useful purpose to repeat them here. Legum v. State, 167 Md. 339, 355, 173 A. 565; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Leasure, 193 Md. 523, 534, 69 A.2d 248; Peregoy v. Western Md. R.R. Co., 202 Md. 203, 211, 95 A.2d 867; Meldrum v. Kellam Distr. Co., 211 Md. 504, 512, 128 A.2d 400.
 It is implicit in the rule that both the plaintiff and defendant were negligent. The doctrine presupposes a perilous situation, created or existing through the negligence of both the defendant and the plaintiff. State v. Wash., B. & A.R. Co., 149 Md. 443, 459, 131 A. 822. It assumes that there was a time after such negligence has occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of the means available avert the accident. United Rwys. Co. v. Sherwood Bros., 161 Md. 304, 310, 157 A. 280. Consequently, this Court has held on many occasions that, in order for the rule to apply, the defendant's negligence must have been sequential, and not concurrent. Legum v. State, supra, 167 Md. 355; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Leasure, supra, 193 Md. 532; West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 252, 100 A.2d 17; Martin v. Sweeney, 207 Md. 543, 552, 114 A.2d 825; Joeckel v. Baltimore Transit Co., 208 Md. 586, 592, 119 A.2d 373; Meldrum v. Kellam Distr. Co., supra; Fowler v. DeFontes, 211 Md. 568, 575, 128 A.2d 395.
 As we found under II that the child was old enough to present a jury question as to whether his conduct constituted contributory negligence, it was the jury's province to determine if he were guilty of contributory negligence or his actions resulted merely from impulse or bewilderment to be expected in one of his age, experience and intelligence. If the jury should conclude that the child was responsible for its own safety, i.e., guilty of contributory negligence, it is apparent, from what we have said above, that his negligence would have been concurrent with any in the driving of the *104 appellee, which would have prevented recovery by the appellant, and the doctrine of last clear chance would have no application. Stafford v. Zake, supra, 179 Md. 463. It is, likewise, apparent that should the jury determine the child was not of sufficient age, experience and intelligence to be accountable for his own safety and his actions were the result of impulse or bewilderment to be expected of one of his age, experience and intelligence, the doctrine is not available, because there would then be no contributory negligence on the child's part. If the jury arrived at the latter conclusion, the case would then turn upon the question of primary negligence of the appellee under all of the surrounding circumstances, alone. The case should have been submitted to the jury with proper instructions to cover either determination; but there was no error in not including an instruction with reference to the doctrine of last clear chance.
 The case of Stafford v. Zake, supra, 179 Md. 460, was similar, in some respects, to the case at bar. There the defendant was driving a truck north in a narrow alley. In order to pass another truck that was parked facing in the same direction, he drove his car to the left side of the alley. A small boy, 9 years of age, ran across the alley in front of him, and reached the other side safely. A little girl, aged 7, started to follow the boy. When nearly to the other side of the alley, she saw the truck, turned and ran back. She was struck by the right fender of the defendant's truck and injured. The lower court granted an instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance. This Court stated (p. 463) the evidence to support such a finding was "meagre"; it consisted entirely in the facts that the driver frequently used the alley, children often played there, loose sand on an adjacent lot attracted them, and the driver had just seen a 9-year-old boy run across in front of him. The opinion then pointed out that it was the jury's province to determine whether the little girl was sufficiently mature to be guilty of contributory negligence, or that she was so young and immature as not to be responsible for her own safety; and, if they decided she was guilty of contributory negligence, her negligence would have been concurrent with that of the driver, which would *105 have barred her recovery. However, the opinion held the instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance proper. An analysis of the situation will show this to be not entirely correct. The opinion, as stated above, had already stated that if the jury concluded the child's conduct constituted contributory negligence, this negligence would be concurrent and bar a recovery by her. In that event, there would be no occasion for the application of the rule of last clear chance. On the other hand, if the jury decided her conduct did not amount to contributory negligence, there, likewise, could have been no application of the doctrine, for it is predicated upon negligence by both the plaintiff and the defendant. Cases cited above. Thus, if the child were entitled to recover at all, she must have been so entitled as a result of primary negligence on the part of the defendant, without the assistance of the rule of last clear chance.
 For the error contained in I, the case will be remanded for a new trial.
 Judgment reversed and case remanded for a new trial.


type: wikipedia

text:
Pathé Rembrandt Utrecht is een bioscoop aan de Oudegracht in de Nederlandse stad Utrecht. De bioscoop maakt deel uit van de bioscoopketen Pathé en heeft drie zalen (het kleinste aantal van alle bioscopen van Pathé in Nederland) met in totaal 864 zitplaatsen.
 Geschiedenis
 De bioscoop werd in 1913 als Rembrandt Bioscoop-Theater opgericht door de Joodse Utrechters Hamburger en Lorjé in een herenhuis dat wel bekendstond als de Landscroon. In dit tijdsgewricht openden meerdere ondernemers in dit nieuwe fenomeen een zaak in Utrecht. Naast filmvoorstellingen stonden er in de beginjaren ook al toneelvoorstellingen op het programma. Het scherm van de bioscoop was van een groot formaat en de films werden van geluid voorzien door een orkest en explicateurs. In de beginjaren is diverse malen verbouwd waardoor het aantal zitplaatsen steeg van 240 naar 650.
 Een grote verbouwing vond in 1919 plaats naar ontwerp van de architecten B. Woord en M. Rietbergen. Tijdens de half jaar durende verbouwing werd uitgeweken naar de schouwburg op het Vredenburg. De vernieuwing bracht een nieuwe voorgevel en een luxueus uitgevoerd interieur. 1150 zitplaatsen kwamen er in een grote zaal die was voorzien van een balkon, een orkestbak en een ophaalbaar projectiedoek van 40 vierkante meter. Achter het doek bevond zich een podium waarop toneelstukken en variétévoorstellingen konden plaatsvinden. De rol van de explicateur stopte dat jaar.
 In 1921 volgde de overname van de bioscoop door de Nederlandse Bioscoop Trust tegen een bedrag van een half miljoen gulden. Omstreeks 1930 was de bioscoop de grootste in de stad Utrecht. De eerste geluidsfilm was onderwijl in 1929 vertoond, wat in 1931 leidde tot de opheffing van het huisorkest dat lokaal faam genoot. In 1933 is de bioscoop grootschalig verbouwd. Het interieur en exterieur werden daarin door de architect H. van Vreeswijk meer in de stijl van de nieuwe zakelijkheid gebracht. Onder andere is daarin de voorgevel wederom gewijzigd en het aantal zitplaatsen verder vergroot naar 1350. Een volgende ingrijpende verbouwing vond omstreeks 1973 plaats. Onder meer is de grote zaal toen gesplitst in een grote en twee kleinere bioscoopzalen. Sinds 1995 maakt de bioscoop deel uit van de bioscoopketen Pathé.
 Bronnen
 B. Agterberg e.a., Sensationele voorstellingen en passend vermaak. Film en bioscoop in Utrecht, Uitgeverij Matrijs, 2009.
 Noten
 Externe link
 Pathé Rembrandt Utrecht
 Bioscoop in Utrecht (stad)
 Bouwwerk in Utrecht (Binnenstad)
 Oudegracht (Utrecht)


text:
Ōbêh är ett distrikt i Afghanistan. Det ligger i provinsen Herat, i den nordvästra delen av landet, km väster om huvudstaden Kabul.
 Trakten runt Ōbêh består i huvudsak av gräsmarker. Runt Ōbêh är det ganska glesbefolkat, med invånare per kvadratkilometer. Ett varmt stäppklimat råder i trakten. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är °C. Den varmaste månaden är juli, då medeltemperaturen är °C, och den kallaste är januari, med °C. Genomsnittlig årsnederbörd är millimeter. Den regnigaste månaden är februari, med i genomsnitt mm nederbörd, och den torraste är juli, med mm nederbörd.
 Källor
 Distrikt i Herat


type: other

text:
Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise kord – Riigi Teataja
 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise kord
 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise kord - sisukord
 § 2 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise algatamine
 § 3 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia eelnõu koostamine ja menetlemine
 § 4 Täiendavate arengukavade eelnõude koostamine ja menetlemine
 § 5 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia vastuvõtmine
 § 6 Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia ülevaatamine, muutmine ja kehtetuks tunnistamine
 § 7 Täiendavate arengukavade ülevaatamine, muutmine ja kehtetuks tunnistamine
 RT IV, 31.08.2018, 1
 Vastu võetud 22.08.2018 nr 40
 Määrus kehtestatakse kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse § 372 lõike 1 ja kohaliku omavalitsuse üksuse finantsjuhtimise seaduse § 20 alusel.
 (1) Määrusega kehtestatakse Peipsiääre valla arengukava (edaspidi arengukava) ja Peipsiääre valla eelarvestrateegia (edaspidi eelarvestrateegia) ning täiendavate arengukavade algatamise, koostamise ja muutmise kord ning Peipsiääre vallast sõltuvatelt üksustelt eelarvestrateegia koostamiseks vajaliku informatsiooni saamiseks andmete esitamise tähtaeg ja kord.
 (2) Täiendav arengukava on:
 1) piirkondlik arengukava;
 2) valdkondlik arengukava;
 3) hallatava asutuse arengukava.
 (3) Arengukava kohta käivaid mõisteid kasutatakse määruses kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse tähenduses.
 (4) Eelarvestrateegia ja vallast sõltuvate üksuste kohta käivaid mõisteid kasutatakse kohaliku omavalitsuse üksuse finantsjuhtimise seaduse tähenduses.
 (5) Eelarvestrateegia koostatakse arengukavast eraldi dokumendina.
 (6) Täiendavaid arengukavasid ei koostata arengukava osana.
 (7) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia hõlmavad vallavalitsuse hallatavate asutuste ning vallast sõltuvate üksuste arvandmeid ja arengusuundi.
 § 2. Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise algatamine
 (1) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise algatab Peipsiääre Vallavalitsus (edaspidi vallavalitsus) korraldusega.
 (2) Piirkondliku arengukava ja valdkonna arengukava koostamise algatab vallavalitsus korraldusega.
 (3) Hallatava asutuse arengukava koostamise algatab vallavalitsus korraldusega, kui hallatava asutuse põhimääruses ei ole sätestatud teisiti.
 § 3. Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia eelnõu koostamine ja menetlemine
 (1) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia eelnõu (edaspidi eelnõu) koostamiseks määrab vallavanem koostamise eest vastutavad isikud.
 (2) Vallavanem moodustab struktuuriüksuste üleselt valdkondlikud töörühmad ning määrab nende juhid.
 (3) Töörühmad korraldavad huvitatud isikute kaasamise, koostavad hetkeolukorra kirjelduse, seavad valdkondlikud arengueesmärgid ja tegevused eesmärkide elluviimiseks ning esitavad need vallavalitsusele.
 (4) Vallast sõltuvad üksused esitavad vallavalitsuse seatud tähtajaks vallavalitsusele ülevaate oma majandusolukorrast ning rahandusministri kehtestatud vormil arvnäitajad, mis on vajalikud põhitegevuse tulemi ja netovõlakoormuse määra arvutamiseks.
 (5) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise eest vastutavad isikud koostavad käesoleva paragrahvi lõigetes 3 ja 4 nimetatud andmete alusel eelnõu ning esitavad selle vallavalitsusele ja vallavolikogu komisjonidele.
 (6) Vallavolikogu menetleb eelnõu valla põhimääruses ning muudes õigusaktides sätestatud korras.
 (7) Eelnõu avalikustatakse vähemalt kaheks nädalaks valla veebilehel.
 (8) Teade avaliku arutelu toimumise aja ja koha kohta avaldatakse valla veebilehel vähemalt 7 päeva enne arutelu toimumist.
 (9) Vallavalitsus esitab eelnõu vallavolikogu istungile vastuvõtmiseks koos omapoolsete seisukohtadega avalikustamise ja avaliku arutelu käigus laekunud ettepanekute kohta.
 § 4. Täiendavate arengukavade eelnõude koostamine ja menetlemine
 (1) Piirkondliku arengukava eelnõu koostab vallavalitsus.
 (2) Valdkonna arengukava eelnõu koostab vallavalitsuse struktuuriüksus, mille haldusalas vastav valdkond asub.
 (3) Hallatava asutuse arengukava eelnõu koostab hallatav asutus koostöös vallavalitsuse ametiasutusega.
 (4) Pärast käesoleva määruse § 2 lg 2 - 3 nimetatud otsuse vastuvõtmist määrab vallavanem arengukava koostamise eest vastutava isiku ja moodustab vajadusel töörühmad.
 (5) Töörühm:
 1) koostab hetkeolukorra kirjelduse ja seab arengueesmärgid ning tegevused eesmärkide elluviimiseks;
 2) teeb vallavalitsusele ettepanekuid ekspertide kaasamiseks ja uuringute läbiviimiseks;
 3) esitab valminud arengukava projekti vallavalitsusele;
 4) korraldab arengukava eelnõu koostamise käigus huvitatud isikute kaasamise.
 (6) Vallavalitsus suunab piirkondliku ja valdkondliku arengukava eelnõu peale valmimist avalikustamisele.
 (8) Vallavalitsus korraldab eelnõu avaliku arutelu, teade avaliku arutelu toimumise aja ja koha kohta avaldatakse valla veebilehel vähemalt 7 päeva enne arutelu toimumist.
 (9) Vallavalitsus esitab piirkondliku ja valdkondliku arengukava eelnõu peale avalikku väljapanekut ja avalikku arutelu vallavolikogu istungile kinnitamisele koos omapoolsete seisukohtadega avalikustamise ja avaliku arutelu käigus laekunud ettepanekute kohta.
 (10) Vallavalitsus suunab hallatava asutuse arengukava eelnõu peale valmimist avalikustamisele.
 (11) Eelnõu avalikustatakse vähemalt kaheks nädalaks valla veebilehel.
 (12) Vallavalitsus korraldab avaliku arutelu, kui avaliku väljapaneku ajal esitati eelnõule muudatusettepanekuid.
 (13) Teade avaliku arutelu toimumise aja ja koha kohta avaldatakse valla veebilehel vähemalt 7 päeva enne arutelu toimumist.
 (14) Vallavalitsus teeb otsuse avaliku arutelu käigus laekunud ettepanekute arvestamise kohta.
 § 5. Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia vastuvõtmine
 (1) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia võtab vastu vallavolikogu määrusega hiljemalt iga aasta 15. oktoobriks. Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia peavad olema vastu võetud enne eelseisva aasta eelarve vastuvõtmist.
 (2) Piirkondliku arengukava võtab vallavolikogu vastu määrusega.
 (3) Valdkondliku arengukava võtab vallavolikogu vastu määrusega.
 (4) Hallatava asutuse arengukava võtab vallavalitsus vastu määrusega, kui hallatava asutuse põhimääruses ei ole sätestatud teisiti.
 § 6. Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia ülevaatamine, muutmine ja kehtetuks tunnistamine
 (1) Määruse § 3 lõikes 2 nimetatud töörühmad vaatavad arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia üle vähemalt kord aastas ning täpsustavad nelja eelseisva aasta arengusuunad. Arengukavas uuendatakse arvandmed, kaasajastatakse hetkeolukord, vaadatakse üle tegevuskava ning prioriteedid, võetakse välja valmis saanud objektid ja lõppenud tegevused.
 (2) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia muutmine toimub samadel alustel selle koostamise, menetlemise ja vastuvõtmisega.
 (3) Määruse § 3 lõikes 1 nimetatud töörühmade juhid ning vallast sõltuvad üksused esitavad vallavalitsusele iga aasta 1. märtsiks ülevaate arengukavas ettenähtud eesmärkide täitmisest ning arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia muutmise vajadusest.
 (4) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia muutmisel koostatakse arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia uues redaktsioonis.
 (5) Ülevaade arengukavas ettenähtud eesmärkide täitmisest aruandeaastal esitatakse majandusaasta aruande tegevusaruandes.
 (6) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia erakorralisel muutmisel ei pea lähtuma määruse § 3 sätestatud tähtaegadest.
 (7) Kui arengukava muudetakse ja sellega kaasneb mõju eelarvele, tuleb eelarvestrateegia viia arengukavaga kooskõlla.
 (8) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia muutmise ja uue redaktsiooni kinnitamise otsustab vallavolikogu määrusega.
 (9) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia kehtetuks tunnistamise otsustab vallavolikogu määrusega.
 § 7. Täiendavate arengukavade ülevaatamine, muutmine ja kehtetuks tunnistamine
 (1) Piirkondlik ja valdkondlik arengukava vaadatakse üle kord aastas samaaegselt arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia ülevaatamisega, kui seadusest ei tulene teisiti.
 (2) Ülevaatamise käigus selgitatakse välja arengukava muutmise vajalikkus. Juhul kui muutmine ei osutu vajalikuks, esitatakse vallavalitsusele informatsioon ülevaatamise tulemuste kohta.
 (3) Juhul kui arengukava ülevaatamise käigus selgub vajadus arengukava muuta, valmistab vallavalitsus ette arengukava muutmisettepanekud. Täiendava arengukava muutmine toimub samadel alustel selle koostamise ja vastuvõtmisega.
 (4) Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia erakorralisel muutmisel ei pea lähtuma määruse § 4 sätestatud tähtaegadest.
 (5) Piirkondliku arengukava ja valdkondliku arengukava muutmise ja uue redaktsiooni kinnitamise ning kehtetuks tunnistamise otsustab vallavolikogu määrusega.
 (6) Hallatava asutuse arengukava vaadatakse üle üks kord aastas, mille käigus selgitatakse välja arengukava muutmise vajalikkus. Juhul kui muutmine ei osutu vajalikuks, esitab asutus informatsiooni ülevaatamise tulemuste kohta struktuuriüksusele.
 (7) Juhul kui hallatava asutuse arengukava ülevaatamise käigus selgub vajadus arengukava muuta, valmistab asutus ette arengukava muutmisettepanekud. Hallatava asutuse arengukava muutmine toimub samadel alustel selle koostamise ja vastuvõtmisega.
 (8) Hallatava asutuse arengukava muutmise ja uue redaktsiooni kinnitamise otsustab vallavalitsus määrusega.
 (9) Hallatava asutuse arengukava kehtetuks tunnistamise otsustab vallavalitsus määrusega.
 Alatskivi Vallavolikogu 28.12.2016 otsusega nr 89 „Alatskivi valla, Peipsiääre valla ja Vara valla ühinemislepingu kinnitamine“, Vara Vallavolikogu 28.12.2016 otsusega nr 42 „Alatskivi valla, Peipsiääre valla ja Vara valla ühinemislepingu kinnitamine“ ja Peipsiääre Vallavolikogu 29.12.2016 otsusega nr 46 „Alatskivi valla, Peipsiääre valla ja Vara valla ühinemislepingu kinnitamine“ Alatskivi valla, Peipsiääre valla ja Vara valla ühinemislepingus kokkulepitud investeeringud või muud arendustegevused tuleb esitada arengukavas ja eelarvestrateegias.
 Arvestades eelmärgitut ning arvestades haldusreformi § 16 lõike 1 ja Eesti territooriumi haldusjaotuse seaduse § 141 lõikeid 41‒42 tunnistada kehtetuks Vara Vallavolikogu 08.04.2015 määrus nr 4 „Arengukava ja eelarvestrateegia koostamise kord“.


text:
Miguel Ángel Araújo Iglesias (* 10. Januar 1920 in Pereiro de Aguiar, Spanien; † 22. Juli 2007 in Ourense) war ein spanischer Geistlicher und Bischof von Mondoñedo-Ferrol.
 Leben
 Miguel Ángel Araújo Iglesias empfing am 25. Juli 1945 die Priesterweihe. 1970 ernannte ihn Paul VI. zum Bischof von Mondoñedo-Ferrol. 1985 wurde seinem Rücktrittsgesuch durch Johannes Paul II. stattgegeben.
 Weblinks
 Römisch-katholischer Bischof (20. Jahrhundert)
 Römisch-katholischer Bischof (21. Jahrhundert)
 Spanier
 Geboren 1920
 Gestorben 2007
 Mann


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22002D0007
 Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 7/2002 av den 1 februari 2002 om ändring av bilaga XX (Miljö) till EES-avtalet
 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning nr L 088 , 04/04/2002 s. 0014 - 0017
 Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslutnr 7/2002av den 1 februari 2002om ändring av bilaga XX (Miljö) till EES-avtaletGEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR FATTAT DETTA BESLUTmed beaktande av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, ändrat genom protokollet med justeringar av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, nedan kallat avtalet, särskilt artikel 98 i detta, ochav följande skäl:(1) Bilaga XX till avtalet ändrades genom Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 163/2001 av den 11 december 2001(1).(2) Kommissionens beslut 2001/397/EG av den 7 maj 2001 om ändring av beslut 98/483/EG om fastställande av de ekologiska kriterierna för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till diskmaskiner(2) bör införlivas med avtalet.(3) Kommissionens beslut 2001/405/EG av den 4 maj 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till mjukpappersprodukter(3) bör införlivas med avtalet.(4) Kommissionens beslut 2001/540/EG av den 9 juli 2001 om ändring av beslut 98/634/EG om fastställande av de ekologiska kriterierna för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till madrasser(4) bör införlivas med avtalet.(5) Kommissionens beslut 2001/607/EG av den 19 juli 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till handdiskmedel(5) bör införlivas med avtalet.(6) Kommissionens beslut 2001/608/EG av den 19 juli 2001 om förlängning av giltighetstiden för beslut 1999/10/EG om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till färger och lacker(6) bör införlivas med avtalet.(7) Kommissionens beslut 2001/686/EG av den 22 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till persondatorer(7) bör införlivas med avtalet.(8) Kommissionens beslut 2001/687/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till bärbara datorer(8) bör införlivas med avtalet.(9) Kommissionens beslut 2001/688/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till jordförbättringsmedel och växtmedier(9) bör införlivas med avtalet.(10) Kommissionens beslut 2001/689/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till diskmaskiner(10) bör införlivas med avtalet.(11) I besluten 2001/405/EG, 2001/686/EG, 2001/687/EG och 2001/688/EEG föreskrivs att två kriterier för miljömärken skall gälla parallellt i tolv månader från och med de beslutens ikraftträdande.HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.Artikel 1Bilaga XX till avtalet skall ändras på följande sätt:1. Följande skall läggas till i punkt 2d (kommissionens beslut 98/483/EG): ", ändrat genom- 32001 D 0397: Kommissionens beslut 2001/397/EG av den 7 maj 2001 (EGT L 139, 23.5.2001, s. 21)."2. Den nuvarande punkten 2es skall betecknas punkt 2esa.3. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2er (kommissionens beslut 1999/698/EG): "2es. 32001 D 0405: Kommissionens beslut 2001/405/EG av den 4 maj 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till mjukpappersprodukter (EGT L 142, 29.5.2001, s. 10)."4. Punkt 2esa skall utgå med verkan från den 18 juni 2002.5. Följande skall läggas till i punkt 2em (kommissionens beslut 98/634/EG): ", ändrat genom- 32001 D 0540: Kommissionens beslut 2001/540/EG av den 9 juli 2001 (EGT L 194, 18.7.2001, s. 50)."6. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2esa (kommissionens beslut 98/94/EG): "2et. 32001 D 0607: Kommissionens beslut 2001/607/EG av den 19 juli 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till handdiskmedel (EGT L 214, 8.8.2001, s. 30, rättat i EGT L 334, 18.12.2001, s. 34)."7. Följande skall läggas till i punkt 2eh (kommissionens beslut 1999/10/EG): ", ändrat genom- 32001 D 0608: Kommissionens beslut 2001/608/EG av den 19 juli 2001 (EGT L 214, 8.8.2001, s. 43)."8. Den nuvarande punkten 2ep skall betecknas punkt 2epa.9. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2eo (kommissionens beslut 1999/179/EG): "2ep. 32001 D 0686: Kommissionens beslut 2001/686/EG av den 22 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till persondatorer (EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 4, rättat i EGT L 334, 18.12.2001, s. 35)."10. Punkt 2epa skall utgå med verkan från den 1 oktober 2002.11. Den nuvarande punkten 2er skall betecknas punkt 2era.12. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2eq (kommissionens beslut 1999/427/EG): "2er. 32001 D 0687: Kommissionens beslut 2001/687/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till bärbara datorer (EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 11)."13. Punkt 2era skall utgå med verkan från den 1 oktober 2002.14. Den nuvarande punkten 2ec skall betecknas punkt 2eca.15. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2eb (kommissionens beslut 94/10/EG): "2ec. 32001 D 0688: Kommissionens beslut 2001/688/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till jordförbättringsmedel och växtmedier (EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 17)."16. Punkt 2eca skall utgå med verkan från den 1 oktober 2002.17. Den nuvarande punkten 2d skall betecknas punkt 2da.18. Följande punkt skall införas efter punkt 2c (kommissionens beslut 2000/45/EG): "2d. 32001 D 0689: Kommissionens beslut 2001/689/EG av den 28 augusti 2001 om fastställande av ekologiska kriterier för tilldelning av gemenskapens miljömärke till diskmaskiner (EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 23)."19. Punkt 2da skall utgå med verkan från den 1 oktober 2002.Artikel 2Texterna till besluten 2001/397/EG, 2001/405/EG, 2001/540/EG, 2001/607/EG, rättat i EGT L 334, 18.12.2001, s. 34, 2001/608/EG, 2001/686/EG, rättat i EGT L 334, 18.12.2001, s. 35, 2001/687/EG, 2001/688/EG och 2001/689/EG på isländska och norska, som skall offentliggöras i EES-supplementet till Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning, skall vara autentiska.Artikel 3Detta beslut träder i kraft den 2 februari 2002 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i avtalet har gjorts till Gemensamma EES-kommittén(11).Artikel 4Detta beslut skall offentliggöras i EES-delen av och EES-supplementet till Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.Utfärdat i Bryssel den 1 februari 2002.På Gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnarP. WesterlundOrdförande(1) EGT L 65, 7.3.2002, s. 44.(2) EGT L 139, 23.5.2001, s. 21.(3) EGT L 142, 29.5.2001, s. 10.(4) EGT L 194, 18.7.2001, s. 50.(5) EGT L 214, 8.8.2001, s. 30.(6) EGT L 214, 8.8.2001, s. 43.(7) EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 4.(8) EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 11.(9) EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 17.(10) EGT L 242, 12.9.2001, s. 23.(11) Inga konstitutionella krav angivna.


type: caselaw

text:
30.10.1999 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 314/7
 TRIBUNAL DE PRIMEIRA INSTÂNCIA
 ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMEIRA INSTÂNCIA 2. É negado provimento ao recurso quanto ao mais.
 3. Cada uma das partes suportará as suas próprias despesas.
 de 16 de Setembro de 1999
 (1) JO C 26 de 25.1.1997.
 no processo T-182/96: Partex — Companhia Portuguesa
 de Serviços, SA contra Comissão das Comunidades Euro-
 peias (1)
 (Polı́tica social — Fundo Social Europeu — Recurso de ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMEIRA INSTÂNCIA
 anulação — Redução de uma contribuição financeira —
 Certificação factual e contabilı́stica — Competência ratione
 temporis do Estado em causa — Fundamentação — Direitos de 29 de Setembro de 1999
 de defesa — Abuso de direito — Confiança legı́tima —
 Salvaguarda dos direitos adquiridos — Desvio de poder)
 no processo T-126/97, Sonasa — Sociedade Nacional
 de Segurança, Ld.a contra Comissão das Comunidades
 Europeias (1)
 (1999/C 314/16)
 (Recurso de anulação — Fundo Social Europeu — Redução
 de uma contribuição financeira — Confiança legı́tima —
 Segurança jurı́dica — Boa administração — Falta de funda-
 mentação)
 (Lı́ngua do processo: português)
 (1999/C 314/17)
 No processo T-182/96, Partex — Companhia Portuguesa de
 Serviços, SA, com sede em Lisboa, representada por Rui (Lı́ngua do processo: português)
 Chancerelle de Machete, Pedro Machete e Miguel Pena Machete,
 advogados em Lisboa, com domicı́lio escolhido no Luxem-
 No processo T-126/97, Sonasa — Sociedade Nacional de
 burgo no escritório do advogado Louis Schiltz, 2, rue du Fort
 Segurança, Ld.a, com sede em Lisboa, representada por Nuno
 Rheinsheim, contra Comissão das Comunidades Europeias
 Morais Sarmento, advogado no foro de Lisboa, com domicı́lio
 (agentes: Maria Teresa Figueira e Knut Simonsson), que tem
 escolhido no Luxemburgo, no escritório do advogado Victor
 por objecto a anulação da Decisão C (96) 1184 da Comissão,
 Gillen, 13, rue Aldringen, contra Comissão das Comunidades
 de 14 de Agosto de 1996, que determina a redução da
 Europeias (agentes: Maria Teresa Figueira e Knut Simonson),
 contribuição do Fundo Social Europeu concedida no processo
 que tem por objecto a anulação da Decisão C (96) 3451 da
 n.o 880412/P3, o Tribunal de Primeira Instância (Terceira
 Comissão, de 16 de Dezembro de 1996, relativa à redução de
 Secção), composto por M. Jaeger, presidente, K. Lenaerts e
 uma contribuição financeira concedida à recorrente pelo
 J. Azizi, juı́zes, secretário: J. Palacio González, administrador,
 Fundo Social Europeu, o Tribunal de Primeira Instância das
 proferiu, em 16 de Setembro de 1999, um acórdão cuja parte
 Comunidades Europeias (Quarta Secção), composto por: R. M.
 decisória é a seguinte:
 Moura Ramos, presidente, V. Tiili e P. Mengozzi, juı́zes,
 secretário: A. Mair, administrador, proferiu, em 29 de Setembro
 de 1999, um acórdão cuja parte decisória é a seguinte:
 1. A Decisão C (96) 1184 da Comissão, de 14 de Agosto de
 1996, que determina a redução da contribuição do Fundo Social 1. É negado provimento ao recurso.
 Europeu concedida no quadro do projecto n.o 880412/P3, é
 anulada na parte em que impõe uma redução nas sub-rubricas
 14.2.6, 14.2.7, 14.3.1, alı́nea b), 14.3.1, alı́nea c), 14.3.7, 2. A recorrente é condenada na totalidade das despesas.
 14.3.8 e 14.3.15 da parte do projecto relativo à Tintas
 Robbialac SA e 14.2.8, 14.3.1, alı́nea b), 14.3.1, alı́nea c),
 14.3.7 et 14.3.11 da parte do projecto relativo à Sapec (1) JO C 199 de 28.6.97.
 — Produits et Engrais Chimiques du Portugal, SA, dos montan-
 tes reclamados pela recorrente no seu pedido de pagamento do
 saldo.


text:
Rámsarský dohovor (iné názvy: Rámsarská konvencia, Rámsarská dohoda, Dohovor o mokradiach, často nesprávne Ramsarský/Ramsarská... ; oficiálne Dohovor o mokradiach majúcich medzinárodný význam najmä ako biotopy vtáctva z ) je medzinárodná zmluva na ochranu a trvalú udržateľnosť mokradí. Dohovor bol prijatý 2. februára 1971 v iránskom meste Rámsar, ležiacom na brehu Kaspického mora.
 Územie spĺňajúce kritériá stanovené v texte dohovoru sa nazýva Rámsarská lokalita a 2. február sa od roku 1997 na počesť prijatia konvencie vyhlasuje za Svetový deň mokradí.
 Dejiny
 Rastúce obavy z rýchlosti, s akou boli „kultivované“ alebo inak zničené rozsiahle plochy močarín a mokradí v Európe, ktorých výsledkom bol pokles počtu vodného vtáctva vyvolali v roku 1962 konferenciu v rámci Projektu MAR (programu založeného v r. 1960), ktorú organizovali Medzinárodný úrad pre výskum vodného vtáctva (IWRB, teraz súčasť Wetlands International), IUCN a Medzinárodná rada pre ochranu vtákov (ICBP, teraz BirdLife International). Na nej zaznela prvá výzva na medzinárodnú konvenciu o mokradiach. Pôvodne sa konvencia špecificky zameriavala na ochranu vodného vtáctva tvorbou siete refúgií. V priebehu nasledujúcich ôsmich rokov sa text konvencie rozpracoval na viacerých medzinárodných a odborných rokovaniach, ktoré sa konali najmä pod záštitou IWRB. Pri rozpracovaní textu postupne prevažovala ochrana biotopov nad ochranou druhov. Napokon v meste Rámsar na pobreží Kaspického mora v Iráne text konvencie odsúhlasili a prijali 2. februára 1971. Tento deň, 2. február, je od roku 1996 Svetovým dňom mokradí.
 Konvencia nadobudla platnosť v decembri 1975, keď siedma krajina doručila dokumenty o pristúpení (alebo ratifikácii) do organizácie UNESCO (depozitár konvencie). Konvencia má v súčasnosti zmluvné strany vo všetkých oblastiach sveta. Od svojho prijatia bola konvencia upravovaná v dvoch prípadoch: protokolom (nový dohovor, ktorý upravuje pôvodný) v decembri 1982 a radom doplnkov v roku 1987, známych ako Dodatky z Reginy.
 Parížsky protokol
 Parížsky protokol upravujúci Rámsarský dohovor schválila Mimoriadna konferencia zmluvných strán, ktorá sa konala na ústredí UNESCO v Paríži v decembri 1982. Protokol potvrdzuje, že všetky jazykové verzie konvencie (anglická, nemecká, francúzska, ruská, španielska a arabská) sú rovnocenné a ustanovuje proces pre úpravy konvencie, prevažne jej nedostatkov. Účinnosť nadobudol v roku 1986.
 Dodatky z Reginy
 Na mimoriadnej konferencii zmluvných strán, ktorá sa konala v Regine v Kanade v roku 1987, bol prijatý rad dodatkov. Tieto neovplyvňujú základné princípy konvencie, ale súvislosti jej fungovania: ustanovenie Stáleho výboru, právomoci konferencie, stály sekretariát (Byro) a rozpočet. Tieto dodatky nadobudli účinnosť 1. mája 1994.
 Slovensko
 Slovensko sa stalo zmluvnou stranou Rámsarského dohovoru ako súčasť bývalého Česko-Slovenska 2. júla 1990 (slovenský text dohovoru bol publikovaný v Zbierke zákonov ako Dohovor č. 396/1990 Zb., v čiastke 67, prílohe 1) a od svojho osamostatnenia 1. januára 1993 plní úlohy samostatného členského štátu.
 Pri svojom pristúpení ku konvencii prihlásilo Česko-Slovensko do rámsarského zoznamu štyri lokality zo Slovenska (Parížske močiare, Senné, Šúr a Číčovské mŕtve rameno). V máji 1993 Slovensko prihlásilo ďalšie tri rozsiahlejšie mokrade (Latorica, Dunajské luhy, Niva Moravy). V roku 1998 pri príležitosti Svetového dňa mokradí to bolo ďalších päť dlhodobejšie pripravovaných lokalít (Poiplie, Alúvium Rudavy, Mokrade Turca, Mokrade Oravskej kotliny, Rieka Orava a jej prítoky). Zároveň sa rozšírila rámsarská lokalita Dunajské luhy na územie novovyhlásenej chránenej krajinnej oblasti, do ktorej bola zahrnutá aj rámsarská lokalita Číčovské mŕtve rameno. Celkový počet rámsarských lokalít na Slovensku tak v septembri 1999 dosiahol 11.
 Pripravené sú návrhy na prihlásenie ďalších dvoch mokradí - Domica-Baradla (cezhraničné krasové a podzemné hydrologické systémy Slovenského krasu a Aggteleku) a Alúvium Tisy ako súčasť multilaterálnej medzinárodnej rámsarskej lokality na hornom toku rieky Tisa (Rumunsko, Ukrajina, Slovensko, Maďarsko).
 Zoznam lokalít na Slovensku
 Senianske rybníky
 Parížske močiare
 Šúr
 Dunajské luhy spolu Číčovským mŕtvym ramenom v rámci chránenej krajinnej oblasti
 Latorica
 Niva Moravy
 Alúvium Rudavy
 Mokrade Turca
 Poiplie
 Mokrade Oravskej kotliny
 Rieka Orava a jej prítoky
 Domica
 Tisa
 Jaskyne Demänovskej doliny
 Zdroj:
 Dohovor v Česku
 Po vzniku samostatného Česka bol ustanovený v roku 1993 Český ramsarský výbor. Zákon o pristúpení k celosvetovému Rámsarskému dohovoru prijalo Česko-Slovensko 2. februára 1990. Na území Česka je vyhlásených 14 významných mokradí, prvé sú ešte z obdobia Česko-Slovenska.
 V roku 1990
 RS1: Šumavské rašeliniská - 6371 ha
 RS2: Třeboňské rybníky - 10 165 ha
 RS3: Novozámecký a Břehyňský rybník - 923 ha
 RS4: Lednické rybníky - 650 ha
 V roku 1993
 RS5: Litovelské Pomoraví - 5122 ha
 RS6: Poodrie - 5450 ha
 RS7: Krkonošské rašeliniská - 230 ha
 RS8: Třeboňské rašeliniská - 1100 ha
 RS9: Mokrade dolného Podyjí - 11525 ha
 V roku 1997
 RS10: Mokrade Liběchovky a Pšovky - 350 ha
 V roku 2004
 RS11: Podzemná Punkva – 1571 ha
 V roku 2006
 RS12: Krušnohorské rašeliniská – 11224 ha
 V roku 2012
 RS13: Horná Jizera - 2303 ha
 RS14: Pramenné vývery a rašeliniská Slavkovského lesa 3223 ha
 V odbornej českej tlači je vyhláška, pojem Rámsarského dohovoru označovaný skratkou RAMSAR.
 (Odstavec prevzatý z českej Wikipédie)
 Referencie
 Iné projekty
 Externé odkazy
 Oficiálna stránka (anglicky)
 Portál venovaný mokradiam – Štátna ochrana prírody SR
 Zoznam medzinárodne významných mokradí
 Mokrade: Príručka pre inventarizáciu, ochranu a starostlivosť o mokrade. I. časť. Prievidza, 1999
 Medzinárodné zmluvy o životnom prostredí
 Ochrana prírody
 Prírodné rezervácie


text:
Oltra Mar est une œuvre musicale orchestrale et vocale composée par la compositrice finlandaise Kaija Saariaho en 1999.
 L'œuvre
 Description
 L'ouvrage, commandé par l'Orchestre philharmonique de New York et la Finnish Broadcasting Company, dure environ vingt-deux minutes et est composé pour orchestre et chœur. Sous-titré Sept préludes au nouveau millénaire, l'ouvrage est distribué en sept tableaux. Le livret des chants, en français, est un montage de différents textes du poète arabe Abou Saîd, de chants traditionnels pygmée et d'extraits de textes d'Amin Maalouf.
 Thème
 Selon Risto Neiminen, Oltra Mar constituerait une étude en vue de l'écriture de l'opéra de Kaija Saariaho en 2000, L'Amour de loin. En effet, la compositrice précise que les thèmes qu'elle y développe sont connectés à ceux de son prochain opéra. Selon elle, le propos de l'œuvre concerne le voyage, la mer de l'origine de la vie.
 Création
 Oltra Mar est créé le à New York par l'Orchestre philharmonique de New York conduit par Kurt Masur.
 Orchestre et voix
 L'ouvrage est écrit pour les voix et instruments suivants :
 un chœur mixte ;
 4 flûtes, 4 hautbois, 4 clarinettes, 4 bassons, 4 cors, 4 trompettes, 4 trombones, un tuba, 3 percussionnistes, une timbale, une harpe, un piano et des cordes.
 Réception
 Elle gagne le Lion d'Or décerné par la Biennale musicale de Venise, lors du concert du 17 septembre 2021 au Théâtre de la Fenice, au cours de la 65e édition du Festival, dans une première création italienne. Oltra mar étant considéré par le directeur artistique de l'événement Lucia Ronchetti, comme un chef-d'œuvre de musique contemporaine.
 Tableaux
 Départ
 Amour
 Vagues
 Temps
 Souvenir de vagues
 Mort (en mémoire de Gérard Grisey)
 Arrivée
 Enregistrements et concert
 Enregistrements
 « Oltra mar », sur Kaija Saariaho, Cinq reflets de L’Amour de loin Nymphea Reflection Oltra mar, Ondine, 2004, ODE 1049-2, 1 CD. Avec dir. Jukka-Pekka Saraste, Pia Freund, Gabriel Suovanen, Tapiola Chamber Choir, Finnish Radio Symphony Orchestra.
 « Oltra mar ; Seven Preludes for the New Millenium», sur Kaija Saariaho: Works for Orchestra, Ondine, 2012, ODE 11132Q, 4 CD. Avec dir. Christoph Eschenbach, Avanti! Chamber Orchestra.
 Concerts
 Donné en concert lors du Kaiku festival de la BBC Symphony Orchestra en 2004, dans une première britannique.
 En 2016, mis en scène et danse par Luca Veggetti, au Swedish Cottage, Marionette Theatre à Philadelphie.
 En concert le 17 septembre 2021 au Théâtre de la Fenice lors de la 65e édition de la Biennale musicale de Venise, dans une première création italienne.
 Concert lors du Brighton Festival, A Sea Symphony, en mai 2022, dirigé par Ilan Volkov avec Gweneth-Ann Rand et Duncan Rock.
 Notes et références
 Liens externes
 Partition complète
 Œuvre de Kaija Saariaho
 Musique classique vocale en français


text:
 27.8.2011
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 252/44
 Acțiune introdusă la 1 iulie 2011 — Bimbo/OAPI — Grupo Bimbo (GRUPO BIMBO)
 (Cauza T-357/11)
 2011/C 252/95
 Limba în care a fost formulată acțiunea: spaniola
 Părțile
 Reclamantă: Bimbo, SA (Barcelona, Spania) (reprezentant: J. Carbonell Callicó, avocat)
 Pârât: Oficiul pentru Armonizare în cadrul Pieței Interne (mărci, desene și modele industriale)
 Cealaltă parte în procedura care s-a aflat pe rolul camerei de recurs: Grupo Bimbo, SAB de CV (México, Mexic)
 Concluziile
 Reclamanta solicită Tribunalului:
 —
 modificarea deciziei Camerei întâi de recurs din 14 aprilie 2011, în conformitate cu articolul 65 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul nr. 207/2009, în temeiul încălcării articolului 8 alineatul (5) din regulamentul menționat și respingerea în întregime a cererii de înregistrare a mărcii figurative nr. 5.025.598 „GRUPO BIMBO” pentru toate produsele și serviciile vizate;
 —
 în subsidiar, în cazul respingerii primei cereri, anularea deciziei Camerei întâi de recurs din 14 aprilie 2011 în temeiul încălcării articolului 8 alineatul (5) din Regulamentul nr. 207/2009;
 —
 obligarea pârâtelor la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 Motivele și principalele argumente
 Solicitantul mărcii comunitare: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
 Marca comunitară vizată: Marca figurativă care cuprinde elementul verbal „GRUPO BIMBO” (cerere de înregistrare nr. 5.025.598), pentru produse și servicii din clasele 5, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35 și 43
 Titularul mărcii sau al semnului invocat în procedura opoziției: Reclamanta
 Marca sau semnul invocat: Marca verbală spaniolă „BIMBO” (nr. 2.689.432), pentru produse din clasele 5, 29 și 30, precum și diferite mărci figurative spaniole (nr. 464.785, nr. 2.244.562, nr. 2.244.563 și nr. 2.255.097) care cuprind elementul verbal „BIMBO”, pentru produse și servicii din clasele 29, 30, 31, 32, 35 și 42
 Decizia diviziei de opoziție: Admite opoziția.
 Decizia camerei de recurs: Anulează în parte decizia atacată.
 Motivele invocate: Interpretarea și aplicarea incorecte ale articolului 8 alineatul (5) din Regulamentul nr. 207/2009 întrucât, după ce a apreciat că mărcile „BIMBO” ale persoanei care a formulat opoziția sunt de notorietate pe piața spaniolă, iar marca a cărei înregistrare s-a solicitat, „GRUPO BIMBO”, este practic identică cu marca persoanei care a formulat opoziția, camera de recurs a admis în parte înregistrarea acestei mărci pentru motivul că persoana care a formulat opoziția nu a dovedit profitul obținut în mod nejustificat în urma mărcilor sale sau riscul pentru notorietatea sau pentru caracterul distinctiv al mărcilor sale.