type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 10.11.2014
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 C 395/9
 Presuda Suda (drugo vijeće) od 4. rujna 2014. (zahtjev za prethodnu odluku koji je uputio Finanzgericht Hamburg – Njemačka) – Simon, Evers & Co GmbH protiv Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen
 (Predmet C-21/13) (1)
 ((Prethodno pitanje - Trgovinska politika - Antidampinške pristojbe - Uredba (EZ) br. 499/2009 - Valjanost - Uvozni proizvodi podrijetlom iz Kine - Uvoz istih proizvoda otpremljenih iz Tajlanda - Izbjegavanje mjera - Dokaz - Nesuradnja))
 (2014/C 395/11)
 Jezik postupka: njemački
 Sud koji je uputio zahtjev
 Finanzgericht Hamburg
 Stranke glavnog postupka
 Tužitelji: Simon, Evers & Co GmbH
 Tuženik: Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen
 Izreka
 Ispitivanjem pitanja koje je postavio sud koji je uputio zahtjev nije utvrđeno postojanje nijednog elementa koji bi bio takve naravi da bi mogao utjecati na valjanost Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 499/2009 od 11. lipnja 2009. o proširenju konačne antidampinške pristojbe uvedene Uredbom (EZ) br. 1174/2005 o uvozu ručnih paletnih viličara i njihovih osnovnih dijelova podrijetlom iz Narodne Republike Kine na uvoz istog proizvoda otpremljenoga iz Tajlanda, bez obzira na to je li prijavljen kao proizvod podrijetlom iz Tajlanda ili ne.
 (1) SL C 114, 20.4.2013.


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b'U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General\n 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.\n Room S5022 - Audit\n Washington, D.C. 20210\n\n\n September 24, 1999\n\n\n MEMORANDUM FOR: RAYMOND BRAMUCCI\n Assistant Secretary for\n Employment and Training\n\n\n FROM: JOHN J. GETEK\n Assistant Inspector General\n for Audit\n\n SUBJECT: Consultation Report No. 20-99-006-03-390\n Impact of Workforce Investment Act Administrative Cost Limitations on\n JTPA Recipients\n\n Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated June 4, 1999, between ETA and OIG, the\n OIG engaged the CPA firm of Carmichael, Brasher, Tuvell and Savage to apply agreed-upon procedures\n in evaluating the potential impact of the Workforce Investment Act\xe2\x80\x99s (WIA\xe2\x80\x99s) administrative cost provisions\n on entities currently operating under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). ETA selected 13 JTPA\n recipients, representing 10 service delivery areas and 3 Section 401 Native American grantees, from a pool\n of entities that volunteered for the survey. In accordance with the MOU, the OIG monitored the task\n order, performed quality control procedures and provided assistance as necessary to assure the quality of\n the work performed. Two copies, one bound and one unbound, of the independent accountants\xe2\x80\x99 report\n are attached.\n\n Briefly, notwithstanding the unknown effect of WIA requirements (including designation of local areas,\n establishment of a one-stop delivery system and other provisions) on program operators\xe2\x80\x99 administrative\n costs, the survey found that:\n\n 1. Only two of the SDAs, as currently configured and operating under JTPA, would be in compliance\n with the WIA administrative cost limitation (10 percent of allocation), even after the cost\n classification requirements and definitions contained in the WIA interim final rule were applied.\n\n 2. Application of the WIA interim final rule cost classification requirements and definitions had a\n negligible effect on the classification of administrative versus program costs for the surveyed entities.\n\x0c -2-\n\n\n3. For the majority of the surveyed entities, program officials stated they intended to seek a waiver\n of the WIA statutory administrative cost limitation.\n\n4. Similarly, a majority stated they intended to change their mode of operations in order to comply\n with the statutory cost limitation.\n\nFrom the OIG\xe2\x80\x99s perspective, these final two points raise concerns about possible unintended consequences\nof the WIA administrative cost limitation. First, ETA may find itself inundated with requests from local\nareas for waivers of the statutory 10 percent limitation. Efforts to treat all such requests equitably could\npotentially result in a majority of local areas operating under waivers, in which case \xe2\x80\x9cthe exception\xe2\x80\x9d\n(waivers) would effectively become more common than \xe2\x80\x9cthe rule\xe2\x80\x9d (the 10 percent limit).\n\nSecond, while none of the program officials in the survey indicated they intended to change how they\ncontract in order to comply with the administrative cost limitation, we believe there is a risk that the WIA\nadministrative funding and definitions may affect how local areas deliver services. The dramatic shift in the\nearly 1980s from cost reimbursement to fixed unit price, performance-based contracting comes to mind\nas an example of the system reacting to a reduction in administrative costs.\n\nSpecifically, the early years of JTPA saw a move to fixed unit price, performance-based contracting in\nresponse to: (1) the reduction in the administrative cost limit from 20 percent under the Comprehensive\nEmployment and Training Act to 15 percent under the original 1982 JTPA statute, and (2) the rule, at 20\nCFR 629.38(e)(2), that permitted certain fixed unit price contracts to be single unit charged entirely to\ntraining. Later, the 1992 JTPA Amendments raised the administrative cost limit to 20 percent and placed\nfurther restrictions on single unit charging of fixed unit price contracts.\n\nTo assist ETA in developing the final rule on administrative costs, the independent accountants\xe2\x80\x99 report\ndetails suggestions and comments made by grantee officials with respect to the WIA administrative cost\nlimitations and definitions.\n\nPlease call me at 219-8404 if you have any questions or wish to arrange a briefing on the survey results.\n\n\nAttachments\n\x0cINDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS\xe2\x80\x99 AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES\n REPORT\n\n IMPACT OF WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT\n ADMINISTRATIVE COST LIMITATIONS\n ON JTPA RECIPIENTS\n\x0c Table of Contents\n\n\n Page\n\nAcronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i\n\nIndependent Accountants\xe2\x80\x99 Report on\n Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1\n\nExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2\n\nAgreed-Upon Procedures and Results\n\n Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5\n\n Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5\n\n Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6\n\n Survey Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7\n\n Procedures Performed and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9\n\nAppendix 1 - List of Grantees Surveyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11\n\nAppendix 2 - Detail Analysis of Results of Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12\n\nAppendix 3 - Detail of Grantees\xe2\x80\x99 Comments/Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16\n\x0c ACRONYMS\n\n\n\n\nETA Employment and Training Administration\n\nJTPA Job Training Partnership Act\n\nHHS Department of Health and Human Services\n\nHUD Department of Housing and Urban Development\n\nINA Indian and Native American\n\nMIS Management Information System\n\nPIC Private Industry Council\n\nSDA Service Delivery Area\n\nUSDOL United States Department of Labor\n\nWIA Workforce Investment Act\n\n\n\n\n i\n\x0c INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS\xe2\x80\x99 REPORT\n ON APPLYING AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES\n\nEmployment and Training Administration\nU.S. Department of Labor and\nOther Specified User Agencies:\n\nWe have performed the procedures described in the Agreed-Upon Procedures and Results section of this\nreport, which were agreed to by the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of\nLabor (USDOL) solely to assist in evaluating the potential impact of the Workforce Investment Act\xe2\x80\x99s\nadministrative cost limitation on selected SDA and INA grantees (prepared in accordance with the criteria\nspecified therein).\n\nThis engagement to apply agreed-upon procedures was performed in accordance with standards\nestablished by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Government Auditing\nStandards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States.\n\nThe sufficiency of these procedures is solely the responsibility of the specified users of the report.\nConsequently, we make no representations regarding the sufficiency of the procedures described later in\nthis report either for the purpose for which this report has been requested or for any other purpose.\n\nWe were not engaged to, and did not perform an audit, the objective of which would be the expression of\nan opinion on the potential impact of the Workforce Investment Act\xe2\x80\x99s administrative cost limitation on\nselected SDA and INA grantees. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion. Had we performed\nadditional procedures, other matters might have come to our attention that would have been reported to\nyou.\n\nThis report should not be used by those who have not agreed to the procedures and taken responsibility\nfor the sufficiency of the procedures for their purpose thereof. This report is intended solely for the\ninformation and use of the U.S. Department of Labor and is not intended to be and should not be used by\nanyone other than these specified parties. However, this report is a matter of public record and its\ndistribution is not limited.\n\nCARMICHAEL, BRASHER, TUVELL & SAVAGE\n\n\nAtlanta, Georgia\nSeptember 2, 1999\n\n 2\n\x0c EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n\nThe Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program will supersede the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)\nand become effective July 1, 2000. Several features of WIA, including establishment of one-stop centers,\ndesignation of local areas, and certain program requirements will have an unknown impact on the\nadministrative cost experience of program operators.\n\nThe administrative cost limitation for local areas under WIA is 10 percent, which is a significant reduction\nfrom similar JTPA programs which were allowed to operate at 20 percent. The WIA administrative cost\nlimitation for Indian and Native American (INA) grantees will be established by grant agreement. Under\nJTPA, INA grantees were limited to 20 percent.\n\nConcerned about the Service Delivery Area (SDA) and INA grantees\xe2\x80\x99 future implementation and\ncompliance with the WIA program, the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) asked for SDA\nvolunteers to undergo a survey. The purpose of the survey was to determine what administrative costs\nwould have been for a particular JTPA program, if the program were operated under the WIA regulations.\n\nETA selected program year 19971 for the survey and JTPA Title IIA, Adult Training, and Title IV-A,\nSection 401, Native American Programs, for the representative programs.\n\nWhat We Did\n\nWe surveyed thirteen grantees (as listed in Appendix 1), representing ten SDAs and three INA grantees,\nto reclassify JTPA 1997 program year (July 1, 1997 - June 30, 1998) costs using the WIA administrative\ncost definition. This report will present the reclassified administrative costs in two ways: (1) as a percent\nof the grantees\xe2\x80\x99 allocation, since both JTPA and WIA express the administrative cost limitation in terms\nof the grantee\xe2\x80\x99s total allocation, and (2) as a percent of total expenditures, to provide ETA with information\non the relationship of administrative costs to ongoing program operations.\n\nOur procedures were performed in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of\nCertified Public Accountants and Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller of the\nUnited States. In accordance with these standards, we rendered an independent accountants\xe2\x80\x99 report on\napplying the agreed-upon procedures.\n\nSurvey Results\n\nApplying the WIA definition of administration to JTPA costs had little effect on the percentage charged to\nadministrative. As a percentage of total program allocation, only two of the SDA grantees and none of the\nINA grantees would have been in compliance\n\n1 Although JTPA funds may be spent during the program year of appropriation and the two succeeding\n years, we reviewed only PY97 funds spent during PY97 (July 1, 1997 through June 30, 1998).\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0c EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n\nwith the proposed administrative guidelines under WIA. As a percentage of total program expenditures,\nnone of the grantees, SDA or INA, would have been in compliance.\n\nThe following chart summarizes our results. For the ten SDAs surveyed, the reclassified administrative\ncosts averaged 16.38 percent of allocation and 20.61 percent of expenditures. For the INA grantees\nsurveyed, the reclassified administrative costs averaged 19.64 percent of allocation and 19.90 percent of\nexpenditures. See Appendix 2 for additional details.\n\n\n\n\nAll of the grantees believe that the 10 percent limitation is too prohibitive to operate the WIA program.\n\nEight of the thirteen grantees, representing 61.5 percent, intend to seek a waiver of the statutory\nadministrative cost limitation imposed by WIA. Ten of the thirteen grantees, representing 76.9 percent,\nintend to change their mode of operations in order to comply with the WIA regulations.\n\nChanges suggested and comments made by the grantees include:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Six of the thirteen grantees surveyed recommended increasing the administrative cost limit.\n If this recommendation was applied and the limit was raised to at least 15 percent, six of\n the ten SDA grantees would be in compliance. In addition, during the course of our\n procedures, USDOL officials and INA grantees reached a compromise on the issue of\n administrative costs. USDOL agreed to raise the floor for negotiating allowable\n administrative costs from 10 to 15 percent. With this change, still only one of the three\n INA grantees surveyed would be in compliance.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0c EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Four of the thirteen grantees surveyed recommended that all subcontracted service costs,\n regardless of nature of contract, should be allowable program\n expenses. Applying this recommendation to the SDA grantees surveyed, the\n administrative costs would have been reduced in an approximate range of .10 percent to\n as much as 7.80 percent. Applying this recommendation to the INA grantees resulted in\n no changes to administrative costs.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The majority of the grantees surveyed requested assistance implementing the WIA\n regulations in regards to the One-Stop concept and other general operating procedures.\n Further, five of the thirteen grantees surveyed responded that administrative cost limitations\n of other federal agencies were similar to those of WIA.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\x0c AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES AND RESULTS\n\n\n Objective, Background and Scope\n\nObjective\n\nThe project objective was to assist ETA in determining if the definition of administration developed for the\nWIA regulations will enable most local programs to comply with the ten percent statutory limitation on\nadministrative costs.\n\nThe Employment and Training Administration (ETA) asked for SDA and INA grantee volunteers to\nundergo a survey. The purpose of the survey was to determine what administrative costs would have been\nfor a particular JTPA program, if the program were operated under the WIA regulations.\n\nBackground\n\nThe Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program will supersede the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)\nand become effective July 1, 2000. Several features of WIA, including establishment of one-stop centers,\ndesignation of local areas, and certain program requirements will have an unknown impact on the\nadministrative cost experience of program operators.\n\nThe administrative cost limitation for local areas under WIA is 10 percent, which is a significant reduction\nfrom similar JTPA programs which were allowed to operate at 20 percent. The WIA administrative cost\nlimitation for Indian and Native Americans (INA) grantees will be established by grant agreement. Under\nJTPA, INA grantees were limited to 20 percent. Although WIA administrative cost limitations for INA\ngrantees will be established by grant agreement, these entities will follow the same definition of\nadministrative cost applicable to the local areas.\n\nETA\xe2\x80\x99s interim final rule at 20 CFR Part 652 established cost classification requirements that differ in many\nrespects from the definition applicable to JTPA programs. These major changes reclassifying administrative\ncosts to program costs are noted below:\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Cost of first line supervisor/team leaders of staff that provide services directly to\n participants.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Costs of the individuals involved in the tracking and monitoring of WIA program,\n participant, or performance requirements; or for collecting, storing and disseminating\n information under the core services provisions.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Costs of public relations directly related to requesting services for/providing services to/for\n participants.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\x0c AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES AND RESULTS\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Costs of tracking and monitoring of WIA program, participant, or performance\n requirements; and collecting, storing and disseminating information under the core services\n provisions\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Cost of continuous improvement efforts that are program related.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Administrative costs associated with fixed price and cost reimbursement contracts for\n \xe2\x80\x9cspecific goods and services.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nScope\n\nWe surveyed thirteen grantees, representing ten SDAs and three INA grantees, to reclassify JTPA PY\n1997 (July 1, 1997 - June 30, 1998) costs using the WIA administrative cost definition. This report will\npresent the reclassified administrative costs in two ways: (1) as a percent of the grantees\xe2\x80\x99 allocation, since\nboth JTPA and WIA express the administrative cost limitation in terms of the grantee\xe2\x80\x99s total allocation, and\n(2) as a percent of total expenditures, to provide ETA with information on the relationship of administrative\ncosts to ongoing program operations.\n\nETA selected program year 1997 for the survey and JTPA Title IIA, Adult Training, and Title IV-A,\nSection 401, Native American Programs, for the representative programs.\n\nOur procedures were performed in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of\nCertified Public Accountants and Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller of the\nUnited States. In accordance with these standards, we rendered an independent accountants\xe2\x80\x99 report on\napplying the agreed-upon procedures.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\x0c AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES AND RESULTS\n\n\n Survey Results\n\nApplying the WIA definition of administration to JTPA costs had little effect on the percentage charged to\nadministrative. As a percentage of total program allocation, only two of the SDA grantees and none of the\nINA grantees would have been in compliance with the proposed administrative guidelines under WIA.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 As a percentage of total program expenditures, none of the grantees, SDA or INA, would have\n been in compliance.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 All of the grantees believe that the 10 percent limitation is too prohibitive to operate the WIA\n program.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Eight of the thirteen grantees, representing 61.5 percent, intend to seek a waiver of the statutory\n administrative cost limitation imposed by WIA.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Ten of the thirteen grantees, representing 76.9 percent, intend to change their mode of operations\n in order to comply with the WIA regulations.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Changes suggested and comments made by the grantees (See Appendix 3 for details) include:\n\n Six of the thirteen grantees surveyed recommended increasing the administrative cost limit.\n\n If this recommendation was applied and the limit was raised to at least 15 percent, six of\n the ten SDA grantees would be in compliance.\n\n During the course of our procedures, USDOL officials and INA grantees reached a\n compromise on the issue of administrative costs. USDOL agreed to raise the floor for\n negotiating allowable administrative costs from 10 to 15 percent. With this change, still\n only one of the three INA grantees surveyed would be in compliance.\n\n Four of the thirteen grantees surveyed recommended that all subcontracted service costs,\n regardless of the nature of the contract, should be allowable program expenses.\n\n Applying this recommendation to the SDA grantees surveyed, the administrative costs\n would have been reduced in an approximate range of .10 percent to as much as 7.80\n percent. Applying this recommendation to the INA grantees resulted in no changes to\n administrative costs.\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\x0c AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES AND RESULTS\n\n\nThe majority of the grantees surveyed requested assistance implementing the WIA regulations in\nregards to the One-Stop concept and other general operating procedures.\n\nFive of the thirteen grantees surveyed responded that administrative cost limitations of other federal\nagencies were similar to those of WIA.\n\nAs noted above, the effects of the regulatory changes were inconsequential. We noted that\ndepending on the internal operating structure of the survey participant, the regulatory changes could\npotentially have even less of an impact. For example, if a recipient did not use subcontractors, one\nof the major reclassifications did not come into play. Alternatively, if a recipient utilized\nsubcontractors to operate all of their programs, the reclassification of the cost of the first-line\nsupervisors was of no consequence.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cFor each of the grantees selected for the engagement, certain agreed-upon procedures\nwere performed with the following results:\n\n Agreed-Upon Procedures Performed Results of Procedures\n Preliminary Work From our review of the regulations, differences were\n noted in the classification of some costs as program\n 1. Review regulations under WIA and administrative under JTPA. These\n differences were isolated and utilized in the\n 2. Obtain and review Job Training Plan reclassification of costs procedure explained later.\n During the entrance conference, all of the SDAs and INA\n 3. Arrange and conduct entrance conference with grantees were very concerned about the proposed\n SDA official to review engagement objectives administrative cost limitations under the WIA program.\n\n Reclassification of Costs With the differences noted between program and\n administrative costs as noted in the preliminary work, we\n 1. Interview SDA and INA officials obtaining went about the task of reclassifying the original\n organizational and financial information regarding administrative costs to what the administrative costs\n the JTPA Title IIA and Title IVA, Section 401, would have been under WIA. The areas that brought\n respectively, for the 1997 program year (July 1, 1997 about the largest amount of reclassification from\n through June 30, 1998) administration to program costs were as follows:\n # Salaries and related fringe benefits of the first line\n 2. Applying WIA criteria, information obtained from supervisors and/or team leaders responsible for\n interview process, and financial information, those staff who provide program services.\n recalculate the historical administrative costs as if # Salaries and fringe benefits regarding information\n the program had been operated as a WIA program systems and data entry costs for:\n i. Tracking or monitoring of participant and\n performance information;\n ii. Employment statistics information, including\n job listing information, job skills information,\n and demand occupation information;\n iii. Performance and program cost information on\n eligible providers of training services, youth\n activities, and appropriate education activities\n # The costs of contracts, whether fixed price or cost\n reimbursement, awarded for the purpose of\n obtaining specific goods or services.\n Although substantive changes were made in the\n regulations for WIA, the quantitative effect of these\n changes were negligible. Depending upon the internal\n operating structure of the survey participant, the\n regulatory changes could potentially have even less of\n an impact. For example, if a recipient did not use\n subcontractors, one of the major reclassifications did not\n come into play. Alternatively, if a recipient utilized\n subcontractors to operate all of their programs, the\n reclassification of the first line supervisors was of no\n consequence.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\x0c Agreed-Upon Procedures Performed Results of Procedures\nViews of SDA Officials We surveyed the grantees for their recommendations on\n matters regarding statutory and/or regulatory language\nInterview grantee officials regarding implementation of the WIA regulations; the treatment of administrative\nand administration limitations imposed under the WIA costs under WIA in comparison to other federal agencies\nprogram. operated by the grantee and overall recommendations in\n regard to WIA.\n\n A summary of those responses follow:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Six of the thirteen grantees surveyed\n recommended increasing the administrative cost\n limit.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Four of the thirteen grantees surveyed\n recommended that all subcontracted service\n costs, regardless of nature of contract, should\n be allowable program expenses.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Majority of the grantees surveyed requested\n assistance implementing the WIA regulations in\n regards to the One-Stop concept and other\n general operating procedures.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Five of the thirteen grantees surveyed\n responded that administrative cost limitations\n of other federal agencies were similar to those\n of WIA.\n\n At appendix 1 are the questions posed to grantees\n and their responses.\n\n\n\nStatement of Facts The statements of facts were provided to grantees at\n the exit conference and also provided to ETA. A\nPrepare statement of facts for grantee official to be summary of these results are noted at Appendix 1.\nprovided at exit conference.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0c APPENDIX 1\n\n\n\n\nSites visited:\n\n 3 INA Grantees:\n\n Colorado River Indian Tribes, Parker, Arizona\n\n Michigan Indian Employment and Training Service, Inc., East Lansing, Michigan\n\n American Indian Community House, Inc., New York, New York\n\n 10 SDA Grantees:\n\n PIC Of San Francisco, Inc., San Francisco, California\n\n Arapahoe/Douglas Works, Aurora, Colorado\n\n The Workplace, Inc., Bridgeport, Connecticut\n\n Northeast Georgia Regional Development Center, Athens, Georgia\n\n Mayors Office of Employment and Training, Chicago, Illinois\n\n Job Works, Fort Wayne, Indiana\n\n Lowell Office of Employment and Training, Lowell, Massachuset\n\n Montana Job Training Partnership, Inc., Helena, Montana\n\n City Of Charlotte Employment and Training Department, Charlotte, North Carolina\n\n Northumberland Montour Training Services, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\x0c APPENDIX 2\n\n\n\n\n SDA GRANTEES\n Administrative Costs As A Percentage of Total Program Allocation\n20%\n 18.2%\n 16.38%\n15%\n\n\n10%\n\n\n5%\n\n\n0%\n JTPA WIA\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0c APPENDIX 2\n\n\n\n\n INA GRANTEES\n Administrative Costs As A Percentage Of Total Program Allocation\n25%\n\n20% 20.16% 19.64%\n\n\n15%\n\n10%\n\n5%\n\n0%\n JTPA WIA\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0c APPENDIX 2\n\n\n\n\nNOTE: Administrative costs presented are actual expenditures of the program including JTPA\n expenditures in excess of JTPA administrative funding limitation.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0c APPENDIX 2\n\n\n\n\n INA GRANTEES\n Administrative Costs As A Percentage Of Total Progam Allocation\n 25%\n 22.79% 22.79% 22.28% 21.79%\n 20%\n\n 15% 15.42%\n 14.34%\n\n 10%\n\n 5%\n\n 0%\n AZ MI NY\n\n JTPA WIA\n\n\n\n\nNOTE: Administrative costs presented are actual expenditures of the program including JTPA\n expenditures in excess of JTPA administrative funding limitation.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\x0c APPENDIX 3\n\n\n\n\nResponses by Survey Participants to Selected Questions\n\nQuestion: Do you/your organization have any recommendations in regard to WIA? (i.e.)\n\n - Increase the administrative cost?\n\n - Revise other regulations?\n\n - Other\n\nResponse: Keep the administrative costs limit at 20% and request from SDAs a \xe2\x80\x98real\xe2\x80\x99 needs budget\n for administration cost and plan around that amount.\n\n Adopt the cost classification rules of other federal agencies and departments and eliminate\n the proposed requirement to continue classifying and reporting administrative costs that are\n incurred at each tier below the principal subgrantee for each Local Workforce Investment\n Area.\n\n Help with understanding the value associated with the separation of the Workforce\n Investment Board and its functions from the actual delivery of services. Provide funds\n necessary to set up these separate administrative and operational systems.\n\n Require that the State be totally responsible for establishing a list of approved training\n vendors as opposed to local boards being responsible.\n\n Perform a review of costs that are borderline administrative and program in nature, i.e.\n contractual and monitoring costs.\n\n Allow an allowance for fees for service revenue.\n\n Allow Regional Workforce Board\xe2\x80\x99s to provide core and intensive services considering that\n they are operating as a One Stop.\n\n Provide financial incentives to all required partners of the One Stop.\n\n Increase the rate to15%.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0c APPENDIX 3\n\n\n\n\nAny items directly related to participant support including processing and responding to\ninquiries on travel, attendance and childcare payments should be program expenses and\nnot administrative.\n\nOnly the costs of PIC should be considered administrative.\n\nAll contracts specifically for participant assistance or training should be allowable program\nexpenses.\n\nProvide for standard cost classification rules for all SDAs that are to be a part of the One-\nStop System.\n\nUSDOL should not have more limiting cost classifications than HHS, HUD, and Wagner-\nPeyser.\n\nProvide assistance to Indian and Native American programs with negotiating with the State\nand/or it\xe2\x80\x99s Workforce Investment Boards.\n\nProvide clarification of sanctions for not creating working relationships with the state, i.e.\nwho will be sanctioned - State or Native programs, what parameters and guidelines for the\nsanctions, will there be an appeal process.\n\nDiscuss in greater details statutory waivers.\n\nProvide concise definitions of administrative costs, including for audit purposes.\n\nProvide training on new definitions and/or policies for SDAs as well as for states.\n\nRevise regulations concerning Voc-Rehab, Welfare to Work, Wagner-Peyser, Carl\nPerkins, etc.\n\nProvide implementation funds and more time to implement.\n\nRevise the cost allocation formula to reflect extenuating circumstances, such as high cost\nof living and transient regions.\n\nThe regulations of other federal workforce development programs should provide for\nadministrative support of the local governance structure.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0c APPENDIX 3\n\n\n\n\n All costs at the service provider level should be considered program costs.\n\n The word \xe2\x80\x98subgrantee\xe2\x80\x99 should be removed from the administrative definition.\n\n\n\n\nQuestion: Howdo other Federal programs (HUD, HHS, etc) treat administrative costs within\n your organization?\n\nResponse: Headstart program administrative limit is 15% of a $1 million budget.\n\n No other funding sources require administrative costs to be classified separately nor\n be subject to a maximum cost rate limit.\n\n One Federal agency defines 15% as administrative cost limitation after excluding\n participant tracking and record-keeping costs.\n\n Wagner-Peyser - no administrative cost limitation.\n\n Administrative cost pool plan assigns percentages to various programs proportionately\n based on cost burden of each program.\n\n Other federal funding streams follow similar patterns in classification.\n\n Other funding sources have allowable administrative percentages from 6% to 20% to\n 100% of funds.\n\n There should be more consistency among the federal agencies on what is defined as\n an administrative cost.\n\n Other federally funded programs do not make an administrative cost distinction.\n\n There is a 27% indirect cost rate with HHS. In addition, several administrative costs\n are direct line items in the budgets.\n\n Single Point of Contact funds contracted to subgrantees are considered program costs.\n\n Welfare to Work uses the same definition as JTPA/WIA.\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\x0c APPENDIX 3\n\n\n\n\nRequest: Please state any specific recommendations with suggestions for revising statutory\n or regulatory language regarding cost limitations or clarification of costs.\n\nResponse: Consider each individual grantee\xe2\x80\x99s needs; and consider the barriers of reservation\n programs in regard to the lack of local training facilities.\n\n Raise the percentage limitation in law and regulations.\n\n Develop common definitions of costs among the various employment and training\n activities, as well as a common set of expectations in regards to the level of\n administration necessary to meet responsibilities.\n\n The costs of certain functions might be better classified as program vs. administrative,\n i.e. contract development, vendor review & monitoring, financial costs related to\n participant services.\n\n There should be some incentive funds built in for good performance.\n\n Costs should not be prorated - if a staff person performs any program services, all of\n the work performed should be charged to program costs.\n\n All costs associated with the operation of a One-Stop Center should be classified as\n program costs.\n\n Provide clear and concise definitions of administrative and program costs.\n\n Limit the definition of administrative dollars to administrative work within the\n administrative entity.\n\n Local program operators\xe2\x80\x99 funds should be program dollars.\n\n Make technical assistance funds available.\n\n All indirect costs which are defined as administrative costs and identified in a federally\n approved indirect cost plan should be allowed.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\x0c APPENDIX 3\n\n\n\n\nAll expenses necessary to cover staff time, travel, and related expenses required to\nproperly oversee USDOL grant funds are allowable and should be classified as either\n\xe2\x80\x98direct program\xe2\x80\x99, \xe2\x80\x98direct administrative\xe2\x80\x99, or \xe2\x80\x98central administrative\xe2\x80\x99 costs.\n\nSection 667.210 (administrative cost limits) are somewhat ambiguous in defining\nadministrative and program costs.\n\nProvide more examples of what is charged to administrative and program costs concerning\nprogram monitoring, MIS, and continuous improvement.\n\nRevise regulations to have only one category of costs.\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\x0c'


text:
7.3.98 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti C 72/13
 Pretura Circondariale di Torinon 18.12.1997 tekemällään Kantaja vaatii, että yhteisöjen tuomioistuin
 päätöksellä esittämä ennakkoratkaisupyyntö asiassa Batti-
 tal Srl vastaan Regione Piemonte
 1. toteaa, että Irlanti ei ole noudattanut perustamissopi-
 (Asia C-14/98) muksen ja eläinten, siemennesteen, munasolujen ja
 alkioiden tuonnissa kolmansista maista sovellettavia
 (98/C 72/24) jalostus- ja polveutumisedellytyksiä koskevista periaat-
 teista ja puhdasrotuisista jalostusnaudoista annetun
 direktiivin 77/504/ETY (1) muuttamisesta 23 päivänä
 kesäkuuta 1994 annetun neuvoston direktiivin 94/28/
 Pretura Circondariale di Torino on pyytänyt 18.12.1997 EY (2) mukaisia velvoitteitaan, koska se ei ole antanut
 tekemällään päätöksellä, joka on saapunut yhteisöjen tuo- kyseisen direktiivin noudattamisen edellyttämiä lakeja,
 mioistuimen kirjaamoon 22.1.1998, Euroopan yhteisöjen asetuksia ja hallinnollisia määräyksiä; ja
 tuomioistuimelta ennakkoratkaisua seuraaviin kysymyksiin
 asiassa Battital Srl vastaan Regione Piemonte:
 2. velvoittaa Irlannin korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 1. Onko 19.7.1995 annetun direktiivin 95/40/EY (1) 1 Oikeudelliset perusteet ja pääasialliset perustelut
 artiklan, 12.3.1996 annetun direktiivin 96/14/EY (2) 2
 artiklan ja 14.3.1996 annetun direktiivin 96/15/EY (3)
 1 artiklan mukaan Italiassa (tai jollakin sen alueella) EY:n perustamissopimuksen 189 artiklassa, jonka mukaan
 yhä voimassa kielto, joka koskee sitrus-sukuun (Cit- direktiivi velvoittaa saavutettavaan tulokseen nähden
 rus) kuuluvien organismien tuontia? jokaista jäsenvaltiota, asetetaan jäsenvaltioille velvollisuus
 noudattaa direktiivissä sen täytäntöönpanemiseksi säädet-
 tyä määräaikaa. Määräaika päättyi 1.7.1995 ilman, että
 Irlanti olisi toteuttanut komission kanteessa mainitun
 2. Onko tämä kielto lakannut olemasta voimassa direktiivin noudattamisen edellyttämiä toimenpiteitä.
 1.4.1996?
 (1) EYVL L 206, 12.8.1977, s. 8.
 (2) EYVL L 178, 12.7.1994, s. 66.
 3. Onko Italian maatalousministeriön 31.1.1996 antama
 asetus, jolla direktiivi 95/40/EY on pantu täytäntöön,
 joltakin osin ristiriidassa sitrus-sukuun (Citrus) kuulu-
 vien kasviorganismien tuontia Italiaan (tai jollekin sen
 alueelle) koskevan kiellon päättymisen kanssa, kuten
 19.7.1995 annetun direktiivin 95/40/EY 1 artiklasta,
 12.3.1996 annetun direktiivin 96/14/EY 2 artiklasta ja Euroopan yhteisöjen komission 28.1.1998 Irlantia vastaan
 14.3.1996 annetun direktiivin 96/15/EY 1 artiklasta nostama kanne
 näyttää seuraavan? (Asia C-24/98)
 (98/C 72/26)
 ( ) EYVL L 182, 2.8.1995, s. 14.
 1
 (2) EYVL L 68, 19.3.1996, s. 24.
 (3) EYVL L 70, 20.3.1996, s. 35. Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio on nostanut 28.1.1998
 Euroopan yhteisöjen tuomioistuimessa kanteen Irlantia
 vastaan. Kantajan asiamiehinä ovat oikeudellinen pääneu-
 vonantaja Richard Wainwright ja komissiossa toimiva
 kansallinen virkamies Michael Shotter, ja prosessiosoite
 Luxemburgissa on c/o oikeudellisen yksikön virkamies
 Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, Centre Wagner, Luxembourg.
 Euroopan yhteisöjen komission 26.1.1998 Irlantia vastaan
 nostama kanne Kantaja vaatii, että yhteisöjen tuomioistuin
 (Asia C-21/98)
 Ð toteaa, että Irlanti ei ole noudattanut hiilivetyjen etsin-
 (98/C 72/25) tään, hyödyntämiseen ja tuotantoon tarkoitettujen
 lupien antamisen ja käytön edellytyksistä 30 päivänä
 toukokuuta 1994 annetun direktiivin 94/22/EY (1)
 mukaisia velvoitteitaan, koska se ei ole antanut kysei-
 Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio on nostanut 26.1.1998 sen direktiivin noudattamisen edellyttämiä lakeja, ase-
 Euroopan yhteisöjen tuomioistuimessa kanteen Irlantia tuksia ja hallinnollisia määräyksiä tai koska se ei ole
 vastaan. Kantajan asiamiehenä on oikeudellisen yksikön ilmoittanut niistä komissiolle;
 virkamies James Macdonald Flett, ja prosessiosoite
 Luxemburgissa on c/o oikeudellisen yksikön virkamies
 Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, Centre Wagner, Luxembourg. Ð velvoittaa Irlannin korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.


type: wikipedia

text:
Is cóitseálaí agus iar-imreoir sacair Albanach é Stephen McManus a rugadh i Lannraig na hAlban ar 10 Meán Fómhair 1982. Tháinig sé in inmhe an spóirt in acadamh na hóige Cheiltigh Ghlaschú. Cúlaí láir ab ea é. D'imir sé le Middlesborough ina dhiaidh sin. Nuair a d'imir sé leis na Ceiltigh bhíodh sé mar chaptaen na foirne. D'éirigh sé as an imirt agus thosaigh sé ag cóitseáil an fhoireann faoi bhun 18 do na Ceiltigh sa bhliain 2017. Sna blianta 2006–2010 d'imir sé d'foireann náisiúnta na hAlban.
 Imreoirí sacair na hAlban
 Daoine as Glaschú
 Daoine beo


type: legislation

text:
 IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA
 Brussell, 7.3.2016
 COM(2016) 119 final
 2016/0066(NLE)
 Proposta għal
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUNSILL
 dwar pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fil-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u ta’ Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fil-qafas tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 MEMORANDUM TA’ SPJEGAZZJONI
 1. Il-kuntest
 L-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali (minn hawn ’il quddiem “l-Aġenzija”) twaqqfet mir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 1
 (minn hawn ’il quddiem, “ir-Regolament”).
 Skont l-Artikolu 2 tar-Regolament, l-għan tal-Aġenzija huwa li tipprovdi lill-istituzzjonijiet, korpi, uffiċċji u aġenziji tal-Unjoni u tal-Istati Membri, fl-implimentazzjoni tal-liġi tal-Unjoni, assistenza u kompetenza relatati mad-drittijiet fundamentali.
 Skont l-Artikolu 28(1) tar-Regolament, l-Aġenzija tkun miftuħa għall-parteċipazzjoni ta' pajjiżi kandidati bħala osservaturi. L-Artikolu 28(2) tar-Regolament jipprovdi li l-parteċipazzjoni u l-modalitajiet rispettivi jiġu ddeterminati b’deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill ta’ Assoċjazzjoni rilevanti. Id-deċiżjoni tindika b’mod partikolari n-natura, sa fejn u l-mod ta’ kif il-pajjiż jipparteċipa fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija, fil-qafas stabbilit fl-Artikoli 4 u 5 ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Hekk kif il-Kunsill ta' Assoċjazzjoni jieħu deċiżjoni, l-Aġenzija tkun tista’ tittratta l-kwistjonijiet tad-drittijiet fundamentali fil-pajjiż kandidat inkwistjoni fil-kamp ta' applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 3(1) tar-Regolament, sa fejn ikun meħtieġ għall-allinjament gradwali tal-pajjiż mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
 2. Id-Deċiżjoni proposta
 Il-Kummissjoni tipproponi lill-Kunsill l-adozzjoni ta' deċiżjoni dwar il-pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fil-Kunsill ta' Stabbilizzazzjoni u Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja dwar il-kwistjoni tal-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet tal-Aġenzija. Id-deċiżjoni b'artikolu uniku proposta tipprevedi li l-pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni hija dik stabbilita fl-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja (“l-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni), anness mad-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill. Mal-proposta tal-Kummissjoni hemm mehmuża wkoll proposta għal abbozz ta' deċiżjoni ta' din ix-xorti. Hija konformi mar-rekwiżiti tal-Artikolu 28 tar-Regolament.
 F'konformità ma' wieħed mill-prinċipji bażiċi li fuqhom huwa bbażat ir-Regolament (jiġifieri, li l-Aġenzija taħdem fuq il-bażi ta' approċċ tematiku, u mhux speċifiku għall-pajjiżi) l-abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni jippermetti lill-Aġenzija sabiex twettaq, fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja, id-dmirijiet stabbiliti fil-qafas tal-Artikoli 4 u 5 tar-Regolament.
 L-abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni jistabbilixxi wkoll li r-Repubblika tas-Serbja għandha taħtar osservatur u osservatur sostitut għall-Bord ta’ Tmexxija tal-Aġenzija. Dawn il-persuni għandhom jissodisfaw il-kriterji stabbiliti fl-Artikolu 12(1) tar-Regolament. Huma jipparteċipaw fix-xogħol tal-Bord ta’ Tmexxija fuq bażi ugwali mal-membri u s-sostituti maħtura mill-Istati Membri, iżda mingħajr ma jkollhom id-dritt tal-vot.
 L-abbozz ta’ Deċiżjoni jinkludi dispożizzjonijiet li jirrigwardaw il-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja u l-persunal tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja (Anness I). L-abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni huwa akkumpanjat minn dikjarazzjoni finanzjarja.
 L-abbozz ta’ Deċiżjoni huwa f’konformità mar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal tal-Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea (“ir-Regolamenti tal-Persunal”) u l-Kundizzjonijiet tal-Impjieg Applikabbli għall-Aġenti l-Oħra tal-Unjoni Ewropea (“CEOS”), stabbiliti permezz tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE, Euratom, KEFA) Nru 259/68
 2
 .
 2016/0066 (NLE)
 Proposta għal
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUNSILL
 dwar pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fil-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u ta’ Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fil-qafas tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 IL-KUNSILL TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA,
 Wara li kkunsidra t-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 352 flimkien mal-Artikolu 218(9) tiegħu,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-proposta mill-Kummissjoni,
 Billi:
 (1)Il-Kunsill Ewropew tal-Lussemburgu ta’ Diċembru 1997 stabbilixxa li l-parteċipazzjoni fl-aġenziji tal-Unjoni bħala mezz kif tittejjeb l-istrateġija ta’ qabel l-adeżjoni. Il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew jistabbilixxu li l-"aġenziji tal-Unjoni li fihom ikunu jistgħu jipparteċipaw il-pajjiżi applikanti jiġu ddeterminati fuq bażi ta’ każ b’każ".
 (2)Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007 li jistabbilixxi Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali ("ir-Regolament") jipprovdi li l-Aġenzija tkun miftuħa għall-parteċipazzjoni tal-pajjiżi kandidati bħala osservaturi.
 (3)Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tikkondividi l-għanijiet u l-objettivi stabbiliti għall-Aġenzija fir-Regolament u tappoġġa l-ħidmiet tal-Aġenzija u l-oqsma ta’ attività tagħha skont l-Artikoli 4 u 5 tiegħu.
 (4)L-objettiv aħħari tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja huwa li ssir membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u l-parteċipazzjoni tagħha fl-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali għandha tgħinha biex tilħaq dan l-objettiv.
 IDDEĊIEDA KIF ĠEJ:
 Artikolu Uniku
 Il-pożizzjoni li għandha tittieħed mill-Unjoni Ewropea fil-Kunsill ta’ Stabilizzazzjoni u ta' Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja fuq il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tagħha hija stabbilita fl-abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill ta’ Stabilizzazzjoni u ta' Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja, anness ma’ din id-Deċiżjoni.
 Magħmul fi Brussell,
 Għall-Kunsill
 Il-President
 (1)
 Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007 tal-15 ta' Frar 2007 li jistabbilixxi Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, ĠU L 53 tat-22.2.2007, p. 1.
 (2)
 ĠU L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1, kif emendat l-aħħar bir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 1023/2013 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-22 ta’ Ottubru 2013, ĠU L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 15.
 ---documentbreak---
 IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA
 Brussell, 7.3.2016
 COM(2016) 119 final
 ANNESSI
 Id-deċiżjoni dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fi ħdan il-qafas tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 Li jakkumpanja
 Abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill
 dwar pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fil-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u ta’ Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE mar-Repubblika tas-Serbja dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fi ħdan il-qafas tar- Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 ANNESSI
 Id-deċiżjoni dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fi ħdan il-qafas tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 Li jakkumpanja
 Abbozz ta' Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill
 dwar pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fil-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u ta’ Assoċjazzjoni tal-UE mar-Repubblika tas-Serbja dwar il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma u l-modalitajiet rispettivi tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, fi ħdan il-qafas tar- Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 IL-KUNSILL TA' STABBILIZZAZZJONI U TA' ASSOĊJAZZJONI TAL-UE MAR-REPUBBLIKA TAS-SERBJA,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-
 Ftehim ta’ Stabilizzazzjoni u ta' Assoċjazzjoni
 bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea, fuq naħa waħda, u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja, fuq in-naħa l-oħra,
 Wara li kkunsidra r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007 li jistabbilixxi Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 28 tiegħu,
 Billi
 (1) Il-Kunsill Ewropew tal-Lussemburgu ta’ Diċembru 1997 stabbilixxa li l-parteċipazzjoni fl-aġenziji tal-Unjoni hija mezz kif tittejjeb l-istrateġija ta’ qabel l-adeżjoni. Il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew jistabbilixxu li l-"aġenziji tal-Unjoni li fihom ikunu jistgħu jipparteċipaw il-pajjiżi applikanti jiġu ddeterminati fuq bażi ta’ każ b’każ".
 (2) Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tikkondividi l-għanijiet u l-objettivi stabbiliti għall-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali ("l-Aġenzija") u tappoġġa l-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni u d-deskrizzjoni tal-kompiti tal-Aġenzija kif stabbiliti fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 (3) Huwa wkoll xieraq li l-Aġenzija tkun tista' tittratta kwistjonijiet ta' drittijiet fundamentali li jaqgħu fil-kamp ta' applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 3(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja sa fejn ikun meħtieġ għall-allinjament gradwali tagħha mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
 (4) Huwa opportun li r-Repubblika tas-Serbja tkun tista’ tipparteċipa bħala osservatur fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija u li jiġu stabbiliti l-modalitajiet għal din il-parteċipazzjoni, inklużi d-dispożizzjonijiet li jirrigwardaw il-parteċipazzjoni f’inizjattivi meħuda mill-Aġenzija, il-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja u l-persunal.
 (5) Skont l-Artikolu 12(2)(a) u 82(3)(a) tal-Kundizzjonijiet tal-Impjieg għall-Aġenti l-Oħra tal-Unjoni Ewropea previsti fir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE, Euratom, KEFA) Nru 259/68
 1
 , id-Direttur tal-Aġenzija jista’ jawtorizza, b'mod eċċezzjonali, l-ingaġġar ta’ ċittadini nazzjonali tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja li jgawdu d-drittijiet sħaħ tagħhom bħala ċittadini.
 ADOTTA DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI:
 Artikolu 1
 Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja, bħala pajjiż kandidat, tipparteċipa bħala osservatur fl-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, stabbilita mir-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 Artikolu 2
 1. L-Aġenzija tista’ tittratta kwistjonijiet ta’ drittijiet fundamentali li jaqgħu fil-kamp ta' applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 3(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja sa fejn ikun meħtieġ għall-allinjament gradwali tagħha mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
 2. Għal dan l-għan l-Aġenzija tkun tista’ twettaq fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja l-kompiti stabbiliti fl-Artikoli 4 u 5 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 Artikolu 3
 Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tikkontribwixxi finanzjarjament għall-attivitajiet tal-Aġenzija msemmija fl-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 f’konformità mad-dispożizzjonijiet stabbiliti fl-Anness ta' din id-Deċiżjoni.
 Artikolu 4
 1. Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja taħtar persuni li jissodisfaw il-kriterji stabbiliti fl-Artikolu 12(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 bħala osservatur u sostitut, rispettivament. Huma jistgħu jipparteċipaw fil-ħidma tal-Bord ta’ Tmexxija fuq bażi ugwali mal-membri u s-sostituti maħtura mill-Istati Membri, iżda mingħajr id-dritt tal-vot.
 2. Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tinnomina uffiċjal tal-gvern bħala Uffiċjal Nazzjonali ta’ Kuntatt, kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 8(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 3. Fi żmien erba’ xhur mid-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni, ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tinforma lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea bl-ismijiet, il-kwalifiki u d-dettalji ta’ kuntatt tal-persuni msemmija fil-paragrafi 1 u 2.
 Artikolu 5
 Id-dejta pprovduta lil jew li toħroġ mill-Aġenzija tista’ tiġi ppubblikata u tkun għad-dispożizzjoni tal-pubbliku, bil-kundizzjoni li l-informazzjoni kunfidenzjali tingħata l-istess grad ta’ protezzjoni fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja hekk kif tingħata fl-Unjoni.
 Artikolu 6
 Fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja l-Aġenzija tgawdi l-istess kapaċità legali bħal dik mogħtija lill-entitajiet legali skont il-liġijiet tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja.
 Artikolu 7
 Sabiex l-Aġenzija u l-persunal tagħha jkunu jistgħu jwettqu l-kompiti tagħhom, ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tagħtihom il-privileġġi u l-immunitajiet identiċi għal dawk imsemmija fl-Artikoli minn 1 sa 4, 5, 6, minn 10 sa 13, 15, 17 u 18 tal-Protokoll (Nru 7) dwar il-Privileġġi u l-Immunitajiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea, mehmuż mat-Trattati dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea u dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 Artikolu 8
 Kull waħda mill-Partijiet tieħu kull miżura ġenerali jew speċifika li hija meħtieġa sabiex ikunu ssodisfati l-obbligi tagħha skont din id-Deċiżjoni u tinnotifikahom lill-Kunsill ta’ Stabbilizzazzjoni u Assoċjazzjoni.
 Artikolu 9
 Din id-Deċiżjoni tidħol fis-seħħ fl-ewwel jum tat-tieni xahar wara d-data tal-adozzjoni tagħha.
 ANNESS I
 KONTRIBUZZJONI FINANZJARJA TAR-REPUBBLIKA TAS-SERBJA LILL-AĠENZIJA TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA GĦAD-DRITTIJIET FUNDAMENTALI
 1.Il-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja li għandha titħallas mir-Repubblika tas-Serbja għall-baġit tal-Unjoni Ewropea biex tipparteċipa fl-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali (l-Aġenzija), kif stipulat fil-punt 2, tirrappreżenta l-ispiża sħiħa tal-parteċipazzjoni tagħha fiha għall-ewwel tliet snin. Mir-raba’ sena 'l quddiem, l-ammonti jiġu determinati skont il-punt 6.
 2.Il-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja li għandha titħallas mir-Repubblika tas-Serbja għall-baġit tal-Unjoni Ewropea tkun kif ġej:
 Sena 1:
 EUR 183 000
 Sena 2:
 EUR 186 000
 Sena 3:
 EUR 189 000
 3.L-appoġġ finanzjarju possibbli mill-programmi ta’ assistenza tal-Unjoni jiġi miftiehem separatament skont il-programm tal-Unjoni rilevanti.
 4.Il-kontribuzzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja tkun amministrata skont ir-Regolament Finanzjarju applikabbli għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 5.L-ispejjeż tal-ivjaġġar u tal-għajxien tar-rappreżentanti u l-esperti tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja għall-iskopijiet tal-parteċipazzjoni fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija jew f'laqgħat relatati mal-implimentazzjoni tal-programm ta’ ħidma tal-Aġenzija jkunu rimborsati mill-Aġenzija fuq l-istess bażi bħal u skont il-proċeduri li huma bħalissa fis-seħħ għall-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 6.Wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni u fil-bidu ta’ kull sena sussegwenti, il-Kummissjoni tibgħat lir-Repubblika tas-Serbja talba għall-fondi li tikkorrispondi mal-kontribuzzjoni tagħha lill-Aġenzija skont din id-Deċiżjoni. Għall-ewwel sena kalendarja tal-parteċipazzjoni tagħha, ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tħallas kontribuzzjoni kkalkulata mid-data tal-parteċipazzjoni sa l-aħħar tas-sena fuq bażi pro rata. Għas-snin ta’ wara, il-kontribuzzjoni tkun skont it-tabella taħt il-punt 2. Mir-rabà sena 'l quddiem, il-kontribuzzjoni tiġi adattata fid-dawl ta’ kull żieda jew tnaqqis tas-sussidju tal-Aġenzija sabiex iżżomm l-analoġija bejn il-kontribuzzjoni għar-Repubblika tas-Serbja u l-baġit tal-Aġenzija għall-UE-28. Il-kontribuzzjoni tista' tiġi riveduta wkoll fis-snin finanzjarji segwenti fuq il-bażi tal-aħħar dejta statistika ppubblikata mill-Uffiċċju tal-Istatistika tal-Unjoni Ewropea (Eurostat).
 7.Din il-kontribuzzjoni tkun espressa f'euro u mħallsa f’kont bankarju tal-euro tal-Kummissjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 8.Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tħallas il-kontribuzzjoni tagħha skont it-talba għal fondi għall-parti tagħha mhux aktar tard minn 30 jum wara li t-talba għall-fondi tintbagħat mill-Kummissjoni.
 9.Kull dewmien fil-ħlas tal-kontribuzzjoni jġib miegħu ħlas ta’ imgħax mir-Repubblika tas-Serbja fuq l-ammont pendenti mid-data dovuta. Ir-rata tal-imgħax tikkorrispondi mar-rata applikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, fid-data dovuta, għall-operazzjonijiet tiegħu f'euro, biż-żieda ta' 1,5 punt perċentwali.
 DIKJARAZZJONI FINANZJARJA LEĠIŻLATTIVA
 1.
 QAFAS TAL-PROPOSTA / TAL-INIZJATTIVA
 1.1.
 Titolu tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva:
 1.2.
 Qasam/oqsma ta’ politika konċernat(i) fl-istruttura ABM/ABB
 1.3.
 Natura tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva:
 1.4.
 Għan(ijiet)
 1.5.
 Raġunijiet għall-proposta / għall-inizjattiva
 1.6.
 Tul taż-żmien u impatt finanzjarju
 1.7.
 Mod/i ta’ ġestjoni ppjanat/i
 2.
 MIŻURI TA’ ĠESTJONI
 2.1.
 Regoli dwar il-monitoraġġ u r-rapportar
 2.2.
 Sistema ta’ ġestjoni u kontroll
 2.3.
 Miżuri għall-prevenzjoni ta’ frodi u irregolaritajiet
 3.
 STIMA TAL-IMPATT FINANZJARJU TAL-PROPOSTA / TAL-INIZJATTIVA
 3.1.
 Intestatura/i tal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali u l-linji tal-baġit tan-nefqa affettwati
 3.2.
 Impatt stmat fuq in-nefqa
 3.2.1.
 Sommarju tal-impatt stmat fuq in-nefqa
 3.2.2.
 Impatt stmat fuq l-approprjazzjonijiet tal-Aġenzija
 3.2.3.
 Impatt stmat fuq ir-riżorsi umani tal-Aġenzija
 3.2.4.
 Kompatibbiltà mal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali attwali
 3.2.5.
 Kontribuzzjonijiet ta’ partijiet terzi
 3.3.
 Impatt stmat fuq id-dħul
 DIKJARAZZJONI FINANZJARJA LEĠIŻLATTIVA
 1.QAFAS TAL-PROPOSTA / TAL-INIZJATTIVA
 1.1.Titolu tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva:
 Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar pożizzjoni tal-Unjoni fuq il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali u l-modalitajiet rispettivi, fil-qafas tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007
 1.2.Qasam/oqsma ta’ politika kkonċernat(i) fl-istruttura ABM/ABB
 2
 Qasam ta' politika:
 33
 "Ġustizzja u konsumaturi"
 Attività:
 33 02
 "Drittijiet, ugwaljanza u ċittadinanza"
 1.3.Natura tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva:
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva hi relatata ma' azzjoni ġdida
 1.4.Għan(ijiet)
 1.4.1.Il-mira/i strateġika/ċi pluriennali tal-Kummissjoni mmirati mill-proposta / mill-inizjattiva
 Il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija bħala osservatur tikkontribwixxi għall-allinjament gradwali tagħha mad-dritt tal-Unjoni u t-tħejjija b’suċċess għas-sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropea.
 1.4.2.Għan(ijiet) speċifiku/speċifiċi u l-attività/attivitajiet ABM/ABB ikkonċernata/i
 L-għan speċifiku:
 Id-deċiżjoni tippermetti lir-Repubblika tas-Serbja tipparteċipa bħala osservatur fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija u tippermetti lill-Aġenzija tkopri kwistjonijiet ta’ drittijiet fundamentali fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja.
 Attività(jiet) ABM/ABB ikkonċernati:
 33 02
 "Drittijiet, ugwaljanza u ċittadinanza".
 1.4.3.Riżultat(i) u impatt(i) mistennija
 Speċifika l-effetti li l-proposta / l-inizjattiva għandu jkollha fuq il-benefiċjarji/gruppi fil-mira.
 Il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija bħala osservatur tikkontribwixxi għall-allinjament gradwali tagħha mad-dritt tal-Unjoni u t-tħejjija b’suċċess għal sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropea.
 1.4.4.Indikaturi tar-riżultati u tal-impatt
 Speċifika l-indikaturi għall-monitoraġġ tal-implimentazzjoni tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva.
 Id-Deċiżjoni proposta tippermetti lill-Aġenzija twettaq fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja l-kompiti stabbiliti fil-qafas tal-Artikoli 4 u 5 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007 (“ir-Regolament”).
 L-indikaturi tal-prestazzjoni huma fil-qalba tal-attivitajiet ta' ppjanar, monitoraġġ, evalwazzjoni u rappurtar tal-Aġenzija. L-indikaturi stabbiliti fil-Qafas tal-Kejl tal-Prestazzjoni (PMF) jintużaw biex ikejlu l-prestazzjoni ġenerali tal-Aġenzija. Il-PMF indikaturi fil-livell tal-proġetti li jiddeskrivu l-produzzjoni pjanata ta’ kull intervent u indikaturi fuq perjodu qasir ta’ żmien, fit-tul u ambizzjużi, li l-biċċa l-kbira minnhom huma mkejla wara t-tlestija tal-interventi u speċifikament tal-inizjattiva ppjanata. B’mod importanti, il-PMF huwa marbut kemm mal-pjan strateġiku u l-Programmi ta’ Ħidma Annwali. Il-PMF tal-Aġenzija jinkludi loġika ta’ intervent u lista ta’ indikaturi tal-prestazzjoni flimkien mal-għanijiet korrispondenti, il-kriterji għall-aġġudikazzjoni, miżuri, sorsi u għodod. Il-PMF jiġbor flimkien l-informazzjoni u d-dejta relatati mal-prestazzjoni taħt qafas loġiku. Il-PMF tal-Aġenzija huwa organizzat b’mod li jappoġġa l-analiżi tal-prestazzjoni (jiġifieri l-monitoraġġ u l-evalwazzjoni kif ukoll l-attivitajiet ta’ rapportar) f’livelli differenti tal-Aġenzija, jiġifieri proġett, attivitajiet, il-qasam tematiku u f’livelli strateġiċi u jintuża biex jissorvelja l-implimentazzjoni tal-inizjattiva. B’mod partikolari, l-indikaturi huma differenzjati skont il-livell tal-kisbiet (jiġifieri, produzzjoni, l-impatti fuq perjodu qasir ta’ żmien, fit-tul u ambizzjużi) skont il-livelli ta’ attivitajiet murija fil-mudell loġiku. Huma jiġu identifikati kull sena (anki għal attività tal-ABM/ABB ikkonċernata mill-inizjattiva) fil-programmi ta’ ħidma operattiva tal-Aġenzija (Dokument ta’ Programmazzjoni) u l-monitoraġġ tal-prestazzjoni u l-valutazzjoni huma inklużi fid-dokument ta’ rappurtar rilevanti (ir-Rapport ta’ Attività Annwali Konsolidat).
 1.5.Raġunijiet għall-proposta / għall-inizjattiva
 1.5.1.Rekwiżit(i) li għandu/hom jiġi/u ssodisfat(i) fi żmien qasir jew twil
 Id-Deċiżjoni proposta għandha tippermetti lir-Repubblika tas-Serbja biex tipparteċipa fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija bħala osservatur u għandha tippermetti lill-Aġenzija tkopri kwistjonijiet ta’ drittijiet fundamentali fir-Repubblika tas-Serbja, fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni provdut mirRegolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 1.5.2.Valur miżjud tal-involviment tal-UE
 Il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja bħala osservatur fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija tikkontribwixxi għall-allinjament gradwali tal-pajjiż mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
 1.5.3.Tagħlim miksub minn esperjenzi simili fl-imgħoddi
 Il-proposta għar-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 kien fiha valutazzjoni tal-impatt li tittratta l-kwistjoni tal-ambitu ġeografiku tal-attivitajiet tal-Aġenzija.
 Iċ-Ċentru Ewropew ta’ Monitoraġġ dwar ir-Razziżmu u l-Ksenofobija (EUMC), il-prekursur tal-Aġenzija tal-UE għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, wettaq proġetti ta’ PHARE f’diversi pajjiżi kandidati (fl-2003 f'dawk l-10 pajjiżi kandidati li ssieħbu mal-Unjoni Ewropea fl-2004, kif ukoll fir-RO, fil-BG, it-TR u fl-HR) li rriżultaw pożittivi ħafna kemm għall-pajjiżi kandidati kif ukoll għall-EUMC.
 1.5.4.Sinerġija u kompatibbiltà possibbli ma’ strumenti xierqa oħra
 Parti mill-ispiża tal-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja titħallas mill-Istrument għall-Assistenza ta' Qabel l-Adeżjoni (IPA).
 1.6.Tul taż-żmien u l-impatt finanzjarju
 Proposta /inizjattiva b’effett mid-dħul fis-seħħ tad-Deċiżjoni (ara l-Artikolu 9 tagħha) sakemm ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja taderixxi mal-Unjoni Ewropea
 Impatt finanzjarju mid-dħul fis-seħħ tad-Deċiżjoni sakemm ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja taderixxi mal-Unjoni Ewropea
 1.7.Mod/i ta’ ġestjoni ppjanat/i
 3
 Ġestjoni indiretta billi l-kompiti ta’ implimentazzjoni tal-baġit jiġu fdati lil korpi msemmija fl-Artikoli 208 u 209 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju
 2.MIŻURI TA’ ĠESTJONI
 2.1.Regoli dwar il-monitoraġġ u r-rapportar
 Speċifika l-frekwenza u l-kundizzjonijiet.
 Il-ħidma tal-Aġenzija tal-UE għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, inkluż il-parteċipazzjoni tal-pajjiżi kandidati fl-attivitajiet tal-Aġenzija, jiġu evalwati regolarment skont il-qafas stabbilit fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 168/2007 u b’kunsiderazzjoni tal-Qafas Pluriennali tal-Aġenzija, kif ukoll tal-Programmi ta’ Ħidma Annwali.
 2.2.Sistema ta’ ġestjoni u kontroll
 2.2.1.Riskju/i identifikat(i)
 (1) L-għarfien tal-persunal dwar is-suq partikolari.
 (2) Problemi speċifiċi fil-ġbir tad-dejta dwar id-drittijiet fundamentali minħabba nuqqas ta’ fornituri fis-suq.
 (3) L-impatt fuq il-proċess tal-akkwist pubbliku minħabba nuqqas ta’ disponibbiltà tal-fornituri ta’ servizzi għall-ġbir tad-dejta dwar id-drittijiet fundamentali.
 (4) L-impatt fuq ir-riżultati tar-riċerka minħabba ġbir ta’ dejta insuffiċjenti jew nuqqas ta’ disponibbiltà ta’ dejta.
 2.2.2. Metodi ta’ kontroll previsti
 (1) Analiżi tal-għarfien, il-ħiliet u l-kompetenzi partikolari meħtieġa għall-implimentazzjoni tal-azzjoni u l-identifikazzjoni tat-taħriġ neċessarju tal-persunal.
 (2) Tisħiħ tal-monitoraġġ fuq l-attivitajiet tal-kuntratturi, speċjalment jekk ikunu ġodda fil-forniment ta’ dejta dwar id-drittijiet fundamentali.
 2.3.Miżuri għall-prevenzjoni ta’ frodi u irregolaritajiet
 Speċifika l-miżuri ta’ prevenzjoni jew ta' protezzjoni eżistenti jew previsti.
 Sabiex jiġu miġġielda l-frodi, il-korruzzjoni u attivitajiet illegali oħrajn, id-dispożizzjonijiet tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 japplikaw mingħajr restrizzjonijiet għall-Aġenzija tal-UE għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali.
 L-Aġenzija tiffirma l-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali tal-25 ta’ Mejju 1999 bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Kummissjoni tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej rigward l-investigazzjonijiet interni mill-Uffiċċju Ewropew Kontra l-Frodi (OLAF) u tapplika, mingħajr dewmien, id-dispożizzjoni rilevanti fil-kuntest tal-istrateġija kontra l-frodi tagħha u l-pjan ta' azzjoni rilevanti.
 Id-deċiżjonijiet rigward finanzjament u l-ftehim ta' implimentazzjoni u strumenti li jirriżultaw minnhom jistipulaw espliċitament li l-Qorti tal-Awdituri u l-OLAF jistgħu jwettqu, jekk meħtieġ, kontrolli fil-post fuq ir-riċevituri tal-finanzjament ta' l-Aġenzija u l-persunal responsabbli mill-allokazzjoni tiegħu.
 3.STIMA TAL-IMPATT FINANZJARJU TAL-PROPOSTA / TAL-INIZJATTIVA
 3.1.Intestatura/i tal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali u l-linji tal-baġit tan-nefqa affettwati
 Il-linji baġitarji eżistenti
 Intestatura tal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali
 Linja baġitarja
 Tip ta’infiq
 Kontribuzzjoni
 NumruIntestatura..........................................
 Diff./Mhux diff.
 4
 minn pajjiżi tal-EFTA
 5
 minn pajjiżi kandidati
 6
 minn pajjiżi terzi
 fis-sens tal-Artikolu 21(2)(b) tar-Regolament Finanzjarju
 3
 33.0206
 Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali
 Mhux diff.
 LE
 IVA
 LE
 IVA
 3.2.Impatt stmat fuq in-nefqa
 3.2.1.Sommarju tal-impatt stmat fuq in-nefqa
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Intestatura tal-qafas finanzjarju
 pluriennali
 Numru
 3 ...........................................................................
 Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali - FRA
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 Titolu 1 - Nefqa tal-Persunal
 Impenji
 (1)
 0,074
 0,075
 0,076
 0,225
 Pagamenti
 (2)
 0,074
 0,075
 0,076
 0,225
 Titolu 2 - Bini u nefqa mixxellanja tal-operat
 Impenji
 (1a)
 0,020
 0,021
 0,021
 0,062
 Pagamenti
 (2a)
 0,020
 0,021
 0,021
 0,062
 Titolu 3 - Nefqa operattiva
 Impenji
 (3 a)
 0,086
 0,087
 0,089
 0,262
 Pagamenti
 (3b)
 0,086
 0,087
 0,089
 0,262
 TOTAL tal-approprazzjonijiet
 għall-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali
 Impenji
 =1+1a +3a
 0,180
 0,183
 0,186
 0,549
 Pagamenti
 =2+2a
 + 3b
 0,180
 0,183
 0,186
 0,549
 L-ispejjeż tal-Aġenzija jkunu koperti mid-dħul assenjat li jkun ġej mill-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja tal-pajjiż kandidat.
 Intestatura tal-qafas finanzjarju
 pluriennali
 5
 "Nefqa amministrattiva"
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 Kummissjoni
 • Riżorsi Umani
 0,067
 0,067
 0,067
 0,201
 • Infiq amministrattiv ieħor
 TOTAL Kummissjoni
 Approprjazzjonijiet
 0,067
 0,067
 0,067
 0,201
 TOTAL tal-approprazzjonijiet
 taħt l-INTESTATURA 5
 tal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali
 (Impenji totali = Pagamenti totali)
 0,067
 0,067
 0,067
 0,201
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 TOTAL tal-approprazzjonijiet
 skont l-INTESTATURI 1 sa 5
 tal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali
 Impenji
 0,247
 0,250
 0,253
 0,750
 Pagamenti
 0,247
 0,250
 0,253
 0,750
 3.2.2.Impatt stmat fuq l-approprjazzjonijiet tal-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva tirrikjedi l-użu ta’ approprjazzjonijiet operazzjonali, ta' ammont ta' EUR 0,086 miljun.
 Il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija bħala osservatur tippermetti lill-Aġenzija li tittratta kwistjonijiet ta’ drittijiet fundamentali f’dak il-pajjiż fi ħdan il-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tal- Artikolu 3(1) tar- Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007, sa fejn huwa meħtieġ għall-allinjament gradwali tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja mal-liġi tal-Unjoni. Il-kompiti li l-Aġenzija tista’ twettaq huma stabbiliti fl-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007 u l-oqsma ta’ fokus tagħha huma stabbiliti fil-Qafas Pluriennali tal-Aġenzija f’konformità mal- Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 168/2007.
 3.2.3.L-impatt stmat fuq l-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għad-Drittijiet Fundamentali
 3.2.3.1.Sommarju
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva teħtieġ l-użu ta’ approprjazzjonijiet ta’ natura amministrattiva, kif spjegat hawn taħt:
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 Uffiċjali (Gradi AD)
 Uffiċjali (Gradi AST)
 Persunal kuntrattwali
 1
 1
 1
 1
 Persunal temporanju
 Esperti Nazzjonali Sekondati
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 1
 1
 1
 1
 3.2.3.2.Ir-rekwiżiti stmati tar-riżorsi umani għall-Kummissjoni
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva tirrikjedi l-użu ta’ riżorsi umani fil-Kummissjoni, kif spjegat hawn taħt:
 L-istima għandha tingħata f’ammonti sħaħ (jew l-iżjed sa punt deċimali wieħed)
 Sena
 1
 Sena
 2
 Sena
 3
 Karigi fil-pjan ta’ stabbiliment (uffiċjali u persunal temporanju)
 XX 01 01 01 (il-Kwartieri Ġenerali u l-Uffiċċji ta’ Rappreżentanza tal-Kummissjoni)
 0,5
 0,5
 0,5
 XX 01 01 02 (Delegazzjonijiet)
 XX 01 05 01 (Riċerka indiretta)
 10 01 05 01 (Riċerka diretta)
 • Persunal estern (f’unità Ekwivalenti għal Full-Time: FTE)
 7
 XX 01 02 01 (AC, END, INT mill-"finanzjament globali")
 XX 01 02 02 (AC, AL, END, INT u JED fid-Delegazzjonijiet)
 XX 01 04 yy
 8
 - fil-Kwartieri Ġenerali
 9
 - fid-Delegazzjonijiet
 XX 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT – Riċerka indiretta)
 10 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT – Riċerka diretta)
 Linji baġitarji oħra (speċifika liema)
 L-AMMONT TOTALI
 0,5
 0,5
 0,5
 XX huwa l-qasam ta' politika jew it-titolu tal-baġit ikkonċernat.
 Ir-riżorsi umani meħtieġa jintlaħqu mill-persunal tad-DĠs li diġà huwa assenjat għall-ġestjoni tal-azzjoni u / jew li diġà ngħata kariga band'oħra fid-DĠs, flimkien, jekk ikun meħtieġ, ma' xi allokazzjoni addizzjonali li tista' tingħata lid-DĠs li jkunu qed imexxu l-azzjoni skont il-proċedura ta' allokazzjoni annwali u fid-dawl tar-restrizzjonijiet baġitarji.
 Deskrizzjoni tal-kompiti li jridu jitwettqu:
 Uffiċjali u persunal temporanju
 Kompiti amministrattivi, finanzjarji u legali li jikkonċernaw il-parteċipazzjoni tar-Repubblika tas-Serbja fil-ħidma tal-Aġenzija bħala osservatur
 Persunal estern
 Mhux applikabbli
 3.2.4.Kompatibbiltà mal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali attwali
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva hija kompatibbli mal-qafas finanzjarju pluriennali attwali.
 3.2.5.Kontribuzzjonijiet ta' partijiet terzi
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva tipprovdi għal kofinanzjament stmat hawn taħt:
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 Totali
 Ir-Repubblika tas-Serbja
 0,180
 0,183
 0,186
 0,549
 TOTAL tal-approprjazzjonijiet kofinanzjati
 0.180
 0.183
 0,186
 0,549
 3.3.Impatt stmat fuq id-dħul
 Il-proposta / l-inizjattiva għandha l-impatt finanzjarju li ġej:
 ◻
 ◻fuq ir-riżorsi proprji
 ⌧
 ⌧fuq id-dħul mixxellanju
 EUR miljun (sa tliet punti deċimali)
 Il-linja baġitarja tad-dħul:
 Approprjazzjonijiet disponibbli għas-sena finanzjarja kurrenti
 Impatt tal-proposta / tal-inizjattiva
 10
 Sena1
 Sena2
 Sena3
 Artikolu 603.1
 0,180
 0,183
 0,186
 Għad-dħul mixxellanju "assenjat", speċifika l-linja/i tan-nefqa tal-baġit affettwat/i.
 33.02.06
 Speċifika l-metodu għall-kalkolu tal-impatt fuq l-introjtu.
 Ara l-anness I tad-deċiżjoni
 (1)
 ĠU 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1, kif emendat l-aħħar bir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 1023/2013 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-22 ta’ Ottubru 2013, ĠU L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 15.
 (2)
 ABM: immaniġġar ibbażat fuq l-attività; ABB: ibbaġitjar ibbażat fuq l-attività.
 (3)
 Id-dettalji dwar il-metodi ta' ġestjoni u r-referenzi għar-Regolament Finanzjarju jinsabu fis-sit web tal-BudgWeb:
 https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/budgweb/EN/man/budgmanag/Pages/budgmanag.aspx
 .
 (4)
 Diff:= Approprjazzjonijiet differenzjati / Mhux diff. = Approprjazzjonijiet mhux differenzjati.
 (5)
 L-EFTA: Assoċjazzjoni Ewropea tal-Kummerċ Ħieles.
 (6)
 Pajjiżi kandidati u, fejn applikabbli, pajjiżi kandidati potenzjali mill-Balkani tal-Punent.
 (7)
 AC = Aġenti Kuntrattwali; AL = Persunal Lokali; END = Espert Nazzjonali Sekondat; INT = persunal tal-aġenzija; JED = Esperti Żgħażagħ f'Delegazzjonijiet.
 (8)
 Sottolimitu għall-persunal estern kopert minn approprjazzjonijiet operazzjonali (linji "BA" preċedenti).
 (9)
 Essenzjalment għall-Fondi Strutturali, il-Fond Agrikolu Ewropew għall-Iżvilupp Rurali (il-FAEŻR) u l-Fond Ewropew għas-Sajd (il-FES).
 (10)
 Fir-rigward ta’ riżorsi proprji tradizzjonali (dazji doganali, imposti fuq iz-zokkor), l-ammonti indikati għandhom ikunu ammonti netti, jiġifieri ammonti gross wara tnaqqis ta’ 25 % għall-ispejjeż ta’ ġbir.


text: b"OIG Investigative Reports Press Release Marrero, LA., 07/25/2013 - Marrero Woman, Shanera Washington-Sylve, Pleads Guilty to Charges Related to Financial Aid Fraud\nSkip to main contentAbout UsContact UsFAQs Language Assistance Englishespa\xc3\xb1ol\xe4\xb8\xad\xe6\x96\x87: \xe7\xb9\x81\xe9\xab\x94\xe7\x89\x88Vi\xe1\xbb\x87t-ng\xe1\xbb\xaf\xed\x95\x9c\xea\xb5\xad\xec\x96\xb4Tagalog\xd0\xa0\xd1\x83\xd1\x81\xd1\x81\xd0\xba\xd0\xb8\xd0\xb9\nU.S. Department of Education\nSearch for:\nToggle navigation\nU.S. Department of Education\nStudent Loans\nGrants\nLaws\nData\nAbout ED\nOFFICES\nHome\nReports & Resources\nPrograms/Initiatives\nNews\nOffice Contacts\nInvestigation Report\nTHE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE\nEASTERN DISTRICT of LOUISIANA\nNEWS\nMARRERO WOMAN, SHANERA WASHINGTON-SYLVE, PLEADS GUILTY TO CHARGES RELATED TO FINANCIAL AID FRAUD\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nJuly 25, 2013\nSHANERA WASHINGTON-SYLVE, age 46, a resident of Marrero, Louisiana, pled guilty in federal court today before U.S. District Judge Lance M. Africk to one count of financial aid fraud, announced U. S. Attorney Dana J. Boente.\nAccording to court documents, WASHINGTON-SYLVE submitted or caused to be submitted false Free Application for Federal Student Aid (\xe2\x80\x9cFAFSA\xe2\x80\x9d) forms, on behalf of her daughter for the 2009 through 2013 academic years, falsely stating that she was \xe2\x80\x9csingle.\xe2\x80\x9d As a result of WASHINGTON-SYLVE\xe2\x80\x99s false statements in the applications, her daughter fraudulently received approximately $23,196 in Federal Pell Grants from the United States Department of Education, an agency and department of the United States.\nWASHINGTON-SYLVE faces a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, a $20,000 fine, and three years of supervised release following imprisonment. Sentencing is set for October 24, 2013 at 2:00 PM.\nThe case was investigated by the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Inspector General, and prosecuted by Assistant U. S. Attorney Julia K. Evans.\n(Download Factual Basis) (PDF)\nTop\nPrintable view\nLast Modified: 08/01/2013\nHow Do I Find...\nStudent loans, forgiveness\nCollege accreditation\nNo Child Left Behind\nFERPA\n2015 Budget Proposal\nFAFSA\nMore >\nInformation About...\nTransforming Teaching\nFamily and Community Engagement\nEarly Learning\nK-12 Reforms\nMore >\nConnect\nFacebook\nTwitter\nYouTube\nEmail\nRSS\nGoogle+\nMore >\nMISUSED\nFOIA\nOIG Fraud Hotline\nOur mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.\nStudent Loans\nRepaying Loans\nDefaulted Loans\nLoan Forgiveness\nLoan Servicers\nGrants & Programs\nApply for Pell Grants\nGrants Forecast\nOpen Grant Competitions\nFind Grant Programs by Eligibility\nLaws & Guidance\nNo Child Left Behind\nIDEA\nCivil Rights\nSignificant Guidance\nData & Research\nEducation Statistics\nIntegrated Postsecondary Education Data System\nNation's Report Card\nWhat Works Clearinghouse\nAbout Us\nContact Us\nJobs\nNews\nFAQs\nBudget, Performance\nNotices FOIAPrivacySecurityInformation qualityInspector GeneralWhitehouse.govUSA.govBenefits.govRegulations.gov"


text:
Conteúdo Jurídico | Da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa
 Da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa
 22 jan 2016, 04:30
 RESUMO: O presente artigo visa analisar o instituto da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa, conceituando-o e bem como esclarecendo a possibilidade de sua utilização direta pela administração pública.
 É sabido que, em razão do princípio da autonomia, a pessoa jurídica apresenta personalidade jurídica diversa dos sócios que a compõe, consubstanciando-se em sujeito de direitos e deveres na ordem jurídica.
 Assim, pode-se afirmar que a principal consequência da personalidade, afeta a essas pessoas jurídicas, é a separação entre o seu patrimônio e aquele que compõe unicamente o de seus componentes, apresentando os sócios, via de erga, responsabilidade subsidiária em relação as dívidas da sociedade.
 Com a desconsideração, a doutrina objetiva evitar a utilização da autonomia patrimonial com objetivo diverso do previsto legalmente, reprimindo fortemente o abuso praticado a partir da indevida aplicação deste princípio.
 Tal instituto possibilita que seja desconsiderada tal autonomia patrimonial, possibilitando o ressarcimento dos prejuízos causados através da utilização, via de regra, dos bens dos sócios, que prima facie, não responderiam por tal incumbência.
 II-TEORIA DA DESCONSIDERAÇÃO DA PERSONALIDADE JURÍDICA.
 O artigo 1024 do Código Civil de 2002 consubstancia o que a doutrina civilista denomina de princípio da autonomia patrimonial.
 De acordo com tal preceito jurídico "os bens particulares dos sócios não podem ser executados por dívidas da sociedade, senão depois de executados os bens sociais"(art.1024 do Código Civil de 2002)
 Nas palavras de André Luiz Ramos Santa Cruz[1] " o reconhecimento da personalidade às pessoas jurídicas corresponde a uma sanção positiva ou premial, pela qual o ordenamento jurídico incentiva os particulares a desempenharem atividades econômicas, o que interessa não apenas aos empreendedores, mas também ao próprio estado".
 Assim, com a atribuição de personalidade distinta às pessoas jurídicas, o Estado visa aplicar regras que limitem a responsabilidade dos que a compõe, criando condições favoráveis ao exercício de atividade econômica pelos indivíduos.
 Porém, não raras as vezes a autonomia patrimonial é utilizada para fins diversos dos tutelados pelo direito, sendo alvo de utilização alusiva por empresários em suas relações econômicas.
 Com o fulcro de proteger a autonomia patrimonial, bem como, objetivando seu uso para os fins previstos no ordenamento jurídico, foi criada a teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica, que visa impedir a utilização obscura e abusiva da autonomia patrimonial, apta a causar danos aos seus credores.
 Destaque-se que a “Disregard Douctrine” ( doutrina da desconsideração) é criação da jurisprudência inglesa e norte americana, tendo como caso emblemático o Solomon X Solomon & Co.Ltda.
 Assim, tornou-se juridicamente viável que se afastassem os efeitos da personalização da sociedade, quando sua utilização fosse realizada de modo abusivo, em detrimento do proveito de seus credores.
 III - A TEORIA DA DESCONSIDERAÇÃO DA PERSONALIDADE JURÍDICA NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO.
 Na década de 1960, mesmo com ausência de previsão legislativa, Rubens Requião foi o precursor da “disregrad douctrine” no direito brasileiro, prelecionando a aplicabilidade de tal instituto independentemente da existência de legislação específica sobre o tema.
 Apenas nos anos 90, com a edição da Lei 8.078/90(Código de Defesa do Consumidor), a teoria foi consagrada expressamente no texto lega. In verbis:
 A Lei 8.884/94, em seu artigo 18, também prevê requisitos para aplicação da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica no âmbito das infrações à ordem econômica. Assim:
 Ainda, a Lei 9.605/98, em seu art.4o dispõe que "poderá ser desconsiderada a pessoa jurídica sempre que sua personalidade for obstáculo ao ressarcimento de prejuízos causados à qualidade do meio ambiente."
 Contudo, tais previsões legais não eram consideradas de aplicação geral por restringirem sua aplicação às matérias que regulavam.
 Porém, com a entrada em vigor do Código Civil de 2002, foi concedida a teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica regulamentação legal geral, através do inserto em seu artigo 50:
 "Art. 50. Em caso de abuso da personalidade jurídica, caracterizado pelo desvio de finalidade, ou pela confusão patrimonial, pode o juiz decidir, a requerimento da parte, ou do Ministério Público quando lhe couber intervir no processo, que os efeitos de certas e determinadas relações de obrigações sejam estendidos aos bens particulares dos administradores ou sócios da pessoa jurídica.
 A corroborar tal entendimento foi editado o Enunciado 51 do Conselho da Justiça Federal, dispondo que " a teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica – disregard doctrine – fica positivada no novo Código Civil, mantidos os parâmetros existentes nos microssistemas legais e na construção jurídica sobre o tema. "
 Neste diapasão, resta evidente que, ressalvadas as relações de consumo, ambientais e às infrações à ordem econômica, a previsão do art.50 do CC/02 materializa regra geral no que diz respeito a aplicabilidade da referida teoria no ordenamento jurídico pátrio.
 IV- DA TEORIA MAIOR E MENOR.
 Os doutrinadores, em virtude dos requisitos legais elencados como autorizadores da desconsideração, passaram a reunir conjuntivamente elementos aptos a caracterizar e diferenciar a teoria maior da teoria menor da desconsideração.
 A teoria maior prevê que, afora a comprovação de insolvência é pungente para que seja deferida a desconsideração, a comprovação do desvio de finalidade, a encetar a teoria maior subjetiva, ou a confusão patrimonial, que consubstancia a teoria maior objetiva, tudo em conformidade com o expresso no artigo 50 do Código Civil de 2002, tendo sido esta adotada como regra geral do direito brasileiro.
 No que toca a teoria menor, para sua caracterização apenas será necessária a demonstração da insolvência da pessoa jurídica. Não havendo que se falar em necessidade de comprovação de desvio de finalidade ou de confusão patrimonial. A simples violação ao direito do credor, com seu subsequente prejuízo, a materializa.
 Impende destacar que a Lei 9.605/1998 adotou a teoria menor da desconsideração, sendo tal classificação doutrinária muito utilizada no âmbito da responsabilização civil por infrações ambientais.
 V-DA DESCONSIDERAÇÃO DA PERSONALIDADE JURÍDICA NA VIA ADMNISTRATIVA.
 A Lei 8666/93, em seu artigo 87 e incisos, prevê as sanções administrativas que poderão ser aplicadas aos contratados pela Administração ante a inexecução total ou parcial do contrato.
 A prática empresarial, bem como as ações judiciais propostas, demonstram que, apesar da aplicação regular de tais sanções, as empresas penalizadas, conseguem, através da constituição de pessoa jurídica diversa da sancionada, participar dos procedimentos licitatórios, prejudicando a administração pública e violando frontalmente os princípios que regem as licitações, bem como, causando enormes prejuízos aos eventuais participantes dos referidos certames.
 Dentro deste contexto, emerge a teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa.
 Tal instituto torna possível a desconsideração da personalidade jurídica de nova entidade constituída com os mesmos sócios que fazem parte da empresa anterior que recebeu penalidade imposta pela administração pública e estava impedida de participar de licitações e contratos com o poder público.[2]
 Assim, seria possível desconsiderar a personalidade jurídica através da via administrativa, como objetivo de alargar o âmbito de incidência de penalidade administrativa regularmente aplicada à sociedade constituída com o fito de fraudar as sanções aplicadas na forma do art.87 da Lei 8666/93.[3]
 Impende destacar que, o STJ, no RMS 15166/BA, entendeu pela possibilidade de tal desconsideração ao afirmar que:
 "A constituição de nova sociedade, com o mesmo objeto social, com os mesmos sócios e com o mesmo endereço, em substituição a outra declarada inidônea para licitar com a Administração Pública Estadual, com o objetivo de burlar à aplicação da sanção administrativa, constitui abuso de forma e fraude à Lei de Licitações Lei n.o 8.666/93, de modo a possibilitar a aplicação da teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica para estenderem-se os efeitos da sanção administrativa à nova sociedade constituída.
 A Administração Pública pode, em observância ao princípio da moralidade administrativa e da indisponibilidade dos interesses públicos tutelados, desconsiderar a personalidade jurídica de sociedade constituída com abuso de forma e fraude à lei, desde que facultado ao administrado o contraditório e a ampla defesa em processo administrativo regular. - Recurso a que se nega provimento. ( RMS 15166/BA, DJ 08.09.2003)"
 A Lei 12.846/2013, em seu artigo 14, enuncia que:
 "A personalidade jurídica poderá ser desconsiderada sempre que utilizada com abuso do direito para facilitar, encobrir ou dissimular a prática dos atos ilícitos previstos nesta Lei ou para provocar confusão patrimonial, sendo estendidos todos os efeitos das sanções aplicadas à pessoa jurídica aos seus administradores e sócios com poderes de administração, observados o contraditório e a ampla defesa."
 Concedendo fundamento legal ao entendimento que aduz possível a desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa.
 VI-DA CONCLUSÃO.
 Ante ao exposto, é possível concluir que a teoria da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica visa evitar a utilização abusiva da autonomia patrimonial, capaz de produzir danos aos credores, com o fito de resguardar os fins previstos no ordenamento jurídico pátrio para as atividades empresariais.
 Destaque-se que, de acordo com decisão do STJ, é possível desconsiderar a personalidade jurídica de nova entidade constituída com os mesmos sócios que fazem parte da empresa anterior que recebeu penalidade imposta pela Administração Pública e estava impedida de participar de licitações e contratos com o poder público.[4]
 RAMOS, André, Direito Empresarial Esquematizado,5a ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense; São Paulo: Método, 2015.
 TORRES, Ronny Charles Lopes de. Lei de licitações públicas comentadas. 6a edição. Salvador: Jus Podium,2014.
 [1] RAMOS,André, Direito Empresarial Esquematizado,5a ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense; São Paulo: Método, 2015, p.413-414.
 [2] SCATOLINO, Gustavo e TRINDADE,João, Manual de Direito Administrativo, 3a ed.,Salvador: Juspodium,2015,p.662-663.
 [3] SCATOLINO, Gustavo e TRINDADE,João, Manual de Direito Administrativo, 3a ed.,Salvador: Juspodium,2015,p.663.
 [4] SCATOLINO, Gustavo e TRINDADE, João, Manual de Direito Administrativo, 3a ed.,Salvador: Juspodium,2015,p.663.
 Conforme a NBR 6023:2000 da Associacao Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT), este texto cientifico publicado em periódico eletrônico deve ser citado da seguinte forma: SOARES, Deborah Maria de Vasconcelos Gomes. Da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica na via administrativa Conteudo Juridico, Brasilia-DF: 19 fev 2020. Disponivel em: https://conteudojuridico.com.br/consulta/Artigos/45862/da-desconsideracao-da-personalidade-juridica-na-via-administrativa. Acesso em: 19 fev 2020.


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Tropisk eller troperne betegner det særligt varme klimabælte omkring ækvator - ordet har dog to lidt forskellige betydninger:
 Indenfor geografi og navigation betegner det området mellem Krebsens vendekreds på 23° 27' nordlig bredde og Stenbukkens vendekreds på 23° 27' sydlig bredde. Dette område er kendetegnet ved at Solen står i zenit mindst én gang om året.
 Indenfor meteorologi og økologien betegner det områder hvor alle 12 måneder har den laveste døgn-gennemsnitstemperatur over 18 °C; dette område kan i særlige tilfælde strække sig nordligere eller sydligere end de to vendekredse, ligesom der findes mange områder mellem de to vendekredse der ikke har tropisk klima, f.eks. i bjergegne. Se Tropisk klima. Den laveste gennemsnitstemperatur for en måned er 14-16 grader Celsius.
 Litteratur
 Se også
 Kilder
 Klima
 Økologi


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 Avis juridique important
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 31993L0081
 Richtlinie 93/81/EWG der Kommission vom 29. September 1993 zur Anpassung der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG des Rates über die Betriebserlaubnis für Kraftfahrzeuge und Kraftfahrzeuganhänger
 Amtsblatt Nr. L 264 vom 23/10/1993 S. 0049 - 0050 Finnische Sonderausgabe: Kapitel 13 Band 25 S. 0042 Schwedische Sonderausgabe: Kapitel 13 Band 25 S. 0042
 RICHTLINIE 93/81/EWG DER KOMMISSION vom 29. September 1993 zur Anpassung der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG des Rates über die Betriebserlaubnis für Kraftfahrzeuge und Kraftfahrzeuganhänger DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN - gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, gestützt auf die Richtlinie 70/156/EWG des Rates vom 6. Februar 1970 über die Betriebserlaubnis für Kraftfahrzeuge und Kraftfahrzeuganhänger (1), zuletzt geändert durch die Richtlinie 92/53/EWG des Rates (2), insbesondere auf Artikel 13 Absatz 2, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: In der Richtlinie 88/77/EWG des Rates vom 3. Dezember 1987 über Maßnahmen gegen die Emissionen gasförmiger Schadstoffe aus Dieselmotoren zum Antrieb von Fahrzeugen (3), geändert durch die Richtlinie 91/542/EWG des Rates (4), wurden die Mengen gasförmiger Schadstoffe aus Dieselmotoren für Neufahrzeuge, die ab dem 1. Oktober 1993 verkauft, zugelassen oder in Betrieb genommen werden, herabgesetzt. Artikel 8 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b) der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG sieht die Möglichkeit vor, daß die Mitgliedstaaten während eines begrenzten Zeitraums für kleine Mengen Ausnahmen für Fahrzeuge aus auslaufenden Serien gewähren dürfen. Diese Ausnahmeregelung ist gemäß Anhang XII Abschnitt B der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG auf Fahrzeuge der Klasse M 1 beschränkt. Nach letzten Prognosen wird der Verkauf von schweren Nutzfahrzeugen in der Gemeinschaft im Jahre 1993 im Vergleich zu 1992 insgesamt um 13 % zurückgehen. Das bedeutet einen Rückgang der Verkaufszahlen um 25 % während der letzten vier Jahre. Erfahrungsgemäß ist zu erwarten, daß als Folge des gravierenden Abschwungs auf dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt für Fahrzeuge mit Dieselmotor, die unter die Richtlinie 88/77/EWG fallen, eine Reihe von Fahrzeugen, für die die Typgenehmigung nach der vorangegangenen Fassung der Richtlinie erteilt wurde, bis zum 1. Oktober 1993 nicht verkauft sein werden. Da keine Richtlinie zur Änderung des Anhangs XII Abschnitt B vorliegt, könnten die Hersteller solcher Fahrzeuge entweder ihre Lagerbestände solcher Fahrzeuge nicht mehr verkaufen oder wären gezwungen, kostspielige Maßnahmen zur Einhaltung der Anforderungen der Richtlinie zu treffen. Das würde zu einer zusätzlichen wirtschaftlichen Belastung der Hersteller führen und ihre Fähigkeit, in künftige technisch fortschrittliche Erzeugnisse zu investieren, erheblich bedrohen, und das zu einem Zeitpunkt, wo der Gemeinschaftsmarkt für solche Fahrzeuge ohnehin ernsthaft geschwächt ist. Ein ähnliches Problem wird sich aufgrund der ungünstigen Entwicklung des Marktes demnächst vermutlich für leichte Nutzfahrzeuge mit Dieselmotor stellen. Um den oben erwähnten unwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen auf den Handel entgegenzuwirken, ist eine Änderung der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG erforderlich, durch die die Ausnahmeregelung für Fahrzeuge aus auslaufenden Serien auf alle Fahrzeugklassen ausgedehnt wird, und die nicht nur für die Klasse M1 gilt. Die Bestimmungen der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG über "auslaufende Serien" müssen verdeutlicht werden, um für alle Fahrzeugklassen einschließlich der in einem Mehrstufenverfahren gebauten Fahrzeuge eine endgültige Lösung zu finden. Die Kommission wird diese Frage bis zum 31. März 1994 prüfen und den Mitgliedstaaten bis dahin geeignete Vorschläge unterbreiten. Die zulässige Stückzahl von Fahrzeugen, die in den Genuß der Regelung für Fahrzeuge aus auslaufenden Serien kommen können, darf nicht mehr als 10 % der Fahrzeuge der betreffenden Typen betragen, die in dem jeweiligen Mitgliedstaat im vorangegangenen Jahr in Betrieb genommen wurden. Diese Änderung wird sich insgesamt nur unbedeutend und vorübergehend auf die Umwelt auswirken. Die Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie entsprechen der Stellungnahme des durch die Richtlinie 70/156/EWG eingesetzten Ausschusses für die Anpassung an den technischen Fortschritt - HAT FOLGENDE RICHTLINIE ERLASSEN: Artikel 1 Der erste Absatz des Abschnitts B des Anhangs XII der Richtlinie 70/156/EWG muß lauten: "Die Hoechstzahl von in jedem Mitgliedstaat gemäß dem Verfahren des Artikels 8 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b) in Verkehr gebrachten Fahrzeugen eines oder mehrerer Typen beträgt weniger oder gleich 10 % der Fahrzeuge aller betreffenden Typen, die im Vorjahr in einem Mitgliedstaat in Verkehr gebracht wurden." Artikel 2 (1) Die Mitgliedstaaten erlassen die erforderlichen Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften, um dieser Richtlinie vor dem 1. Oktober 1993 nachzukommen. Sie setzen die Kommission unverzueglich davon in Kenntnis. (2) Wenn die Mitgliedstaaten diese Vorschriften erlassen, nehmen sie in diesen Vorschriften selbst oder durch einen Hinweis bei der amtlichen Veröffentlichung auf diese Richtlinie Bezug. Die Mitgliedstaaten regeln die Einzelheiten dieser Bezugnahme. (3) Die Mitgliedstaaten teilen der Kommission den Wortlaut der wichtigsten innerstaatlichen Rechtsvorschriften mit, die sie auf dem unter diese Richtlinie fallenden Gebiet erlassen. Artikel 3 Diese Richtlinie ist an alle Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet. Brüssel, den 29. September 1993 Für die Kommission Martin BANGEMANN Vizepräsident (1) ABl. Nr. L 42 vom 23. 2. 1970, S. 1. (2) ABl. Nr. L 225 vom 10. 8. 1992, S. 1. (3) ABl. Nr. L 36 vom 9. 2. 1988, S. 33. (4) ABl. Nr. L 295 vom 25. 10. 1991, S. 1.


text:
Rok 1212 (MCCXII) gregoriánského kalendáře začal v neděli 1. ledna a skončil v pondělí 31. prosince. Dle židovského kalendáře nastal přelom roků 4972 a 4973, dle islámského kalendáře 633 a 634.
 Události
 10. července – Velkou část Londýna včetně katedrály v Southwarku poničil rozsáhlý požár.
 16. července – Spojená křesťanská vojska kastilského krále Alfonse VIII., Pedra II., Alfonse II. a Sancha VII. Navarrského porazila v bitvě na Las Navas de Tolosa vojsko almohadského chalífy Muhammada al-Nazira.
 26. září – Budoucí římský král Fridrich II. vydal v Basileji Přemyslu Otakaru I. tzv. Zlatou bulu sicilskou, kterou mu potvrdil královskou hodnost.
 9. prosince – Fridrich II. byl v Mohuči korunován římskoněmeckým králem.
 Dětská křížová výprava
 Narození
 22. března – Go-Horikawa, 86. japonský císař († 31. srpna 1234)
 6. května – Konstancie Babenberská, míšeňská markraběnka († 5. června 1243)
 ? – Jolanda Jeruzalémská, královna jeruzalémská a sicilská a císařovna Svaté říše římské († 25. dubna 1228)
 Úmrtí
 29. února – Hónen, japonský buddhistický mnich (* 13. května 1133)
 16. dubna – Marie z Montferratu, jeruzalémská královna (* okolo 1192)
 26. března – král Sancho I. Portugalský
 11. srpna – Beatrix Štaufská, římská královna z dynastie Štaufů (* 1197)
 4. listopadu – Svatý Felix z Valois, francouzsky poustevník, kněz, spoluzakladatel řádu trinitářů (* 1127)
 ? – Vsevolod III. Velké hnízdo, vladimirský velkokníže (* 1154)
 Hlavy státu
 České království – Přemysl Otakar I.
 Svatá říše římská – Ota IV. Brunšvický – Fridrich II.
 Papež – Inocenc III.
 Anglické království – Jan Bezzemek
 Francouzské království – Filip II. August
 Polské knížectví – Lešek I. Bílý
 Uherské království – Ondřej II.
 Sicilské království – Fridrich I.
 Kastilské království – Alfonso VIII. Kastilský
 Rakouské vévodství – Leopold VI. Babenberský
 Skotské království – Vilém Lev
 Portugalské království – Alfonso II. Portugalský
 Norské království – Inge II.
 Mongolská říše – Čingischán
 Benátky – Pietro Ziani
 Latinské císařství – Jindřich
 Nikájské císařství – Theodoros I. Laskaris
 Externí odkazy
 13. století