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 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2019 10 14
 COM(2019) 470 final
 2019/0223(NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl Protokolo, kuriuo iš dalies keičiama Tarptautinė konvencija dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos, pasirašymo Europos Sąjungos vardu ir laikino taikymo
 AIŠKINAMASIS MEMORANDUMAS
 1.PASIŪLYMO APLINKYBĖS
 •Pasiūlymo pagrindimas ir tikslai
 Tarptautine konvencija dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos (toliau – ICCAT konvencija) siekiama įsteigus Tarptautinę Atlanto tunų apsaugos komisiją skatinti bendradarbiavimą, kuriuo siekiama Atlanto vandenyno tunų ir tunams giminingų rūšių žuvų populiacijas išlaikyti tokio dydžio, kuris užtikrintų mitybos ir kitais tikslais žvejojamą didžiausią galimą tausios žvejybos laimikį. Konvencija įsigaliojo 1969 m. kovo 21 d. Sąjunga 1986 m. birželio 9 d. Tarybos sprendimu
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 patvirtino Konvenciją ir yra jos šalis.
 Tarptautinė Atlanto tunų apsaugos komisija (ICCAT) yra ICCAT konvencija įsteigtas organas, kurio tikslas – išsaugoti ir valdyti jo kompetencijai priklausančias žuvų rūšis. ICCAT turi įgaliojimus priimti rekomendacijas, kurios Susitariančiosioms Šalims yra privalomos. Sąjunga, kaip ICCAT konvencijos Susitariančioji Šalis, yra ICCAT narė ir joje turi dalyvavimo bei balsavimo teises.
 Siekdama padidinti savo veiksmingumą ir geriau išsaugoti bei valdyti jos kompetencijai priklausančias žuvų rūšis, ICCAT sutarė, kad reikia iš dalies pakeisti Konvenciją. 2013 m. gegužės 13 d. Taryba įgaliojo Komisiją Europos Sąjungos vardu derėtis dėl Konvencijos pakeitimų
 2
 .
 2013–2018 m. ICCAT vyko diskusijos dėl būtinų Konvencijos pakeitimų. Joms pasibaigus parengtas Protokolo, kuriuo iš dalies keičiama Konvencija, projektas. Įsigaliojus Protokolui, pagrindiniais juo padarytais pakeitimais bus:
 (1)praplėsta Konvencijos taikymo sritis, kad ji apimtų ryklių išsaugojimą ir valdymą;
 (2)išaiškintos balsavimo ICCAT taisyklės ir kvorumo reikalavimai, visų pirma balsų daugumos reikalavimai tais atvejais, kai neįmanoma pasiekti bendro sutarimo;
 (3)nustatyti principai, pagal kuriuos ICCAT ir jos narės turi atlikti darbą pagal ICCAT konvenciją;
 (4)nuo šešių iki keturių mėnesių (skaičiuojant nuo pranešimo ICCAT narėms išsiuntimo) sutrumpintas ICCAT priimamų rekomendacijų įsigaliojimo laikotarpis;
 (5)paaiškintas prieštaravimo ICCAT priimtoms rekomendacijoms procedūros taikymas;
 (6)sudarytos sąlygos bendradarbiaujančioms šalims, kurios nėra Susitariančiosios Šalys, ir žvejybos subjektams aktyviau dalyvauti ICCAT darbe ir
 (7)nustatytas ICCAT ginčų sprendimo mechanizmas, kuris būtų taikomas savanoriškai, tačiau pagal jį priimti sprendimai juo pasinaudojusioms šalims būtų galutiniai ir privalomi.
 Be to, iš dalies keičiant Konvenciją pasinaudojama galimybe panaikinti nedidelius Konvencijos redakcijos anglų, prancūzų ir ispanų kalbomis (teksto redakcija visomis šiomis kalbomis yra autentiška) skirtumus. Todėl Protokole pateikiamos visos nuostatos, kurių redakcija bet kuria iš šių trijų kalbų turi būti iš dalies keičiama.
 Protokolą Susitariančiosios Šalys priims 2019 m. lapkričio 18–25 d. vyksiančiame 28-ajame eiliniame ICCAT posėdyje.
 Šis pasiūlymas teikiamas dėl Tarybos sprendimo, kuriuo suteikiami įgaliojimai Sąjungos vardu pasirašyti ir laikinai taikyti Protokolą. Protokolo 13 straipsnyje nustatyta, kad jis kiekvienai jį priėmusiai Susitariančiajai Šaliai įsigalioja devyniasdešimtą dieną po dienos, kai trys ketvirtadaliai Susitariančiųjų Šalių Jungtinių Tautų Maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui deponuoja priėmimo dokumentą, o kiekvienai likusiai Susitariančiajai Šaliai – kai tik ši jį priima. Todėl būtina numatyti, kad tuo atveju, jei Protokolas įsigaliotų prieš Sąjungai baigiant vidaus ratifikavimo procedūras, jis būtų laikinai taikomas. Be to, nuostata dėl laikino taikymo dera su Tarybos sprendimu, kuriuo Komisijai suteikiami įgaliojimai derėtis dėl Konvencijos pakeitimų.
 Protokolas yra dalis platesnio dokumentų rinkinio, kurį, be kita ko, sudaro:
 (1)ICCAT rezoliucija dėl žvejybos subjektų dalyvavimo pagal iš dalies pakeistą ICCAT konvenciją. Šia rezoliucija paaiškinami Konvencijos pakeitimai, susiję su šalių, kurios nėra Susitariančiosios Šalys, dalyvavimu ICCAT darbe: visų pirma turimas omenyje Kinijos Taipėjus – žvejybos subjektas, kuriam turi būti taikomas 2 priedas „Žvejybos subjektai“, kuris prie Konvencijos pridedamas pagal Protokolo 11 straipsnį, ir
 (2)ICCAT rekomendacija dėl žuvų, kurios laikomos tunais ir tunams giminingų rūšių žuvimis arba okeaninėmis, pelaginėmis ir toli migruojančiomis plokštėtažiaunėmis žuvimis. Rekomendacijoje paaiškinama, kurioms žuvų rūšims taikoma Konvencija, visų pirma aiškiai apibrėžiant ICCAT rūšių žuvis ir nustatant, kad joms priskiriamos plokštėtažiaunės žuvys (rykliai ir rajos), kurios yra okeaninių, pelaginių ir toli migruojančių rūšių žuvys.
 ICCAT rezoliuciją ir rekomendaciją turi priimti tuo pačiu metu, kai Susitariančiosios Šalys priims Protokolą. Pagal ICCAT konvencijos VIII straipsnio 2 dalį rekomendacija įsigalios praėjus šešiems mėnesiams nuo dienos, kai apie ją bus pranešta Susitariančiosioms Šalims. Rekomendacija nebus privaloma Susitariančiajai Šaliai, kuri pareiškė jai prieštaraujanti ir prieštaravimą patvirtino. Jei prieštaravimui pritaria dauguma Susitariančiųjų Šalių, rekomendacija neįsigalioja.
 •Suderinamumas su toje pačioje politikos srityje galiojančiomis nuostatomis
 Regioninės žvejybos valdymo organizacijos (RŽVO) yra tarptautinės organizacijos, kurias sudaro valstybės (kai kurios iš jų yra pakrantės valstybės), regioninės integracijos organizacijos, tokios kaip ES, ir žvejybos subjektai, turintys žvejybos interesų konkrečiame rajone. Kai kurios RŽVO valdo visus tam tikrame rajone esančius žuvų išteklius, kitos daugiausia dėmesio skiria tam tikroms toli – per plačius geografinius rajonus – migruojančioms rūšims, pirmiausia tunams. Kai kurių organizacijų vaidmuo vien patariamasis, tačiau dauguma jų turi valdymo įgaliojimų ir gali nustatyti žuvų laimikio bei žvejybos pastangų apribojimus, technines priemones ir kontrolės pareigas.
 Europos Sąjunga, atstovaujama Europos Komisijos, remia ICCAT darbą ir prie jo aktyviai prisideda, vadovaudamasi Komisijos komunikatu „Dalyvavimas regioninėse žuvininkystės organizacijose“
 3
 , Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamento (ES) Nr. 1380/2013 dėl bendros žuvininkystės politikos
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 29 straipsniu ir 2012 m. kovo 19 d. Tarybos išvadomis dėl Komisijos komunikato dėl bendros žuvininkystės politikos išorės aspekto
 5
 . Konvencijos pakeitimai yra būtini siekiant užtikrinti tausų ICCAT valdomų jūrų biologinių išteklių ir jūrų aplinkos, taip pat žuvų, kurios sužvejojamos vykdant ICCAT rūšių žuvų tikslinę žvejybą, išteklių naudojimą, valdymą ir išsaugojimą.
 •Suderinamumas su kitomis Sąjungos politikos sritimis
 Remiantis ES vyriausiosios įgaliotinės užsienio reikalams ir saugumo politikai ir Europos Komisijos bendru komunikatu „Tarptautinis vandenynų valdymas. Mūsų vandenynų darnaus valdymo darbotvarkė“
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 ir Tarybos išvadomis dėl to bendro komunikato
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 , pagrindinis Sąjungos veiksmų šiuose forumuose siekis – skatinti įgyvendinti priemones, kuriomis remiamas ir didinamas RŽVO veiksmingumas, o prireikus gerinamas jų valdymas.
 2.TEISINIS PAGRINDAS, SUBSIDIARUMO IR PROPORCINGUMO PRINCIPAI
 •Teisinis pagrindas
 Šis pasiūlymas dėl Tarybos sprendimo grindžiamas Sutartimi dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo, ypač jos 43 straipsnio 2 dalimi kartu su 218 straipsnio 5 dalimi.
 Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) Nr. 1380/2013
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 yra teisinis principų, į kuriuos turi būti atsižvelgta šioje pozicijoje, pagrindas.
 •Subsidiarumo principas (neišimtinės kompetencijos atveju)
 Netaikoma.
 •Proporcingumo principas
 Šiuo pasiūlymu neviršijama to, kas būtina nurodytiems tikslams – būtent tikslui, kad Sąjunga pasirašytų ir laikinai taikytų Protokolą, – pasiekti.
 •Priemonės pasirinkimas
 Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 218 straipsnio 5 dalyje reikalaujama, kad Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos pasiūlymu, priimtų sprendimą, kuriuo būtų suteikiami įgaliojamai pasirašyti Protokolą ir prireikus jį laikinai taikyti iki jo įsigaliojimo.
 3.EX POST VERTINIMO, KONSULTACIJŲ SU SUINTERESUOTOSIOMIS ŠALIMIS IR POVEIKIO VERTINIMO REZULTATAI
 •Galiojančių teisės aktų ex post vertinimas / tinkamumo patikrinimas
 Netaikoma.
 •Konsultacijos su suinteresuotosiomis šalimis
 2013 m. gegužės 13 d. Taryba įgaliojo Komisiją Europos Sąjungos vardu derėtis dėl Konvencijos pakeitimų.
 Pakeitimai buvo parengti per šešis darbo grupės Konvencijos pakeitimų klausimais, kurią šiuo tikslu subūrė ICCAT, posėdžius, kurių pirmasis įvyko 2013 m. liepos 10–12 d., o paskutinysis – 2018 gegužės 24 ir 25 d. Valstybės narės buvo nuolat informuojamos apie derybų pažangą.
 •Tiriamųjų duomenų rinkimas ir naudojimas
 Rengdamasi ICCAT vyksiančioms deryboms dėl Konvencijos pakeitimų ir per jas Komisija rėmėsi valstybių narių patirtimi.
 •Poveikio vertinimas
 Netaikoma.
 •Reglamentavimo tinkamumas ir supaprastinimas
 Netaikoma.
 •Pagrindinės teisės
 Netaikoma.
 4.POVEIKIS BIUDŽETUI
 Dėl šio pasiūlymo ES biudžetas nepatirs papildomų išlaidų.
 5.KITI ELEMENTAI
 •Įgyvendinimo planai ir stebėsena, vertinimas ir ataskaitų teikimo tvarka
 Netaikoma.
 •Aiškinamieji dokumentai (direktyvoms)
 Netaikoma.
 •Išsamus konkrečių pasiūlymo nuostatų paaiškinimas
 Netaikoma.
 2019/0223 (NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl Protokolo, kuriuo iš dalies keičiama Tarptautinė konvencija dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos, pasirašymo Europos Sąjungos vardu ir laikino taikymo
 EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS TARYBA,
 atsižvelgdama į Sutartį dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo, ypač į jos 43 straipsnio 2 dalį kartu su 218 straipsnio 5 dalimi,
 atsižvelgdama į Europos Komisijos pasiūlymą,
 kadangi:
 (1)2013 m. gegužės 13 d. Taryba įgaliojo Europos Komisiją pradėti derybas dėl Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos (toliau – ICCAT konvencija) pakeitimų
 9
 . 2018 m. lapkričio mėn. šios derybos buvo sėkmingai baigtos;
 (2)parengtas Protokolas turėtų padėti padidinti ICCAT veiksmingumą ir geriau išsaugoti bei valdyti jos kompetencijai priklausančias žuvų rūšis;
 (3)Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamente (ES) Nr. 1380/2013
 10
 nustatyta, kad Sąjunga turi užtikrinti, kad žvejybos ir akvakultūros veikla ilguoju laikotarpiu būtų aplinkosauginiu požiūriu tvari ir valdoma tokiu būdu, kuris dera su tikslais užtikrinti naudą ekonominėje, socialinėje ir užimtumo srityse ir padėti užtikrinti maisto tiekimą. Jame taip pat nustatyta, kad Sąjunga žuvininkystės valdymui turi taikyti atsargumo principą ir siekti užtikrinti, kad gyvieji jūrų biologiniai ištekliai būtų naudojami taip, kad atkurti ir išlaikyti žvejojamų rūšių populiacijų dydžiai viršytų dydžius, kuriais gali būti užtikrintas didžiausias galimas tausios žvejybos laimikis. Be to, tame reglamente nustatyta, kad Sąjunga turi imtis patikimiausiomis turimomis mokslinėmis rekomendacijomis grindžiamų išteklių valdymo ir išsaugojimo priemonių, remti mokslinių žinių ir rekomendacijų plėtotę, laipsniškai panaikinti žuvų išmetimo į jūrą praktiką ir skatinti taikyti tokius žvejybos metodus, kuriais prisidedama prie selektyvesnės žvejybos ir padedama vengti nepageidaujamos priegaudos bei kuo labiau ją mažinti, taip pat vykdyti žvejybą, kuria daromas mažas poveikis jūrų ekosistemoms ir žvejybos ištekliams. Be to, Reglamente (ES) Nr. 1380/2013 taip pat pabrėžta, kad Sąjunga tų tikslų ir principų turi laikytis žuvininkystės išorės santykiuose. Protokolas dera su šiais tikslais;
 (4)Sąjungos vyriausiosios įgaliotinės užsienio reikalams ir saugumo politikai ir Europos Komisijos bendrame komunikate „Tarptautinis vandenynų valdymas. Mūsų vandenynų darnaus valdymo darbotvarkė“
 11
 ir Tarybos išvadose dėl to bendro komunikato
 12
 teigiama, kad pagrindinis Sąjungos veiksmų šiuose forumuose siekis – skatinti įgyvendinti priemones, kuriomis remiamas ir didinamas regioninių žvejybos valdymo organizacijų veiksmingumas ir prireikus gerinamas jų valdymas. Protokolas visiškai dera su šiais tikslais;
 (5)Protokolas turėtų būti pasirašytas Sąjungos vardu ir laikinai taikomas, kol bus baigtos jam sudaryti būtinos procedūros;
 (6)atsižvelgiant į galimybę, kad Protokolas įsigalios prieš Sąjungai baigiant vidaus ratifikavimo procedūras, jis turėtų būti laikinai taikomas,
 PRIĖMĖ ŠĮ SPRENDIMĄ:
 1 straipsnis
 Suteikiami įgaliojimai Sąjungos vardu pasirašyti Protokolą, kuriuo iš dalies keičiama Tarptautinė konvencija dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos (toliau – Protokolas), su sąlyga, kad Protokolas bus sudarytas.
 Pasirašyti numatyto Protokolo tekstas pridedamas prie šio sprendimo.
 2 straipsnis
 Tarybos generalinis sekretoriatas parengia įgaliojamąjį raštą, kuriuo Protokolo derybininko nurodytam (-iems) asmeniui (-ims) suteikiami įgaliojimai pasirašyti Protokolą su sąlyga, kad jis bus sudarytas.
 3 straipsnis
 Protokolas pagal jo 13 straipsnį laikinai taikomas iki jo įsigaliojimo dienos.
 4 straipsnis
 Šis sprendimas įsigalioja jo priėmimo dieną.
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Tarybos vardu
 Pirmininkas
 (1)
 1986 m. birželio 9 d. Tarybos sprendimas dėl Bendrijos prisijungimo prie Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos su pakeitimais, padarytais protokolu prie valstybių Konvencijos dalyvių įgaliotųjų atstovų konferencijos baigiamojo akto, pasirašyto Paryžiuje 1984 m. liepos 10 d. (OL L 162, 1986 6 18, p. 33).
 (2)
 2013 m. gegužės 13 d. Tarybos sprendimas, kuriuo Komisijai suteikiami įgaliojimai Europos Sąjungos vardu pradėti derybas dėl Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos pakeitimų.
 (3)
 COM(99) 0613 galutinis.
 (4)
 Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) Nr. 1380/2013 dėl bendros žuvininkystės politikos, kuriuo iš dalies keičiami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 1954/2003 ir (EB) Nr. 1224/2009 bei panaikinami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 2371/2002 ir (EB) Nr. 639/2004 bei Tarybos sprendimas 2004/585/EB (OL L 354, 2013 12 28, p. 22).
 (5)
 COM(2011) 424, 2011 7 13.
 (6)
 JOIN(2016) 49 final.
 (7)
 7348/1/17 REV 1.
 (8)
 Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) Nr. 1380/2013 dėl bendros žuvininkystės politikos, kuriuo iš dalies keičiami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 1954/2003 ir (EB) Nr. 1224/2009 bei panaikinami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 2371/2002 ir (EB) Nr. 639/2004 bei Tarybos sprendimas 2004/585/EB (OL L 354, 2013 12 28, p. 22).
 (9)
 2013 m. gegužės 13 d. Tarybos sprendimas, kuriuo Komisijai suteikiami įgaliojimai Europos Sąjungos vardu pradėti derybas dėl Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos (ICCAT konvencijos) pakeitimų.
 (10)
 2013 m. gruodžio 11 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) Nr. 1380/2013 dėl bendros žuvininkystės politikos, kuriuo iš dalies keičiami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 1954/2003 ir (EB) Nr. 1224/2009 bei panaikinami Tarybos reglamentai (EB) Nr. 2371/2002 ir (EB) Nr. 639/2004 bei Tarybos sprendimas 2004/585/EB (OL L 354, 2013 12 28, p. 22).
 (11)
 JOIN(2016) 49 final, 2016 11 10.
 (12)
 7348/1/17 REV 1, 2017 3 24.
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2019 10 14
 COM(2019) 470 final
 PRIEDAS
 prie
 Pasiūlymo dėl Tarybos sprendimo
 dėl Protokolo, kuriuo iš dalies keičiama Tarptautinė konvencija dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos, pasirašymo Europos Sąjungos vardu ir laikino taikymo
 PRIEDAS
 PROTOKOLAS, KURIUO IŠ DALIES KEIČIAMA TARPTAUTINĖ KONVENCIJA DĖL ATLANTO TUNŲ APSAUGOS
 Tarptautinės konvencijos dėl Atlanto tunų apsaugos, sudarytos Rio de Žaneire 1966 m. gegužės 14 d. (toliau – Konvencija), Susitariančiosios Šalys,
 PRISIMINDAMOS ICCAT rekomendaciją sudaryti darbo grupę, kuri parengtų ICCAT konvencijos pakeitimus [Rekomendaciją Nr. 12-10], ir šioje darbo grupėje parengtus pakeitimų pasiūlymų projektus,
 ATSIŽVELGDAMOS į ICCAT rezoliuciją dėl žvejybos subjektų dalyvavimo pagal iš dalies pakeistą ICCAT konvenciją [Rezoliuciją Nr. 19-XX] ir ICCAT rekomendaciją dėl žuvų, kurios laikomos tunais ir tunams giminingų rūšių žuvimis arba okeaninėmis, pelaginėmis ir toli migruojančiomis plokštėtažiaunėmis žuvimis [Rekomendaciją Nr. 19-XX], kurios yra sudedamosios pakeitimų pasiūlymų dalys ir kurias komisija priėmė kartu su baigtu rengti Protokolu,
 ATSIŽVELGDAMOS į tai, kad šiame dokumente išdėstyti Konvencijos pakeitimų pasiūlymai yra susiję su naujais įsipareigojimais,
 PABRĖŽDAMOS, kad svarbu skubiai užbaigti savo atitinkamas vidaus priėmimo procedūras, kad Protokolas galėtų kuo greičiau įsigalioti visoms Susitariančiosioms Šalims,
 susitarė:
 1 straipsnis
 Konvencijos preambulė iš dalies keičiama ir išdėstoma taip:
 „Vyriausybės, kurių tinkamai įgalioti atstovai pasirašė šį dokumentą, atsižvelgdamos į savo bendrą interesą dėl Atlanto vandenyne aptinkamų tunų bei tunams giminingų rūšių žuvų ir okeaninių, pelaginių ir toli migruojančių plokštėtažiaunių žuvų populiacijų ir norėdamos bendradarbiauti išlaikant tokius šių žuvų populiacijų dydžius, kuriems esant bus galima jas ilgą laiką išsaugoti ir tausiai naudoti mitybos bei kitais tikslais, nusprendžia sudaryti Konvenciją dėl šių išteklių išsaugojimo ir tuo tikslu susitaria:“
 2 straipsnis
 Konvencijos II ir III straipsniai iš dalies keičiami ir išdėstomi taip:
 „II straipsnis
 Nė viena Konvencijos nuostata nepažeidžiamos valstybių teisės, jurisdikcija ir įsipareigojimai pagal tarptautinę teisę. Konvencija aiškinama ir taikoma laikantis tarptautinės teisės.
 III straipsnis
 1.
 Susitariančiosios Šalys susitaria įsteigti ir išlaikyti komisiją, vadinamą Tarptautine Atlanto tunų apsaugos komisija (toliau – komisija), kuri turi įgyvendinti Konvencijoje nustatytus tikslus. Kiekviena Susitariančioji Šalis yra komisijos narė.
 2.
 Kiekvienai komisijos narei komisijoje atstovauja ne daugiau kaip trys atstovai. Šiems atstovams gali padėti ekspertai ir patarėjai.
 3.
 Paprastai komisijos sprendimai priimami bendru sutarimu. Jei Konvencijoje nenumatyta kitaip, tuo atveju, kai bendro sutarimo pasiekti neįmanoma, sprendimai priimami dviejų trečdalių dalyvaujančių komisijos narių, balsuojančių „už“ arba „prieš“, dauguma; kiekviena komisijos narė turi po vieną balsą. Du trečdaliai visų komisijos narių sudaro kvorumą.
 4.
 Komisija kartą per dvejus metus surengia eilinį susirinkimą. Visų komisijos narių daugumos prašymu arba pagal VI straipsnį suformuotos tarybos sprendimu bet kuriuo metu gali būti sušauktas neeilinis susirinkimas.
 5.
 Per savo pirmąjį susirinkimą, o vėliau per kiekvieną eilinį susirinkimą komisija iš Susitariančiųjų Šalių išrenka pirmininką, pirmąjį pirmininko pavaduotoją ir antrąjį pirmininko pavaduotoją; šie negali būti perrinkti daugiau kaip vienai kadencijai.
 6.
 Jei komisija nenusprendžia kitaip, jos ir jai pavaldžių įstaigų susirinkimai yra vieši.
 7.
 Komisijos oficialiosios kalbos yra anglų, prancūzų ir ispanų.
 8.
 Komisija yra įgaliota priimti tokias darbo tvarkos taisykles ir finansines taisykles, kokių jai reikia savo funkcijoms atlikti.
 9.
 Komisija kas dvejus metus savo narėms pateikia savo darbo ir išvadų ataskaitą, o gavusi kurios nors komisijos narės prašymą ją taip pat informuoja bet kuriuo klausimu, susijusiu su Konvencijos tikslais.“
 3 straipsnis
 Konvencija papildoma nauju IV straipsniu, kuris išdėstomas taip:
 „IV straipsnis
 Dirbdamos pagal Konvenciją, komisija ir jos narės:
 a)
 vadovaujasi atsargumo principu ir taiko ekosisteminį žuvininkystės valdymo metodą, laikydamosi atitinkamų tarptautiniu mastu sutartų standartų ir, kai tinkama, rekomenduojamos praktikos bei procedūrų;
 b)
 remiasi geriausiais turimais moksliniais įrodymais;
 c)
 saugo jūros aplinkos biologinę įvairovę;
 d)
 užtikrina, kad sprendimų priėmimo procesai, įskaitant tuos, per kuriuos paskirstomos žvejybos galimybės, ir kita veikla būtų vykdomi teisingai ir skaidriai, ir
 e)
 visapusiškai atsižvelgia į specialius besivystančių komisijos narių poreikius, įskaitant poreikį pagal tarptautinę teisę stiprinti gebėjimus vykdyti savo įsipareigojimus pagal Konvenciją ir plėtoti savo žuvininkystę.“
 4 straipsnis
 Konvencijos IV, V, VI, VII ir VIII straipsnių numeriai keičiami atitinkamais numeriais V, VI, VII, VIII ir IX ir šie straipsniai iš dalies keičiami bei išdėstomi taip:
 „V straipsnis
 1.
 Įgyvendindama Konvencijos tikslus:
 a)
 Komisija yra atsakinga už tunų bei tunams giminingų žuvų ir okeaninių, pelaginių ir toli migruojančių plokštėtažiaunių žuvų (toliau – ICCAT rūšių žuvų) populiacijų, taip pat kitų tokių rūšių žuvų, kurios sužvejojamos Konvencijos rajone žvejojant ICCAT rūšių žuvis, tyrimus, atsižvelgiant į kitų atitinkamų tarptautinių su žuvininkyste susijusių organizacijų ar pagal atitinkamus tarptautinius su žuvininkyste susijusius susitarimus vykdomą darbą. Tokie tyrimai apima minėtų rūšių mokslinius tyrimus, jų aplinkos okeanografinius tyrimus ir gamtinių bei žmogiškųjų veiksnių poveikio jų gausai mokslinius tyrimus. Be to, komisija gali tirti tai pačiai ekosistemai, kaip ICCAT rūšys, priklausančias rūšis arba nuo ICCAT rūšių priklausančias ar su jomis susijusias rūšis.
 b)
 Vykdydama šias pareigas, komisija, kiek įmanoma, naudojasi savo narių oficialių agentūrų ir jų politinių padalinių teikiamomis techninėmis ir mokslinėmis paslaugomis bei informacija, ir, kai pageidauja, gali pasinaudoti bet kurios valstybinės ar privačios institucijos, organizacijos ar asmens teikiamomis paslaugomis ir informacija, taip pat neviršydama savo biudžeto ir bendradarbiaudama su atitinkamomis savo narėmis gali atlikti nepriklausomus mokslinius tyrimus, kurie papildytų vyriausybių, nacionalinių institucijų ar kitų tarptautinių organizacijų atliekamą mokslinių tyrimų darbą.
 c)
 Komisija užtikrina, kad visa iš tokios institucijos, organizacijos ar asmens gauta informacija atitiktų nustatytus mokslinius kokybės ir objektyvumo standartus.
 2.
 Vykdant šio straipsnio 1 dalies nuostatas, be kita ko:
 a)
 renkama ir analizuojama statistinė informacija, susijusi su dabartinėmis ICCAT rūšių žuvų Konvencijos rajone sąlygomis ir tendencijomis;
 b)
 tiriama ir vertinama informacija, susijusi su priemonėmis ir metodais, kuriais siekiama Konvencijos rajone išlaikyti arba viršyti tokius ICCAT rūšių žuvų populiacijų dydžius, kuriais gali būti užtikrintas didžiausias galimas tausios žvejybos laimikis ir veiksmingas, su šiuo laimikiu suderinamas šių rūšių žuvų naudojimas;
 c)
 komisijos narėms rekomenduojami tyrimai ir tyrinėjimai ir
 d)
 leidžiamos ir kitaip platinamos komisijos išvadų ataskaitos ir statistinė, biologinė bei kita mokslinė informacija, susijusi su ICCAT rūšimis Konvencijos rajone.
 VI straipsnis
 1.
 Komisijoje įsteigiama taryba, kurią sudaro komisijos pirmininkas ir pirmininko pavaduotojai, taip pat ne mažiau kaip keturių ir ne daugiau kaip aštuonių Susitariančiųjų Šalių atstovai. Susitariančiosios Šalys, kurioms atstovaujama taryboje, renkamos kiekviename eiliniame komisijos susirinkime. Tačiau, jeigu kuriuo nors metu Susitariančiųjų Šalių skaičius viršija keturiasdešimt, komisija gali išrinkti dvi papildomas Susitariančiąsias Šalis, kurioms atstovaujama taryboje. Susitariančiosios Šalys, kurių piliečiai yra pirmininkas ir pirmininko pavaduotojas, į tarybą nerenkamos. Tarybos rinkimuose komisija tinkamai atsižvelgia į Susitariančiųjų Šalių geografinius, tunų žvejybos ir tunų apdorojimo interesus, taip pat į lygias Susitariančiųjų Šalių teises turėti taryboje savo atstovų.
 2.
 Taryba atlieka Konvencijoje jai paskirtas ar komisijos nustatytas funkcijas ir laikotarpiu tarp eilinių komisijos susirinkimų bent vieną kartą surengia susirinkimą. Laikotarpiu tarp komisijos susirinkimų taryba priima būtinus sprendimus dėl pareigų, kurias turi vykdyti darbuotojai, ir teikia reikalingus nurodymus vykdomajam sekretoriui. Tarybos sprendimai priimami komisijos nustatyta tvarka.
 VII straipsnis
 Siekdama įgyvendinti Konvencijos tikslus, komisija gali steigti specialistų grupes, atsakingas už tam tikras rūšis, rūšių grupes ar geografinius rajonus. Tokiu atveju kiekviena specialistų grupė:
 a)
 yra atsakinga už jos kompetencijai priklausančių rūšių, rūšių grupių ar geografinio rajono stebėseną ir su tuo susijusios mokslinės bei kitos informacijos rinkimą;
 b)
 remdamasi moksliniais tyrimais gali siūlyti komisijai rekomendacijų dėl bendrų komisijos narių veiksmų ir
 c)
 gali rekomenduoti komisijai atlikti tyrimus ir tyrinėjimus, reikalingus siekiant gauti informacijos apie tos grupės kompetencijai priklausančias rūšis, rūšių grupes ar geografinį rajoną, taip pat koordinuoti tiriamąsias komisijos narių programas.
 VIII straipsnis
 Komisija paskiria vykdomąjį sekretorių, kuris vykdo komisijos nurodymus. Vykdomasis sekretorius turi įgaliojimus, laikydamasis komisijos nustatytų taisyklių ir procedūrų, atrinkti komisijos darbuotojus ir jiems vadovauti. Be to, vykdomasis sekretorius atlieka, inter alia, tokias komisijos jam pavestas funkcijas:
 a)
 koordinuoja pagal Konvencijos V ir VII straipsnius vykdomas tiriamąsias programas;
 b)
 rengia biudžeto sąmatas komisijai svarstyti;
 c)
 suteikia leidimą išmokėti lėšas, kaip numatyta komisijos biudžete;
 d)
 atsiskaito už komisijos lėšas;
 e)
 organizuoja bendradarbiavimą su Konvencijos XIII straipsnyje nurodytomis organizacijomis;
 f)
 atlieka parengiamąjį duomenų, reikalingų Konvencijos tikslams pasiekti, ypač duomenų, susijusių su esamu momentu sužvejojamu ir didžiausiu galimu ICCAT rūšių išteklių tausios žvejybos laimikiu, rinkimo ir analizavimo darbą ir
 g)
 rengia komisijai tvirtinti mokslines, administracines ir kitas komisijos ir jai pavaldžių įstaigų ataskaitas.
 IX straipsnis
 1.
 a)
 Remdamasi moksliniais įrodymais, komisija gali teikti rekomendacijas, skirtas:
 i)
 ilgalaikiam ICCAT rūšių išteklių išsaugojimui ir tausiam naudojimui Konvencijos rajone užtikrinti rūpinantis, kad išlaikyti arba atkurti tų rūšių išteklių dydžiai pasiektų arba viršytų dydžius, kuriems esant užtikrinamas didžiausias galimas tausios žvejybos laimikis;
 ii)
 prireikus skatinti išsaugoti kitas rūšis, kurios priklauso nuo ICCAT rūšių arba yra su jomis susijusios, siekiant, kad išlaikyti arba atkurti tų rūšių populiacijų dydžiai viršytų dydžius, kuriems esant gali kilti didelė grėsmė jų reprodukcijai.
 Šios rekomendacijos komisijos narėms įsigalioja šio straipsnio 2 ir 3 dalyse nustatytomis sąlygomis.
 b)
 Minėtos rekomendacijos teikiamos:
 i)
 komisijos iniciatyva, jeigu nėra įsteigta atitinkama specialistų grupė;
 ii)
 komisijos iniciatyva, pritarus ne mažiau kaip dviem trečdaliams komisijos narių, jeigu atitinkama specialistų grupė yra įsteigta, tačiau ji pasiūlymo nepatvirtino;
 iii)
 atitinkamos specialistų grupės patvirtintu siūlymu arba
 iv)
 atitinkamų specialistų grupių patvirtintu siūlymu, jeigu aptariama rekomendacija yra susijusi su daugiau kaip vienu geografiniu rajonu, rūšimi ar rūšių grupe.
 2.
 Kiekviena pagal šio straipsnio 1 dalį pateikta rekomendacija visoms komisijos narėms įsigalioja praėjus keturiems mėnesiams nuo komisijos pranešimo, kuriuo komisijos narėms perduodama rekomendacija, dienos, nebent tuo metu, kai priimama rekomendacija, komisija nusprendžia kitaip ir išskyrus šio straipsnio 3 dalyje numatytus atvejus. Tačiau jokiomis aplinkybėmis rekomendacija neįsigalioja greičiau nei per tris mėnesius.
 3.
 a)
 Jeigu tuo atveju, kai rekomendacija teikiama pagal 1 dalies b punkto i ar ii papunktį, kuri nors komisijos narė arba tuo atveju, kai rekomendacija teikiama pagal 1 dalies b punkto iii ar iv papunktį, kuri nors komisijos narė, kuri taip pat yra atitinkamos specialistų grupės narė, per laikantis 2 dalies nustatytą laikotarpį dėl tokios rekomendacijos pateikia komisijai prieštaravimą, rekomendacija toms prieštaravimą pateikusioms komisijos narėms neįsigalioja.
 b)
 Jei per laikantis 2 dalies nustatytą laikotarpį prieštaravimą pateikia dauguma komisijos narių, rekomendacija neįsigalioja nė vienai komisijos narei.
 c)
 Prieštaravimą pagal a punktą teikianti komisijos narė tuo pačiu metu komisijai pateikia raštu išdėstytas prieštaravimo priežastis, kurios gali būti grindžiamos vienu ar keliais iš šių elementų:
 i)
 rekomendacija nedera su Konvencija ar kitomis susijusiomis tarptautinės teisės taisyklėmis;
 ii)
 rekomendacijos forma arba turiniu nepagrįstai diskriminuojama prieštaraujančioji komisijos narė;
 iii)
 komisijos narė negali praktiškai laikytis priemonės, nes ji laikosi kitokio požiūrio į išteklių išsaugojimą ir darnų valdymą arba neturi techninių galimybių rekomendacijai įgyvendinti, arba
 iv)
 esama saugumo apribojimų, dėl kurių prieštaraujančioji komisijos narė negali įgyvendinti priemonės arba jos laikytis.
 d)
 Kiekviena prieštaravimą pagal šį straipsnį teikianti komisijos narė, kiek praktiškai įmanoma, komisijai taip pat pateikia bet kokių alternatyvių išsaugojimo ir valdymo priemonių, kurios yra bent tiek pat veiksmingos, kiek priemonė, kuriai ji prieštarauja, aprašymą.
 4.
 Bet kuri rekomendacijai prieštaraujanti komisijos narė gali bet kuriuo metu tą prieštaravimą atšaukti ir rekomendacija tai komisijos narei įsigalioja nedelsiant, jeigu ji jau yra galiojanti, arba tuomet, kai ji gali įsigalioti pagal šio straipsnio sąlygas.
 5.
 Vykdomasis sekretorius informaciją apie bet kokį pagal šį straipsnį gautą prieštaravimą bei jo priežastis ir apie kiekvieną tokio prieštaravimo atšaukimą nedelsdamas išplatina visoms komisijos narėms ir joms visoms praneša apie bet kurios rekomendacijos įsigaliojimo laiką.“
 5 straipsnis
 Konvencija papildoma nauju X straipsniu, kuris išdėstomas taip:
 „X straipsnis
 1.
 Komisijoje dedamos visos pastangos išvengti ginčų ir bet kokio su Konvencija susijusio ginčo šalys konsultuojasi tarpusavyje siekdamos jį draugiškai ir kuo greičiau išspręsti.
 2.
 Jei ginčas susijęs su techninio pobūdžio klausimu, ginčo šalys gali ginčą drauge perduoti spręsti ad hoc specialistų grupei, kuri suformuojama pagal komisijos priimtas procedūras. Specialistų grupė tariasi su ginčo šalimis ir stengiasi ginčą skubiai išspręsti, netaikydama privalomų procedūrų.
 3.
 Jei ginčas tarp dviejų ar daugiau Susitariančiųjų Šalių kyla dėl Konvencijos aiškinimo ar taikymo, dedamos visos pastangos jį išspręsti taikiai.
 4.
 Bet koks ginčas, kuris nėra išsprendžiamas ankstesnėse dalyse nurodytomis priemonėmis, bendru ginčo šalių prašymu gali būti perduodamas spręsti galutiniam ir privalomam arbitražui. Prieš pateikdamos bendrą prašymą perduoti ginčą arbitražui, ginčo šalys turėtų sutarti dėl ginčo aprėpties. Ginčo šalys gali sutarti, kad arbitražo kolegija būtų sudaryta ir veiktų pagal Konvencijos 1 priedą arba bet kokias kitas procedūras, kurias ginčo šalys gali nuspręsti taikyti bendru sutarimu. Tokia arbitražo kolegija savo sprendimus priima pagal Konvenciją, tarptautinę teisę ir atitinkamus ginčo šalių pripažįstamus jūrų gyvųjų išteklių išsaugojimo standartus.
 5.
 Šiame straipsnyje nustatyti ginčų sprendimo mechanizmai taikomi tik ginčams, susijusiems su bet kokiu veiksmu, faktu ar situacija, įvykusiu (-ia) ar nustatytu (-a) po šio straipsnio įsigaliojimo dienos.
 6.
 Nė viena šio straipsnio nuostata netrukdoma jokio ginčo šalims siekti ginčą spręsti ne pagal šiame straipsnyje nustatytas ginčų sprendimo procedūras, o pagal kitas sutartis ar tarptautinius susitarimus, kurių šalys jos yra, laikantis tos sutarties ar tarptautinio susitarimo reikalavimų.“
 6 straipsnis
 Konvencijos IX, X ir XI straipsnių numeriai keičiami atitinkamais numeriais XI, XII ir XIII ir šie straipsniai iš dalies keičiami bei išdėstomi taip:
 „XI straipsnis
 1.
 Komisijos narės susitaria imtis visų veiksmų, būtinų Konvencijos įgyvendinimui užtikrinti. Kiekviena komisijos narė kas dvejus metus ar kitu komisijos reikalaujamu laiku jai perduoda savo veiksmų, kurių ji tuo tikslu ėmėsi, ataskaitą.
 2.
 Komisijos narės susitaria:
 a)
 gavusios komisijos prašymą, teikti bet kokią turimą statistinę, biologinę ir kitą mokslinę informaciją, kurios komisijai gali reikėti Konvencijos tikslais;
 b)
 jei jų oficialios agentūros minėtos informacijos gauti ir pateikti negali, leisti komisijai savanoriškai per savo nares gauti įmonių ir pavienių žvejų tiesiogiai teikiamą informaciją.
 3.
 Komisijos narės įsipareigoja bendradarbiauti tarpusavyje siekdamos priimti tinkamas veiksmingas priemones, kuriomis užtikrinamas Konvencijos nuostatų taikymas.
 4.
 Susitariančiosios Šalys įsipareigoja sukurti tarptautinio vykdymo užtikrinimo sistemą, taikytiną Konvencijos rajone, išskyrus teritorinę jūrą ir kitus vandenis, kuriuose žvejybos veikla pagal tarptautinę teisę priklauso valstybės jurisdikcijai, jei tokių yra.
 XII straipsnis
 1.
 Komisija dvejų metų laikotarpiui, prasidedančiam po kiekvieno eilinio susirinkimo, patvirtina bendrų komisijos išlaidų biudžetą.
 2.
 a)
 Kiekviena komisijos narė kasmet į komisijos biudžetą sumoka įnašo sumą, kuri apskaičiuojama pagal komisijos patvirtintose finansinėse taisyklėse nustatytą sistemą. Patvirtindama šią sistemą, komisija turėtų atsižvelgti į, inter alia, kiekvienos komisijos narės fiksuotus bazinius narystės komisijoje ir specialistų grupėje mokesčius, bendrą gyvąjį Atlanto tunų bei tunams giminingų žuvų laimikio svorį ir grynąjį konservuotų Atlanto tunų bei tunams giminingų žuvų produktų svorį ir komisijos narės ekonominio išsivystymo lygį.
 b)
 Finansinėse taisyklėse nustatyta metinių įnašų apskaičiavimo sistema nustatoma arba keičiama tik visų dalyvaujančių ir balsuojančių komisijos narių sutarimu. Komisijos narės apie tai informuojamos prieš devyniasdešimt dienų.
 3.
 Taryba savo eiliniame susirinkime, rengiamame laikotarpiu tarp komisijos susirinkimų, peržiūri antrąją dvimečio biudžeto dalį ir, atsižvelgdama į esamus ir numatomus pokyčius, gali leisti komisijos biudžeto lėšas, skirtas antriesiems metams, perskirstyti neviršijant viso komisijos patvirtinto biudžeto.
 4.
 Komisijos vykdomasis sekretorius kiekvienai komisijos narei praneša apie jai nustatytą metinį mokesčio dydį. Įnašai tampa mokėtini metų, už kuriuos paskirtas nustatytas mokestis, sausio pirmą dieną. Įnašai, negauti iki paskesnių metų sausio pirmos dienos, laikomi įsiskolinimu.
 5.
 Dvimečio biudžeto įnašai mokami komisijos nustatytomis valiutomis.
 6.
 Komisija savo pirmajame susirinkime patvirtina pirmųjų komisijos veiklos metų biudžeto balansą ir paskesnių dvejų metų biudžetą. Šių biudžetų kopijas kartu su pranešimais apie atitinkamus nustatytus jų pirmųjų metinių įnašų dydžius ji nedelsdama nusiunčia komisijos narėms.
 7.
 Tuomet likus ne mažiau kaip šešiasdešimt dienų iki eilinio komisijos susirinkimo, po kurio prasideda dvejų metų laikotarpis, vykdomasis sekretorius kiekvienai komisijos narei pateikia dvimečio biudžeto projektą ir siūlomų nustatytų mokesčių dydžių planą.
 8.
 Jei kurios nors komisijos narės įsiskolinta įnašų suma yra lygi jos už dvejus praėjusius metus mokėtinai sumai arba ją viršija, komisija gali sustabdyti šios komisijos narės balsavimo teisę.
 9.
 Prieš pradėdama gauti metinius įnašus, komisija įsteigia apyvartinio kapitalo fondą savo operacijoms finansuoti ir kitiems tikslams, kuriuos komisija gali numatyti. Komisija nustato fondo dydį, įvertina jam įsteigti būtinas išankstines įmokas ir priima fondo lėšų naudojimą reglamentuojančias taisykles.
 10.
 Komisija organizuoja kasmetinį nepriklausomą komisijos sąskaitų auditą. Tokių auditų ataskaitas peržiūri ir tvirtina komisija arba, jeigu tais metais eilinis komisijos susirinkimas nevyksta, taryba.
 11.
 Komisija gali priimti kitus, nei numatyti šio straipsnio 2 dalyje, įnašus savo darbui atlikti.
 XIII straipsnis
 1.
 Susitariančiosios Šalys sutinka, kad komisiją ir Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizaciją turėtų sieti darbo ryšiai. Šiuo tikslu komisija pradeda derybas su Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacija, siekdama sudaryti susitarimą pagal organizacijos įstatų XIII straipsnį. Tokiame susitarime turėtų būti, inter alia, numatyta, kad Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generalinis direktorius turi skirti atstovą, kuris be balsavimo teisės dalyvautų visuose komisijos ir jai pavaldžių įstaigų susirinkimuose.
 2.
 Komisijos narės sutinka, kad komisija turėtų bendradarbiauti su kitomis tarptautinėmis žuvininkystės komisijomis ir mokslo organizacijomis, kurios galėtų prisidėti prie komisijos darbo. Komisija gali su tokiomis komisijomis ir organizacijomis sudaryti susitarimus.
 3.
 Komisija gali paprašyti bet kurios atitinkamos tarptautinės organizacijos ar valstybės, kuri yra Jungtinių Tautų arba bet kurios specializuotos Jungtinių Tautų agentūros narė, tačiau nėra komisijos narė, vyriausybės atsiųsti stebėtojų į komisijos ir jai pavaldžių įstaigų susirinkimus.“
 7 straipsnis
 Konvencijos XII straipsnio numeris keičiamas numeriu XIV. Šio straipsnio 2 dalis iš dalies keičiama ir išdėstoma taip:
 „2.
 Bet kuriuo metu praėjus dešimt metų nuo Konvencijos įsigaliojimo dienos bet kuri Susitariančioji Šalis gali bet kurių metų, įskaitant dešimtuosius metus, gruodžio trisdešimt pirmą dieną pasitraukti iš Konvencijos, prieš tai ėjusių metų gruodžio trisdešimt pirmą dieną ar anksčiau Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui pateikusi rašytinį pranešimą apie pasitraukimą.“
 8 straipsnis
 Konvencijos XIII straipsnio numeris keičiamas numeriu XV. Šio straipsnio 1 dalis iš dalies keičiama ir išdėstoma taip:
 „1.
 a)
 Komisija bet kurios Susitariančiosios Šalies ar savo iniciatyva gali siūlyti atlikti Konvencijos pakeitimus. Visi tokie pasiūlymai teikiami bendru sutarimu.
 b)
 Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generalinis direktorius patvirtintą bet kokio pasiūlyto pakeitimo teksto kopiją perduoda visoms Susitariančiosioms Šalims.
 c)
 Visi pakeitimai, dėl kurių neatsiranda naujų įsipareigojimų, visoms Susitariančiosioms Šalims įsigalioja trisdešimtą dieną po to, kai juos priima trys ketvirtadaliai Susitariančiųjų Šalių.
 d)
 Visi pakeitimai, dėl kurių atsiranda naujų įsipareigojimų, kiekvienai pakeitimus priėmusiai Susitariančiajai Šaliai įsigalioja devyniasdešimtą dieną po to, kai juos priima trys ketvirtadaliai Susitariančiųjų Šalių, o vėliau kiekvienai likusiai Susitariančiajai Šaliai – tada, kai tik ji juos priima. Laikoma, kad bet kokiu pakeitimu, dėl kurio, vienos ar daugiau Susitariančiųjų Šalių nuomone, atsiranda naujų įsipareigojimų, sukuriama naujų įsipareigojimų ir jis įsigalioja atitinkama tvarka.
 e)
 Vyriausybė, kuri Susitariančiąja Šalimi tampa po to, kai pagal šio straipsnio nuostatas pateikiamas priimti Konvencijos pakeitimas, yra saistoma Konvencijos su pakeitimais, kai tas pakeitimas įsigalioja.“
 9 straipsnis
 Konvencija papildoma nauju XVI straipsniu, kuris išdėstomas taip:
 „XVI straipsnis
 Priedai yra neatsiejama Konvencijos dalis ir nuorodos į Konvenciją apima nuorodas į priedus.“
 10 straipsnis
 Konvencijos XIV, XV ir XVI straipsnių numeriai keičiami atitinkamais numeriais XVII, XVIII ir XIX ir šie straipsniai iš dalies keičiami bei išdėstomi taip:
 „XVII straipsnis
 1.
 Konvencija teikiama pasirašyti visų valstybių, kurios yra Jungtinių Tautų ar bet kurios specializuotos Jungtinių Tautų agentūros narės, vyriausybėms. Bet kuri Konvencijos nepasirašiusi vyriausybė gali bet kuriuo metu prie jos prisijungti.
 2.
 Konvenciją pasirašiusios šalys turi ją ratifikuoti ar patvirtinti pagal savo konstitucijas. Ratifikavimo, patvirtinimo ar prisijungimo dokumentai deponuojami Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui.
 3.
 Konvencija įsigalioja, kai ratifikavimo, patvirtinimo ar prisijungimo dokumentus deponuoja septynios vyriausybės, o kiekvienai ratifikavimo, patvirtinimo ar prisijungimo dokumentą vėliau deponavusiai vyriausybei ji įsigalioja deponavimo dieną.
 4.
 Konvencija teikiama pasirašyti bet kuriai tarpvyriausybinei ekonominės integracijos organizacijai, kurią sudaro valstybės, jai perdavusios kompetenciją Konvencijos reglamentuojamais klausimais, įskaitant kompetenciją tais klausimais sudaryti sutartis, arba tokios organizacijos gali prie Konvencijos prisijungti.
 5.
 Deponavusi savo oficialaus patvirtinimo ar prisijungimo dokumentą, bet kuri 4 dalyje nurodyta organizacija tampa Susitariančiąja Šalimi, pagal Konvenciją turinčia tokias pat teises ir pareigas, kaip ir kitos Susitariančiosios Šalys. Konvencijos teksto XI straipsnio 4 dalyje nuoroda į sąvoką „valstybė“ ir preambulėje bei XV straipsnio 1 dalyje nuoroda į sąvoką „vyriausybė“ aiškinamos tokiu pat būdu.
 6.
 4 dalyje nurodytai organizacijai tapus Konvencijos Susitariančiąja Šalimi, tos organizacijos valstybės narės ir vėliau į ją įstojusios valstybės nustoja būti Konvencijos šalimis; apie tai jos raštu praneša Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui.
 XVIII straipsnis
 Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generalinis direktorius apie deponuotus ratifikavimo, patvirtinimo, oficialaus patvirtinimo ar prisijungimo dokumentus, Konvencijos įsigaliojimą, pakeitimų pasiūlymus, pranešimus apie pakeitimų priėmimą, pakeitimų įsigaliojimą ir pranešimus apie pasitraukimą informuoja visas XVII straipsnio 1 dalyje nurodytas vyriausybes ir visas to paties straipsnio 4 dalyje nurodytas organizacijas.
 XIX straipsnis
 Konvencijos originalas deponuojamas Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui, o jis patvirtintas jos kopijas nusiunčia XVII straipsnio 1 dalyje nurodytoms vyriausybėms ir to paties straipsnio 4 dalyje nurodytoms organizacijoms.“
 11 straipsnis
 Konvencija papildoma dviem priedais, kurie išdėstomi taip:
 „1 PRIEDAS
 GINČŲ SPRENDIMO PROCEDŪROS
 1.
 X straipsnio 4 dalyje nurodytą arbitražo kolegiją turėtų sudaryti atitinkami trys arbitrai, kurie gali būti skiriami taip:
 a)
 viena iš ginčo šalių turėtų nurodyti arbitro vardą ir pavardę kitai ginčo šaliai, o ši per keturiasdešimt dienų nuo to pranešimo gavimo dienos turėtų nurodyti antrojo arbitro vardą ir pavardę. Jei ginče dalyvauja daugiau nei dvi komisijos narės, tą patį interesą turinčios šalys turėtų kartu paskirti vieną arbitrą. Ginčo šalys per šešiasdešimt dienų nuo antrojo arbitro paskyrimo turėtų paskirti trečiąjį arbitrą, kuris neturi būti nė vienos komisijos narės pilietis ir neturi turėti tos pačios pilietybės kaip pirmasis ar antrasis arbitras. Trečiasis arbitras turėtų pirmininkauti arbitražo teismui;
 b)
 jei antrasis arbitras per nustatytą laikotarpį nepaskiriamas arba šalys per nustatytą laikotarpį negali sutarti dėl trečiojo arbitro skyrimo, tą arbitrą ginčo šalių prašymu per du mėnesius nuo prašymo gavimo dienos gali paskirti komisijos pirmininkas.
 2.
 Arbitražo kolegijos sprendimas turėtų būti priimamas jos narių, kurie neturėtų susilaikyti balsuojant, balsų dauguma.
 3.
 Arbitražo kolegijos sprendimas ginčo šalims yra galutinis ir privalomas. Ginčo šalys sprendimą turėtų vykdyti nedelsdamos. Vienos iš ginčo šalių prašymu arbitražo kolegija sprendimą gali išaiškinti.
 2 PRIEDAS
 ŽVEJYBOS SUBJEKTAI
 1.
 Įsigaliojus<priėmimo data> priimtiems Konvencijos pakeitimams, tik tas žvejybos subjektas, kuris bendradarbiaujančiosios šalies statusą pagal komisijos nustatytas procedūras įgijo iki 2013 m. liepos 10 d., kaip nurodyta pagal šį priedą priimtoje Rezoliucijoje Nr. <XX-XX>, gali komisijos vykdomajam sekretoriui pateikti raštišką dokumentą ir jame pareikšti esąs tvirtai įsipareigojęs laikytis Konvencijos sąlygų ir pagal ją priimtų rekomendacijų. Toks įsipareigojimas įsigalioja praėjus trisdešimčiai dienų nuo dokumento gavimo dienos. Toks žvejybos subjektas savo įsipareigojimą gali atšaukti pateikdamas komisijos vykdomajam sekretoriui adresuotą raštišką pranešimą. Įsipareigojimas nustoja galioti praėjus vieniems metams nuo pranešimo apie atšaukimą gavimo dienos, nebent pranešime nurodyta vėlesnė data.
 2.
 Jei pagal XV straipsnį atliekami kiti Konvencijos pakeitimai, 1 dalyje nurodytas žvejybos subjektas gali komisijos vykdomajam sekretoriui pateikti raštišką dokumentą ir jame pareikšti esąs tvirtai įsipareigojęs laikytis iš dalies pakeistos Konvencijos sąlygų ir pagal ją priimtų rekomendacijų. Šis žvejybos subjekto įsipareigojimas įsigalioja kurią nors iš XV straipsnyje nurodytų datų arba šioje dalyje nurodyto raštiško pranešimo gavimo dieną, atsižvelgiant į tai, kuri iš šių datų vėlesnė.
 3.
 Vykdomasis sekretorius apie tokių įsipareigojimų ar pranešimų gavimą praneša Susitariančiosioms Šalims; leidžia joms su tokiais pranešimais susipažinti; teikia Susitariančiųjų Šalių pranešimus, įskaitant pranešimus apie Konvencijos bei jos pakeitimų ratifikavimą, patvirtinimą ar įsigaliojimą arba prisijungimą prie jos, žvejybos subjektui ir patikimai saugo visus tokius žvejybos subjekto ir vykdomojo sekretoriaus vienas kitam perduotus dokumentus.
 4.
 1 dalyje nurodytas žvejybos subjektas, pateikęs 1 bei 2 dalyse nurodytą raštišką dokumentą ir jame pareiškęs esąs tvirtai įsipareigojęs laikytis Konvencijos sąlygų ir pagal ją priimtų rekomendacijų, gali dalyvauti atitinkamame komisijos darbe, įskaitant sprendimų priėmimą, ir, mutatis mutandis, turi tas pačias, kaip komisijos narės, teises ir įsipareigojimus, nurodytus Konvencijos III, V, VII, IX, XI, XII ir XIII straipsniuose.
 5.
 Jei ginčas susijęs su 1 dalyje nurodytu žvejybos subjektu, kuris pagal šį priedą pareiškė esąs įsipareigojęs laikytis Konvencijos sąlygų, ir negali būti išspręstas draugiškai, ginčo šalims tarpusavyje sutarus ir atsižvelgiant į konkretų atvejį, ginčas gali būti perduodamas spręsti ad hoc specialistų grupei arba, prieš tai susitarus dėl ginčo aprėpties, galutiniam ir privalomam arbitražui.
 6.
 Šio priedo nuostatos, susijusios su 1 dalyje nurodyto žvejybos subjekto dalyvavimu, taikomos tik Konvencijos tikslais.
 7.
 Bet kuri šalis, kuri nėra Susitariančioji Šalis, subjektas ar žvejybos subjektas, kuris bendradarbiaujančiosios šalies statusą įgyja po 2013 m. liepos 10 d., šiame priede nelaikomas žvejybos subjektu ir todėl neturi tų pačių, kaip komisijos narės, teisių ir įsipareigojimų, nurodytų Konvencijos III, V, VII, IX, XI, XII ir XIII straipsniuose.“
 12 straipsnis
 Protokolo originalas, kurio tekstai anglų, prancūzų ir ispanų kalbomis yra vienodai autentiški, deponuojamas Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui. Jis teikiamas pasirašyti 2019 m. lapkričio <XX> d. <Maljorkos Palmoje, Ispanijoje>, o vėliau iki 2020 m. lapkričio <XX> d. Romoje. Nepaisant to, Protokolo nepasirašiusios Konvencijos Susitariančiosios Šalys gali bet kuriuo metu deponuoti patvirtinimo, ratifikavimo ar priėmimo dokumentus. Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generalinis direktorius patvirtintą Protokolo kopiją nusiunčia kiekvienai Konvencijos Susitariančiajai Šaliai.
 13 straipsnis
 Protokolas kiekvienai jį priėmusiai Konvencijos Susitariančiajai Šaliai įsigalioja devyniasdešimtą dieną po dienos, kai patvirtinimo, ratifikavimo ar priėmimo dokumentą Jungtinių Tautų Maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui deponuoja trys ketvirtadaliai Konvencijos Susitariančiųjų Šalių, o kiekvienai likusiai Konvencijos Susitariančiajai Šaliai – kai tik ši jį patvirtina, ratifikuoja ar priima. Vyriausybė, kuri Konvencijos Susitariančiąja Šalimi tampa po to, kai Protokolas pateikiamas pasirašyti pagal 12 straipsnį, laikoma priėmusia Protokolą.
 14 straipsnis
 Kai Protokolas įsigalioja tiems trims ketvirtadaliams Konvencijos Susitariančiųjų Šalių, kurios Jungtinių Tautų maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui deponuoja patvirtinimo, ratifikavimo ar priėmimo dokumentą, tokių dokumentų nedeponavusios Konvencijos Susitariančiosios Šalys toliau laikomos komisijos narėmis. Komisija priima priemones, skirtas savo tinkamam veikimui užtikrinti tol, kol Protokolas įsigalios visoms Konvencijos Susitariančiosioms Šalims. Konvencijos Susitariančioji Šalis, kuriai Protokolas dar neįsigaliojo, vis dėlto gali nuspręsti šiuos pakeitimus laikinai taikyti ir gali apie savo sprendimą pranešti Maisto ir žemės ūkio organizacijos generaliniam direktoriui.
 Priimta <Maljorkos Palmoje, Ispanijoje,> 2019 m. lapkričio <XX> d.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 12 A.3d 116 (2011)
 417 Md. 678
 STATE of Maryland
 v.
 Dean CATES, Randy Kucsan, Bill Tran, Dana Way.
 No. 107, September Term, 2009.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 January 24, 2011.
 *118 William A. Snoddy, Associate County Atty. (Marc P. Hansen, Acting County Atty., and Edward B. Lattner, Chief, Division of Human Resources & Appeals, Rockville, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
 William J. Chen, Jr. (Chen, Walsh, Tecler & McCabe, LLP, Rockville, MD), on brief, for respondents.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS, BARBERA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
 ADKINS, J.
 Respondents Dean Cates, Randy Kucsan, Bill Tran, and Dana Way (the "Officers") are police officers working for Montgomery County (the "County"). The County's automated speed monitoring system captured the Officers exceeding the posted speed limits in police vehicles at various locations in the County. The initial citations were issued to the County, as the owner of the police vehicles. The County and the Montgomery County Police Department (the "Department") determined that, although the Officers were on duty, they were not responding to emergencies, and the Department reissued the citations directly to the Officers. The Officers were found guilty in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, and appealed their cases to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for *119 a consolidated, de novo trial. The Circuit Court reversed the District Court's judgment, holding that the Department's procedure for investigating the tickets violated the Officers' due process rights, and dismissed the charges.[1] We granted the State's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari[2] to consider the following questions:
 1. Whether a political subdivision may transfer liability to a police officer for a speed monitoring system citation when the police officer was on duty and operating an emergency vehicle in excess of the speed limit?
 2. Whether a police officer is entitled to "due process" before liability for a speed monitoring system citation may be transferred to the officer?
 We shall hold that the Officers would be subject to liability for operating their vehicles in excess of the speed limit, even while on-duty, and that the Officers were not deprived of due process, but instead were afforded ample opportunity to contest their liability under the statute.
 FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
 1. The Automated Enforcement Program ("AEP")
 As part of its effort to enforce traffic laws, the County uses speed monitoring systems, which are "device[s] with one or more motor vehicle sensors producing recorded images of motor vehicles traveling at speeds at least 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit." Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 21-809(a)(5) of the Transportation Article ("TA").[3] The statute provides that anyone thus cited, or anyone to whom a citation is reissued, may "[e]lect to stand trial in the District Court for the alleged violation." TA § 21-809(d)(5)(ii). At trial, the cited person may present evidence that they were not driving the vehicle, as well as "[a]ny other issues and evidence that the District Court deems pertinent." TA § 21-809(f)(1). The cited person may also argue that the State has failed to meet the numerous requirements of TA Section 21-809.[4]
 *120 TA Section 21-809 also provides the procedures required in the District Court before the Department may reissue a citation to a non-owner.[5] During the District Court hearing, the owner of a cited vehicle may present "evidence that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation[.]" TA § 21-809(f)(ii). The owner must then provide the District Court with:
 . . . a letter, sworn to or affirmed by the person and mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, that:
 (i) States that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation;
 (ii) Provides the name, address, and, if possible, the driver's license identification number of the person who was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation; and
 (iii) Includes any other corroborating evidence.
 TA § 21-809(f)(3). Then, "[i]f the District Court finds that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation or receives evidence. . . identifying the person driving the vehicle at the time of the violation," the District Court must forward the file to the Department so that it may reissue the citation in the alleged driver's name. TA § 21-809(f)(4).
 Arguably, the formality of the District Court proceeding varies depending on who, or what, owns the vehicle. Where the owner of the vehicle is a person, that person must convince the District Court with credible evidence that she was not driving at the time of the citation. Where the owner, however, is an entity (such as the Police Department), which is physically incapable of operating a vehicle, the required procedure is less clear. Presumably the District Court will always find that the entity was not the vehicle's actual operator. Once the District Court has determined that the owner was not driving, the District Court's only remaining statutory tasks are to "receive[ ] evidence" of the identity of alleged driver, and to "provide to the local police department a copy of any evidence substantiating who was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation." TA § 21-809(f)(4)(i).
 When a police vehicle is captured speeding by the Automated Enforcement Program (the "AEP"), the Department uses an internal procedure, as opposed to this statutory procedure, to reissue a citation to the responsible officer.[6] According to *121 the testimony of AEP's director, the AEP staff first determines whether the vehicle was using its emergency lights and/or sirens:
 [W]hen we see an event, or, which is an image, a picture of the, of a vehicle going through one of our cameras, and if that picture clearly shows that the vehicle in the picture, which is a, whether it be a Montgomery County Police Department vehicle or a Fire and Rescue vehicle, or some emergency vehicle, if there are lights and sirens, then we would then not issue that citation.
 If there is no corroborating physical evidence that this, that the vehicle was attending to an emergency situation, then the citation would be issued similar to every other citation that we issue.
 (Emphasis added). Without physical evidence that the officer was responding to the emergency, the AEP issues a citation to the Department, which is the owner of the vehicles.
 Upon receiving a citation, the Department further checks the Computer-Aided Dispatch ("CAD") reports to determine if the operating Officer was responding to an emergency at the time. If the CAD reports demonstrate that the Officer was responding to an emergency, the Department sends a written request to the AEP to void the citation. If, however, the Department
 . . . doesn't find on the CAD report an exact notation or incident that corresponds with the time of the ticket; for example, that there was a traffic stop, or that they were pursuing somebody, or they had their lights and flashers on, it was an emergency runif they don't see an exact denotation on the CAD report to match the time of the ticket, preliminarily, they say that it wasn't an authorized speed. And the officer was unauthorized in going fast because it's not on the CAD report.
 If neither the recording nor the CAD reports demonstrate that the Officer was responding to an emergency, the Department initiates a third layer of investigation, in which it interviews the Officer to determine if she had a justification for speeding. The Department summarizes the result of its investigation to the AEP in a memo, with a recommendation either to reissue the ticket to the Officer or to void the citation.
 2. The Officers' Citations
 The Respondents in this case are all police officers employed by Montgomery County. Each officerDean Cates, Randy Kucsan, Bill Tran, and Dana Waywas recorded speeding by the AEP in 2008.[7] The Officers were on-duty and driving official police vehicles when the cameras captured them speeding. In its initial review of the recordings, the AEP did not observe emergency lights or sirens, and issued initial citations to the Montgomery County Department of Police, the owner of the Officers' vehicles, as required by the statute. See TA § 21-809(d)(1). The Department compared the complaints against the CAD reports, and found no evidence that the Officers had been responding to an *122 emergency at the time. The Department then forwarded the complaints to the Officers' respective divisions. The Officers' supervisors interviewed the Officers and, in each case, found no justification for the speeding violations. Accordingly, the Department sent memoranda to the AEP, directing them to reissue the citations in the Officers' names.[8]
 The Officers elected to plead not guilty and stand trial for their violations in the District Court, sitting in Montgomery County. The trials, heard together, occurred on March 9, 2009, and the District Court found each Officer guilty. The Officers appealed to the Circuit Court, where they received a de novo trial on July 13, 2009.
 At trial, the Officers stipulated to most of the facts. The Officers did not dispute that the speed cameras were properly functioning, and they admitted to driving the vehicles. Moreover, the Officer did not contest the CAD reports, which failed to show an emergency to which they were responding.
 Instead, the Officers advanced two due process arguments, each based on a concept of justified speeding. First, the Officers argued that the Department failed to follow the statutory procedure for re-issuing the citations, and instead "created [its] own procedure, which is not by statute" and "without legislative authority." The Officers claim that this internal procedure caused delay, which prevented them from remembering their justification for speeding:
 Now, due, on a due process argument, we submit that the [O]fficers' due process rights have been violated.
 One, it's often weeks or months after they get the ticket where they're asked by their sergeant, "Why were you going, why were you speeding?" And I have not seen a case yet where the officer could recall a reason. If it's not on the CAD report, basically, their responses are, "I have no explanation." And we submit that's a due process violation. . .
 * * *
 Secondly, Your Honor, the County has taken too much time in getting these tickets processed through their own internal investigation until the case comes to court. It's often months before the officer's required to go to court. Again, a due process violation. How are they going to recall that it wasn't because they were speeding to stop a kid from running in the street, chasing a ball; or a person in a wheelchair was spinning.
 The Officers' counsel then continued:
 [T]hat's exactly our argument, that there are many, many reasons for an officer to speed that are lawful and justified. But because they're not on the CAD report, or they don't recall, [they are liable for the citation]. . .
 * * *
 . . . [W]hen an officer is on duty in an authorized vehicle, they are entitled to speed for public safety and lawful reasons.
 For example, a ball is running, you know, running across a street, and a kid is going to run into the street. The officer may speed up to stop traffic, stop the boy.
 * * *
 . . . There are so many reasons for an officer to accelerate.
 *123 And then they're asked, and that's why I brought up the time frames, you know, some of these times where they, between the ticket being issued and when the County says, "Officer, you're responsible," is months later. We don't know exactly when he's questioned, but some of these are months later. And the, they can't remember. How are they going to remember what they did yesterday? I mean, an officer's in his car for eight hours, 10 hours. And if they're accelerating for a lawful purpose, and it's not on the CAD, or they can't remember, then they get the ticket.
 We're saying the whole process violates their due process.
 * * *
 . . .[T]he fact that an officer is speeding, and it's not on the CAD report, and he can't recall two months later why, violates his due process to force him to be penalized under a statute which is not incorporating their action. . . .
 Second, the Officers argued that the Department's unwritten investigation policy provided inefficient notice as to what speeding was justified and could lead to arbitrary results. The trial court agreed:
 [T]here's no written policy that says, "We, we'll take reasons (a) through (d), but don't come in here with (e), (f), and (g)[.]
 * * *
 Why isn't that not arbitrary? What ifI'm not saying thiswhat if Captain A thinks it's a good reason, but Captain B doesn't think it's a good reason?
 * * *
 You're going to have two different results
 * * *
 . . . [Y]ou agree that Captain A could say the reason is fine, Captain B could say the reason is not fine, who knows what Captain C would say.
 * * *
 . . . The procedures do not have to be unduly sophisticated or unduly elaborate. . . .
 But it seems to me that if the Department is going to institute a system, it should be in writing, distributedit could be a page, it doesn't mean it has to be 200 pagessetting forth those elements which will result in exoneration, and those elements which will not. I understand there's always a gray area which is left to discretion, but it could be said, Point A, if you're doing (a), (b), and (c), and you can prove it, you win; B, if you're doing any of the things listed in B, you lose. Okay? For example, not on duty, going to Johnny's soccer game. Can't do that. It's against Department policy. And C could be the gray area.
 But it'll be delineated so that the individuals driving the vehicles know what's expected of them, and the individuals deciding these matters will know what's, what the parameters are. Like I'm saying, it does not have to be unduly formal; it could be a page or two.
 The Circuit Court thus reversed the Officers' convictions on the grounds that the Department violated their due process rights through its informal investigation policy for determining whether violations ought to be reissued. The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the State's petition.
 DISCUSSION
 In their briefs, the parties present different arguments from those relied upon by them in the Circuit Court. The Officers shift their theory from the assertion that their speeding could have been justified, and instead focus on the Department's *124 failure to comply with the statutory procedure. Accordingly, the Officers do not contest the applicability of TA Section 21-106, which requires that Officers follow the rules of the road except in limited circumstances.
 The County claims that police officers are subject to the "rules of the road," and may not break the speed limit except where allowed by TA Sections § 21-106(a) and (b)(3). The County thus argues that the Circuit Court erred in its underlying assumption that speeding may be justified even though the Officers did not engage their lights or siren and were not responding to an emergency listed in the CAD report. The County also argues that the Officers failed to preserve the current iteration of its due process argument, which focuses not on the possibility that the Officers were justified in speeding, but merely on the asserted statutory deviation by the Department.
 This case presents only issues of law, involving questions of constitutional rights and statutory interpretation, and will therefore be reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc., 386 Md. 28, 43, 871 A.2d 554, 563 (2005) ("Decisions on matters of law are reviewed de novo.") While the "due process" issue is the determinative issue here, we will first address the issues of preservation and the "rules of the road."
 Preservation
 The State argues that the Officers failed to preserve what we interpret as their principal argument in this Court that the Department violated the Officers' rights by reissuing the citations without observing the procedures required by TA Section 21-809. The State correctly points out that this Court "ordinarily will consider only an issue . . . that has been preserved for review[.]" Md. Rule 8-131(b). The State also recognizes our holding that "[a]n appellee, in seeking an affirmance, is ordinarily entitled to assert any ground shown by the record for upholding the trial court's decision, even though the ground was not relied on by the trial court and was perhaps not raised in the trial court by the parties." Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 53 n. 3, 472 A.2d 459, 462 n. 3 (1984).[9]
 Despite the Officers' recharacterization of their argument, our review of the record in the Circuit Court shows that the Officers did raise the issue of the Department's failure to follow the statute. At trial, the Officers's counsel made the following statement to the court:
 Here, the Police Department has set up their own procedure, which is not by statute. They have created their own procedure without legislative authority. And their procedure is that when the County gets the ticket, the County refers it to the Police Department, which is the agency assigned to the vehicle; then the Police Department does an internal investigation, and they determine whether or not the ticket should be voided, or who was driving, and [if] the officer should pay. The County has refused to pay these tickets.
 This statement establishes, on the record, the Officers' objections to the procedure used by the Department, and to its circumvention of the applicable statutes. We are *125 therefore satisfied that the principal argument the Officers present to this Court has been preserved for review.
 Police Officers and "The Rules of the Road"
 While the Officers do not argue, on appeal to this Court, that they are exempt from the so-called "rules of the road," the issue is integral to the resolution of this case.
 The relevant statute, TA Section 21-106, grants certain privileges to the drivers of various emergency vehicles.[10] There are precisely three circumstances in which the driver of an emergency vehicle may violate traffic laws: "(1) Responding to an emergency call; (2) Pursuing a violator or suspected violator of the law; or (3) Responding to, but not while returning from, a fire alarm." TA § 21-106(a). The statute also enumerates the traffic laws which may be violated:
 Under the [three] circumstances stated. . . the driver of an emergency vehicle may:
 (1) Park or stand without regard to the other provisions of [Title 21];
 (2) Pass a red or stop signal, a stop sign, or a yield sign, but only after slowing down as necessary for safety;
 (3) Exceed any maximum speed limit, but only so long as the driver does not endanger life or property; and
 (4) Disregard any traffic control device or regulation governing direction of movement or turning in a specified direction.
 TA § 21-106(b) (emphasis added).
 Even when the driver is operating under one of the circumstances listed in Section 21-106(a), she does not have carte blanche to violate traffic laws. There are two further restrictions on such a driver. First, the driver must also be in compliance with TA Section 21-106(c), which requires that the driver of an emergency vehicle must be using her vehicle's sirens, flashing lights, alarm bells, exhaust whistles, or other alert signals, at the time of the violation. See TA § 21-106(c) (requiring the use of alarms in order to engage in a privileged violation of the rules of the road); see also TA § 22-218 (outlining permissible and required forms of alarms on emergency vehicles). Second, a driver who is in compliance with all of these requirements still bears "the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." TA § 21-106(d).
 The provisions of TA Section 21-106 make clear that drivers of emergency vehicles are subject to the rules of the road except under extremely limited, specifically delineated circumstances. There is no suggestion in this record that the Officers' alleged speeding occurred in response to an emergency call, while pursuing a suspected violator of the law, or in connection with a fire alarm as required by Section 21-106(a).
 *126 Due Process
 In analyzing the final issue on appealwhether the Department violated the Officers' due process rightsit is important to clarify the "private interest"[11] which the Officers assert was inadequately protected, and those which they do not. The Officers do not contend, as they did below, that the unwritten policy of investigations by the Department would lead to inconsistent results as to what speeding was justified. The Officers abandoned this argument, perhaps in recognition that police officers are subject to the "rules of the road" except in limited circumstances. Nor do the Officers contend that they were deprived of an adequate hearing to contest the actual violations before paying the fines. Indeed, the Officers had an opportunity to stand trial in District Court and a de novo trial in Circuit Court.
 Instead, the Officers assert that the Department deprived them of a statutory right to a District Court proceeding before the tickets were reissued, as the Department identified the drivers of the police vehicles internally and reissued the citations without first submitting evidence to the District Court. The Officers argue that this procedure deprived them of a "judicial finding as to whether a speed camera citation should be reissued." The Department's chosen procedure, the Officers state, caused inordinate delay that deprived them of due process. Alternatively, the Officers argue that this is an extreme case where proving the statutory violation itself is enough to show a due process violation.
 The Officers first claimthat their due process was violated by "delay"is a vestige of their argument at trial that they could not remember their justifications for speeding. The Officers use as an example the "delay" caused to Cates:
 The citation was first issued to the "owner", the County. Its violation date is September 17, 2008; it was mailed to the County on September 17, 2008; and its due date is October 17, 2008
 . . . [I]f the County followed the statutory procedure it would have notified the District Court on or before October 12, 2008, that [Cates] was responsible. . . .
 After being notified on October 12, 2008, the District Court would instruct the clerk of the court to provide the Police Department with the evidence, and "[u]pon receipt of that evidence, the Police Department had 2 weeks to re-issue a citation[.]" The Officers argue that, because Cates did not receive a citation until January 2, 2009, the Department's procedure created months of delay that the statutory procedure would have avoided.
 While an inordinate delay might deprive an officer of due process, the Officers have failed to show any significant delay in receiving notice. The Officers received notice of the charges at least as early as when they were interviewed by the Department, well before the citations were reissued in their names. By the Officers' own admission, for example, Cates was interviewed by the Department regarding the charges on or before November 13, 2008, the date the Department completed its investigation. Cates thus had notice of his charges, at the latest, one month after the Department should have submitted his identity to the District Court.[12] We will *127 not speculate how long it would have taken the citation to navigate the District Court, return to the Police Department, and then be reissued to Cates, but it would not have been significantly earlier, if earlier at all, than November 13, 2008. Moreover, in two of the Officers' cases, the Department's procedure actually provided notice to them before the statutory process would have even begun.[13] The time that passed during the Department's internal investigation, but after the Officers received notice of the alleged speeding violations, did not violate their due process. As the County argued at trial, the Officers were no worse off than a regular citizen who could be issued a citation months after the violation date.[14]
 Alternatively, the Officers' assert that the departure from the statutory procedure "alone and without more, was sufficient `to create an unfairness or arbitrariness in the proceeding that [is] of Constitutional significance[,]'" citing Calvert County Planning Commission v. Howlin Realty Management, 364 Md. 301, 322, 772 A.2d 1209, 1221 (2001). The language from Howlin quoted by the Officers, however, is part of a larger section in which we emphasized that a due process claim requires more:
 Due process is concerned with fundamental fairness in [a] proceeding, not with whether the agency has failed in some way to comply with a statutory requirement. A statutory violation may, in some instances, suffice to create an unfairness or arbitrariness in the proceeding that would be of Constitutional significance, but the Constitutional deficiency would then be in the effect of the statutory violation, not in the violation itself.
 Howlin, 364 Md. at 322, 772 A.2d at 1221 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A due process claimant must still show some unfairness or arbitrariness caused by a statutory violation.
 Our holding in Howlin, moreover, supports the County's assertion that informal procedures may satisfy due process requirements where they do not create procedural unfairness. In Howlin, we considered whether the Calvert County Planning *128 Commission violated the due process rights of the owner of subdivided lots of land. Howlin, 364 Md. at 305, 772 A.2d at 1211. In an argument similar to the Officers', the owner in Howlin argued that a statutory deviation was a due process violation:
 Section 3.03 provides generally for the organization of the commissionselection of a chairperson, frequency and openness of meetings. That section states that a planning commission "shall adopt rules for transactions of business and shall keep records of its resolutions, transactions, findings, and determinations." At the time this matter was presented to and heard by the Commission, it had not adopted any formal, written rules, at least not any dealing with the reconsideration of an earlier approval of a subdivision. HRM complained about that lack, arguing . . . that the statutory violation alone precluded the Commission from proceeding[.]
 Id. at 321, 772 A.2d at 1220. We rejected the owner's claim, however, and held that due process had been satisfied because the Commission set forth, orally, the procedures at the start of the hearing. Id. at 326-28, 772 A.2d at 1223-25. Howlin instructs us that due process does not always require strict adherence to statutory procedures where administrative action is governed by statute.
 Identifying a deviation from statutory procedure, therefore, does not end our due process inquiry. Instead, we determine what procedure is required by the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 24, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The minimum requirements of procedural due process are "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 424, 893 A.2d 1067, 1097 (2006), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) (emphasis added). To determine the specific nature of procedures required, we engage in the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), where we determine three factors:
 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
 Under the Mathews test, due process "is flexible and calls only for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Procedures adequate under one set of facts may not be sufficient in a different situation." Dep't of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 416, 474 A.2d 191, 203 (1984) (citation omitted).
 We have also stated that "due process does not necessarily mean judicial process. It is sufficient if there is at some stage an opportunity to be heard suitable to the occasion and an opportunity for judicial review[.]" Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Md. 178, 188, 96 A.2d 254, 260 (1953); see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246, 64 S. Ct. 599, 606, 88 L. Ed. 692 (1944) ("[I]t is not an indispensable requirement of due process that every procedure affecting the ownership or disposition of property be exclusively by judicial proceeding."). Thus, we look at whether the amount of procedure provided by the agency, along with opportunities for judicial review, gave the parties proper notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.
 *129 Applying these standards, we find that the Officers' private interestthe right to a District Court finding before reissuance of the citationis of limited importance. The statutory reissuance procedure is entirely concerned with ascertaining the identity of the driver. Red-light and speeding cameras present a unique problem concerning identity: owners of vehicles could be cited for other drivers' violations, and owners could mis-identify a person as the operator of a cited vehicle to escape liability. The drafters of Section 21-809 thus created the above procedure, an ex parte proceeding with limited evidentiary scope, to assist the Department and District Court in identifying the driver. The reissuance procedure provides no additional procedural protections to a person accused of speedingthe alleged speeder has no right to notice of this proceeding nor a right to appear and contest his identification as the driver. Instead, those protections are provided at the District Court hearing after reissuance. The Officers were not entitled to notice of these ex parte proceedings nor did they have a right to appear and defend themselves. The statute provides those rights through the later District Court hearing after reissuance, and the Officers were given that hearing, as well as the de novo Circuit Court hearing.
 Additionally, the risk, if any, that an Officer will be mis-identified as the operator of a vehicle through the Department's procedure is low. The record suggests instead that the Department's identification of the drivers of the implicated vehicles was accurate and likely supported by the CAD records. Indeed, the Officers have not contested that they were the drivers, nor have the Officers demonstrated on the record any likelihood that the Department would mis-identify the driver of a police vehicle.[15]
 We also find guidance in Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 249 Md. 334, 346-347, 239 A.2d 740, 745-746 (1968). In Chevy Chase Village, the petitioners argued that Montgomery County violated due process by failing to provide them a hearing before granting a permit to a developer to build a highrise, luxury building. See id. at 337, 239 A.2d at 740. In rejecting that claim, we reasoned that the subsequent judicial review satisfied the minimums of due process: "even if it be assumed that a hearing would have been required if the statutes offered no opportunity for [judicial review], there was such an opportunity and the appellants availed themselves of it and thereby cannot successfully complain that they were constitutionally aggrieved." Id. at 346, 239 A.2d at 745. See also Albert v. Public Service Com., 209 Md. 27, 39-40, 120 A.2d 346, 352 (1956) ("Where the question has been a close one as to whether due process required a hearing in a given situation, the fact that a court review was afforded has been held to swing the decision to the side where no hearing is necessary.")
 Although Chevy Chase Village dealt with a different administrative procedure, that case demonstrates that we should consider, when analyzing a due process claim, whether the statute provides a "backstop" of procedural protections in the form of judicial review. Here, like petitioners in Chevy Chase Village, the Officers received additional protections after the reissuance *130 of the tickets in the form of a consolidated District Court hearing in which the they could contest their identification by the Police Department.
 Given the Officers' limited interest in an initial ex parte District Court proceeding, the absence of a risk of misidentification, and the later opportunity for a District Court trial, not to mention the right of de novo appeal to the Circuit Court, we see no due process violation. Indeed, the Officers have not argued that the Department's procedures for identifying the vehicles' operators will lead to misidentifications or otherwise undermine the accuracy, consistency, or procedural fairness of the citations. The accuracy of the Department's investigations was affirmed by the Officers' stipulation to every relevant fact at trial. Due process does not require strict adherence to a statute by an administrative agency where such adherence would provide no additional guarantees of fairness, notice, or an opportunity to be heard.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
 NOTES
 [1] In Circuit Court, the Officers' counsel made clear that "[e]ven though this [case] has a criminal number . . . these are, in effect, civil appeals from the District Court." See also Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 21-809(c) of the Transportation Article ("TA") ("[T]he driver of a motor vehicle is subject to a civil penalty if the motor vehicle is recorded by a speed monitoring system while being operated in violation of this subtitle.") (emphasis added). As this is a civil case, there is no double jeopardy issue presented.
 [2] See State v. Cates, 410 Md. 702, 980 A.2d 482 (2009). This Court has certiorari jurisdiction in "any case in which a circuit court has rendered a final judgment on appeal from the District Court[.]" Md.Code, (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP"); see also State v. Monroe, 82 Md.App. 65, 70, 570 A.2d 338, 340 (1990) (review by certiorari is the "sole additional avenue of review" in such a case).
 [3] The statutes in operation at the time of the citations in question are located in the 2009 Replacement Volume of the Transportation Article, Vol. 2. Unless stated otherwise, all citations to the Maryland Code in this opinion refer to this version of the statute. The provisions of the 2009 Supplement to the Transportation Article were not in effect at the time the Officers were cited for speeding.
 [4] For instance, according to TA Section 21-809(d)(1)(vi), the State must supply the cited person with a copy of the "recorded image" showing:
 1. The rear of a motor vehicle;
 2. At least two time-stamped images of the motor vehicle that include the same stationary object near the motor vehicle; and
 3. On at least one image or portion of the tape, a clear identification of the registration plate number of the motor vehicle.
 TA § 21-809(a)(4)(ii).
 The State must also keep on file (1) a certificate of training for the speed monitoring system operator from the system's manufacturer, (2) "a daily set-up log" for the speed-monitoring system that "[s]tates that the speed monitoring system operator successfully performed the manufacturer-specified self-test of the speed monitoring system prior to producing a recorded image[,]" and (3) a signed certificate from an independent calibration laboratory that the speed-monitoring system has undergone an annual calibration check. TA § 21-809(b)(2)-(4).
 [5] The Department cannot mail a citation to a person who is not the owner of the vehicle unless it complies with these procedures. See TA § 21-809(d)(3).
 [6] From the record, there is no rule, regulation, or statute pursuant to which the Police Department conducts this investigation. While TA Section 21-809(i) authorizes the Chief Judge of the District Court to establish procedures for the issuance of citations, "[i]n consultation with the Montgomery County Department of Finance and the local police departments," no such procedure has been presented to this Court.
 In its reply brief, the State asserts that "had this issue been raised in the [C]ircuit [C]ourt, the County would have readily produced evidence demonstrating that the [Department] does request and receive approval from the District Court before reissuing citations to officers." At oral argument before this Court, the State's counsel again argued that the Department had complied with the mandate of the statute, and had in fact submitted the citations to the District Court as a precursor to reissuance. While we agree with the County that the Officers did not focus on this argument at trial, we find that Maurice Wilson, director of the AEP, testified in detail about the AEP's procedures for issuing tickets, and did not mention any resort to the District Court.
 [7] Cates was cited for traveling 50 MPH in a 25 MPH zone on September 8, 2008; Kucsan for traveling 36 MPH in a 25 MPH zone on October 23, 2008; Tran for traveling 51 MPH in a 25 MPH zone on July 25, 2008; and Way for traveling 46 MPH in a 35 MPH zone on May 28, 2008.
 [8] The Department reissued a citation to Cates on January 2, 2009; reissued a citation to Kucsan on January 2, 2009; reissued a citation to Tran on January 8, 2009; and reissued a citation to Way on December 9, 2008.
 [9] Although we may consider an issue not raised by the parties in the trial court, we "will not ordinarily consider an issue which was not raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari, in a cross-petition or in the Court's order granting certiorari." Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979). See also Md. Rule 8-131(b)(1) ("[T]he Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition[.]").
 [10] "Emergency vehicles" are defined as:
 (1) Vehicles of federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies;
 (2) Vehicles of volunteer fire companies, rescue squads, fire departments, the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems, and the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute;
 (3) State vehicles used in response to oil or hazardous materials spills;
 (4) State vehicles designated for emergency use by the Commissioner of Correction;
 (5) Ambulances; and
 (6) Special vehicles funded or provided by federal, State, or local government and used for emergency or rescue purposes in this State.
 Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 11-118 of the Transportation Article ("TA") (emphasis added).
 [11] Procedural due process under the Federal Constitution is only implicated where a party faces the "deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972).
 [12] This one month delay was the longest experienced by any of the four officers. In second place sits Tran, who received notice within three weeks of when the District Court would have begun its proceeding. The County was cited for Tran's violation on August 8, 2008, and was therefore required to submit his identity to the District Court by September 3, 2008. The Department completed its investigation of Tran by September 19, 2008.
 [13] Kucsan received notice before the reissuance procedure would have begun. The County was cited for Kucsan's violation on October 31, 2008. According to the Officers' calculation, the County should have submitted his identity to the District Court by November 25, 2008. The Department had completed its investigation, thus giving notice to Kucsan by November 21, 2008.
 Way also received notice before the reissuance procedure would have begun. The County was cited for Way's violation on June 11, 2008, and thus, should have submitted Way's identity to the District Court by July 5, 2008. The Department completed its procedure, however, by June 26, 2008.
 [14] Under the statutory process, the District Court could wait months before directing the Department to reissue a citation. Maryland law requires a vehicle owner who wishes to challenge the citation to request a trial "at least 5 days prior to the date of payment as set forth in the citation." CJP § 7-302(e)(1). The Transportation Article also imposes a time limit after the ex parte preliminary District Court proceeding, requiring the Department to reissue a citation "no later than 2 weeks after receipt of the evidence from the District Court." TA § 21-809(f)(4)(iii). There is no statutory time constraint, however, on the District Court's processing of the citation after the vehicle owner returns the citation with an affidavit attesting that she was not the driver, and identifying the actual driver.
 [15] While the issue was not fully addressed at trial, CAD systems can record highly detailed information about a police officer's activities. See Prince George's County v. Brent, 414 Md. 334, 351, 995 A.2d 672, 682 (2010) (factual record included CAD reports which showed identity of responding officer, time of dispatch, time of arrival, and whether other officers were also dispatched).


type: wikipedia

text:
Joël Suter (Frutigen, 25 oktober 1998) is een Zwitsers wielrenner die anno 2022 rijdt voor UAE Team Emirates.
 Carrière
 Als junior werd Suter onder meer achttiende in het eindklassement van de GP Rüebliland en derde op het Zwitsers kampioenschap tijdrijden. in 2019 won hij met de Zwitserse ploeg de ploegentijdrit in de Ronde van de Toekomst en behaalde hij een tweede plaats in de belofte versie van Parijs-Tours.
 Overwinningen
 2016
 Zwitsers kampioenschap tijdrijden, junioren
 2019
 2e etappe Ronde van de Toekomst, ploegentijdrit
 Zwitsers kampioenschap tijdrijden, beloften
 2022
 Zwitsers kampioen tijdrijden, Elite
 Resultaten in voornaamste wedstrijden
 Ploegen
 2018 – Akros-Renfer
 2019 – Akros-Thömus
 2020 – Bingoal-Wallonie Bruxelles
 2021 – Bingoal Pauwels Sauces WB
 2022 – UAE Team Emirates
 Zwitsers wielrenner


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 20.8.2014
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 L 245/9
 DECISIÓN No 2/2014 DEL COMITÉ DE EMBAJADORES ACP-UE
 de 5 de agosto de 2014
 por la que se nombra a los miembros del Consejo de Administración del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa (CDE)
 (2014/534/UE)
 EL COMITÉ DE EMBAJADORES ACP-UE,
 Visto el Acuerdo de Asociación entre los Estados de África, del Caribe y del Pacífico, por una parte, y la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por otra, firmado en Cotonú el 23 de junio de 2000 (1), modificado por primera vez en Luxemburgo el 25 de junio de 2005 (2) y por segunda vez en Uagadugú el 22 de junio de 2010 (3), y, en particular, el artículo 2, apartado 6, de su anexo III,
 Vista la Decisión no 8/2005 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-CE, de 20 de julio de 2005, sobre los estatutos y el reglamento interno del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa (4), y, en particular, su artículo 9, apartado 1,
 Considerando lo siguiente:
 (1)
 El artículo 9 de los Estatutos y el Reglamento interno del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa (CDE), aprobado por la Decisión no 8/2005 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-CE, establece que el Comité de Embajadores será responsable del nombramiento de los miembros del Consejo de Administración por un período máximo de cinco años.
 (2)
 El mandato de los miembros UE del Consejo de Administración del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa, nombrados por la Decisión no 3/2013 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-UE (5), que se prorrogó en virtud de la Decisión no 1/2014 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-UE (6), concluirá el 6 de septiembre de 2014.
 DECIDE:
 Artículo 1
 Sin perjuicio de las decisiones ulteriores que el Comité pueda estar llamado a tomar en el marco de sus prerrogativas, se nombra miembros UE del Consejo de Administración del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa a las siguientes personas:
 —
 D. Jacek ADAMSKI
 —
 D. Martin BENKO
 —
 D.a Nicole BOLLEN
 —
 D. John Atkins ARUHURI
 —
 D.a Maria MACHAILO-ELLIS
 —
 D. Félix MOUKO
 cuyo mandato expirará el 6 de septiembre de 2018, o en la fecha de cierre del Centro, siendo de aplicación la primera de estas dos fechas.
 Artículo 2
 La presente Decisión entrará en vigor el día de su adopción. Podrá ser revisada en cualquier momento en función de la situación del Centro.
 Hecho en Bruselas, el 5 de agosto de 2014
 Por el Comité de Embajadores ACP-UE
 El Presidente
 D. B. KAMALA
 (1) DO L 317 de 15.12.2000, p. 3.
 (2) Acuerdo por el que se modifica el Acuerdo de Asociación entre los Estados de África, del Caribe y del Pacífico, por una parte, y la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por otra, firmado en Cotonú el 23 de junio de 2000 (DO L 209 de 11.8.2005, p. 27).
 (3) Acuerdo por el que se modifica por segunda vez el Acuerdo de asociación entre los Estados de África, del Caribe y del Pacífico, por una parte, y la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados miembros, por otra, firmado en Cotonú el 23 de junio de 2000 y modificado por primera vez en Luxemburgo el 25 de junio de 2005 (DO L 287 de 4.11.2010, p. 3).
 (4) DO L 66 de 8.3.2006, p. 16.
 (5) Decisión no 3/2013 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-UE, de 30 de julio de 2013, por la que se nombra a los miembros del consejo de administración del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa (CDE) (DO L 263 de 5.10.2013, p. 18).
 (6) Decisión no 1/2014 del Comité de Embajadores ACP-UE, de 7 de febrero de 2014, por la que se nombra a los miembros del Consejo de Administración del Centro para el Desarrollo de la Empresa (CDE) (DO L 67 de 7.3.2014, p. 7).