text:
33-vuotias salolaisyrittäjä harrastaa vanhojen pelikonsoleiden keräilyä, lumilautailua, nettisivujen tekoa ja ylläpitoa, autotallibaarin rakentelua, amerikkalaisia urheiluautoja ja vuodesta 2013 lähtien myös vesijetteilyä.
 Mikko | 13.10.2014 21:28 | 0 kommenttia
 Jos lapsi olisi onnistunut salaamaan sattuneen vahingon paremmin eikä perätön väite olisi selvinnyt nopeasti, mitä olisikaan voinut tapahtua? Juuri taannoin telkkarista tuli Häjyt-elokuvan uusinta, jossa poltettiin vanhan isännän uusi piharakennus pelkkien perättömien huhujen takia. Tämä voisi olla totta oikeassa elämässä ja joku täysin viaton mopoteini olisi voinut saada palovammoja naamaansa white trash -poppoon omankädenoikeuksien seurauksena. Tässä mielessä sosiaalinen media on pelottavan tehokas - väärällä tavalla.
 Mikko | 7.2.2014 21:12 | 0 kommenttia
 Monilla vanhoilla ihmisillä on "salaisia" reseptejä, jotka saattavat kadota samalla, kun ihminen siirtyy autuaammille kokkausmaille. Onni onnettomuudessa, että äidiltäni jäi yksi resepti minulle talteen, nimittäin maailman parhaan raparperipiirakan ohje. En todellakaan ole mikään ruoanlaittaja tai kokkaaja ja tämä onkin ainut asia, johon olen ylipäätään pyytänyt reseptiä. Jo pahasti kellastunut paperilappunen on seurannut minua jääkaapin ovesta toiseen. Nyt olen päättänyt siirtää tämän ohjeen digitaaliseen muotoon ja samalla jakaa sen kaikille kokeilunhaluisille.
 Itse piirakkapohja:
 1 1⁄2 dl kermamaitoa (eli esim. 50/50 suhteessa kermaa ja maitoa tai ihan vaikka kaupan valmista kuohukermaa)
 Pinnalle raparperit
 Uuniin 200 asteeseen 15 - 20 minuutiksi
 Tämä itsessään oli jo ihan toimiva raparperipiirakan ohje, mutta se mikä tekee tästä maailman parhaan raparperipiirakkaohjeen, tulee kuorrutuksesta:
 3-4 tl vanilliinisokeria
 Kaikki aineet laitetaan hellalle kattilaan ja vispataan kunnes sakenee. Kaadetaan kypsän piirakan päälle. Annetaan jäähtyä - Valmis!
 Jos joku uskaltautuu kokeilemaan, kirjoitathan kommentin, kiitos :)
 Mikko | 22.8.2013 17:45 | 0 kommenttia
 Mikko | 8.8.2013 18:41 | 0 kommenttia
 Mikko | 25.3.2013 19:02 | 0 kommenttia
 Chevrolet Corvette C4 1989 huutokauppa Salossa
 Mikko | 10.3.2013 18:12 | 0 kommenttia
 En ole koskaan ostanut mitään huutokaupasta. Eipä asia tämän päivän kohdallakaan muuksi muuttunut, mutta kävin kurkkaamassa Salossa järjestettyä huutokauppaa, jossa kaupan oli vuoden '89 Corvette. Auton hinta pompsahti 8600 euroon ja lähdinkin tämän myynnin jälkeen kotiin ennen kuin piha oli tukossa väkijoukosta.
 Se miksi tästä ylipäätään kirjoitan, tulee tässä:
 Auto löytyi noin 3 tuntia myöhemmin Nettiautosta hintaan 12 950 € (kuvakaappaus myynti-ilmoituksesta). Eihän siinä ole mitään ihmeellistä, että auto ostetaan ja myydään kalliimmalla eteenpäin, mutta harvoin auton mittarilukema pienenee kolmessa tunnissa kymmeniä tai satoja tuhansia kilometrejä.
 Huutokaupan vetäjä ilmoitti autossa olevan noin 200 000 mittarissa. Itselle jäi epäselväksi, että oliko kyseessä kilometrit vai mailit, mutta ihan kummat vain niin nyt autoa myydään 123 000 kilometriä ajettuna. Sillä on melko suuri ero, että onko autolla ajettu 123 tuhatta vai 320 tuhatta (200 tuhatta mailia).
 Autokauppiaita ei kai suotta kutsuta suuriksi huijareiksi ja ilmeisesti Järkiostos Oy ei tee tässä asiassa poikkeusta. Toivottavasti auto löytää kuitenkin kivan kodin! Tällaisia kokemuksia tänään.
 MCS värikasettihuijaus
 Mikko | 8.3.2013 19:22 | 0 kommenttia
 Sain viime viikolla puhelinsoiton työnumerooni, jossa Antti Mäkelä kertoi soittavansa MCS nimisestä yrityksestä, joka sijaitsi Tukholmassa. Puhelinlinjan ääni oli hieman rohiseva, mutta kyllä siitä hyvin selvää sai. Antti vaikutti ihan mukavalta kaverilta ja ilmoitti, että olin voittanut arvonnassa, johon olin osallistunut puolisen vuotta sitten. Sain oikein valita, että haluanko 10 euron lahjakortin ruokakauppaan vai Alkoon. Viinaa on jo niin paljon baaritiskin takana, että päätin valita hyödyllisemmän vaihtoehdon.
 Antti antoi vielä jonkin kummallisen kirjainnumeroyhdistelmänkin, jota kuulemma tarvitsisin arvontapalkinnon lunastamisessa. Minulle ei koskaan selvinnyt missä tätä koodia tarvitsisin. Kuvittelin asian olevan valmis ja, että voisin siirtyä taas töiden pariin, mutta Anttipa halusikin yllättäen kysellä kaikki lomasuunnitelmat ja muut kuulumiset. Kertoipa myös lähtevänsä itse Espanjaan katsomaan jalkapallopeliä, voi että miten hän nauttisi siitä - totesi. Minua ei Antin lomasuunnitelmat olisi voineet paljon vähempää kiinnostaa ja komppasin mukana muutamalla "kiva" ja "ok"-sanalla. Joko pääsen jatkamaan tekemisiäni?
 No enpä tietenkään. Antti totesi, että jos nyt samalla päivitettäisiin heidän tiedot järjestelmään meidän tulostinmalleista, hehän kuitenkin myyvät tulostinkasetteja ja tietokannan olisi hyvä olla ajantasainen. Kerrotaan nyt Antille sitten edes se meidän käytetyin tulostinmallimme, olihan hän sentään soittanut iloisella asialla onnitellakseen voitosta.
 Siinä Antti kyseli ja jaaritteli värin riittoisuudesta (45000 sivua/väripatruuna), ympäristöystävällisyydestä ja edullisista hinnoista. Kaikki nämä komponentit heidän tuotteistaan löytyisi.
 Seuraavaksi tulikin sitten suora ehdotus ja keskustelu meni kutakuinkin näin:
 Antti: Meillä on tällainen hyvä tutustumistarjous, saat 2 mustekasettia hintaan 356 euroa / kpl.
 Minä: Oho, onpas siinä hintaa kaseteille. Voisitko lähettää minulle tarjouksen sähköpostiin?
 Antti: Mikäs sinun sähköpostiosoitteesi on?
 Minä: <etunimi.sukunimi@firmannimi.fi>
 Antti: Selvä. Eli laitettaisiinko tämä tarjous teillekin tulemaan?
 Minä: No ei laiteta. Lähetä minulle kirjallinen tarjous sähköpostiin, jossa mainitset mustekasetin tulostettavien sivujen lukumäärän, hinnan sekä edustamasi yrityksen yhteystiedot, jotta voin palata asiaan, kun olen lukenut sähköpostit.
 Antti: Laitan sähköpostia, mutta eiköhän me voitaisi lähettää tämän erinomaisen tarjouksen kasetit teille silti?
 Minä: Etkö ymmärrä, että haluan tarjouksen kirjallisena? Olen nyt pahassa paikassa enkä pääse vertailemaan hintoja, että mitä maksan nykyisin kaseteista ja mikä tulee edullisemmaksi vaihtoehdoksi. Lähetä sähköpostia ja palaan asiaan.
 Tässä vaiheessa puhelinlinjan rohina loppui kokonaan ja uusi puheääni kuului kristallin kirkkaana. Aivan eri mieshenkilö tuli linjalle ja kysyi vielä kertaalleen:
 Joku muu mies kuin Antti: Laitettaisiinko nämä kasetit teille nyt matkaan?
 Minä: Heeeetkonen... Mitäs nyt tapahtui? Vaihtuiko siellä puhuja?
 Joku muu mies kuin Antti: Ei. Miten niin?
 Minä: No kun kuulostaa ihan erilaiselta...?
 Tähän katkesi harras puhelumme eikä sähköpostia saatikka arvonnan palkintoa ole paljon näkynyt. Tässä puhelinkeskustelussa kun olisi vahingossa hieman myöntävämmin vastannut niin varmasti parin päivän sisällä olisi postissa saapunut 2 täysin ylihinnoiteltua mustekasettia ja yli 700 euron lasku. Monikohan tähän epähuomiossa sortuu mukavan "Antin" tarinoiden jälkeen?
 Asia jäi sen verran vaivaamaan, että päätin ottaa Googlen esiin. Ei tarvinnut kirjoittaa, kuin "MCS värikasetit" ja ensimmäisenä hakutuloksena puhutaan vastaavasta huijauksesta MuroBBS:n foorumilla. Murossa on maininta, että yritys on ennen toiminut nimellä Scandinavian Business System (SBS) sekä Nordic Office Solutions (NOS).
 MCS taas tulee sanoista Millennium Computer Solutions ja tai Millennium Computer Services, kukapa näistä tietää, mikä se nimi oikeasti on. Minun puhelussani eivät sitä ainakaan maininneet kuin lyhenteen muodossa. Harmi, että tällaista asiaa ei saada kitkettyä pois vaan toiminta jatkuu vuosia. MuroBBS:n kirjoituskin on päivätty jo 2009 ja näillä aiemmilla toiminimillä samaa on harrastettu Suomi24:n mukaan ainakin vuodesta 2004 lähtien.


type: wikipedia

text:
Evelyn Charles Vivian (Bedingham, Norfolk, Anglia, 1882. – London, 1947. május 21.) angol író, szerkesztő.
 Írói álnevei: Jack Mann, Barry Lynd, Charles Cannell
 Legnépszerűbb magyarra fordított műve a Robin Hood.
 Művei
 The Shadow of Christine (1907 Gay & Bird) – as Evelyn C H Vivian
 The Woman Tempted Me : The Story of a Selfish Man (1909 Andrew Melrose)
 Wandering of Desire (1910 Melrose)
 Following Feet (1911 Melrose)
 Passion Fruit (1912 Heinemann)
 Divided Ways (1914 Holden & Hardingham)
 Peru : Illustrated (1914 Pitman)
 The British Army From Within (1914 Hodder & Stoughton) (1914 H & S pb)
 With the Royal Army Medical Corps at the Front (1914 H & S / Daily Telegraph)
 The Young Man Absalom (1915 Chapman & Hall)
 With the Scottish Regiments at the Front (1915 Hodder & Stoughton) (1914 H & S pb)
 The Way of the Red Cross (1915 H & S / The Times) – with J E Hodder Williams
 A History of Aeronautics (1921 Collins) – with W L Marsh
 Heard This One ? : A Book of Funny Stories (1922 C Arthur Pearson pb)
 City of Wonder (1923 Hutchinson)
 Fields of Sleep (1923 Hutchinson 7/6)
 The Guarded Woman (1923 Hutchinson) – as Charles Cannell
 Broken Couplings (1923 Hutchinson 7/6) – as Charles Cannell
 A Scout of the '45 : A Tale of the Jacobite Rising (1923 Boy's Own Paper)
 Barker's Drift (1924 Hutchinson 7/6) – as Charles Cannell
 People of the Darkness (1924 Hutchinson 7/6)
 Ash (1925 Hutchinson) – as Charles Cannell
 The Guardian of the Cup (1925 Hodder & Stoughton) – as Charles Cannell
 Star Dust (1925 Hutchinson)
 The Lady of the Terraces (1925 Hodder & Stoughton)
 The Passionless Quest (1926 Hodder & Stoughton) – as Charles Cannell
 A King There Was (1926 Hodder & Stoughton)
 The Forbidden Door (1927 Ward Lock)
 Robin Hood and His Merry Men (1927 Ward Lock); Robin Hood (Bp., 1959)
 Man Alone (1928 Ward Lock)
 Nine Days (1928 Ward Lock)
 Shooting Stars (1928 Hurst & Blackett)
 The Moon and Chelsea (1928 Ward Lock) – as Charles Cannell
 The Tale of Fleur (1929 Ward Lock)
 Woman Dominant (1929 Ward Lock)
 Double or Quit (1930 Ward Lock)
 One Tropic Night (1930 Ward Lock)
 Delicate Fiend (1930 Ward Lock)
 Unwashed Gods (1931 Ward Lock)
 Innocent Guilt (1931 Ward Lock)
 And the Devil (1931 John Lane, Bodley Head) – as Charles Cannell
 Infamous Fame (1932 Ward Lock)
 Lone Isle (1932 Ward Lock)
 False Truth (1932 Ward Lock)
 The Keys of the Flat (1933 Ward Lock)
 Reckless Coulson (1933 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Ladies in the Case (1933 Ward Lock)
 Coulson Goes South (1933 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Girl in the Dark (1933 Ward Lock)
 Jewels Go Back (1934 Ward Lock)
 Shadow on the House (1934 Ward Lock)
 The Dead Man's Chest (1934 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Egyptian Nights (1934 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Accesory After (1934 Ward Lock)
 The Capsule Mystery (1935 Ward Lock)
 Seventeen Cards (1935 Ward Lock)
 Detective Coulson (1935 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Cigar for Inspector Head (1935 Ward Lock)
 Who Killed Gatton ? (1936 Ward Lock)
 Coulson Alone (1936 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 With Intent to Kill (1936 Ward Lock)
 The Black Prince (1936 Ward Lock)
 Gees' First Case (1936 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Tramps' Evidence (1937 Ward Lock)
 .38 Automatic (1937 Ward Lock)
 Grey Shapes (1937 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Nightmare Farm (1937 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Evidence in Blue (1938 Ward Lock)
 The Rainbow Puzzle (1938 Ward Lock)
 Trailed Down (1938 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 Dude Ranch (1938 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 The Kleinert Case (1938 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Maker of Shadows (1938 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Problem by Rail (1939 Ward Lock)
 Touch and Go (1939 Ward Lock)
 Ghost Canyon (1939 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 Riders to Bald Butte (1939 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 The Ninth Life (1939 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 The Impossible Crime (1940 Ward Lock)
 The Man with a Scar (1940 Ward Lock)
 The Glass Too Many (1940 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 And Then There Was One (1941 Ward Lock)
 The Ten Buck Trail (1941 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 Her Ways are Death (1941 Wright & Brown) – as Jack Mann
 Curses Come Home (1942 Robert Hale)
 George on the Trail (1942 Ward Lock) – as Barry Lynd
 Dangerous Guide (1943 Robert Hale)
 Samson (1944 Robert Hale)
 She Who Will Not (1945 Robert Hale)
 Other Gods (1945 Robert Hale)
 Magyarul
 Robin Hood; ford., átdolg. Bartos Tibor; Móra, Bp., 1959
 Források
 Angol írók
 1882-ben született személyek
 1947-ben elhunyt személyek


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 886 A.2d 112 (2005)
 389 Md. 402
 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
 v.
 Robert E. CAPPELL.
 Misc. Docket AG No. 55, September Term, 2004.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 November 15, 2005.
 *113 Fletcher P. Thompson, Asst. Bar Counsel (Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland), for Petitioner.
 Robert E. Cappell, Bowie, for Respondent.
 Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
 GREENE, Judge.
 The Attorney Grievance Commission, through Bar Counsel and in conformance with Maryland Rule 16-751, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against respondent, Robert E. Cappell, alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.15(a), (b), and (c) (Safekeeping Property),[1] and 8.4(b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).[2] We referred the petition to Judge Cathy H. Serrette, of the Circuit Court for Prince George's *114 County, to conduct a hearing and submit to this Court her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
 Judge Serrette conducted a hearing on April 5, 2005, and on May 9, 2005, submitted her findings and conclusions. She concluded that respondent had violated MRPC 1.15(a), (b), (c), 8.4(b), (c), and (d). With regard to mitigation, Judge Serrette found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "Mr. Cappell was suffering from a major depressive disorder at the time of the misconduct, with a secondary diagnosis of personality disorder." She further found that, "[a]lthough Mr. Cappell understood the wrongfulness of his behavior, but for his illness, Mr. Cappell would not have committed the misconduct, his illness having been the root cause of his wrongdoing." Neither petitioner nor respondent filed exceptions to the judge's findings or conclusions of law.
 BACKGROUND
 The facts of this case are not in dispute. Respondent was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar on June 16, 1980, the Maryland Bar on June 4, 1986, and the Virginia Bar in 1992. In addition to his Juris Doctor's degree, he holds a Masters of Law degree in taxation from Georgetown University Law School. While attending undergraduate school, during his sophomore year, he became ill and was diagnosed with and treated for Hodgkin's disease.[3]
 He married into a wealthy family in 1987 and apparently had difficulty trying to provide his wife with a comfortable standard of living. In 1993, his wife requested that he move out. She divorced Mr. Cappell in 1995. In 1997, he began a romantic relationship with a woman he had met through his church. At the request of his new lady friend, Mr. Cappell obtained a life insurance policy and named her as the beneficiary. As part of the process to obtain life insurance, Mr. Cappell was tested and learned that he was infected with Hepatitis C,[4] his second potentially-fatal illness. Upon receiving that diagnosis, he obtained medical treatment and took daily shots of interferon.[5] The hearing judge found that respondent "lost his health insurance [coverage], ... [sought treatment at] a homeless shelter clinic [but only obtained] enough medication for a period of five months." Instead of taking the medication, Mr. Cappell prayed for his health to improve. Unable to pay for his own medical necessities, nonetheless, Mr. Cappell managed to pay for groceries and rent for his lady friend and her two children. That relationship, however, ended abruptly when another man moved in with Mr. Cappell's girlfriend, and she and the new gentleman *115 friend decided to get married. Thereafter, Mr. Cappell moved out of his apartment. The hearing judge further found that, in February 1999, "[Mr. Cappell] suffered paralysis of the right side of his face" and was diagnosed with "Bell's [P]alsy."[6] In addition, the hearing judge found that rather than pursue further diagnostic testing or medical care, "[Mr. Cappell] stayed home for several months during which time he took folic acid and antibiotics as his only form of treatment."
 In 1997, he began experiencing sleep disturbances and other depression symptoms. Mr. Cappell believed he would die from the Hepatitis C infection. Although he did not follow through with medical treatment, Mr. Cappell indicated that, he "believed that God was punishing him and that God would save him." At times, according to Mr. Cappell, "[h]e felt anxious and agitated and contemplated suicide on a number of occasions." Respondent did not seek psychiatric or psychological assistance of any type. Instead, Mr. Cappell stated that he, "talked to an elder at his church and to God. His church directed him to pray...."
 The professional conduct which gave rise to disciplinary charges in Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland began in 1998. A $7,000 check from the Hartford Insurance Company, payable to respondent and his client Ernest Tyrone Williams was deposited by respondent into his Trust Account in August 1998. The check represented payment for a personal injury settlement. Subsequently, respondent properly disbursed from that account a check in the amount of $3,191 representing payment for Mr. Williams's share of the settlement. In addition, respondent drew a check in the amount of $2,333 representing payment for his own attorney fees. The sum of $1,476 should have been held in escrow to pay J. Richard Lilly, MD and Assoc., to cover Mr. Williams's medical expenses. The hearing judge concluded that, in violation of the MRPC, the checks written by respondent and drawn on the Trust Account from October 6, 1998, through June 7, 1999, "were not issued to or on behalf of Mr. Williams or Dr. Lilly, the medical provider, but rather were knowingly drawn by Respondent for his business and personal expenses, or for client matters unrelated to Mr. Williams's claim...." On June 11, 1999, respondent drew a check on his Trust Account, in the amount of $1,476 payable to J. Richard Lilly, MD and Assoc., representing payment for medical services rendered to Mr. Williams.
 In addition, respondent deposited a check in the amount of $8,000 from the Continental Insurance Company into his Trust Account on January 21, 1999. Respondent properly disbursed the following checks: check number 1249 to his client, Ms. Herold, in the amount of $2,520.20, representing her share of the settlement proceeds; check number 1258 payable to himself in the amount of $2,000, representing a portion of his legal fees in the case; check number 1266 payable to Howard University Hospital in the amount of $349.90, representing payment for hospital services rendered to Ms. Herold; and check number 1268 payable to Dr. Joseph in the amount of $401.25, representing a partial payment for medical services rendered to Ms. Herold. From January 28 through March 16, 1999, respondent drew checks on the Trust Account for his business and personal expenses or for matters unrelated to Ms. Herold or her claim. Respondent *116 paid the balance due to Dr. Joseph with a cashier's check in the amount of $2,200. From January 28 through March 11, 1999, the balance in respondent's Trust Account was below the amount that should have been there to pay Howard University Hospital, Dr. Joseph and HCC for the cost of medical records. HCC was never paid its bill of $29.10 from respondent's Trust Account. Respondent's Trust Account was overdrawn on March 19 and 30, 1999.
 These instances of misappropriation were the only acts of misconduct reported. There were no prior disciplinary proceedings filed against respondent. Disciplinary proceedings were filed first in the District of Columbia by the District of Columbia Bar Counsel. Maryland and Virginia Bar Counsel followed with separate disciplinary actions.
 Judge Serrette found that,
 [o]n July 22, 2004, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered that Mr. Cappell be disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, but that operation of the disbarment be stayed and Mr. Cappell be placed on three-years' probation subject to the conditions imposed by the Board of Professional Responsibility. Those conditions required that Mr. Cappell: 1) not engage in further misconduct; 2) continue to receive regular treatment; 3) be monitored by a financial practice monitor appointed by the Board; and 4) submit quarterly medical and psychiatric reports to the Board. Any failure to comply with medical or psychiatric advice, or violation of any term of probation will subject Mr. Cappell to the revocation of probation and imposition of disbarment.
 The District of Columbia Bar notified Maryland Bar Counsel that a disciplinary action had been filed against respondent. On November 16, 2004, Maryland Bar Counsel filed a petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, while proceedings were pending in the District of Columbia. It is not clear from the record when the District of Columbia Bar Counsel notified the Virginia State Bar of its disciplinary action against respondent. Shortly after Maryland filed disciplinary proceedings against respondent, and while disciplinary proceedings were pending in Virginia against respondent, Seth Guggenheim, Virginia State Assistant Bar Counsel, recommended to the Board of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary System that, "an Order be entered by the Board vacating Mr. Cappell's interim suspension, canceling the currently scheduled hearing date, and dismissing the matter without prejudice." Mr. Guggenheim conferring with Virginia Bar Counsel, Barbara Ann Williams, reasoned that because "Mr. Cappell's license to practice law in the District of Columbia has been neither revoked nor suspended, reciprocal action by the Virginia State Bar is not appropriate. Reciprocal action in Virginia will be appropriate in the event the D.C. Court of Appeals ... revok[es respondent's] license in the District of Columbia because he has not fulfilled the terms of probation in effect in that jurisdiction."
 Mr. Cappell's psychiatric history was well documented in the District of Columbia disciplinary proceedings. That history was stipulated to and filed in the disciplinary action in Maryland and found by the hearing judge to have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Judge Serrette found that respondent did not meet with a psychiatrist until the District of Columbia Bar Counsel referred him to Dr. Richard A. Ratner. In addition to Dr. Ratner, D.C. Bar Counsel referred Mr. Cappell to Dr. Thomas C. Goldman for an *117 independent evaluation and Maryland Bar Counsel referred Mr. Cappell to Dr. Joanna Brandt for evaluation in connection with the Maryland disciplinary proceedings. The hearing judge held that, "[a]ll three doctors concluded that at the time of the professional misconduct, Mr. Cappell was suffering from a Major Depressive Disorder, as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TV)." Further, the hearing judge found that, Mr. Cappell "experienced a depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, and experienced significant sleep disorder [sic], feelings of worthlessness and guilt, [a] diminished ability to concentrate, and thoughts of death or suicide." The hearing judge determined that Mr. Cappell met the criteria for having a personality disorder.
 In Dr. Ratner's opinion, "Mr. Cappell's illness caused the professional misconduct" and that "had Mr. Cappell not been ill, he would not have made the same choices." Dr. Ratner advised the District of Columbia Bar Counsel that "based upon (Mr. Cappell's) conduct throughout this inquiry... he has hidden nothing and attempted at all times to be as forthcoming as he is able to be, based upon his attitude toward treatment and his following through with it, I feel strongly that Mr. Cappell is not in any danger of recidivism." The hearing judge found that Dr. Goldman's testimony supported Dr. Ratner's diagnosis:
 Dr. Goldman, testifying on behalf of Bar Counsel before the Board of Professional Responsibility of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, opined that at the time Mr. Cappell committed the offenses, he was barely able to carry on the functions of his life due to the severity of the symptoms of his illness. Dr. Goldman characterized Mr. Cappell as "a person whose functioning was very compromised and a person who would not have done this sort of thing if he was not in a state of significant depression." He cited Hodgkin's Lymphoma, and Bell's Palsy as additional significant medical conditions affecting Mr. Cappell. He concluded, "[t]here is no clear evidence to suggest any antisocial intent (that is to rob or defraud his clients)." Dr. Goldman maintained that while Mr. Cappell is at risk of a future recurrence of depression, it was unlikely that he would again engage in misconduct.
 Judge Serrette stated in her findings of fact that, "Dr. Brandt agreed with the diagnosis [of Drs. Ratner and Goldman]. [Dr. Brandt] testified, however, that Mr. Cappell's mental illness had not rendered him utterly debilitated."
 The hearing judge concluded that respondent recognized the impropriety of his conduct and that "he has consistently demonstrated remorse and has cooperated with the District of Columbia Board of Professional Responsibility and Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland."
 DISCUSSION
 Respondent admits that he has violated the provisions of Rules 1.15 and 8.4(a), (b), and (c) of the MRPC. Petitioner recommends disbarment and respondent proposes that we adopt the recommendation of the Maryland Peer Review Panel and impose corresponding discipline similar to the District of Columbia and Virginia.
 At the outset we note that this is not a case of reciprocal discipline under Md. Rule 16-773.[7] Here, Bar Counsel did *118 not wait until disciplinary proceedings in the District of Columbia had concluded before litigating a proceeding in Maryland. The rules applicable to reciprocal discipline matters are not applicable in situations where the Attorney Grievance Commission does not initiate or process the disciplinary proceeding as a reciprocal discipline matter. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Steinberg, 385 Md. 696, 703, 870 A.2d 603, 607 (2005). Although, in the present proceedings, Bar Counsel and respondent agreed to a stipulation of the facts entered in the District of Columbia disciplinary proceedings and conducted the hearing on the basis of those previously proven facts, there was no opinion from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals when the present case was docketed in Maryland, and Bar Counsel did not rely on Rule 16-731 in presenting its case. Even if this were a matter of reciprocal discipline, as to the appropriate sanction we have said that this Court is "inclined, but not required, to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred. We are required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission." Attorney Griev. Comm'n. v. Scroggs, 387 Md. 238, 254, 874 A.2d 985, 995 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the disciplinary proceedings conducted in the District of Columbia, including the sanction imposed, while relevant to our consideration of this case, are not entitled to the same weight as if this were a proceeding pursued as a reciprocal discipline matter.
 In addition, matters which took place at the Peer Review Panel hearing are relevant in this case only because respondent raises the matter of the Panel's recommendations in support of his argument for the appropriate disposition. Ordinarily the conduct of the Peer Review Panel is confidential and inadmissible in any proceeding. See Md. Rule 16-723(a) (Confidentiality of peer review meetings). The Peer Review Panel met and recommended to Bar Counsel that because respondent's misconduct "occurred when [he] was acting under both mental and physical disabilities," as supported by the uncontradicted medical testimony, he "should not be disbarred[,] but[,] his actions should be monitored in a manner similar to that imposed by the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibilities."
 In Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108, 874 A.2d 897, 908 (2005), in discussing the Peer Review process, we pointed out that the "process features a panel of ... attorneys and ... non-attorney[s], that make[] a preliminary determination as to whether formal charges should be filed against the respondent attorney." Judge Harrell writing for the Court explained:
 [T]he Peer Review Panel proceeding is an informal, nonadversarial meeting designed to allow Bar Counsel, the respondent attorney, the complainant, and other invited persons to meet and discuss the issues presented in the complaint in an environment similar to a mediation process.... The Panel is not governed by any formal rules of evidence, but must respect lawful privileges....
 *119 The purpose of the Peer Review Panel is not principally to make recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal charges....
 If a Peer Review Panel concludes that the complaint has a substantial basis indicating the need for some remedy, some behavioral or operational changes on the part of the lawyer, or some discipline short of suspension or disbarment, part of the peer review process can be an attempt through both evaluative and facilitative dialogue, (A) to effectuate directly or suggest a mechanism for effecting an amicable resolution of the existing dispute between the lawyer and the complainant, and (B) to encourage the lawyer to recognize any deficiencies on his or her part that led to the problem and take appropriate remedial steps to address those deficiencies. The goal, in this setting, is not to punish or stigmatize the lawyer or to create a fear that any admission of deficiency will result in substantial harm, but rather to create an ambience for a constructive solution. The objective views of two fellow lawyers and a lay person, expressed in the form of advice and opinion rather than in the form of adjudication, may assist the lawyer (and the complainant) to retreat from confrontational positions and look at the problem more realistically. [Committee note to Rule 16-743(a).]
 If, however, after hearing statements, the Panel determines that the Statement of Charges "has a substantial basis and that there is reason to believe that the [respondent] attorney has committed professional misconduct or is incapacitated, the Panel may ... make an appropriate recommendation to the Commission or ... inform the parties of its determination and allow the attorney an opportunity to consider a reprimand or a Conditional Diversion Agreement." The Panel is authorized to recommend to the Commission that either a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action be filed, the Statement of Charges be dismissed, or that a Conditional Diversion Agreement or reprimand is appropriate. Although the purpose of the Panel proceeding is not to generate any formal findings of fact, the Panel must accompany its recommendation with "a brief explanatory statement."
 Lee, 387 Md. at 108-09, 874 A.2d at 908-09 (internal citations omitted).
 In the present case, the Peer Review Panel considered Bar Counsel's evidence against respondent and concluded that there was a substantial basis for a finding that respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the MRPC; that respondent admitted the conduct; and that there was a substantial basis for mitigation in the punishment imposed in these violations. The Panel asked Bar Counsel to consider entering into a Conditional Diversion Agreement with respondent because "respondent was acting under a severe disability at the time of the misappropriation as a result of the breakdown of his marriage, problems with the IRS and mental and physical disabilities." In the Panel's view, a similar sanction to that imposed in the District of Columbia could be achieved in a diversion agreement and would be appropriate because of the mitigating evidence in this case. Bar Counsel declined that invitation indicating that it was not authorized to enter into such an agreement. Assistant Bar Counsel explained during oral argument in this case that, in light of Bar Counsel's duty to investigate complaints of misconduct and our decision in Attorney Griev. Comm'n. v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001), diversion agreements *120 are inappropriate in matters involving misappropriation of client funds or other dishonest conduct. Because, for reasons to be explained, infra, we believe Bar Counsel and therefore the Commission may have misinterpreted the scope of Md. Rule 16-736, we shall remand this case for reconsideration.
 Effective July 1, 2001, the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure, for the first time contained a conditional diversion rule. Md. Rule 16-736. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Olver, 376 Md. 650, 652, 831 A.2d 66, 67 (2003). Rule 16-736 provides, in part:
 (a) When Appropriate. Upon completing an investigation, Bar Counsel may agree to a Conditional Diversion Agreement if Bar Counsel concludes that:
 (1) the attorney committed professional misconduct or is incapacitated;
 (2) the professional misconduct or incapacity was not the result of any wilful or dishonest conduct and did not involve conduct that could be the basis for an immediate Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action pursuant to Rules 16-771,[8] 16-773,[9] or 16-774;[10]
 (3) the cause or basis of the professional misconduct or incapacity is subject to remediation or resolution through alternative programs or mechanisms, including (A) medical, psychological, or other professional treatment, counseling, or assistance, (B) appropriate educational courses or programs, (C) mentoring or monitoring services, or (D) dispute resolution programs; and
 (4) the public interest and the welfare of the attorney's clients and prospective clients will not be harmed if, instead of the matter proceeding immediately with a disciplinary or remedial proceeding, the attorney agrees to and complies with specific measures that, if pursued, will remedy the immediate problem and likely prevent any recurrence of it.
 We said in Olver, "that the purpose for promulgating the diversion rule was to give Bar Counsel and the Commission the flexibility to resolve or remediate certain kinds of misconduct or incapacity, without resort to the full panoply of resources required for resolution of formal disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 658, 831 A.2d at 71. The Committee note to Rule 16-736 provides some examples of conduct that may be appropriate for conditional diversion:
 Examples of conduct that may be susceptible to conditional diversion include conduct arising from (A) unfamiliarity with proper methods of law office management, record-keeping, or accounting, (B) unfamiliarity with particular areas of *121 law or legal procedure, (C) negligent management of attorney trust accounts or other financial matters, (D) negligent failure to maintain proper communication with clients, (E) negligent failure to provide proper supervision of employees, or (F) emotional stress or crisis or abuse of alcohol or other drugs.
 In Olver, we focused our discussion on the specific types of impairments which would qualify attorneys for the conditional diversion program. In that regard, Chief Judge Bell, writing for the Court, said:
 This case seems to fall within the Rule, to be the kind of case that the Court had in mind when it approved a diversion alternative to be administered outside of, and without the supervision of, judicial proceedings  the Comment to Rule 16-736(a) lists "emotional stress or crisis or abuse of alcohol or other drugs" as an "[e]xample of conduct that may be susceptible to conditional diversion."
 Olver, 376 Md. at 656, 831 A.2d at 70. Although the hearing judge in Olver had made factual findings and drew conclusions of law, we elected not to consider the merits of the proceedings and remanded the case to the Attorney Grievance Commission in order for Bar Counsel to determine whether to propose a conditional diversion agreement or inactive status. See Olver at 659, 831 A.2d at 71-72.
 In Olver, however, we considered the testimony regarding the attorney's mental disorder and the hearing judge's factual findings pertaining thereto. Id. In our discussion of the attorney's alleged misconduct which the hearing court concluded violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(d), we placed considerable emphasis on the attorney's misconduct stemming from his mental illness or infirmity. Mr. Olver's misconduct was characterized by Bar Counsel's witness, a board certified general psychiatrist and forensic psychiatrist, as "Major Depression, a chronic illness, punctuated by episodes of severe depression, and a Personality Disorder, `a lifelong condition resulting in the [lawyer] experiencing persistent and consistent interactions that will get the patient into difficult situations....'" Olver at 657, 831 A.2d at 70. Bar Counsel acknowledged that Mr. Olver was "unable to render adequate legal services by reason of mental illness or infirmity." Id. Moreover, the doctor in Olver "concluded that the [attorney's] mental condition caused him to act as he did in his representation of the complainant ... that [O]ver wa]s not capable of rendering adequate legal services." Id. The psychiatrist, however, pointed out that if Mr. Olver took "his medication, remain[ed] in psychiatric therapy and [was] supervised weekly, he may be able to practice." Olver, 376 Md. at 657, 831 A.2d at 70-71.
 In remanding this case for consideration of conditional diversion, we placed substantial emphasis on Mr. Olver's mental impairment rather than on his professional misconduct. We acknowledged that the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Olver violated Rule 8.4(d)  conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and that Mr. Olver's alleged misconduct was characterized as "unusual and strange." Olver, 376 Md. at 657, 831 A.2d at 70. In characterizing the nature of Mr. Olver's misconduct, we relied upon allegations in the complaint that "the petitioner indicated that the respondent's `unusual and odd behavior ... stemmed from one or more psychiatric disorders'" and that "... respondent was `unable to render adequate legal services by reason of [his] mental illness or infirmity.'" Id.
 Similarly, in the present case, the hearing judge found that Mr. Cappell's alleged misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Unlike Mr. Olver, however, *122 respondent's alleged misconduct violated Rule 8.4(b) and (c). Although Mr. Cappell's conduct involved allegations of dishonesty and misappropriation of client funds, under the circumstances, the present case is not materially different from the circumstances in Olver since Mr. Cappell's misconduct "was the root cause of his wrongdoing." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the hearing judge in this case concluded that, at the time of his misconduct, respondent suffered from a mental disorder, and but for that illness the misconduct would not have occurred. The hearing judge found from the evidence that respondent was depressed most of the day, nearly every day, and was unable to concentrate. As explained by Dr. Goldman, the psychiatrist engaged to give an independent psychiatric examination, "[t]he depression contributed substantially to [Mr. Cappell] getting into a tight cash-flow situation and also impaired his ability to come up with more adaptive solutions to the bind, and to make an accurate assessment of the risk he was incurring in acting as he did." Although, Dr. Brandt, who was engaged by Maryland Bar Counsel to give a psychiatric examination, concluded that Mr. Cappell's mental impairment did not result "in his utter inability to conform his conduct in accordance with the law and the [MRPC]." Dr. Brandt stated that Mr. Cappell suffered "from symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder at the time of his misconduct," and that the "symptoms included depressed mood, sleep disorder, diminished interest in activities, feelings of hopelessness and suicidal ideation," which impaired to some extent his social and occupational functioning.
 In attorney disciplinary matters, conditional diversion[11] is a disposition to be distinguished from that of imposing a sanction. When deciding the issue of whether conditional diversion is appropriate, the initial question for Bar Counsel is whether the filing of a disciplinary or remedial action is necessary. Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel may, among other dispositions, recommend to the Commission either the approval of a Conditional Diversion Agreement or the immediate filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action. See Rule 16-734.[12] Neither Bar Counsel nor the Commission *123 is required to determine the appropriate sanction or predict which sanction we might impose on the merits. The issue of assessing the appropriate sanction to be imposed after review of the merits of a disciplinary action is a matter left solely to the province of this Court. Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 653 A.2d 909 (1995); see also Md. Rule 16-721(a) (sanctions imposed by the Court of Appeals include disbarment, suspension or reprimand).
 An attorney may be eligible for conditional diversion when his or her professional misconduct was not the result of any wilful or dishonest conduct; the cause or basis of the misconduct can be resolved through remediation or alternative programs or mechanisms; and the disposition is in the best interest of the public and the attorney's clients both present and prospective. See Rule 16-736. Accordingly, consistent with the eligibility requirements of conditional diversion,[13] and Rule 16-736(a)(2), Bar Counsel could have concluded, in this case, that Mr. Cappell's misconduct was not solely "the result of any wilful or dishonest conduct." Moreover, in our view, the hearing judge's factual findings tend to cast doubt on whether respondent's misconduct was wilful and intentionally dishonest. Although respondent appeared to concede facially at every level of the disciplinary process that he knew his conduct was wrong, the medical evidence supports the hearing judge's conclusion that, during the time of Mr. Cappell's misconduct, his cognitive abilities were substantially impaired.
 Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789 A.2d 119 (2002) (stating that a hearing judge's factual findings with regard to mitigating factors tended to negate any dishonest or fraudulent intent); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. *124 Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661 (2001) (noting that "the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] `important in the context of mitigation'"); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression). In light of our construction of Rule 16-736, conduct involving "emotional stress or crisis or abuse of alcohol and drugs ... may be susceptible to conditional diversion." Because of our interpretation of the eligibility requirements of Rule 16-736, an attorney may be eligible for conditional diversion even in situations where his or her conduct is allegedly wilful or dishonest.
 The Vanderlinde standard of mitigation is a separate standard and is not a factor in deciding whether a case qualifies for disposition under Rule 16-736. It does not preclude the Attorney Grievance Commission or Bar Counsel from entering into conditional diversion agreements. The Vanderlinde standard should not be determinative of the Commission's or Bar Counsel's decision to enter or not to enter into conditional diversion.
 Recently in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. James, 385 Md. 637, 870 A.2d 229 (2005), we held that disbarment was the appropriate disciplinary sanction for an attorney's misappropriation of client funds and other misconduct. Our decision to disbar the attorney had no bearing, and, should have had no bearing on the Commission's or Bar Counsel's decision to enter into conditional diversion with Mr. James. In that case, two complaints were filed against Mr. James for professional misconduct. Apparently after the first complaint, but before the second complaint, Bar Counsel and Mr. James entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement, on November 18, 2002. James, 385 Md. at 646, 870 A.2d at 234-35. After approximately 18 months, however, Mr. James was found to have violated the agreement. Id. After revocation of the agreement, we transmitted the matter to this Court to hear the charges contained in the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 16-757. Id. Thereafter, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial action against Mr. James. The matter came for hearing before a judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County who made findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding that Mr. James violated the MRPC, 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(a), 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); Md. Rule 16-604, 16-607, 16-609; and §§ 10-304 and 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. James, 385 Md. at 662, 870 A.2d at 244. Bar Counsel charged Mr. James with violating different sections of the MRPC in each complaint. Id.
 Only the complaint involving allegations that Mr. James misused his attorney escrow account between January 2000 and August 2001 is relevant to our discussion. Bar Counsel charged Mr. James with violating MRPC 1.1, 1.15(a), 8.4(a) and (d), Rules 16-607 and 16-609 and Business Occupations and Professions Article §§ 10-306 and 10-307. The facts which support the allegations of misappropriation and commingling of trust money predated the Conditional Diversion Agreement entered into on November 18, 2002. Although, the attorney's misconduct involved misappropriation and commingling of trust money, he could have been but was not charged with violating Rule 8.4(c) (acts of dishonesty).
 *125 The hearing judge found that in January 2000, Mr. James intentionally stopped using his personal account and started using his attorney escrow account for personal and business matters. James, 385 Md. at 648, 870 A.2d at 236. For example, on January 10, 2000, Mr. James wrote escrow check number 1063 to Directv, representing a personal expenditure. Id. On June 18, 2001, Mr. James's escrow account had a negative running balance of $38.39. This was apparently due to his overpayment by $10 to his client, Shelia Smith, of her portion of the proceeds from an arbitration award and a bank fee of $30 assessed for insufficient funds. Id. On June 19, 2001, Mr. James deposited $8,000 into his escrow account on behalf of his client, Catherine A. Davis. He mishandled Ms. Davis's $8,000 settlement by failing to maintain her money in tact due to several negative account balances which went below the amount of monies he was suppose to hold in trust for the client. The net proceeds of Ms. Davis's settlement ($1,774.75), which Mr. James held in escrow, fell below that amount on at least three occasions. Id. On April 22, 2002, three of Mr. James's escrow checks were presented to his bank for payment and "[a]ll three checks caused an overdraft in a combined total amount of $70." James, 385 Md. at 648, 870 A.2d at 236.
 The hearing judge concluded that "[Mr. James's] mishandling of his escrow account and his failure to keep Ms. Davis's monies intact until disbursed [were] prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d)." James, 385 Md. at 649-650, 870 A.2d at 236. Upon our review of the case, we determined that "Mr. James misappropriated Ms. Davis's funds in escrow... and ... use[d] client funds for personal purposes." We pointed out that "[i]ntentional [m]isappropriation, by an attorney, of funds entrusted to [an attorney's] care `is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty.'" James, 385 Md. at 665-66, 870 A.2d at 246. By comparison, Mr. James's behavior in handling his escrow account was not materially different than Mr. Cappell's behavior in handling his escrow account. Both cases involved attorneys failing to keep client funds in tact until they were disbursed and using client funds for personal purposes. Although Mr. James was not charged with violating Rule 8.4(c), his handling of his escrow account, specifically the misappropriation of client funds, involved wilful and dishonest acts in violation of that Rule.
 For whatever reasons, in James, Bar Counsel and the Commission opted to attempt resolution of the matter first by conditional diversion. We were not privy to that decision. In making that decision, however, Bar Counsel and the Commission were not required to predict what our disposition might have been on the merits of the case prior to entering into conditional diversion. Bar Counsel and therefore the Commission had the benefit of Rule 16-736 and its own discretion to enter into conditional diversion. It appears that in James, Bar Counsel was not guided by the Vanderlinde standard of mitigation and entered into an agreement with Mr. James for conditional diversion notwithstanding our holding in Vanderlinde. Because it was determined that Mr. James had violated the agreement, it was appropriate in accordance with the Md. Rules, that the matter was brought to our attention for disciplinary action.
 In Vanderlinde, we held:
 In cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as "compelling extenuating circumstances," anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, *126 arising from any source that is the "root cause" of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney's utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and the MRPC.
 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485 (emphasis in original); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 648-49, 861 A.2d 692, 706 (2004) (finding compelling extenuating circumstances when an attorney's severe major depression and alcoholism were the root cause of his misconduct and resulted in his utter inability to conform his conduct in accordance with the law and the MRPC). See also Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Alsafty, 379 Md. 1, 17-18, 838 A.2d 1213, 1223 (2003) (stating that before Vanderlinde and post Vanderlinde we continue to recognize "a distinction between intentional conduct, as in Vanderlinde ... and negligent or unintentional conduct") (internal citations omitted). In those situations where we have applied the Vanderlinde standard, it was after a determination on the merits and for the purpose of imposing a sanction. We have never said that satisfaction of the Vanderlinde standard is a necessary precondition for conditional diversion. Rule 16-736(b) contains the eligibility requirements for conditional diversion. Based upon our construction of that rule, if there is competent evidence presented from which Bar Counsel and therefore the Commission may conclude that an attorney's unprofessional conduct was not solely the result of wilful or intentionally dishonest conduct, conditional diversion may be an appropriate disposition. Because Bar Counsel believed that our decision in Vanderlinde precluded respondent's eligibility for conditional diversion, we decline to consider the merits of these proceedings at this time. We remand this case for the Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel to reconsider entering into a Conditional Diversion Agreement even though disciplinary proceedings have begun.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.
 NOTES
 [1] Rule 1.15 provides:
 (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.
 * * * *
 (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
 (e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.
 * * * *
 [2] Rule 8.4 provides in relevant part:
 * * * *
 It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
 * * * *
 (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
 (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
 (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 * * * *
 [3] Hodgkin's disease is an alternative name for lymphoma [cancer of the lymph nodes], which is "[m]arked by chronic enlargement of the lymph nodes, often local at the onset and later generalized, together with enlargement of the spleen and often the liver, ... and commonly anemia and continuous or remittent... fever." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 516 (27th ed. 2000).
 [4] Hepatitis C is characterized as, "[i]nflammation of the liver, due usually to viral infection, and sometimes to toxic agents." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 808 (27th ed. 2000). Hepatitis C is the principal form of transfusion-induced hepatitis, a chronic active form that often develops. See id. Acute infection with hepatitis B or C has a higher mortality rate than hepatitis A. See id.
 [5] Medication to induce enzymes, suppress cell proliferation, inhibit viral proliferation, enhance the phagocytic activity of macrophases, and augment the cytotoxic activity of T lymphocytes. "Alpha interferons are used in the treatment of chronic ... hepatitis C, leukemias, [and] malignant melanoma...." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 911 (27th ed. 2000).
 [6] Bell's Palsy causes, "[p]aresis or paralysis, usually unilateral, of the facial muscles, caused by dysfunction of the 7th cranial nerve; probably due to a viral infection; usually demyelinating in type." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1301 (27th ed. 2000).
 [7] Maryland Rule 16-773(e)(3) and (4) provides, in relevant part:
 * * * *
 (e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:
 * * * *
 (3) the imposition of corresponding discipline would result in grave injustice;
 (4) the conduct established does not constitute misconduct in this State or it warrants substantially different discipline in this State....
 [8] Rule 16-771, titled "Disciplinary or remedial action upon conviction of crime," requires Bar Counsel to file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals when it learns and verifies that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime. The Rule further provides that, after a hearing, this Court may suspend the attorney from the practice of law until final disposition of the disciplinary or remedial action if it determines that the attorney has been convicted of a serious crime.
 [9] Rule 16-773 addresses reciprocal or inactive status cases in which, "[a]n attorney who in another jurisdiction (1) is disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined, (2) resigns from the bar while disciplinary or remedial action is threatened or pending in that jurisdiction, or (3) is placed on inactive status based on incapacity...."
 [10] Rule 16-774 involves attorneys "summarily placed on inactive status for an indefinite period if the attorney has been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent or to require a guardian of the person for any of the reasons stated in Code, Estates and Trusts Article, § 13-705(b), or, in accordance with law, has been involuntarily admitted to a facility for inpatient care treatment of a mental disorder."
 [11] Rule 16-712(b)(3) grants Bar Counsel the authority to "enter into and implement Conditional Diversion Agreements...." We acknowledged in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Harlan, 320 Md. 571, 580, 578 A.2d 1196, 1200 (1990), that Bar Counsel exercises prosecutorial discretion in the performance of his duties. See also Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 250, 760 A.2d 1108 (2000) (noting that Bar Counsel is empowered, "inter alia, to investigate all matters involving possible misconduct called to his attention and to prosecute disciplinary cases"). Not unlike a prosecutor, Bar Counsel, in the performance of his duty, does not act in a purely ministerial capacity. His function involves the exercise of discretion. See Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944) (noting generally that the State's Attorney institutes any particular prosecution as a matter of discretion) (internal citations omitted).
 [12] Rule 16-734. Procedure upon completion of investigation.
 Upon completion of an investigation, Bar Counsel shall take one of the following actions:
 (a) recommend to the Commission dismissal of the complaint or termination of the proceeding without discipline, with or without a warning, in accordance with Rule 16-735;
 (b) recommend to the Commission approval of a Conditional Diversion Agreement signed by Bar Counsel and the attorney in accordance with Rule 16-736;
 (c) recommend to the Commission a reprimand in accordance with Rule 16-737;
 (d) file with the Commission a Statement of Charges with an election for peer review in accordance with Rule 16-741; or
 (e) recommend to the Commission the immediate filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, with or without collateral remedial proceedings in accordance with Rules 16-771, 16-773, or 16-774.
 [13] Eleven other states and the District of Columbia (Rule XI, Section 8.1) have adopted diversion programs: Alabama (Rule 8(h)), Arizona (Rule 55), Colorado (Rule 251.13), Kansas (Rule 203(d)), Louisiana (Rule XIX, Section 10(A)(9)), Nevada (Rule 105.5), New Hampshire (Rule 37A(g)), New York (Rule 691.4(m)), Oregon (Rule 2.10), Wisconsin (Rule 22.10), and Wyoming (Section 14, Disciplinary Code). Some states have adopted other non-disciplinary proceedings the equivalent of diversion programs: Delaware (Rule 9(b)(2)(C)), Florida (Rule 3-5.1(b)(2)), Georgia (Rule 4-102(b)(5)), Hawaii (Rule 2.3(a)(6)), Michigan (Rule 9.106(6)), Missouri (Rule 16.01), New Jersey (Rule 1:20-14(a)), and Texas (Rule 2.14(C)). Generally, the jurisdictions do not allow participation in a diversion program where "the misconduct is severe, or involves theft of client funds, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, or where the attorney has been previously disciplined (or has previously entered into a diversion program)." See Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Current Development, Professional Misconduct By Mentally Impaired Attorneys: Is There A Better Way to Treat An Old Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (2004) ("Diversion Programs assist attorneys while preserving the public's trust, and thereby conform to the goals of discipline").
 The exception to the general rule of ineligibility for participation in the diversion program because of serious misconduct is found in the Wisconsin Rule. That Rule specifically provides, however, that if good cause is shown an attorney can participate in the diversion program even if his or her misconduct involves misappropriation of client funds. In Oregon, in addition to the general rule, the exception specifically provides for participation in the diversion program if the attorney's misconduct is the result of a mental condition.


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 13.7.2015
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 228/7
 Prasība, kas celta 2015. gada 12. maijā – Eiropas Komisija/Vācijas Federatīvā Republika
 (Lieta C-220/15)
 (2015/C 228/09)
 Tiesvedības valoda – vācu
 Lietas dalībnieki
 Prasītāja: Eiropas Komisija (pārstāvji – D. Kukovec, A. C. Becker)
 Atbildētāja: Vācijas Federatīvā Republika
 Prasītājas prasījumi:
 —
 Die erste Verordnung zum Sprengstoffgesetz [Likuma par sprāgstvielām pirmajos izpildes noteikumos] (turpmāk tekstā – “1. SprengV”) papildus direktīvas prasībām paredzot, ka, kaut arī iepriekš ir novērtēta pirotehnisko izstrādājumu atbilstība, pirms to laišanas tirgū ir jāveic 1. SprengV 6. panta 4. punktā paredzētā procedūra un ka Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung [Federālā materiālu izpētes un pārbaudes iestāde] ir pilnvarota atbilstoši 1. SprengV 6. panta 4. punkta piektajam teikumam pārbaudīt visu pirotehnisko izstrādājumu lietošanas pamācības un – vajadzības gadījumā tās grozīt, Vācijas Federatīvā Republika nav izpildījusi pienākumus, kas tai paredzēti Direktīvas 2007/23/EK (1) 6. panta 1. punktā,
 —
 piespriest Vācijas Federatīvajai Republikai atlīdzināt tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 Pamati un galvenie argumenti
 Šī prasība attiecas uz jautājumu par to, ciktāl dalībvalstis pirotehnisko izstrādājumu laišanai tirgū var paredzēt papildus valsts prasības pirotehnisko izstrādājumu ražotājiem un importētājiem Direktīvas 2007/23/EK izpratnē attiecībā arī uz tādiem izstrādājumiem, kas atbilstoši CE marķējumam atbilst direktīvas būtiskajām prasībām. Turklāt Komisijas apstrīdētajā regulējumā nav noteiktas saturiskas prasības šiem izstrādājumiem, bet tajā tikai ir paredzēta papildu procedūra, kas jāveic pirms piekļuves tirgum atbildētājas suverēnajā teritorijā.
 Neņemot vērā atbilstības pierādījumus, atbildētāja prasa, lai visi pirotehniskie izstrādājumi Direktīvas 2007/23/EK izpratnē tiek uzrādīti likumā noteiktā federālajā iestādē, kas uzrādīšanas pierādīšanas nolūkos piešķir identifikācijas numuru. Šī procedūra ne tikai ilgst ievērojamu laiku, bet tajā var būt paredzēta tostarp arī apstrādes nodevas samaksas, kā arī paraugu pārbaudei iesniegšana. Komisija uzskata, ka šāda procedurāla prasība ir pretrunā Direktīvas 2007/23/EK 6. pantā garantētajai to pirotehnisko izstrādājumu brīvai apritei, kuri atbilst direktīvas prasībām.
 Šajā situācijā nekas neesot mainījies arī pēc Direktīvas 2013/29/ES (2) pieņemšanas, ar kuru no 2015. gada 1. jūlija tika atcelta Direktīva 2007/23/EK. Pirmkārt, lai novērtētu, vai ir pārkāpts līgums, atsauces laikposms ir argumentētajā atzinumā norādītais termiņš (šajā gadījumā – 2014. gada 27. marts). Otrkārt, Direktīvas 2013/29/ES 4. panta 1. punktā ir ietverta Direktīvas 2007/23/EK 6. panta 1. punktam identiska norma par to visu pirotehnisko izstrādājumu brīvas aprites nodrošināšanu, kas atbilst Savienības tiesībās ietvertajām prasībām.
 Līdz ar to Komisijas skatījumā šajā lietā apgalvoto atbildētājas izdarīto tiesību pārkāpumu būtībā veido nepieļaujams, Savienības tiesības harmonizējošās prasības pārsniedzošs procesuāls nosacījums pirotehnisko izstrādājumu laišanai tirgū. Prima facie apstrīdētais regulējums kā procesuāla prasība rada iespaidu, ka tas tikai rada nelielu aizkavēšanos atsevišķos gadījumos šo izstrādājumu tirdzniecībā. Tomēr nedrīkst novērtēt par zemu šī regulējuma faktiskās sekas. Šajā ziņā vispirms ir jāņem vērā, ka atbildētājam ir viens no lielākajiem, ja ne – pats lielākais, pirotehnisko izstrādājumu noieta tirgus iekšējā tirgū. Turklāt ir jāņem vērā, ka noteikti pirotehniskie izstrādājumi atbildētājas suverēnajā teritorijā drīkst tikt nodoti patērētājiem tikai vienu reizi gadā un uz neilgu laika posmu, ar ko šīs piekļuves tirgum laika aspekts iegūst vēl lielāku nozīmi. Visbeidzot, šajā ziņā ir jādomā arī, ka šajā lietā apstrīdēto regulējumu atbilstoši valsts tiesībām īsteno tā pati iestāde, kas kā pilnvarotā iestāde Direktīvas 2007/23/EK izpratnē ir pilnvarota veikt atbilstības vērtējumu. Tādējādi atbildētājas valsts tiesībās noteiktā prasība veikt papildu procedūru rada šai iestādei konkurences priekšrocību salīdzinājumā ar citu dalībvalstu pilnvarotajām iestādēm. Ņemot vērā šīs apstrīdētā regulējuma praktiskās sekas, šajā tiesvedībā nekādā ziņā nav runa tikai par tirgus principiālu juridisko vērtējumu dalībnieka ierobežojumam tirgot preces, ko jau cita iestāde, kas nav Vācijas pilnvarotā iestāde, ir novērtējusi kā atbilstošu Savienības tiesību prasībām.
 (1) Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2007. gada 23. maija Direktīva 2007/23/EK par pirotehnisko izstrādājumu laišanu tirgū, OV L 154, 1. lpp.
 (2) Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2013. gada 12. jūnija Direktīva 2013/29/ES par dalībvalstu tiesību aktu saskaņošanu attiecībā uz pirotehnisko izstrādājumu pieejamību tirgū (pārstrādāta redakcija), OV L 178, 27. lpp


type: other

text:
Amtsblatt REGIERUNG VON SCHWABEN. Inhaltsverzeichnis. Augsburg, den 18. August 2009 Seite 117. Wirtschaft, Landesentwicklung und Verkehr - PDF
 Download "Amtsblatt REGIERUNG VON SCHWABEN. Inhaltsverzeichnis. Augsburg, den 18. August 2009 Seite 117. Wirtschaft, Landesentwicklung und Verkehr"
 1 Amtsblatt REGIERUNG VON SCHWABEN Nr Jahrgang Augsburg, den 18. August 2009 Seite 117 Inhaltsverzeichnis Wirtschaft, Landesentwicklung und Verkehr Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz EnWG) vom 7. Juli 2005 (BGBl I S. 1970) Bekanntmachung der Regierung von Schwaben Schule, Kultur und Sport Verordnung zur Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen im Markt Mering Vom 13. Juli Verordnung zur Auflösung, Errichtung und Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Augsburg Vom 23. Juli Verordnung über die Einrichtung eines regierungsbezirksübergreifenden Fachsprengels für die Beschulung im Einzeltagesunterricht an der Städtischen Berufsschule Augsburg IV (Welser Schule) im Ausbildungsberuf Servicefachkraft für Dialogmarketing und im Ausbildungsberuf Kaufmann/Kauffrau für Dialogmarketing Vom 30. Juli Verordnung zur Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Königsbrunn Vom 31. Juli Bekanntmachungen anderer Behörden Stadtentwicklungsverband Ulm/Neu-Ulm Bebauungsplanteiländerung M 54.2 Schwaighofen Süd/Auf den Aulen, 2. Änderung Bekanntmachung des Satzungsbeschlusses, Inkrafttreten Haushaltssatzung des Abfallzweckverbandes Augsburg - AZV für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 Vom 15. Juni Haushaltssatzung des Schulverbandes Memmingen-Amendingen für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 Vom 10. Juli
 2 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/ Wirtschaft, Landesentwicklung und Verkehr Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz EnWG) vom 7. Juli 2005 (BGBl I S. 1970) Bekanntmachung der Regierung von Schwaben Nach 3a EnWG bedürfen die Entgelte für den Zugang zu Strom- und Gasnetzen einer behördlichen Genehmigung. Mit dem Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Zuständigkeiten zum Vollzug wirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften (ZustWiG) vom (GVBl Nr. 5, S. 122) und der darauf beruhenden Verordnung zur Änderung der Verordnung zum Vollzug wirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften (ZustWiV) vom (GVBl Nr. 6, S. 127) wird die Genehmigung der Netzentgelte - mit Ausnahme des jeweils größten Strom- und Gasnetzbetreibers in Bayern - rückwirkend zum auf die Regierungen übertragen. Gemäß 74 Satz 1 EnWG sind Entscheidungen der Regulierungsbehörde auf der Internetseite und im Amtsblatt der Regulierungsbehörde zu veröffentlichen. Wegen der kurzfristigen Ergänzungen und der großen Datenmengen wird die Veröffentlichung der Entscheidungen über die Anträge der Netzbetreiber im Regierungsbezirk Schwaben ausschließlich auf der Internetseite der Regierung von Schwaben (Suchbegriff: Regulierung) vorgenommen. RABl Schw S. 118 Schule, Kultur und Sport Verordnung zur Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen im Markt Mering Vom 13. Juli 2009 Auf Grund des Art. 26 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 29 und Art. 32 Abs. 5 des Bayerischen Gesetzes über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen (BayEUG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 31. Mai 2000 (GVBl S. 414), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22. Juli 2008 (GVBl S. 467), erlässt die Regierung von Schwaben folgende Verordnung: 3 der Verordnung über die Auflösung und Errichtung von Volksschulen im Markt Mering, Lkr. Aichach-Friedberg, vom (RABl Schw. S. 12), zuletzt geändert durch Verordnung vom (RABl Schw. S. 113), wird geändert und erhält folgende Fassung: Als Schulsprengel werden bestimmt 1. für die in Nr. 1 genannte Grundschule (Volksschule Mering Ambérieustraße) das westliche Teilgebiet des Marktes Mering, das nach Osten begrenzt wird durch die Bundesstraße 2 (nördlicher Abschnitt) Kreuzung der Bundesstraße 2 mit der Bahnlinie Augsburg-München Bahnlinie Augsburg-München in südöstliche Richtung bis zur Paarstraße Zettlerstraße in südwestliche Richtung bis zur Querung Finsterbach Finsterbach in südliche Richtung bis zur Gemeindegrenze Gemeindegrenze in östliche Richtung bis zur Bahnlinie Augsburg- München Bahnlinie Augsburg-München bis zur südlichen Gemeindegrenze, 2. für die in Nr. 2 genannte Grundschule (Volksschule Mering Luitpoldstraße) das östlich von vorstehender Grenzlinie liegende Teilgebiet des Marktes Mering. Die mit der Neubeschreibung der beiden Schulsprengel in verbundene Sprengeländerung wird wirksam - für die Jahrgangsstufe 1 ab dem Schuljahr 2009/2010, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 2 ab dem Schuljahr 2010/2011, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 3 ab dem Schuljahr 2011/2012, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 4 ab dem Schuljahr 2012/2013.
 3 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/ Diese Verordnung tritt am 1. August 2009 in Kraft. Augsburg, den 13. Juli 2009 Regierung von Schwaben Karl Michael Scheufele Regierungspräsident RABl Schw S. 118 Verordnung zur Auflösung, Errichtung und Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Augsburg Vom 23. Juli 2009 Auf Grund des Art. 26 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 29 und Art. 32 Abs. 5 des Bayerischen Gesetzes über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen (BayEUG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 31. Mai 2000 (GVBl S. 414), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22. Juli 2008 (GVBl S. 467), erlässt die Regierung von Schwaben folgende Verordnung: Die Verordnung zur Auflösung, Errichtung und Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Augsburg vom (RABl Schw. S. 36) wird geändert und erhält in 3 folgende Fassung: 3 (1) Die Errichtung der neuen Volksschule in Abs. 2 wird ab dem wirksam. (2) Die Auflösung der Spicherer-Grundschule in Abs. 1 wird ab dem wirksam. (3) Die Sprengelbestimmungen in Abs. 4 und werden für die Jahrgangsstufen 1 und 3 ab dem Schuljahr 2011/2012 und für die Jahrgangsstufen 2 und 4 ab dem Schuljahr 2012/2013 wirksam. Diese Verordnung tritt am 1. August 2009 in Kraft. Augsburg, den 23. Juli 2009 Regierung von Schwaben Karl Michael Scheufele Regierungspräsident Verordnung über die Einrichtung eines regierungsbezirksübergreifenden Fachsprengels für die Beschulung im Einzeltagesunterricht an der Städtischen Berufsschule Augsburg IV (Welser Schule) im Ausbildungsberuf Servicefachkraft für Dialogmarketing und im Ausbildungsberuf Kaufmann/Kauffrau für Dialogmarketing Vom 30. Juli 2009 Auf Grund des Art. 34 Abs. 2 des Bayerischen Gesetzes über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen (BayEUG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 31. Mai 2000 (GVBl S. 414), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22. Juli 2008 (GVBl S. 467), erlässt die Regierung von Schwaben folgende Verordnung: (1) An der Städtischen Berufsschule IV Augsburg (Welser Schule) wird ein Fachsprengel für die Beschulung im Einzeltagesunterricht für den Ausbildungsberuf Servicefachkraft für Dialogmarketing und den Ausbildungsberuf Kaufmann/Kauffrau für Dialogmarketing eingerichtet. (2) Der Fachsprengel umfasst die Gebiete der Regierungsbezirke Schwaben und Oberbayern. (3) Für die Blockbeschulung der Auszubildenden aus beiden Regierungsbezirken verbleibt es unverändert bei dem bestehenden Fachsprengel an der Staatlichen Berufsschule Regen. (4) Die Fachsprengelregelung wird ab dem Schuljahr 2009/2010 für die Jahrgangsstufe 10, ab dem Schuljahr 2010/2011 für die Jahrgangsstufe 11 und ab dem Schuljahr 2011/2012 auch für die Jahrgangsstufe 12 wirksam. Diese Rechtsverordnung tritt zum 1. August 2009 in Kraft. Augsburg, den 30. Juli 2009 Regierung von Schwaben Karl Michael Scheufele Regierungspräsident RABl Schw S. 119 RABl Schw S. 119
 4 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/ Verordnung zur Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Königsbrunn Vom 31. Juli 2009 Auf Grund des Art. 26 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 29 und Art. 32 Abs. 5 des Bayerischen Gesetzes über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen (BayEUG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 31. Mai 2000 (GVBl S. 414), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22. Juli 2008 (GVBl S. 467), erlässt die Regierung von Schwaben folgende Verordnung: Das Baugebiet 110 in der Stadt Königsbrunn wird hinsichtlich der Jahrgangsstufen 1 mit 4 aus dem Schulsprengel der Volksschule Königsbrunn- Süd (Grundschule) ausgegliedert und dem Schulsprengel der Volksschule Königsbrunn-West (Grundschule) zugeordnet. Die Sprengelbeschreibungen in 3 Nr. 2 und Nr. 3 der Verordnung über die Errichtung und Sprengeländerung von Volksschulen in der Stadt Königsbrunn vom (RABl Schw. S. 101), zuletzt geändert durch Verordnung vom (RABl Schw. S. 120), erhalten folgende Fassung: Mitte Römerallee in westliche Richtung bis zur Stadtgrenze westliche Stadtgrenze nach Norden bis zur Ausfahrt Königsbrunn- Nord der Bundesstraße 17 Mitte Augsburger Straße in östliche Richtung bis zur Haunstetter Straße, 3. für die dritte Grundschule (Süd) das südliche Teilgebiet der Stadt Königsbrunn, das nach Norden begrenzt wird durch die Linie östliche Stadtgrenze Meringer Straße Mitte St.-Johannes-Straße Mitte Bürgermeister- Wohlfahrt-Straße in südliche Richtung bis zur Einmündung Römerallee Mitte Römerallee Römerallee nach Westen verlängert bis zur westlichen Stadtgrenze 3 Die Sprengeländerung in und wird wirksam - für die Jahrgangsstufe 1 ab dem Schuljahr 2009/2010, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 2 ab dem Schuljahr 2010/2011, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 3 ab dem Schuljahr 2011/2012, - für die Jahrgangsstufe 4 ab dem Schuljahr 2012/ Diese Verordnung tritt am 1. August 2009 in Kraft. 2. für die zweite Grundschule (West) das westliche Teilgebiet der Stadt Königsbrunn, das wie folgt begrenzt ist: Mitte Haunstetter Straße in südliche Richtung Mitte Bürgermeister-Wohlfahrt-Straße in südliche Richtung bis zur Einmündung der Römerallee Augsburg, den 31. Juli 2009 Regierung von Schwaben Karl Michael Scheufele Regierungspräsident RABl Schw S. 120 Bekanntmachungen anderer Behörden Stadtentwicklungsverband Ulm/Neu-Ulm Bebauungsplanteiländerung M 54.2 Schwaighofen Süd/Auf den Aulen, 2. Änderung Bekanntmachung des Satzungsbeschlusses, Inkrafttreten Der Stadtentwicklungsverband Ulm/Neu-Ulm hat in seiner Sitzung am 23. Juni 2009 die Bebauungsplanteiländerung M 54.2 Schwaighofen Süd/Auf den Aulen, 2. Änderung, gemäß 0 Abs. 1 des Baugesetzbuches (BauGB) als Satzung beschlossen. Maßgebend ist die Bebauungsplanteiländerung mit textlichen Festsetzungen und Begründung in der Fassung vom 5. Februar Auf die Rechtsfolgen gemäß 15 Abs. 1 und 2 BauGB wird hingewiesen.
 5 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/ Unbeachtlich werden: 1. eine beachtliche Verletzung der in 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 bis 3 BauGB bezeichneten Verfahrens- und Formvorschriften, 2. eine nach 14 Abs. 2 BauGB beachtliche Verletzung der Vorschriften über das Verhältnis des Bebauungsplanes und des Flächennutzungsplanes, 3. nach 14 Abs. 3 Satz 2 BauGB beachtliche Mängel des Abwägungsvorganges, wenn sie nicht innerhalb von einem Jahr seit Bekanntmachung der Bebauungsplanteiländerung schriftlich gegenüber der Stadt Neu-Ulm unter Darlegung des die Verletzung begründeten Sachverhaltes geltend gemacht worden sind. Satz 1 gilt entsprechend, wenn Fehler nach 14 Abs. 2 a beachtlich sind. Die Verletzung oder der Mangel ist schriftlich oder zur Niederschrift bei der Stadt Neu-Ulm, Fachbereich 3, Abt. Stadtplanung, Rathaus Neu-Ulm, Augsburger Straße 15, während der Sprechzeiten geltend zu machen. Auf die Vorschriften des 44 Abs. 3 und 4 BauGB über die fristgemäße Geltendmachung etwaiger Entschädigungsansprüche für Eingriffe in eine bisher zulässige Nutzung durch diese und über das Erlöschen der Entschädigungsansprüche wird hingewiesen. Mit der Bekanntmachung wird die Bebauungsplanteiländerung M 54.2 Schwaighofen Süd/Auf den Aulen, 2. Änderung rechtsverbindlich. Die Bebauungsplanteiländerung einschließlich Begründung kann beim Fachbereich 3, Abt. Stadtplanung im Rathaus Neu-Ulm, Augsburger Straße 15, während der Dienststunden allgemein eingesehen werden. Haushaltssatzung des Abfallzweckverbandes Augsburg - AZV für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 Vom 15. Juni 2009 Auf Grund der Art. 40 Abs. 1 und Art. 26 Abs. 1 KommZG und Art. 63 ff GO erlässt der Abfallzweckverband Augsburg - AZV folgende Haushaltssatzung: I. Der als Anlage beigefügte Haushaltsplan für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 wird hiermit festgesetzt; er schließt im Verwaltungshaushalt in den Einnahmen und Ausgaben mit Euro und im Vermögenshaushalt in den Einnahmen und Ausgaben mit ab Euro Kreditaufnahmen für Investitionen und Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen sind nicht vorgesehen. 3 Verpflichtungsermächtigungen im Vermögenshaushalt werden nicht festgesetzt. 4 Der Umlagebedarf beträgt Euro. Die Verteilung der Umlage richtet sich nach 9 der Verbandssatzung. Neu-Ulm, den 15. Juli 2009 Stadt Neu-Ulm Fachbereich 3 Stadtplanung RABl Schw S Der Höchstbetrag der Kassenkredite zur rechtzeitigen Leistung von Ausgaben nach dem Haushaltsplan wird auf Euro festgesetzt.
 6 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/ e n t f ä l l t - 7 Diese Haushaltssatzung tritt mit dem 1. Januar 2009 in Kraft. Augsburg, den 15. Juni 2009 Abfallzweckverband Augsburg - AZV Christian Knauer Landrat Verbandsvorsitzender II. Der Haushaltsplan liegt vom Tage dieser Bekanntmachung an eine Woche lang bei der Geschäftsstelle des Zweckverbandes in Augsburg, Am Mittleren Moos 60, während der Geschäftszeiten öffentlich zur Einsichtnahme auf. RABl Schw S. 121 Haushaltssatzung des Schulverbandes Memmingen-Amendingen für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 Vom 10. Juli 2009 Auf Grund des Art. 9 Abs. 7 des Bayerischen Schulfinanzierungsgesetzes in Verbindung mit Art. 63 ff der Gemeindeordnung erlässt der Schulverband Memmingen-Amendingen folgende Haushaltssatzung: Der als Anlage beigefügte Haushaltsplan für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 wird hiermit festgesetzt; er schließt im Verwaltungshaushalt in den Einnahmen und Ausgaben mit und im Vermögenshaushalt in den Einnahmen und Ausgaben mit Kreditaufnahmen für Investitionen und Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen sind nicht vorgesehen. 3 Verpflichtungsermächtigungen im Vermögenshaushalt werden nicht festgesetzt. 4 Der durch Einnahmen nicht gedeckte Bedarf wird festgesetzt im Verwaltungshaushalt auf im Vermögenshaushalt auf insgesamt auf Schülerzahl nach dem Stand vom Umlage je Schüler 1.258,36 5 Kassenkredite zur rechtzeitigen Leistung von Ausgaben nach dem Haushaltsplan werden nicht beansprucht. 6 Diese Haushaltssatzung tritt mit dem 1. Januar 2009 in Kraft. Memmingen, den 10. Juli 2009 Schulverband Memmingen-Amendingen Dr. Holzinger Oberbürgermeister II. Der Haushaltsplan liegt vom Tage dieser Bekanntmachung an eine Woche lang bei der Geschäftsstelle des Schulverbandes in Memmingen, Ratzgraben 4 b, während der Geschäftszeiten öffentlich zur Einsichtnahme aus. RABl Schw S. 122 ab.
 7 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/
 8 Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben. Herausgeber, Verlag und Druck: Regierung von Schwaben, Augsburg. Erscheint nach Bedarf, in der Regel alle 3 Wochen. Das Jahresabonnement beträgt 24,00. Abbestellungen schriftlich jährlich bis zum 31. Oktober. Bestellungen für den laufenden Bezug oder für Einzelnummern sind an die Regierung von Schwaben, Amtsblatt, Augsburg zu richten. Amtsblatt der Regierung von Schwaben Nr. 11/


type: contracts

text:
Nr. L 356 2 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 11 . 12 . 81
 AFTALE
 i form af brevveksling mellem Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab og Den
 demokratiske folkerepublik Algeriet vedrørende fastsættelse for perioden 1 . no
 vember 1981 til 31 . oktober 1982 af det tillægsbeløb, som skal fratrækkes den af
 gift, der anvendes ved indførsel til Fællesskabet af ikke behandlet olivenolie med
 oprindelse i Algeriet
 Brev nr. 1
 Hr ,
 I bilag B til samarbejdsaftalen mellem Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab og Den
 demokratiske folkerepublik Algeriet bestemmes det med hensyn til ikke behandlet oliven
 olie henhørende under pos. 1 5.07 A I i den fælles toldtarif, at det beløb, der skal fratræk
 kes afgiften i henhold til artikel 16, stk . 1 , litra b), i samarbejdsaftalen, forhøjes med et til
 lægsbeløb for at tage hensyn til visse faktorer og afhængigt af betingelserne på olivenolie
 markedet ; forhøjelsen sker på samme vilkår og efter samme retningslinjer som dem , der
 er fastsat for anvendelsen af ovennævnte bestemmelser.
 For så vidt angår perioden 1 . november 1981 til 31 . oktober 1982 kan jeg meddele Dem ,
 at Fællesskabet på baggrund af kriterierne i ovennævnte bilag vil træffe de nødvendige for
 anstaltninger for, at tillægsbeløbet udgør 12,09 ECU pr. 100 kg.
 Jeg beder Dem venligst anerkende modtagelsen af dette brev og over for mig bekræfte
 Deres regerings tiltrædelse af dets indhold .
 Modtag, hr , forsikringen om min mest udmærkede højagtelse.
 På Rådet for
 De europæiske Fællesskabers vegne
 ---pagebreak--- 11 . 12 . 81 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. L 356/3
 Brev nr. 2
 Hr ,
 Jeg anerkender herved modtagelsen af Deres brev af dags dato med følgende ordlyd :
 »I bilag B til samarbejdsaftalen mellem Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab og
 Den demokratiske folkerepublik Algeriet bestemmes det med hensyn til ikke behand
 let olivenolie henhørende under pos. 15.07 A I i den fælles toldtarif, at det beløb, der
 skal fratrækkes afgiften i henhold til artikel 16, stk. 1 , litra b), i samarbejdsaftalen, for
 højes med et tillægsbeløb for at tage hensyn til visse faktorer og afhængigt af betingel
 serne på olivenoliemarkedet ; forhøjelsen sker på samme vilkår og efter samme ret
 ningslinjer som dem, der er fastsat for anvendelsen af ovennævnte bestemmelser.
 For så vidt angår perioden 1 . november 1981 til 31 . oktober 1982 kan jeg meddele
 Dem , at Fællesskabet på baggrund af kriterierne i ovennævnte bilag vil træffe de nød
 vendige foranstaltninger for, at tillægsbeløbet udgør 12,09 ECU pr. 100 kg.
 Jeg beder Dem venligst anerkende modtagelsen af dette brev og over for mig bekræfte
 Deres regerings tiltrædelse af dets indhold .«.
 Jeg bekræfter, at min regering kan tiltræde det foregående .
 Modtag, hr , forsikringen om min mest udmærkede højagtelse.
 For regeringen for
 Den demokratiske folkerepublik Algeriet


text:
 28.5.2009
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 L 130/11
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉNS BESLUT
 nr 23/2009
 av den 17 mars 2009
 om ändring av bilaga I (Veterinära frågor och växtskyddsfrågor) till EES-avtalet
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR BESLUTAT FÖLJANDE
 med beaktande av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, ändrat genom protokollet med justeringar av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, nedan kallat avtalet, särskilt artikel 98, och
 av följande skäl:
 (1)
 Bilaga I till avtalet ändrades genom gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 2/2009 av den 5 februari 2009 (1).
 (2)
 Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 393/2008 av den 30 april 2008 om godkännande av astaxantindimetyldisuccinat som fodertillsats (2) bör införlivas med avtalet.
 (3)
 Detta beslut bör inte gälla Liechtenstein.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Följande punkt ska införas i kapitel II efter punkt 1zzzzn (kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 209/2008) i bilaga I till avtalet:
 ”1zzzzo.
 32008 R 0393: Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 393/2008 av den 30 april 2008 om godkännande av astaxantindimetyldisuccinat som fodertillsats (EUT L 117, 1.5.2008, s. 20).”
 Artikel 2
 Texten till förordning (EG) nr 393/2008 på isländska och norska, som ska offentliggöras i EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning, ska vara giltig.
 Artikel 3
 Detta beslut träder i kraft den 18 mars 2009 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i avtalet har gjorts till gemensamma EES-kommittén (3).
 Artikel 4
 Detta beslut ska offentliggöras i EES-delen av och EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
 Utfärdad i Bryssel den 17 mars 2009.
 På gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnar
 Alan SEATTER
 Ordförande
 (1) EUT L 73, 19.3.2009, s. 32.
 (2) EUT L 117, 1.5.2008, s. 20.
 (3) Inga institutionella krav angivna.


text:
Alfonso Carafa (Napels, 16 juli 1540 – aldaar, 29 augustus 1565) was een invloedrijke kardinaal in de pauselijke hofhouding van zijn oudoom Paulus IV. Hij ijverde voor de belangen van het koninkrijk Napels en zijn familie in de Curie. Nadat hij in ongenade was gevallen, eindigde hij zijn carrière als aartsbisschop van Napels (1557-1565).
 Levensloop
 Met zijn oudoom
 De familie Carafa of Caraffa was een vooraanstaande familie in de stad Napels en het koninkrijk Napels. Zij telde meerdere prelaten. De ouders van Alfonso Carafa waren Antonio Carafa, de latere markies van Montebello, en Brianna Beltrame. Zijn ouders stuurden de 8-jaar oude Alfonso naar Rome (1548). Zijn oudoom Gian Pietro Carafa, de latere paus Paulus IV, voedde hem op. In de hofhouding van zijn oudoom kreeg hij onderwijs in letteren en de Klassieke Oudheid; ook zijn oudoom gaf hem lessen. De tienerjongen werd geheim kamerheer bij zijn oudoom; tevens was hij in titel (en in inkomen) kanunnik van de kathedraal van Napels.
 In 1555 werd zijn oudoom verkozen tot paus. Carafa was ontgoocheld dat hij van zijn oudoom geen kardinaalshoed kreeg. Pas in 1557 werd Carafa kardinaal, op niveau van diaken. Carafa kreeg de diakenwijding en het aartsbisdom Napels viel hem te beurt. Omdat hij te jong was voor het ambt van aartsbisschop werd Carafa benoemd als administrator van Napels. Dit bezorgde hem eveneens een inkomen naast dat van kardinaal die in Rome resideerde. Andere inkomsten die de tienerkardinaal kreeg van paus Paulus IV waren (1559): prebendes als titulair abt van de rijke abdij San Stefano del Como dei Santi Vittore e Costanzo in het markiezaat van Saluzzo (1559); titulair abt van Santa Maria di Tubenna in het bisdom Salerno; titulair abt van Santa Maria di Mirasole in het bisdom Lodi; gouverneur van drie steden in de Pauselijke Staten: Sutri en Todi en Benevento. Hij was bovendien bibliothecaris van de Vaticaanse Bibliotheek (1559). In 1559 adviseerde hij het Heilige Roomse Rijk over de machtsovername van keizer Ferdinand I, die keizer Karel V opvolgde. Op vraag van zijn oudoom zaaide hij twijfel over het katholieke geloof van Ferdinand bij de Duitse bisschoppen. De paus beloonde zijn trouwe kleinneef met 4.000 gouden dukaten (1559).
 De macht en welstand van de kardinaal-nepoot Alfonso Carafa groeiden. Dit gold ook voor de rest van de familie Carafa. Ze werden rijkelijk voorzien door het nepotisme van de renaissancepaus Paulus IV, die hun oudste familielid was. Zo was zijn oom Carlo Carafa ook kardinaal aan het pauselijke hof. Carafa zelf had als kardinaal achtereenvolgens de volgende vier titelkerken in Rome: De San Nicola in Carcere, de Santa Maria in Portico, de Santa Maria in Domnica en de Santi Giovanni e Paolo. De kardinaal-diaken Carafa reisde als legatus a latere naar koning Filips II van Spanje om de belangen van Napels en van de familie Carafa te verzekeren (1557-1558).
 In 1558 bereikte Carafa het hoogtepunt van zijn macht binnen de Curie. Hij werd regent van de Apostolische Kamer. Deze functie in de Curie bestond tevoren niet. Zijn oudoom creëerde dit ambt speciaal voor hem. Tot dan had het Consistorie van kardinalen uit Romeinse families de macht over de Apostolische Kamer. Families zoals de Colonna en Guidi zagen het met lede ogen gebeuren.
 Na de dood van zijn oudoom
 Een jaar later, in 1559, stierf paus Paulus IV Carafa. De macht van de familie Carafa in Rome was in vrije val. Giovanni Angelo Medici uit Milaan haalde de pausverkiezing en werd paus Pius IV. Paus Pius IV liet drie familieleden Carafa arresteren: Carafa zelf, zijn ooms kardinaal Carlo Carafa en officier Giovanni Carafa (1560). Zij werden opgesloten in de Engelenburcht in Rome. Carafa kon vanuit zijn cel horen hoe zijn oom en kardinaal Carlo Carafa gewurgd werd. Zijn andere oom werd onthoofd en het hoofd werd in Rome rondgedragen. Alfonso Carafa werd beschuldigd van diefstal van edelstenen uit het pauselijke paleis en van bezit van verboden boeken. Alfonso Carafa kon zich evenwel vrijkopen: hij beloofde 100.000 dukaten aan paus Pius IV en tekende zijn ontslag als regent van de Apostolische Kamer (1561). Hij had alles samen één jaar in de gevangenis doorgebracht (1560-1561).
 Hij doolde vervolgens door Rome om aan de 100.000 dukaten te komen (1561-1562). Zijn familie in Napels bezorgde hem nauwelijks geld. Bankiers uit Firenze benaderden hem om zijn welstellende abdijen te verpanden en hem zo hypotheekgeld te bezorgen. Ook organiseerde Carafa een methode om de kerkbelasting uit Napels aan de paus te bezorgen. In 1562 arresteerde de pauselijke militie de Fransman Jean de la Save. De la Save werkte op de Curie en bezat bezwarende documenten over Carafa. Carafa vluchtte de Pauselijke Staat uit.
 Eenmaal aangekomen in het koninkrijk Napels vroeg hij bescherming van Filips II van Spanje, de koning van Napels. Deze kende Carafa nog van zijn periode als ambassadeur in Madrid. De paus vaardigde een arrestatiebevel uit tegen Carafa doch Filips II weigerde het uit te voeren. In 1562-1563 kon Carafa het Concilie van Trente meemaken, zonder gearresteerd te worden. Het Concilie van Trente was het katholieke antwoord op de Reformatiebewegingen in Europa.
 Er restte Carafa niets anders over dan residerend aartsbisschop te worden in zijn aartsbisdom, Napels. De kardinaal-aartsbisschop liet zich in 1564 tot priester wijden – want dat was hij nog altijd niet-. Nadien moest hij zich nog laten wijden tot aartsbisschop om in orde te zijn met de besluiten van het Concilie van Trente. Voor aartsbisschop was Carafa nog steeds te jong: hij was slechts 24 jaar en een aartsbisschop moest minstens 27 jaar zijn. Paus Pius IV gaf hem dispensatie vanuit Rome. Tevens ontnam de paus hem de abdij van San Stefano del Como (1565).
 In 1565 organiseerde Carafa in Napels een synode om de besluiten van het Concilie van Trente uit te voeren in zijn aartsbisdom. Dit hield onder meer in meer kerkelijke discipline in de kloosters van Napels en een vervolging van ketters. Zo liet Carafa twee mannen onthoofden: Gianfrancesco Alois en Gianbernardino Gargano; zij werden veroordeeld wegens ketterij volgens de predikingen van onderpastoor Campagna. Het protest van de steden in het koninkrijk Napels was groot: ze vreesden immers dat Carafa op het punt stond de Inquisitie te installeren in Napels. Campagna kon Napels ontvluchten en zocht onderkomen bij paus Pius IV.
 In de zomer van 1565 had Carafa talrijke koortsaanvallen. Hij stierf datzelfde jaar nog. Hij was 25 jaar. Onmiddellijk ging het gerucht in Rome en in Duitse steden dat paus Pius IV de vergiftiging had bevolen. Vooral Hans Fugger, een bankier van de keizer, verspreidde dit gerucht. Pius IV haastte zich om dit ontkennen en prees de verdiensten van kardinaal-aartsbisschop Carafa in de Curie.
 Italiaanse adel
 gouverneur
 Apostolisch diplomaat
 Italiaans kardinaal
 Kardinaal-nepoot
 Aartsbisschop van Napels
 16e-eeuws abt
 16e-eeuws bisschop


text:
Katariina Jagellonica () oli Juhana III:n ensimmäinen vihitty puoliso, Suomen herttuatar ja sittemmin Ruotsin kuningatar.
 Elämäkerta
 Katariinan isä oli Puolan kuningas Sigismund I ja äiti Bona Sforza, joka oli milanolaista ruhtinassukua. Katariina oli vanhempiensa nuorin tytär. Nimi Jagellonica on latinankielinen muoto kuningassuvun nimestä Jagiełło.
 Katariina varttui kuninkaan hovissa Krakovassa ja sai hyvän kasvatuksen. Hänet naitettiin 11 vuotta nuoremmalle Suomen herttua Juhanalle Vilnassa 4. lokakuuta 1562. Avioliitto oli poliittinen; se oli osa Juhanan pyrkimyksiä muodostaa Venäjän vastainen liittoutuma. Myös Venäjän Iivana IV Julma oli yrittänyt kosia Katariinaa, mutta tuloksetta. Toisaalta avioliitto hiersi Juhanan ja hänen veljensä Ruotsin kuninkaan Eerik XIV:n välejä. Eerik kiisteli Sigismund I:n pojan, Sigismund II Augustin kanssa vallasta Baltiassa. Avioliittoneuvotteluja käytiin Ruotsin ja Puolan ollessa sodassa.
 Juhana ja Katariina saapuivat Turkuun 24. joulukuuta 1562. Turun linnasta muodostui pienimuotoinen renessanssihovi, mutta jo saman vuoden syksyllä Juhanan ja Eerikin ristiriita oli kehittynyt sodaksi. Juhana ja Katariina joutuivat Eerikin vangeiksi, ja heidät vietiin Gripsholmin linnaan. Katariina seurasi miestään vapaaehtoisesti vankeuteen. Eräässä vaiheessa häntä uhkasi joutuminen Venäjälle, kun Iivana IV ehdotti Eerikille, että Katariinaa voitaisiin käyttää panttivankina Puolan painostamiseksi. Vankeusaikana Katariina synnytti kolme lasta, Isabellan, joka eli puolitoistavuotiaaksi, Annan ja Sigismundin, josta tuli Puolan ja Ruotsin kuningas.
 Vankeutta kesti syksyyn 1567, jolloin Eerik syrjäytettiin valtaistuimelta. Saman vuoden syyskuussa Juhana huudettiin Ruotsin kuninkaaksi, ja 10. heinäkuuta 1569 Katariina kruunattiin miehensä rinnalla Ruotsin kuningattareksi. 1500-luvun lopulla katolilaisuuden merkitystä haluttiin lisätä. Syynä saattoi olla se, että Katariinalle oli tulossa suuri perintö Sforza-suvulta ja Juhana halusi perinnön Ruotsiin. Kuitenkaan perintöä ei saanut lähettää muuhun kuin roomalaiskatoliseen maahan ja niinpä Juhana yritti saada Ruotsin kirkon osittain katoliseksi. Kuningaspari vieraili usein Vadstenassa ja Katariina tuki Vadstenan luostarin toimintaa. Myös Naantalin luostari koki viimeisen lopulta lyhyeksi jääneen kukoistuksensa.
 Katariina kuoli muutaman vuoden sairastelun jälkeen Vadstenan linnassa syyskuussa 1583.
 Lähteet
 Viitteet
 Aiheesta muualla
 Ruotsin kuningattaret
 Vuonna 1526 syntyneet
 Vuonna 1583 kuolleet