jurisdiction: US

text:
Adam Santo v. Grace Santo, No. 89, September Term, 2015, Opinion by Adkins, J.
 FAMILY LAW — CHILD CUSTODY — JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY — TIE-
 BREAKING PROVISIONS: The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the parties
 joint legal custody with tie-breaking provisions over several matters affecting their
 children. Although the parties lack the capacity to communicate or cooperate well, that
 factor is not a prerequisite under Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986) for a legally valid
 joint custody order. Moreover, trial courts in Maryland are legally authorized to use tie-
 breaking provisions in custody awards. The use of such provisions in this case was not an
 abuse of discretion in light of the parties’ inability to make decisions together.
 Circuit Court for Montgomery County
 Case No.: 87541
 Argued: May 5, 2016
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 89
 September Term, 2015
 ADAM SANTO
 v.
 GRACE SANTO
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired,
 Specially Assigned),
 JJ.
 Opinion by Adkins, J.
 Watts and Battaglia, JJ., concur.
 Filed: July 11, 2016
 In Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 293 (1986), we decided that an award of joint
 custody was a permissible exercise of a trial court’s general equity powers. Notably, we
 also explained in Taylor that the most important factor for a court to consider before
 awarding joint custody is the capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared
 decisions affecting a child’s welfare. Id. at 304. Today we address whether a court abused
 its discretion in awarding joint custody in spite of evidence that, to put it mildly, the parents
 could not communicate and reach shared decisions for their two children. As a related
 matter—one not addressed explicitly in Taylor—we consider the propriety of the use of
 provisions in joint custody awards that grant one parent the authority to make a decision
 about a matter affecting the child when the parents cannot agree. We call these tie-breaking
 provisions.
 FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
 Adam Santo (“Father”) and Grace Santo (“Mother”) married in 2000 and divorced
 in 2011. They have two sons, who were eight and five years old, respectively, at the time
 of the divorce. Following a 2011 order of joint legal custody, the Santos renewed the battle
 over their children by filing more motions. Custody was modified in 2013 to, among other
 things, facilitate joint custody through the use of a parenting coordinator. Several other
 motions are indicative of their ongoing struggle.
 The precise motion that led to the question we review today was Father’s 2014
 motion to modify custody. Therein Father sought sole custody of his sons so that, he
 maintains, “the children will not remain in a combat zone forever.” Following a three-day
 hearing, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied Father’s motion and preserved
 a joint custody arrangement. We shall discuss the court’s findings and the details of that
 arrangement infra, particularly the tie-breaking provisions awarded to each parent.
 Father noted a timely appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit
 Court’s decision in an unreported opinion.
 Father filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted1:
 Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering joint
 custody in light of Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986)?
 Because we answer no, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
 Appeals.
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 We review a trial court’s custody determination for abuse of discretion. Petrini v.
 Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470 (1994). This standard of review accounts for the trial court’s
 unique “opportunity to observe the demeanor and the credibility of the parties and the
 witnesses.” Id.
 Though a deferential standard, abuse of discretion may arise when “‘no reasonable
 person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court’ or when the court acts ‘without
 reference to any guiding rules or principles.’” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347
 Md. 295, 312 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Such an abuse may also occur when the
 court’s ruling is “‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the
 1
 We have rephrased Father’s question, which in his Petition asks: “Whether the so-
 called ‘Taylor factors,’ in particular the requirement that parents effectively communicate
 to make shared parenting decisions in the children’s best interests, continue to constitute
 binding legal parameters, circumscribing the discretion of a custody court faced with a
 ‘joint’ versus ‘sole’ legal custody decision.”
 2
 court’ or when the ruling is ‘violative of fact and logic.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
 Put simply, we will not reverse the trial court unless its decision is “‘well removed from
 any center mark imagined by the reviewing court.’” Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
 The light that guides the trial court in its determination, and in our review, is “the
 best interest of the child standard,” which “is always determinative in child custody
 disputes.” Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178 (1977).
 DISCUSSION
 Father avers that the Circuit Court erred because it did not follow the “sine qua non
 for an award of joint legal custody” as established in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986).
 In his view, an award of joint legal custody requires that the parents effectively
 communicate or will be capable of making parenting decisions together in the future. The
 record and the Circuit Court’s findings, Father contends, reflect a tale of “parties [who]
 have been and remain at war with one another.” He thus maintains that it was an abuse of
 discretion for the Circuit Court to have granted an award of joint custody to parents whom
 it knew could not communicate effectively.
 Mother disagrees, and reads Taylor as merely setting forth “nonexclusive factors”
 for a court to apply in a custody dispute. Mother maintains that Taylor requires the court
 to consider “all factors and options available” to determine “what is in the best interest of
 the children.” In Mother’s view, the Circuit Court did just that—applied the relevant
 factors, considered options, and made a decision for the children’s best interests.
 3
 Taylor v. Taylor
 We begin our analysis of Taylor by reviewing the Court’s explication of legal and
 physical custody, and joint legal and joint physical custody—terms important to our
 discussion. “Legal custody carries with it the right and obligation to make long range
 decisions” that significantly affect a child’s life, such as education or religious training.
 Taylor, 306 Md. at 296. “Physical custody, on the other hand, means the right and
 obligation to provide a home for the child and to make” daily decisions as necessary while
 the child is under that parent’s care and control. Id.
 In joint legal custody, the Taylor Court explained, “both parents have an equal voice
 in making [long range] decisions, and neither parent’s rights are superior to the other.” Id.
 In joint physical custody, the parents will share or divide custody of the child, but not
 necessarily “on a 50/50 basis.” Id. at 297. With respect to a circuit court’s authority in
 child custody cases, “the power of the court is very broad so that it may accomplish the
 paramount purpose of securing the welfare and promoting the best interest of the child.”
 Id. at 301–02. To assist trial courts “in determining whether joint custody is appropriate,”
 the Taylor Court offered up “the major factors” to consider. Id. at 303.2
 2
 Although the majority of jurisdictions have statutory factors for courts to consider
 in custody cases, Maryland does not. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review
 of the Year in Family Law: Numbers of Disputes Increase, 45 Fam. L.Q. 443, 494–96
 (2012) (denoting which jurisdictions have statutory factors and which do not).
 The only statutory directive relates to child abuse or neglect, which is not pertinent
 here. Under Md. Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 9-101 of the Family Law Article (“FL”),
 a trial court must determine if there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that a child has
 been abused or neglected by a party seeking custody. If there are reasonable grounds, the
 4
 To be sure, the Taylor Court saw “the most important factor” in deciding whether
 to award joint legal custody as the “capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach
 shared decisions affecting the child’s welfare.”3 Id. at 304. As it explained, “there is
 nothing to be gained and much to be lost by conditioning the making of decisions affecting
 the child’s welfare upon the mutual agreement of” parents who are “severely embittered”
 and whose “relationship [is] marked by dispute, acrimony, and a failure of rational
 communication.” Id. at 305.
 In other words, Taylor stands for the proposition that effective parental
 communication is weighty in a joint legal custody situation because, under such
 circumstances, parents are charged with making important decisions together that affect a
 child’s future. If parents cannot make those decisions together because, for example, they
 are unable to put aside their bitterness for one another, then the child’s future could be
 compromised.
 To further guide trial courts in evaluating parental communication, the Taylor Court
 explained that “the best evidence” a court should look for is “past conduct or [a] ‘track
 record’ of the parties.” Id. at 307. “Rarely, if ever,” is a joint legal custody award
 court must make a finding that there is no further likelihood of abuse or neglect before
 awarding unsupervised custody to that person.
 3
 The other factors the Court expressly discussed in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290,
 307–11 (1986) were the willingness of the parents to share custody, the fitness of the
 parents, the relationship established between the child and each parent, the preference of
 the child, the potential disruption of the child’s social and school life, the geographic
 proximity of parental homes, the demands of parental employment, the age and number of
 children, the sincerity of the parents’ request, the financial status of the parents, the impact
 on state or federal assistance, and the benefit to the parents.
 5
 permissible, the Court stated, absent such conduct, “and then only when it is possible to
 make a finding of a strong potential for such conduct in the future.” Id. at 304. In the latter
 circumstance, the Court said, “the trial judge must articulate fully the reasons that support
 that conclusion.” Id. at 307.
 In asking us to hold that joint legal custody “should be awarded only if a custody
 court” concludes that parents “are or likely will be capable of communicating and reaching
 joint (i.e., shared) parenting decisions,” Father would have us impose an inflexible template
 on equity courts making child custody decisions. (Emphasis added.) But, as the Taylor
 Court recognized, “[f]ormula[s] or computer solutions in child custody matters are
 impossible because of the unique character of each case, and the subjective nature of the
 evaluations and decisions that must be made.” Id. at 303. To elevate effective parental
 communication so that it becomes a prerequisite to a joint custody award would undermine
 the trial court’s complex and holistic task. On this point, Taylor is and remains vitally
 instructive:
 The resolution of a custody dispute continues to be one of the
 most difficult and demanding tasks of a trial judge. It requires
 thorough consideration of multiple and varied circumstances,
 full knowledge of the available options, including the positive
 and negative aspects of various custodial arrangements, and a
 careful recitation of the facts and conclusions that support the
 solution ultimately selected.
 Id. at 311.
 Courts in other jurisdictions that, like Maryland, have no applicable statutory
 factors, concur that no one factor serves as a prerequisite to a custody award. See, e.g.,
 Clark v. Reiss, 831 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (“The prime concern and
 6
 controlling factor is the best interest of the child, and the court in its sound discretion will
 look into the peculiar circumstances of each case and act as the welfare of the child appears
 to require.”); Hamby v. Hamby, 102 So. 3d 334, 337 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (“The Albright
 [v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983)] factors are a guide for chancellors in weighing
 the facts to determine the child’s best interest.”) (citation and internal quotation marks
 omitted); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (N.Y. 1982) (“‘[N]o agreement
 of the parties can bind the court to a disposition other than that which a weighing of all the
 factors involved shows to be in the child’s best interests.’”) (citation omitted); Hall v. Hall,
 655 S.E.2d 901, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (“‘These findings may concern physical, mental,
 or financial fitness or any other factors brought out by the evidence and relevant to the
 issue of the welfare of the child.’”) (citation omitted); Waters v. Magee, 877 A.2d 658,
 664–65 (R.I. 2005) (“No one factor is determinative; rather, the trial justice should consider
 a combination of and an interaction among all the relevant factors.”) (citation and internal
 quotation marks omitted); Scott v. Scott, 579 S.E.2d 620, 623 (S.C. 2003) (“[I]n making
 custody decisions ‘the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the
 only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.’”) (citation omitted);
 Hathaway v. Bergheim, 648 N.W.2d 349, 352 (S.D. 2002) (“These factors serve as
 guidelines and the trial court need not address all of them.”); but see Foshee v. Foshee, 247
 P.3d 1162, 1168–69 (Okla. 2010) (“[J]oint custody is not proper where the parents are
 unable to cooperate.”).4
 4
 In jurisdictions with statutory factors, the statutes do not contain restrictive
 language but instead expansive language such as “including” or “any other factor.” See,
 7
 Based on Taylor, and our review of other jurisdictions, we decline to hold as a matter
 of law that a court errs if it awards joint custody to parents who fail to communicate
 effectively with one another. As the Taylor Court cautioned, “none” of the major factors
 in a custody case “has talismanic qualities, and [] no single list of criteria will satisfy the
 demands of every case.” Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
 Consistent with Taylor, we emphasize that a trial court should carefully set out the
 facts and conclusions that support the solution it ultimately reaches. To use words from
 Father’s brief, no “robotic recitation that a custody award proposed by a custody court is
 in the ‘child’s best interest’ serve[s] as a replacement for the serious consideration” of the
 facts and circumstances of each case. This is especially so in those cases where a court
 considers awarding joint legal custody to parents who cannot communicate effectively. In
 such cases, a court must articulate well the justifications for awarding joint custody.
 Tie-Breaking Provisions in Joint Legal Custody Awards
 Neither party disputes that this is a case in which a trial court awarded joint custody
 to parents who do not communicate well. As the Circuit Court explained, “[t]hese parents
 have essentially been at war with each other since 2010.” Anticipating that these parents
 would not succeed in making all decisions on behalf of their children, the Circuit Court
 included tie-breaking provisions in the award so one parent would have the last word if
 they reached an impasse.
 e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-403A (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); Cal.
 Fam. Code § 3011 (West, Westlaw through ch. 22 of 2016 Reg. Sess.).
 8
 Father argues that such provisions are inconsistent with Taylor and Md. Code (1984,
 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 5-203(d) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). FL § 5-203(d) provides
 that “a court may award custody of a minor child to either parent or joint custody to both
 parents.” FL § 5-203(d). Reading this section of the statute literally, Father avers that
 Maryland courts have two options—award sole or joint custody—but no option to create
 “hybrids of the two.” He also fears that the use of tie-breaking provisions “has
 exponentially expanded” into “spheres of major importance.” Finally, Father argues that,
 as a practical matter, tie-breaking provisions may promote conflict or simply be
 ineffective.5
 In Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md. App. 548, 556 (2004) the Court of Special Appeals held
 that the trial court “acted within its legal authority” in awarding joint legal custody and
 designating one parent as the “tie[-]breaker” if the parents disagreed about a matter
 5
 Mother contends that Father’s argument about tie-breaking provisions is not
 preserved for our review. What Mother overlooks is that this issue was “decided by the
 trial court.” Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (emphasis added.) That is, the Circuit Court granted
 joint legal custody and said “there will be specific tie[-]breaker authority as follows,”
 which the court then discussed.
 Additionally, we have previously determined that an issue that a party fails to
 present to the trial court is reviewable when the issue “transcends” that case, “may affect
 hundreds of cases,” “implicates important” rights, and where “guidance is needed.” See
 Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 468 (2007) (reviewing a challenge to a restitution order that
 the appellant never presented in his complaint to the trial court). We agree with Father that
 when tie-breaking provisions reach “spheres of major importance” in children’s lives, as
 in this case, the issue meets the Chaney standards.
 9
 affecting their children.6 The intermediate appellate court rejected the argument that
 Taylor precluded such an award by noting that Taylor “expressly acknowledged the
 existence of ‘multiple forms’ of joint custody” and rejected formulaic approaches to child
 custody matters as inconsistent with the “‘unique character of each case.’” Id. at 560
 (quoting 306 Md. at 303). In the intermediate appellate court’s view, joint legal custody
 with tie-breaking authority in one parent was still joint custody. Id. (“The accommodation
 fashioned by the trial court does not transform the arrangement into something other than
 joint custody.”). Finally, the Shenk court reasoned that the trial court’s ability to fashion
 such an award was “in keeping with the ‘broad and inherent power of an equity court to
 deal fully and completely with matters of child custody.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 306 Md. at
 301).
 Here we decide whether a custody award—comparable to that in Shenk—comports
 with the Taylor Court’s formulation of joint legal custody. The Taylor Court defined joint
 legal custody as “both parents hav[ing] an equal voice in making [long range] decisions [of
 major significance concerning the child’s life and welfare], and neither parent’s rights
 [being] superior to the other.” 306 Md. at 296. In a joint legal custody arrangement with
 tie-breaking provisions, the parents are ordered to try to decide together matters affecting
 their children. When, and only when the parties are at an impasse after deliberating in good
 faith does the tie-breaking provision permit one parent to make the final call. Because this
 According to our research, Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md. App. 548 (2004) is the first
 6
 reported Maryland appellate case with a decision on the propriety of tie-breaking
 provisions.
 10
 arrangement requires a genuine effort by both parties to communicate, it ensures each has
 a voice in the decision-making process.
 To be sure, the Taylor Court’s definition of joint legal custody places parents’
 decision-making rights on an equal footing; indeed, it characterizes their voices as being
 equal. See id. A delegation of final authority over a sphere of decisions to one parent has
 the real consequence of tilting power to the one granted such authority.
 But such an award is still consonant with the core concept of joint custody because
 the parents must try to work together to decide issues affecting their children. See Ronny
 M. v. Nanette H., 303 P.3d 392, 405 (Alaska 2013) (“The court’s approach [awarding joint
 legal custody with final decision-making authority to mother] is reasonably intended to
 encourage both parents to communicate and attempt to make decisions about their
 children . . . .”). We require that the tie-breaker parent cannot make the final call until after
 weighing in good faith the ideas the other parent has expressed regarding their children.
 Cf. State on behalf of Maddox S. v. Matthew E., 873 N.W.2d 208, 219 (Neb. Ct. App. 2016)
 (“We also point out that the court maintained the goal of ‘mutual agreement’ between the
 parties . . . .; only now, the final say as to certain major issues rests with the designated
 parent if they cannot otherwise agree.”). Such an award has the salutary effect of
 empowering both parents to participate in significant matters affecting their children.7 See
 7
 As the Court in Taylor, 306 Md. at 311 aptly noted:
 Although the primary focus is properly upon the best interest
 of the child, it is also appropriate to consider the salutary effect
 that joint custody may have on the parents, not only because
 their feelings and interests are worthy of consideration, but also
 11
 Shea v. Metcalf, 712 A.2d 887, 891 (Vt. 1998) (“By avoiding an ‘all or nothing approach,’
 the order keeps both parents in the role of active parenting, takes full advantage of their
 individual strengths, and avoids awarding either parent responsibility for which he or she
 is not suited.”). Because this arrangement requires both parties to attempt to make
 decisions together, it is a form of joint custody. See Taylor, 306 Md. at 303 (“The
 availability of joint custody, in any of its multiple forms, is but another option available to
 the trial judge.”).8
 The requirement of good faith communication between the parents helps to ensure
 the parent with tie-breaking authority does not abuse the privilege of being a final decision-
 maker. And a court has the means to sanction a breach of good faith. In Downing v. Perry,
 123 A.3d 474, 483–85 (D.C. 2015), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a
 trial court order of joint legal custody that transferred final decision-making authority from
 the father to a neutral third party because the father had abused this privilege. Among other
 things, the Downing court emphasized the trial court’s finding that the father had “rigid[ly]
 because their improved self-image as parents is likely to
 redound to the ultimate benefit of the child.
 8
 The Taylor Court did not explore the possibility or permissibility of tie-breaking
 provisions in a joint custody arrangement. But we do not infer the Court’s silence on the
 issue to constitute a rejection thereof. As an initial matter, joint custody was still a fairly
 new concept around the time of Taylor. See, e.g., Child Custody Practice and Procedure
 § 5:1, at 582 (Linda D. Elrod ed. 2015) (“Although there were instances of ‘divided’
 custody, ‘joint’ custody did not emerge as a legislated custody option until the early
 1970s.”). Moreover, our research suggests that the use of tie-breaking provisions in joint
 custody awards is quite a recent innovation in child custody cases. Only one jurisdiction
 to approve of such an award did so before Taylor and many published cases have come
 down in just the past few years.
 12
 exercise[d]” tie-breaking authority granted him under a prior agreement based on a
 “patterned negative response [to the mother’s] suggestions, rather than making decisions
 in the child’s best interest.” Id. at 484. Even though both parents had “equal rights,” the
 Downing court explained that the father “was using his tie-breaking authority as a form of
 de facto sole legal custody.” Id. at 484 n.11.
 Downing underscores that tie-breaking authority does not eliminate the voice of the
 parent without that authority. Rather, such measure pragmatically reflects the need for
 some decision to be made for the child when parents themselves cannot agree. It is the
 child, after all, whom the court must consider foremost in fashioning custody awards. See
 Taylor, 306 Md. at 301–02 (“As has historically been the case, the power of the court is
 very broad so that it may accomplish the paramount purpose of securing the welfare and
 promoting the best interest of the child.”).
 Other jurisdictions have affirmed awards of joint custody with tie-breaking
 provisions precisely because of the parties’ inability to make decisions for their children.
 Bonner v. Bonner, 170 So. 3d 697, 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (“The trial court’s judgment
 [awarding joint custody], however, resolved those types of conflicts by designating the
 husband as the primary decision maker regarding the child’s education.”); Schneider v.
 Schneider, 864 So. 2d 1193, 1994–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of shared
 parental responsibility with final-decision making authority to wife and noting that “[g]iven
 the hostility between the parties throughout this litigation, the trial court imposed a sensible
 plan”); Rembert v. Rembert, 674 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. 2009) (“Thus, it is unlikely that they
 will agree on these issues; the need to designate a final decision-maker is apparent; and the
 13
 trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the primary custodial parent as that
 decision-maker [in its joint custody award].”); Glidewell v. Glidewell, 869 N.W.2d 796,
 808 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming joint custody with division of decision-making duties
 where “the anger that [the parents] ha[d] towards one another cloud[ed] their judgment and
 prevent[ed] them from making important collective decisions on behalf of their children”).9
 Other jurisdictions view joint custody awards with tie-breaking provisions as
 pragmatic solutions to the problem of parents failing to make decisions in a timely manner
 for their children’s benefit. State on behalf of Maddox S., 873 N.W.2d at 218–19
 (“Ultimately, by dividing responsibilities and designating which parent had the final say
 with regard to certain decisions [in the joint custody award], the court minimized the
 potential for conflict and the ongoing power struggle between the parties—something that
 is certainly in Maddox’s best interests.”); Thomas v. Thomas, 757 S.E.2d 375, 382 (N.C.
 Ct. App. 2014) (“‘Given the parties’ dysfunctional relationship history and the current level
 of conflict between the parties, unless one parent is given final decision making authority
 on important issues, joint legal custody is not in [the minor child’s] best interest in light of
 the risk of delay in making timely decisions[.]’”); Hall, 655 S.E.2d at 907 (“Those findings
 must detail why a deviation from ‘pure’ joint legal custody is in the best interest of the
 children. As an example, past disagreements between the parties regarding matters
 affecting the children, such as where they would attend school or church, would be
 9
 See also Baker-Grenier v. Grenier, 83 A.3d 698, 700–01 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)
 (affirming joint custody award with final decision-making authority and noting that “the
 plaintiff ‘harbors too much anger . . . which affects her dealings with’ the defendant”).
 14
 sufficient . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); cf. In re Marriage of McSoud,
 131 P.3d 1208, 1214 (Colo. App. 2006) (“A disagreement regarding routine immunizations
 for the child was sufficiently severe and prolonged that a court hearing had been scheduled
 to resolve it . . . .”). We thus disagree with Father that a joint custody award with tie-
 breaking provisions would likely be ineffective or promote conflict.10
 For us now to constrain trial courts in fashioning awards in the best interests of the
 child at the center of a dispute would be plainly inconsistent with our recognition in Taylor
 that such courts have “broad and inherent power” as equity courts “to deal fully and
 completely with matters of child custody.” 306 Md. at 301 (emphasis added). In short,
 trial courts have broad discretion in how they fashion relief in custody matters.11
 10
 Father maintains that there is an “ongoing debate” about whether the notion of
 tie-breaking authority is consonant with joint legal custody. His argument, which rests
 entirely on a conflict between two New York state intermediate appellate decisions, is
 belied by the substantial number of jurisdictions that have affirmed awards of joint custody
 with tie-breaking provisions.
 11
 The American Law Institute (“ALI”) supports the allocation of decision-making
 authority to parents jointly. ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
 and Recommendations § 2.09 (2002) (adopted May 16, 2000) (“[T]he court should allocate
 responsibility for making significant life decisions on behalf of the child . . . to one parent
 or to two parents jointly . . . .”). Importantly, the ALI states that “[d]ecision[-]making
 responsibility may be allocated as a whole, or by separate areas.” Id. § 2.09 cmt. a
 (emphasis added); see also id. § 2.09 cmt. b., illus. 1 (“The court should allocate
 decision[-]making responsibility for health care for Paul in the parenting plan to either
 Roger or Mary [Paul’s divorced parents]. Health-care decisions for Paul and disputes over
 them are virtually inevitable and, on these facts, Roger and Mary are unlikely to agree
 about them when the time arises.”).
 15
 Father’s Statutory Argument Against Tie-Breaking
 Father nevertheless attacks the award of joint custody with tie-breaking provisions
 as illegal, on grounds that it violates FL § 5-203 as a custody award that is neither single
 nor joint, but a hybrid of the two—an option not set forth in the statute. The fallacy in
 Father’s argument is that it presumes that the court’s authority to award custody is derived
 strictly from statute. This is incorrect. Rather, it is a long-established rule of construction
 in Maryland that “statutes are to be construed in reference to the principles of the common
 law. For it is not to be presumed that the [L]egislature intended to make any innovation
 upon the common law, further than the case absolutely required.” Hooper v. City of Balt.,
 12 Md. 464, 475 (1859); see The Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502 n.5 (2004);
 see also 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
 § 26:5, at 600 (7th ed. 2009) (“Statutes declaratory of the common law are coextensive
 with the common law and no change in meaning is presumed to have been intended by
 their enactment.”). Consistent with this rule of construction, we said in Taylor that “[o]ur
 inquiry [] is not whether the [the General Assembly] has granted a power, but whether it
 has attempted to limit a power that exists as a part of the inherent authority of the court.”
 306 Md. at 298 (emphasis added). The Court undertook this inquiry because the issue in
 Taylor—the authority to grant joint custody—“is an integral part of the broad and inherent
 authority of a court exercising its equitable powers to determine child custody.” Id. In
 16
 addressing again the court’s authority to grant joint custody, we undertake the same
 inquiry.
 FL § 5-203(d) states that “[i]f the parents live apart, a court may award custody of
 a minor child to either parent or joint custody to both parents.” The precursor to FL § 5-
 203 stated in pertinent part: “Where the parents live apart, the court may award the
 guardianship of the child to either of them . . . .” Maryland Code (1957, 1983 Repl. Vol.),
 § 1 of Article 72A. The Taylor Court analyzed the precursor and concluded that nothing
 therein limited “the broad and inherent power of an equity court to deal fully and
 completely with matters of child custody,” and, pertinent in that case, to award joint
 custody. 306 Md. at 301. When FL § 5-203 was re-enacted and took effect shortly after
 Taylor,12 the “bill codifie[d] existing case law” that approved of the authority of courts to
 award joint custody. Summ. of Comm. Rep., S. Judicial Proceedings Comm. H.B. 810
 (1986) (citing Kerns v. Kerns, 59 Md. App. 87 (1984)). The General Assembly’s decision
 to codify case law in FL § 5-203 established no limitation upon a trial court’s equity powers
 to fashion custody awards. See also Taylor, 306 Md. at 300–01 n.9 (“We consider this
 amendment [in 1986 to FL § 5-203] to be declarative of existing common law.”). Since
 1986, the General Assembly has not amended this statute in any way that limited the court’s
 authority to award custody. Cf. R.H. v. B.F., 653 N.E.2d 195, 203 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
 (discussing custody statute that requires ability to communicate as prerequisite to joint
 12
 See Act of July 1, 1986, ch. 65, 1986 Md. Laws 272.
 17
 custody award). There is, notably, no definition of joint custody in the Family Law Article
 that could arguably serve to constrain a trial court in fashioning such an award.
 In sum, because we consider joint custody with tie-breaking provisions to be a form
 of joint custody, and because FL § 5-203(d) expressly authorizes joint custody without any
 limitations thereto, we hold that nothing in the statute precludes this award.13
 Trial Court’s Decision
 On a motion for modification of custody, a trial court employs a two-step process:
 (1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances, and (2) what custody
 arrangement is in the best interests of the children. See In re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152, 166
 (2009); Nodeen v. Sigurdsson, 408 Md. 167, 175 (2009) (“In either situation, the decision
 whether to modify is governed by the material change in circumstances and best interest
 standards.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
 Father argues that the Circuit Court abused its discretion because it awarded joint
 custody to two parents whom the court found to be utterly incapable of communicating.14
 13
 Father also argues that Shulick v. Richards, 729 N.W.2d 533, 536, 538–39 (Mich.
 Ct. App. 2006) in which the Court of Appeals of Michigan rejected an award of joint legal
 custody with a division of decision-making responsibility, is apposite because the pertinent
 statute in Shulick “is not dissimilar to Maryland’s present statutory custody schema as
 interpreted by this Court in Taylor.” (Emphasis in original.) In Shulick, however, the court
 read a Michigan custody statute to provide for a joint custody arrangement “‘only where
 “the parents will be able to cooperate [and generally agree on matters concerning important
 decisions affecting the welfare of]” their children.’” Id. at 539 (emphasis added) (citation
 omitted). FL § 5-203(d) however, does not limit a trial court’s power to award custody,
 and so Shulick is inapposite.
 14
 Father does not challenge the Circuit Court’s determination that there was a
 material change of circumstances.
 18
 In Father’s view, the court’s reasoning that the parties should have joint legal custody “so
 that both of them have access to information about their children” is faulty because the
 parents are statutorily entitled to have access to records pertaining to their children. He
 further maintains that the Circuit Court “paid mere lip service to the Taylor [f]actors,”
 particularly whether the parents could effectively communicate. The custody order strikes
 Father as simply ineffective in protecting his children from his toxic relationship with
 Mother.
 Mother, on the other hand, reasons that the court was “within its discretion” because
 it found that the children needed both parents to be involved in their lives. She maintains
 that the court’s finding of ineffective parental communication does not undermine the joint
 custody award because the Circuit Court proceeded to analyze the relevant factors under
 Taylor and articulated its reasons for awarding joint custody with tie-breaking provisions.
 She contends that Father’s attempts to previously exclude her through his final decision-
 making authority are strong evidence supporting the court’s decision to grant joint legal
 custody with tie-breaking provisions.
 Once the Circuit Court explained that there was a material change in circumstances
 in the children’s lives,15 the court proceeded to engage in the following analysis of the
 Taylor factors, see 306 Md. at 304–11:
  Parental fitness: “This is a very complicated issue[]. Each
 of the parents loves and is capable of providing for the
 15
 The court concluded: “The children are in danger of losing their school placement.
 Ironically, the parents agree that the arrangement they have does not work and is harming
 the children, and that joint custody and shared physical custody as now exists is not
 workable.”
 19
 children. However, their unvarnished hatred of each other
 leads them to do and say things that are contrary to the
 welfare of the children.”
  The sincerity of the parents’ requests: “The request[s]
 are simple, each one [wants] sole legal custody and primary
 physical custody and to minimize the other’s role in the
 lives of the children. They are sincere.”
  Parents’ willingness to share custody: “None.”
  Parents’ capacity to communicate and make shared
 decisions: “[T]hey’re unable to function cooperatively.”
  Number of children: “Mother has no other children, father
 and his wife have a daughter who is an infant.”
  Geographic proximity of parents’ homes: “Mother
 recently moved about 15 to 20 miles from the boy[s’]
 school. She does not seem to object to driving the distance
 to keep them at [this school], if that was a possibility.”
  Financial resources: “Father earns more than twice what
 [M]other earns. Mother has filed for bankruptcy. Father is
 soliciting funds for legal fees on public bulletin boards.
 Father’s wife is employed outside of the home, so he has
 help in meeting his household expenses.”
  Demands of parental employment: “There was no
 testimony that there [w]as any interference with the
 parents[’] ability to parent related to their jobs.”
  Relationships of parents with their children: “There was
 no testimony about [M]other’s relationship with the boys,
 other than her own, which was that it was good. Several
 witnesses noted [F]ather’s good relationship with the
 boys.”
  Potential for disruption in the children’s school and
 social lives: “The children are in danger of losing their
 school placement.”
 20
  Impact on state or federal assistance: “There is no impact
 on state or federal assistance.”
  Benefit to parents: “There is no benefit[], other than
 having the children with them for either parent.”
  Preferences of the children: “There was no testimony
 presented about their preferences.”
 The Circuit Court also considered several other factors on the record16:
  Character and reputation: “[Father] had witnesses who
 say he is a fine citizen. The testimony about [M]other was
 critical of her combative style and non-cooperative
 approach. Neither parent presented well in court.”
  Agreements between the parties: “None, other than the
 children’s attendance at [their school] and that it has been a
 good thing for them.”
  Parents’ ability to maintain relationships between the
 children and others who may affect the children’s best
 interests: “Neither parent has demonstrated skill in this
 category.”
  Parents’ ability to maintain a stable, appropriate home:
 “Each of the parties has ability to do so, [and] [F]ather’s
 resources are greater.”
 A review of the record reveals a thoughtful, painstaking consideration of the
 relevant issues affecting the parties’ custody dispute. The court was aware of the challenge
 it faced in fashioning an appropriate award, noting that “[t]his is a very difficult case.”
 Indeed, before announcing its decision during its oral opinion, the court expressed that it
 16
 In Taylor, 306 Md. at 311, the Court explained that the factors it expressly
 discussed are “not intended to be all-inclusive, and a trial judge should consider all other
 circumstances that reasonably relate to the issue.”
 21
 had “considered a variety of options, none of which is especially satisfactory.” At the end
 of the three-day hearing, for example, the Circuit Court had observed: “each parent seems
 to have the view that if they respectively, one or the other, has sole legal custody the
 problems will stop and they will have control. The reality is that will never happen.”
 The court also acknowledged that the existing joint custody arrangement had proved
 problematic. But the court expressed that the parents had good relationships with their
 children, loved and could provide for them. Thus, the court reasoned that “the children
 will do best if they see each parent regularly” and that “the children need to see each of
 you and have a close relationship with both [of] you.” The court’s discussion reveals that,
 in maintaining joint legal custody, it was focused on what was in the children’s best
 interests.
 The court candidly and repeatedly acknowledged that the parents were unable to
 communicate or cooperate well, but was concerned about the children’s need to stay
 involved with both parents. It determined that “the only way both of these parents can stay
 involved with their children’s lives is with [a] strict set of rules about who does what and
 when.” Such rules included provisions granting tie-breaking authority on education,
 religion, and medical issues to Father, and selection of therapist to Mother. As we have
 explained supra, courts have employed tie-breaking provisions in joint custody awards on
 account of poor parental communication. See, e.g., Bonner, 170 So. 3d at 703 (“The trial
 court’s judgment [awarding joint custody], however, resolved those types of conflicts by
 designating the husband as the primary decision maker regarding the child’s education.”);
 Rembert, 674 S.E.2d at 894 (“Thus, it is unlikely that they will agree on these issues; the
 22
 need to designate a final decision-maker is apparent; and the trial court did not abuse its
 discretion in selecting the primary custodial parent as that decision-maker [in its joint
 custody award].”); Glidewell, 869 N.W.2d at 808 (affirming joint custody with division of
 decision-making duties where “the anger that [the parents] ha[d] towards one another
 cloud[ed] their judgment and prevent[ed] them from making important collective decisions
 on behalf of their children”).
 Moreover, testimony at the hearing, including the excerpts below, provided a basis
 for the Circuit Court to award one parent decision-making authority over the other as it did:
  Education (Father): The children’s school principal
 testified she would reconsider allowing them to attend “if
 [Father] was in charge, then it would definitely be. So, if
 he had sole custody it would be dealing with one person
 who had the children’s best interests and could work
 cooperatively with the school.”
  Religion (Father): A member of the temple where the
 children attend religious school testified that she nominated
 Father to be a board member: “[Father] was an involved
 parent at the religious school. And I thought he would be
 [sic] a good perspective to the Board of Education.”
  Medical issues (Father): One of the children’s
 psychiatrist, who administered his medications, testified on
 cross-examination about email communication with the
 parents: “So, with the email that was sent, the impression
 that I got unfortunately, was that she [Mother] no longer
 wanted to communicate with me. And so I have to use the
 resources that I have to make the best decisions that I can
 for a child.”
  Selection of therapist (Mother): Mother testified: “I am a
 psychiatric therapist. I am in private practice, and have a
 number of ongoing consulting cases.”
 23
 The Circuit Court’s order also included solutions to the relevant problems the court
 identified at the hearing:
  Medication: “Mother will be provided the medication
 necessary for each child while the child or children are with
 her. Father shall assure that [M]other has the name and
 dosage for each such medication.”17
  Therapy: “The children will remain in regular therapy.
 The parents will see that the children go on a regular,
 consistent basis and that the therapy takes precedence over
 other activities.”18
  Extracurricular activities: “Each parent will decide the
 activities in which the children will participate when the
 children are [with] that parent and will pay for those
 activities individually.”19
  Threats: “Mother will not threaten school, religious, or
 medical personnel.”20
  Derogatory remarks: “Father will not speak or act in a
 derogatory manner toward [M]other or denigrate her in
 public.”21
 17
 The court concluded: “Father. Is dictatorial and finds ways to make everything a
 final legal custody decision.”
 18
 The court concluded: “These children will need therapeutic intervention because
 they are living in a war zone.”
 19
 The court concluded: “Mother refuses to allow the children to participate in
 activities on, quote, her parenting time, close quote, ignoring the children’s right to a life
 unencumbered by parental bickering.”
 20
 The court concluded: “[Mother] has risked the school placement.”
 21
 The court concluded: “[Father] has humiliated [M]other in public . . . .”
 24
 Father pins the basis for the court’s decision to award joint custody on its statement
 that “the reason for [the parties to continue to have joint legal custody] is so that both of
 them have access to information about the children.” In Father’s view, this reason is
 insufficient because Maryland law already entitles parents to records about their children.
 That is, FL § 9-104 states that “access to medical, dental and educational records
 concerning the child may not be denied to a parent because the parent does not have
 physical custody of the child.” FL § 9-104.
 The Circuit Court’s statement is better understood, in context, as reflecting its
 concern that Father was “dictatorial,” and that his actions deprived Mother of information
 about her children, information that goes beyond the scope of FL § 9-104, which simply
 entitles parents to records. See FL § 9-104. Mother gave the following testimony about
 Father’s actions:
  “However, over the course, especially of the last year,
 [Father] has treated me and third parties as if he had full
 custody and actively excluded me from decision making
 and information pertaining to the lives of the children.”
  “Without any discussion with me, he and Dr. Wu pulled
 medication and decided that [our son’s] [medication] needs
 to be provided by the school.”
  “[Father] will do things like send me e-mails saying that he
 took [our son] to an emergency medical appointment, that
 [our son] was diagnosed with swimmer’s ear. Will not tell
 me what the medication is, which ear it is, when I’m
 supposed to give the medication. I have to ask every
 specific question in detail in order to get any information.”
  “[Father] informed me of [our son’s sprained wrist], after it
 happened, but failed to give me pertinent details.”
 25
  Mother explains she cannot get information at an urgent
 care center because the center did not know she was a
 custodial parent.
  “[Father] regularly has the children in locations that I don’t
 know about being taken care of by his parents, or by [his
 new wife’s] parents, and I don’t know where they are or
 when they’re going.”
  “[T]here was this series of 7 or 8 instances during that time
 period where I was not given information where the
 children were injured on school property and I was not
 called.”
 Ultimately, Father’s argument about FL § 9-104 overlooks the evidence of Mother’s
 exclusion and the court’s view of Father’s “dictatorial” conduct. The court evidently
 believed that it was in the children’s best interests to “have a close relationship” with
 Mother—as well as with Father. For Mother to have an effective relationship, though, she
 would need access to information about her children; granting Father sole legal custody
 would undermine that objective.
 The Circuit Court’s determination—predicated on its thorough review of the Taylor
 factors, deliberation over custody award options, sober appreciation of the difficulties
 before it, and use of strict rules including tie-breaking provisions to account for the parties’
 inability to communicate—was rational and guided by established principles of Maryland
 law. No abuse of discretion occurred in this case.
 CONCLUSION
 We hold today that a court of equity ruling on a custody dispute may, under
 appropriate circumstances and with careful consideration articulated on the record, grant
 joint legal custody to parents who cannot effectively communicate together regarding
 26
 matters pertaining to their children. In doing so, the court has the legal authority to include
 tie-breaking provisions in the joint legal custody award. In this case, the Circuit Court’s
 order of joint legal custody with tie-breaking provisions was not an abuse of discretion.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
 SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS
 TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
 27
 Circuit Court for Montgomery County
 Case No. 87541
 Argued: May 5, 2016
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 89
 September Term, 2015
 ______________________________________
 ADAM SANTO
 v.
 GRACE SANTO
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired,
 Specially Assigned),
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Concurring Opinion by Watts, J., which
 Battaglia, J., joins
 ______________________________________
 Filed: July 11, 2016
 Respectfully, I concur and write separately to elaborate on the majority opinion in
 one respect only.
 I agree with the Majority that the holding in Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508
 A.2d 964 (1986) does not act as a bar to joint custody where the parties are unable to
 effectively communicate. See Maj. Slip Op. at 8, 25-26. In Taylor, this Court expressly
 acknowledged that in unusual cases joint custody may be appropriate despite parents’
 inability to effectively communicate with each other. In Taylor, id. at 307, 508 A.2d at
 972, we explained:
 In the unusual case where the trial [court] concludes that joint legal custody
 is appropriate notwithstanding the absence of a “track record” of willingness
 and ability on the part of the parents to cooperate in making decisions dealing
 with the child’s welfare, the trial [court] must articulate fully the reasons that
 support that conclusion.
 (Emphasis added). As Taylor permits, here, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
 ordered joint legal custody, notwithstanding evidence of the parties’ inability to effectively
 communicate with each other. Stated otherwise, the evidence established that this was the
 unusual case that warranted such a result, and the trial court fully articulated the reasons
 supporting that conclusion.
 Taylor has served the State well for thirty years, and establishes that an order of
 joint legal custody despite parents’ inability to communicate should be “the unusual
 case[,]” not the norm. Id. at 307, 508 A.2d at 972. The rationale for joint legal custody
 being the unusual case where parents are unable to communicate seems obvious; children
 should not be placed in a contentious environment, between embattled parents, unless there
 is no other alternative that achieves the goal of serving their best interests. The Majority
 did not alter Taylor to reach the correct result in this case. I fear, however, that in endorsing
 a trial court’s ability to order joint legal custody where the evidence establishes that the
 parties are unable to communicate effectively and make joint decisions, the Majority did
 not include the caveat explicitly set forth in Taylor that such a result is to be the unusual or
 infrequent case. Given that the majority opinion does not purport to alter or abridge Taylor
 in any manner, Taylor in its entirety—including the observation that an award of joint legal
 custody despite the ability of the parents to effectively communicate is the unusual case—
 remains good law. From my perspective, this is an important point that should not be
 overlooked.
 For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur.
 Judge Battaglia has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.
 -2-


type: other

text:
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 § 8 Kundenrücktritt
 1. Stornierungen durch den Auftraggeber sind nur mit schriftlicher Zustimmung der Agentur möglich. Ist die Agentur mit einer Storno einverstanden, so hat diese das Recht neben den erbrachten Leistungen und aufgelaufenen Kosten eine Stornogebühr in Höhe von 50% des noch nicht abgerechneten Auftragswerkes des Gesamtprojektes zu verrechnen, darin sind entstandene Aufwendungen und entgangener Gewinn erhalten.
 Sollten einzelne Bestimmungen dieser allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen durch gesetzliche oder gerichtliche Urteile unwirksam sein, so bleiben alle übrigen Bestimmungen unberührt. Anstelle der unwirksamen Geschäftsbedingung(en) tritt die gesetzliche Neuregelung in Kraft. Gerichtsstand ist Stuttgart. Es gilt das Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Nebenabreden, Änderungen und von dieser AGB abweichende Vereinbarungen – bedürfen der Schriftform.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 25.9.2008
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 257/29
 BESCHLUSS DES GEMEINSAMEN EWR-AUSSCHUSSES
 Nr. 66/2008
 vom 6. Juni 2008
 zur Änderung des Anhangs IX (Finanzdienstleistungen) des EWR-Abkommens
 DER GEMEINSAME EWR-AUSSCHUSS —
 gestützt auf das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, geändert durch das Anpassungsprotokoll zum Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, nachstehend „Abkommen“ genannt, insbesondere auf Artikel 98,
 in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
 (1)
 Anhang IX des Abkommens wurde durch den Beschluss des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 51/2008 vom 25. April 2008 (1) geändert.
 (2)
 Die Richtlinie 2007/18/EG der Kommission vom 27. März 2007 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/48/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates hinsichtlich des Ausschlusses bzw. der Aufnahme bestimmter Institute aus ihrem bzw. in ihren Anwendungsbereich und hinsichtlich der Behandlung der Forderungen an multilaterale Entwicklungsbanken (2) ist in das Abkommen aufzunehmen —
 BESCHLIESST:
 Artikel 1
 In Anhang IX des Abkommens wird unter Nummer 14 (Richtlinie 2006/48/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates) Folgendes angefügt:
 „ , geändert durch:
 —
 32007 L 0018: Richtlinie 2007/18/EG der Kommission vom 27. März 2007 (ABl. L 87 vom 28.3.2007, S. 9).“
 Artikel 2
 Der Wortlaut der Richtlinie 2007/18/EG in isländischer und norwegischer Sprache, der in der EWR-Beilage des Amtsblatts der Europäischen Union veröffentlicht wird, ist verbindlich.
 Artikel 3
 Dieser Beschluss tritt am 7. Juni 2008 in Kraft, sofern dem Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuss alle Mitteilungen nach Artikel 103 Absatz 1 des Abkommens vorliegen (3), oder am Tag des Inkrafttretens des Beschlusses des Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschusses Nr. 65/2008 vom 6. Juni 2008, je nachdem, welcher Zeitpunkt der spätere ist.
 Artikel 4
 Dieser Beschluss wird im EWR-Abschnitt und in der EWR-Beilage des Amtsblatts der Europäischen Union veröffentlicht.
 Geschehen zu Brüssel am 6. Juni 2008.
 Für den Gemeinsamen EWR-Ausschuss
 Der Präsident
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) ABl. L 223 vom 21.8.2008, S. 49.
 (2) ABl. L 87 vom 28.3.2007, S. 9.
 (3) Ein Bestehen verfassungsrechtlicher Anforderungen wurde nicht mitgeteilt.


type: wikipedia

text:
Téba alebo Thebe alebo Jupiter XIV je štvrtý Jupiterov mesiac (podľa vzdialenosti od planéty). Bol objavený Stephenom P. Synnottom z fotiek, ktoré urobila sonda Voyager 1 5. marca 1979, a získal dočasný názov S/1979 J 2. Neskôr ho objavili aj na starších fotkách z 27. februára 1979. V roku 1983 bol oficiálne pomenovaný Thebe podľa mytologickej postavy, ktorá bola milenkou Dia (grécky boh Jupiter).
 Obežná dráha
 Téba je najvzdialenejší zo štyroch malých vnútorných mesiacov Jupitera. Okolo planéty obieha vo vzdialenosti ~222 000 km. Obežná dráha má excentricitu ~0,018 a inklináciu ~1,08° vzhľadom na rovník Jupitera. Tieto veličiny sú nezvyčajne vysoké, pravdepodobne kvôli vplyvom mesiaca Io v minulosti. Obežná dráha Téby leží v blízkosti vonkajšieho okraja tenkého prstenca, ktorý je tvorený materiálom vyvrhnutým týmto satelitom.
 Charakteristika
 Téba má veľmi nepravidelný tvar s eliptickou aproximáciou 116x98x84 km. Jej celková hustota a hmotnosť nie sú známe, ale predpokladá sa veľká podobnosť s mesiacom Amalthea, hustota ~0.86 g/cm3, hmotnosť ~4.3×1017 kg.
 Téba rotuje viazane, čo znamená, že je stále otočená jednou stranou k planéte, podobne ako všetky vnútorné satelity Jupitera. Pohybuje sa tak, že dlhá os stále ukazuje smerom k planéte. Úniková rýchlosť je veľmi malá, čo dovoľuje prachu a ďalšiemu materiálu po dopade meteoritov ľahko uniknúť do kozmického priestoru. Tým sa formuje tenký prstenec.
 Povrch je veľmi tmavý a javí sa ako červený. Je tu asymetria hmoty medzihemisférou vo smere pohybu mesiaca a hemisférou otočenou do protismeru pohybu mesiaca. Predná, tzv. vedúca hemisféra, je 1,3 krát väčšia ako koncová. Asymetria je pravdepodobne spôsobená vyššou rýchlosťou a frekvenciou dopadov meteoritov na vedúcu hemisféru, čo spôsobuje uvoľňovanie materiálu (ľad) z vnútra satelitu. Na povrchu Téby sa vyskytuje množstvo kráterov. Nachádzajú sa tu najmenej tri alebo štyri impaktné krátery, ktoré sú veľmi rozsiahle, každý z nich je veľkosťou porovnateľný s vlastným priemerom Téby. Najväčší (~40 km) sa nachádza na odvrátenej strane a nazýva sa Zethus (jediný povrchový útvar na Téby, ktorý dostal meno). Na hrane tohto kráteru sa nachádza niekoľko jasných miest.
 Prieskum
 Téba bola objavená z fotografií, ktoré urobil Voyager 1 Stephenom P. Synnottom, ktorý bol členom navigačného tímu sondy Voyager. Pred príletom sondy Galileo (kozmická sonda) k Jupiteru boli informácie o tomto mesiaci veľmi limitované. Galileo vyfotografoval takmer celý povrch tohto satelitu.
 Pozri aj
 Jupiter
 Mesiace Jupitera
 Slnečná sústava
 Referencie
 Externé odkazy
 NASA profil - Thebe
 Iné projekty
 Mesiace Jupitera
 Astronomické objekty objavené v roku 1979


text:
 Важна правна забележка
 |
 22005A0520(01)
 Официален вестник n° L 127 , 20/05/2005 стр. 0028 - 0031 Официален вестник n° L 164 , 16/06/2006 стр. 0026 - 0029
 20050504Споразумениемежду Европейския съюз и Нова Зеландия относно участието на Нова Зеландия във военната операция на ЕС по управление на кризата в Босна и Херцеговина (операция Althea)ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЯТ СЪЮЗ (EС),от една страна, иПРАВИТЕЛСТВОТО НА НОВА ЗЕЛАНДИЯ (НОВА ЗЕЛАНДИЯ),от друга страна,наричани по-нататък "Страните",КАТО ИМАТ ПРЕДВИД, ЧЕ:- приемането от Съвета на Европейския съюз на Съвместно действие 2004/570/ОВППС oт 12 юли 2004 г. относно военна операция на Европейския съюз в Босна и Херцеговина [1],- поканата към Нова Зеландия да участва в командваната от ЕС операция,- успешното завършване на процеса на сформиране на военните части и препоръките на командващия европейската операция и на Военния комитет на ЕС да се постигне съгласие относно участието на сили на Нова Зеландия в командваната от ЕС военна операция,- Решение BiH/1/2004 на Комитета по политика и сигурност за Босна и Херцеговина oт 21 септември 2004 г. [2] относно приемане участието на Нова Зеландия в командваната от ЕС военна операция за Босна и Херцеговина,- Решение BiH/3/2004 на Комитета по политика и сигурност за Босна и Херцеговина oт 29 септември 2004 г. относно изграждането на Комитета на участващите държави във военната операция на ЕС за Босна и Херцеговина [3],СЕ СПОРАЗУМЯХА ЗА СЛЕДНОТО:Член 1Участие в операцията1. Нова Зеландия следва да се асоциира със Съвместно действие 2004/570/ОВППС oт 12 юли 2004 г. относно военна операция на Европейския съюз в Босна и Херцеговина, както и с всяко съвместно действие или решение, с които Съветът на Европа решава да удължи военната операция, ръководена от ЕС по управление на криза, в съответствие с разпоредбите на настоящото споразумение и с всички останали договорености, които се изискат, за неговото прилагане.2. Участието на Нова Зеландия във военната операция, ръководена от ЕС по управление на криза, не нарушава изискването за автономност на ЕС при вземането на решения.3. Нова Зеландия гарантира, че нейните сили и личен състав, които участват във военната операция, ръководена от ЕС по управление на криза, приемат своята мисия в съответствие със:- Съвместно действие 2004/570/ОВППС и евентуални последващи изменения,- оперативния план,- мерките по изпълнение.4. Силите и личният състав, които са командировани за операцията от Нова Зеландия, следва да изпълняват задълженията си и да се ръководят в поведението си единствено от интересите на военната операция, провеждана под командването на ЕС за управление на криза.5. Нова Зеландия следва да информира в срок командващия операцията на ЕС в случай на някаква промяна на нейното участие в операцията.Член 2Статут на силите1. Статусът на силите и личният състав от Нова Зеландия, участващи във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза, се управлява в съответствие с разпоредбите, съдържащи се в параграф 12 от Резолюция 1575 (2004) на Съвета за сигурност на ООН oт 22 ноември 2004 г.2. Статусът на силите и личният състав, командировани в щабквартирата или командните структури, локализирани извън Босна и Херцеговина, се управлява от договореностите между заинтересованата щабквартира и командните структури и Нова Зеландия.3. Без да се засягат разпоредбите за статуса на силите, отбелязани в параграф 1 от настоящия член, Нова Зеландия упражнява юрисдикция върху своите сили и личен състав, участващи във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза.4. Нова Зеландия носи отговорности за произнасяне относно претенции във връзка с участието във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза, предявени от или засягащи всички нейни сили или личен състав. Нова Зеландия носи отговорността за привеждане в сила на всяко едно действие, по-специално правно или дисциплинарно, срещу всички нейни сили или личен състав в съответствие със законодателството и регламентите на страната.5. Нова Зеландия поема отговорностите да направи декларация във връзка с отказване от правото на претенции срещу всяка една държава, участваща във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза, както и да стори същото, подписвайки настоящото споразумение.6. Европейският съюз поема отговорностите да направи декларация във връзка с отказване от правото на претенции срещу Нова Зеландия, участваща във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза, както и да стори същото, подписвайки настоящото споразумение.Член 3Класифицирана информация1. Нова Зеландия приема подходящите мерки, за да гарантира, че класифицираната информация на ЕС е защитена в съответствие с регламентите за сигурност на Съвета на ЕС, които се съдържат в Решение 2001/264/EО на Съвета oт 19 март 2001 г. [4], и в съгласие с понататъшни указания, издавани от компетентните органи, включително и от командващия операцията на ЕС.2. Там, където ЕС и Нова Зеландия са сключили споразумение относно процедурите за сигурност при обмен на класифицирана информация, разпоредбите на подобно споразумение се прилагат в контекста на операцията на ЕС по управление на военната криза.Член 4Субординация на командването1. Всички сили и личен състав, участващи във военната операция на ЕС по управление на криза, остават под пълното командване на техните национални власти.2. Националните власти прехвърлят оперативното и тактическото командване и/или контрола върху техните сили и личния състав на командващия операцията на ЕС. Командващият операцията на ЕС има право да делегира правата си.3. Нова Зеландия има същите права и задължения по отношение на ежедневното управление на операцията, както и участващите в нея държави-членки на ЕС.4. Командващият операцията на ЕС би могъл след консултации с Нова Зеландия във всеки един момент и по всяко време да поиска изтегляне на силите на Нова Зеландия от операцията.5. Нова Зеландия назначава висш военен представител, който да представлява нейния военен контингент във военната операция на Европейския съюз по управление на криза. Този висш военен представител провежда консултации с командващия силите на ЕС по всички въпроси, касаещи операцията, и носи отговорности за дисциплината на контингента през цялото време, през което се провежда операцията.Член 5Финансови аспекти1. Нова Зеландия поема всички разходи, свързани с участието ѝ в операцията, освен ако тези разходи не са предмет на общо финансиране, както е отбелязано в правните инструменти, посочени в член 1, параграф 1 от настоящото споразумение, както и в Решение 2004/197/ОВППС на Съвета oт 23 февруари 2004 г. за създаване на механизъм за администриране на общите разходи за операциите на Европейския съюз с военни и отбранителни последици [5].2. В случай на смърт, травма, загуба или щета, нанесени на физическо или юридическо лице от държавата/държавите, в които операцията се провежда, Нова Зеландия след установяване на нейното задължение изплаща компенсация според условията, предвидени в разпоредбите, касаещи статута на силите, както това е отбелязано в член 2, параграф 1 от настоящото споразумение.Член 6Договорености по прилагане на споразумениетоВсички необходими технически и административни договорености по прилагане на настоящото споразумение се сключват между генералния секретар на Съвета на Европейския съюз или върховния представител по въпросите на ОВППС и съответните оправомощени органи на Нова Зеландия.Член 7Неспазване на задълженияАко някоя от страните не спази задължение, предвидено по смисъла на предишните членове, другата страна има правото да прекрати настоящото споразумение с предизвестие от един месец.Член 8Уреждане на споровеСпоровете, отнасящи се до тълкуването на прилагането на настоящото споразумение ще бъдат уреждани с дипломатически средства между страните.Член 9Влизане в сила1. Настоящото споразумение влиза в сила на първия ден от първия месец, след като страните се нотифицират взаимно относно приключването на вътрешните процедури, необходими за тази цел.2. Настоящото споразумение се прилага временно от датата на неговото подписване.3. Настоящото споразумение остава в сила за срока на участието на Нова Зеландия в операцията.Съставено в Брюксел на+++++ TIFF +++++, на английски език, в четири екземпляра.За Европейския съюз+++++ TIFF +++++За Нова Зеландия+++++ TIFF +++++[1] ОВ L 252, 28.7.2004 г., стр. 10.[2] ОВ L 324, 27.10.2004 г., стр. 20.[3] ОВ L 325, 28.10.2004 г., стр. 64. Решение, изменено с Решение BiH/5/2004 (ОВ L 357, 2.12.2004 г., стр. 39).[4] ОВ L 101, 11.4.2001 г., стр. 1. Решение, изменено с Решение 2004/194/EC (ОВ L 63, 28.2.2004 г., стр. 48).[5] ОВ L 63, 28.2.2004 г., стр. 68.--------------------------------------------------20050504ДЕКЛАРАЦИИсъгласно член 2, параграфи 5 и 6 от споразумениетоДекларация на държавите-членки на ЕС:"В приложение към Съвместно действие 2004/570/ОВППС на ЕС от 12 юли 2004 г. относно военната операция на Европейския съюз в Босна и Херцеговина държавите-членки на ЕС полагат усилия, доколкото вътрешните им законодателства позволяват това, по възможност да не предявяват искове срещу Нова Зеландия за увреждане, смърт на техен персонал, щети или загуба на притежавано от тях имущество и използвано от операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата, ако това увреждане, смърт, щета или загуба:- са причинени от новозеландски персонал по време на изпълнение на служебните им задължения във връзка с операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата, освен в случай на сериозна небрежност или умишлено увреждане, или- са възникнали от използването на имущество, принадлежащо на Нова Зеландия, при условие че имуществото е използвано във връзка с операцията и с изключение на случаите на сериозна небрежност или умишлено увреждане от страна на личния състав от Нова Зеландия, ползващ това имущество и участващ в операцията на ЕС по управление на кризата."Декларация на Нова Зеландия:"В приложение към Съвместно действие 2004/570/ОВППС на ЕС от 12 юли 2004 г. относно военната операция на Европейския съюз в Босна и Херцеговина Нова Зеландия полага усилия, доколкото вътрешното ѝ законодателство позволява това, по възможност да не предявява искове срещу някоя от държавите, участващи във военната операция на ЕС за управление на кризата, за увреждане, смърт на персонал от Нова Зеландия, щети или загуба на притежавано от нея имущество и използвано от операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата, ако това увреждане, смърт, щета или загуба:- са причинени от персонал по време на изпълнение на служебните му задължения във връзка с операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата освен в случай на сериозна небрежност или умишлено увреждане, или- са възникнали от използването на имущество, принадлежащо на държави, участващи в операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата, при условие че имуществото е използвано във връзка с операцията и с изключение на случаите на сериозна небрежност или умишлено увреждане от страна на персонала на операцията на ЕС за управление на кризата, ползващ това имущество."--------------------------------------------------


text:
 17.3.2016
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 72/66
 DECISION OF THE EU-ICELAND JOINT COMMITTEE No 1/2016
 of 17 February 2016
 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation [2016/386]
 THE JOINT COMMITTEE,
 Having regard to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, signed in Brussels on 22 July 1972 (1), (‘the Agreement’), and in particular its Article 11,
 Having regard to Protocol 3 to the Agreement concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation, (‘Protocol 3’),
 Whereas:
 (1)
 Article 11 of the Agreement refers to Protocol 3 which lays down the rules of origin and provides for cumulation of origin between the EU, Iceland, Switzerland (including Liechtenstein), Norway, Turkey, the Faroe Islands and the participants in the Barcelona Process, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine (2), Syria and Tunisia..
 (2)
 Article 39 of Protocol 3 provides that the Joint Committee provided for in Article 30 of the Agreement may decide to amend the provisions of this protocol.
 (3)
 The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (3) (‘the Convention’), aims to replace the protocols on rules of origin currently in force among the countries of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean area with a single legal act.
 (4)
 The EU and Iceland signed the Convention on 15 June 2011 and 30 June 2011, respectively.
 (5)
 The EU and Iceland deposited their instruments of acceptance with the depositary of the Convention on 26 March 2012 and 12 March 2012, respectively. Consequently, in application of its Article 10(3), the Convention entered into force in relation to the EU and Iceland on 1 May 2012.
 (6)
 The Convention has included participants in the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Republic of Moldova in the pan-Euro-Mediterranean zone of cumulation of origin.
 (7)
 Protocol 3 to the Agreement should therefore be amended so as to make reference to the Convention,
 HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
 Article 1
 Protocol 3 to the Agreement, concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation shall be replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.
 Article 2
 This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
 It shall apply from 1 May 2015.
 Done at Brussels, 17 February 2016.
 For the Joint Committee
 The President
 Petros SOURMELIS
 (1) OJ L 301, 31.12.1972, p. 2.
 (2) The designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on the issue.
 (3) OJ L 54, 26.2.2013, p. 4.
 ANNEX
 Protocol 3
 concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation
 Article 1
 Applicable rules of origin
 For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, Appendix I and the relevant provisions of Appendix II to the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (1), (‘the Convention’) shall apply.
 All references to the ‘relevant agreement’ in Appendix I and in the relevant provisions of Appendix II to the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin shall be construed so as to mean this Agreement.
 Article 2
 Dispute settlement
 Where disputes arise in relation to the verification procedures of Article 32 of Appendix I to the Convention that cannot be settled between the customs authorities requesting the verification and the custom authorities responsible for carrying out this verification, they shall be submitted to the Joint Committee.
 In all cases the settlement of disputes between the importer and the customs authorities of the importing country shall take place under the legislation of that country.
 Article 3
 Amendments to the Protocol
 The Joint Committee may decide to amend the provisions of this Protocol.
 Article 4
 Withdrawal from the Convention
 1. Should either the EU or Iceland give notice in writing to the depositary of the Convention of their intention to withdraw from the Convention according to its Article 9, the EU and Iceland shall immediately enter into negotiations on rules of origin for the purpose of implementing this Agreement.
 2. Until the entry into force of such newly negotiated rules of origin, the rules of origin contained in Appendix I and, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of Appendix II to the Convention, applicable at the moment of withdrawal, shall continue to apply to this Agreement. However, as of the moment of withdrawal, the rules of origin contained in Appendix I and, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of Appendix II to the Convention shall be construed so as to allow bilateral cumulation between the EU and Iceland only.
 Article 5
 Transitional provisions — cumulation
 Notwithstanding Articles 16(5) and 21(3) of Appendix I of the Convention, where cumulation involves only EFTA States, the Faroe Islands, the EU, Turkey, the participants in the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Republic of Moldova, the proof of origin may be a movement certificate EUR.1 or an origin declaration.
 (1) OJ L 54, 26.2.2013, p. 4.


text:
 28.7.2005
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 L 198/22
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS nr 32/2005,
 11. märts 2005,
 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu II lisa (Tehnilised normid, standardid, katsetamine ja sertifitseerimine)
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi “leping”, eriti selle artiklit 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1)
 Lepingu II lisa on muudetud EMP Ühiskomitee 8. veebruari 2005. aasta otsusega nr 7/2005. (1)
 (2)
 Komisjoni 22. märtsi 2004. aasta direktiiv 2004/33/EÜ, millega rakendatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 2002/98/EÜ seoses teatavate tehniliste nõuetega vere ja verekomponentide osas, (2) tuleb inkorporeerida lepingusse,
 ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Lepingu II lisa XIII peatüki punkti 15u järele (Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv 2002/98/EÜ) lisatakse järgmine punkt:
 “15v.
 32004 L 0033: komisjoni direktiiv 2004/33/EÜ, 22. märts 2004, millega rakendatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 2002/98/EÜ seoses teatavate tehniliste nõuetega vere ja verekomponentide osas, (ELT L 91, 30.3.2004, lk 25).”
 Artikkel 2
 Direktiivi 2004/33/EÜ islandi- ja norrakeelne tekst, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentsed.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus jõustub 12. märtsil 2005, tingimusel et kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõikele 1 vastavad teated on edastatud EMP Ühiskomiteele. (3)
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 Brüssel, 11. märts 2005
 EMP Ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja
 Richard WRIGHT
 (1) ELT L 161, 23.6.2005, lk 15.
 (2) ELT L 91, 30.3.2004, lk 25.
 (3) Põhiseadusest tulenevad nõuded on nimetatud.


text:
 Fontos jogi nyilatkozat
 |
 22004D0049
 Az EGT-Vegyesbizottság határozata 49/2004 (2004. április 23.) az EGT-megállapodás XX. mellékletének (Környezet) módosításáról — a Bizottság 2003/532/EK ajánlása (EMAS — közösségi környezetvédelmi vezetési és hitelesítési rendszer)
 Hivatalos Lap L 277 , 26/08/2004 o. 0016 - 0016
 Az EGT-Vegyesbizottság 49/2004 határozata(2004. április 23.)az EGT-megállapodás XX. mellékletének (Környezet) módosításárólAZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG,tekintettel az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló, az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodás kiigazításáról szóló jegyzőkönyvvel módosított megállapodásra (a továbbiakban: a Megállapodás), és különösen annak 98. cikkére,mivel:(1) A Megállapodás XX. mellékletét a 2003. november 7-i 160/2003 EGT-vegyesbizottsági határozat [1] módosította.(2) A szervezeteknek a közösségi környezetvédelmi vezetési és hitelesítési rendszerben (EMAS) való önkéntes részvételének lehetővé tételéről szóló 761/2001/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet végrehajtásával kapcsolatos útmutatásról szóló, 2003. július 10-i 2003/532/EK bizottsági ajánlást [2] be kell építeni a Megállapodásba,A KÖVETKEZŐKÉPPEN HATÁROZOTT:1. cikkA Megállapodás XX. melléklete a 41. pontot (2003/47/EK bizottsági ajánlás) követően a következő ponttal egészül ki:"42. 32003 H 0532: A Bizottság 2003. július 10-i 2003/532/EK ajánlása a szervezeteknek a közösségi környezetvédelmi vezetési és hitelesítési rendszerben (EMAS) való önkéntes részvételének lehetővé tételéről szóló 761/2001/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet végrehajtásával kapcsolatos útmutatásról (HL L 184., 2003.7.23., 19. o.)."2. cikkA 2003/532/EK ajánlás izlandi és norvég nyelvű szövegei, amelyeket az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-kiegészítésében közzé kell tenni, hitelesek.3. cikkEz a határozat 2004. április 24-én lép hatályba, amennyiben a Megállapodás 103. cikkének (1) bekezdése szerint előírt összes értesítést eljuttatták az EGT-Vegyesbizottsághoz [3].4. cikkEzt a határozatot az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-re vonatkozó részében, illetve EGT-kiegészítésében közzé kell tenni.Kelt Brüsszelben, 2004. április 23-án.az EGT-Vegyesbizottság részérőlaz elnökP. Westerlund[1] HL L 41., 2004.2.12., 58. o.[2] HL L 184., 2003.7.23., 19. o.[3] Nincsenek alkotmányos követelmények.--------------------------------------------------


type: caselaw

text:
 24.10.2016
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 392/6
 Преюдициално запитване от Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Гърция), постъпило на 22 юли 2016 г. — Ypourgos Esoterikon, Ypourgos Paideias kai Thriskevmaton/Maria-Eleni Kalliri
 (Дело C-409/16)
 (2016/C 392/08)
 Език на производството: гръцки
 Запитваща юрисдикция
 Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Гърция)
 Страни в главното производство
 Жалбоподатели: Ypourgos Esoterikon, Ypourgos Paideias kai Thriskevmaton
 Ответник: Maria-Eleni Kalliri
 Преюдициални въпроси
 Съответства ли член 1, параграф 1 от Президентски указ 90/2003, който изменя член 2, параграф 1 от Президентски указ 4/1995 и по смисъла на който цивилните кандидати в школите за офицери и полицейски служители на Полицейската академия, наред с другите изисквания, трябва „да са с ръст (както мъжете, така и жените) поне от 1.70 м“, на разпоредбите на директиви 76/207/ЕИО (1), 2002/73/ЕО (2) и 2006/54/ЕО (3), които забраняват всяка непряка дискриминация, основана на пол, по отношение на достъпа до заетост, професионалната квалификация и развитие, и условията на труд в публичния сектор (освен ако това фактически диференцирано третиране се дължи на фактори, обективно обосновани и чужди на всякаква дискриминация, основана на пол, и не надхвърля това, което е подходящо и необходимо за постигане на преследваната с мярката цел)?
 (1) Директива 76/207/ЕИО на Съвета от 9 февруари 1976 година относно прилагането на принципа на равното третиране на мъжете и жените по отношение на достъпа до заетост, професионалната квалификация и развитие, и на условията на труд (ОВ 1976, L 39, стр. 40; Специално издание на български език, 2007 г., глава 5, том 1, стр. 164).
 (2) Директива 2002/73/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 23 септември 2002 година за изменение на Директива 76/207/ЕИО на Съвета за прилагането на принципа на равно третиране на мъжете и жените по отношение на достъпа до заетост, професионално обучение и повишаване, и условията на труд (ОВ 2002, L 26, стр. 1; Специално издание на български език, 2007 г., глава 5, том 6, стр. 143).
 (3) Директива 2006/54/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 5 юли 2006 година за прилагането на принципа на равните възможности и равното третиране на мъжете и жените в областта на заетостта и професиите (преработена) (ОВ 2006, L 204, стр. 23; Специално издание на български език, 2007 г., глава 5, том 8, стр. 262).


text:
 9.8.2007
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 209/5
 AZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG
 3/2007 határozata
 (2007. április 27.)
 az EGT-megállapodás I. mellékletének (Állat- és növény-egészségügyi kérdések) módosításáról
 AZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodás kiigazításáról szóló jegyzőkönyvvel módosított, az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodásra (a továbbiakban: a megállapodás) és különösen annak 98. cikkére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A megállapodás I. mellékletét a 2006. december 8-i 142/2006 EGT-vegyesbizottsági határozat (1) módosította.
 (2)
 A takarmányokban lévő egyes adalékanyagok végleges engedélyezéséről szóló, 2006. augusztus 29-i 1284/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (2) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (3)
 Az egyes takarmány-adalékanyagok állandó és egy kokcidiosztatikum tíz évre szóló engedélyezéséről szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 1443/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (3) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (4)
 A Bacillus subtilis C-3102 (Calsporin) takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 1444/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (4) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (5)
 Az 1200/2005/EK rendeletnek a mikroorganizmusok csoportjába tartozó Bacillus cereus var. toyoi takarmány-adalékanyag engedélyezése tekintetében történő módosításáról szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 1445/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (5) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (6)
 Az Enterococcus faecium (Biomin IMB52) takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 1446/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (6) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (7)
 A Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Biosaf SC 47) új felhasználásának takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 1447/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletet (7) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (8)
 A 2002/32/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv I. mellékletének a takarmányban előforduló szerves klórvegyületek legnagyobb szintjeinek tekintetében történő módosításáról szóló, 2006. szeptember 29-i 2006/77/EK bizottsági irányelvet (8) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba,
 A KÖVETKEZŐKÉPPEN HATÁROZOTT:
 1. cikk
 A megállapodás I. mellékletének II. fejezete az alábbiak szerint módosul:
 1.
 Az 1zzw. pont (773/2006/EK bizottsági rendelet) után a következő pontokat kell beilleszteni:
 „1zzx.
 32006 R 1284: a Bizottság 2006. augusztus 29-i 1284/2006/EK rendelete a takarmányokban lévő egyes adalékanyagok végleges engedélyezéséről (HL L 235., 2006.8.30., 3. o.).
 1zzy.
 32006 R 1443: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 1443/2006/EK rendelete az egyes takarmány-adalékanyagok állandó és egy kokcidiosztatikum tíz évre szóló engedélyezéséről (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 12. o.).
 1zzz.
 32006 R 1444: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 1444/2006/EK rendelete a Bacillus subtilis C-3102 (Calsporin) takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 19. o.).
 1zzza.
 32006 R 1446: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 1446/2006/EK rendelete az Enterococcus faecium (Biomin IMB52) takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 25. o.).
 1zzzb.
 32006 R 1447: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 1447/2006/EK rendelete a Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Biosaf SC 47) új felhasználásának takarmány-adalékanyagként való engedélyezéséről (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 28. o.).”
 2.
 Az 1zzm. pont (1200/2005/EK bizottsági rendelet) a következővel egészül ki:
 „, az alábbi módosítással:
 —
 32006 R 1445: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 1445/2006/EK rendelete (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 22. o.).”
 3.
 A 33. pont (2002/32/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv) a következő francia bekezdéssel egészül ki:
 „—
 32006 L 0077: a Bizottság 2006. szeptember 29-i 2006/77/EK irányelve (HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 53. o.).”
 2. cikk
 Az 1284/2006/EK, 1443/2006/EK, 1444/2006/EK, 1445/2006/EK, 1446/2006/EK és az 1447/2006/EK rendeletnek, valamint a 2006/77/EK irányelvnek az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja EGT-kiegészítésében közzéteendő izlandi és norvég nyelvű szövege hiteles.
 3. cikk
 Ez a határozat 2007. április 28-án lép hatályba, amennyiben a megállapodás 103. cikkének (1) bekezdése szerint előírt összes értesítést eljuttatták az EGT-Vegyesbizottsághoz (9).
 4. cikk
 Ezt a határozatot az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-re vonatkozó részében, illetve EGT-kiegészítésében kell közzétenni.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2007. április 27-én.
 az EGT-Vegyesbizottság részéről
 az elnök
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) HL L 89., 2007.3.29., 8. o.
 (2) HL L 235., 2006.8.30., 3. o.
 (3) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 12. o.
 (4) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 19. o.
 (5) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 22. o.
 (6) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 25. o.
 (7) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 28. o.
 (8) HL L 271., 2006.9.30., 53. o.
 (9) Alkotmányos követelmények fennállását nem jelezték.