text:
 Fontos jogi nyilatkozat
 |
 22001D0088
 Hivatalos Lap L 238 , 06/09/2001 o. 0043 - 0044
 Az EGT-Vegyesbizottság 88/2001 határozata(2001. június 19.)az EGT-megállapodás egyes, a négy alapszabadságon kívül eső területeken folytatott együttműködésről szóló 31. jegyzőkönyvének módosításárólAZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG,tekintettel az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló, az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodás kiigazításáról szóló jegyzőkönyvvel módosított megállapodásra (a továbbiakban: a Megállapodás), és különösen annak 86. és 98. cikkére,mivel:(1) A Megállapodás 31. jegyzőkönyvét a 2000. április 11-i 39/2000 EGT-vegyesbizottsági határozat [1] módosította.(2) Helyénvaló kiterjeszteni a Megállapodásban résztvevő Szerződő Felek közötti együttműködést a nemek közötti egyenlőségre vonatkozó közösségi keretstratégiához kapcsolódó program (2001-2005) létrehozásáról szóló, 2000. december 20-i 2001/51/EK tanácsi határozatra [2].(3) A Megállapodás 31. jegyzőkönyvét ezért módosítani kell annak érdekében, hogy lehetséges legyen ez a kiterjesztett együttműködés 2001. január 1-jei hatállyal,A KÖVETKEZŐKÉPPEN HATÁROZOTT:1. cikkA Megállapodás 31. jegyzőkönyvének 5. cikke a következőképpen módosul:1. A (5) bekezdés szövegének helyébe a következő szöveg lép:"Az EFTA-államok 1996. január 1-jétől részt vesznek a (8) bekezdés első két francia bekezdésében említett közösségi programokban és fellépésekben, 2000. január 1-jétől részt vesznek a harmadik francia bekezdésben említett programban, és 2001. január 1-jétől részt vesznek a negyedik francia bekezdésben említett programban.";2. A (8) bekezdés a következő francia bekezdéssel egészül ki:"- 32001 D 0051: A Tanács 2000. december 20-i 2001/51/EK határozata a nemek közötti egyenlőségre vonatkozó közösségi keretstratégiához kapcsolódó program (2001-2005) létrehozásáról (HL L 17., 2001.1.19., 22. o.)."2. cikkEz a határozat 2001. június 20-án lép hatályba, amennyiben a Megállapodás 103. cikkének (1) bekezdése szerint előírt összes értesítést eljuttatták az EGT-Vegyesbizottsághoz [3].A határozat 2001. január 1-jétől alkalmazandó.3. cikkEzt a határozatot az Európai Közösségek Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-re vonatkozó részében, illetve EGT-kiegészítésében közzé kell tenni.Kelt Brüsszelben, 2001. június 19-én.az EGT-Vegyesbizottság részérőlaz elnökP. Westerlund[1] HL L 141., 2000.6.15., 67. o.[2] HL L 17., 2001.1.19., 22. o.[3] Alkotmányos követelmények nem merültek fel.--------------------------------------------------


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN
 Bryssel den 28.9.2020
 COM(2020) 586 final
 2020/0271(NLE)
 Förslag till
 RÅDETS BESLUT
 om ändring av rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020 för att införa den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen under det 75:e mötet i kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön och det 102:a mötet i sjösäkerhetskommittén om godkännande av ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär om ett modellavtal för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar
 MOTIVERING
 1.Fråga som behandlas i förslaget
 Detta förslag avser en ändring av rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020
 1
 om fastställande av den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar vid det 102:e mötet i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens sjösäkerhetskommitté (MSC 102), som kommer att hållas i London den 4–11 november 2020 och vid det 75:e mötet i IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön (MEPC 75), som kommer att hållas i London den 16–20 november 2020, i samband med det planerade antagandet av ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär om ett modellavtal för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar för administrationens räkning.
 Bakgrund till förslaget
 1.1.Konventionen om upprättande av Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen
 Genom konventionen om upprättande av Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen (nedan kallad IMO) inrättas IMO. Syftet med IMO är att tillhandahålla ett forum för samarbete på området för lagstiftning och praxis i tekniska frågor av alla slag som påverkar sjöfarten i internationell handel. Den syftar vidare till att främja ett allmänt antagande av högsta möjliga standarder i fråga om sjösäkerhet, effektiv navigering samt förebyggande och kontroll av marina föroreningar från fartyg, vilket främjar likvärdiga förutsättningar. Den ska också hantera relaterade administrativa och rättsliga frågor.
 Konventionen trädde i kraft den 17 mars 1958.
 Samtliga medlemsstater är parter i konventionen.
 Samtliga medlemsstater är parter i den internationella konventionen om säkerheten för människoliv till sjöss (Solas) från 1974, som trädde i kraft den 25 maj 1980. Unionen är inte part i Solas.
 Samtliga medlemsstater är parter i den internationella konventionen till förhindrande av förorening från fartyg (Marpol) från 1973, som trädde i kraft den 2 oktober 1983, och i bilaga VI, som trädde i kraft den 18 maj 2005. Unionen är inte part i Marpol.
 1.2.Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen
 Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen (IMO) är ett specialiserat fackorgan inom FN med ansvar för säkerhet och trygghet inom sjöfarten och för att förhindra att fartygen förorenar haven. Fackorganet är den globala normgivande myndigheten för säkerhet, trygghet och miljöprestanda inom internationell sjöfart. Fackorganets viktigaste uppgift är att skapa ett regelverk för sjöfartsindustrin som är rättvist och effektivt och som antas och tillämpas globalt.
 Medlemskap i organisationen är öppet för alla stater och EU:s samtliga medlemsstater är medlemmar i IMO. Sedan 1974 har Europeiska kommissionen observatörsstatus i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen (IMO). Detta grundar sig på ett avtal om samarbete mellan Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen (IMO) och Europeiska kommissionen i frågor av gemensamt intresse för parterna.
 IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté består också av IMO:s samtliga medlemmar och sammanträder minst en gång om året. Den behandlar alla frågor inom organisationens behörighet som rör navigationshjälpmedel, byggande och utrustning av fartyg, säkerhetsaspekter på bemanningskrav, regler för förhindrande av kollisioner, hantering av farligt gods, förfaranden och krav på sjösäkerhet, hydrografisk information, loggböcker och navigeringsinformation, undersökning av olyckor till havs, räddning och bärgning, samt eventuella andra frågor som direkt berör sjösäkerhet.
 IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté tillhandahåller resurser för att utföra de uppgifter den tilldelats genom IMO-konventionen, IMO:s generalförsamling eller IMO:s råd eller uppgifter inom ovan nämnda tillämpningsområde som kommittén tilldelas genom eller enligt andra internationella instrument och som godkänts av IMO. Beslut av sjösäkerhetskommittén, och av dess underordnade organ, ska antas av en majoritet av medlemmarna.
 IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön består av IMO:s samtliga medlemmar och de sammanträder minst en gång om året. Den behandlar miljöfrågor inom organisationens tillämpningsområde när det gäller kontroll och förhindrande av föroreningar förorsakade av fartyg som omfattas av Marpolkonventionen, inbegripet olja, kemikalier som transporteras i bulk, avloppsvatten, fast avfall och utsläpp från fartyg, inklusive luftföroreningar och utsläpp av växthusgaser. Andra frågor som omfattas inbegriper hantering av ballastvatten, antifoulingsystem, återvinning av fartyg, beredskap och insatser vid utsläpp samt identifiering av särskilda områden och särskilt känsliga havsområden.
 IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön tillhandahåller resurser för att utföra de uppgifter den tilldelats genom IMO-konventionen, IMO:s generalförsamling eller IMO:s råd, eller uppgifter inom ovan nämnda tillämpningsområde som kommittén tilldelas genom eller enligt andra internationella instrument och som godkänts av IMO. Beslut av kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön och av dess underordnade organ ska antas av en majoritet av medlemmarna.
 1.3.Den föreslagna rättsakten från IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté
 Den 4–11 november 2020, vid sitt 102:a möte (MSC 102), kommer sjösäkerhetskommittén att godkänna ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär, som kommer att fastställa ett modellavtal som regeringar ska använda för att bemyndiga erkända organisationer som agerar på deras vägnar. Cirkuläret ska godkännas gemensamt av sjösäkerhetskommittén och kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön.
 År 2016 godkände sjösäkerhetskommittén ett nytt arbetsprogram för att se över och ändra modellavtalet för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar för att anpassa det till kraven i koden för erkända organisationer (RO-koden). Utkastet till modellavtal diskuterades vid flera möten i IMO:s underkommitté för genomförande av IMO-instrument och behandlas nu av kommittén för godkännande.
 1.4.Förslaget till rättsakt från IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön
 Den 16–20 november 2020, vid sitt 75:e möte (MEPC 75), kommer kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön att godkänna samma MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär med modellavtal för regeringar att använda för att bemyndiga erkända organisationer som agerar på deras vägnar.
 2.Den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar
 2.1.Godkännande av cirkuläret MSC-MEPC.5
 Vid det 97:e mötet i sjösäkerhetskommittén (MSC 97), som ägde rum i London den 21–25 november 2016, godkändes ett nytt resultat för att se över och ändra modellavtalet för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar (MSC.1/Circ.710 – MEPC.1/Circ.307) för att anpassa det till kraven i RO-koden. Det nya resultatet togs upp på den tvååriga agendan för 2016–2017 för underkommittén för genomförande av IMO-instrument och på den preliminära dagordningen för det 4:e mötet i underkommittén för genomförande av IMO-instrument (III 4), där 2018 angavs som genomförandeår.
 III 4, som ägde rum i London den 25–29 september 2017, beslutade att ändra modellavtalet på grundval av ett IACS-dokument och bildade en korrespondensgrupp för att utveckla texten. III 5, som ägde rum i London den 24–28 september 2018, färdigställde utkastet till modellavtal och vidarebefordrade det till det 74:e mötet i kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön (MEPC 74) och sjösäkerhetskommitténs 101:a möte (MSC 101) för godkännande.
 MEPC 74 sköt upp behandlingen av utkastet till cirkulär till MEPC 75 på grund av tidsbrist. MSC 101 diskuterade utkastet till text, men på grund av starka invändningar från IACS att deras föreslagna innehållsmässiga ändringar inte godtogs hänsköt MSC 101 utkastet tillsammans med ändringsförslagen från IACS till det 6:e mötet i underkommittén för genomförande av IMO-instrument (III 6) för övervägande. III 6, som ägde rum i London den 1–5 juli 2019, granskade utkastet till modellavtal och förslagen från IACS. Den godtog deras redaktionella förslag men förkastade förslagen i sak. III 6 vidarebefordrade därefter utkastet till cirkulär till MEPC 75 och MSC 102 för godkännande.
 Unionen bör stödja de ändringar av IMO:s modellavtal som man enats om i III 6. Det nya cirkuläret ersätter MSC/Circ.710 och MEPC/Circ.307, uppdaterar modellavtalet och anpassar det till RO-koden (resolutionerna MSC.349 (92) och MEPC.237 (65)) . Det kommer att öka noggrannheten, transparensen och ansvarsskyldigheten för både flaggstatens administration och de erkända organisationerna på global nivå.
 2.2.Relevant unionsrätt och EU:s befogenhet
 Modellavtalet, som för närvarande fastställs i MSC/Circ.710 och MEPC/Circ.307, genomförs i unionsrätten genom Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed. I artikel 5 i direktiv 2009/15/EG anges följande:
 ”1
 Medlemsstater som beslutar i enlighet med artikel 3.2 ska upprätta en arbetsförbindelse mellan sin behöriga administration och de organisationer som agerar för deras räkning.
 2
 Arbetsförbindelsen ska regleras genom ett formaliserat, skriftligt och icke-diskriminerande avtal (...) som åtminstone omfattar följande: a) Bestämmelserna i bihang II till IMO:s resolution A.739(18) om riktlinjer för bemyndigande av organisationer som agerar för administrationens räkning, med beaktande av bilagan, bihangen och tillägget till IMO:s MSC/cirkulär 710 och MEPC/cirkulär 307 om modellavtal för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar för administrationens räkning. [...]”
 EU-befogenhet
 Ersättandet av MSC/Circ.710 och MEPC/Circ.307 med utkastet till MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret skulle påverka unionsrätten genom tillämpningen av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed.
 Unionen har således exklusiv befogenhet i enlighet med den sista delen av artikel 3.2 i EUF-fördraget och det är därför nödvändigt att fastställa unionens ståndpunkt om de rättsakter genom vilka ovannämnda ändringar antas.
 3.Rättslig grund
 3.1.Förfarandemässig rättslig grund
 3.1.1.Principer
 I artikel 218.9 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (nedan kallat EUF-fördraget) föreskrivs att beslut ska antas ”om fastställande av vilka ståndpunkter som på unionens vägnar ska intas i ett organ som inrättas genom ett avtal, om detta organ ska anta akter med rättslig verkan, med undantag av sådana akter som kompletterar eller ändrar avtalets institutionella ram.”
 Artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget är tillämplig oberoende av om unionen är medlem i organet eller part i avtalet
 2
 .
 Begreppet akter med rättslig verkan omfattar akter som har rättslig verkan med stöd av de regler i internationell rätt som tillämpas på organet i fråga. Det omfattar även instrument som inte har bindande verkan enligt internationell rätt, men som är ”ägnade att på ett avgörande sätt påverka innehållet i de bestämmelser som antas av unionslagstiftaren”
 3
 .
 3.1.2.Tillämpning i det aktuella fallet
 IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön och IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté är organ som inrättats genom ett avtal, nämligen konventionen om upprättande av Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen.
 Den akt som IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön och IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté uppmanas att anta utgör en akt med rättslig verkan. Den planerade akten kan på ett avgörande sätt påverka innehållet i följande unionsrätt:
 –Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed.
 Detta beror på att medlemsstaternas förvaltningar enligt Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed ska reglera sina arbetsförbindelser med erkända organisationer genom ett formaliserat skriftligt och icke-diskriminerande avtal, som måste bygga på modellavtalet i MSC/Circ. 710 och MEPC/Circ. 307.
 Det nya cirkulär som ersätter MSC/Circ.710 och MEPC/Circ.307 skulle därför påverka unionsrätten genom tillämpningen av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed.
 Den planerade akten varken kompletterar eller ändrar avtalets institutionella ram.
 Den förfarandemässiga rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet är därför artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget.
 3.2.Materiell rättslig grund
 3.2.1.Principer
 Den materiella rättsliga grunden för ett beslut enligt artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget är främst beroende av syftet med och innehållet i den planerade akt avseende vilken en ståndpunkt intas på unionens vägnar. Om den planerade akten har två syften eller två beståndsdelar av vilka det ena syftet eller den ena beståndsdelen kan identifieras som det eller den huvudsakliga, medan det eller den andra endast är av underordnad betydelse, måste det beslut som antas enligt artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget ha en enda materiell rättslig grund, nämligen den som krävs med hänsyn till det huvudsakliga eller avgörande syftet eller den huvudsakliga eller avgörande beståndsdelen.
 3.2.2.Tillämpning i det aktuella fallet
 Den planerade aktens huvudsakliga syfte och innehåll avser sjöfart. Den materiella rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet är därför artikel 100.2 i EUF-fördraget.
 3.3.Slutsats
 Den rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet bör vara artikel 100.2 i EUF-fördraget jämförd med artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget.
 2020/0271 (NLE)
 Förslag till
 RÅDETS BESLUT
 om ändring av rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020 för att införa den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen under det 75:e mötet i kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön och det 102:a mötet i sjösäkerhetskommittén om godkännande av ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär om ett modellavtal för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar
 EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT
 med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, särskilt artikel 100.2 jämförd med artikel 218.9,
 med beaktande av Europeiska kommissionens förslag, och
 av följande skäl:
 (1)Unionens åtgärder inom sjötransportsektorn bör syfta till att skydda den marina miljön, människors hälsa och förbättra sjösäkerheten.
 (2)Konventionen om upprättande av Internationella sjöfartsorganisationen (IMO) trädde i kraft den 17 mars 1958.
 (3)IMO är ett specialiserat fackorgan inom FN med ansvar för säkerhet och trygghet inom sjöfarten och för att förhindra att fartygen förorenar havet och luften. Samtliga EU-medlemsstater är medlemmar i IMO.
 (4)Enligt artikel 28 b i IMO-konventionen ska sjösäkerhetskommittén tillhandahålla resurser för att utföra de uppgifter den tilldelats genom IMO-konventionen, IMO:s generalförsamling eller IMO:s råd, eller uppgifter inom den artikelns tillämpningsområde som sjösäkerhetskommittén tilldelats genom andra internationella instrument och som godkänts av IMO.
 (5)Enligt artikel 38 a i IMO-konventionen ska kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön utföra uppgifter som tilldelats eller kan tilldelas IMO genom eller enligt internationella konventioner till förhindrande och bekämpning av havsföroreningar från fartyg, särskilt när det gäller antagande och ändring av bestämmelser eller andra regler.
 (6)Den internationella konventionen om säkerheten för människoliv till sjöss (Solaskonventionen) trädde i kraft den 25 maj 1980.
 (7)Enligt artikel VIII b iii i Solaskonventionen får IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté anta ändringar av Solaskonventionen.
 (8)Den internationella konventionen till förhindrande av förorening från fartyg (Marpolkonventionen) trädde i kraft den 2 oktober 1983.
 (9)Enligt artikel 16.2 c i Marpolkonventionen får ändringar av den antas genom ett lämpligt organ, i detta fall kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön.
 (10)Sjösäkerhetskommittén ska vid sitt 102:a möte den 4–11 november 2020 (nedan kallat MSC 102) tillsammans med kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön godkänna ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär om modellavtal för godkännande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar.
 (11)Kommittén för skydd av den marina miljön ska vid sitt 75:e möte den 16–20 november 2020 (nedan kallat MEPC 75) tillsammans med MSC 102 godkänna ett MSC-MEPC.5-cirkulär om modellavtal för bemyndigande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar.
 (12)Det är lämpligt att fastställa den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar under MSC 102, eftersom godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret på ett avgörande sätt kan komma att påverka innehållet i unionsrätten, nämligen Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG
 4
 .
 (13)Det är lämpligt att fastställa den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar under MEPC 75, eftersom godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret på ett avgörande sätt kan komma att påverka innehållet i unionsrätten, nämligen Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG.
 (14)Godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret, som ersätter MSC/Circ.710 och MEPC/Circ.307, uppdaterar modellavtalet och anpassar det till koden för erkända organisationer (RO-koden) (resolutionerna MSC.349 (92) och MEPC.237 (65)). Det kommer att bidra till att öka noggrannheten, transparensen och ansvarsskyldigheten för både flaggstatens administration och de erkända organisationerna på global nivå.
 (15)Rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020
 5
 bör ändras så att det innehåller en hänvisning till godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret.
 (16)Unionens ståndpunkt bör uttryckas på ett samfällt sätt av de medlemsstater i unionen som är medlemmar i IMO:s sjösäkerhetskommitté och IMO:s kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 ska ändras på följande sätt:
 ”Artikel 1
 Den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön vid dess 75:e möte ska vara att stödja antagandet av ändringarna av reglerna 2, 14 och 18 och tilläggen I och VI i bilaga VI till den internationella konventionen till förhindrande av förorening från fartyg, som anges i bilagan till IMO-dokument MEPC 75/3 och godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret i enlighet med bilaga 8 till IMO-dokument III 6/15.
 Artikel 2
 1. Den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens sjösäkerhetskommitté vid dess 102:a möte ska vara att stödja antagandet av ändringarna av
 a) delarna A-1, B, B-1, B-2 till B-4 i kapitel II-1 i den internationella konventionen om säkerheten för människoliv till sjöss, som anges i bilaga 1 till IMO-dokument MSC 102/3,
 b) delarna A-1 och B-1 i den internationella säkerhetskoden för fartyg som använder gaser eller andra bränslen med låg flampunkt, som anges i bilaga 2 till IMO‐dokument MSC 102/3,
 c) resolution A.658(16) om användning och montering av reflexmaterial på livräddningsutrustning,
 och godkännandet av MSC-MEPC.5-cirkuläret om modellavtal för godkännande av erkända organisationer som agerar på administrationens vägnar.”
 Artikel 2
 Detta beslut riktar sig till medlemsstaterna.
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den
 På rådets vägnar
 Ordförande
 (1)
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020 om den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön vid dess 75:e möte och i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens sjösäkerhetskommitté vid dess 102:a möte vad gäller antagandet av ändringar av reglerna 2, 14 och 18 och tilläggen I och VI i bilaga VI till den internationella konventionen till förhindrande av förorening från fartyg, delarna A-1, B, B-1, B-2 till B-4 i kapitel II-1 i den internationella konventionen om säkerheten för människoliv till sjöss, delarna A-1 och B-1 i den internationella säkerhetskoden för fartyg som använder gaser eller andra bränslen med låg flampunkt och resolution A.658(16) om användning och montering av reflexmaterial på livräddningsutrustning (EUT L 171, 2.6.2020, s. 1)
 (2)
 Mål C-399/12, Tyskland mot rådet, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, punkt 64.
 (3)
 Mål C-399/12, Tyskland mot rådet, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, punkterna 61–64.
 (4)
 Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2009/15/EG av den 23 april 2009 om gemensamma regler och standarder för organisationer som utför inspektioner och utövar tillsyn av fartyg och för sjöfartsadministrationernas verksamhet i förbindelse därmed (EUT L 131, 28.5.2009, s. 47).
 (5)
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2020/721 av den 19 maj 2020 om den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens kommitté för skydd av den marina miljön vid dess 75:e möte och i Internationella sjöfartsorganisationens sjösäkerhetskommitté vid dess 102:a möte vad gäller antagandet av ändringar av reglerna 2, 14 och 18 och tilläggen I och VI i bilaga VI till den internationella konventionen till förhindrande av förorening från fartyg, delarna A-1, B, B-1, B-2 till B-4 i kapitel II-1 i den internationella konventionen om säkerheten för människoliv till sjöss, delarna A-1 och B-1 i den internationella säkerhetskoden för fartyg som använder gaser eller andra bränslen med låg flampunkt och resolution A.658(16) om användning och montering av reflexmaterial på livräddningsutrustning (EUT L 171, 2.6.2020, s. 1)


type: caselaw

text:
 22.11.2008
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 301/48
 Acțiune introdusă la 11 septembrie 2008 — Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki și alții/Comisia
 (Cauza T-384/08)
 (2008/C 301/82)
 Limba de procedură: engleza
 Părțile
 Reclamante: Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki AE Chartofylakeiou (Skaramangas, Grecia) Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH (Kiel, Germania) și ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG (Hamburg, Germania) (reprezentant: U. Soltész, lawyer)
 Pârâtă: Comisia Comunităților Europene
 Concluziile reclamantelor
 —
 Anularea articolului 16 din Decizia Comisiei din 2 iulie 2008 privind Măsurile nr. C 16/2004 (foste NN29/2004, CP 71/2002 și CP 133/2005) aplicate de Grecia în favoarea societății Hellenic Shipyards
 —
 obligarea Comisiei Comunităților Europene la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 Motivele și principalele argumente
 Prin cererea introductivă, reclamantele solicită anularea parțială a Deciziei C (2008)3118 final a Comisiei din 2 iulie 2008 privind 16 măsuri aplicate de statul Elen în favoarea societății Hellenic Shipyards SA („HSY”) și, în special, anularea articolului 16 din decizia respectivă, potrivit căruia Comisia a decis că garanția de despăgubire acordată de fostul proprietar al HSY, Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development („ETVA”), consorțiului (1) care a achiziționat HSY prin intermediul unui acord de cesiune de acțiuni (Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (2) și Ferrostaal), în eventualitatea recuperării ajutorului de stat de la HSY, constituie ajutor de stat nelegal și trebuie să înceteze imediat.
 Reclamantele consideră că, în mod greșit, Comisia a considerat că garanția de despăgubire menționată în acordul de privatizare a fost acordată într-un moment în care ETVA se afla sub controlul statului. În opinia reclamantelor, acordul privind garanția de despăgubire a fost încheiat în mod valid numai după privatizarea societății ETVA și, prin urmare, constituie o măsură negociată între părți private, care nu poate fi imputată statului Elen și, în consecință, nu poate fi considerată ajutor de stat.
 În plus, reclamantele susțin că este eronată afirmația Comisiei potrivit căreia cele două clauze separate menționate în anexa la acordul de cesiune de participații constituiau un mecanism de ansamblu de care ar fi beneficiat HSY. În realitate, reclamantele susțin că cele două garanții au fost acordate în mod independent una de cealaltă. În plus, în opinia reclamantelor, Comisia a considerat în mod greșit că HSY beneficia de garanția de despăgubire întrucât, având în vedere faptele din speță, singura societate despre care se putea considera că a beneficiat de această garanție era Piraeus Bank.
 În opinia reclamantelor, Comisia a considerat în mod greșit că a fost acordat un avantaj economic societății HSY prin garanția de despăgubire, care (i) este o clauză tip în dreptul privat, (ii) a fost acordată după o evaluare ce respectă toate condițiile privind forma și (iii) este în conformitate cu comportamentul unui vânzător privat.
 În plus, se susține că articolul 88 alineatul (2) CE și articolul 14 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 659/1999 au fost aplicate greșit de Comisie întrucât aceasta vizează societatea Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki, care nu a fost beneficiara ajutorului, obligând-o să înceteze garanția de despăgubire.
 De asemenea, reclamantele susțin că argumentul Comisiei potrivit căruia ar fi fost ocolit efectul util al recuperării este întemeiat în mod greșit pe afirmația că ocolirea constă numai în faptul de a acorda o garanție de despăgubire.
 În sfârșit, reclamantele susțin că articolul 296 CE ar fi fost aplicat în mod greșit de Comisie în măsura în care aceasta nu permite societății HSY să desfășoare anumite activități civile, care sunt accesorii prin natura lor, pentru a susține funcționarea întregului șantier.
 (1) Acest consorțiu a creat Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastikipentru ca, prin aceasta, să dețină participații în cadrul societății HSY.
 (2) HDW este deținută în întregime de ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, care a achiziționat în 2005 și participațiile deținute de Ferrostaaal în carul societății Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki.


text:
 30.11.2013
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 C 352/8
 Petición de decisión prejudicial planteada por el Bundesgerichtshof (Alemania) el 19 de septiembre de 2013 — Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH/AOK Sachsen-Anhalt
 (Asunto C-503/13)
 2013/C 352/14
 Lengua de procedimiento: alemán
 Órgano jurisdiccional remitente
 Bundesgerichtshof
 Partes en el procedimiento principal
 Recurrente: Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH
 Recurrida: AOK Sachsen-Anhalt
 Cuestiones prejudiciales
 1)
 ¿Se ha de interpretar el artículo 6, apartado 1, de la Directiva 85/374/CEE (1) del Consejo, de 25 de julio de 1985, relativa a la aproximación de las disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y administrativas de los Estados miembros en materia de responsabilidad por los daños causados por productos defectuosos, en el sentido de que, cuando se trata de un producto médico implantado en el cuerpo humano (en este caso, un marcapasos), un producto es defectuoso desde el momento en que aparatos del mismo modelo presentan un riesgo de avería significativamente mayor, aunque en el aparato implantado en el caso concreto no se haya detectado defecto alguno?
 2)
 En caso de respuesta afirmativa a la primera cuestión:
 ¿Los costes de la operación para la extracción del producto y para la implantación de otro marcapasos constituyen daños causados por lesiones corporales en el sentido de los artículos 1 y 9, párrafo primero, letra a), de la Directiva 85/374/CEE?
 (1) DO L 210, p. 29; EE 13/19, p. 8.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 693 A.2d 806 (1997)
 345 Md. 578
 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
 v.
 Douglas T. SACHSE.
 Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 5, September Term, 1996.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 May 9, 1997.
 *807 Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Raymond A. Hein, Assistant Bar Counsel, for Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, Petitioner.
 Philip N. Tirabassi, Baltimore, for Respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, RAKER and WILNER, JJ.
 KARWACKI, Judge.
 The Review Board of the Attorney Grievance Commission directed Bar Counsel to file charges against Douglas T. Sachse for violating several Rules of Professional Conduct stemming from his actions as trustee of a testamentary trust. Specifically, the Petition for Disciplinary Action alleged that, in approving the issuance and negotiation of five checks drawn upon the corpus of the trust, Sachse had failed to provide competent representation, *808 Rule 1.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, had represented interests in conflict with those owed to the trust, Rule 1.7(b), and had engaged in professional misconduct, Rule 8.4(a) and (c). The Petition further alleged that Sachse had made a false statement of material fact, Rule 8.1(a), and had violated Maryland Code (1989, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (BP), which provides: "A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer."
 Pursuant to Maryland Rule BV9,[1] we transmitted the case to Judge John O. Hennegan of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge Hennegan found that Sachse had violated Rule 1.1 and BP § 10-306, but had not violated Rules 1.7, 8.1, or 8.4. Bar Counsel excepted solely to the hearing judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law in respect to Rule 1.7(b), and recommended that Sachse be indefinitely suspended, with the right to apply for reinstatement after one year. As conditions upon that reinstatement, Bar Counsel asks that we order restitution of the principal of the trust and that Sachse submit to monitoring by Richard B. Vincent, Director of Lawyer Counseling for the Maryland State Bar Association, for a period of two years.
 For the reasons recited below, we shall sustain Bar Counsel's exception.
 After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Hennegan made the following findings of fact:
 "Mr. Douglas T. Sachse was admitted to the Maryland Bar on November 9, 1979. He maintains an office for the practice of law with the firm of Turnbull, Mix and Farmer in Towson, Maryland. Shirley Stemler is the daughter of the late Dorothy J. Thompson. Whitney Stemler Riley and Erin Stemler Drew are the daughters of Shirley Stemler. On or about March 19, 1978, Dorothy J. Thompson executed a Last Will and Testament (hereinafter "the Thompson Will") that provided, inter alia, for the creation of a trust upon Mrs. Thompson's death to hold one-half of her net estate for the benefit of her daughter, Shirley Stemler, and Mrs. Stemler's descendants. The Thompson Will specified that Shirley Stemler was to receive net income from the trust in at least quarterly installments during Mrs. Stemler's lifetime, with the principal and undistributed income to be distributed to Mrs. Stemler's then living descendants, per stirpes, upon Mrs. Stemler's death. Mrs. Thompson died on May 13, 1985, and the Thompson Will thereafter was probated in Harford County. Pursuant to the terms of the Thompson Will, a trust (hereinafter "the Stemler Trust") was established, with County Banking and Trust Company appointed to serve as trustee. The original corpus of the Stemler Trust was approximately $50,000.00, of which approximately $45,000.00 was invested in blue-chip stocks and $4,500.00 was placed in a certificate of deposit at County Banking and Trust Company. Mr. Sachse had a professional and social relationship with Shirley Stemler dating back to approximately 1980. Sometime in the spring of 1987, Shirley Stemler hired Mr. Sachse to seek removal of County Banking and Trust Company as trustee of the Stemler Trust based on Mrs. Stemler's dissatisfaction with its investment of the trust assets and the income she was receiving. With the consent of Mrs. Stemler's two daughters, Whitney Stemler (now Riley) and Erin Stemler (now Drew), who were the only then living residual beneficiaries of the Stemler Trust, the Circuit Court for Harford County approved a Consent Order on May 6, 1987, by which Mr. Sachse became substitute trustee of the Stemler Trust. Upon his appointment as trustee, Mr. Sachse arranged to have the Stemler Trust's stock portfolio transferred into an investment account at Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter *809 "Alex. Brown"). Alex. Brown received the transferred stock certificates on or about September 18, 1987. Mr. Sachse also received $5,000.00 from redemption of the County Banking and Trust certificate of deposit at the end of December 1987. Out of those funds, Mr. Sachse took $750.00 as a fee for petitioning for appointment of a substitute trustee and for his services as trustee to that point. The remaining $4,250.00 was forwarded to Alex. Brown for investment on behalf of the Stemler Trust. In August 1987, Mr. Sachse, at the request of Mrs. Stemler, filed a petition to have the Stemler Trust terminated and to allow distribution of the principal to Mrs. Stemler's two daughters prior to Mrs. Stemler's death. The Circuit Court for Harford County denied that petition on August 16, 1990. As of the time that the petition to terminate the trust was denied, the total market value of the stocks held in the Alex. Brown investment account was in excess of $70,000.00. From September 1987 through August 1990, Shirley Stemler received periodic distributions of dividend and interest income by transfer from the Stemler Trust investment account into a separate account held at Alex. Brown in the name of Mrs. Stemler individually. Beginning in September 1990 and continuing through August 1991, several distributions were made from the Alex. Brown investment account by way of checks made payable to Mr. Sachse as follows:
 Date Check No. Amount
 ---- --------- -------
 (i) September 7, 1990 2022318 $19,472.98
 (ii) February 20, 1991 2174207 $18,758.78
 (iii) April 30,1991 2175800 $16,255.89
 (iv) July 29, 1991 2176459 $ 2,000.00
 (v) August 5, 1991 6480069 $15,272.70
 __________
 Total $71,760.35
 The distributions from the Alex. Brown account depleted the principal to the Stemler Trust, leaving a balance of only eight cents ($0.08) in the account as of August 30, 1991. With the exception of Check No. 2174207, drawn on February 20, 1991, and Check No. 2175800, drawn on April 30, 1991,[2] Mr. Sachse acknowledges that he authorized the above listed distributions and endorsed the checks over to Shirley Stemler with knowledge that she planned to invest the funds in a company known as Autel Corporation.[3] Mr. Sachse prepared Articles of Incorporation for Autel Corporation in 1987. Mr. Sachse had no further active involvement in the operations and activities of Autel Corporation from the time of its incorporation in 1987 through September 1990, when he began releasing Stemler Trust funds to Shirley Stemler for investment in the corporation. Mr. Sachse obtained no financial data about Autel Corporation before releasing Trust funds to Shirley Stemler for investment in the corporation. Mr. Sachse did not obtain any formal security from Shirley Stemler or anyone else to protect the Stemler Trust's "investment" in Autel Corporation. After he began releasing Trust funds to Shirley Stemler for investment in Autel Corporation, Mr. Sachse never requested or received an accounting of those funds. Shirley Stemler took the position that the Trust funds were for her personal use as she deemed appropriate.
 Fred Eisenbrandt handled the trust account for the [Stemler] Trust. He recalls the distribution of the funds. He states that the sale of the stock could not have occurred without authorization from the Respondent. It was standard procedure *810 at Alex. Brown for sales of stock to occur only at the request of the account holder.
 Mr. Sachse began drinking on a regular basis at the law firm when they developed a habit of taking off Friday afternoons and drinking at lunch into the late afternoon. This continued and eventually extended into other days of the week, i.e. Thursday. He eventually had an affair with his current wife while married to his first wife that produced a child with cerebral palsy and a hearing impairment. Obviously, this led to difficulties with the marriage and increased drinking. The marriage ultimately broke down, a separation resulted and the Respondent's drinking became more severe in an effort to sleep and deal with his emotional problems and dilemma[s]. His social worker feared he was suicidal and it was clear he had no judgment or ability to make sound decisions. As a result, he was admitted to Sheppard Pratt's substance abuse program. Subsequently, he was released, got control of his substance abuse and emotional problems, and has been sober since his discharge from Sheppard Pratt Hospital.
 Upon his release he attempted to obtain an executed note from Shirley Stemler and Karl Keffer [with whom Shirley Stemler had approached Mr. Sachse about investing in Autel Corporation]. He purchased life insurance policies and executed an indemnity deed of trust to protect the trust corpus.
 Respondent admits that he would not invest any of his personal assets in the Autel Corporation."
 Based upon these findings, Judge Hennegan concluded that Sachse had "failed to use the knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the protection of the Trust or its beneficiaries" in violation of Rule 1.1[4] and BP § 10-306. Sachse's admission that he allowed the corpus to be depleted in furtherance of Mrs. Stemler's investment in Autel, without obtaining security therefor or ascertaining the precise nature of the transaction, provided clear and convincing evidence that Sachse had failed to provide competent representation to the Stemler Trust and its beneficiaries, and his attempts to correct his "errors in judgment" were "too late to avoid the responsibilities required" by the Rule. The hearing judge then rejected Bar Counsel's assertion that the fact of Sachse's interest in Autel in conjunction with his representation of Mrs. Stemler constituted a per se conflict of interest under Rule 1.7.[5] Given evidence indicating that Sachse had possibly relinquished his interest, if any, in Autel in 1987 and the fact that the disbursements at issue took place in 1990 and 1991, the court was not persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the Rule had been violated. Judge Hennegan also rejected Bar Counsel's claim that Sachse had "knowingly assisted or induced another to violate the rules of professional conduct or engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" in violation of Rule 8.4.[6] Although the court found that Sachse's bouts with depression and alcoholism had clouded his judgment and that he was subject to "extreme pressure" from Mrs. Stemler and her demands for money, the court was not persuaded that Sachse had engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of Rule 8.4(a) or (c).
 Judge Hennegan further determined that Sachse had not knowingly made a false statement *811 of material fact in denying that he authorized the sale of the stock in the trust. Specifically, the court found that Sachse's acknowledgment of his ultimate responsibility for the investment of trust assets in Autel could not be reconciled with violation of Rule 8.1. "It is hard to believe," the judge stated, "that [Sachse] would knowingly make a false statement when he accepts full responsibility for the ultimate event. The sale of the stock may be a material [f]act in the distribution of the Trust funds but the denial of it may not be a material fact since there is no denial that the distribution of the funds to Shirley Stemler could easily have been averted by [Sachse] after the sale of the stock."
 As we have stated, Bar Counsel has excepted solely to the hearing judge's failure to find a violation of Rule 1.7(b). Bar Counsel asserts that Sachse's representation of the Stemler Trust was compromised by his relationship with Shirley Stemler when he authorized the release of trust funds to Mrs. Stemler. Bar Counsel adds that the severity of Sachse's misconduct was "compound[ed]" by his failure to arrest further depletion of the trust assets when he ratified an unauthorized distribution from Alex. Brown on April 30, 1991. "At that point," Bar Counsel argues, Sachse's "conduct transcended what might be characterized as simply poor judgment and rose to the level of affirmative participation in Shirley Stemler's systematic use of trust monies to fund the operations of Autel Corporation." Bar Counsel further disputes that Sachse's alcoholism may mitigate the egregiousness of his conduct, arguing that "he understood the nature of Shirley Stemler's conduct yet chose to ratify it rather than taking appropriate remedial measures."
 In the management of a trust, a trustee is charged with exercising "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinary prudent [person] engaged in similar business affairs and with objectives similar to those of the trust in question." Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Cummins, 322 Md. 570, 580, 588 A.2d 1205, 1210 (1991). "All trustees are subject to common law duties and equitable rules or principles." George G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 541 (2d ed. rev. 1993). "Perhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiar[ies] and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interests of third persons." Id. § 543; see also Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 109, 562 A.2d 720, 738 (1989) ("[T]he general duty of loyalty is well-established in Maryland law."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S. Ct. 1167, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (1990). "[A] trustee is charged by law with representing the beneficiaries' interests," Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 90, 562 A.2d at 728, and is liable for acting to their detriment when the conduct causing the loss "failed to conform to the standard of care and skill applicable to trustees in the administration of the trusts," Bogert, supra § 541. "It is clear that the trustee's duty of loyalty extends beyond a prohibition against self-dealing and conflict of interest.... Even if the trustee has no personal stake in a transaction, the duty of loyalty bars him from acting in the interest of third parties at the expense of the beneficiaries." Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 109, 562 A.2d at 738. Conflicts of interest impair the trustee's ability to act on behalf of the beneficiaries with independent and disinterested judgment in the administration of the trust, the rationale being that it is generally not possible for the same person to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same transaction. Bogert, supra § 543. Whether or not a conflict exists must be determined by the facts of each individual case. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 379, 653 A.2d 909, 918 (1995).
 "In reviewing the multiple findings made by the hearing judge, we accept findings of fact made by the hearing judge if they are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and are not clearly erroneous." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Boyd, 333 Md. 298, 303, 635 A.2d 382, 384 (1994) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287-88, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 402, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991)). To this end, hearing judges may pick and choose the evidence upon which they will rely. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nothstein, *812 300 Md. 667, 684, 480 A.2d 807, 816 (1984). We shall, however, make "an independent, detailed review of the complete record with particular reference to ... evidence relating to [a] disputed factual finding." Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516, 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973).
 Judge Hennegan concluded that no conflict of interest existed by virtue of Sachse's ownership, if at all, of a one percent interest in Autel. "His representation of Shirley Stemler in part and while trustee," Judge Hennegan added, "was ... clearly known to all parties in interest and there is no evidence of any objections raised by any beneficiaries." Bar Counsel excepts to this conclusion, charging that Sachse "violated Rule 1.7(b) by virtue of the conflict between his obligation to preserve the principal of the Stemler Trust and the interest of Shirley Stemler individually in pursuing the Autel `investment.' " "When [Sachse] succumbed to Shirley Stemler's requests for the distribution of trust monies to be used for her own misguided funding of Autel Corporation," Bar Counsel argues, "he pursued Mrs. Stemler's interests at the expense of the trust's [interests]."
 As a threshold matter, Sachse challenges Bar Counsel's ability to except to Judge Hennegan's findings of fact and conclusions of law on Rule 1.7(b). He contends that Bar Counsel did not argue alternative bases of conflict, relying solely upon the fact of his one percent ownership interest in Autel in charging him with a conflict of interest. Therefore, he continues, Bar Counsel may not argue at this juncture that his simultaneous representation of Shirley Stemler and the Trust was the basis for its allegation of conflict. Sachse also disagrees that the facts support the substance of Bar Counsel's exception. He contends that his belief that Mrs. Stemler and her daughters had a very close relationship, and that Mrs. Stemler was providing them with candid information regarding the Trust, was not unreasonable and demonstrates that "his decision making process was based on his belief that he was seeking the interest of all the beneficiaries of the Stemler Trust."
 Our independent review of the record reveals that Bar Counsel did in fact raise alternative theories of conflict before the circuit court[7] and, therefore, may pursue its exception before this Court. Thus, we shall proceed to determine whether Sachse's actions relative to the trust were improper. Sachse maintains that his impression of the closeness of Mrs. Stemler and her daughters, coupled with his belief that the Autel investment could net millions to the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries, warrants this Court's acceptance of Judge Hennegan's Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law. Although superficially attractive, upon closer examination, Sachse's contentions are without merit. In his testimony before the circuit court, Sachse stated that he knew that he, as trustee, had to give Alex. Brown authorization before the sale of stock in the Stemler Trust could be effected, and admitted that, although he did not recall authorizing the sale of the constituent stock or the distribution of the checks, he either signed the checks over to Mrs. Stemler or, in the case of the April 30, 1991 check, he ratified its issuance. He also described Mrs. Stemler as "assertive, [and] strong," and admitted that he "let [him]self give in to her relentlessness." He added that, except for the first disbursement, he understood that the money was in furtherance of investment in Autel. Yet, he did not obtain any information about the security of the investment *813 prior to the periodic outlay of sums totaling $71,760.35 to Mrs. Stemler based upon her word alone.
 Furthermore, his testimony that he had no reason to believe that the relationship extant between Mrs. Stemler and her daughters did not remain close and that she was advising them of her actions is unpersuasive. An honest but misguided assessment of the facts does not relieve a trustee of the responsibility to act solely in the interest of the trust. " `Fiduciaries in general, and attorneys in particular, must remember that the entrustment to them of the money and property of others involves a responsibility of the highest order. They must carefully administer and account for those funds.' " Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kramer, 325 Md. 39, 51, 599 A.2d 100, 107 (1991) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 345, 587 A.2d 511, 516 (1991)). Sachse had a duty to ascertain whether the alleged investment in Autel was one properly pursued by the Trust. He did not conduct any such investigation, permitting, instead, Mrs. Stemler to dictate the ultimate disposition of the funds. In so doing, he breached his duty of loyalty to the Trust.[8] Sachse admittedly knew of his responsibilities as trustee of the Stemler Trust and, armed with the knowledge that Mrs. Stemler was anxious to access the trust principal (as evidenced by, inter alia, her 1989 campaign to have the Trust terminated), Sachse nevertheless yielded to her machinations and sacrificed the integrity of the Trust. We shall, therefore, sustain Bar Counsel's exception to Judge Hennegan's findings and conclusion relative to Rule 1.7(b) and hold that Sachse did entertain a conflict of interest when he permitted Mrs. Stemler's imperiousness to override the best interests of the Stemler Trust and its beneficiaries.
 We now turn to the matter of Sachse's sanction. We are mindful that the imposition of sanctions is reflective of our responsibility "to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute." Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974). "In determining the appropriate sanction for an offending attorney, we have recognized that `the severity of the sanction to be imposed is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case' and the Court `may consider facts in mitigation....'" Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 587, 664 A.2d 854, 858 (1995) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 238, 369 A.2d 61, 68 (1977)). "[A] less severe sanction than that ordinarily dictated may be appropriate when an attorney is able to establish the existence of compelling extenuating circumstances." Id. at 588, 664 A.2d at 858.
 At the hearing before Judge Hennegan, the evidence revealed that Sachse has had a long history of emotional and substance abuse problems. Bar Counsel maintains that, "[a]lthough some of [Sachse]'s decisions may be partially attributable to impaired judgment arising from his alcoholism, ... [Sachse] had the capacity to recognize Shirley *814 Stemler's actions ... as conduct fraught with deceit." Sachse's alcoholism notwithstanding, Bar Counsel continues, "he understood the nature of Shirley Stemler's conduct yet chose to ratify it rather than taking appropriate remedial measures." Sachse concedes that his conduct stemmed from the exercise of poor judgment, but submits that he has "attempted to right the wrongs he committed [and] ... worked diligently and faithfully to resolve the underlying problems resulting in the poor judgment and impaired decision making ability that gave rise to this proceeding." He asserts that he has remained sober for five years and asks that we accept Judge Hennegan's recommended sanction of a published reprimand.
 Although we have of late been reticent to allow alcoholism to mitigate violations of legal and ethical rules that would ordinarily warrant disbarment, see Kenney, supra, 339 Md. at 594, 664 A.2d at 862, we recognize that Bar Counsel has not sought Sachse's disbarment in the instant proceeding. Rather, Bar Counsel asks, for the violation of a fiduciary obligation, that we indefinitely suspend Sachse, with a right to apply for reinstatement after one year. Bar Counsel also asks that we condition his reinstatement upon restitution of the principal of the Stemler Trust and periodic monitoring by Richard B. Vincent. As we stated in Kenney, 339 Md. at 594-95, 664 A.2d at 862:
 "Severe sanctions are necessary to protect the public from being victimized from any further dishonesty on the part of the attorney. We do, however, recognize that alcoholism is a serious medical condition and we will be more sympathetic to attorneys who recognize their need for assistance and seek to rehabilitate themselves before their transgressions are discovered. Nonetheless, we believe that when violations ordinarily warranting disbarment are found, our duty to protect the public is strong and we cannot permit alcoholism to alleviate an attorney's responsibility to recognize the wrongfulness of his or her actions and to honor his or her commitments to his or her clients."
 While Sachse has not attempted to avoid responsibility for his actions in respect to the Stemler Trust, he is not relieved of liability for those actions. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the proper sanction for his violation of Rule 1.7(b) and BP § 10-306 will be indefinite suspension from the practice of law with the right to reapply not less than one year from the date of the filing of this opinion. As a condition to his readmission, Sachse is also ordered to provide or absolutely assure restitution of the corpus of the Trust and to submit to monitoring by Richard B. Vincent for a period of two years.
 IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE BV15(c), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST DOUGLAS T. SACHSE.
 NOTES
 [1] By order dated June 5, 1996, effective January 1, 1997, this Court renumbered this Rule and the other Rules governing attorney discipline proceedings. They are now found in Chapter 700, Maryland Rules 16-701 through 16-718. In this opinion, all reference to the Maryland Rules will be to the former Md. Rules, BV1 through BV18, which were in effect at the time these proceedings were commenced.
 [2] Although Sachse has no independent recollection of authorizing the sale of stock to support the distributions, he admitted before the circuit court that he signed the checks over to Shirley Stemler with the understanding that, except as to the first distribution, the funds were in furtherance of an investment in Autel Corporation, a company operated by Mrs. Stemler. In the case of the April 30, 1991 check, Sachse categorically denied having endorsed the check and stated that he later learned that Karl Keffer, with whom Mrs. Stemler approached him about investment in Autel, had been the one to do so. Upon becoming aware of Mr. Keffer's unlawful negotiation of the check, Sachse ratified the disbursement of the funds.
 [3] Apparently, Autel Corporation, purportedly a producer of defense computer technology, was operated by Shirley Stemler and her husband, Walter, out of the basement of the Stemler home; Mr. Stemler handled the research and development end of the business, while Shirley Stemler managed its business aspects.
 [4] Rule 1.1, Competence, mandates:
 "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
 [5] Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule, provides, in pertinent part:
 "(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
 (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
 (2) the client consents after consultation."
 [6] Rule 8.4, Misconduct, reads, in relevant part:
 "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
 (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; [or]
 ....
 (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
 [7] Specifically, in closing, Bar Counsel argued:
 "I would like to point out to the Court with respect to the 1.7(b) issue, even absent the ownership interest in the Autel Corporation, I think there is still an issue for the Court to evaluate ... that being whether ... in connection with his responsibilities to the trust, whether those were materially limited by his responsibilities to another client or to a third person, that being Shirley Stemler.
 Whether you identify her as a client or a third person, Mr. Sachse obviously had some sort of ongoing relationship, business and social, with her and he allowed himself to be persuaded, I would submit to the Court, by that relationship, into releasing funds that he had an obligation to the other client, the trust, to protect.
 So I think that there can still be a finding of a Rule [1.7](b)(1) violation, even in finding that he had a 1 percent interest in Autel Corporation. Those are two alternative theories."
 [8] Indeed, looking to each disbursement, we discern a pattern of behavior in which Sachse (admittedly) compromised the integrity of the Trust in response to pressure from Mrs. Stemler. At the hearing before Judge Hennegan, Sachse testified that, although he believed the September 7, 1990 disbursement of $19,472.98 to be an interest payment under the terms of the Stemler Trust, he did ask that Mrs. Stemler obtain her daughters' written concession that the money was in fact a payment of interest. He received nothing from them and did not pursue the matter further. Although he had no independent recollection of the circumstances surrounding the February 20, 1991 distribution of $18,758.78, in response to a letter from Alex. Brown confirming the sale of shares to support the issue, Sachse wrote Alex. Brown, stating that he did not grant permission for the sale but that he expected any proceeds therefrom to be forwarded to him. He received the funds and, apparently, endorsed them over to Shirley Stemler. Sachse adamantly denied that he had authorized the sale of stock necessary to support the issuance of the $16,255.89 check on April 30, 1991. He further testified that he had not signed the check; he later learned that Karl Keffer had negotiated it in his name, to which Sachse "said it was ok." In July of 1991, Sachse recalled that Mrs. Stemler went so far as to jump out of her car in traffic to ask him to endorse the $2,000.00 check issued on July 29, because she needed more funding for Autel. He further testified that he could not recall the circumstances respecting the distribution of $15,272.70 on August 5, 1991.


text:
 20.12.2008
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 L 344/139
 DÉCISION EUPOL COPPS/1/2008 DU COMITÉ POLITIQUE ET DE SÉCURITÉ
 du 16 décembre 2008
 relative à la nomination du chef de la mission de police de l'Union européenne pour les territoires palestiniens
 (2008/970/PESC)
 LE COMITÉ POLITIQUE ET DE SÉCURITÉ,
 vu le traité sur l'Union européenne, et notamment son article 25, troisième alinéa,
 vu l'action commune 2005/797/PESC du Conseil du 14 novembre 2005 concernant la mission de police de l'Union européenne pour les territoires palestiniens (1), et notamment son article 11, paragraphe 2,
 considérant ce qui suit:
 (1)
 En vertu de l'article 11, paragraphe 2 de l'action commune 2005/797/PESC, le COPS est autorisé, conformément à l'article 25 du traité, à prendre les décisions appropriées aux fins d'exercer le contrôle politique et la direction stratégique de la mission EUPOL COPPS, et notamment la décision de nommer un chef de mission.
 (2)
 Le secrétaire général/haut représentant a proposé de nommer M. Paul KERNAGHAN chef de la mission EUPOL COPPS,
 DÉCIDE:
 Article premier
 M. Paul KERNAGHAN est nommé chef de mission de la mission de police de l'Union européenne pour les territoires palestiniens (EUPOL COPPS) à partir du 1er janvier 2009.
 Article 2
 La présente décision prend effet le jour de son adoption.
 Elle est applicable jusqu’au 31 décembre 2009.
 Fait à Bruxelles, le 16 décembre 2008.
 Par le Comité politique et de sécurité
 Le président
 I. SRAMEK
 (1) JO L 300 du 17.11.2005, p. 65.