type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 243 Md. 234 (1966)
 220 A.2d 537
 ROSSELLO
 v.
 FRIEDEL
 [No. 350, September Term, 1965.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided June 23, 1966.
 The cause was argued before HAMMOND, HORNEY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
 Samuel S. Smalkin, with whom were Hyman Ginsberg, Rollins, Smalkin, Weston & Andrew and Ginsberg & Ginsberg on the brief, for the appellant.
 *236 Wylie L. Ritchey, with whom was James A. Gede on the brief, for the appellee.
 McWILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 On 8 March 1962 Friedel (appellee) was injured in a collision between the truck in which he was a passenger and an automobile driven by Mrs. Rossello (appellant). At the trial below it was stipulated that the verdict of the jury should be in favor of Friedel, "the only matter at issue * * * [being] the amount of damages to be awarded." A verdict of $8,000 in his favor was the outcome.
 After the accident Friedel was taken to Union Memorial Hospital where he was examined and treated by Dr. Robert E. Martin for multiple lacerations of the head, abdomen and left leg. In the admission note there is an entry reading "Back  Neg." He went home the following day. Dr. Martin saw him at intervals during the following three weeks. In a letter to Friedel's attorney, some nine months later, he stated that Friedel's wounds "all [had] healed satisfactorily" and that he had discharged him "from further followup care" on 28 March 1962. There was no mention of an injury to or complaint about his back.
 Friedel was examined, on 10 July 1962, by Dr. George H. Yeager who reported his impression as follows: "Multiple subjective complaints for which an objective explanation cannot be found, when considered from the viewpoint of injuries incurred March 8, 1962."
 Ten days after the accident Friedel filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a claim for compensation in which no mention is made of an injury to his back. In mid-April he resumed his job as a route salesman for a dairy. After five weeks he quit because, he said, he couldn't do the work. After that he drove a taxicab, worked for the State Roads Commission, caught stray animals for the Humane Society, and, since 1963, he has worked at his trade. He is a plumber. Dr. H. Alvan Jones examined him on 8 October 1963. He testified that "except for * * * [noting] minor developmental or structural abnormalities * * * namely, * * * [a] tilted fifth vertebra and *237 mild scoliosis * * * [his] examination * * * [was] entirely normal and negative."
 Dr. Packard, an orthopedist, testified that Friedel had been sent to him by counsel[1] "for orthopedic evaluation only, and not for treatment." He first examined Friedel on 16 July 1962. When he began to read Friedel's history from his notes, counsel for appellant objected. The trial judge (Turnbull, J.) did not rule on the objection but he told the doctor not to give "the history which he [Friedel] gave * * * [him]," and to give only his "evaluation as a result of * * * [his] examination." Dr. Packard thereupon described, at length, what he found in the course of his examination, virtually none of which has any relevance here. He said Friedel complained of some pain, beginning "about three weeks prior" (about 15 weeks after the accident) to his first visit, in the area of his left sacroiliac joint and he concluded he had a "symptomatic left sacro-iliac [sic] joint." He felt the basic symptoms could "be aggravated by a trauma" but that the cause of his condition was "not traumatic." Since some months had gone by, between the injury [8 March to about 25 June] "and the [onset of] symptoms in this region * * * [he] couldn't see any definite causal connection."
 He saw Friedel again on 17 December 1962. On this occasion he found that his chest expansion had increased 1 1/4 inches, which, he said, was "the most important physical finding" made on that date. His "symptoms" were still centered about "the left sacro-iliac [sic] joint." He said that he could not discuss "physical impairment" because "the range of motion he * * * [was] able to demonstrate for his back would be considered within normal limits." Over objection he was then permitted to say, "his symptoms are all subjective in nature yet [they] appear to be real. This would therefore be considered as a five per cent loss of use of patient's lower back." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant's motion to strike was overruled.
 Because of its importance we quote verbatim the following portion of the transcript:
 *238 "(The Court) As a result of your examinations, Doctor, the two examinations which you made, were you able to come to a conclusion as to the cause of the disability which you estimated?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) I would have to object, if your Honor please, with due deference to that question, because the Doctor was not permitted to give a history.
 "(The Court) Well, excluding the history which you received were you able to come to a conclusion as to the cause of the disability which you estimated?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Overruled.
 "(The Witness) No. Without the history I couldn't come to a conclusion as to the causal connection.
 "(Mr. Smalkin) I renew my motion to strike the opinion of the Doctor as to disability.
 "(The Court) Considering the history which was given you, taking that into consideration, could you come to an opinion, with reasonable medical probability, as to the cause of the disability which you estimated. Objection; overruled. You can answer, Doctor.
 "(The Witness) My conclusion would be based on the history that the patient gave me, namely, he had been injured in an accident, that subsequent thereto he developed these back complaints and thereafter had had no trauma, nor had he previously had any trauma to this same area. Because I felt he localized his symptoms well, I felt this lent great credence to the fact his symptoms were real, were not simply something that he told me, and because of this I felt that I should assign some acknowledgment to this medically as to permanency, and that is the reason I arrived at this five per cent figure.
 "(The Court) Motion to strike; motion overruled. Do you have an opinion, with reasonable medical probability, as to whether or not the condition which you found was brought about as a result of an accident of some kind?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 *239 "(The Court) Overruled. Answer the question yes or no, please, Doctor.
 "(The Witness) To the opinion?
 "(The Court) Yes. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not it was brought about as a result of an accident?
 "(The Witness) There is no definite medical proof, to my mind, this can be attributed to a trauma irrefutably with reasonable medical certainty.
 "(The Court) Motion to strike; motion overruled."
 Produced next was Dr. Hilbert M. Levine, another orthopedist, to whom Friedel was sent also by counsel. He examined him first on 7 September 1962 "to see if he needed any further treatment." He added that he "didn't feel that he needed any further treatment at that time" and that he "didn't give him any treatment." Friedel visited Dr. Levine again on 20 February 1963, "for evaluation only" he (Dr. Levine) believed. The third visit was 14 October 1963, again "for evaluation purposes." The fourth and last visit, "for evaluation" was 22 May 1964. He (Dr. Levine) had been told the trial of the case was imminent. Actually it was not reached, as earlier noted, until 22 March 1965. Over objection he told of Friedel's complaints and of his being sent to Dr. Packard by "the insurance company." Judge Turnbull would not let him tell what Friedel said his injuries were at the time of the accident although a moment later he said it was his "impression * * * that * * * [Friedel] had sustained multiple injuries in a truck accident on March 8, 1962." Most of his lengthy testimony consisted of a recitation of irrelevant details seldom rising above the level of pointing out that the patient had hands, feet and a head. Appellant's counsel objected to his stating any impression which was based in part upon another physician's interpretation of X-ray pictures. We quote again, verbatim, from the record:
 "(The Court) Strike that out, and strike out the other answer which he started to give. Doctor, if you can give us an impression, casting aside from your mind the report on the X-rays if you can give us an impression based solely and only upon your examinations *240 you may do so, but your impression must be based upon your examination alone. Can you give us an impression based on your examination?
 "(The Witness) Yes, sir.
 "(The Court) Very well. You may give that.
 "(The Witness) Based on my examination  examinations, my impression was that the patient had sustained a chronic lumbosacral strain and a left sacro-iliac [sic] strain.
 "(Mr. Smalkin) I move the answer be stricken.
 "(The Court) Overruled.
 "Q. (Mr. Gede) As a result of the examinations and your impression, did the patient, or Mr. Friedel suffer any permanency?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Sustained.
 "Q. (Mr. Gede) Did you find as a result of your examination, Doctor, that there would be any disability whatsoever that would have inured to Mr. Friedel as a result of these
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Read that.
 "(Whereupon, question was read by the Reporter.)
 "(The Court) As a result of these findings  that is the end of the question. The objection is sustained.
 "Q. (Mr. Gede) Do you feel as a result of your examinations of Mr. Friedel, Doctor, that he will have any difficulties in the future?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Sustained. Doctor, answer this yes or no, please sir. Do you have an opinion, with reasonable medical probability, as to whether or not Mr. Friedel suffers from a condition which is in its nature permanent?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Objection overruled. Based solely upon your examinations.
 "(The Witness) Yes, sir.
 "(The Court) Very well. What is that opinion?
 *241 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Overruled.
 "(The Witness) He has developed a chronic lumbosacral and sacro-iliac [sic] strain.
 "(The Court) What is your opinion as to whether or not, with reasonable medical probability, that condition is a permanent condition?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Overruled.
 "(The Witness) This is permanent.
 "Q. (Mr. Gede) Can you estimate the percentage of this disability, Doctor, as a whole?
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) Answer yes or no, please, sir.
 "(The Witness) Yes.
 "Q. (Mr. Gede) Would you state that percentage.
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Objection.
 "(The Court) With reasonable medical probability, Doctor.
 "(The Witness) I feel there is now a fifteen per cent permanent partial disability of his back.
 "(The Court) Motion to strike; motion overruled."
 At the conclusion of the evidence appellant's counsel pressed his motion to strike from the testimony of Dr. Packard the opinions he expressed and his repetition of Friedel's history. Judge Turnbull, probably anticipating a verdict favorable to appellant (defendant) said, "I am going to do you a favor and overrule your motion." Responding to further argument the court said, "Your logic is irrefutable, but the motion is overruled." A similar motion in respect of the testimony of Dr. Levine was denied.
 No attempt was made to elicit the opinions of Dr. Packard and Dr. Levine by the use of hypothetical questions nor is there any showing why this was not done.
 The exclusion of medical testimony based on statements by "patients" who are not patients is supported by the weight of authority, included in which are the decisions of this Court. We think it unnecessary to do little more than quote from our most recent consideration of the rule. In Wilhelm v. State Traffic *242 Comm., 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715 (1962), Judge Prescott (now Chief Judge), for the Court, said:
 "Doctor Rothstein, a psychiatrist, was called to the witness stand by the appellants. The appellee, Paul Edward Burke, objected to his reciting the history he had obtained from the wife when he examined her. The doctor testified that he did not treat her, and there was no attempt made to show that he was employed to recommend treatment of her by her other physicians. Cf. Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168 A.2d 501. This Court has consistently and repeatedly recognized the principle that a non-treating physician may not relate the history given to him by a litigant. Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244, 55 A.2d 784; Francies v. De Baugh, 194 Md. 448, 71 A.2d 455; Wolfinger v. Frey, 223 Md. 184, 162 A.2d 745. And in Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699, this Court, in an opinion by Judge Horney, flatly held that this rule applied to psychiatrists. In addition, appellants admit that Dr. Rothstein would have repeated `the same history which was given by Dr. Filtzer and Dr. Jones [appellants' witnesses who had already testified]'; hence, if the doctor's opinion were desired, there is no apparent reason for not having asked him a hypothetical question. There was no error here."
 Judge Horney also said in Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 557, 171 A.2d 699 (1961) (cited in the above quotation):
 "It was likewise proper to exclude testimony as to the `subjective' conclusions of the psychiatrist based on the complaints of the defendant. What we have said with regard to the `history' of the defendant applies with equal force to the non-objective symptoms. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Friedel contends it was not error to allow the testimony of Dr. Packard and Dr. Levine because they were, in fact, treating physicians. We are unable to find any merit in this contention. *243 Dr. Packard said Friedel "was referred to * * * [him] for orthopedic evaluation only, and not for treatment." (Emphasis supplied.) Dr. Levine said he examined Friedel "to see if he needed any further treatment." He concluded he didn't need "any further treatment" and he "didn't give him any treatment" then or "at any time thereafter." Later, when asked by the Court, "did you give him any treatment at all by way of medication or manipulation or anything of that kind" he replied, "No, sir."
 After the jury had been impaneled and sworn the court, as earlier indicated, said:
 "(The Court) For the record, gentlemen, it is stipulated by counsel in open court that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in his favor, and that the only matter at issue is the amount of damages to be awarded, is that correct, gentlemen?
 "(Mr. Ritchey) Yes, your Honor.
 "(Mr. Smalkin) Yes, sir."
 Friedel contends the stipulation, ipso facto, establishes a causal connection between the accident and all injuries recited in the declaration. It is there stated that the "plaintiff sustained * * * injuries to his head, back, body and limbs." (Emphasis supplied.) We do not find in the record anything to suggest that the trial judge considered this contention or that any argument was advanced urging him to do so. Maryland Rule 885. Nevertheless, we find it devoid of merit. The language in the declaration is obviously nothing but the customary catchall. It seems clear to us that the main issue, from the very beginning, has been the extent of the appellee's injuries and whether they were the result of the accident. It has been said that the language of a stipulation will not be so construed as to give it the effect of an admission of a fact obviously intended to be controverted. 83 C.J.S., Stipulations, § 11 (1953). The argument reflects ingenuity and imagination on the part of counsel which very well may be turned to account in different circumstances but which, in this instance, must be disregarded.
 Since the judgment will be reversed and the case remanded *244 it will not be necessary for us to consider the other contentions made by the parties.
 Judgment reversed.
 Case remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.
 Appellee to pay the costs.
 NOTES
 [1] Friedel was referred to Dr. Packard by the attorney for his employer's compensation carrier.


type: other

text:
Ana Lívia Weber Guterres
 1 Regulamento do Seguro Escolar O presente documento constitui o Regulamento do Seguro Escolar a estabelecer no Colégio de S. Pedro e tem por base a legislação em vigor, nomeadamente, a Portaria n.o413/99, de 8 de junho, da qual não se dispensa a consulta. Artigo 1.o Âmbito 1. O seguro escolar, enquanto sistema de apoio socioeconómico dos alunos, no âmbito da Ação Social Escolar, constitui um sistema de proteção destinado a garantir a cobertura financeira da assistência, em caso de acidente escolar, atuando como complemento à assistência assegurada por outros sistemas públicos e privados de segurança social ou saúde. 2. O seguro escolar é regulamentado pela Portaria n.o413/99, de 8 de junho e constitui um sistema de proteção destinado a garantir a cobertura de danos resultantes de acidentes escolares ocorridos no local e tempo de atividade escolar ou atividade desenvolvida com conhecimento e sob a responsabilidade da Direção da escola, que provoque no aluno lesão, doença ou morte. Artigo 2.o Acidente Escolar É considerado acidente escolar: 1. Qualquer acontecimento que ocorra numa atividade escolar e que provoque ao aluno lesão, doença ou morte; 2. Qualquer acidente que resulte de atividade desenvolvida com o consentimento ou sob responsabilidade da Direção da escola; 3. Um acidente que ocorra no percurso habitual entre a residência e o estabelecimento e vice-versa nos termos dos artigos 21.o e seguintes da Portaria n.o413/99, de 8 de junho (excluem-se os acidentes que ocorram no trajeto com veículo ou velocípedes com ou sem motor, que transportem o aluno ou sejam por este conduzidos). Artigo 3.o Abrangência do Seguro Escolar Estão abrangidos pelo seguro escolar: 1. Alunos dos 2.o e 3.o ciclos do ensino básico; 2. Os jovens inscritos em atividades ou programas de ocupação de tempos livres, organizados pela escola e desenvolvidos em tempo de férias; 3. Os alunos que se desloquem ao estrangeiro, integrados em visitas de estudo, projetos de intercâmbio e competições desportivas no âmbito do desporto escolar. Nestes casos é obrigatório a celebração de um contrato de seguro de assistência em viagem a que se 1
 2 refere o artigo 34.o da referida Portaria desde que a deslocação seja comunicada aos serviços competentes do Ministério da Educação e Ciência, para efeitos da autorização, com a antecedência mínima de 30 dias. Artigo 4.o Competências da Direção da Escola 1. À Direção cabe a primeira análise da ocorrência e a respetiva decisão, considerando-a incluída ou excluída das garantias do seguro escolar; 2. No caso de se tratar de ocorrência enquadrada na definição de acidente escolar é da sua responsabilidade: a) Providenciar pela condução do sinistrado à entidade hospitalar que prestará assistência, comunicando tal facto ao encarregado de educação; b) Elaborar o inquérito e recolher todos os elementos complementares indispensáveis ao seu preenchimento, o qual deverá ser esclarecedor das condições em que se verificou a ocorrência; c) Acompanhar, na medida do possível, a forma como decorre o tratamento e a evolução clínica do sinistrado, bem como os encargos que vão ser assumidos; d) Verificar se a documentação que se pretende entregar está em condições de ser aceite; e) Zelar pela celeridade das comunicações e reembolsos aos sinistrados ou aos seus representantes legais. 3. Relativamente a cada aluno dever-se-á, no ato da matrícula, obter todos os elementos referentes ao sistema ou subsistema de saúde de que seja beneficiário, que farão parte integrante do respetivo processo. Artigo 5.o Procedimentos a seguir em caso de acidente 1. O aluno ou quem presenciar o acidente deverá dar conhecimento do sucedido ao diretor de turma e/ou funcionário mais próximo. 2. Caso a este lhe seja possível avaliar claramente a situação e não se trate de uma situação grave, deverá prestar-lhe os cuidados de saúde necessários; 3. Sempre que não se consiga avaliar corretamente a situação ou se suspeite de algo mais grave, deverá ser contactada a Direção e aguardar pelas indicações a seguir; 4. Avaliada a situação, caso se considere necessário que o aluno seja encaminhado para o hospital, deverá ser contactado o encarregado de educação a fim de comunicar o acidente ocorrido com o aluno e dar oportunidade ao mesmo de o poder acompanhar; 5. Caso não haja oportunidade da parte do encarregado de educação de acompanhar o aluno, será indicado um funcionário para esse efeito; 2
 3 6. Nos serviços administrativos encontram-se as fichas dos alunos. A funcionária que acompanhe o aluno terá de ser portadora da fotocópia da respetiva ficha; 7. A funcionária que acompanha o aluno ao hospital fica responsável por toda a documentação, bem como por acompanhar o aluno durante o período necessário para que o encarregado de educação assuma essa responsabilidade; 8. De cada acontecimento que ocorra na escola ou noutra atividade escolar, que provoque no aluno lesão ou doença será instruído um inquérito pelo diretor de turma, no próprio dia ou nas 24 horas seguintes para se indagar dos acontecimentos e preencher a documentação necessária. Artigo 6.o Garantias abrangidas pelo Seguro Escolar 1. As garantias do seguro escolar são complementares aos apoios assegurados pelos sistemas, subsistemas e seguros de proteção social e de saúde de que o aluno seja beneficiário. O seguro escolar consiste na cobertura financeira da assistência a prestar ao aluno sinistrado e por ele abrangido, também garante a assistência médica e medicamentosa e o transporte indispensáveis para garantir essa assistência. 2. A assistência médica e medicamentosa abrange: a) A assistência médica, geral e especializada, incluindo os meios complementares de diagnóstico e cirurgia; b) Os meios auxiliares de locomoção, de uso transitório, que serão obtidos, em regime de aluguer, sempre que este seja um meio mais económico que a respetiva aquisição; c) Os meios, incluindo aparelhos de ortopedia e meios auxiliares de visão, receitados por médicos da especialidade, que se tornem necessários em consequência do acidente. 3. A assistência médica é prestada ao sinistrado pelas instituições hospitalares públicas, podendo ainda ser prestada por instituições hospitalares privadas ou por médicos particulares abrangidos pelo sistema ou subsistema de que aquele seja beneficiário. 4. Em caso de internamento do sinistrado, este só poderá efetuar-se em regime de quarto comum ou de enfermaria, nas instituições hospitalares públicas ou privadas, desde que abrangidas por sistema ou subsistema de que aquele seja beneficiário. 5. Sempre que do acidente resulte dano ou inutilização dos meios auxiliares de locomoção ou de próteses que o sinistrado já utilizasse, as reparações necessárias ou a sua substituição serão asseguradas pelo seguro escolar. 6. As instituições integradas no Serviço Nacional de Saúde: a) Faturam as despesas resultantes da prestação de cuidados de saúde aos segurados, desde que estes sejam beneficiários de um subsistema público ou privado; b) Nada poderão faturar pela prestação de cuidados de saúde, no caso de os segurados não serem beneficiários de qualquer subsistema e na qualidade de beneficiários do Serviço Nacional de Saúde. 7. O recurso à especialidade de estomatologia deverá ser feito em médicos que tenham acordo com os respetivos subsistemas. No caso de não existirem, poderão recorrer a médicos particulares. 3
 4 8. Os tratamentos de fisioterapia devem ser efetuados em hospital oficial, clínicas que tenham acordo com o sistema, subsistema ou seguros de proteção social e de saúde. 9. O transporte do sinistrado no momento do acidente será o mais adequado à gravidade da lesão. 10. As despesas de transporte, nos dias posteriores ao acidente, terão que ser justificadas por documento comprovativo da sua realização e por documento hospitalar onde conste a data da consulta ou dos tratamentos. 11. O sinistrado deverá utilizar os transportes coletivos, salvo quando não existam ou se outros forem mais indicados à situação em concreto e determinados pelo médico assistente, através de declaração expressa. 12. No caso de o transporte se fazer em viatura particular, cujo recurso foi devidamente justificado, haverá lugar ao pagamento de uma verba correspondente ao número de quilómetros percorridos, ao preço unitário que estiver fixado na portaria que estabelece o subsídio de viagem em transporte em veículo adstrito a carreira de serviço público para os funcionários públicos, devendo ser apresentado recibo onde conste: a) A matrícula do veículo; b) O número de quilómetros percorridos; c) A data e finalidade do transporte, devidamente titulado por documento hospitalar de que conste a data da consulta ou dos tratamentos. 13. A assistência médica e medicamentosa é garantida pelo subsistema de que o aluno seja beneficiário, pelo que: a) Nas situações de recurso a clínicas ou médicos particulares sem acordo com o sistema / subsistemas de saúde e devidamente autorizadas pela Direção Regional de Saúde respetiva, os originais dos documentos de despesa devem ser apresentados nos Centros de Saúde, para a devida comparticipação; b) Só mediante a declaração de comparticipação e a cópia do recibo de pagamento se poderá requerer o pagamento das despesas referidas na alínea anterior, no âmbito do seguro escolar. 14. As cópias dos documentos de despesa de farmácia devem ser acompanhadas da respetiva prescrição médica. 15. Se o transporte for efetuado por serviço de táxi, os respetivos recibos deverão ser integralmente preenchidos, indicando o nome do sinistrado e entregues conjuntamente com o documento hospitalar. Artigo 7.o Direitos e deveres dos sinistrados 1. O sinistrado tem direito às prestações aqui referidas e previstas no Regulamento do Seguro Escolar, que pode ser consultado no sítio do Colégio. 2. Os sinistrados e os seus representantes legais obrigam-se a: a) Participar, em tempo útil, o acidente escolar; b) Utilizar a assistência nos termos definidos no referido Regulamento, munidos do cartão do sistema ou subsistema de que sejam benificiários; 4
 5 c) Não efetuar pagamentos que considerem da responsabilidade do sistema ou subsistema de que sejam beneficiários, sem conhecimento das autoridades escolares; d) Não tomar qualquer iniciativa sem se assegurarem, através do estabelecimento de educação, que o sinistro se enquadra no âmbito do referido Regulamento; e) Apresentar no sistema ou subsistema de saúde os originais dos documentos de despesa para efeitos de comparticipação; f) Apresentar na escola toda a documentação comprovativa dos encargos assumidos ou das despesas efetuadas, quando tenham direito ao respetivo reembolso; g) Prestar todos os esclarecimentos que lhes sejam solicitados por responsáveis da escola ou pela Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares Direção de Serviços da Região Centro; h) Submeter-se aos exames médicos que sejam decididos pela Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares Direção de Serviços da Região Centro; i) Dar quitação de todas as importâncias que lhe sejam entregues para reembolso de despesas que hajam efetuado ou de indeminização atribuída; Artigo 8.o Situações de exclusão do Seguro Escolar 1. Excluem-se do conceito de acidente escolar e, consequentemente, da cobertura do respetivo seguro: a) A doença de que o aluno é portador, sua profilaxia e tratamento, salvo a primeira deslocação à unidade de saúde; b) O acidente que ocorra nas instalações escolares quando estas estejam encerradas ou tenham sido cedidas para atividades cuja organização não seja da responsabilidade da escola; c) O acidente que resultar de força maior, considerando-se, para este efeito, os cataclismos e outras manifestações da natureza; d) O acidente ocorrido no decurso de tumulto ou de desordem; e) As ocorrências que resultem de atos danosos cuja responsabilidade, nos termos legais, seja atribuída a entidade extraescolar; f) Os acidentes que ocorram em trajeto com veículos ou velocípedes com ou sem motor, que transportem o aluno ou sejam por este conduzidos; g) Os acidentes com veículos afetos aos transportes escolares. 2. Ficam excluídos dos direitos e garantias do seguro escolar os sinistrados que por si ou por intermédio do respetivo encarregado de educação: a) Assumam conduta prejudicial ao seu estado clínico, designadamente os que abandonem os serviços hospitalares em que estejam internados ou em tratamento médico ambulatório, sem alta autorizada, não se apresentem às consultas e tratamentos determinados pelo médico assistente, quando em tratamento ambulatório, ou o interrompam sem justificação aceitável; 5
 6 b) Não observem as condições e as disposições do Regulamento do Seguro Escolar ou não obedeçam às instruções da Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares Direção de Serviços da Região Centro; c) Tomem iniciativas à margem das instruções definidas, sem prévia concordância da Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares Direção de Serviços da Região Centro; d) Não aceitem a indeminização atribuída no prazo de 30 dias após a notificação, salvo se tiver sido requerida a constituição da junta médica de recurso. 3. Ficam excluídas no âmbito do seguro escolar as despesas realizadas ou assumidas pelos sinistrados ou pelos seus representantes legais em claro respeito pelo presente Regulamento, designadamente: a) As que não resultem de acidentes de atividade escolar participado pela escola, nos termos do Regulamento do Seguro Escolar; b) As que não se encontram devidamente justificadas. Artigo 9.o Competências da Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares 1. Compete à Direção-Geral dos Estabelecimentos Escolares - Direção de Serviços da Região Centro decidir sobre a qualificação do evento como acidente escolar nos casos não abrangidos nas competências da Escola, e nas seguintes situações: a) Casos de morte ou em que se presume a invalidez permanente do aluno sinistrado; b) Atropelamento; c) Situações de recurso a instituições hospitalares, médicos privados ou sem acordo com o sistema nacional de saúde. 6


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 19.6.2010
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 161/31
 Преюдициално запитване, отправено от Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio (Италия) на 2 април 2010 г. — Sandra Castronovo/Ministero dell’Interno
 (Дело C-169/10)
 (2010/C 161/43)
 Език на производството: италиански
 Запитваща юрисдикция
 Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale del Lazio
 Страни в главното производство
 Жалбоподател: Sandra Castronovo
 Ответник: Ministero dell’Interno
 Преюдициален въпрос
 Съвместимо ли е националното законодателство (въведено с Декрет Bersani, Декрет-закон No 223 от 4 юли 2006 г., преобразуван в Закон No 248 от 4 август 2006 г.) с членове 43 и 49 от Договора за ЕО, когато в националната система, която то урежда, между другото:
 а)
 съществува обща тенденция за защита на притежателите на концесии, предоставени към по-ранен момент въз основа на процедура, при която неправомерно са изключени част от операторите,
 б)
 са налице разпоредби, които на практика гарантират запазването на придобитите търговски позиции (като например забраната новите концесионери да изграждат своите пунктове на разстояние под определеното от вече съществуващите пунктове),
 в)
 се предвижда прекратяване на концесията, ако концесионерът пряко или косвено извършва трансгранични игрални дейности, които могат да се приравнят на дейностите, обект на концесията?