jurisdiction: US

text:
 325 Md. 488 (1992)
 601 A.2d 667
 ROY CAMPBELL
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND.
 No. 38, September Term, 1991.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 February 19, 1992.
 Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
 Kreg Paul Greer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
 Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.
 ROBERT M. BELL, Judge.
 In this case, we are asked to decide if an indictment charging "conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland" charges an offense within the fundamental jurisdiction of the circuit court, for which that court lawfully could convict and sentence one so accused. Considering the appeal by Roy Campbell, the petitioner, from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County convicting him of that charge, the Court of Special Appeals held that it did and, thus, affirmed. Campbell v. State, 86 Md. App. 158, 586 A.2d 32 (1991). Having granted certiorari at the behest of the petitioner, we shall do likewise.
 Count two of the indictment filed against the petitioner, consistent with Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol) art. 27 § 40,[1] charged:
 The Grand Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of Prince George's County, on their oath do present that Joseph Spinelli Ciccarelli, Michael Joseph Ciccarelli, Sherri Lynn Ciccarelli and Roy NMN Campbell of Prince George's County, aforesaid, from June, 1986 through the 31st day of May, 1989, at Prince George's County, aforesaid, conspired each with the other and with others known and unknown to the State to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland, in violation of the Common Law of Maryland, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State. (Conspiracy to violate CDS laws.)
 Notwithstanding that, in the trial court, he did not object to the indictment, nor move to dismiss it, see Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2)[2], in the Court of Special Appeals, petitioner argued that, where commission of a crime is its object, a conspiracy indictment must identify that crime. When, he insists, the indictment does not "specify what crime or crimes were the object of the conspiracy it does not state a cognizable offense." (footnote omitted). For that proposition, the petitioner relies on Garland v. State, 112 Md. 83, 86-7, 75 A. 631, 633 (1910), particularly, the following passage:
 When the agreement is to commit an offense known to the common law or created by statute, it is not necessary, in stating the object of the conspiracy, to set out the offense with the accuracy or detail required in an indictment for that offense. The reason for the rule is that the crime of conspiracy does not consist in the accomplishment of the unlawful object, or in doing the acts by means of which the desired end is to be attained, but the essence of the offense is, as we have stated, the unlawful combination and agreement for any purpose that is unlawful or criminal.
 See also State v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 350, 273 S.W.2d 143, 146 (1954). Moreover, the petitioner maintains that failure to identify the crime results in the failure of notice both of the precise nature of the charge as well as the maximum penalty faced.
 The Court of Special Appeals held "that neither the controlled dangerous substances, i.e., cocaine, heroin, etc., nor the activity, i.e., possession, selling, distributing, etc. need be specified when the short form conspiracy indictment is utilized." Campbell v. State, 86 Md. App. at 165-66, 586 A.2d at 36. That holding was mandated, it asserted, by the holding in one of its prior cases, Quaglione v. State, 15 Md. App. 571, 292 A.2d 785 (1972), which holding, it concluded, "remains the law and is determinative of this question." 86 Md. App. at 165, 586 A.2d at 36. To reach this conclusion, in addition to reviewing its decision in Quaglione, the court surveyed cases from this Court which addressed related issues. In particular, the court found McMorris v. State, 277 Md. 62, 355 A.2d 438 (1976),[3] with particular emphasis on the dissenting opinion, and Winters v. State, 301 Md. 214, 482 A.2d 886 (1984) instructive. Although the Quaglione court relied on this Court's opinion in Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575 (1952), which was extensively discussed in the McMorris dissent, the intermediate court did not give it top billing when it decided this case.
 One of the primary purposes of a charging document is to inform an accused of the accusation against him or her. Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 790-92, 490 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1985); State v. Morton, 295 Md. 487, 490, 456 A.2d 909, 911 (1983); Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.[4]See also Maryland Rule 4-202 which implements the constitutional mandate. Subsection (a) of the rule requires the charging document to
 "contain a concise and definite statement of the essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged and, with reasonable particularity, the time and place the offense occurred."
 Subsection (b), which requires charging documents to be signed, makes clear that a plea to the merits of an indictment not signed by the State's Attorney, or his designee, waives that defect. See also Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(1) and (2). Subsection (d) provides:
 "A charging document need not negate an exception, excuse, or proviso contained in a statute or other authority creating or defining the offense charged."
 Addressing the purpose underlying the constitutional requirement, in Williams, Chief Judge Murphy, speaking for the Court, wrote that they included:
 (1) putting the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend by characterizing and describing the crime and conduct;
 (2) protecting the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense;
 (3) enabling the accused to prepare for his trial;
 (4) providing a basis for the court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document; and
 (5) informing the court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case. Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 163-64, 433 A.2d 1150 [, 1155] (1981). We have repeatedly emphasized that every criminal charge must, first, characterize the crime; and, second, it must provide such description of the criminal act alleged to have been committed as will inform the accused of the specific conduct with which he is charged, thereby enabling him to defend against the accusation and avoid a second prosecution for the same criminal offense. (Some citations omitted)
 302 Md. at 791, 490 A.2d at 1279. At issue in Williams was the sufficiency of an indictment charging that the accused "unlawfully with a dangerous and deadly weapon did rob the complainant," without, however, an express allegation that he intended permanently to deprive the owner of the property. We held that the indictment was sufficient:
 As the criminal information sufficiently characterized the crime of armed robbery, it was not defective for lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court. Although the customary method of identifying the particular crime charged has been to aver its essential elements in the charging document, that is not the exclusive method, and the use of other words that sufficiently characterize the crime will satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.... This does not mean that the charging document will be immune from attack, for it may otherwise be deficient in failing to fully inform the accused of the specific conduct with which he is charged, and in that event a timely motion pursuant to Rule 4-252(a) may be filed[3]
 [3] None of the cases upon which the dissent places reliance actually hold[s] (albeit some may indicate) that to invest a court with jurisdiction over a criminal charge, every essential element of the crime must be alleged in the charging document.
 302 Md. at 793, 490 A.2d at 1280. Of course, even though not all of the essential elements must be set forth in the charging document, enough must be alleged in order "to invest the circuit court with power to proceed to trial...." State v. Chaney, 304 Md. 21, 26, 497 A.2d 152, 155 (1985).
 The issue for us to determine is whether that count of the indictment charging "conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland," sufficiently characterized the crime lodged against the petitioner; does it contain sufficient "essential elements" of the crime of conspiracy to invest the circuit court with jurisdiction to try the petitioner and, if convicted, punish him? If it does, then, even though the indictment may otherwise be defective, of which the court, if requested, could have taken cognizance, those defects not having been raised, the judgment was properly entered.
 The crime of conspiracy is defined in Maryland as:
 [T]he combination of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement. The agreement need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design. [Furthermore], the crime is complete when the unlawful agreement is reached, and no overt act in furtherance of the agreement need be shown.
 Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 461-62, 593 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1991), quoting Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75, 548 A.2d 832, 834 (1988). See Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 221, 582 A.2d 525, 528 (1990); Mason v. State, 302 Md. 434, 444-45, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (1985). It is well settled that, in order validly to charge conspiracy, a charging document must allege both the fact of the conspiracy and its object. Winters v. State, 301 Md. at 234, 482 A.2d at 896; Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. at 584, 92 A.2d at 577; Quaglione v. State, 15 Md. App. at 581, 292 A.2d at 791. It is equally well settled "that the means by which [the conspiracy] was intended to be accomplished need not be set out, being only matters of evidence to prove the charge, and not the crime itself, and may be perfectly indifferent...." State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 352 (1821). See also Winters and Hurwitz, both supra.
 When the object of a conspiracy is the commission of a crime, alleging that fact in the charging document obviously would be a sufficient statement of the conspiracy's object. Nevertheless, "[i]t is ... not required that the object of the unexecuted conspiracy should be set out with great particularity and certainty in the indictment, because only such facts need be stated as shall fairly and reasonably inform the accused of the offense with which he is charged," Hurwitz 200 Md. at 587, 92 A.2d at 579, quoting Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 608-09, 71 A. 1058, 1060 (1909). Thus, because it is not essential to the proof of conspiracy that its object be attained, the crime need not be alleged with such specificity as to render an indictment for it sufficient. See Garland v. State, 112 Md. at 86, 75 A. at 633. This is consistent with the fact that the offense of which the accused is required to be informed is the conspiracy, rather than the crime which is its object.
 In Hurwitz, the defendant was charged with conspiring with others "unlawfully to violate the lottery laws of the State." 200 Md. at 581, 92 A.2d at 576. There, no particular lottery laws were mentioned, prompting the Court, at the outset to concede "that ordinarily the words `unlawfully violate the lottery laws of the State' do not so definitely describe acts done as to charge an offense; they even seem too indefinite to charge acts contemplated as the object of a conspiracy." 200 Md. at 582, 92 A.2d at 577. Nevertheless, we held the indictment to be sufficient. 200 Md. at 589, 92 A.2d at 580.
 In so doing, and in an effort to grasp the distinction between the object of a conspiracy and the means, or method, by which the conspiracy's object was to be attained, we reviewed our prior cases, in particular, State v. Buchanan, supra. Observing that
 in some respects these principles and rules seem to permit loosely drawn indictments, in other respects they express only the logic and common sense (and sometimes the sheer necessity) of the case. An indictment for robbery or larceny must ordinarily state the property stolen and the name (if known) of the owner. If, however, pickpockets conspire to ply their trade in a public place it is manifestly impossible to state what property they conspired to steal or whom they conspired to rob,
 200 Md. at 585, 92 A.2d at 578, we recognized that, to some extent, whether the object of the conspiracy has properly been alleged depends on the circumstances.
 We held, "[o]n the authority of State v. Buchanan and later cases in this court, and in view of the evident meaning of `the lottery laws of the State', ... that the first count of the instant indictment validly stated an offense and not a mere conclusion of law." 200 Md. at 589, 92 A.2d at 580. Before stating that holding, we had commented:
 The subtitle "Lotteries" comprises §§ 423-438, inclusive.
 "The lottery laws of the State" in the instant indictment is identical in scope with sections 423-438 and with the laws referred to in section 696 and (in part) in section 435. The words "to violate the lottery laws of the State" have a promiscuous sound, but by comparison with sections 423-438, mean in substance, to participate in the conduct of a lottery, as broadly defined. Sections 423-438, with considerable tautology, prohibit drawing a lottery, selling a lottery ticket (sec. 423), keeping or permitting to be used a house as a place for selling lottery tickets (secs. 427-428), bringing into the State or having in possession (sec. 429) lottery tickets,  in short, practically every incident of the conduct of a lottery except buying a lottery ticket.
 200 Md. at 588-89, 92 A.2d at 580. We also declined to "approve as a general formula for the statement of the object of a conspiracy, `to violate the ... laws of the State.'" Id.
 In Quaglione, the indictment charged conspiracy "to violate the narcotic laws of the State of Maryland." Quaglione argued that the indictment "was so vague in its wording that it failed to charge an offense," 15 Md. App. at 580, 292 A.2d at 791; thus, the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. Undeterred by the Hurwitz court's limitation of its holding and express refusal to approve a general formula for the statement of the object of a conspiracy, 15 Md. App. at 582 n. 8, 292 A.2d at 792 n. 8, the Court of Special Appeals rejected that argument. It held that "the subject indictment did sufficiently charge a conspiracy and state the object of it. The meaning of the phrase `narcotics laws of the State of Maryland' is evident and apparent to the appellant to the same extent that the meaning of `the lottery laws of the State' [was] held to be evident and apparent to the accused in Hurwitz." 15 Md. App. at 582, 292 A.2d at 792 (emphasis in original). A defendant's right to demand particulars, pursuant to the Maryland Rules was specifically reserved. See Maryland Rule 4-241(a).[5]
 One of the issues in Winters was the propriety of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the conspiracy count of an indictment. 301 Md. at 219, 482 A.2d at 888. That count, utilizing the statutory short form, alleged as the object of the conspiracy, the violation of the "Maryland Income Tax Laws, Art. 81, § 279 et. seq., Annotated Code of Maryland." 301 Md. at 233 n. 2, 482 A.2d at 895 n. 2. The defendant argued: "Although the language of Count I stated the conspiracy, it did not properly allege the object of the conspiracy, thus, ... the count was defective." 301 Md. at 234, 482 A.2d at 896. In particular, he maintained that, given the number of ways the income tax laws could be violated, how this conspiracy proposed, or intended, to do so should have been alleged. Id. We rejected that argument, pointing out:
 It is well settled in Maryland that so long as the object of the conspiracy is set forth in the indictment there is no necessity to also set forth the means by which the conspiracy was intended to be accomplished. See Pearlman v. State, 232 Md. 251, 192 A.2d 767 (1963) (conspiracy to cheat and defraud customers by wrongful and indirect means and false pretenses, etc. sufficient), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 943, 84 S. Ct. 797, 11 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1964), Piracci v. State, 207 Md. 499, 115 A.2d 262 (1955) (conspiracy to defraud City of Baltimore  means to accomplish object of conspiracy need not be set out); Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310, 93 A.2d 753 (1953) (conspiracy to violate lottery laws sufficient to charge a crime), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955, 73 S. Ct. 937, 97 L. Ed. 1377 (1953); Quaglione v. State, 15 Md. App. 571, 292 A.2d 785 (1972) (conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws of the state held sufficient). All these cases demonstrate a consistent holding on the issue dating back to State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (1821), where our predecessors first held that in a prosecution for conspiracy, it is sufficient to state in the indictment the conspiracy and the object of it; the means by which it was intended to be accomplished need not be set forth. We see no need to depart from this well settled law.
 Id.
 In context and especially in view of the arguments made by Winters, "means" was used by both Winters and the Court to refer to the "acts", i.e., crimes, proscribed by the applicable sections of Article 81. Specifying which of the acts the conspirators intended to commit certainly would have apprised Winters fully of the "crime" which was the object of the conspiracy and, thus, would have satisfied his concerns.
 A defendant charged with a conspiracy involving controlled dangerous substances cannot be fully apprised of the "crime" that is the object of the conspiracy unless informed both of the substance involved and what was intended to be done with it, or how that substance was to be used, i.e., possessed, sold, imported, etc. While it cannot be gainsaid that identification of the particular substance involved would more particularly describe the object of the conspiracy, and, indeed, may be sufficient, see McMorris, 277 Md. at 89, 355 A.2d at 453 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting), from the petitioner's perspective, even that would not suffice. The petitioner believes that, in addition to identifying the controlled dangerous substance, the indictment must also allege how the conspirators intended to use the substance or what they intended to do with it. The failure to allege either, he says, renders the indictment jurisdictionally defective; only if it contains both prongs would the indictment be sufficient, i.e., give notice of the precise nature of the charge and permit the applicable penalty to be determined.
 We are not persuaded. To hold as the petitioner would have us do would be to require that, in a conspiracy indictment, when the commission of a crime is the object of the indictment, that crime must be charged with the same specificity as if it were the substantive charge. That clearly is not the law. See Buchanan, 5 H. & J. at 346. Even Garland v. State, the case upon which the petitioner places reliance, is to the contrary. 112 Md. at 86-7, 75 A. at 633. Our opinion in Winters also belies that contention. When we decided Winters, we were, of course, aware of Quaglione and we easily could have corrected any misapprehensions apparent in that opinion. We did not. Instead, consistent with the settled principle that the object of a conspiracy need not be set out with the same particularity as if charging it as a substantive crime, we determined that the acts characterizing the manner in which the income tax laws were proposed to be violated were the "means by which" the conspiracy would be carried out, not its object.
 The charge, conspiracy "to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland," sufficiently characterizes the crime of conspiracy so as to invest the circuit court with jurisdiction. Williams, 302 Md. at 793, 490 A.2d at 1280. Sections 276-304 of Article 27 are codified under the subheading, "Health  Controlled Dangerous Substances," the purpose of which is "to establish a uniform law controlling the manufacture, distribution, possession, and administration of controlled dangerous substances and related paraphernalia in order to insure their availability for legitimate medical and scientific purposes, but to prevent their abuse which results in a serious health problem to the individual and represents a serious danger to the welfare of the people of the State of Maryland." That the subheading applies to numerous substances, having legitimate and illegitimate uses, and prohibits numerous acts when done in connection with those substances, cannot be doubted, but all those substances and prohibited acts (including the definitions critical to the proper understanding and interpretation of the subheading) are grouped together in one place for easy reference. Moreover, they share, as we have seen, a common element: their abuse is inimical to the health and welfare of the citizenry. Thus, though numerous, the substances, and the proscribed acts pertaining to them, comprise, not an unlimited range of possibilities, but only a finite one. This was also true of the "lottery laws," see Hurwitz, 200 Md. at 589, 92 A.2d at 580 and the "Maryland income tax laws," applied in Winters, 301 Md. at 234, 482 A.2d at 896. Consequently, while it could have been more explicit, the charge put the accused on notice, albeit only in a general way, of what he was called upon to answer. And it was sufficient to provide a basis for the court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document. This is not a situation in which the indictment presented an unlimited number of possible objects of the conspiracy as, for example, would be the case if the charge was conspiracy to violate "the laws of the State of Maryland," But see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875), in which the Court observed:
 "In Maine, it is an offense for two or more to conspire with intent unlawfully and wickedly to commit any crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison (State v. Roberts) [34 Me. 320]; but we think it will hardly be claimed that an indictment would be good under this statute, which charges the object of the conspiracy to have been `Unlawfully and wickedly to commit each, every, all and singular the crimes punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.' All crimes are not so punishable. Whether a particular crime be such a one or not, is a question of law. The accused has, therefore, the right to have a specification of the charge against him in this respect, in order that he may decide whether he should present his defense by motion to quash, demurrer or plea; and the court, that it may determine whether the facts will sustain the indictment."
 Here, the indictment presents a finite number of objects, only those pertaining to the controlled dangerous substances law; "to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of the State of Maryland" apprises the court of that universe of criminal acts in which the conspirators proposed to operate. A violation of one, or more, of those laws would be an "unlawful purpose," and, thus, a proper goal of a conspiracy.
 To be sure, count 2 of the indictment[6] did not inform the petitioner of the substance involved, how the conspirators intended to use it, or what they planned to do with it. Without that information, he did not have sufficient information to determine, as he alleges, the precise nature of the crime which was the object of the conspiracy and, therefore, to determine the maximum penalty he faced. The indictment might well have been, on that account, defective, enabling the petitioner to challenge those omissions by motion filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252(a). As we have seen, no timely motion was made in that regard and, accordingly, the defects were waived. Furthermore, Maryland Rule 4-241(a) permits a defendant to file a demand for a bill of particulars, to which the State would have had to respond within ten days. Rule 4-241(b). Again, the petitioner filed no such demand.
 II.
 In addition to the conspiracy count, the petitioner was charged with maintaining a common nuisance (count 1), two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (counts 3 and 8), two counts of possession of cocaine (counts 4 and 9), possession of phencyclidine (PCP) with intent to distribute (count 5), possession of phencyclidine (count 6), and two counts of possession of paraphernalia (counts 7 and 10).[7] Following a jury trial, he was convicted of conspiracy, along with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, one count of simple possession of cocaine and one count of possession of paraphernalia. The petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, into which the simple possession of cocaine count was merged, the ten-year sentence for conspiracy being without parole. The court imposed a concurrent term of four years for possession of paraphernalia.
 Pointing out that "one purpose of an indictment is `to inform the court of the specific crime charged so that, if required, sentence may be pronounced in accordance with the right of the case,'" quoting Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 163, 433 A.2d 1150, 1155 (1981), the petitioner argues that count 2 was not sufficiently specific to apprise him, and the court, of the sentence to be imposed after conviction. He challenges whether an after-the-fact interpretation of the verdict by the trial court is a sufficient substitute. The petitioner relies on State v. Simpson, 318 Md. 194, 567 A.2d 132 (1989).
 In that case, based only on evidence that he made a purchase from an individual, from whom the police recovered a bag containing both heroin and cocaine, and even though what he purchased was never conclusively proven, Simpson was convicted of both possession of cocaine and possession of heroin. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove either charge. 77 Md. App. 184, 549 A.2d 1145 (1988). We affirmed. 318 Md. at 196, 567 A.2d at 133. We rejected the State's argument that, because, by its express terms, the offense defined in Article 27, § 287(a) is "unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance," identification of the particular controlled dangerous substance is not an element of the offense which must be proven. We explained (318 Md. at 198-99, 567 A.2d at 134):
 As we pointed out in Cunningham v. State, [318 Md. 182, 188, 567 A.2d 126, 128-9 (1989)], the penalty structure of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act is tied to the particular substance involved. The penalty for possession with intent to distribute a narcotic drug listed in Schedules # 1 or #2 differs from the penalty for possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine, and the penalty for possession with intent to distribute any other controlled dangerous substance differs from both of these. Article 27 § 286(b). Similarly, the penalty for possession of marijuana differs significantly from the penalty for the possession of any other controlled dangerous substance. Article 27 § 287(e). Enhanced penalties are available for possession with intent to distribute certain specified quantities of controlled dangerous substances, but only as to those particular substances. If, as the State seems to suggest, it would be sufficient to charge a defendant with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, without specifying the substance allegedly involved, neither the parties nor the court would know whether the defendant was facing a maximum sentence of twenty years or five years. No one could know whether the defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges, or four. Maryland Rule 4-313(a). In the absence of a special verdict, the court could not determine the permissible penalty.
 See also Spratt v. State, 315 Md. 680, 685, 556 A.2d 667, 669 (1989) and Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 450, 559 A.2d 792, 802 (1989), on which the Simpson court relied. Both of those cases stand for the proposition that a necessary element of an offense is one that is the sine qua non for the determination of the crime and/or its grade.
 Although our analysis referred to the charging process, at issue in Simpson, was the sufficiency of the proof as to the charges actually brought, not, as here, the sufficiency of the indictment. Moreover, substantive offenses, rather than a conspiracy to commit them, were charged. As we have already seen, a count charging conspiracy need not describe the crime which is its object with the same particularity as would be required were that crime, as a substantive offense, being charged. To the extent that the Court of Special Appeals distinguished the case on these bases, it did not err.
 The State argues that, "[i]n any event, Campbell was on notice of the maximum penalty he faced in the present case." In support of that assertion, it refers to the other counts in the indictment. Thus, it maintains, the jury, by finding the petitioner guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine, did decide what the actual objects of the conspiracy were and, consequently, "the trial court properly interpreted the verdict as a finding of guilt of a conspiracy to unlawfully sell cocaine."[8] That being so, the State asserts, the petitioner was properly punished pursuant to Art. 27 § 38.[9] On the facts sub judice, we agree.[10]
 We have already noted that the petitioner neither moved to dismiss the conspiracy count as defective, nor sought the particulars underlying it. From this, considering the other counts in the indictment, it may be inferred that the petitioner was fully informed of the objects of the conspiracy. Moreover, instructing the jury concerning conspiracy, the court said:
 The Defendant in this case is charged with conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substance laws of the State of Maryland. Cocaine is indeed a controlled dangerous substance.
 Now, conspiracy, conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime. In order to convict the defendant of conspiracy the State must prove, number one, that the defendant entered into an agreement with at least one other person to commit the crime of violating the CDS Act of the State of Maryland, and that he entered into that agreement with the intent to commit that crime. (emphasis supplied)
 With respect to the intent element, the court had previously told the jury:
 Intent is a state of mind and ordinarily cannot be proven directly because there is no way of looking into a person's mind. Therefore, a defendant's intent may be shown by surrounding circumstances. In determining the defendant's intent you may consider the defendant's acts and statements as well as the surrounding circumstances. Further, you may but are not required to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
 From the foregoing, it may be inferred that the jury was adequately instructed.[11] Furthermore, by its verdict, it likewise may be inferred that it found that the objects of the conspiracy were to possess cocaine and to possess it with intent to distribute. The petitioner does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain either of the substantive charges. Nor does he contend that the way those charges were presented to the jury precluded the jury from considering them as the objects of the conspiracy. His argument is premised completely upon the failure of that count of the indictment charging conspiracy to specify the object of the conspiracy. We have already rejected that argument. We now reject the inference the petitioner draws from it, that the sentence imposed was thereby illegal.[12]
 III.
 The paraphernalia counts, charging possession of "numerous smoking pipes, adapted for administration of controlled dangerous substance under circumstances which reasonably indicate an intention to use for purpose of illegally administering controlled dangerous substance ...," were brought pursuant to Article 27, § 287(d). Although the petitioner does not raise the issue, it is quite obvious that § 287(d) does not apply and, so, as to the count of which he was convicted, the petitioner received an illegal sentence. Illegal sentences may be challenged at any time, even on appeal. Rule 4-345(a); Matthews v. State, 304 Md. 281, 288, 498 A.2d 655, 658 (1985), citing to Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985).
 Section 287(d)(1) defines "controlled paraphernalia" as it pertains to its use, rather than its packaging (see subsection (d)(2)) or its preparation (see subsection (d)(3)), as "[a] hypodermic syringe, needle or other instrument or implement or combination thereof adapted for the administration of controlled dangerous substances by hypodermic injections...." The "numerous smoking pipes" referred to in the paraphernalia counts simply do not come within that definition. The petitioner should have been charged under Article 27, § 287A(a), which defines "drug paraphernalia" as: "all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use, in ... ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled dangerous substance...." The maximum penalty for a violation of § 287A(c), "Use or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia," is: for the first violation, a $500.00 fine, and for a subsequent violation, two years imprisonment, $2000 fine or both. The petitioner was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.
 JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED AS TO ALL COUNTS EXCEPT AS TO THE SENTENCE FOR POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, AS TO WHICH THE SENTENCE IS VACATED. THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO FURTHER REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY FOR RESENTENCING ON THAT COUNT.
 COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
 MURPHY, C.J., concurs in the result only.
 ELDRIDGE and McAULIFFE, Judges, dissenting:
 We dissent from the Court's affirmance of the conspiracy conviction for essentially the reasons set forth by Judge O'Donnell in McMorris v. State, 277 Md. 62, 77-90, 355 A.2d 438, 447-454 (1976).
 NOTES
 [1] That section provides:
 In any indictment or warrant for the crime of conspiracy, it shall be sufficient to use a formula substantially to the following effect: "That A-B and C-D on the ____ day of ____, 19__, at the County (City) aforesaid unlawfully conspired together to murder X-Y (or other conspiracy here stating briefly the object of the conspiracy), against the peace, government and dignity of the State."
 [2] That rule provides:
 (a) Mandatory motions. In the circuit court, the following matters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise:
 * * * * * *
 (2) A defect in the charging document other than its failure to show jurisdiction in the court or its failure to charge an offense.
 * * * * * *
 [3] The indictment in that case charged that McMorris and others "unlawfully conspired together and with each other and with certain other persons ... to violate the controlled dangerous substance laws of the State of Maryland," and the same allegation as contained in the indictment in Quaglione. The majority did not directly address the sufficiency of that indictment; it did note, however, that "[i]f McMorris was uncertain as to what facts the State was proceeding upon under this count ... he could have demanded particulars...." 277 Md. 62, 70 n. 4, 355 A.2d 438, 443 n. 4 (1976). The dissent, on the other hand, made a substantial attack on the sufficiency of the indictment and, necessarily, on the Quaglione holding. 277 Md. at 83-4, 355 A.2d at 450-51.
 [4] Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in relevant part:
 That in all criminal prosecutions, every man has a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence....
 [5] Maryland Rule 4-241(a), in pertinent part, provides:
 (a) Demand. Within 15 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213(c), the defendant may file a demand in the circuit court for a bill of particulars. The demand shall be in writing, unless otherwise ordered by the court, and shall specify the particulars sought.
 [6] As we shall see infra, other counts charged included possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia, of which the petitioner was convicted. It may be argued that the presence of those counts in the indictment is significant to the conspiracy's object. See Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 588, 92 A.2d 575, 580 (1952). There, in addition to the conspiracy count, Hurwitz was charged, in other counts, with specific violations of the lottery laws. 200 Md. at 581, 92 A.2d at 576. We think it significant that, when distinguishing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875), in which the United States Supreme Court found insufficient a conspiracy indictment, the object of which was "unlawfully and wickedly to commit any crime punishable by imprisonment in the State prison," the Court commented that the indictment failed "to specify in any of the counts what right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, the traversers had conspired to defeat." 200 Md. at 586, 92 A.2d at 579.
 [7] The counts charging the same offense differ only in the date on which the occurrence was alleged to have occurred.
 [8] In its instruction to the jury, see infra, to which the petitioner did not except, the court told the jury that the case was about cocaine; accordingly, we agree with the petitioner that the applicable offenses were the possession with intent to distribute and the simple possession counts, not the possession of paraphernalia count.
 [9] That section provides: "The punishment of every person convicted of the crime of conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for the offense he or she conspired to commit."
 [10] A different result may be required where the only charge before the court is conspiracy and the proof is of more than one object for that conspiracy. In that situation, because it is impossible to determine which object the jury found, the judge will not be in a position to make, and, therefore, should not make, that determination. Accordingly the applicable sentence may well be that for the object carrying the least penalty. See n. 12 infra.
 [11] A conspiracy may have more than one object. See Tracy v. State, 319 Md. 452, 459, 573 A.2d 38, 41 (1990) (citing to Mason v. State, 302 Md. 434, 445, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (1985)); Jordan v. State, 323 Md. 151, 161, 591 A.2d 875, 879-80 (1991) (quoting Tracy, supra). However many objects a conspiracy may have, only one sentence may be imposed. Where a defendant is found guilty of conspiracy to commit two crimes, the crime that carries the more severe penalty is the guideline offense for purposes of sentencing. Jordan, 323 Md. at 162, 591 A.2d at 880. In this case, the jury's verdict established that the conspiracy had two objects, to possess with the intent to distribute, and to possess, cocaine. Of the two, possession with intent to distribute carries the more severe penalty and, thus, is the guideline offense.
 [12] Where multiple sentences are possible in respect of multiple acts, all of which could, though not necessarily, be objects of the conspiracy, but the jury does not identify which of them are involved, it may be argued that the applicable sentence is that for the crime carrying the least severe penalty. See Spratt, 315 Md. 680, 690, 556 A.2d 667, 672 (1989) and Hagans, 316 Md. 429, 445, 559 A.2d 792, 800 (1989). In this case, that would mean that the petitioner could only be sentenced for possession of paraphernalia. See note 10, supra.
 The petitioner does not argue his entitlement to the lesser penalty, seeking, instead, outright reversal because of the failure of the charging document adequately to characterize, for jurisdictional purposes, the conspiracy charge. Since we have determined that it passes muster from a jurisdictional perspective, the issue need not be further addressed.


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Maksumaksja portaal - Maksuviktoriini võitjad selgunud. Lasse Lehis - 2007 > aprill (nr 4) - EML ajakiri MaksuMaksja
 EML ajakiri MaksuMaksja > 2007 > aprill (nr 4) > Maksuviktoriini võitjad selgunud. Lasse Lehis
 Maksuviktoriini võitjad selgunud. Lasse Lehis
 Kõikidest küsimustest, mida EML on küsinud TSD küsimuste kohta, kõige tähtsam küsimus, et mitte öelda küsimuste küsimus on siiski see: “Mille k....di pärast seda jama vaja on?” Sellele küsimusele antud vastusega mina isiklikult kindlasti rahul ei ole.
 MTA vastuses on öeldud, et TSD küsimustik on oluline, et juhtida maksumaksja tähelepanu võimalikule vajadusele hinnata seotud isikutega toimuvate tehingute väärtusi ja võrrelda neid turuväärtusega.
 Armastuskiri või ähvarduskiri?
 Minu arvates on maksudeklaratsioon siiski maksu arvutamise dokument. Nii on ka kirjas maksukorralduse seaduse §-s 85. Maksuhalduri ja maksumaksja vaheline suhtlus ei pea toimuma ainult maksudeklaratsioonide kaudu. On mitmeid muid sobivamaid meetodeid, mille kaudu maksuhaldur saab maksumaksjat teavitada toimunud seadusemuudatustest ja juhtida maksumaksja tähelepanu vajadusele olla seadustega kursis.
 Näiteks kui maksumaksjate liit soovib oma liikmeid teavitada uuest koolitusüritusest, siis me avaldame sellekohase reklaami ajakirjas ja kodulehel või saadame näiteks e-postiga vastava teate. Me näiteks ei trüki koolituskava liikmemaksuarvele. Kui me soovime liikmelt saada arvamusi ja ettepanekuid koolituse teemade või lektorite valiku kohta, siis me jagame koolitusel välja tagasiside lehed või paneme kodulehele välja küsitlusankeedi. Kindlasti ei hakkaks me kunagi kedagi sundima, et ta näiteks koolituse arve tasumisel peaks märkima maksekorralduse selgituste lahtrisse ettepanekuid või hinnanguid koolituse kohta. Ühesõnaga – iga asi õigel ajal ja õiges kohas.
 Alati võib esineda erandeid ja nii on ka mõnes maksudeklaratsioonis ette nähtud näiteks maksuvabade tulude või väljamaksete deklareerimine (nt dividendide deklareerimine vormil INF1 või välismaalt saadud palga ja dividendide deklareerimine füüsilise isiku tuludeklaratsioonis). Iga erand peab olema põhjendatud, info kogumiseks peab olema vajadus. Välistulude deklareerimise põhjus on täiesti olemas, sest on vaja kontrollida, kas maksuvabastuse tingimused on täidetud. Ka dividendide deklareerimine on õigustatud, sest see annab maksuhaldurile teavet füüsilise isiku legaalsete sissetulekute kohta ja kogutud info võib elimineerida maksupettuse kahtlusi.
 Seotud isikutega tehtud tehingute kohta kogutud teave ei anna minu arvates mingit maksuhalduri tööks oluliselt vajalikku infot. Lihtsalt selleks, et iga kuu maksumaksjatele meelde tuletada, et teatud juhtudel võib teatud tehingutelt tekkida teatud summas tulumaksu maksmise kohustus, ei ole küll vaja deklaratsioonile lisalahtreid. Selle jaoks on olemas deklaratsiooni täitmise juhendid ja muu lisainfo. Arvestades seda, et suurem osa deklaratsioone esitatakse elektrooniliselt, ei ole mingi eriline probleem lisada deklaratsiooni vormile vajalikesse kohtadesse lingid lisainfole.
 Siirdehinnad ei ole sugugi ainus koht, mida peaks maksumaksjatele meelde tuletama. Alustame kasvõi TSD väljamaksete koodidest. Vaevalt et keegi neid kõiki peast teab. Elementaarne oleks, kui TSD lisa 1 täitmisel saaks uues aknas kuvada koodide loetelu, et järele vaadata, kellel 01, kellel 11, kellel 13, kellel 15 jne. Samuti on abistav teave igati teretulnud kõikidel juhtudel, kus rakendatakse maksuvabasid piirmäärasid, mahaarvamisi või ümberarvutamisi jne.
 Miks ei ole TSD põhivormil kunagi olnud näiteks küsimusi Kas te olete saanud Lätist intresse või Portugalist litsentsitasu?, Kas te olete aastatel 1994–1999 teenitud kasumi juba dividendidena välja jaganud? vms. Sest me eeldame, et asjast huvitatud maksumaksja otsib ise üles õige vormi ja sinna juurde kuuluvad juhendid. Miks ei võiks siis ka piirduda kasvõi vilkuva punase tulukesega, millele klikates avaneb siirdehindade maksustamist tutvustav tekst koos väljavõtete või linkidega asjakohastele õigusaktidele?
 Või mida arvata sellest, kui TSD põhivormil küsitaks: Kas maksustamisperioodil tehti tehinguid, mille majanduslik sisu ja juriidiline vorm ei kattu ning mille tulemusel on võimalik maksukohustuse tekkimine?, mis juhiks maksumaksja tähelepanu MKS §-dele 83–84? Minu arvates ei oleks taoline teavitamismeetod vajalik ega kohane.
 Veelgi enam oleks lisateavet vaja füüsilistele isikutele. Näiteks selles kohas, kus deklareeritakse kasu vara võõrandamisest, võiks vabalt olla lingid elukohana kasutatud kinnisvara maksuvabastusi tutvustavatele tekstidele jne. Kui selle asemel oleks vaid lihtsalt küsimus: Kas te müüsite maksustamisperioodil kinnisasja, korteriomandit või -hoonestusõigust, mille oluliseks osaks või esemeks on eluruum, mida te kuni võõrandamiseni kasutasite oma alalise või peamise elukohana? ilma mistahes lisaselgituseta, tekitaks see vaid segadust ja arusaamatust.
 Järjekorranumber revisjoniosakonda?
 Üks võimalik versioon on, et teavet kogutakse revisjonitöö planeerimiseks. Et lugeda kokku, palju on potentsiaalseid kontrolliobjekte. See hakkas meidki huvitama. Niisiis sai saadetud MTA-le teabenõude ja palutud neil edastada arvud, kui palju vastati jaanuaris ja veebruaris küsimustele jaatavalt ja eitavalt. Tulemused on teie ees.
 Esimesele küsimusele Kas maksustamisperioodil on sooritatud tehinguid seotud isikutega? vastati jaanuaris “JAH” 8482 korral ja “EI” 58 728 korral. Veebruaris vastati “JAH” 8728 ja “EI” 57 550 korral.
 Teisele küsimusele Kas maksukohustuslane on osaline seotud isikute vahelises kulude jaotuse kokkuleppes, millele laienevad kohustuslikud kulude jaotuse kokkulepete dokumenteerimise nõuded? vastati jaanuaris “JAH” 1671 korral ja “EI” 65 533 korral. Veebruaris vastati “JAH” 1554 ja “EI” 64 713 korral.
 Kolmandale küsimusele Kas maksukohustuslasele on kohustuslikud seotud isikute vaheliste tehingute detailsed dokumenteerimise reeglid? vastati jaanuaris “JAH” 3371 korral ja “EI” 63 830 korral. Veebruaris vastati “JAH” 3111 ja “EI” 63 154 korral.
 Koosseisu järgi on Maksu- ja Tolliametis kokku 2417 ametikohta. Kui rakendada kõik see mees alates peadirektorist koristajateni kontrollima potentsiaalseid siirdehindlasi, siis saaks iga ametnik keskmiselt igas kuus kontrollida kahte maksumaksjat. Vaevalt et seda keegi sooviks või tahaks. Ka ei tohiks MTA töö planeerimist väga palju muuta teadmine, et näiteks juulis tõuseb esimesele küsimusele jaatavalt vastanute arv 8864-ni ja langeb augustis 8327-ni. Seega on minu arvates vajalik statistika käes ja pole mingit põhjust sama numbrite jada iga kuu korrata.
 Kui arvestada veel seda, et kindlasti võivad seotud isikutega tehinguid teha mittekäibemaksukohustuslased, kes teatavasti ei pea TSD-sid esitama, kui neil tulumaksukohustust ei teki, samuti seda, et TSD-sid esitavad näiteks riigiasutused, füüsilisest isikust ja mitteresidendist tööandjad, kelle kohta TuMS § 50 lg 4 ei kehti, siis tegelikult ei anna viktoriini tulemused tegelikust elust ka praegu õiget pilti.
 Kokkuvõtteks arvan, et just praegu on sobiv hetk viktoriin lõpetada, õiged vastused välja kuulutada ja parimate vastajate vahel maastur välja loosida.
 EML-iga seotud isik
 RM vastus EML küsimusele
 Selgitus seoses vormi TSD täiendustega
 Vastuseks maksudeklaratsiooni TSD põhivormi täitmisel tekkinud küsimustele[1] teatab Rahandusministeerium järgmist.
 1. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse § 67 ja võlaõigusseaduse § 8 alusel on tehing isiku soovil baseeruv toiming või toimingute kogum, mis on (VÕS § 2 mõistes) võlasuhte tekkimise aluseks. Maksudeklaratsiooni TSD põhivormile lisandunud esimeses küsimuses kasutatud mõiste „tehing“ sisustamisel lähtutakse eelnimetatud sätetest, kuivõrd need sisustavad tehingu mõiste üldtingimused.
 Samas on deklaratsiooni märkustes viidatud tulumaksuseaduse § 50 lõigete 6 ja 8 alusel kehtestatud rahandusministri määrusele. Rahandusministri 10. novembri 2006. a määruses nr 53 kirjeldatakse seotud isikute vaheliste tehingutena üksikasjalikumalt tehinguid materiaalse varaga, mittemateriaalse varaga ja teenuseid.
 2. Tehingu sooritamise aja määramisel tuleb eelkõige määratleda tehingu eesmärk, st mida tehingu alusel soovitakse saavutada ja millised sooritused on vajalikud tehingu eesmärgi saavutamiseks.
 Laenulepingu puhul on tehingu eesmärk ühele poolele (laenusaajale) laenu saamine ja teisele poolele (laenuandjale) laenu andmisest teenimine. Tehingu esmase eesmärgi täitmisel tekib laenusaajal majanduslik muudatus – võimalus kasutada lisaraha ja kohustus see kokkulepitud aja möödudes koos lisaraha kasutamise eest lisanduva tasuga laenuandjale tagastada. Leping loetakse täidetuks tehingu eesmärgi täitmiseks vajalike soorituste tegemisega.
 Laenu võtmise ja selle tagasimaksmise korral tuleb lähtuda põhimõttest, et pooled on üldjuhul sõlminud lepingu, mille sisuks on korduvad sooritused (igakuised või kvartaalsed tagasimaksed ja intressimaksed), st tegemist on kestvuslepinguga. Kestvuslepingute puhul saab tehingu tegemise ajaks lugeda aega alates tehingu esmase eesmärgi saavutamisest kuni hetkeni, kui tehingupoolte võetud õigused ja kohustused saavad täidetud.
 Seotud isikute vahelise tehingu saab lugeda lõppenuks pärast viimast tehingu eesmärgi täitmiseks vajalikku sooritust, st laenulepingu puhul viimane laenuintressimakse laenuandjale. Tehing loetakse lõppenuks, kui poolte võetud õigused ja kohustused saavad täidetud.
 3. Üürilepingu puhul tuleb määratleda, kas pooled on soovinud sõlmida ühekordsele sooritusele suunatud lepingu või on pooled pidanud silmas pikaajalist lepingulist suhet, mille sisuks on korduvad sooritused. Üürilepingu puhul, mis on suunatud korduvate soorituste tegemisele, on tegemist kestvuslepinguga. Lähtudes üldpõhimõttest, saab tehingu soorituse ajaks lugeda aega, mille jooksul tehingu eesmärk saavutatakse.
 Tehingu esmase eesmärgi täitmisel läheb üüritav objekt üürniku käsutusse – üürnikule tekib majanduslik muudatus, õigus üüritavat objekti kokkulepitud tasu eest kasutada. Nagu mainitud, saab kestvuslepingute puhul tehingu sooritamise ajaks lugeda aega alates tehingu esmase eesmärgi saavutamisest kuni hetkeni, kui tehingupoolte võetud õigused ja kohustused saavad täidetud.
 Ainuüksi üürilepingu sõlmimist ei saa pidada tehingu sooritamiseks, sest tehingu eesmärk ja põhikohustused (üüri tasumine) ei ole täidetud. Nt juhul, kui pooled sõlmivad üürilepingu, kuid üüritava objekti üürniku käsutusse minek ja üüri tasumine toimub kokkulepitud aja pärast, ei saa tehingut lugeda lõppenuks. Samuti ei saa üürileandjale reeglina tekkida kohustust tasuda makse, kui üürileping on sõlmitud, kuid üürnikupoolne kohustus üüri tasuda on täitmata, st üürileandjal ei ole tekkinud majanduslikku kasu.
 Samas, kui seotud isikute vahelise lepingu alusel ei olegi üürnikul kohustust üüri tasuda või on kokkulepitud üüritasu alla turuväärtuse, tekib üürileandjal maksukohustus TuMS § 50 lõigete 4 ja 5 alusel tuluosalt, mida ta oleks võinud teenida, kui tehing oleks sõlmitud turuväärtuse tingimustes.
 4. Kui tegemist on kestvuslepinguga (igakuised intressi-, üüri- või laenu tagasimaksed), tuleb vormi TSD küsimustik täita ka enne 1. jaanuari 2007 sõlmitud lepingute täitmise kohta ja isikute seotuse tuvastamisel tuleb aluseks võtta lepingu igakordne täitmise aeg.
 5. Tulumaksuseaduse § 50 käsitleb dividendidelt ja muudelt (ka varjatud) kasumieraldistelt tekkivat tulumaksukohustust. Viidatud paragrahvi lõiked 4–8 käsitavad seotud isikute vaheliste tehingute turuhinnast erinevate tehinguteväärtuste kaudu varjatud kasumieraldiste tuvastamist ning võimaliku maksukohustuse tekkimist. Rahandusministri määruses nr 53 täpsustatakse seotud isikute vaheliste tehingute väärtuse turuväärtusele vastamise tingimusi ja sellega kehtestatakse nimetatud tehingute asjaolude täiendavad dokumenteerimise reeglid.
 Tehingud, millega seoses tekib maksumaksjal TuMS §-le 50 eelnevate sätete alusel maksukohustus (nt turuhinnast kõrgem intressimäär või erisoodustus), siirdehinna regulatsiooni alusel täiendavat maksukohustust ei teki. Kuna nimetatud tehingute puhul on tehinguosaline maksukohustuse täitnud, siis TuMS § 50 lõigete 6 ja 8 alusel kehtestatud määruse kohaselt need tehingud deklaratsioonivormil täiendavalt äramärkimist ei vaja.
 Maksukorralduse seaduse § 56 alusel on maksukohustuslane kohustatud maksuhaldurile teatama kõik talle teadaolevad asjaolud, mis omavad või võivad omada maksustamise seisukohast tähendust. Samuti on maksukohustuslane kohustatud pidama arvestust maksustamise seisukohast tähendust omavate asjaolude kohta, andma seletusi, esitama deklaratsioone ja muid tõendeid ning säilitama neid seadusega ettenähtud tähtaja jooksul.
 Seotud isikute vaheliste tehingute väärtuste turuväärtusele vastamise nõue ei ole uus, vaid on kehtivas tulumaksuseaduses olnud alates selle loomisest – 2000. aastast. Rahandusministri määruse nr 53 „Seotud isikute vahel tehtud tehingute väärtuse määramise meetodid“ väljatöötamise käigus tegi Rahandusministeeriumi maksupoliitika osakond koostööd nii maksuhalduri kui ka maksumaksjate esindajatega.
 Et määruse kohaldamine maksumaksjatele võimalikult lihtsaks teha, on Maksu- ja Tolliamet oma Interneti koduleheküljel avaldanud mitmeid abistavaid materjale. Muuhulgas on jaanuarist 2007 maksuhalduri kodulehekülje kaudu kättesaadav eestikeelne tõlge Majandusliku Koostöö ja Arengu Organisatsiooni poolt koostatud siirdehindade määramise juhendist.
 Maksuhalduri koduleheküljel on kättesaadav ka selgitus „Vormi TSD muudatus alates 2007. aastast“, kust deklaratsiooni põhivormile lisandunud küsimustele vastamisega hätta jäädes abi saab. Väljatöötamisel on täiendav juhend, mis käsitleb rahandusministri määruse rakendamist siirdehindade määramisel ning selle koostamise aluseks võetakse maksumaksjate enamtõstatatud küsimused.
 [1] EML pressiteade. Arusaamatu „maksuviktoriin“ maksumaksjatele. – MaksuMaksja, 2007, nr 2, lk 15.
 MTA vastus EML küsimusele
 MTA selgitab Rahandusministeeriumi vastust
 Vastuseks teie järelepärimisele ja lähtudes siin toodud Rahandusministeeriumi vastusest, teatab Maksu- ja Tolliamet oma nõusolekust ministeeriumi vastuses kirjapanduga, kuid soovib lisada täiendava selgituse.
 Alates 1. jaanuarist 2007 on maksudeklaratsiooni TSD põhivormil küsimustik kolme küsimusega, mille põhiliseks eesmärgiks loeme maksumaksjate tähelepanu juhtimist siirdehinna turuväärtusega seotud maksukohustuste tekkimise võimalusele.
 TSD põhivormile märgitud küsimustik on oluline siirdehinna turuväärtuse määramise protsessis. Seotud isikute vahelise tehingu väärtuse määramine peaks ideaalis toimuma samaaegselt tehingu toimumisega. Kui siirdehind ei ole turuhinnas, kasutatakse maksustamisel tehingute väärtusi, mida rakendavad sarnastes tingimustes mitteseotud iseseisvad isikud. Tulumaksuseaduse § 50 lg 5 kohaselt maksustatav summa deklareeritakse vormi TSD lisa 6 real 10.
 TSD küsimustik on oluline, et juhtida maksumaksja tähelepanu võimalikule vajadusele hinnata seotud isikutega toimuvate tehingute väärtusi ja võrrelda neid turuväärtusega.
 Esimesele küsimusele „Kas maksustamisperioodil on sooritatud tehinguid seotud isikutega?“ vastatakse jaatavalt igal maksustamisperioodil, mil on toimunud tehing seotud isikuga, olenemata asjaolust, kas seotud isikutega tehtud tehing on turuhinnas või mitte, ning olenemata maksukohustuse tekkimisest vormi TSD lisa 6 real 10.
 Maksustamisperioodil on sooritatud tehing seotud isikuga, kui seotud isikute vaheline kokkulepe tehingu toimumiseks on sõlmitud ja kehtiv. Kui kirjalikku lepingudokumenti ei allkirjastata, loetakse lepingu sõlmimiseks tagasivõtmatu tahteavalduse väljendamist.
 Seega ootame laenulepingu korral jaatavat vastust esimesele küsimusele kõikidel kuudel, mil leping kehtib – alates laenulepingu sõlmimisest selle eesmärgi täitmiseni ehk kuni intressidega laenusumma täieliku tagasimaksmiseni. Jaatavalt vastatakse ka kuudel, mil mingeid rahalisi ülekandeid ei toimu.
 Üürilepingu puhul vastatakse TSD esimesele küsimusele jaatavalt igal maksustamisperioodil, mil leping kehtib – alates perioodist, mil poolte vahel leping sõlmiti kuni lepingu kohustuste viimase täitmiseni.
 Ka juhul, kui laenu- või üürileping on sõlmitud enne 1. jaanuari 2007, vastatakse esimesele küsimusele jaatavalt igal maksustamisperioodil, kuni leping kehtib.
 Samane põhimõte toimib ka teenuse osutamise lepingu korral. Loeme, et seotud isikuga on sooritatud tehing igal maksustamisperioodil, mil leping kehtib – alates lepingu sõlmimisest kuni teenuse osutamise lõppemiseni.
 Isikute seotuse tuvastamiseks võetakse aluseks igakordne lepingu täitmise aeg. TSD põhivormile märgitud küsimustikule vastavad jaatavalt kõik tehingu seotud osapooled.
 IRENA LIPATOVA
 MTA maksude osakonna peaspetsialist juhataja asetäitja ülesannetes


type: wikipedia

text:
Mostová je obec na Slovensku v okrese Galanta.
 Dejiny
 Židovská menšina
 V obci kedysi žila početná židovská komunita, o čom svedčí aj židovský cintorín na konci dediny pri Čiernom Brode. V roku 1896 v obci z 1752 obyvateľov, z ktorých 128 malo židovské vierovyznanie. V druhej polovici 19. storočia postavili svoju modlitebňu. Synagóga stála vedľa dnešnej ZŠ slovenskej. Synagóga bola zbúraná v 50 rokoch 20. storočia.
 Kultúra a zaujímavosti
 Pamiatky
 Rímskokatolícky Kostol povýšenia sv. Kríža, jednoloďová baroková stavba so segmentovým ukončením presbytéria a vežou tvoriacou súčasť jej hmoty, z rokov 1758-1759. Donátorom kostola bol Karol Esterházi, jeho staviteľom Jakub Fellner. Stojí na mieste staršej, asi stredovekej stavby zbúranej v polovici 18. storočia. Interiér je zaklenutý pruskými klenbami. Nachádza sa tu hlavný oltár z konca 19. storočia s obrazom Povýšenia sv. Kríža a bočnými sochami sv. Štefana kráľa a sv. Alžbety. Bočný oltár Panny Márie je neskorobarokový z roku 1781. Kazateľnica je klasicistická z prvej polovice 19. storočia s reliéfom Rozsievača na parapete. Na konvexno-konkávne prehnutej empore je klasicistický organ z polovice 19. storočia. Nástenné maľby v kostole sú dielom maliara E. Massányiho z roku 1959. Fasády kostola sú členené lizénami a polkruhovo ukončenými oknami so šambránami a klenákmi. Priečelie je členené pilastrami a lemované párom ník, ukončené je štítom s volútami. Veža je členená kordónovou rímsou a lizénami, ukončená je korunnou rímsou s terčíkom s hodinami a barokovou helmicou.
 Súsošie kalvárie, barokovo-klasicistická socha z roku 1760. Súsošie stojí pred kostolom. Autorom súsošia je Georgius Alt a postavil ho na pamiatku tunajšej morovej epidémie. Uprostred je kamenný kríž lemovaný sochami sv. Jána evanjelistu a Panny Márie.
 Prícestný kamenný kríž s kamenným korpusom z roku 1766. Socha stojí pred reštauráciou Zlatý bažant. Kamenný kríž dal postaviť Mátyás Firsutih. Okolo sochy je malý park s oplotením.
 Socha sv. Jána Nepomuckého, polychrómovaná kamenná socha z roku 1800. Stojí pred rímskokatolíckou farou. Ako uvádza podstavec, farárom obce bol András Németh, starostom György Bózsing a sudcom György Huszár. Na súčasné miesto bola prenesená v roku 1989.
 Socha sv. Floriána, kamenná socha zo začiatku 19 storočia.
 Trojičný stĺp, klasicistické súsošie z roku 1817. Stojí pri križovatke smerom na Čiernu Vodu. Stĺp bol postavený Lajosom Hodúrom a manželkou Joli Mészáros.
 Parný mlyn, technická pamiatka z roku 1905. Veľký hospodársky rozmach obce nastal založením Spoločnosti Mostovský parný mlyn roku 1895. Vyrábali tu veľmi kvalitnú múku rôznych druhov. V 50. rokoch 20. storočia boli z mlyna odstránené stroje.
 Pamätník k obetiam I. svetovej vojny z roku 1927. Nachádza sa v lodi rímskokatolíckeho kostola. Je to dielo bratislavského sochára Alojza Riegeleho. Pamätník sa skladá z dvoch častí. Na stene sa nachádza mramorová tabuľa s orámovaním, na ktorej je vyrytých 52 mien obetí. Pod ňou na podstavci je osadené súsošie Piety. Pamätník dala vyrobiť vdova Istvána Benkőa.
 Pomníky
 Reliéf Nechajte maličkých prísť ku mne. Je osadený v stene kostola, pôvodne bol osadený v stene obecnej školy. Po zbúraní školy bol reliéf roku 1988 osadený do vonkajšej steny rímskokatolíckeho kostola. Na reliéfe je znázornený Kristus privolávajúci deti so slovami „Engedjétek hozzám a kisdedeket“.
 Hrobka maďarských vojakov padlých počas II. svetovej vojny. Nachádza sa na cintoríne.
 Ústredný kríž cintorína, kríž je na vysokom stĺpe s kamenným korpusom, pravdepodobne z 19. storočia. Na podstavci sa nachádza reliéf Sedembolestnej Panny Márie.
 Pomník obetiam II. svetovej vojny, pomník sa nachádza na cintoríne. Je to sústava troch mramorových tabuliek postavený a navrhnutý Tiborom Cservenkou roku 1995.
 Osárium (kostnica) zrušeného starého cintorína okolo kostola. Osárium je vymurovaná jama postavená roku 1995.
 Pamätná tabuľa k 25. výročiu oslobodenia obce sovietskou armádou 31. marca 1945. Tabuľa sa nachádza budove ONIX-u, bývalý MNV.
 Plastika mladíka sadiaceho kvety, socha je v parku ZŠ s VJM zo 70. rokov 20. storočia.
 Pamätná tabuľa Štefana Sečéniho, nachádza sa na stene strediska praktického vyučovania pri SSOU. Pamätník bol postavený Jánosom Cservenkom a Széchenyiho spoločnosťou roku 1997. Reliéf je darom Sedmohradskej spoločnosti.
 Plastika Anonymus, dielo rodáka z Mostovej, akademického maliara Alexandra Kissa z roku 2004. Je to najnovšia socha v obci. Celé dielo sa skladá z dvoch betónových pekne urobených držiacich stĺpov a z ústrednej časti. Ústrednú časť tvorí dvojkreslo z medi. Predná časť znázorňuje minulosť, s vyrytým textom „Halotti beszéd“ (Úmrtný príhovor) a z druhej strany budúcnosť s vyrytým technickým pokrokom.
 Občianska vybavenosť
 Okrem rímskokatolíckeho kostola sa v obci nachádza evanjelická modlitebňa, dom č. 17, bývalá krčma a mäsiarstvo rodiny Hegedűsovcov, ktorý v 50. rokoch 20. storočia kúpili tunajší repatrianti z Maďarska a upravili pre potreby evanjelického cirkevného zboru. V súčasnosti je budova zrenovovaná a týždenne raz sa konajú v ňom evanjelické služby Božie.
 Rímskokatolícka fara, stojí pri kostole, pôvodnú faru postavili v rokoch 1774-1775. Predná časť starej budovy však bola zbúraná v roku 1977. Zostala len bočná časť starej budovy a vo dvore postavili roku 1975 novú faru.
 Referencie
 Externé odkazy
 Oficiálna stránka obce
 Obce okresu Galanta


text:
(Mean) Time Between Overhaul (MTBO bzw. TBO) sind synonyme englische Bezeichnungen für die durchschnittliche Dauer bis zur Überholung von Geräten, Maschinen oder Motoren. MTBO dient als Maß für die Langlebigkeit von Geräten oder Anlagen.
 Je höher der MTBO-Wert, desto langlebiger sollte das Gerät sein. Ein Gerät mit einer MTBO von 100 Stunden wird also wahrscheinlich eher zur Überholung anstehen, als ein ansonsten vergleichbares Gerät mit einer MTBO von 1000 Stunden.
 Beispiel
 Die TBO gibt bei einem Flugmotor die Zeit an, bis der Motor grundüberholt werden muss. Bei Hubkolbenmotoren beträgt die TBO zwischen 1000 und 2500 Stunden. Innerhalb dieser Zeit müssen diverse andere Checks durchgeführt werden wie z. B. die 100-Stunden-Kontrolle oder eine 500-Stunden-Kontrolle, die nur von einem geprüften Luftfahrzeugmechaniker ausgeführt werden dürfen.
 Ist die TBO-Dauer abgelaufen, muss das Triebwerk zum Hersteller oder zu einer dafür zugelassenen Fachwerkstatt, um grundüberholt zu werden.
 Generell gibt es jedoch bei nicht-kommerziell betriebenen Luftfahrzeugen keine Verpflichtung, ein Triebwerk nach Verstreichen der TBO überholen zu lassen. Vermindert sich die Kompression in einem oder mehreren Zylindern unter einen von Motor zu Motor unterschiedlichen Grenzwert oder wird beim Ölwechsel ein hoher Anteil von Metallspänen im Öl gefunden, soll das Triebwerk überholt werden. Je nach Umgang mit dem Triebwerk kann so die tatsächliche Lebensdauer um mehrere 100 Stunden von der angegebenen TBO abweichen.
 Bei Luftfahrzeugen in kommerziellem Betrieb ist die TBO jedoch bindend und kennzeichnet den maximalen Wert an Betriebsstunden bis zur Überholung.
 Siehe auch
 Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
 Mean Time To Recover (MTTR)
 Instandhaltung


text:
VSM Sklep II Kp 21203/2016
 ECLI:SI:VSMB:2018:II.KP.21203.2016
 VSM00007296
 zahteva za preiskavo za več kaznivih dejanj - opis očitanih ravnanj - opis kaznivega dejanja
 Pritožbeno sodišče se namreč strinja z razlogi v napadenem sklepu, da niti pri prvem niti pri drugem kaznivem dejanju, ki se v zahtevi za preiskavo očitata osumljenemu L.P., niso opisana konkretna ravnanja, ki naj bi jih osumljeni P. storil. Iz opisa kaznivih dejanj je razvidno, da naj bi L.P. naklepoma napeljal A.M. k storitvi dveh kaznivih dejanj (pod točko I in II zahteve za preiskavo), s tem da naj bi mu kot dejanski direktor družbe F. d.o.o. dajal predhodna navodila. Kot pravilno ugotavlja zunajobravnavni senat, iz takšnega opisa ne izhaja kakšna navodila naj bi mu dajal in v kakšnih okoliščinah, niti ali je osumljeni s takšnimi navodili izzval odločitev A.M., da naklepoma stori očitani kaznivi dejanji.
 Opis kaznivega dejanja je namreč najpomembnejša sestavina zahteve za preiskavo, saj se z njo določa okvir, v katerem bo potekala preiskava, prav tako pa osumljencem omogoča učinkovito pravico do obrambe, ki je v nasprotnem primeru kršena.
 I. Pritožba Specializiranega državnega tožilstva se zavrne kot neutemeljena.
 II. Stroški pritožbenega postopka bremenijo proračun.
 1. Zunajobravnavni senat Okrožnega sodišča v Mariboru je s sklepom I Ks 21203/2016 z dne 30.8.2017, ko je odločal o nestrinjanju preiskovalne sodnice z zahtevo za preiskavo Specializiranega državnega tožilstva RS, opr. št. SDT-KT/2955/2013 z dne 19.5.2016, zahtevo za preiskavo zoper osumljenega L.P., zaradi suma storitve dveh kaznivih dejanj napeljevanja h kaznivemu dejanju zlorabe položaja ali zaupanja pri gospodarski dejavnosti po prvem in drugem odstavku 240. člena Kazenskega zakonika (nadalje KZ-1) v zvezi s 37. členom KZ-1, na podlagi sedmega odstavka 169. člena Zakona o kazenskem postopku (v nadaljevanju ZKP) v zvezi s 4. točko prvega odstavka 181. člena ZKP, zavrnil. Po drugem odstavku 96. člena ZKP je odločil, da bremenijo stroški kazenskega postopka iz 1. do 5. točke prvega odstavka 92. člena ZKP in potrebni izdatki osumljenega L.P. ter potrebni izdatki zagovornikov iz Odvetniške pisarne G.&S. o. p., d. o. o. iz M., proračun.
 2. Zoper tak sklep se je pritožilo Specializirano državno tožilstvo (SDT), kot navajajo iz razlogov po 2. in 3. točki 370. člena ZKP v zvezi s 372. členom in 373. členom ZKP. Pritožbenemu sodišču smiselno predlagajo, da napadeni sklep spremeni in se opravi preiskava tudi zoper osumljenega L.P., ker bo šele preiskava pokazala, na kakšen način je osumljeni dajal navodila A.M. in ali je bil A.M. storilec, posredni storilec ali celo pomagač.
 3. Pritožbi ni utemeljena.
 4. Pritožba uveljavlja pritožbeni razlog kršitve kazenskega zakona iz 372. člena ZKP, ki ga ne obrazloži. Ne navaja namreč, s čim naj bi sodišče prve stopnje kršilo kazenski zakon in za katero konkretno kršitev iz 372. člena ZKP bi naj šlo. Neobrazložene pritožbe pa ni mogoče preizkusiti. Zato pritožba z uveljavljanjem navedenega pritožbenega razloga ne more biti uspešna.
 5. Pritožbi ni mogoče pritrditi niti, ko navaja, da je opis napeljevanja v izreku zahteve za preiskavo zoper osumljenega L.P. dovolj konkretiziran ter da je utemeljenost suma izkazana, podrobneje pa se bodo dejstva lahko ugotovila šele tekom preiskave ter da je sodišče prve stopnje zahtevo za preiskavo zoper osumljenega L.P. preuranjeno zavrnilo.
 6. Pritožbeno sodišče se namreč strinja z razlogi v napadenem sklepu, da niti pri prvem niti pri drugem kaznivem dejanju, ki se v zahtevi za preiskavo očitata osumljenemu L.P., niso opisana konkretna ravnanja, ki naj bi jih osumljeni P. storil. Iz opisa kaznivih dejanj je razvidno, da naj bi L.P. naklepoma napeljal A.M. k storitvi dveh kaznivih dejanj (pod točko I in II zahteve za preiskavo), s tem da naj bi mu kot dejanski direktor družbe F. d. o. o. dajal predhodna navodila. Kot pravilno ugotavlja zunajobravnavni senat, iz takšnega opisa ne izhaja kakšna navodila naj bi mu dajal in v kakšnih okoliščinah, niti ali je osumljeni s takšnimi navodili izzval odločitev A.M., da naklepoma stori očitani kaznivi dejanji. Na pomanjkljivost opisa ravnanj, ki se očitajo L.P., je zunajobravnavni senat pritožnike opozoril že v sklepu I Ks 21203/2013 z dne 20.6.2016, ko je odločal o pritožbi zagovornika osumljenega L.P. zoper sklep o preiskavi in pritožbi ugodil ter sklep o preiskavi zoper tega osumljenca razveljavil. Toda pritožniki v tej smeri zahteve za preiskavo niso dopolnili. Tudi v pritožbi v tej smeri ne navajajo ničesar, ampak vztrajajo, da je opis dejanja dovolj konkretiziran, čeprav sami ugotavljajo, ?da v tem trenutku na podlagi zbranih dokazov v predkazenskem postopku ni mogoče na ravni gotovosti zatrjevati, s čim je pravzaprav osumljeni L.P. napeljal A.M. k izvršitvi očitanih mu kaznivih dejanj, ampak le, da je M. vnaprej pripravljene dokumente podpisoval v pisarni tajnice L.P., B.Ž..? Obrazložitev zahteve za preiskavo in dokazno gradivo pa ne moreta nadomestiti konkretnega opisa dejanja v tenorju zahteve za preiskavo, iz katerega morajo konkretizirano izhajati vsi zakonski znaki očitanega kaznivega dejanja. Opis kaznivega dejanja je namreč najpomembnejša sestavina zahteve za preiskavo, saj se z njo določa okvir, v katerem bo potekala preiskava, prav tako pa osumljencem omogoča učinkovito pravico do obrambe, ki je v nasprotnem primeru kršena (tretji odstavek 168. člena ZKP).
 7. Po obrazloženem je sodišče prve stopnje utemeljeno zavrnilo zahtevo za preiskavo zoper osumljenega L.P., pri tem pa se dodatno spustilo še v presojo utemeljenega suma, ki tudi po oceni pritožbenega sodišča ni podan. Pritrditi je sodišču prve stopnje in preiskovalni sodnici, ki je podala nesoglasje z zahtevo za preiskavo tudi v tej smeri, ker niti A.M., niti kateri izmed osumljenih, ki je bil v tej zadevi zaslišan pri preiskovalni sodnici (S.Z., M.V.S.) oziroma katerakoli druga oseba, ki je podala izjavo policiji v predkazenskem postopku, osumljenega P. v smeri očitanih kaznivih dejanj, ni obremenila. Pritožba zato ne more biti uspešna niti z izvajanji, s katerimi poskuša prikazati, da je podan utemeljen sum, da je osumljeni ravnal na očitana načina.
 8. Glede na navedeno, in ker pritožba niti v preostalem ne navaja nič takšnega, kar bi lahko omajalo pravilnost in zakonitost napadenega sklepa, je pritožbeno sodišče pritožbo SDT zavrnilo kot neutemeljeno (tretji odstavek 402. člena ZKP).
 9. Odločitev o stroških postopka temelji na določilu prvega odstavka 98. člena ZKP in določbi prvega odstavka 96. člena ZKP.
 Kazenski zakonik (uradno prečiščeno besedilo) (2012) - KZ-1-UPB2 - člen 37, 240, 240/1, 240/2
 VSM sklep IV Kp 24396/2014
 P2RvYy0yMDE1MDgxMTExNDE0OTg1


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 14.1.2015
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 L 8/18
 DÉCISION (UE) 2015/44 DU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN ET DU CONSEIL
 du 17 décembre 2014
 relative à la mobilisation du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation, conformément au point 13 de l'accord interinstitutionnel du 2 décembre 2013 entre le Parlement européen, le Conseil et la Commission sur la discipline budgétaire, la coopération en matière budgétaire et la bonne gestion financière
 (demande EGF/2013/014 FR/Air France, présentée par la France)
 LE PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN ET LE CONSEIL DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE,
 vu le traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne,
 vu le règlement (CE) no 1927/2006 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 décembre 2006 portant création du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (1), et notamment son article 12, paragraphe 3,
 vu le règlement (UE) no 1309/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 17 décembre 2013 relatif au Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation pour la période 2014-2020 et abrogeant le règlement (CE) no 1927/2006 (2),
 vu le règlement (UE, Euratom) no 1311/2013 du Conseil du 2 décembre 2013 fixant le cadre financier pluriannuel pour la période 2014-2020 (3), et notamment son article 12,
 vu l'accord interinstitutionnel du 2 décembre 2013 entre le Parlement européen, le Conseil et la Commission sur la discipline budgétaire, la coopération en matière budgétaire et la bonne gestion financière (4), et notamment son point 13,
 vu la proposition de la Commission européenne,
 considérant ce qui suit:
 (1)
 Le Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation (ci-après dénommé «Fonds») a été créé pour apporter un soutien complémentaire aux travailleurs licenciés à la suite de modifications majeures dans la structure du commerce international résultant de la mondialisation, en vue de les aider à se réinsérer dans le marché du travail.
 (2)
 La dotation annuelle du Fonds n'excède pas 150 millions d'EUR (aux prix de 2011), comme le prévoit l'article 12 du règlement (UE, Euratom) no 1311/2013.
 (3)
 Le 20 décembre 2013, la France a introduit une demande de mobilisation du Fonds pour des licenciements survenus dans l'entreprise Air France, demande qu'elle a complétée par des informations complémentaires dont les dernières ont été fournies le 24 juillet 2014. Cette demande remplit les conditions relatives à la fixation du montant des contributions financières énoncées à l'article 10 du règlement (CE) no 1927/2006. La Commission propose dès lors de mobiliser un montant de 25 937 813 EUR.
 (4)
 Il convient par conséquent de mobiliser le Fonds en vue d'octroyer une contribution financière en réponse à la demande présentée par la France,
 ONT ADOPTÉ LA PRÉSENTE DÉCISION:
 Article premier
 Dans le cadre du budget général de l'Union européenne établi pour l'exercice 2014, une somme de 25 937 813 EUR en crédits d'engagement et de paiement est mobilisée au titre du Fonds européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation.
 Article 2
 La présente décision est publiée au Journal officiel de l'Union européenne.
 Fait à Strasbourg, le 17 décembre 2014.
 Par le Parlement européen
 Le président
 M. SCHULZ
 Par le Conseil
 Le président
 B. DELLA VEDOVA
 (1) JO L 406 du 30.12.2006, p. 1.
 (2) JO L 347 du 20.12.2013, p. 855.
 (3) JO L 347 du 20.12.2013, p. 884.
 (4) JO C 373 du 20.12.2013, p. 1.


text:
Američka deklaracija o neovisnosti (engl. The Declaration of Independence) je deklaracija koju je u Philadelphiji potpisalo 13 dotadašnjih britanskih kolonija u Novom svijetu, čime su proglasile svoju nezavisnost i objasnile svoje razloge za to. U Deklaraciji je istaknuto pravo na revoluciju, tj. načelo da je pravo i dužnost svakog naroda da izmijeni ili zbaci tiransku vlast koja ga tlači. Potvrđena je od Kongresa 4. srpnja 1776. godine te je Deklaracija postala konstitutivni akt SAD-a, tj. njihov prvi ustavni akt. Taj dan se u SAD-u slavi kao Dan nezavisnosti. Velika Britanija je priznala nezavisnost svojih bivših kolonija 3. rujna 1783. Četvrtog srpnja u SAD-u slavi se Dan nezavisnosti, jer je toga dana 1776. godine izglasana slavna Deklaracija nezavisnosti, kojom su se američke države odcijepile od Velike Britanije.U vrijeme potpisivanja Deklaracije, Sjedinjene Države sastojale su se od 13 kolonija, pod vladavinom engleskog kralja Georgea III. Kako je nezadovoljstvo u kolonijama, zbog plaćanja poreza Engleskoj, bilo sve veće i glasnije, engleski je kralj, u pokušaju da pobunu uguši, u njih uputio dodatnu vojsku. Godine 1774., trinaest je kolonija poslalo svoje delegate u Philadelphiju, sa zadaćom da osnuju Prvi kontinentalni kongres. Delegati Engleskom nisu bili zadovoljni, ali još joj nisu bili spremni objaviti rat.
 -“The British are coming, the British are coming”, bile su riječi kojima je Paul Revere, jašući ulicama Concordea, u Massachusettsu, u noći 18. travnja 1775. godine, upozorio o napredovanju britanske vojske ka tom gradu. Pucnji koji su odjeknuli u Concordeu najavili su početak rata za nezavisnost (1775. – 1783.).
 U svibnju iduće, 1776. godine, kolonije su ponovno poslale svoje delegate u Philadelphiju, na Drugi kontinentalni kongres. Kongres je tijekom cijele prethodne godine pokušavao riješiti razlike s Engleskom. U lipnju 1776. postalo je jasno da su njihovi napori beznadni i imenovan je odbor za sastavljanje Deklaracije o neovisnosti. U njega su ušli John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Livingston, Roger Sherman i Thomas Jefferson. Mladom, ali elokventnom Jeffersonu bila je povjerena uloga sastavljanja Deklaracije, zbog njegove “izuzetne lakoće izraza”.Potkraj lipnja, prvi je nacrt Deklaracije bio podnesen, sljedećih su dana unesene neke promjene i kasno poslijepodne 2. srpnja, održano je glasovanje. Od 13 kolonija, dvanaest je glasovalo “za”, uključujući Pennsylvaniju, South Carolinu i Delaware, koje su nešto ranije, iz različitih razloga, glasovale “protiv”, jedino New York nije imao dopuštenje da glasuje “za” pa se njegova delegacija uzdržala (dopuštenje od Pokrajinskog kongresa New Yorka dobit će tek tjedan dana kasnije). Četvrtog srpnja 1776., više od godinu dana nakon početka rata za nezavisnost, Deklaracija je bila usvojena. John Hancock, predsjednik Kontinentalnog kongresa, dao je službeni potpis na rukom pisani tekst, velikim, lijepo ispisanim slovima, kako bi ih, rekao je Hancock, “kralj George mogao čitati i bez naočala!” Dva dana kasnije, 6. srpnja, Philadelphia Evening Post prvi je objavio tekst Deklaracije. Još dva dana kasnije, 8. srpnja, ona je, uz oduševljene poklike i zvonjavu zvona, dva puta bila javno pročitana na filadelfijskom trgu koji otada i nosi ime “Independence Square ”. Iako puno potpisivanje Deklaracije nije bilo dovršeno sve do kolovoza, četvrti je srpanj određen kao službeni datum njena potpisivanja i već iduće, 1777. godine, Amerika je slavila svoj prvi rođendan upravo tog dana srpnja.
 Dodatno
 Jeffersonovo nasljeđe, epitaf nastranu, i jest trostruko. Prvo, artikulirao je mit agrarnog raja Novog svijeta koji maštu nacije hrani i inspirira još od tih davnih dana. Na gradove i industriju Jefferson je gledao jednako podozrivo kao i na autokraciju! Njegov drugi najveći doprinos bila su - prava država. Koncept nije bio njegov, ali on mu je dao pečat svog, velikog autoriteta. Treći Jeffersonov dar Americi, onaj koji je i sam priznavao, bio je dokument kojim su definirana vodeća načela zemlje. Kao glavni autor tog dokumenta, Jefferson, kako je sam rekao, nije težio za originalnošću, već za “zdravim razumom”. Ta, naizgled skromna, procjena njegove zadaće odražavala je vjeru prosvjetiteljstva u ljudski razum.Veći dio Deklaracije o neovisnosti sastoji se od niza pritužbi i prigovora britanskoj kruni. Dva najšira poteza kistom povučena su jedan na kraju, gdje kolonije hrabro objavljuju svoju neovisnost, i jedan na početku, gdje Jefferson definira narodnu vladu. Započinje slavnim “KAD, tijekom čovječanskih zbivanja postane nužno za koji narod raskinuti političke sveze što su ga vezivale uz drugi....”, kojima, u biti, kaže: Spremni smo “petama dati vjetra”, a sad ćemo vam reći i zašto, a za njom slijedi ona, jedna od najpoznatijih rečenica u engleskom jeziku, s najsnažnijim i najvažnijim riječima u američkoj povijesti, i onaj, s punim pravom, najčešće citirani dio Deklaracije – Jeffersonova prekrasno sročena, razborita obrana “samorazumljivih istina”: “MI držimo ove Istine samorazumljivim: svi su ljudi stvoreni jednakima i obdareni od svojeg Tvorca određenim neotuđivim pravima, među kojima su život, sloboda i potraga za srećom. Radi očuvanja tih prava vlast se uspostavlja među ljudima, što izvodi svoje pravedne ovlasti iz suglasnosti onih kojima vlada, a kad god bilo koji oblik vlasti postane razoran za te ciljeve, tada je pravo građana izmijeniti je ili napustiti i uspostaviti novu vlast, što će se temeljiti na tim načelima i ustrojiti svoje ovlasti u takvom obliku kakav im izgleda najprikladnijim za ozbiljenje njihove sigurnosti i sreće.” Ukratko, ono što je Jefferson htio reći - ako vlada ne odgovara i ne služi vašim potrebama, možete je se riješiti i postaviti drugu! To je shvaćanje možda bilo “samorazumljivo” Thomasu Jeffersonu, ali ne i njegovim suvremenicima. I doista, povijesni značaj američkog rata za neovisnost i jest u tome što je te radikalne ideje iskušavao u žestini bitke. Istina je i to da je potreban bio još jedan rat – građanski, kako bi i crnci dospjeli u rubriku “svi ljudi”. I još 50 godina da se slome muške predrasude, da među “sve ljude” budu uključene i žene. Ali određivanje modela, zasluga je Thomasa Jeffersona! Uzvišenim, nezaboravnim riječima i frazama Jefferson je izrazio uvjerenja u umovima i srcima američkog naroda. Političku filozofiju deklaracije iznijeli su, još prije Jeffersona, engleski filozof i empirist John Locke i neki drugi europski filozofi. Ono što je Jefferson učinio – sažeo je tu filozofiju u “Samorazumljive Istine” i razložio zamjerke i pritužbe kralju kako bi pred svijetom opravdao kidanje veza između matične zemlje i kolonija.
 Abraham Lincoln je, kasnije, Deklaraciju smatrao temeljem svoje političke filozofije i govorio da je ona izjava načela putem kojih treba interpretirati Ustav Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Američka Deklaracija o neovisnosti nadahnula je borbu za prava marginaliziranih naroda diljem svijeta.
 Deklaracija je gotovo doslovno preuzimala formulacije velikog filozofa Johna Lockea, a sama je nadahnula Deklaraciju o ljudskim pravima iz Francuske revolucije.
 Zemlje potpisnice
 Ovo je popis tadašnjih kolonija koje su potpisale deklaraciju:
 New Hampshire
 Massachusetts
 Rhode Island
 Connecticut
 New York
 New Jersey
 Pennsylvania
 Delaware
 Maryland
 Virginia
 North Carolina
 South Carolina
 Georgia
 Tekst deklaracije
 ̋Deklaracija neovisnosti Kongres, 4. Srpnja 1776. godine
 Jednoglasna Deklaracija 13 ujedinjenih država Amerike
 Kada tijekom ljudske povijesti postane neophodno za jedan narod da raskine političke sprege koje su ga povezivale s drugim, i preuzme odvojeno i ravnopravno mjesto među moćima na zemlji, na koje mu zakoni prirode i Prirodnog Boga daju pravo, dužno poštovanje mišljenja čovječanstva od njega zahtijeva da objavi razloge koji ga nagone na odvajanje. Mi smatrano ove istine očiglednim: da su svi ljudi stvoreni jednaki, da su obdareni od strane njihovog Tvorca određenim neotuđivim pravima, među kojima su život, sloboda i težnja za srećom. – U cilju osiguravanja ovih prava, vlade ustanovljene među ljudima, izvode svoje zakonite moći iz suglasnosti onih nad kojima se vlada. – Ako ikada ijedan oblik vlade postane prepreka ostvarivanju ovih ciljeva, pravo je naroda da ga promjeni ili ukine, da ustanovi novu vladu, koja će ležati na temeljima takvih načela, i organizirati svoje moći tako da najbolje utiče na narodnu sigurnost i sreću. Razboritost će, zaista, zahtijevati da davno ustanovljene vlade ne bi trebalo mijenjati zbog nebitnih i prolaznih razloga; tako je i sve iskustvo pokazalo da su ljudi više raspoloženi da trpe kada su zla podnošljiva, nego da uklone nepravdu ukidanjem oblika (vlasti) na koje su navikli. Ali kada se dugi niz zloupotreba i uzurpacija, narušavajući stalno isti objekt, ispoljava kao namjera dovođenja ljudi pod apsolutni despotizam, pravo je ovih ljudi, njihova je dužnost, da zbace takvu vladu, i uspostave nove čuvare svoje buduće sigurnosti. – Takva je bila strpljiva patnja ovih kolonija, takva je sada potreba koja ih prisiljava da promjene svoj raniji oblik vlasti. Prošlost sadašnjeg kralja Velike Britanije povijest je neprekidnih povreda i uzurpacija koje za svoj direktni cilj imaju uspostavljanje apsolutne tiranije nad ovim državama. Da bismo to dokazali, treba izložiti iskrenome svijetu ove činjenice: Odbacio je njihovu suglasnost zakonima, najkorisniju i najneophodniju za opće dobro. Zabranio je njihovim guvernerima da usvajaju zakone od neposredne i hitne važnosti, ili je suspendirao njihovo djelovanje do njegovog pristanka. Oni tako suspendirani ostaju, jer on potpuno zanemaruje da se njima pozabavi. Odbio je usvojiti ostale zakone o naseljavanju velikog broja ljudi, sem ako bi se ti ljudi odrekli prava na predstavljanje u zakonodavnom tijelu, prava koje je za njih neprocjenjivo, a opasno i strašno samo tiraninu. Sazivao je zakonodavna tijela na mjestima neuobičajenim, neudobnim i dalekim od mjesta čuvanja njihovih javnih akata, u cilju zamaranja radi povinovanja njegovim mjerama. Više puta je raspustio Predstavničke domove, zbog izuzetno čvrstog protivljenja njegovim napadima na ljudska prava. Odavno je odbijao da poslije takvog raspuštanja drugi budu izabrani, čime su se neuništive zakonodavne moći vratile cjelokupnom narodu na raspolaganje. Država je, u međuvremenu, bila izložena svim opasnostima od invazije izvana, i potresima iznutra. Nastojao je spriječiti naseljavanje ovih država; i u tu svrhu vršio opstrukciju Zakona o primanju stranaca u državljanstvo; odbijajući usvojiti druge zakone koji bi ohrabrili njihove migracije ovamo i podižući nivo uvjeta za novo prisvajanje zemlje. Vršio je opstrukciju nad Ministarstvom pravde, odbijajući da dâ pristanak na zakone o uspostavljanju sudstva. Načinio je sudce ovisnim samo od njegove volje, određujući njihove javne položaje, kao i iznos i isplatu njihovih plaća. Stvorio je mnoštvo novih javnih položaja i poslao ovamo gomile službenika da zlostavljaju naš narod i proždiru njegovo bogatstvo. U miru držao je među nama stajaće vojske bez suglasnosti našeg zakonodavstva. Utjecao je na to da se vojsci pruži nezavisnost od građanske moći i nadmoć nad njom. Udružio se s drugima da nas potčini sudstvu stranom našem ustavu i nepoznatom našim zakonima, dajući svoj pristanak njihovim aktima navodne zakonitosti: Za razmještanje velikog broja naoružanih trupa među nama; Za njihovu zaštitu, lažnim suđenjem, od kazne za bilo koje ubojstvo koje bi počinili nad stanovnicima ovih država; Za presjecanje naših trgovačkih veza sa svim krajevima svijeta; Za nametanje poreza bez naše suglasnosti; Za često uskraćivanje naše koristi od suđenja pred porotom; Za prevoženje naših stanovnika preko mora, da bi im se sudilo zbog navodnih prekršaja; Za ukidanje slobodnog sistema engleskih zakona u susjednoj Provinciji, uspostavljanje arbitrarne vlasti na tom mjestu i uvećavanje granica takve vlasti; čime se ujedno daje primjer i pogodno sredstvo za uvođenje istog apsolutnog pravila u ovim Kolonijama; Za oduzimanje naših povelja, ukidanje naših najvrijednijih zakona, i korjenito mijenjanje oblikâ naših vlada; Za suspendiranje naših zakonodavnih tela i proglašavanje vlastitih ovlaštenim da u ma kojim slučajevima donose zakone u naše ime. Odrekao se ovdašnje vlade, objavljujući da smo izvan njihove zaštite i pokrenuvši rat protiv nas. Pljačkao je naša mora, pustošio naše obale, spaljivao naše gradove, uništavao živote našeg naroda. On u ovom trenutku prevozi ogromnu vojsku stranih najamnika da završi posao smrti, pustošenja i tiranije, koji je već započet pod okolnostima surovosti i podmuklosti čemu jedva mogu da pariraju najbarbarskija doba. Kao takav, on je potpuno nedostojan biti na čelu civiliziranog naroda. Prinudio je naše sunarodnjake, zarobljene na morima, da podignu ruku na svoju zemlju, da postanu dželati svoje braće i prijateljâ. Podigao je unutrašnje pobune među nama i nastojao da na naseljenike naših prostora podigne nemilosrdne divlje Indijance, čije je poznato pravilo rata uništavanje koje ne zna ni za godine, ni za pol, ni za uslove. Na svakom stupnju ovih ugnjetavanja mi smo za obeštećenje molili na najponizniji način: na naše molbe odgovoreno je samo stalnim povredama. Onaj princ čiji je karakter određen svim djelima svojstvenim tiraninu, nepogodan je da bude vladar slobodnog naroda. Nismo podbacili ni u obraćanjima našoj britanskoj braći. Upozoravali smo ih, s vremena na vreme, na pokušaje njihovog zakonodavstva da proširi neopravdanu nadležnost na nas. Podsjetili smo ih na okolnosti našeg iseljavanja i naseljavanja ovdje. Obraćali smo se njihovoj urođenoj pravdi i velikodušnosti, i preklinjali ih vezama zajednička roda da se odreku uzurpacija koje bi neizbježno prekinule naše veze i korespondenciju. Oni su bili gluhi za glas pravde i jednakosti po krvi. Prema tome, mi se moramo suočiti s neminovnošću osude našeg otcjepljenja i smatrati ih, kao što smatramo ostatak čovječanstva, neprijateljima u ratu, prijateljima u miru. Dakle, mi se kao predstavnici ujedinjenih država Amerike, okupljeni na generalnoj skupštini, obraćamo najvišem sudu svijeta: naše su namjere čestite i iskrene i sprovodimo ih u ime i pod autoritetom dobrog naroda ovih kolonija; svečano objavljujemo i izjavljujemo, da ove ujedinjene kolonije imaju pravo biti slobodne i neovisne države, i da one to jesu, da su one oslobođene svake vjernosti britanskoj Kruni i da sve političke veze između njih i države Velike Britanije, jesu i moraju biti u cijelosti raskinute, da, kao slobodne i nezavisne države, imaju punu moć da vode rat, zaključuju mir, sklapaju saveze, uspostavljaju trgovinu, da donose sve odluke i čine sve ostalo što nezavisne države imaju pravo činiti. I u cilju podrške ovoj Deklaraciji, sa snažnim oslanjanjem na zaštitu od strane božanskog proviđenja, obećavamo jedni drugima naše živote, našu sreću i našu svetu čast. ̋
 Izvori
 Integralni tekst Deklaracije
 Povijest SAD-a do 1789.