type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' ACTIONS NEEDED TO MINIMIZE\nLONG, ON-BOARD FLIGHT DELAYS\n Office of the Secretary of Transportation\n\n Report Number: AV-2007-077\n Date Issued: September 25, 2007\n\x0c U.S. Department of\n Memorandum\n Transportation\n Office of the Secretary\n of Transportation\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\nSubject: ACTION: Actions Needed To Minimize Long, Date: September 25, 2007\n On-Board Flight Delays\n Office of the Secretary of Transportation\n Report Number AV-2007-077\n From: Reply to\n Calvin L. Scovel III Attn. of: JA-1\n Inspector General\n To: Secretary of Transportation\n\n Thousands of passengers suffered long, on-board aircraft delays triggered by\n severe weather last winter, causing serious concerns about the airlines\xe2\x80\x99\n contingency planning for such situations.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On December 29, 2006, the Dallas-Fort Worth area experienced unseasonably\n severe weather that generated massive lightning storms and a tornado warning;\n this caused the airport to shut down operations several times over an 8-hour\n period. American Airlines (American) diverted over 100 flights, and many\n passengers on those flights were stranded on board aircraft on the tarmac for as\n long as 9 hours. The number of diversions on this date was second only to the\n number reached on September 11, 2001.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On February 14, 2007, snow and ice blanketed the northeastern United States.\n JetBlue Airways (JetBlue) stranded hundreds of passengers aboard its aircraft\n on the tarmac at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) for as long as\n 10 and a half hours. At 1 point during that day, JetBlue had 52 aircraft on the\n ground with only 21 available gates. JetBlue has publicly admitted\n shortcomings in its systems that were in place at the time for handling such\n situations.\n\n This report presents the results of the review you requested in response to these\n incidents. Our audit objectives\xe2\x80\x94based on your February 26, 2007,\n memorandum\xe2\x80\x94were to: (1) look into the specific incidents involving American\n and JetBlue, during which passengers were stranded on board aircraft for extended\n\n\n\n\n i\n\x0cperiods of time; (2) examine the Air Transport Association\xe2\x80\x99s (ATA) 1 member\nairlines\xe2\x80\x99 2 customer service plans, contracts of carriage, 3 and internal policies\ndealing with long, on-board delays; (3) highlight best practices that could help\ndeal with these situations; and (4) provide recommendations on what airlines,\nairports, and the Government can do to prevent recurrence of such events.\n\nOther incidents in 2006 and 2007 highlight airline customer service issues and the\nneed for coordinated contingency planning to prevent long, on-board delays:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On December 20, 2006, severe blizzards closed Denver\xe2\x80\x99s airport, causing\n several flights to divert to other airports. United Airlines diverted two flights\n to Cheyenne, Wyoming. The following morning, United\xe2\x80\x99s flight crew and\n attendants boarded the aircraft and departed, leaving all 110 passengers behind\n to take care of themselves.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On March 16, 2007, an ice storm hit the Northeast, causing numerous delays\n and cancellations and forcing passengers to endure long, on-board flight\n delays. In fact, several Office of Inspector General staff were flying that day\n and observed first-hand a 9-hour, on-board delay.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On July 29, 2007, because of severe weather, a Continental Airlines flight from\n Caracas, Venezuela, to Newark, New Jersey, was diverted to\n Baltimore-Washington International Airport, where passengers were stranded\n on the tarmac for over 4 hours. Because this was an international flight,\n Federal law prohibited Continental from allowing passengers off the plane;\n however, Continental could have provided for customers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs\n during this ordeal.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On August 9, 2007, severe, east-bound weather stranded hundreds of\n US Airways passengers on board aircraft at Philadelphia International Airport,\n some for up to 6 hours.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On August 11, 2007, at Los Angeles International Airport, more than\n 17,000 in-bound passengers on 73 international flights were stranded on board\n aircraft or in the terminal holding area for 10 hours because U.S. Customs\n authorities were unable to screen them due to a computer outage. We note that\n in incidents involving international flights, airlines and airports have little, if\n\n\n1\n The Air Transport Association is the trade association for America\xe2\x80\x99s largest air carriers. Its members transport over\n 90 percent of all the passenger and cargo traffic in the United States.\n2\n The 13 ATA member airlines included in our review were: Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, American Airlines, ATA\n Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Midwest Airlines, Northwest\n Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways. During our review, ATA Airlines terminated its\n membership in ATA.\n3\n A contract of carriage is the document air carriers use to specify legal obligations to passengers. Each air carrier\n must provide a copy of its contract of carriage free of charge upon request. The contract of carriage is also available\n for public inspection at airports and ticket offices.\n\n\n ii\n\x0c any, control over the amount of time passengers are inconvenienced because\n passenger screening and processing is outside of their control.\n\nWe conducted this review between March 2007 and September 2007, in\naccordance with generally accepted Government Auditing Standards as prescribed\nby the Comptroller General of the United States. To conduct our analysis, we\nrequested a range of data from selected airlines related to weather, operations, and\ncustomer service. Exhibits A through D provide details on: (A) our objectives,\nscope and methodology, and related audits; (B) selected airlines\xe2\x80\x99 terms and\nconditions for handling long, on-board delays; (C) selected airports\xe2\x80\x99 policies for\nassisting in long, on-board delays; and (D) stakeholders visited or contacted.\n\n\nBACKGROUND\nAccommodating passengers during long, on-board delays is a major customer\nservice challenge that airlines face. However, this is not a new problem for the\nairlines. Airline customer service first took center stage in January 1999, when\nhundreds of passengers remained in planes on snowbound Detroit runways for up\nto 8 and a half hours. After those events, both the House and Senate considered\nwhether to enact a \xe2\x80\x9cpassenger bill of rights.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nFollowing hearings after the\nJanuary 1999 incident, Congress, Figure 1. Provisions of the Airline Customer\nthe Department of Transportation \xe2\x80\xa2 Offer the lowest Service Commitment\n fare available.\n(DOT), and ATA agreed that the \xe2\x80\xa2 Notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and diversions.\nair carriers should have an \xe2\x80\xa2 Deliver baggage on time.\nopportunity to improve their \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 Support an increase in the baggage liability limit.\n Allow reservations to be held or cancelled.\ncustomer service without \xe2\x80\xa2 Provide prompt ticket refunds.\nlegislation. To demonstrate the \xe2\x80\xa2 Properly accommodate disabled and special-needs passengers.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Meet customers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs during long, on-aircraft delays.\nairlines\xe2\x80\x99 ongoing dedication to \xe2\x80\xa2 Handle \xe2\x80\x9cbumped\xe2\x80\x9d passengers with fairness and consistency.\nimproving air travel, ATA and its \xe2\x80\xa2 Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer\nmember airlines executed the \xe2\x80\xa2 rules, and aircraft configuration.\n Ensure good customer service from code-share partners.\nAirline Customer Service \xe2\x80\xa2 Be more responsive to customer complaints.\nCommitment (the Commitment), 4\non June 17, 1999. Each ATA Source: Airline Customer Service Commitment, June 1999\nairline agreed to prepare a\ncustomer service plan implementing the 12 provisions of the Commitment (see\nfigure 1); including a provision to meet customers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs during long,\non-aircraft delays; and prepare contingency plans to address such circumstances.\n4\n ATA signed the Commitment on behalf of the then 14 ATA member airlines (Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines,\n American Airlines, American Trans Air, America West Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian\n Airlines, Midwest Express Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines,\n and US Airways). JetBlue was not an airline or a member of ATA when ATA made its commitments.\n\n\n iii\n\x0cBecause aviation delays and cancellations continued to worsen, eventually\nreaching their peak during the summer of 2000, Congress directed our office to\nevaluate the effectiveness of the Commitment and the customer service plans of\nindividual ATA airlines. We issued our final report 5 in February 2001. Although\nthe ATA airlines made progress toward meeting the Commitment, we found that\nthe Commitment did not directly address the underlying causes of deep-seated\ncustomer dissatisfaction\xe2\x80\x94flight delays and cancellations. This is still the case\ntoday with record-breaking flight delays and cancellations leading to more long,\non-board delays.\n\n\nRising Flight Delays Are Leading to More Long, On-Board Delays\nBased on the first 7 months of the year, it is clear that 2007 may be the busiest 6\ntravel period since the peak of 2000 and may surpass the 2000 record levels for\nflight delays, cancellations, and diversions. So far in 2007, nearly 28 percent of\nflights were delayed, cancelled, or diverted compared to about 24 percent during\nthe same period in 2006. In 2006, nearly 25 percent of domestic flights were\ndelayed, cancelled, or diverted, the highest percentage since peak year 2000, when\nit hit 27 percent. Figure 2 illustrates the changes in percentage of domestic flights\ndelayed, cancelled, or diverted from 2000 to 2007.\n\n Figure 2. Percent of Flights Delayed, Cancelled, Figure 3. Average Length of Arrival Delays\n or Diverted for Years 2000 to 2007 for Years 2000 to 2007\n\n 60 56.7\n 30% 27.4% 27.8% 54.0\n 52.5 51.4 52.2\n 24.6% 49.2 48.9\n Percent of Scheduled Flights\n\n\n\n\n 46.8\n 25% 22.6% 22.6%\n 21.9%\n 45\n\n 20% 17.9% 18.0%\n Minutes\n\n\n\n\n 15% 30\n\n\n 10%\n 15\n\n 5%\n\n\n 0% 0\n 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*\n\n\n\n\n *January through July *January through July\n Source: BTS data Source: BTS data\n\nNot only are there more delays, but also longer delay durations. Of domestic\nflights arriving late in 2006, the average delay was a record-breaking 54 minutes.\nFigure 3 illustrates the changes in the average length of flight delays from 2000 to\n2007. Based on the first 7 months of data, it is clear that 2007 could be even\n\n\n5\n OIG Report Number AV-2001-020, \xe2\x80\x9cFinal Report on Airline Customer Service Commitment,\xe2\x80\x9d February 12, 2001.\n OIG reports and testimonies are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.\n6\n As measured by scheduled departures.\n\n\n iv\n\x0cworse. For flights that arrived late, passengers experienced an average flight delay\nof nearly 57 minutes, up nearly 3 minutes from 2006.\n\nThese rising flight delays are leading to more on-board tarmac delays. Based on\nthe first 7 months of 2007, over 54,000 scheduled flights\xe2\x80\x94affecting nearly\n3.7 million passengers\xe2\x80\x94experienced taxi-in and taxi-out times of 1 to 5 hours or\nmore (see table 1). This is an increase of nearly 42 percent (from 38,076 to\n54,029) as compared to the same period in 2006.\n\n Table 1. Number of Flights With Long, On-Board Tarmac Delays of\n 1 to 5+ Hours January Through July of 2006 and 2007\n Time Period 2006 2007 % Change\n\n 1-2 Hrs. 33,438 47,558 42.23\n 2-3 Hrs. 3,781 5,213 37.87\n 3-4 Hrs. 710 1,025 44.37\n 4-5 Hrs. 120 189 57.50\n 5 or > Hrs. 27 44 62.96\n Total: 38,076 54,029 41.90\n Source: OIG analysis based on BTS data\n\nRising Flight Delays Are Also Leading to More Air Traveler\nComplaints\nDOT\xe2\x80\x99s Air Travel Consumer Reports disclosed that, for the first 7 months of 2007,\ncomplaints against U.S. airlines increased nearly 65 percent (3,947 to 6,504) over\ncomplaints during the same period in 2006, with complaints relating to flight\nproblems (delays, cancellations, and missed connections) more than doubling\n(1,096 to 2,468) for the same period. Complaints in 2007 have already exceeded\nfull-year 2006 complaint totals, including complaints about flight problems.\n\nOver the last several years, flight\n Figure 4. Air Travel Consumer\nproblems have ranked as the number Complaints, 2006\none air traveler complaint to DOT,\n Others Flight\nwith baggage complaints and Disability 12%\n Problems\n 7 6%\ncustomer care ranked as number two 29%\n Refunds\nand number three, respectively. As 7%\nshown in figure 4, flight problems Reservations\naccounted for more than one-quarter Ticketing &\n Boarding Customer Baggage\nof all complaints the Department 11% Care 22%\nreceived in 2006. So far, this year is 13%\n Source: DOT\xe2\x80\x99s Air Travel Consumer Reports for 2006\n7\n Complaints such as poor employee attitude, refusal to provide assistance, unsatisfactory seating, and unsatisfactory\n food service are categorized as customer care complaints.\n\n\n v\n\x0cbecoming a near record-breaking year percentage-wise for flight problem\ncomplaints, with those accounting for nearly 38 percent of all complaints the\nDepartment received in the first 7 months of 2007.\n\n\nPassengers\xe2\x80\x99 Flight Experiences Are Further Complicated by Capacity\nand Demand Matters\nAir travelers\xe2\x80\x99 dissatisfaction with flight problems, especially cancellations, is\nfurther compounded by reduced capacity and increased demand, which leads to\nfuller flights. Domestic-wide, the first 6 months of 2007 (the most recent data\navailable) compared to the same period in peak-year 2000 show that:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The number of scheduled flights (capacity) decreased from 5.5 million in 2000\n to 5.0 million in 2007, a drop of 9 percent. Scheduled seats also declined by\n over 9 percent between 2000 and 2007, from 510 million to 462 million.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Even though the number of flights and seats declined, passenger enplanements\n went up over 12 percent, from 312 million passengers in 2000 to 350 million\n passengers in 2007.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reduced capacity and increased demand led to fuller flights. For 2007,\n average load factors increased from 71.1 percent in 2000 to 79.7 percent in\n 2007, with an unprecedented 86.1 percent in June.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reduced capacity and higher load factors can also result in increased\n passenger inconvenience and dissatisfaction with customer service. With more\n seats filled, air carriers have fewer options to accommodate passengers from\n cancelled flights.\n\nThe extent to which delays and cancellations will continue to impact passengers in\n2007 depends on several key factors, including weather conditions, the impact of\nthe economy on air travel demand, and capacity management at already congested\nairports.\n\n\nEXECUTIVE OVERVIEW\nFlight delays and cancellations continue as a major source of customer\ndissatisfaction. The severity of the on-board delays last winter drew national\nattention and demonstrated that airlines, airports, the Federal Aviation\nAdministration (FAA), and DOT must work together to reduce long, on-board\ndelays and minimize the impact on passengers when these delays occur. The\nwinter events that received the most attention concerned two carriers: American\nand JetBlue. On December 29, 2006, American\xe2\x80\x99s operations at Dallas-Fort Worth\n\n\n vi\n\x0cInternational Airport (DFW) were severely affected by unprecedented weather\nleading to 654 flight cancellations, 124 diversions, and 44 long on-board delays\nexceeding 4 hours. The diversions to Austin-Bergstrom International Airport\ngenerated substantial interest because some of the lengthiest on-board delays\noccurred there\xe2\x80\x94in one case, for over 9 hours. JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s JFK operations also\nsuffered on February 14, 2007, when severe weather hit the northeastern United\nStates, leading to 355 cancellations, 6 diversions; and 26 long, on-board delays\nexceeding 4 hours.\nWhile weather was the primary contributor to the extraordinary flight disruptions\nit was not the only factor in passengers being stranded on board aircraft for long\nperiods of time. We found that neither airline had a system-wide policy or\nprocedure in place to mitigate long, on-board delays and off-load passengers\nwithin a certain period of time. American also did not control the number of\ndiverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed its operations at Austin.\n\nJetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice of not cancelling flights. As a\nresult, its personnel at JFK airport became overwhelmed with the sheer number of\narriving and departing aircraft on the ground at the same time, with no gates\navailable for deplaning passengers on arriving flights.\n\nWe also found that other airlines experienced flight disruptions on those two dates;\nsome were able to minimize the time passengers spent on-board aircraft while\nothers experienced similar on-board delays. For example, Delta Airlines had more\nflights delayed at JFK than JetBlue on February 14, 2007, with a total of 54 flights\nbeing delayed more than 1 hour versus 43 for JetBlue.\n\nWe examined 13 airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service plans, including customer service\ncommitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency plans dealing with\nextended ground delays aboard aircraft. In addition, we reviewed 13 selected\nairports\xe2\x80\x99 8 contingency plans. We found that both airline and airport contingency\nplans are limited in addressing long, on-board delays. In fact, we found that there\nhas been little improvement from what we reported in 2001\xe2\x80\x94that only a few\nairlines\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans specified in any detail the efforts planned to get\npassengers off the aircraft when delayed for extended periods and that airlines had\nnot clearly and consistently defined terms in the 1999 Commitment provision\n(such as what constitutes an \xe2\x80\x9cextended period of time\xe2\x80\x9d for meeting passengers\nessential needs or a \xe2\x80\x9clong, on-board delay\xe2\x80\x9d before deplaning passengers).\n\n\n\n8\n Austin-Bergstrom International, Chicago O\xe2\x80\x99Hare International, Dallas/Fort Worth International, Dallas Love Field,\n General Mitchell International, George Bush Intercontinental, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International, Honolulu\n International, Indianapolis International, John F. Kennedy International, Minneapolis-St. Paul International, Phoenix\n Sky Harbor International, and Seattle-Tacoma International.\n\n\n vii\n\x0cOur examination of the 13 airports, including 12 major hub airports, (see\nexhibit C) found that only 2 airports have a process for monitoring and mitigating\nlong, on-board delays that involves contacting the airline to request a plan of\naction after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac. We also found that\nairports intervene only upon an airline\xe2\x80\x99s request primarily because they do not\nhave the authority to interfere with a carrier\xe2\x80\x99s operations during long, on-board\ndelays.\n\nAirport operators must collaborate with airlines to establish a policy for how long\npassengers can be kept aboard aircraft while on the ground during extraordinary\nflight disruptions.\n\nAs requested, we also identified best practices and initiatives that could help deal\nwith long on-board delays. For example, some airlines and airports keep gate\nspace open for off-loading passengers in times of irregular operations. Some also\nconstantly monitor aircraft on the tarmac so when an aircraft remains for more\nthan a certain period of time (typically 2 hours), the airline manager can\ncoordinate the aircraft\xe2\x80\x99s return to a gate. Also, two major airport operators\xe2\x80\x94the\nPort Authority of New York and New Jersey and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta\nInternational Airport\xe2\x80\x94are looking into procedural improvements, such as more\nefficient use of the runways at JFK, and customer service improvements, such as\nbest methods for getting passengers off aircraft and reducing the amount of time\nthey are kept on aircraft. These practices are good steps, but, in our opinion, a\nmore comprehensive plan of action is needed to mitigate long, on-board delays\nand should involve collaboration among airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT.\n\nWe still maintain that all airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service plans should specify in detail\nthe efforts that will be made to get passengers off aircraft that are delayed for long\nperiods, either before departure or after arrival. Airlines should also incorporate\nthese policies in their contracts of carriage and post them on their Internet sites.\nTo ensure adherence to the policies, airlines must resume efforts to self-audit their\ncustomer service plans. We recommended most of these actions in our 2001\nreport, and the airlines agreed and stated plans to implement them. We realize that\nsetting a time limit on delay durations will have to be tailored to individual airlines\nand airports and will heavily depend on the situation. Airlines and airports need to\nwork together to determine the various situations that can occur and devise plans\nfor handling those occurrences.\n\nThe airlines also agreed to establish a task force of representatives from airlines,\nairports, and FAA to develop and coordinate contingency plans to deal with\nlengthy delays. Although the task force was formed, the effort never materialized\nas priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. In our testimony before the House\n\n\n\n\n viii\n\x0cSubcommittee on Aviation in April 2007, 9 we recommended that the task force be\nreconvened, and, to date, there still has been no action to do so. Now is the time\nfor airlines to reconvene a national task force and develop and coordinate\ncontingency plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.\n\nIn addition, DOT should take a more active role in overseeing customer service\nissues to ensure that airlines comply with their policies governing long, on-board\ndelays, especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such\ndelays, and advise Congress if the airlines retreat from the commitment provisions\nor dilute the language in the current contracts of carriage.\n\n\nSUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS\nOur recommendations focus on actions that could help the Department, airlines,\nand airports improve customer service for air travelers; these include:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Defining what constitutes an \xe2\x80\x9cextended period of time\xe2\x80\x9d for meeting\n passengers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs and setting limits for delay durations.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Establishing specific targets for reducing chronically delayed or cancelled\n flights.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Disclosing on-time flight performance.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Requiring airports to establish a process for monitoring lengthy, on-board\n delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Establishing a national task force of airlines, airports, and FAA to develop and\n coordinate contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Conducting incident investigations involving long, on-board ground delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Directing the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings to ensure that\n airlines comply with their public policies governing long, on-board delays.\n\nA complete list of our recommendations can be found on pages 21 and 22.\n\n\n\n\n9\n OIG Testimony Number CC-2007-046, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve Airline Customer Service,\xe2\x80\x9d April 20, 2007.\n\n\n ix\n\x0cDEPARTMENT, AIRLINE, AND AIRPORT COMMENTS\nWe provided American Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Airports Council\nInternational-North America with various sections of our report related to their\nairline or organization and included their comments as appropriate. On\nSeptember 19, 2007, we met with Air Transport Association and airline\nrepresentatives to discuss our report. We provided the Office of the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s\nGeneral Counsel and the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs\nOffices with our draft report. On September 20, 2007, we met with staff from\nGeneral Counsel\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings and received\ntheir verbal comments. Their comments were incorporated into this report as\nappropriate.\n\nWe also received a memorandum from the Secretary of Transportation on\nSeptember 24, 2007, which stated that she is fully committed to improving the air\ntravel environment for passengers. The Secretary has directed DOT staff to\ncarefully consider the recommendations in this report, including those for\nimproving the information provided to the public and the manner in which\npassengers are treated, including compliance by carriers with their own policies.\nThe appendix to this report presents the full text of the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s memorandum.\n\n\nACTION REQUIRED\nIn accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1C, within\n30 calendar days, please provide us with your formal written comments regarding\nthe specific actions that DOT plans to take to implement our recommendations\nalong with timeframes for completion. We will consider the recommendations\nunresolved until we receive the requested information.\n\nWe appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of Department of Transportation and\nairlines\xe2\x80\x99 and airports\xe2\x80\x99 representatives during this audit. If you have any questions\nconcerning this report, please contact me at (202) 366-1959 or Todd Zinser,\nDeputy Inspector General, at (202) 366-6767.\n\n\n #\n\n\ncc: Chief of Staff\n Office of General Counsel\n Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs\n Acting FAA Administrator\n\n\n x\n\x0c TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\nFINDINGS .............................................................................................. 1\n Lack of a System-Wide Policy Contributed to\n American\xe2\x80\x99s and JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Long, On-Board Delays ........................... 1\n Airline and Airport Contingency Plans Are Still Not\n Adequate To Handle Long, On-Board Delays................................. 10\n Ongoing Actions for Mitigating Long, On-Board Delays.................. 13\n DOT, FAA, Airlines, and Airports Should Complete\n Actions on Outstanding Recommendations To Improve\n Airline Customer Service and Minimize Long, On-Board\n Delays ............................................................................................. 17\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 21\n\nEXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND\nMETHODOLOGY, AND RELATED AUDIT COVERAGE ................... 23\n\nEXHIBIT B. SELECTED AIRLINES\xe2\x80\x99 TERMS AND\nCONDITIONS FOR HANDLING LONG, ON-BOARD\nDELAYS............................................................................................... 28\n\nEXHIBIT C. SELECTED AIRPORTS\xe2\x80\x99 POLICIES FOR\nASSISTING IN LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS .................................... 29\n\nEXHIBIT D. STAKEHOLDERS VISITED OR\nCONTACTED....................................................................................... 30\n\nAPPENDIX. DEPARTMENT COMMENTS ......................................... 31\n\x0c 1\n\n\n\n\nFINDINGS\nAirlines and airports continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary flight\ndisruptions such as long, on-board delays during extreme weather. Based on BTS\ndata, 659,988 flights were delayed in 2006 due to poor weather conditions\n(9.2 percent of all commercial flights). Based on the first 7 months of 2007, the\nnumber of flights delayed due to poor weather conditions increased by nearly\n18 percent for the same period in 2006 and is on pace to exceed 2006 totals.\n\nThese delays occurred throughout the system and at many airlines, and, after the\nsevere long on-board delays that occurred last winter, the Secretary asked that we\nassess airlines\xe2\x80\x99 contingency planning for such situations. Overall, we found that:\n(1) the on-board delays that passengers endured last winter were largely due to\nairlines\xe2\x80\x99 lack of a system-wide policy to minimize such delays; (2) airlines\xe2\x80\x99 and\nairports\xe2\x80\x99 customer service contingency plans are still not adequate to handle these\noccurrences; (3) airlines and airports have best practices and are moving forward\nwith other initiatives to help mitigate these delays; and (4) there are other actions\nthat airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT can undertake immediately to address such\nsituations.\n\n\nLack of a System-Wide Policy Contributed to American\xe2\x80\x99s and\nJetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Long, On-Board Delays\nWhile weather was the primary contributor to the extraordinary flight disruptions\nit was not the only factor in passengers being stranded on board aircraft for long\nperiods of time. We found that American and JetBlue experienced long, on-board\ndelays on December 29, 2006, and February 14, 2007, respectively, because they\nboth lacked a system-wide policy and procedure to minimize long, on-board\ndelays and off-load passengers within a certain period of time. American also did\nnot control the number of diverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed\ntheir operations. In Austin, some passengers experienced delays on the tarmac for\nover 9 hours under American\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cmonitor and evaluate\xe2\x80\x9d approach. Contrary to\nsome media reports, American did provide food, water, and tolerable restroom\nfacilities on the aircraft delayed in Austin; however, some passengers felt\nAmerican\xe2\x80\x99s efforts were inadequate in that regard.\n\nJetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice of not cancelling flights\nwhenever possible. As a result, its personnel at JFK airport in New York became\noverwhelmed with the sheer number of arriving and departing aircraft on the\nground at the same time, with no gates available for deplaning passengers. Based\non weather forecasts for that day, both airlines were optimistic that the severe\nweather would subside and that the delayed and diverted flights would be able to\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 2\n\n\ndepart, but the break in the weather never materialized. Since the incidents, both\nairlines have taken actions to facilitate better planning when these incidents occur.\n\nWe also found that other airlines experienced flight disruptions on those two dates;\nsome were able to minimize the time passengers spent on-board aircraft while\nothers experienced similar on-board delays.\n\nSevere Weather in Texas Caused American To Divert an Extraordinary\nNumber of Flights on December 29, Resulting in Thousands of\nPassengers Experiencing Long Delays on Aircraft\nOn December 29, 2006, severe weather that generated massive lightning storms,\nand a tornado warning in the Dallas-Fort Worth area caused American to cancel,\ndivert, or delay over 1,100 of its 1,600 (69 percent) scheduled flights into DFW,\ndisrupting holiday travel plans for over 13,000 passengers system-wide. American\ndiverted 130 flights; 124 flights were bound for DFW but had to be diverted to\n24 nearby airports. The number of diversions on December 29 ranked as the\nsecond largest in American\xe2\x80\x99s history, the first being September 11, 2001.\n\nTable 2 shows the seven airports that accepted the majority (63 percent) of the\nDFW diversions on that day. Ultimately, out of the more than 314,000 passengers\nAmerican carried that day, 4,738 American passengers on 44 diverted flights\nendured long, on-board delays of over 4 hours.\n\n Table 2. Seven Airports Accepting Most of American\xe2\x80\x99s Diversions\n Airport Location No. of Diversions\n San Antonio Regional San Antonio, TX 13\n Shreveport Regional Shreveport, LA 12\n Adams Field Little Rock, AR 11\n Will Rogers World Oklahoma City, OK 11\n Austin-Bergstrom International Austin, TX 11\n Tulsa International Tulsa, OK 10\n Midland International Midland, TX 10\n Total 78\n Source: OIG\n\n\nAmerican\xe2\x80\x99s Lack of System-Wide Policy, Diversion Recovery Approach,\nand Only Partial Adherence to Austin-Bergstrom Local Policy Caused\nLong, On-Board Delays\nAmerican did not have a system-wide policy to minimize long, on-board delays or\nan established time and system for deplaning passengers in the event of\nextraordinary on-board (tarmac) delays. American also did not control the number\nof diverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed their operations. We\nfocused our review of the December 29 events on the 11 American flights that\n\nFindings\n\x0c 3\n\n\nwere diverted to Austin, where some of the lengthiest on-board delays occurred.\nWe found that American did not fully adhere to its local policy to deplane\npassengers upon request when a delayed or diverted flight is held for more than\n2 hours.\n\nUnder its \xe2\x80\x9cmonitor and evaluate\xe2\x80\x9d approach, American kept passengers on aircraft,\nintending for the diverted flights to re-depart and reach their ultimate destinations,\nbut the severe weather conditions on that day prevented some of the diverted\nflights from doing that. For American, when severe weather hit, the normal\npractice was to divert aircraft to nearby airports not affected by the severe weather\nand wait out the storms. American usually diverted aircraft to a nearby airport\nwithout a plan to spread out its diversions. This practice heavily weighed down\noperations at Austin. At two points during that day, American\xe2\x80\x99s pilots on the\nground at Austin could not reach the local dispatcher to request a gate assignment\nand ended up contacting FAA air traffic controller for assistance who was also\nunsuccessful in contacting the local dispatcher.\n\nAmerican also failed to deplane passengers upon request in Austin when the\ndiverted flights were held for more than 2 hours. On 8 of the 11 diverted flights,\n74 of the 979 passengers, most of which had final destinations of Austin or San\nAntonio, were deplaned in Austin on December 29. However, several passengers\nwe interviewed from two of the eights flights stated that they had requested to\ndeplane but were not accommodated.\n\nTable 3 below shows the number of hours that each flight was on the ground in\nAustin. Some passengers were stranded on board for 6 hours or longer on 4 of the\n11 diverted flights, with the longest on-board delay reaching over 9 hours. For\n5 of the 11 diverted flights, with on-board delays of less than 2 and a half hours,\nAmerican\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cmonitor and evaluate\xe2\x80\x9d approach paid off with those flights reaching\nDFW the same day. The other six flights were not as fortunate, with passengers\nremaining overnight in Austin and arriving at DFW the next day.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 4\n\n\n\n Table 3. Length of On-Board Delay and Outcome of the\n 11 Diverted Flights to Austin\n Flight Origin City/Number Length of On-Board Flight Outcome\n Delay\n San Francisco, CA 9 hours 16 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/\n Flight #1348 arrived DFW next day\n Los Angeles, CA 7 hours 14 minutes Cancelled/rebooked/arrived DFW\n Flight #2412 next day\n Oakland, CA 7 hours 6 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/\n Flight #1008 arrived DFW next day\n Fresno, CA 6 hours 8 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/\n Flight #534 arrived DFW next day\n Seattle, WA 2 hours 26 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day\n Flight #2302\n Fresno, CA 2 hours 16 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/\n Flight #1372 arrived DFW next day\n Vancouver, British Columbia 2 hours 8 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day\n Flight #330\n Salt Lake City, UT 2 hours 4 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/\n Flight #1074 arrived DFW next day\n San Jose, CA 1 hour 39 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day\n Flight #1514\n Orange County, CA 1 hour 32 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day\n Flight #592\n San Diego, CA 1 hour 31 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day\n Flight #1708\nSource: OIG\n\nAt Austin-Bergstrom Airport, Some Passengers Were Dissatisfied With\nAmerican\xe2\x80\x99s Attempts To Meet Their Needs During the Delays. We\ninterviewed passengers from 2 of the 11 diverted flights\xe2\x80\x94flights 1348 and 534\xe2\x80\x94\nto obtain passenger feedback on the events of the day at the Austin airport.\n\nFlight 1348 was scheduled to depart San Francisco at 6:05 a.m. Pacific Time, but,\ndue to mechanical problems (the passengers had to change gates and aircraft), the\nflight did not depart until 7:10 a.m. Pacific Time, with 113 passengers on board.\n\nWhile en route to DFW, the flight was diverted to Austin because of the severe\nweather in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Several passengers with Austin and San\nAntonio as their final destinations were allowed to deplane and go to the airport\nterminal via bus. The remaining passengers stayed on board expecting to reach\ntheir final destinations or make their connecting flight at DFW.\n\nAt 10:05 p.m. Central Time, after sitting on the ground in Austin for 9 hours, with\na total on-board time of almost 13 hours, the passengers were finally deplaned and\nremained overnight in Austin. Although American offered vouchers for hotel\naccommodations and meals to passengers on flight 1348\xe2\x80\x9436 hotel vouchers and\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 5\n\n\n11 meal vouchers in total\xe2\x80\x94not all passengers were accommodated. Those\npassengers may not have been aware that American was offering the vouchers or\ndid not want to wait in line and found overnight accommodations on their own.\nThe flight continued to DFW the following day. Passengers on this flight were\nlater given flight vouchers valued up to $500 by American.\n\nPassengers on flight 534 from Fresno, California, experienced similar\ncircumstances with a shorter on-board delay of 6 hours in Austin. Although the\npassengers on both flights confirmed that snacks and beverages were served and\nthe restroom facilities were tolerable, passengers we interviewed felt that\nAmerican\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to meet their essential needs during the delays were insufficient\ngiven the length of the delays.\n\nAmerican Has Since Instituted a System-Wide Policy Designed To Avoid\nLong, On-Board Delays\nAfter the December 29 incident, American instituted a new policy designed to\nprevent on-board delays from exceeding 4 hours and implemented an airborne\ndiversion distribution plan aimed at spreading out its diversions to more airports to\nprevent overloading any given airport. American has also implemented decision\nassistance technology designed to \xe2\x80\x9cautomatically track and monitor delayed and\ndiverted flights and assist in creating a centralized approach for the prioritizing the\nhandling of such flights.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nAmerican was able to demonstrate its new policy and plan during an incident that\noccurred on February 24, 2007. On that day, American\xe2\x80\x99s operations at DFW were\nsignificantly affected by severe wind gusts of 37 to 47 knots (about 43 to 55 miles\nper hour), causing the airport to close for over 5 hours. American diverted\n76 flights bound for DFW to 32 airports, with no single airport handling more than\n9 diversions. This is in contrast to December 29, 2006, when 124 flights were\ndiverted to 24 airports, with almost a third of them (7 airports) handling 10 or\nmore diversions.\n\nWhile the February 24 disruption was the 7th worst diversion day in American\xe2\x80\x99s\nhistory, only 1 flight (34 passengers) experienced on-board delays of over 4 hours\nversus the 44 flights (4,738 passengers) on December 29, 2006, and that was due\nto an absence of U.S. Customs officials at the diversion airport. According to\nAmerican, the results of the February 24 experience indicate that its new 4-hour\npolicy and diversion plan worked well to avoid long, on-board delays during\nextraordinary events.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 6\n\n\n\nJetBlue Ran Out of Gate Availability on February 14, Stranding Thousands\nof Passengers on Aircraft for Extended Periods of Time\nOn February 14, 2007, a severe ice storm hit the northeastern United States,\ncausing JetBlue to eventually cancel 355 departures and arrivals, incur\n6 diversions, and strand\npassengers on 26 flights Table 4. Breakdown of JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s\nfor over 4 hours, all at its Long, On-Board Arrival and Departure\n Delays at JFK\nJFK hub. See table 4 for a\nbreakdown of JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Number of On-Board Delays Over 1 hour 43\n Number of On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 26\nlong, on-board delays at Number of On-Board Delays Over 5 hours 21\nJFK. Ultimately, 31,569 Number of Passengers That Endured\nJetBlue passengers were On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 2,962\n Average Time Delay for Arrivals (in minutes) 265\naffected by cancellations, Average Time Delay for Departures (in minutes) 298\ndelays, or diversions at Source: OIG\nJFK between February 13\nand 20.\n\nInitial weather forecasts for JFK on February 14 predicted rain in the morning\nwith temperatures slightly higher than 32 degrees; the weather was dramatically\nworse with freezing rain starting around 8:00 a.m. JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s flights continued to\narrive at the airport, although flights could not depart\xe2\x80\x94only 2 of the first\n13 scheduled morning flights departed\xe2\x80\x94thereby causing gridlock on the airport\ntarmac.\n\nBy 8:30 a.m., JetBlue ran out of gate space and asked FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Air Traffic Control\nto issue a ground stop 10 on all JetBlue flights headed for JFK. At 11:00 a.m.,\nJetBlue requested that FAA issue a ground stop for all its flights system-wide\nwhether or not they were heading to JFK\xe2\x80\x94an unprecedented request according to\nFAA. This request was due to JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s operations control center being\noverwhelmed with the JFK situation.\n\nJetBlue officials stated that they contacted the Port Authority of New York and\nNew Jersey (the Port Authority) at 1:30 p.m., asking for buses to off-load\npassengers from five aircraft stuck on the tarmac. By 3:00 p.m., the temperature\nstill remained below freezing and airport surfaces were covered with ice. Around\n3:30 p.m., the Port Authority finally started to off-load passengers from the five\nstranded flights.\n\nBy nightfall on February 14, JetBlue had 52 aircraft on the ground at JFK, instead\nof the usual 22, and only 21 gates. JetBlue called other airlines, including foreign\n\n10\n During an FAA ground stop, flights destined to the affected airport are held at their departure point for the duration\n of the ground stop.\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 7\n\n\nairlines, to see about available gates, but no gates were available. The airport also\nunsuccessfully tried to assist JetBlue in finding gates for its flights. Based on our\nreview of the events of that day, it appears that the airlines and airports were trying\nto help each other; however, the severe weather hampered much movement of\naircraft on the airfield.\n\nBy the end of the day, JetBlue had cancelled 80 percent of its arrivals and\n89 percent of its departures for that day. JetBlue had to cancel another 55 percent\nof its scheduled arrivals and 50 percent of its departures on February 15. These\ncancellations were related to both the weather and the fact that JetBlue did not\nhave crew and aircraft available.\n\nJetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Lack of Policy and Reluctance To Cancel Flights Caused Long,\nOn-Board Delays\nJetBlue did not have a policy to minimize long, on-board delays or an established\ntime and system for deplaning passengers in the event of extraordinary on-board\n(tarmac) delays. In addition, JetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice\nof not cancelling flights and had previously never dealt with extremely long,\non-board delays. JetBlue was optimistic based on weather forecasts that the\nweather would break and eventually its flights would be able to depart. However,\nthe break in the weather never materialized on February 14, and JetBlue personnel\nbecame overwhelmed with the sheer number of arriving and departing aircraft on\nthe ground at the same time, with no gates available for deplaning passengers on\nflight arrivals.\n\nOur review of the February 14 events focused on JetBlue flights that experienced\nthe worst tarmac delays at or traveling to JFK. As shown in table 5, 26 flights\nwere on the tarmac for 4 hours or more, with 14 flights exceeding 6 hours. Eight\nof the flights were arrivals, with the worst on-board delay lasting over 9 hours.\nThe remaining 18 were departing flights, with the worst on-board delay exceeding\n10 hours. Eight of the departing flights eventually took off but the other 10 were\nfinally cancelled.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 8\n\n\n\n Table 5. Length and Outcome of JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Long, On-Board Delays\n for Flights at or Traveling to JFK\n Flight Origin City Length of Delay Flight Outcome\n JFK Arrivals\n Ft. Myers, FL 9+ hours Deplaned\n Nashville, TN 8+ hours Deplaned\n Houston-Hobby, TX 7+ hours Deplaned\n Burbank, CA Almost 6 hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day\n Austin, TX Almost 6 hours Deplaned\n Orlando, FL 5 \xc2\xbe hours Deplaned\n Long Beach, CA 5 hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day\n Oakland, CA 4 \xc2\xbe hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day\n Flight Destination City\n JFK Departures\n Aruba 10 \xc2\xbd hours Cancelled\n Burbank, CA 9 hours Cancelled\n Cancun, Mexico Nearly 8 hours Cancelled\n Syracuse, NY 7 \xc2\xbd hours Cancelled\n Houston-Hobby, TX 7 \xc2\xbc hours Departed\n Buffalo, NY 7 \xc2\xbc hours Cancelled\n Boston, MA 7 hours Cancelled\n Orlando, FL Nearly 7 hours Cancelled\n Phoenix, AZ 6 \xc2\xbe hours Cancelled\n Burbank, CA 6 \xc2\xbc hours Departed\n Ft. Lauderdale, FL 6 \xc2\xbc hours Departed\n Tampa, FL 5 \xc2\xbd hours Departed\n New Orleans, LA 5 \xc2\xbd hours Cancelled\n Burbank, CA 5 \xc2\xbc hours Departed\n Buffalo, NY 5 hours Departed\n Seattle, WA 4 \xc2\xbe hours Departed\n Long Beach, CA 4 \xc2\xbd hours Cancelled\n Phoenix, AZ 4 hours Departed\nSource: OIG\n\nJetBlue did not recover from the effects of February 14 until about 5 days later.\nWhile only one runway was open on both February 14 and 15, capacity issues\nwere not a problem because so many of the other air carriers had pre-cancelled\ntheir flights. The downstream effect of the February 14 event resulted in JetBlue\ncancelling 1,204 flights through February 20, or 44 percent of its operations.\nJetBlue provided passengers with over $11 million in refunds for this incident.\n\nJetBlue Has Since Instituted a System-Wide Policy Designed To Avoid\nLong, On-Board Delays\nAfter the February 14 event, JetBlue set a 5-hour time limit for deplaning\npassengers delayed on the ground and established procedures to monitor delayed\nflights. Since then, JetBlue has demonstrated on at least one occasion that it is not\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 9\n\n\ngoing to allow passengers to sit on aircraft for long periods of time during massive\ncancellations. For example, during the March 16, 2007, ice storm, JetBlue\ncancelled over 200 flights scheduled to fly in and out of JFK.\n\nAlso, just a week after the February 14 incident (February 20), and before our\nMarch 2007 review, JetBlue published its own customer bill of rights. JetBlue\nplans to offer compensation in the form of vouchers for flight disruptions, such as\ncancellations.\n\nJetBlue Was Not the Only Airline To Experience Flight Disruptions on\nFebruary 14, 2007\nWhile JetBlue received the most publicity for stranding its passengers on the\ntarmac at JFK on February 14, the weather also affected other airlines there\xe2\x80\x94\nnearly 97 percent of all scheduled flights at JFK were either delayed, cancelled, or\ndiverted, with over 83 percent of those flights cancelled.\n\nDelta had more flights delayed at JFK than JetBlue on February 14, with\n15 arriving flights and 39 departing flights delayed over 1 hour. American had\n15 arrival delays and 8 departure delays of over 1 hour. However, the average\ndelay length was worse for JetBlue, as shown in table 6.\n\n Table 6. Average On-Board Delays on February 14, 2007,\n at JFK for JetBlue, Delta, and American\n Airline No. of Flights Average On Longest Delay No. of Flights\n Delayed Board Delay with Delays\n > 1 Hour > 3 hours\n Arrivals:\n JetBlue 14 4 \xc2\xbd hours 9 hours 9\n Delta 15 2 \xc2\xbd hours 4 \xc2\xbc hours 6\n American 15 1 \xc2\xbd hours 2 \xc2\xbe hours 0\n Departures:\n JetBlue 29 5 \xc2\xbe hours 10 \xc2\xbc hours 20\n Delta 39 3 \xc2\xbd hours 7 \xc2\xbc hours 19\n American 8 1 \xc2\xbd hours 4 \xc2\xbc hours 0\nSource: OIG\n\nAll of the New York area airports were dramatically affected on\nFebruary 14, 2007. New York\xe2\x80\x99s LaGuardia Airport had 92 percent of its flights\neither delayed, cancelled, or diverted, and Newark International had 87 percent.\nWhile our audit did not examine operations at those airports, it is very likely that\npassengers on flights operating at these airports experienced long, on-board\ndelays.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 10\n\n\nAirline and Airport Contingency Plans Are Still Not Adequate To\nHandle Long, On-Board Delays\nIn response to the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s February 2007 request, we examined airlines\xe2\x80\x99\ncustomer service commitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency\nplans dealing with extended ground delays aboard aircraft. We also reviewed\nairports\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans. We found that both air carriers\xe2\x80\x99 and airports\xe2\x80\x99\ncontingency plans are limited in addressing long, on-board delays. Overall, we\nfound that there has been little improvement from what we reported in 2001\xe2\x80\x94that\nonly a few airlines\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans specified in any detail the efforts planned to\nget passengers off the aircraft when delayed for extended periods and that airlines\nhad not clearly and consistently defined terms in the1999 Commitment provision.\n\nIn 2001, we examined individual airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service plans in order to\nevaluate the effectiveness of the Commitment provision, which states that airlines\nwill:\n\n (1) make every reasonable effort to provide food, water, restroom facilities,\n and access to medical treatment for passengers aboard an aircraft that is on the\n ground for an extended period of time without access to the terminal, as\n consistent with passenger and employee safety and security concerns and\n\n (2) prepare contingency plans to address such circumstances and will work\n with carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an\n emergency.\n\nHowever, as we noted in our 2001 report, the airlines had not clearly and\nconsistently defined terms in the Commitment provision such as \xe2\x80\x9can extended\nperiod of time.\xe2\x80\x9d We also noted that only a few airlines\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans specify\nin any detail the efforts that will be made to get passengers off the aircraft when\ndelayed for extended periods, either before departure or after arrival. We\nrecommended that the airlines:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 clarify, in their customer service plans, what is meant by an \xe2\x80\x9cextended period\n of time\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cemergency,\xe2\x80\x9d so that passengers will know what they can expect\n during extended on-aircraft delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ensure that comprehensive customer service contingency plans specify the\n efforts that will be made to get passengers off the aircraft when delayed for\n extended periods, either before departure or after arrival.\n\nIn response to our 2001 report recommendations, the airlines agreed to:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 clarify the terminology used in their customer service plans for extended\n delays.\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 11\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 establish a task force to coordinate and develop contingency plans with local\n airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.\n\nHowever, our 2007 review found that airlines still have neither clearly and\nconsistently defined certain terminology in their customer service plans (such as\nwhat constitutes an \xe2\x80\x9cextended period of time\xe2\x80\x9d or a \xe2\x80\x9clong, on-board delay\xe2\x80\x9d) nor\nestablished a viable task force. Our opinion was then, as it is now, that this should\nbe a top-priority area for the airlines when implementing their contingency plans,\nespecially with long, on-board delays on the rise from 2006 to 2007\xe2\x80\x94particularly\nthose exceeding 4 hours.\n\nNot All Airlines Have Established a Time Limit for On-Board Delays or\nClearly and Consistently Defined Certain Terminology\nFew airlines have stated a specific time before efforts will be made to get\npassengers off the aircraft during long, on-board delays in their customer service\ncommitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency plans that deal with\nthese delays. Prior to the American and JetBlue incidents, only 4 of the 13 airlines\nreviewed had an established time limit on the duration of tarmac delays (see\nexhibit B). After these incidents, eight airlines now have a set time limit on delay\ndurations before deplaning passengers but five still do not. Also, seven airlines\nhave not defined either what constitutes an extended period of time for meeting\npassengers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs or what constitutes a long, on-board delay before\ndeplaning passengers.\n\nIn addition,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 of the airlines that have defined \xe2\x80\x9can extended period of time,\xe2\x80\x9d the trigger\n thresholds for meeting passengers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs vary from 1 to 3 hours. We\n think it is unlikely that passengers\xe2\x80\x99 definition of an extended period of time\n will vary depending upon which airline they are flying. A consistent policy\n across the airlines would be helpful to passengers.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 of the airlines that have defined what constitutes a \xe2\x80\x9clong, on-board delay,\xe2\x80\x9d the\n trigger thresholds for deplaning passengers vary from 1 to 5 hours.\n\nAll airlines need to specify in detail the efforts that will be made to get passengers\noff the aircraft when delayed for extended periods, either before departure or after\narrival. Although the airlines formed a task force, the effort never materialized as\npriorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Our testimony before the House\nSubcommittee on Aviation in April 2007 recommended that the task force be\nreconvened, and, to date, there has been no action to do so.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 12\n\n\nAirports\xe2\x80\x99 Contingency Plans Addressing Long, On-Board Delays Are Also\nLimited\nIn addition to examining airline contingency plans for mitigating long, on-board\ndelays as requested, we also examined contingency plans from selected major\nairports nationwide. We requested contingency plans from 13 airports, including\n12 hub airports (see exhibit C). We received plans or responses from all\n13 airports and found the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Only two airports have a process for monitoring and mitigating long, on-board\n delays that involves contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an\n aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Airports intervene only upon an airline\xe2\x80\x99s request primarily because they do not\n have the authority to interfere with a carrier\xe2\x80\x99s operations during long, on-board\n delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Most plans address assisting airlines, when assistance is requested, during\n long, on-board delays. This includes providing gates to deplane passengers or,\n when a gate is not available, deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs,\n loading them onto buses, and returning to the terminal.\n\nBased on discussions with airline personnel, it appears that in the recent events\nthat stranded passengers for extraordinarily long periods there was not a\ncoordinated effort by the airlines, airport operators, and FAA to deal with such\nevents.\n\nIn our opinion, airport operators need to become more involved in contingency\nplanning for extraordinary flight disruptions, including long, on-board delays\nduring extreme weather or any other disruptive event. Airports are public\nagencies heavily supported by Federal funding to provide better service to the\npublic. As recipients of Federal funds for airport improvement projects, airports\nhave an obligation to increase airport efficiency, decrease delays, and transport\npassengers in the most efficient manner.\n\nAlso, air travelers can still choose which connecting airport to fly through to get to\ntheir final destinations or take direct flights to avoid chronically delayed airports\nall together. If certain airports continue to maintain a reputation for long flight\nand tarmac delays, passengers may simply choose other airports whenever\npossible.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 13\n\n\nIn our view, large- and medium-hub airport 11 operators should establish a process\nfor monitoring and mitigating long, on-board delays that involves contacting the\nairline to request a plan of action after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the\ntarmac. As part of the plan, the airport operators need to work with the airlines to\nensure that the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 deplaning policies are adhered to. Absent any airline\npolicy, the airport operators should work with airlines to establish policies for\ndeplaning passengers and ensure that these policies are adhered to.\n\n\nOngoing Actions for Mitigating Long, On-Board Delays\nSecretary Peters asked that we highlight some of the best practices we found that\ncould help in dealing with long, on-board delays. During our review of selected\nairlines and airports, we found several practices by some airlines and airports to\nmitigate the effects of these occurrences. Also, after our review began, some\nairports moved forward with other initiatives meant to assist the airlines in dealing\nwith long, on-board delays. In addition, ATA announced a new initiative for\ndealing with such situations. FAA also expanded an existing initiative this\nsummer to other parts of the National Airspace System to reduce the amount of\ntime that flights sit on tarmacs waiting to depart. We have included these actions\nalong with best practices identified during our review to provide an overall picture\nof the actions being taken across the industry that relate to the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s\nconcerns.\n\nAirlines\xe2\x80\x99 and Airports\xe2\x80\x99 Best Practices and Ongoing Initiatives\nBest Practices: The best practices we identified during our review include the\nfollowing:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will remain on-board\n aircraft before deplaning them. An airline\xe2\x80\x99s local contingency planning at one\n airport is to do everything reasonably possible to ensure that passengers do not\n remain on board aircraft for more than 1 hour.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x9cIntelligent cancelling\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x94cancelling flights most likely to be affected by the\n weather event without being too optimistic or pessimistic. Pre-cancelling\n flights before the passengers leave home keeps them away from the airport,\n thus reducing congestion. There are trade-offs when implementing this\n practice\xe2\x80\x94passengers avoid experiencing long, on-board delays, but they need\n to be re-accommodated on later flights, optimally that same day. However,\n\n11\n FAA defines (1) large hubs as those airports that each account for at least 1 percent of the total U.S. passenger\n enplanements and (2) medium hubs as those airports that each account for between .025 percent and 1 percent of the\n total passenger enplanements. Large-hub airports (30 in total) account for 69 percent of all passenger enplanements,\n while medium-hub airports (37 in total) account for 20 percent of all enplanements.\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 14\n\n\n reduced capacity and higher load factors can result in increased passenger\n inconvenience and dissatisfaction with customer service. With more seats\n filled, air carriers have fewer options to accommodate passengers from\n cancelled flights.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Keeping gate space available for off-loading passengers in times of irregular\n operations. This could be done by the airport authority or the carriers. The gate\n would be available for arriving aircraft and solely for deplaning passengers.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Implementing programs that provide volunteer employees from throughout the\n airline\xe2\x80\x99s system that are flown or driven to the destination needing assistance.\n These volunteers (i.e., customer service agents) act as additional help during\n irregular operations. The goal of the agents would be to separate and service\n passengers needing to be rebooked from those passengers arriving at the\n airport already ticketed for on-time flights or non-cancelled, operating flights.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Implementing flexible staffing arrangements and periodic duty rotations to\n meet the challenges during irregular operations. For example, certain non-\n customer service employees have been cross-trained to assist in re-booking\n passengers whose flights have been cancelled.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Holding teleconferences before a known weather event (e.g., winter storm,\n hurricane, tropical depression, etc.) with potentially affected airports\xe2\x80\x99 general\n managers. In addition to asking for recommendations from the general\n managers, they discuss the status of snow removal equipment, liquid de-icing\n amounts/availability, staffing, and possible scheduled operation (aircraft and\n passenger) reductions. Similar meetings are already held between FAA and\n airlines.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Using the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System\n (equipped on most commercial aircraft) to send a message to the airline\xe2\x80\x99s\n Operations Control Center notifying the Center that the aircraft has been off\n the gate for more than 3 hours without departing.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Constantly monitoring aircraft on the tarmac; in cases of aircraft remaining for\n more than 2 hours, airport staff will contact the appropriate airline manager to\n coordinate the aircraft\xe2\x80\x99s return to a gate. If necessary, airport staff will assist in\n deplaning an aircraft and provide an escort, buses, and mobile stairs. Finally,\n staff will ensure that airport services (e.g., concessions, security, and ground\n transportation) remain open during an irregular operation.\n\nThe best practices we identified during our review are not all-inclusive, and the\nairlines or airports should consider incorporating them into their ongoing\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 15\n\n\noperations, especially the best practice of setting the maximum amount of time\nthat passengers will remain on board aircraft before deplaning.\n\nHowever, in our opinion, a more comprehensive national plan of action is needed\nto prevent and mitigate long, on-board delays and should involve collaboration\namong airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT. Therefore, a national task force of\nrepresentatives from each of these groups should be established to develop and\ncoordinate contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays. Although the airlines\nformed a task force in response to our 2001 report recommendations, the effort\nnever materialized as priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Now is the time\nto reconvene the task force.\n\nAirports\xe2\x80\x99 Ongoing Initiatives To Address Long, On-Board Delays: During\nour review, two major airport operators put forth initiatives to address long, on-\nboard delays. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey set up a task force\nto find ways to reduce flight delays at the region\xe2\x80\x99s three main airports. The Port\nAuthority; which operates JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International\nAirports; leads the group. The task force includes airline executives and Federal,\nstate, and city government officials.\n\nThe task force convened its first meeting July 18, 2007, with 42 airline executives\nand Federal, state, and city government officials attending, including then FAA\nAdministrator Blakey. The task force met a second time on September 18, and\nanother meeting is scheduled for November 2007; conference calls are planned to\noccur periodically. The task force plans to issue a report by the end of 2007.\n\nThe task force is addressing two main areas\xe2\x80\x94technical issues and customer\nservice. In the technical area, the Port Authority and FAA are working on\nprocedural improvements, such as more efficient use of the runways at JFK. Also,\nwork is being delegated to the airlines that are looking into ways that airports\ncould be changed to reduce flight delays. In the customer service area, the focus is\non best methods for getting passengers off aircraft and enhancements for reducing\nthe amount of time they are kept on aircraft.\n\nHartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is moving forward with a plan to\ncut gate delays for arriving passengers by busing people from planes directly to\nconcourses when airline gates are full. The city of Atlanta, which operates the\nairport, approved a $2.5 million proposal for 4 new buses that can transport about\n80 passengers and their carry-on luggage. The plan also includes sets of mobile\nstairways that allow passengers to leave planes and another vehicle to help\ndisabled passengers. Airlines requesting the service will reimburse the city for the\nuse of the buses.\n\n\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 16\n\n\nIt is encouraging to see that some airport operators are becoming more involved in\nmitigating long, on-board delays. However, as passenger traffic continues to\ngrow, airports will need to become more proactive in dealing with long, on-board\ndelays, especially those airports with limited airfield or gate capacity. Airports\nwill also need to proactively deal with in-terminal delays when multiple flights are\ncancelled and passengers are stranded in the gate areas where terminal capacity\ncould be limited.\n\nATA Initiative To Address Long, On-Board Delays\nOn February 22, 2007, ATA announced an initiative for dealing with long, on-\nboard delays and proposed the following course of action:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Each airline will continue to review and update its policies to ensure the safety,\n security, and comfort of customers.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Each airline will work with FAA to allow long-delayed flights to return to\n terminals in order to off-load passengers who choose to disembark without\n losing that flight\xe2\x80\x99s position in the departure sequence.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ATA will ask the Department to review airline and airport emergency\n contingency plans to ensure that the plans effectively address weather\n emergencies in a coordinated manner and provide passengers with essential\n needs (i.e., food, water, lavatory facilities, and medical services).\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ATA will ask the Department to promptly convene a meeting of air carrier,\n airport, and FAA representatives to discuss procedures to better respond to\n weather emergencies that result in lengthy flight delays.\n\nWhile we understand the current pressures that ATA and its member airlines face\nin maintaining profitability, we are concerned that the actions proposed merely\nshift responsibility from ATA to the Department. We agree that the Department\nmust be an active partner, but ATA\xe2\x80\x99s proposed course of action is not significantly\ndifferent than what the airlines agreed to do in response to our 2001\nrecommendations, such as \xe2\x80\x9cto establish a task force to coordinate and develop\ncontingency plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s Expanded Program To Reduce Flight Delays\nFAA is also taking action to minimize delays; the Agency expanded an existing\ninitiative this summer to other parts of the National Airspace System to reduce the\namount of time that flights sit on tarmacs waiting to depart. This initiative, known\nas the Airspace Flow Program, gives FAA and the airlines the capability to\nmaximize the overall use of the National Airspace System while minimizing\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 17\n\n\ndelays and congestion. These efforts, which are managed by FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Command\nCenter, do not create additional capacity but limit the negative effects of bad\nweather. For instance, it gives airlines the option of either accepting delays for\nflights scheduled to fly through storms or flying longer routes to safely maneuver\naround them.\n\nThe Agency successfully launched the program last year at seven locations in the\nNortheast. According to FAA, on bad weather days at major airports in the\nregion, delays fell by 9 percent compared to the year before. Cost savings for the\nairlines and the flying public from the program were estimated to be $100 million\nannually. The number of Airspace Flow Program locations\xe2\x80\x94chosen for their\ncombination of heavy traffic and frequent bad weather\xe2\x80\x94was expanded from 7 to\n18. The additional locations will ease delays for passengers flying through the\nsouthern and midwestern United States and for those on transcontinental flights.\n\nIn the past, severe storms often forced FAA to ground flights at affected airports.\nThis \xe2\x80\x9cpenalized\xe2\x80\x9d flights whose scheduled paths would have taken them around the\nstorm had they not been grounded with the flights directly affected by the storms.\nThe Airspace Flow Program allows FAA to manage traffic fairly and efficiently\nby identifying only those flights scheduled to fly through storms and giving them\nestimated departure times. Airspace Flow Programs will also be used in\nconditions not related to weather, such as severe congestion near major cities.\n\nIn another development, the Agency rolled out a new software program that is\nintended to ensure that airports affected by bad weather receive the maximum\nnumber of flights that can safely fly to them. During storms, arrival slots often\nopen up due to delayed or cancelled flights. The new software program, called\nAdaptive Compression, would automatically fill those slots with the next available\nflight. The software tool, which was launched in March 2007, is intended to\nreduce delays, saving time and money for the airlines and passengers.\n\nWhile it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of these ongoing initiatives, they\nall have merit and, if properly executed, should help in mitigating long, on-board\ndelays in the immediate term.\n\nDOT, FAA, Airlines, and Airports Should Complete Actions on\nOutstanding Recommendations To Improve Airline Customer Service\nand Minimize Long, On-Board Delays\nGiven the events of this past winter, DOT should take a more active role in\noverseeing customer service issues, and there are actions that the Department, the\nairlines, airports, and FAA can undertake immediately to do so. Many of the\nactions are not new and date back to recommendations in our 2001 report, which\nwere directed at delay and cancellation problems\xe2\x80\x94key drivers of customer\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 18\n\n\ndissatisfaction with airlines. To improve the accountability, enforcement, and\nprotection afforded to air travelers we recommend the following.\n\nActions Needed From the Airlines and Airports\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Clarify delay terminology and set limits for delay durations before\n deplaning passengers. Those airlines who have not already done so must:\n (1) define what constitutes an extended period of time for meeting passengers\xe2\x80\x99\n essential needs, (2) set a time limit on long, on-board delay durations before\n deplaning passengers, and (3) incorporate such policies in their contracts of\n carriage and post them on their Internet site. We recommended most of these\n actions in 2001, and the airlines agreed and stated plans to implement them.\n\n We realize that certain procedures may need to be tailored to individual airlines\n and airports and will heavily depend on the situation (e.g., setting a time limit\n on delay durations before returning to a gate or, when a gate is not available,\n deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs, loading them onto buses, and\n returning to the terminal). There may be situations or conditions that make it\n difficult to bring passengers back to a gate during long, on-board delays. Some\n of the main obstacles to this are the physical layouts of the airports. Some\n airports, by virtue of their design and modern facilities, may be able to safely\n accommodate aircraft movement. Other airports, because of their layout\n design (narrow taxiways), may not be able to accommodate aircraft moving\n about and off-loading passengers safely.\n\n Also, weather factors can limit off-loading options. For example, deplaning\n passengers onto metal mobile stairs is not feasible during a lightning storm.\n Likewise, it may not be necessary to deplane passengers at JFK after 2 hours,\n since typical Friday afternoon delays normally last that long. However, a 2-\n hour, on-board delay at Austin might require deplaning activities to commence.\n Airlines and airports need to work together to determine the various situations\n that can occur and devise plans for handling those occurrences.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed or cancelled\n flights. 12 In our 2001 report, we recommended that the airlines establish in the\n Commitment and their Customer Service Plans targets for reducing the number\n of flights chronically delayed (i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled\n 40 percent or more of the time.\n\n In response to our recommendation, the airlines stated they were \xe2\x80\x9cwilling to\n accept the challenge of reducing chronically delayed or cancelled flights, for\n\n12\n We define chronically delayed or cancelled flights as those flights delayed 30 minutes or longer or cancelled at least\n 40 percent of the time during a single month.\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 19\n\n\n factors we can control, in order to relieve unneeded and unwanted passenger\n frustration.\xe2\x80\x9d However, there were no actions identified on how or when the\n airlines would go about implementing this challenge. After\n September 11, 2001, their focus shifted, but the problem has returned and must\n be resolved.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Disclose on-time flight performance. We recommended in our 2001 report\n that the airlines disclose to customers at the time of booking, without being\n asked, the prior month\xe2\x80\x99s on-time performance rate for those flights that have\n been delayed (i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled 40 percent or more of the\n time. Currently, the airlines are required to disclose on-time performance only\n upon request from the customer.\n The ATA airlines disagreed with this recommendation and, as an alternative,\n agreed to make on-time performance data accessible to customers on the\n airlines\xe2\x80\x99 Internet sites, on a link to the BTS Internet site, or through toll-free\n telephone reservation systems.\n However, in our 2006 review, 13 only 5 of the 16 airlines we reviewed made\n on-time performance data available on their Internet sites. Given the ease of\n availability of this information to the airlines, we continue to believe that\n airlines should post on-time flight performance information on their Internet\n sites and make it available through their telephone reservation systems without\n being prompted.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Resume efforts to self-audit their customer service plans. We also\n recommended in 2001 that the airlines establish quality assurance and\n performance measurement systems and conduct internal audits to measure\n compliance with the Commitment provisions and customer service plans. The\n ATA airlines agreed with the recommendation.\n\n In June 2001, we confirmed that 12 of the 14 ATA airlines that were\n signatories to the Commitment had established and implemented their quality\n assurance and performance measurement systems. In our 2006 review,\n however, we found that the quality assurance and performance measurement\n systems were being implemented at just five of the ATA airlines. The other\n ATA airlines had either discontinued their systems after September 11, 2001,\n or combined them with operations or financial performance reviews where the\n Commitment provisions were overshadowed by those issues.\n\n The key to the success of the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 new policies designed to prevent\n on-board delays is for each airline to (1) have a credible tracking system for\n\n13\n OIG Report Number AV-2007-012, \xe2\x80\x9cFollow-Up Review: Performance of U.S. Airlines in Implementing Selected\n Provisions of the Airline Customer Service Commitment,\xe2\x80\x9d November 21, 2006.\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 20\n\n\n compliance with its new policy and with all other Commitment provisions and\n (2) implement its customer service plan, reinforcing it with performance goals\n and measures.\n\n These systems and audit procedures will also help DOT to more efficiently\n review the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with the Commitment provisions and ensure\n that airlines comply with their policies governing long, on-board delays,\n especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reconvene the task force. In response to our 2001 report recommendations,\n the airlines agreed to establish a task force of representatives from airlines,\n airports, and FAA to develop and coordinate contingency plans to deal with\n lengthy delays, such as working with carriers and the airports to share facilities\n and make gates available in an emergency. Although the airlines formed a task\n force, the effort never materialized because their priorities shifted after\n September 11, 2001. In our testimony before the House Subcommittee on\n Aviation in April 2007, we recommended that the task force be reconvened, to\n date, there still has been no action to do so. Now is the time for airlines to\n reconvene a national task force and develop and coordinate contingency plans\n with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Implement processes for monitoring lengthy delays. Large- and\n medium-hub airport operators should establish a process for monitoring and\n mitigating long, on-board delays that involves contacting the airline to request\n a plan of action after an aircraft has remained on the tarmac for 2 hours. As\n part of the plan, the airport operators need to work with the airlines to ensure\n that the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 deplaning policies are adhered to. Absent any airline policy,\n the airports should establish their own policies for deplaning passengers.\n\nActions Needed From DOT\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Implement the necessary changes in the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 on-time performance\n reporting to capture all long, on board delays. Under 14 Code of Federal\n Regulations Part 234, \xe2\x80\x9cAirline Service Quality Performance Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d air\n carriers that account for at least 1 percent of domestic scheduled passenger\n revenues must submit monthly reports to the BTS that include, among other\n things, the number of (1) flights that departed and arrived on time by airport;\n (2) flights delayed, cancelled, and diverted; and (3) flights delayed or cancelled\n by cause.\n\n However, the delay statistics (see statistics reflected in table 1 on page v) do\n not accurately portray the magnitude of long, on-board delays because carriers\n are not required to report a delay if the flight is cancelled or diverted. For\n example, if a flight taxies out, sits for hours, and then taxies back in and is\n\n\nFindings\n\x0c 21\n\n\n cancelled, the cancellation is recorded but the delay is not. Therefore, there is\n no record of how long a flight remained at the gate or sat on the tarmac before\n it was cancelled. This was the case with some JetBlue flights at JFK on\n February 14, 2007. Also, if a flight is diverted to an airport other than the\n destination airport and sits on the tarmac for an extended period of time, the\n flight is not recorded in delay statistics. This was the case with American\xe2\x80\x99s\n flights that were diverted to Austin on December 29, 2006.\n\n BTS is looking into whether changes are needed in how the airlines record\n long, on-board delays. BTS should make this a priority and implement the\n necessary changes in the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 on-time performance reporting requirements\n to capture all events resulting in long, on-board delays, such as flight\n diversions and cancellations.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Conduct incident investigations involving long, on-board delays. Also,\n based on the results of this review, the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Office of General\n Counsel\xe2\x80\x94in collaboration with FAA, airlines, and airports\xe2\x80\x94should review\n incidents involving long, on-board ground delays and their causes; identify\n trends and patterns of such events; and implement workable solutions for\n mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Oversee the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 policies for dealing with long, on-board delays. The\n Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings should ensure that airlines\n comply with their policies governing long, on-board delays, especially in the\n event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays, and advise\n Congress if the airlines retreat from the Commitment provisions or dilute the\n language in the current contracts of carriage.\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nIn order to improve the accountability, enforcement, and the protection afforded to\nair travelers, we are making the following recommendations to the Secretary of\nTransportation:\n\n 1. Require each certificated and commuter airline that provides domestic\n scheduled service using any aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats to\n (a) define what constitutes an extended period of time; (b) set a time limit on\n delay durations before deplaning passengers; and (c) incorporate such\n policies in its contract of carriage and post on its Internet site.\n\n 2. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to\n 14 CFR Part 234 to establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed\n or cancelled flights.\n\n\nRecommendations\n\x0c 22\n\n\n 3. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to\n 14 CFR Part 234 to post on-time flight performance information on their\n Internet sites.\n\n 4. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to\n 14 CFR Part 234 to disclose to customers at the time of booking, without\n being asked, the prior month\xe2\x80\x99s on-time performance rate for those flights that\n have been delayed (i.e., for 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled 40 percent or\n more of the time.\n\n 5. Require each certificated and commuter airline that provides domestic\n scheduled service using any aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats to\n self-audit their customer service plans.\n\n 6. Require large- and medium-hub airport operators to establish and implement\n a process for monitoring and mitigating long, on-board delays that involves\n contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an aircraft has remained\n for 2 hours on the tarmac.\n\n 7. Establish a national task force of airlines, airports, and FAA to coordinate\n and develop contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays, such as working\n with carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an\n emergency.\n\n 8. Require BTS to implement the necessary changes in the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 on-time\n performance reporting requirements to capture all events resulting in long,\n on-board delays, such as flight diversions.\n\n 9. In collaboration with FAA, airlines, and airports, review incidents involving\n long, on-board ground delays and their causes; identify trends and patterns of\n such events; and implement workable solutions for mitigating extraordinary\n flight disruptions.\n\n 10. Direct the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings to ensure that\n airlines comply with their public policies governing long, on-board delays,\n especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays,\n and advise Congress if the airlines retreat from such policies.\n\n\n\n\nRecommendations\n\x0c 23\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY, AND\nRELATED AUDIT COVERAGE\n\nObjectives\nOn February 26, 2007, Secretary Peters requested that the Office of Inspector\nGeneral (OIG) examine the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service plans, contracts of carriage,\nand internal policies dealing with long, on-board delays and the specific incidents\ninvolving American Airlines and JetBlue Airways when passengers were stranded\non board aircraft for extended periods of time. She also requested that we provide\nrecommendations on what actions should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such\nevents.\n\nConsistent with Secretary Peter\xe2\x80\x99s request, we (1) looked into the specific situations\ninvolving American and JetBlue, in light of whatever specific commitment these\ncarriers made concerning policies and practices for meeting customers\xe2\x80\x99 essential\nneeds during long on-board delays; (2) examined the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service\ncommitments, contracts of carriage, and policies dealing with extended ground\ndelays aboard aircraft; and (3) provided recommendations as to what, if anything,\nthe airlines, airports, or the Government, including the Department, might do to\nprevent a recurrence of such events, highlighting any \xe2\x80\x9cbest practices\xe2\x80\x9d discovered\nby the industry in dealing with such situations.\n\n\nScope and Methodology\nWe conducted this review between March 2007 and September 2007. The audit\nwas conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards prescribed by\nthe Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests as we\nconsidered necessary to provide reasonable assurance of detecting abuse or illegal\nacts. In conducting this review, we relied on computer-generated data from the\nairlines and did not access the general and application controls for each of the\nautomated systems.\n\nTo examine the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service commitments, contracts of carriage, and\npolicies dealing with extended ground delays aboard aircraft we obtained the\ncustomer service plans and contracts of carriage from the Air Transport\nAssociation member airlines. We reviewed these documents in particular for\nreferences related to the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 handling of long on-board delays and essential\nneeds of the passengers. We also obtained and reviewed 13 airports\xe2\x80\x99 policies\ndealing with extended ground delays from selected Airports Council International-\nNorth America member airports. We reviewed these documents in particular for\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit\nCoverage\n\x0c 24\n\n\nreferences related to the airports monitoring and assisting in handling long,\non-board delays.\n\nTo evaluate the specific situations involving American and JetBlue, we visited\nJetBlue Airways\xe2\x80\x99 headquarters in New York (including JFK) and American\nAirlines\xe2\x80\x99 in Texas\xe2\x80\x94specifically, Dallas-Fort Worth International and\nAustin-Bergstrom Airports. We reviewed information and data from American\nand JetBlue regarding the events of December 29, 2006, and February 14, 2007.\nWe also received information from other carriers providing service from Dallas-\nFort Worth, Austin, and New York airports and met with officials from FAA air\ntraffic control and those three airports.\n\n\nRelated Audit and Testimony Coverage\nIn the past 7 years, OIG has performed a number of customer service-related\naudits and testimonies. We issued our most recent update in April 2007.\n\nReport AV-2000-102, \xe2\x80\x9cInterim Report on Airline Customer Service\nCommitment,\xe2\x80\x9d June 27, 2000. The June 2000 report provided the 6-month\nprogress of the airlines in implementing their customer service plans. The Interim\nReport provided the preliminary results and observations on the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 systems\nto measure performance against their plans, discussed the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 contracts of\ncarriage in relation to their plans, provided observations of the Department\xe2\x80\x99s\ncapacity to enforce consumer protection rights, and discussed the importance of\ncustomer service in the marketplace.\n\nReport AV-2001-020, \xe2\x80\x9cFinal Report on Airline Customer Service\nCommitment,\xe2\x80\x9d February 12, 2001 and Testimony CC-2001-090, \xe2\x80\x9cAirline\nCustomer Service Commitment,\xe2\x80\x9d on February 13, 2001. In this final report\nand testimony, we reported that the airlines were making progress toward meeting\ntheir Customer Service Commitment and that the Commitment has been a plus for\nair travelers. Notwithstanding progress by the airlines toward meeting their\nCommitment, we found significant shortfalls in reliable and timely communication\nwith passengers by the Airlines about flight delays and cancellations. Further, we\nfound the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 Commitment does not directly address the most deep-seated,\nunderlying cause of customer dissatisfaction\xe2\x80\x94flight delays and cancellations, and\nwhat the airlines plan to do about them in the areas under their control in the\nimmediate term.\n\nTestimony CC-2001-217, \xe2\x80\x9cStatus Report on Airline Customer Service,\xe2\x80\x9d\nJune 20, 2001. In June 2001, the OIG presented testimony before the House\nTransportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation\nregarding progress made by 14 airlines in improving customer service since our\n2001 report. We reported that most airlines had: (1) incorporated the original\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit\nCoverage\n\x0c 25\n\n\nAirline Customer Service Commitment into their contracts of carriage, (2)\nestablished performance measurement systems, and (3) petitioned the Department\nto revise regulations for reporting mishandled baggage and compensating\npassengers involuntarily bumped from a flight. The airlines also formed a task\nforce to develop plans for accommodating passengers delayed overnight, ensuring\nairport display monitors are accurate, and providing for passengers\xe2\x80\x99 needs during\nlong on-board delays. There were several important recommendations that the\nairlines did not address, such as petitioning the Department to require that each\nairline with a frequent flyer program make available to the public a more\ncomprehensive reporting of frequent flyer redemption information in its frequent\nflyer literature and annual reports (e.g., the percentage of successful redemptions\nand frequent flyer seats made available in the airline\xe2\x80\x99s top origin and destination\nmarkets).\n\nReport SC-2005-051, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of December 2004 Holiday Air Travel\nDisruptions,\xe2\x80\x9d February 28, 2005. Pursuant to Secretary Mineta\xe2\x80\x99s request of\nDecember 27, 2004, we issued a report on our review of the travel disruptions\nexperienced over the December holiday travel period by Comair and US Airways.\nWe found that Comair\xe2\x80\x99s problems were a function of severe weather at Cincinnati\nand failure of the computer system it used to schedule its crews. In Cincinnati,\nComair\xe2\x80\x99s flight cancellations and delays ultimately affected approximately\n269,000 passenger itineraries. Additionally, we found that US Airways\xe2\x80\x99 problems\ncentered on staffing shortfalls going into the holiday travel period in two critical\nfunctions\xe2\x80\x94fleet service employees and flight attendants, particularly at its\nPhiladelphia hub. Plans to offset the staffing shortages through overtime and\nincreasing the required number of hours worked by flight attendants did not work.\nUS Airways cancelled 405 flights during the holiday travel period, affecting more\nthan 46,000 passengers and delayed over 3,900 flights affecting over\n518,000 passengers.\n\nReport AV-2007-012, \xe2\x80\x9cFollow-Up Review: Performance of U.S. Airlines in\nImplementing Selected Provisions of the Airline Customer Service\nCommitment,\xe2\x80\x9d November 21, 2006. In the 2006 follow-up review, we reported\nthat the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 customer service plans were still in place to carry out the\nprovisions of the Commitment and that the Commitment provisions were still\nincorporated in their contracts of carriage, as we recommended in our prior review.\n\nWe found that the airlines needed to (1) resume efforts to self-audit their customer\nservice plans; (2) emphasize to their customer service employees the importance\nof providing timely and adequate flight information; (3) focus on the training for\npersonnel who assist passengers with disabilities; (4) provide straightforward,\ncomprehensive reporting on frequent flyer award redemptions; and (5) improve\nthe handling of bumped passengers.\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit\nCoverage\n\x0c 26\n\n\nWe also found that the Department was using its additional resources to oversee\nand enforce air travel consumer protection requirements with a focus on\ninvestigations and enforcement of civil rights issues, including complaints from\npassengers with disabilities. However, when the Department discovered violations\nand assesses penalties, it almost always forgave a portion of the penalty if the air\ncarrier agreed to mitigate the conditions and remain in future compliance with the\nrule for which the penalty was assessed. The Department\xe2\x80\x99s follow-up monitoring\nof compliance with these conditions was limited, and in some cases there was no\nfollow-up monitoring by the Department.\n\nTestimony CC-2007-042, \xe2\x80\x9cRefocusing Efforts To Improve Airline Customer\nService,\xe2\x80\x9d April 11, 2007. In April 2007, the OIG presented testimony to the\nSenate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reporting that the\nairlines continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions,\nincluding long, on-board delays during extreme weather. The airlines, FAA, and\nthe Department cannot prevent significant weather events. What they can do,\nhowever, is work together to plan for such events and minimize the impact on\npassengers.\n\nHowever, there are actions that the airlines, airports, the Department, and FAA\ncould undertake immediately without being prompted by Congress to do so. For\nexample:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Those airlines that have not already done so should implement quality\n assurance and performance measurement systems and conduct internal audits\n of their compliance with the Commitment provisions. The Department should\n use these systems to more efficiently review the airlines\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with\n those Commitment provisions governed by Federal regulation.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Department should revisit its current position on chronic delays and\n cancellations and take enforcement actions against air carriers that consistently\n advertise flight schedules that are unrealistic, regardless of the reason.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The airlines, airports, and FAA should establish a task force to coordinate and\n develop contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays, such as working with\n carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an\n emergency.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Department\xe2\x80\x99s Office of General Counsel; in collaboration with FAA,\n airlines, and airports; should review incidents involving long, on-board ground\n delays and their causes; identify trends and patterns of such events; and\n implement workable solutions for mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions.\n\nTestimony CC-2007-046, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve Airline Customer\nService,\xe2\x80\x9d April 20, 2007. In April 2007, the OIG presented testimony before the\nHouse Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit\nCoverage\n\x0c 27\n\n\nreporting that the airlines continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary\nflight disruptions, including long, on-board delays during extreme weather.\nSimilar recommendations were provided to the House committee as were\npresented to the Senate committee the week before.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit\nCoverage\n\x0c 28\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT B. SELECTED AIRLINES\xe2\x80\x99 TERMS AND CONDITIONS\nFOR HANDLING LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS\n Airline Definition of Extended Time to Deplane Stated in\n Period of Time Stated in Customer Service Plans\n Customer Service Plans and/or Contracts of\n and/or Contracts of Carriage and/or Defined\n Carriage by Internal Policies (I)\nAlaska 90 Minutes 2 Hours for Arrivals\nAloha None None\nAmerican 2 Hours 4 Hours (I)\n (as of 4/10/07)\nATA 1 Hour for Beverages None\n 4 Hours for Catering\nContinental 2 Hours 4 Hours for Departures\n (as of 6/15/07)\nDelta None None\nHawaiian 2 Hours 2 Hours\n (as of 8/01/01)\nJetBlue None 5 Hours\n (as of 2/20/07)\nMidwest None None\nNorthwest 1 Hour for Arrivals 1 Hour for Arrivals\n 3 Hours for Departures 3 Hours for Departures\nSouthwest 2 Hours 2 Hours\nUnited None 1\xc2\xbd Hours for Arrivals\n 4 Hours for Departures\n (as of 9/05/07)\nUS Airways 2 Hours None\n\n\n\n\nExhibit B. Selected Airlines\xe2\x80\x99 Terms and Conditions for Handling\nLong, On-Board Delays\n\x0c 29\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT C. SELECTED AIRPORTS\xe2\x80\x99 POLICIES FOR ASSISTING\nIN LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS\n Airport Plan to Deplane Airport Policy*\n Passengers\n Seattle-Tacoma Yes Determine remote parking locations for\n International aircraft to deplane passengers and provide\n buses if requested.\n Dallas/Fort Worth Yes Monitor length of time hold positions of\n International aircraft. If over 2 hours, coordinate\n aircraft return to gate.\n Austin/Bergstrom No Determine parking spots of diverted\n International aircraft.\n Indianapolis Yes Provide available gate or remotely\n International deplane passengers to buses upon request.\n George Bush Yes Provide buses when requested.\n Intercontinental\n Hartsfield-Jackson Yes Provide mobile lounges to take passengers\n Atlanta to gate when requested by airlines.\n International\n Honolulu No Encourage carriers to off-load passengers\n International and offer immediate assistance by, among\n other things, offering use of available\n airport facilities.\n John F. Kennedy Yes After 2 hours and upon request, help to\n International (New find alternate airport locations to safely\n York) deplane passengers.\n General Mitchell Yes Provide buses when requested.\n International\n (Milwaukee)\n Minneapolis-St. Yes Provide air stairs and buses to deplane\n Paul International passengers when requested.\n Dallas Love Field Yes Provide emergency services upon request.\n Chicago O\xe2\x80\x99Hare No Monitor length of time hold positions of\n International aircraft.\n Phoenix Sky Yes Help with deplanements via jet bridge or\n Harbor remote hardstand and provide buses to\n International transport passengers.\n*The policies listed in the table are not all inclusive; these are highlights from the airports\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans for\n dealing with long, on-board delays.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit C. Selected Airports\xe2\x80\x99 Policies for Assisting in Long, On-\nBoard Delays\n\x0c 30\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT D. STAKEHOLDERS VISITED OR CONTACTED\nAirlines Visited Airlines Contacted\nAmerican Airlines Alaska Airlines JetBlue Airways\n Headquarters, Ft. Worth, TX Aloha Airlines Midwest Airlines\n DFW International Airport, TX American Airlines Northwest Airlines\n Austin-Bergstrom International, TX ATA Airlines Southwest Airlines\n JFK International Airport, NY Continental Airlines United Airlines\n Delta Air Lines US Airways\n Hawaiian Airlines\n\nJetBlue Airways\n Headquarters, Forest Hills, NY N/A\n JFK International Airport, NY\nSouthwest Airlines\n Dallas-Love Field, TX N/A\n Austin-Bergstrom International, TX\nUnited Airlines\n DFW International Airport, TX N/A\n JFK International Airport, NY\nContinental Airlines\n Austin-Bergstrom International, TX\n N/A\nDelta Airlines\nJFK International Airport, NY\n N/A\nAirports Visited Airports Contacted\nDallas/Fort Worth International Chicago O\xe2\x80\x99Hare International\nCity of Austin Aviation Department Dallas Love Field\n Austin-Bergstrom International, Austin, TX General Mitchell International (Milwaukee)\nPort Authority of New York and New Jersey George Bush Intercontinental (Houston)\n John F. Kennedy Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International\n International, Jamaica, NY Honolulu International\n Indianapolis International\n Minneapolis-St. Paul International\n Phoenix Sky Harbor International\n Seattle-Tacoma International\nFAA ATC Facilities Visited or Contacted Trade Associations Contacted\nDFW Air Traffic Control Tower, DFW Air Transport Association, Washington D.C.\nAirport, TX Airports Council International-North America,\nAir Route Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, Washington D.C.\nTX Airline Pilots Association, Washington D.C.\nAustin Air Traffic Control Tower, Austin, TX Association of Flight Attendants,\nAir Traffic Systems Operations, Tactical Washington D.C.\nOperations Northeast United States,\n Jamaica, NY\nJFK Air Traffic Control Tower, Jamaica, NY\n\n\n\n\nExhibit D. Stakeholders Visited or Contacted\n\x0c 31\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX. DEPARTMENT COMMENTS\n\n THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION\n WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n\n\n\n\nSeptember 24, 2007\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM TO: Calvin L. Scovel, III\n\nFROM: Mary E. Peters\n\nSUBJECT: Response to OIG Recommendations for Minimizing\n Lengthy, On-Board Flight Delays\n\n\n\nI appreciate the hard work of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in preparing its\nreport titled \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed to Minimize Lengthy, On-Board Flight Delays.\xe2\x80\x9d This\nreport was in response to my February 26, 2007, request that, among other things, you\nexamine carrier policies regarding extended on-ground delays and recommend actions the\nairlines, airports, or the government (including the Department) can take to prevent\nincidents in which passengers are stranded on board aircraft for extended periods of time.\nIt goes without saying that lengthy, on-board flight delays are inconvenient to all\nconcerned and can be frustrating and stressful for passengers. I am fully committed to\nimproving the air travel environment for passengers. Toward that end, I have directed\nDOT staff to carefully consider the recommendations in your report, including those for\nimproving the information provided the public and the manner in which passengers are\ntreated, including compliance by carriers with their own policies.\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Department Comments\n\x0cThe following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts found in this\ndocument. These pages were not in the original document but have been added\nhere to accommodate assistive technology.\n\x0c Actions Needed To Minimize Long, On-Board Flight Delays\n\n 508 Compliant Presentation\n\nFigure 1. Provisions of the Airline Customer Service Commitment\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Offer the lowest fare available.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and diversions.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Deliver baggage on time.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Support an increase in the baggage liability limit.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Allow reservations to be held or cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Provide prompt ticket refunds.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Properly accommodate disabled and special-needs passengers.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Meet customers\xe2\x80\x99 essential needs during long, on-aircraft delays.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Handle \xe2\x80\x9cbumped\xe2\x80\x9d passengers with fairness and consistency.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer rules, and aircraft\n configuration.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensure good customer service from code-share partners.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Be more responsive to customer complaints.\nSource: Airline Customer Service Commitment, June 1999\n\nFigure 2. Percent of Flights Delayed, Cancelled, or Diverted for Years 2000 to 2007\n\n Year Percentage\nFor year 2000 27.4 percent\nFor year 2001 22.6 percent\nFor year 2002 17.9 percent\nFor year 2003 18.0 percent\nFor year 2004 21.9 percent\nFor year 2005 22.6 percent\nFor year 2006 24.6 percent\nFor year 2007 27.8 percent\nNote: The percentage given for the year 2007 is based on January to July data.\nSource: Bureau of Transportation Statistics data\n\x0cFigure 3. Average Length of Arrival Delays for Years 2000 to 2007\n\n Year Minutes\nFor year 2000 52.5 minutes\nFor year 2001 49.2 minutes\nFor year 2002 46.8 minutes\nFor year 2003 48.9 minutes\nFor year 2004 51.4 minutes\nFor year 2005 52.2 minutes\nFor year 2006 54.0 minutes\nFor year 2007 56.7 minutes\nNote: The minutes of arrival delays given for the year 2007 is based on January to July\ndata.\nSource: Bureau of Transportation Statistics data\n\nTable 1. Number of Flights With Long, On-Board Tarmac Delays of 1 to 5 Hours or\nLonger for January Through July of 2006 and 2007\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 33,438 flights with on-board, tarmac delays\n of 1 to 2 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 47,558. This represents a\n 42.23 percent change.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 3,781 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of\n 2 to 3 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 5,213. This represents a 37.87\n percent change.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 710 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 3\n to 4 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 1,025. This represents a 44.37\n percent change.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 120 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 4\n to 5 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 189. This represents a 57.50\n percent change.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 27 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of\n 5 hours or longer. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 44. This represents a\n 62.96 percent change.\n\nThe total number of flights with long, on-board tarmac delays of 1 to 5 hours or longer\nfor January through July of 2006 was 38,076. The total number of flights with long, on-\nboard tarmac delays of 1 to 5 hours or longer for January through July of 2007 was\n54,029. This represents a 41.90 percent increase.\n\nSource: Office of Inspector General analysis based on Bureau of Transportation Statistics\ndata\n\x0cFigure 4. Air Travel Consumer Complaints, 2006\n\n Complaint Percentage\nFlight Problems Accounted for 29 percent of complaints.\nBaggage Accounted for 22 percent of complaints.\nCustomer Care Accounted for 13 percent of complaints.\nReservations, Ticketing, and Boarding Accounted for 11 percent of complaints\nRefunds Accounted for 7 percent of complaints.\nDisability Accounted for 6 percent of complaints.\nOthers Accounted for 12 percent of complaints.\nSource: Department of Transportation Air Travel Consumer Reports for 2006\n\n\nTable 2. Seven Airports Accepting Most of American\xe2\x80\x99s Diversions (on December\n29, 2006)\n\n Airport Location Number of\n Diversions\nSan Antonio Regional San Antonio, Texas 13 diversions\nAirport\nShreveport Regional Airport Shreveport, Louisiana 12 diversions\nAdams Field Airport Little Rock, Arkansas 11 diversions\nWill Rogers World Airport Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 11 diversions\nAustin-Bergstrom Austin, Texas 11 diversions\nInternational Airport\nTulsa International Airport Tulsa, Oklahoma 10 diversions\nMidland International Airport Midland, Texas 10 diversions\n\nThese airports accepted a total of 78 American Airlines diverted flights on December 29,\n2006.\n\nSource: Office of Inspector General\n\x0cTable 3. Length of On-Board Delay and Outcome of the 11 Diverted Flights to\nAustin\n\n Flight Origin City and Length of On- Flight Outcome\n Flight Number Board Delay\nFlight Number 1348 out On-Board Delay of 9 Flight was diverted, remained\nof San Francisco, hours 16 minutes overnight, and arrived at DFW the\nCalifornia next day.\nFlight Number 2412 out On-Board Delay of 7 Flight was cancelled, rebooked, and\nof Los Angeles, hours 14 minutes arrived at DFW the next day.\nCalifornia\nFlight Number 1008 out On-Board Delay of 7 Flight was diverted, remained\nof Oakland, California hours 6 minutes overnight, and arrived at DFW the\n next day.\n\nFlight Number 534 out of On-Board Delay of 6 Flight was diverted, remained\nFresno, California hours 8 minutes overnight, and arrived at DFW the\n next day.\nFlight Number 2302 out On-Board Delay of 2 Flight was diverted and then arrived\nof Seattle, Washington hours 26 minutes at DFW the same day.\n\nFlight Number 1372 out On-Board Delay of 2 Flight was diverted, remained\nof Fresno, California hours 16 minutes overnight, and arrived at DFW the\n next day.\nFlight Number 330 out of On-Board Delay of 2 Flight was diverted and then arrived\nVancouver, British hours 8 minutes at DFW the same day.\nColumbia\n\nFlight Number 1074 out On-Board Delay of 2 Flight was diverted, remained\nof Salt Lake City, Utah hours 4 minutes overnight, and arrived at DFW the\n next day.\nFlight Number 1514 out On-Board Delay of 1 Flight was diverted and then arrived\nof San Jose, California hour 39 minutes at DFW the same day.\n\nFlight Number 592 out of On-Board Delay of 1 Flight was diverted and then arrived\nOrange County, hour 32 minutes at DFW the same day.\nCalifornia\n\nFlight Number 1708 out On-Board Delay of 1 Flight was diverted and then arrived\nof San Diego, California hour 31 minutes at DFW the same day.\n\x0cTable 4. Breakdown of JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Long, On-Board Arrival and Departure Delays at\nJFK\n\nNumber of On Board Delays Over 1 hour 43\nNumber of On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 26\nNumber of On-Board Delays Over 5 hours 21\nNumber of Passengers That Endured 2,962\nOn-Board Delays Over 4 hours\nAverage Time Delay for Arrivals 265 minutes\nAverage Time Delay for Departures 298 minutes\nSource: Office of Inspector General\n\nTable 5. Length and Outcome of JetBlue\xe2\x80\x99s Long, On-Board Delays for Flights at or\nTraveling to John F. Kennedy Airport\n\nItem 1. On-Board Delays for JFK Arrivals\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Fort Myers, Florida, was delayed over 9 hours. The flight was\n eventually deplaned.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Nashville, Tennessee, was delayed over 8 hours. The flight was\n eventually deplaned.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Houston, Texas, (Hobby Airport) was delayed over 7 hours. The flight\n was eventually deplaned.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Burbank, California, was delayed almost 6 hours. The flight was\n diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Austin, Texas, was delayed almost 6 hours. The flight was eventually\n deplaned.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Orlando, Florida, was delayed for 5 and three-quarter hours. The flight\n was eventually deplaned.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Long Beach, California, was delayed for 5 hours. The flight was\n diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight out of Oakland, California was delayed for 4 and three-quarter hours. The\n flight was diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day.\n\n Item 2. On-Board Delays for JFK Departures\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Aruba was delayed for 10 and half hours. The flight was eventually\n cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 9 hours. The flight was eventually\n cancelled.\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Cancun, Mexico, was delayed for nearly 8 hours. The flight was eventually\n cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Syracuse, New York, was delayed for 7 and a half hours. The flight was\n eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Houston, Texas, (Hobby Airport) was delayed for 7 and one-quarter hours.\n The flight eventually departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Buffalo, New York, was delayed for 7 and one-quarter hours. The flight\n was eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Boston, Massachusetts, was delayed for 7 hours. The flight was eventually\n cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Orlando, Florida, was delayed for nearly 7 hours. The flight was eventually\n cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Phoenix, Arizona, was delayed for 6 and three-quarter hours. The flight was\n eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 6 and one-quarter hours. The flight\n eventually departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was delayed for 6 and one-quarter hours. The\n flight eventually departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Tampa, Florida, was delayed for 5 and half hours. The flight eventually\n departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to New Orleans, Louisiana, was delayed for 5 and a half hours. The flight was\n eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to New Orleans, Louisiana, was delayed for 5 and a half hours. The flight was\n eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 5 and one-quarter hours. The flight\n eventually departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Buffalo, New York, was delayed for 5 hours. The flight eventually\n departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Seattle, Washington, was delayed for 4 and three-quarter hours. The flight\n eventually departed.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Long Beach, California, was delayed for 4 and a half hours. The flight was\n eventually cancelled.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Flight to Phoenix, Arizona, was delayed for 4 hours. The flight eventually departed.\n\nSource: Office of Inspector General\n\x0cTable 6. Average On-Board Delays on February 14, 2007, at JFK for JetBlue,\nDelta, and American\n\nItem 1. On-Board Delays for Arrivals\n \xe2\x80\xa2 JetBlue had 14 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board\n delay of 4 and half hours. The longest delay was 9 hours. There were 9 flights with\n delays longer than 3 hours.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Delta had 15 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board\n delay of 2 and half hours. The longest delay was 4 and one-quarter hours. There\n were 6 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 American had 15 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-\n board delay of 1 and half hours. The longest delay was 2 and three-quarter hours.\n There were 0 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.\nItem 2. On-Board Delays for Departures\n \xe2\x80\xa2 JetBlue had 29 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board\n delay of 5 and three-quarter hours. The longest delay was 10 and one-quarter hours.\n There were 20 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Delta had 39 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board\n delay of 3 and a half hours. The longest delay was 7 and one-quarter hours. There\n were 19 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 American had 8 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-\n board delay of 1 and a half hours. The longest delay was 4 and one-quarter hours.\n There were 0 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.\nSource: Office of Inspector General\n\nExhibit B. Selected Airlines\xe2\x80\x99 Terms and Conditions for Handling Long, On-Board\nDelays\n\n Airline Definition of Extended Period of Time to Deplane Stated in Customer\n Time Stated in Customer Service Service Plans and/or Contracts of\n Plans and/or Contracts of Carriage and/or Defined by Internal\n Carriage Policies\nAlaska Definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage = 90 and/or defined by internal policies = 2\n minutes hours for arrivals\nAloha No definition of extended period of No time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage and/or defined by internal policies\nAmerican Definition of extended period of Time to deplane defined by internal\n time stated in customer service plan policies = 4 hours (as of April 10,\n and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 2007)\n\x0cATA Definition of extended period of No time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage =1 hour and/or defined by internal policies\n for beverages and 4 hours for\n catering\nContinental Definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours and/or defined by internal policies = 4\n hours for departures (as of June15,\n 2007)\nDelta No definition of extended period of No time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage and/or defined by internal policies\nHawaiian Definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours and/or defined by internal policies = 2\n hours (as of August 1, 2001)\nJetBlue No definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage and/or defined by internal policies = 5\n hours (as of February 20, 2007)\nMidwest No definition of extended period of No time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage and/or defined by internal policies\nNorthwest Definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage =1 hour and/or defined by internal policies = 1\n for arrivals and 3 hours for hour for arrivals and\n departures 3 hours for departures\nSouthwest Definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours and/or defined by internal policies = 2\n hours\nUnited No definition of extended period of Time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage and/or defined by internal policies = 1\n and a half hours for arrivals and 4\n hours for departures\n (as of September 5, 2007)\nUS Airways Definition of extended period of No time to deplane stated in customer\n time stated in customer service plan service plan and/or contract of carriage\n and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours and/or defined by internal policies\n\x0cExhibit C. Selected Airports\xe2\x80\x99 Policies for Assisting in Long, On-Board Delays\n\n Airport Plan to Deplane Airport Policy\n Passengers\n Seattle-Tacoma Plan to deplane Airport policy is to determine remote\n International passengers? Yes parking locations for aircraft to deplane\n passengers and provide buses if requested.\n Dallas/Fort Worth Plan to deplane Airport policy is to monitor length of time\n International passengers? Yes hold positions of aircraft. If over 2 hours,\n coordinate aircraft return to gate.\n Austin/Bergstrom Plan to deplane Airport policy is to determine parking\n International passengers? No spots of diverted aircraft.\n Indianapolis Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide available gate\n International passengers? Yes or remotely deplane passengers to buses\n upon request.\n George Bush Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide buses when\n Intercontinental passengers? Yes requested.\n Hartsfield-Jackson Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide mobile\n Atlanta passengers? Yes lounges to take passengers to gate when\n International requested by airlines.\n Honolulu Plan to deplane Airport policy is to encourage carriers to\n International passengers? No off-load passengers and offer immediate\n assistance by, among other things,\n offering use of available airport facilities.\n John F. Kennedy Plan to deplane Airport policy is to, after 2 hours and\n International (New passengers? Yes upon request, help to find alternate airport\n York) locations to safely deplane passengers.\n General Mitchell Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide buses when\n International passengers? Yes requested.\n (Milwaukee)\n Minneapolis-St. Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide air stairs and\n Paul International passengers? Yes buses to deplane passengers when\n requested.\nDallas Love Field Plan to deplane Airport policy is to provide emergency\n passengers? Yes services upon request.\nChicago O\xe2\x80\x99Hare Plan to deplane Airport policy is to monitor length of time\nInternational passengers? No hold positions of aircraft.\nPhoenix Sky Plan to deplane Airport policy is to help with\nHarbor passengers? Yes deplanements via jet bridge or remote\nInternational hardstand and provide buses to transport\n passengers.\nNote: The policies listed in the table are not all inclusive; these are highlights from the\nairports\xe2\x80\x99 contingency plans for dealing with long, on-board delays.\n\x0cExhibit D. Stakeholders Visited or Contacted\n\nAirlines Visited:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 American Airlines\xe2\x80\x94at its headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, at DFW International\n Airport, Texas, at Austin-Bergstrom International, Texas, and at JFK International\n Airport, New York.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 JetBlue Airways\xe2\x80\x94at its headquarters in Forest Hills, New York, and at JFK\n International Airport, New York.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Southwest Airlines\xe2\x80\x94at Dallas-Love Field, Texas, and at Austin-Bergstrom\n International, Texas.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 United Airlines\xe2\x80\x94at DFW International Airport, Texas, and at JFK International\n Airport, New York.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Continental Airlines\xe2\x80\x94at Austin-Bergstrom International, Texas.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Delta Airlines\xe2\x80\x94at JFK International Airport, New York.\n\n Airlines Contacted:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Alaska Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Aloha Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 American Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ATA Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Continental Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Delta Air Lines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Hawaiian Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 JetBlue Airways\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Midwest Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Northwest Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Southwest Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 United Airlines\n \xe2\x80\xa2 US Airways\n\nAirports Visited:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Dallas/Fort Worth International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 City of Austin Aviation Department at Austin-Bergstrom International, Austin, Texas\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey at John F. Kennedy International,\n Jamaica, New York\n\nAirports Contacted:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Chicago O\xe2\x80\x99Hare International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Dallas Love Field\n \xe2\x80\xa2 General Mitchell International (Milwaukee)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 George Bush Intercontinental (Houston)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Honolulu International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Indianapolis International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Minneapolis-St. Paul International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phoenix Sky Harbor International\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Seattle-Tacoma International\n\n\nFederal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Facilities Visited or\nContacted:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DFW Air Traffic Control Tower, DFW Airport, Texas\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Air Route Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, Texas\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Austin Air Traffic Control Tower, Austin, Texas\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Air Traffic Systems Operations, Tactical Operations Northeast United States,\n Jamaica, New York\n \xe2\x80\xa2 JFK Air Traffic Control Tower, Jamaica, New York\n\nTrade Associations Contacted\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Airports Council International-North America, Washington, D.C.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Airline Pilots Association, Washington, D.C.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Association of Flight Attendants, Washington, D.C.\n\x0c'