type: caselaw

text:
This is an action brought by the appellees against the appellant to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery made upon the female plaintiff by one Joseph Molis while in the discharge of his duties and in the course of his employment, as the servant or agent of the appellant.
 At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant offered eight prayers, by each of which, in varying form, the Court was asked to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury. All these prayers were rejected by the Court, and their rejection constitutes the first exception.
 After the rejection of these prayers, the defendant proceeded with his case and introduced a number of witnesses to sustain his defense.
 At the close of the whole case prayers were offered by both parties, and were passed upon by the Court, but are not embraced in the record, it appearing therefrom that the defendant waived all objection to the ruling on all these prayers, and on questions of evidence.
 At the time of the signing and sealing of the first bill of exceptions, which is referred to and made part of the *Page 55
 second exception, the plaintiffs insisted that the cross-examination of Joseph Molis, one of the defendants' witnesses, should be incorporated in, and constitute part of the record, to which the defendant objected, but the Court overruled his objection and directed the cross-examination of said witness to be incorporated in the record, which ruling being excepted to, constitutes the second exception.
 The appellees contend that though there may have been error in the Court's ruling, refusing to take the case from the jury at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, such error was waived by the defendant in proceeding with his own case, and cannot be reviewed on this appeal.
 Prior to the Act of 1894, ch. 516 (section 87G., of Art. 75 of the Code), this question could not have arisen in Baltimore City, because, before the passage of that Act, if the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, submitted a prayer to take the case from the jury, and such prayer was refused, the defendant could not under the rules of the Courts of Baltimore City offer testimony in defense, and the case went to the jury on the plaintiff's testimony; just as, prior to the Act of 1867,ch. 388 (Code, Art. 75, § 8), if a party demurred to the declaration or to a plea at any stage of the case, and his demurrer was overruled, the other party was entitled to judgment on the demurrer, unless by leave of Court the demurrer was withdrawn and plea was filed in due course according to the stage of the case. This was so, because when the party elected by his demurrer to rest his case upon an issue at law, he thereby waived the right to have an issue of fact (or, to speak more accurately, acknowledged there was no issue of fact), so long as the issue of law tendered by him, was not by leave of Court withdrawn. This reason of the common law would seem to be equally applicable and controlling in the case of a prayer offered at the close of plaintiff's testimony to take the case from the jury. By offering such prayer, the defendant admitted all the facts established by the plaintiff's testimony, and rested his defense *Page 56
 upon an issue of law, viz., the sufficiency of those facts to warrant a recovery. But Parliament in England and American Legislatures are constantly modifying the rigor of the common law, and our own Legislature, by the Act of 1867, gave to the party demurring to a declaration or plea, the right to plead over without withdrawing his demurrer, and expressly provided in such case, that "upon appeal or writ of error the question of law arising upon the demurrer should be decided and determined as fully to every intent as if the party demurring had not pleaded over." This privilege was a wise and salutary one, since without it only partial relief would have been afforded against the evil intended to be remedied. Without it, the demurrant would have lost absolutely the right to have decided the issues of law, upon which he might be correct, and the only benefit he would have secured would be the chance of establishing his defense upon the issue of fact to be raised by plea. In other words he would purchase the doubtful result of an issue of fact by the abandonment of the uncertain result of an issue of law. But under the operation of the Act of 1867 he enjoys the benefit of a defense both at law and on the facts. Thus equal and exact justice is done to both parties, and the cost and delay of litigation is greatly reduced. The practice of offering prayers to take a case from the jury is said to be equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, and when a defendant, at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, submits such a prayer, it is in effect a motion for a non-suit, which is the practice prevailing in some States to-day. The only difference in the effect of a demurrer to evidence, and a motion for non-suit, upon plaintiff's testimony, as stated by Mr. Justice Gray in Central Transportation Co. v.Pullman Co., 139 U.S. 39, being that the judgment on the former is a final determination of the rights of the parties, whereas if the judgment on the latter is in favor of plaintiff, the case must be submitted to the jury, and if in favor of defendant, it is no bar to a new action. *Page 57
 The Act of 1894 enacted that where the defendant offers such a prayer at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and it is rejected, "the defendant shall not be precluded from offering evidence of defense, but any defendant in any such action may offer evidence of defense as fully and to the same extent as though such prayer had not been offered." It does not however provide, as the Act of 1867 did in reference to its subject-matter, that "upon appeal or writ of error the question of law arising upon such rejected prayer shall be decided and determined as fully to every intent as if no evidence in defense had been offered." We think there was a sound reason for not so providing; because the defendant's evidence being in by his own deliberate election, should be available as well for the plaintiff as for the defendant, since it not infrequently happens that the defendant, in so electing, supplies the deficiency of plaintiff's testimony, and if the defendant is still of opinion that upon the whole testimony, which he has himself invoked, there is no legally sufficient evidence to warrant a recovery, he may renew his prayer to take the case from the jury, and so is not deprived of his right to have determined upon the whole case, at that stage to which his election has brought the case, the question of law raised by the renewed prayer to take the case from the jury. If, on the other hand, he is of opinion that he can no longer successfully rely upon such prayer by reason of any additional evidence brought into the case, we can perceive no reason why he should be permitted to resort again to a position which would operate to exclude his own testimony making for the plaintiff.
 The question here raised has never been presented in this Court, but for the reasons we have given we think the contention of the appellees is logical and correct. It would certainly produce a failure of justice if a verdict of a jury rendered upon the evidence of both parties, and upon instructions at the close of the case, to the granting or refusing of which there was no exception, should be set aside upon an alleged erroneous ruling upon the plaintiff's evidence *Page 58
 only; and it would be trifling with the purposes for which Courts of justice are created to require the review of an error which, if declared, would not justify a reversal.
 The reasoning of this Court in the case of Harvey v. The B. O.R.R. Co., 69 Md. 343, very strongly suggests the view which we have expressed. JUDGE STONE said: "At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, if the defendant thinks that the evidence of the plaintiff is not legally sufficient to support the action, he has the right to ask and have the ruling of the Court upon it. In such case there is nothing before the Court except the plaintiff's testimony. But if the whole evidence, both of plaintiff and defendant, is in, before such instruction is asked for, the whole evidence must be considered by the Court, and not that of the plaintiff only." We can perceive no reason for a different rule where the instruction is asked for at the close of plaintiff's testimony, but where defendant subsequently offers evidence in defense, and the verdict is founded on all the evidence.
 Accordingly, we find the authorities cited for the appellees, and which have not been met by the appellant with counter authority, sustain the position of the appellees. A number of these cases are from the Supreme Court of the United States, the earliest being Grand Trunk R.W. v. Cummings, 106 U.S. 700. There the instruction was asked at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and being refused, an exception was taken. All of the plaintiff's testimony was put in the bill of exceptions. The defendant then produced his testimony, none of which was put in the record, and at the close of the case the Court gave both parties instructions, not excepted to, and also gave plaintiff one which was excepted to, but which has no bearing upon this case. Two errors were assigned; first, the refusal to direct a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and second, the granting of the last instruction mentioned. Neither assignment of error was sustained, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE saying: "The evidence introduced on the part of the Company *Page 59
 is not in the bill of exceptions, and the Court was not asked toinstruct the jury to find for the defendant on the whole case. Under such circumstances, it must be presumed in the absence of anything to the contrary, that when the case was closed on both sides, there was enough in the testimony to make it proper to leave the issues to be settled by the jury. In this we are not to be understood as saying the instruction ought to have been given when it was asked." It might perhaps be argued from the language of that case that if the defendant's testimony had all been embraced in the record, that the Court would have treated the prayer as if offered and rejected at the close of the whole case, and would therefore have considered the whole case; but the later cases in that Court do not permit that argument. In AccidentInsurance Company v. Crandal, 120 U.S. 530, where the case was presented in the same manner, JUSTICE GRAY disposed of the question in these words: "The refusal of the Court to instruct the jury, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, that she was not entitled to recover, cannot be assigned as error, because the defendant at the time of requesting such instruction had not rested its case, but afterwards went on and introduced evidence in its own behalf. Grand Trunk R.W. Co. v. Cummings,106 U.S. 700, Bradley v. Poole, 98 Mass. 169."
 In Columbia R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 206, where the case arose under the Washington State practice upon a motion for non-suit, the same Judge said: "It has been repeatedly decided that a request for a ruling that upon the evidence introduced the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, cannot be made by the defendant as a matter of right, unless at the close of the whole evidence; and that if the defendant, at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and without resting his own case, request, and is refused, such a ruling, the refusal cannot be assigned as error."
 In Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 23, JUSTICE BROWN says: "Defendant has an undoubted right to stand upon his motion for non-suit and have his writ of error, if refused; but he *Page 60
 has no right to insist upon his exception after putting in his testimony and making his case on the merits, The defendant's testimony may supply the missing link, and if not, he may moveto take the case from the jury at the conclusion of the wholetestimony."
 There are numerous other decisions to the same effect in the Federal Courts.
 N.P.R.R. Co. v. Mares, 123 U.S. 710; Robertson v.Perkins, 129 U.S. 233; Alexandria v. Stabler, 50 Fed. Rep. 689; Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 53 Fed. Rep. 257; German Ins.Co. v. Frederick, 58 Fed. Rep. 147. Also in the State Courts:Wentworth v. Leonard, 4 Cush 418; McGregory v. Prescott,
 5 Cush. 67; Oakes v. Thornton, 28 N.H. 44; Joliet, etc., R.Co. v. Velie, 140 Ill. 59.
 The last is a recent and well considered case fully in line with the authorities cited. Also cases cited in 6 Ency. Pleadingand Practice, 668, "Directing Verdicts." In view of the conclusion we have reached, it is useless to consider any of the prayers which were refused, on the ruling upon the incorporation into the record of Molis' cross-examination. The case is one of some importance, as involving the liability of a pastor of a church to a member of the congregation, for an alleged assault by a member of a committee of the church, charged with the duty of enforcing reasonable regulations, made by the pastor for the preservation of order in the conduct of the church services. The testimony appearing in the record is of a low grade, and reached the jury in a most unsatisfactory manner, both by reason of the high excitability of the witnesses and the obvious difficulty of interpreting the idiomatic expressions of the Polish language into our own. For this reason we regret that the case is so narrowly presented by the record as to confine us to the point decided, and prevent a thorough review of the case; but, as presented, we are constrained to affirm the judgment.
 Judgment affirmed with costs above and below.
 (Decided March 22d 1900.) *Page 61


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 4.7.2009
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 153/51
 2009. március 27-én benyújtott kereset — B kontra Parlament
 (F-26/09. sz. ügy)
 2009/C 153/98
 Az eljárás nyelve: francia
 Felek
 Felperes: B (Brüsszel, Belgium) (képviselő: E. Boigelot ügyvéd)
 Alperes: Európai Parlament
 A jogvita tárgya és leírása
 A Parlament arra történő kötelezése, hogy fizessen meg a felperesnek 12 000 euró összeget azon károk megtérítése jogcímén, amelyek a felperest egyrészt a vele szemben alkalmazott lelki és szakmai zaklatás folytán, másrészt pedig a független szerv által lefolytatott belső adminisztratív vizsgálat hiánya következtében érték
 A felperes kereseti kérelmei
 —
 A Közszolgálati Törvényszék kötelezze a Parlamentet, hogy fizessen meg a felperesnek 12 000 euró összeget azon károk (nem vagyoni kár, a felperes politikai jóhírnevében és szakmai előmenetelében bekövetkezett sérelem, valamint a felperes emberi méltóságában és egészségében bekövetkezett sérelem) megtérítése jogcímén, amelyek a felperest egyrészt a Parlamentben teljesített szolgálati időszaka során vele szemben alkalmazott lelki és szakmai zaklatás folytán, másrészt pedig a független szerv által lefolytatott belső adminisztratív vizsgálat hiánya következtében érték;
 —
 a Közszolgálati Törvényszék az Európai Parlamentet kötelezze a költségek viselésére.


text:
 18.5.2013
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 C 141/25
 Beroep ingesteld op 20 maart 2013 — Selo Medical/BHIM — biosyn Arzneimittel (SELOGYN)
 (Zaak T-173/13)
 2013/C 141/46
 Taal van het verzoekschrift: Duits
 Partijen
 Verzoekende partij: Selo Medical GmbH (Unternberg, Oostenrijk) (vertegenwoordiger: T. Schneider, advocaat)
 Verwerende partij: Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen)
 Andere partij in de procedure voor de kamer van beroep: biosyn Arzneimittel GmbH (Fellbach, Duitsland)
 Conclusies
 —
 de beslissing van de vierde kamer van beroep van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen) van 21 januari 2013 in zaak R 2601/2011-4 vernietigen en de oppositie tegen de gemeenschapsmerkaanvraag afwijzen;
 —
 het BHIM respectievelijk interveniënte verwijzen in de kosten van de procedure overeenkomstig artikel 87, lid 2, van het Reglement voor de procesvoering van het Gerecht
 Middelen en voornaamste argumenten
 Aanvrager van het gemeenschapsmerk: verzoekster
 Betrokken gemeenschapsmerk: woordmerk „SELOGYN” voor waren van klasse 5 — gemeenschapsmerkaanvraag nr. 9 049 016
 Houder van het oppositiemerk of -teken in de oppositieprocedure: biosyn Arzneimittel GmbH
 Oppositiemerk of -teken: nationaal woordmerk „SELESYN” voor waren en diensten van de klassen 5, 29 en 44
 Beslissing van de oppositieafdeling: toewijzing van de oppositie
 Beslissing van de kamer van beroep: verwerping van het beroep
 Aangevoerde middelen: schending van artikel 8, lid 1, sub b, van verordening (EG) nr. 207/2009


text:
 22.10.2011
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 311/21
 Жалба, подадена на 10 август 2011 г. от Съвета на Европейския съюз срещу Решение, постановено от Общия съд (пети разширен състав) на 8 юни 2011 г. по дело T-86/11, Bamba/Съвет
 (Дело C-417/11 P)
 2011/C 311/35
 Език на производството: френски
 Страни
 Жалбоподател: Съвет на Европейския съюз (представители: M. Bishop, B. Driessen и E. Dumitriu-Segnana)
 Други страни в производството: Nadiany Bamba, Европейска комисия
 Искания на жалбоподателя
 Съветът иска от Съда:
 —
 да отмени Решение на Общия съд (пети разширен състав), постановено на 8 юни 2011 г. по дело Bamba/Съвет, Т-86/11;
 —
 да се произнесе окончателно по въпросите, предмет на настоящата жалба, и да отхвърли като неоснователна подадената в първоинстанционното производство жалба от г-жа Nadiany Bamba и
 —
 да осъди г-жа Nadiany Bamba да заплати съдебните разноски на Съвета, направени в първоинстанционното производство и в рамките на настоящото производство по обжалване.
 Правни основания и основни доводи
 Съветът изтъква две правни основания в подкрепа на жалбата си.
 Жалбоподателят твърди основно, че предоставената с оспорваните актове мотивация отговаря на изискванията на член 296 ДФЕС и поради това Общият съд е допуснал грешка при прилагане на правото, като е приел, че оспорваните актове са опорочени от непълнота на мотивите. Всъщност, в съображенията на оспорваните актове Съветът бил направил обстоятелствено описание на особено тежкото положение в Кот д’Ивоар, което обосновавало мерките, приети срещу определени лица и образувания. Освен това, Съветът бил посочил ясно причините, поради които счита, че г-жа Nadiany Bamba трябва да бъде обект на съответните ограничителни мерки.
 При условията на евентуалност, Съветът изтъква, че Общият съд е допуснал грешка при прилагане на правото, като в рамките на своята преценка относно спазването на задължението за мотивиране не е отчел добре познатите обстоятелства около г-жа Nadiany Bamba, при които са били приети оспорваните актове.


text:
 20.11.2004
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 284/11
 2004 m. rugsėjo 21 d. La cour d'appel de Poitiers (2ème chambre civile) sprendimu pateiktas prašymas priimti prejudicinį sprendimą byloje Conseil général de la Vienne prieš Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects
 (Byla C-419/04)
 (2004/C 284/23)
 La cour d'appel de Poitiers (2ème chambre civile) (Poitiers apeliacinis teismas, antroji civilinių bylų kolegija) 2004 m. rugsėjo 21 d. sprendimu kreipėsi į Europos Bendrijų Teisingumo Teismą su prašymu, kurį Teisingumo Teismo sekretoriatas gavo 2004 m. rugsėjo 30 d., priimti prejudicinį sprendimą byloje Conseil général de la Vienne prieš Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects.
 La cour d'appel de Poitiers prašo Teisingumo Teismo atsakyti į šį klausimą:
 Ar Bendrijos muitinės kodekso 871 straipsnis, reglamentuojantis skolos muitinei išieškojimą, turi būti aiškinamas kaip nustatantis būtiną ir privalomą skolos muitinei išieškojimo procedūrą, kurios nesilaikymas atliktus veiksmus paverstų niekiniais, tuo atveju, kai nacionalinei muitinės įstaigai bet kurioje išieškojimo iš sąžiningo asmens, atsakingo už atitinkamos pinigų sumos sumokėjimą, proceso stadijoje kyla abejonė dėl išieškojimo kriterijų, kuriais grindžiamas sprendimas išieškoti arba neišieškoti mokesčių, kylančių iš skolos muitinei, kurios buvo išvengta dėl to, kad tuo metu, kai ši skola (skola, susijusi su galimu fiksuoto mokesčio, privalomai įtraukto į įėjimo į pramogų parką, kuriame ši įranga buvo naudojama, bilieto kainą, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar lankytojai sumokėję šį mokestį naudojosi šia įranga, įtraukimu į audiovizualinės įrangos, įsigytos iš tiekėjo Kanadoje, kainą) galėjo būti išieškota, ji nebuvo įtraukta į apskaitą, apimties?


type: other

text:
Language of document : Bulgarian Spanish Czech German Estonian Greek French Latvian Lithuanian Hungarian Maltese Dutch Polish Portuguese Romanian Finnish Swedish Croatian ECLI:EU:C:2019:779
 DIGRIET TAL-QORTI TAL-ĠUSTIZZJA (Is-Sitt Awla)
 24 ta’ Settembru 2019 (*)
 “Rinviju għal deċiżjoni preliminari – Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea – Dritt għal protezzjoni ġudizzjarja effettiva – Preċedent ġuridiku – Qorti ta’ Arbitraġġ – Inammissibbiltà u inkompetenza manifesti tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja – Artikolu 53(2) u Artikolu 94 tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja”
 Fil-Kawża C‐185/19,
 li għandha bħala suġġett talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari skont l-Artikolu 267 TFUE, imressqa mit-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociaţia de arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj, ir-Rumanija), permezz ta’ deċiżjoni tat-12 ta’ Frar 2019, li waslet fil-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fil-25 ta’ Frar 2019, fil-proċedura
 komposta minn C. Toader, President tal-Awla, A. Rosas u M. Safjan (Relatur), Imħallfin,
 wara li rat id-deċiżjoni, meħuda wara li nstema’ l-Avukat Ġenerali, li l-kawża tinqata’ permezz ta’ digriet motivat, konformement mal-Artikolu 53(2) tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja,
 1 It-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari tirrigwarda l-interpretazzjoni tal-Artikolu 6(1) TUE u tal-Artikoli 20 u 47 tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea (iktar ’il quddiem il-“Karta”).
 2 Din it-talba tressqet fil-kuntest ta’ kawża bejn KE u LF, żewġ avukati li jeżerċitaw il-professjoni tagħhom fir-Rumanija, dwar il-legalità ta’ kummenti li jikkonċernaw artiklu ppubblikat minn KE, li LF irriproduċa fuq il-paġna Facebook tiegħu.
 3 L-Artikolu 30(6) tal-Kostituzzjoni Rumena jipprovdi:
 “Il-libertà tal-espressjoni ma tistax tippreġudika d-dinjità, l-unur, il-ħajja privata tal-persuna u lanqas id-dritt għall-immaġni tagħha.”
 4 L-Artikolu 58 tal-Kodiċi Ċivili, intitolat “Drittijiet relatati mal-personalità”, jipprovdi:
 “(1) Kull persuna għandha d-dritt għall-ħajja, għas-saħħa, għall-integrità fiżika u mentali, għad-dinjità, għall-immaġni tagħha, għar-rispett tal-ħajja privata kif ukoll għad-drittijiet l-oħra ta’ din in-natura rrikonoxxuti mil-liġi.
 (2) Dawn id-drittijiet ma humiex trażmissibbli.”
 5 L-Artikolu 72 tal-Kodiċi Ċivili, intitolat “Dritt għad-dinjità”, jipprovdi:
 “(1) Kull persuna għandha d-dritt għar-rispett tad-dinjità tagħha.
 (2) Kull dannu għall-unur u għar-reputazzjoni ta’ persuna fl-assenza tal-kunsens ta’ din tal-aħħar jew bi ksur tal-limiti previsti fl-Artikolu 75 huwa pprojbit.”
 6 Skont l-Artikolu 252 tal-Kodiċi Ċivili, intitolat “Protezzjoni tal-persuna umana”:
 “Kull persuna fiżika għandha d-dritt għall-protezzjoni tal-valuri intrinsiċi għall-persuna umana, bħalma huma l-ħajja, is-saħħa, l-integrità fiżika u mentali, id-dinjità, l-intimità tal-ħajja privata, il-libertà ta’ kuxjenza u ta’ kreazzjoni xjentifika, artistika, letterarja jew teknika.”
 7 L-Artikolu 253 tal-Kodiċi Ċivili, intitolat “Mezzi ta’ difiża”, jipprovdi:
 “(1) Il-persuna fiżika li d-drittijiet mhux patrimonjali tagħha ġew miksura jew mhedda tista’ titlob, ġudizzjarjament, fi kwalunkwe mument:
 a) il-projbizzjoni tat-twettiq ta’ fatti illegali, jekk dan ikun imminenti;
 b) it-tmiem tal-ksur u l-projbizzjoni tiegħu fil-futur, jekk dan jissokta;
 c) il-konstatazzjoni tan-natura illegali tal-fatti li seħħew, jekk jissoktaw id-diffikultajiet li huma jipproduċu.
 (2) Permezz ta’ deroga mid-dispożizzjonijiet tal-paragrafu 1, fil-każ ta’ ksur ta’ drittijiet mhux patrimonjali minħabba l-eżerċizzju tad-dritt għal-libertà ta’ espressjoni, il-qorti tista’ tieħu biss il-miżuri previsti fil-paragrafu 1(b) u (c).
 (3) Barra minn hekk, il-vittma ta’ ksur ta’ tali drittijiet tista’ titlob lill-qorti tobbliga lill-persuna li wettqet il-fatti tikkonforma ruħha ma’ kull miżura li l-qorti tqis neċessarja sabiex tippermetti l-istabbiliment mill-ġdid tad-dritt li jkun ġie ppreġudikat, kif ġej:
 a) l-obbligu tal-persuna li wettqet il-fatti li tippubblika s-sentenza ta’ kundanna bi spejjeż tagħha;
 b) kull miżura oħra neċessarja sabiex jintemm il-fatt illegali jew sabiex jiġi kkumpensat id-dannu kkawżat.
 (4) Bl-istess mod, il-vittma tista’ titlob danni jew, skont il-każ, kumpens patrimonjali għad-dannu, inkluż mhux patrimonjali, li ġie kkawżat lilha jekk dan ikun imputabbli lill-persuna li wettqet il-fatt dannuż. F’dawn il-każijiet, id-dritt ta’ rikors huwa suġġett għal preskrizzjoni estintiva.”
 8 Skont l-Artikolu 6 tal-Kodiċi ta’ Proċedura Ċivili, intitolat “Dritt għal smigħ xieraq, mill-iktar fis possibbli u prevedibbli”:
 “(1) Kull persuna għandha d-dritt għal smigħ ġust, mill-iktar fis possibbli u prevedibbli, minn qorti indipendenti u imparzjali, stabbilita bil-liġi. Għal dan il-għan, il-qorti għandha l-obbligu tieħu l-miżuri kollha awtorizzati mil-liġi u tiggarantixxi l-iżvolġiment mill-iktar fis possibbli tal-kawża.
 (2) Id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-paragrafu 1 għandhom japplikaw mutatis mutandis għall-proċedura ta’ eżekuzzjoni forzata.”
 9 KE u LF huma avukati membri tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj (ir-Rumanija). KE jindika li, fit-22 ta’ Frar 2018, il-Jurnalul Baroului Cluj (il-Ġurnal tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj), li huwa l-ġurnal tal-assoċjazzjoni professjonali tal-avukati ta’ din il-kamra tal-avukati, ippubblika artiklu miktub minnu, intitolat “Exercitarea dreptului la apărare prin declarații conținând afirmații necorespunzătoare adevărului în fața organelor judiciare” (“Eżerċizzju tad-drittijiet tad-difiża quddiem il-qrati ġudizzjarji permezz ta’ dikjarazzjonijiet li fihom affermazzjonijiet mhux konformi mal-verità”).
 10 KE jirrileva li, minkejja li LF, li huwa l-editur prinċipali ta’ dan il-ġurnal, inizjalment ma kellu ebda oġġezzjoni għall-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-artiklu xjentifiku, huwa esprima ċerti kritiki wara l-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu, li skont KE kienu inġustifikati, u li l-kulminazzjoni tagħhom kienet il-pubblikazzjoni ta’ avviż fuq il-paġna Facebook tiegħu, li l-kontenut tiegħu ma huwiex espost fid-deċiżjoni tar-rinviju.
 11 Skont KE, tali dikjarazzjonijiet b’ebda mod ma jaqgħu taħt il-kategorija ta’ kritiki koperti mid-dritt ta’ espressjoni libera.
 12 Fit-28 ta’ Jannar 2019, KE ppreżenta rikors quddiem it-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj, ir-Rumanija) kontra LF. KE talab lill-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ jogħġobha:
 – tikkonstata n-natura illegali tal-pubblikazzjoni tas-7 ta’ Jannar 2019 minn LF fuq il-paġna Facebook tiegħu u
 – tordna lil LF, konformement mal-Artikolu 253(3)(a) u (b) tal-Kodiċi Ċivili, jippubblika s-sentenza fuq il-paġna Facebook tiegħu u jżomm din il-pubblikazzjoni għal perijodu mill-inqas ugwali għal dak li matulu dehret il-pubblikazzjoni illegali fuq din il-paġna.
 13 LF talab lit-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de Arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj) tadixxi lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja b’domanda preliminari.
 14 Din il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ issostni li għandha quddiemha l-kwistjoni, minn naħa, dwar l-obbligu tal-qrati Rumeni li jirrispondu għat-talbiet kollha u għall-mezzi ta’ difiża kollha tal-partijiet, u għalhekk għal talba għal rinviju quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, u, min-naħa l-oħra, dwar in-natura vinkolanti tal-preċedent ġudizzjarju, sa fejn l-imsemmija qorti tqis li ma tistax tadotta soluzzjoni li hija differenti mill-preċedent ġudizzjarju rilevanti jekk ma tidentifikax applikazzjoni iktar konformi tal-leġiżlazzjoni inkwistjoni.
 15 Huwa f’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi li t-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de Arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj) iddeċidiet li tissospendi l-proċeduri quddiemha u li tagħmel lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja d-domanda preliminari li ġejja:
 “Id-dispożizzjonijiet tat-Trattat [UE], u b’mod partikolari l-Artikolu 6(1), li bis-saħħa tagħhom l-Unjoni [Ewropea] tirrikonoxxi d-drittijiet, il-libertajiet u l-prinċipji stabbiliti fil-Karta [...], li għandha l-istess valur legali bħat-Trattati, u d-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Karta, b’mod partikolari l-Artikolu 20 tagħha, li jistabbilixxi li l-persuni kollha huma ugwali fid-dritt, u l-Artikolu 47 tagħha, li jistabbilixxi li kull persuna għandha d-dritt għal smigħ xieraq, għandhom jiġu interpretati fis-sens li qorti nazzjonali Rumena hija obbligata:
 – tirrispondi għat-talbiet kollha u għall-mezzi ta’ difiża kollha tal-partijiet, billi teżaminahom b’mod effettiv, filwaqt li l-partijiet ikollhom id-dritt jippretendu risposta speċifika u espliċita fir-rigward tal-mezzi deċiżivi għas-soluzzjoni tal-kawża inkwistjoni, u
 – tosserva n-natura vinkolanti ta’ preċedent ġudizzjarju, meta l-preċedent ġudizzjarju jkun sentenza definittiva tal-istess qorti, jew ta’ qorti nazzjonali Rumena oħra, f’kawża li fiha l-qorti nazzjonali adita tistabbilixxi li huwa rilevanti li tevoka dan il-preċedent u tikkonstata x-“xebh legali” tal-kawżi, u din in-natura vinkolanti tkun timplika li l-qorti, li tikkonstata tali “xebh legali”, tista’ tadotta soluzzjoni differenti biss jekk timmotiva l-approċċ diverġenti tagħha b’applikazzjoni iktar konformi stricto sensu mal-liġi?”
 Fuq l-ammissibbiltà tat-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari u l-kompetenza tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja
 16 Skont l-Artikolu 53(2) tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, meta l-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja manifestament ma jkollhiex ġurisdizzjoni li tieħu konjizzjoni ta’ kawża jew meta talba jew rikors ikunu manifestament inammissibbli, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tista’, f’kull ħin u wara li jinstema’ l-Avukat Ġenerali, tiddeċiedi permezz ta’ digriet motivat, mingħajr ma tkompli l-proċedura.
 17 Hemm lok li din id-dispożizzjoni tiġi applikata fil-kuntest ta’ din il-kawża.
 18 F’dan ir-rigward, hemm lok li jiġi rrilevat li t-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari hija manifestament inammissibbli fid-dawl tal-Artikolu 94(ċ) tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura, peress li l-informazzjoni esposta f’din it-talba ma tippermettix li tiġi kkonstatata l-ammissibbiltà tagħha fid-dawl tal-kundizzjoni li t-talba għandha toriġina minn “qorti”, fis-sens tal-Artikolu 267 TFUE. Fil-fatt, it-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de Arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj) ma tippreżenta ebda informazzjoni ta’ natura li turi li hija għandha din il-kwalità.
 19 Sa fejn ma jidhirx li l-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali teżiġi r-rikors lil din il-qorti bħala l-uniku mezz li tiġi deċiża l-kawża prinċipali u teskludi l-possibbiltà għall-partijiet li jirrikorru għall-qrati ordinarji, l-imsemmija Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ kellha tistabbilixxi r-raġunijiet li għalihom ir-rinviju kien, f’dan il-każ, obbligatorju. Barra minn hekk, fid-deċiżjoni tar-rinviju, ma jsir ebda riferiment għad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Kodiċi ta’ Proċedura Ċivili li jirregola l-arbitraġġ istituzzjonalizzat. Konsegwentement, għandu jitqies li din it-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari hija manifestament inammissibbli.
 20 Fir-rigward, barra minn hekk, tal-kompetenza tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja li tinterpreta ċerti dispożizzjonijiet tal-Karta, għandu jingħad ukoll li, anki kieku jitqies li hija ammissibbli, id-deċiżjoni tar-rinviju ma tinkludi ebda informazzjoni konkreta li tippermetti li jitqies li s-suġġett tal-kawża prinċipali jikkonċerna l-interpretazzjoni jew l-applikazzjoni ta’ regola tal-Unjoni għajr dawk inklużi fil-Karta.
 21 Fil-fatt, id-domanda preliminari taqa’ fil-kuntest ta’ kawża bejn żewġ individwi dwar talba intiża li tiġi kkonstatata n-natura illegali ta’ pubblikazzjoni fuq paġna Facebook. F’dan il-kuntest, it-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de Arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj) tixtieq tapplika l-Artikolu 6(1) TUE u l-Artikoli 20 u 47 tal-Karta sabiex jiġu evalwati ċerti obbligi ta’ natura proċedurali.
 22 Madankollu, fid-dawl tal-Artikolu 51(1) tal-Karta, id-dispożizzjonijiet tagħha huma intiżi għall-Istati Membri biss meta jimplimentaw id-dritt tal-Unjoni. Fil-fatt, skont ġurisprudenza stabbilita tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, id-drittijiet fundamentali ggarantiti fl-ordinament ġuridiku tal-Unjoni għandhom japplikaw fis-sitwazzjonijiet kollha rregolati mid-dritt tal-Unjoni, iżda mhux barra minn tali sitwazzjonijiet (sentenza tas-26 ta’ Frar 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‐617/10, EU:C:2013:105, punt 19, u digriet tal-11 ta’ Jannar 2017, Boudjellal, C‐508/16, mhux ippubblikat, EU:C:2017:6, punt 17).
 23 F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, għandu jiġi kkonstatat, abbażi tal-Artikolu 53(2) tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, li t-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari mressqa mit-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de Arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj), permezz ta’ deċiżjoni tat-12 ta’ Frar 2019, hija manifestament inammissibbli u li, fi kwalunkwe każ, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja manifestament ma għandhiex ġurisdizzjoni sabiex tieħu konjizzjoni ta’ din it-talba.
 24 Peress li l-proċedura għandha, fir-rigward tal-partijiet fil-kawża prinċipali, in‐natura ta’ kwistjoni mqajma quddiem il-qorti tar-rinviju, hija din il-qorti li tiddeċiedi fuq l-ispejjeż.
 Għal dawn il-motivi, Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja (Is-Sitt Awla) tordna:
 It-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari mressqa mit-Tribunalul Arbitral de pe lângă Asociația de arbitraj de pe lângă Baroul Cluj (il-Qorti tal-Arbitraġġ fi ħdan l-Assoċjazzjoni ta’ Arbitraġġ tal-Kamra tal-Avukati ta’ Cluj), permezz ta’ deċiżjoni tat-12 ta’ Frar 2019, hija manifestament inammissibbli u, fi kwalunkwe każ, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea manifestament ma għandhiex ġurisdizzjoni sabiex tieħu konjizzjoni ta’ din it-talba.
 * Lingwa tal-kawża: ir-Rumen