text:
Manhattan [menhétən] je otok, obdan z rekami Hudson, East River ter Harlem in eno od petih mestnih okrožij New Yorka. Leta 2000 je imel 1.537.195 prebivalcev.
 Manhattan je z mostovi in s predori povezan z New Jerseyem ter z ostalimi newyorškimi okrožji Bronx, Brooklyn in Queens; na Staten Island vozi le trajekt.
 Ime Manhattan izhaja iz indijanskega izraza za gričevnat svet, kar je ta otok dejansko bil, ko so ga indijanci za smešno nizko vsoto prodali Nizozemcem. Ob izgradnji mnogoštevilnih objektov je reliefna podoba Manhattna večinoma izginila. Rudninska sestava tal je večinoma granit, zato je otok primeren za gradnjo velikih stolpnic.
 Zunanje povezave
 Uradna spletna stran lokalnih mestnih oblasti
 Randall's Lost New York City (v angleščini)
 Letter of 1626 stating that Manhattan Island had been purchased for the value of 60 guilders (PD) (v angleščini)
 NYC MTA Transit Bus Map of Manhattan (PDF file) (v angleščini)
 The Story of Manhattan , by Charles Hemstreet. 1901 publication from Projekt Gutenberg (v angleščini)
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 Rečni otoki


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 840 A.2d 715 (2004)
 379 Md. 170
 Martin F. SCOTT
 v.
 STATE of Maryland.
 No. 52, Sept. Term, 2003.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 January 13, 2004.
 *716 Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for petitioner.
 Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, ELDRIDGE, JOHN C., (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
 BATTAGLIA, J.
 This case comes to us from a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's denial of Martin Scott's motion to correct an illegal sentence. We must consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it used the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to a Circuit Court order denying Scott's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Moreover, we must decide whether Scott's sentence was illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345 because his commitment records were corrected without a hearing and in such a way as to allegedly increase his sentence.[1] We conclude *717 that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it applied the doctrine of the law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm, however, the Court of Special Appeals' judgment on the ground that Scott's sentence was not illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345.
 I. Background
 A. Facts
 On October 1, 1981, Scott was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the following offenses:
  Case No. 18035413:
 Count 1: First-degree murder.
 Count 2: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
  Case No. 18035416:
 Count 1: Robbery with a deadly weapon.
 Count 8: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
  Case No. 18107511:
 Count 1: Assault with intent to murder.
 Count 2: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
 The offenses arose out of the same incident that occurred on November 25, 1980; the State, however, had charged Scott with the crimes in separate indictments.
 On November 5, 1981, the jury determined death to be the appropriate sentence for the first-degree murder charge, and the trial judge, Judge Peter Ward, imposed the following sentences:
  Case No. 18035413:
 Count 1: Death.
 Count 2: 15 years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony "consecutive to 1st countMurder in the First Degree."
  Case No. 18035416:
 Count 1: 20 years "consecutive to the sentence in 18033413" for robbery with a deadly weapon. Count 8: 15 years "consecutive to the 1st count" for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
  Case No. 18107511:
 Count 1: 30 years "consecutive to sentence in 18035416" for assault with intent to murder. Count 2: 15 years "consecutive to the 1st count" for the *718 use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
 Scott's total sentence, thus, was death plus ninety-five years.
 On July 28, 1983, while incarcerated pursuant to the murder conviction in Case No. 18035413, Scott pled guilty to first-degree murder in a case involving a different incident, Case No. 18035701, for which Judge Edgar Silver, on the same day, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, specifically stating, "Balance of Natural Life. Sentence to run consecutive to sentence now serving."
 On September 19, 1983, this Court vacated the death sentence for the first-degree murder charge in Case No. 18035413, remanding the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new sentencing proceeding. Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983). A new jury, with Judge John Byrnes presiding, again imposed the death sentence.
 On August 5, 1987, this Court again vacated the death sentence in Case No. 18035413, remanding the case for another new sentencing proceeding. Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277, 529 A.2d 340 (1987). This time, on remand, the State and Scott agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder charge. As a result, on February 10, 1988, Judge Byrnes resentenced Scott to "balance of life," with this sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Silver in Case No. 18035701.
 On October 10, 1989, Scott filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Judge Byrnes noted that Scott's motion lacked "complete clarity," but it appeared that Scott intended to argue that both of his life sentences were illegal. In support of his motion, without specifying which sentence he was referring to, Scott first argued that "balance of Natural Life ... lends to ambiguity in the interpretation of the actual sentence" because it could be construed as a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He then argued that his commitment records failed to comply with Rule 4-351(a)(5),[2] as the term "consecutive" was "deficient" in that it did not indicate a starting date.
 Judge Byrnes held a hearing on the motion on May 2, 1990. At that hearing, Scott acknowledged that his complaint essentially concerned the absence of a clear starting date for both life sentences. Scott argued that, even though he had received the death sentence and had been incarcerated since November 27, 1980, his commitment records did not stipulate when his sentence began. On May 17, Judge Byrnes had modified commitment records prepared for all of Scott's cases. The modified commitment records included information such as the original sentencing judge, the fact that the sentences had been corrected, and the fact that the corrections had been witnessed by the Clerk of the Court. The note "Total Time Served On All Cases: 2 consecutive life sentences plus ninety-five years" was also included on the final commitment record for the *719 1983 murder conviction for which a life sentence had been imposed.
 On June 6, 1990, Judge Byrnes issued a memorandum and order denying Scott's motion to correct the illegal sentence. In his order, Judge Byrnes dismissed Scott's first contention that the sentence imposed in 1983 by Judge Silver in Case No. 18035701 was ambiguous because the State might interpret "natural life" to mean no possibility of parole, reasoning that the "historical record fact is that the State did not invoke Section 412(b)(2)"[3] "imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole...." As such, Judge Byrnes concluded, there was no basis for Scott's contention that the correctional authorities would be confused and imprison him without possibility for parole. Judge Byrnes stated, however, that "to clarify the matter fully, an amended commitment will be issued to delete the phrase `natural life.'"
 With respect to Scott's second contention, Judge Byrnes concluded that Rule 4-351(a)(5) was not violated because it was clear that the sentences were to run consecutive to each other. Judge Byrnes noted, however, that, because of Judge Silver's subsequent life sentence in 1983 and because of the fact that Scott's death sentence was vacated twice and ultimately reduced to a life sentence in 1988, Scott's commitment records should be corrected to clarify his sentence. Judge Byrne explained:
 [S]ince this Court's sentence of February 10, 1988 [the life sentence that replaced the vacated death sentence] reads: "Balance of Life ... consecutive to ... No. 18035701 (Silver, J. 7/28/83), and that latter sentence was ordered by Judge Silver to run consecutive to the sentence then being served (J. Peter Ward's November 6, 1981 sentence in No. 18035413 of 15 years, and in No. 18035416 of 20 years and 15 years, and in No. 18107511 of 30 years and 15 years all consecutive to one another) the result at that time (7/28/83) would have been 95 years consecutive to the death sentence first imposed on November 6, 1981 and later reimposed on February 14, 1985. When these two death sentences in No. 18035413, Count 1 were vacated and ultimately replaced, with defendant's concurrence on February 10, 1988, by a life sentence, and the result is that those 95 years are consecutive to that life sentence, and the life sentence imposed in No. 18035701 by Judge Silver on July 28, 1983 will run consecutive to it, i.e., the life sentence in No. 18035413. Consequently, the Commitment record in No. 18035413, Count 1 should be corrected to delete the phrase ... `consecutive to # 18035701.'" Judge Byrnes also concluded that Scott's sentences began when he was incarcerated on November 27, 1980.[4]
 *720 On January 24, 1997, Scott filed his first petition for post conviction relief, which was dismissed without prejudice. On January 30, 1998, Scott filed a second petition for post conviction relief, arguing, among other things, that Judge Byrnes erred by "revising" Scott's sentence. Scott contended that, under Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 564 A.2d 395 (1989), the Court of Appeals had held that the language "[consecutive to] sentence now being served" was deficient. On April 19, 1999, Judge Carol Smith denied Scott's petition. In her ruling, Judge Smith distinguished Scott's case from Robinson. Specifically, she noted the following:
 Petitioner seems to suggest that his various original commitment records used the term "sentence now being served" as the link to each other consecutive sentence in his various cases. This is incorrect. Only in the original commitment record issued in case number 18035701, dated July 7, 1983, is that language used. All of the other six original commitment records, as well as the four sentence modifications dated May 17, 1990, refer to case numbers and counts to provide clarity for both the Petitioner and the prison authority. Furthermore, any anomaly in Petitioner's sentencing records was the result of Petitioner's resentencing after his twice successful appeals of the imposition of death sentences. In this regard, Petitioner's case is dissimilar to Robinson, wherein the sentences were being imposed for convictions of new and different crimes.
 Judge Smith then explained that Scott incorrectly had stated the holding in Robinson:
 In that case, the Court of Appeals merely stated that the trial judge has an obligation "to articulate the period of confinement with clarity so as to facilitate the prison authority's task." Robinson v. Lee at 379, 564 A.2d 395. "Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must pay to society for his transgressions." Id. at 380, 564 A.2d 395. In dicta, the Court encouraged trial judges to "spell out with reasonable specificity the punishment to be imposed commensurate with the defendant's background, conduct, and personality traits." Id. The Court did not hold that the use of the phrase "consecutive to sentence now serving" was, in and of itself, deficient.
 Finally, Judge Smith concluded that Judge Byrnes did not err when he rewrote Scott's commitment records on May 17, 1990, without benefit of a hearing because the modifications did not "change the substance of Petitioner's sentences" and a hearing on the motion to correct an illegal sentence was indeed held prior to when the corrections were made. She concluded that it was "abundantly clear that ... Petitioner is to serve two life sentences plus ninety-five years, all to be served consecutively, commencing on November 27, 1980."
 On September 4, 2001, Scott filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence and for a reduction of sentence, repeating his previous claims and including, as a new claim, that his sentence was rendered illegal because of Governor Glendening's new parole guidelines. On November 19, Judge Albert Matricciani denied Scott's motion. He first noted that "petitioner's *721 allegations regarding the ambiguity and illegality of his sentences have already been addressed by Judge Carol Smith in her memorandum dated April 16, 1999 [and that] Judge Smith found `no fatal ambiguity or illegality in Petitioner's sentences.'" Judge Matricciani then stated that Judge Smith had concluded that Scott's claim that the Court erred by rewriting his commitment records on May 17, 1990, without a hearing as required by Maryland Rule 4-345(c) to be without merit. Judge Matricciani also concluded that, under State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999), Scott's sentence was not rendered illegal by Governor Glendening's parole policies.
 On June 16, 2003, Scott appealed. Scott v. State, 150 Md.App. 468, 822 A.2d 472 (2003). He presented two questions for the Court of Special Appeals' review:
 1. Did the motion court abuse its discretion in failing to make its own determination on the merits regarding whether appellant's sentence was illegal?
 2. Did the motion court err in accepting the post-conviction court's determination regarding whether Md. Rule 4-345(d) was violated?[5]
 Id. at 470, 822 A.2d at 473.
 With respect to Scott's contention that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion in failing to make his own determination on the merits about the legality of his sentence, the Court of Special Appeals held that, while Rule 4-345(a) created a "limited exception to the general rule of finality," a "court is [not] required to consider anew repeated motions by a litigant setting forth the same facts and contentions." Id. at 473-74, 822 A.2d at 475. The intermediate appellate court supported its conclusion by determining that the doctrine of law of the case is applicable to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 474, 822 A.2d at 475. It also determined that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith's rationale for denying Scott's motion. Id. at 477, 822 A.2d at 477.
 With respect to Scott's contention that a hearing was required when his commitment records were corrected in 1990, the Court of Special Appeals explained that Rule 4-345 requires a hearing when a sentence is modified. Id. at 479, 822 A.2d at 478. When commitment records are modified, however, the intermediate appellate court concluded that a hearing is not required. Id. Because Judge Byrnes did not modify Scott's sentence but rather clarified his commitment records, the Court of Special Appeals thus concluded that there was no error. Id.
 Scott then filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. Scott v. State, 376 Md. 543, 831 A.2d 3 (2003).
 II. Discussion
 Scott first contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it applied the doctrine of law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Scott argues that, because Rule 4-345(a) allows a defendant to raise the illegality of a sentence at any time, it is inappropriate to use the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to earlier orders in a case denying relief. In the same vein, Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith's ruling denying Scott's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finally, Scott argues *722 that, when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records, he violated Rule 4-345 by doing so without a hearing. Scott, moreover, maintains that his sentence became illegal due to Judge Byrnes' actions because Judge Byrnes effectively increased his sentence by eighty years when he corrected Scott's commitment records. This is so, Scott argues, because he was serving his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413) and not the death sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the additional life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 18035701). Scott reasons that the life sentence imposed by Judge Silver should run consecutive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with his subsequent sentences because Judge Silver stated that Scott's life sentence was "to run consecutive to sentence now serving."
 The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case may be applied in connection with a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State also contends that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith's ruling denying Scott's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finally, the State argues that Judge Byrnes did not impose an illegal sentence when he corrected Scott's commitment records because a hearing was not required and Scott's sentence was not increased by eighty years. The State maintains that a hearing was not required because, when Judge Byrnes corrected Scott's commitment records, he did not modify Scott's sentence. The State also argues that Scott's sentence was not increased by eighty years when the corrections were made because Scott was serving the sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, not the handgun sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the additional life sentence.
 A. Law of the Case
 We agree with Scott that the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of law of the case.[6] We do not agree with Scott, however, that the intermediate appellate court erred because Rule 4-345(a) renders the doctrine of law of the case inapplicable to motions to correct an illegal sentence.[7] Rather, the Court of Special Appeals erred in its conclusion that Judge Matricciani was bound by Judge Smith's denial of Scott's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the two judges were "colleague[s] of coordinate jurisdiction." Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 91, 570 A.2d 1229, 1234 (1990). It is for this reason that the doctrine of the law of the case does not apply.
 *723 In Maryland, as we explained in Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244, 825 A.2d 985 (2003), generally, the "law of the case doctrine is one of appellate procedure." Id. at 253, 825 A.2d at 990 (internal quotations omitted). Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case.[8]Turner v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 364 Md. 24, 32, 770 A.2d 671, 676 (2001). Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, but "[d]ecisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal" at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would result in manifest injustice. Hawes v. Liberty Homes, 100 Md.App. 222, 231, 640 A.2d 743, 747 (1994); see also Goldstein, 375 Md. at 260, 825 A.2d at 994 (adopting the reasoning in Hawes ); Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent. Co., 305 Md. 407, 414, 504 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1986)(explaining that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the Court of Appeals because it is required to review judgments of subordinate courts)(citing Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 229-34, 462 A.2d 58, 61(1983)). Here, however, there have been no appellate rulings in Scott's case with respect to whether Scott's sentence was illegal; rather, one circuit court judge followed the reasoning of another circuit court judge in the same case. Therefore, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.
 With respect to the decisions of circuit courts, we have held that, "as a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court." Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 273, 661 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1995)(quoting State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283 (1984)); see also Stewart, 319 Md. at 91, 570 A.2d at 1234 (stating that "no trial judge is required to abdicate his own individual judgment merely because a colleague of coordinate jurisdiction has made a ruling"). Of course, the second judge may adopt the prior judge's reasoning as his or her own, as long as that judge does not "abdicate his own individual judgment." Stewart, 319 Md. at 91, 570 A.2d at 1234. When Judge Matricciani denied Scott's second motion to correct an illegal sentence, he cited Judge Smith, his peer on the Circuit Court, and quoted her earlier denial of Scott's first motion, thereby reflecting his agreement with her reasoning. Having so agreed, Judge Matricciani, as Judge Smith's colleague of coordinate jurisdiction, thus, was free to adopt Judge Smith's reasoning, but he was not bound by the doctrine of the law of the case to do *724 so. See Gertz, 339 Md. at 273, 661 A.2d at 1163. The Court of Special Appeals erred by determining otherwise.
 As earlier mentioned, Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion by failing to make his own determination when he adopted or agreed with Judge Smith's reasoning. We need not explore this contention further, however, because as explained in Part B below, the determination by both judges that Scott's sentence was not illegal is correct as a matter of law.
 B. Issue of Error
 The Court of Special Appeals correctly held that Judge Matricciani did not err when he concluded that Scott's corrected commitment records did not result in an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345. We agree that, by correcting Scott's commitment records, Judge Byrnes did not modify Scott's sentence and render it illegal. We also agree that Judge Byrnes did not violate Rule 4-345(c) when he corrected Scott's commitment records.[9]
 Scott contends that his sentence was modified because Judge Byrnes' corrections effectively increased his sentence by eighty years. This occurs, according to Scott, because, when Judge Silver imposed a life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 18035701), he was serving his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413). Because Judge Silver stated that Scott's life sentence was "to run consecutive to sentence now serving," Scott, relying on Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 564 A.2d 395 (1989), reasons that the life sentence imposed by Judge Silver should run consecutive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with his subsequent sentences.
 Because Scott relies so heavily on Robinson, however, we first shall review the case in detail. In Robinson, the defendant, Lee, was convicted of robbery and sentenced by Judge Cardin of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to prison for five years. Id. at 373, 564 A.2d at 395. Lee then escaped and committed other crimes. After Lee was returned to custody, he was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced by Judge Jones of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to six years "consecutive with any sentence now serving." Id., 564 A.2d at 396. Meanwhile, six months later, Judge Evans of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County sentenced Lee to one year's imprisonment "consecutive to any sentences now being served" for escape. Id. Thereafter, Lee escaped again, and again committed robbery with a deadly weapon, for which he was convicted by Judge Perrott of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment "consecutive with sentence now serving." Id. A year later, Lee was convicted for the second escape and sentenced by Judge Biener of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to one year of imprisonment "consecutive to any sentence now being served." Id. Finally, three years later, Lee was convicted for possession of marijuana, and Judge Boublitz of the District Court of Maryland, Washington County, sentenced Lee to a six-month sentence "commencing at the expiration of the present term." Id. Lee argued that his fifteen-year sentence for robbery was consecutive to his first five-year sentence for robbery and concurrent with the other additional offenses, four of which had been imposed during his original sentence and were to be served consecutive *725 to the sentence he was "now serving." Id. at 373-74, 564 A.2d at 396.
 In Robinson, we agreed with Lee that "now serving" could "refer only to the precise sentence being served at the time the new sentence is imposed." Id. at 377, 564 A.2d at 398. We further held that "[t]he trial judge's obligation is to articulate the period of confinement with clarity so as to facilitate the prison authority's task," and we concluded that, in Lee's case, "this was not done." Id. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399. As a result, we determined that the rule of lenity applied, stating:
 Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must pay to society for his transgressions. If there is doubt as to the penalty, then the law directs that his punishment must be construed to favor a milder over a harsher one.
 Id. at 379-80, 564 A.2d at 399. Therefore, in Robinson, under the rule of lenity, the result was that Lee's fifteen-year sentence for robbery was consecutive to his first five-year sentence for robbery and concurrent with the other additional sentences that were, in essence, simultaneously imposed.[10]
 Scott's case differs from Robinson in several ways. The first is that Scott was still serving the sentence for murder for Case No. 18035413 when Judge Silver imposed the life sentence in 1983 for a separate murder conviction. Scott, citing Robinson, contends that Judge Silver's statement that the life sentence was to "run consecutive to the sentence now serving" refers "only to the precise sentence being served." Id. at 377, 564 A.2d at 398. To a point, we do not disagree. The precise sentence being served in this case, however, was the sentence for murder for Case No. 18035413not the handgun sentence as Scott claims. Although Scott's death sentence was vacated by this Court twice and ultimately modified to a life sentence in 1988, his death sentence had not been modified when he was sentenced to life in 1983 by Judge Silver. When Judge Silver sentenced Scott, he stated that the life sentence was to "run consecutive to the sentence now serving." The sentence Scott then was serving was the sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413.
 More importantly, although Scott's death sentence was ultimately changed, the judgment as to his murder conviction was affirmed. Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983); Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277, 529 A.2d 340 (1987). The fact that Scott's sentence changed from death to life makes no difference as to the order of his "chain" of sentences-his conviction for murder remained. See Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 692, 496 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985)(stating that, even though the defendant's previous death sentence had been vacated, the convictions remained and the subsequent sentences imposed on remand were in full force and effect). We, thus, cannot accept Scott's argument that, because his death sentence was eventually changed to a life sentence, the first of his consecutive sentences after the death sentence, the handgun sentence, was the "first" sentence he was actually serving. See also State v. Jones, 218 Neb. 713, 358 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1984)(holding that, when two sentences are pronounced at the same time by the same court without a consecutiveness direction, they cannot be served concurrently when death is one of the sentences); Commonwealth v. Graham, 541 *726 Pa. 173, 661 A.2d 1367, 1374 (1995) (holding that the death sentence is of such magnitude that the trial court does not have the discretion to order that it be consecutive to any other sentences then being imposed or previously imposed). When Judge Silver imposed the second life sentence in 1983, Scott was serving, undoubtedly, his sentence for first-degree murder.
 The second problem with Scott's reliance on Robinson is that the facts in Robinson are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Unlike Scott, the defendant in Robinson received four additional sentences during the same five-year period for which he was serving his first sentence. 317 Md. at 378, 564 A.2d at 398. In addition, each of the four judges imposing the subsequent sentences used language indicating that the sentence imposed was to be served consecutive to the one the defendant was then serving. As we explained in Robinson, for both the first escape and second robbery, "the language `now serving' still related to the initial five year sentence." Id. at 378, 564 A.2d at 398. Likewise, when the defendant was sentenced for his second escape and third robbery, he was serving the same initial five-year sentence. Id. The result was that all of the subsequent convictions, as they were to be served "consecutive" with any sentence the defendant was "currently serving," began to run after the defendant's initial five-year conviction at the same time. In other words, several different judges, using essentially the same language, imposed different sentences on the defendant that nevertheless began to run concurrently because they were all imposed while he was serving his first five-year sentence. Given these facts, we concluded that, under the rule of lenity, the subsequent sentences were consecutive to the first sentence and concurrent with each other. Id. at 379-80, 564 A.2d at 399.
 In Scott's case, the facts are much different. As Judge Smith correctly concluded, when Judge Silver used the language "consecutive to sentence now serving" when he imposed the life sentence in 1983, this language did not create the kind of ambiguity that arose in Robinson. See id. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399 (requiring that the trial judge articulate a period of confinement with sufficient clarity to facilitate the prison authority's task). After Scott was sentenced to death in Case No. 18035413 in 1980, he was convicted and sentenced for a different murder in 1983 while he was still serving his sentence for murder in the earlier case. Unlike the defendant in Robinson, however, he did not receive multiple additional sentences while he was still serving his original sentence; he, instead, received one additional life sentence. Consequently, the problem of simultaneously overlapping sentences that had occurred in Robinson did not arise in Scott's case. Further, unlike Robinson, all of Scott's commitment records for the original murder conviction and related offenses (Case Nos. 18035413, 18035416, 18107511) clearly indicated the order in which they were to be served and referred to both case numbers and counts; as such, the ambiguity that arose in Robinson did not arise in this instance.
 Finally, when Judge Silver imposed the life sentence in 1983, he said nothing "expressly or by implication" that would indicate that the life sentence was to be served concurrently with Scott's other sentences; rather, he expressly indicated that the life sentence was a consecutive sentence. See Maryland Correctional Institution v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 523, 766 A.2d 80, 92 (2001)(concluding that the "trial court said nothing that expressly or by implication would indicate that each of the ... sentences was to be served concurrently with the previously imposed sentence"). Therefore, we conclude that the life sentence *727 imposed by Judge Silver in 1983 was a consecutive and not a concurrent sentence. Because Scott's sentence in Case No. 18035413 for murder was later changed to a life sentence, the result is that Scott's total sentence is two life sentences plus ninety-five years.
 Scott's final argument is that, when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records, Judge Byrnes modified his sentence and violated Rule 4-345(c) because he did not hold a hearing when the corrections were made. In 1990, when Judge Byrnes modified Scott's commitment records, Rule 4-345(c) stated:
 Open Court Hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.
 Although Scott argues otherwise, Scott was indeed afforded a hearing in open court on his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In response to Scott's motion, Judge Byrnes held a hearing on May 2, 1990. As his June 6 order reflects, Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records only after Scott had an opportunity to be heard on his motion. Cf. Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 398-99, 829 A.2d 1007, 1014-15 (2003) (holding that an order revising a sentence resulted in an illegal sentence because no hearing was held in open court and no notice was given to the defendant). Moreover, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly pointed out, the open hearing requirement found in Rule 4-345 ordinarily applies only when the court intends to "modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence." Scott, 150 Md.App. at 479, 822 A.2d at 478 (emphasis added). When Judge Byrnes corrected Scott's commitment records, however, Rule 4-345 did not apply; rather, Rule 4-351(a), regarding commitment records, governed his actions.[11] Rule 4-351(a), unlike Rule 4-345, does not require a hearing in open court.
 III. Conclusion
 Although the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that a hearing was not required when Scott's commitment records were corrected. Moreover, we conclude that Scott's sentence was not increased by eighty years when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records because he was serving his sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, not the fifteen-year handgun sentence, when he received his second life sentence. It is clear that his sentences, other than his first sentence, the sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, are to be served consecutively to each other. As such, Scott's total sentence is two life sentences plus ninety-five years.
 *728 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
 NOTES
 [1] In 1990, when Scott's commitment records were corrected, Maryland Rule 4-345 provided:
 Rule 4-345. SentencingRevisory power of court.
 (a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
 (b) Modification or ReductionTime for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed, the court may modify or reduce or strike, but may not increase the length of, a sentence. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (d) of this Rule.
 (c) Open Court Hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.
 (d) Desertion and Non-support Cases. At any time before expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and non-support of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may modify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court imposes.
 Maryland Rule 4-345 was amended on November 1, 2001. We note that Scott, in his questions presented, refers to Maryland Rule 4-345(d) with respect to his contention that a hearing was required in 1990 when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records. In 1990, however, it was Maryland Rule 4-345(c) that provided the open hearing requirement. When the rule was amended in 2001, it moved, among other things, the open hearing requirement in part (c) to part (d), so that it read:
 (a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
 (b) Modification or reductionTime for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evidence mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding.
 (c) Notice to victims. The State's Attorney shall give notice to each victim and victim's representative who has filed a Crime Victim Notification Request form pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-104 or who as submitted a written request to the State's Attorney to be notified of subsequent proceedings as provided under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-503 that states: (1) that a motion to modify or reduce a sentence has been filed; (2) that the motion has been denied without a hearing or the date, time, and location of the hearing; and (3) if a hearing is to be held, that each victim or victim's representative may attend and testify.
 (d) Open court hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim's representative who requests an opportunity to be heard. No hearing shall be held on a motion to modify or reduce the sentence until the court determines that the notice requirements in section (c) of this Rule have been satisfied. If the court grants the motion, the court ordinarily shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is based.
 (e) Desertion and non-support cases. At any time before expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and non-support of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may modify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court imposes.
 [2] In 1980 and 1983, when Scott's commitment records were completed, Maryland Rule 777(a)(5), which preceded Rule 4-351(a)(5), stated, in pertinent part:
 (a) When a person is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment, the clerk shall deliver to the officer in whose custody defendant has been placed a commitment record containing: ...
 (5) A statement whether the sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively, and if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to the termination of the preceding term or any other outstanding or unserved sentence.
 [3] Maryland Code, Article 27, Section 412(b) (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1979 Cum.Supp.) provided:
 A person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced either to death or to imprisonment for life. The sentence shall be imprisonment for life unless (1) the State notified the person in writing at least 30 days prior to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of death, and advised the person of each aggravating circumstance upon which it intended to rely, and (2) a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413.
 [4] Judge Byrnes listed Scott's sentences as follows:
 No. 18035413 Count 1: Life, from November 27, 1980.
 Count 3: 15 years consecutive to Count 1.
 No. 18035416 Count 1: 20 years consecutive to No. 18035413.
 Count 8: 15 years consecutive to Count 1.
 No. 18107511 Count 1: 30 years consecutive to No. 18035416.
 Count 3: 15 years consecutive to Count 1.
 No. 18035701 Count 1: Life, consecutive to all preceding sentences.
 [5] As we noted supra, Scott refers to Maryland Rule 4-345(d) as requiring an open hearing when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records in 1990. In 1990, however, it was Maryland Rule 4-345(c) that provided the open hearing requirement.
 [6] As we explained in Tu v. State, "[t]he law of the case doctrine lies somewhere beyond stare decisis and short of res judicata." 336 Md. 406, 416, 648 A.2d 993, 997 (1994). The law of the case doctrine differs from res judicata in that it applies to court decisions made in the same, rather than a subsequent, case. Id. We observe that, because motions to correct an illegal sentence occur as "part of the same criminal proceeding and not a wholly independent action," State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999), the doctrine of res judicata might apply if such a motion was considered to be a wholly independent action. We note, however, that this is unlikely to occur because, although Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time," we have explained that the rule "creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality [by sanctioning] a method of opening a judgment otherwise final and beyond the reach of the court." State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995). Rule 4-345(a) is a "limited exception" because it applies only to motions that occur as part of the same criminal proceeding. Kanaras, 357 Md. at 184, 742 A.2d at 516.
 [7] Md. Rule 4-345(a) provides: "Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."
 [8] Notably, the cases regarding the law of the case doctrine cited by the Court of Special Appeals involve the preclusive effect of prior rulings of appellate courts, not trial courts as is the case here, in the same case. See, e.g., United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir.1986)(holding that the law of the case applied where a defendant, after his double jeopardy argument was rejected by the appellate court, advanced the same grounds in a motion to correct an illegal sentence); Paul v. United States, 734 F.2d 1064, 1066 (5th Cir.1984)(concluding that the law of the case applied when, after the appellate court remanded the defendant's case for re-sentencing, he appealed and tried to relitigate the same issues); Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del.1998)(noting that relitigation of an issue is precluded when the appellate court previously has decided the issue); White v. State, 651 So. 2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995)(holding that, because the defendant's claim had been decided in a previous appeal, the law of the case doctrine precluded him from raising the claim again).
 [9] When Scott's commitment records were corrected in 1990, Maryland Rule 4-345(c) provided: "Open Court Hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard."
 [10] In Robinson, we excepted the defendant's marijuana conviction from our conclusion that the defendant's subsequent sentences were to run concurrently because the sentencing language "commencing at the expiration of his present term" was "clearly consecutive to the aggregate of all the sentences then imposed." 317 Md. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399.
 [11] At the time Judge Byrnes corrected Scott's commitment records, Rule 4-351(a) provided:
 (a) Content.When a person is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment, the clerk shall deliver to the officer into whose custody the defendant has been placed a commitment record containing:
 (1) The name and date of birth of the defendant;
 (2) The docket reference of the action and the name of the sentencing judge;
 (3) The offense and each count for which the defendant was sentenced;
 (4) The sentence for each count, the date the sentence was imposed, the date from which the sentence runs, and any credit allowed to the defendant by law;
 (5) A statement whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to termination of the preceding term or to any other outstanding or unserved sentence.


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 21.7.2014
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 C 235/14
 Tribunalens dom av den 4 juni 2014 – Sina Bank mot rådet
 (Mål T-67/12) (1)
 ((Gemensam utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik - Restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran i syfte att hindra kärnvapenspridning - Frysning av tillgångar - Talan om ogiltigförklaring - Rättsakter mot vilka talan inte kan väckas - Avvisning - Rätten till försvar))
 2014/C 235/18
 Rättegångsspråk: engelska
 Parter
 Sökande: Sina Bank (Teheran, Iran) (ombud: advokaterna B. Mettetal och C. Wucher-North)
 Svarande: Europeiska unionens råd (ombud: B. Driessen och D. Gicheva)
 Saken
 Ansökan om, för det första, ogiltigförklaring av rådets beslut 2011/783/Gusp av den 1 december 2011om ändring av beslut 2010/413/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran (EUT L 319, 2.12.2011, s. 71), i den del sökandens namn efter omprövning behålls i bilaga II till rådets beslut 2010/413/Gusp av den 26 juli 2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och om upphävande av gemensam ståndpunkt 2007/140/Gusp (EUT L 195, s. 39), i dess lydelse enligt rådets beslut 2010/644/Gusp av den 25 oktober 2010 (EUT L 281, s. 81), och av rådets genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 1245/2011 av den 1 december 2011 om genomförande av förordning (EU) nr 961/2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran (EUT L 319, s. 11), i den del sökandens namn efter omprövning behålls i bilaga VIII till rådets förordning (EU) nr 961/2010 av den 25 oktober 2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och om upphävande av förordning (EG) nr 423/2007 (EUT L 281, s. 1), och, för det andra, ogiltigförklaring av artikel 16.2 i förordning nr 961/2010 samt av artikel 19.1 b och artikel 20.1 b i beslut 2010/413, i den del dessa bestämmelser avser sökanden.
 Domslut
 1)
 Talan avvisas eftersom den väckts vid en domstol som saknar behörighet att pröva den, i den del den avser ogiltigförklaring av artikel 19.1 b och artikel 20.1 b i rådets beslut 2010/413/Gusp av den 26 juli 2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och om upphävande av gemensam ståndpunkt 2007/140/Gusp. Talan avvisas även i den del den avser ogiltigförklaring av artikel 16.2 i rådets förordning (EU) nr 961/2010 av den 25 oktober 2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och om upphävande av förordning (EG) nr 423/2007.
 2)
 Rådets beslut 2011/783/Gusp av den 1 december 2011 om ändring av beslut 2010/413/Gusp om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran och rådets genomförandeförordning (EU) nr 1245/2011 av den 1 december 2011 om genomförande av förordning (EU) nr 961/2010 om restriktiva åtgärder mot Iran ogiltigförklaras, i den del namnet Sina Bank efter omprövning behålls i bilaga II till beslut 2010/413, i dess lydelse enligt rådets beslut 2010/644/Gusp av den 25 oktober 2010 om ändring av beslut 2010/413, respektive i bilaga VIII till förordning nr 961/2010.
 3)
 Europeiska unionens råd ska bära fyra femtedelar av sina rättegångskostnader och ersätta fyra femtedelar av de rättegångskostnader som uppkommit för Sina Bank.
 4)
 Sina Bank ska bära en femtedel av sina rättegångskostnader och ersätta en femtedel av de rättegångskostnader som uppkommit för rådet.
 (1) EUT C 109, 14.4.2012.


text:
 28.8.2004
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 C 217/39
 (2004/C 217/71)
 Última publicación del Tribunal de Justicia en el
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 DO C 201 de 7.8.2004
 Recopilación de las publicaciones anteriores
 DO C 190 de 24.7.2004
 DO C 179 de 10.7.2004
 DO C 168 de 26.6.2004
 DO C 156 de 12.6.2004
 DO C 146 de 29.5.2004
 DO C 106 de 30.4.2004
 Estos textos se encuentran disponibles en:
 EUR-Lex: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex
 CELEX: http://europa.eu.int/celex


type: other

text:
P-1/18
 ECLI:SI:USRS:2018:P.1.18
 Za nadzor nad izvajanjem ukrepov za padavinsko odpadno vodo v skladu z Uredbo o emisiji snovi in toplote pri odvajanju odpadnih voda v vode in javno kanalizacijo (Uradni list RS, št. 64/12, 64/14 in 98/15) je pristojen Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za okolje in prostor.
 Za nadzor nad izvajanjem ukrepov za padavinsko odpadno vodo je pristojna državna inšpekcija, pristojna za varstvo okolja.
 1.3.52.1.1 - Ustavno sodstvo - Pristojnost - Odločitev - V sporu o pristojnosti - Med državo in lokalnimi skupnostmi.
 Člen 61.4, 62, Zakon o Ustavnem sodišču [ZUstS]
 P-1-18, P-3-18 - Pritrdilno LM dr. Rajko Knez.pdf
 P-1-18.pdf
 P-1/18-5
 Ustavno sodišče je v postopku za rešitev spora glede pristojnosti, začetem z zahtevo Medobčinskega inšpektorata in redarstva Maribor, Maribor, na seji 24. oktobra 2018
 1. Medobčinski inšpektorat in redarstvo Maribor (v nadaljevanju Medobčinski inšpektorat) je vložil zahtevo za rešitev spora glede pristojnosti za nadzor nad odvajanjem odpadnih padavinskih voda v vode na območju Mestne občine Maribor med njim in Inšpektoratom Republike Slovenije za okolje in prostor (v nadaljevanju IRSOP). Predlagatelj pojasnjuje, da se spor nanaša na primere, ko bi bilo treba meteorno vodo v skladu s prvim odstavkom 17. člena Uredbe o emisiji snovi in toplote pri odvajanju odpadnih voda v vode in javno kanalizacijo (v nadaljevanju Uredba o emisiji) odvajati neposredno v vodotoke ali ponikati v podtalnico zaradi bogatenja nivoja podtalnih voda. Trdi, da v občinskih predpisih ni pravne podlage za njegovo odločanje. Odvajanje meteorne vode v podtalnico naj ne bi bilo zadeva odvajanja in čiščenja v javnem kanalizacijskem sistemu, kar je opredeljeno kot obvezna gospodarska javna služba lokalnih skupnosti in je zato v pristojnem nadzorstvu občinskih inšpekcij, temveč naj bi šlo za ravnanje varstva okolja (bogatenja podtalnih voda), nadzor nad tem pa naj bi bil v 36. členu Uredbe o emisiji podeljen inšpektorjem, pristojnim za varstvo okolja. Predlagatelj zato meni, da ni pristojen za nadzor obveznega odvajanja padavinskih voda v vodotoke ali ponikanja padavinske vode v ponikalnico.
 2. Ustavno sodišče je na podlagi sedme alineje prvega odstavka 160. člena Ustave in sedme alineje prvega odstavka 21. člena Zakona o Ustavnem sodišču (Uradni list RS, št. 64/07 – uradno prečiščeno besedilo in 109/12 – v nadaljevanju ZUstS) pristojno, da odloča o sporih glede pristojnosti med državo in lokalnimi skupnostmi. Za te spore se v skladu z 62. členom ZUstS smiselno uporablja 61. člen ZUstS. Po drugem odstavku 61. člena ZUstS lahko, če pride do spora, ker več organov zavrača pristojnost v posamezni zadevi, zahteva rešitev spora glede pristojnosti organ, ki mu je bila zadeva odstopljena, pa meni, da zanjo ni pristojen.
 3. V obravnavanem primeru tako predlagatelj kot IRSOP zavračata pristojnost za nadzor nad odvajanjem padavinskih voda[1] neposredno ali posredno v vode.[2] Iz dopisa št. 06181-339/2018-2 z dne 19. 2. 2018, s katerim se je IRSOP izrekel za nepristojnega, je razvidno njegovo stališče, da je v skladu s 37. členom Uredbe o odvajanju in čiščenju komunalne odpadne vode (Uradni list RS, št. 98/15 in 76/17 – v nadaljevanju Uredba o komunalni odpadni vodi) pristojen le za nadzor nad določbami uredbe, ki se nanašajo na obveznosti izvajalca javne službe odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, katere izvajanje je Mestna občina Maribor zagotovila z Odlokom o načinu opravljanja lokalne gospodarske javne službe odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode v Mestni občini Maribor (Medobčinski uradni vestnik, št. 11/16 in 27/17 – v nadaljevanju Odlok). Nadzor nad odvajanjem padavinske odpadne vode, ki se nanaša na fizično osebo, pa naj bi v okviru nadzora nad izvajanjem določb Odloka izvajal pristojni občinski inšpekcijski organ.
 4. Odvajanje in čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode je obvezna občinska gospodarska javna služba varstva okolja (2. točka prvega odstavka 149. člena Zakona o varstvu okolja, Uradni list RS, št. 39/06 – uradno prečiščeno besedilo, 70/08, 108/09, 48/12, 57/12, 92/13, 56/15, 102/15 in 30/16 – ZVO-1). Vrste nalog, ki se izvajajo v okviru javne službe odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, podrobneje predpisuje Uredba o komunalni odpadni vodi, ki kot nalogo javne službe določa tudi odvajanje in čiščenje padavinske odpadne vode, ki se odvaja v javno kanalizacijo s streh, če za to padavinsko odpadno vodo ni mogoče zagotoviti ravnanja v skladu s predpisom, ki ureja emisijo snovi in toplote pri odvajanju odpadnih voda v vode in javno kanalizacijo (8. točka prvega odstavka 15. člena Uredbe o komunalni odpadni vodi).[3] Ta predpis je Uredba o emisiji, ki v prvem odstavku 17. člena, na katerega se sklicuje predlagatelj, določa, da mora lastnik objekta padavinsko odpadno vodo, ki odteka s strehe objekta, odvajati neposredno ali posredno v vode, kadar je to tehnično izvedljivo, razen če to vodo uporabi kot dodatni vir vode za namene, pri katerih ni treba zagotoviti kakovosti za pitno vodo, na primer splakovanje stranišč, pranje perila ali zalivanje, in se za tako uporabljeno padavinsko odpadno vodo zagotovi izvedba ukrepov za komunalno odpadno vodo iz 16. člena Uredbe o emisiji.
 5. V obravnavani zadevi torej ne gre za nadzorstvo nad ravnanjem uporabnikov storitev gospodarske javne službe, ki jo Mestna občina Maribor ureja z Odlokom, temveč za nadzorstvo nad izvajanjem ukrepov za padavinske odpadne vode, kot jih določa prvi odstavek 17. člena Uredbe o emisiji. Ravnanje v nasprotju s predpisanimi ukrepi za padavinsko odpadno vodo pomeni prekršek (38. člen Uredbe o emisiji), v 36. členu Uredbe o emisiji pa je določeno, da nadzor nad izvajanjem te Uredbe opravlja inšpekcija, pristojna za varstvo okolja.
 6. Glede na navedeno je za nadzor nad izvajanjem ukrepov za padavinsko odpadno vodo v skladu z Uredbo o emisiji pristojen IRSOP.
 7. Ustavno sodišče je sprejelo to odločbo na podlagi četrtega odstavka 61. člena v zvezi z 62. členom ZUstS in četrte alineje drugega odstavka 46. člena Poslovnika Ustavnega sodišča (Uradni list RS, št. 86/07, 54/10, 56/11 in 70/17) v sestavi: predsednica dr. Jadranka Sovdat ter sodnice in sodniki dr. Matej Accetto, dr. Dunja Jadek Pensa, DDr. Klemen Jaklič, dr. Rajko Knez, dr. Etelka Korpič – Horvat, dr. Špelca Mežnar, dr. Marijan Pavčnik in Marko Šorli. Odločbo je sprejelo soglasno. Sodnik Knez je dal pritrdilno ločeno mnenje.
 [1] Padavinska odpadna voda je odpadna voda, ki kot posledica meteornih padavin onesnažena odteka z utrjenih, tlakovanih ali z drugim materialom prekritih površin v vode ali se odvaja v javno kanalizacijo, razen če gre za površine iz tretje alineje 10. točke 4. člena Uredbe o emisiji (41. točka 4. člena Uredbe o emisiji). Odvajanje odpadne vode je odvajanje odpadne vode po cevovodu prek iztoka v kanalizacijo, čistilno napravo ali okolje (39. točka 4. člena Uredbe o emisiji).
 [2] Neposredno odvajanje v podzemne oziroma v površinske vode je odvajanje odpadne vode, pri katerem lahko pride do vnosa onesnaževal v podzemno vodo brez precejanja skozi zemljino ali kamnine, ki so pod površjem tal, oziroma v površinsko vodo (31. in 32. točka 4. člena Uredbe o emisiji). Posredno odvajanje v podzemne vode pa je odvajanje odpadne vode na površje tal ali s ponikanjem v tla, od koder odpadna voda pronica skozi neomočene sedimente ali zemljino in lahko pride do vnosa onesnaževal v podzemne vode (44. točka 4. člena Uredbe o emisiji).
 [3] To določbo je povzela tudi Mestna občina Maribor v 3. členu Odloka, ki opredeljuje naloge obvezne lokalne gospodarske javne službe odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode na območju Mestne občine Maribor (9. točka prvega odstavka 3. člena Odloka).
 P-1/18-6
 P-3/18-6
 Pritrdilno ločeno mnenje sodnika dr. Rajka Kneza k odločbama št. P-1/18 in P-3/18, obe z dne 24. 10. 2018, ki se mu pridružuje sodnik dr. Matej Accetto
 1. V obeh zadevah je šlo za vprašanje pristojnosti inšpekcijskih služb za nadzor nad odvajanjem padavinskih odpadnih voda (odslej meteornih voda) in komunalne odpadne vode (odslej odpadne vode). Glasoval sem za odločitvi, vendar pa zakonsko, podzakonsko in občinsko ureditev ravnanja z odpadno in meteorno vodo vidim kot del precej širše in še zdaleč ne nepomembne problematike tako z vidika varstva okolja na splošno, in tudi z vidika varovanja vodnih virov kot specifičnega dela varstva okolja, tesno povezanega tudi s človekovim zdravim okoljem. In ureditev, menim, ni tako učinkovita kot bi lahko bila. To je tudi razlog, da sem se odločil za ločeno mnenje, čeprav vprašanja učinkovitosti Ustavno sodišče ne presoja. Ker bi, iz slednjega razloga, vprašanje primernosti ločenega mnenja bilo na mestu, pojasnjujem še, da v njem vidim določeno sporočilno vrednost, ki posega na sistemska vprašanja odnosa do okolja in tudi na ravnanja določenega dela prebivalcev Slovenije, do katerih sem kritičen.[1]
 2. Neustrezno ravnanje z odpadno in meteorno vodo je eno ključnih vprašanj varstva vodnih virov, tako površinskih voda kot podtalnice v celoti in, s tem, tudi tistih vodnih virov, ki jih uporabljamo za oskrbo s pitno vodo. Izhodišče je podatek, da v Sloveniji očistimo približno 58 odstotkov[2] odpadne vode. K temu je potrebno dodati podatek, da je v Sloveniji veliko infrastrukture takšne, ki meša meteorno in odpadno vodo. S tem torej, ko ne čistimo odpadne vode (in jo spuščamo v podtalnico in površinske vode), to počnemo tudi z meteorno vodo – a ta, pomešana z odpadno vodo, tudi sama postane odpadna voda. Količina odpadne vode se tako znatno poveča.
 3. V številnih državah članicah Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju EU) pred širitvijo 2004 znaša delež očiščene odpadne vode zelo blizu 100 odstotkov.[3] Z drugimi besedami, podtalne in površinske vode onesnažujemo precej bolj kot v "starih" državah članicah EU. Razlogi za takšno stanje so večplastni oziroma jih je več; zakonodaja je vrsto let dopuščala tako uporabo greznic kot tudi združevanje odpadne in meteorne vode. Zdi se celo, da je logika bila ta, da meteorna voda pomaga k manjši koncentriranosti oziroma nasičenosti odpadne vode; torej, da odpadna voda postane sprejemljiva za okolje. Vendar pa je ne očisti. Šele s prilagajanjem pravilom EU smo v Sloveniji morali prevzeti zavezo o čiščenju odpadnih voda. Te zaveze, ki izhajajo iz Direktive 91/271/EGS[4] ter rokov, ki so jo spremljali, nikoli nismo uspeli doseči. Zato se proti Sloveniji vodi postopek spoštovanja prava EU;[5] Evropska komisija je spoznala, da podaljševanje rokov omenjenih zavez Sloveniji ne vodi do uspeha. To ugotavlja tudi delovni dokument Evropske komisije.[6] Razlog, kot ga sam vidim, zakaj je Slovenija pri tem neuspešna, ni toliko v pomanjkanju volje in financiranja precej zahtevne infrastrukture (sploh v primeru uspešnega črpanja sredstev iz EU), ampak v njeni izrazito razpršeni poseljenosti (torej pri kulturi poseganja v prostor) in reliefni danosti.[7] Zaradi teh razlogov so potrebne infrastrukture, vključno s čistilnimi napravami, izgrajene pretežno v urbanem okolju, veliko neurbanega, primestnega in ruralnega okolja, ki je prav tako gosto poseljeno, pa je neustrezno opremljenega in to tako z vidika mešanja meteorne in odpadne vode, odvodnjavanja oziroma kanalizacijskega sistema kot tudi (pomanjkanja) (malih) čistilnih naprav. Rešitev se vidi v individualnih oziroma malih bioloških čistilnih napravah (kar Slovenija sicer spodbuja), vendar, kot kažejo zapisani statistični podatki, upam zapisati, številni to zanemarjajo. Sicer bi bil odstotek očiščenih odpadnih vod enostavno višji.
 4. Tako nakazan problem ne odstopa veliko od dejanskih stanj zadev, o katerih je Ustavno sodišče moralo odločiti glede vprašanja pristojnosti. V zadevi št. P-1/18 je izvajalec gospodarske javne službe, javno podjetje, ugotovilo, da posamezniki ne ravnajo pravilno z meteorno vodo, torej da je ne odvajajo neposredno v vodotoke ali v podtalnico zaradi bogatenja nivoja podtalnih voda. Iz razlogov, navedenih v tem mnenju, popolnoma razumem izvajalca gospodarske javne službe, ki mu je v interesu odkrivati takšne fizične in pravne osebe, ki ne spoštujejo pravil o ravnanja z odpadno in meteorno vodo. V zadevi št. P-3/18 pa je na nepravilno ravnanje z odpadno vodo opozoril lastnik nepremičnine, na katero so odtekale odpadne vode z druge nepremičnine. Vendar pa v praksi ne gre le za primere, kjer je sosedu vidno kaj počne z odpadno vodo drugi sosed, ampak je prevladujoče takšno stanje, kot opisano zgoraj; torej skrito očem in posledično, seveda, tudi inšpekcijskim službam.
 5. Zapisano omogoča prehod na drugo, tesno povezano vprašanje, namreč, kako pristopiti k nadzoru pravil, ki določajo ravnanje z odpadno in meteorno vodo. Pri tem je treba predhodno pojasniti, da so lokalne skupnosti tiste, ki so pristojne za ravnanje z meteorno in odpadno vodo, tako za njihovo zbiranje in odvodnjavanje kot tudi za čiščenje. To je, skladno z Zakonom o varstvu okolja (ZVO-1),[8] obvezna občinska gospodarska javna služba in, verjamem, ena tistih, ki povzroča lokalni skupnosti številne preglavice.[9] Storitev kanalizacijskih sistemov, odvodnjavanja in čiščenja odpadnih voda se končnim uporabnikom zaračuna po kriteriju količine porabe pitne vode. Ta pa se ugotovi tako, da se vzame podatek iz merilne naprave za porabo pitne vode. Koliko pitne vode porabi določeno gospodinjstvo, toliko, se predpostavlja, je te vode treba očistiti. A ta pristop se močno zalomi v primerih, kjer se odpadni vodi pridruži tudi meteorna voda. Količina slednje se namreč ne meri in njeno čiščenje se zato ne zajame v račune (oziroma, povedano razumljivejše, v položnice, izdane končnim uporabnikom, naj si bodo to posamezna gospodinjstva ali pravne osebe). Čistilne naprave, na drugi strani, morajo očistiti tako pomešano odpadno-meteorno vodo in količine tam zbrane vode se lahko enormno povečajo. Več kot je dežja, večja je razlika med izračunanimi količinami pitne vode, ki naj bi se očistila, in količinami, ki jih čistilna naprava dejansko mora očistiti. Ker, posledično, čistilne naprave čistijo več vode, kot lahko pridobijo plačil za svoje storitve od končnih uporabnikov, nastaja finančna razlika, ki jo, predvidevam, morajo lokalne skupnosti kriti iz proračunov.
 6. Da bi pridobile prihodke za ta namen, se odločajo za občinske odloke, s katerimi uvajajo t. i. »davek na dež«, kar pomeni, da želijo pavšalno zaračunati čiščenje tudi meteornih voda (največkrat po kriteriju površine streh ali/in drugih površin, s katerih odtekajo meteorne vode v kanalizacijske sisteme). Tukaj pa se pojavijo druge težave, med drugim tudi takšne, tesno povezane z nadzorom oziroma inšpekcijami, kar je predmet obeh zadevnih odločb. Namreč, jasno je, da tisti posamezniki, ki imajo infrastrukturo prilagojeno tako, da meteorna voda ne konča v greznici ali v kanalizacijskem sistemu, in s tem tudi ne v čistilni napravi, niso naslovniki t. i. davka na dež. To pa bo treba tudi dokazati. Posamezniki lahko namreč meteorno vodo (odgovorno) zbirajo kot deževnico in jo uporabljajo za zalivanje in druge namene, lahko jo spuščajo v podtalnico, uporabljajo ponikovalnice, ali pa ta na drugačne načine priteče v površinske vode, ne da bi pri tem bila pomešana z odpadno vodo. V nobenem od teh primerov meteorna voda ne konča v čistilnih napravah.[10]
 7. Iz zapisanega je očitno, da imajo (bi morale imeti) lokalne skupnosti največji interes nadzorovati tudi ravnanje z odpadno in meteorno vodo (torej, ne le za to, ker imajo dolžnost in pristojnost organizirati in izvrševati gospodarsko javno službo, ampak tudi zaradi težav, s katerimi se srečujejo, in razlogi zanje ne izhajajo iz njihove sfere oziroma zanje niso odgovorne). Posledice so namreč precej neposredne za njihove občinske proračune, kot za javna podjetja ali koncesionarje, ki čistijo odpadno vodo. Šele posredne so posledice, a zato nič manj pomembne, ki se kažejo na okolju, podtalnici in vodnih virih. Le za slednje lahko smiselnost nadzora povežem z državnim nivojem, medtem ko za prvi neposredni učinek vidim precej več smisla v tem, da bi lokalne skupnosti ravnanje z odpadno in meteorno vodo tudi same nadzorovale.
 8. Dodatno k temu razmišljanju kaže pripomniti tudi to, da je način nadzora precej zahteven. Kot zapisano zgoraj, je ravnanje z odpadno in meteorno vodo (največkrat) očem skrito. Cevi so pod zemljo, niso vidne, treba je odpirati jaške, odstranjevati zemljino, ki jih pokriva, itd. Pogosto tudi sami lastniki ne vedo, kaj se dogaja z vodo po tem, ko npr. zapusti toaletne prostore, ali kje v resnici konča meteorna voda. To še posebej velja za tiste primere, kjer se že izgrajena nepremičnina proda novemu lastniku, ki tudi sam ne more enostavno preveriti načina odvodnjavanja. Eden izmed načinov preverjanja je okolju prijazno obarvanje meteorne vode in spremljanje (v ceveh in jaških) kam ta priteče. A tudi to ni vedno učinkovito. Z drugimi besedami, tudi sam nadzor je kompleksen, in predstavljam si, da ga občinske gospodarske javne službe lahko precej lažje opravijo kot inšpekcijske službe na državni ravni.
 9. Menim, da se Slovenija sooča z velikimi težavami pri čiščenju in odvodnjavanju odpadnih in meteornih vod, kar je predvsem posledica dopuščanja razpršene gradnje, neustreznega poseganja v prostor ter dolgega obdobja dopuščenega neustreznega ravnanja z odpadno in meteorno vodo pri posameznih objektih, vključno z individualnimi hišami. Je torej ujetnica nekritičnih poseganj v prostor in neustreznih praks ravnanja z odpadno in meteorno vodo. Pravila EU, ki zahtevajo čiščenje odpadnih vod, se zato v praksi izredno težko aplicirajo in zahtevajo izrazite ter finančno boleče gradbene posege pri že izgrajenih objektih. Če k temu dodamo še delež tistih zavezancev (lastnikov nepremičnin), ki nekritično dojemajo to problematiko, je vloga nadzornih organov toliko večja.
 10. Zato se mi, ko ne gre za vprašanje zakonitosti, ampak za vprašanje učinkovitosti ureditve,[11] postavlja vprašanje, ali ne bi bilo bolj učinkovito urediti nadzor na ravni lokalnih skupnosti in zgolj sekundarno (nadzor nadzora, kar tudi ne bi bilo neustavno) na ravni države. Na vprašanje učinkovitosti, kot pišem v uvodu, ni nesprejemljivo opozoriti v ločenem mnenju kot obiter dictum. Bilo bi namreč nadvse ustrezno, če se širše slike problematike ne bi zavedali šele, ko bo postopek, ki ga Evropska komisija vodi proti Sloveniji, dosegel stopnjo postopka na Sodišču EU in, posledično, denarno kazen zaradi nespoštovanja prava EU, ki bo vplivala na državna javna sredstva oziroma na nas, davkoplačevalce. Pri tem pa, zgolj zaradi tega postopka, vsakodnevno onesnaževanje vodnih virov ne bo prav nič manjše, okolju in nam ter prihodnjim generacijam pa tudi nič prizaneseno.
 [1] Zame so vprašanja varstva okolja in narave, ter s tem povezana ravnanja posameznikov (in ne le oblasti) enako pomembna kot teme, ki jih vidimo kot par excellence ustavne teme. Pogosto interesi posameznikov niso enaki interesom okolja, čeravno je varstvo okolja v javnem interesu. Slednje izpostavljam, ker je trk zasebnih interesov z interesi varstva okolja (ki jih zastopajo inšpekcije) tudi v ozadju problematike obeh presojanih zadev.
 [2] Glede na podatke OECD (https://data.oecd.org/water/waste-water-treatment.htm; 2. 11. 2018). Evropska komisija pa je objavila tudi podatek, da ustrezno očistimo le 33,9 % zbrane odpadne vode. Glej v: Pregled izvajanja okoljske politike EU – Poročilo za državo – SLOVENIJA, Bruselj, 3. 2. 2017, SWD(2017) 57 final, str. 19.
 [3] Glede na podatke OECD (vir iz op. 2) Nemčija očisti 96,76 % odpadne vode, Avstrija 96,90 %, Slovenija pa zgolj 57,59 %. Podatki so za leto 2015. Slovenija je od leta 2000, ko je očistila samo 36,20 %, napredovala. Še vedno pa je razkorak do okoljsko bolj zavednih držav precejšen in menim, da ga je v veliki meri treba pripisati neurbanim območjem, ki niso povezana v kanalizacijske sistem in čistilne naprave (zakaj menim, da je temu tako, razlagam v nadaljevanju). EU predvideva, da je treba na letni ravni vložiti v infrastrukturo za čiščenje voda 25 milijard, od tega 681 milijard EUR v Sloveniji. Precejšen prispevek za infrastrukturo za odpadne vode (125 milijonov EUR) naj bi bil zagotovljen v okviru kohezijske politike za obdobje 2014–2020. A vključeval bo tudi velik naložbeni projekt za ljubljansko komunalno čistilno napravo, da se zagotovi njena popolna skladnost (torej ne za neurbana in ruralna okolja, kjer je težišče te problematike zaradi negativnih posledic razpršene gradnje, o čemer pišem v nadaljevanju (glejhttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-urbanwaste/implementation/factsfigures_en.htm; 2. 11. 2018).
 [4] Direktiva Sveta z dne 21. maja 1991 o čiščenju komunalne odpadne vode (UL L 135, 30. 5. 1991, str. 40–52, Special edition in Slovene: Chapter 15 Volume 2, str. 26–38).
 [5] Delovni dokument št. 20162188, dne 15. 2. 2017 je bilo izdano uradno obvestilo o kršitvi 258. člena PDEU.
 [6] Poročilo (navedeno v op. 1) na str. 19 zapiše: "Kar zadeva izvajanje direktive o čiščenju komunalne odpadne vode, je morala Slovenija zagotoviti skladnost do 31. decembra 2015. Slovenija zaostaja pri izvajanju direktive: zadnji sporočeni podatki (2012) so zadevali skladnost Slovenije s prvim in drugim prehodnim rokom (2008 in 2010) ter so kazali, da je zahteve direktive v zvezi z zbiranjem izpolnilo samo devet aglomeracij, zahteve v zvezi s sekundarnim čiščenjem pa samo štiri aglomeracije. Strožji postopek čiščenja v skladu s členom 5 direktive o čiščenju komunalne odpadne vode se opravi za samo 33,9 % zbrane odpadne vode. Komisija izvaja nadaljnje ukrepe v zvezi z navedeno neskladnostjo".
 [7] Infrastruktura z odvodnjavanjem odpadnih voda in njihovim čiščenjem je v primerjavi z drugo komunalno infrastrukturo, kot je npr. infrastruktura za oskrbo z vodo in električno energijo, precej zahtevnejša. Ta zahtevnost je tesno povezana s pogoji samega terena, ti pa so v Sloveniji izrazito zahtevni. Odpadna voda namreč potrebuje padec ustreznih cevi približno 1 do 2 cm na meter in ne več, kar se doseže z vmesnimi jaški. Ker je površina oziroma relief Slovenije prav tako izrazito razgiban, hkrati pa je Slovenija poseljena izrazito disperzijsko oziroma razpršeno, o čemer sem pisal tudi že v pritrdilnem ločenem mnenju k odločbi št. U-I-64/14 z dne 12. 10. 2017, je izgradnja tovrstne infrastrukture tudi operativno tehnično in finančno zahtevna. Zato ne čudi, da ima Slovenija velike težave pri njeni izgradnji in da je to pomemben razlog za zamude in nespoštovanje postavljenih rokov s strani EU.
 [8] Člen 149 ZVO-1 določa: "(Občinske gospodarske javne službe varstva okolja)
 (1) Obvezne občinske gospodarske javne službe varstva okolja so:
 2. odvajanje in čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
 [9] Neredko se lokalne skupnosti odločajo tudi za koncesije (največkrat BOT koncesije, kjer zasebni kapital zgradi čistilno napravo in jo določen čas upravlja ter je plačana za storitve upravljanja in izgradnje skupaj). Čiščenje odpadnih voda zahteva visoko raven strokovnega znanja in (velike) čistilne naprave so tehnično kompleksne. Lokalne skupnosti, ki običajno nimajo svojih R&D (research and developments) oddelkov, prav tako ne njihovi javni gospodarski zavodi oziroma javna podjetja, pri tem zato pogosto naletijo na težave. Ker je izgradnja čistilnih naprav tudi finančno zajeten zalogaj, rešitev v koncesijah gradenj gotovo ni nevsakdanja. Še posebej ne v okoliščinah, ko se na državni in lokalni ravni vse do obdobja prilagajanja pravu EU konec devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja sistemsko ni vlagalo v pridobivanje znanja in izkušenj na tem področju in smo bili nepripravljeni soočeni z zahtevo EU po čiščenju odpadnih voda. Dejansko je to bila značilnost ne le celotne regije, ampak širše, celotne vzhodne Evrope. Glej npr. Concessions – Mobilising private financing for development, v: EBRD: Law in Transition, London, Spring 2001, predvsem str. 19–60.
 Koncesionar, ki je torej primoran očistiti več vode, kot lahko zaračuna končnim uporabnikom (ker ne more zaračunati čiščenja meteorne vode), bo torej v situaciji, ko bo deloval z izgubo. Terjati razliko od koncendentov pa se dotakne nove težave, to je državnih pomoči. Bilo bi izven okvirjev tega ločenega mnenja ukvarjati se tudi s tem vprašanjem, zato naj navedem zgolj osebno stališče, da se klasična stroga aplikacija državnih pomoči na to vprašanje, zaradi zgodovinsko pogojenih razlogov, o katerih pišem v tem mnenju, ne more neprilagojeno uporabiti.
 [10] Med drugim je to zelo pomembno tudi zaradi tega, ker meteorna voda povzroči težave čistilni napravi v samem procesu čiščenja. Velike količine meteorne vode, npr. ob močnem deževju, povečajo, v primerih mešanja meteornih voda z odpadno vodo, večjo količino voda, ki se mora očistiti; a ne gre le za vprašanje količine, temveč tudi razvodenitev koncentracije odpadnih voda povzroča težave pri biološkem čiščenju. Manjša koncentracija mikroorganizmov, ki biološko čistijo odpadno vodo, ne doseže tako kvalitetnega očiščenja odpadne vode in negativni učinek se tako prenese na odstotek očiščenja odpadnih vod.
 [11] Obe odločitvi Ustavnega sodišča, ki razlagata Uredbo o emisiji snovi in toplote pri odvajanju odpadnih voda v vode in javno kanalizacijo, presojata vprašanje pristojnosti in ne zakonitosti, vendar pa je po četrtem odstavku 61. člena Zakona o Ustavnem sodišču mogoče tudi, da se razveljavi predpis, če bi se ugotovila tudi protiustavnost ali nezakonitost. Do takšne ugotovitve pa Ustavno sodišče ne more priti zgolj iz razloga, ker bi menilo, da je predpis neučinkovit oziroma ne tako učinkovit, ko bi lahko bil, če bi uredil drugačno rešitev glede pristojnosti.
 Uradni list RS, št. 74/2018
 US31677


type: contracts

text:
330 LV Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis 11/1. sēj.
 21996D0523(11)
 23.5.1996. EIROPAS KOPIENU OFICIĀLAIS VĒSTNESIS L 124/27
 EEZ APVIENOTĀS KOMITEJAS LĒMUMS
 Nr. 19/96
 (1996. gada 26. marts),
 kas groza EEZ līguma XIII pielikumu (Transports)
 EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,
 ņemot vērā Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līgumu, kas grozīts ar protokolu, kurš precizē Eiropas Ekonomikas
 zonas līgumu, še turpmāk “līgums”, un jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,
 tā kā līguma XIII pielikums ir grozīts ar EEZ Apvienotās komitejas 1995. gada 15. decembra Lēmumu
 Nr. 74/95 (1);
 tā kā līgumā jāiekļauj Padomes 1995. gada 6. oktobra Direktīva 95/50/EK par vienotu kārtību, kādā
 pārbauda bīstamo kravu pārvadājumus pa autoceļiem (2),
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 Aiz līguma XIII pielikuma 17. punkta c) apakšpunkta (Padomes Direktīva 93/704/EK) iekļauj šādu punktu:
 “17. punkta d) apakšpunkts. 395 L 0050: Padomes 1995. gada 6. oktobra Direktīva 95/50/EK par vie-
 notu kārtību, kādā pārbauda bīstamo kravu pārvadājumus pa autoceļiem
 (OV L 249, 17.10.1995., 35. lpp.).”
 2. pants
 Tie Padomes Direktīvas 95/50/EK teksti islandiešu un norvēģu valodā, kas pievienoti šā lēmuma redak-
 cijām attiecīgajās valodās, ir autentiski.
 3. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā 1996. gada 1. aprīlī, ja EEZ Apvienotajai komitejai ir sniegti visi paziņojumi
 saskaņā ar līguma 103. panta 1. punktu.
 4. pants
 Šo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Kopienu Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un EEZ pielikumā.
 Briselē, 1996. gada 26. martā
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā —
 priekšsēdētājs
 P. BENAVIDES
 (1) OV L 57, 7.3.1996., 36. lpp.
 (2) OV L 249, 17.10.1995., 35. lpp.


text:
 Ważna informacja prawna
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 22004D0015
 Dziennik Urzędowy L 116 , 22/04/2004 P. 0068 - 0068
 Decyzja Wspólnego Komitetu EOGnr 15/2004z dnia 6 lutego 2004 r.zmieniająca załącznik XXII (Prawo spółek) do Porozumienia EOGWSPÓLNY KOMITET EOG,uwzględniając Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, zmienione Protokołem dostosowującym Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, zwane dalej Porozumieniem, w szczególności jego art. 98,a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:(1) Załącznik XXII do Porozumienia został zmieniony decyzją Wspólnego Komitetu EOG nr 176/2003 z dnia 5 grudnia 2003 r. [1].(2) Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1435/2003 z dnia 22 lipca 2003 r. w sprawie statutu spółdzielni europejskiej (SCE) [2], należy włączyć do Porozumienia,STANOWI, CO NASTĘPUJE:Artykuł 1W załączniku XXII do Porozumienia po pkt 10b (rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1606/2002 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady) wprowadza się następujący pkt w brzmieniu:"10c. 32003 R 1435: Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1435/2003 z dnia 22 lipca 2003 r. w sprawie statutu spółdzielni europejskiej (SCE) (Dz.U. L 207 z 18.8.2003, str. 1)."Artykuł 2Teksty rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1435/2003 w językach islandzkim i norweskim, które zostaną opublikowane w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej, są autentyczne.Artykuł 3Niniejsza decyzja wchodzi w życie dnia 7 lutego 2004 r., pod warunkiem że wszystkie notyfikacje na mocy artykułu 103 ustęp 1 Porozumienia zostały dokonane wobec Wspólnego Komitetu EOG [3].Artykuł 4Niniejsza decyzja zostaje opublikowana w Sekcji EOG oraz w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej.Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia 6 lutego 2004 r.W imieniu Wspólnego Komitetu EOGP. WesterlundPrzewodniczący[1] Dz.U. L 88 z 25.3.2004, str. 53.[2] Dz.U. L 207 z 18.8.2003, str. 1.[3] Wskazano wymogi konstytucyjne.--------------------------------------------------


type: wikipedia

text:
Bitwa o Romani miała miejsce w trakcie kampanii synajsko-palestyńskiej w pobliżu egipskiego miasta Romani (37 km na wschód od Kanału Sueskiego). 3 sierpnia 1916 armia Imperium Osmańskiego pod dowództwem Friedricha Freiherra Kressa von Kressenstein zaatakowała brytyjskie pozycje pod Romani. Fort Romani miał kluczowe znaczenie w brytyjskiej obronie Kanału Sueskiego. Turcy zostali pokonani, alianci odzyskali inicjatywę i zmusili Turków do wycofania się. Bitwa ta oznaczała kres nadziei na opanowanie Egiptu.
 Bitwy I wojny światowej
 Bitwy Imperium Osmańskiego
 Bitwy w historii Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii
 Bitwy w 1916
 Synaj Północny


text:
 Avis juridique important
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 11992M/PRO/DE/02
 Συνθήκη για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση - Πρωτόκολλο σχετικά με τη διαδικασία του υπερβολικού ελλείμματος - Άρθρο 2
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. C 191 της 29/07/1992 σ. 0084
 Άρθρο 2 Στο άρθρο 104 Γ της παρούσας συνθήκης και στο παρόν πρωτόκολλο: - Οι όροι "δημόσιος" και "δημοσιονομικός" νοούνται με ευρεία έννοια, ήτοι καλύπτουν την κεντρική κυβέρνηση, την περιφερειακή ή τοπική διοίκηση και τα ταμεία κοινωνικής ασφάλισης, εξαιρουμένων των εμπορικών πράξεων, όπως ορίζονται στο Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ολοκληρωμένων Οικονομικών Λογαριασμών, - ως έλλειμμα νοείται ο καθαρός δανεισμός, όπως ορίζεται στο Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ολοκληρωμένων Οικονομικών Λογαριασμών, - ως επένδυση νοείται η δημιουργία ακαθάριστου πάγιου κεφαλαίου, όπως ορίζεται στο Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ολοκληρωμένων Οικονομικών Λογαριασμών, - ως χρέος νοείται το συνολικό ακαθάριστο χρέος, στην ονομαστική του αξία, που εκκρεμεί στο τέλος του έτους, ενοποιημένο εντός και μεταξύ των τομέων του κατά την ευρεία έννοια δημοσίου, όπως ορίζεται στην πρώτη περίπτωση.


text:
 Dôležité právne oznámenie
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 22001D0119
 Úradný vestník L 322 , 06/12/2001 S. 0035 - 0035
 Rozhodnutie Spoločného výboru EHPč. 119/2001z 28 septembra 2001,ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa príloha XIII (Doprava) k Dohode o EHPSPOLOČNÝ VÝBOR EHP,so zreteľom na Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, zmenenú a doplnenú protokolom upravujúcim Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, ďalej označovanú ako "dohoda", a najmä na jej článok 98,keďže:(1) príloha XIII k dohode bola zmenená a doplnená rozhodnutím Spoločného výboru EHP č. 93/2001 z 13. júla 2001 [1];(2) rozhodnutie Komisie 2001/260/ES z 21. marca 2001 o interoperabilite systému transeurópskych vysokorýchlostných železníc v prílohe II bod.3 smernice 96/48/ES [2] ako "vlastnosti ERTMS" sa má začleniť do dohody,ROZHODOL TAKTO:Článok 1V prílohe XIII k dohode za bod 37b (rozhodnutie Komisie 1999/569/ES) sa pridá nasledovný bod:"37c 32001 D 0260: rozhodnutie Komisie 2001/260/ES z 21. marca 2001 o interoperabilite systému transeurópskych vysokorýchlostných železníc v prílohe II bod. 3 smernice 96/48/ES ako "vlastnosti ERTMS" (Ú. v. ES L 93, 3.4.2001, s. 53)."Článok 2Text rozhodnutia Komisie 2001/260/ES v jazyku islandskom a nórskom sa uverejňuje v doplnku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskych spoločenstiev, pričom obidve znenia sú autentické.Článok 3Toto rozhodnutie nadobúda účinnosť 29. septembra 2001 za predpokladu, že Spoločnému výboru EHP [3] boli predložené všetky oznámenia požadované podľa článku 103 ods. 1.Článok 4Táto smernica sa uverejňuje v oddiele EHP, a v doplnku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskych spoločenstiev.V Bruseli 28. septembra 2001Za Spoločný výbor EHPpredsedaE. Bull[1] Ú. v. ES L 251, 20.9.2001, s. 19.[2] Ú. v. ES L 93, 3.4.2001, s. 53.[3] Ústavné požiadavky sa neuvádzajú.--------------------------------------------------


text:
Puolueohjelma on poliittisen puolueen yleisohjelma, jollaista Suomen laki vaatii rekisteröityneeltä puolueelta. Puolueohjelma esittää puolueen politiikan periaatteita ja tavoitteita.
 Puolueohjelman asema on erilainen eri puolueissa. Jotkut puolueet uudistavat puolueohjelmansa muutaman vuoden välein, kun taas toisilla kuluu puolueohjelmien päivitysten välissä kymmeniä vuosia.
 Ohjelmatyypit
 Puolueohjelmia on erilaisia ja eritasoisia, joita ovat muun muassa:
 Periaateohjelma edustaa jäykkiä ja pysyviä maailmankatsomuksellisia periaatteita ja on luonteeltaan pysyvä.
 Toimintaohjelma luettelee lyhyehköjä ajanjakoja koskevia konkreettisia ja esittelee monesti propagoivasti hyvin yksityiskohtaisia toimintatavoitteita.
 Yleisohjelma on periaate- ja toimintaohjelman välimalli, joka ilmaisee aihepiirien liittymistä maailmankatsomuksellisiin kysymyksiin ja sen jälkeen esittelee yksityiskohtaisempia toimintavaatimuksia. Sisäisessä toiminnassa puolueet antavat yleisohjelmalle periaateohjelman aseman.
 Erityisohjelma kulkee yleisohjelman rinnalla ja sillä on selvästi käytännöllisen toimintaohjelman luonne.
 Organisatorinen erityisohjelma ei koske koko puoluetta, vaan ainoastaan osaa sen tavoittelemasta jäsen- ja kannattajakunnasta. Tällaisia ohjelmia ovat esimerkiksi nais- ja nuorisojärjestöjen ohjelmat.
 Funktionaalinen erityisohjelma käsittelee politiikan eri toimintalohkoja. Tällaisia ovat esimerkiksi talous-, sosiaali- ja kulttuuripoliittiset ohjelmat sekä kunnallispoliittiset ohjelmat.
 Reformiohjelma on hyvin seikkaperäinen ja keskitetty funktionaalinen ohjelma, jonka tavoite on konkreettisen uudistusvaatimuksen esittely ja propagoiminen.
 Tilannekohtaiset ohjelmat käsittää erityisesti vaaliohjelmat, jotka sisältävät selviä maailmankatsomuksellisia ja ideologisia arvokannanottoja ja yleensä sisältävät runsaasti puoluetaktisia, lyhytjännitteisiä ja tarkoitushakuisesti propagandistisia aineksia.
 Yhteistyöohjelmat muodostavat ohjelman yli puoluerajojen ja ovat toimintaohjelma esimerkiksi koalitiohallitusten yhteydessä tai muissa pyrkimyksissä yhteistoimintaan selvästi erilaisten ryhmien kesken.
 Kansainvälinen suositusohjelma ylittää kansallisvaltioiden rajat ja koskee lähes ainoastaan sosialististen puolueiden perustamisjulistuksia ja virallisia julkilausumia.
 Historia
 Ensimmäisen poliittisen ohjelman Suomessa laati ruotsinkielinen Liberaalinen puolue vuonna 1880 ja toisen "nuoret suomalaiset" vuonna 1894. Vuosina 1899–1908 syntyi kaikkiaan kahdeksan puolueohjelmaa tai siihen verrattavaa periaateluetteloa. Puoluelaitoksen perustamisvaiheeseen kuului olennaisesti ideologinen debatti ja tarve esitellä puoluetta äänestäjille synnytti periaatetasoisia ohjelmia ja julistuksia.
 Katso myös
 Kansallissosialistinen puolueohjelma (Saksan kansallissosialistisen puolueen puolueohjelma)
 Erfurtin ohjelma (Saksan sosiaalidemokraattisen puolueen puolueohjelma)
 Forssan ohjelma (Suomen sosiaalidemokraattisen puolueen puolueohjelma)
 Lähteet
 Viitteet
 Kirjallisuutta
 Aiheesta muualla
 POHTIVA – Poliittisten ohjelmien tietovaranto.
 Puolueet


text:
Iċ-Ċirkewwa huwa port li jinsab fl-iżjed punt fit-Tramuntana ta' Malta.
 Huwa l-post fejn hemm it-Terminal taċ-Ċirkewwa għal-lanċa tal-Gozo Channel Company Limited li topera regolarment sal-port tal-Imġarr, Għawdex, u minnu. Fis-sajf joperaw ukoll laneċ għal Kemmuna, kif ukoll eskurjonijiet organizzati għall-bugħaddasa. Peress li ċ-Ċirkewwa huwa port u mhux raħal, ma hemmx infrastruttura għajr it-terminal.
 Il-viżitatur li jivvjaġġaw lejn Għawdex jistgħu jaslu ċ-Ċirkewwa bil-karozza billi jsegwu s-sinjali fit-toroq li jindikaw lejn Għawdex, u bil-karozza tal-linja mill-Belt Valletta, minn Tas-Sliema, minn Buġibba u minn San Pawl il-Baħar.
 Ħdejn il-port hemm lukanda u l-bajja bir-ramel ta' Paradise Bay.
 Għadis
 Iċ-Ċirkewwa hija wieħed mill-iżjed siti li jżuruh bugħaddasa fil-Gżejjer Maltin. Hemm irdumijiet taħt il-baħar, għerien, mini u ħnejja f'qiegħ il-baħar, f'fond ta' 27 metru. Fiċ-Ċirkewwa hemm ukoll relitti tat-tugboat MV Rozi u tad-dgħajsa P29 li kienet tintuża għar-rondi, li ġew mgħerrqa apposta fl-1992 u fl-2007 rispettivament. 'Il barra mix-xatt lejn l-Iskoll tal-Marfa hemm statwa tal-Madonna li tpoġġiet f'għar naturali mill-Klabb tal-Bugħaddasa magħruf bħala Amphibians Diving Club.
 Minn nofs l-2010, il-bugħaddasa kkooperaw bejniethom biex iċ-Ċirkewwa tiġi ddeżinjata bħala Riżerva tal-Baħar Volontarja. Is-sit issa jgawdi l-appoġġ tal-komunità tal-bugħaddasa li qed taħdem biex tikseb l-appoġġ tal-komunitajiet tas-sajd professjonali, tas-sajd rikreattiv u tat-tbaħħir bid-dgħajjes sabiex jiġi implimentat kodiċi ta' mġiba ħalli s-sit jiġi ppreservat u protett.
 Referenzi
 Portijiet ta' Malta