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Leidse hoogleraren - Boot, Gerrard Christiaan
 Gerrard Christiaan Boot (Gerrard)
 Zzp-ers: flexibiliteit, bescherming en zekerheid
 Boot G.C., Meer H.Th. van der, Rutgers D., Laat I. de & Noordhoven T. (2015), Arbeidsprocesrecht (hoofdstukken 8, 9 en 10). In: Boot G.C., Meer H.Th. van der, Rutgers D., Laat I. de, Noordhoven T. (red.) Arbeidsprocesrecht.. Deventer: Wolters Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2015), Het loonbegrip in de transitievergoeding, ArbeidsRecht 5(2015/26): 16-18.
 Boot G.C. (2015), Groen Schoevers op losse schroeven?, ArbeidsRecht 3(ArbeidsRecht 2015/14): 3-6.
 Boot G.C., Houweling A.R. & Keulaerds M.J.M.T. (2015), Parlementaire Geschiedenis Wet werk en zekerheid (deel 1 & 2) nr. 1. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers.
 Boot G.C. & Hiessl C. (2013), The application of the EU Framework for Disability Discrimination in 18 European Countries, European Labour Law Journal(2): 119-134.
 Boot G.C. (2013), De toetsing van het algemeen verbindend verklaren van cao’s. In: Jongeneel R.H.C. (Red.) Recht voor gewone mensen (Peeters-bundel). Amsterdam: s.n.. 20-28.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Arbeidsrechtelijke bescherming van afhankelijke zzp-ers, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid 11(84): 5-10.
 Boot G.C. (27 januari 2005), Arbeidsrechtelijke bescherming (Dissertatie, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Leiden). Promotor(en) en Copromotor(en): Heerma van Voss G.J.J.
 Boot G.C. 14 oktober 2015, USZ 2015.
 Boot G.C. 8 juli 2015, USZ 2015.
 Boot G.C. 18 maart 2015, USZ 2015.
 Boot G.C. 25 maart 2015, USZ 2015.
 Houweling A.R., Vestering P.G., Zondag W.A. & Boot G.C. (2015), SDU Commentaar. In: Houweling A.R., Vestering P.G., Zondag W.A., Boot G.C. (red.) SDU Commentaar.. Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers. 2041 - 2128.
 Slooten J.M. van, Vegter M.S.A., Verhulp E. & Boot G.C. (2014), Arbeidsrecht. In: Slooten J.M. van, Vegter M.S.A., Verhulp E., Boot G.C. (red.) Arbeidsrecht. Tekst & Commentaar nr. 8: Wolters Kluwer. 537 - 552.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 10 april 2013, USZ 2013,7.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 19 juni 2013, USZ 2013,9.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 20 november 2013, USZ 2013,16.
 Boot G.C. , annotatie bij: CRvB 28 augustus 2013, USZ 2013,13.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Flexrecht en ontslagrecht: sober maar eerlijk. In: Halem A. van (Red.) Sociaal Akkoord 2013: Arbeidsmarkt in beweging Optiek nr. 21: Vakmedianet. 29-34.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Historisch-juridische achtergrond van het ontslagrecht. In: Halem A. van (Red.) Ontslagbescherming in de arena Optiek nr. 19: Vakmedianet. 17-22.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Naschrift, Tijdschrift voor Recht en Arbeid(47).
 Boot G.C. , annotatie bij: Gerechtshof Arnhem- Leeuwarden 23 juli 2013, USZ 2013,13.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: Hoge Raad 15 maart 2013, USZ 2013,5.
 Boot G.C. (2013), P&O Pocket 2013. Houten: Below the line Amsterdam B.V..
 Boot G.C. (2013), Ontslagbescherming in de arena: een uitleiding. In: Halem A. van (Red.) Ontslagbescherming in de arena Optiek nr. 19: Vakmedianet. 71-78.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Rembrandt, de pre-pack en het faillissementsrecht als uitlaatklep, ArbeidsRecht(37).
 Boot G.C. (2013), Arbeidsrecht (I.7.10) en Sociaal zekerheidsrecht (VI.A.1, VI.A.5, VI.A.6., VI.A.11, VI.A.16). In: Snijders H.J. (Red.) Modellen voor de rechtspraktijk. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Wet vereenvoudiging regelingen UWV: over de fictieve opzegtermijn en de WW als trampoline naar ander werk, ArbeidsRecht(11).
 Boot G.C. (2013), Werkloosheidswet (artt. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 17, 17a, 17b, 19, 20, 21, 22, 22a, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 27a, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 42, 42a, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48). In: Loonstra C.J., Zondag W.A., (Red.) 2014 Sdu commentaar arbeidsrecht artikelsgewijs. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Boetebesluit socialezekerheidswetten. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Regeling vrijstelling verplichtingen sociale zekerheidswetten. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Richtlijn passende arbeid 2008. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Besluit sollicitatieplicht werknemers WW en IOW 2012. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Per januari 2012 opnieuw wijziging van art. 24 WW, ArbeidsRecht 4(15): 3-5.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Werkloosheidswet (art. 3, 16, 20, 22, 24, 30, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48). In: Loonstra C.J., Zondag W.A. (red.) Sdu Commentaar Arbeidrecht.. Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Sociaal Zekerheidsrecht (VI.A.5, VI.A.5, VI.A.11, VI.A.16). In: Modellen voor de rechtspraktijk.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), P&O Pocket 2012. Houten: Below the line Amsterdam b.v.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Beleidsregels toepassing artikelen 24 en 27 WW 2006. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar art. 7. Besluit passende arbeid schoolverlaters en academici WW en ZW. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Beleidsregel maatregelen UWV. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: Centrale Raad van Beroep 4 april 2012, USZ 2012 (USZ 2012, 116).
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: Centrale Raad van Beroep 23 november 2011, USZ 2012 (USZ 2012, 6).
 Boot G.C. (2012), [Bespreking van: Van den Berg, L. (2010) Tussen Feit en Fictie. Rechtspersoonlijkheid en de verzekerings- en premieplicht voor werknemersverzekeringen. Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers], Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid 52.
 Boot G.C. (2012), BBA-werknemerschap, ArbeidsRecht 10(42): 3-6.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: Centrale Raad van Beroep 5 september 2012, USZ 2012 (USZ 2012, 301).
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: Centrale Raad van Beroep 20 juni 2012, USZ 2012 (USZ 2012, 224).
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar artikelen 7:627, 628, 629, 629a, 658, 658a, 660, 670, 672, 677, 678, 685, 690 BW. In: Nederlandse Documentatie Sociale Zekerheid..
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar Beleidsregel Boete werknemer 2010. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar art. 24 WW. In: Nederlandse Documentatie Sociale Zekerheid..
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar art. 24 WW. Verwijtbare werkloosheid. In: van der Heijden P.F., van Slooten J.M. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Arbeidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2012), Commentaar art. 22 t/m 29 WW. In: Heerma van Voss G.J.J., Pennings F.J.L. (red.) Tekst en Commentaar Socialezekerheidsrecht.. Deventer: Kluwer.
 Boot G.C. (2011), Nieuwe inlenersaansprakelijkheid op grond van art. 7:692 BW, ArbeidsRecht (10): 12-16.
 Boot G.C. (2011), Bonussen, toeslagen, de bedrijfsauto en art. 7:628 BW, ArbeidsRecht(49): 3-6.
 Boot G.C. & Zondag W.A. (2011), Wettenverzameling Arbeidsrecht. ’s-Gravenhage: SDU.
 Boot G.C. (2011), Arbeidsrecht geschetst. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 8 december 2010, USZ 2011,51.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 8 juni 2011, USZ 2011,204.
 Boot G.C. (2011), P&O 2. In: P&O Pocket 2011.. Houten: Below the Line. 69-132.
 Boot G.C. (2011), P&O 1. In: P&O Pocket 2011.. Houten: Below the Line. 8-40.
 Boot G.C. (2011), P&O 3. In: P&O Pocket 2011.. Houten: Below the Line. 153-199.
 Boot G.C. (2011), Commentaar Arbeidsrecht. In: Commentaar Arbeidsrecht.. ’s-Gravenhage: SDU. 1675-1757.
 Boot G.C., annotatie bij: CRvB 20 juli 2011, USZ 2011,264.
 Boot G.C. & Slooten J.M. van (2011), Een brug tussen de wal en het schip, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid (1): 3-4.
 Boot G.C. (2013), Commentaar art. 24 Werkloosheidswet en artt. 7:627, 628, 629, 629a, 658, 658a, 660, 670, 672, 677, 678, 685, 690 Burgerlijk wetboek. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, (Nederlandse Documentatie Sociale Zekerheid). [website]
 Boot G.C. (13 januari 2012), Zzp-ers: flexibiliteit, bescherming en zekerheid (Oratie). Leiden: Universiteit Leiden.
 Boot G.C. (2011), Werkloosheidswet, art. 22 – 29, NDSZ: NDSZ. [website]
 Boot G.C. (2011), Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 7:627, 628, 629, 658a, 658b, 660a, 670, 672, 677, 678, 679, 685, 691BW, NDSZ: NDSZ. [website]
 https://hoogleraren.leidenuniv.nl/id/3404


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
Miss Harriet S. Bentley lived on a farm in Howard County, Md., a few miles from Laurel. The value of the farm, which contained about 141 acres, is not definitely shown in the record, but Miss Bentley acquired a half interest *Page 429
 in it on August 12th, 1910, and on November 19th, 1918, after some proceedings in court, she acquired title to the whole of it, and gave a mortgage of that date on it to James W. Travers for $3,000 — taking up a prior mortgage which he held on it. As far as the exhibits, etc., in the record indicate, the farm was apparently valued at about six thousand dollars in 1918.
 On the 25th of June, 1919, Miss Bentley made a deed of trust to James W. Travers, trustee, by which she conveyed and assigned all the property she had, including the farm and personal property,in trust for him to manage the same and collect the income therefrom and, after paying all taxes, fixed charges and expenses, to pay the net income to her for her natural life, and after her death the trust to "close," and all the property "to be paid over, deeded, or transferred in whatever manner may be necessary and proper, by said James W. Travers, trustee, to Frank H. Bentley, absolutely." Miss Bentley died on July 22d 1920, leaving surviving her two brothers, Benjamin A. and Frank H. Bentley, and two nieces and a nephew, children of her brother Charles, who had predeceased her.
 On June 17th, 1921, Benjamin A. Bentley filed a bill of complaint against Frank H. Bentley and James W. Travers as trustee and in his individual capacity, alleging that the deed of trust had been obtained through and by "duress, fraud and undue influence exercised and practiced upon" Miss Bentley, and praying that it be "annulled, set aside and held for naught," and that James W. Travers be required to render an account of all things received, had or done in connection with his supposed trusteeship. The lower court on March 28th, 1922, passed a decree setting aside the deed and declaring it to be utterly null and void, requiring the trustee forthwith to return to that court an account, and ordering the defendants to pay the costs. From that decree this appeal was taken by Frank H. Bentley.
 Miss Bentley was about seventy-eight years of age when she made the deed of trust. The evidence is conflicting as *Page 430
 to her mental condition, although physically she was infirm for some time prior to the execution of the deed of trust. Forty exceptions were filed by the plaintiff to questions and answers asked witnesses by the defendants relating to her mental condition, and if we were required to pass on them we would be compelled to hold that the most of them were well taken, as laymen in most of the instances expressed opinions as to her mental capacity without there being such foundations laid as are required by our decisions. The lower court did not pass on the exceptions, but decided the case on other grounds regardless of them, and hence we will not do more than say that there was little or no probative force in the testimony of the lay witnesses on either side as to the mental condition of Miss Bentley, if we consider all of it, although there were no exceptions filed by the defendants. The testimony of Dr. Linthicum, the only physician examined, shows that he had not seen her professionally for about two years before the deed of trust was made, and if he saw her at all during that time, neither the time nor the circumstances are given. His evidence is not of much aid to the court in reaching a conclusion, as it does not show whether or not she was in such a condition as she might have been easily influenced.
 There are a few prominent facts which are determinative of the case. When the record is stripped of immaterial matters and some evidence on both sides as to her mental condition, we find an old lady seventy-seven or seventy-eight years of age possessed of a farm, subject to a mortgage of probably something like half its value, and some personal property, the amount or value of which is not shown. She had two brothers, two nieces and a nephew, children of a deceased brother, who survived her. One brother, the plaintiff, had formerly lived in Maryland, but was staying with his daughter in Washington, D.C., in 1918, when he was called by some one over the telephone to go to his sister, Miss Bentley, who was sick. He went there the first of *Page 431
 May, 1918, and remained until the fifteenth of September, 1919. He was evidently a man of small means, and made and sold brooms for a living. He testified as to a number of peculiar things she did, but we will not state them, as they do not throw much, if any, light on the case.
 Frank H. Bentley lived about a mile from his sister's place. Before the plaintiff went there, he would take butter and eggs to market for her, and the plaintiff testified that his brother attended to business for her. He said that he and his brother talked about the condition of their sister's mind, and he told his brother "there ought to be a guardian put over her." He replied, "I know that, it ought to have been done five years ago." He was asked if he said anything else, and answered: "Well, I asked him if he wanted to go with me and have a guardian appointed. He never said whether he would or would not. He said it would make the family mad. I told him there was no other family but me and him and brother Charlie's children." That was in 1918. Miss Hattie E. Bentley, a daughter of the plaintiff, testified that her Uncle Frank said in their store, the latter part of the summer or early fall of 1917, that her aunt ought to have a guardian. Mrs. Sarah Jackson, an aunt by marriage of Benjamin and Frank Bentley, testified that Frank told her in 1917 that his sister was unable to do business, and when she was at Miss Bentley's in August, 1919, she told her that she did not know what she was signing when she signed the deed of trust. Frank H. Bentley said his brother, Benjamin, talked with him on one occasion about having a guardian appointed for her, "and I said, you want to make her good and mad, you just mention it to her." He said he did not remember telling his niece about having a guardian appointed.
 There is no doubt that for some reason Miss Bentley did not feel very kindly towards her brother, Benjamin, although he spent more time with her than any other relative the latter part of her life, up to September, 1919. That she was *Page 432
 feeble and needed assistance in 1918, 1919 and until her death, cannot be successfully denied, but in October, 1919, Mr. and Mrs. Carr moved into her place. The evidence of the two defendants is sufficient to show that they did, consciously or unconsciously, influence Miss Bentley to do what she did do in reference to the deed of trust. Frank H. Bentley testified that as he went to market to do her shopping, she called him in the house, "and wanted to know what she could do to keep brother Ben from disposing of everything on the place. I said, well, I will do anything I can for you. Mr. Travers was suggested because he had a mortgage on the place. I suggested Mr. Travers be appointed trustee, and she said that was all right, and she said for me to tell him to come up. As far as the disposition of the property, I never mentioned such a thing."
 It is asking a great deal of the court, to conclude from what appears in the record, that he did not know that he had been made a beneficiary in the deed of trust until he went up to Ellicott City some time later, the exact time not being shown. Miss Bentley was taken to his house, away from her own home where Benjamin Bentley, her other brother, was staying, to execute the deed. When it was being read to her and she executed it, her brother, Frank, remained outside of the house. What possible reason could there have been for having him excluded, if he was not to be made a beneficiary? Mr. Donovan, who drew the deed, testified that the message for him to go to see Miss Bentley came to him by telephone from Frank Bentley's place. Frank Bentley was asked, on direct examination, "When did you learn that you were the beneficiary under that deed of trust?" and replied: "Well, when Mr. Donovan came out, and said it is customary to present the pen to the beneficiary, I present this pen to you, Mr. Bentley." Anyone of ordinary intelligence would have known from that that he had been made the beneficiary, or at least would have made some inquiry about it when the pen was given to him. Mr. Donovan must *Page 433
 have either known, or have assumed that he did know he had been. If Frank Bentley did not know what was in the deed, he ought to have known it, as he says he was acting for his sister, had sent for Mr. Donovan, and had seen Mr. Travers about acting as trustee. It would have been inexcusable for him not to know what disposition his sister was making of her property, when she was relying on him to have it attended to, and it would be difficult to understand why an attorney would not, under the circumstances, have informed him, unless he assumed that he already knew, as Mr. Donovan must have known, when he gave him the pen with the remark quoted. Frank Bentley admitted, on cross-examination, that he had written to Mrs. O'Brien, his niece, who lives in New York State, in reply to inquiries about her aunt's property, "Ben has been living with sister Hattie for more than a year, and treated her badly that I went before the court and had a trustee and guardian appointed to look after her." He did not tell her that the property went to him after his sister's death, or give her any definite information about it. In point of fact, he had not had a trustee or guardian appointed by the court, and he knew that.
 Mr. Travers testified that Mr. Frank Bentley spoke to him at Laurel of his sister's "condition, and the people takingadvantage of her," and asked him if he would be trustee and look after her affairs. He said he asked him why he would not, and "he said he would rather somebody disinterested take care of it. I said I wouldn't do it unless Miss Hattie was willing." A day or two afterwards Mr. Travers went to her house, and asked her about it, and she said she was willing for him to take care of her matters, that "I then told Mr. Frank Bentley, and he said I will get Mr. Donovan to draw the papers up. He said you can take her down to your place, I said, no, I would come up to your house, and so my wife and myself went up to Miss Hattie's and got her ready and went up to Mr. Frank Bentley's and Mr. Donovan came." Again, he said: "He came to me at *Page 434
 Laurel, and asked me about the interest (referring to the interest on the mortgage), and he said didn't I think it would be a good idea to have some one look after Miss Hattie's affairs." Why did Frank Bentley suggest taking his sister down to Mr. Travers' place? Can there be any reasonable explanation of it excepting that it was due to the fact that her brother Benjamin was at his sister's house? Unless the deed was intended to be made as it was made, as Benjamin had suggested to Frank the advisability of having some one appointed, there could have been no reason for taking that old lady away from her home to have the deed executed. Common courtesy between brother and brother demanded that Frank Bentley should tell his brother Benjamin, who was at their sister's house, that she was about to make a deed of trust.
 The question was asked Mr. Travers: "Was there anything said prior to the execution of the deed about the property going to Frank Bentley after her death?" and he replied: "When Mr. Donovan asked Miss Hattie how she wanted to dispose of her property after she had gone, she said `She wanted it to be divided up equally between her two brothers.' Well, I said, `If you want it that way I don't want anything to do with it.' Then she spoke up and said, `I'll leave it all to brother Frank.'" Mr. Travers testified that she did not say, when he went up to see whether she was willing to have him take charge of her papers, about how she wanted the property to go, but he admitted that when the deed was signed he knew it was to go to Frank Bentley. What Mr. Travers says she said about it was when Mr. Donovan and Mr. Travers were both present, and there is nothing to show that they were present with her at any time, except the day the deed was made. Mr. Donovan said he went to her house twice — that the first time he went alone and the second time he took his wife and mother along. So it would seem to be clear that the conversation with her about the property was the day the deed was drawn, and, indeed, Mr. Travers *Page 435
 so testified. It must have occurred before Mr. Donovan said he took her into the room adjoining the porch, and read the deed over to her in the presence of Mr. Little, the notary, and Mr. Travers. If that was not so, then the deed must have been drawn, leaving the remainder in the property to Frank Bentley, before Miss Bentley said how she wanted the remainder left, but it is not shown by the testimony that the deed was changed after it was first drawn, although Mr. Donovan's recollection is that he drew the deed in Mr. Bentley's house, and Mr. Little spoke of Mr. Donovan detaining them there some time after he reached the house. At any rate, it would seem to be clear that when Miss Bentley went to her brother Frank's house on that day, she did not intend to leave the remainder to him alone, and it was only after Mr. Travers threatened to refuse to accept the trust, if it went to both, that she agreed to it going to her brother Frank. Mrs. Jackson testified that she was talking to Miss Bentley three or four years before August, 1919, and she said she wanted her property to be divided equally between her heirs.
 Of course, an owner of property has the right to leave it as he or she pleases, if not contrary to some principle of law, and the law does not pronounce deeds or other papers invalid, simply because they are made by old people, or those in bad health, or those who are both old and in bad health. But the law does protect old and feeble people from being placed in positions that take away their freedom of action, and make it improbable, if not impossible, for them to carry out their wishes freely. It may be conceded to have been wise to place Miss Bentley's property in the hands of some one who would protect it, but if she was capable of executing a power of attorney, she could have appointed Mr. Travers her attorney in fact, and if she was not, a committee could have been appointed by the court. Moreover, there was no necessity to dispose of the remainder after her death in order to protect her, which is the reason given by Mr. Bentley for her wanting to make the deed, but we find this old lady making an irrevocable deed of trust, turning over to her mortgagee *Page 436
 as trustee all that she had, real, personal and mixed, being away from her own home, and under the roof of the beneficiary named in the deed, who was to have all at her death. There was no attempt to explain why she was taken from her own home, turning her back on one brother, whom she said after she reached Frank's home she wanted to be one of her two beneficiaries. She may have changed her mind as to her nephew and nieces after she told Mrs. Jackson that she wanted to leave her property to her heirs, which would have included the nephew and nieces, but she was taken by the trustee to her brother Frank's house with an intention, so far as she was capable of having an intention, to have it divided between her nearest of kin, her two brothers, and is there met with the refusal of the trustee, in whom she had great confidence, as the record shows, to accept the trust if she included her brother Benjamin as a remainderman.
 As we have seen, Frank H. Bentley testified that when his sister called him into her house she "wanted to know what he could do to keep brother Ben from disposing of everything on the place." It is only just to say that he denied on the stand selling any property belonging to his sister, which he did not account for, and there is nothing in the record to prove the contrary. But if there was any need of such protection against him, and if she was of opinion, justly or unjustly, that he was improperly disposing of any of her property, the simple, easy, and natural thing to do, was to send him away. She was not required to let him remain there, but even if it be assumed that the object in having Mr. Travers appointed trustee was merely to protect her from her brother Ben, there is nothing to suggest that she indicated a desire to dispose of her property remaining after her death, when she spoke to her brother Frank about keeping her brother Ben from disposing of her property. Mr. Travers testified that he had not said anything to Miss Bentley, and she did not say anything to him about how she wanted the property to go, when he went to see her about taking charge of her affairs. Again he was asked: "Did *Page 437
 she say anything to you about the disposition of her property?" and answered: "Not at that time," and that question was followed up by one: "Did she say anything about it at any other time?" and he answered, "No, sir." It was only when Mr. Donovan asked her, and she then said what we have stated above.
 She had great confidence in Frank H. Bentley and James W. Travers, as the record clearly shows. The former said he did her shopping before his brother Ben came there, and after that he did some of it because his brother did not have a horse. In answer to the question: "Did you furnish her any assistance during the last ten years of her life?" he said: "Anything she wanted, she always came to me in selling her wheat and helping her financially." We do not want to be understood as intimating that there was anything wrong or suspicious in thus helping his sister, but the relations between them were such that when we find that she gave everything to him, subject to her life estate, especially under such suspicious circumstances as we have related, to the exclusion of her other heirs and next of kin, some valid explanation must be made.
 It would unduly prolong this opinion to quote from many authorities bearing on the case. In Chase v. Grey,134 Md. 623, JUDGE BURKE quoted, from 2 Pom. Eq. sec. 956, what has been in substance said in a number of our own decisions, but we repeat it as a concise statement of what is applicable here. It is there said: "Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relations, in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a confidential relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. The relation and duties involved in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic or merely personal." See alsoZimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 115; Horner v. Bell,102 Md. 435, 444; *Page 438 Thiede v. Startzman, 113 Md. 278, 287-289. In the last case JUDGE PEARCE quoted from Cherbonnier v. Evitts, 56 Md. 276, that "it is not inconsistent with the exercise of undue influence or artifice that the instrument assailed was executed voluntarily and with a knowledge of its contents," and he also quoted from Lord Eldon in Hugenin v. Baseley, 14 Vesey, 275, where he said: "The question is not whether she knew what she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced; whether all that care and providence was placed around her as against those who advised her, which from their situation and relation with respect to her, they were bound to exert in her behalf."
 We have considered the cases cited by the appellant, such asFrush v. Green, 86 Md. 494; Somers v. McCready,96 Md. 437; Giltz v. O'Malley, 135 Md. 281, and others, but after giving this case and the authorities thorough consideration, we can have no doubt about our duty in the premises. The learned judge in the lower court filed an excellent opinion, and we fully concur with him in his conclusions. It would make but little difference where the burden was placed in this case, as there is little, if any, conflict in what we regard as the most material points.
 No special point is made of it, and there was not, under the circumstances of the case, such laches on the part of the plaintiff in filing this bill, as calls upon the court to refuse to grant the relief prayed for. The decree of the lower court will be affirmed.
 Decree affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs in this Court,the defendants in the bill to pay them in the lower court, asdirected by the decree. *Page 439


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22003D0049
 2003/49/CE: Decisão n.° 2/2002 do Conselho de Associação UE-Bulgária, de 1 de Julho de 2002, no que diz respeito à melhoria do regime das trocas comerciais aplicável aos produtos agrícolas transformados, previsto no Protocolo n.° 3 do Acordo Europeu
 Jornal Oficial no L 018 de 23/01/2003 p. 0021 - 0050
 Decisão n.o 2/2002 do Conselho de Associação UE-Bulgáriade 1 de Julho de 2002no que diz respeito à melhoria do regime das trocas comerciais aplicável aos produtos agrícolas transformados, previsto no Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo Europeu(2003/49/CE)O CONSELHO DE ASSOCIAÇÃO,Tendo em conta o Acordo Europeu que cria uma Associação entre as Comunidades Europeias e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a República da Bulgária(1), por outro, e, nomeadamente, o n.o 2 do seu artigo 1.o do Protocolo n.o 3,Considerando o seguinte:(1) O Protocolo n.o 3, conforme substituído pelo Protocolo que adapta os aspectos comerciais do Acordo Europeu(2), fixa as disposições para o comércio de produtos agrícolas transformados entre a Comunidade e a Bulgária.(2) Nos termos do n.o 2 do artigo 1.o do Protocolo, o Conselho de Associação decide, em particular, qualquer alteração dos direitos mencionados nos anexos do protocolo e o aumento ou a abolição dos contingentes pautais.(3) Nos termos do segundo travessão do artigo 2.o do protocolo, o Conselho de Associação decide também da possibilidade de redução dos direitos aplicados, em resposta às reduções resultantes de concessões mútuas relativas aos produtos agrícolas transformados.(4) Os contingentes anuais indicados nos anexos I e II da presente decisão devem ser abertos para 2002. Dado que os mesmos contingentes anuais só podem ser abertos após 1 de Janeiro de 2002, em data a fixar, devem ser reduzidos proporcionalmente em relação ao período já decorrido,DECIDE:Artigo 1.oOs anexos I e II do Protocolo n.o 3 sobre o comércio de produtos agrícolas transformados entre a Comunidade e a Bulgária são substituídos pelos anexos I e II da presente decisão.Artigo 2.oOs contingentes anuais para 2002 previstos nos anexos I e II são reduzidos proporcionalmente, tendo em conta o período, baseado em meses completos, já decorrido.Artigo 3.oA presente decisão entra em vigor no primeiro dia do segundo mês seguinte ao da sua aprovação.Feito em Bruxelas, em 1 de Julho de 2002.Pelo Conselho de AssociaçãoO PresidenteS. Passy(1) JO L 358 de 31.12.1994, p. 3.(2) JO L 112 de 29.4.1999, p. 3.ANEXO IQuadro 1Contingentes aplicáveis à importação na Comunidade de mercadorias originárias da Bulgária - isentos de direitos>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>Quadro 2Direitos aplicáveis à importação na Comunidade de mercadorias originárias da Bulgária>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>Quadro 3Montantes de base tomados em consideração no cálculo dos elementos agrícolas reduzidos (EAR) e dos direitos adicionais aplicáveis às importações na Comunidade das mercadorias enumeradas quadro 2>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>ANEXO IIQuadro 1Lista de produtos originários da Comunidade relativamente aos quais a Bulgária concede um tratamento preferencial no âmbito de limites quantitativos>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>Quadro 2Direitos aplicáveis à importação na Bulgária de mercadorias originárias da Comunidade>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>


text:
14 ta’ Settembru 2011
 Kawża F-47/10
 “Servizz pubbliku — Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Artikoli 73 u 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal — Regolarità tal-opinjoni tal-Kumitat Mediku — Rifjut li tiġi rikonoxxuta l-invalidità parzjali permanenti”
 Suġġett: Rikors ippreżentat skont l-Artikolu 270 TFUE applikabbli għat-Trattat KEFA bis-saħħa tal-Artikolu 106(a) tiegħu, li permezz tiegħu A. Hecq essenzjalment jitlob l-annullament tad-deċiżjoni tas-7 ta’ Settembru 2009 tal-Awtorità tal-Ħatra li tiċħad it-talba tiegħu għar-rikonoxximent ta’ rata għall-invalidità parzjali permanenti minħabba mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol tiegħu.
 Deċiżjoni: Ma hemmx lok li tingħata deċiżjoni dwar it-talbiet intiżi għall-annullament tad-deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni tas-7 ta’ Settembru 2009, sa fejn dawn jimponu fuq ir-rikorrent l-ispejjeż u l-onorarji tat-tabib li huwa ħatar sabiex jirrappreżentah fi ħdan il-Kumitat Mediku kif ukoll nofs l-ispejjeż u l-onorarji tat-tielet tabib tal-Kumitat Mediku maħtur bi ftehim. It-talbiet għall-annullament tad-deċiżjonijiet tas-7 ta’ Settembru 2009, sa fejn dawn jirrifjutaw ir-rikonoxximent lir-rikorrent ta’ rata għall-invalidità permanenti, huma miċħuda bħala infondati. Ir-rikorrent għandu jbati l-ispejjeż kollha.
 1. Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Perizja medika — Setgħa diskrezzjonali tal-Kumitat Mediku — Stħarriġ ġudizzjarju — Limiti
 (Regolamenti tal-Persunal, Artikolu 73; leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għar-riskji ta’ inċident u ta’ mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol, Artikolu 23)
 2. Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Kumitat Mediku — Prinċipju ta’ funzjonament kolleġjali tal-Kummissjoni
 3. Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Invalidità permanenti skont l-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal u l-Artikolu 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal — Kunċetti distinti
 (Regolamenti tal-Persunal, Artikoli 73 u 78)
 4. Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Perizja medika — Obbligu ta’ motivazzjoni tal-Kumitat Mediku — Portata
 5. Uffiċjali — Sigurtà soċjali — Assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol — Perizja medika — Kompożizzjoni tal-Kumitat Mediku
 (Regolamenti tal-Persunal, Artikolu 73)
 1. L-evalwazzjonijiet mediċi attwali fformulati mill-Kumitat Mediku, imsemmi fl-Artikolu 23 tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol tal-uffiċjali, għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati definittivi meta jinħarġu f’kundizzjonijiet regolari. Il-qorti għandha s-setgħa li tivverifika biss, minn naħa, jekk l-imsemmi Kumitat ġiex stabbilit u jiffunzjonax b’mod regolari u, min-naħa l-oħra, jekk l-opinjoni tiegħu hijiex regolari, b’mod partikolari jekk fihiex motivazzjoni li tippermetti li jiġu evalwati l-kunsiderazzjonijiet li fuqhom hija bbażata u jekk tistabbilixxix rabta li tinftiehem bejn il-konstatazzjonijiet mediċi li huwa jwettaq u l-konklużjonijiet li jasal għalihom.
 Għalhekk, fir-rigward tal-istħarriġ ġudizzjarju limitat li għandu jagħmel it-Tribunal għas-Servizz Pubbliku, kritika bbażata fuq żball manifest ta’ evalwazzjoni li bih hija vvizzjata l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat Mediku ma tistax tintlaqa’.
 F’ċirkustanzi bħal dawn, stħarriġ ġudizzjarju strett tal-proċedura użata mill-Kumitat Mediku jidher bħala garanzija importanti tad-drittijiet tal-persuna assigurata.
 Madankollu, jekk il-garanziji proċedurali tal-persuna assigurata quddiem dan il-Kumitat għandhom jiġu mistħarrġa biss mill-qorti, xorta jibqa’ l-fatt li dan l-istħarriġ għandu jikkunsidra n-natura stess tax-xogħol ta’ dan il-Kumitat, liema xogħol ma huwiex intiż sabiex jiddeċiedi dibattitu kontradittorju, iżda sabiex jistabbilixxi konstatazzjonijiet mediċi.
 (ara l-punti 44 sa 47)
 Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja 19 ta’ Jannar 1988, Biedermann vs Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri, 2/87, punt 16
 It-Tribunal għas-Servizz Pubbliku: 14 ta̕ Settembru 2010, AE vs Il-Kummissjoni, F‐79/09, punti 64, u l-ġurisprudenza ċċitata, u 89; 11 ta̕ Mejju 2011, J vs Il-Kummissjoni, F‐53/09, punt 104
 2.Ma teżisti l-ebda dispożizzjoni espressa dwar il-prinċipju ta’ kulleġjalità fil-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol. Dan il-prinċipju, li jimplika li kull wieħed mill-membri tal-Kumitat Mediku għandu jkollu l-opportunità li jsostni b’mod effettiv l-opinjoni tiegħu quddiem il-membri l-oħra, huwa l-korollarju tas-salvagwardja tal-interessi tal-uffiċjal, fi ħdan il-Kumitat Mediku, fil-preżenza ta’ tabib li jgawdi mill-fiduċja tiegħu, kif ukoll fil-ħatra tat-tielet tabib bi ftehim mill-membri maħtura minn kull waħda mill-partijiet.
 Il-prinċipju ta’ kulleġjalità ma jfissirx li l-Kumitat Mediku ma jistax jiddeċiedi b’mod validu b’maġġoranza, u lanqas li r-responsabbiltà prinċipali tal-abbozzar tar-rapport tal-Kumitat Mediku ma tistax tiġi żgurata miż-żewġ tobba b’maġġoranza fi ħdanu.
 Għalhekk, meta t-tabib maħtur mill-uffiċjali kien tpoġġa fil-pożizzjoni li jissottometti l-osservazzjonijiet u l-analiżi tiegħu tal-fajl tal-persuna interessata matul laqgħa tal-Kumitat Mediku, in-nuqqas ta’ ftehim li kien jeżisti bejn iż-żewġ tobba l-oħra b’maġġoranza fi ħdan dan il-Kumitat u dan it-tabib, li kien issepara ruħu mill-analiżi medika tal-kollegi tiegħu wara eżami kulleġjali tal-persuna interessata u tal-fajl tagħha, ma jirrilevax preġudizzju għall-kulleġjalità tax-xogħol tal-Kumitat Mediku u lanqas irregolarità tat-tip li tippreġudika r-rapport stabbilit f’ismu. B’mod partikolari, il-fatt li t-tabib maħtur mill-uffiċjal irċieva rapport stabbilit f’isem il-Kumitat Mediku biex jiffirmah, elaborat miż-żewġ kollegi tiegħu b’maġġoranza u ppreżentat bħala li diġà huwa ffinalizzat, u li f’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, ma kien hemm l-ebda possibbiltà oħra ħlief li tinkiteb nota ta’ nuqqas ta’ qbil, ma huwiex waħdu biżżejjed sabiex jikkostitwixxi preġudizzju għall-prinċipju ta’ kulleġjalità li għandu jirregola x-xogħol tal-Kumitat Mediku.
 (ara l-punti 52, 55, 57 u 58)
 Il-Qorti Ġenerali: 15 ta̕ Novembru 2000, Camacho-Fernandes vs Il-Kummissjoni, T‐20/00, punti 31 u 32
 3.Teżisti distinzjoni fundamentali bejn l-invalidità permanenti skont l-Artikolu 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal, kunċett ekwivalenti għall-inkapaċità tax-xogħol u għaldaqstant għall-bżonn ta’ dħul sostituttiv taħt forma ta’ allowance tal-invalidità, u l-invalidità permanenti skont l-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal, ekwivalenti għall-preġudizzju għall-integrità fiżika u psikika.
 Fil-fatt, jekk invalidità totali skont l-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal tfisser b’mod ġenerali inkapaċità totali ta’ xogħol, il-kuntrarju ma huwiex neċessarjament minnu peress li uffiċjal jista’ ma jkunx assolutament kapaċi għax-xogħol skont l-Artikolu 78, filwaqt li jkun isofri biss minn invalidità permanenti parzjali baxxa ħafna skont l-imsemmi Artikolu 73.
 Barra minn hekk, il-kumpens ta’ invalidità previst fl-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal huwa differenti mill-pensjoni tal-invalidità prevista fl-Artikolu 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal li tingħata biss f’każ ta’ inkapaċità ta’ xogħol. Min-naħa l-oħra, il-kumpens previst fl-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal jingħata lill-persuna interessata tkun xi tkun il-kapaċità ta’ din tal-aħħar sabiex tkompli teżerċita l-impjieg tagħha. Invalidità permanenti parzjali tagħti lok għall-kumpens, anki jekk din ma taffettwa bl-ebda mod il-possibbiltajiet tal-persuna interessata li teżerċita l-impjieg tagħha. Minn dan jirriżulta li l-invalidità skont l-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal għandha tiġi interpretata bħala li hija intiża li tippreġudika l-integrità fiżika jew psikika tal-uffiċjal, mingħajr ma tieħu inkunsiderazzjoni l-eventwali inkapaċità ta’ xogħol.
 Isegwi li, fis-sistema tal-Artikoli 73 u 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal, ma jistax jiġi eskluż li ma tiġi rrikonoxxuta lil uffiċjal, li kien suġġett ta’ invalidità abbażi tal-Artikolu 78 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal minħabba mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol, ebda rata ta’ invalidità permanenti parzjali skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Artikolu 73 tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal, tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol u tal-iskema, jekk din il-marda ma tkun ikkawżatlu ebda preġudizzju għall-integrità fiżika jew psikika skont dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet.
 (ara l-punti 73 sa 76)
 Il-Qorti Ġenerali: 14 ta̕ Mejju 1998, Lucaccioni vs Il-Kummissjoni, T‐165/95, punt 74; 27 ta̕ Ġunju 2000, Plug vs Il-Kummissjoni, T‐47/97, punti 73 u 74
 4. Meta l-Kumitat Mediku, previst fl-Artikolu 23 tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għall-inċidenti u għall-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol tal-uffiċjali, jitressqulu domandi ta’ natura medika kumplessi li jirrigwardaw dijanjosi diffiċli jew rabta kawżali bejn il-kundizzjoni li tkun qed tbati minnha l-persuna kkonċernata u l-eżerċizzju tal-attività professjonali tagħha fi ħdan istituzzjoni, huwa għandu jindika b’mod partikolari fl-opinjoni tiegħu l-elementi tal-fajl li huwa bbaża ruħu fuqhom u jippreċiża, f’każ ta’ diverġenza sinjifikattiva, ir-raġunijiet li għalihom huwa jvarja minn ċerti rapporti mediċi, preċedenti u rilevanti, iktar favorevoli għall-persuna kkonċernata.
 Ma huwiex meħtieġ, li r-rapport tal-Kumitat Mediku jkun, fuq il-pjan formali mudell fir-rigward tal-abbozzar. Huwa biss meħtieġ li jkun fih raġuni li tagħti l-opportunità li jiġi eżaminat fuq liema kunsiderazzjonijiet kienu bbażati l-konklużjonijiet li jinsabu fih u li tistabbilixxi rabta li tinftiehem bejn il-verifiki mediċi li jissemmew u l-konklużjonijiet li wasal għalihom il-Kumitat Mediku.
 Barra minn hekk, peress li r-rapport tal-Kumitat Mediku huwa ta’ natura xjentifika, il-ħtieġa li jkun koerenti u li jinftiehem ma għandhomx għalfejn jiġu eżaminati mill-perspettiva tal-uffiċjal stess, iżda minn dik tat-tabib li jirrappreżentah fi ħdan il-Kumitat Mediku, peress li b’mod partikolari dan it-tabib għandu r-rwol li jispjega lill-pazjent tiegħu, jekk dan huwa meħtieġ, ir-raġunijiet taċ-ċaħda tat-talba tiegħu għar-rikonoxximent tal-mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol.
 (ara l-punti 80, 86 u 87)
 It-Tribunal għas-Servizz Pubbliku: AE vs Il-Kummissjoni, iċċitata iktar ʼil fuq, punti 64 u 65, u l-ġurisprudenza ċċitata; J vs Il-Kummissjoni, iċċitata iktar ʼil fuq, punt 96
 5.Meta t-tliet tobba tal-Kumitat Mediku, previst fl-Artikolu 23 tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għar-riskji ta’ inċident u ta’ mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol tal-uffiċjali, ikunu ġew maħtura mill-persuni li għandhom tali setgħa, is-salvagwardja tal-interessi tal-uffiċjal tkun debitament żgurata permezz tal-preżenza ta’ tabib li jgawdi mill-fiduċja tiegħu u mill-ħatra tat-tielet tabib, li ma jagħmilx parti mill-amministrazzjoni. F’dan ir-rigward, il-leġiżlazzjoni dwar l-assigurazzjoni għar-riskji ta’ inċident u ta’ mard ikkaġunat mix-xogħol ma tistabbilixxi l-ebda eżiġenza partikolari ta’ speċjalizzazzjoni tal-membri tal-Kumitat Mediku. Għaldaqstant, sa fejn din il-leġiżlazzjoni tagħti libertà totali fir-rigward tal-għażla tat-tabib kemm lill-uffiċjal interessat kif ukoll lill-amministrazzjoni, ma hemm xejn li jfixkel lill-uffiċjali milli jaħtar tabib speċjalizzat sabiex jirrappreżentah fi ħdan il-Kumitat Mediku, jekk huwa jqis li dan huwa neċessarju.
 (ara l-punti 107 u 108)
 Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja: 14 ta̕ Lulju 1981, Suss vs Il-Kummissjoni, 186/80, punt 9
 It-Tribunal għas-Servizz Pubbliku: AE vs Il-Kummissjoni, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punti 50 u 51


text:
 24.11.2014
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 421/5
 Euroopa Kohtu (viies koda) 18. septembri 2014. aasta otsus (Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo – Hispaania eelotsusetaotlus) – Vueling Airlines S.A. versus Instituto Galego de Consumo de la Xunta de Galicia
 (Kohtuasi C-487/12) (1)
 ((Eelotsusetaotlus - Lennutransport - Euroopa Liidus lennuteenuste osutamist käsitlevad ühiseeskirjad - Määrus (EÜ) nr 1008/2008 - Hinnakujundamise vabadus - Pagasi registreerimine - Lisatasu - Mõiste „piletihind” - Tarbijakaitse - Ebaõiglase lepingutingimuse tõttu lennuettevõtjale trahvi määramine - Siseriiklik õigusnorm, mille kohaselt reisijate vedu ja pagasi registreerimine peab olema arvestatud lennupileti baashinna sisse - Vastavus liidu õigusele))
 2014/C 421/06
 Kohtumenetluse keel: hispaania
 Eelotsusetaotluse esitanud kohus
 Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo
 Põhikohtuasja pooled
 Hageja: Vueling Airlines S.A.
 Kostja: Instituto Galego de Consumo de la Xunta de Galicia
 Resolutsioon
 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 24. septembri 2008. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 1008/2008 ühenduses lennuteenuste osutamist käsitlevate ühiseeskirjade kohta artikli 22 lõiget 1 tuleb tõlgendada nii, et sellega on vastuolus niisugune siseriiklik õigusnorm, nagu on käsitlusel põhikohtuasjas, mis kohustab lennuettevõtjaid lennupileti hinna eest igal juhul vedama mitte ainult reisijaid, vaid ka nende registreeritud pagasit, tingimusel et see pagas vastab teatavatele eeskätt kaaluga seotud nõuetele, ilma et niisuguse pagasi veo eest võiks nõuda mis tahes hinnalisa.
 (1) ELT C 26, 26.1.2013.


type: wikipedia

text:
Con i suoi 33 gol, è il difensore centrale ad aver segnato di più tra Campeonato Brasileiro Série A e Coppa del Brasile.
 Carriera
 Club
 Nella sua carriera Júnior giocò nel Flamengo, nel San Paolo, nel (in Bundesliga), nel Palmeiras, nel Vasco da Gama, nello Shanghai Shenhua (in Cina) e nell'Internacional. Si ritirò alla fine del 2005, ma nel dicembre 2006 firmò un contratto con l'América di Rio de Janeiro per giocare nel Campionato Carioca all'inizio del 2007. Nella stagione 2007-2008 ha giocato con il Brasiliense, nella seconda divisione del campionato brasiliano. Ha giocato come difensore nel Miami FC.
 Nazionale
 Con la Nazionale brasiliana Júnior Baiano prese parte ai Mondiali 1998, raggiungendo la finale, dove però i verdeoro furono sconfitti dalla Francia padrona di casa per 3-0.
 Conta 25 presenze in Nazionale, la prima delle quali nell'agosto 1997 e l'ultima di esse nel luglio 1998.
 Palmarès
 Giocatore
 Club
 Competizioni statali
 Flamengo: 1991, 2004
 Competizioni nazionali
 Flamengo: 1990
 Flamengo: 1992
 Vasco da Gama: 2000
 Competizioni internazionali
 São Paulo: 1994
 São Paulo: 1994
 Palmeiras: 1999
 Palmeiras: 1998
 Vasco da Gama: 2000
 Nazionale
 1997
 Individuale
 1997
 Note
 Collegamenti esterni
 Calciatori della Nazionale brasiliana
 Calciatori vincitori della Confederations Cup


text:
 7.12.2013
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 359/9
 Sentenza tal-Qorti Ġenerali tat-23 ta’ Ottubru 2013 — Bode Chemie vs UASI — Laros (sterilina)
 (Kawża T-114/12) (1)
 (Trade mark Komunitarja - Proċedimenti ta’ oppożizzjoni - Applikazzjoni għat-trade mark Komunitarja figurattiva sterlina - Trade marks Komunitarji verbali u figurattivi preċedenti STERILLIUM u BODE Sterillium - Raġuni relattiva għal rifjut - Assenza ta’ probabbiltà ta’ konfużjoni - Artikolu 8(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 207/2009)
 2013/C 359/15
 Lingwa tal-kawża: il-Franċiż
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: Bode Chemie GmbH (Hamburg, il-Ġermanja) (rappreżentant: N. Aicher, avukat)
 Konvenut: L-Uffiċċju għall-Armonizzazzjoni fis-Suq Intern (Trade marks u Disinni) (rappreżentant: V. Melgar, aġent)
 Parti oħra fil-proċedimenti quddiem il-Bord tal-Appell tal-UASI, intervenjenti quddiem il-Qorti Ġenerali: Laros Srl (Cremona, l-Italja) (rappreżentant: F. Caricato, avukat)
 Suġġett
 Rikors kontra d-deċiżjoni tar-Raba’ Bord tal-Appell tal-UASI, tas-16 ta’ Jannar 2012 (Każ R 2423/2010-4), dwar proċedimenti ta’ oppożizzjoni bejn Bode chemie GmbH u Laros Srl.
 Dispożittiv
 (1)
 Ir-rikors huwa miċħud.
 (2)
 Bode Chemie GmbH hija kkundannata għall-ispejjeż, inklużi l-ispejjeż indispensabbli sostnuti minn Laros Srl għall-finijiet tal-proċedimenti quddiem il-Bord tal-Appell tal-Uffiċċju għall-Armonizzazzjoni fis-Suq Intern (Trade marks u Disinni) (UASI).
 (1) ĠU C 165, 09.06.2012


text:
 24.11.2005
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 306/14
 DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE
 No 93/2005
 of 8 July 2005
 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement
 THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,
 Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, as amended by the Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agreement’, and in particular Article 98 thereof,
 Whereas:
 (1)
 Annex I to the Agreement was amended by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 51/2005 of 29 April 2005 (1).
 (2)
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 745/2004 of 16 April 2004 laying down measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption (2), is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (3)
 This Decision is not to apply to Iceland and Liechtenstein,
 HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
 Article 1
 The following point shall be inserted after point 126 (Commission Decision 2005/91/EC) in Part 1.2 of Chapter I of Annex I to the Agreement:
 ‘127.
 32004 R 0745: Commission Regulation (EC) No 745/2004 of 16 April 2004 laying down measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption (OJ L 122, 26.4.2004, p. 1).The provisions of this Regulation shall, for the purpose of the present Agreement, be read with the following adaptations:
 (a)
 The following shall be added in Article 2:
 “—
 Game meat and game meat products entering Norway from Svalbard, in so far as the amount or quantity does not exceed 5 kilograms per person.”
 (b)
 The words “European Union” on the notice in Annex II shall be replaced by the words “European Union and Norway”.
 (c)
 The word “Norway” in Article 1(4), in the footnote of the notice in Annex II and in the communication in Annex III shall be deleted.’
 Article 2
 The text of Regulation (EC) No 745/2004 in the Norwegian language, to be published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be authentic.
 Article 3
 This Decision shall enter into force on 9 July 2005, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee (3).
 Article 4
 This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of, and in the EEA Supplement to, the Official Journal of the European Union.
 Done at Brussels, 8 July 2005.
 For the EEA Joint Committee
 The President
 HSH Prinz Nikolaus von LIECHTENSTEIN
 (1) OJ L 239, 15.9.2005, p. 22.
 (2) OJ L 122, 26.4.2004, p. 1.
 (3) No constitutional requirements indicated.


text:
C 184/2 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 13.6.98
 trotzdem insoweit verlangt werden, als es aufgrund der ausgestaltet sein dürfen, daû sie die Erlangung der Ent-
 Besonderheiten des Verfahrens zur Herstellung des schädigung praktisch unmöglich machen oder übermä-
 Ausgangsstoffes aus dem betreffenden Stoff kein ande- ûig erschweren.
 res Mittel gibt, um die Reinheit des Ausgangsstoffes zu
 beurteilen. (1) ABl. C 174 vom 8.7.1995.
 Verlangt die zuständige Behörde von demjenigen, der
 eine Genehmigung für das Inverkehrbringen beantragt,
 Angaben gemäû Artikel 9 Ziffer 3 der Richtlinie 81/
 851/EWG, so werden die in Artikel 8 dieser Richtlinie
 vorgesehenen Fristen so lange gehemmt, bis diese URTEIL DES GERICHTSHOFES
 Angaben gemacht worden sind. (Sechste Kammer)
 vom 30. April 1998
 2. Für die Beantwortung der ersten Frage ist es nicht von
 Bedeutung, ob das Verfahren zur Herstellung eines in der Rechtssache C-230/96 (Vorabentscheidungsersuchen
 Arzneimittels kontinuierlich oder nicht kontinuierlich der Cour d'appel Douai): Cabour SA und Nord Distribu-
 ist. tion Automobile SA gegen Arnor SOCO SARL (1).
 (Wettbewerb Ð Vertrieb von Kraftfahrzeugen Ð Gültig-
 keit des Alleinvertriebvertrags Ð Artikel 85 Absätze 1 und
 3. Der zuständigen Behörde ist es nicht erlaubt, denjeni-
 3 EG-Vertrag Ð Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 123/85 Ð Ver-
 gen, der eine Genehmigung für das Inverkehrbringen
 ordnung (EG) Nr. 1475/95)
 beantragt, von der Vorlage von Angaben oder Unterla-
 gen im Sinne von Artikel 5 der Richtlinie 81/851/ (98/C 184/02)
 EWG zu befreien, auch wenn sich herausstellt, daû die
 Erlangung der betreffenden Informationen in einem (Verfahrenssprache: Französisch)
 konkreten Fall praktisch unmöglich ist.
 (Vorläufige Übersetzung; die endgültige Übersetzung
 4. Die Prüfung der vierten Frage hat nichts ergeben, was erscheint in der Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des
 die Gültigkeit des Artikels 5 Absatz 2 Ziffern 3, 4 und Gerichtshofes)
 9 der Richtlinie 81/851/EWG und der Abschnitte A, B
 und C des 1. Teils des Anhangs der Richtlinie 81/852/
 EWG im Hinblick auf den Grundsatz der Verhältnis- In der Rechtssache C-230/96 betreffend ein dem Gerichts-
 mäûigkeit beeinträchtigen könnte. hof nach Artikel 177 EG-Vertrag von der Cour d'appel
 Douai (Frankreich) in dem bei diesem anhängigen Rechts-
 streit Cabour SA und Nord Distribution Automobile SA
 5. Die Prüfung der fünften Frage hat nichts ergeben, was gegen Arnor SOCO SARL, Streithelferinnen: Automobiles
 die Gültigkeit der Richtlinien 81/851/EWG und 81/ Peugeot SA und Automobiles CitroeÈn SA, vorgelegtes
 852/EWG im Hinblick auf die Artikel 30 bis 36 EG- Ersuchen um Vorabentscheidung über die Auslegung des
 Vertrag beeinträchtigen könnte. Artikels 85 Absatz 1 EG-Vertrag und einiger Vorschriften
 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 123/85 der Kommission vom
 12. Dezember 1984 über die Anwendung von Artikel 85
 6. Artikel 40 der Richtlinie 81/851/EWG ist dahin auszu- Absatz 3 des Vertrages auf Gruppen von Vertriebs- und
 legen, daû eine auf Artikel 9 Ziffer 3 dieser Richtlinie Kundendienstvereinbarungen über Kraftfahrzeuge (ABl.
 gestützte Forderung nach zusätzlichen Angaben nicht L 15 vom 18.1.1985, S. 16) sowie der Verordnung (EG)
 begründet zu werden braucht. Nr. 1475/95 der Kommission vom 28. Juni 1995 (ABl.
 L 145 vom 29.6.1995, S. 25) hat der Gerichtshof (Sechste
 7. Ein Mitgliedstaat muû die Schäden ersetzen, die dem- Kammer) unter Mitwirkung des Kammerpräsidenten H.
 jenigen, der eine Genehmigung für das Inverkehrbrin- Ragnemalm sowie der Richter R. Schintgen (Berichterstat-
 gen beantragt, durch Forderungen nach Angaben und ter), G. F. Mancini, P. J. G. Kapteyn und G. Hirsch Ð
 durch Voraussetzungen entstanden sind, die gegen die Generalanwalt: G. Tesauro, Kanzler: D. Louterman-
 Richtlinien 81/851/EWG und 81/852/EWG verstoûen, Hubeau, Hauptverwaltungsrätin Ð am 30. April 1998 ein
 wenn die Gemeinschaftsrechtsnorm, gegen die versto- Urteil mit folgendem Tenor erlassen:
 ûen worden ist, bezweckt, dem einzelnen Rechte zu
 verleihen, der Verstoû hinreichend qualifiziert ist und 1. Artikel 5 Absatz 2 Ziffer 1 Buchstaben a) und b) der
 zwischen diesem Verstoû und dem dem einzelnen ent- Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 123/85 der Kommission vom
 standenen Schaden ein unmittelbarer Kausalzusam- 12. Dezember 1984 über die Anwendung von
 menhang besteht. Unter diesem Vorbehalt hat der Artikel 85 Absatz 3 des Vertrages auf Gruppen von
 Staat die Folgen des Schadens, der durch einen ihm Vertriebs- und Kundendienstvereinbarungen über
 zurechenbaren Verstoû gegen das Gemeinschaftsrecht Kraftfahrzeuge ist dahin auszulegen, daû die durch die
 verursacht worden ist, im Rahmen des nationalen Haf- Verordnung gewährte Freistellung für eine Klausel
 tungsrechts zu beheben, wobei die im anwendbaren eines Alleinvertriebsvertrags gilt, die lediglich vorsieht,
 nationalen Recht festgelegten Voraussetzungen nicht daû die Parteien sich auf sachlich gerechtfertigte
 ungünstiger sein dürfen als bei ähnlichen Rechtsbehel- Gründe berufen können, um sich von ihren jeweiligen
 fen, die nur nationales Recht betreffen, und nicht so Wettbewerbsverboten freizumachen, ohne daû darin
 ---pagebreak--- 13.6.98 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften C 184/3
 im einzelnen angegeben wird, worin diese Gründe URTEIL DES GERICHTSHOFES
 bestehen können.
 (Sechste Kammer)
 Artikel 3 Ziffer 3 und Artikel 5 Absatz 2 der Verord- vom 30. April 1998
 nung (EWG) Nr. 123/85 sind dahin auszulegen, daû
 in der Rechtssache C-24/97: Kommission der
 die durch die Verordnung gewährte Freistellung nicht
 Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegen Bundesrepublik
 für eine Vertragsklausel gilt, die dem Händler auûer
 Deutschland (1)
 bei Vorliegen sachlich gerechtfertigter Gründe verbie-
 tet, neue Fahrzeuge jeder anderen Marke auch in ande- (Vertragsverletzung eines Mitgliedstaats Ð Aufenthalts-
 ren Geschäftsräumen als denjenigen zu vertreiben, in recht Ð Ausweispflicht Ð Sanktionen)
 denen die Vertragswaren angeboten werden.
 (98/C 184/03)
 Artikel 4 Absatz 1 Ziffer 3 und Artikel 5 Absatz 2
 Ziffern 2 und 3 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 123/85
 sind dahin auszulegen, daû die durch die Verordnung (Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch)
 eingeräumte Freistellung für eine Vertragsklausel gilt,
 die dem Händler ein bestimmtes Verkaufsziel vorgibt
 und die bis zur Kündigung des Vertrages gehende In der Rechtssache C-24/97, Kommission der Europäi-
 Sanktionen für den Fall vorsieht, daû dieses Ziel nicht schen Gemeinschaften (Bevollmächtigte: Peter Hillenkamp
 erreicht wird, jedoch unter der Voraussetzung, daû die und Pieter Jan Kuijper) gegen Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 Festsetzung des Verkaufsziels den Ausdruck einer blo- (Bevollmächtigter: Ernst Röder) wegen Feststellung, daû
 ûen Verpflichtung zum Einsatz geeigneter Mittel dar- die Bundesrepublik Deutschland dadurch gegen ihre Ver-
 stellt. pflichtungen aus den Artikeln 48, 52 und 59 EG-Vertrag
 sowie aus Artikel 4 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 68/360/EWG
 2. Artikel 3 Ziffer 3 und Artikel 5 Absatz 2 der Verord- des Rates vom 15. Oktober 1968 zur Aufhebung der
 nung (EG) Nr. 1475/95 der Kommission vom 28. Juni Reise- und Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für Arbeitnehmer
 1995 über die Anwendung von Artikel 85 Absatz 3 der Mitgliedstaaten und ihre Familienangehörigen inner-
 des Vertrages auf Gruppen von Vertriebs- und Kunden- halb der Gemeinschaft (ABl. L 257 vom 19.10.1968, S. 13)
 dienstvereinbarungen über Kraftfahrzeuge sind dahin und aus Artikel 4 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 73/148/EWG des
 auszulegen, daû die durch die Verordnung gewährte Rates vom 21. Mai 1973 zur Aufhebung der Reise- und
 Freistellung nicht für eine Vertragsklausel gilt, die dem Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für Staatsangehörige der Mit-
 Händler auûer bei Vorliegen sachlich gerechtfertigter gliedstaaten innerhalb der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet
 Gründe verbietet, Neufahrzeuge anderer Marken auch der Niederlassung und des Dienstleistungsverkehrs (ABl.
 in Geschäftsräumen zu vertreiben, die von denjenigen L 172 vom 28.6.1973, S. 14) verstoûen hat, daû sie Staats-
 getrennt sind, in denen die Vertragswaren angeboten angehörige der anderen Mitgliedstaaten, die sich im deut-
 werden. schen Hoheitsgebiet aufhalten, bei vergleichbaren Verstö-
 ûen gegen die Ausweispflicht hinsichtlich des Verschul-
 densmaûstabs und des Buûgeldrahmens in
 Artikel 4 Absatz 1 Ziffer 3 und Artikel 5 Absätze 2 unverhältnismäûiger Weise anders behandelt als deutsche
 und 3 der Verordnung Nr. 1475/95 sind dahin auszule- Staatsangehörige, hat der Gerichtshof (Sechste Kammer)
 gen, daû die durch die Verordnung gewährte Freistel- unter Mitwirkung des Kammerpräsidenten H. Ragnemalm
 lung für eine Vertragsklausel gilt, die dem Händler ein (Berichterstatter) sowie der Richter G. F. Mancini, J. L.
 bestimmtes Verkaufsziel vorgibt, und die für den Fall, Murray, G. Hirsch und K. M. Ioannou Ð Generalanwalt:
 daû dieses Ziel nicht erreicht wird, Sanktionen vor- F. G. Jacobs, Kanzler: R. Grass Ð am 30. April 1998 ein
 sieht, die bis zur Kündigung des Vertrages gehen kön- Urteil mit folgendem Tenor erlassen:
 nen, jedoch unter der Voraussetzung, daû die Festset-
 zung des Verkaufsziels den Ausdruck einer bloûen Ver-
 pflichtung zum Einsatz geeigneter Mittel darstellt und
 daû diese Festsetzung einvernehmlich von den Parteien 1. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat dadurch gegen
 oder bei fehlendem Einvernehmen von einem sachver- ihre Verpflichtungen aus den Artikeln 48, 52 und 59
 ständigen Dritten vorgenommen wird. EG-Vertrag sowie aus Artikel 4 der Richtlinie 68/360/
 EWG des Rates vom 15. Oktober 1968 zur Aufhe-
 bung der Reise- und Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für
 3. Das Verbot des Artikels 85 Absatz 1 des Vertrages Arbeitnehmer der Mitgliedstaaten und ihre Familienan-
 erfaût Klauseln in einem Kraftfahrzeugvertriebsvertrag gehörigen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft und aus
 auch in dem Fall, daû für diese die Gruppenfreistellung Artikel 4 der Richtlinie 73/148/EWG des Rates vom
 nicht gilt, wenn diese Klauseln unter Berücksichtigung 21. Mai 1973 zur Aufhebung der Reise- und Aufent-
 des wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Zusammenhangs haltsbeschränkungen für Staatsangehörige der Mit-
 eine spürbare Einschränkung des Wettbewerbs inner- gliedstaaten innerhalb der Gemeinschaft auf dem
 halb des Gemeinsamen Marktes bezwecken oder Gebiet der Niederlassung und des Dienstleistungsver-
 bewirken und wenn sie geeignet sind, den Handel zwi- kehrs verstoûen, daû sie Staatsangehörige der anderen
 schen den Mitgliedstaaten zu beeinträchtigen. Mitgliedstaaten, die sich im deutschen Hoheitsgebiet
 aufhalten, bei vergleichbaren Verstöûen gegen die Aus-
 (1) ABl. C 269 vom 14.9.1996. weispflicht hinsichtlich des Verschuldensmaûstabs und
 des Buûgeldrahmens in unverhältnismäûiger Weise
 anders behandelt als deutsche Staatsangehörige.