text:
 25.3.2014
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 L 89/77
 Numai textele originale CEE–ONU au efect juridic în temeiul dreptului public internațional. Situația și data intrării în vigoare ale prezentului regulament trebuie verificate în cea mai recentă versiune a documentului de situație CEE-ONU TRANS/WP.29/343, disponibilă la adresa:
 http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29fdocstts.html
 Regulamentul nr. 56 al Comisiei Economice pentru Europa a Organizației Națiunilor Unite (CEE-ONU) – Dispoziții uniforme privind omologarea farurilor pentru mopede și vehicule asimilate acestora
 Include întreg textul valabil până la:
 Seria 01 de amendamente – Data intrării în vigoare: 12 septembrie 2001
 CUPRINS
 REGULAMENT
 1.
 Domeniul de aplicare
 2.
 Definiția „tipului”
 3.
 Cererea de omologare
 4.
 Marcaje
 5.
 Omologarea
 6.
 Specificații generale
 7.
 Specificații speciale
 8.
 Cerințe privind dispersoarele și filtrele colorate
 9.
 Conformitatea producției
 10.
 Sancțiuni în cazul nerespectării conformității producției
 11.
 Modificarea și extinderea omologării unui tip de far
 12.
 Încetarea definitivă a producției
 13.
 Denumirile și adresele serviciilor tehnice responsabile cu efectuarea încercărilor de omologare, precum și ale serviciilor administrative
 14.
 Dispoziții tranzitorii
 ANEXE
 Anexa 1 –
 Comunicare privind acordarea, extinderea, refuzul sau retragerea omologării sau încetarea definitivă a producției unui tip de far în temeiul Regulamentului nr. 56
 Anexa 2 –
 Dispunerea mărcii de omologare
 Anexa 3 –
 Măsurători fotometrice
 Anexa 4 –
 Cerințe minime privind procedurile de control al conformității producției
 Anexa 5 –
 Cerințe minime privind eșantionarea efectuată de către un inspector
 1. DOMENIUL DE APLICARE
 Prezentul regulament se aplică omologării farurilor care utilizează lămpi cu incandescență, care produc o singură lumină de întâlnire și care sunt destinate echipării mopedelor (1) și vehiculelor asimilate acestora.
 2. DEFINIȚIA „TIPULUI”
 „Faruri de diferite tipuri” înseamnă faruri care diferă în privința unor aspecte esențiale, precum:
 2.1.
 denumirea comercială sau marca;
 2.2.
 caracteristicile sistemului optic;
 2.3.
 includerea sau eliminarea unor componente care pot modifica rezultatele optice prin reflexie, refracție sau absorbție. O schimbare a culorii fasciculelor emise de faruri ale căror alte caracteristici nu sunt modificate nu este considerată o schimbare a tipului de far. Pentru astfel de faruri trebuie să se atribuie același număr de omologare.
 3. CEREREA DE OMOLOGARE
 Cererea de omologare se depune de către titularul denumirii comerciale sau al mărcii sau de către reprezentantul său autorizat. Orice cerere trebuie să fie însoțită de:
 3.1.
 desene, în triplu exemplar, suficient de detaliate pentru a permite identificarea tipului. Desenele trebuie să indice poziția prevăzută pentru marca de omologare și să prezinte farul în vedere frontală și în secțiune laterală transversală, cu indicarea schematică a striațiilor optice și a prismelor dispersorului;
 3.2.
 o descriere tehnică succintă care să precizeze, în special, clasa lămpii cu incandescență prezentate;
 3.3.
 două dispozitive cu dispersoare incolore (2).
 3.4.
 Autoritatea competentă verifică existența unor condiții satisfăcătoare pentru asigurarea controlului efectiv al conformității producției, înainte de acordarea omologării de tip.
 4. MARCAJE
 4.1.
 Farurile prezentate pentru omologare trebuie să poarte următoarele inscripții, în mod clar, lizibil și de neșters:
 4.1.1.
 denumirea comercială sau marca solicitantului;
 4.1.2.
 identificarea categoriei de lampă cu incandescență prezentate.
 4.2.
 În plus, farurile trebuie să includă, pe dispersor și pe corpul principal (reflectorul fiind considerat corpul principal) (3) un spațiu de mărime suficientă pentru marca de omologare; aceste spații trebuie să fie prezentate în desenele menționate la punctul 3.1. de mai sus.
 5. OMOLOGAREA
 5.1.
 În cazul în care dispozitivele prezentate în vederea omologării în conformitate cu prevederile de la punctul 3 de mai sus îndeplinesc cerințele prezentului regulament, se acordă omologarea.
 5.2.
 Pentru fiecare tip omologat se atribuie un număr de omologare. Primele două cifre ale acestuia (în prezent 00, corespunzătoare regulamentului în forma sa originală) indică seria de amendamente care cuprind cele mai recente modificări tehnice majore la regulament în momentul acordării omologării. Aceeași parte contractantă nu poate să atribuie același număr unui alt tip de far.
 5.3.
 Notificarea privind omologarea, extinderea sau refuzul omologării unui tip de far în temeiul prezentului regulament trebuie să fie comunicată părților la Acordul din 1958, care aplică prezentul regulament, printr-o fișă conformă cu modelul din anexa 1 la prezentul regulament.
 5.4.
 Pe fiecare far conform cu un tip omologat în temeiul prezentului regulament trebuie să se aplice, în spațiile menționate la punctul 4.2. de mai sus, în plus față de marcajul prevăzut la punctul 4.1.
 5.4.1.
 o marcă de omologare internațională (4) formată din următoarele elemente:
 5.4.1.1.
 un cerc în interiorul căruia se află litera „E” urmată de numărul de identificare al țării care a acordat omologarea (5);
 5.4.1.2.
 un număr de omologare.
 5.5.
 Aceste marcaje trebuie să fie clar lizibile și să nu poată fi șterse, în conformitate cu punctul 5.4.
 5.6.
 Anexa 2 la prezentul regulament oferă un exemplu de dispunere a mărcii de omologare.
 6. SPECIFICAȚII GENERALE
 6.1.
 Fiecare dispozitiv trebuie să corespundă specificațiilor indicate la punctul 7 din prezentul regulament.
 6.2.
 Farurile trebuie să fie concepute și construite astfel încât, în condiții normale de utilizare și în ciuda vibrațiilor la care pot fi supuse, să continue să funcționeze corect și să își păstreze caracteristicile prevăzute de prezentul regulament.
 6.3.
 Piesele destinate susținerii lămpii cu incandescență în reflector trebuie să fie construite astfel încât, chiar pe întuneric, să permită montarea lămpii cu incandescență doar în poziția corectă.
 7. SPECIFICAȚII SPECIALE
 7.1.
 Poziția corectă a dispersorului față de sistemul optic trebuie să fie marcată în mod clar și să fie blocată pentru a preveni rotirea.
 7.2.
 Pentru măsurarea iluminării produse de far, se utilizează un ecran de măsurare, ca cel descris în anexa 3 la prezentul regulament, și o lampă cu incandescență standard, cu un balon incolor și cu suprafața netedă, în conformitate cu categoria S3 din Regulamentul nr. 37.
 Lampa cu incandescență standard trebuie să fie reglată pentru a atinge fluxul luminos de referință aplicabil, în conformitate cu valorile prevăzute pentru aceste lămpi în Regulamentul nr. 37.
 7.3.
 Fasciculul trebuie să aibă o linie de separație delimitată suficient de bine pentru a permite un reglaj satisfăcător cu ajutorul său. Linia de separație trebuie să fie cât mai orizontală și cât mai dreaptă posibil, pe o lungime orizontală de cel puțin ± 900 mm, măsurată la o distanță de 10 m.
 Atunci când reglajul se face conform dispozițiilor din anexa 3, farurile trebuie să îndeplinească cerințele specificate în anexa respectivă.
 7.4.
 Modelul fasciculului proiectat nu trebuie să prezinte nicio variație laterală, care să afecteze buna vizibilitate.
 7.5.
 Iluminarea pe ecranul menționat la punctul 7.2. de mai sus trebuie să fie măsurată prin intermediul unui fotoreceptor cu o suprafață utilă cuprinsă într-un pătrat cu latura de 65 mm.
 8. CERINȚE REFERITOARE LA DISPERSOARE ȘI FILTRE COLORATE
 8.1. Omologarea poate fi obținută pentru faruri care emit, cu o lampă incoloră, fie lumină incoloră, fie lumină galben-selectiv. Exprimate în coordonate tricromatice ale CIE, caracteristicile colorimetrice corespunzătoare dispersoarelor sau filtrelor galbene sunt următoarele:
 Filtru galben-selectiv (ecran sau dispersor)
 Limită spre roșu
 y ≥
 0,138 + 0,58 x
 Limită spre verde
 y ≤
 1,29 x – 0,1
 Limită spre alb
 y ≤
 – x + 0,966
 Limită spre valoare spectrală
 y ≤
 – x + 0,992
 ceea ce se poate exprima, de asemenea, în modul următor:
 lungime de undă dominantă
 575 - 585 nm
 factor de puritate
 0,90 - 0,98
 Factorul de transmisie trebuie să fie ≥ 0,78
 Factorul de transmisie trebuie să fie determinat cu ajutorul unei surse de lumină cu o temperatură de culoare de 2 854 K [corespunzător etalonului de iluminat A al Comisiei Internaționale pentru Iluminat (CIE)].
 8.2. Filtrul trebuie să facă parte din far și să fie atașat astfel încât utilizatorul să nu îl poată demonta accidental sau intenționat, cu scule obișnuite.
 8.3. Observație privind culoarea
 Întrucât orice omologare în baza prezentului regulament se acordă, în temeiul punctului 8.1. de mai jos, pentru un tip de far care emite fie lumină incoloră, fie lumină galben-selectiv, articolul 3 din Acordul la care este anexat regulamentul nu împiedică părțile contractante să interzică farurile care emit un fascicul de lumină incoloră sau galben-selectiv pe vehicule înmatriculate de acestea.
 9. CONFORMITATEA PRODUCȚIEI
 9.1.
 Farurile omologate în temeiul prezentului regulament sunt fabricate astfel încât să fie conforme cu tipul omologat, îndeplinind cerințele de la punctele 7. și 8.
 9.2.
 Pentru a verifica dacă sunt respectate cerințele de la punctul 9.1., trebuie să se efectueze controale corespunzătoare ale producției.
 9.3.
 În special, titularul omologării trebuie:
 9.3.1.
 să asigure existența procedurilor pentru un control eficace al calității produselor;
 9.3.2.
 să aibă acces la echipamentul de control necesar verificării conformității pentru fiecare tip omologat;
 9.3.3.
 să asigure înregistrarea datelor privind rezultatele încercărilor, precum și faptul că documentele conexe rămân disponibile o anumită perioadă, stabilită de comun acord cu serviciul administrativ;
 9.3.4.
 să analizeze rezultatele fiecărui tip de încercare, pentru a verifica și pentru a asigura stabilitatea caracteristicilor produsului, ținând cont de variațiile admisibile în producția industrială;
 9.3.5.
 să garanteze că pentru fiecare tip de produs se efectuează cel puțin încercările prevăzute în anexa 4 la prezentul regulament;
 9.3.6.
 să asigure că orice eșantionare care pune în evidență neconformitatea cu tipul de încercare luat în considerare este urmată de o nouă eșantionare și de o nouă încercare. Trebuie să se ia toate măsurile necesare pentru a restabili conformitatea producției în cauză.
 9.4.
 Autoritatea competentă care a acordat omologarea poate, în orice moment, să verifice metodele de control al conformității aplicabile fiecărei unități de producție.
 9.4.1.
 Cu ocazia fiecărei inspecții, trebuie să se prezinte inspectorului extern rapoartele de încercare și de control al producției.
 9.4.2.
 Inspectorul poate alege, prin sondaj, eșantioane pentru a fi încercate în laboratorul producătorului. Numărul minim de eșantioane poate fi determinat în funcție de rezultatele controalelor proprii ale producătorului.
 9.4.3.
 În cazul în care nivelul calității pare a fi nesatisfăcător sau atunci când pare necesar să se verifice validitatea încercărilor efectuate în temeiul punctului 9.4.2. de mai sus, inspectorul trebuie să selecteze eșantioane pentru a le trimite la serviciul tehnic care a efectuat încercările de omologare, pe baza criteriilor din anexa 5.
 9.4.4.
 Autoritatea competentă poate efectua oricare dintre încercările prevăzute în prezentul regulament. Aceste încercări se efectuează pe eșantioane selectate aleatoriu, fără a perturba angajamentele de livrare ale producătorilor și în conformitate cu criteriile din anexa 5.
 9.4.5.
 Autoritatea competentă depune eforturi pentru a obține o frecvență a inspecțiilor de una la doi ani. Cu toate acestea, frecvența inspecțiilor este la discreția autorității competente și depinde de încrederea acesteia în măsurile de asigurare a unui control eficient al conformității producției. În cazul în care se înregistrează rezultate negative, autoritatea competentă se asigură că sunt luate toate măsurile necesare pentru restabilirea, în cel mai scurt timp, a conformității producției.
 9.5.
 Nu se iau în considerare farurile care prezintă defecte evidente.
 10. SANCȚIUNI ÎN CAZUL NERESPECTĂRII CONFORMITĂȚII PRODUCȚIEI
 10.1.
 Omologarea acordată pentru un far în temeiul prezentului regulament poate fi retrasă în cazul în care nu sunt respectate cerințele precizate mai sus sau atunci când un far care poartă marca de omologare nu este conform cu tipul omologat.
 10.2.
 În cazul în care o parte contractantă la acordul din 1958, care pune în aplicare prezentul regulament, retrage o omologare acordată anterior, aceasta informează imediat celelalte părți contractante care pun în aplicare prezentul regulament, prin intermediul unei fișe de comunicare conforme cu modelul din anexa 1 la prezentul regulament.
 11. MODIFICAREA ȘI EXTINDEREA OMOLOGĂRII UNUI TIP DE FAR
 11.1.
 Orice modificare a tipului de vehicul se comunică serviciului administrativ care a omologat tipul de far. Acest serviciu poate:
 11.1.1.
 să considere că modificările făcute nu sunt susceptibile să aibă un efect negativ semnificativ și că, în orice caz, tipul de far îndeplinește, în continuare, cerințele sau
 11.1.2.
 să solicite un raport de încercare suplimentar serviciului tehnic responsabil cu efectuarea încercărilor.
 11.2.
 Confirmarea sau refuzul omologării, cu precizarea modificărilor, trebuie notificate părților la acord care aplică prezentul regulament, prin procedura specificată la punctul 5.3. de mai sus.
 11.3.
 Autoritatea competentă care acordă extinderea omologării atribuie extinderii respective un număr de serie, pe care îl notifică părților contractante la Acordul din 1958, care aplică prezentul regulament, prin intermediul unei fișe de comunicare conforme cu modelul din anexa 1 la prezentul regulament.
 12. ÎNCETAREA DEFINITIVĂ A PRODUCȚIEI
 În cazul în care titularul unei omologări încetează definitiv să mai fabrice un far omologat în conformitate cu prezentul regulament, acesta trebuie să informeze în consecință autoritatea care a acordat omologarea. După primirea comunicării relevante, această autoritate, la rândul său, notifică celelalte părți la Acordul din 1958, care aplică prezentul regulament, prin intermediul unei fișe de comunicare conforme modelului din anexa 1 la prezentul regulament.
 13. DENUMIRILE ȘI ADRESELE SERVICIILOR TEHNICE RESPONSABILE CU EFECTUAREA ÎNCERCĂRILOR DE OMOLOGARE, PRECUM ȘI ALE SERVICIILOR ADMINISTRATIVE
 Părțile la acordul din 1958, care aplică prezentul regulament, comunică Secretariatului Organizației Națiunilor Unite denumirile și adresele serviciilor tehnice responsabile cu efectuarea încercărilor de omologare, precum și ale serviciilor administrative care acordă omologarea și cărora trebuie să le fie trimise certificatele de omologare sau de extindere, refuz sau retragere a omologării, emise în alte țări.
 14. DISPOZIȚII TRANZITORII
 14.1.
 După șase luni de la data oficială a intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului nr. 113, părțile contractante care aplică prezentul regulament nu mai acordă omologări CEE în conformitate cu prezentul regulament.
 14.2.
 Părțile contractante care aplică prezentul regulament nu refuză acordarea de extinderi ale omologărilor emise în temeiul seriei 01 de amendamente la prezentul regulament.
 14.3.
 Omologările acordate în temeiul prezentului regulament înainte de data intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului nr. 113, precum și toate extinderile omologărilor, inclusiv cele acordate pe baza versiunii originale a prezentului regulament, își păstrează valabilitatea pe o perioadă nedeterminată.
 14.4.
 Părțile contractante care aplică prezentul regulament continuă să acorde omologări pentru faruri pe baza seriei 01 de amendamente sau pe baza versiunii originale a prezentului regulament, cu condiția ca farurile să fie destinate montării ca piese de schimb pentru vehiculele în uz.
 14.5.
 Începând cu data oficială a intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului nr. 113, nicio parte contractantă care aplică prezentul regulament nu interzice echiparea unui nou tip de vehicul cu un far omologat în temeiul Regulamentului nr. 113.
 14.6.
 Părțile contractante care aplică prezentul regulament permit în continuare montarea pe un vehicul sau pe un tip de vehicul a unui far omologat în temeiul prezentului regulament.
 14.7.
 Părțile contractante care aplică prezentul regulament permit în continuare montarea sau utilizarea pe un vehicul în uz a unui far omologat în temeiul prezentului regulament, în versiunea sa originală, cu condiția ca farul să fie destinat utilizării ca piesă de schimb.
 (1) Astfel cum este definit în Convenția din 1968 privind circulația rutieră, capitolul I, articolul 1 litera (m) (E/CONF.56/16/Rev.l).
 (2) În cazul în care sunt destinate producției de faruri cu dispersoare colorate, trebuie să fie prezentate două eșantioane de dispersoare colorate în plus, doar pentru încercarea culorii.
 (3) În cazul în care dispersorul nu poate fi separat de corpul principal (reflectorul fiind considerat corpul principal), este suficientă prevederea unui astfel de spațiu pe dispersor.
 (4) În cazul în care diferite tipuri de faruri au un dispersor identic sau un reflector identic, dispersorul și reflectorul pot purta diverse mărci de omologare ale acestor tipuri de faruri, cu condiția ca numărul de omologare acordat pentru tipul specific prezentat în vederea omologării să poată fi identificat fără ambiguitate.
 (5) Numerele de identificare ale părților contractante la Acordul din 1958 sunt reproduse în anexa 3 la Rezoluția consolidată privind construcția vehiculelor (R.E.3), documentul TRANS/WP.29/78/Rev.2/Amend.1.
 ANEXA 1
 FIȘĂ DE COMUNICARE
 [Format maxim: A4 (210 × 297 mm)]
 ANEXA 2
 DISPUNEREA MĂRCII DE OMOLOGARE
 a ≥ 5 mm
 Farul care poartă marca de omologare de mai sus a fost omologat în Țările de Jos (E4), sub numărul de omologare 00243. Primele două cifre indică faptul că omologarea a fost acordată în conformitate cu cerințele prezentului regulament, în forma sa originală.
 Notă
 Numărul de omologare trebuie să fie amplasat în apropierea cercului și dispus fie deasupra sau dedesubtul literei „E”, fie la stânga sau la dreapta acestei litere. Cifrele care formează numărul de omologare trebuie să se afle de aceeași parte a literei „E” și să fie orientate în aceeași direcție. Trebuie evitată utilizarea cifrelor romane la scrierea numerelor de omologare, pentru a se elimina orice risc de confuzie cu alte simboluri.
 ANEXA 3
 MĂSURĂTORI FOTOMETRICE
 1.
 Pentru măsurători, ecranul de măsurare trebuie să fie amplasat la o distanță de 10 m în fața farului și perpendicular pe o linie care unește filamentul lămpii și punctul HV; linia H-H trebuie să fie orizontală. Pentru lămpi cu filament transversal, în timpul efectuării măsurătorilor filamentul trebuie să fie dispus cât mai orizontal posibil.
 2.
 Pe lateral, farurile trebuie să fie reglate astfel încât fasciculul să fie cât mai simetric posibil față de linia V-V.
 3.
 Pe verticală, farul trebuie să fie reglat astfel încât iluminarea în punctul HV să fie de 2 lx. În aceste condiții, linia de separație trebuie să fie situată între linia H-H și linia H-100 mm.
 4.
 Atunci când reglajul se face conform punctelor 2 și 3 de mai sus, nivelul de iluminare trebuie să atingă următoarele valori:
 4.1.
 pe linia H-H și deasupra acesteia: maximum 2 lx;
 4.2.
 pe o linie situată la 300 mm sub linia H-H și pe o lățime de 900 mm de ambele părți ale liniei verticale V-V: nu mai puțin de 8 lx;
 4.3.
 pe o linie situată la 600 mm sub linia H-H și pe o lățime de 900 mm de ambele părți ale liniei verticale V-V: nu mai puțin de 4 lx;
 Ecran de măsurare
 (dimensiuni în mm, pentru o distanță de 10 m)
 ANEXA 4
 CERINȚE MINIME PRIVIND PROCEDURILE DE CONTROL AL CONFORMITĂȚII PRODUCȚIEI
 1. DISPOZIȚII GENERALE
 1.1.
 Cerințele de conformitate se consideră ca fiind îndeplinite din punct de vedere mecanic și geometric atunci când diferențele nu depășesc abaterile inevitabile survenite în cursul procesului de fabricație care se încadrează în cerințele prezentului regulament.
 1.2.
 În ceea ce privește caracteristicile fotometrice, conformitatea farurilor produse în serie nu este contestată în cazul în care, în timpul încercării caracteristicilor fotometrice ale unui far ales la întâmplare și echipat cu o lampă cu incandescență standard, nicio valoare măsurată nu se abate, în sens nefavorabil, cu mai mult de 20 % de la valorile prescrise în prezentul regulament.
 1.3.
 În cazul în care rezultatele încercărilor descrise mai sus nu satisfac cerințele, farul este supus din nou încercărilor, utilizându-se o altă lampă cu incandescență standard.
 1.4.
 Nu se iau în considerare farurile care prezintă defecte evidente.
 1.5.
 Coordonatele cromatice se consideră a fi respectate atunci când farul este prevăzut cu o lampă cu incandescență reglată la temperatura de culoare conformă cu etalonul A.
 Performanțele fotometrice ale unui far care emite lumină galben-selectiv atunci când este echipat cu o lampă cu incandescență incoloră trebuie să fie valorile din prezentul regulament înmulțite cu 0,84.
 2. CERINȚE MINIME PENTRU VERIFICAREA CONFORMITĂȚII DE CĂTRE PRODUCĂTOR
 Pentru fiecare tip de far, titularul mărcii de omologare trebuie să efectueze cel puțin încercările următoare, la intervale adecvate. Aceste încercări trebuie efectuate în conformitate cu dispozițiile prezentului regulament.
 Orice eșantionare care pune în evidență neconformitatea pentru tipul de încercare considerat trebuie să conducă la o nouă eșantionare și la o nouă încercare. Producătorul trebuie să ia toate măsurile pentru a asigura conformitatea producției respective.
 2.1. Natura încercărilor
 Încercările de conformitate din prezentul regulament acoperă caracteristicile fotometrice.
 2.2. Metodele utilizate în cadrul încercărilor
 2.2.1.
 Încercările trebuie efectuate, în general, în conformitate cu metodele definite în prezentul regulament.
 2.2.2.
 Pentru orice încercare de conformitate efectuată de către producător se pot utiliza metode echivalente, cu aprobarea autorității competente responsabile cu efectuarea încercărilor de omologare. Producătorul trebuie să demonstreze că metodele de încercare utilizate sunt echivalente cu cele indicate în prezentul regulament.
 2.2.3.
 Aplicarea punctelor 2.2.1 și 2.2.2 necesită o etalonare continuă a echipamentelor de încercare și o corelare a acestora cu măsurătorile efectuate de o autoritate competentă.
 2.2.4.
 În toate cazurile, metodele de referință sunt cele din prezentul regulament, în special pentru controalele administrative și pentru eșantionare.
 2.3. Modul de eșantionare
 Eșantioanele de faruri trebuie să fie selectate aleatoriu, dintr-un lot de producție omogen. Prin lot omogen se înțelege un ansamblu de faruri de același tip, definit în conformitate cu metodele de fabricație ale producătorului.
 Evaluarea se referă, în general, la producția de serie a unor fabrici specifice. Cu toate acestea, un producător poate grupa cifrele de producție privind același tip de far de la mai multe fabrici, cu condiția ca acestea să aplice aceleași criterii de calitate și același management al calității.
 2.4. Caracteristicile fotometrice măsurate și înregistrate
 Farul selectat ca eșantion trebuie să fie supus măsurărilor fotometrice în punctele prevăzute de regulament, citirile fiind limitate la punctele HV, LH, RH, L 600 și R 600.
 2.5. Criterii de acceptabilitate
 Producătorul este responsabil cu efectuarea analizei statistice a rezultatelor încercărilor și cu definirea, în acord cu autoritatea competentă, a criteriilor de acceptabilitate a produselor sale, pentru a îndeplini specificațiile definite pentru controlul conformității producției la punctul 9.1 din prezentul regulament.
 Criteriile de acceptabilitate trebuie stabilite astfel încât, la un nivel de încredere de 95 %, probabilitatea minimă de a obține rezultate pozitive la o verificare prin sondaj, în conformitate cu anexa 5 (prima eșantionare), să fie de 0,95.
 ANEXA 5
 CERINȚE MINIME PRIVIND EȘANTIONAREA EFECTUATĂ DE UN INSPECTOR
 1. DISPOZIȚII GENERALE
 1.1.
 Cerințele de conformitate se consideră ca fiind îndeplinite din punct de vedere mecanic și geometric, atunci când diferențele nu depășesc abaterile inevitabile survenite în cursul procesului de fabricație, care se încadrează în cerințele prezentului regulament.
 1.2.
 În ceea ce privește caracteristicile fotometrice, conformitatea farurilor produse în serie nu este contestată în cazul în care, în timpul încercării caracteristicilor fotometrice ale unui far ales aleatoriu și echipat cu o lampă cu incandescență standard, nicio valoare măsurată nu se abate, în sens nefavorabil, cu mai mult de 20 % ce la valorile prescrise în prezentul regulament.
 1.3.
 Coordonatele cromatice se consideră a fi respectate atunci când farul este prevăzut cu o lampă cu incandescență reglată la temperatura de culoare conformă cu etalonul A.
 Performanțele fotometrice ale unui far care emite lumină galben-selectiv atunci când este echipat cu o lampă cu incandescență incoloră se înmulțesc cu 0,84.
 2. PRIMA EȘANTIONARE
 La prima eșantionare, se aleg în mod aleatoriu patru faruri. Primul eșantion de două faruri este marcat cu litera A, iar al doilea eșantion de două faruri este marcat cu litera B.
 2.1. Conformitatea nu este contestată
 2.1.1. Ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, conformitatea farurilor de serie nu este contestată dacă abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri, în sens nefavorabil, sunt următoarele:
 2.1.1.1. eșantionul A
 A1:
 un far
 0 %
 celălalt far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 A2:
 ambele faruri peste
 0 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 20 %
 se trece la eșantionul B
 2.1.1.2. eșantionul B
 B1:
 ambele faruri
 0 %
 2.2. Conformitatea este contestată
 2.2.1. Ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, conformitatea farurilor de serie este contestată și producătorului i se cere să își readucă producția în conformitate (aliniere), în cazul în care abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri sunt următoarele:
 2.2.1.1. eșantionul A
 A3:
 un far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far peste
 20 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 30 %
 2.2.1.2. eșantionul B
 B2:
 în cazul lui A2
 un far peste
 0 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 B3:
 în cazul lui A2
 un far
 0 %
 celălalt far peste
 20 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 30 %
 2.3. Retragerea omologării
 Conformitatea este contestată și se aplică punctul 10 în cazul în care, ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri sunt următoarele:
 2.3.1. eșantionul A
 A4:
 un far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far peste
 30 %
 A5:
 ambele faruri peste
 20 %
 2.3.2. eșantionul B
 B4:
 în cazul lui A2
 un far peste
 0 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far peste
 20 %
 B5:
 în cazul lui A2
 ambele faruri peste
 20 %
 B6:
 în cazul lui A2
 un far
 0 %
 celălalt far peste
 30 %
 3. REPETAREA EȘANTIONĂRII
 În cazurile A3, B2 și B3 este necesară o nouă eșantionare în termen de două luni de la notificare, selectând un al treilea eșantion C, compus din două faruri, și un al patrulea eșantion D, compus din două faruri, alese din stocul produs după alinierea producției.
 3.1. Conformitatea nu este contestată
 3.1.1. Ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, conformitatea farurilor de serie nu este contestată atunci când abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri sunt următoarele:
 3.1.1.1. eșantionul C
 C1:
 un far
 0 %
 celălalt far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 C2:
 ambele faruri peste
 0 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 20 %
 se trece la eșantionul D
 3.1.1.2. eșantionul D
 D1:
 în cazul lui C2
 ambele faruri
 0 %
 3.2. Conformitatea este contestată
 3.2.1. Ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, conformitatea farurilor de serie este contestată și producătorului i se cere să își repună producția în conformitate (aliniere), în cazul în care abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri sunt următoarele:
 3.2.1.1. eșantionul D
 D2:
 în cazul lui C2
 un far peste
 0 %
 dar nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 3.3. Retragerea omologării
 Conformitatea este contestată și se aplică punctul 10 în cazul în care, ca urmare a procedurii de eșantionare indicate în figura 1 din prezenta anexă, abaterile valorilor măsurate pentru faruri sunt următoarele:
 3.3.1. eșantionul C
 C3:
 un far nu mai mult de
 20 %
 celălalt far peste
 20 %
 C4:
 ambele faruri peste
 20 %
 3.3.2. eșantionul D
 D3:
 în cazul lui C2
 un far 0 % sau peste
 0 %
 celălalt far peste
 20 %


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 308 Md. 129 (1986)
 517 A.2d 761
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 v.
 KEITH JOSEPH LYLES, LOVETTE HALSEY, EMMANUEL KING AND MICHAEL J. ULRICH.
 No. 108, September Term, 1985.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 November 25, 1986.
 Valerie V. Cloutier, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
 Joseph S. Friedman, Washington, D.C., for appellee (Lyles).
 Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellees (King & Ulrich).
 Gregory A. Jenifer, Baltimore, for appellee (Halsey).
 Argued before SMITH,[*] ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.
 COUCH, Judge.
 Following the convictions and sentencing of Keith Lyles, Lovette Halsey, Emanuel King and a finding of violation of probation by Michael Ulrich, in different circuit courts, each defendant filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals raising, inter alia, a common issue. In each case it was contended that error was committed when the defendant was sentenced without being advised of the right to allocution in mitigation of punishment pursuant to Md. Rule 4-342(d).[1] Lyles also alleged that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of battery.
 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed each of the convictions; the sentences, however, were vacated and the cases remanded for further proceedings. In Ulrich's case it vacated the finding of probation revocation.[2] Thereafter, the State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari on a single issue concerning a defendant's right to allocution. In due time Lyles answered the State's petition and filed a conditional cross-petition. In briefing the cross-appeal, he discussed the following three issues, although the third issue was not raised in the cross-petition:
 1. Whether the cross-appellant waived his right to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
 2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for battery.
 3. Whether the imposition of a ten year sentence for simple battery is a cruel and unusual punishment.
 We granted certiorari on both the petition and conditional cross-petition to consider questions of public importance. The question, common to all the cases, is whether a sentence must be vacated for the court's failure to advise a defendant that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to speak in mitigation of punishment where the defendant made no request to make a statement and no objection to the sentencing procedure. The issues raised by Lyles in his cross-petition will be addressed later in this opinion.
 (1)
 Allocution
 The various parties to this controversy agree to the following:
 "At each sentencing defense counsel availed themselves of the opportunity to present argument in mitigation of punishment to the court. In each instance, the court did not advise the defendant that he had a right to make a statement. However, in none of the four sentencings at issue did either the defendant or his attorney object to the procedure or request the opportunity for the defendant to address the court personally."
 The Court of Special Appeals, by four different panels, held that Md.Rule 4-342(d) was violated; that court therefore vacated each of the sentences and remanded the matters for new sentencing proceedings.
 Rule 4-342(d), under which this appeal arises, is not the first such provision in the Maryland Rules. Former Rule 761(a), from which Rule 4-342(d) evolved, provided:
 "Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford an accused or his counsel an opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment."
 In 1977, this rule was revised and changed to Md.Rule 772(c) which read:
 "Before imposing sentence the court shall inform the defendant that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment, and the court shall afford an opportunity to exercise this right."
 See 4 Md.R. 253 (Feb. 16, 1977). Finally, in 1984, the present version, as set forth at note 1, was adopted. It is readily apparent that from the very inception of the rule providing for the right of allocution the use of the word shall makes the rule mandatory. Indeed, Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court in Kent v. State, 287 Md. 389, 393, 412 A.2d 1236, 1238 (1980) (decided under Rule 772(c) redesignated as Rule 772(d)), observed, "Considering the language of the rule, its requirements are clearly mandatory." (citations omitted). Furthermore, in Kent we held that "where there is a violation of the rule, the remedy is resentencing." Id. at 393-94, 412 A.2d at 1238. In so doing we referred to Rome and Modo v. State, 236 Md. 583, 589, 204 A.2d 674 (1964) (decided under former Rule 761(a)).
 In our view there is simply no requirement that the court inform the accused of his right to allocute under the present rule. Rule 4-342 is somewhat different than former Rule 772(c). The former rule, by its terms, required the court to inform an accused that he has the right, personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment before sentence was imposed. The rule also required the court to afford the defendant an opportunity to exercise this right. The requirement that the court inform the accused of this right was eliminated in the present version of the rule leaving only the requirement that an opportunity to make a statement be afforded.
 Since the wording of the former rule required affirmative action by the trial court, there would have been no necessity to change the rule had there been an intention to maintain the requirement to inform the accused of his right to allocute. The rule was changed, however, and is unambiguous; the requirement of informing the accused was eliminated while the requirement of affording an opportunity was retained. The rule says what it says; the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the rule required the court to inform the accused of his right to make a statement in mitigation of punishment.
 The procedural right to allocute is not one of constitutional proportion. Robinson v. Warden, 242 Md. 171, 218 A.2d 217 (1966); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962). Rather, it is grounded in the common law. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914); see also Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986). Hence, the right to allocute, because it is not a fundamental right, may be waived if not asserted at trial. Harris v. State, 306 Md. at 357, 509 A.2d at 126, cited with approval in State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 511 A.2d 461 (1986) (applying waiver principles to common law right of allocution); cf. Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978) (objection to lack of closing argument held waived); Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 102 A.2d 267 (1954) (right to have stenographic record of trial held waived). Consequently, by failing to request an opportunity to address the court personally, each of the defendants waived any Rule 4-342(d) right to allocute.
 Furthermore, a court's failure to ask a defendant, who is represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not a jurisdictional error. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962). Md.Rule 885 provides that, aside from questions concerning the jurisdiction of the circuit court, "[t]his Court will not ordinarily decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the circuit court." Since the defendants made no objection to the alleged error at trial and made no proffer as to the contents of any desired allocution, the issue was not presented to the trial court. Consequently, it was not properly before the intermediate appellate court and is not now before this Court. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 487, 425 A.2d 632 (1981).
 (2)
 Cross-Appeal
 Turning next to the issues raised by Keith Lyles on cross-petition, we need only address the first. Our conclusion that it is without merit makes it unnecessary to address the second. His third issue was not raised in the petition or conditional cross-petition for certiorari and thus is not subject to review here. Md.Rule 813a.
 With respect to Lyles' first issue, whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in refusing to review the sufficiency of the evidence, we agree with that court in its conclusion that the issue has not been preserved for review. Lyles' trial occurred after the effective date of Md.Rule 4-324 and consequently was governed thereby. See Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 510 A.2d 573 (1986), for a discussion of the history and application of Md.Rule 4-324, upholding its validity against an equal protection attack. Section (a) of Rule 4-324 provides:
 "(a) Generally.  A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees, at the close of the evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence. The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted. No objection to the motion for judgment of acquittal shall be necessary. A defendant does not waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of the State's case." (emphasis supplied).
 The language of the rule is mandatory. Hence Lyles was required to state with particularity all reasons why his motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted. The record is clear; he did not do so on either occasion he made such motion. In fact, his counsel expressly waived making an argument.
 We agree with the intermediate appellate court's analysis of why, when former Md.Rule 756 a was changed to Rule 4-324(a), a requirement of a particularized statement of reasons for a motion for judgment of acquittal was added. That court pointed out that by doing so this criminal rule was made consistent with its civil counterpart  Rule 2-519(a). Lyles v. State, 63 Md. App. 376, 382, 492 A.2d 959, 962 (1985); see also Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Rep. No. 87 (Dec. 9, 1983).
 Accordingly, no grounds for the motion having been given, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence has not been preserved.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASES REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS. COSTS TO APPELLEES LYLES, HALSEY, KING, AND ULRICH, AND TO CROSS-APPELLANT LYLES.
 Concurring opinion by ELDRIDGE, J. in which COLE, J., concurs.
 ELDRIDGE, Judge, concurring:
 I concur in the result but not in the Court's opinion. With regard to the allocution issue, I agree that Maryland Rule 4-342(d) does not require the trial judge to inform the accused of his right to allocute.
 My basic disagreement with the majority concerns Part (2) of the Court's opinion, relating to the application of the rule authorizing motions for judgment of acquittal. This rule, formerly denominated Rule 756, was renumbered Rule 4-324 effective July 1, 1984. At the same time the rule was amended by the addition of language purporting to require that the defendant, in moving for judgment of acquittal, "state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted." Counsel for the defendant Lyles, both at the close of the prosecution's case and at the close of all of the evidence, did move for judgment of acquittal. Counsel did not, however, argue the matter before the circuit court. Thus, the majority today concludes, counsel failed to "state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted." In light of this failure, the majority refuses to review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Lyles's conviction. Nevertheless, Lyles's counsel did comply with the constitutional and statutory prerequisite for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence by making motions for judgment of acquittal. Therefore, I would reach the issue of sufficiency and would uphold the conviction on the ground that the evidence was sufficient.
 I.
 The language added to the motion for judgment of acquittal rule in 1984 does not provide that a defendant's failure to articulate the reasons for granting the motion precludes appellate review. In fact, neither before July 1, 1984, nor after that date, has the rule contained any language making compliance with its requirements a condition for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Unlike provisions in the rules concerning objections to evidence or other rulings (Rule 4-322(a) and (c)), or objections to instructions (formerly Rule 757 h, now Rule 4-325(e)) or raising questions in the trial court (Rule 885 and 1085), neither former Rule 756[1] nor present Rule 4-324[2] makes any reference to appellate review or the role of an appellate court.
 Actually, as this Court has made clear (e.g., Woodell v. State, 223 Md. 89, 93, 162 A.2d 468 (1960)), it is not the rule but a statute which sets forth the condition for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 593, after delineating the role of a jury in a criminal case and after providing for a motion for judgment of acquittal, states that "[i]f the motion is denied the defendant may have a review of such ruling on appeal."[3]
 The defendant in the instant case did make the appropriate motions for judgment of acquittal, and the motions were denied by the trial court. Under the unambiguous language of Art. 27, § 593, the defendant Lyles is entitled to appellate review of the trial court's rulings. The effect of today's decision is to deny Lyles and other defendants similarly situated this statutory right conferred by the General Assembly.
 II.
 Even though Rule 4-324 does not specify a sanction of nonreviewability on appeal for failure to specify the reasons for a motion for judgment of acquittal, I recognize that Rule 1-201(a) authorizes this Court to "determine the consequences of the noncompliance [with a rule] in light of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule." Considering the historical function and purpose of a motion for judgment of acquittal in Maryland, this Court should not hold that there will be no appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant makes the required motion for judgment of acquittal but fails to "state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted."
 The Maryland requirement relating to a motion for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases is not a discretionary appellate preservation rule such as Rules 1085, 885 or 4-325(e). Instead, as recently reviewed by Judge Couch for the Court in Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 583-587, 510 A.2d 573 (1986), and by Judge Orth for the Court in Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 148-151, 472 A.2d 981 (1984), the requirement of a motion for judgment of acquittal was enacted by the General Assembly to implement the 1950 constitutional amendment authorizing a court to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases[4] and to confer jurisdiction for appellate review of the trial court's ruling as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, the provisions for a motion for judgment of acquittal, and the ruling thereon, were intended to constitute a legislative grant of subject matter appellate jurisdiction. As explained in Woodell v. State, supra, 223 Md. at 93, 162 A.2d 468:
 "The 1950 amendment, which empowered the trial court to direct (not merely to advise) a verdict for the defendant because of the legal insufficiency of the evidence, does not in terms confer a right of appeal. That right is conferred by what is now § 593 of Article 27 of the Code (1957), and that section predicates the right of appeal upon a motion for a directed verdict having been made at the end of the State's case, or, if then overruled and waived by the defendant's offering evidence, upon its having been renewed at the close of all the evidence.... Rule 738 a provides for the making of the above motions (substantially in the words of the statute), but it neither grants nor attempts to limit the right of appeal conferred by the statute.... We may add that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute, and not of the constitutional amendment."
 See, e.g., Ennis v. State, supra, 306 Md. at 589, 510 A.2d 573 ("failure to renew the requisite motion effectively withdraws our authority to consider an insufficiency contention"); Brooks v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 150 n. 3, 472 A.2d 981 (the provisions "not only authorize an appellate court to review the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, but impress upon it the duty to do so"); Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 387-388, 255 A.2d 5 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944, 90 S. Ct. 961, 25 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1970) (constitutional amendment and statute granted this Court "the power to review the sufficiency of the evidence"); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 384, 183 A.2d 359 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 767, 83 S. Ct. 1102, 10 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1963) (refusal of motion gives "this Court the power to review the sufficiency of the evidence" and "the defendant is afforded the right of appeal"); Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 123, 175 A.2d 777 (1961) ("appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case before a jury is predicated entirely upon the refusal of the court to grant a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty"); Ledbetter v. State, 224 Md. 271, 273, 167 A.2d 596 (1961); Briley v. State, 212 Md. 445, 447, 129 A.2d 689 (1957); Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 291-292, 100 A.2d 789 (1953); Auchincloss v. State, 200 Md. 310, 315, 89 A.2d 605 (1952).
 Assuming arguendo that this Court might have the authority to change by rule the legislatively prescribed appellate jurisdiction with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, such purpose should not be attributed to this Court absent clear evidence. There is no indication that, in approving the Rules Committee's proposed change to the motion for judgment of acquittal rule in 1984, this Court intended to expand the jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. The minutes of this Court's meetings dealing with the 1984 revision of the rules disclose no discussion with regard to the additional language requiring the defendant to set forth all reasons for the judgment of acquittal motion. In fact, there is no indication that this Court was even aware of this particular change proposed by the Rules Committee.
 While it is the intent of this Court, and not of the Rules Committee, which determines the meaning and effect of a rule, it is noteworthy that nothing in the reports of the Rules Committee suggests an intent to add to the jurisdictional conditions for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases. The Court of Special Appeals in the instant case relied upon a statement in the Eighty-Seventh Report of the Rules Committee that certain proposed amendments "are intended to provide consistency between the criminal rules and counterpart civil rules when there is no apparent reason for differentiation...." Lyles v. State, 63 Md. App. 376, 382, 492 A.2d 959 (1985). The report goes on to list certain examples, but the change in the motion for judgment of acquittal rule is not included within the list. More importantly, there are reasons for differentiation between the motion for judgment of acquittal rule and any civil "counterpart." The historical background and jurisdictional function of the statute providing for motions for judgment of acquittal has no parallel with regard to the civil rules. Moreover, a motion for judgment of acquittal is limited to challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict. See the discussion by Chief Judge Murphy for the Court of Special Appeals in Vuitch v. State, 10 Md. App. 389, 395-398, 271 A.2d 371 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 868, 92 S. Ct. 44, 30 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1971).[5]
 In summary, I would not interpret the new language of Rule 4-324, requiring a statement of reasons for the motion for judgment of acquittal, as imposing an additional prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the evidence. The language of the rule does not compel such interpretation, and there is no evidence that it was intended by the Court. In light of the history and jurisdictional function of the motion for judgment of acquittal, the majority's holding is inappropriate.
 III.
 Even if the history and function of a motion for judgment of acquittal were different in Maryland, I would not refuse to review the sufficiency of the evidence because of defense counsel's failure to specify all reasons for granting the motion.
 1. As previously discussed, the only issue which the defense may raise by a motion for judgment of acquittal is the sufficiency of the evidence. The making of the motion itself is an assertion that the evidence is legally insufficient to be considered by the jury. The only purpose in requiring a more detailed statement of reasons for the motion is to benefit the trial judge. Nevertheless, in many instances when the motion is made, it will be obvious to the trial judge what aspects of the case, if any, may be questionable insofar as evidentiary sufficiency is concerned. In this situation a statement of reasons is unnecessary, and neither the trial judge nor counsel may want to prolong the proceedings by oral argument. This is precisely what happened in the case at bar, with the trial judge excusing any requirement of argument, entertaining the motion on its merits each time it was made, and ruling that the evidence was sufficient. Where a rule imposes certain requirements in making a motion, for the benefit of the trial court, ordinarily a trial court has discretion to excuse those requirements and rule on the merits of the motion, and, on appeal, the correctness of the trial court's ruling will be reviewed. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 436-437 n. 11, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), and cases there cited; Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17, 20-21, 472 A.2d 444 (1984); Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447 (1984).
 2. Additionally, refusal to review the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal does not end the matter. It simply causes unnecessary delay and a waste of valuable judicial resources. The right not to be convicted on insufficient evidence is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). It is not waived by a defense attorney's inadvertence. United States v. McIntyre, 467 F.2d 274, 276 n. 1 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911, 93 S. Ct. 972, 35 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973). Consequently, despite the failure of Lyles's counsel to specify reasons for the motion for judgment of acquittal, Lyles will be entitled to have the sufficiency of the evidence reviewed in a post conviction proceeding. Under these circumstances, "interests of expedition and judicial economy support review ... on direct appeal." Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), and cases there cited.
 IV.
 Lyles's argument of evidentiary insufficiency relates to his conviction for battery upon Joseph Edmondson. The victim Edmondson specifically identified Lyles as one of two prison inmates who entered Edmondson's cell and stabbed him with a homemade knife. A correctional officer also testified that he saw Lyles and another inmate walk into Edmondson's cell, that he heard scuffling, that he saw Lyles and the other inmate walk out of the cell, and that Edmondson then came out of the cell shouting that he had been stabbed. This was clearly sufficient evidence for the battery charge to have been submitted to the jury. The trial judge was correct in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal.
 Judge COLE has authorized me to state that he agrees with the views expressed in this opinion.
 NOTES
 [*] SMITH, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
 [1] Md. Rule 4-342(d) states:
 "(d) Allocution and Information in Mitigation  Before imposing sentence, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity personally and through counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment."
 [2] There is no explanation in the record why the entire probation revocation was vacated rather than just the disposition.
 [1] Former Rule 756 provided as follows:
 "Rule 756. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
 "a. When Made.
 "At the close of the evidence offered by the State, a defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees. If the motion is not then granted, the defendant may offer evidence, but if so, he withdraws his motion. In a jury trial, a motion for a judgment of acquittal may be made at the close of all the evidence, whether or not such a motion was made at the close of the evidence offered by the State.
 "b. Action by the Court.
 "If the court grants a motion for judgment of acquittal or determines on its own motion that a judgment of acquittal or determines on its own motion that a judgment of acquittal should be granted, it shall direct the clerk to enter the judgment of acquittal and to note that it has been entered by direction of the court."
 [2] Rule 4-324 states as follows:
 "Rule 4-324. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
 "(a) Generally.  A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees, at the close of the evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence. The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted. No objection to the motion for judgment of acquittal shall be necessary. A defendant does not waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of the State's case.
 "(b) Action by the Court.  If the court grants a motion for judgment of acquittal or determines on its own motion that a judgment of acquittal should be granted, it shall enter the judgment or direct the clerk to enter the judgment and to note that it has been entered by direction of the court. The court shall specify each count or degree of an offense to which the judgment of acquittal applies."
 [3] Art. 27, § 593, reads in its entirety as follows:
 "In the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be the judges of law, as well as of fact, except that at the conclusion of the evidence for the State a motion for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense, may be made by an accused on the ground that the evidence is insufficient in law to justify his conviction as to any such count or degree. If the motion is denied, he may offer evidence on his own behalf without having reserved the right to do so, but by so doing, he withdraws his motion. The motion may be made at the close of all the evidence whether or not such motion was made at the conclusion of the evidence for the State. If the motion is denied the defendant may have a review of such ruling on appeal."
 [4] Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights.
 [5] Although the federal motion for judgment of acquittal rule does not have the same jurisdictional history and function as the Maryland rule, it is noteworthy that the federal rules differentiate between such motion and a motion for a directed verdict in civil cases. Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a "motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor," while Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing motions for judgment of acquittal, includes no equivalent requirement, stating instead that the motion shall be granted "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction."


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 10.8.2015
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 262/39
 Avaliku Teenistuse Kohtu (teine koda) 30. juuni 2015. aasta otsus – Z versus Euroopa Kohus
 (Kohtuasi F-64/13) (1)
 ((Avalik teenistus - Ametnikud - Hindamisaruanne - Hilinenult koostatud hindamisaruanne - Tühistamishagi - Kahju hüvitamise hagi))
 (2015/C 262/52)
 Kohtumenetluse keel: prantsuse
 Pooled
 Hageja: Z (esindaja: advokaat F. Rollinger)
 Kostja: Euroopa Liidu Kohus (esindaja: A. V. Placco)
 Ese
 Nõue tühistada hageja ajavahemiku 1. jaanuar 2008 kuni 31. detsember 2008 hindamisaruanne ning mõista kostjalt hageja kasuks välja hüvitis mittevaralise kahju eest.
 Resolutsioon
 1.
 Jätta hagi rahuldamata.
 2.
 Jätta Z-i kohtukulud tema enda kanda ja mõista temalt välja Euroopa Liidu Kohtu kohtukulud.
 (1) ELT C 274, 21.9.2013, lk 30.


type: legislation

text:
 25.9.2010
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 252/207
 BESCHLUSS DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS
 vom 5. Mai 2010
 betreffend die Entlastung zur Ausführung des Haushaltsplans der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte für das Haushaltsjahr 2008
 (2010/546/EU)
 DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT,
 in Kenntnis der endgültigen Rechnungsabschlüsse der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte für das Haushaltsjahr 2008,
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Rechnungshofs über den Jahresabschluss 2008 der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte, zusammen mit den Antworten der Agentur (1),
 in Kenntnis der Empfehlung des Rates vom 16. Februar 2010 (5827/2010 — C7-0061/2010),
 gestützt auf Artikel 276 des EG-Vertrags und Artikel 319 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 des Rates vom 25. Juni 2002 über die Haushaltsordnung für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (2), insbesondere auf Artikel 185,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 168/2007 des Rates vom 15. Februar 2007 zur Errichtung einer Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte (3), insbesondere auf Artikel 21,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 2343/2002 der Kommission vom 19. November 2002 betreffend die Rahmenfinanzregelung für Einrichtungen gemäß Artikel 185 der Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 (4), insbesondere auf Artikel 94,
 gestützt auf Artikel 77 und Anlage VI seiner Geschäftsordnung,
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Haushaltskontrollausschusses sowie der Stellungnahme des Ausschusses für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres (A7-0090/2010),
 1.
 erteilt dem Direktor der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte Entlastung zur Ausführung des Haushaltsplans der Agentur für das Haushaltsjahr 2008;
 2.
 legt seine Bemerkungen in der nachstehenden Entschließung nieder;
 3.
 beauftragt seinen Präsidenten, diesen Beschluss sowie die als integraler Bestandteil dazugehörige Entschließung dem Direktor der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte, dem Rat, der Kommission und dem Rechnungshof zu übermitteln und die Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union (Reihe L) zu veranlassen.
 Der Präsident
 Jerzy BUZEK
 Der Generalsekretär
 Klaus WELLE
 (1) ABl. C 304 vom 15.12.2009, S. 10.
 (2) ABl. L 248 vom 16.9.2002, S. 1.
 (3) ABl. L 53 vom 22.2.2007, S. 1.
 (4) ABl. L 357 vom 31.12.2002, S. 72.
 ---documentbreak---
 25.9.2010
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 252/208
 ENTSCHLIEßUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS
 vom 5. Mai 2010
 mit den Bemerkungen, die integraler Bestandteil seines Beschlusses betreffend die Entlastung zur Ausführung des Haushaltsplans der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte für das Haushaltsjahr 2008 sind
 DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT,
 in Kenntnis der endgültigen Rechnungsabschlüsse der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte für das Haushaltsjahr 2008,
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Rechnungshofs über den Jahresabschluss 2008 der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte, zusammen mit den Antworten der Agentur (1),
 in Kenntnis der Empfehlung des Rates vom 16. Februar 2010 (5827/2010 — C7-0061/2010),
 gestützt auf Artikel 276 des EG-Vertrags und Artikel 319 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 des Rates vom 25. Juni 2002 über die Haushaltsordnung für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (2), insbesondere auf Artikel 185,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 168/2007 des Rates vom 15. Februar 2007 zur Errichtung einer Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte (3), insbesondere auf Artikel 21,
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 2343/2002 der Kommission vom 19. November 2002 betreffend die Rahmenfinanzregelung für Einrichtungen gemäß Artikel 185 der Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 (4), insbesondere auf Artikel 94,
 gestützt auf Artikel 77 und Anlage VI seiner Geschäftsordnung,
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Haushaltskontrollausschusses sowie der Stellungnahme des Ausschusses für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres (A7-0090/2010),
 A.
 in der Erwägung, dass der Rechnungshof erklärt hat, er habe mit angemessener Sicherheit feststellen können, dass der Jahresabschluss für das Haushaltsjahr 2008 zuverlässig ist und die zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge rechtmäßig und ordnungsgemäß sind,
 B.
 in der Erwägung, dass das Parlament dem Direktor der Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte am 23. April 2009 Entlastung zur Ausführung des Haushaltsplans der Agentur für das Haushaltsjahr 2007 erteilt hat (5) und in seiner dem Entlastungsbeschluss beigefügten Entschließung unter anderem festgestellt hat, dass
 —
 die Agentur sich bemühen sollte, Synergieeffekte zu erzielen und Überschneidungen mit anderen im Bereich der Menschenrechte tätigen Einrichtungen, insbesondere dem Europarat, zu vermeiden,
 —
 das Europäische Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF) im Zusammenhang mit der Agentur eine Untersuchung eingeleitet hat; OLAF, die Agentur und die Kommission wurden entsprechend aufgefordert, die Entlastungsbehörde so bald wie möglich über die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung und etwaige Folgemaßnahmen zu unterrichten,
 —
 der Rechnungshof angemerkt hat, dass bei einem Vergabeverfahren die veröffentlichte Bewertungsmethode indirekt zu einer Verringerung der relativen Bedeutung des Preiskriteriums führte, was möglicherweise auf potenzielle Bieter abschreckend gewirkt hat und nicht im Einklang mit dem Haushaltsgrundsatz der Wirtschaftlichkeit der Haushaltsführung stand,
 1.
 nimmt mit Genugtuung zur Kenntnis, dass der Rechnungshof mit angemessener Sicherheit hat feststellen können, dass der Jahresabschluss der Agentur für das am 31. Dezember 2008 zu Ende gegangene Haushaltsjahr in allen Sachaspekten zuverlässig ist und dass die dem Jahresabschluss zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge insgesamt gesehen rechtmäßig und ordnungsgemäß sind;
 Leistung
 2.
 ermutigt die Agentur, im Rahmen ihrer Programmplanung zum Zweck einer besseren Leistungsbewertung SMART-Ziele und RACER-Indikatoren festzulegen; nimmt allerdings zur Kenntnis, dass die Agentur erklärt hat, dass sie diese Bemerkungen in ihrem Programm für 2009 berücksichtigt habe;
 3.
 beglückwünscht die Agentur dazu, dass sie Mitte 2009 eine Software für die Aufstellung des Haushaltsplans nach Tätigkeitsbereichen eingeführt hat, die klare Indikatoren zu den bereitgestellten finanziellen Mitteln und Humanressourcen liefern wird;
 4.
 beglückwünscht die Agentur dazu, dass sie den während des vorhergehenden Entlastungsverfahrens vom Rechnungshof und von der Haushaltsbehörde vorgebrachten Bemerkungen Folge geleistet hat;
 5.
 weist darauf hin, dass die Entlastung für die Ausführung des Haushaltsplans der Agentur in den kommenden Jahren außerdem auf der von der Agentur im gesamten Jahresverlauf erbrachten Leistung basieren sollte;
 OLAF-Untersuchung
 6.
 nimmt zur Kenntnis, dass OLAF seine im Jahr 2008 eingeleitete Untersuchung der Agentur abgeschlossen und sie jetzt ohne weitere Maßnahme eingestellt hat;
 Interne Prüfung
 7.
 erkennt an, dass der Dienst Internes Audit (IAS) im Februar 2008 die Umsetzung der noch nicht befolgten Empfehlungen seines Berichts 2007 einer Folgeprüfung unterzogen hat und dabei zu dem Ergebnis kam, dass nur eine Empfehlung (Überwachung der Einstellungen durch den Verwaltungsrat) noch nicht umgesetzt worden war; stellt jedoch fest, dass sich die Umstände geändert hatten und diese Empfehlung mit der Tätigkeitsaufnahme der Agentur und der Ernennung ihres neuen Direktors ihren Zweck verloren hat und folglich als befolgt gelten kann;
 8.
 verweist, was weitere, horizontale Bemerkungen zum Entlastungsbeschluss betrifft, auf seine Entschließung vom 5. Mai 2010 (6) zu Leistung, Finanzmanagement und Kontrolle der Agenturen.
 (1) ABl. C 304 vom 15.12.2009, S. 10.
 (2) ABl. L 248 vom 16.9.2002, S. 1.
 (3) ABl. L 53 vom 22.2.2007, S. 1.
 (4) ABl. L 357 vom 31.12.2002, S. 72.
 (5) ABl. L 255 vom 26.9.2009, S. 198.
 (6) Angenommene Texte, P7_TA(2010)0139. (Siehe Seite 241 dieses Amtsblatts.)


text:
 109 HR 2622 IH: Social Security Uninsured Children’s Entitlement Act of 2005
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2005-05-25
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 I
 109th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 2622
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 May 25, 2005
 Mr. Andrews introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
 A BILL
 To amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide monthly benefits for certain uninsured children living without parents.
 1.Short titleThis Act may be cited as the Social Security Uninsured Children’s Entitlement Act of 2005.
 2.Benefits for certain uninsured children
 (a)In generalTitle II of the Social Security Act is amended by adding after section 234 (42 U.S.C. 434) the following new section:
 235.Benefits for certain uninsured children
 (a)EligibilityEvery individual who would not be entitled to child’s insurance benefits under section 202(d) upon filing application therefor and who—
 (1)has not attained the age of 18 and has not married,
 (2)
 (A)has no living parent or (B) with respect to any parent (including an adoptive parent) who is living, has provided to the Commissioner of Social Security (in such form and manner as shall be prescribed in regulations of the Commissioner) a notarized statement that such individual has had no contact with such parent for at least 2 years and that reasonable attempts by a guardian or appropriate government agency to locate such parent have not been successful,
 (3)is a resident of the United States (as defined in subsection (c)), and is (A) a citizen of the United States or (B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who has resided in the United States (as defined in subsection 210(i)) continuously during the 5 years immediately preceding the month in which he or she files application under this section, and
 (4)has filed application for benefits under this section, shall (subject to the limitations in this section) be entitled to a benefit under this section for each month beginning with the first month in which he or she becomes so entitled to such benefits and ending with the month preceding the month in which he or she attains 18 years of age or marries. No application under this section which is filed by an individual more than 3 months before the first month in which he or she meets the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall be accepted as an application for purposes of this section.
 (b)Benefit amountThe benefit amount to which an individual is entitled under this section for any month shall be the larger of $200 or the amount most recently established in lieu thereof under section 215(i).
 (c)Suspension where individual is residing outside the United StatesThe benefit to which any individual is entitled under this section for any month shall not be paid if, during such month, such individual is not a resident of the United States. For purposes of this subsection, the term United States means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
 (d)Treatment as monthly insurance benefitsFor purposes of subsections (t) and (u) of section 202, a monthly benefit under this section shall be treated as a monthly insurance benefit payable under section 202.
 (e)Annual reimbursement of Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust FundThere are authorized to be appropriated to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2006, and for each fiscal year thereafter, such sums as the Commissioner of Social Security deems necessary on account of—
 (1)payments made under this section during the second preceding fiscal year and all fiscal years prior thereto to individuals entitled to benefits under this section,
 (2)the additional administrative expenses resulting from the payments described in paragraph (1), and
 (3)any loss in interest to such Trust Fund resulting from such payments and expenses, in order to place such Trust Fund in the same position at the end of such fiscal year as it would have been in if such payments had not been made..
 (b)Cost of living adjustmentsSection 215(i)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)(2)(A)(ii)(I)) is amended by striking section 227 or 228 and inserting section 227, 228, or 235.
 3.Effective dateThe amendments made by this Act shall take effect with respect to applications filed on or after January 1, 2006.


text:
 11.10.2014
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 L 295/55
 ROZPORZĄDZENIE WYKONAWCZE KOMISJI (UE) NR 1072/2014
 z dnia 10 października 2014 r.
 ustanawiające standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 KOMISJA EUROPEJSKA,
 uwzględniając Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej,
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) nr 1308/2013 z dnia 17 grudnia 2013 r. ustanawiające wspólną organizację rynków produktów rolnych oraz uchylające rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 922/72, (EWG) nr 234/79, (WE) nr 1037/2001 i (WE) nr 1234/2007 (1),
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie wykonawcze Komisji (UE) nr 543/2011 z dnia 7 czerwca 2011 r. ustanawiające szczegółowe zasady stosowania rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1234/2007 w odniesieniu do sektorów owoców i warzyw oraz przetworzonych owoców i warzyw (2), w szczególności jego art. 136 ust. 1,
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)
 Rozporządzenie wykonawcze (UE) nr 543/2011 przewiduje — zgodnie z wynikami wielostronnych negocjacji handlowych Rundy Urugwajskiej — kryteria, na których podstawie Komisja ustala standardowe wartości dla przywozu z państw trzecich, w odniesieniu do produktów i okresów określonych w części A załącznika XVI do wspomnianego rozporządzenia.
 (2)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie jest obliczana każdego dnia roboczego, zgodnie z art. 136 ust. 1 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, przy uwzględnieniu podlegających zmianom danych dziennych. Niniejsze rozporządzenie powinno zatem wejść w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZE ROZPORZĄDZENIE:
 Artykuł 1
 Standardowe wartości celne w przywozie, o których mowa w art. 136 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, są ustalone w załączniku do niniejszego rozporządzenia.
 Artykuł 2
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wchodzi w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wiąże w całości i jest bezpośrednio stosowane we wszystkich państwach członkowskich.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 10 października 2014 r.
 W imieniu Komisji,
 za Przewodniczącego,
 Jerzy PLEWA
 Dyrektor Generalny ds. Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich
 (1) Dz.U. L 347 z 20.12.2013, s. 671.
 (2) Dz.U. L 157 z 15.6.2011, s. 1.
 ZAŁĄCZNIK
 Standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 (EUR/100 kg)
 Kod CN
 Kod państw trzecich (1)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie
 0702 00 00
 AL
 65,0
 MA
 177,0
 MK
 51,9
 XS
 75,9
 ZZ
 92,5
 0707 00 05
 MK
 29,8
 TR
 116,3
 ZZ
 73,1
 0709 93 10
 TR
 130,3
 ZZ
 130,3
 0805 50 10
 AR
 107,9
 BR
 84,6
 CL
 117,7
 IL
 102,2
 TR
 115,0
 UY
 125,3
 ZA
 112,3
 ZZ
 109,3
 0806 10 10
 BR
 166,4
 MK
 31,8
 TR
 136,0
 ZZ
 111,4
 0808 10 80
 BA
 57,3
 BR
 51,7
 CL
 79,6
 NZ
 133,2
 US
 192,8
 ZA
 132,2
 ZZ
 107,8
 0808 30 90
 CN
 95,2
 TR
 110,0
 ZA
 80,2
 ZZ
 95,1
 (1) Nomenklatura krajów ustalona w rozporządzeniu Komisji (UE) nr 1106/2012 z dnia 27 listopada 2012 r. w sprawie wykonania rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 471/2009 w sprawie statystyk Wspólnoty dotyczących handlu zagranicznego z państwami trzecimi, w odniesieniu do aktualizacji nazewnictwa państw i terytoriów (Dz.U. L 328 z 28.11.2012, s. 7). Kod „ZZ” odpowiada „innym pochodzeniom”.


text:
 26.1.2017
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 26/16
 EFTA kohtult nõuandva arvamuse saamise taotlus, mille Norges Høyesterett esitas 19. veebruaril 2016 seoses kohtuasjaga Ski Taxi SA, Follo Taxi SA og Ski Follo Taxidrift AS vs. staten v/Konkurransetilsynet
 (kohtuasi E-3/16)
 (2017/C 26/07)
 Norges Høyesterett (Norra Ülemkohus) esitas 19. veebruaril 2016 EFTA kohtule taotluse (taotlus saabus kohtukantseleisse 24. veebruaril 2016) kohtuasjas Ski Taxi SA, Follo Taxi SA og Ski Follo Taxidrift AS vs. staten v/Konkurransetilsynet nõuandva arvamuse saamiseks järgmistes küsimustes:
 1.
 Millist õiguslikku kriteeriumit kasutatakse, et selgitada välja, kas ettevõtjate vahelisel lepingul on EMP lepingu artikli 53 tähenduses konkurentsi piirav eesmärk?
 a)
 Kas selleks, et teataval käitumisel on EMP lepingu artikli 53 tähenduses konkurentsi piirav eesmärk, piisab oletusest, et koostöö võib konkurentsi piirata?
 2.
 Millist õiguslikku tähendust omab asjaolu, et selline koostöö leidis aset avalikult hankeasutuse teadmisel, kui uuritakse, kas teataval käitumisel on konkurentsi piirav eesmärk?
 3.
 Millist õiguslikku kriteeriumi tuleb eelkõige rõhutada, kui uuritakse, kas koostööl, mille raames kaks konkureerivat äriühingut esitavad ühisettevõtte kaudu ühispakkumuse, mille raames kaks äriühingut on ühisettevõtte alltöövõtjad, on konkurentsi piirav eesmärk?


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21994D1229(04)
 Decisione del Comitato misto SEE n. 27/94, del 2 dicembre 1994, che modifica l'allegato XI (Servizi di telecomunicazione) dell'accordo SEE
 Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 339 del 29/12/1994 pag. 0086 - 0086
 DECISIONE DEL COMITATO MISTO SEE N. 27/94 del 2 dicembre 1994 che modifica l'allegato XI (Servizi di telecomunicazione) dell'accordo SEEIL COMITATO MISTO SEE, visto l'accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo, modificato dal protocollo di adattamento dell'accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo, in appresso denominato « accordo », in particolare l'articolo 98, considerando che l'allegato XI dell'accordo è stato modificato da ultimo dalla decisione del Comitato misto SEE n. 7/94, del 21 marzo 1994, che modifica il protocollo n. 47 e alcuni allegati dell'accordo SEE (1); considerando che occorre incorporare nell'accordo la decisione 94/439/CE della Commissione, del 15 giugno 1994, che modifica l'allegato II della direttiva 92/44/CEE del Consiglio (2), DECIDE: Articolo 1 Nell'allegato XI dell'accordo, al punto 5b (direttiva 92/44/CEE del Consiglio) prima degli adattamenti, è aggiunto il seguente testo: « , modificata da: - 394 D 0439: decisione 94/439/CE della Commissione, del 15 giugno 1994 (GU n. L 181 del 15. 7. 1994, pag. 40). ». Articolo 2 Fanno fede i testi della decisione 94/439/CE nelle lingue finlandese, islandese, norvegese e svedese, allegati alle rispettive versioni linguistiche della presente decisione. Articolo 3 La presente decisione entra in vigore il 1° febbraio 1995, a condizione che siano state date al Comitato misto SEE tutte le notifiche previste dall'articolo 103, paragrafo 1 dell'accordo. Articolo 4 La presente decisione è pubblicata nella sezione SEE e nel supplemento SEE della Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee. Fatto a Bruxelles, addì 2 dicembre 1994. Per il Comitato misto SEE Il Presidente H. HAFSTEIN