text:
James Adam Fallin v. State of Maryland
 No. 79, September Term 2017
 Criminal Procedure – Witness Credibility – Expert Witnesses. It is for the jury alone
 to determine the credibility of witnesses whose testimony and statements are relevant to
 the factual issues to be decided by the jury. Thus, expert testimony as to whether another
 witness exhibited signs of fabrication when that witness made an out-of-court statement is
 ordinarily not admissible.
 Circuit Court for Charles County
 Case No. 08-K-15-000610
 Argument: June 1, 2018
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 79
 September Term, 2017
 JASON ADAM FALLIN
 V.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 _____________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.,
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Opinion by McDonald, J.
 Watts and Getty, JJ., concur and dissent.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: July 12, 2018
 2018-07-12
 11:06-04:00
 A basic principle of a criminal jury trial, incorporated in the Maryland Constitution,1
 is that the jury is the judge of the facts. A corollary is that it is “the province of the jury”
 to determine the credibility of the witnesses who provide evidence about those facts.2 This
 Court is sometimes called upon to determine whether particular testimony is helpful to the
 jury in assessing witness credibility or whether it purports to supplant the jury in carrying
 out that function. This is one of those cases.
 Petitioner, Jason Adam Fallin, was accused of abusing his daughter on three
 occasions when she was between five and eight years old, by inappropriately touching her
 genitals. Virtually all of the evidence against him consisted of testimony and out-of-court
 statements of the daughter. A forensic examiner testified that the daughter showed “no
 signs of fabrication” and that the examiner had no concerns about fabrication when she
 made certain out-of-court statements implicating Mr. Fallin. We hold that this testimony
 impermissibly intruded on the responsibility of the jury to assess the credibility of
 witnesses.
 I
 Background
 On July 6, 2015, Mr. Fallin was indicted by a grand jury in the Circuit Court for
 Charles County. All of the offenses charged in the indictment were related to three alleged
 incidents in which Mr. Fallin inappropriately touched the genitals of his daughter, whom
 1
 Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Articles 20, 21, 23.
 2
 Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277 (1988).
 we shall refer to as “S.” The case first went to trial in January 2016, but the jury could not
 agree on a verdict and the court declared a mistrial. The case was retried in April 2016.
 The retrial is the subject of this appeal.
 S was born in September 2005 as a result of a brief relationship of Mr. Fallin with
 S’s mother, whom we shall refer to as “Heather.” Mr. Fallin and Heather eventually
 entered into a consent order concerning custody of S in 2009, under which S was to reside
 with Heather, but visit with Mr. Fallin every other weekend. At the time Heather and S
 resided with Mr. Fallin’s parents, although Mr. Fallin himself did not live with them.
 Heather apparently has experienced her own challenges and S has spent much of her young
 life residing with either Mr. Fallin’s parents or Heather’s mother. S had seen Heather only
 once during the year preceding the trial of this case.
 At the trial of this case, S herself directly testified about two of the alleged incidents.
 She dated one incident to sometime in 2012 (when she was five or six years old) while she
 was in bed with both of her parents (“the bed incident”). She also testified about a second
 incident that occurred inside a port-a-potty along a trail near her paternal grandparents’
 home in 2014 (“the trail incident”). A forensic examiner, who had interviewed S in 2012
 testified that S had told her about a third incident, which allegedly occurred while S and
 her father were watching television in 2012 (“the television incident”), although in her own
 testimony S did not mention that incident and denied that there had been any incidents
 other than the two she testified about herself.
 The issues before us arise out of the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses who
 testified about out-of-court statements of S. One issue is whether a forensic examiner’s
 2
 repeated opinion that S did not show “signs of fabrication” was properly admitted in
 evidence. Another issue is whether the Circuit Court should have provided a more detailed
 curative instruction to the jury about inadmissible testimony by the same examiner that she
 did not believe S was “incorrect” in her testimony. The remaining issue is whether
 testimony by one of the State’s investigators concerning hearsay statements by S, although
 erroneously admitted in evidence, was harmless error.
 To provide perspective on these issues, we first outline the legal context and then
 recount the evidence at trial in some detail.
 A. Legal Context
 1. The “Tender Years” Hearsay Exception
 Testimony concerning out-of-court statements of an alleged victim of child abuse
 may be admissible under what is known as the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule
 contained in Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), §11-304. That statute
 concerns the admissibility of an out-of-court statement3 of a child under the age of 13 who
 is an alleged victim of child abuse or of certain sex offenses. To be admissible under the
 statute, the statement must have been made to a person acting in the course of a particular
 profession, the statement must not be admissible under any other hearsay exception, the
 child must also testify at trial, and the statement must have “particularized guarantees of
 trustworthiness” according to factors set forth in the statute. CP §11-304(c), (d), (e).
 The statute defines “statement” to mean an “(1) an oral or written assertion; or (2)
 3
 nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion, including sounds, gestures, demonstrations,
 drawings, and similar actions.” CP §11-304(a).
 3
 Pertinent to this case, the out-of-court statement is admissible only if made to one
 of the following professionals “acting lawfully in the course of the person’s profession”:
 (1) a physician;
 (2) a psychologist;
 (3) a nurse;
 (4) a social worker;
 (5) a principal, vice principal, teacher, or school counselor at a
 public or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary
 school;
 (6) a counselor licensed or certified in accordance with Title 17 of
 the Health Occupations Article; or
 (7) a therapist licensed or certified in accordance with Title 17 of
 the Health Occupations Article.
 CP §11-304(c).
 2. Expert Testimony Concerning Evaluation of Alleged Victim’s Statements
 Maryland appellate courts have previously considered the admissibility of expert
 opinion testimony related to the statements of an alleged victim of child abuse. Among the
 cases that bear on this issue and that form the backdrop for the objections made at trial are
 Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266 (1988); Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480 (1995); and Yount v.
 State, 99 Md. App. 207 (1994).
 Bohnert
 In Bohnert, as in this case, the defendant’s conviction of a sexual offense against a
 child turned on whether the jury believed certain statements of the child. In that case, the
 defendant lived in an apartment with a woman and her two children, a boy and a girl. The
 4
 girl alleged that the defendant frequently took her into the bathroom of the apartment to
 engage in sex acts. Other testimony at the trial suggested that she was jealous of her
 mother’s relationship with the defendant and might have other motives for testifying falsely
 against him. The girl had twice recanted her allegations of abuse, and a physical
 examination found no signs of sexual abuse.
 A social worker employed as a protective services investigator by the local
 department of social services, who had interviewed the girl and her mother, was qualified
 by the trial court as an expert in the field of child sexual abuse. In response to a question
 from the prosecution, the social worker responded that, in her opinion, the girl was a victim
 of sexual abuse. While the social worker alluded to other sources of information, she said
 that her opinion was based chiefly on statements made by the girl.
 The jury convicted the defendant of the charges and the Court of Special Appeals
 affirmed the conviction. This Court, however, reversed, holding that it was an abuse of
 discretion to admit the social worker’s opinion as to the girl’s credibility.
 The Court first observed that the social worker’s opinion was based solely on what
 the girl had told her, as there were no eyewitnesses or physical evidence and the only other
 evidence was similar statements made by the girl to her mother or others. The Court
 observed that, while the admission of expert testimony on a particular subject is normally
 a matter within the discretion of a trial court, the social worker’s opinion rested solely on
 the statements of the girl, who was also a witness in the case, and thus essentially amounted
 to an opinion concerning that witness’ credibility.
 5
 The Court stated:
 In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the
 credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness’
 testimony are solely within the province of the jury.... It is ... error for
 the court to permit to go to the jury a statement, belief, or opinion of
 another person to the effect that a witness is telling the truth or lying.
 Whether a witness on the stand personally believes or disbelieves
 testimony of a previous witness is irrelevant, and questions to that effect
 are improper, either on direct or cross-examination.
 312 Md. at 277 (citations omitted). Noting that the results of lie detector tests are not
 admissible, the Court stated that no one “can qualify as an ‘expert in credibility’ no matter
 what his experience and expertise” and reiterated that the credibility of a witness is solely
 the province of the jury. Id. at 278. “It is the settled law of this State that a witness, expert
 or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth.”
 Id.
 The Court concluded that, in the case before it, the social worker’s opinion that the
 girl had been sexually abused was “tantamount to a declaration by [the social worker] that
 the child was telling the truth...” Id. Such an opinion was “inadmissible as a matter of
 law” and the trial court had no discretion to admit it. Id. at 279.
 Hutton
 The Court reiterated that principle in Hutton, which also arose out of a child sex
 abuse prosecution. In that case, a social worker who had counseled the alleged victim
 testified in the State’s case. The social worker described characteristics of children who
 have been sexually abused and stated that the alleged victim exhibited many of those
 characteristics. When asked by the prosecutor how she assessed credibility of her client,
 6
 the social worker said that she looked for, and found, “consistency” in the client’s
 statements. 339 Md. at 485-88. The State also called a psychologist who had interviewed
 the alleged victim. The psychologist opined that the child suffered from post traumatic
 stress disorder (“PTSD”) which, in the psychologist’s opinion, was attributable to child sex
 abuse. Id. at 488. When asked by the State how she assessed the child’s credibility, the
 psychologist responded that, in her opinion, the child’s representations were “not in any
 way faked.” Id. at 490.
 This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction in Hutton, in part on the basis that
 the testimony of the social worker and the psychologist concerning the alleged victim’s
 credibility was contrary to the holding in Bohnert. The social worker had been permitted
 to “indicate her opinion of the victim’s consistency and, indirectly, her truthfulness.” Id.
 at 505. The psychologist’s testimony amounted to a “credibility assessment, a matter
 outside [her] area of expertise and one historically and appropriately entrusted to the jury.”
 Id. at 503.4
 Yount
 In Yount, the Court of Special Appeals held that generic testimony concerning
 statements by victims of child abuse was admissible. In that case, the defendant was
 charged with abusing his eight-year-old daughter. The daughter, who had recanted the
 allegation of abuse and then recanted the recantation, testified in the State’s case-in-chief
 4
 A concurring opinion of two members of the Court would have allowed a larger
 role to testimony concerning PTSD in child sex abuse cases, but agreed with the majority
 that “the rule of Bohnert ... was violated.” Id. at 507-8.
 7
 that her father had abused her. In its rebuttal case, the State called a professional counselor
 who was qualified by the trial court as an expert in child abuse and who testified that it was
 common for victims of child abuse to recant their initial reports of abuse. The counselor
 did not express an opinion about the statements of the daughter in the case on trial. The
 jury convicted the defendant, who challenged the admission of the expert’s testimony on
 appeal.
 The Court of Special Appeals first held that expert testimony by the counselor
 concerning “the arcane context of sexual child abuse ... would be of appreciable help” to
 the jury. 99 Md. App. at 212. The court next determined that the counselor’s training and
 experience rendered her qualified to provide that testimony. Id. at 213. The court noted
 that the counselor had not testified on the ultimate issue in the case – whether the abuse
 had occurred – and was not testifying directly on the issue of the victim’s credibility, but
 rather on “a phenomenon that had a bearing on an assessment of ... credibility.” Id. at 214.
 The court distinguished the situation before it from that in Bohnert. The expert
 testimony concerning recantation simply “advised the jury as to the existence of a
 psychological phenomenon that would explain the ... victim’s wavering or vacillation.
 Beyond that, it did nothing to indicate that the victim’s version of events rather than the
 appellant’s version of events should be believed.” Id. at 218-19. The intermediate
 appellate court held that the testimony was admissible and affirmed the conviction.
 8
 B. The Evidence at Trial
 1. Testimony of S, Her Mother, and Her Maternal Grandmother
 Trial Testimony of S
 S testified that, when she was five and six years old, she lived with Mr. Fallin’s
 parents, who sometimes took trips to North Carolina. She said that, on one occasion when
 her grandparents were away, she was lying in bed with Heather and Mr. Fallin with her
 eyes closed, when Mr. Fallin touched her “in the private area.” S testified that it hurt badly
 and that she later told her mother and her maternal grandmother about the incident.
 S recounted a second incident that she believed also happened when she was six
 years old. During a time when she was staying with her paternal grandparents, she went
 for a walk on a nearby trail with Mr. Fallin. According to S, when she told Mr. Fallin she
 had to go to the bathroom, he took her to a port-a-potty on the trail. While they were inside,
 he touched her in the front of her private area in a way that felt like “scratching.” She said
 that, after she pulled her pants up, they left the port-a-potty and went back on the trail,
 where she told him he could not do that because there were people around. S also testified
 that on the way back on the trail Mr. Fallin pulled her pants down outside and took a picture
 of her. She later told her mother about the incident.
 S testified that she wanted to continue to see her father, but she did not want him to
 touch her again in her private parts. She denied that he had touched her in that way on any
 other occasion.
 9
 Heather
 Heather testified that, from 2008 through 2012, she and S lived with Mr. Fallin’s
 parents, with whom she had a good relationship. Mr. Fallin did not live with them at the
 time, but visited his daughter under the custody consent order.
 According to Heather, her daughter had twice reported to her that Mr. Fallin had
 touched her inappropriately. The first occasion was sometime in 2012. According to
 Heather, S told her on that occasion about “touching” by Mr. Fallin. Heather moved herself
 and S out of the Fallins’ home and into her own mother’s home. She obtained a protective
 order against Mr. Fallin but did not call the police. The protective order temporarily halted
 visitation but, upon its expiration, visitation between S and Mr. Fallin resumed.
 Heather testified that the second occasion was two years later in 2014 after she had
 picked up S from a visit with Mr. Fallin. At that time, S told her that Mr. Fallin “had dug
 her again.” Heather understood S to mean that Mr. Fallin had touched his daughter’s
 genitals. Heather then called the police.
 Heather testified that she had ceased living with her mother and S in January 2015
 and that she had seen her daughter only once during the year prior to her testimony, a
 situation that she attributed to her own health issues.
 Heather’s Mother
 Heather’s mother (S’s maternal grandmother) testified that she and Mr. Fallin’s
 mother had helped arrange Mr. Fallin’s visitations with S under the custody consent order.
 In July 2012, S told her about an incident a week or two before in which her father had
 touched her genitals. S said that she had been sleeping on one side of the bed next to her
 10
 mother and that she woke up with Mr. Fallin’s hands in her underwear “digging her.” The
 grandmother called the Sheriff’s Office and accompanied Heather to obtain a protective
 order.
 Two years later in 2014, S again reported inappropriate touching by her father. The
 grandmother called S’s pediatrician and then contacted the Sheriff’s Office. The
 grandmother accompanied Heather and S to the Sheriff’s Office to report the incident. She
 and Heather then obtained a second protective order against Mr. Fallin in late 2014.
 She testified that she had been S’s temporary guardian since January 2015, when
 Heather had left her home.
 2. The Sheriff’s Office Investigation – February and March 2014
 In February 2014, a detective from the Charles County Sheriff’s Office was assigned
 to investigate the trail incident. At the outset of her investigation, the detective interviewed
 S at the station in the presence of Heather and Heather’s mother. According to the
 detective, S reported to her that Mr. Fallin had touched her genitals in a port-a-potty while
 they were on a walk on the trail behind her paternal grandparents’ home. The detective
 went to the trail and confirmed that there were port-a-potties along the trail.
 The detective met with Mr. Fallin on March 11, 2014. During that interview, Mr.
 Fallin told the detective that he had taken walks on the trail with his daughter and his
 parents. In response to the detective’s questions, Mr. Fallin denied that he had touched his
 daughter’s genitals and said that there were no nude pictures of her on his phone. When
 the detective told Mr. Fallin that she was going to obtain a search and seizure warrant for
 his cell phone, he turned over the phone and volunteered the passcode to it.
 11
 The mobile phone forensics examiner for the Sheriff’s Office testified that he had
 examined Mr. Fallin’s cell phone and determined that it had only two days of data on it.
 He successfully extracted the files from the cell phone, which included one photograph of
 S. In the photo she was clothed and standing outdoors. The forensics examiner determined
 that the photograph had been taken with a camera other than the camera on the cell phone.
 A forensic nurse examiner testified that she had conducted a physical examination
 of S in February 2014. S told the nurse that she had been touched in her genital area. The
 nurse examined S’s genitals and noted no trauma, which she said could be “consistent”
 with genital touching.
 3. Report from Mr. Fallin’s Therapist – September 2014
 A licensed clinical social worker therapist, who was Mr. Fallin’s therapist from
 2010 through 2014, was called as a witness by the State. She testified that, during a session
 with her in September 2014, Mr. Fallin told her about a dream in which S had spent the
 night at his residence. In the dream, he had woken up with an erection, placed his hand in
 S’s pants, apologized to her when she awoke, and heard her say “That was okay, Daddy.”
 Mr. Fallin told the therapist that he was “90 per cent sure” that what he recounted was a
 dream, but was not absolutely certain.
 Under Maryland law, a licensed clinical social worker is required to notify the local
 department of social services or an appropriate law enforcement agency if the social worker
 has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect. Maryland Code,
 Family Law Article (“FL”), §5-704. In light of that provision, the therapist contacted the
 authorities concerning Mr. Fallin’s statements to her during the session. On cross-
 12
 examination, the therapist acknowledged that Mr. Fallin was on medications when he was
 seeing her and that she could not say how the medications may have affected what he told
 her.
 4. Forensic Interviews of S
 The issues before us concern testimony about two forensic interviews of S that were
 conducted in 2012 and 2014. Evidence of out-of-court statements made by S during those
 interviews was introduced under the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule.
 August 2012 Forensic Evaluation – Meredith Drum, Professional Counselor
 In August 2012, Meredith Drum, a licensed counselor, who was working at the time
 as a psychotherapist with the Center for the Children, conducted a forensic evaluation of
 S. That evaluation consisted of four sessions with S, one of which was attended by Heather.
 In anticipation of Ms. Drum’s testimony, the defense raised two objections. First,
 it objected to any testimony by Ms. Drum about whether she had observed signs of
 fabrication by S during the sessions. Referring to similar testimony that Ms. Drum had
 given during the first trial of the case,5 the defense argued that such testimony would be
 contrary to the holding in Bohnert. The defense reasoned that testimony that S had not
 exhibited signs of fabrication would be the functional equivalent of saying that she was
 telling the truth and that Ms. Drum would be “functioning as a human lie detector.”
 Second, the defense argued that allowing Ms. Drum to provide hearsay testimony that S
 had described a third incident of inappropriate touching – the television incident – when S
 5
 Ms. Drum had testified at the earlier trial, which had resulted in a hung jury.
 13
 had not described such an incident in her own trial testimony would violate Mr. Fallin’s
 constitutional right of confrontation.
 In response, the State contended that admission of Ms. Drum’s testimony would not
 be contrary to Bohnert and would be permissible under Yount because Ms. Drum would
 not directly opine on the ultimate issue of whether S had been sexually abused. As to the
 confrontation issue, the State argued that the defense had had an opportunity to cross-
 examine S about whether the television incident happened, if it had wished to do so.
 After a lengthy discussion, the Circuit Court ruled that Ms. Drum could testify about
 her training concerning signs of fabrication and state whether she had observed signs of
 fabrication by S, but could not testify directly whether S was lying or telling the truth. With
 respect to the confrontation issue, the court overruled the objection, stating that the defense
 should not have been surprised by Ms. Drum’s anticipated testimony about the television
 incident and had made a choice not to cross-examine S about that alleged incident. Defense
 counsel asked “if we could have a continuing objection so we don’t have to keep
 objecting,” to which the court responded affirmatively.
 Later, as Ms. Drum was about to take the stand, the court and counsel revisited the
 discussion:
 The Court: All right.
 Okay.
 So just to be clear I have; maybe you
 already said, but I have all your objections
 on mistrial; all of them noted.
 If something else comes up please but [sic].
 14
 Defense Counsel: And yeah, just to clarify it.
 The Court: Yeah.
 Defense Counsel: Anything; even though Your Honor I think
 sort of agree [sic] with me in part on the
 fabrication stuff.
 The Court: Um hum.
 Defense Counsel: Any; the signs of fabrication and not seeing
 any is the functional equivalent in my view.
 The Court: Right.
 Defense Counsel: And frankly I think any reasonable
 interpretation.
 The Court: Come on up, Ma’am.
 Come on up, Ma’am.
 Go ahead.
 I got it.
 I got your objection to it.
 Defense Counsel: The functional equivalent of saying she’s
 not fabricating it.
 Defense Counsel: Yeah.
 The Court: Okay.
 Defense Counsel: And anything like that where you have the
 functional equivalent of saying I think she’s
 credible.
 The Court: I got it.
 I got you.
 15
 Ms. Drum then testified that she had received training at the National Children’s
 Advocacy Center in Alabama, and at the National Center for Forensic Interviewing. She
 said that her training taught her how to conduct extended multiple-session evaluations of
 children, how to start with broad questions and move to narrower ones, and what signs to
 look for to determine if a child is fabricating or being coached. According to Ms. Drum,
 such signs include the immediate and unsolicited disclosure of sexual abuse, “using the
 exact same phrase repeatedly,” and the use of “too grown up language.” It was not clear
 from Ms. Drum’s testimony whether this list was meant to be exhaustive.
 The court found that Ms. Drum was qualified as an expert in the field of child abuse
 disclosure and clinical counseling in the area of child abuse.
 Ms. Drum testified that she met with S four times in August 2012. The first session
 was devoted to getting to know S and building rapport. Ms. Drum said that S, who was six
 years old at the time, was talkative and bouncy. According to Ms. Drum, it is not a “goal”
 of the initial session to obtain disclosures of child abuse, and S did not say anything about
 being molested or touched during that interview.
 Ms. Drum testified that, during their second session, S told her that her father had
 “digged her” and pointed to her groin area. According to Ms. Drum, S said that the
 “digging” occurred at her grandparents’ house when the grandparents were away in Florida
 and while S was in bed with her mother and father. S said she would scream when the
 digging happened. According to Ms. Drum, S was concerned about whether she would
 “get in trouble” for telling Ms. Drum about it, but Ms. Drum assured her that she would
 not. S said that she was scared to return to her father’s house.
 16
 During their third session, according to Ms. Drum, S again mentioned that Mr. Fallin
 had “digged” her and pointed to the vagina on an anatomical drawing of a girl. S talked
 about the same incident as in the second session and recounted an additional detail – i.e.,
 that she was wearing pajamas.
 Ms. Drum testified that, during their fourth and final session, S told her about a
 second incident with her father. According to Ms. Drum, S said that Mr. Fallin touched
 her when they were in the living room of her grandparents’ house watching television.
 Ms. Drum said that S had told her that she had never experienced any bad touches
 by anyone else.
 Throughout Ms. Drum’s testimony, the prosecutor repeatedly asked her whether she
 had observed signs of fabrication or coaching in S during their several sessions together.
 Ms. Drum consistently denied observing such signs in S. At the conclusion of the State’s
 direct examination, the State reiterated those questions and Ms. Drum testified as follows:
 Prosecutor: Throughout your four sessions did you have any
 concern that [S] was fabricating?
 Ms. Drum: No.
 Prosecutor: Did you have any concern that she was being
 coached?
 Ms. Drum: No.
 Prosecutor: Did you observe any of the signs in which you
 were taught through your training and experience
 that she was being coached or this was fabricated?
 Ms. Drum: No.
 17
 Later, during redirect examination, the State again asked:
 Prosecutor: And is there any indication in your sessions with
 [S] that when she was disclosing her father as the
 person who was digging her that she was
 incorrect?
 Ms. Drum: No.
 The defense objected, and a bench conference ensued. Defense counsel argued that the
 testimony had crossed the line into an assertion by Ms. Drum that S had been truthful in
 identifying her father as a perpetrator of child sexual abuse. The following colloquy took
 place:
 Defense Counsel: And she also asked earlier subject to our
 continued objection, do you have any concerns
 about whether she was fabricating or not. That –
 The Court: Well, that’s interesting cause I was surprised you
 didn’t object on that one.
 Defense Counsel: Well, the continuing objection so I.
 The Court: That’s for somebody else to decide.
 I thought that was slightly different but whatever.
 Defense Counsel: I; if it wasn’t covered I move to strike it.
 ...
 The Court: Okay.
 That’s fine.
 Just stand by.
 One thing at a time.
 18
 After some discussion, the Circuit Court concluded that the question was improper.
 Defense counsel then asked for a curative instruction “in light of that and the other two
 questions which I thought were covered by our continuing objection.” The court replied
 “Yeah, maybe they were.” The defense then requested the following instruction:
 [I]t is for the jury alone to assess whether a witness or an alleged victim
 is telling the truth.
 It is not an appropriate subject for expert testimony to tell you whether
 or not they believe someone’s telling the truth.
 The State asserted that the instruction was incorrect under the law, and that it specifically
 disagreed with the second part. The court ended the bench conference stating that it would
 take up the proposed curative instruction after Ms. Drum’s testimony concluded.
 The State then asked Ms. Drum if she had “any concerns” based on her training and
 experience, and the court sustained an objection because the question went “too far.” The
 State then once again asked Ms. Drum if she had “observe[d] any signs of fabrication or
 coercion” and Ms. Drum responded, “No.”
 After Ms. Drum finished testifying, the defense requested the same two-part
 instruction as earlier. The court said it was not going to give the second part because “I
 don’t think that’s what happened.” The State also objected to the second part because an
 “expert witness can assess the credibility. That’s exactly what [Yount] said can happen.”
 The court said it was not going to go as far as putting in the second part of the instruction
 and said it understood that the defense wanted it in.
 19
 Shortly after the discussion, the court told jurors:
 All right ladies and gentlemen just a couple things:
 Just as a reminder it is for you alone to determine the credibility of any
 witness; that’s Number 1.
 Number 2, the Court has to; you probably noticed the courtroom’s
 filling up, take up some other matters ...
 This was followed by a lengthy instruction to the jury about adjourning for the day.
 September 2014 Forensic Interview – Melissa Mohler, Social Services Investigator
 In September 2014 – more than two years after S had been interviewed by Ms. Drum
 – she was interviewed by Melissa Mohler, a child protective services investigator with the
 Department of Social Services, as a result of the report made by Mr. Fallin’s therapist. Ms.
 Mohler testified that S had seemed “happy-go-lucky” and had no trouble communicating
 during their single interview. Over a hearsay objection, Ms. Mohler recounted statements
 that S had made during that interview.
 Ms. Mohler testified that she told S what Mr. Fallin had said to his therapist.
 According to Ms. Mohler, S had responded that Mr. Fallin was lying when he said he had
 abused her recently, when in fact he had not done so. S also said that Mr. Fallin had lied
 twice in the past when he denied abusing her, when he had in fact done so.
 Ms. Mohler said that S also told her about her interview with the detective from the
 Sheriff’s Office earlier that year. S told Ms. Mohler that she had not been alone with Mr.
 Fallin since that interview with the detective and that Mr. Fallin had not touched her private
 area in the week prior to their interview. S said that Mr. Fallin had apologized to her about
 20
 touching her private area. According to Ms. Mohler, S said that, in response to the apology,
 she had told her father that he “cannot do that to me.”
 Ms. Mohler also testified about a conversation she had with Mr. Fallin and his
 mother. Mr. Fallin told Ms. Mohler that he believed that S was just repeating what Heather
 and Heather’s mother had told her to say. Mr. Fallin said that he loved S and would
 relinquish his rights to visitation out of concern for her well-being.
 5. The Defense Case
 The defense called two of Mr. Fallin’s relatives as witnesses. An aunt, who
 happened to be a licensed clinical professional counselor, testified that she had had frequent
 contact with S since her birth. She said that S had never disclosed anything to her that
 would have triggered the mandatory duty under FL §5-704 to report suspected child abuse
 or neglect.
 Mr. Fallin’s sister-in-law testified that she had a son close in age to S who was “best
 friends” with S. She recounted that, on a weekend, in late January or early February 2014,
 she and Mr. Fallin took S and her son for a walk on the trail. The children got cold, and
 they returned home after only walking about 500 feet. She said that there were 10 or 12
 other people out on the trail that day and that S never used a port-a-potty. The sister-in-
 law testified that her son had never told her that S had disclosed any sort of sexual abuse.
 Mr. Fallin elected not to testify in his defense.
 21
 C. Legal Proceedings
 1. Verdict and Sentencing
 The 12-count indictment against Mr. Fallin included one count of continuing course
 of conduct involving sex crimes against a child, in violation of Maryland Code, Criminal
 Law Article (“CR”) §3-315, three counts of third-degree sexual offense in violation of CR
 §3-307, three counts of fourth-degree sexual offense in violation of CR §3-308, three
 counts of sexual abuse of a minor in violation of CR §3-602, and two counts of second-
 degree assault in violation of CR §3-203.
 During the trial the State dismissed, by nolle prosequi, four of the charges – in
 particular, the count charging a continuing course of conduct and three counts related to
 digital anal penetration. On April 22, 2016, the jury began its deliberations on the
 remaining eight counts. After deliberating that morning, the jury sent a note to the court
 stating that they were “hung on all counts.” With the assent of counsel, the court repeated
 the standard instruction it had given earlier on the jury’s duty to deliberate.6 Later that
 afternoon the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Fallin guilty of three charges, all of which
 related to the bed incident, but could not reach a verdict on the five remaining charges
 related to the trail incident or the television incident.
 On July 15, 2016, the Circuit Court sentenced Mr. Fallin to 25 years incarceration,
 with all but 21 years suspended, for sexual abuse of a minor, and 10 years concurrent for
 6
 See Maryland State Bar Association, Maryland Criminal Pattern Instructions (2d
 ed. 2012), MPJI-Cr. 2:01.
 22
 the third-degree sexual offense conviction, with five years supervised probation. The
 second-degree assault conviction was merged into the sexual offense conviction for
 purposes of sentencing.
 2. Appeal to Court of Special Appeals
 Mr. Fallin appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported decision dated
 October 13, 2017, the intermediate appellate court affirmed his convictions. With respect
 to the issues before us, that court concluded that, although some of the evidence had been
 admitted in error, it did not require reversal of Mr. Fallin’s convictions.7
 With respect to the testimony of Ms. Drum, the Court of Special Appeals
 distinguished her testimony from that in Bohnert. Citing Yount, the intermediate appellate
 court reasoned that Ms. Drum simply applied “objective knowledge” in testifying that S
 did not exhibit signs of fabrication or coaching and that she had not opined directly as to
 whether S was telling the truth.
 With respect to Ms. Mohler’s testimony reporting out-of-court statements made by
 S, the court held that the testimony was inadmissible because Ms. Mohler did not come
 within any of the occupational categories of CP §11-304(c) and therefore the statutory
 “tender years” hearsay exception did not apply to her hearsay testimony. However, the
 7
 The Court of Special Appeals also considered Mr. Fallin’s arguments that the
 prosecutor had included facts not in evidence in her rebuttal argument to the jury and that
 the trial court had admitted certain allegedly irrelevant evidence. The intermediate
 appellate court found no merit in either of those arguments and Mr. Fallin has not pursued
 those contentions before us.
 23
 court concluded that, in light of the fact that S herself had testified at trial about the same
 information, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the
 hearsay statements of S through Ms. Mohler did not affect the verdict.
 We granted Mr. Fallin’s petition for certiorari and the State’s cross petition.
 II
 Discussion
 Mr. Fallin presents three questions for review:
 (1) Whether Ms. Drum’s testimony that S exhibited no signs of fabrication or
 coaching, and that Ms. Drum had no concerns on that score, was admissible.8
 (2) Whether the Circuit Court should have given the jury a curative instruction
 that credibility of a witness – i.e., S – was not a proper subject of expert testimony.
 (3) Whether allowing an unlicensed social services investigator – Ms. Mohler –
 to testify as to out-of-court statements of S was harmless error.
 In its cross-petition, the State raised the issue as to whether Mr. Fallin had
 adequately preserved objections related to the first two questions.
 For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Mr. Fallin preserved his objection
 to Ms. Drum’s testimony and that her opinion as to whether S showed signs of fabrication
 or coaching was inadmissible under Bohnert. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new
 trial and need not address the second and third questions.
 8
 Mr. Fallin stated two related questions in his petition that, in our view, are both
 subsumed in this issue.
 24
 A. Preservation
 As a preliminary matter, the State argues that at least part of Mr. Fallin’s objection
 to Ms. Drum’s testimony was waived and not preserved. In particular, the State contends
 that (1) it is ambiguous whether the defense’s continuing objection to Ms. Drum’s
 testimony related to its argument under Bohnert, as opposed to the confrontation issue
 related to Ms. Drum’s testimony about the television incident; and (2) even if the defense
 had registered a continuing objection under Bohnert, that objection concerned only the
 testimony by Ms. Drum that she saw no “signs” of fabrication and not her testimony that
 she had no “concerns” about fabrication.
 In a criminal trial, an objection to evidence is waived unless the party objects at the
 time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become
 apparent. Maryland Rule 4-323(a). The court may grant a continuing objection to a line
 of questions, but such an objection is effective only as to questions “clearly within its
 scope.” Maryland Rule 4-323(b).
 In our view, the State’s waiver argument parses the defense objections and the trial
 court’s rulings too finely. As set forth above, there was a lengthy colloquy between the
 Circuit Court and counsel concerning the defense objections to Ms. Drum’s testimony.
 Most of that discussion involved the defense objection based on Bohnert that Ms. Drum’s
 testimony about whether S had shown signs of fabrication in their August 2012 sessions
 amounted to an opinion by Ms. Drum that S’s statements to her were true. It is true that
 the defense also raised a confrontation issue concerning her testimony about the alleged
 television incident, on the basis that S herself had not testified about such an incident and
 25
 had, in fact, denied that there were any touching incidents besides the two – the bed incident
 and the trail incident – that S described in her own testimony. At the conclusion of the
 colloquy the defense asked for a “continuing objection so we don’t have to keep objecting.”
 The Circuit Court assented to that request. Later, immediately before Ms. Drum took the
 stand, the Circuit Court noted that “I have all your objections on mistrial” 9 and defense
 counsel again reiterated his argument based on Bohnert, to which the court affirmed “I got
 it.”
 A fair reading of the record reveals that the defense adequately stated a continuing
 objection under Bohnert – whether characterized as “signs” or “concerns” about
 fabrication. The main thrust of the defense objection to Ms. Drum’s testimony was clearly
 based on Bohnert. The essence of that objection (equating Ms. Drum’s expected testimony
 with the social worker’s opinion in Bohnert) was repeated multiple times, including
 immediately before Ms. Drum took the stand, and the Circuit Court repeatedly gave
 affirmative responses such as “I got it” while disagreeing with the defense on the substance
 of the objection. It is perfectly understandable why the defense did not object each time
 Ms. Drum repeated her conclusion during her subsequent testimony that S had not
 9
 The defense had filed a written motion for a mistrial three months earlier during
 the first trial of the case related to the testimony of Mr. Fallin’s therapist. There is no
 evident reason that the court would be referring to that motion, which concerned a different
 trial and a different witness, at this juncture. It seems more likely that the court was
 referring to the contemporaneous defense objections to the testimony that was then under
 discussion.
 26
 exhibited signs of fabrication during their four sessions or that Ms. Drum did not have
 “concerns” about fabrication.
 The State argues that the defense must not have understood the scope of its
 continuing objection to be so broad and points to an objection registered by the defense
 toward the conclusion of Ms. Drum’s direct examination. On that occasion, the defense
 objected when the prosecutor went a step beyond her previous questions and asked Ms.
 Drum if she had any concerns whether S’s statements that Mr. Fallin had abused her were
 “incorrect.” This question clearly was not within the parameters permitted by the trial
 court’s earlier ruling overruling the defense objection to the “signs of fabrication”
 questions. The trial court agreed that this new question was “improper.” While under the
 defense theory this question was as impermissible as the “signs of fabrication” questions,
 it was not the same question to which the defense had lodged an advance continuing
 objection and lost. Thus, the fact that defense counsel objected to this new question is not
 an indication that the scope of its continuing objection was too narrow to encompass
 questions concerning “signs” or “concerns” about fabrication.
 B. Whether Expert Testimony Concerning Signs of Fabrication by Another Witness
 is Admissible
 As outlined earlier,10 a fundamental principle underlying trial by jury is that “the
 credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness’ testimony are solely
 within the province of the jury.” Bohnert, 312 Md. at 277. Accordingly, a trial court may
 10
 See Part I.A.2 of this opinion.
 27
 not ordinarily permit questioning that calls for one witness to assess the credibility of
 testimony or statements made by another witness concerning the facts of the case. This is
 not to say that a witness may not offer the jury general information that may be useful to
 the jury in making the credibility determinations, such as character evidence or tools related
 to the assessment of credibility.
 Character Evidence Related to General Credibility
 A person designated as a character witness may provide opinion or reputation
 evidence about the general credibility of another witness. See Maryland Rule 5-608.
 Under that rule, a person who knows the witness or the witness’ reputation may testify that
 the witness has a reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness or that, in the person’s
 opinion, the witness is a truthful or an untruthful person. Id.
 There is no contention here that this rule would apply to the testimony provided by
 Ms. Drum. First, to come within Rule 5-608, there must be a basis for the character
 witness’ opinion or knowledge – i.e., the character witness must establish past knowledge
 of the witness or the witness’ reputation. In this case, Ms. Drum explicitly disclaimed any
 prior familiarity with S. Indeed, she indicated that it would have been unethical for her to
 have conducted a forensic interview with a child that she knew prior to the interview.
 Second, a character witness does not express an opinion on specific testimony or
 statements of a witness that are at issue at trial – i.e. whether they are true or false,
 straightforward or fabricated. Rather, the character witness testifies as to the general
 reputation or propensity of the witness to tell the truth. It becomes another factor that the
 jury can consider in carrying out its role to assess the credibility of the statements made by
 28
 the witnesses who appear before it. By contrast, in this case, Ms. Drum had nothing to say
 about S’s general character or propensity to tell the truth. Rather, she expressed an opinion
 as to whether S showed signs of fabrication in making the out-of-court statements that were
 admitted in evidence under the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule and that went
 directly to the issues before the jury.
 Other Tools for Assessing Credibility Generally
 There may also be circumstances, as exemplified in Yount, where expert testimony
 concerning particular categories of witnesses, such as child witnesses or abuse victims,
 may be helpful to a jury. As described earlier, the State presented expert testimony in that
 case concerning the frequency with which victims of sexual assaults recant reports of
 assaults. Unlike this case, the expert in Yount did not provide any opinion specific to the
 complainant in that case or the charges at issue in the trial. It was left to the jury in Yount
 to decide whether and how to apply the information concerning recantations should affect
 their evaluation of the testimony of the complaining witness. By contrast, in this case, Ms.
 Drum did not so much advise the jury on how to assess a witness for signs of fabrication
 as provide her own conclusions on the credibility of the primary prosecution witness. In
 reversing a conviction based on similar expert testimony, the Ninth Circuit emphasized this
 distinction:
 The testimony of the experts in this case was not limited to
 references to psychological literature or experience or to a discussion
 of a class of victims generally. Rather the experts testified that these
 particular children in this particular case could be believed.
 United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985).
 29
 This case would be closer to Yount if a witness such as Ms. Drum had simply
 provided the jury with expert information on some signs of fabrication or coaching they
 might look for and if the jury was able to use that information as it chose in forming its
 own judgment as to the credibility of S. However, the jury had no basis for applying the
 signs of fabrication identified by Ms. Drum to the out-of-court statements that Ms. Drum
 reported and therefore no basis for assessing the accuracy of Ms. Drum’s opinion whether
 S showed such signs. No tapes or even transcripts of the interviews of S by Ms. Drum
 were before the jury.11 In response to questions concerning what S said during their
 interviews, Ms. Drum frequently confessed to a lack of recollection and had to consult her
 notes – by our count, at least 16 times over the course of her testimony. This no doubt was
 an effort on her part to be as accurate as possible in responding to those questions.
 However, it may be questioned how Ms. Drum, who understandably could not remember
 what S said during interviews that had taken place in August 2012 – more than three and a
 half years before her testimony at the trial – could nevertheless remember important details
 as to how S said what she said – e.g., whether she repeated the “exact same phrase” or used
 “grown up” language.
 11
 Ms. Drum’s sessions with S had been audio and video recorded. However, the
 recordings were not produced at trial, despite being subpoenaed by the defense. At the
 request of the defense, the court included a missing evidence instruction in its final charge
 to the jury.
 30
 Expert Opinion About a Witness’ Credibility in the Particular Case
 The testimony at issue in this case appears to be indistinguishable from that which
 this Court found impermissible in Bohnert and Hutton. Ms. Drum testified that she
 concluded, based on her training and expertise, that there were no “signs” of fabrication or
 coaching in S’s out-of-court statements to her. As a result, she had no “concerns” about
 fabrication by S or coaching by someone else. The inevitable conclusion from that
 testimony, which the prosecutor asked her to draw explicitly, was that S’s statements
 concerning touching incidents by Mr. Fallin were not “incorrect” ‒ i.e., true. That
 testimony was no less problematic than the social worker’s testimony in Hutton that she
 found the victim’s statements credible because of their consistency, the psychologist’s
 opinion in that case that the representations of the victim to her were “not in any way
 faked,” or the social worker’s testimony in Bohnert that she had concluded that the alleged
 victim had suffered abuse.
 The State argues that Ms. Drum’s testimony is distinguishable from that of the social
 worker in Bohnert on the ground that Ms. Drum was providing the jury with information
 about objective tests – i.e., particular signs of fabrication – rather than a general conclusion
 about the alleged victim’s credibility. In the State’s view, Ms. Drum was merely providing
 a tool to the jury to use in its own assessment of S’s out-of-court statements.
 As explained above, it is not clear how the jury was supposed to apply this
 information itself to the out-of-court statements. Moreover, the distinction advanced by
 the State is difficult to discern. As one court has observed, the “subtle distinction between
 an expert’s testimony that a child has or has not been coached versus an expert’s testimony
 31
 that the child did or did not exhibit any signs or indicators of coaching is insufficient to
 guard against the dangers that such testimony will constitute impermissible vouching.”
 Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 991-92 (Ind. S. Ct. 2015) (emphasis in original).12
 In this regard, it is instructive to compare the evidence derived from a polygraph
 examination to the testimony given in this case. Evidence derived from a polygraph
 examination – i.e., a lie detector test – is widely held to be inadmissible in evidence, in part
 because it amounts to expert opinion testimony on whether a witness is telling the truth or
 fabricating. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-14 (1998); A. Shniderman,
 You Can’t Handle the Truth: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence,
 22 Albany L. J. Sci. & Tech. 433, 434 (2012).
 A polygraph machine precisely measures certain physical characteristics of a person
 – blood pressure, pulse, respiration rate, and galvanic skin resistance – while the person is
 12
 The State points out that some jurisdictions permit testimony about whether a
 victim exhibited “indications of coaching” after a defendant “opens the door” by
 contending that the alleged victim was coached to accuse the defendant. See Sampson,
 supra, 38 N.E.3d at 991. We agree that otherwise inadmissible testimony may become
 relevant and admissible to respond to an issue introduced into a case by an opposing party.
 The State argues that the defense opened the door in this case in its cross-
 examination of Ms. Mohler concerning her interview of Mr. Fallin with his mother.
 However, in this case, the exception to the general rule does not apply for a couple of
 reasons. First, Ms. Mohler’s interview of Mr. Fallin and his mother concerning the trail
 incident took place in late 2014, more than two years after Ms. Drum’s sessions with S in
 2012 concerning a different allegation. Second, at the trial, Ms. Drum was asked not only
 about signs of “coaching” of S, but also about signs and concerns about fabrication by S
 generally, as well as whether S was “incorrect” in describing abuse by Mr. Fallin. If the
 exception is construed broadly to encompass any case in which the credibility of the
 complaining witness is an issue, the exception will swallow the Bohnert rule.
 32
 answering questions posed by the polygraph examiner. P. Gianelli, Polygraph Evidence:
 Post Daubert, 49 Hastings L.J. 895, 903-6 (1998). The machine produces a detailed report
 of those measurements that can be correlated to specific answers given by the person. The
 polygraph examiner reviews that report to determine whether that data “indicates
 deception” by the person in the answers to particular questions. Id. at 905.
 In the trial of this case, Ms. Drum testified that she looked for certain “signs of
 fabrication” – the volunteering of information, repetition of the “exact same phrase,” use
 of “too grown up language” – as she questioned S. Much as a polygraph examiner
 considers the readings from the machine’s instruments to determine whether there were
 indications of “deception,” Ms. Drum considered the form and content of S’s answers for
 indications of “fabrication.” Ms. Drum’s testimony in that regard was thus essentially
 identical to the testimony a polygraph examiner would give, except based on less precise
 and more subjective data.13 While Ms. Drum may not quite have purported to function
 herself as a “human lie detector” (as defense counsel suggested at trial), her testimony was
 indistinguishable from that of a person who operates a lie detector and reports the results.
 The State also draws a comparison to Brooks v. State, 439 Md. 698 (2014). That
 case concerned a violent sexual assault against an adult woman. At the trial of that case, a
 SAFE nurse detailed her various findings from a forensic physical examination of the
 13
 A polygraph examination may be open to criticism that it is ultimately based on
 the subjective judgment of the particular examiner who determines the significance of the
 data collected by the machine. See P. Gianelli, supra, 49 Hastings L.J. at 905 (stating that
 “[t]he examiner’s role cannot be overstated” and acknowledging that examiners may lack
 adequate training).
 33
 victim. At the conclusion of that testimony, the prosecutor posed a binary question to the
 nurse: were her findings “consistent or inconsistent” with a sexual assault? The nurse
 responded that her findings would “verify” that the victim had been sexually assaulted.
 This Court held that, while the nurse had perhaps made a poor choice of a synonym, in
 context it was clear that she was affirming that her findings were “consistent” with a sexual
 assault and not opining on the veracity of another witness. Moreover, the Court noted that
 any error would be harmless as there was hardly a need for an expert opinion to establish
 that severe injuries suffered by the victim in that case would be consistent with a sexual
 assault.
 Testimony similar to that of the SAFE nurse in Brooks was admitted without
 objection in this case. As described above, a forensic nurse examiner testified that the
 results of her physical examination of S could be consistent with abuse that consisted of
 genital touching. By contrast, unlike the nurse in this case or in Brooks, Ms. Drum did not
 provide any objective data, but rather just stated her conclusion as to whether S was being
 deceptive.
 Summary
 We are reluctant to abandon the general rule that one witness may not opine on the
 credibility of another witness’ testimony in a case. While the issue arises here in the
 context of an out-of-court statement of a child witness, the rationale for permitting it could
 easily apply to in-court testimony and to adult witnesses. Once that door is opened, it is
 not hard to imagine that the defense will wish to present an opposing expert who discerns
 signs of fabrication where the prosecution’s expert did not. The principle that our system
 34
 relies on the common sense of jurors to make these difficult credibility judgments will be
 lost to a battle of experts.
 III
 Conclusion
 This was a difficult case for the prosecution. The record shows that the case was
 prosecuted zealously, as should any case involving an alleged crime against a child, and
 defended zealously, as our system of justice requires.
 It was also evidently a difficult case for a jury. The jury in the first trial could not
 reach a verdict on any of the charges. The jury in the second trial at first indicated that it
 was hung, but ultimately reached a guilty verdict on three counts of the indictment, all
 related to the only incident for which there was evidence other than S’s statements – the
 dream that Mr. Fallin reported to his therapist two years later.
 In its effort to support the testimony of its main – and essentially only – witness, the
 prosecution elicited what amounted to an endorsement of the credibility of an out-of-court
 statement by that witness that the jury did not see and could not evaluate for itself. It
 consisted of the expert opinion of Ms. Drum that there were no “signs” – and no need for
 “concern” – that the out-of-court statement was fabricated or coached. That testimony
 crossed the line that this Court drew in Bohnert and Hutton. We must reverse and remand
 for a new trial.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE
 REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF
 THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AND REMAND THE
 CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
 CHARLES COUNTY.
 35
 Circuit Court for Charles County
 Case No. 08-K-15-000610
 Argued: June 1, 2018
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 79
 September Term, 2017
 ______________________________________
 JASON ADAM FALLIN
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Watts,
 J., which Getty, J., joins.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: July 12, 2018
 Respectfully, I concur that the issue as to expert witness testimony is preserved; I
 dissent as to the merits. Over the past several years, society has become more aware of the
 pervasiveness of child sexual assault and abuse. One of the hallmark defenses in child
 sexual abuse cases is attacking the credibility of the child victim. This case presents the
 question of whether an expert witness who has evaluated an alleged victim of child sexual
 abuse may testify as to whether the alleged victim showed specified signs of fabrication or
 coaching. I would hold that an expert in an appropriate field may testify as to whether he
 or she saw any signs of fabrication or coaching on the part of an alleged victim of child
 sexual abuse.
 Such testimony is not inconsistent with the prohibition on a witness opining that
 another witness was credible. This is because such testimony does not constitute an
 opinion that the alleged victim was sexually abused, or that the alleged victim is testifying
 truthfully. Where an expert testifies that he or she did not observe any signs of fabrication
 or coaching on an alleged victim’s part, the expert does not offer the opinion that, in fact,
 the alleged victim is testifying credibly. Instead, the expert simply testifies that he or she
 did or did not detect any indications of fabrication or coaching. This testimony allows for
 the determination by the trier of fact that the alleged victim was not testifying credibly, but
 did not show signs of fabrication or coaching that the expert detected. The expert’s
 testimony does not invade the province of the jury, which remains free to assess the alleged
 victim’s credibility and find whether the defendant sexually abused the alleged victim.
 The Majority reasons that “[t]he testimony at issue in this case appears to be
 indistinguishable from that which this Court found impermissible in” Bohnert v. State, 312
 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988) and Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995).
 Maj. Slip Op. at 31. I disagree. Bohnert and Hutton are easily distinguishable. In Bohnert,
 312 Md. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663, this Court held that a trial court erred in allowing a
 social worker to opine that an alleged victim was sexually abused. In Hutton, 339 Md. at
 504-05, 485, 663 A.2d at 1301, 1291, this Court concluded that a trial court erred in
 allowing a psychologist to testify that an alleged victim had been sexually abused, and in
 allowing a social worker to testify that child sexual abuse had caused the alleged victim to
 suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. Critically, in Bohnert and Hutton, this Court
 explained that the testimony was impermissible because it essentially constituted an
 opinion that the alleged victim was credible.
 In contrast to the impermissible testimony in Bohnert and Hutton, an expert’s
 testimony about an alleged victim’s lack of signs of fabrication or coaching does not
 constitute an opinion that the alleged victim was credible, or that the alleged victim was
 sexually abused. With the testimony at issue, the expert applies methodology that the
 expert has been trained to use, and gives an opinion as to whether any signs of fabrication
 or coaching are present. The expert would be subject to cross-examination. Even if
 believed, an expert’s testimony about an alleged victim’s lack of signs of fabrication or
 coaching would not conclusively demonstrate that, in fact, the alleged victim was credible.
 As the Majority recognizes, the Court of Special Appeals’s holding in Yount v.
 State, 99 Md. App. 207, 636 A.2d 50, cert. denied, 335 Md. 82, 642 A.2d 193 (1994) is not
 instructive in this case. See Maj. Slip Op. at 7-8, 29-30. In Yount, 99 Md. App. at 218,
 210-11, 636 A.2d at 55, 51-52, the Court of Special Appeals held a trial court did not err
 -2-
 in allowing a child therapist to testify that it would be normal for a minor to recant a report
 of sexual abuse under certain circumstances. This case, of course, does not involve an
 alleged victim’s recantation. In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals asserted that
 Yount “clarifies and narrows” Bohnert. Jason Adam Fallin v. State, No. 1083, Sept. Term,
 2016, 2017 WL 4570680, at *10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 13, 2017), cert. granted, 457
 Md. 396, 178 A.3d 1241 (2018). Clearly, an opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
 cannot “narrow” an opinion of this Court. More importantly, contrary to the Court of
 Special Appeals’s assertion in this case, in Yount, that Court did not purport to “narrow”
 this Court’s holding in Bohnert. Instead, in Yount, 99 Md. App. at 218, 636 A.2d at 55,
 the Court of Special Appeals distinguished Bohnert on the ground that, in Yount, the expert
 did not testify that the alleged victim’s version of events should be believed and that the
 defendant’s version should be disbelieved. Bohnert is simply distinguishable here, just as
 it was distinguishable under Yount’s circumstances.
 I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Meredith Drum’s “testimony was
 indistinguishable from that of a person who operates a lie detector and reports the results.”
 Maj. Slip Op. at 33. One of the reasons that lie detector test results are inadmissible is that
 they essentially constitute credibility determinations. See Bohnert, 312 Md. at 278, 539
 A.2d at 663; United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998). In contrast to a lie
 detector operator, Drum did not offer a credibility determination; instead, she identified
 specific signs of fabrication or coaching that she had been trained in her field of expertise
 to detect, and testified that she did not detect those signs while interviewing S.L.
 On a related note, the Majority’s discussion of Maryland Rule 5-608 is completely
 -3-
 inapplicable. See Maj. Slip Op. at 28-29. Maryland Rule 5-608 does not apply here
 because it pertains to witnesses who offer lay opinions of other persons’ character for
 truthfulness or untruthfulness. Drum was neither a character witness nor a lay witness; she
 was an expert in the fields of child abuse disclosure and clinical counseling in child abuse.
 Drum’s testimony was subject to Maryland Rule 5-702, which states in pertinent part:
 “Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court
 determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
 determine a fact in issue.” Comparing Drum’s testimony to the admissibility requirements
 of Maryland Rule 5-608 is of no utility.
 I would follow the lead of courts in other jurisdictions that have held that an expert’s
 testimony about a lack of signs of fabrication or coaching is admissible at a trial on child
 sexual abuse. For example, in State v. Wilson, 795 P.2d 336, 343-44 (Kan. 1990), the
 Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that a trial court did not err in allowing an expert’s
 testimony that certain circumstances—such as “vocabulary, sentence construction, [and]
 consistency over time”—were “unlikely . . . to happen in a child who’s coached.”
 (Emphasis omitted). In State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, 67 (Mont. 2013), the Supreme
 Court of Montana determined that a trial court did not err in allowing an expert to testify
 that she did not detect any indications of coaching while interviewing an alleged victim.
 In State v. Baymon, 446 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (N.C. 1994), where a defendant “attempted to leave
 the impression that the [alleged] victim had been coached[,]” the Supreme Court of North
 Carolina held that a trial court did not err in allowing an expert to testify “that she had not
 picked up on anything to suggest that someone had told the [alleged] victim what to say or
 -4-
 that the [alleged] victim had been coached.” In Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ind.
 2015), the Supreme Court of Indiana held that “testimony about the signs of coaching and
 whether a child exhibited such signs or has or has not been coached[ is admissible],
 provided the defendant has opened the door to such testimony” by calling the child’s
 credibility into question. (Footnote omitted). In State v. James W., 866 A.2d 719, 731-32
 (Conn. App. 2005), where a defendant attempted to impeach an alleged victim on the
 ground that she had been coached, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a trial court
 did not abuse its discretion in allowing an expert to testify that she did not observe signs of
 coaching while interviewing the alleged victim.
 I would hold that the Circuit Court for Charles County did not err in allowing
 Drum—a licensed graduate professional counselor whom the circuit court admitted as an
 expert in the fields of child abuse disclosure and clinical counseling in child abuse—to
 testify that she did not see any signs of fabrication or coaching on the part of the alleged
 victim, S.L. Drum’s testimony did not constitute an opinion that S.L. had, in fact, been
 sexually abused. And, Drum did not testify that she believed S.L., or that S.L. was credible.
 Drum’s testimony did not invade the jury’s province, and was wholly consistent with
 Bohnert and Hutton.
 Drum based her testimony on the extended forensic evaluation training that she
 received at the National Children’s Advocacy Center in Alabama. Drum testified that,
 during that training, she learned about signs of fabrication or coaching. Drum explained
 that such signs include a child alleging abuse “out of nowhere[,]” “using the exact same
 phrase repeatedly[,]” and “using developmentally inappropriate language”—i.e., “using
 -5-
 too[-]grown[-]up language[.]” Drum did not render an opinion about S.L.’s credibility;
 instead, she measured S.L.’s behaviors against specific factors and testified that none of
 those factors were present. In other cases, the expert’s testimony may be the opposite, i.e.,
 that signs of fabrication or coaching are present. Under either circumstance, the ultimate
 issue of whether child sexual abuse occurred, or whether the witness is credible, remains
 an issue for the jury to decide.
 I fear that the majority opinion deprives juries of admissible evidence regarding the
 circumstances of an expert’s interview of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse, a crime
 that is all too prevalent and repugnant in our society, and in which the credibility of children
 is routinely attacked.
 For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur and dissent.
 Judge Getty has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.
 -6-


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 |
 52011PC0819
 Pasiūlymas EUROPOS PARLAMENTO IR TARYBOS REGLAMENTAS dėl valstybių narių, kurios turi didelių finansinio stabilumo euro zonoje sunkumų arba kurioms tokie sunkumai gresia, ekonominės ir biudžeto priežiūros griežtinimo /* KOM/2011/0819 galutinis - 2011/0385 (COD) */
 2011/0385 (COD)
 Pasiūlymas
 EUROPOS PARLAMENTO IR TARYBOS REGLAMENTAS
 dėl valstybių narių, kurios
 turi didelių finansinio stabilumo euro zonoje sunkumų arba kurioms
 tokie sunkumai gresia, ekonominės ir biudžeto priežiūros griežtinimo
 EUROPOS PARLAMENTAS IR EUROPOS
 SĄJUNGOS TARYBA,
 atsižvelgdami į Sutartį dėl
 Europos Sąjungos veikimo, ypač į jos 136 straipsnį
 kartu su 121 straipsnio 6 dalimi,
 atsižvelgdami į Europos Komisijos
 pasiūlymą,
 atsižvelgdami į Europos Centrinio Banko
 nuomonę,
 teisės akto pasiūlymą perdavus
 nacionaliniams parlamentams,
 laikydamiesi įprastos
 teisėkūros procedūros,
 kadangi:
 (1)
 precedento neturinti pasaulinė krizė,
 apėmusi pasaulį pastaruosius trejus metus, labai pakenkė
 ekonomikos augimui ir finansiniam stabilumui ir sukėlė didelį
 valstybių narių valdžios sektoriaus deficito ir skolos
 būklės pablogėjimą, priversdama kai kurias iš jų
 kreiptis finansinės pagalbos už Sąjungos sistemos ribų;
 (2)
 visiškas Sutartimi sukurtos Sąjungos
 daugiašalės priežiūros sistemos ir galimų politikos
 sąlygų, susijusių su šia finansine pagalba, nuoseklumas
 turėtų būti įtvirtintas Sąjungos teisėje.
 Valstybių narių, kurių valiuta yra euro, ekonomikos ir
 finansų integracijai reikalinga griežtesnė priežiūra, kad
 būtų išvengta finansinio stabilumo sunkumų patiriančios valstybės
 narės užkrečiamojo poveikio likusioje euro zonos dalyje;
 (3)
 ekonominės ir fiskalinės priežiūros
 intensyvumas turėtų būti proporcingas patiriamų
 finansinių sunkumų dydžiui ir turėtų atitikti gautos
 finansinės pagalbos, kuri gali būti skirtinga – nuo tiesiog
 prevencinės paramos, grindžiamos reikalavimų atitikimo
 sąlygomis, iki išsamios makroekonominio koregavimo programos,
 apimančios griežtas politikos sąlygas, pobūdį;
 (4)
 jei valstybė narė, kurios valiuta yra
 euro, patiria arba rizikuoja patirti rimtų finansinių sutrikimų,
 jai turėtų būti taikoma griežtesnė priežiūra, siekiant
 užtikrinti greitą jos normalios būklės atkūrimą ir
 apsaugoti kitas euro zonos valstybes nares nuo galimo neigiamo šalutinio
 poveikio. Ši griežtesnė priežiūra turėtų apimti
 geresnę prieigą prie informacijos, reikalingos ekonominei, fiskalinei
 ir finansinei situacijai įdėmiai stebėti, ir reguliarų
 ataskaitų teikimą Ekonomikos ir finansų komitetui (EFK) arba
 kuriam nors pakomitečiui, kurį pastarasis gali nurodyti tuo tikslu.
 Tos pačios priežiūros sąlygos turėtų būti
 taikomos valstybėms narėms, prašančioms prevencinės
 pagalbos iš Europos finansinio stabilumo fondo (EFSF), Europos stabilumo
 mechanizmo (ESM), Tarptautinio valiutos fondo (TVF) ar kitos tarptautinės
 finansų institucijos;
 (5)
 valstybių narių, kurioms taikoma
 makroekonominio koregavimo programa, ekonominės ir fiskalinės
 situacijos priežiūra turėtų būti labai sugriežtinta.
 Dėl visapusiško tokios programos pobūdžio kiti ekonominės ir
 fiskalinės priežiūros procesai turėtų būti sustabdyti,
 kol vykdoma makroekonominio koregavimo programa, siekiant išvengti
 ataskaitų teikimo prievolės dubliavimo;
 (6)
 turėtų būti nustatytos
 taisyklės, skirtos stiprinti dialogą tarp Sąjungos
 institucijų, visų pirma, Europos Parlamento, Tarybos ir Komisijos, ir
 užtikrinti didesnį skaidrumą ir atskaitomybę;
 (7)
 priėmus sprendimą dėl valstybės
 narės koregavimo programos nesilaikymo taip pat bus sustabdyti
 Sąjungos fondų mokėjimai ar įsipareigojimai, kaip numatyta
 Reglamento (ES) Nr. XXX, kuriuo nustatomos Europos regioninės plėtros
 fondui, Europos socialiniam fondui, Sanglaudos fondui, Europos žemės
 ūkio fondui kaimo plėtrai ir Europos jūros reikalų ir
 žuvininkystės fondui, kurių veiklos gairės pateiktos Bendroje
 strateginėje programoje, bendros nuostatos ir Europos regioninės
 plėtros fondui, Europos socialiniam fondui ir Sanglaudos fondui taikytinos
 bendrosios nuostatos, ir panaikinamas Reglamentas (EB) Nr. 1083/2006, 21
 straipsnio 6 dalyje,
 PRIĖMĖ
 ŠĮ REGLAMENTĄ:
 1 straipsnis
 Dalykas ir taikymo sritis
 1. Šiuo reglamentu nustatomos
 valstybių narių, kurios turi didelių finansinio stabilumo
 sunkumų arba kurioms tokie sunkumai gresia ir (arba) kurios gauna arba
 gali gauti finansinę pagalbą iš vienos ar kelių kitų
 valstybių, Europos finansinio stabilumo fondo (EFSF), Europos finansinės
 padėties stabilizavimo priemonės (EFSM), Europos stabilumo mechanizmo
 (ESM) ar kitų tarptautinių finansų institucijų (IFI), kaip
 antai Tarptautinio valiutos fondo (TVF), ekonominės ir biudžeto priežiūros
 griežtinimo nuostatos.
 2. Šis reglamentas taikomas
 valstybėms narėms, kurių valiuta yra euro.
 2 straipsnis
 Valstybės narės, kurioms taikoma griežtesnė priežiūra
 1. Komisija gali nuspręsti
 valstybei narei, turinčiai didelių finansinio stabilumo sunkumų,
 taikyti griežtesnę priežiūrą. Tokiai valstybei narei suteikiama
 galimybė iš anksto pareikšti savo nuomonę. Kas šešis mėnesius
 Komisija sprendžia, ar reikia toliau taikyti griežtesnę
 priežiūrą.
 2. Komisija sprendžia, ar
 valstybei narei, kuri prevenciškai gauna finansinę pagalbą iš vienos
 ar kelių kitų valstybių, EFSF, ESM ar kitos tarptautinės
 finansų institucijos, kaip antai TVF, taikyti griežtesnę
 priežiūrą. Komisija sudaro atitinkamų prevencinių
 finansinės pagalbos priemonių sąrašą ir nuolat jį
 atnaujina, atsižvelgdama į galimus EFSF, ESM ar kitos susijusios
 tarptautinės finansų institucijos finansinės paramos politikos
 pasikeitimus.
 3. 2 dalis netaikoma valstybei
 narei, prevenciškai gaunančiai finansinę pagalbą kredito linijos
 forma, kuri nepriklauso nuo to, ar atitinkama valstybė narė
 priėmė naujas politikos priemones, jei kredito linija
 nepasinaudojama.
 3 straipsnis
 Griežtesnė priežiūra
 1. Valstybė narė,
 kuriai taikoma griežtesnė priežiūra, konsultuodamasi ir
 bendradarbiaudama su Komisija, veikiančia kartu su Europos Centriniu Banku
 (ECB), imasi priemonių, skirtų sunkumų priežastims arba galimoms
 priežastims šalinti.
 2. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos
 reglamento (ES) Nr. XXX 7 straipsnio 2, 3 ir 6 dalyse numatyta atidesnė
 fiskalinės situacijos stebėsena taikoma valstybei narei, kuriai
 taikoma griežtesnė priežiūra, nepriklausomai nuo perviršinio deficito
 egzistavimo. Ataskaita pagal šio straipsnio 3 dalį pateikiama kas
 ketvirtį.
 3. Komisijai paprašius,
 valstybė narė, kuriai taikoma griežtesnė priežiūra:
 (a)
 nustatytu dažnumu pateikia Komisijai, ECB ir Europos
 bankininkystės institucijai (EBI) išskaidytą informaciją apie
 finansų įstaigų, kurias prižiūri nacionalinės
 priežiūros institucijos, finansinę situaciją;
 (b)
 Europos bankininkystės institucijos
 prižiūrima vykdo testavimą nepalankiausiomis sąlygomis arba jautrumo
 analizę, kai reikia įvertinti bankų sektoriaus atsparumą
 įvairiems makroekonominiams ir finansiniams sukrėtimams, kaip
 nurodyta Komisijos ir ECB, ir pasidalija su jomis išsamiais rezultatais;
 (c)
 dalyvauja reguliariuose jos bankų sektoriaus
 priežiūros gebėjimų vertinimuose, atliekamuose per specialų
 EBI vykdomą tarpusavio vertinimą;
 (d)
 teikia visą informaciją, reikalingą
 makroekonominiam disbalansui stebėti, kaip numatyta Europos Parlamento ir
 Tarybos reglamente Nr. XXX dėl makroekonominio disbalanso prevencijos ir
 naikinimo.
 4. Komisija kartu su ECB vykdo
 reguliarius išvykstamuosius patikrinimus valstybėje narėje, kuriai
 taikoma priežiūra, siekdama patikrinti, kokia pažanga padaryta
 įgyvendinant 1, 2 ir 3 dalyse nurodytas priemones. Kiekvieną
 ketvirtį ji teikia savo išvadas Ekonomikos ir finansų komitetui (EFK)
 – arba kuriam nors pakomitečiui, kurį pastarasis gali nurodyti tuo
 tikslu – ir įvertina, ar reikalingos tolesnės priemonės. Šie
 išvykstamieji patikrinimai pakeičia Reglamento (EB) 1467/97 10a straipsnio
 2 dalyje numatytą stebėseną vietoje.
 5. Kai nusprendžiama – remiantis
 4 dalyje numatytu įvertinimu – kad reikalingos tolesnės
 priemonės ir kad atitinkamos valstybės narės finansinė
 situacija turi didelį neigiamą poveikį euro zonos finansiniam
 stabilumui, Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos pasiūlymu kvalifikuota balsų
 dauguma gali rekomenduoti atitinkamai valstybei narei kreiptis finansinės
 pagalbos ir parengti makroekonominio koregavimo programą. Taryba gali
 nuspręsti šią rekomendaciją paskelbti viešai.
 6. Kai rekomendacija pagal 5
 dalį paskelbiama viešai:
 (a)
 atitinkamas Europos Parlamento komitetas gali
 pakviesti atitinkamos valstybės narės atstovus pasikeisti
 nuomonėmis;
 (b)
 atitinkamos valstybės narės parlamentas
 gali pakviesti Komisijos atstovus pasikeisti nuomonėmis.
 4 straipsnis
 Informacija apie numatomus finansinės pagalbos prašymus
 Valstybė
 narė, norinti gauti finansinę pagalbą iš vienos ar kelių
 kitų valstybių, EFSF, ESM, Tarptautinio valiutos fondo (TVF) ar kitos
 institucijos, nepriklausančios Sąjungos sistemai, nedelsdama apie
 savo ketinimus informuoja Tarybą, Komisiją ir ECB. Gavęs
 Komisijos įvertinimą, EFK arba kuris nors pakomitetis, kurį
 pastarasis gali nurodyti tuo tikslu, surengia šio numatomo prašymo
 aptarimą.
 5 straipsnis
 Valstybės skolos tvarumo įvertinimas
 Kai finansinės
 pagalbos kreipiamasi į EFSF ar ESM, Komisija – kartu su ECB ir, kai
 įmanoma, TVF – parengia atitinkamos valstybės narės
 valstybės skolos tvarumo, taip pat valstybės narės gebėjimo
 grąžinti numatomą finansinę pagalbą analizę ir
 perduoda ją EFK arba kuriam nors pakomitečiui, kurį pastarasis
 gali nurodyti tuo tikslu.
 6 straipsnis
 Makroekonominio koregavimo programa
 1. Valstybė narė,
 gaunanti finansinę pagalbą iš vienos ar kelių kitų
 valstybių, IMF, EFSF ar ESM, Komisijos, veikiančios kartu su ECB,
 pritarimu parengia koregavimo programos, skirtos patikimai ir tvariai
 ekonominei ir finansinei situacijai ir jos gebėjimui finansuoti visus savo
 poreikius finansų rinkose atkurti, projektą. Koregavimo programos
 projekte atsižvelgiama į esamas rekomendacijas, skirtas atitinkamai
 valstybei narei pagal Sutarties 121, 126 ir (arba) 148 straipsnius – ir į
 jos veiksmus jas įgyvendinant – kartu siekiant plėsti, stiprinti ir
 gilinti reikalingas politikos priemones.
 2. Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos
 pasiūlymu, kvalifikuota balsų dauguma tvirtina koregavimo
 programą.
 3. Komisija kartu su ECB stebi
 pažangą, padarytą įgyvendinant koregavimo programą, ir kas
 tris mėnesius informuoja EFK ar kurį nors pakomitetį, kurį
 pastarasis gali nurodyti tuo tikslu. Atitinkama valstybė narė visapusiškai
 bendradarbiauja su Komisija. Visų pirma, ji pateikia Komisijai visą
 informaciją, kurią pastaroji laiko būtina programai
 stebėti. Taikoma 3 straipsnio 3 dalis.
 4. Komisija, bendradarbiaudama
 su ECB, kartu su atitinkama valstybe nare analizuoja, kokie jos koregavimo
 programos pakeitimai gali būti reikalingi. Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos
 pasiūlymu, kvalifikuota balsų dauguma priima sprendimą dėl
 koregavimo programos pakeitimų.
 5. Jeigu vykdant 3 dalyje
 nurodytą stebėseną nustatomi dideli nukrypimai nuo
 makroekonominio koregavimo programos, Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos
 pasiūlymu, kvalifikuota balsų dauguma gali nuspręsti, kad
 atitinkama valstybė narė nevykdo koregavimo programoje nustatytų
 politikos reikalavimų.
 6. Jei valstybė narė,
 kuriai taikoma koregavimo programa, turi nepakankamai administracinių
 pajėgumų arba patiria didelių problemų įgyvendindama
 savo koregavimo programą, ji kreipiasi techninės pagalbos į
 Komisiją.
 7. Atitinkamas Europos
 Parlamento komitetas gali pakviesti atitinkamos valstybės narės
 atstovus pasikeisti nuomonėmis apie pažangą, padarytą
 įgyvendinant koregavimo programą.
 8. Atitinkamos valstybės
 narės parlamentas gali pakviesti Komisijos atstovus pasikeisti
 nuomonėmis apie pažangą, padarytą įgyvendinant koregavimo
 programą.
 7 straipsnis
 Perviršinio deficito procedūros atitikimas
 1. Laikoma, kad koregavimo
 programa ir jos pakeitimai, numatyti šio reglamento 6 straipsnyje,
 pakeičia Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1466/97 4 straipsnyje numatytas
 stabilumo programas.
 2. Jei atitinkamai valstybei
 narei yra pateikta rekomendacija pagal Sutarties 126 straipsnio 7 dalį
 arba įspėjimas pagal Sutarties 126 straipsnio 9 dalį dėl
 perviršinio deficito padėties ištaisymo:
 (a)
 laikoma, kad šio reglamento 6 straipsnyje numatyta
 koregavimo programa taip pat atitinkamai pakeičia Tarybos reglamento (EB)
 Nr. 1467/97 3 straipsnio 4a dalyje ir 5 straipsnio 1a dalyje numatytas
 ataskaitas;
 (b)
 laikoma, kad minėtoje rekomendacijoje ir
 įspėjime metiniai biudžeto tikslai koregavimo programoje, numatytoje
 šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 3 dalyje, atitinkamai pakeičia metinius biudžeto
 tikslus, numatytus pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1467/97 3 straipsnio 4 dalį
 ir 5 straipsnio 1 dalį. Jei atitinkamai valstybei narei yra pateiktas
 įspėjimas pagal Sutarties 126 straipsnio 9 dalį, laikoma, kad
 šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 3 dalyje numatyta koregavimo programa taip pat
 pakeičia nurodymus dėl priemonių, kuriomis siekiama
 įspėjime pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1467/97 5 straipsnio 1 dalį
 numatytų tikslų;
 (c)
 laikoma, kad šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 3 dalyje
 numatyta stebėsena pakeičia stebėseną, numatytą
 Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1467/97 10 straipsnio 1 dalyje ir 10a straipsnyje,
 ir stebėseną, kuria grindžiamas bet koks sprendimas, numatytas
 Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1467/97 4 straipsnio 2 dalyje ir 6 straipsnio 2 dalyje.
 8 straipsnis
 Perviršinio disbalanso procedūros atitikimas
 Tose
 valstybėse narėse, kurioms taikoma makroekonominio koregavimo
 programa, patvirtinta Tarybos pagal šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 2 dalį,
 Reglamento (ES) Nr. XXX dėl makroekonominio disbalanso prevencijos ir
 naikinimo įgyvendinimas sustabdomas. Sustabdymas galioja visą
 makroekonominio koregavimo programos laikotarpį.
 9 straipsnis
 Europos ekonominės politikos koordinavimo semestro atitikimas
 Laikoma, kad šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 3
 dalyje numatyta stebėsena pakeičia Europos ekonominės politikos
 koordinavimo semestro stebėseną ir vertinimą, numatytus
 Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1466/97 dėl biudžeto būklės priežiūros
 stiprinimo ir ekonominės politikos priežiūros bei koordinavimo 2a
 straipsnyje.
 10 straipsnis
 Reglamento (ES) Nr. XXX dėl euro zonos valstybių narių biudžeto
 planų projektų stebėsenos ir vertinimo ir perviršinio deficito
 padėties ištaisymo užtikrinimo bendrųjų nuostatų atitikimas
 Reglamento (ES)
 Nr. XXX dėl biudžeto planų projektų stebėsenos ir vertinimo
 ir euro zonos valstybių narių perviršinio deficito padėties
 ištaisymo užtikrinimo bendrųjų nuostatų įgyvendinimas
 sustabdomas tose valstybėse narėse, kurioms taikoma makroekonominio
 koregavimo programa, patvirtinta Tarybos pagal šio reglamento 6 straipsnio 2
 dalį. Sustabdymas galioja visą makroekonominio koregavimo programos
 laikotarpį.
 11 straipsnis
 Priežiūra po programos įgyvendinimo
 1. Valstybei narei bus taikoma
 priežiūra po programos įgyvendinimo, kol bus grąžinta ne mažiau
 kaip 75 % finansinės pagalbos, gautos iš vienos arba kelių
 kitų valstybių narių, EFSM, EFSF ar ESM. Taryba, remdamasi
 Komisijos pasiūlymu, kvalifikuota balsų dauguma gali pratęsti po
 programos įgyvendinimo vykdomos priežiūros trukmę.
 2. Taikoma 3 straipsnio 3 dalis.
 Komisijos prašymu valstybė narė taip pat teikia informaciją,
 nurodytą Reglamento (ES) Nr. XXX dėl biudžeto planų
 projektų stebėsenos ir vertinimo ir euro zonos valstybių
 narių perviršinio deficito padėties ištaisymo užtikrinimo
 bendrųjų nuostatų 7 straipsnio 3 dalyje.
 3. Komisija kartu su ECB vykdo
 reguliarius išvykstamuosius patikrinimus valstybėje narėje, kuriai
 taikoma priežiūra po programos įgyvendinimo, siekdama įvertinti
 jos ekonominę, fiskalinę ir finansinę situaciją.
 Kiekvieną pusmetį ji pateikia savo išvadas EFK – arba kuriam nors
 pakomitečiui, kurį pastarasis gali nurodyti tuo tikslu – ir
 įvertina, ar reikalingos taisomosios priemonės.
 4. Taryba, remdamasi Komisijos
 pasiūlymu, kvalifikuota balsų dauguma gali rekomenduoti valstybei
 narei, kuriai taikoma priežiūra po programos įgyvendinimo, imtis
 taisomųjų priemonių.
 12 straipsnis
 Balsavimas Taryboje
 Dėl 2 straipsnio 1 dalyje, 3 straipsnyje,
 6 straipsnio 2 ir 4 dalyse ir 11 straipsnio 4 dalyje nurodytų
 priemonių balsuoja tik tie Tarybos nariai, kurie atstovauja
 valstybėms narėms, kurių valiuta yra euro, o Taryba
 sprendimą priima neatsižvelgdama į Tarybos nario, atstovaujančio
 atitinkamai valstybei narei, balsą.
 Pirmoje pastraipoje minėtų Tarybos
 narių kvalifikuota balsų dauguma apskaičiuojama pagal Sutarties 238
 straipsnio 3 dalies b punktą.
 13 straipsnis
 Pagalbos tipai ir paskolos, kurioms netaikomi 5 ir 6 straipsniai
 5 ir 6
 straipsnių nuostatos netaikomos prevenciškai teikiamai finansinei pagalbai
 ir paskoloms, skirtoms finansų įstaigų kapitalui atkurti.
 14 straipsnis
 Įsigaliojimas
 Šis reglamentas įsigalioja
 dvidešimtą dieną po jo paskelbimo Europos Sąjungos
 oficialiajame leidinyje.
 Šis reglamentas pagal Sutartis
 privalomas visas ir tiesiogiai taikomas valstybėse narėse.
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Europos Parlamento vardu Tarybos
 vardu
 Pirmininkas Pirmininkas


type: contracts

text:
 12.10.2017
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 L 263/18
 ROZHODNUTÍ SMÍŠENÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 306/2015
 ze dne 11. prosince 2015,
 kterým se mění příloha II (Technické předpisy, normy, zkoušení a certifikace) Dohody o EHP [2017/1817]
 SMÍŠENÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 s ohledem na Dohodu o Evropském hospodářském prostoru (dále jen „Dohoda o EHP“), a zejména na článek 98 této dohody,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1)
 Nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) č. 251/2014 ze dne 26. února 2014 o definici, popisu, obchodní úpravě, označování a ochraně zeměpisných označení aromatizovaných vinných výrobků a o zrušení nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 1601/91 (1) by mělo být začleněno do Dohody o EHP.
 (2)
 Nařízením (EU) č. 251/2014 se zrušuje nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 1601/91 (2), které je začleněno do Dohody o EHP, a to je proto třeba v Dohodě o EHP zrušit.
 (3)
 Toto rozhodnutí se týká právních předpisů vztahujících se na lihoviny. Jak je uvedeno v úvodu kapitoly XXVII přílohy II Dohody o EHP, právní předpisy vztahující se na lihoviny se nepoužijí na Lichtenštejnsko po celou dobu, po niž bude na Lichtenštejnsko rozšířena Dohoda mezi Evropským společenstvím a Švýcarskou konfederací o obchodu se zemědělskými produkty. Toto rozhodnutí se tedy nepoužije na Lichtenštejnsko.
 (4)
 Příloha II Dohody o EHP by proto měla být odpovídajícím způsobem změněna,
 PŘIJAL TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 Kapitola XXVII přílohy II Dohody o EHP se mění takto:
 1)
 Za bod 9a (prováděcí nařízení Komise (EU) č. 716/2013) se vkládá nový bod, který zní:
 „9b.
 32014 R 0251: nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) č. 251/2014 ze dne 26. února 2014 o definici, popisu, obchodní úpravě, označování a ochraně zeměpisných označení aromatizovaných vinných výrobků a o zrušení nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 1601/91 (Úř. věst. L 84, 20.3.2014, s. 14).
 Pro účely Dohody se nařízení upravuje takto:
 Dotčené státy ESVO se vyzývají, aby vyslaly své zástupce na zasedání Výboru pro aromatizované vinné výrobky, který je uveden v článku 34 a který se bude zabývat otázkami, jež jsou upraveny právními předpisy, na něž odkazuje Dohoda. Zástupci států ESVO se plně účastní práce výboru, avšak nemají hlasovací právo.“
 2)
 Znění bodu 3 (nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 1601/91) se zrušuje.
 Článek 2
 Znění nařízení (EU) č. 251/2014 v islandském a norském jazyce, která mají být zveřejněna v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie, jsou platná.
 Článek 3
 Toto rozhodnutí vstupuje v platnost dnem 12. prosince 2015 za předpokladu, že jsou učiněna veškerá oznámení podle čl. 103 odst. 1 Dohody o EHP (*1).
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí bude zveřejněno v oddíle EHP a v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie.
 V Bruselu dne 11. prosince 2015.
 Za Smíšený výbor EHP
 předsedkyně
 Oda SLETNES
 (1) Úř. věst. L 84, 20.3.2014, s. 14.
 (2) Úř. věst. L 149, 14.6.1991, s. 1.
 (*1) Nebyly oznámeny žádné ústavní požadavky.


text:
 Ważna informacja prawna
 |
 21999D0708(08)
 Dziennik Urzędowy L 172 , 08/07/1999 P. 0056 - 0056
 Decyzja Wspólnego Komitetu EOGnr 77/98z dnia 31 lipca 1998 r.zmieniająca protokół 21 do Porozumienia EOG w sprawie wdrażania zasad konkurencji mających zastosowanie do przedsiębiorstwWSPÓLNY KOMITET EOG,uwzględniając Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, dostosowane protokołem dostosowującym Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, zwane dalej Porozumieniem, w szczególności jego art. 98,a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:do Porozumienia włącza się rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 447/98 z dnia 1 marca 1998 r. w sprawie zgłoszeń, terminów i przesłuchań przewidzianych w rozporządzeniu Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw [1], zastępujące rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 3384/94 w sprawie zgłoszeń, terminów i przesłuchań przewidzianych w rozporządzeniu Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw [2];lista podana w art. 3 ust. 1 protokołu 21 do Porozumienia odzwierciedla ogólny stan prawa Wspólnoty w tym obszarze;protokół 21 do Porozumienia został zmieniony decyzją Wspólnego Komitetu EOG nr 27/98 z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. [3];do listy podanej w art. 3 ust. 1 protokołu 21 do Porozumienia włącza się rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 447/98,STANOWI, CO NASTĘPUJE:Artykuł 1"2. 398 R 0447: rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 447/98 z dnia 1 marca 1998 r. w sprawie zgłoszeń, terminów i przesłuchań przewidzianych w rozporządzeniu Rady (EWG) nr 4064/89 w sprawie kontroli koncentracji przedsiębiorstw."Artykuł 2Teksty rozporządzenia Komisji (EWG) nr 447/98 w języku islandzkim i norweskim, załączone do odpowiednich wersji językowych, są autentyczne.Artykuł 3Niniejsza decyzja wchodzi w życie z dniem 1 września 1998 r., pod warunkiem że wszystkie notyfikacje na mocy artykułu 103 ustęp 1 Porozumienia zostały dokonane wobec Wspólnego Komitetu EOG.Artykuł 4Niniejsza decyzja zostaje opublikowana w Sekcji EOG i w Suplemencie EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Wspólnot Europejskich.Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia 31 lipca 1998 r.W imieniu Wspólnego Komitetu EOGN. v. LiechtensteinPrzewodniczący[1] Dz.U. L 61 z 2.3.1998, str. 1.[2] Dz.U. L 377 z 31.12.1994, str. 1.[3] Dz.U. L 310 z 19.11.1998, str. 9.--------------------------------------------------