type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 11.3.2021.
 COM(2021) 116 final
 2021/0061(NLE)
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje u ime Europske unije treba zauzeti u Europskom odboru za izradu standardâ u području unutarnje plovidbe i u Središnjoj komisiji za plovidbu Rajnom o donošenju standardâ za usklađene riječne informacijske servise
 OBRAZLOŽENJE
 1.Predmet prijedloga
 Predmet je ovog prijedloga odluka o utvrđivanju stajališta koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u okviru Europskog odbora za izradu standardâ unutarnje plovidbe (CESNI) na sastanku 15. travnja 2021. i na plenarnoj sjednici Središnje komisije za plovidbu Rajnom (CCNR) 2. lipnja 2021. u vezi s predviđenim donošenjem europskog standarda za riječne informacijske servise (ES-RIS, izdanje 2021/1).
 2.Kontekst prijedloga
 2.1.CCNR i CESNI
 Središnja komisija za plovidbu Rajnom (CCNR) je međunarodna organizacija s regulatornim ovlastima u području prijevoza unutarnjim plovnim putovima Rajne. Četiri države članice EU-a (Belgija, Francuska, Njemačka i Nizozemska) te Švicarska članice su CCNR-a.
 U revidiranoj Konvenciji o plovidbi Rajnom potpisanoj 17. listopada 1868. u Mannheimu definira se pravni okvir za upotrebu Rajne kao unutarnjeg plovnog puta za plovidbu i utvrđuju nadležnosti CCNR-a. Konvencija koja se trenutačno primjenjuje temelji se na Konvenciji o izmjeni Revidirane konvencije o plovidbi Rajnom donesene 20. studenoga 1963., koja je stupila na snagu 14. travnja 1967. Plenarne sjednice održavaju se dvaput godišnje. Na njima sudjeluju predstavnici država članica CCNR-a. Plenarna sjednica tijelo je CCNR-a za donošenje odluka. Na njoj se donose rezolucije Središnje komisije. Svaka država ima jedan glas, a odlučuje se jednoglasno. Te su rezolucije pravno obvezujuće. EU nije član CCNR-a.
 CCNR je 2015. donio rezoluciju o osnivanju Europskog odbora za izradu standardâ unutarnje plovidbe („Comité Européen pour l’Élaboration de Standards dans le Domaine de Navigation Intérieure” – CESNI). Zadaci tog odbora uključuju donošenje tehničkih standarda u različitim područjima, posebno u pogledu plovila, informacijske tehnologije i posade, ujednačenog tumačenja tih standarda i odgovarajućih postupaka te razmatranja o sigurnosti plovidbe, zaštiti okoliša i drugim područjima povezanima s plovidbom.
 CESNI je sastavljen od stručnjaka koji predstavljaju države članice CCNR-a i čija su prava glasa ograničena na jedan glas za svaku državu. EU nije član CESNI-ja. Međutim, može sudjelovati u radu CESNI-ja, kao što to mogu i druge međunarodne organizacije čije se zadaće odnose na područja za koja je zadužen CESNI, ali bez prava glasa.
 2.2.Predviđeni akt CESNI-ja i CCNR-a
 Na sastanku koji će se održati 15. travnja 2021. CESNI treba donijeti prvo izdanje europskog standarda za riječne informacijske servise (ES-RIS, izdanje 2021/1).
 Stručnjaci CESNI-ja su tijekom 2019. i 2020. pripremili nacrt za ES-RIS 2021/1. To će biti prvo CESNI-jevo izdanje standarda za riječne informacijske servise i njime će se utvrditi osnova za buduće revizije ES-RIS-a. ES-RIS 2021/1 sadržava tehničke specifikacije u područjima uređenima Direktivom 2005/44/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 7. rujna 2005. o usklađenim riječnim informacijskim servisima (RIS) na unutarnjim vodnim putovima u Zajednici
 1
 i provedbene akte koje je Komisija donijela na temelju članka 5. te direktive. Tehničke specifikacije sadržane u provedbenim aktima temelje se na tehničkim načelima iz Priloga II. Direktivi 2005/44 i njima se uzima u obzir rad nadležnih međunarodnih organizacija u tom području (npr. CCNR, UNECE). U tom prvom izdanju ES-RIS-a nije bilo izmjena sadržaja tehničkih specifikacija. Relevantni standardi su u cijelosti navedeni u dijelovima i prilozima ES-RIS-a, a ne samo upućivanjem na dokumente koje je objavio UNECE. ES-RIS 2021/1 ujedno sadržava ispitni standard za unutarnju plovidbu AIS 2021/3.0, koji je CESNI donio 13. listopada 2020. i koji je predmet Odluke Vijeća (EU) 2020/1508
 2
 .
 ES-RIS 2021/1 obuhvaća sljedeće tehničke standarde za riječne informacijske servise:
 dio I.: standardni elektronički prikaz navigacijskih karata i informacijski sustav za unutarnju plovidbu,
 dio II.: standardno praćenje i određivanje položaja plovila za unutarnju plovidbu,
 dio III.: operativni i izvedbeni zahtjevi za brodsku opremu AIS-a unutarnje plovidbe, načini ispitivanja i zahtijevani rezultati ispitivanja (ispitni standard za unutarnju plovidbu AIS),
 dio IV.: standardno elektroničko izvješćivanje s brodova u unutarnjoj plovidbi,
 dio V.: standardne obavijesti kapetanima.
 ES-RIS će se redovito ažurirati imajući u vidu rad CESNI-jevih radnih skupina. Redovita ažuriranja ES-RIS-a potrebna su radi:
 –održavanja visokog stupnja sigurnosti unutarnje plovidbe,
 –praćenja tehničkog razvoja,
 –osiguravanja usklađenosti s pravnim okvirom EU-a i međunarodnim zahtjevima.
 Odbor CESNI-ja je na sastanku 13. listopada 2020. uvrstio donošenje standarda ES-RIS 2021/1 na dnevni red sastanka 15. travnja 2021. Prije tog sastanka 15. travnja 2021. očekuju se samo manje izmjene nacrta standarda. ES-RIS 2021/1 objavit će se na posebnoj internetskoj stranici (cesni.eu). Sve države članice EU-a imaju (zaštićeni) pristup prethodno navedenim nacrtima standarda.
 Tehničke specifikacije sadržane u standardu ES-RIS 2021/1 odgovaraju tehničkim specifikacijama koje su već donesene na temelju pravnog okvira Direktive 2005/44
 3
 .
 CCNR će donijeti rezoluciju o izmjeni pravilnika CCNR-a kako bi se uključilo upućivanje na standard ES-RIS 2021/1.
 Kako bi se osigurala usklađenost dvaju postojećih pravnih režima za usklađene riječne informacijske servise (standardi za plovidbu Rajnom i EU-ova pravila), primjereno je uskladiti relevantne standarde. Iako je relevantno zakonodavstvo EU-a već na snazi, pravilnici CCNR-a upućivat će na ES-RIS 2021/1 od 25. travnja 2022. Taj datum odgovara roku za primjenu Provedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2019/1744, zadnjeg provedbenog akta koji je trebao stupiti na snagu na temelju Direktive 2005/44. Time će se osigurati usklađivanje vremenskog rasporeda provedbe.
 3.Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije
 Stajalište Unije potrebno je s obzirom na to da se predmet predviđenih akata odnosi na područje koje je u isključivoj nadležnosti Unije i da je potrebno osigurati da se interesi EU-a na odgovarajući način uzmu u obzir pri donošenju odluka o utvrđivanju standarda za usklađene riječne informacijske servise (RIS). U skladu s člankom 3. stavkom 2. UFEU-a, Europska unija ima isključivu vanjsku nadležnost u područjima obuhvaćenima predmetnim standardima jer oni mogu utjecati na zajednička pravila EU-a. Države članice uspostavljaju riječne informacijske servise prema članku 4. Direktive 2005/44 u skladu s tehničkim specifikacijama iz provedbenih akata koje je Komisija donijela u skladu s člankom 5. te direktive. Sadržaj predmetnih nacrta standarda trebao bi biti u potpunosti usklađen sa standardima koji su trenutačno uvršteni u obvezujuće EU-ove tehničke specifikacije donesene na temelju Direktive 2005/44 i navedene u provedbenim uredbama (EU) br. 2018/2032, 2018/1973, 2019/838 i 2019/1744. Ti se standardi odnose na tehničke specifikacije za usklađene riječne informacijske servise koje bi s obzirom na uvodnu izjavu 3. Direktive 2005/44/EZ trebalo uzeti u obzir pri donošenju obvezujućih tehničkih specifikacija u skladu s člankom 5. te direktive.
 Stručnjaci CESNI-ja temeljito su pripremili izradu standarda ES-RIS. U tom je pogledu provedeno savjetovanje s brojnim stručnjacima iz javnog i privatnog sektora. Sljedeći tehnički sastanci na razini CESNI-ja održani su tijekom razvoja tih standarda:
 –sastanci radne skupine (13.–14. 2. 2019., 11.–12. 12. 2019., 1.–2. 4. 2020., 23.–26. 6. 2020., 2.–3. 9. 2020.) i
 –sjednica Odbora (13. 10. 2020.).
 Na tim sastancima stručnjaci su uspjeli postići dogovor u pogledu standarda za usklađene riječne informacijske servise.
 Predloženo stajalište Unije je donošenje standarda ES-RIS 2021/1 jer se njime olakšava postizanje najviše razine sigurnosti unutarnje plovidbe, prati tehnički razvoj u tom sektoru i osigurava kompatibilnost riječnih informacijskih servisa u Europi.
 4.Pravna osnova
 4.1.Postupovnopravna osnova
 4.1.1.Načela
 Člankom 218. stavkom 9. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije (UFEU) predviđeno je donošenje odluka kojima se utvrđuju „stajališta koja u ime Unije treba donijeti tijelo osnovano na temelju sporazuma kada je to tijelo pozvano donositi akte koji proizvode pravne učinke, uz iznimku akata kojima se dopunjuje ili mijenja institucionalni okvir sporazuma”.
 Članak 218. stavak 9. UFEU-a primjenjuje se neovisno o tome je li Unija članica tog tijela ili stranka tog sporazuma
 4
 .
 Pojam „akti koji proizvode pravne učinke” obuhvaća akte koji proizvode pravne učinke na temelju pravila međunarodnog prava kojima se uređuje predmetno tijelo. Obuhvaća i instrumente koji nemaju obvezujući učinak na temelju međunarodnog prava, ali postoji mogućnost da „presudno utječu na sadržaj propisa koje donese zakonodavac Unije”
 5
 .
 4.1.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 I CESNI i CCNR tijela su osnovana na temelju međunarodnog sporazuma.
 Iako pravila koja donosi CESNI nisu sama po sebi obvezujuća, postat će obvezujuća za članove CCNR-a nakon što CCNR izmijeni svoj zakonodavni okvir povezan s tehničkim specifikacijama riječnih informacijskih servisa upućivanjem na standarde koje donese CESNI te nakon što ti standardi postanu obvezujući u okviru primjene revidirane Konvencije o plovidbi Rajnom. Pravilnik za plovidbu Rajnom je obvezujuć za članove CCNR-a na temelju Konvencije iz Mannheima od 17. listopada 1868.
 6
 Nadalje, standard ES-RIS 2021/1 i njegove buduće revizije akti su koji proizvode pravne učinke za potrebe primjene članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a jer mogu presudno utjecati na sadržaj prava EU-a. Člankom 5. Direktive 2005/44 Komisija se ovlašćuje za donošenje tehničkih smjernica i specifikacija radi potpore riječnim informacijskim servisima i osiguravanja interoperabilnosti tih usluga. U uvodnoj izjavi 3. Direktive navedeno je da bi se zbog sigurnosnih razloga te u interesu paneuropskog usklađivanja, sadržaj takvih zajedničkih zahtjeva i tehničkih specifikacija trebao temeljiti na radu koji u tom području obavljaju odgovarajuće međunarodne organizacije, kao što su Središnje povjerenstvo za plovidbu rijekom Rajnom (CCNR) i Ekonomsko povjerenstvo UN-a za Europu (UNECE).
 ES-RIS 2021/1 sadržavat će tehničke specifikacije koje odgovaraju onima koje su već donesene u okviru članka 5. Direktive 2005/44. Tehničke specifikacije primjenjive na riječne informacijske servise na temelju Konvencije iz Mannheima uskladit će se s onima donesenima u okviru Direktive 2005/44, a svaka buduća revizija standarda ES-RIS 2021/1 imat će izravan učinak na pravnu stečevinu Unije u tom području.
 Rezolucija koju treba donijeti CCNR, kojom će se izmijeniti pravilnici CCNR-a kako bi se uključilo upućivanje na standard ES-RIS 2021/1, bit će pravno obvezujući akt za članice CCNR-a. Međutim, time se neće dopuniti niti izmijeniti institucionalni okvir Konvencije iz Mannheima.
 Stoga je potrebno utvrditi stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u okviru CESNI-ja i CCNR-a u vezi s donošenjem standarda za usklađene riječne informacijske servise.
 Postupovnopravna osnova za predloženu odluku stoga je članak 218. stavak 9. UFEU-a.
 4.2.Materijalnopravna osnova
 4.2.1.Načela
 Materijalnopravna osnova odluke na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a prije svega ovisi o cilju i sadržaju predviđenog akta o kojemu se zauzima stajalište u ime Unije. Ako predviđeni akt ima dva cilja ili elementa te ako se može utvrditi da je jedan od ta dva cilja ili elementa glavni, a drugi samo sporedan, odluka na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a mora se temeljiti na samo jednoj materijalnopravnoj osnovi, naime onoj koju zahtijeva glavni ili prevladavajući cilj ili element.
 4.2.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 Glavni cilj i sadržaj predviđenog akta odnosi se na zajedničku prometnu politiku.
 Stoga je materijalnopravna osnova predložene odluke članak 91. stavak 1. UFEU-a.
 4.3.Zaključak
 Pravna osnova predložene odluke trebao bi biti članak 91. stavak 1. UFEU-a u vezi s člankom 218. stavkom 9. UFEU-a.
 2021/0061 (NLE)
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje u ime Europske unije treba zauzeti u Europskom odboru za izradu standardâ u području unutarnje plovidbe i u Središnjoj komisiji za plovidbu Rajnom o donošenju standardâ za usklađene riječne informacijske servise
 VIJEĆE EUROPSKE UNIJE,
 uzimajući u obzir Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije, a posebno njegov članak 91. stavak 1. u vezi s člankom 218. stavkom 9.,
 uzimajući u obzir prijedlog Europske komisije,
 budući da:
 (1)Revidirana Konvencija o plovidbi Rajnom, potpisana u Mannheimu 17. listopada 1868. i izmijenjena Konvencijom o izmjeni Revidirane konvencije o plovidbi Rajnom, potpisanom u Strasbourgu 20. studenoga 1963., stupila je na snagu 14. travnja 1967.
 (2)U skladu s člankom 1. Sporazuma, Središnja komisija za plovidbu Rajnom („CCNR”) može izmijeniti regulatorni okvir koji se odnosi na riječne informacijske servise („RIS”) upućivanjem na standarde koje je donio Europski odbor za izradu standarda unutarnje plovidbe („CESNI”) i učiniti te standarde obveznima u okviru primjene Revidirane konvencije o plovidbi Rajnom.
 (3)Europski odbor za izradu standardâ unutarnje plovidbe (CESNI) osnovan je 3. lipnja 2015. u okviru CCNR-a radi razvoja tehničkih standarda za unutarnje plovne putove u različitim područjima, posebno u pogledu plovila, informacijske tehnologije i posade.
 (4)Mjerama Unije u sektoru unutarnje plovidbe trebalo bi nastojati osigurati ujednačenost u razvoju tehničkih specifikacija koje se primjenjuju u Uniji na riječne informacijske servise.
 (5)Za učinkovit prijevoz i sigurnu plovidbu unutarnjim plovnim putovima važno je da su riječni informacijski servisi kompatibilni i usklađeni u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri u okviru različitih pravnih režima u Europi.
 (6)Na sastanku koji će se održati 15. travnja 2021. CESNI treba donijeti europski standard za riječne informacijske servise (ES-RIS) 2021/1.
 (7)Standardom ES-RIS 2021/1 utvrđuju se jedinstvene tehničke specifikacije i standardi radi potpore riječnim informacijskim servisima i osiguravanja interoperabilnosti tih usluga. Predmetne tehničke specifikacije i standardi podudaraju se s onima čije se donošenje zahtijeva Direktivom 2005/44/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća
 7
 , a posebno u sljedećim područjima: elektronički prikaz navigacijskih karata i informacijski sustav za unutarnju plovidbu, elektroničko izvješćivanje s brodova, obavijesti kapetanima, sustavi za praćenje i određivanje položaja plovila te kompatibilnost opreme potrebne za upotrebu riječnih informacijskih servisa.
 (8)Tehničke specifikacije za riječne informacijske servise temelje se na tehničkim načelima iz Priloga II. Direktivi 2005/44/EZ i njima se uzima u obzir rad nadležnih međunarodnih organizacija u tom području.
 (9)Primjereno je utvrditi stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u okviru CESNI-a jer će ES-RIS 2021/1 moći presudno utjecati na sadržaj prava Unije, konkretno na obvezujuće tehničke specifikacije donesene u okviru Direktive 2005/44/EZ.
 (10)CCNR na plenarnoj sjednici 2. lipnja 2021. treba donijeti rezoluciju kojom će se izmijeniti pravilnici CCNR-a kako bi se uključilo upućivanje na ES-RIS 2021/1. Stoga je primjereno utvrditi stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u okviru CCNR-a.
 (11)Unija nije članica CCNR-a ni CESNI-ja. Stajalište Unije trebaju izraziti države članice Unije koje su članice tih tijela djelujući zajednički,
 DONIJELO JE OVU ODLUKU:
 Članak 1.
 1.Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u okviru Europskog odbora za izradu standarda unutarnje plovidbe (CESNI) na sastanku 15. travnja 2021. jest suglasnost s donošenjem europskog standarda za riječne informacijske servise (ES-RIS) 2021/1.
 2.Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije na plenarnoj sjednici Središnje komisije za plovidbu Rajnom (CCNR) na kojoj se odlučuje o riječnim informacijskim servisima jest poduprijeti sve prijedloge kojima se pravilnici CCNR-a usklađuju s odredbama standarda ES-RIS 2021/1.
 Članak 2.
 1.Stajalište iz članka 1. stavka 1. zajednički izražavaju države članice Unije koje su članice CESNI-ja.
 2.Stajalište iz članka 1. stavka 2. zajednički izražavaju države članice Unije koje su članice CCNR-a.
 Članak 3.
 Manje tehničke izmjene stajališta navedenih u članku 1. mogu se dogovoriti bez daljnje odluke Vijeća.
 Članak 4.
 Ova je Odluka upućena državama članicama.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu,
 Za Vijeće
 Predsjednik
 (1)
 Direktiva 2005/44/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 7. rujna 2005. o usklađenim riječnim informacijskim servisima (RIS) na unutarnjim vodnim putovima u Zajednici (SL L 255, 30.9.2005., str. 152.).
 (2)
 Odluka Vijeća (EU) 2020/1508 od 12. listopada 2020. o stajalištu koje treba zauzeti u ime Europske unije u okviru Europskog odbora za izradu standardâ unutarnje plovidbe (CESNI) i u okviru Središnje komisije za plovidbu Rajnom (CCNR) u vezi s donošenjem standardâ za tehnička pravila za plovila unutarnje plovidbe (SL L 345, 19.10.2020., str. 6.).
 (3)
 Provedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2018/2032 оd 20. studenoga 2018. o izmjeni Uredbe (EZ) br. 416/2007 u vezi s tehničkim specifikacijama za priopćenja za brodarce (SL L 332, 28.12.2018., str. 1.–181.);
 Provedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2018/1973 оd 7. prosinca 2018. o izmjeni Provedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) br. 909/2013 o tehničkim specifikacijama za elektronički prikaz navigacijskih karata i informacijski sustav za unutarnju plovidbu (Inland ECDIS) iz Direktive 2005/44/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća (SL L 324, 19.12.2018., str. 1.–44.);
 Provedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2019/838 od 20. veljače 2019. o tehničkim specifikacijama za sustave za praćenje i određivanje položaja plovila i o stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe (EZ) br. 415/2007 (SL L 138, 24.5.2019., str. 31.–69.);
 Provedbena uredba Komisije (EU) 2019/1744 оd 17. rujna 2019. o tehničkim specifikacijama za elektroničko izvješćivanje s brodova u unutarnjoj plovidbi i stavljanju izvan snage Uredbe (EU) br. 164/2010 (SL L 273, 25.10.2019., str. 1.–182.);
 (4)
 Presuda Suda od 7. listopada 2014., Njemačka protiv Vijeća, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, točka 64.
 (5)
 Presuda Suda od 7. listopada 2014., Njemačka protiv Vijeća, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, točke od 61. do 64.
 (6)
 Revidirana Konvencija o plovidbi Rajnom od 17. listopada 1868. kako je izmijenjena 20. studenoga 1963.
 (7)
 Direktiva 2005/44/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 7. rujna 2005. o usklađenim riječnim informacijskim servisima (RIS) na unutarnjim vodnim putovima u Zajednici (SL L 255, 30.9.2005., str. 152.).


type: contracts

text:
 22.11.2018
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 L 297/11
 EEZ APVIENOTĀS KOMITEJAS LĒMUMS
 Nr. 9/2017
 (2017. gada 3. februāris)
 ar ko groza EEZ līguma II pielikumu (Tehniskie noteikumi, standarti, testēšana un sertifikācija) [2018/1743]
 EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,
 ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu (“EEZ līgums”) un jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,
 tā kā:
 (1)
 EEZ līgumā jāiekļauj Komisijas 2016. gada 6. septembra Īstenošanas regula (ES) 2016/1825, ar ko Īstenošanas regulu (ES) Nr. 901/2014 groza attiecībā uz administratīvajām prasībām divu riteņu vai trīs riteņu transportlīdzekļu un kvadriciklu apstiprināšanai un tirgus uzraudzībai (1).
 (2)
 Tādēļ būtu attiecīgi jāgroza EEZ līguma II pielikums,
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 EEZ līguma II pielikuma I nodaļas 46.c punktam (Komisijas Īstenošanas regula (ES) Nr. 901/2014) pievieno šādu tekstu:
 “, kurā grozījumi izdarīti ar:
 —
 32016 R 1825: Komisijas 2016. gada 6. septembra Īstenošanas regulu (ES) 2016/1825 (OV L 279, 15.10.2016., 47. lpp.).”
 2. pants
 Īstenošanas regulas (ES) 2016/1825 teksts islandiešu un norvēģu valodā, kas jāpublicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ papildinājumā, ir autentisks.
 3. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā 2017. gada 4. februārī, ja ir iesniegti visi paziņojumi saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 103. panta 1. punktu (*1).
 4. pants
 Šo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un tā EEZ papildinājumā.
 Briselē, 2017. gada 3. februārī
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā –
 priekšsēdētājs
 Claude MAERTEN
 (1) OV L 279, 15.10.2016., 47. lpp.
 (*1) Konstitucionālās prasības nav norādītas.


type: wikipedia

text:
Ceapadóir is eitleoir a rugadh i gCoventry Shasana ba ea Sir Frank Whittle, OM, KBE, FRS, Hon FRAeS (1 Meitheamh 1907 – 9 Lúnasa 1996). Bhain sé clú agus cáil amach mar gheall a chuid oibre i bhforbairt an scairdinnill. D'fhorbair sé an scairdinneall d'aerárthaigh i 1941.
 Bhí sé ina oifigeach in aerfhórsa na Breataine, agus comhairleoir teicniúil do rialtas na Breataine ar dhearadh innill eitleán (1946-8).
 Tagairtí
 Innealtóirí Sasanacha
 Daoine a rugadh i 1907
 Básanna i 1996


text:
Percy Bysshe Shelley (4. august 1792 – 8. juuli 1822) oli inglise romantiline luuletaja, kelle kuulsate luuletuste hulgas on "Ozymandias", "Ode to the West Wind" ja "To a Skylark".
 Shelley sündis väga jõukas Sussexi maa-aadli perekonnas baronetitiitli pärijana.
 Ta sai hariduse Eton College'is ja Oxfordi Ülikooli University College'is.
 Tema esimene avaldatud teos oli gooti romaan "Zastrozzi" (1810), milles ta väljendas oma ateismi kelm Zastrozzi kuju kaudu. Samal aastal avaldas Shelley koos oma õega raamatu "Original Poetry by Victor and Cazire". Oxfordis õppides andis ta välja luulekogu "Posthumous Fragments of Margaret Nicholson". Võib-olla tegi kaastööd kaasüliõpilane Thomas Jefferson Hogg.
 1811 avaldas Shelley pamfleti "Ateismi paratamatus" ("The Necessity of Atheism"), mille pärast ta pidi koos Hoggiga Oxfordist lahkuma. Isa sekkumisel oleks ta võinud ülikooli edasi jääda, kui ta oleks oma vaadetest lahti öelnud. Ta keeldus ning see viis täieliku suhete katkemiseni isaga.
 Aastal 1811 põgenes Shelley Šotimaale ning abiellus kohvikupidaja tütre Harriet Westbrookiga. Seejärel siirdus ta Järvepiirkonda kirjutama, kuid varsti pärast seda külastas Iirimaad, et kirjutada poliitilisi pamflette. 1813 avaldas ta poeemi "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem". See oli mõjutatud briti filosoofist William Godwinist ning väljendas tolle radikaalset filosoofiat.
 Shelley, kes oli õnnetus abielus, armus Godwini ja Mary Wollstonecrafti tütresse Marysse. Juulis 1814 põgenesid nad mandrile, läbides Prantsusmaa ja jõudes Šveitsi. Kuue nädala pärast sai neil raha otsa ja nad naasid Inglismaale.
 Teosed
 "Luuletusi". Tõlkinud Minni Nurme, järelsõna Villem Alttoa, Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, Tallinn 1960
 "Valik lüürikat". Tõlkinud ja eessõna: Ants Oras, järelsõna Anne Lange, Hortus Litterarum, Tallinn 1998
 Kirjandus
 "André Maurois, Ariel ehk Shelley elulugu". Prantsuse keelest tõlkinud ja eessõna: Lydia Raudsepp, EKS, Tartu 1928
 Ants Oras, "Percy Bysshe Shelley ja tema luule" – Looming, 1935, nr 2, lk 209–218 ja Ants Oras, "Ilus, haljas. Luulekool III", Ilmamaa, Tartu 2007, lk 49–61
 Jüri Talvet, "Kas Orase Shelley või Shelley Oras?" (raamatu "Valik lüürikat" tõlkearvustus) – Looming 1999, nr 2, lk 310–315 ja Jüri Talveti raamatus "Tõrjumatu äär", Ilmamaa, Tartu 2005, lk. 408–416
 Anne Lange, "Orase Shelley" – Keel ja Kirjandus 2004, nr 1, lk 11–24 (ülevaade Ants Orase väitekirjast "Statistical inquiry into the use of colour names in the longer poems of Shelley" – "Statistiline uurimus Shelley pikemate poeemide värvinimedest", 1923)
 Vikerkaar 2004, nr. 7–8 (inglise romantismi erinumber)
 Anne Lange, "Ants Oras". Ilmamaa, Tartu 2005, peatükk "Ood läänetuulele" lk 57–81
 Inglise kirjanikud
 Taimetoitlased
 Sündinud 1792
 Surnud 1822


text:
 3.9.2015
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 L 230/28
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE
 Nru 225/2014
 tal-24 ta' Ottubru 2014
 li temenda l-Anness II (Regolamenti tekniċi, standards, ittestjar u ċertfikazzjoni) u l-Anness IV (l-Enerġija) tal-Ftehim ŻEE [2015/1449]
 IL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (“il-Ftehim ŻEE”), u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 98 tiegħu,
 Billi:
 (1)
 Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 85/536/KEE tal-5 ta' Diċembru 1985 dwar l-iffrankar taż-żejt mhux raffinat bl-użu ta' komponenti sostituti tal-karburant fil-petrol (1) tħassret permezz tad-Direttiva 98/70/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Ottubru 1998 dwar il-kwalità tal-karburanti tal-petrol u tad-diżil u li temenda d-Direttiva 93/12/KEE (2), li huma t-tnejn inkorporati fil-Ftehim ŻEE, u għaldaqstant id-Direttiva 85/536/KEE għandha titħassar mill-Ftehim ŻEE.
 (2)
 Għalhekk, l-Annessi II u IV tal-Ftehim ŻEE għandhom jiġu emendati skont dan,
 ADOTTA DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI:
 Artikolu 1
 It-test tal-punt 1 (id-Direttiva 85/536/KEE) tal-Kapitolu XXVI tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim jitħassar.
 Artikolu 2
 It-test tal-punt 6 (id-Direttiva 85/536/KEE) tal-Anness IV tal-Ftehim jitħassar.
 Artikolu 3
 Din id-Deċiżjoni tidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta’ Novembru 2014, bil-kundizzjoni li jkunu saru n-notifiki kollha skont l-Artikolu 103(1) tal-Ftehim ŻEE (*).
 Artikolu 4
 Din id-Deċiżjoni tiġi ppubblikata fis-Sezzjoni taż-ŻEE u fis-Suppliment taż-ŻEE ta' Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 Magħmul fi Brussell, l-24 ta’ Ottubru 2014.
 Għall-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE
 Il-President
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) ĠU L 334, 12.12.1985, p. 20.
 (2) ĠU L 350, 28.12.1998, p. 58.
 (*) L-ebda rekwiżiti kostituzzjonali ma huma indikati.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 272 Md. 201 (1974)
 321 A.2d 737
 VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. ET AL.
 v.
 YOUNG, INDIV. AND AS ADM'X OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES C. YOUNG ET AL.
 [Misc. No. 5, September Term, 1973.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided July 8, 1974.
 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ.
 Laidler B. Mackall, with whom were Richard O. Cunningham, John M. Edsall, Scott R. Schoenfeld and Steptoe & Johnson, Herbert Rubin, Michael Hoenig and Herzfeld & Rubin, Hal C.B. Clagett and Sasscer, Clagett, Channing & Bucher on the brief, for petitioners.
 *203 John C. Joyce and F. Robert Troll, Jr., with whom were Donald L. Hoage and Duckett, Orem, Christie & Beckett on the brief, for respondents.
 ELDRIDGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This matter reaches us via the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974), § 12-601 et seq., of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.[1] The case is a wrongful death action, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by the mother and the widow of James C. Young who was killed in a 1971 automobile accident in Prince George's County, Maryland. After the filing of the complaint and before any further proceedings took place, the defendants moved to certify a question of law to this Court; the plaintiffs consented; and the court issued an "Order For Certification." The question certified by the Order of the United States District Court is:
 "Whether or not, under Maryland law, the definition of the `intended use' of a motor vehicle includes the vehicle's involvement in a collision and thus in turn, whether a cause of action is stated against the manufacturer or importer of said vehicle in breach of warranty or negligence or absolute liability or misrepresentation by allegations that the design and manufacture of the vehicle unreasonably increased the risk of injury to *204 occupants following a collision not caused by any defect of the vehicle."
 Compare Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.1966), cert. den. 385 U.S. 836, 87 S. Ct. 83, 17 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1966), with Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968).
 The statement of "Facts Relevant to Question Certified" contained in the Order of the United States District Court is as follows:
 "This is an action brought by plaintiffs against an automobile manufacturer who manufactures Volkswagen automobiles in Germany (VWAG) and against an importer of Volkswagen automobiles (VWOA), in which plaintiffs allege the wrongful death of plaintiffs' decedent, survival of decedent's claim and loss of consortium of decedent's widow based on breach of warranty, negligence, absolute liability and misrepresentation.
 "The action allegedly grows out of a Maryland automobile accident in which plaintiffs' decedent, operating a Volkswagen in a northerly direction, stopped at a stop light and thereafter the Volkswagen was struck in the rear by another vehicle negligently driven in the same direction.
 "The complaint alleges that immediately upon collision the Volkswagen was propelled forward and the seat assembly failed, resulting in plaintiffs' decedent being thrown into the rear portion of the Volkswagen where he allegedly suffered injuries which resulted in his death. The complaint alleges that the injuries were caused by the design and manufacture of the seat assembly and the design and manufacture of the passenger compartment structures, surfaces and protrusions.
 "Plaintiffs do not allege that any defect in the Volkswagen caused or contributed to the collision, but all causes of action alleged are based upon the *205 so-called `crashworthy doctrine'  that the `intended use' of a motor vehicle includes the vehicle's involvement in collisions and thus in turn, that there is a duty to design and manufacture the vehicle so as not to unreasonably increase the risk of injury to occupants following a collision not caused by a defect in the vehicle."
 The Order of the United States District Court further specified that the phrasing of the certified question was not intended to restrict our consideration of the problems involved and the issues as we perceive them in light of the complaint in the case.
 The complaint in the case was attached to the "Order For Certification," and it reveals certain additional detail concerning the factual allegations. The Volkswagen which James C. Young was operating at the time of the accident was a 1968 "Type I Beetle Sedan." It was purchased on March 30, 1968 by the deceased in the state of Alabama. It was alleged that "[d]uring the course of said purchase, plaintiffs' decedent relied on advertisements by the defendants that he had seen, heard, and read in the communications media stating or implying that said Volkswagen was sound and fit for its intended and foreseeable purposes to be used as a passenger automobile on the streets and highways of the United States of America." It was further alleged that the vehicle was "defectively designed, manufactured, and marketed with defects which rendered it structurally hazardous, not merchantable, and not fit for the purpose intended" because the seat assembly was "unreasonably vulnerable to separation from the floor upon collision" and "[t]he rear passenger compartment structures, surfaces and protrusions ... allowed an unreasonable risk of injury upon collision...." The nature of the claimed defective design of the car was more specifically set forth in the allegations concerning the injury:
 "... [T]he vehicle of plaintiffs' decedent was struck in the rear portion thereof by a 1967 Ford *206 negligently driven in the same direction by one William Benjamin Benson. Immediately upon collision the car driven by plaintiffs' decedent was propelled forward and the seat assembly unit, seat frame, seat bracing pieces, seat adjustment mechanism, seat reinforcements and metal tracks to which the seat itself was fastened, hereinafter collectively referred to as the `seat assembly,' failed to withstand the impact against the rear of the vehicle with the direct and proximate result that the driver's seat separated from the floor of the car causing it and James C. Young, deceased, to be thrown violently into the rear portion of said car where his head, body and torso impacted into and was impacted by various inadequate and defectively designed passenger compartment structures, surfaces and protrusions."
 The plaintiffs went on to allege that James Young's death directly resulted from the asserted design defects. Finally, it was alleged that the defendants had "actual notice and knowledge" of the defective seat assembly and rear compartment defects because of surveys and reports given to them and studies made by various testing institutions; that, notwithstanding these reports, defendants gave no warning to Volkswagen owners and operators generally or to James Young in particular; and that the defects were "latent and hidden." Several studies from named testing organizations were listed in the complaint.
 In light of the factual allegations of the instant complaint, and with the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we answer the "Question Certified" in the affirmative. The "intended use" or "intended purpose" of an automobile, in our view, is not merely to provide transportation. It is to provide reasonably safe transportation. The complaint in this case was sufficient, we believe, to set forth a cause of action in negligence under Maryland law.
 This is the first case to reach this Court concerning the extent of an automobile manufacturer's liability for a design defect resulting in enhanced injuries in a motor vehicle *207 accident, where the defect did not cause the initial impact or movement of the injured person. Such cases are often called "second collision" cases or "automobile crashworthiness" cases. They differ from other products liability cases involving defective automobiles by the combination of two factors. First, the alleged defect is in the design of the automobile rather than a negligent deviation during the construction or assembly process from the manner in which the vehicle was supposed to be made. The latter is usually called a "construction defect."[2] Second, the defect is not the cause of the initial impact. Typically, the actions of the driver of the car in which the plaintiff is riding, or the actions of the driver of another vehicle, or the actions of some third person, cause an initial disruption or impact which in turn results in the plaintiff's colliding with the interior (or occasionally the exterior) of the car. The plaintiff's collision with the car is the so-called "second collision." The issue of whether the automobile manufacturer has a duty to take reasonable steps to design its vehicles so as to minimize the injuries caused by "second collisions" has engendered much controversy and comment throughout the nation.
 The principal case holding that an automobile manufacturer has no duty to design its cars so as to minimize the injuries suffered in automobile accidents is Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 836, 87 S. Ct. 83, 17 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1966). The plaintiff in Evans was killed when his 1961 Chevrolet station wagon was struck broadside by another car. He claimed that General Motors was negligent in designing the frame of his car, inasmuch as an "X" type frame rather than a box or perimeter type frame was used, contrary to the construction of some other cars. The claim *208 was that an "X" type frame without side rails would not adequately protect occupants during a side impact collision, and that the defendant manufacturer had created an unreasonable risk of serious injury. The trial court, applying Indiana law, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and the dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the critical question was the nature of the manufacturer's duty. It went on to conclude that a manufacturer has a duty only to design a car reasonably fit for its intended purpose, and that
 "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur. As defendant argues, the defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip them with pontoons." (359 F.2d at 825.)
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also stated as grounds for its decision that a "manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof" (id. at 824) and that requiring "manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide ... [is] a legislative function...." (Ibid.)
 Some of the cases applying the Evans holding that an automobile manufacturer has no duty to design the vehicle so as not to increase unreasonably the risk of injury following a collision are McClung v. Ford Motor Company, 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), aff'd per curiam 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.1973); Shumard v. General Motors Corporation, 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corporation, 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); General Motors Corporation v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969); Biavaschi v. Frost, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. § 6547 (N.J. Super. *209 Ct. 1970); Enders v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. § 5930 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1968). See also Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974), cert. granted July 5, 1974 (No. 88, September Term, 1974).
 The seminal case on the other side of the issue is Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). The plaintiff in Larsen suffered severe bodily injuries while driving a 1963 Corvair which collided head-on with another car. The impact caused the steering mechanism to thrust forward into the plaintiff's head. The suit against General Motors charged negligence in the design of the steering assembly and the placement of the component parts of the steering assembly into the structure of the car. It was alleged that General Motors was also negligent in not warning the user of this latent condition. The specific defect relied upon by the plaintiff was that the solid steering shaft was so designed as to extend "without interruption from a point 2.7 inches in front of the leading surface of the front tires to a position directly in front of the driver," exposing him "to an unreasonable risk of injury from the rearward displacement of that shaft in the event of a left-of-center head-on collision. So positioned it receives the initial impact of forces generated by a left-of-center head-on collision. The unabsorbed forces of the collision in this area are transmitted directly toward the driver's head, the shaft acting as a spear aimed at a vital part of the driver's anatomy." 391 F.2d 497, n. 2. The plaintiff also pointed out that other cars were designed so as to protect against such rearward displacement, in that the steering column did not protrude beyond the forward surface of the front tires. The lower court in Larsen granted General Motors' motion for summary judgment on the theory that the manufacturer had no duty to design a vehicle which would protect the plaintiff from injury in a collision. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had made out a sufficient case for consideration by the jury.
 The Court of Appeals in Larsen first reviewed the many cases throughout the country holding manufacturers liable *210 in tort for hidden defects in automobiles, whether of design or construction, which made the vehicles unsuitable for their intended use, causing collisions and resulting injuries. 391 F.2d at 501. The court then stated that the issue was whether an injury resulting from the so-called "second collision" was encompassed within the "intended use" of an automobile (id. at 501-502):
 "Accepting, therefore, the principle that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper interpretation of `intended use.' Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in transporting persons and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be carried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved hazard of injury-producing impacts of various types. The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product to be involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it knows that the probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some type of injury-producing accident."
 And later the court emphasized (id. at 502):
 "The sole function of an automobile is not just to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art."
 The Court of Appeals concluded that an automobile manufacturer "is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision." (Ibid.)
 The Larsen court then emphasized the limitations of its *211 holding; that it was not making automobile manufacturers "insurers"; that it was merely applying common law principles of negligence; that the standard for manufacturers was "reasonable care"; and that an automobile did not have to be absolutely crash-proof but only designed to provide "a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel." 391 F.2d at 503. The court went on to reiterate these limitations, stating (ibid.):
 "This duty of reasonable care in design rests on common law negligence that a manufacturer of an article should use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of his product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. The duty of reasonable care in design should be viewed in light of the risk. While all risks cannot be eliminated nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present state of the art, there are many common-sense factors in design, which are or should be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen the injurious effects of a collision. The standard of reasonable care is applied in many other negligence situations and should be applied here."
 The court also stated that the "failure to use reasonable care in design or knowledge of a defective design gives rise to the reasonable duty on the manufacturer to warn of this condition." (Id. at 505.) The court continued (ibid.):
 "Where the danger is obvious and known to the user, no warning is necessary and no liability attaches for an injury occurring from the reasonable hazards attached to the use of chattels or commodities; but where the dangerous condition is latent it should be disclosed to the user, and non-disclosure should subject the maker or supplier to liability for creating an unreasonable risk."
 A growing number of jurisdictions have followed the principles set forth in Larsen in so-called "second collision" *212 cases. Just last year the Court of Appeals of New York adopted the Larsen view with respect to an alleged design defect in a motorcycle, which enhanced the motorcycle operator's injuries following an initial collision with an automobile. The New York court in Bolm v. Triumph Corporation, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1973), held that the trier of facts should determine if there was a latent design defect which the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would cause injury, saying:
 "As was stated in Campo [v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950)], a manufacturer is under no duty to design a product which is accident-proof. There is no liability on the part of a manufacturer for injuries resulting from dangers which are patent or obvious. Thus, the operator of a motor vehicle assumes the dangers which inhere in its operation, including the probability of many `second collision' injuries. The extent of that assumption, however, should be no greater than those `second collision' injuries which would result from an impact in a reasonably designed and constructed vehicle. While a vehicle need not be made `crash-worthy,' the manufacturer should not be permitted to argue that a user of its product assumes dangers from unknown or latent defects, either in construction or design, which the manufacturer can reasonably foresee will cause injury on impact. The standards for imposing liability for such unreasonably dangerous design defects are, thus, general negligence principles (see Larsen v. General Motors Corp., supra. ..."
 Even more recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law and assuming that Virginia would follow Larsen, applied the principles of Larsen to reverse a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and to hold that the manufacturer was not liable under the facts of that case. In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir.1974), the plaintiff was seated in the center *213 of the seat of a Volkswagen "microbus" next to the driver. Upon impact with a telephone pole the vehicle crumpled, causing the plaintiff's leg to fasten between the seat and the dashboard of the van and throwing her forward. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the vehicle was defectively designed because the manufacturer failed to provide "`sufficient energy-absorbing materials or devices or "crush space" ... so that at 40 miles an hour the integrity of the passenger compartment would not be violated....'" (Id. at 1068-1069.) The crux of the plaintiff's case was that the "`Volkswagen station wagon did not provide the protection for the front seat passengers as did the "normal" or standard passenger car,'" with the passengers in the middle, the motor in the front, and a "long hood" in front of the passenger compartment (id. at 1074).
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Dreisonstok, quoting extensively from Larsen, emphasized that the manufacturer's duty is to design a vehicle so that there is no "`unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision'" and that liability "`is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is created.'" (489 F.2d at 1071.) The court went on to hold that in determining whether the design of a vehicle gives rise to an unreasonable risk of danger in a second collision, the court must consider the "attractiveness of the style of the car" as an element "by which buyers are influenced"; the "purpose of the particular type of vehicle"; the price of the vehicle; and the circumstances of the accident, for example whether it is a "head-on" collision, whether the vehicle is traveling at a high speed, etc. (Id. at 1072-1073.) The court then stated (id. at 1073):
 "In summary, every case such as this involves a delicate balancing of many factors in order to determine whether the manufacturer has used ordinary care in designing a car, which, giving consideration to the market purposes and utility of the vehicle, did not involve unreasonable risk of injury to occupants within the range of its `intended use.'"
 *214 The court applied these principles to hold that the manufacturer's design had not been negligent, as the vehicle was of a "special type and particular design ... uniquely developed in order to provide the owner with the maximum amount of either cargo or passenger space in a vehicle inexpensively priced and of such dimensions as to make possible easy maneuverability." (Id. at 1073-1074.) In addition to holding that the design was not unreasonable in light of the pertinent factors that must be considered, the court also relied on the fact that the nature of the design and any danger inherent in not having any substantial part of the vehicle in front of the passenger compartment "was readily discernible to any one using the vehicle; in fact, it was... the unique feature of the vehicle." (Id. at 1074.)
 Other cases adopting and applying the Larsen principles to design defects in automobiles causing "second collisions" are: Passwaters v. General Motors Corporation, 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.1972); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corporation, 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corporation, 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Badorek v. General Motors Corporation, 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 509 P.2d 24 (Or. 1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).[3]
 In our view, Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, supra, *215 and the cases following it, are more in accord with traditional negligence principles than Evans v. General Motors Corporation, supra. Since the time of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), it has been generally held that an automobile manufacturer or supplier, like the manufacturer or supplier of other products, is liable in negligence to an ultimate user of the vehicle for a construction defect of which he was or reasonably should have been aware, which was not obvious to the user, and which causes a collision and resulting injuries. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302 (1965).
 The principle is no different where the defect is in the design of a product rather than its construction. We have imposed liability upon manufacturers for injuries caused by the unsafe designs of their products, Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958). See also Restatement 2d, Torts, § 398. The recent cases in Maryland which have held manufacturers and suppliers not liable for allegedly unsafe designs of their products, have not been on the theory that a design defect does not give rise to a cause of action in negligence; instead, the denial of liability in each case was based on the fact that the danger in the design was patent or obvious to the user. Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969). Where the unsafe design was not obvious to the user, the manufacturer was held responsible, Babylon v. Scruton, supra.
 That the design defect does not cause the initial collision should make no difference if it is a cause of the ultimate injury. Where the injuries to an occupant of a motor vehicle resulted from both the negligence of a driver as well as a negligent condition created by some other entity, this Court has held that both negligent actors may be liable, Howard County v. Leaf, 177 Md. 82, 95, 8 A.2d 756 (1939). We have also stated that the "aggravation of the results of a collision" may give rise to tort liability, Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 358, 189 A. 260 (1937). As stated by the Court of Appeals *216 of New York in Bolm v. Triumph Corporation, supra, 305 N.E. at 773-774:
 "Neither sound policy nor reason can be found to justify a distinction between the liability of the manufacturer whose defective item causes the initial accident and that of the manufacturer whose defective product aggravates or enhances the injuries after an intervening impact. Assuming that in each case the defect is `a substantial factor in bringing about [the] injury or damages,' what possible justification is there for disallowing a claim against the manufacturer whose defective product results in injury after a foreseeable intervening cause? It is well settled that foreseeable intervening cause will not relieve a wrongdoer of liability in other situations (41 N.Y.Jur., Negligence, § 38; 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 20-5). We can perceive no reason why a manufacturer of motor vehicles should be held to a lesser degree of liability. Accordingly, we reject the `second collision rule' in favor of traditional rules of negligence and warranty."
 In sum, "traditional rules of negligence" lead to the conclusion that an automobile manufacturer is liable for a defect in design which the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance injuries on impact, which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which in fact leads to or enhances the injuries in an automobile collision.
 The arguments advanced by Volkswagen in the instant case for creating an exception to the application of traditional negligence principles in "second collision" cases are not persuasive. They are essentially the same reasons set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Evans and the other cases following Evans. Volkswagen's principal arguments are: (1) that the intended purpose of an automobile is transportation and does not include its participation in collisions; (2) that "a *217 manufacturer is not required to produce accident-proof or injury-proof cars"; (3) that manufacturers are not insurers; and (4) that "[d]esign requirements are a legislative, not a judicial function...."
 While the intended purpose of an automobile may not be to participate in collisions, the intended purpose includes providing a reasonable measure of safety when, inevitably, collisions do occur. For many years automobiles have been equipped with safety glass, bumpers, windshield wipers, etc. More recently, and largely as a result of governmental action, automobiles are equipped with additional safety devices such as seat belts, shoulder harnesses, padded dashboards, padded visors, non-protruding knobs, etc. Frequent collisions are foreseeable, and the intended purpose of all of these parts of the vehicle is to afford reasonable safety when those collisions occur.
 The arguments that there is no duty to design "accident-proof" or "injury-proof" vehicles, and that automobile manufacturers are not insurers, are "straw men." No case has ever held that an automobile manufacturer must design an "accident-proof" or "injury-proof" vehicle or that the manufacturer is an insurer. Concerning two of the examples most often used by the advocates of non-liability for design defects, no one has suggested that an automobile must be designed to withstand a high speed head-on collision with a truck or to float if it leaves the road and goes into a body of water. As the court stated in Larsen, supra, 391 F.2d at 502:
 "We do agree that under the present state of the art an automobile manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats on water, but such manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision."
 The standard to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness.
 *218 The contention that the design of automobiles involves a legislative function and not a judicial function, similarly furnishes no sound reason for exempting automobile "second collision" cases from the normal principles of tort liability. Legislative or administrative requirements that persons or businesses conduct their operations in a particular manner, and adhere to specified standards, have never been viewed as supplanting tort liability. On the contrary, such statutory or regulatory requirements are deemed to furnish standards by which courts or juries determine, along with other circumstances, whether or not conduct is negligent. Failure to adhere to those standards is evidence of negligence for the court or jury to consider. McLhinney v. Lansdell Corp. of Md., 254 Md. 7, 14-15, 254 A.2d 177 (1969); Paramount Development v. Hunter, 249 Md. 188, 193, 238 A.2d 869 (1968); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259, 260, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65, 155 A.2d 698 (1959); Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 70, 124 A.2d 793 (1956), and cases therein cited. Moreover, the most significant legislation dealing with motor vehicle safety standards makes it clear that Congress did not view the question of safe motor vehicle design as solely a legislative problem. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 specifically provides that "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. 1397 (c). The committee reports and debates specify that the purpose of this provision was to insure that "state common law standards of care" and the principles of "product liability at common law" would continue to be viable, and that the legislative safety standards were not "to affect the rights of parties under common law...." S. Rep. No. 1301, Committee on Commerce, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 1966, p. 12; H.R. Rep. No. 1776, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 1966, p. 24; 112 Cong. Rec. 14230 (1966).
 While we hold that the federal court complaint in the present case is sufficient to set forth a cause of action in negligence under Maryland law, the limitations upon this *219 type of liability should be reiterated. As emphasized in Larsen and the cases following it, the automobile manufacturer does not have to design a crash-proof car. Instead, the manufacturer must use only reasonable care in the design of a vehicle in order to avoid subjecting a user to an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision.
 Moreover, in determining "reasonableness," many factors must be considered. There must be "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens against the burden of the precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm." Larsen, supra, 391 F.2d at 502, n. 3. The style and type of vehicle, and its particular purpose, must be taken into consideration. A "convertible could not be made `as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard four-door sedan with center posts and full-door frames.'" Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., supra, 489 F.2d at 1072, quoting from Dyson v. General Motors Corporation, supra, 298 F. Supp. at 1073. Price must be a pertinent factor, as the cost of a particular design change may in some instances be so great, while adding little to safety, that the vehicle will be taken "out of the price range of the market to which it was intended to appeal." Dreisonstok, supra, 489 F.2d at 1073. And the price of the vehicle itself should be considered, for "a Cadillac may be expected to include more in the way of ... `crashworthiness' than the economy car." Id. at 1073. The nature of the accident is to be taken into account, as "`it could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable because its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed.'" Id. at 1073; Dyson, supra, 298 F. Supp. at 1073. There are perhaps many other factors that will be pertinent in particular cases. In order to impose liability, the trier of the facts must be able to conclude that the design was unreasonable in light of all of the relevant considerations.
 In addition, there can be no recovery if the danger inherent in the particular design was obvious or patent to the user of the vehicle. Larsen, supra, 391 F.2d at 505. See *220 also Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., supra, 263 Md. at 368-370; Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., supra, 255 Md. at 245-246; Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 253 Md. at 292-295.
 The plaintiffs-respondents also argued before us that their complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action under theories of breach of warranty and strict liability. As to a cause of action for breach of warranty, this would depend upon Alabama law and not Maryland law. The general rule, to which we adhere, is that "the law of the place of the sale determines the extent and effect of the warranties which attend the sale." Schultz v. Tecumseh Products, 310 F.2d 426, 428 (6th Cir.1962). See also, e.g., Modern Farm Service, Inc. v. Ben Pearson, Inc., 308 F.2d 18, 22-23 (5th Cir.1962); Texas Motorcoaches v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91, 93 (3rd Cir.1946); Pipe Welding Supply Co. v. Gas Atmospheres, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 191, 196-197 (N.D. Ohio 1961); Grummons v. Zollinger, 189 F. Supp. 64, 66 (N.D. Ind. 1960); Hunt Truck Sales and Service, Inc. v. Omaha Standard, 187 F. Supp. 796, 798-799 (S.D. Iowa 1960); Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Super. Ct. 479, 117 A.2d 840, 842 (1954); McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 921 (D.C. 1969); Amos v. Walter N. Kelley Co., 240 Mich. 257, 215 N.W. 397 (1927); Somerville Container Sales v. General Metal Corp., 39 N.J. Super. 348, 120 A.2d 866, 871 (1956); but cf. Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971). Since the Volkswagen was purchased in Alabama, the law of that state determines whether a cause of action for breach of warranty was alleged.
 With respect to the contention that the complaint sets forth a cause of action under the "strict liability" theory of Restatement 2d, Torts, § 402A, this Court has not endorsed the theory of that section. Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 77, 285 A.2d 607 (1972); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 253 Md. at 296-297; Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 487-489, 237 A.2d 434 (1968). Regardless of whether the theory of § 402A of the Restatement should be accepted in other contexts, we are convinced that it has no proper *221 application to liability for design defects in motor vehicles. The thrust of § 402A is that a seller of "any product in a defective condition" is liable to a user for harm caused by that defective condition even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." This principle obviously changes the standard of care with regard to a construction defect. But as to a defect in design, it has no special meaning. Since the existence of a defective design depends upon the reasonableness of the manufacturer's action, and depends upon the degree of care which he has exercised, it is wholly illogical to speak of a defective design even though the manufacturer has "exercised all possible care" in the preparation of his product. While a few cases applying Larsen principles have used language of "strict liability" with respect to design defects, it has been recognized that this results in "no practical difference" from the application of negligence principles. Note, 24 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 862, 866-867 (1971); Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need For Uniformity, 4 Seton Hall L. Rev. 499, 507, 522-523 (1973). Consequently, the tort liability under Maryland law of a manufacturer or supplier of a motor vehicle, for a defective design which enhances injuries in a collision, depends upon traditional principles of negligence.
 Question of law answered as herein set forth.
 Petitioners to pay costs.
 NOTES
 [1] That Act provides in pertinent part:
 "§ 12-601. Jurisdiction granted to Court of Appeals
 "The Court of Appeals may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court, or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state when requested by the certifying court if there is involved in any proceeding before the certifying court a question of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the Court of Appeals of this state.
 * * *"
 With regard to our jurisdiction under the Act, see Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 154-155, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
 [2] The author of one article has described the distinction as follows (Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors And Its Aftermath, 118 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. 299, n. 4 (1969)):
 "Design defects are, by definition, common to all vehicles of a particular model. Construction defects are generally limited to an extremely small portion of a given model."
 [3] The question of a motor vehicle manufacturer's liability for a design defect which enhances injuries in a "second collision" has also been the subject of much legal literature. See, e.g., Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need For Uniformity, 4 Seton Hall L. Rev. 499 (1973); Hoenig and Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 20 Clev. St. L. Rev. 578 (1971); Note, 24 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 862 (1971); Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors And Its Aftermath, 118 U. Penn. L. Rev. 299 (1969); Note, "Intended Use" And The Unsafe Automobile: Manufacturers' Liability For Negligent Design, 28 Md. L. Rev. 386 (1968); Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 645 (1967); Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 953 (1967); Katz, Liability Of Automobile Manufacturers For Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1956).


text:
 II
 111th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 1910
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
 STATES
 October 26, 2009
 Mr. Roberts introduced
 the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
 Committee on
 Finance
 A BILL
 To extend the temporary suspension of duty
 on calcium chloride phosphor activated by manganese and
 antimony.
 1.Calcium chloride phosphor activated by
 manganese and antimony
 (a)In generalHeading 9902.22.70 of the Harmonized Tariff
 Schedule of the United States (relating to calcium chloride phosphor activated
 by manganese and antimony) is amended by striking the date in the effective
 period column and inserting 12/31/2011.
 (b)Effective
 dateThe amendment made by
 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for
 consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this
 Act.


text:
 |
 52011PC0704
 Ettepanek: EUROOPA PARLAMENDI JA NÕUKOGU MÄÄRUS millega muudetakse määrust (EÜ) nr 428/2009, millega kehtestatakse ühenduse kord kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi, edasitoimetamise, vahendamise ja transiidi kontrollimiseks /* KOM/2011/0704 lõplik - 2011/0310 (COD) */
 SELETUSKIRIMäärusega 428/2009 [1] kehtestatud ELi kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi kontrollisüsteemi kohaselt[2] on kõnealuse määruse I lisas loetletud kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordiks vaja luba. Määruse artikli 9 lõikega 1 on täpsustatud, et Euroopa Liidu üldine ekspordiluba on üks ekspordilubade neljast liigist, mida saab kasutada kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordiks EList. Määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 II lisas on esitatud praegu kehtiv ELi üldine ekspordiluba.ELi kontrollinimekirja (määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 I lisa) ajakohastamineKahesuguse kasutusega kaupade kontrolli käsitlevad otsused tehakse rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide raames konsensuse alusel (Austraalia grupp (AG) bioloogiliste ja keemiliste materjalide puhul, tuumatarneriikide grupp (NSG) tsiviilkasutuseks ettenähtud tuumakaupade puhul, raketitehnoloogia kontrollirežiim (MTCR) ja Wassenaari kokkulepe (WA) tavarelvade ning kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ja tehnoloogiate puhul). Need ekspordikontrollirežiimid on kehtestatud selleks, et piirata tundlike kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade kasutamist sõjalisel otstarbel ja/või nende levitamist. Selleks et muuta ekspordi kontrollimine võimalikult tõhusaks, koondavad rahvusvahelised ekspordikontrollirežiimid kokku peamised kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade tarnijad. Teatavate kaupadega kauplemise kontrollimises kokku leppimise teel tehakse tõhusat koostööd nende levitamise piiramiseks ja tagatakse, et õiguspärane kaubandus ei oleks takistatud.Tehnika kiire arengu tõttu tänapäeval on kontrollitavate kaupade nimekirja vaja korrapäraselt ajakohastada. Kuigi eespool nimetatud rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide raames tehtud otsused ei ole siduvad, on määruse artiklis 15 sätestatud, et „I lisas esitatud kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade loetelu ajakohastatakse kooskõlas selliste ülesannete ja kohustustega ning nende võimalike muudatustega, mida liikmesriigid on võtnud tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise rahvusvahelise korra ja ekspordi kontrollimise korra raames või asjakohaste rahvusvaheliste lepingute ratifitseerimise tulemusel.”Rahvusvahelise ekspordikontrollirežiimi raames tehakse kontrollinimekirja kohta otsuseid tavaliselt neli korda aastas. Kõnealused ajakohastused tuleb ELi õigusaktidesse sisestada korrapäraselt ja õigeaegselt, arvestades nende mõju ohutusele ja kaubandusele. Rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide otsus kontrollinimekirja uute artiklite lisamiseks tähendab ühest küljest seda, et neid lisatud artikleid tuleb kogu Euroopa Liidus ohutuse seisukohast järjekindlalt kontrollida. Teisalt tuleb võimalikult kiiresti ELi üle õigusaktidesse võtta ka selline rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide otsus, millega nähakse ette teatavate artiklite kontrollimise lõpetamine, et ELi eksportijatel oleks võimalik maailmaturul konkureerida.Praegu tuleb määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009, sealhulgas I lisa ajakohastamiseks iga kord teha seadusandlik tavamenetlus. Kuid arvestades selliste muudatuste tehnilist külge ja seda, et sellised muudatused tuleb teha kooskõlas rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide tehtud otsustega, jääb üsna vähe vabadust kontrollirežiimidega kokku lepitud muudatuste muutmiseks.Seega tuleks võtta kasutusele delegeeritud aktid, et korrapäraselt määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 I lisa ajakohastamiseks muudatusi teha. Selline lahendus võimaldaks komisjonil igal ajal, kui vaja, vajalikke muudatusi teha.Euroopa Liidu üldise ekspordiloa vajalikud muudatused (määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 II lisa)Euroopa Liidu üldine ekspordiluba, mis on sätestatud määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 artikli 9 lõikes 1 ja II lisas, on osutunud väga edukaks vahendiks lihtsustamaks teatavate artiklite väheohtlikku eksporti teatavatesse sihtkohtadesse. Juba aastaid kasutusel olnud Euroopa Liidu üldine ekspordiluba (EU001) on võimaldanud lihtsustatult eksportida enamikku kontrollitud kaupu seitsmesse vähese riskiga sihtkohta (Austraalia, Kanada, Jaapan, Uus-Meremaa, Norra, Šveits ja USA). 2008. aasta detsembris tegi komisjon ettepaneku võtta vastu kuus uut Euroopa Liidu üldist ekspordiluba[3]. 2011. aasta keskpaigaks saavutati nende lubade osas kokkulepe.Nii praegust kui ka tulevasi Euroopa Liidu üldisi ekspordilube tuleb pidevalt jälgida, et veenduda, et need hõlmavad üksnes väheohtlikke tehinguid. Kuna olukord maailmas kiiresti muutub, tuleb tagada, et olemasolevaid ELi üldisi ekspordilube saaks kiiresti muuta nii sihtkohtade kui ka artiklite osas, et ELi ekspordikontrollisüsteem järgiks õigesti olukorda muutuvas maailmas.Seega tuleks võtta kasutusele delegeeritud aktid, et komisjon saaks olemasoleva ELi üldise ekspordiloa reguleerimisealast kiiresti eemaldada sihtkohti ja artikleid.Kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi kontrolli kohta olemas olevad seadusandlikud ettepanekudEuroopa Parlamendis ja nõukogus käsitletakse praegu kahte ettepanekut määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 muutmiseks.1. Esimeses ettepanekus (KOM(2008) 854) käsitletakse uute ELi üldiste ekspordilubade kasutusele võtmist. Euroopa Parlament hääletas ettepaneku poolt 27. septembril 2011. Selle muutmismäärusega, kui see on vastu võetud, muudetakse terminoloogiat määruses (EÜ) nr 428/2009 (viited ühendusele muudetakse võimalust mööda viideteks liidule).2. Teise ettepanekuga (KOM(2010) 509) ajakohastatakse ELi kontrollinimekirja, millesse tehakse muudatused, nagu 2009. aastal rahvusvahelise ekspordi kontrollirežiimi raames kokku lepitud. Euroopa Parlament hääletas ettepaneku poolt 13. septembril 2011.Komisjoni ettepanekEelnevast lähtudes on vaja muuta määrust (EÜ) nr 428/2009.2011/0310 (COD)Ettepanek:EUROOPA PARLAMENDI JA NÕUKOGU MÄÄRUSmillega muudetakse määrust (EÜ) nr 428/2009, millega kehtestatakse ühenduse kord kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi, edasitoimetamise, vahendamise ja transiidi kontrollimiseksEUROOPA PARLAMENT JA EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingut, eriti selle artiklit 207,võttes arvesse Euroopa Komisjoni ettepanekut,olles edastanud seadusandliku akti eelnõu riikide parlamentidele,olles toiminud seadusandliku tavamenetluse kohaseltning arvestades järgmist:3. Nõukogu 5. mai 2009. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 (millega kehtestatakse ühenduse kord kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi, edasitoimetamise, vahendamise ja transiidi kontrollimiseks)[4] kohaselt tuleb selliseid kaupu tõhusalt kontrollida, kui neid eksporditakse liidust või veetakse läbi liidu või kui neid tarnitakse kolmandasse riiki liidus elava või siin asutatud vahendaja osutatud vahendusteenuse tulemusena.4. Selleks et liikmesriigid ja Euroopa Liit saaksid järgida oma rahvusvahelisi kohustusi, kehtestatakse määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 I lisaga selliste kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade loetelu, mis kuuluvad Euroopa Liidus kontrolli alla. Otsused kontrollitavate kaupade kohta tehakse Austraalia grupis (AG), raketitehnoloogia kontrollirežiimis (MTCR), tuumatarneriikide grupis (NSG) ja Wassenaari kokkuleppes ning keemiarelvade keelustamise konventsioonis (CWC) osalemise raames.5. Nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 artiklis 15 on sätestatud, et I lisa ajakohastatakse kooskõlas selliste ülesannete ja kohustustega ning nende võimalike muudatustega, mida iga liikmesriik on võtnud tuumarelvade leviku tõkestamise rahvusvaheliste mehhanismide ja ekspordi kontrollimise korra raames või asjakohaste rahvusvaheliste lepingute ratifitseerimise tulemusel.6. Määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 I lisa tuleb korrapäraselt ajakohastada, et tagada selle täielik kooskõla rahvusvaheliste ohutusalaste kohustustega, et tagada läbipaistvus ja hoida alal eksportijate konkurentsivõimet. ELi kontrollinimekirja ajakohastamisega viivitamine võib avaldada ebasoovitavat mõju ohutusele, rahvusvahelise relvaleviku tõkestamisele ja Euroopa Liidu eksportijate majandustegevusele. Arvestades selliste muudatuste tehnilist külge ja seda, et muudatused tuleb teha kooskõlas rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide tehtud otsustega, tuleks kasutada kiirendatud menetlust ajakohastamise jõustamiseks Euroopa Liidus.7. Määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 artikli 9 lõikega 1 kehtestatud ELi üldine ekspordiluba on üks neljast ekspordiloa tüübist, mis on määrusega ette nähtud. Selline üldine ekspordiluba lubab ELis asutatud eksportijatel eksportida teatavaid kaupu teatavatesse sihtkohtadesse vastavalt üldise ekspordiloa tingimustele.8. Määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 II lisas on esitatud praegu kehtiv ELi üldine ekspordiluba. Arvestades ELi üldise ekspordiloa iseloomu, võib osutuda vajalikuks loast mõne sihtkoha ja/või kauba eemaldamine, eelkõige sel juhul, kui olukorra muutumise tõttu on selge, et teatavasse sihtkohta toimuvat ja/või teatava kauba eksporti ei ole enam vaja lihtsustada ELi üldise ekspordiloaga. Teatava sihtkoha või kauba eemaldamisega ELi üldise ekspordiloa reguleerimisalast ei tohiks siiski välistada eksportija võimalust taotleda teist tüüpi ekspordiluba määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 asjaomaste sätete alusel.9. Tagamaks ELi kontrollinimekirja korrapärast ja õigeaegset ajakohastamist kooskõlas rahvusvaheliste ekspordikontrollirežiimide raames liikmesriikide võetud ülesannete ja kohustustega, tuleks kooskõlas Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikliga 290 delegeerida komisjonile õigus võtta vastu õigusakte, et muuta määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 I lisa määruse artikli 15 reguleerimisala piires. Eriti oluline on, et komisjon peaks oma ettevalmistustöö käigus asjakohaseid konsultatsioone, sh ekspertide tasandil.10. Võimaldamaks ELil kiiresti reageerida muutuvates oludes toimuva ekspordi tundlikkuse hindamisel seoses ELi üldise ekspordiloaga, tuleks kooskõlas Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikliga 290 delegeerida komisjonile õigus võtta vastu õigusakte, et muuta määruse (EÜ) nr 428/2009 II lisa ELi üldise ekspordiloa reguleerimisalast sihtkohtade ja/või artiklite eemaldamiseks. Arvesse võttes asjaolu, et selliseid muudatusi tuleks teha vaid vastava ekspordi hinnangulise ohu suurenemise korral ning et sellise ekspordi puhul üldise ekspordiloa kasutamise jätkumine võiks avaldada kahjulikku mõju Euroopa Liidu ja liikmesriikide ohutusele, võib komisjon kasutada kiirmenetlust.11. Komisjon peaks delegeeritud õigusaktide ettevalmistamise ja koostamise ajal tagama asjakohaste dokumentide sama- ja õigeaegse ning asjakohase edastamise Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule.12. Seetõttu tuleks määrust (EÜ) nr 428/2009 vastavalt muuta,ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA MÄÄRUSE:Artikkel 1Määrust (EÜ) nr 428/2009 muudetakse järgmiselt.13. Artikli 9 lõike 1 lõppu lisatakse järgmised lõigud:„Komisjonil on kooskõlas artikliga 23a õigus võtta vastu delegeeritud õigusakte sihtkohtade ja artiklite eemaldamiseks II lisas esitatud Euroopa Liidu üldise ekspordiloa reguleerimisalast.Käesoleva lõike kohaselt vastu võetud delegeeritud õigusaktide suhtes kohaldatakse artiklis 23b sätestatud menetlust, kui eriti kiireloomuliste asjaolude tõttu on nõutav teatavate sihtkohtade ja/või kaupade eemaldamine II lisas esitatud Euroopa Liidu üldisest ekspordiloast, kuna loa alusel toimuva ekspordi hinnangulist tundlikkust mõjutavad asjaolud on tunduvalt muutunud.”14. Artiklisse 15 lisatakse järgmine lõige 3:„3. Komisjonil on õigus võtta vastu delegeeritud akte kooskõlas artikliga 23a, et ajakohastada I lisas sätestatud kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade loetelu. I lisa ajakohastatakse lõikes 1 sätestatud reguleerimisalas.”15. Lisatakse artikkel 23a:„1. Delegeeritud õigusaktide vastuvõtmise õigus antakse komisjonile käesolevas artiklis sätestatud tingimustel.2. Artikli 9 lõikes 1 ja artikli 15 lõikes 3 osutatud õigus delegeeritakse määramata ajaks alates määruse (EL) nr .../... [käesolev määrus] jõustumise kuupäevast.3. Euroopa Parlament ja nõukogu võivad artikli 9 lõikes 1 ja artikli 15 lõikes 3 osutatud õiguse delegeerimise igal ajal tagasi võtta. Tagasivõtmise otsusega lõpetatakse otsuses nimetatud õiguse delegeerimine. See jõustub järgmisel päeval pärast otsuse avaldamist Euroopa Liidu Teatajas või otsuses sätestatud hilisemal kuupäeval. See ei mõjuta juba jõustunud delegeeritud õigusaktide kehtivust.4. Niipea kui komisjon on delegeeritud õigusakti vastu võtnud, teeb ta selle üheaegselt teatavaks Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule.5. Delegeeritud õigusakt, mis on vastu võetud kooskõlas artikli 9 lõikega 1 ja artikli 15 lõikega 3, jõustub ainult sel juhul, kui Euroopa Parlament ega nõukogu ei ole esitanud vastuväiteid kahe kuu jooksul pärast kõnealusest õigusaktist teatamist Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule või kui nii Euroopa Parlament kui ka nõukogu on enne nimetatud ajavahemiku lõppemist komisjonile teatanud, et nad ei kavatse vastuväiteid esitada. Kõnealust ajavahemikku võib Euroopa Parlamendi või nõukogu taotluse korral kahe kuu võrra pikendada.”16. Lisatakse artikkel 23b:„1. Käesoleva artikli alusel vastu võetud delegeeritud õigusaktid jõustuvad viivitamata ja neid kohaldatakse seni, kuni nende suhtes ei esitata lõike 2 kohaselt vastuväiteid. Kui delegeeritud õigusakt Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule teatavaks tehakse, tuleb ühtlasi põhjendada kiirmenetluse rakendamist.2. Euroopa Parlament ja nõukogu võivad delegeeritud õigusakti suhtes esitada vastuväiteid kooskõlas artikli 23a lõikes 5 osutatud menetlusega. Sellisel juhul tunnistab komisjon õigusakti kehtetuks kohe, kui talle on teatatud Euroopa Parlamendi või nõukogu otsusest esitada vastuväiteid.”Artikkel 2Käesolev määrus jõustub kahekümnendal päeval pärast selle avaldamist Euroopa Liidu Teatajas .Käesolev määrus on tervikuna siduv ja vahetult kohaldatav kõikides liikmesriikides.Brüssel,Euroopa Parlamendi nimel Nõukogu nimelPresident eesistuja [1] Nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 428/2009, 5. mai 2009, millega kehtestatakse ühenduse kord kahesuguse kasutusega kaupade ekspordi, edasitoimetamise, vahendamise ja transiidi kontrollimiseks[2] Kahesuguse kasutusega kaubad on määruse 428/2009 artikli 2 lõikes 1 määratletud kui „kaubad, sealhulgas tarkvara ja tehnoloogia, mida saab kasutada nii tsiviil- kui ka sõjalisel otstarbel, kaasa arvatud kaubad, mida saab kasutada nii rahuotstarbelisel eesmärgil, st mitte lõhkeainena, kui ka abivahendina tuumarelvade või muude tuumalõhkeseadmete tootmisel”.[3] KOM(2008) 854 lõplik[4] ELT L 134, 29.5.2009, lk 1.


text:
 1 . 2. 97 Qf Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 31 / 59
 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 199/97 DELLA COMMISSIONE
 del 31 gennaio 1997
 che stabilisce entro quali limiti possono essere accettate le domande di titoli
 d'importazione presentate nel mese di gennaio 1997 per taluni prodotti del
 settore delle uova e del pollame nel quadro del regime previsto dagli accordi
 conclusi tra la Comunità e la Repubblica di Polonia, la Repubblica di Ungheria,
 la Repubblica ceca, la Repubblica slovacca, la Romania e la Bulgaria
 LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, quantitativi disponibili e devono pertanto essere ridotte
 visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea, applicando una percentuale fissa in modo da garantire
 un'equa ripartizione dei quantitativi,
 visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 2699/93 della Commissio
 ne ('), che stabilisce le modalità d'applicazione, per il
 HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO:
 settore delle uova e del pollame, del regime previsto dagli
 accordi di associazione tra la Comunità e la Polonia,
 l'Ungheria e la ex Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca, Articolo 1
 modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n . 2513/96 (2),
 in particolare l'articolo 4, paragrafo 5, 1. Le domande di titoli d'importazione per il periodo
 dal 1° gennaio al 31 marzo 1997, presentate ai sensi dei
 visto il regolamento (CE) n . 1559/94 della Commissio regolamenti (CEE) n . 2699/93 e (CE) n . 1559/94, sono
 ne (3), che stabilisce le modalità d'applicazione, per il soddisfatte secondo quanto indicato nell'allegato I.
 settore delle uova e del pollame, del regime previsto dagli
 accordi di associazione tra la Comunità da una parte, e la 2. Nei primi dieci giorni del periodo dal 1° aprile al 30
 Bulgaria e la Romania, dall'altra, modificato da ultimo dal giugno 1997 possono essere presentate, ai sensi dei regola
 regolamento (CE) n. 2513/96, in particolare l'articolo 4, menti (CEE) n . 2699/93 e (CE) n. 1559/94, domande di
 paragrafo 5, titoli d'importazione per il quantitativo globale indicato
 nell'allegato II.
 considerando che le domande di titolo di importazione
 presentate per il primo trimestre 1997 vertono, per alcuni Articolo 2
 prodotti, su quantitativi inferiori o uguali ai quantitativi
 disponibili e possono pertanto essere interamente soddi Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1° febbraio
 sfatte, mentre, per altri prodotti, esse sono superiori ai 1997.
 Il presente regolamento e obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile
 in ciascuno degli Stati membri .
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 31 gennaio 1997.
 Per la Commissione
 Franz FISCHLER
 Membro della Commissione
 (') GU n. L 245 dellì . 10 . 1993, pag. 88 .
 (2) GU n. L 345 del 31 . 12. 1996, pag. 30.
 (A GU n. L 166 dell' i . 7. 1994, pag. 62.
 ---pagebreak--- N. L 31 /60 flTl Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 1 . 2. 97
 ALLEGATO I
 Percentuale di accettazione delle domande
 Numero di titoli d'importazione presentate
 del gruppo per il periodo che va dal
 1° gennaio al 31 marzo 1997
 1 5,10
 2 8,80
 4 100,00
 7 3,41
 8 10,42
 9 4,20
 10 100,00
 11 100,00
 12 12,71
 14
 15 74,36
 16 100,00
 17
 18
 19 50,00
 21 100,00
 22 100,00
 23 100,00
 24 100,00
 25
 26
 27
 28
 30
 31
 32
 33
 34
 35
 36
 37 23,23
 38
 39
 40
 43 100,00
 ---pagebreak--- 1 . 2. 97 | IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 31 /61
 ALLEGATO II
 (in tonnellate)
 Numero Quantitativo globale disponibile
 per il periodo dal
 del gruppo
 1° aprile al 30 giugno 1997
 1 2 335,50
 2 332,50
 4 5 335,00
 7 2 100,00
 8 512,50
 9 512,50
 10 693,50
 11 145,00
 12 198,90
 14 875,00
 15 1 225,00
 16 700,00
 17 750,00
 18 110,00
 19 71,25
 21 693,36
 22 475,00
 23 1 105,00
 24 125,00
 25 2 395,00
 26 130,00
 27 905,00
 28 78,00
 30 625,00
 31 275,00
 32 345,00
 33 225,00
 34 1 215,00
 35 70,00
 36 490,00
 37 49,38
 38 282,01
 39 886,80
 40 165,40
 43 562,62


text:
Umeå (kiejtve kb. űmió; finnül Uumaja, északi számiul Ubmi) város Svédországban. Norrland legnagyobb városa, Västerbotten megye és Umeå község székhelye. Lakossága .
 Umeå egyike Svédország leggyorsabban fejlődő városainak. A fejlődés 1965-ben, az Umeåi Egyetem megalapításának évében kezdett felgyorsulni. Az utóbbi 30 évben a lakásépítések száma megduplázódott.
 Történelem
 Nevét az Ume-folyóról kapta. (Az å svédül folyót jelent. Eredetileg a folyó és a város neve azonos volt. A mai svéd nyelvben azonban az Ume folyóra a nagyobb folyót jelentő älv szót alkalmazzák, az Umeå csak a város neve maradt.)
 Az első említés Umeåról a XIV. században történt. Ezekben az időkben Észak-Svédország nagy része még felfedezetlen volt. A város egyfajta őrtoronyként szolgált az északi pusztán.
 A következő évszázadokban Umeå volt az egyik olyan hely, ahol jelentős kereskedelem folyt a számikkal.
 1622-ben a várost II. Nagy Gusztáv Adolf alapította újra. 1638-ban körülbelül 40 ház volt itt.
 Az itteniek sokat szenvedtek az orosz támadásoktól 1714-ben és 1720-ban. 1809-ben a finn háború alatt az orosz hadsereg, Barclay de Tolly vezetésével elfoglalta a várost, de nemsokára el is vesztette azt.
 1888. június 20-án Umeå keleti részét tűz sújtotta, ami miatt a város 3000 lakójából 2300 otthontalanná vált. A tűz utáni újjáépítéskor rengeteg közönséges nyírfát ültettek, hogy a jövőbeli tüzek terjedését megakadályozzák.
 Innen ered a város mai beceneve; A nyírfák városa (Björkarnas Stad).
 Kultúra
 Umeå a kultúra észak-svédországi fővárosává vált. Itt található a Norrland Opera. Az Umeåi Jazzfesztivál egyike Skandinávia legnagyobb jazzfesztiváljainak. Ezenkívül Umeå az otthona a Refused együttesnek, valamint a progresszív metált játszó Meshuggahnak és Cult of Lunának. A városban található a Bildmuseet kortárs művészeti múzeum, a Västerbottens Múzeum és a Gitármúzeum.
 Umeå rendkívül multikulturális város: több mint 100 nemzetiség lakja. A világ legészakibb mecsetje szintén itt található.
 A város elnyerte a jogot, hogy 2014-ben Rigával együtt Európa kulturális fővárosa címet viselheti.
 Nevezetességei
 Umeå városi templom – 1892 és 1894 között épült neogót stílusú evangélikus templom.
 Döbeln-park – 1865-ben létesített közpark a város központjában, számos kulturális rendezvény színhelye.
 Északi Arborétum – a város központjától mintegy 8 kilométerre fekszik, megtalálhatók benne az északi félteke minden kontinensének hidegtűrő fa- és cserjefajai.
 Gamla bron (Öreg híd) – Umeå legrégebbi fennmaradt hídja az Ume-folyó fölött.
 Von Ahnska magasinet – fából készült műemlék raktár-épület az Ume-folyó partján.
 Bildmuseet (Képmúzeum) – kortárs művészeti múzeum.
 Gamla bankhuset (Régi banképület) – 1877-ben épült kétszintes sárga neoreneszánsz műemlék épület.
 Lev! – 170 méter hosszú üvegfal egy gyalogos és kerékpáros alagútban
 Média
 Az SVT Nord és a TV4 észak-svédországi irodái a városban találhatók. A megye fő újságjainak, a Västerbottens-Kurirennek és a Västerbottens Folkbladnak szintén ebben a városban van a központja.
 Sport
 Az Umeå IK a világ egyik legjobb női labdarúgó csapata, többszörös svéd bajnok és nemzetközi kupagyőztes.
 A legjobb férfi labdarúgóklub az Umeå FC jelenleg a harmadosztályban játszik míg a város jégkorongcsapata az IF Björklöven a másodosztályban.
 Egészségügy
 Első kórháza – katonai jellegű járványkórházként – 1784-ben létesült, az egykori lazarett épülete még ma is áll. A város terjeszkedésével azonban új kórház építésére volt szükség, amit 1907-ben adtak át, és azóta is folyamatosan fejlesztik. A Norrland Egyetemi Kórház ma Észak-Svédország legnagyobb egészségügyi létesítménye, egyben az Umeåi Egyetem oktató kórháza.
 Személyek
 Meshuggah - Svéd extrém metalegyüttes
 Jesper Blomqvist (1974–) labdarúgó
 Linda Bergkvist
 Testvérvárosok
 Vaasa, Finnország
 Harstad, Norvégia
 Helsingør, Dánia
 Würzburg, Németország
 Petrozavodszk, Oroszország
 Saskatoon, Kanada
 Kásán, Irán
 Oxford, Anglia
 Panoráma
 Jegyzetek
 Források
 Hivatalos oldal
 Svédország települései
 Västerbotten megye