type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 3.7.2010
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 179/35
 Vispārējās tiesas 2010. gada 11. maija spriedums — Abadía Retuerta/ITSB (“CUVÉE PALOMAR”)
 (Lieta T-237/08) (1)
 (Kopienas preču zīme - Kopienas vārdiskas preču zīmes “CUVÉE PALOMAR” reģistrācijas pieteikums - Absolūts atteikuma pamatojums - Vīna preču zīmes, kas ietver ģeogrāfiskas norādes - TRIPs līgums - Regulas (EK) Nr. 40/94 7. panta 1. punkta j) apakšpunkts (tagad - Regulas (EK) Nr. 207/2009 7. panta 1. punkta j) apakšpunkts))
 2010/C 179/59
 Tiesvedības valoda — spāņu
 Lietas dalībnieki
 Prasītāja: Abadía Retuerta, SA (Sardona de Dvero, Spānija) (pārstāvji — X. Fàbrega Sabaté un M-l. Curell Aguilà, advokāti)
 Atbildētājs: Iekšējā tirgus saskaņošanas birojs (preču zīmes, paraugi un modeļi) (ITSB) (pārstāvis — J. Crespo Carrillo)
 Priekšmets
 Prasība par ITSB Apelāciju pirmās padomes 2008. gada 2. aprīļa lēmumu lietā R 1185/2007-1 par vārdiska apzīmējuma “CUVÉE PALOMAR” reģistrāciju kā Kopienas preču zīmi
 Rezolutīvā daļa:
 1)
 prasību noraidīt;
 2)
 Abadía Retuerta, SA atlīdzina tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 (1) OV C 272, 25.10.2008.


text:
8.3.2003 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie C 55/3
 Cellier des Dauphins, en Newcastle United Football Company samengesteld als volgt: G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias, president,
 Ltd, om een prejudiciële beslissing over de uitlegging van J.-P. Puissochet en M. Wathelet, kamerpresidenten, C. Gul-
 artikel 59 EG-Verdrag (thans, na wijziging, artikel 49 EG), mann, A. La Pergola (rapporteur), P. Jann, V. Skouris, F. Mac-
 heeft het Hof, samengesteld als volgt: G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias, ken, N. Colneric, S. von Bahr en J. N. Cunha Rodrigues,
 president, J.-P. Puissochet en M. Wathelet, kamerpresidenten, rechters; advocaat-generaal: L. A. Geelhoed; griffier: M.-F. Con-
 C. Gulmann, D. A. O. Edward, P. Jann (rapporteur) en tet, administrateur, op 21 januari 2003 een arrest gewezen
 V. Skouris, F. Macken en N. Colneric, S. von Bahr en J. N. Cunha waarvan het dictum luidt als volgt:
 Rodrigues, rechters; advocaat-generaal: A. Tizzano; griffier:
 L. Hewlett, hoofdadministrateur, op 21 januari 2003 een arrest 1) Verklaart nietig artikel 11, lid 2, van verordening (EG)
 gewezen waarvan het dictum luidt als volgt: nr. 1655/2000 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van
 17 juli 2000 betreffende het financieringsinstrument voor het
 Het bij beschikking van 28 juli 2000 van de High Court of Justice milieu (LIFE).
 (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division, ingediende verzoek om
 een prejudiciële beslissing is niet-ontvankelijk. 2) Verstaat dat de op de datum van uitspraak van dit arrest
 reeds vastgestelde maatregelen tot uitvoering van verordening
 nr. 1655/2000 niet door dit arrest worden aangetast.
 ( 1) PB C 302 van 21.10.2000.
 3) Verstaat dat de gevolgen van artikel 11, lid 2, van verordening
 nr. 1655/2000 volledig worden gehandhaafd totdat het
 Parlement en de Raad nieuwe bepalingen inzake de comitépro-
 cedure voor de maatregelen tot uitvoering van voornoemde
 verordening zullen hebben vastgesteld.
 ARREST VAN HET HOF
 4) Verwijst het Europees Parlement en de Raad van de Europese
 Unie in de kosten.
 van 21 januari 2003
 (1 ) PB C 355 van 9.12.2000.
 in zaak C-378/00: Commissie van de Europese Gemeen-
 schappen tegen Europees Parlement en Raad van de
 Europese Unie (1)
 („Comitologie — Besluit 1999/468/EG van de Raad tot
 vaststelling van de voorwaarden voor de uitoefening van de ARREST VAN HET HOF
 aan de Commissie verleende uitvoeringsbevoegdheden —
 Criteria voor keuze tussen verschillende procedures tot vast- (Zesde kamer)
 stelling van uitvoeringsmaatregelen — Gevolgen — Motive-
 ringsplicht — Gedeeltelijke nietigverklaring van verordening van 23 januari 2003
 (EG) nr. 1655/2000 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad
 betreffende het financieringsinstrument voor het milieu in de gevoegde zaken C-421/00, C-426/00 en C-16/01
 (LIFE)”) (verzoek van het Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für
 Kärnten, het Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat Wien en het
 (2003/C 55/05) Verwaltungsgerichtshof om een prejudiciële beslissing):
 Renate Sterbenz en Paul Dieter Haug (1)
 (Procestaal: Frans)
 („Harmonisatie van wetgevingen — Artikelen 28 EG en 30
 EG — Richtlijn 79/112/EEG — Etikettering en presentatie
 (Voorlopige vertaling; de definitieve vertaling verschijnt in de Jurispru- van levensmiddelen”)
 dentie van het Hof)
 (2003/C 55/06)
 In zaak C-378/00, Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschap- (Procestaal: Duits)
 pen (gemachtigde: D. Maidani) tegen Europees Parlement
 (gemachtigden: C. Pennera en M. Moore), en Raad van de (Voorlopige vertaling; de definitieve vertaling verschijnt in de Jurispru-
 Europese Unie (gemachtigden: J.-P. Jacqué en G. Houttuin) dentie van het Hof)
 ondersteund door Verenigd Koninkrijk van Groot-Brittannië
 en Noord-Ierland (gemachtigde: G. Amodeo, bijgestaan door
 M. Hoskins), betreffende een beroep tot nietigverklaring van In de gevoegde zaken C-421/00, C-426/00 en C-16/01,
 verordening (EG) nr. 1655/2000 van het Europees Parlement betreffende verzoeken aan het Hof krachtens artikel 234
 en de Raad van 17 juli 2000 betreffende het financieringsin- EG van respectievelijk de Unabhängige Verwaltungssenat für
 strument voor het milieu (LIFE) (PB L 192, blz. 1), voorzover Kärnten (Oostenrijk), de Unabhängige Verwaltungssenat Wien
 daarin de vaststelling van maatregelen tot uitvoering van het (Oostenrijk) en het Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Oostenrijk), in de
 programma LIFE wordt onderworpen aan de regelgevingspro- aldaar dienende strafzaken tegen Renate Sterbenz (C-421/
 cedure bedoeld in artikel 5 van besluit 1999/468/EG van de 00), en Paul Dieter Haug (C-426/00 en C-16/01), om een
 Raad van 28 juni 1999 tot vaststelling van de voorwaarden prejudiciële beslissing over de uitlegging van de artikelen 28
 voor de uitoefening van de aan de Commissie verleende EG en 30 EG alsmede richtlijn 79/112/EEG van de Raad van
 uitvoeringsbevoegdheden (PB L 184, blz. 23), heeft het Hof, 18 december 1978 betreffende de onderlinge aanpassing van


text:
 9.6.2007
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 129/20
 Prasība, kas celta 2007. gada 8. aprīlī — Spira/Komisija
 (Lieta T-108/07)
 (2007/C 129/36)
 Tiesvedības valoda — angļu
 Lietas dalībnieki
 Prasītāja: Diamanthandel A. Spira BVBA, Antverpene (Beļģija) (pārstāvji — J. Bourgeois, Y. van Gerven, F. Louis un A. Vallery, advokāti)
 Atbildētāja: Eiropas Kopienu Komisija
 Prasītājas prasījumi:
 —
 atcelt Komisijas 2007. gada 26. janvāra lēmumu, kas pieņemts saskaņā ar Padomes Regulas Nr. 773/2004 7. panta 2. punktu lietā COMP/38.826/B-2 — Spira/De Beers/DTC Supplier of Choice;
 —
 piespriest Komisijai atlīdzināt tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 Pamati un galvenie argumenti
 Prasītāja apstrīd Komisijas 2007. gada 26. janvāra lēmumu konkurences lietā COMP/38.826/B-2 — Spira/De Beers/DTC Supplier of Choice, ar kuru Komisija noraidīja prasītājas sūdzību par EKL 81. un 82. panta pārkāpumu saistībā ar De Beers uzņēmuma grupas izmantoto “Izvēlētā piegādātāja ”sistēmu neapstrādātu dimantu izplatīšanai, apgalvojot, ka Kopienai nav pietiekamu interešu rīkoties saistībā ar prasītājas sūdzību.
 Prasītāja apgalvo, ka De Beers, neapstrādātu dimantu ražotāja, kas saskaņā ar prasītājas teikto galvenokārt ir iesaistīta neapstrādātu dimantu tirdzniecības sākotnējā stadijā, ar “Izvēlētā piegādātāja ”sistēmu mēģina palielināt kontroli tirgū, lai aptvertu visu dimantu ceļu no raktuvēm līdz patērētājam, proti, arī vēlākus tirgus.
 Prasības pamatojumā prasītāja izvirza trīs pamatus.
 Pirmkārt, prasītāja apgalvo, ka Komisija neizpildīja savu pienākumu rūpīgi un objektīvi izskatīt sūdzību un ar pienācīgu rūpību un objektivitāti pārbaudīt sūdzībā kritizētās pret konkurenci vērstās darbības.
 Otrkārt, prasītāja apgalvo, ka Komisija nevarēja apgalvot, ka Kopienai nebija pietiekamu interešu rīkoties saistībā ar sūdzību, ievērojot iesaistītā uzņēmuma lielumu, pret konkurenci vērsto darbību ģeogrāfisko apmēru, kā arī pārkāpumu konkurencei un iekšējam tirgum nodarīto kaitējumu.
 Treškārt un visbeidzot, prasītāja apgalvo, ka Komisija secināja, ka nepastāv pietiekamas Kopienas intereses, pamatojoties uz kļūdainu lietas apstākļu faktisko un juridisko vērtējumu, jo:
 1)
 Komisija neņēma vērā acīmredzamo un publiski paziņoto De Beers ierobežotās selektīvās izplatīšanas sistēmas pret konkurenci vērsto mērķi;
 2)
 Komisija nevarēja novērtēt De Beers izplatīšanas sistēmas pret konkurenci vērstās sekas, vispirms nenovērtējot De Beers dominējošo stāvokli un ietekmi tirgū;
 3)
 Komisija neņēma vērā daudzus pierādījumus, uz kuriem tās uzmanība bija vērsta sūdzībā un kuri apliecināja sistēmas ļaunprātīgo un pret konkurenci vērsto raksturu;
 4)
 Komisija nepareizi novērtēja pārskatīto Noteikumu par vēršanos pie šķīrējtiesneša, ko De Beers ieviesa, lai atrisinātu strīdus par izplatīšanas sistēmas ieviešanu, iedarbīgumu;
 5)
 Komisija pieļāva kļūdu tiesību piemērošanā un acīmredzamu kļūdu faktu vērtējumā, atzīstot, ka De Beers izplatīšanas sistēma nenoslēdza tirgu.


text:
 22.11.2008
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 301/66
 2008. október 3-án benyújtott kereset – Ackerman és társai kontra EBB
 (F-79/08. sz. ügy)
 (2008/C 301/129)
 Az eljárás nyelve: francia
 Felek
 Felperes: Lucie Ackerman (Strasbourg, Franciaország) és társai (képviselő: L. Lévi ügyvéd)
 Alperes: Európai Beruházási Bank
 A jogvita tárgya és leírása
 A felperesek 2008. februári nyugdíjértesítőinek megsemmisítése annyiban, amennyiben azok 2007-re vonatkozóan csupán 2008. január 1-jére visszamenőlegesen alkalmaznak éves kiigazítást, nem pedig 2007. július 1-jétől kezdődően, ebből következően az Európai Beruházási Bank kötelezése a 2007. évi kiigazítás hátralékának megfizetésére, valamint a 2007. évi kiigazításnak a 2009. januárjától fizetendő nyugdíjra való kihatásaként járó összeg megfizetésére, továbbá a nyugdíjhátralék után késedelmi kamat megfizetése a felpereseknek járó teljes összeg megfizetéséig.
 Kereseti kérelmek
 —
 A Közszolgálati Törvényszék semmisítse meg a felperesek 2008. februári nyugdíjértesítőit annyiban, amennyiben azok 2007-re vonatkozóan csupán 2008. január 1-jére visszamenőlegesen alkalmaznak éves kiigazítást, nem pedig 2007. július 1-jétől kezdődően, és amennyiben szükséges semmisítse meg az alperes által a felperesekhez címzett 2008. február 13-i feljegyzést;
 —
 a Közszolgálati Törvényszék kötelezze az alperest (i) a 2007. évi kiigazítás hátralékának, vagyis a 2007. július 1.–2007. december 31. közötti időszakra vonatkozóan 2,2 %-os emelés; (ii) a 2007. évi kiigazításnak a 2009. januárjától fizetendő nyugdíjra való kihatásaként járó összeg; (iii) a felpereseknek fizetendő teljes összeg kiegyenlítéséig a nyugdíjhátralék után járó késedelmi kamat megfizetésére; a késedelmi kamatot az Európai Központi Bank által a főbb refinanszírozási műveletekre megállapított, az érintett időszakban alkalmazott kamatlábat három százalékponttal meghaladó mértéket alapul véve kell kiszámítani;
 —
 a Közszolgálati Törvényszék az Európai Beruházási Bankot kötelezze a költségek viselésére.


type: other

text:
LEGE 22 11/01/2007 - Portal Legislativ
 LEGE nr. 22 din 11 ianuarie 2007pentru aprobarea Ordonantei de urgenta a Guvernului nr. 54/2006 privind regimul contractelor de concesiune de bunuri proprietate publică
 Parlamentul României adopta prezenta lege. + Articolul UNICSe aprobă Ordonanţa de urgenta a Guvernului nr. 54 din 28 iunie 2006 privind regimul contractelor de concesiune de bunuri proprietate publică, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 569 din 30 iunie 2006, cu urmatoarele modificari:1. La articolul 10, alineatul (2) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"(2) Concedentul este obligat ca, într-un termen de 30 de zile de la insusirea propunerii de concesionare formulate de persoana interesata, sa procedeze la intocmirea studiului de oportunitate."2. La articolul 14, litera a) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"a) licitaţia - procedura la care persoana fizica sau juridica interesata are dreptul de a depune oferta;".3. Articolul 19 va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 19. - Persoana interesata are dreptul de a transmite o solicitare de participare la procedura de atribuire a contractului de concesiune."4. La articolul 20, alineatul (1) şi litera b) a alineatului (2) vor avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 20. - (1) Concedentul are obligaţia să asigure obtinerea documentatiei de atribuire de către persoana interesata, care inainteaza o solicitare în acest sens......................................................................... b) punerea la dispoziţia persoanei interesate care a inaintat o solicitare în acest sens a unui exemplar din documentaţia de atribuire, pe suport hartie şi/sau pe suport magnetic." ... 5. La articolul 22, alineatul (1) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 22. - (1) Persoana interesata are dreptul de a solicita şi de a obtine documentaţia de atribuire."6. La articolul 23, alineatul (1) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 23. - (1) Persoana interesata are dreptul de a solicita clarificari privind documentaţia de atribuire."7. La articolul 28, alineatul (1) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 28. - (1) Persoana interesata are dreptul de a solicita şi de a obtine documentaţia de atribuire."8. La articolul 29, alineatul (1) va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 29. - (1) Persoana interesata are dreptul de a solicita clarificari privind documentaţia de atribuire."9. Articolul 47 va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 47. - Persoana care a participat la intocmirea documentatiei de atribuire are dreptul de a fi ofertant, dar numai în cazul în care implicarea sa în elaborarea documentatiei de atribuire nu este de natura sa defavorizeze concurenta."10. Articolul 64 va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 64. - Persoana care considera ca un contract a fost calificat drept contract de concesiune de bunuri proprietate publică, cu nerespectarea prevederilor Ordonantei de urgenta a Guvernului nr. 34/2006, aprobata cu modificari şi completari prin Legea nr. 337/2006, poate solicita punctul de vedere al Autorităţii Naţionale pentru Reglementarea şi Monitorizarea Achizitiilor Publice."11. Articolul 69 va avea urmatorul cuprins:"Art. 69. - Prevederile art. 67 şi 68 referitoare la contraventii se completeaza cu dispozitiile Ordonantei Guvernului nr. 2/2001 privind regimul juridic al contraventiilor, aprobata cu modificari şi completari prin Legea nr. 180/2002, cu modificările şi completările ulterioare."Această lege a fost adoptata de Parlamentul României, cu respectarea prevederilor art. 75 şi ale art. 76 alin. (1) din Constitutia României, republicată.PRESEDINTELE CAMEREI DEPUTATILOR PRESEDINTELE SENATULUIBOGDAN OLTEANU NICOLAE VACAROIUBucureşti, 11 ianuarie 2007.Nr. 22.----------


jurisdiction: US

text:
The appeal in this case is from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City in favor of the appellees against the appellant. The suit was brought in assumpsit on the common counts, and a special count to recover for furnishing and erecting, in the appellant's theatre, an engine and dynamo with a switch board and other appliances. The articles thus supplied by the appellees, when connected with a boiler already on the appellant's premises and the system of wiring already installed there, were intended to produce an electric current sufficient for about 950 lights distributed around the interior of the building.
 The contract declared on in the special count of the declaration originated in the sending on Dec. 22d 1899, by the appellees to the appellant of the following letter:
 "Mr. James L. Kernan, Proprietor Howard Auditorium, City.
 Dear Sir: We submit for your consideration the following proposal. We propose to furnish and erect at your Auditorium on North Howard street one 100 horse power automatic engine and one 1000 light dynamo. We propose to furnish and erect this engine and dynamo on foundation complete, the engine to be connected with steam pipes from boiler and the exhaust pipe up through the building with hood on same. We also propose to connect exhaust from the engine to your heating apparatus, and also make provision for a direct connection of steam, so that the building can be heated by live steam when the engine is not in operation.
 We propose also to furnish with this plant a switch-board and all the necessary connections including an excitor for the dynamo and all the belting. We will also furnish if necessary any converter that is required in the building.
 This estimate is intended to put this engine and dynamo up complete, and in running order, and we guarantee to do the same within three weeks from date of order. We have the *Page 219
 engine and dynamo on hand. We will complete the above in first class manner for the sum of $3,500.
 Soliciting your order we beg to remain,
 Yours truly,
 Crook, Horner Co."
 The appellant declined to accept the proposal at the price of $3,500, whereupon the appellees reduced the proposed price to $3,000 and the appellant accepted the proposal.
 There is evidence in the record tending to prove the following facts, towit: It was known to both parties to this contract that the engine and dynamo proposed to be supplied were not made by the appellees but were second-hand ones which had been purchased by them from sources which they made known. The appellees furnished and erected the various articles and performed the work called for in the contract, in the theatre of the appellant, and also cleaned out the tubes of the boiler and made sundry repairs to it in order to put it in working order, and also supplied the material and performed the labor charged for in the account filed with the declaration in addition to those called for in the contract. After the engine had been connected with the boiler and the dynamo and other appliances connected with the wires in place at the theatre, the lighting plant thus made up frequently if not currently proved inadequate to supply the 950 lights in position there and furnished an insufficient and unsteady illumination of the building. The plant was kept in operation by the appellant from when it was turned over to him in about the middle of March until the close of his theatrical season in the middle of May. During this period the appellees with his permission made sundry repairs to and changes of portions of the plant to improve its service, but the appellant was frequently compelled to procure from the Electric Light Company a portion of the electric current necessary to keep in operation the 950 lights which the plant was expected to provide for.
 On May 10th the appellant wrote to the appellees this letter. *Page 220
 "Baltimore, Md., May 10, 1900.
 "Messrs. Crook, Horner Co., North Howard street, Baltimore.
 Gentlemen, I regret to inform you that it will be impossible for me to accept the electric light plant which you have installed in the Howard Auditorium, as it is entirely unsatisfactory. My season will close on Saturday night of the present week, and I would suggest that you remove the machinery as soon thereafter as possible.
 "If I should decide during the summer to install a larger plant with sufficient capacity to carry the lights of the entire house, I will be pleased to consult with you and give your firm the preference.
 "Yours truly,
 James L. Kernan."
 The appellees insisted that they had complied with their contract and refused to take back the portion of the plant that had been furnished by them and demanded payment therefor, and subsequently brought the present suit and recovered the judgment from which the appeal was taken.
 The evidence as to the true cause of the failure of the electric plant to do satisfactorily the work expected of it was quite conflicting. The appellant offered much testimony of experts and others tending to prove that the failure was occasioned by the inefficiency of the engine and dynamo and also by the improper manner in which they had been coupled in their erection, which rendered it impossible to continuously maintain the high speed of the dynamo essential to the production of a sufficiently strong and steady current to supply the 950 lights required for illuminating the theatre. The appellees on the other hand offered the testimony of one of their firm, and of the engineer who ran the engine and of two electrical engineers tending to prove that the several stipulations of the contract had been performed and that the engine and dynamo were in good condition and properly erected and were capable of furnishing and did at times furnish sufficient current for about 1,000 lights; but that the boiler with which the appellant attempted to operate them was too small to constantly generate the *Page 221
 quantity of steam requisite to drive them at the speed necessary to furnish the desired current, and also that some of the wires of the lighting system in use at the theatre were so small that they caused a loss of the current in its transmission over them. The appellee Crook testified without contradiction that all of the appliances, furnished under the contract by his firm to the appellant, except the engine and dynamo were new and that the appellees had paid $1,150 for those appliances and their installation at the theatre.
 The principles of law controlling the determination of this case as it was presented in the lower Court are familiar and can be stated without great difficulty. The contract of the appellees made in conformity to their written proposal of December 22d 1899, did not contain a warranty either express or implied that the engine, dynamo and other articles supplied by them would, when erected in the appellant's theatre, efficiently light the 950 lights already installed in that building. This is not the case of a manufacturer contracting to supply an article which he manufactures to be applied to the particular purpose for which it is to be used by the purchaser, where there arises by operation of law, as an incident of the sale, an implied warranty that the article sold shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied. The law applicable to that class of cases is clearly stated and well supported by authority in the recent case of Queen City Glass Co. v. Clay Pot Co., 97 Md. 440.
 In the present case it was known to the purchaser that the engine and dynamo, which were the most important articles included in the sale, were not manufactured by the vendors and were not even new, but were second-hand articles which they had in their possession. Still more important is the fact that these articles did not of themselves when erected and put in good running order constitute a complete electric light plant. The essential elements of steam power to operate the engine and wires to transmit the electric current when generated by the dynamo, were to be supplied by the purchaser and for those purposes he furnished an old boiler which had been used *Page 222
 for heating the building and a system of wiring which had also been in use before. Out of that state of facts no implied warranty arose that, as a result of the performance by the appellees of their contract, the 950 lights of the theatre should be kept supplied with a sufficient illuminating current.
 All that the appellees contract amounted to, beyond an undertaking to supply and erect complete and in running order the articles mentioned in their proposal and make the connections therein specified, was a representation that when they were so erected and connected the engine would be capable of furnishing 100 horse-power and the dynamo of supplying current sufficient for 1000 electric lights. These representations being material ones the appellees were bound to an essential and substantial fulfillment of them, but not to a strictly and technically accurate one as would have been the case if they had been warranties. The appellees, upon proof that they had performed their contract as above stated and had essentially and substantially complied with those representations, were entitled to recover the contract price.
 The taking over by the appellant to his own control of the articles supplied and erected by the appellees under their contract, and operating them by his own employees for two months until the end of the season amounted to an acceptance of them, unless the jury believed his testimony that while he was so using the plant he repeatedly informed the appellees that it was not doing its work properly and was not satisfactory and that he continued using it only in reliance on the assurance of the appellees that they would make it supply the proper amount of light and that if they failed to do so they would take out the articles supplied by them and they should not cost the appellant anything. If he once accepted these articles he could not afterwards reject them or rescind the contract. Cole v.Hines, 81 Md. 476. If they proved to be defective or unsound or did not reasonably and substantially answer to the representations made at the time of their sale to him and he suffered any loss or damage therefrom he was entitled to rely on those facts by way of defense or recoupment *Page 223
 and thereby diminish the amount of the recovery against him.Abbott v. Gatch, 13 Md. 315; Warfield v. Booth,33 Md. 72-3; Graff v. Hensel, 33 Md. 165; Sentman v. Gamble,69 Md. 306; Harmon v. Bannon, 71 Md. 428.
 If on the other hand the jury believed that the articles furnished and erected by the appellees under their contract were never accepted by the appellant and that the engine was not capable of developing 100 horse-power or the dynamo of generating current sufficient to reasonably supply 1,000 electric lights, after the said engine and dynamo had been completely erected and finished by the appellees, then the appellant having by his letter of May 10th, 1900, declined to accept the said articles and requested their removal by the appellees the latter were not entitled to recover anything for them.
 It appears from the record that the appellees as plaintiffs offered five prayers and the appellant as defendant offered seventeen. The Court granted the plaintiffs first, second, third and fourth and the defendant's third, fourth, sixth and seventh prayers and rejected all of the others.
 We will first notice the prayers which were granted. The plaintiffs first prayer correctly states the law upon the theory that they had fully complied with and performed their contract. Their second prayer requires the jury to allow the plaintiffs the reasonable worth of certain articles charged in the account filed with the declaration, exclusive of those called for in the contract, if they should find that they had been delivered to the defendant upon his order and accepted by him. Their third prayer instructs the jury that, if they find that the plaintiffs performed their contract as set forth in the first prayer, then the defendant had no right to require the removal of the plant because he thought that it would not accomplish the work that he desired. Their fourth prayer asserts that if the jury find that the plaintiffs substantially and in good faith executed their contract they were entitled to recover the contract price notwithstanding the fact that there was some delay in the completion of the installation of the electric plant. As there was no attempt made to insist upon the time limit of the contract this prayer was properly granted. *Page 224
 The defendant's third prayer instructed the jury that if, after the plaintiffs had finally and completely installed the electric light plant, it failed to supply current for 1,000 lights in a reasonably efficient manner because of the want of capacity or by reason of improper installation of the dynamo, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover anything for the plant unless the defendant accepted the same, and in that event they could only recover what it was reasonably worth. His fourth prayer asserted that his use of the electric plant up until the middle of May did not amount to an acceptance of it if he was induced to continue to use it by the plaintiffs assurance that if he would do so they would make it work properly or take it out and charge him nothing for it. His sixth prayer asserted that if the plant failed to supply the 1,000 light current by reason of its faulty installation by the plaintiffs they were not entitled to recover the contract price, but if the defendant had accepted the plant they were entitled to recover what it was worth and no more. His seventh prayer asserts that there is no legally sufficient evidence in the case of the negligent operation of the light plant by the defendant's employees.
 These granted prayers of the plaintiffs and defendant correctly and fully stated the law of the case, and gave to the latter the benefit of every proposition to which he was fairly entitled.
 Of the defendant's rejected prayers Nos. 1 and 1 1/2 assert that there was no evidence legally sufficient to show that the dynamo did or could supply current sufficient for 1,000 lights. Nos. 2 and 2 1/2 assert that there was no such evidence of an acceptance by the defendant of the articles furnished and erected under the contract, and No. 3 3/4 asserts that there was no such evidence of the failure of the wiring at the theatre to convey a sufficient current for the lights. We have already said that in our opinion there was such evidence of all of those facts. Some of the evidence was not very strong, but it was legally sufficient. Its weight was a question for the jury. His prayers Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 assert propositions which are in effect covered by the proposition asserted in his sixth prayer *Page 225
 which was granted and has already been noticed by us. His prayer No. 2 3/4 asserts that there is no legally sufficient evidence that defendant derived any benefit from the installation of the plant furnished by the plaintiffs. In view of the fact that he used it to light his theatre in whole or in part for several months, the Court could not properly have granted that prayer. His prayer No. 5 proceeds upon the theory that the plant installed by the plaintiffs under their contract must have been sufficient to supply current for 1,000 lights, without making any reference to the furnishing by the defendant of sufficient steam power to operate the plant which is not mentioned or noticed in the prayer. Prayer No. 12 asserts that if the failure to supply sufficient electric current was due to the inability of the boiler to generate enough steam the plaintiffs could not recover, because there is no evidence that they informed the defendant of that fact. It is apparent from what we have said of the true nature of the plaintiffs contract neither of these two prayers should have been granted.
 What we have said of the prayers disposes of the defendant's special exceptions to the granting of the plaintiffs prayers one, two, three and four for want of legally sufficient evidence to sustain them.
 The record discloses seven bills of exceptions taken to the Court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence. The first of these was to the question put by the plaintiff's counsel to their expert witness Roberts, who had superintended the erection of the plant. He was asked to state of his own knowledge what was the character of the dynamo, how many lights it was expected to furnish. He replied in substance, that the factory rating of the dynamo was 1,200 lights; that so far as he knew no test of its full capacity had been made, but in the service at the theatre according to the test of the instruments on the switch board it gave approximately 1,000 lights. The question required the witness to speak of his own knowledge, and his answer was pertinent to the issue and was competent evidence. That objection was properly overruled. The next two objections were to questions put by the plaintiffs counsel *Page 226
 on cross-examination to one of the defendant's experts who had testified that the coupling of the engine and dynamo was too short. He was asked whether the engine room was large enough to have permitted a longer coupling and replied that it was not. The objection was based upon the theory that the record showed that the engine room had been selected by the plaintiffs, and that there were other adjoining rooms that could have been added to the engine room to make it larger if the plaintiff had demanded them. Those were all facts to be considered by the jury in determining the responsibility for the short coupling if they found that to be defective construction, but the questions were within the range of legitimate cross-examination.
 The remaining objections related to questions put by plaintiff's counsel in rebuttal to their expert witnesses in reference to their views and experience as to what the defendant's experts had testified were in their opinion defective or injudicious features of the method of erecting the engine and dynamo adopted by the plaintiffs. We do not find any reversible error in the admission of this evidence. The defendant had the benefit of his expert testimony upon the same subject, and the plaintiffs were entitled to have the opinion of their experts upon it also go to the jury for what it was worth.
 We are of opinion upon the whole record that the case was fairly put before the jury and we will affirm the judgment appealed from.
 Judgment affirmed with costs.
 (Decided January 12th, 1905.) *Page 227


type: wikipedia

text:
Vojvodja, (Rumen: voievodat, Pollakk: województwo, Serb: vojvodina (војводина), vojvodstvo (војводство) jew vojvodovina (војводовина), Ungariż: vajdaság) kienet forma ta' stat fewdali fir-Rumanija, Ungarija, Polonja, Russja u fis-Serbja tal-Medjuevu. Il-vojvodija kienet tiġi maħkuma mill-Vojvod, (traduzzjoni kelma b'kelma: "dak li jmexxi il-gwerrieri"). Oriġinarjament kien kmandant militari li jmexxi flimkien ma' mexxej ieħor. Il-kelma vojvodja għadha tiġi użata għall-Vojvodji tal-Polonja, li huma sittax -il reġjun amministrativi f'dan il-pajjiż. Vojvodina li titnissel mill-istess kelma hija wkoll l-isem tal-provinċja awtonoma fin-nofsinhar tas-Serbja.
 Serbja


type: contracts

text:
 28.11.2013
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 L 318/11
 ROZHODNUTÍ SMÍŠENÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 110/2013
 ze dne 14. června 2013,
 kterým se mění příloha II (Technické předpisy, normy, zkoušení a certifikace) Dohody o EHP
 SMÍŠENÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 s ohledem na Dohodu o Evropském hospodářském prostoru (dále jen „Dohoda o EHP“), a zejména na článek 98 této dohody,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1)
 Prováděcí rozhodnutí Komise 2013/63/EU ze dne 24. ledna 2013, kterým se přijímají pokyny pro provádění zvláštních podmínek pro zdravotní tvrzení stanovených v článku 10 nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1924/2006 (1), by mělo být začleněno do Dohody o EHP.
 (2)
 Toto rozhodnutí se týká právních předpisů o potravinách. Jak je uvedeno v úvodu kapitoly XII přílohy II Dohody o EHP, právní předpisy o potravinách se nepoužijí na Lichtenštejnsko po celou dobu, po níž je na Lichtenštejnsko rozšířena působnost Dohody mezi Evropským společenstvím a Švýcarskou konfederací o obchodu se zemědělskými produkty. Toto rozhodnutí se tudíž nevztahuje na Lichtenštejnsko.
 (3)
 Příloha II Dohody o EHP by proto měla být odpovídajícím způsobem změněna,
 PŘIJAL TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 Za bod 54zzzzzr (nařízení Komise (EU) č. 873/2012) kapitoly XII přílohy II Dohody o EHP se vkládá nový bod, který zní:
 „54zzzzzs.
 32013 D 0063: Prováděcí rozhodnutí Komise 2013/63/EU ze dne 24. ledna 2013, kterým se přijímají pokyny pro provádění zvláštních podmínek pro zdravotní tvrzení stanovených v článku 10 nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1924/2006 (Úř. věst. L 22, 25.1.2013, s. 25).“
 Článek 2
 Znění prováděcího rozhodnutí 2013/63/EU v islandském a norském jazyce, která mají být zveřejněna v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie, jsou platná.
 Článek 3
 Toto rozhodnutí vstupuje v platnost dnem 15. června 2013 za předpokladu, že Smíšenému výboru EHP jsou učiněna veškerá oznámení podle čl. 103 odst. 1 Dohody o EHP (2).
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí bude zveřejněno v oddíle EHP a v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie.
 V Bruselu dne 14. června 2013.
 Za Smíšený výbor EHP
 předseda
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) Úř. věst. L 22, 25.1.2013, s. 25.
 (2) Nebyly oznámeny žádné ústavní požadavky.