jurisdiction: US

text: b' FAA FACES SIGNIFICANT RISKS IN\nIMPLEMENTING THE AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT\nSURVEILLANCE \xe2\x80\x93 BROADCAST PROGRAM AND\n REALIZING BENEFITS\n\n Federal Aviation Administration\n Report Number: AV-2011-002\n Date Issued: October 12, 2010\n\x0c U.S. Department of\n Memorandum\n Transportation\n Office of the Secretary\n of Transportation\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\nSubject: ACTION: FAA Faces Significant Risks in Date: October 12, 2010\n Implementing the Automatic Dependent\n Surveillance \xe2\x80\x93 Broadcast Program and\n Realizing Benefits\n Federal Aviation Administration\n Report Number AV-2011-002\n\n From: Lou E. Dixon Reply to\n Attn. of: JA-1\n Principal Assistant Inspector General\n for Auditing and Evaluation\n\n To: Federal Aviation Administrator\n\n This report presents the results of our review of the Federal Aviation\n Administration\xe2\x80\x99s (FAA) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)\n program. 1 ADS-B is a satellite-based surveillance technology that also uses\n aircraft avionics and ground-based systems to provide information on aircraft\n location to pilots and air traffic controllers. ADS-B has the potential to\n fundamentally change the way air traffic is managed in the United States, and\n FAA expects that it will enhance capacity, improve safety, and play a critical role\n in the planned transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System\n (NextGen).\n\n At the request of the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation\n Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Aviation, we examined FAA\xe2\x80\x99s plans for\n implementing ADS-B. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) examine key risks\n to FAA\xe2\x80\x99s successful implementation of ADS-B and (2) assess the strengths and\n weaknesses of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contracting approach. This report summarizes our\n assessment of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s progress to date and provides our recommendations for\n reducing risk in developing and deploying ADS-B technology and strengthening\n contract oversight. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted\n government auditing standards prescribed by the Comptroller General of the\n United States. Exhibit A details our scope and methodology.\n\n 1\n ADS-B is \xe2\x80\x9cautomatic\xe2\x80\x9d because no external interrogation is required and is \xe2\x80\x9cdependent\xe2\x80\x9d because it relies on\n equipment on board aircraft to transmit flight information to controllers and pilots.\n\x0c 2\n\n\nRESULTS IN BRIEF\nFAA is making progress in implementing ADS-B at limited locations and working\nwith airspace users to refine the use of the new technology. However, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nplans to deploy ADS-B throughout the National Airspace System (NAS) and\nrealize expected benefits face significant risks and challenges.\n\nThe greatest risks to successfully implementing ADS-B are airspace users\xe2\x80\x99\nreluctance to purchase and install new avionics for their aircraft and FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability\nto define requirements for the more advanced capabilities. Users have raised\njustifiable concerns about evolving requirements and uncertain equipage costs and\nbenefits. For example, based on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s analysis, the costs for users to equip with\nADS-B avionics could range from $2.5 billion to $6.2 billion. Moreover, while\nFAA is planning to mandate equipage for \xe2\x80\x9cADS-B Out\xe2\x80\x9d by 2020, it plans to\ninitially provide ADS-B surveillance information that essentially replicates\nexisting domestic radar coverage\xe2\x80\x94resulting in few new benefits to airspace users.\nMost new capabilities and benefits, such as enhancing airspace capacity, rely on\n\xe2\x80\x9cADS-B In\xe2\x80\x9d and the display of information in the cockpit. 2 However\nrequirements and costs for ADS-B In may not be mature for at least 2 years. FAA\nalso has yet to fully define requirements for modifying its existing automation\nsystems that will display ADS-B information to controllers. Problems with\nintegrating ADS-B on displays at the initial operating sites indicate this will be a\nsignificant challenge to nationwide deployment. Until FAA effectively addresses\nthese uncertainties associated with equipage and requirements for ADS-B\xe2\x80\x99s\nadvanced capabilities, progress with ADS-B will be limited, and the potential for\ncost increases, delays, and performance shortfalls will continue.\n\nIn addition to implementation issues that may delay deployment, risks within\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s acquisition and contract approach for ADS-B could also increase the\noverall program cost. Specifically, while FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contract includes controls and\nanalytical tools to measure progress with cost and schedule baselines, FAA did not\nconduct a comprehensive financial analysis before deciding that a service-based\ncontract would save the Government more money than the traditional method of\nowning and operating the system. In fact, only months after it briefed Congress\nthat this approach would save the Government $821 million, FAA revised its\nestimated cost savings to $628 million. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s data show that if the Agency had\nowned the system through the first phase of ADS-B (establishing ground\ninfrastructure), the Government could have saved over $600 million in that phase\nalone. FAA officials acknowledge that the analysis used to justify the service-\nbased approach and cost savings was flawed but asserted that over the long term,\n\n2\n \xe2\x80\x9cADS-B Out\xe2\x80\x9d allows aircraft to broadcast more accurate flight position data to controllers on the ground.\n \xe2\x80\x9cADS-B In\xe2\x80\x9d will allow for display of key flight information in the cockpit, such as allowing pilots to \xe2\x80\x9csee\xe2\x80\x9d other\n aircraft.\n\x0c 3\n\n\nthe cost-benefit equation changes in favor of the contractor owning and operating\nthe system. Yet, FAA has not updated its cost and benefit analysis to support the\nservice-based approach. FAA will also pay the contractor over $1 billion for\nbroadcast services\xe2\x80\x94before airspace users are required to equip in 2020 and\ncongested airports see significant delay reductions. The contractor will be paid\nregardless of whether important efforts, such as modifying controller displays,\nremain on track. Moreover, there are unresolved questions with the contract that\ncould increase the cost of the ADS-B ground system. For example, the contract\ndoes not have specific estimates for providing ADS-B In services to aircraft that\nwill rely on different broadcast frequencies. Unless FAA addresses these\nconcerns, the larger risk of minimal return on Federal investment and indefinite\ndelays in achieving NextGen goals remains. We are making recommendations to\nhelp FAA reduce risk with ADS-B implementation and enhance contract\noversight.\n\nBACKGROUND\nAccording to FAA, ADS-B will supplement and ultimately replace ground-based\nradar because an ADS-B-equipped aircraft can provide controllers and pilots in\nother aircraft with faster updates of important flight information (e.g., aircraft\nidentification, position, altitude, direction, and speed). Specifically, ADS-B\ntransmits position information once per second, whereas radar systems in the\nvicinity of airports generate reports once every 4 to 5 seconds. Also, unlike radar,\nthe accuracy of ADS-B does not change based on the distance between the aircraft\nand the sensor. In 1998, FAA began examining ADS-B as an alternative to radar\nat several locations, including Alaska and the Ohio River Valley.\n\nIn 2007, FAA awarded a contract to ITT Corporation for $1.8 billion\xe2\x80\x94if all\noptions are exercised through 2025\xe2\x80\x94to develop and deploy the ADS-B ground\ninfrastructure and start broadcasting services. FAA plans to implement ADS-B in\ntwo segments. Segment 1 (establish ground infrastructure for five key sites) is\ncontracted under a cost-plus incentive fee agreement in which FAA covers the cost\nfor any additional requirements. 3 Segment 2 (equipment needed to fully deploy\nADS-B nationwide) is contracted under a fixed-price arrangement in which ITT\ncovers the cost of deploying enough radios to meet requirements. FAA approved\nnearly $1.7 billion in capital costs through 2014, to support ADS-B\nimplementation. FAA is planning to spend just over $200 million in fiscal year\n(FY) 2010. The total life-cycle cost through 2035 of the ADS-B effort is uncertain\nbut estimated to be about $4.0 billion\xe2\x80\x94this includes $2.3 billion in capital costs\nnot yet formally \xe2\x80\x9cbaselined.\xe2\x80\x9d The following figure illustrates FAA\xe2\x80\x99s spending\nplans for ADS-B for the next 5 years.\n\n3\n Miami, Florida; Louisville, Kentucky; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Gulf of Mexico; and Juneau, Alaska.\n\x0c 4\n\n\n Figure. ADS-B Spending Plan FY 2010 to FY 2014\n (Dollars in Millions)\n $300.0\n $284.2\n $270.7\n $256.9\n $250.0\n\n\n $201.4\n $200.0\n $175.2\n\n\n $150.0\n\n\n\n $100.0\n\n\n\n $50.0\n\n\n\n $0.0\n FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014\n\n\n Source: FAA\xe2\x80\x99s 2010 budget enacted and Capital Investment Plan 2010-2014\n\nA key ADS-B priority is its air-to-air applications\xe2\x80\x94this technology is a major step\nin the NextGen transition and a primary benefit expected by airspace users. In FY\n2008 and FY 2009, Congress provided more funding than FAA requested to\nspecifically advance these ADS-B capabilities. Congress has shown significant\nsupport for the ADS-B program overall since its inception in 2007, with\n$510 million provided during the first 3 years of the program.\n\nIn October 2007, FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) for\nADS-B outlining a mandate for airspace users to equip with new avionics for\nADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cOut\xe2\x80\x9d by 2020. The NPRM was issued after review by FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nindustry/Government Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The ARC\nrecommended key actions FAA must take to increase user equipage. These\ninclude approving ADS-B-based aircraft separation standards that meet current\nones and expediently deploying ADS-B where reduced separation standards will\noffer users the most value. The proposed rule generated considerable debate\namong stakeholders who expressed concerns about undefined costs, benefits, and\ntechnical requirements. Based on public comments, FAA asked the ARC for\nadditional recommendations. In 2008, the ARC made 36 recommendations,\nincluding studying frequency congestion concerns, adjusting ADS-B standards\nand requirements, and incentivizing airspace users to equip with new systems. 4\n\nThe ARC cautioned that FAA should delay the proposed 2020 date for ADS-B\nequipage if ground station coverage, automation systems improvements, and\n4\n Report from the ADS\xe2\x80\x93B Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the FAA, September 26, 2008.\n\x0c 5\n\n\ncontroller training slip beyond 2013. Based on industry comments, FAA adjusted\nits plans for ADS-B and issued the final rule in May 2010.\n\nADS-B IMPLEMENTATION FACES A WIDE RANGE OF RISKS\nTHAT WILL IMPACT COSTS AND EXPECTED BENEFITS\nFAA is in a difficult position with ADS-B because it is managing the parallel\ndevelopment and implementation of the air and ground components of a new\nsatellite-based technology. Implementing ADS-B is a high-risk, complex\nundertaking that will require coordinated, billion-dollar investments from FAA\nand industry over the next decade. Our review identified the following five major\nrisks that will have a direct bearing on the cost, schedule, and expected benefits of\nADS-B: airspace users\xe2\x80\x99 reluctance to equip, changing requirements and\ncontroller/pilot procedures for ADS-B In technologies, frequency congestion\naffecting ADS-B broadcasts, delays in integrating ADS-B with air traffic\nmanagement systems, and potential security vulnerabilities.\n\nAirspace Users Are Reluctant To Equip with ADS-B Due to Undefined\nCosts and Benefits\nAirspace users have raised legitimate questions about the costs to equip aircraft,\nevolving requirements for ADS-B In, and a lack of clearly defined benefits for\nenhancing capacity and reducing delays. FAA considers their concerns as a major\nrisk to the successful implementation of ADS-B. Skepticism in the aviation\ncommunity is largely due to prior experiences with other FAA programs, and\nusers are concerned that ADS-B could become another situation where they equip\nwith a new technology but FAA never follows through with the requisite ground\ninfrastructure. For example, FAA cancelled a Microwave Landing System in the\n1990s because of industry concerns and opposition. More recently, in 2003, FAA\ncancelled the Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications Program due to\nuncertain benefits, technical problems, and cost growth issues. 5 As a result, FAA\nfaces difficult challenges in determining how to move forward with ADS-B and\nspur airspace users to purchase and install new avionics.\n\nADS-B equipage cost estimates for airspace users vary widely. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nequipage estimates reflect considerable uncertainty and require further refinement.\nFAA estimates that the aggregate cost for airspace users to equip with ADS-B\navionics could range from $2.5 billion to $6.2 billion. In addition, these estimates\ngenerally exclude the cost associated with taking transport aircraft out of service to\ninstall new technology. As shown in table 1, estimated unit costs to equip aircraft\nalso vary significantly.\n\n5\n OIG Report Number AV-2004-101, \xe2\x80\x9cObservations on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications Program,\xe2\x80\x9d\n September 30, 2004. OIG reports are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.\n\x0c 6\n\n\n Table 1. Unit Cost Estimates for Equipping Aircraft with ADS-B\n ADS-B Out ADS-B In\n\n Airspace User Technology Low High Low High\n Air Transport Aircraft 1090 MHz Extended Squitter $32,000 $174,640 $162,250 $670,000\n Universal Access\n General Aviation $7,644 $10,920 $10,444 $29,770\n Transceiver (UAT ) 978 MHz\nSource: OIG analysis of data from FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Surveillance and Broadcast Services\n\nSeveral factors can affect the equipage cost estimates. These factors include\naircraft age and type, the broadcast link airspace users decide to purchase, and the\nservices users expect to obtain. One of the primary variables for ADS-B cost\nestimates is whether airspace users need other new avionics or upgrades to\nexisting aircraft systems. For example, some users may be required to purchase:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 new or upgraded Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers or flight\n management system for aircraft. This will depend on the performance level of\n their current aircraft navigation systems.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 avionics for the Wide Area Augmentation System\xe2\x80\x94a satellite-based\n navigational system\xe2\x80\x94to augment the GPS signal according to FAA standards.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 new ADS-B avionics, in addition to those previously installed, to comply with\n updated standards in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s recently issued ADS-B rule. While all new\n aircraft being produced by Airbus and Boeing will be able to broadcast ADS-B\n without modification, other large, commercial aircraft equipped with the 1090\n ES 6 alternative may not be compliant with the proposed rule.\n\nEvolving requirements for \xe2\x80\x9cADS-B In\xe2\x80\x9d make it difficult for FAA to develop cost\nestimates for users to equip with this technology\xe2\x80\x94which will add new cockpit\ndisplays capable of displaying traffic information. FAA expects that once airspace\nusers have invested in ADS-B Out as mandated, they will then voluntarily equip to\nrealize the additional capabilities of ADS-B In (see table 2 below). However,\nADS-B In is still in its early stages, and requirements for the full range of its\napplications envisioned in planning documents continue to change. FAA has\nestablished groups to develop a strategy for ADS-B In, including an ARC and a\nSteering Committee, but without mature requirements, reliable cost estimates, and\ndefined benefits to offset those costs airlines are unlikely to expend resources to\nfurther modify aircraft. Further, because FAA adopted less stringent performance\nstandards with the recently published rule in May 2010, airspace users may have\nto equip multiple times to take full advantage of ADS-B In capabilities.\n\n\n\n6\n Air Transport Aircraft transponders operate using 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090 ES).\n\x0c 7\n\n\n Table 2. Anticipated Benefits of ADS-B\n\n ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cOut\xe2\x80\x9d\n Allows aircraft to broadcast position and other flight data to ground systems for\n en route, terminal, and surface operations\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Enables more accurate data on aircraft position than current radar\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Provides surveillance coverage where radar coverage is limited or non-\n existent\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Yields cost savings from decommissioning secondary surveillance radar\n ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cIn\xe2\x80\x9d\n Requires new cockpit displays; allows aircraft to receive and display air traffic\n information in the cockpit\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Provides the above benefits, plus others, such as enhancing capacity at\n congested airports under all weather conditions\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Enables air to air applications that could change current air traffic control\n concepts\n Source: OIG analysis of RTCA staff paper and FAA\xe2\x80\x99s benefits analysis\n\nFAA faces challenges in quantifying and delivering ADS-B benefits for\nairspace users. The question of benefits\xe2\x80\x94and what it will take to obtain them\xe2\x80\x94\nwill drive the transition to ADS-B. In the near term, ADS-B will not provide\ncapacity benefits or relief from delays at many of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s most congested\nairports. This is because the first stage of ADS-B implementation will be limited\nto specific geographic locations, including select airports on the East Coast, such\nas Philadelphia and Miami, and airports where existing radar coverage is limited,\nsuch as Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico.\n\nThus far, ADS-B has been beneficial in areas with limited radar coverage; for\nexample, it has proven valuable in search and rescue missions. FAA and the\nindustry expect to see tangible benefits from ADS-B in the Gulf of Mexico from\nreduced separation between aircraft (from 50 to 5 nautical miles). However, FAA\nstill faces the challenges of quantifying and delivering the benefits from ADS-B in\nthe continental United States where radar coverage exists and determining how to\nuse new procedures to enhance capacity and reduce delays in congested airspace.\n\nIn the near term, however, FAA expects ADS-B Out to provide \xe2\x80\x9cradar-like\xe2\x80\x9d\nseparation services. Coupled with new automation, this could allow for more\nefficient merging and spacing of air traffic within existing separation standards\nand improve detection of conflicts between aircraft. However, FAA has yet to\nfully quantify related benefits\xe2\x80\x94such as enhanced controller productivity and more\nefficient management of the airport surface\xe2\x80\x94and validate that ADS-B will meet\nor exceed the current level of separation services. To achieve these goals, FAA\nmust effectively develop, certify, and implement the new procedures needed to\nseparate aircraft at high capacity locations through the NAS based on ADS-B\ninformation. These procedures include significant changes to existing automation\nsystems, such as new tools for controllers. In the longer term, industry officials\n\x0c 8\n\n\npoint out that ADS-B will be key to enhancing capacity but must be integrated\nwith other NextGen initiatives (e.g., 4D trajectory management and data link\ncommunications for controllers and pilots). 7\n\nDue to industry concerns about whether ADS-B can provide equivalent separation\nservices, FAA sponsored research and modeling that examined the use of radar\nand ADS-B targets for separating air traffic. 8 The studies show that\nADS-B should be able to provide surveillance that is at least as good as radar if\nnot better. However, automation systems will need to compensate for differences\nin ADS-B and radar with respect to update and error rates that will in turn provide\ncontrollers with reliable information. Table 3 identifies the existing criteria for\nseparating aircraft that ADS-B must meet. The most stringent criteria focus on\n4,300-foot spacing on parallel, independent approaches.\n Table 3. ADS-B Required To Meet Existing Separation Criteria\n Separation Range\n Existing Aircraft Separation Criteria\n (in nautical miles)\n En Route Environment 5.0\n\n Terminal Environment 3.0\n\n Approach 2.5\n\n Staggered, Dependent Approach 1.5\n\n Parallel, Independent Approaches 4,300 feet\n Source: FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Surveillance and Broadcast Services Briefing: Report on Modeling\n Results for Separation Standards with ADS-B\n\nFAA is testing ADS-B\xe2\x80\x99s ability to manage and separate traffic at the key sites.\nHowever, a critical question remains open\xe2\x80\x94whether ADS-B could allow a\nreduction in existing separation standards. FAA is examining whether separation\nstandards at high altitude could be safely reduced from 5 to 3 miles, which could\nlead to significant benefits for airspace users.\n\nFAA faces important policy questions regarding incentives to spur ADS-B\nequipage. Given ADS-B\xe2\x80\x99s wide-ranging cost estimates and undefined benefits,\nmany within the aviation community (i.e., airspace users and avionics\nmanufacturers) and FAA believe that incentives will be required to help spur\naircraft equipage. As stakeholders point out, there is a precedent for helping\nairspace users equip specifically with ADS-B avionics. FAA purchased ADS-B\navionics for operators in Alaska as part of the Capstone initiative. This provided\n\n7\n 4D trajectory management is an automation system that will rely on advanced software to assign and monitor flights.\n8\n Report on Modeling Results for Separation Standards with ADS-B, August 29, 2007. This research was performed\n by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Labs, the Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics\n Laboratory, and the Mitre Corporation.\n\x0c 9\n\n\nFAA with a base of properly equipped aircraft and allowed the Agency to examine\nthe costs and benefits of the new technology.\n\nOur work shows that incentives for ADS-B deployment could take a number of\nforms. These include purchasing equipment for operators, an investment tax\ncredit, an adjustment to current excise taxes for ADS-B-equipped aircraft, or\nresearch and development tax credits specifically for avionics manufacturers. In\n2008, the ARC\xe2\x80\x99s report called for FAA to establish agreements with operators,\nsubsidize the purchase and installation of new avionics, and accelerate ADS-B\ndeployment at designated locations. FAA has since established several\nagreements with airlines and avionics manufacturers and purchased equipment for\nsome airspace users.\n\nFAA has never managed such a large effort to equip commercial aircraft.\nTherefore, the aviation community will need a clear understanding of what the\nincentives would be used for as well as their strengths and weakness, timing, and\npotential impacts. Cost sharing mechanisms have merit because they help share\nrisks between the Government and airspace users. If FAA does use equipage\nincentives, it must properly design them to achieve objectives at minimal cost to\ntaxpayers.\n\nRequirements for ADS-B In and Cockpit Displays Continue To Evolve\nand Will Influence Pilot and Controller Roles\nMost new capabilities and benefits in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s plans to enhance capacity through\nNextGen rely on \xe2\x80\x9cADS-B In\xe2\x80\x9d and the display of information in the cockpit.\nAccording to airspace users, without ADS-B In\xe2\x80\x99s cockpit capabilities and related\nair-to-air applications, ADS-B will provide insufficient benefits. However, FAA\nhas not yet certified the type of cockpit display (in the pilot\xe2\x80\x99s forward field of\nview) needed to achieve ADS-B In capabilities due to safety concerns.\n\nOnce FAA certifies the cockpit display, airlines must either install new ones or\nmodify their existing displays. However, since FAA has yet to clearly define\nADS-B In requirements or estimated costs and benefits, it will be difficult to get\nusers to equip. An aviation industry expert from Boeing pointed out that the\neffectiveness of cockpit displays depends on large numbers of aircraft being\nequipped; otherwise the display might be hazardous as it would give pilots a sense\nof confidence that should not be expected. Table 4 below illustrates how ADS-B\nand cockpit displays can enhance situational awareness and help fundamentally\nchange how air traffic is managed when the display is in the pilot\xe2\x80\x99s forward field\nof view.\n\x0c 10\n\n\n Table 4. Anticipated Capabilities of ADS-B In\n\n Situational Awareness\n Enhances the flight crew\xe2\x80\x99s knowledge of traffic both in the air and on the ground,\n thus improving their decision process for the safe and efficient management of\n flight. No changes in separation tasks or responsibility are required.\n\n Spacing\n Flight crews are responsible for spacing with designated aircraft in response to\n Air Traffic Control instruction. The separation minima are unchanged, and\n separation responsibility remains with controller.\n\n Delegated Separation\n The controller delegates separation responsibility to the flight crew for specific\n aircraft during certain operations.\n\n Self Separation\n The flight crew is responsible for separation to a given minima from all other\n traffic for the duration of any particular phase of flight.\n Source: FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Surveillance and Broadcast Services Program Office, December 2007\n\nWe found that FAA faces considerable work to establish requirements and\nstandards for ADS-B In. In its September 2008 report, the ARC recommended\nthat FAA, in partnership with industry, define a strategy for ADS-B In by 2012.\nAccording to ADS-B program officials, they will define ADS-B In requirements\nand benefits through multiple workgroups and a new ARC, which is slated to\nbegin work this summer. FAA also states that it has established a workgroup to\nconduct research and analysis on high-value advanced ADS-B In applications.\nAccording to FAA, the criteria for some of the more demanding ADS-B In\napplications should be completed by 2012. However, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s decision to adopt\nless stringent performance requirements in the recently published final rule for\nADS-B may further slow progress to transition to ADS-B In capabilities.\n\nGiven that most benefits users anticipate rely on ADS-B In, FAA must obtain\nsome consensus with industry on the specific applications it plans to consider.\nFAA has\xe2\x80\x94and continues\xe2\x80\x94to work with airspace users to refine ADS-B In\napplications and requirements. For example, the United Parcel Service (UPS) has\nbeen instrumental in pioneering ADS-B and the first generation of cockpit display\napplications for enhanced \xe2\x80\x9csee and avoid\xe2\x80\x9d capabilities. FAA is also providing\n$6 million to assist US Airways and an avionics manufacturer to equip up to\n20 Airbus aircraft, with the goal of assessing the economic and operational value\nof ADS-B at Philadelphia\xe2\x80\x99s airport and on some transatlantic flights.\n\nFinally, the full potential of ADS-B In will require consideration of human factors,\nsuch as new procedures for pilots and controllers. As FAA officials point out, the\nAgency must conduct rigorous safety assessments to ensure changes do not impact\n\x0c 11\n\n\nsafety or introduce new hazards. Therefore, FAA needs to prioritize efforts,\nexamine sequencing of capabilities, and resolve the display requirements,\nincluding human factors considerations for both pilots and controllers.\n\nFrequency Congestion Concerns for the Broadcast of ADS-B for\nTransport Aircraft Could Limit Its Air-to-Air Benefits\nThe frequency planned for ADS-B broadcasts to large commercial carriers could\nbecome overcrowded when FAA adds ADS-B signal traffic. Currently, FAA and\nairspace users rely on the same frequency for other important systems, such as\nground-based secondary radar, runway incursion systems, and aircraft collision\navoidance systems. There is concern that the broadcast of ADS-B could cause\nsignal interference problems with these systems. This is one reason that FAA\ndecided to rely on two separate frequencies 9 for ADS-B and the contractor decided\nto increase the number of ground radio stations from 500 to 794.\n\nFrequency congestion could particularly impact ADS-B usage in high-density\nairspace, such as the Northeast Corridor (e.g., Washington, DC, and New York).\nAs FAA expands ADS-B implementation between 2020 and 2035, problems with\nsignal interference could increase and occur around more major airports across the\ncountry, such as Chicago, Los Angles, Dallas Forth Worth, and Atlanta. Unless\nFAA mitigates this problem, the number and type of air-to-air applications for\nADS-B In will be limited due to the reduced range\xe2\x80\x94or distance\xe2\x80\x94of the\nADS-B In signal. Table 5 illustrates the expected requirements for some of the\nplanned uses of the ADS-B In signal.\n\n\n\n\n9\n FAA will implement ADS-B via two separate broadcast links that will operate at one of two frequencies\xe2\x80\x94\n 1090 megahertz (MHz) for air carrier and commuter fleets and 978 MHz for air taxi and general aviation fleets. The\n 978 MHz band has more available bandwidth and can therefore provide graphic weather information and other\n data\xe2\x80\x94a service needed by non-commercial fleets that do not communicate with airline dispatchers.\n\x0c 12\n\n\nTable 5. Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for ADS-B In\n\n Range\n Minimum Performance Standards\n (in nautical miles)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Enhanced Visual Acquisition\n 10\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Conflict Detection\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Station Keeping\n 20\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Airborne Conflict Management\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Merging\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Conflict Management 40\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In-Trail Climb\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Long Range Conflict Management 90 (desired - 120)\n Source: Report from the ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration,\n September 26, 2008.\n\nThe frequency congestion problem is complex, but a number of techniques, such\nas multi-sector aircraft antennae and additional ADS-B ground stations could help\nensure adequate air-to-ground and air-to-air reception. However, solutions to\naddress frequency congestion may require changes to the ADS-B baseline or\nequipment on aircraft, which would increase the program cost. Currently, FAA\ndoes not plan to make changes until 2020 when airspace users are required to\npurchase and install ADS-B equipment. The ARC recommended that FAA study\nthe issue of congestion and consider the mitigation efforts needed to ensure a 45-\nnautical mile range for ADS-B In applications. In response, FAA is examining\npotential solutions and exploring the specific changes needed for ADS-B air and\nground components and existing systems (including airborne traffic collision and\navoidance systems). 10\n\nIntegrating ADS-B with FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Existing Automation Systems for\nControllers Could Delay Its Implementation\nBefore FAA can implement ADS-B nationwide, it will need to modify the\nautomation systems controllers use to separate aircraft. Currently, most of these\nsystems\xe2\x80\x94in both the terminal and en route environments\xe2\x80\x94do not process and\ndisplay ADS-B information. FAA will also need to adjust the format of flight\nplans to properly identify ADS-B-equipped aircraft. Without these changes, users\nwill be unable to operate ADS-B air traffic surveillance applications. FAA has\nelevated this issue to high risk, and the ADS-B program office is providing\n$150 million in Segment 1 to other FAA lines of business to modify their\nrespective automation systems.\n\nFAA is testing ADS-B information on controller displays at key sites but has\nexperienced a number of problems and limitations. For example, FAA has\n\n10\n According to FAA documents, realizing the air-to-air performance of ADS-B in the long term may depend on a\n replacement of ground radars or other technology (i.e. passive multilateration) and modifying the Traffic Collision\n and Avoidance System to exploit ADS-B signals.\n\x0c 13\n\n\nexperienced problems with integrating ADS-B on controller displays at Louisville,\nKentucky. Controllers report that ADS-B targets (i.e., the location of aircraft on\ntheir display screens) split or drift, causing false alerts; therefore, controllers often\nopt to limit their ADS-B usage. However, as noted in FAA test reports,\nassessments at this point do not fully reflect the ADS-B end-state because there is\na limited number of properly equipped aircraft and no approved standards for\nADS-B In operations.\n\nAn important step to mitigate problems with ADS-B is implementing \xe2\x80\x9cfusion.\xe2\x80\x9d\nFusion in this context is defined as taking all surveillance data available for an\naircraft and using the best data or combination of data to determine aircraft\nposition and intent. FAA is working to refine fusion capability on the Louisville\nCommon Automated Radar Terminal System. Table 6 shows the progress and\nchallenges with implementing ADS-B with existing FAA automation systems\xe2\x80\x94all\nof which will impact ADS-B deployment.\n Table 6. Key Automation Platforms Requiring Modifications for ADS-B\n Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)\n Manufactured by Raytheon and used at 51 medium sites to manage traffic in the vicinity of airports\n \xe2\x80\xa2 FAA modified STARS to display ADS-B information at the Philadelphia TRACON.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 STARS processors, displays, and network equipment face end-of-life issues.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 STARS processors at 47 of 52 sites will be unable to support ADS-B beyond 2013 when large\n numbers of airspace users are expected to equip with the new technology.\n Common Automated Radar Terminal System (CARTS)\n Manufactured by Lockheed Martin and used at 11 large and 99 small sites to manage traffic in the\n vicinity of airports\n \xe2\x80\xa2 FAA modified CARTS at Louisville, Kentucky, to accept and display ADS-B information.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 FAA tested CARTS with UPS ADS-B-equipped aircraft and achieved initial operating capability\n in November 2009.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Additional CARTS work is required for the large sites such as New York and Chicago.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CARTS processors at 7 of the 11 large sites have limited ability to accept major improvements,\n including ADS-B.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The 99 small sites, as presently configured, cannot support any major improvements.\n En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)\n Developed by Lockheed Martin; will be used to manage high-altitude traffic at 20 planned sites\n \xe2\x80\xa2 ERAM has experienced problems during testing at its first site (Salt Lake City), the severity of\n which is unknown.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 FAA is delaying initial ADS-B functionality to later ERAM software releases that have not been\n baselined. ADS-B will initially be incorporated into ERAM Release 1 in a virtual radar format;\n later releases will accept ADS-B format for full functionality.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 FAA has not determined the allocation of ADS-B requirements among future ERAM software\n releases.\n Source: OIG analysis of ADS-B automation program documentation\n\x0c 14\n\n\nPotential Security Vulnerabilities in Using ADS-B To Manage Air\nTraffic Will Require Periodic Reassessment\nADS-B implementation has important security implications for the National\nAirspace System and the transition to NextGen. The Department of Defense\n(DOD)\xe2\x80\x94a key stakeholder in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s NextGen development efforts\xe2\x80\x94raised\nconcerns that because ADS-B technology makes it possible to receive information\nabout aircraft without a ground station, a lack of needed precautions could make\nthe position of aircraft available to virtually anyone.\n\nThe September 2008 ARC report highlights other potential vulnerabilities with\nADS-B that malicious cyber attacks may attempt to exploit. Examples include\ninterfering with ADS-B transmissions, jamming ADS-B broadcasts, and\nintroducing false targets into the system. Failure to address these concerns early in\nthe ADS-B program could result in cost increases and schedule delays.\n\nWhile the ADS-B signal is vulnerable like other satellite transmissions,\nmitigations or countermeasures are possible. In commenting on FAA\xe2\x80\x99s proposed\nADS-B rule, stakeholders, including DOD, stressed the need to develop some\nlevel of encryption of ADS-B signals to prevent adversaries from using the system\nto disrupt air traffic. DOD has asked FAA for a thorough security assessment\ninvolving DOD and the Department of Homeland Security to determine ADS-B\nrisks and appropriate countermeasures.\n\nFAA is working with the National Security Agency and the Director of National\nIntelligence to get a better understanding of ADS-B vulnerabilities and has\ncompleted a classified report. According to FAA, the report concluded that while\nthe ADS-B transmission gives more accurate data on aircraft position than\nprevious technology, many other factors are involved in coordinating and\nexecuting an attack on an aircraft, which severely limits the likelihood of success.\nNevertheless, FAA must maintain focus on this issue to adequately address any\nthreats and vulnerabilities. Given the substantial support ADS-B receives from\nFederal investments, FAA should also inform Congress of the results of\nvulnerability assessments and identify the countermeasures necessary to address\nknown vulnerabilities. In December 2009, we began a review of information\ntechnology security and controls over the ADS-B system and will continue to\nmonitor these issues. 11\n\n\n\n\n11\n OIG Audit Announcement, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit Initiated of Security and Controls of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance\xe2\x80\x93\n Broadcast System,\xe2\x80\x9d December 8, 2009.\n\x0c 15\n\n\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99S ACQUISITION STRATEGY HAS NOT BEEN UPDATED,\nAND CONSIDERABLE UNKNOWNS COULD IMPACT THE COST\nOF THE ADS-B CONTRACT\nFAA chose to rely on a service-based contract approach to implement ADS-B.\nDespite subsequent data showing that FAA could have saved significantly with a\ntraditional acquisitions approach for at least the first phase of the program, FAA\nstill has not conducted an updated cost analysis to ensure it is pursuing the most\ncost effective way to introduce a new surveillance technology. FAA must update\nADS-B cost and benefit information given the complexity and unresolved\nimplementation issues of the contract, which could cost the U.S. Government\nalmost $2 billion if all options are exercised. Moreover, it is difficult for decision\nmakers to track current and potential costs due to the contract\xe2\x80\x99s structure, which\n\xe2\x80\x9cbundles\xe2\x80\x9d costs for various ADS-B services. FAA will be challenged to address\nthese issues without the right skill mix among staff responsible for developing and\nmanaging ADS-B; however, FAA has not yet assessed staffing gaps or actions\nneeded to ensure the Agency can effectively oversee the contractor once it begins\noperating the ADS-B ground system.\n\nFAA Has Not Updated the Cost and Benefit Analysis of Its Contract\nApproach for Developing the ADS-B Ground System\nFAA is relying on a service-based contract, which means it will not own the\nADS-B ground infrastructure. FAA will own the data transmitted between aircraft\nand the ground but not the hardware, software, or ground stations. In a more\ntraditional acquisition, FAA would specify the functional design and hardware\ndeliverables and would ultimately own the equipment.\n\nFAA decided on this contract approach without a comprehensive analysis of the\ncosts involved. In May 2007, FAA provided Congress with data that showed a\nservice-based approach for ADS-B would cost about $821 million less than a\ntraditional acquisition approach. Yet, several months later, FAA increased its cost\nestimates to reflect the need for additional ADS-B ground stations, which reduced\nits cost savings estimate to about $628 million. Table 7 shows the differences\nbetween the service-based approach and more traditional FAA acquisition in cost\nestimates FAA provided to the FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Joint Resources Council (JRC).\n\x0c 16\n\n\n Table 7. Adjusted Cost Differential from FAA Ownership\n and Service Approach ($ in Millions)\n\n Traditional\n Program Office Estimates Government- Service Provider Expected\n as of : Owned Approach Approach Cost Savings\n\n May 2007 $ 3,745.60 $ 2,923.90 $ 821.70\n\n August 2007* $ 5,022.77 $ 4,394.48 $ 628.29\n\nDifference $ 1,277.17 $ 1,470.58 $ -193.41\nSource: FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Surveillance and Broadcast Service Program Office JRC Cost Estimates, August 2007 and\nFAA analysis, \xe2\x80\x9cService Provider vs. Government owned\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nADS-B officials state there is no need to do a complete analysis to fully update the\nlatest Government estimate to account for changes (including the change in\nground stations) in order to have an \xe2\x80\x9capples to apples\xe2\x80\x9d comparison. This is despite\nFAA data showing that it may have been more cost beneficial for the Government\nto own the system until completion of Segment 1. For example, according to\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s data, the Government could have saved approximately $600 million in\nSegment 1 alone ($1.77 billion for Government-owned cost versus $2.37 billion\nvia service provider owned and operated). FAA points out that over the long term,\nthe cost-benefit equation changes in favor of ITT owning and operating the\nsystem. According to ADS-B program officials, the independent Government\nestimates used to support the costs were flawed because the Agency incorrectly\nallocated more radios than required under Segment 2 of the program. This further\ndemonstrates why FAA should have updated the analysis.\n\nFAA decision makers need a full understanding of the cost parameters of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\napproach for implementing ADS-B given the key role it is expected to play in\nNextGen and the evolving requirements for ADS-B In. Therefore, FAA should\nupdate its analysis and validate that its preferred approach remains cost beneficial\nbefore committing to an additional $2.7 billion by 2012 to proceed with the\nnationwide implementation of ADS-B air and ground capabilities.\n\nThe ADS-B Contract Is a Complex Financial Agreement That Will\nRequire Rigorous Oversight To Protect Government Interests\nFAA is using a hybrid contract that includes elements such as a cost-plus incentive\nfee arrangement for the development of the ground system, firm fixed-price\nsubscription charges for the broadcast of ADS-B services, and time and materials\narrangements for engineering work. Each type of contract mechanism has unique\nrisks and management challenges.\n\nSegment 1, or the first 3 years of the contract, is predominately a cost-plus\nincentive fee agreement that places the majority of risk with the Government\n\x0c 17\n\n\n because FAA must pay the cost for any cost overruns associated with additional\n work to meet existing requirements. Under this arrangement, FAA reimburses the\n contractor for all costs incurred for work performed up to a cost target; this\n encourages the contractor to accomplish work specifications at target costs. This\n first segment focuses largely on developing and installing the ground\n infrastructure for five key sites. FAA has a number of controls in place on the\n contract to incentivize or penalize the contractor for cost overruns for the first\n segment. The bulk of the remaining contract relies on fixed-price subscription\n charges. Under the fixed-price contract, the contractor is obligated to perform the\n stated effort within the fixed price of the contract and assumes the risks of any cost\n increases. Table 8 below describes the elements of the ADS-B contract.\n Table 8. Elements of the ADS-B Contract\nContract Line Item\nNumber (CLIN) Supplies /Services Contract Type Costs\nCLIN 0001 Development and Installation Cost Plus $ 207,576,480\n Incentive Fee\nCLIN 0002 Equipment Usage Charges Firm Fixed Price 30,952,941\nCLIN 0018 (3 years) Engineering Services Time and Material 4,500,000\n\n Subtotal $ 243,029,421\nOptions (FY 2009-FY 2025)\n Subscription Charges\nCLIN 0003 thru 0014 (Essential & Critical Service) Firm Fixed Price $ 1,398,508,646\nCLIN 0015 thru 0017 Program Management Firm Fixed Price 84,823,266\nCLIN 0018 Engineering Services Time and Material 30,004,404\n Subscription Charges\nCLIN 0019 thru 0034 (Including Weather Services) Firm Fixed Price 108,625,534\n Subtotal $1,621,961,849\n Grand Total $1,864,991,270\n Source: OIG analysis of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ADS-B contract\n\n FAA will pay the contractor on average over $90 million annually for broadcast\n services before airspace users are required to equip by 2020. The contractor will\n be paid regardless of whether important efforts remain on track, including\n modifications to various controller displays and automation equipment, finalizing\n requirements for ADS-B In, procedure development, and controller training\n programs. Under the current plan, FAA will have spent almost $2 billion on the\n ground infrastructure, but neither the traveling public nor airspace users will\n realize significant benefits in terms of delay reduction at already congested\n airports until 2020.\n\n The ADS-B contract also allows ITT to sell \xe2\x80\x9cvalue-added services to airspace\n users.\xe2\x80\x9d The contractor must seek approval from FAA before releasing the\n surveillance data, and the Agency is expected to provide criteria for filtering the\n\x0c 18\n\n\ndata. These services could include enhanced weather products for specific regions\n(like the Gulf of Mexico) and sales of traffic information. FAA officials\ncommented that airports may be interested in purchasing information on aircraft\nposition and location for a better understanding of facility utilization and better\nsurface management.\n\nFAA believes that the sale of value-added services will help reduce the overall\ncosts with ADS-B and therefore made it an essential element of the business\nmodel for the contractor. The contract states that the Government and the\ncontractor will share revenue from the sale of these services. Several industry\nrepresentatives have stated that ITT and FAA\xe2\x80\x99s value-added services need greater\nclarity and raised concerns that these services appear to be a \xe2\x80\x9cback-door method\xe2\x80\x9d\nto augment FAA\xe2\x80\x99s budget.\n\nAt this juncture, however, it is difficult to predict the demand for services and\nwhat stakeholders will value over the life of the ADS-B contract. Further, there\nmay be other entities that can share or provide information on the location of\naircraft on the surface at high-activity airports or weather to pilots. For example,\nFAA is currently testing enhanced information sharing with an existing ground-\nbased system for surface surveillance at New York\xe2\x80\x99s John F. Kennedy airport. 12\nFAA should assess ongoing and planned efforts to share more information as part\nof NextGen and determine whether the assumptions and profitability of value-\nadded services specifically for ADS-B remain valid. If value-added services do\nnot materialize, the underlying business case for the ADS-B contractor may not be\nachievable and cause problems for FAA in managing the implementation of a key\nNextGen technology. FAA indicated that its Chief Operating Officer is chairing\nmeetings on information sharing as part of NextGen and the role of the ADS-B\ncontractor regarding value-added services.\n\nUnresolved Questions Exist That Could Materially Affect the\nGovernment\xe2\x80\x99s Liability and Overall Cost for Implementing the ADS-B\nGround System\nAccording to FAA, the Agency has minimized contract risks because most of the\ncontract is fixed price (including the capital and operating costs), which places the\nmajority of risk with the contractor. This assumes, however, that requirements are\nfirm and achievable and that there is a clear end state to ADS-B. We identified\nseveral unknowns within the contract that could materially affect the cost of the\nADS-B effort and the Government\xe2\x80\x99s liability.\n\n\n\n12\n A key element of this effort is Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X), planned for deployment at\n 35 airports, including JFK. This system displays aircraft and vehicle positions and identification to aid air traffic\n controllers in preventing ground collisions on the airport surface and reducing runway incursions.\n\x0c 19\n\n\nThe contract does not require critical services throughout the NAS. The\nADS-B contract does not include cost estimates to support critical services for all\nsites throughout the life of the contract. 13 The ADS-B contract states that the\ncontractor shall provide both critical and essential services at an estimated cost of\n$1.4 billion at defined sites as specified by the Government. The contract includes\nabout $1.3 billion in subscription charges for essential services but only\n$62 million for critical services, which have far more demanding performance\nrequirements.\n\nThe contract includes charges supporting a total of 323 service volumes, or about\n239 sites that will provide ADS-B services. 14 These totals are different because\nmultiple service volume types (i.e., en route, terminal, and/or surface operations)\ncan support one site. However, we found the contract does not require that critical\nservices be provided at all sites or include life cycle costs at numerous sites (such\nas Washington, Boston, and Chicago) that will have critical services. For\nexample, for 24 of the 25 sites, the contract only includes ADS-B critical service\ncharges supporting the en route operations for 1 year but did not state any price for\nthe remaining years through 2025. In addition, the contract only includes costs for\n35 airports to obtain critical services supporting surface operations, and 10 of\nthose 35 have costs for only 1 year. As a result, FAA has not specified to decision\nmakers how the contractor will provide critical ADS-B services supporting the en\nroute and airport surface domains throughout the National Airspace System over\nthe life of the contract.\n\nDevelopment risks with broadcasting ADS-B on two distinct links could\nincrease costs. The contract does not provide cost estimates specifically for the\ndevelopment of a critical service called Automatic Dependent Surveillance-\nRebroadcast (ADS-R). Because FAA will rely on two links, it must rebroadcast\nthe ADS-B information to all aircraft to get the benefits from ADS-B In. It is\nimportant to ensure that different aircraft (equipped with different broadcast links)\ncan \xe2\x80\x9csee\xe2\x80\x9d each other. The timely delivery of ADS-R signals will be necessary to\nenable advanced applications such as runway safety information. There is\npotential for cost growth as FAA officials told us that they expect some changes to\nrequirements. One FAA official stated that it may be cost prohibitive to\nimplement ADS-R nationwide.\n\nIn addition to uncertain costs, ADS-R presents added risks of faults, failures, and\ndelays in the ground hardware and software required to merge and rebroadcast\ninformation on two links. Various representatives from airline associations\nexpressed concern that ADS-R may not be technically feasible and that it may lack\n\n13\n Essential services will be used by pilots as advisory information, whereas critical services will be used to separate\n and manage aircraft.\n14\n In addition to the 239 sites, there are 25 more sites where ADS-B weather services will be provided.\n\x0c 20\n\n\nsufficient growth capacity to support future applications, including collision\navoidance. For example, information based on ADS-R could lack the precision\nnecessary for some important applications, such as merging and spacing and\nultimately allowing pilots to \xe2\x80\x9cself-separate.\xe2\x80\x9d In addition, the system could present\nfalse targets to pilots during critical phases of flight.\n\nFAA, however, believes that it can mitigate these risks and that they will not result\nin performance issues for targeted ADS-B In applications. Nevertheless, the\ndevelopment of ADS-R remains a key risk to full ADS-B implementation, and its\ntrue costs remain unknown.\n\nThe number of ADS-B ground radio stations could grow and increase\ncontract costs. The number of ADS-B ground radio stations and their installation\ncosts are key cost drivers for the ADS-B program. Due to changing requirements\nbetween air and ground elements, the need for additional ground stations is\nuncertain and could increase FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contract costs and therefore the Government\xe2\x80\x99s\nliability. For example, FAA\xe2\x80\x99s own analysis increased the estimated system\ndeployment costs by over $1 billion regardless of public or private ownership of\nthe ground system.\n\nFAA states that the contractor will deliver more than 300 ground systems as part\nof Segment 1 of the contract under the cost plus agreement. However, FAA\nproposed that aircraft be equipped with both a top and bottom antenna to support\nADS-B Out and future ADS-B In applications. Many stakeholders oppose these\nrequirements due to the increased costs. As FAA points out, there are legitimate\nreasons for more than one antenna to achieve sufficient update rates for\ncontrollers. Nevertheless, the ARC urged FAA to consider allowing aircraft with\na single antenna to fly through high-density airspace and recommended that FAA\nexplore how the drawbacks of single antenna could be offset by adding additional\nground stations. In the final rule for ADS-B, FAA decided to rely on a single\nbottom-mounted antenna, which could translate into more ground stations.\n\nCurrently, FAA estimates it will need almost 800 ground radio stations to provide\nservice to 323 segments of airspace, or \xe2\x80\x9cservice volumes.\xe2\x80\x9d For example, each\nmajor airport constitutes a specific service volume. FAA estimates that 60 service\nvolumes will be required to provide surveillance for the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s 20 facilities that\nmanage high-altitude traffic. As FAA points out, the number of radio stations is\nsubject to change as the Agency conducts more detailed site surveys. Until FAA\ncompletes all site surveys, the total number of radio stations FAA is responsible\nfor under the first segment remains uncertain.\n\nFAA will procure the remaining 454 radio stations needed to complete ADS-B\ndeployment nationwide under Segment 2 of the contract, which makes ITT\nresponsible for the cost of deploying enough radios to meet requirements. ITT\n\x0c 21\n\n\nwill recover its costs through fixed-price subscription charges. FAA states that\nthere will be no risk to the Government if additional ground stations or towers are\nneeded during Segment 2. This is because the contract does not specify the\nnumber of radios or towers. Nevertheless, the number of radio stations will be\nimportant to obtain the necessary coverage and level of performance with ADS-B\nfor safe, efficient operations, particularly in congested airspace.\n\nA September 2009 joint government and industry task force report on NextGen\xe2\x80\x99s\nmid-term implementation made recommendations that if accepted, could also\nimpact the ADS-B contract. 15 The task force stated that FAA should expand the\nvolume of what \xe2\x80\x9cradar-like services\xe2\x80\x9d will be provided by redefining the contract\nwith ITT to deliver ADS-B data in \xe2\x80\x9cnon-radar\xe2\x80\x9d airspace. It also noted that FAA\nshould expand ADS-B to additional locations. The initial focus is low altitude\nairspace, where radar is not available, within 35 to 40 miles of airports in\nWashington, D.C., and New York. If FAA reallocates requirements between air\nand ground elements or adds locations, it could result in a change to the contract.\nSuch a change would entitle the contractor to request an equitable adjustment to\nthe contract\xe2\x80\x99s price and schedule.\n\nThe ADS-B contract misclassified essential service charges as critical service\ncharges for the Gulf of Mexico service volumes. We found a $16 million\nvariance for subscription charges supporting Segment 1 critical services through\n2016 (see table 9). While the contract states the value is about $2 million, our\nreview of the pricing table found costs totaling about $18 million. According to\nADS-B program officials, although the contract pricing spreadsheet shows ADS-B\ncritical services under the Gulf of Mexico (GOMEX) Service Volume, it should\nhave been included as an essential service price. FAA officials acknowledge that\nthis same condition exists with contract line items that identify charges between\n2017 through 2025.\n Table 9. Contract Misclassification of Essential Services as Critical Services\n (Dollars in Millions)\n\nContract Line Total Costs\nItem Number Subscription Charges Discrepancy\n(CLIN) (thru 2016) CLIN Pricing Table Amount\n0003 Segment 1: Critical $2,072,944 $18,101,786 $16,028,842\n Services\n\n0006 Segment 1: Essential $311,873,778 $295,844,936 ($16,028,842)\n Services\nSource: OIG analysis of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ADS-B contract\n\n\n15\n RTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force, NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Report,\n September 9, 2009.\n\x0c 22\n\n\nBased on concerns we raised with the program office, FAA modified the ADS-B\ncontract in June 2010 to make the CLINs and pricing tables consistent. FAA\nmodified the pricing spreadsheets by deleting ADS-B critical service charges from\nGOMEX service volumes and reclassifying them under essential services. This\nwill ensure that the contract accurately reflects what ADS-B critical and essential\nservices the contractor is liable to provide and that both parties agree on their\nrespective charges.\n\nThe ADS-B Contract Structure Bundles and Comingles Tasks and\nCosts, Making It Difficult for Decision Makers To Track Capital and\nOperating Costs\nThe basic structure of the ADS-B contract makes it difficult for FAA to accurately\ntrack costs. For example, the first contract line item number (CLIN-0001)\nsupports the development and installation of the ADS-B ground infrastructure for\napproximately $207 million. However, various tasks and their associated costs for\ndeveloping this system (e.g., program management, hardware and software design,\nprocurement/production, and site installation) are embedded or bundled together\nwithin this one contract line item. This makes it difficult to trace actual\ndevelopment and unit production costs, including how many radio stations will be\nneeded to support Segment 1.\n\nWe are also concerned that the contract currently comingles the costs of capital\nassets (the equipment required to broadcast the ADS-B signal) and a variety of\noperating costs within the contract line items. For example, based on recent ITT\nestimates, $295.2 million is associated with capital assets for radio stations and\ncomplementary hardware and software that fall within two distinct contract line\nitems (CLINS 0006 and 0012) ). 16 The subscription charges for these two contract\nline items total $676.1 million. However, ITT\xe2\x80\x99s cost proposal for these two\ncontract line items also includes operating costs, such as rent, utilities, operations,\nand maintenance for radio stations, control stations, and service delivery points,\nplus service monitoring costs. The contract does not separately identify or track\nany of these operating costs elsewhere. As a result, it will be difficult for FAA\nand the contractor to identify and verify the capital and operating costs incurred or\nbilled under this contract.\n\nFor example, FAA conducted an extensive review of the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s cost proposal\nin 2007 and reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that capital\ncosts for about $150 million were required for the contract. However, in August\n2009, FAA advised us that ITT had since estimated that ADS-B capital costs\xe2\x80\x94\nincluding amounts for research and development, bid and proposal, and general\n\n16\n FAA reported these assets as capital leases to the Office of Management and Budget officials that represent the net\n present value of future payments.\n\x0c 23\n\n\nand administrative costs\xe2\x80\x94were $348 million. Additionally, in August 2009\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s legal counsel determined that the assets being constructed for ADS-B did\nnot meet the criteria for a capital lease. This means that additional radio stations,\nequipment, software, and implementation costs may be required. FAA needs to\nunderstand what the expected capital costs are for the system; track the types of\ncapital and operating costs billed to identify potential cost overruns; and monitor\nprogress by determining whether ADS-B is meeting program goals in terms of\ncost, schedule, and performance.\n\nCapital costs for expenditures, construction, equipment, software, and\nimplementation costs should be separately estimated, recorded, and billed. Such\naccountability helps to identify operating costs and prevents \xe2\x80\x9chiding\xe2\x80\x9d of related\ncost overruns in capital accounts as construction progresses. Since operating costs\nare period costs they should be easily identified and excluded from capital charges\nin subscription fees billed to FAA. In January 2010, FAA agreed with our\nobservation that the contract provided the Agency with the means to require the\ncontractor to separately track and bill the Government for capital costs at no\nadditional expense. In June 2010, FAA issued a contract modification to exercise\nthis option.\n\nBasic Management Controls Over the ADS-B Contract Are Lacking\nWhile FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contract for ADS-B has controls that are important for managing\nand overseeing a complex acquisition, we identified a number of areas where FAA\ncould strengthen them. Specifically, FAA convened an oversight and review\nboard that meets monthly and relies on Earned Value Management (EVM)\xe2\x80\x94an\nanalytical tool\xe2\x80\x94to monitor progress in meeting cost and schedule targets. 17\nHowever, EVM will primarily be used for the first segment of the contract. This\nis a concern given the problems we have identified with basic contract\nadministration, such as undocumented contract changes, and the question of\nwhether FAA has the in-house expertise to effectively oversee the contractor once\nthe ground infrastructure is in place.\n\nMechanisms to track progress with cost and schedule parameters are limited\nto the first segment of the contract. Our July 2009 management advisory to\nFAA raised a number of concerns about its methods for assessing progress with\nADS-B. For example, the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s EVM data showed that the estimated\nsolution development cost to complete ADS-B ground infrastructure through\nSeptember 2009 was approximately $111.8 million; however, this activity was\ninitially budgeted to cost about $84.1 million. Despite this $27.7 million variance,\n\n\n\n17\n Earned Value Management System (EVM) is a management tool that provides for integrating technical, cost, and\n schedule information about contract performance. This information enables FAA to proactively manage contracts.\n\x0c 24\n\n\nthe contracting officer was reporting that the contractor was meeting ADS-B cost\ngoals.\n\nIn an updated analysis we reviewed, we questioned why the contractor EVM data\nreported as of September 2009 indicated the estimated costs and fees to develop\nand install ADS-B would exceed the contract total by approximately $7 million\n(from $207 million to $214 million). FAA officials acknowledge there have been\na number of changes to requirements that increased the ADS-B development and\ninstallation costs.\n\nFAA is planning to use EVM to measure progress with ADS-B development and\ninstallation activities, which are under a cost-plus incentive fee arrangement. This\nrepresents only the first segment of the contract, which was originally valued just\nover $207 million (or approximately 10 percent of the total contract value).\nHowever, FAA points out that EVM is generally not used for fixed-price contract\nelements, which make up the later segments of the ADS-B contract. FAA would\nbenefit from establishing a mechanism to track and monitor the costs of the\nremaining ADS-B implementation activities associated with fixed-price elements.\n\nFAA needs to correct improper contract administration practices and\ndocument contract modifications. Our July 2009 management advisory also\nraised concerns that FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contracting officer for ADS-B was not documenting\ncontract changes in a timely manner. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Acquisition Management System\nguidance specifies that contract modifications should be properly documented to\ndescribe the changes made to the scope of work, the contract price, the period of\nperformance, and other contract terms. During our review, we analyzed\n13 contract modifications that primarily funded development and installation\nactivities.\n\nWe found that although FAA\xe2\x80\x99s contracting officer had provided funds to the\ncontractor, he did not identify the changes in the scope of the work, the prices,\nperiods of performance, or other terms. For example, in March 2009, the ADS-B\ncontracting officer issued a contract modification funding the contract to\napproximately $124 million but did not define the additional scope of work to be\nperformed. As a result, FAA agreed to pay the contractor more than $60 million\nwithout the proper documentation needed to adequately account for what the\ncontract would perform.\n\nDocumenting contract changes is a fundamental contracting officer responsibility.\nUnless the contract includes a clear definition of the work and its prices, the\nGovernment is at risk of overpaying or paying for something it does not want. In\nresponse to our concerns, FAA has placed additional resources to help improve\noverall contract administration.\n\x0c 25\n\n\nFAA does not yet have the in-house expertise to effectively oversee\nADS-B. As we have noted in multiple reports and testimonies, the right skill mix\nis essential to develop and manage NextGen initiatives, and this is particularly true\nfor ADS-B. For example, FAA must ensure that all 323 planned service volumes\nare working as intended on a regular basis. It will be difficult for the Agency to\nbuild and sustain sufficient in-house knowledge of how the system actually works\nand how problems are solved since it will neither own the hardware, ground\nstations, and related software nor be responsible for the operation and maintenance\nof the ground system.\n\nFurther, much of the ADS-B infrastructure will be embedded in commercial\nequipment and networks. FAA knowledge may diminish once contractors assume\nsole responsibility for operating and maintaining the satellite-based system. The\nkey personnel skills that are needed for effective ADS-B oversight include\ntelecommunications, signal processing, and knowledge of the GPS constellation.\nHowever, FAA has not assessed the in-house skills it needs to oversee the ADS-B\nground infrastructure. Without this information, we are concerned that FAA could\nfind itself in the unenviable position of knowing very little about a system that is\nexpected to be the foundation of NextGen.\n\nCONCLUSION\nADS-B is a cornerstone NextGen technology and has the potential to significantly\nenhance capacity and safety. However, FAA faces multiple challenges and\nconsiderable risks in implementing ADS-B. FAA must provide Congress and\nairspace users with a plan to address the challenges, mitigate the risks, and assess\nthe costs and benefits of its decisions. Until FAA addresses challenges such as\nequipage, requirements, system integration, and contract management issues,\nrealization of ADS-B program goals will remain uncertain and NextGen initiatives\nwill be delayed.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nTo reduce risk with ADS-B implementation, FAA needs to:\n\n 1. Accelerate efforts to establish requirements for ADS-B In and certify cockpit\n displays for enhancing pilot situational awareness to improve operations at\n high-density airports.\n\n 2. Further quantify and validate controller productivity enhancements that can\n result from displaying ADS-B information on controller displays and the\n additional automation needed to maximize these ADS-B benefits.\n\x0c 26\n\n\n 3. Develop and fund a targeted human factors research effort for pilots and\n controllers for ADS-B In requirements (display and procedures) in order to\n prioritize efforts and examine the proper sequence for introducing new\n capabilities.\n\n 4. Work with the U.S. intelligence community to assess potential threats to the\n ADS-B system and ways to mitigate them.\n\nTo enhance oversight of the ADS-B contract, FAA needs to:\n\n 5. Update the cost benefit analysis for the acquisition to ensure that FAA\xe2\x80\x99s plan\n is still appropriate before committing the additional funds for a nationwide\n deployment of the ADS-B ground infrastructure.\n\n 6. Clarify the use of ADS-B value-added services and reexamine assumptions\n about the ability of ITT to sell them in light of other planned NextGen efforts\n to greatly expand information sharing between FAA and stakeholders.\n\n 7. Specify the cost and schedule for providing ADS-B critical services to all en\n route and airport surface domains over the life of the contract.\n\n 8. Assess the technical readiness of ADS-R and any risks to its development\n and determine which locations will need ADS-R.\n\n 9. Determine and obtain the necessary in-house expertise to effectively monitor\n the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s efforts and oversee the ADS-B ground infrastructure over the\n long term.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\nRESPONSE\nWe discussed the results of our review with FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Assistant Chief Counsel,\nAcquisition and Commercial Law Division, and the Director of Surveillance and\nBroadcast Services and provided FAA with our draft report on September 2, 2010.\nWe received the Agency\xe2\x80\x99s formal response on September 28, 2010. FAA\nconcurred with seven of our nine recommendations but did not provide a target\ncompletion date for recommendation 2 and partially concurred with\nrecommendations 5 and 7. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s complete response is included as an appendix\nto this report.\n\nSpecifically, for recommendation 2, FAA stated that it is finalizing negotiations\nwith the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) about the nature\nand extent of controller participation in potential ADS-B modifications to\ncontroller displays. FAA noted\xe2\x80\x94and we agree\xe2\x80\x94that controller productivity\n\x0c 27\n\n\nenhancements could arise from procedural changes, not necessarily changes to the\nautomation systems. While FAA\xe2\x80\x99s efforts with NATCA are an important step,\nFAA must determine what levels of productivity it can realistically achieve and\nwhat new technology and procedures it will need to do so. This will help boost\nindustry confidence in FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to not only deliver technology but also\nbenefits to airspace users. Therefore, FAA needs to provide our office with target\naction dates for completing ongoing work with the controllers to identify potential\nmodifications to procedures and automation platforms.\n\nFor recommendation 5, FAA agreed that it needs to update the cost benefit\nanalysis but stated that it is premature to update the benefits portion at this time\nsince benefits are tied to the equipage rate. While users are not mandated to equip\nuntil 2020, FAA proposed doing an interim sample of the equipage rate between\n2015 and 2016, at which time it will validate the cost benefit analysis against the\noriginal baseline. We note, however, that our recommendation also included\nvalidating that FAA\xe2\x80\x99s acquisition approach is still appropriate since FAA may\nspend an additional $2.7 billion to implement ADS-B. FAA needs to conduct this\nanalysis sooner rather than later given the central role ADS-B will play in\nrevamping air traffic management. Therefore, we reiterate that FAA should\nvalidate that its preferred approach remains cost beneficial before committing\nadditional funds by the planned Joint Resources Council in 2012, which will\nbaseline and fund activities for 2014 and beyond.\n\nFor recommendation 7, FAA agreed that the lifecycle contract costs for critical\nservices require clarification. FAA stated, however, that it is difficult to reflect\nthis in contract pricing tables, which show only the initial costs for critical\nservices. FAA proposed to issue a contract modification by October 31, 2010, in\nlieu of reissuing the pricing tables. This contract modification will clarify pricing\nassumptions to state when charges for ADS-B critical services are included under\nEssential Services for a specific service volume if the pricing table does not\nseparately reflect them. Moreover, FAA is planning to refine its schedule for\nestablishing critical services for all locations by FY 2014. FAA\xe2\x80\x99s response meets\nthe intent of our recommendation and if implemented will increase contract\ntransparency. However, we plan to keep this recommendation open until the end\nof FY 2014 so we can verify whether the ADS-B contract includes cost estimates\nto support critical services for all sites throughout the life of the contract.\n\nACTION REQUIRED\nFAA\xe2\x80\x99s proposed actions for all nine recommendations are responsive, and we\nconsider them addressed but open pending completion of the planned actions. In\naccordance with DOT Order 8000.1c, we request that FAA provide us with a\ntarget completion date for recommendation 2 and reconsider its completion date\n\x0c 28\n\n\nfor recommendation 5. We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of\nDepartment of Transportation, FAA, and various stakeholder representatives\nduring this audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact\nme at (202) 366-1427 or Kevin Dorsey, Program Director, at (202) 366-1518.\n\n #\n\ncc: FAA Assistant Administrator for Financial Services/CFO\n FAA Deputy Administrator\n Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs\n FAA Chief of Staff\n FAA Director, Audit and Evaluation\n Anthony Williams, AAE-001\n Martin Gertel, M-1\n\x0c 29\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY\nAt the request of the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation\nInfrastructure and the House Subcommittee on Aviation, we examined FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nplans for implementing ADS-B. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) examine\nkey risks to FAA\xe2\x80\x99s successful implementation of ADS-B and (2) assess the\nstrengths and weaknesses of FAA\xe2\x80\x99s proposed contracting approach.\n\nTo achieve our objectives, we analyzed contract data, budget data, acquisition\ndocuments, cost and schedule projections and other supporting documentation\nprovided by FAA. We also reviewed the ADS-B contract and relevant contractor\nfinancial and performance reports from ITT Corporation, the prime contractor.\nWe reviewed FAA\xe2\x80\x99s ADS-B budget and cost estimates and ADS-B strategy\ndocuments for reasonableness and cost effectiveness. We examined FAA\nexpenditure data for ADS-B, to determine how much has been spent since the\nprogram\xe2\x80\x99s inception and for FAA\xe2\x80\x99s legacy systems to determine if ADS-B is\nachieving cost and benefit goals. We also analyzed the FAA\xe2\x80\x99s Notices of\nProposed Rulemaking for the ADS-B system.\n\nWe interviewed key FAA and ADS-B program officials at FAA Headquarters in\nWashington, D.C. We also met with industry officials and union representatives.\nWe interviewed ITT Corporation officials to discuss the contract and the status of\nthe system\xe2\x80\x99s development, installation, and implementation.\n\nWe conducted this performance audit between August 2007 and June 2010. The\naudit was performed in accordance with Generally Accepted Government\nAuditing Standards prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States.\nAs required by those standards, we obtained evidence that we believe provides a\nreasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objecti ves, Scope, and Methodology\n\x0c 30\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT B. KEY ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION MILESTONES\nThus far, FAA has completed a number of important ADS-B actions on schedule.\nFor example, FAA has completed a critical design review 18 of the ground system\nand ADS-B ground systems have been deployed at the first key site in Miami,\nFlorida. The Miami systems have been declared suitable for operational use and\nare providing services to a limited number of pilots in properly equipped aircraft. 19\n\nBetween 2009 and 2014, FAA plans to complete the ground infrastructure, and\nfully integrate ADS-B with existing FAA automation systems that controllers\ncurrently rely on to manage traffic, and provide weather services. Further\nrefinement of additional air-to-air applications (for ADS-B-In) and the\ndecommissioning of radars are planned for the 2015 to 2025 timeframe.\nTable B-1 shows the key milestones for ADS-B implementation.\n\n Table B-1. ADS-B Key Milestones\n Projected/Actual\n Milestone\n Completion Date\n In Service Decision\xe2\x80\x94Miami November 2008\n Initial Operating Capability\xe2\x80\x94Louisville November 2009\n Initial Operating Capability\xe2\x80\x94Gulf of Mexico December 2009\n Initial Operating Capability\xe2\x80\x94Philadelphia March 2010\n Initial Operating Capability\xe2\x80\x94Juneau April 2010\n Publish Final Rule for ADS-B Out May 2010\n In Service Decision for Critical Services September 2010\n Complete ADS-B NAS-wide Infrastructure Deployment September 2013\n Source: FAA Contract\xe2\x80\x94ADS-B Program, August 24, 2007\n\n\n\n\n18\n A critical design review validates that the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s overall design of the system meets the contract requirements.\n19\n It is important to note that the ADS-B ground systems deployed in Miami are broadcasting \xe2\x80\x9cessential\xe2\x80\x9d services\n (advisory information) to pilots as opposed to broadcasting \xe2\x80\x9ccritical\xe2\x80\x9d services or the down-linking of information to\n FAA automation systems that will be used for separating aircraft.\n\n\nExhibit B. Key ADS-B Implementation Milestones\n\x0c 31\n\n\nEXHIBIT C. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT\n\n\n Name Title .\n\n\n Kevin Dorsey Program Director\n\n Lillian Slodkowski Project Manager\n\n Melissa Pyron Senior Analyst\n\n Won Kim Auditor\n\n Andrea Nossaman Writer-Editor\n\n Arthur Shantz Technical Advisor\n\n\n\n\nExhibit C. Major Contributors to This Report\n\x0c 32\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS\n\n\n Federal Aviation\n Administration\n\nMemorandum\nDate: September 28, 2010\nTo: Matthew E. Hampton, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and\n Special Program Audits\nFrom: Clay Foushee, Director, Audit and Evaluation\nPrepared by: Anthony Williams, x79000\nSubject: OIG Draft Report: FAA Faces Significant Risks in Implementing the\n Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast Program and Realizing Benefits\n\n\nThe Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) program is a cornerstone of the\nFederal Aviation Administration\xe2\x80\x99s (FAA) overall approach to evolving air traffic control, from its\npresent state into the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) approach; increasing\nsafety and the overall efficiency of the National Airspace System. While it employs a complex\nmultifaceted approach, it is built upon the straightforward concept of leveraging Global\nPositioning System technology to give the pilot and controller the access to better information for\nmaking safe aviation decisions. The FAA appreciates the Office of Inspector General (OIG)\nreport\xe2\x80\x99s recognition of the strides that FAA has achieved and agrees that the program offers the\npotential for significant long term benefits. At the same time, it is a long term program that\nrequires the careful coordination of disparate participants, with varying perspectives ranging\nfrom cost, to effectiveness, to national security.\n\nFAA Involved Stakeholders and ADS-B Development\n\nFAA obtained stakeholder input throughout the ADS-B program and ensured that decisions were\ntransparent, objective and appropriate. FAA enlisted the participation of diverse stakeholders to\nhelp refine requirements for both ground and avionics system elements. Significant industry\ninvolvement resulted in a performance-based contract that incentivized the contractor to perform\n- and actual results are essentially on-time and under budget. The ADS-B signal provides the\ncontrollers more accurate data than previously available and FAA is soliciting controller\nfeedback on how best to display and use that data across each automation platform. The ADS-B\nfinal rule for equipage was issued on May 27, 2010 after Aviation Rulemaking Committee\n(ARC) and significant industry input. The FAA coordinated with the Radio Technical\nCommission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and other aviation organizations before issuing a Technical\nStandard Order (TSO) which defines ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cOut\xe2\x80\x9d manufacturer requirements for avionics. The\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 33\n\n\nFAA has also established an advisory circular which identifies the requirements for avionics\ninstallation. This stability in requirements is expected to allow the avionics industry to\nmanufacture, certify and install rule-compliant equipment well in advance of the 2020 required\ndate.\n\nFAA Defining Advanced ADS-B Requirements\n\nFAA is now defining the more advanced requirements for ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cIn\xe2\x80\x9d applications. Due in part\nto program success to-date, increased demand for avionics applications by the user community\nmay present the FAA with the future choice of whether to modify ADS-B air or ground\ncomponents. The plan for ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cIn\xe2\x80\x9d high value advanced applications is to define\nrequirements through the Applications Integrated Work Plan Steering Committee and Work\nGroup, and from an Aviation Rulemaking Committee convened July 2010. If these ADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cIn\xe2\x80\x9d\nrequirements are cost beneficial, the FAA will decide whether to add to the existing program or\ncontract baseline.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES\n\nRecommendation 1. Accelerate efforts to establish requirements for ADS-B In and certify\ncockpit displays for enhancing pilot situational awareness to improve operations at high-density\nairports.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. In July 2010, FAA formed an ARC to explore ADS-B In. The FAA has\nagreements with several airline partners (e.g., United Parcel Service, United, US Air, etc.) to\nequip aircraft and collect data. The airline partners have subcontracts with avionics\nmanufacturers and those efforts will lead to certified avionics. Cockpit displays are expected to\nbe the most expensive type of avionics. As the FAA and industry research potential high-value\nADS-B \xe2\x80\x9cIn\xe2\x80\x9d applications, part of that work will involve prioritizing which applications would\nrequire a cockpit display. The ARC is chartered to deliver a final report on its recommendations\nby September 30, 2011. It will also complete all follow on work and prepare a summary report\ndetailing recommended next steps by June 1, 2012.\n\nRecommendation 2. Further quantify and validate controller productivity enhancements that can\nresult from displaying ADS-B information on controller displays and the additional automation\nneeded to maximize these ADS-B benefits.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. The FAA is nearing completion of negotiations with the National Air\nTraffic Controllers Association about the nature and extent of controller participation in\nevaluating any potential modifications. Potential productivity enhancements could arise from\nprocedural changes and do not necessarily involve changes to the automation system. The FAA\nwill analyze the costs and benefits between contemplated procedural and automation changes in\nits decision making process. As part of the FAA\xe2\x80\x99s business case, the benefits of providing\nimproved surveillance data via ADS-B Out to air traffic control decision support tools such as\nUser Request Evaluation Tool (URET) and Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) were\nquantified. The present value of increasing the utility of these decision tools was estimated to be\n$802 million for URET and $417 million for TMA. The URET benefits begin to be accrued in\n2017 after the decision support tool is migrated to the R-Side (radar) while the TMA benefits\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 34\n\n\nwere not to be accrued until 2020 due to uncertainty of achieving the benefit prior to full user\nequipage.\n\nAdditionally, the implementation of a ground based interval management system in conjunction\nwith ADS-B Out provides air traffic control with the ability to support optimal profile descents in\nbusier traffic environments translating to $796 million in present value dollars between 2014 and\n2035.\n\nRecommendation 3. Develop and fund a targeted human factors research effort for pilots and\ncontrollers for ADS-B In requirements (display and procedures) in order to prioritize efforts and\nexamine the proper sequence for introducing new capabilities.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. The Agency will evaluate any recommendations from the ADS-B \xe2\x80\x98In\xe2\x80\x99\nARC and RTCA efforts. All recommendations will be addressed and incorporated into the Joint\nResources Council (JRC) in 2012 which will baseline and fund activities 2014 and beyond.\n\nDO-317 A, the standard for cockpit based ADS-B \xe2\x80\x98In\xe2\x80\x99 applications, is under development as a\njoint RTCA/EuroCAE product. Development of this standard will be completed by the end of\nfiscal year (FY) 2011 third quarter. After DO-317A is published, a TSO \xe2\x80\x93 certification\nrequirements for avionics invoking it will be published within 3 months (by FY 2011 fourth\nquarter).\n\nThe Agency has conducted multiple focused human factors research efforts to date related to\nADS-B \xe2\x80\x98In\xe2\x80\x99 and has plans to continue conducting this research in the future. Examples of\nresearch efforts include and/or will include: Surface Indications with Alerts - conducted 5\nhuman-in-the-loop (HITL) studies (between 2008-2010) plus additional simulation and flight test\nHITL studies (February 2010); In Trail Procedures (ITP) - white paper on ITP display issues and\npotential resolutions (March 2010), demonstration of ITP display concepts (July 2010), human\nfactors flight simulator evaluation (September 2010), human factors flight test evaluation\n(February 2011); Interval Management - HITL simulations (April 2007, June 2008, July 2008,\nSeptember 2008, December 2008, August 2009), field tests (June 2010, August 2010), and\nadditional HITL simulations (beginning FY11 if the ARC endorses). There will also be Traffic\nSituation Awareness with Alerts human factors studies completed by 2012.\n\nRecommendation 4. Work with the U.S. intelligence community to assess potential threats to\nthe ADS-B system and ways to mitigate them.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. FAA is conducting an ongoing dialogue with DoD and the intelligence\ncommunity and making annual updates to its Security Certification and Authorization Package\n(SCAP). The next authorization date (SCAP update) is October 29, 2010.\n\nRecommendation 5. Update the cost benefit analysis for the acquisition to ensure that FAA\xe2\x80\x99s\nplan is still appropriate before committing the additional funds for a nationwide deployment of\nthe ADS-B ground infrastructure.\n\nFAA Response: Partially Concur. The FAA agrees with the need to eventually update the cost\nbenefit analysis, but disagrees with the timing of the recommendation. It is premature to update\nthe benefits portion of the cost benefit analysis because the benefits are tied to the equipage rate.\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 35\n\n\nThe FAA approved and baselined the nationwide deployment of ADS-B at the August 2007 JRC\nmeeting. Using the latest July 2010 Earned Value Management data, FAA planned to spend\n$522,762,990 by that point and actually spent $488,038,680. The plan included attaining Initial\nOperating Capability at four key sites and publishing a rule for ADS-B Out, all of which have\nbeen accomplished. The program Cost Performance Index is 1.04 and program Schedule\nPerformance Index is 0.97, indicating a healthy program.\n\nThe ADS-B In Service Decision (ISD) occurred on September 22, 2010. At this time, an analysis\nof approved versus spent dollars will be conducted as part of a decision to continue nationwide\ndeployment of the system.\n\nThe ADS-B Out rule was recently published (May 2010) and the compliance date is not until\n2020. The cost benefit analysis will be updated once a substantial level of equipage is in place to\nrealize and calculate the planned benefits. In the interim, the Agency will sample the equipage\nrate between 2015 - 2016 and validate the cost benefit analysis as compared to the baseline.\n\nRecommendation 6. Clarify the use of ADS-B value-added services and reexamine assumptions\nabout the ability of ITT to sell them in light of other planned NextGen efforts to greatly expand\ninformation sharing between FAA and stake holders.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. The FAA agrees that plans to share data with the aviation industry and\nothers should be carefully coordinated. The ADS-B contractor was not promised exclusive use of\nADS-B data - but the value of that data feed could be diluted to the extent that similar aviation\ndata becomes available from alternate sources. The FAA is in the process of creating a new\norganization (ATO-V, Mission Support Services) with overall responsibility for coordinating\ndata release issues. The ability of ITT to sell value added services in light of other planned\nNextGen efforts may be aided by segregating data related to FAA \xe2\x80\x9ccore\xe2\x80\x9d activities from data to\nbe used for other customer activities such as asset tracking and resale of surveillance data to third\nparties. Actual sale of value added services is dependent on equipage rates, customer demand,\nand ITT marketing.\n\nThe Surveillance Broadcast Services (SBS) program office has initiated discussions with ITT\nregarding which value added services would be most attractive to potential customers and would\nprovide an effective stream of revenue. The ITT value added ADS-B architecture has been\napproved by FAA. A Beta Test period has been initiated where data is currently being provided\nto several users. The Beta Test will aid in determining how the delivered data could be displayed\nand utilized. The SBS program office is developing a governance policy (to be in place by\ncalendar year 2010) which will guide the type of data which will be released and the authorized\nusage by each customer. It is envisioned the Beta Test will last approximately 6 months. After\nthe Beta Test is completed, ITT will charge customers for data. At that time, a system will have\nbeen developed which will include the data release approval process and a related revenue\nreporting system. The SBS program office has also authorized ITT to establish a link for display\nof ADS-B value added data to Alaskan pilots to enable them to assess the potential of value\nadded products.\n\nRecommendation 7. Specify the cost and schedule for providing ADS-B critical services to all\nEnroute and airport surface domains over the life of the contract.\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 36\n\n\nFAA Response: Partially Concur. The FAA agrees that the contract pricing tables do not in some\ninstances separately identify pricing for ADS-B Critical Services and that it is not always clear in\nthose tables whether the costs are included in the pricing.\n\nThe stated cost for providing Critical Services is a layer of the overall cost because the contract\npricing assumptions stated that the Critical Services would be built upon the pre-established\nEssential Services network. Accordingly, there is an initial charge for establishing Critical\nServices, after which the cost of providing Critical Services are included in the Service Volume\nEssential Services prices.\n\nThe schedule for establishing Critical Services (based on the contract\xe2\x80\x99s pricing tables) for\nremaining locations is:\n\n FY 2011: 6\n FY 2012: 97\n FY 2013: 109\n FY 2014: 86\n Total: 298 locations\n\nIn lieu of reissuing the pricing tables with a specific cost and schedule for ADS-B Critical\nServices, existing contract provisions for pricing assumptions will be clarified to state that where\nthere is no separate ADS-B Critical Services subscription charge in the pricing table, the charge\nis included in the Essential Services charge for that service volume. A contract modification will\nbe completed by October 31, 2010.\n\nRecommendation 8. Assess the technical readiness of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-\nRebroadcast (ADS-R) and any risks to its development and determine which locations will need\nADS-R.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. ADS-R was baselined for situational awareness as part of the essential\nservices ISD in November 2008, before reaching ISD extensive testing and validation was\ncompleted to ensure technical readiness. All sites will be deployed with ADS-R capability by\n2014. When high value ADS-B \xe2\x80\x98in\xe2\x80\x99 applications are baselined ADS-R will be reassessed, which\nwill include all necessary testing and validation.\n\nRecommendation 9. Determine and obtain the necessary in-house expertise to effectively\nmonitor the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s efforts and oversee the ADS-B ground infrastructure over the long term.\n\nFAA Response: Concur. The FAA is continually assessing the extent to which various skill sets\nare necessary as part of its annual Acquisition Workforce Planning. In addition, there were two\nSBS ISD action plans related to staffing identified and approved within Category 8 of the ISD\nchecklist which will be closed by June 2011.\n\nOverall, the OIG report provides a useful summary of the issues and perspectives involved with\nADS-B development. The FAA appreciates the time that the OIG office took to carefully review\nthe ADS-B program and to speak with Agency officials.\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c'


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 5.7.2008
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 171/16
 Lūgums sniegt prejudiciālu nolēmumu — Izteikts ar Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (Spānija) 2008. gada 15. aprīļa rīkojumu — Real Sociedad de Fútbol S.A.D. un Nihat Kahveci/Consejo Superior de Deportes un Real Federación Española de Fútbol
 (Lieta C-152/08)
 (2008/C 171/28)
 Tiesvedības valoda — spāņu
 Iesniedzējtiesa
 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid
 Lietas dalībnieki pamata procesā
 Prasītāji: Real Sociedad de Fútbol S.A.D. un Nihat Kahveci
 Atbildētāji: Consejo Superior de Deportes un Real Federación Española de Fútbol
 Prejudiciālais jautājums
 Vai Ankarā 1963. gada 12. septembrī parakstītā un ar EEK Padomes 1963. gada 23. decembra Lēmumu 64/732/EEK noslēgtā EEK un Turcijas asociācijas līguma (1) 37. pants, kā arī tā 1970. gada 23. novembra Papildprotokols (2) nepieļauj to, ka sporta federācija profesionālam sportistam, kam ir Turcijas valstspiederība un kas ir likumīgi nodarbināts Spānijas futbola klubā, kā tas ir pamata prāvā, piemēro noteikumu, atbilstoši kuram valsts mērogā organizētās sacensībās klubi drīkst izmantot tikai ierobežotu spēlētāju skaitu no trešām valstīm, kas neietilpst Eiropas Ekonomikas zonā?
 (1) Eiropas Ekonomikas Kopienas un Turcijas asociācijas līgums, kas parakstīts Ankarā 1963. gada 12. septembrī un Kopienas vārdā apstiprināts ar Padomes 1963. gada 23. decembra Lēmumu 64/732/EEK (OV 1964, 217, 3685. lpp.).
 (2) Papildprotokols, kas parakstīts 1970. gada 23. novembrī Briselē un Kopienas vārdā apstiprināts ar Padomes 1972. gada 19. decembra Regulu (EEK) Nr. 2760/72 (OV L 293, 1. lpp.).


type: wikipedia

text:
Victor Apfelbeck (ou Viktor avec un k) né le à Eisenerz et décédé le à Sarajevo, est un entomologiste de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il a été conservateur au Muséum de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine (), à Sarajevo.
 Une partie de sa riche collection d'insectes est déposée au Muséum d'histoire naturelle de Vienne () et une collection d'insectes de la péninsule balkanique d'environ 500.000 specimens est conservée au muséum de Sarajevo.
 Spécialisé dans les Coléoptères, il a découvert plusieurs espèces d'insectes troglobies.
 Il publie en 1900 Zur Kenntnis der palaearctischen Curculioniden: synonymische und zoogeographische Beiträge nebst Beschreibungen neuer Arten von der Balkan-Halbinsel.
 Liens externes
 Naissance en avril 1859
 Décès en mai 1934
 Entomologiste
 Décès à 75 ans