text:
Foclóirí, teangeolaí, aistritheoir agus scríbhneoir Gaeilge ab ea Niall Ó Dónaill (27 Lúnasa 1908, Loch an Iúir – 10 Feabhra 1995, BÁC). Chuir an Dálach in eagar an foclóir mór Gaeilge-Béarla a tháinig i gcló a chéad uair sa bhliain 1977. Is beag scríbhneoirí na Gaeilge sna 1980idí-2000idí ar fud na cruinne nach raibh foclóir Uí Dhónaill acu – ‘Bíobla’ na Gaeilge a bhí ann ar go leor bealaí.
 Saol
 Cainteoir dúchais ó Thír Chonaill a bhí ann. In Ailt an Eidhinn in aice le Loch an Iúir, paróiste Anagaire, Co. Dhún na nGall, a rugadh é 27 Lúnasa 1908. Ba é an duine ba shine de sheisear é.
 Trí Bhéarla amháin a cuireadh bunoideachas ar an Dálach i Scoil Loch an Iúir. Thug scoláireacht é go Coláiste Adhamhnáin, Leitir Ceanainn (1921-25), agus scoláireacht eile ón gcomhairle contae go dtí an Coláiste Ollscoile, Baile Átha Cliath.
 Bhí tosaithe aige ar scéalta agus aistí a chur i gcló in An tUltach in 1927 agus bhí ag aistriú don Ghúm ó 1929.
 Saothair
 Scríobh an Dálach a shaith aistí agus gearrscéalta d’irisí ar nós ‘An tUltach’ sna 1930idí, agus ‘Comhar’ níos déanaí.
 Ó 1959 go 1978 bhí sé ina Eagarthóir ar Foclóir Gaeilge-Béarla, a tháinig i gcló a chéad uair sa bhliain 1977.. Ba é ba chuspóir ‘don fhoclóir seo an chuid is coitianta de stór focal na Nua-Ghaeilge a thabhairt le chéile agus a mhíniú i mBéarla’
 Thairis sin, d'fhoilsigh sé leabhar stairsheanchais faoi cheantar na Rosann sa bhliain 1952, Na Glúnta Rosannacha - ceann den bheagán leabhar Gaeilge a úsáideann litriú caighdeánach agus cló Gaelach.
 D'aistrigh an Dálach príomhscríbhinní na Fiannaíochta go Nua-Ghaeilge sa leabhar Seanchas na Féinne a foilsíodh sa bhliain 1942 - foilsíodh eagrán nua caighdeánaithe de sa bhliain 1998 - agus phléigh sé staid chomhaimseartha na Gaeilge sa leabhar clúiteach Forbairt na Gaeilge (1951).
 Scríobh sé beathaisnéis Sheán Mhistéil chomh maith, agus rinne sé a lán aistriúchán.
 Ba eisean a chuir in eagar Cora Cinniúna, Cith is Dealán, Nuair a Bhí Mé Óg agus Caisleáin Óir le Séamus Ó Grianna i litriú nua-aimseartha a bhí inléite acu siúd nach raibh taithí acu ach ar an gCaighdeán.
 Sonraí pearsanta
 Fuair a bhean Sorcha bás ar 5 Eanáir 1995 agus d’éag an Dálach 10 Feabhra na bliana céanna; in Ascaill Vernon, Cluain Tarbh, Baile Átha Cliath, a bhí cónaí orthu. Cuireadh iad i nGlas Naíon.
 Féach freisin
 Foclóirí Gaeilge
 Naisc sheachtracha
 Teach Niall Ó Dónaill Loch an Iúir,
 Tagairtí
 Scríbhneoirí Éireannacha
 Scoláirí Gaeilge
 Daoine a rugadh i 1908
 Básanna i 1995
 Foclóirithe Éireannacha
 Daoine as Gaoth Dobhair


type: other

text:
Polasaí Príobháideachta - Dreadbag.com
 Baile Ráiteas Príobháideachta
 Nuair a thugann tú cuairt ar ár láithreán gréasáin, is féidir measúnú staitistiúil a dhéanamh ar d'iompar surfing. Tarlaíonn sé seo go príomha le fianáin agus le cláir anailíse ar a dtugtar. De ghnáth níl an anailís ar do iompraíocht surfing gan ainm; ní féidir an iompar surfing a rianú ar ais chugat. Is féidir leat agóid a dhéanamh leis an anailís seo nó é a chosc trí uirlisí áirithe a úsáid. Is féidir faisnéis mhionsonraithe a fháil sa pholasaí príobháideachta seo a leanas.
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 3. Oifigeach Cosanta Sonraí
 Oifigeach reachtúil um chosaint sonraí
 Cheapamar oifigeach cosanta sonraí dár gcuideachta.
 4. Bailiú sonraí ar ár láithreán gréasáin
 Tá bailiú na sonraí seo bunaithe ar Ealaín 6 para. 1 lit. f DSGVO. Tá suim dhlíthiúil ag oibreoir an tsuímh gréasáin sa chur i láthair go héifeachtach ó thaobh earráidí agus uasmhéadú a shuíomh gréasáin - mar sin ní mór na comhaid logála freastalaí a thaifeadadh.
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 tharchur muid sonraí pearsanta do thríú páirtithe ach amháin más gá sin mar chuid den chonradh, mar na húdaráis atá freagrach as soláthar an chuideachta earraí nó na foirne atá freagrach as íocaíochtaí a phróiseáil. Ní dhéantar tarchur breise ar na sonraí nó ní amháin má thoiligh tú go sainráite don tarchur. Ní tharlaíonn aistriú do chuid sonraí chuig tríú páirtithe gan toiliú sainráite, mar shampla chun críocha fógraíochta.
 5. Na meáin shóisialta
 Ar ár leathanaigh tá forlíontáin den líonra sóisialta Facebook, soláthróir Facebook Inc., 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, California 94025, SAM, comhtháite. Is féidir na forlíontáin Facebook a aithint ag an lógó Facebook nó an "Like-Button" ("Like") ar ár suíomh. Is féidir forbhreathnú ar na forlíontáin Facebook a fháil anseo: https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.
 Nuair a thugann tú cuairt ar ár leathanaigh, bunaíonn an breiseán nasc díreach idir do bhrabhsálaí agus an freastalaí Facebook. Faigheann Facebook an fhaisnéis ar thug tú cuairt uirthi ar ár láithreán le do sheoladh IP. Má chliceálann tú ar an Facebook "Like-Button" agus tú logáilte isteach i do chuntas Facebook, is féidir leat ábhar ár leathanaigh a nascadh le do phróifíl Facebook. Mar thoradh air sin, is féidir le Facebook an chuairt ar ár leathanaigh a shannadh ar do chuntas úsáideora. Tugaimid faoi deara nach eol dúinn, mar sholáthraí na leathanach, ábhar na sonraí a tharchuirtear agus a n-úsáid ag Facebook. Le haghaidh tuilleadh eolais, féach Polasaí Príobháideachta Facebook ag: https://de-de.facebook.com/policy.php.
 Ar fheidhmeanna ár leathanaigh ar Twitter áirítear Twitter. Tairgtear na gnéithe seo trí Twitter Inc., Sráid an Mhargaidh 1355, Suite 900, San Francisco, CA 94103, SAM. Trí úsáid a bhaint as Twitter agus as an bhfeidhm "Re-Tweet", tá na láithreáin ghréasáin a dtugann tú cuairt orthu nasctha le do chuntas Twitter agus iad a roinnt le húsáideoirí eile. Tarchuirtear na sonraí seo chuig Twitter freisin. Tugaimid faoi deara nach eol dúinn, mar sholáthraí na leathanach, ábhar na sonraí a tharchuireadh agus a n-úsáid ag Twitter. Le haghaidh tuilleadh eolais, féach an polasaí príobháideachais Twitter ag: https://twitter.com/privacy.
 Breiseán Instagram
 Tá feidhmeanna na seirbhíse Instagram comhtháite ar ár taobh. Cuirtear na gnéithe seo ar fáil ag Instagram Inc., 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025, Stáit Aontaithe Mheiriceá.
 Má tá tú logáilte isteach i do chuntas Instagram, is féidir leat ábhar ár leathanaigh a nascadh le do phróifíl Instagram trí chliceáil ar an gcnaipe Instagram. Ligeann sé seo do Instagram an cuairt a chomhcheangal ar ár leathanaigh le do chuntas úsáideora. Tugaimid in iúl nach bhfaigheann muid mar sholáthraí na leathanaigh eolas ar ábhar na sonraí tarchurtha agus a n-úsáideann Instagram.
 Le haghaidh tuilleadh eolais a fháil, féach ar an bpolasaí príobháideachta Instagram: https://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/.
 Breiseán Tumblr
 Bain úsáid as ár leathanaigh cnaipí den tumblr seirbhíse. Is é an Soláthraí an Tumblr, Inc., 35 East 21st St, 10th Floor, Nua-Eabhrac, NY 10010, Stáit Aontaithe Mheiriceá.
 Ceadaíonn na cnaipí seo duit post nó leathanach a roinnt ar Tumblr nó an soláthraí a leanúint ag Tumblr. Nuair a thugann tú cuairt ar cheann dár láithreáin ghréasáin ag baint úsáide as an gcnaipe Tumblr, bunaíonn an bhrabhsálaí nasc dhíreach le freastalaithe Tumblr. Níl aon smacht againn ar an méid sonraí a bhailíonn Tumblr agus a tharchuireann leis an mbreiseán seo. De réir an stáit reatha, tarchuirtear seoladh IP an úsáideora chomh maith le URL na láithreán gréasáin faoi seach.
 Is féidir tuilleadh faisnéise a fháil i ráiteas cosanta sonraí Tumblr faoi: https://www.tumblr.com/policy/de/privacy.
 Pinterest breiseán
 Ar ár suíomh, bainimid úsáid as forlíontáin shóisialta ón líonra sóisialta Pinterest a fheidhmíonn Pinterest Inc., 808 Sráid Brannan, San Francisco, CA94103-490, SAM ("Pinterest").
 Nuair a thugann tú cuairt ar leathanach ina bhfuil breiseán den sórt sin, nascann do bhrabhsálaí go díreach chuig freastalaithe Pinterest. Cuireann an breiseán sonraí prótacail chuig freastalaí Pinterest sna Stáit Aontaithe. D'fhéadfadh na sonraí logála seo do sheoladh IP, seoladh na suíomhanna gréasáin a ndearnadh cuairt orthu a áireamh, a chuimsíonn gnéithe Pinterest, cineál brabhsálaí agus suímh, dáta agus am an iarratais, conas a úsáideann tú Pinterest agus fianáin.
 Le haghaidh tuilleadh eolais a fháil ar an cuspóir, raon feidhme agus tuilleadh próiseála agus úsáid sonraí ag roghanna chomh maith le do chearta agus bealaí a chosaint do phríobháideacht i polasaithe príobháideachta na roghanna seo: https://about.pinterest.com/de/privacy-policy.
 6. Uirlisí anailíse agus fógraíocht
 Anaithnid IP
 7. Nuachtlitir
 Más mian leat a fháil ar an nuachtlitir ar fáil ar an suíomh gréasáin, ní mór dúinn do sheoladh r-phoist agus faisnéis a ligfidh dúinn chun a fhíorú go bhfuil tú an t-úinéir an seoladh r-phoist agus a aontú leis an nuachtlitir iad , Ní bhailítear sonraí breise nó ní dhéantar ach deonach. Bainimid úsáid as na sonraí seo go heisiach chun an fhaisnéis a iarrtar a sheachadadh agus ní chuirimid ar aghaidh chuig tríú páirtithe.
 Tarlaíonn próiseáil na sonraí a chuirtear isteach sa bhfoirm chlárúcháin nuachtlitir go heisiach ar bhonn do thoilithe (Airt. 6 para. 1 lit. DSGVO). Is féidir leat do thoiliú a chúlghairm le sonraí a stóráil, an seoladh ríomhphoist agus a úsáid chun an nuachtlitir a sheoladh ag am ar bith, mar shampla tríd an nasc "díliostáil" sa nuachtlitir. Níl aon tionchar ag an gcúlghairm ar dhlíthiúlacht na n-oibríochtaí próiseála sonraí atá críochnaithe cheana.
 Úsáideann an láithreán gréasáin seo seirbhísí MailChimp chun nuachtlitreacha a sheoladh. Is é an Soláthraí Grúpa Eolaíochta Rocket LLC, 675 Ponce De Leon Ave NE, 5000 Suite, Atlanta, GA 30308, Stáit Aontaithe Mheiriceá.
 Is seirbhís í MailChimp inar féidir, i measc nithe eile, seoltaí nuachtlitir a eagrú agus a anailísiú. Má chuireann tú sonraí isteach chun síntiúis nuachtlitir a chur isteach (m.sh. seoladh r-phoist), stóráiltear iad seo ar fhreastalaí MailChimp sna Stáit Aontaithe.
 Tá MailChimp deimhnithe faoi Shield Príobháideachta AE-SAM. Is comhaontú idir an tAontas Eorpach (AE) agus na Stáit Aontaithe an Shield Príobháideachta chun a chinntiú go gcomhlíonfar caighdeáin phríobháideachta na hEorpa sna Stáit Aontaithe.
 Le cabhair ó MailChimp is féidir linn ár bhfeachtais nuachtlitir a anailísiú. Nuair a osclaíonn tú r-phost a sheol MailChimp, nascann comhad san r-phost (ar a dtugtar beacon gréasáin) le freastalaithe MailChimp sna Stáit Aontaithe. Ar an mbealach seo is féidir leat a chinneadh an bhfuil teachtaireacht nuachtalitir oscailte agus na naisc a bhfuil cliceáil orthu. Ina theannta sin, bailítear faisnéis theicniúil (m.sh. am aisghabhála, seoladh IP, cineál brabhsálaí agus córas oibriúcháin). Ní féidir an fhaisnéis seo a shannadh don fhaighteoir nuachtalitir faoi seach. Úsáidtear iad go heisiach le haghaidh anailís staitistiúil ar fheachtais nuachtlitir. Is féidir torthaí na n-anailísí seo a úsáid chun nuachtlitreacha amach anseo a oiriúnú níos fearr ar mhaithe le leas an fhaighteora.
 Mura bhfuil anailís ag MailChimp uait, díliostáil ón nuachtlitir. Chuige sin, cuirimid nasc ar fáil i ngach teachtaireacht nuachtalitir. Ina theannta sin, is féidir leat díliostáil ón nuachtlitir go díreach ar an láithreán gréasáin.
 Bíonn an próiseáil sonraí ar siúl ar bhonn do thoilithe (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a DSGVO). Is féidir leat an toiliú seo a chúlghairm tráth ar bith trí neamhscríobh ón nuachtlitir. Ní bhíonn tionchar ag dlíthiúlacht na n-oibríochtaí próiseála sonraí atá críochnaithe cheana féin ag an gcúlghairm.
 An thaisceadh ag tú chun críche an tagairt nuachtlitreach inár shonraí atá stóráilte ag dúinn suas le do bhaint as an nuachtlitir agus scriosadh tar éis an cealú an nuachtlitir, ó thaobh ár freastalaithe agus as na freastalaithe na MailChimp. fós sonraí stóráilte chun críocha eile le linn (seoltaí eg r-phoist do na baill) unaffected.
 Le haghaidh sonraí, féach polasaí príobháideachta MailChimp: https://mailchimp.com/legal/terms/.
 Nuachtlitir2Go
 Úsáideann an suíomh Gréasáin Newsletter2Go le haghaidh nuachtlitreacha a sheoladh. Is é an Soláthraí an Nuachtlitir2Go GmbH, Nürnberger Strasse 8, 10787 Berlin, an Ghearmáin.
 Nuachtlitir Is seirbhís 2Go é, i measc rudaí eile, is féidir seoltaí nuachtlitir a eagrú agus a anailísiú. Stóráiltear na sonraí a chuir tú isteach chun síntiús nuachtlitir ar fhreastalaithe Nuachtlitir2Go sa Ghearmáin.
 Mura ndéanann Nuachtlitir2Go anailís uait, caithfidh tú díliostáil ón nuachtlitir. Chuige sin, cuirimid nasc ar fáil i ngach teachtaireacht nuachtalitir. Ina theannta sin, is féidir leat díliostáil ón nuachtlitir go díreach ar an láithreán gréasáin.
 Anailís ar shonraí ag Newsletter2Go
 Le cabhair ó Newsletter2Go, is féidir linn ár bhfeachtais nuachtlitir a anailísiú. Mar shampla, is féidir linn a fheiceáil má osclaíodh teachtaireacht nuachtalitir agus a bhfuil naisc cliceáil. Ar an mbealach seo, is féidir linn a chinneadh, i measc nithe eile, cliceáil ar na naisc go leor uaireanta.
 Ina theannta sin, is féidir linn a fheiceáil an ndearnadh gníomhartha réamhshainithe áirithe tar éis oscailt / cliceáil (ráta comhshó). Mar shampla, is féidir linn a rá má rinne tú ceannach tar éis cliceáil ar an nuachtlitir.
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 Tá faisnéis mhionsonraithe faoi ghnéithe Nuachtlitir2Go le fáil anseo: https://www.newsletter2go.de/features/newsletter-software/.
 Bíonn an próiseáil sonraí ar siúl ar bhonn do thoilithe (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. a DSGVO). Is féidir leat an toiliú seo a chúlghairm aon tráth. Ní bhíonn tionchar ag dlíthiúlacht na n-oibríochtaí próiseála sonraí atá críochnaithe cheana féin ag an gcúlghairm.
 am a stóráil
 An thaisceadh ag tú chun críche an tagairt nuachtlitreach inár shonraí atá stóráilte ag dúinn suas le do bhaint as an nuachtlitir agus scriosadh tar éis an cealú an nuachtlitir, ó thaobh ár freastalaithe agus as na freastalaithe na Newsletter2Go. Ní bhíonn tionchar ag sonraí a stóráiltear chun críocha eile le linn (m.sh. seoltaí r-phoist do limistéar na gcomhaltaí).
 Le haghaidh tuilleadh faisnéise, féach polasaí príobháideachta Newsletter2Go ag: https://www.newsletter2go.de/features/datenschutz-2/.
 Conradh próiseála sonraí ordú a chríochnú
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 8. Breiseáin agus uirlisí
 Le haghaidh tuilleadh faisnéise faoi Google Clónna Gréasáin, féach https://developers.google.com/fonts/faq agus i bpolasaí príobháideachta Google: https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/
 9. soláthraí íocaíochta
 Ar ár láithreán gréasáin cuirimid an íocaíocht ar fáil trí PayPal. Is soláthraí na seirbhíse íocaíochta PayPal (Europe) S.à.rl et Cie, SCA, 22 24-Boulevard Royal, L-2449 Lucsamburg (an "PayPal").
 Má roghnaíonn tú íoc trí PayPal, cuirfear na sonraí íocaíochta a chuirfidh tú isteach chuig PayPal.
 Tá tarchur do shonraí chuig PayPal bunaithe ar Art. 6 para. 1 lit. DSGVO (toiliú) agus Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b DSGVO (próiseáil chun conradh a chomhlíonadh). Tá an rogha agat do thoiliú a chúlghairm chun próiseáil sonraí ag am ar bith. Ní dhéanann an cúlghairm difear d'éifeachtacht na n-oibríochtaí próiseála sonraí stairiúla.
 Ar ár láithreán gréasáin cuireann muid an íocaíocht ar fáil trí "Sofortüberweisung". Is é Soláthraí an tseirbhís íocaíochta seo an Sofort GmbH, Theresienhöhe 12, 80339 München (dá ngairtear "Sofort GmbH" anseo feasta).
 Le cabhair ón nós imeachta "Sofortüberweisung" gheobhaimid dearbhú íocaíochta ó Sofort GmbH i bhfíor-am agus is féidir linn ár n-oibleagáidí a chomhlíonadh láithreach.
 Má shocraigh tú an modh íocaíochta "Sofortüberweisung" a úsáid, cuir an PIN agus TAN bailí chuig Sofort GmbH ar aghaidh, agus is féidir leat logáil isteach i do chuntas baincéireachta ar líne. Seiceálfaidh Sofort GmbH d'iarmhéid cuntas go huathoibríoch tar éis logáil isteach agus aistrítear an t-airgead dúinn tríd an TAN a chuir tú isteach. Ina dhiaidh sin cuirfidh sé dearbhú idirbheart chugainn gan mhoill. Tar éis do logáil isteach, do dhíolacháin, líne creidmheasa an líne chreidmheasa agus cuntais eile a bheith ann chomh maith lena stoic a sheiceáil go huathoibríoch freisin.
 Chomh maith leis an PIN agus an TAN, cuirfear na sonraí íocaíochta a chuir tú isteach chomh maith le sonraí pearsanta chuig Sofort GmbH. Is iad na sonraí pearsanta an chéad ainm, sloinne, seoladh, uimhir (í) teileafóin, seoladh ríomhphoist, seoladh IP agus b'fhéidir sonraí breise a theastaíonn le haghaidh próiseála íocaíochta. Is gá tarchur na sonraí seo chun do chéannacht a bhunú gan amhras agus chun calaois a chosc.
 Tá tarchur do shonraí chuig Sofort GmbH bunaithe ar Art. 6 para. 1 lit. DSGVO (toiliú) agus Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b DSGVO (próiseáil chun conradh a chomhlíonadh). Tá an rogha agat do thoiliú a chúlghairm chun próiseáil sonraí ag am ar bith. Ní dhéanann an cúlghairm difear d'éifeachtacht na n-oibríochtaí próiseála sonraí stairiúla.
 Le haghaidh sonraí maidir le híocaíocht le Sofortüberweisung féach na naisc seo a leanas: https://www.sofort.de/datenschutz.html und https://www.klarna.com/sofort/.
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type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 319 Md. 540 (1990)
 573 A.2d 1317
 JEFFREY SIMS
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND.
 No. 113, September Term, 1988.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 May 30, 1990.
 Michael R. Braudes, Asst. Public Defender, Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, both on brief, Baltimore, for petitioner.
 Richard B. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief, Baltimore, for respondent.
 Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL[*], JJ.
 McAULIFFE, Judge.
 Shortly before midnight on 9 September 1986, someone shot and killed Michael Bucino in the parking lot of the 602 Club in Laurel, Maryland. Jeffrey Sims claims that he was not present and did not shoot Bucino, but a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found to the contrary and convicted him of murder in the second degree. Sims does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding, but contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning voluntary manslaughter. Sims claims he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction because the evidence fairly generated the question of whether the shooter, 1) acted in hot-blooded response to legally adequate provocation or, 2) was entitled to claim imperfect self-defense. We find no fault with the defendant's attempt to interpose inconsistent theories of defense and mitigation, but hold that the evidence was insufficient to warrant an instruction on manslaughter.
 I
 Facts
 The victim, Bucino, was known to his friends as "Bear," apparently because he was six feet three inches tall, weighed 327 pounds, and wore a full beard and mustache. He was a regular patron of the 602 Club, and sometimes volunteered his services in maintaining order and in securing the Club and its parking lot at closing. Bucino arrived at the 602 Club sometime between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. on September 9, and remained there until the bar closed. He drank about two pitchers of beer during that time.
 The defendant entered the 602 Club shortly after 11:30 that evening, and ordered a beer. Although "last call" for drinks had been announced earlier, and the bartender had begun his closing duties, Sims was served a beer because the bartender recognized him.[1] The first words between Sims and Bucino that evening occurred when Sims put a quarter in the jukebox and complained because it did not play. According to Sims, Bucino said, "[T]hey don't play your kind of music." Sims is black and Bucino was white. Sims testified that Bucino had also spoken to him on an earlier date, when they were both at the package store adjacent to the bar. On that occasion, Sims was advised by the clerk that the item he ordered was not in stock, and Bucino gratuitously interjected, "[T]ake what you get, boy."
 On the night in question, after the bartender explained to Sims that the jukebox had been turned off for the evening, Sims began talking to an inebriated white female, as well as to another black male who was described as being shorter than Sims. The manager of the bar heard Bucino say to someone, she did not know to whom, "[Y]ou don't put your hands on a woman in here." Shortly thereafter, Bucino told the manager that he did not want any trouble, that Sims had been calling him "obscenities" and "fat boy." Just prior to midnight, Sims, the shorter black male, and the white female left the bar. As they were preparing to leave, Bucino said to the female, "[W]hy are you leaving with them," or words to that effect.
 What happened outside the bar was described by two Navy enlisted men who were stationed at nearby Fort Meade, and who had been in the 602 Club earlier in the evening. John Harkness, Jr., testified that he and William Stevenson had gone to another bar in the area, the Tack Room, at about 5 p.m., where they each drank one beer. He said they came to the 602 Club about an hour later, and except for a period of approximately an hour when they were out for dinner, spent the rest of the evening in the 602 Club. Harkness testified he had seen Bucino come into the 602 Club at about 7 p.m. and realized he had seen him earlier that evening at the Tack Room. He said Bucino was "a little bit rowdy" at the Tack Room, but "didn't do anything" at the 602 Club. Harkness and Stevenson left the 602 Club when last call was announced, apparently before Sims entered. They walked across the street to a convenience store, bought soft drinks and potato chips, and returned to Stevenson's car in the 602 Club parking lot. As he was seated in the car talking to Stevenson, Harkness observed two black males and a white female exit the bar. He said the taller male and the female walked along the front of the building to a beige automobile that was parked near the door to the adjacent package store. The shorter black male went in a different direction to a white car. The shorter black male drove the white car to the area of the beige car, where the other two persons were talking. After what appeared to be a brief conversation, the person in the white car drove out of the parking lot. At this point, the female walked back into the lounge. Other evidence indicated she had left her purse on the bar, and had returned to retrieve it.
 A few moments after the female re-entered the bar, Bucino came out, and walked to the area of the beige car. By this time, the taller male was in the beige car. When Bucino was within three to seven feet of the car, he appeared to engage the driver in conversation, and at one point was shaking his finger and appeared to be yelling at the occupant. Harkness said, "[I]t looked like an argument," but because he was approximately 50 to 60 feet away, he could not hear what was said. Bucino then turned and started to walk away from the car. He stopped, turned back, and took a couple of steps toward the car. At that point, Harkness's attention was diverted by a light coming on somewhere else on the lot, and he looked away. He then heard two or three "loud cracks" from the direction of the beige car. He immediately looked back, saw the beige car leave the lot "fast." He also saw Bucino lying on the sidewalk near the Club, and saw the female coming out of the Club.
 Stevenson's recollection was that he and Harkness had arrived at the 602 Club about 9 p.m., and had remained there until last call, which occurred at about 11:30 p.m. He said Bucino came into the Club at 9:45 p.m. or 10 p.m. Stevenson generally corroborated Harkness's account of what happened in the parking lot, except Stevenson testified that Bucino, when he first approached the beige car, had at one point "lean[ed] over the door." He said that at first Bucino and the occupant of the car appeared to be talking calmly, but "then it looked like they may have been arguing," because Bucino "was kind of shaking his finger at the man in the car." Stevenson said Bucino then turned and walked away from the car, walking about halfway back to the door of the bar. At that point, Bucino stopped, turned around, and began walking back toward the car. Stevenson observed Bucino say something to the occupant of the car, as he approached it, but Stevenson then averted his gaze to speak to Harkness. Stevenson heard what he believed to be a shot, looked back, and saw the flashes of muzzle fire from a gun in the area of the driver's seat of the vehicle as two additional shots were fired. Stevenson testified that at the time the shots were fired, Bucino was four to five feet from the car. He said the beige car then quickly left the lot. Stevenson later identified a car belonging to the defendant's wife as the beige car from which the shots were fired.
 The defendant testified that he left the bar at the same time as the white female, although they were not together. He said the shorter black male who had been in the bar with them then drove by in a white car, stopping long enough to invite the female to join him. When she refused, the male in the white car left. The defendant said that at about this time he noticed a tall white male standing by the entrance to the package store. He said the female then returned to the bar, and Sims got in his car, a black Volkswagen "beetle", and left. He said he heard a "pop or something" as he left the parking lot, but paid no attention to it.
 II
 The Requested Manslaughter Instruction
 At a bench conference called at the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge discussed with counsel the jury instructions to be given. Defendant's attorney asked for an instruction on manslaughter. He said:
 I think that the State in its evidence may have triggered the issue of manslaughter. And I would ask the court to instruct the jury and allow them to return a verdict of manslaughter if they feel that the killing of Mr. Bucino was done by my client but may have been done with mitigation.
 The prosecutor assumed that the defense request was based on one of two theories: hot-blooded response to a legally adequate provocation, or imperfect self-defense. He addressed both theories, and opined that the evidence was insufficient to generate an instruction on either. Defense counsel clarified his position:
 What I'm saying, judge, I don't think this is an imperfect self-defense case at all. I think this is a case where the jury may find that because of the man's size and because of his condition as to sobriety, or lack of same, that his  he's been described as massive. He was described as intimidating.... That the jury may feel, and they are the trier of the fact, that the person responded to these gestures. And that this coming back after he had left, came back in an aggressive-type manner, to be adequate provocation. And I think it's a question for the trier of fact to determine. I think  I don't think it's necessary for my client to substantially put himself at the scene. If the State's evidence, and they're trying to show that he was a criminal agent, and if the State's evidence fairly generates the issue I think that it's up to the trier of fact to determine.
 The trial judge denied the request, finding the defendant's testimony to be inconsistent with a theory of mitigation. He said:
 It may have been had he remained silent, but once he takes the stand and denies it I'm not going to allow him to walk both sides of the street which is what you want to do. The appellate court's going to have to permit that. The court will deny the motion.
 The trial judge instructed the jury concerning murder in the first and second degrees but, consistent with his ruling, did not give an instruction concerning manslaughter. Although the defendant noted certain exceptions at the conclusion of the charge, he did not include an exception to the court's failure to instruct on manslaughter.
 The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.[2] He appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unreported opinion. The intermediate appellate court, relying upon its earlier decision in Brown v. State, 29 Md. App. 1, 349 A.2d 359 (1975), held that where the defendant denied involvement in the shooting, the trial judge properly refused to instruct on manslaughter. We granted the defendant's petition for certiorari, and we affirm the conviction. We do so, however, on the ground that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to generate the issue of manslaughter, and not on the ground that the defendant was precluded from advancing alternative or inconsistent theories of defense.
 Preliminary to our discussion of the substantive issues, we note a potential problem with respect to adequate preservation of this point for appellate review. Maryland Rule 4-325(e) provides, in part:
 No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection. (Emphasis added.)
 We have said that under certain well-defined circumstances, when the objection is clearly made before instructions are given, and restating the objection after the instructions would obviously be a futile or useless act, we will excuse the absence of literal compliance with the requirements of the Rule. Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 208-09, 522 A.2d 1338 (1987); Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562, 188 A.2d 142 (1963). We make clear, however, that these occasions represent the rare exceptions, and that the requirements of the Rule should be followed closely. Many issues and possible instructions are discussed in the usual conference that takes place between counsel and the trial judge before instructions are given. Often, after discussion, defense counsel will be persuaded that the instruction under consideration is not warranted, and will abandon the request. Unless the attorney preserves the point by proper objection after the charge, or has somehow made it crystal clear that there is an ongoing objection to the failure of the court to give the requested instruction, the objection may be lost. See Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 685-89, 531 A.2d 675 (1987). In reading the transcript of these proceedings, for example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether defense counsel acquiesced in the judge's determination that the defendant could not "walk both sides of the street" or, whether having considered the apparent inconsistency of the two positions, counsel decided to abandon the request for a manslaughter instruction as a matter of sound trial tactics or, whether he intended to persist in his request.
 We shall consider the issue notwithstanding the defendant's failure to follow the precise dictates of Rule 4-325(e) because, as the State concedes, the Court of Special Appeals apparently considered the substantive question under the "plain error" exception built into the Rule, and that Court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 643, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988).
 The trial judge was of the opinion that the defendant could not "walk both sides of the street"  that is, that the defendant could not simultaneously advance inconsistent theories of defense. We do not agree. We hold that a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly supported by the evidence, even if several theories offered are inconsistent. This is the position taken by the federal courts, and by the vast majority of state courts. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988); People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934 (1965); State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 455 A.2d 342 (1983); State v. Shehan, 242 Kan. 127, 744 P.2d 824, 827-28 (1987); State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (1985), appeal after remand, 517 A.2d 1075 (Me. 1986); Love v. State, 441 So. 2d 1353 (Miss. 1983); State v. Baker, 277 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1955); State v. Kills Small, 269 N.W.2d 771 (S.D. 1978); People v. Fugua, 146 Mich. App. 133, 379 N.W.2d 396 (1985); Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1984).
 This holding is consistent with the requirement of Maryland Rule 4-325(c) that "[t]he court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law...." It is also consistent with the general proposition that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by evidence. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179, 486 A.2d 196 (1985); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477, 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S. Ct. 2183, 53 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1977). See also Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 41, 553 A.2d 233 (1989) (defendant entitled to an instruction on lesser included offense when that offense is fairly supported by the evidence).
 To the extent that language of the Court of Special Appeals in Brown v. State, supra, 29 Md. App. at 20, 349 A.2d 359, is inconsistent with our holding today, that language is disapproved.
 Although as a legal matter there is no bar to putting forth different or inconsistent theories of defense, there will often be practical problems of proof, particularly where different theories involve proof of different mental states on the part of the defendant. Where, for example, a particular subjective belief is required, a defendant who testifies that he was not present may find it difficult or impossible to adduce evidence that will fairly support the required finding. Indeed, that is the crux of the problem facing the defendant in this case.
 Sims argues that he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction on either of two theories  hot-blooded response to provocation, or imperfect self-defense. Concerning the first, he argues that the jury could have found he acted in hot blood either as a result of a mutual affray, or in direct response to provocation evidenced by Bucino's words coupled with his conduct.
 In Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 331, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988), we defined voluntary manslaughter to include "intentional homicide, done in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool." In Whitehead v. State, 9 Md. App. 7, 11, 262 A.2d 316 (1970), Judge Orth for the Court of Special Appeals set forth the four elements of the rule of provocation described by Professor Rollin M. Perkins:[3]
 (1) There must have been adequate provocation;
 (2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion;
 (3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion  that is, the killing must have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool;
 (4) There must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.
 Mutual combat has been recognized as a possible source of adequate provocation. Carter v. State, 66 Md. App. 567, 572, 505 A.2d 545 (1986); Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 38-40, 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976); Whitehead v. State, supra, 9 Md. App. at 11, 262 A.2d 316; R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law 88-91 (3d ed. 1982); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 159 (14th ed. 1979). The rule of provocation will apply when persons enter into angry and unlawful combat with a mutual intent to fight and, as a result of the effect of the combat, the passion of one of the participants is suddenly elevated to the point where he resorts to the use of deadly force to kill the other solely because of an impulsive response to the passion and without time to consider the consequences of his actions. In the case before us, there was no evidence of a mutual affray. Insulting words or gestures, no matter how opprobrious, do not amount to an affray, and standing alone, do not constitute adequate provocation. See 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, § 156; R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law, supra, 93-94; Lang v. State, 6 Md. App. 128, 250 A.2d 276 (1969). Although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that Bucino had directed racial and derogatory comments toward Sims in the bar, this conduct did not constitute adequate provocation. Moreover, Sims testified that he was not upset by the comments. He said:
 I didn't pay him no attention. I don't  you know, I didn't want to argue about it, right. So I just looked at him, you know, and that was it.... Me and him never really had any words, you know, about anything.
 As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Lang v. State, supra, 6 Md. App. at 132, 250 A.2d 276, there is authority for the proposition that sufficient provocation may consist of words accompanied by conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause the defendant bodily harm. See 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 177 (Anderson ed. 1957). Assuming, without deciding, that a combination of words and conduct may give rise to sufficient provocation, we find the evidence here insufficient to support that theory.
 Even if we were to find the evidence sufficient to objectively show adequate provocation, there is not a shred of evidence showing the state of mind of the defendant at the moment of the shooting. Sims' testimony sheds no light on this because he testified that he was not there. No one else saw his facial expressions or heard his speech at the time critical to this determination. Assuming that there might be a case where evidence of that type could demonstrate the sudden onset of hot-blooded passion that produced the mortal blow or shot, this is not such a case. The blood must indeed be hot, and under some circumstances only the hot-blooded killer can attest to that. See Price v. State, 82 Md. App. 210, 217, 570 A.2d 887 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 58 Md. App. 249, 259, 473 A.2d 40 (1984); Tripp v. State, 36 Md. App. 459, 469, 374 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 281 Md. 745 (1977); Bartram v. State, 33 Md. App. 115, 175, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976), aff'd, 280 Md. 616, 374 A.2d 1144 (1977).
 Although the ultimate burden of proving the absence of mitigation rests upon the State when that issue is properly in the case, the burden of initially producing "some evidence" on that issue (or of relying upon evidence produced by the State or adduced from witnesses called by the State) sufficient to give rise to a jury issue with respect to mitigation, is properly cast upon the defendant. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 215-17, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990); Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 207-08, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). Sims was singularly unsuccessful in placing before the jury evidence sufficient to fairly generate the issue of mitigation by hot-blooded response to adequate provocation.
 Sims fares no better with his second argument, concerning the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. He did not preserve this point for appellate review. Indeed, he expressly disavowed any reliance upon the theory of imperfect self-defense when he requested an instruction on manslaughter. We add that had the point been preserved, we would have found it to be without merit.
 We recognized the doctrine of imperfect self-defense in State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984), and we have more recently discussed it in Simmons v. State, supra, and Dykes v. State, supra. Imperfect self-defense may be available to mitigate murder to manslaughter when the defendant is able to show that he honestly held certain subjective beliefs even though those beliefs may be objectively unreasonable, and all other requirements of "perfect" self-defense are present. Judge Moylan, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Watkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 136, 138, 555 A.2d 1087 (1989), noted:
 Where ... the defender unreasonably (though honestly) perceives the danger or unreasonably (though honestly) responds with more than necessary force, it is a case of imperfect self-defense, which mitigates the level of blameworthiness down to the manslaughter level even though it does not totally exculpate. (Emphasis in original.)
 Sims has never contended that he was entitled to an instruction on "perfect" self-defense. He does not contend that there was evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the person who shot Bucino had reasonable grounds to believe himself in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that resort to the use of fatal force was justified. Rather, he contends that even in the absence of proof of an objectively reasonable belief concerning the level of danger he faced or the need to resort to fatal force, he was entitled to have the jury consider his subjective state of mind. The difficulty with that argument is that there is not a scintilla of evidence concerning the beliefs actually entertained by the person who shot Bucino. As we pointed out above, the defendant has the burden of presenting some evidence sufficient to reasonably generate the issue. The issue in this instance involved the honestly held subjective feelings of the perpetrator at the moment of the shooting. When the defendant maintains that he was not the perpetrator, this becomes a very difficult, though probably not impossible,[4] burden to meet. In this case, the defendant did not meet that burden.
 III
 Evidence of Victim's Prior Conduct
 Harkness, one of the two Navy men who was present at the 602 Club on the night of the shooting, testified on direct examination that he had seen Bucino at the 602 Club, and had seen him earlier in the evening, at about 5 or 6 p.m., at the Tack Room. He said, "[t]he reason he stuck in my mind was because he was a little bit rowdy at the last place I'd seen him." On cross-examination, when defense counsel began to ask about events at the Tack Room, the prosecutor objected and requested a bench conference. The trial judge instructed defense counsel to state what he intended to ask the witness concerning the earlier events, and counsel replied "I'm going to ask him if [Bucino] got thrown out." He explained that he wished thereby to show that Bucino was "drunk and intoxicated and unruly that night." The prosecutor questioned the probative value of the proposed testimony, and argued that "you [can] be drunk and unruly in one place and then nice in another." The trial judge sustained the objection.
 The ruling was not error. The defendant was attempting to show that because Bucino was rowdy at one bar at 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. in the evening, it was likely that he was also rowdy later in the evening at another bar.[5] The inferential value of proof of the existence of a condition at one point in time to prove its existence at a later point of time depends on a variety of circumstances.
 When the existence of an object, condition, quality, or tendency at a given time is in issue, the prior existence of it is in human experience some indication of its probable persistence or continuance at a later period.
 The degree of probability of this continuance depends on the chances of intervening circumstances having occurred to bring the existence to an end. The possibility of such circumstances will depend almost entirely on the nature of the specific thing whose existence is in issue and the particular circumstances affecting it in the case in hand. That a soap-bubble was in existence half-an-hour ago affords no inference at all that it is in existence now; that Mt. Everest was in existence ten years ago is strong evidence that it exists yet; whether the fact of a tree's existence a year ago will indicate its continued existence today will vary according to the nature of the tree and the conditions of life in the region. So far, then, as the interval of time is concerned, no fixed rule can be laid down; the nature of the thing and the circumstances of the particular case must control. (Emphasis in original.)
 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 437 (3d ed. 1940).
 In Hammond v. Inloes, 4 Md. 138, 172 (1853), our predecessors held that "where seisen of an estate has been shown its continuance will be presumed." And, in Stitzel v. Kurz, 18 Md. App. 525, 538, 308 A.2d 430, cert. denied, 269 Md. 761 (1973), the Court of Special Appeals held that evidence concerning the condition of a road sign was properly admitted:
 When it is shown that a condition existed at a certain time, and the condition is one which by its nature is relatively permanent, rather than transitory or changeable, it is rational to infer that the same condition existed before and after the time shown, for a length of time reasonably consistent with the circumstances, unless there is evidence from which a change in the condition could reasonably be inferred.
 In dealing with conditions more likely to change, however, this Court has recognized that evidence of the earlier condition may not have sufficient probative value to be admissible. In Transit Company v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 453, 149 A. 4, (1930) appeal dismissed, 282 U.S. 801, 51 S. Ct. 40, 75 L. Ed. 720 (1929), the Court held that evidence of the manner in which a truck was driven when it passed a detour about 1,000 yards from the place of the accident was properly excluded. In Reid v. Humphreys, 210 Md. 178, 185, 122 A.2d 756 (1956), the Court found no error in the exclusion of evidence of the speed of a vehicle just prior to the accident, but one and one-half miles distant therefrom, saying:
 Generally, the admissibility of testimony as to the speed or reckless operation of a motor vehicle at some distance from the place where it afterwards collided with another vehicle is discretionary with the trial court, and a ruling admitting such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
 To the same effect, see Bennett v. Bass, 248 Md. 260, 266, 235 A.2d 715 (1967) (speed of vehicle at various points ranging from one and one-half miles to six blocks from scene of accident properly excluded).
 The defendant did not proffer any facts that Harkness might have been able to add to his previous testimony that Bucino had been "a little bit rowdy." He did not proffer that Harkness had knowledge that Bucino had "been thrown out" of the Tack Room, or if so, that Harkness knew what Bucino had done that may have brought about his ejection. He did not proffer that Harkness was able to offer an opinion concerning the Bucino's sobriety when he saw him earlier. Given these circumstances, and considering the inherent impermanence of the condition that Sims sought to show by earlier conduct, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding the evidence.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
 NOTES
 [*] Blackwell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference while an active member of this Court but did not participate in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
 [1] Sims worked nearby, and for business and social reasons was often in the 602 Club and on its parking lot.
 [2] The defendant was also found guilty of the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and was sentenced to five years concurrent imprisonment on that charge.
 [3] R. Perkins, Criminal Law 43-55 (1957). More recently, see R. Perkins, Criminal Law 53-54 (2d ed. 1969); R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law 84-85 (3d ed. 1982).
 [4] See the discussion in Lambert v. State, 70 Md. App. 83, 98, 519 A.2d 1340 (1987).
 [5] The defendant does not argue that he was attempting to show the turbulent and dangerous nature of the victim in conjunction with a claim of self-defense. See Williamson v. State, 25 Md. App. 338, 345, 333 A.2d 653, cert. denied, 275 Md. 758 (1975). In any event, from what we have said it is clear that the defendant did not lay a proper foundation of evidence tending to show that he acted in self-defense.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 31.3.2020
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 98/30
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) 2020/466
 af 30. marts 2020
 om midlertidige foranstaltninger til begrænsning af risici for menneskers, dyrs og planters sundhed og dyrevelfærden i forbindelse med visse alvorlige forstyrrelser i medlemsstaternes kontrolsystemer som følge af coronavirussygdommen (covid-19)
 (EØS-relevant tekst)
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2017/625 af 15. marts 2017 om offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter med henblik på at sikre anvendelsen af fødevare- og foderlovgivningen og reglerne for dyresundhed og dyrevelfærd, plantesundhed og plantebeskyttelsesmidler, om ændring af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 999/2001, (EF) nr. 396/2005, (EF) nr. 1069/2009, (EF) nr. 1107/2009, (EU) nr. 1151/2012, (EU) nr. 652/2014, (EU) 2016/429 og (EU) 2016/2031, Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2005 og (EF) nr. 1099/2009 samt Rådets direktiv 98/58/EF, 1999/74/EF, 2007/43/EF, 2008/119/EF og 2008/120/EF og om ophævelse af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 854/2004 og (EF) nr. 882/2004, Rådets direktiv 89/608/EØF, 89/662/EØF, 90/425/EØF, 91/496/EØF, 96/23/EF, 96/93/EF og 97/78/EF og Rådets afgørelse 92/438/EØF (forordningen om offentlig kontrol) (1), særlig artikel 141, stk. 1, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Ved forordning (EU) 2017/625 er der fastsat regler for bl.a. medlemsstaternes kompetente myndigheders gennemførelse af offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter. Ved forordningen tillægges Kommissionen også beføjelse til ved en gennemførelsesretsakt at vedtage hensigtsmæssige midlertidige foranstaltninger til begrænsning af risici for bl.a. menneskers, dyrs og planters sundhed og dyrevelfærden, hvis den har dokumentation for en alvorlig forstyrrelse i en medlemsstats kontrolsystem.
 (2)
 Den aktuelle krise i relation til coronavirussygdommen (covid-19) udgør en ekstraordinær, hidtil uset udfordring for medlemsstaterne for så vidt angår deres muligheder for fuldt ud at gennemføre offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter i overensstemmelse med EU-lovgivningen.
 (3)
 I sine »Retningslinjer for grænseforvaltningsforanstaltninger for at beskytte sundheden og sikre adgangen til varer og vigtige tjenesteydelser« (2) understregede Kommissionen, at det indre markeds funktion ikke må bringes i fare i den nuværende situation. Desuden bør medlemsstaterne fortsat sikre bevægeligheden for varer.
 (4)
 I henhold til forordning (EU) 2017/625 er medlemsstaterne forpligtet til at indføre et kontrolsystem bestående af kompetente myndigheder, der er udpeget til at gennemføre offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter. De kompetente myndigheder skal først og fremmest, i henhold til nævnte forordnings artikel 5, stk. 1, litra e), råde over eller have adgang til et tilstrækkeligt stort personale med passende kvalifikationer og erfaring, således at offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter kan gennemføres effektivt.
 (5)
 I forbindelse med den aktuelle covid-19-krise har medlemsstaterne indført betydelige flytningsrestriktioner for deres befolkninger for at beskytte menneskers sundhed.
 (6)
 En række medlemsstater har meddelt Kommissionen, at disse flytningsrestriktioner har haft alvorlige konsekvenser for deres muligheder for at sende egnet personale ud til offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter som påkrævet i henhold til forordning (EU) 2017/625.
 (7)
 En række medlemsstater har specifikt underrettet Kommissionen om vanskeligheder med at gennemføre offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter, der kræver, at kontrolpersonalet er fysisk til stede. Især klinisk undersøgelse af dyr, visse former for kontrol af animalske produkter, planter og planteprodukter og af ikke-animalske fødevarer og foderstoffer samt testning af prøver på officielle laboratorier udpeget af medlemsstaterne giver anledning til vanskeligheder.
 (8)
 Det følger af EU-lovgivningen til regulering af handelen med levende dyr og avlsmateriale i det indre marked, navnlig Rådets direktiv 64/432/EØF (3), 88/407/EØF (4), 89/556/EØF (5), 90/429/EØF (6), 91/68/EØF (7), 92/65/EØF (8), 2006/88/EF (9), 2009/156/EF (10) og 2009/158/EF (11), at sendinger af dyr og avlsmateriale, som flyttes mellem medlemsstater, under hele flytningen skal ledsages af de originale dyresundhedscertifikater.
 (9)
 Flere medlemsstater har også meddelt Kommissionen, at offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter, der resulterer i undertegnelse og udstedelse af originale officielle certifikater og officielle attester i papirform, som skal ledsage sendinger af dyr og avlsmateriale, der flyttes mellem medlemsstater eller indføres til Unionen, i øjeblikket ikke kan gennemføres i overensstemmelse med EU-lovgivningen.
 (10)
 Det bør derfor midlertidigt være tilladt at benytte et alternativ til forelæggelse af originale officielle certifikater og officielle attester i papirform under hensyntagen til, hvordan de registrerede brugere anvender Traces-systemet (Trade Control and Expert System) som omhandlet i Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/1715 (12), og til, at det i øjeblikket ikke er teknisk muligt at udstede elektroniske certifikater i overensstemmelse med nævnte gennemførelsesforordning i Traces. Dette alternativ bør ikke berøre operatørernes forpligtelse i henhold til forordning (EU) 2017/625 til at forelægge originaldokumenterne, i det omfang det er teknisk muligt.
 (11)
 Der bør i lyset af disse særlige omstændigheder træffes foranstaltninger til at forhindre alvorlige sundhedsrisici for de kompetente myndigheders personale, uden at det går ud over forebyggelsen af risici for menneskers, dyrs og planters sundhed forårsaget af dyr og planter og produkter heraf og uden at sætte forebyggelsen af risici for dyrevelfærden over styr. Samtidig bør det sikres, at det indre marked, baseret på EU-lovgivningen om agrofødevarekæden, fungerer korrekt.
 (12)
 Medlemsstater, der oplever alvorlige vanskeligheder med anvendelsen af deres eksisterende kontrolsystemer, bør derfor kunne anvende de midlertidige foranstaltninger, der hjemles ved denne forordning, i det omfang det er nødvendigt for at håndtere de relevante alvorlige forstyrrelser i deres kontrolsystemer. Medlemsstaterne bør træffe alle nødvendige foranstaltninger til snarest muligt at afhjælpe de alvorlige forstyrrelser i deres kontrolsystemer.
 (13)
 Medlemsstater, der anvender de ved denne forordning hjemlede midlertidige foranstaltninger, bør underrette Kommissionen og de øvrige medlemsstater herom samt om foranstaltninger, der træffes for at afhjælpe vanskelighederne med gennemførelsen af offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) 2017/625.
 (14)
 Denne forordning bør finde anvendelse i to måneder med henblik på at lette tilrettelæggelsen og gennemførelsen af offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter under COVID-19-krisen. I lyset af de oplysninger, der er modtaget fra en række medlemsstater, og som tyder på, at der er behov for midlertidige foranstaltninger øjeblikkeligt, bør denne forordning træde i kraft dagen efter offentliggørelsen
 (15)
 Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Den Stående Komité for Planter, Dyr, Fødevarer og Foder —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 Ved denne forordning fastsættes der midlertidige foranstaltninger, som er nødvendige for at begrænse de omfattende risici for menneskers, dyrs og planters sundhed og dyrevelfærden, med det formål at afhjælpe alvorlige forstyrrelser i medlemsstaternes kontrolsystemer på baggrund af krisen i relation til covid-19.
 Artikel 2
 Medlemsstater, der ønsker at anvende de ved denne forordning hjemlede midlertidige foranstaltninger, underretter Kommissionen og de øvrige medlemsstater herom samt om foranstaltninger, der træffes for at afhjælpe deres problemer med at gennemføre offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) 2017/625.
 Artikel 3
 Offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter kan undtagelsesvis gennemføres af en eller flere fysiske personer, som af den kompetente myndighed specifikt er bemyndiget hertil på grundlag af deres kvalifikationer, uddannelse og praktiske erfaring, som er i kontakt med den kompetente myndighed ved hjælp af et hvilket som helst tilgængeligt kommunikationsmiddel, og som er forpligtet til at følge den kompetente myndigheds instrukser vedrørende gennemførelsen af de(n) pågældende offentlige kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter. Sådanne personer skal handle upartisk og må ikke have interessekonflikter i forhold til den offentlige kontrol og de andre officielle aktiviteter, de gennemfører.
 Artikel 4
 Offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter vedrørende officielle certifikater og officielle attester kan undtagelsesvis gennemføres i form af offentlig kontrol af en elektronisk kopi af originalen af sådanne certifikater eller attester eller af en elektronisk udgave af det certifikat eller den attest, der forelægges og indgives i Traces, forudsat at den person, der er ansvarlig for at forelægge det officielle certifikat eller den officielle attest, forelægger den kompetente myndighed en erklæring om, at originalen af det officielle certifikat eller den officielle attest vil blive indgivet så hurtigt som teknisk muligt. Ved gennemførelsen af sådan offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter tager den kompetente myndighed hensyn til risikoen for, at de pågældende dyr og varer ikke er i overensstemmelse med reglerne, og til operatørens historik med hensyn til resultaterne af den offentlige kontrol, der er gennemført af dem og deres overholdelse af de regler, der er omhandlet i artikel 1, stk. 2, i forordning (EU) 2017/625.
 Artikel 5
 Offentlig kontrol og andre officielle aktiviteter kan undtagelsesvis gennemføres:
 a)
 hvis der er tale om analyser, test eller diagnosticeringer, som skal udføres af officielle laboratorier, af ethvert laboratorium, der midlertidigt er udpeget til dette formål af den kompetente myndighed
 b)
 hvis der er tale om fysiske møder med operatører og deres personale i relation til offentlige kontrolmetoder og -teknikker som omhandlet i artikel 14 i forordning (EU) 2017/625, ved hjælp af en tilgængelig fjernkommunikationsteknik.
 Artikel 6
 Denne forordning træder i kraft dagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Den anvendes indtil den 1. juni 2020.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 30. marts 2020.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 Ursula VON DER LEYEN
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 95 af 7.4.2017, s. 1.
 (2) C(2020) 1753 final af 16. marts 2020.
 (3) Rådets direktiv 64/432/EØF af 26. juni 1964 om veterinærpolitimæssige problemer ved handel inden for Fællesskabet med kvæg og svin (EFT 121 af 29.7.1964, s. 1977/64).
 (4) Rådets direktiv 88/407/EØF af 14. juni 1988 om fastsættelse af de veterinærpolitimæssige krav i forbindelse med handelen inden for Fællesskabet med frosset tyresæd og indførsel heraf (EFT L 194 af 22.7.1988, s. 10).
 (5) Rådets direktiv 89/556/EØF af 25. september 1989 om fastsættelse af veterinærpolitimæssige betingelser i forbindelse med handel inden for Fællesskabet med embryoner af tamkvæg samt med indførsel heraf fra tredjelande (EFT L 302 af 19.10.1989, s. 1).
 (6) Rådets direktiv 90/429/EØF af 26. juni 1990 om fastsættelse af de dyresundhedsmæssige krav i forbindelse med handelen inden for Fællesskabet med ornesæd og indførsel heraf (EFT L 224 af 18.8.1990, s. 62).
 (7) Rådets direktiv 91/68/EØF af 28. januar 1991 om dyresundhedsmæssige betingelser for samhandelen med får og geder inden for Fællesskabet (EFT L 46 af 19.2.1991, s. 19).
 (8) Rådets direktiv 92/65/EØF af 13. juli 1992 om dyresundhedsmæssige betingelser for samhandel med og indførsel til Fællesskabet af dyr samt sæd, æg og embryoner, der for så vidt angår disse betingelser ikke er underlagt specifikke fællesskabsbetingelser som omhandlet i bilag A, del I, til direktiv 90/425/EØF (EFT L 268 af 14.9.1992, s. 54).
 (9) Rådets direktiv 2006/88/EF af 24. oktober 2006 om dyresundhedsbestemmelser for akvakulturdyr og produkter deraf og om forebyggelse og bekæmpelse af visse sygdomme hos vanddyr (EUT L 328 af 24.11.2006, s. 14).
 (10) Rådets direktiv 2009/156/EF af 30. november 2009 om dyresundhedsmæssige betingelser for enhovede dyrs bevægelser og indførsel af enhovede dyr fra tredjelande (EUT L 192 af 23.7.2010, s. 1).
 (11) Rådets direktiv 2009/158/EF af 30. november 2009 om dyresundhedsmæssige betingelser for samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet med fjerkræ og rugeæg samt for indførsel heraf fra tredjelande (EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 74).
 (12) Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/1715 af 30. september 2019 om regler for driften af informationsstyringssystemet vedrørende offentlig kontrol og dets systemkomponenter (»IMSOC-forordningen«) (EUT L 261 af 14.10.2019, s. 37).


type: contracts

text:
 11/Sv. 97
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 305
 22004D0018
 L 127/120
 SLUŽBENI LIST EUROPSKE UNIJE
 ODLUKA ZAJEDNIČKOG ODBORA EGP-a
 br. 18/2004
 od 19. ožujka 2004.
 o izmjeni Priloga II. (Tehnički propisi, norme, ispitivanje i potvrđivanje) Sporazumu o EGP-u
 ZAJEDNIČKI ODBOR EGP-a,
 uzimajući u obzir Sporazum o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, kako je izmijenjen Protokolom o prilagodbi Sporazuma o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, dalje u tekstu „Sporazum”, a posebno njegov članak 98.,
 budući da:
 (1)
 Prilog II. Sporazumu je izmijenjen Odlukom Zajedničkog odbora EGP-a br. 170/2003 od 5. prosinca 2003. (1).
 (2)
 Direktiva Komisije 2003/76/EZ od 11. kolovoza 2003. o izmjeni Direktive Vijeća 70/220/EEZ o mjerama koje se poduzimaju protiv onečišćenja zraka emisijama iz motornih vozila (2) treba se unijeti u Sporazum.
 (3)
 Direktiva Komisije 2003/77/EZ od 11. kolovoza 2003. o izmjeni Direktiva 97/24/EZ i 2002/24/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o homologaciji motornih vozila na dva ili tri kotača (3) treba se unijeti u Sporazum,
 ODLUČIO JE:
 Članak 1.
 Poglavlje I. Priloga II. Sporazumu mijenja se kako slijedi:
 1.
 U točku 3. (Direktiva Vijeća 70/220/EEZ) dodaje se sljedeća alineja:
 „—
 32003 L 0076: Direktiva Komisije 2003/76/EZ od 11. kolovoza 2003. (SL L 206, 15.8.2003., str. 29.).”
 2.
 U točku 45.x (Direktiva 97/24/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća) dodaje se sljedeća alineja:
 „—
 32003 L 0077: Direktiva Komisije 2003/77/EZ od 11. kolovoza 2003. (SL L 211, 21.8.2003., str. 24.).”
 3.
 U točku 45.za (Direktiva 2002/24/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća) prije teksta prilagodbe dodaje se:
 „ , kako je izmijenjeno:
 —
 32003 L 0077: Direktivom Komisije 2003/77/EZ od 11. kolovoza 2003. (SL L 211, 21.8.2003., str. 24.).”
 Članak 2.
 Tekstovi Direktiva 2003/76/EZ i 2003/77/EZ na islandskom i norveškom jeziku, koji se objavljuju u Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije, vjerodostojni su.
 Članak 3.
 Ova Odluka stupa na snagu 20. ožujka 2004. pod uvjetom da su sve obavijesti iz članka 103. stavka 1. Sporazuma podnesene Zajedničkom odboru EGP-a (4).
 Članak 4.
 Ova se Odluka objavljuje u odjeljku o EGP-u i Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu 19. ožujka 2004.
 Za Zajednički odbor EGP-a
 Predsjednik
 P. WESTERLUND
 (1) SL L 88, 25.3.2004., str. 41.
 (2) SL L 206, 15.8.2003., str. 29.
 (3) SL L 211, 21.8.2003., str. 24.
 (4) Ustavni zahtjevi nisu navedeni.


type: wikipedia

text:
Microgadus tomcod () è un pesce osseo marino e d'acqua dolce della famiglia Gadidae.
 Distribuzione e habitat
 È endemico dell'Oceano Atlantico nordoccidentale, si trova lungo le coste atlantiche nordamericane tra la parte meridionale del Labrador (Canada) e la Virginia (USA). Si tratta di una specie molto eurialina, che può vivere e riprodursi sia in acqua marina che salmastra e perfino in acqua del tutto dolce tanto che esistono popolazioni stabili in laghi non connessi al mare. In acqua marina ha abitudini strettamente costiere; occasionalmente può spingersi a profondità di 69 metri.
 Descrizione
 Ha un aspetto complessivo simile a quello degli altri Gadidae come il merluzzo, con 3 pinne dorsali, 2 pinne anali, pinna caudale spatolata e un barbiglio sotto il mento. Nelle pinne ventrali è presente un raggio allungato. La sagoma è piuttosto allungata con testa e occhi proporzionalmente piccoli. Il colore è bruno verdastro o giallastro che schiarisce sul ventre, la regione laterale e le pinne sono coperte di macchie scure di forma variabile. La taglia arriva a 38 cm.
 Biologia
 Alimentazione
 Carnivoro. Si ciba di crostacei (gamberetti e anfipodi soprattutto), vermi, cefalopodi e altri molluschi e pesci (sperlani, spinarelli, persici spigola, Alosa pseudoharengus e altre Alosa, aringhe e cottidi.
 Predatori
 È predato dal persico spigola e dal pesce serra.
 Pesca
 Di scarsa importanza per la pesca commerciale, ha qualche interesse per la pesca sportiva.
 Note
 Altri progetti
 Collegamenti esterni
 Gadidae


text:
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 9.10.2017
 COM(2017) 584 final
 2017/0257(NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no Comité de Comércio, no que respeita à alteração do anexo XII do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro, para estabelecer a lista de entidades adjudicantes da administração pública da Colômbia em conformidade com as disposições do título VI («Contratos Públicos»)
 EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS
 1.Objeto da proposta
 A presente proposta diz respeito à decisão que estabelece a posição a adotar em nome da União no Comité de Comércio do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro («Acordo Comercial»)
 1
 , em ligação com a adoção prevista de uma decisão relativa à alteração, pela Colômbia, do anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo.
 O anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo estabelece a lista de entidades da administração pública subcentral da Colômbia abrangidas pelos compromissos em matéria de contratos públicos.
 A Colômbia propõe a alteração do anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo mediante o aditamento de uma nota a indicar que a expressão «entidades adjudicantes» abrange todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial.
 Os representantes das Partes acordaram que essa alteração não exige ajustamentos compensatórios nos termos do artigo 191.o, n.o 2, alínea a), dado que não implica uma redução da cobertura.
 2.Contexto da proposta
 2.1.O Acordo Comercial
 O Acordo Comercial tem por objetivo abrir os mercados de ambos os lados e reforçar a estabilidade da relação comercial.
 Um dos principais objetivos do Acordo Comercial é a abertura efetiva e recíproca dos mercados de contratação pública das Partes. Os objetivos do título VI do Acordo Comercial, relativo a contratos públicos, são dois: estabelecer disciplinas de adjudicação de contratos públicos que garantam que estes são celebrados de forma transparente, eficiente e não discriminatória, e abrir mutuamente os mercados de contratos públicos aos proponentes, às mercadorias e aos serviços da outra Parte. Deste modo, a UE e a Colômbia negociaram bilateralmente o acesso mútuo aos concursos públicos da outra Parte cobertos no capítulo sobre contratos públicos. A cobertura do capítulo relativo aos contratos públicos define os tipos de contratos individuais a que se aplicam as regras processuais e substantivas negociadas.
 No seguimento da aplicação provisória do Acordo Comercial
 2
 , foi recusado a empresas da UE o acesso ao mercado dos contratos públicos adjudicados por entidades do nível subcentral na Colômbia. As Partes acordaram em que a Colômbia iria alterar a sua lista em matéria de acesso ao mercado no que diz respeito ao nível subcentral e esclareceram que tal não implicaria quaisquer ajustamentos compensatórios.
 O Acordo Comercial tem estado a ser aplicado a título provisório desde 1 de março de 2013 com o Peru e desde 1 de agosto de 2013 com a Colômbia. Em 1 de janeiro de 2017, o Equador aderiu ao Acordo
 3
 . No entanto, uma vez que, nos termos do artigo 14.o, n.o 3, do Acordo Comercial, a decisão a adotar pela Parte UE e pela Colômbia apenas produz efeitos entre essas Partes, a decisão pode ser tomada bilateralmente pela Parte UE e pela Colômbia.
 2.2.O Comité de Comércio
 O Comité de Comércio instituído pelo artigo 12.o do Acordo supervisiona e facilita o funcionamento do Acordo e a correta aplicação das suas disposições; avalia os resultados obtidos com a aplicação do Acordo, em especial a evolução das relações comerciais e económicas entre as Partes; supervisiona o trabalho de todos os órgãos especializados instituídos ao abrigo do Acordo e recomenda as ações necessárias; avalia e adota decisões relativamente a qualquer questão que lhe seja submetida pelos órgãos especializados; e adota o seu próprio regulamento interno, bem como o calendário de reuniões e a ordem de trabalhos das mesmas. O Comité de Comércio adota as suas decisões por consenso. As decisões adotadas são vinculativas para as Partes, que tomam todas as medidas necessárias para a sua aplicação. Nos casos a que se refere o artigo 12.o, n.o 4, do Acordo, as decisões são adotadas pela Parte UE e pelo País Andino signatário em causa e produzem efeitos apenas entre essas Partes, desde que tais decisões não afetem os direitos e as obrigações de outro País Andino signatário (artigo 14.o, n.o 3).
 2.3.O ato previsto do Comité de Comércio
 Em 24 de novembro de 2017, na sua quarta reunião, o Comité de Comércio deverá adotar uma decisão relativa à alteração da cobertura da Colômbia no que diz respeito aos contratos públicos, nomeadamente o anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo («ato previsto»).
 O objetivo do ato previsto consiste em introduzir uma alteração no anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo, enumerando as entidades do nível subcentral da administração pública da Colômbia cujos contratos públicos são cobertos pelo título VI. A alteração proposta pela Colômbia inclui uma nota complementar à subsecção 2 para especificar que a expressão «entidades adjudicantes» abrange todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial.
 , O ato previsto tornar-se-á vinculativo para as Partes em conformidade com o artigo 14.o, n.o 2, do Acordo, que prevê o seguinte: «As decisões adotadas pelo Comité de Comércio são vinculativas para as Partes, que devem tomar todas as medidas necessárias para a sua aplicação.»
 3.Posição a adotar em nome da União
 Solicita-se ao Conselho que adote a posição, em nome da União Europeia, sobre uma proposta de decisão do Comité de Comércio UE-Colômbia-Peru que altera o anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo Comercial para especificar as entidades adjudicantes de nível subcentral da administração pública da Colômbia cujos contratos são cobertos pelo título VI. A posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, sobre a proposta de alteração deverá estar em conformidade com o projeto de decisão do Comité de Comércio em anexo à presente decisão.
 A referida alteração visa aditar uma nota à subsecção 2 relativa à cobertura da Colômbia no que diz respeito aos contratos públicos a fim de especificar que a expressão «entidades adjudicantes» abrange todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial.
 A razão para esta alteração é que a UE e a Colômbia interpretam de maneiras diferentes a cobertura da Colômbia no que diz respeito aos contratos públicos a nível subcentral, o que teve como resultado que tenha sido recusado o acesso a empresas da UE em concursos públicos na Colômbia por entidades públicas do nível subcentral com importância económica. Com essa alteração, a cobertura das entidades adjudicantes colombianas a nível subcentral seria clarificada e passaria a incluir entidades como o «Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano» (IDU), responsável pelo desenvolvimento das infraestruturas de Bogotá.
 O artigo 191.o («Alterações e retificações da cobertura») do Acordo prevê a possibilidade de alterar a cobertura do título VI relativo a «Contratos Públicos»; e o Comité de Comércio tem competência para aprovar qualquer proposta de alteração, pelas Partes, do anexo aplicável, ou seja, o anexo XII («Contratos públicos») do Acordo, nos termos do artigo 191.o, n.o 4.
 Tendo em conta que a decisão só produz efeitos entre a União Europeia e a Colômbia, a decisão pode ser adotada no Comité de Comércio pela União Europeia e a Colômbia, uma vez que diz exclusivamente respeito às relações bilaterais entre elas nos termos do artigo 14.o, n.o 3, do Acordo.
 A proposta é da competência exclusiva da União Europeia. Por conseguinte, o princípio da subsidiariedade não se aplica.
 4.Base jurídica
 4.1.Base jurídica processual
 4.1.1.Princípios
 O artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia (TFUE) prevê a adoção de decisões que definam «as posições a tomar em nome da União numa instância criada por um acordo, quando essa instância for chamada a adotar atos que produzam efeitos jurídicos, com exceção dos atos que completem ou alterem o quadro institucional do acordo».
 4.1.2.Aplicação ao caso em apreço
 O Comité de Comércio é um organismo criado por um acordo, a saber, o Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro.
 A decisão que o Comité de Comércio é chamado a adotar constitui um ato que produz efeitos jurídicos vinculativos, nos termos do artigo 14.o, n.o 2, do Acordo Comercial. O ato previsto não completa nem altera o quadro institucional do Acordo.
 A base jurídica processual da decisão proposta é, por conseguinte, o artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE.
 4.2.Base jurídica material
 4.2.1.Princípios
 A base jurídica material de uma decisão ao abrigo do artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE depende essencialmente do objetivo e do conteúdo do ato previsto em relação ao qual é adotada uma posição em nome da União.
 4.2.2.Aplicação ao caso em apreço
 O principal objetivo e o conteúdo do ato previsto, ou seja, alargar a cobertura da contratação ao abrigo do título VI do Acordo, são abrangidos pelo âmbito de aplicação da política comercial comum.
 A base jurídica material da decisão proposta é, pois, o artigo 207.o do TFUE, em especial o seu n.o 4.
 4.3.Conclusão
 A base jurídica da decisão proposta deve ser o artigo 204.o, n.o 4, do TFUE, em conjugação com o artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE.
 2017/0257 (NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no Comité de Comércio, no que respeita à alteração do anexo XII do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro, para estabelecer a lista de entidades adjudicantes da administração pública da Colômbia em conformidade com as disposições do título VI («Contratos Públicos»)
 O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 Tendo em conta o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, nomeadamente o artigo 207.o, n.o 4, em conjugação com o artigo 218.o, n.o 9,
 Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão Europeia,
 Considerando o seguinte:
 (1)O Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro («Acordo Comercial») tem sido aplicado a título provisório com a Colômbia desde 1 de agosto de 2013
 4
 .
 (2)Nos termos do artigo 14.o, n.os 1 e 3, do Acordo, o Comité de Comércio pode adotar decisões por consenso, envolvendo apenas a Parte UE e o País Andino signatário em causa (ou seja, a Colômbia), desde que tais decisões não afetem os direitos e as obrigações de outro País Andino signatário.
 (3)O Comité de Comércio, na sua quarta reunião, a realizar em 24 de novembro de 2017, irá adotar uma decisão relativa à alteração do anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo. A alteração consiste numa clarificação da cobertura das entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública na Colômbia. A referida alteração visa aditar uma nota à subsecção 2 relativa à cobertura das entidades adjudicantes da administração pública na Colômbia a fim de especificar que a expressão «entidades adjudicantes» abrange todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial. A UE e a Colômbia acordam em que essa alteração não exige ajustamentos compensatórios.
 (4)É oportuno estabelecer a posição a adotar, em nome da União, no Comité de Comércio, já que a decisão será vinculativa para a União.
 (5)Uma vez que a decisão do Comité de Comércio irá alterar o anexo XII do Acordo, é oportuno publicá-la no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia após a sua adoção.
 (6)No Comité de Comércio, a União é representada pela Comissão, em conformidade com o artigo 17.o, n.o 1, do Tratado da União Europeia (TUE),
 ADOTOU A PRESENTE DECISÃO:
 Artigo 1.o
 A posição a adotar, em nome da União, na quarta reunião do Comité de Comércio, em 24 de novembro de 2017, deve basear-se no projeto de decisão do Comité de Comércio que acompanha a presente decisão.
 Artigo 2.o
 Após a sua adoção, a decisão do Comité de Comércio será publicada no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.
 Artigo 3.o
 A destinatária da presente decisão é a Comissão.
 Feito em Bruxelas, em
 Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 (1)
 JO L 354 de 21.12.2012, p. 3.
 (2)
 JO L 56 de 28.2.2013, p. 1.
 (3)
 JO L 356 de 24.12.2016, p. 3.
 (4)
 Decisão 2012/735/UE do Conselho, de 31 de maio de 2012, relativa à assinatura, em nome da União, e à aplicação provisória, do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro (JO L 354 de 21.12.2012, p. 3).
 ---documentbreak---
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 9.10.2017
 COM(2017) 584 final
 ANEXO
 da
 Proposta de Decisão do Conselho
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no Comité de Comércio, no que respeita à alteração do anexo XII do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro, para estabelecer a lista de entidades adjudicantes da administração pública da Colômbia em conformidade com as disposições do título VI («Contratos Públicos»)
 APÊNDICE
 DECISÃO N.o [...]/2017 DO COMITÉ DE COMÉRCIO UE-COLÔMBIA-PERU
 de [...] de 2017
 que altera o apêndice 1 do anexo XII («Contratos públicos») do Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro
 O COMITÉ DE COMÉRCIO,
 Tendo em conta o Acordo Comercial entre a União Europeia («União») e os seus EstadosMembros, por um lado, e a Colômbia e o Peru, por outro («Acordo Comercial»), em especial o artigo 191.o,
 Considerando o seguinte:
 1)O artigo 191.o do Acordo Comercial estabelece as modalidades segundo as quais uma Parte pode alterar ou retificar a sua cobertura da contratação ao abrigo do título VI do Acordo.
 2)O anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo especifica as entidades do nível subcentral da administração pública da Colômbia cujos contratos públicos são cobertos pelo título VI.
 3)Na sequência de contactos entre a União e a Colômbia sobre a aplicação do Acordo Comercial, a Colômbia notificou a União da sua intenção de aditar uma nota à subsecção 2 a fim de especificar que a expressão «entidades adjudicantes» abrange todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral da administração pública que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial. A União e a Colômbia acordaram nessa alteração e que a mesma não implicará ajustamentos compensatórios.
 4)A fim de incluir esta nota, há que alterar o anexo XII, apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo. A decisão de alterar o anexo pode ser adotada pelo Comité de Comércio criado ao abrigo do Acordo entre a União Europeia e a Colômbia («País Andino em causa»), nos termos do artigo 14.o, n.o 3, do Acordo Comercial, uma vez que está em causa, exclusivamente, a relação bilateral entre elas,
 ADOTOU A PRESENTE DECISÃO:
 Artigo 1.o
 As notas do anexo XII («Contratos públicos»), apêndice 1, secção A, subsecção 2, do Acordo Comercial passam a ter a seguinte redação:
 «Notas da presente subsecção
 1.Para efeitos da presente subsecção, entende-se por «entidades adjudicantes» todas as entidades adjudicantes do nível subcentral das administrações públicas que não tenham um caráter industrial ou comercial.
 2.O título VI do presente Acordo não abrange:
 a)Contratos de produtos alimentares, matérias-primas/inputs agrícolas, e animais vivos relacionados com programas de apoio à agricultura e de assistência alimentar; e
 b)Contratos das mercadorias classificadas na secção 2 (produtos alimentares, bebidas e tabaco; têxteis, vestuário e couro) da CPC, versão 1.0, para programas de assistência social.»
 Artigo 2.o
 A alteração prevista no artigo 1.o não implica um ajustamento compensatório, uma vez que não implica uma redução da cobertura.
 Artigo 3.o
 A presente decisão entra em vigor na data da sua adoção.
 Feito em [...], em [...] de 2017
 Pelo Comité de Comércio


text: b'OIG Investigative Reports, Former Resident Indicted for Student Loan and Social Security Fraud\nSkip to main contentAbout UsContact UsFAQs Language Assistance Englishespa\xc3\xb1ol\xe4\xb8\xad\xe6\x96\x87: \xe7\xb9\x81\xe9\xab\x94\xe7\x89\x88Vi\xe1\xbb\x87t-ng\xe1\xbb\xaf\xed\x95\x9c\xea\xb5\xad\xec\x96\xb4Tagalog\xd0\xa0\xd1\x83\xd1\x81\xd1\x81\xd0\xba\xd0\xb8\xd0\xb9\nU.S. Department of Education\nSearch for:\nToggle navigation\nU.S. Department of Education\nStudent Loans\nGrants\nLaws\nData\nAbout ED\nOFFICES\nHome\nReports & Resources\nPrograms/Initiatives\nNews\nOffice Contacts\nInvestigative Reports\nNEWS RELEASE:\nOhio September 2, 1999\nCONTACT: Public Information Office\n(614) 469-5715, ext. 365\nor (888) 953-2199\nFormer Resident Indicted for Student Loan and Social Security Fraud\nCincinnati -- Sharon J. Zealey, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; Christopher Fox, Special Agent in Charge, Department of Education. Office of the Inspector General; and Dennis Neizgoda, Special Agent in Charge, Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General today announced that a former resident of Cincinnati was indicted yesterday for defrauding both the U.S. Department of Education and the Social Security Administration. The Indictment was returned by the Federal Grand Jury in Cincinnati\nKenneth Payne. 38, formerly of Mt. Auburn, now believed to live in Maryland, is charged with falsely representing to a psychiatrist in September 1997 that he was unemployed and disabled by mental illness. Payne is accused of fraudulently obtaining the psychiatrist\'s certification that Payne was permanently and totally disabled for purposes of Payne applying for Department of Education forgiveness of his obligation to repay five student loans. Payne\tsubmitted the psychiatrist\'s certification to the Department of Education, and is relieved him of the obligation to repay $27,855.56.\nPayne is also charged with deceiving the Social Security Administration in order to receive disability benefits to which he was not entitled. The indictment alleges that in March 1998 Payne, who was them receiving Social Security disability benefits, told an agency field representative that he had not been employed since 1996, although Payne had been employed full tine since July 1997, Payne received federal disability benefits in the amount of $6,682.32 to which he was not entitled as a result of the misrepresentation.\nBoth agencies discovered the fraud in 1998. The Social Security Administration stopped Payne\'s disability benefits at that time. The Department of Education has not collected the unpaid loans from Payne.\nWith regard to the return of the Indictment, Ms. Zealey said,\n"We strongly support the efforts of the Department of Education and the Social Security Administration to fight fraud and abuse in their programs. Our office prosecutes to the fullest those who lie in order to obtain federal benefits they are not eligible to receive. We are equally vigorous in bringing charges against borrowers who falsely claim disability in order to escape their obligations to repay student loans. We believe that citizens want their tax dollars directed to those who truly qualify for federal benefits and want borrowers to repay student loans unless they are truly disabled. We use prosecutions wherever they are appropriate to assure the integrity of such programs. In addition, we regularly use civil actions to collect money owed to the United States by delinquent borrowers."\nIf convicted, Payne faces up to 10 years in prison, a $500,000 fine, and restitution to the agencies of the amounts unlawfully obtained.\nPayne will appear September 23, 1999, in Cincinnati for arraignment. No trial date has been set.\nMs Zealey praised the investigative efforts by Special Agents for both the Department of Education and the Social Security Administration.\nAn indictment is merely an accusation. The defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.\nNews releases from the U.S. Attorney\'s Office for the Southern District of Ohio are available on the Internet at www.usdoj.gov/usao/ohs\nTop\nPrintable view\nShare this page\nLast Modified: 03/03/2005\nHow Do I Find...\nStudent loans, forgiveness\nCollege accreditation\nNo Child Left Behind\nFERPA\n2015 Budget Proposal\nFAFSA\nMore >\nInformation About...\nTransforming Teaching\nFamily and Community Engagement\nEarly Learning\nK-12 Reforms\nMore >\nConnect\nFacebook\nTwitter\nYouTube\nEmail\nRSS\nGoogle+\nMore >\nMISUSED\nFOIA\nOIG Fraud Hotline\nOur mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.\nStudent Loans\nRepaying Loans\nDefaulted Loans\nLoan Forgiveness\nLoan Servicers\nGrants & Programs\nApply for Pell Grants\nGrants Forecast\nOpen Grant Competitions\nFind Grant Programs by Eligibility\nLaws & Guidance\nNo Child Left Behind\nIDEA\nCivil Rights\nSignificant Guidance\nData & Research\nEducation Statistics\nIntegrated Postsecondary Education Data System\nNation\'s Report Card\nWhat Works Clearinghouse\nAbout Us\nContact Us\nJobs\nNews\nFAQs\nBudget, Performance\nNotices FOIAPrivacySecurityInformation qualityInspector GeneralWhitehouse.govUSA.govBenefits.govRegulations.gov'