jurisdiction: US

text:
Ronald Sinclair v. State of Maryland
 No. 43, 2014 Term
 Criminal Procedure - Mandatory Pretrial Motions - Waiver. Maryland Rule 4-252
 directs that a motion to exclude evidence on the ground that it was derived from an unlawful
 search be filed within a certain time period in advance of trial, that the motion state the
 factual and legal grounds for exclusion of evidence, and that the motion be decided in
 advance of the trial. Failure to comply with the rule waives the motion, unless the trial court
 finds good cause for non-compliance. The filing of a bare bones “omnibus” motion that was
 later withdrawn “without prejudice,” resulting in cancellation of the scheduled motions
 hearings, followed seven months later by an oral motion to exclude evidence on the morning
 of trial, without a showing of good cause for the delay, did not comply with the rule and
 waived the motion to exclude evidence.
 Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Search Incident to Arrest - Cell Phones. A
 police officer who seizes a cell phone incident to a valid arrest may inspect and secure the
 cell phone, but may not search the data on the cell phone unless the officer secures a warrant
 or another exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, applies.
 When an officer seizes a flip phone incident to a lawful arrest, the officer may view and
 photograph a screen saver image that is in plain view when the officer physically flips the
 phone open to inspect and secure the phone. But a warrant – or applicable exception to the
 warrant requirement – is necessary for the officer to view data in the phone that is not in
 plain view.
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CT100766X
 Argued: January 8, 2015
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 43
 September Term, 2014
 RONALD SINCLAIR
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 Barbera, C.J.
 *Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 McDonald
 Watts
 Raker, Irma S.
 (Retired, Specially Assigned),
 JJ.
 Opinion by McDonald, J.
 Filed: July 27, 2015
 *Harrell, J., now retired, participated in the
 hearing and conference of the case while an active
 member of this Court; after being recalled
 pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
 3A, he also participated in the decision and
 adoption of this opinion.
 Petitioner Ronald Sinclair was convicted of various charges related to a carjacking.
 Part of the evidence against him was derived from a flip cell phone that was seized from him
 incident to his arrest – screen images that matched the custom wheel rims of the stolen car.
 He sought to exclude that evidence from his trial in an oral motion made by his attorney on
 the morning of trial. The Circuit Court allowed the use of that evidence and the Court of
 Special Appeals affirmed that decision. Before us, Mr. Sinclair relies on the Supreme
 Court’s intervening decision in Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) to
 argue that the arresting officer’s review of photos on the cell phone without a warrant was
 an unconstitutional search and that the evidence derived from the cell phone should have
 been suppressed.
 We hold that, in failing to make his motion to suppress the evidence derived from his
 cell phone within the time period and with the specificity required by the Maryland Rules,
 Mr. Sinclair waived that motion. Moreover, even had the motion been made in a timely
 manner, the primary evidence obtained from the cell phone – the screen saver image that was
 in plain view upon physical inspection of the phone – was admissible under the Supreme
 Court’s decision in Riley.
 I
 Background
 A. Charges, Evidence, Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
 In two indictments that were consolidated for trial, Mr. Sinclair was charged with
 carjacking and related offenses, various firearms offenses, and possession of illicit drugs.
 The evidence presented at trial showed the following:
 On the evening of April 29, 2010, Thomas Gaines stopped at a gas station in Camp
 Springs to refuel his Dodge Charger – a car for which he had paid $36,000 and purchased
 a special set of custom wheel rims. When he pulled into the station, Mr. Gaines noticed two
 men speaking on a phone. As he filled his gas tank, one of the men approached him and
 asked if he wanted to buy “some weed.” He declined, but when he turned to get in his car,
 the other man was standing in his way. The first man put a gun to Mr. Gaines’ side while the
 other searched him and took his wallet, cash, and phone. The two men entered his car and
 drove away. At trial Mr. Gaines identified Mr. Sinclair as the man who had offered to sell
 him marijuana and who had put a gun to his side.
 The gas station clerk, Gamadanayau Salami,1 saw the two men approach Mr. Gaines,
 pull out a gun, search through Mr. Gaines’ pockets, and “zoom off” in Mr. Gaines’ car. Mr.
 Salami called 9-1-1. He was unable to see the men’s faces from inside his cubicle and could
 1
 Mr. Salami is also referred to in the record variously as Mr. Gamadanayau, Mr.
 Salami Adechina, and Salami Ganiyu Adeshina. We refer to him by the name he gave and
 spelled for the court reporter at trial.
 2
 not identify the man who held the gun. Although it was night, both Mr. Salami and Mr.
 Gaines testified that the gas station was well-lit and that they could see clearly.
 The next day, at approximately 3 or 4 p.m., Mr. Gaines and his girlfriend spotted his
 Dodge Charger backed into a parking space in the lot of a strip shopping center in Temple
 Hills. He asked his girlfriend to go to a nearby police car to summon the police while he
 blocked in the Charger with the vehicle they were driving so that the stolen car could not be
 driven out of the parking lot. He also recognized Mr. Sinclair, who was inside a barber shop
 in the strip shopping center, as one of the men who had robbed him the previous night. He
 noticed that Mr. Sinclair kept looking at him.
 Shortly thereafter, Officer Kevin Stevenson of the Prince George’s County Police
 Department, who had responded to the gas station the previous night, was dispatched to the
 shopping center. He verified that the Charger was Mr. Gaines’ car, and waited with Mr.
 Gaines at a distance for Mr. Sinclair to leave the barber shop. After approximately 45
 minutes, Mr. Sinclair left the barber shop while talking on his cell phone and entered a car
 that pulled up to the curb.
 Officer Stevenson stopped the car and ordered its occupants onto the curb. He saw
 bags of marijuana on the floor boards where Mr. Sinclair had been sitting. Although the
 officer had instructed Mr. Gaines to keep his distance from the traffic stop, Mr. Gaines
 walked up to Mr. Sinclair and told Officer Stevenson again that Mr. Sinclair was the man
 3
 who had stolen his car. Officer Stevenson placed Mr. Sinclair under arrest and recovered
 cash, suspected cocaine, and a cell phone from his pockets.
 The cell phone was a Samsung “flip” phone designed for use on the T-Mobile
 network. Officer Stevenson testified at trial that, shortly after recovering it from Mr.
 Sinclair, he opened the phone and saw a screen saver image (sometimes also referred to as
 a “wallpaper” image) of a wheel rim and fender that matched the wheel rim and color of the
 stolen car. The officer scrolled through the photos on the phone. In addition to a photograph
 of the screen saver image, two other photographs of the cell phone screen were introduced
 into evidence – an image of a photo identical to the screen saver image and an image of a
 “properties” screen2 that indicated “sent” on “04/30/10 7:00...”.3
 Photographs of the cell phone’s screen showing the screen saver image, the identical
 image from the phone’s photo library, and the screen of that photo’s properties were all
 admitted into evidence. Also introduced into evidence were photos of Mr. Gaines’ car and
 a close-up of one of its wheels, which appears identical to the screen saver image from Mr.
 Sinclair’s phone.
 2
 A digital file’s properties, also sometimes called metadata, are details about the file,
 which can include, for example, the type of file, its size, the date it was created, and its
 storage location on the electronic device. See J. Boyce, Windows® 7 Bible (2009) (Chapter
 31 – “Metadata and Power Searches”) (electronic version) at 2143-47.
 3
 The properties screen does not specify what was “sent” or how it was sent. Nor did
 the screen image indicate whether “7:00” meant 7 a.m. or 7 p.m.
 4
 The parties stipulated that Mr. Sinclair was prohibited from possessing a regulated
 firearm as a result of a prior disqualifying conviction. A forensic chemist testified she had
 tested the suspected cocaine recovered from Mr. Sinclair and that it was in fact crack
 cocaine.
 The defense case was an alibi presented through the testimony of Mr. Sinclair’s father
 and a friend named Jason Slaughter. Mr. Slaughter testified that, on the evening of April 29,
 2010, he and Mr. Sinclair had borrowed a car from Mr. Sinclair’s father to go the mall. Mr.
 Slaughter testified that, after borrowing the car, the two men had spent the night “hanging
 out” at a mall and a restaurant before returning home. Mr. Sinclair’s father agreed that he
 had lent them the car that night, but did not have further information about their activities as
 he had gone to bed before they returned.
 In rebuttal, the prosecution played a recording of a post-arrest telephone call that Mr.
 Sinclair had with his probation agent in which he asserted that the identification of him as
 the carjacker was mistaken because he had been with his mother and his girlfriend at the
 time. He did not mention borrowing his father’s car or spending the evening with Mr.
 Slaughter.
 The jury found Mr. Sinclair guilty of armed carjacking, carjacking, robbery with a
 dangerous weapon, robbery, first and second degree assault, theft, theft over $10,000, use of
 a handgun in commission of a crime of violence, wearing a handgun, conspiracy to commit
 armed carjacking, possession of cocaine and possession of a regulated firearm by a
 5
 disqualified person.4 The trial court merged several counts for purposes of sentencing and
 sentenced him to a total of 40 years imprisonment.5
 Mr. Sinclair appealed his conviction on several grounds. The Court of Special
 Appeals found no merit in any of them and affirmed his convictions. 214 Md. App. 309, 76
 A.3d 442 (2013).
 Mr. Sinclair then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the question of the
 constitutionality of the search of the contents of his cell phone and noted that the Supreme
 Court was then considering whether to grant a writ of certiorari in two cases involving a
 similar issue.6 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court agreed to review the issue, consolidated
 the cases, and decided them during its 2013 term. Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.
 Ct. 2473 (2014). We then granted certiorari in Mr. Sinclair’s case to consider Mr. Sinclair’s
 4
 Mr. Sinclair was acquitted of possession of marijuana. At the end of the State’s case,
 the prosecution nolle prossed a charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and agreed to
 amend the indictment to reduce a charge of theft of property valued between $1,000 and
 $10,000 to theft of property without a specific value.
 5
 In particular, on August 26, 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Sinclair to 20 years
 imprisonment for armed carjacking; 20 years consecutive for use of a handgun in a felony
 or crime of violence; 20 years for conspiracy to commit armed carjacking to run concurrent
 with the sentence imposed for armed carjacking; and 4 years concurrent for possession of
 cocaine. Other convictions were merged for purposes of sentencing. On December 16,
 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Sinclair to five years imprisonment without the possibility of
 parole for possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person concurrent to the
 sentences imposed on August 26, 2011.
 6
 Resolution of this issue would not appear to affect Mr. Sinclair’s conviction and
 sentence for possession of cocaine as there appears to be no contention concerning the
 constitutionality of the seizure of the cocaine at the time of his arrest.
 6
 arguments in light of the Riley opinion. We also granted the State’s conditional cross
 petition, which raised the question of whether Mr. Sinclair had waived the issue in the Circuit
 Court, asserted that the officer’s viewing of the screen saver image was permissible under
 Riley, and argued that any error in the admission of the evidence was harmless. Because the
 State has questioned the timeliness of Mr. Sinclair’s effort to suppress the three photographs
 of images from his cell phone, we turn briefly to the circumstances under which the issue was
 raised and decided in the Circuit Court.
 B. Motion to Exclude Evidence Obtained from Cell Phone
 Mr. Sinclair was arraigned on the initial indictment in the Circuit Court for Prince
 George’s County on July 30, 2010 and referred to the Public Defender. The court scheduled
 a pretrial motions hearing for September 24, 2010, and a trial to commence on October 19,
 2010.
 Less than a week after the arraignment, on August 5, 2010, an Assistant Public
 Defender entered his appearance as counsel for Mr. Sinclair, and filed a one-page pleading
 entitled “Entry of Appearance, Election for Jury Trial, Mandatory Motions, and Motion for
 Discovery and Inspection.” Among other things, it sought dismissal of the indictment,
 elected a jury trial, moved to sever the trial of co-defendants7 and charges, requested
 discovery, moved to exclude evidence, and demanded a speedy trial. Such a pleading, at
 7
 There were no co-defendants in the case.
 7
 once both comprehensive and cryptic, is sometimes referred to as an “omnibus motion.” 8
 With respect to the suppression of evidence, a one-sentence paragraph in the pleading stated
 that the defendant “[m]oves to suppress any and all evidence obtained by the State in
 violation of defendant’s rights as guaranteed by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to
 the Constitution of the United States, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”
 On September 2, 2010, the Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the case sent defense
 counsel a letter asserting that, as a pretrial suppression motion, the pleading did not comply
 with Maryland Rule 4-252(e)9 and “d[id] not put the State on notice of any issues that you
 actually wish to raise ... and what legal precepts support your position.” The letter noted that
 discovery was being provided to the defense and advised defense counsel to update the
 pleading with specific motions to which the State would respond. Under cover of another
 letter of the same date, the prosecutor provided documentary discovery and invited defense
 counsel to make an appointment to inspect the physical evidence in the case. In yet another
 pleading filed that same date, the prosecution notified defense counsel of the seizure of the
 cell phone and drugs from Mr. Sinclair, as further detailed in the discovery materials.
 On the date of the pretrial motions hearing, September 24, 2010, the Assistant Public
 Defender filed a “Line Withdrawing Motions” which stated that all motions were withdrawn
 8
 E.g., Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 660, 837 A.2d 944 (2003).
 9
 Rule 4-252(e) requires that “A motion ... shall state the grounds upon which it is
 made, and shall set forth the relief sought.... Every motion shall contain or be accompanied
 by a statement of points and citation of authorities.” See Part II.B. of this opinion.
 8
 “without prejudice.” As a result, the scheduled motions hearing was canceled as “moot.”
 The trial date was later postponed to January 26, 2011.
 On the date scheduled for trial, January 26, 2011, the Assistant Public Defender
 appeared in court and withdrew from the case in favor of private counsel newly retained by
 Mr. Sinclair. When asked whether he was ready to go to trial, the new defense counsel told
 the court, “I have prepared some, but I believe there’s additional discovery I would seek.
 And I believe there might be a motion or two I would wish to litigate.” With the assent of
 Mr. Sinclair, the court postponed the trial and scheduled another motions hearing for March
 4, and trial for March 17. The March 4 hearing date was later continued to March 11,
 apparently because a new Assistant State’s Attorney was to enter the case.
 No pretrial motions were filed by the new defense counsel. Docket entries for March
 11, 2011 indicate that the motions had been “withdrawn without prejudice” – apparently a
 reference to the withdrawal of the omnibus motion – and that the motions hearing scheduled
 for that date was therefore moot.10 A few days later, the court granted the State’s motion to
 consolidate the firearms charge with the carjacking related offenses for trial and a defense
 motion to postpone the trial, on the ground that discovery had not been made in a timely
 manner. The new trial date was April 19, 2011.
 10
 A court form in the court file for that date similarly indicates “motions withdrawn
 without prejudice” – also apparently a reference to the earlier withdrawal of the omnibus
 motion, as no other defense motions had been filed in the interim.
 9
 On April 19, 2011, immediately after the clerk called the case and counsel introduced
 themselves, the court said: “The jury’s coming up, on its way. Are getting lined up.
 Anything we can do while we wait?” Defense counsel responded: “Yes, Your Honor,
 there’s two issues that the Defense would like to raise in limine prior to commencing trial.”
 Mr. Sinclair’s counsel then objected to admission of the cell phone pictures on the grounds
 that they were obtained in violation of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.11
 He described the search: “The law enforcement officer opens the cell phone, goes through
 it, and apparently pulls out what purports to be some photographs.” He posited that “there’s
 been some case law about if the phone is just opened ... that might be permissible, Your
 Honor, but here the State did more in the absence of a warrant.” Mr. Sinclair’s counsel
 described in some detail cases from Ohio and Colorado12 supporting his position, but noted
 that no Maryland appellate court had addressed the issue.
 The prosecutor responded: “I’m glad [defense counsel] stopped at the Court of
 Appeals, because the Fourth Circuit has, in fact, looked at this and addressed this as a valid
 search incident to arrest.” He continued: “Now, I’ll be honest, I do not have that case in front
 11
 See also Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 26.
 12
 Although he did not provide citations, defense counsel was apparently referring to
 Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (2009) and Colorado v. Schutter, 249 P.3d 1123 (2011).
 10
 of me because we have already litigated motions, time has been passed and so on and so forth
 so I had no notice that this will be raised[.]” 13
 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, stating that the search of the cell phone
 was a valid search incident to arrest.14 The court made no fact findings and did not further
 explain its legal conclusion. Photographs of three cell phone images were later admitted in
 evidence at trial.
 II
 Discussion
 The sole issue raised by Mr. Sinclair is whether the three photographs of his cell
 phone screen should have been excluded from the evidence at trial on the ground that they
 were obtained by Officer Stevenson in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State raises
 a preliminary question as to whether Mr. Sinclair’s suppression motion complied with
 Maryland Rule 4-252 and, if not, whether he has waived consideration of his Fourth
 Amendment claim.
 A. Standard of Review
 In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, an appellate
 court ordinarily limits its review to the record of the motions hearing. Trusty v. State, 308
 13
 Although he had neither the name or the citation of the case at hand, the prosecutor
 was apparently referring to United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
 14
 The defense also argued that the time stamp on the third image from the cell phone
 was hearsay that could not be admitted without expert testimony. The court rejected that
 contention and Mr. Sinclair has not reiterated it on appeal.
 11
 Md. 658, 669-72, 521 A.2d 749 (1987). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
 to the prevailing party, and the trial court’s fact findings are accepted unless clearly
 erroneous. Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 531, 993 A.2d 626 (2010). “The ultimate
 determination of whether there was a constitutional violation, however, is an independent
 determination that is made by the appellate court alone, applying the law to the facts found
 in each particular case.” Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120, 981 A.2d 1247 (2009) (citations
 omitted); see also Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788 A.2d 646 (2002).
 B. Whether Mr. Sinclair’s Motion Complied with Rule 4-252
 1. Maryland Rule 4-252
 Maryland Rule 4-252 governs the form, content, and timing of a motion to suppress
 evidence allegedly obtained as the result of an unlawful search. It states, in relevant part:
 (a) Mandatory Motions. In the circuit court, the following
 matters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule
 and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause
 shown, orders otherwise: ... (3) An unlawful search, seizure,
 interception of wire or oral communication, or pretrial
 identification; ...
 (b) Time for Filing Mandatory Motions. A motion under
 section (a) of this Rule shall be filed within 30 days after the
 earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of
 the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 4-213(c), except
 when discovery discloses the basis for a motion, the motion may
 be filed within five days after the discovery is furnished.
 ...
 (e) Content. A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in
 writing unless the court otherwise directs, shall state the grounds
 upon which it is made, and shall set forth the relief sought. A
 motion alleging an illegal source of information as the basis for
 12
 probable cause must be supported by precise and specific factual
 averments. Every motion shall contain or be accompanied by a
 statement of points and citation of authorities.
 (f) Response. A response, if made, shall be filed within 15 days
 after service of the motion and contain or be accompanied by a
 statement of points and citation of authorities.
 (g) Determination. (1) Generally. Motions filed pursuant to
 this Rule shall be determined before trial and, to the extent
 practicable, before the day of trial .... If factual issues are
 involved in determining the motion, the court shall state its
 findings on the record....
 Maryland Rule 4-252 provides for the orderly resolution of suppression motions.
 Pertinent to this case, a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was obtained in
 violation of the Fourth Amendment must normally be filed within 30 days of the first
 appearance of the defendant; it may be filed later if the basis for the motion only becomes
 evident from discovery, in which case the motion must be filed within five days. As to
 content, the motion must ordinarily be in writing, state the basis for suppression of evidence,
 and set forth the legal authority on which it is based. A written response by the State must
 be filed promptly and also provide supporting legal authority. A court should resolve the
 motion before the trial – ideally before the day of trial – and make any necessary fact findings
 on the record. A deviation from these requirements must be justified by “good cause.”
 The rule is thus designed to facilitate the fair consideration of a suppression motion
 in advance of trial. “The obvious and necessary purpose of [Rule 4-252(e)] is to alert both
 the court and the prosecutor to the precise nature of the complaint, in order that the
 13
 prosecutor have a fair opportunity to defend against it and that the court understand the issue
 before it.” Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 660, 837 A.2d 944 (2003); see also Jones v.
 State, 395 Md. 97, 116, 909 A.2d 650 (2006) (“a defendant must state sufficient information
 to put the court and State on notice of the evidence he or she wishes to suppress and the basis
 therefore. Neither the trial court nor the prosecutor should be surprised at the hearing.”).15
 Although Rule 4-252 is unambiguous in setting a time limit and requiring some detail
 as to the basis for a suppression motion, it also grants trial courts discretion to hear non-
 compliant motions “for good cause shown.” In Denicolis, this Court observed that some trial
 courts allow defense counsel to file timely an omnibus motion “seeking a panoply of relief
 15
 The rule’s directive to file and litigate suppression motions in advance of trial was
 a deliberate policy decision of this Court. Prior to 1977, the predecessor rule provided that
 “[a]ny defense or objection capable of determination without the trial of the general issue
 may be raised before trial by motion.” Maryland Rule 725(b) (1971 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis
 added); see also Shrout v. State, 238 Md. 170, 173-74, 208 A.2d 585 (1965).
 In 1977, the Court adopted Rule 736, which included motions alleging an unlawful
 search or seizure on a list of mandatory motions and which required that mandatory motions
 be filed “within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance
 of the defendant before the court ... except when discovery is furnished on an issue which
 is the subject of the motion, then the motion may be filed within five days after discovery is
 furnished.” Failure to file a timely motion would result in a waiver, unless the court found
 good cause to order otherwise. The evident purpose was to adopt the approach of Federal
 Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. See Kohr v. State, 40 Md. App. 92, 98, 388 A.2d 1242
 (1978) (“Both rules are identical in that they require that motions to suppress be filed pre-trial
 and both consider a failure to raise timely objections to the admissibility of unlawfully seized
 evidence to constitute a waiver.”).
 In 1984, Rule 4-252 replaced Rule 736, retaining the listing of mandatory motions,
 deadlines, and other requirements relating to suppression motions. Although the rule has
 been amended in other respects, those provisions remain unchanged.
 14
 based on bald, conclusory allegations devoid of any articulated factual or legal
 underpinning,” and later supplement that motion to flesh out the specific grounds at or before
 a motions hearing. 378 Md. at 660. Courts exercise their discretion to hear those non-
 compliant motions in light of “the time constraints under which defense counsel and pro se
 defendants often operate.” Id. The Court acknowledged that “[a]lthough that practice is not
 what the Rule anticipates and is not to be encouraged, we have not disturbed the discretion
 of the trial courts to permit [that practice], at least where the State is not unduly prejudiced.”
 Id; see also Phillips v. State, 425 Md. 210, 216 n.4, 40 A.3d 25 (2012); Jones 395 Md. at 103
 n.3.
 2. Application to this case
 The requirements of Rule 4-252 were not satisfied in this case, as is evident from the
 following time line:
 July 30, 2010 Mr. Sinclair is arraigned in the Circuit Court and is referred to
 the Public Defender for representation. A pretrial motions
 hearing is scheduled for September 24, 2010, with the trial to
 follow on October 19, 2010.
 August 5, 2010 An Assistant Public Defender enters his appearance and files an
 “omnibus” motion that includes a sentence seeking suppression
 of “any and all evidence obtained by the State in violation of the
 defendant’s rights as guaranteed by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th
 Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and the
 Maryland Declaration of Rights.”
 September 2, 2010 The Assistant State’s Attorney sends discovery to the defense,
 including information concerning the seizure of Mr. Sinclair’s
 cell phone and also sends a letter noting that the omnibus motion
 is deficient under Rule 4-252 and requesting that the basis for
 15
 any suppression motion be explained, so that the State may
 respond.
 September 24, 2010 On the date of the pretrial motions hearing, defense counsel files
 a line stating that “all motions ... are hereby withdrawn without
 prejudice.” As a result, the motions hearing is cancelled.
 January 26, 2011 The court postpones the trial when a privately retained counsel
 enters his appearance on behalf of Mr. Sinclair. New defense
 counsel states that he may wish to litigate pretrial motions and
 the court schedules a pretrial motions hearing for March 4 (later
 changed to March 11). However, no new motions are filed.
 March 11, 2011 The pretrial motions hearing is canceled, again on the basis that
 the motions had been withdrawn.
 March 17, 2011 Trial is continued to April 19 at the request of Mr. Sinclair’s
 counsel on the basis that “discovery not timely provided.”
 April 19, 2011 On the morning of the first day of trial, as the jury panel is en
 route to the courtroom, defense counsel orally makes a motion
 in limine to suppress the photographs of the screen of Mr.
 Sinclair’s cell phone. The prosecutor protests that he is
 unprepared for the motion and that it is too late for such a
 motion. The trial court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
 After hearing argument and a brief factual proffer from defense
 counsel and legal argument from both sides, the court orally
 denies the motion.
 Although the “omnibus” motion filed by Mr. Sinclair’s initial counsel may have been timely,
 it did not specifically seek suppression of evidence derived from his cell phone nor did it
 provide factual allegations or legal authority to support such an action. It thus did not state
 the grounds upon which suppression of evidence was sought, as required by Rule 4-252(e).
 Ray v. State, 435 Md. 1, 15, 76 A.3d 1143 (2013); see also Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 49,
 843 A.2d 63 (2004) (“omnibus” motion that generally asserted that evidence was seized in
 16
 violation of constitutional rights did not satisfy Rule 4-252(e)). Perhaps that defect in the
 motion was attributable to the fact that the Assistant Public Defender had not yet received
 discovery. However, no supplemental motion was filed within five days after discovery
 (including specific notice of seizure of the cell phone) was provided in September 2010, as
 required by Rule 4-252(b). Instead, a few weeks later, the Assistant Public Defender
 withdrew all pretrial motions – thereby cancelling the pretrial motions hearing.16
 At the time he entered his appearance in January 2011, Mr. Sinclair’s new attorney
 did alert the court to the possibility that there would be a pretrial motion to be litigated, with
 the result that the court scheduled a new motions hearing in advance of the trial date. But
 defense counsel filed no motions during the next three months and acquiesced in the
 cancellation of the pretrial motions hearing.
 It was not until the morning of trial – approximately seven months after the omnibus
 motion had been withdrawn – that the defense “supplemented” that motion by specifically
 seeking suppression of the cell phone evidence. Although defense counsel had evidently
 16
 The Court of Special Appeals held that the timing requirements of Rule 4-252 were
 satisfied by the omnibus motion and that its withdrawal “without prejudice” preserved the
 right to raise issues in a motion in limine. 214 Md. App. at 323-24. The intermediate
 appellate court appeared to believe that the trial court had approved the withdrawal “without
 prejudice,” although the withdrawal was not framed as a motion and there is no explicit
 approval of it expressed by the Circuit Court in the record.
 Even were we to accept that the unilateral withdrawal of a mandatory motion “without
 prejudice” preserved a right to refile it at a later date – a question we do not decide here – the
 most Mr. Sinclair may have done for purposes of Rule 4-252 was to preserve his compliance
 with the 30-day deadline.
 17
 researched the issue and cited specific out-of-state cases in support of his motion, he did not
 file a written motion and apparently had not notified the prosecution of the motion or the
 authorities on which it was based. The prosecutor protested that the motion was late, as
 indeed it was. Defense counsel did not suggest any particular reason for failing to comply
 with the rule, and the court did not make a finding of good cause. Ordinarily, that would
 mean that the motion was waived. See Rule 4-252(a).
 C. Whether Non-Compliance with Rule 4-252 was a Waiver
 Mr. Sinclair “acknowledges that the omnibus motion did not comply with Rule 4-
 252(e) as it did not describe the particular issue defense counsel intended to raise, nor did it
 cite legal authority in support of any particular argument.” He contends, however, that the
 prosecutor did not actually object17 and that, in any event, the Circuit Court implicitly found
 good cause to excuse the non-compliance and properly exercised its discretion to hear the
 belated oral motion.18 However, there must be a basis for such a finding and none is evident
 17
 Mr. Sinclair suggests that the prosecutor’s statement was simply an explanation why
 he was unprepared to respond to the motion and not an objection to the late filing.
 Nevertheless, the statements that the “time has been passed,” “we have already litigated
 motions” and “I had no notice” appear to be objections that speak to the purpose of the
 requirements of Rule 4-252.
 18
 The Court of Special Appeals agreed that either the prosecution had waived any
 objection based on Rule 4-252 or that the trial court had implicitly found good cause to
 consider the oral motion in limine despite its non-compliance with the rule. 214 Md. App.
 at 324-25.
 18
 in this record.19 To conclude that there was a waiver in this case in the absence of any
 showing or findings of good cause does not require a departure from this Court’s past
 willingness to allow trial courts discretion to find good cause for non-compliance with the
 rule.20
 As the Court in Denicolis indicated, a key concern in determining whether to excuse
 non-compliance with the rule and permit a belated supplement is whether it results in “undue
 prejudice” to the State. 378 Md. at 660. Mr. Sinclair argues that there was no prejudice, as
 the prosecutor understood the issue, correctly referenced a relevant Fourth Circuit case –
 although not by name – and prevailed when the Circuit Court denied the suppression motion.
 But the failure to comply with the rule resulted in a truncated motions hearing with
 the jury panel at the door. The only “facts” developed at the motions hearing – the record
 to which we are limited in considering the trial court’s ruling – was the proffer by Mr.
 Sinclair’s counsel that “[t]he law enforcement officer opens the cell phone, goes through it,
 19
 At oral argument before this Court, Mr. Sinclair’s counsel asserted that the lateness
 of the motion may have been attributable to late provision of discovery by the State.
 However, this was not briefed, and as noted above, the record shows that the State disclosed
 to Mr. Sinclair that it had seized a cell phone in early September 2010, seven months before
 the trial.
 20
 It is understandable that a trial court, presented with a suppression motion on the
 morning of trial, will be tempted to resolve the motion substantively – particularly if the
 motion appears to lack merit – and avoid the Monday morning quarterbacking that future
 post-conviction litigation may entail. Here, however, the issue was not a simple one and the
 belated raising of the issue resulted in a motions hearing that substituted a very brief proffer
 for factfindings, and a legal argument in which one side presented detailed summaries of out-
 of-state cases without citation and the other side alluded to an unnamed federal case.
 19
 and apparently pulls out what purports to be some photographs.” Here, Mr. Sinclair’s failure
 to comply prejudiced the State by depriving it of the opportunity to develop an appropriate
 record.21
 At oral argument, Mr. Sinclair sought to cure the prejudice by conceding that Officer
 Stevenson would have testified – as he did at trial – that, when he opened the phone, he saw
 the first image in plain view as a screen saver. Mr. Sinclair also contended that, even if the
 motion had been properly made and the trial court had held an evidentiary hearing, the
 findings of fact and analysis would not have changed. However, evidence adduced at a
 pretrial motions hearing is often more detailed and quite distinct from what is presented to
 a jury at trial. A pretrial suppression hearing will necessarily explore details of an arrest or
 search that have no bearing on a trial jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. This Court
 has been skeptical of the notion that a trial record provides an adequate substitute on which
 to decide a belated suppression motion. See Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 226-27, 686 A.2d
 274 (1996) (“Even though [the defendant] is now willing to treat the trial record as a
 21
 Mr. Sinclair suggests that, even if there had been a pretrial motions hearing, the
 State would have adduced nothing more as to the circumstances of the seizure and search of
 the cell phone than it did in trial testimony and that, because Riley had not yet been decided,
 it would have relied only on the exception for a search incident to an arrest. Perhaps. But
 more than a few attorneys adopt a belt-and-suspenders approach when dealing with an
 unsettled legal question with time to prepare a response and this argument simply invites
 speculation that the rule was designed to eliminate.
 20
 suppression hearing record, that waiver cannot deprive the State of the procedure to which
 it is entitled.”).22
 The flexibility contemplated by the Court in Denicolis involves situations in which
 a defendant files a bare-bones suppression motion and then supplements it with more specific
 information before or at the motions hearing. Here, no supplement was ever filed, the bare
 bones motion was in fact withdrawn, and the scheduled motions hearing was canceled as
 moot. Rather, a new motion with specific grounds and authorities was orally made for the
 first time at trial. Thus, not only did Mr. Sinclair’s motion fail to comply with Rule 4-252,
 it did not even come within the permissive deviation from the rule that Denicolis recognized
 that a trial court might allow.
 If a defendant may file a bare bones motion that provides no notice as to the evidence
 it seeks to suppress or the reasons for doing so, withdraw that motion to avoid its disposition
 at a pretrial motions hearing, renew it with the missing detail on the morning of trial without
 any showing that there is “good cause” for the belated action and without time for an
 evidentiary hearing, and then litigate the issue on appeal without an adequate factual record,
 Rule 4-252 will have been completely defeated. That is what happened here.
 22
 In Perry, the defendant moved to suppress evidence for the first time in the middle
 of a long murder trial. The trial court found the issue waived and denied the motion. This
 Court affirmed, noting that the State is bound to the suppression hearing record on appeal.
 The Court held that “the parties should be given substantially the same opportunity to
 develop a factual record, and legal arguments based thereon ... that they would have enjoyed
 in presenting and responding to a pretrial suppression motion.” 344 Md. at 226.
 21
 We are willing to assume that this was not a deliberate tactic to sandbag an opposing
 party. Perhaps it can be ascribed, at least in part, to Mr. Sinclair’s decision to change counsel
 mid-stream. But if we countenance it in this instance we are giving license to such tactics
 in the future.
 D. Whether the Images of the Cell Phone Screen Were Obtained Unlawfully
 Although we hold that, pursuant to Rule 4-252, the defense waived a motion to
 suppress the cell phone images in this case, the seizure of a cell phone in connection with an
 arrest is likely to be a common occurrence. In an effort to provide guidance to the trial courts
 in light of the Riley decision, we explain why at least one of the photographs at issue on this
 appeal would be admissible and why the admission of the others, even if derived from an
 unlawful search, would be harmless error.23
 1. Riley v. California
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Riley resolved two cases that the Court had
 consolidated for decision. In those cases, appellate courts had reached different conclusions
 23
 The State contends that, if waiver is found under Rule 4-252, the Court should not
 exercise the discretion afforded under Rule 8-131(a) to decide issues not raised or decided
 in the trial court. See, e.g., Savoy v. State, 218 Md. App. 130, 138-42, 96 A.3d 842 (2014).
 Mr. Sinclair argues that the Court should not reach that question because (1) there was no
 waiver under Rule 4-252 and (2) the issue was raised and decided in the Circuit Court, so that
 discretionary review provision of Rule 8-131(a) does not apply. We agree with Mr. Sinclair
 that, because the trial court did reach the issue, we do not rely on the discretionary review
 provision of Rule 8-131(a). Our views in this section of the opinion are more in the nature
 of an alternative holding or dicta.
 22
 as to the constitutionality of a warrantless search of data contained on a cell phone seized
 from a defendant incident to the defendant’s arrest.
 In the first case, Riley v. California, a police officer stopped Riley for driving with
 expired registration tags, discovered that his license was suspended, and then arrested him
 when an inventory search of the car revealed firearms in violation of California law. When
 the officer searched Riley incident to the arrest, he found gang-related items and a smart
 phone. The officer accessed information in the smart phone, finding gang-related photos and
 videos and a photograph linking Riley to a shooting.
 In the companion case, United States v. Wurie, a police officer observed Wurie make
 a drug sale from a car, arrested him, and seized two cell phones incident to that arrest. One
 of the phones, a flip phone, repeatedly received calls from a source identified as “my house”
 on the phone’s external screen. The officers opened the phone and observed an image of a
 woman and baby as the screen saver. They accessed the call log on the phone to obtain the
 number associated with “my house” and used a phone directory to trace that phone number
 to an address. When they went to that address they observed Wurie’s name on the mailbox
 and saw inside a woman who resembled the image on the screen saver. They obtained a
 search warrant for the apartment and recovered illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, a firearm
 and ammunition, and cash.
 In both cases, the trial courts denied motions to suppress the evidence derived from
 the searches of the cell phones and upheld the searches as valid searches incident to arrest.
 23
 The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision in Riley; a divided panel of
 the First Circuit reversed the denial of the suppression motion and conviction in Wurie.
 In its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a search of a person incident to
 an arrest is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
 134 S. Ct. at 2482. To assess the reasonable scope of such a search with respect to the
 contents of a cell phone, the Court first reviewed its three major precedents that molded the
 search incident to arrest exception: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States
 v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 134 S. Ct. at
 2483-84.
 In Chimel, the Court had articulated two justifications underlying a search incident
 to arrest: evidence preservation and officer safety.24 395 U.S. at 762-63. Consistent with
 those rationales, the Court limited the scope of that search to “the arrestee’s person and the
 area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within
 which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id. at 763.
 In Robinson, the Court had explained that, while the general rationale for a
 warrantless search incident to arrest rested on officer safety and evidence preservation, the
 validity of a particular search did not depend on the probability of finding weapons or
 24
 In a concurring opinion in Riley, Justice Alito noted that Chimel actually involved
 a search of a house and contended that historically the search-incident-to-an-arrest rule as
 regards a search of the arrestee was not closely linked to these two justifications. 134 S. Ct.
 at 2495-96.
 24
 evidence on the particular arrestee. It upheld an officer’s search of a cigarette packet found
 on the arrestee, even though the packet was not likely to hold a weapon or evidence relevant
 to the offense justifying the arrest – driving with a revoked license. The Court reasoned: “A
 custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
 Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
 additional justification.” 414 U.S. at 235.
 Finally, in Gant, the Court had held that police may search a vehicle incident to arrest,
 but “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
 compartment at the time of the search” – hearkening back to the concerns for officer safety
 and evidence preservation stated in Chimel. 556 U.S. at 343. The Court also noted the
 applicability of an independent exception to the warrant requirement “unique to the vehicle
 context.” Id.
 Following this review, the Court then turned to the cell phone searches in Riley and
 Wurie. It assessed, “‘on the one hand, the degree to which [a given type of search] intrudes
 upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
 promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting
 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). The Court noted that “a mechanical
 application of Robinson might well support the warrantless [cell phone] searches.” However,
 because digital data does not present the normal risks to officer safety or destruction of
 evidence, and because cell phones contain a vast quantity and quality of personal
 25
 information, the Court held “that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting
 such a search.” Id. at 2484-85.
 The Court analyzed the two rationales cited in Chimel in the context of a cell phone.
 With respect to officer safety, the Court affirmed an officer’s authority to “examine the
 physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon – say, to determine
 whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
 2485. Put another way, officers may “secure[] a phone and eliminate[] any potential physical
 threats.” Id. Even if it is unlikely that an item could be dangerous, “unknown physical
 objects may always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a
 custodial arrest.” Id. Once those concerns are accounted for, officers may secure, but not
 search, cell phones until they obtain a warrant. Id. at 2486.
 As for the rationale of evidence preservation, the prosecution in each case argued that
 digital data on cell phones was vulnerable to remote wiping or might be locked through
 encryption. The Court first discussed the limited ability of an arresting officer to deal with
 those concerns,25 and then noted that officers have other options to prevent remote wiping:
 25
 First, the arrestee would not be the one damaging evidence in the case of remote
 wiping or encryption; rather, it would be a third party or an automatic setting in the phone.
 Second, there was no indication that remote wiping and encryption are prevalent problems.
 Third, at the scene of an arrest, officers are focused on the arrest and securing the scene, and
 would probably not search the data in a cell phone immediately. It is therefore doubtful that
 an arresting officer would be able to prevent remote wiping or encryption even if the officer
 could search the phone without a warrant. 134 S. Ct. at 2486-87.
 26
 they “can turn the phone off or remove its battery,” or put the phone in a “Faraday bag” 26 to
 protect it from radio waves and, thus, remote wiping. 134 S. Ct. at 2487. Finally, the Court
 clarified that in true emergencies officers may rely on other exceptions to the warrant
 requirement, such as exigent circumstances or taking reasonable steps to secure a scene.27
 Id.
 The Court then considered whether an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests – which
 supported the inspection of physical objects found on an arrestee, like the cigarette packet
 in Robinson – weighed in favor of a warrantless search of cell phone data. 134 S. Ct. at
 2488. In this respect, the Court noted the “immense storage capacity” of modern cell phones
 that allow a person to carry personal documents and information that would fill a trunk in
 paper format. Id. at 2489. The vast quantity of personal and sensitive data stored on many
 cell phones could expose to government view a “broad array of private information never
 found in a home in any form – unless the phone is.” Id. at 2489-91. Moreover, the Court
 pointed out, much digital data observed through a cell phone actually physically resides
 26
 Faraday bags, named for “English scientist Michael Faraday[,] ... are essentially
 sandwich bags made of aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, and easy to use.” 134 S. Ct. at
 2487 (citation omitted); see also Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,
 Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders 14 (2d ed. Apr. 2008).
 27
 134 S. Ct. at 2487 (“[I]f officers happen to seize a phone in an unlocked state, they
 may be able to disable a phone’s automatic-lock feature in order to prevent the phone from
 locking and encrypting data. Such a preventive measure could be analyzed under the
 principles set forth in ... [Illinois v. ]McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, which
 approved officers’ reasonable steps to secure a scene to preserve evidence while they awaited
 a warrant.”).
 27
 elsewhere and is simply accessed through the phone – a fact that severely weakened any
 analogy to a physical container. Id. at 2491. The Court rejected several proposals for limited
 data searches incident to an arrest because they were either flawed, impractical, or contrary
 to the Court’s preference to provide guidance through categorical rules rather than rely on
 ad hoc case-by-case balancing.28
 2. Application to this case
 As outlined above, the evidence at issue in this case consists of three photographs of
 screen images of Mr. Sinclair’s cell phone – a flip phone seized from him at the time of his
 arrest. The seizure of the phone itself is not at issue. Although the factual record is sketchy
 due to non-compliance with Rule 4-252, at oral argument Mr. Sinclair conceded that one
 photograph depicts a screen saver image that was readily apparent to Officer Stevenson when
 he opened the flip phone. The other two photographs of the cell phone screen apparently
 were the result of the officer’s “scrolling” through the phone, although the record provides
 no details. The analysis as to the first photograph is thus distinct from that as to the other
 two.
 28
 The rejected limiting principles included proposals that a warrantless search of cell
 phone data be permitted whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains evidence
 relevant to the crime of arrest; that a warrantless search be restricted in scope to areas of the
 phone reasonably believed to have information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity,
 or officer safety; that a warrantless search be limited to the phone’s call log; or that a
 warrantless search be limited to information that would have been available from a pre-
 digital counterpart, such as a wallet. 134 S. Ct. at 2491-93.
 28
 The screen saver image
 Mr. Sinclair argues that the act of opening a flip phone is an unlawful search under
 Riley. He acknowledges that Riley allowed that officers may power off the phone to prevent
 remote wiping, and may inspect it for hidden weapons. Mr. Sinclair asserts that (1) flip
 phones are not susceptible to remote wiping,29 and (2) it is impossible to hide a weapon
 inside a flip phone, and concludes that Riley does not permit an officer to physically open a
 flip phone seized incident to an arrest. Therefore, he argues the photograph of the screen
 saver image was derived from an unlawful search.
 In our view, even on the very limited factual record supplemented by Mr. Sinclair’s
 concession, the photograph of the screen saver image would be admissible under the plain
 view doctrine. “The plain view doctrine of the Fourth Amendment requires that: (1) the
 police officer’s initial intrusion must be lawful ... (2) the incriminating character of the
 evidence must be ‘immediately apparent;’ and (3) the officer must have a lawful right of
 access to the object itself.” In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 545, 789 A.2d 607 (2002) (citing
 Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 88–89, 771 A.2d 389 (2001)).
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley did not distinguish between flip phones and
 smart phones, and did not explicitly address whether an officer may physically open a flip
 29
 As an aside, advancing technology seems to have nullified Mr. Sinclair’s argument
 that flip phones lack wireless capability, see, e.g., Samsung Rugby® 4,
 (last visited July
 20, 2015).
 29
 phone without obtaining a warrant.30 Under the categorical approach favored by the Supreme
 Court in Riley, an officer who seizes a flip cell phone incident to an arrest may physically
 inspect and secure the phone, which would include an examination of the phone and its case
 for weapons, powering off the phone, and removing its batteries. Such actions would
 inevitably involve physically opening a flip phone, although they would not entail a search
 of its data.31 Thus, physically opening a cell phone would not be an unlawful search under
 Riley.32 And a photograph of a screen saver image in plain view when the phone is
 physically opened – an image that the investigator immediately recognized as the stolen item
 under investigation – would not be subject to suppression.
 30
 One of the cases decided by the Supreme Court in Riley involved a flip phone and
 the parties in that case stipulated that the phone’s external screen was in plain view and
 therefore not subject to the motion to suppress that ultimately reached the Supreme Court.
 Mr. Sinclair attempts to distinguish that case on the basis that it was an exterior screen of that
 phone and asserts that Officer Stevenson viewed the screen saver only by opening the phone.
 However, the record in this case neither confirms nor contradicts the factual basis for Mr.
 Sinclair’s distinction – a factual basis that could have been developed at a pretrial hearing.
 In any event, for reasons stated in the text, we believe that the officer did not conduct an
 unconstitutional search when he physically opened Mr. Sinclair’s flip phone.
 31
 The Court in Robinson clarified that a valid search incident to arrest authorizes the
 police to search evidence found on the arrestee even if it does not relate to the suspected
 criminal conduct. The same concept applies here – the rationale for Riley’s rules is to
 prevent remote wiping and conserve officer safety, but the rules apply regardless of whether
 those concerns exist with a particular cell phone. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
 32
 At the brief hearing that was conducted in the trial court, Mr. Sinclair’s counsel
 appeared to concede that “if the phone is just opened ... that might be permissible.”
 30
 The other two images
 Mr. Sinclair contends that, even if the screen saver image was lawfully obtained as
 evidence in plain view, the officer had no lawful justification for searching the phone’s data
 and viewing the other two images without a warrant. He further argues that the court’s error
 in admitting the other two photographs of the cell phone screen was not harmless.
 Although the particular circumstances of Officer Stevenson’s creation of the other two
 photographs of cell phone images are not entirely clear – due to the lack of an evidentiary
 hearing – they were likely the product of a warrantless navigation through the phone’s photo
 library. Such action is not ordinarily lawful under Riley. Even if that were the case, because
 the second photograph was identical to the screen saver image, any error in admitting that
 duplicate image would be harmless under any standard.33 Whether admission of the third
 photograph depicting a properties screen would be harmless error is a more difficult question.
 An error is harmless only if the “reviewing court, upon its own independent review
 of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
 influenced the verdict.” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). In our
 view, if we were to reach the issue, admission of the third picture was harmless error. Mr.
 Gaines stood face-to-face with the man who stole his car at gunpoint, and less than 24 hours
 33
 See Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 120, 55 A.3d 25 (2012) (quoting Jones v. State,
 310 Md. 569, 588-89, 530 A.2d 743 (1987)) (“Where competent evidence of a matter is
 received, no prejudice is sustained where other objected to evidence of the same matter is
 also received.”).
 31
 later identified Mr. Sinclair as the carjacker with certainty, first at a distance and again from
 only a few feet away. Mr. Sinclair was found in close proximity to the stolen car and, when
 the car was blocked in, attempted to leave the area in another car. In trying to establish an
 alibi, he presented a different story to his probation officer shortly after the crime than he did
 a year later at trial. The State used the photograph images from his cell phone to corroborate
 the other evidence that linked him to the carjacking and the stolen vehicle – i.e., the screen
 saver image, and the duplicate second image, depicted a custom wheel rim and fender
 identical in appearance and color to those of the stolen car. The third photograph, although
 admitted in evidence, was only briefly referenced in the State’s rebuttal argument, apparently
 for the date (“4/30/2010”) that the image was displayed. That added little to the
 prosecution’s proof, as it was undisputed that Mr. Gaines was identified by the victim on that
 date in close proximity to the stolen vehicle.34 We are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt,
 that admission of the image properties screen did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdict.
 III
 Conclusion
 In failing to make his motion to suppress the three photographs of his cell phone
 screen within the time period and with the specificity required by the Maryland Rules, Mr.
 Sinclair waived that motion. If the motion had not been waived and if a pretrial hearing had
 34
 On appeal, Mr. Sinclair argues that the prosecutor used the third image to argue that
 he was trying to sell the wheel rims; while the prosecutor did suggest that Mr. Sinclair
 planned to sell the rims, she did not single out the third image to support that argument.
 32
 established the facts as posited by Mr. Sinclair, the primary evidence obtained from the cell
 phone – the screen saver image that was in plain view upon physical inspection of the phone
 – would be admissible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. The remaining two
 photographs which, under the facts as posited by Mr. Sinclair, were the product of a
 warrantless search of the cell phone’s data, would not be admissible. However, given that
 one of those photos was identical to the first photo and the other was of limited probative
 value and cumulative at best, that error was harmless.
 J UDGMENT OF THE C OURT OF S PECIAL
 A PPEALS AFFIRMED. C OSTS TO BE PAID
 BY PETITIONER.
 33


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 29.5.2017
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 168/30
 2017. március 31-én benyújtott kereset – Printeos kontra Bizottság
 (T-201/17. sz. ügy)
 (2017/C 168/39)
 Az eljárás nyelve: spanyol
 Felek
 Felperes: Printeos SA (Alcalá de Henares, Spanyolország) (képviselők: H. Brokelmann és P. Martínez–Lage Sobredo ügyvéd)
 Alperes: Európai Bizottság
 Kérelmek
 A felperes azt kéri, hogy a Törvényszék:
 —
 kötelezze a Bizottságot az EUMSZ 266. cikk első bekezdése és másodlagosan az EUMSZ 266. cikk második bekezdése, az EUMSZ 268. cikk és az EUMSZ 340. cikk második bekezdése, valamint az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartája 41. cikkének (3) bekezdése alapján az alábbi összegek megfizetésére:
 a)
 4 729 000 euró vonatkozásában, a 2015. március 9. és 2017. február 1-je közötti időszakra számított, az Európai Központi Bank által a refinanszírozási műveleteire alkalmazott kamatlábat két százalékponttal meghaladó mértékű kompenzációs kamatoknak, amelyek 184 592,95 euró összegnek felelnek meg, vagy másodlagosan a Törvényszék által megfelelőnek ítélt kamatlábbal számított kamatoknak megfelelő összegű pénzbeli kártérítés; és
 b)
 az előző pont szerinti kompenzációs kamatok utáni, a 2017. február 1-je és a Bizottság által az előző pontban kért összegnek a jelen kereset helybenhagyása esetén ténylegesen történő kifizetésének az időpontja közötti időszakra számított, az Európai Központi Bank által a refinanszírozási műveleteire alkalmazott kamatlábat három és fél százalékponttal meghaladó mértékű késedelmi kamatoknak, vagy a Törvényszék által megfelelőnek ítélt kamatlábbal számított kamatoknak megfelelő összeg;
 —
 másodlagosan, az EUMSZ 263. cikk szerint semmisítse meg a felperesnek a borítékokról szóló határozat alapján jogalap nélkül megfizetett bírságból a kamatokat nem tartalmazó, csak tőkeösszeg visszafizetéséről szóló, 2017. január 26-i bizottsági határozatot;
 —
 mindenesetre a Bizottságot kötelezze a jelen eljárás költségeinek a viselésére.
 Jogalapok és fontosabb érvek
 A jelen keresetben a felperes elsődlegesen azon kamatok összegének megfelelő pénzbeli kár megtérítését kéri, amelyeket a Bizottságnak kellett volna fizetnie az EUMSZ 101. cikk és az EGT-Megállapodás 53. cikke alkalmazására vonatkozó eljárásban (AT.39780 – Borítékok) 2014. december 10-én hozott C(2014) 9295 végleges bizottsági határozat (borítékokról szóló határozat) alapján a felperes által jogalap nélkül megfizetett bírság visszatérítésekor, amennyiben e határozatot a Törvényszék 2016. december 13-i T-95/15. sz. Printeos S.A. és társai kontra Bizottság ítélete (Printeos ítélet) megsemmisítette. Másodlagosan a felperes a 2017. január 26-i bizottsági határozat megsemmisítését kéri, amely határozatban a fent hivatkozott kamatok megfizetése iránti kérelme elutasításra került.
 1.
 Kártérítési kérelme alátámasztására a felperes úgy érvel, hogy kártérítési kérelme az EUMSZ 266. cikk első bekezdésen alapul, mivel a Bizottság nem hajtotta végre teljes mértékben a Printeos ítéletet, amikor nem fizette meg a vonatkozó kamatokat; vagy másodlagosan az EUMSZ 266. cikk második bekezdésen és az EUMSZ 340. cikk második bekezdésen, valamint az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartája 41. cikkének (3) bekezdésén a borítékokról szóló határozat által okozott károk és a Printeos ítélet nem teljes mértékű végrehajtása vonatkozásában.
 A felperes e tekintetben azt állítja, hogy a Bizottság jogellenes magatartásának nincs jogalapja, mivel a 2017. január 26-i bizottsági határozatban hivatkozott, az Európai Közösségek általános költségvetésére alkalmazandó költségvetési rendeletről szóló 1605/2002/EK, Euratom tanácsi rendelet végrehajtására vonatkozó részletes szabályok megállapításáról szóló, 2002. december 23-i 2342/2002/EK, Euratom bizottsági rendeletet (HL 2002. L 357., 1. o.; magyar nyelvű különkiadás 1. fejezet, 4. kötet, 145. o.) már hatályon kívül helyezték, és mivel az Unió általános költségvetésére alkalmazandó pénzügyi szabályokról szóló 966/2012/EU, Euratom európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet alkalmazási szabályairól szóló, 2012. október 29-i 1268/2012/EU felhatalmazáson alapuló bizottsági rendelet (HL 2012 L 362., 1. o.) ellentétes az EUMSZ 266. és az EUMSZ 340. cikkel és az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartája 41. cikkének (3) bekezdésével és 47. cikkével.
 2.
 A másodlagos, a megsemmisítés iránti kérelme alátámasztására a felperes úgy érvel, hogy a 2017. január 26-i bizottsági határozat jogalapját hatályon kívül helyezték, nem volt alkalmazható, és hogy mindenesetre jogtalannak minősül, és e tekintetben a felperes jogellenességi kifogást is emel.


type: wikipedia

text:
Podlesiec (prononciation : ) est un village polonais de la gmina de Dobiegniew dans le powiat de Strzelce-Drezdenko de la voïvodie de Lubusz dans l'ouest de la Pologne.
 Histoire
 Au cours du deuxième partage de la Pologne en 1793, le village est annexé par le Royaume de Prusse. (voir Évolution territoriale de la Pologne)
 Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, avec la mise en œuvre de la ligne Oder-Neisse, le village retourne à la République populaire de Pologne. La population d'origine allemande est expulsée et remplacée par des polonais.
 De 1975 à 1998, le village appartenait administrativement à la voïvodie de Gorzów.
 Depuis 1999, il appartient administrativement à la voïvodie de Lubusz
 Références
 Village dans la voïvodie de Lubusz
 Powiat de Strzelce-Drezdenko


type: legislation

text:
 18.6.2010
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 152/14
 BESCHLUSS 2010/336/GASP DES RATES
 vom 14. Juni 2010
 zu EU-Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie
 DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION —
 gestützt auf den Vertrag über die Europäische Union, insbesondere auf Artikel 26 Absatz 2 und Artikel 31 Absatz 1,
 in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
 (1)
 Der Europäische Rat hat am 12. Dezember 2003 eine Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie angenommen, in der eine Weltordnung auf der Grundlage eines wirksamen Multilateralismus gefordert wird. In der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie wird anerkannt, dass die Charta der Vereinten Nationen den grundlegenden Rahmen für die internationalen Beziehungen bildet. Es ist ein vorrangiges Ziel der Europäischen Union, die Vereinten Nationen zu stärken und sie mit den zur Erfüllung ihrer Aufgaben und für ein effizientes Handeln erforderlichen Mitteln auszustatten.
 (2)
 Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen hat am 6. Dezember 2006 die Resolution 61/89 mit dem Titel „Auf dem Wege zu einem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel: Aufstellung gemeinsamer internationaler Normen für die Einfuhr, die Ausfuhr und den Transfer von konventionellen Waffen“ angenommen.
 (3)
 Der Rat hat in seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 11. Dezember 2006 die förmliche Aufnahme des Prozesses zur Ausarbeitung eines rechtsverbindlichen internationalen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel begrüßt und mit Befriedigung zur Kenntnis genommen, dass eine deutliche Mehrheit der Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen einschließlich aller Mitgliedstaaten der Union die Resolution 61/89 der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen unterstützt hat. Der Rat bekräftigte erneut, dass die Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten eine aktive Rolle in diesem Prozess übernehmen werden, und hob hervor, wie wichtig die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Staaten und regionalen Organisationen in diesem Prozess ist.
 (4)
 Der Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen hat eine 28 Mitglieder umfassende Gruppe von Regierungssachverständigen (nachstehend „GGE“ genannt) eingesetzt, um die Diskussion über einen möglichen Vertrag über den Waffenhandel fortzusetzen. Die GGE hat während des gesamten Jahres 2008 Sitzungen abgehalten und ist zu dem Schluss gelangt, dass weitere Beratungen erforderlich sind und dass diesbezügliche Anstrengungen Schritt für Schritt und in offener und transparenter Weise im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen unternommen werden sollten. Die GGE appellierte an die Staaten, die dazu in der Lage sind, hilfebedürftigen Staaten auf Ersuchen Unterstützung zu leisten.
 (5)
 Der Rat hat in seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 10. Dezember 2007 die Einsetzung einer GGE der Vereinten Nationen begrüßt und seine feste Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass ein umfassendes, rechtsverbindliches Instrument, das im Einklang mit den bestehenden einschlägigen völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeiten der Staaten steht und gemeinsame internationale Standards für die Ein- und Ausfuhr und den Transfer konventioneller Waffen festlegt, einen bedeutenden Beitrag dazu leisten würde, die unerwünschte und verantwortungslose Verbreitung konventioneller Waffen zu bekämpfen.
 (6)
 Das Institut der Vereinten Nationen für Abrüstungsforschung (UNIDIR) hat diesen Prozess mit einer zweiteiligen Studie unterstützt, die aus zwei eingehenden Analysen der Standpunkte der Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen in Bezug auf die Durchführbarkeit, den Anwendungsbereich und mögliche Parameter eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel bestand. Die im Dezember 2007 und im Januar 2008 vorgelegten Analysen bildeten einen nützlichen Beitrag zur Arbeit der GGE.
 (7)
 Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen hat am 24. Dezember 2008 die Resolution 63/240 mit dem Titel „Auf dem Wege zu einem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel: Aufstellung gemeinsamer internationaler Normen für die Einfuhr, die Ausfuhr und den Transfer von konventionellen Waffen“ angenommen, mit der eine offene Arbeitsgruppe (nachstehend „OAG“ genannt) eingesetzt wurde, um diejenigen Elemente in dem Bericht der GGE weiter zu prüfen, über deren Aufnahme in einen späteren rechtsverbindlichen Vertrag über die Ein- und Ausfuhr sowie den Transfer konventioneller Waffen ein Konsens erzielt werden könnte. Die OAG ist 2009 zweimal zusammengetreten und hat der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen einen Bericht vorgelegt, in dem darauf hingewiesen wird, dass das Problem des unregulierten Handels mit konventionellen Waffen und deren Abzweigung in den illegalen Markt mit internationalen Maßnahmen bewältigt werden muss.
 (8)
 Auf der Grundlage der oben genannten Schlussfolgerungen des Rates hat die Union beschlossen, den Prozess zur Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel zu unterstützen, indem die Debatte auf Staaten, die nicht in der GGE vertreten sind, sowie auf andere Akteure, wie die Zivilgesellschaft und die Wirtschaft, ausgeweitet wird, um so das Verständnis dieser Frage zu vertiefen und zur Arbeit der OAG beizutragen. Zu diesem Zweck hat der Rat am 19. Januar 2009 den Beschluss 2009/42/GASP des Rates (1) zur Unterstützung von EU-Maßnahmen, mit denen im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie in Drittstaaten der Prozess zur Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel gefördert wird, angenommen.
 (9)
 Im Rahmen der Durchführung des Beschlusses 2009/42/GASP hat UNIDIR als Durchführungsstelle des Beschlusses zwischen Februar 2009 und Februar 2010 sechs regionale Seminare, eine Nebenveranstaltung sowie eine Eröffnungs- und eine Abschlussveranstaltung organisiert. Diese Maßnahmen ermöglichten den einschlägigen Interessenvertretern, darunter Vertretern der Zivilgesellschaft, der Wirtschaft und von Ländern, die nicht in der GGE vertreten sind, sich an informellen Gesprächen über einen Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zu beteiligen. Ferner bot die Durchführung des Beschlusses 2009/42/GASP die Möglichkeit, nationale und regionale Konzepte in den laufenden internationalen Prozess zu integrieren und zur Bestimmung des Anwendungsbereichs und der Auswirkungen eines Vertrags über den Handel mit konventionellen Waffen beizutragen.
 (10)
 Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen hat am 2. Dezember 2009 die Resolution 64/48 mit dem Titel „Der Vertrag über den Waffenhandel“ angenommen, mit der beschlossen wurde, die Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zu dem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel für das Jahr 2012 einzuberufen, um eine rechtsverbindliche Übereinkunft über die höchstmöglichen gemeinsamen internationalen Normen für den Transfer konventioneller Waffen auszuarbeiten. Ferner wurde in der Resolution beschlossen, dass die restlichen Tagungen der OAG als Vorbereitungsausschuss für die Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zu betrachten sind.
 (11)
 In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass die Maßnahmen des Beschlusses 2009/42/GASP im Mai 2010 enden und Vorbereitungen für eine erfolgreiche Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zum Vertrag über den Waffenhandel im Jahr 2012 erforderlich sind, und angesichts der in der Resolution 64/48 enthaltenen Empfehlung, eine möglichst breite und wirksame Teilnahme an der Konferenz zu gewährleisten, sollte die Union die Vorbereitungen für die Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen unterstützen, damit sichergestellt wird, dass sie möglichst viele Seiten einschließt und in der Lage ist, konkrete Empfehlungen zu den Elementen eines künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel abzugeben. Die Unterstützung der Union für den Prozess zur Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel sollte auch Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung nationaler Einfuhr- und Ausfuhrkontrollsysteme in Drittländern umfassen, die im Einklang mit einem künftigen Vertrag über den Waffenhandel stehen müssten —
 HAT FOLGENDEN BESCHLUSS ERLASSEN:
 Artikel 1
 (1) Um den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zu unterstützen, trifft die Union Maßnahmen mit den folgenden Zielen:
 —
 Unterstützung der Vorbereitungen für eine Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zum Vertrag über den Waffenhandel, um sicherzustellen, dass sie möglichst viele Seiten einschließt und in der Lage ist, konkrete Empfehlungen zu den Elementen des künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel abzugeben;
 —
 Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen bei der Entwicklung und Verbesserung nationaler und regionaler Sachkompetenz bei der Durchführung wirksamer Kontrollen von Waffentransfers, um zu gewährleisten, dass ein künftiger Vertrag über den Waffenhandel bei seinem Inkrafttreten möglichst wirksam ist.
 (2) Zur Verwirklichung der in Absatz 1 genannten Ziele führt die Union folgendes Projekt durch:
 —
 Ausrichtung von sieben Regionalseminaren, einer Eröffnungsveranstaltung, einer Abschlussveranstaltung und bis zu drei Nebenveranstaltungen und Verbreitung der Ergebnisse.
 Eine ausführliche Beschreibung des oben genannten Projekts ist im Anhang enthalten.
 Artikel 2
 (1) Für die Durchführung dieses Beschlusses ist der Hohe Vertreter der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (nachstehend „Hoher Vertreter“ genannt) zuständig.
 (2) Die Durchführung des in Artikel 1 Absatz 2 genannten Projekts wird durch das Institut der Vereinten Nationen für Abrüstungsforschung (UNIDIR) gewährleistet.
 (3) UNIDIR nimmt diese Aufgabe unter der Verantwortung des Hohen Vertreters wahr. Hierfür trifft der Hohe Vertreter die notwendigen Vereinbarungen mit UNIDIR.
 Artikel 3
 (1) Der finanzielle Bezugsrahmen für die Durchführung des in Artikel 1 Absatz 2 genannten Projekts beträgt 1 520 000 EUR.
 (2) Die mit dem Betrag nach Absatz 1 finanzierten Ausgaben werden entsprechend den für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Union geltenden Verfahren und Vorschriften verwaltet.
 (3) Die Europäische Kommission beaufsichtigt die ordnungsgemäße Verwaltung der in Absatz 1 genannten Ausgaben. Hierfür schließt sie ein Finanzierungsabkommen mit UNIDIR ab. In diesem Abkommen wird festgehalten, dass UNIDIR zu gewährleisten hat, dass dem Beitrag der Union die seinem Umfang entsprechende öffentliche Beachtung zuteil wird.
 (4) Die Kommission bemüht sich, das in Absatz 3 genannte Finanzierungsabkommen so bald wie möglich nach Inkrafttreten dieses Beschlusses zu schließen. Sie unterrichtet den Rat über etwaige diesbezügliche Schwierigkeiten und den Zeitpunkt, zu dem das Finanzierungsabkommen geschlossen wird.
 Artikel 4
 Der Hohe Vertreter unterrichtet den Rat auf der Grundlage regelmäßiger Berichte, die nach der Ausrichtung jedes Regionalseminars, des Eröffnungs- und dem Abschlussseminars sowie der Nebenveranstaltungen erstellt werden, über die Durchführung dieses Beschlusses. Die Berichte werden von UNIDIR erstellt und dienen dem Rat als Grundlage für seine Bewertung. Die Kommission stellt Informationen über die finanziellen Aspekte der Durchführung des in Artikel 1 Absatz 2 genannten Projekts zur Verfügung.
 Artikel 5
 (1) Dieser Beschluss tritt am Tag seiner Annahme in Kraft.
 (2) Seine Geltungsdauer endet 24 Monate nach Abschluss des in Artikel 3 Absatz 3 genannten Finanzierungsabkommens. Sie endet sechs Monate nach dem Inkrafttreten des Beschlusses, falls bis dahin kein Finanzierungsabkommen geschlossen wurde.
 Geschehen zu Luxemburg am 14. Juni 2010.
 Im Namen des Rates
 Die Präsidentin
 C. ASHTON
 (1) ABl. L 17 vom 22.1.2009, S. 39.
 ANHANG
 1. Ziel
 Das Gesamtziel dieses Beschlusses besteht darin, die Vorbereitungen für eine Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zum Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zu unterstützen, um sicherzustellen, dass diese möglichst viele Seiten einschließt und in der Lage ist, konkrete Empfehlungen zu den Elementen des künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel abzugeben; ferner sollen die Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen bei der Entwicklung und Verbesserung nationaler und regionaler Sachkompetenz bei der Durchführung wirksamer Kontrollen von Waffenausfuhren und -transfers unterstützt werden.
 2. Projektbeschreibung
 2.1. Projektziel
 Folgende besonderen Ziele sollen durch das Projekt erreicht werden:
 a)
 Unterstützung der Vorbereitungen für die Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zum Vertrag über den Waffenhandel, u. a. durch folgende Maßnahmen:
 i)
 stärkere Sensibilisierung von Vertretern der Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen, der Zivilgesellschaft und der Wirtschaft und Verbesserung ihres Wissens und Verständnisses in Bezug auf den Prozess zur Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel;
 ii)
 Förderung einer umfassenden, aktiven und wirksamen Teilnahme möglichst vieler Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen an den für 2010-2011 geplanten Tagungen des Vorbereitungsausschusses;
 iii)
 Festlegung und Ausarbeitung konkreter Vorschläge zum Inhalt eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, die im Hinblick auf Anwendungsbereich, Parameter und Auswirkungen höchst umfassend sein sollten;
 iv)
 Eintreten gegenüber Drittstaaten für höchstmögliche Normen für den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel, auch auf der Grundlage von regionalen Erfahrungen und Instrumenten;
 v)
 Unterstützung der Vorbereitung der Konferenz im Jahr 2012, indem die Verhandlungskapazitäten der Teilnehmer gestärkt werden;
 b)
 Unterstützung von Drittländern in ihrem Bemühen, Ausfuhr- und Transferkontrollsysteme je nach Sachlage zu errichten, zu verbessern und anzuwenden, insbesondere durch folgende Maßnahmen:
 i)
 Unterstützung bei der Einführung und Durchsetzung von Genehmigungssystemen;
 ii)
 Unterstützung im Hinblick auf eine bessere Einhaltung und Durchsetzung nationaler Kontrollen zur Durchführung eines künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, einschließlich Grenzkontrollen, und zur Überwachung von Waffenausfuhren und -transfers;
 iii)
 Unterstützung bei der Erstellung nationaler und regionaler Berichte über Waffeneinfuhren und -ausfuhren, um Transparenz und Rechenschaft beim Waffenhandel zu fördern;
 iv)
 Unterstützung für mehr Transparenz und Rechenschaft beim Waffenhandel durch die Beteiligung am Register der Vereinten Nationen für konventionelle Waffen (UN ROCA);
 v)
 Unterstützung einzelstaatlicher Bemühungen um die Kennzeichnung und Rückverfolgung von Kleinwaffen und leichten Waffen.
 2.2. Angestrebte Projektergebnisse
 Die Durchführung des Projekts soll zu folgenden Ergebnissen führen:
 a)
 stärkere Sensibilisierung, höheres Wissen und besseres Verständnis der Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen in Bezug auf den Prozess der Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel;
 b)
 breite und substanziellere Beteiligung von Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen an den für 2010-2011 geplanten Tagungen des Vorbereitungsausschusses, u. a. durch die Formulierung von konkreten Vorschlägen zum Inhalt eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, der einen höchst umfassenden Anwendungsbereich und höchstmögliche Normen aufweisen sollte;
 c)
 stärkere Sensibilisierung von Drittstaaten hinsichtlich der Struktur und der Funktionsweise von Ausfuhrkontrollsystemen für konventionelle Waffen, u. a. durch Unterstützung mit dem Ziel, die Einhaltung und die Durchsetzung nationaler Kontrollen zur Durchführung eines künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, einschließlich Grenzkontrollen, zu verbessern und Waffenausfuhren und -transfers zu überwachen;
 d)
 Verbesserung der Waffenregistrierung und der Buchführung über Waffen, u. a. durch Kennzeichnung und Rückverfolgung, nationale Meldungen an das UN ROCA über und verbesserte nationale Kapazitäten für Ausfuhrkontrollen zwischen den Teilnehmerstaaten.
 2.3. Beschreibung der Maßnahmen
 Im Rahmen des Projekts sind die Durchführung von sieben regionalen Seminaren, einer Eröffnungsveranstaltung, einer Abschlussveranstaltung sowie bis zu drei Nebenveranstaltungen und die Verbreitung der Ergebnisse vorgesehen.
 Die Regionalseminare sind dreitägig und finden an einem noch festzulegenden Ort in den Zielregionen statt.
 2.3.1. Struktur der Regionalseminare
 Die Seminare umfassen folgende Präsentationen und Diskussionen:
 Erster Teil [TAG 1 und TAG 2 (Vormittag)]:
 a)
 allgemeiner Überblick über den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel, Hintergründe, möglicher Geltungsbereich, Parameter usw.;
 b)
 nationale und regionale Standpunkte zu dem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel, einschließlich der Vorstellung des Standpunkts der Union zu dem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel;
 c)
 weitere Aspekte des Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, einschließlich Transparenz und Unterstützungsmaßnahmen;
 d)
 Ausarbeitung von Empfehlungen für die Arbeit der Tagungen des Vorbereitungsausschusses.
 Zweiter Teil [TAG 2 (Nachmittag) und TAG 3]:
 a)
 Vorstellung nationaler und regionaler Systeme zur Kontrolle des Handels mit konventionellen Waffen, einschließlich des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts des Rates 2008/944/GASP vom 8. Dezember 2008 betreffend gemeinsame Regeln für die Kontrolle der Ausfuhr von Militärtechnologie und Militärgütern (1);
 b)
 Aspekte der Einführung und Durchsetzung von Genehmigungssystemen, einschließlich rechtlicher und administrativer Aspekte;
 c)
 Aspekte einer besseren Einhaltung und Durchsetzung nationaler Kontrollen zur Durchführung eines künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel, einschließlich Grenzkontrollen, und zur Überwachung von Waffenausfuhren und -transfers;
 d)
 Aspekte der Waffenregistrierung und Buchführung über Waffen, einschließlich nationaler und regionaler Berichte über Waffenausfuhren und -transfers;
 e)
 Rolle und Funktionsweise des UN ROCA, einschließlich Unterstützung bei der Übermittlung nationaler Berichte an das Register;
 f)
 internationale und nationale Instrumente für die Kennzeichnung und Rückverfolgung von Kleinwaffen und leichten Waffen und Hilfe bei ihrer Umsetzung.
 Die dreitägigen Seminare werden auch Arbeitsgruppensitzungen zu spezifischen Aspekten eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel umfassen.
 2.3.2. Seminarteilnehmer
 Der Teilnehmerkreis der Regionalseminare setzt sich wie folgt zusammen:
 a)
 diplomatisches und/oder militärisches/Verteidigungspersonal aus den Ländern der Regionen, insbesondere von Stellen, die für die nationale Politik in Bezug auf den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zuständig sind, einschließlich nationaler Delegierter, die an dem Vorbereitungsausschuss für den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel teilnehmen;
 b)
 Fach- und Strafverfolgungspersonal aus den Ländern der Regionen, insbesondere von Ausfuhrkontroll- und Zollbehörden, sowie Strafverfolgungsbeamte (zwei Teilnehmer je Land);
 c)
 Vertreter internationaler und regionaler Organisationen, von in den Regionen vertretenen Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs), Reflexionsgruppen und der lokalen/regionalen Wirtschaft;
 d)
 Vertreter von UNIDIR und des Büros der Vereinten Nationen für Abrüstungsfragen (UNODA, Abteilung „konventionelle Waffen“ und Regionalabteilung, gegebenenfalls einschließlich der Regionalzentren),
 e)
 nationale und internationale technische Experten für Aspekte der Ausfuhrkontrolle konventioneller Waffen, einschließlich Experten und Wirtschaftsvertreter der Union.
 Je nach Größe der Regionen werden zu jedem Seminar 45 bis 80 Teilnehmer erwartet. Aus jedem eingeladenen Staat wird am ersten Teil der einzelnen Seminare jeweils ein Diplomat oder Militärangehöriger und am zweiten Teil ein Fachbeamter oder Strafverfolgungsbeamter teilnehmen. Der Hohe Vertreter wird in Absprache mit den zuständigen Ratsgremien auf der Grundlage eines Vorschlags von UNIDIR eine Auswahl der Länder und Teilnehmer treffen, die zu den einzelnen Seminaren eingeladen werden.
 Die Teilnahme von Experten der Union an dem Seminar sollte auf einem im Hinblick auf die technische wie auch die politische Sachkompetenz angemessenen Niveau erfolgen.
 2.3.3. Beiträge: Forschungskomponente
 Um sachkundige, substanzielle und rechtzeitige Beiträge zu dem Prozess der Vereinten Nationen zu gewährleisten, bedarf es einer soliden Forschungskomponente. UNIDIR wird bis zu zwölf Hintergrundstudien bei kompetenten Forschungsinstituten oder einzelnen Experten in Auftrag geben, die sich auf einige für das Projekt und die regionalen Seminare bedeutsame Schlüsselaspekte konzentrieren sollen. UNIDIR wird dem Hohen Vertreter eine engere Auswahl möglicher Forschungsinstitute oder einzelner Experten vorschlagen, die solides Wissen über spezielle Fragen eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel besitzen. Der Hohe Vertreter wird auf der Grundlage dieser Auswahl und in Absprache mit den zuständigen Ratsgremien die am besten geeigneten Institute und Experten auswählen.
 2.3.4. Regionale Verteilung der Seminare
 Die Regionalseminare werden für folgende Ländergruppen veranstaltet:
 a)
 ein Seminar für Nord-, Mittel- und Südamerika einschließlich der Karibik,
 b)
 ein Seminar für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten,
 c)
 ein Seminar für Nord-, West- und Zentralafrika,
 d)
 ein Seminar für Ostafrika und das Südliche Afrika,
 e)
 ein Seminar für Ostasien und den Pazifischen Raum,
 f)
 ein Seminar für Süd- und Zentralasien,
 g)
 ein Seminar für die Region „größeres Europa“.
 Mögliche Veranstaltungsorte für die Seminare sind
 a)
 Buenos Aires oder Rio de Janeiro für Nord-, Mittel- und Südamerika einschließlich der Karibik,
 b)
 Kairo oder Beirut für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten,
 c)
 Rabat oder Accra für Nord-, West- und Zentralafrika,
 d)
 Nairobi oder Johannesburg für Ostafrika und das Südliche Afrika,
 e)
 Jakarta oder Peking für Ostasien und den Pazifischen Raum,
 f)
 New Delhi oder Astana für Süd- und Zentralasien,
 g)
 Moskau oder Belgrad für die Region „größeres Europa“.
 Die endgültigen Veranstaltungsorte werden auf der Grundlage der verfügbaren Unterstützung vor Ort so festgelegt, dass ein Höchstmaß an Ressourcen und ein möglichst kleiner CO2-Fußabdruck erreicht werden. UNIDIR wird begründete Empfehlungen zu den Veranstaltungsorten unterbreiten, die vom Hohen Vertreter in Absprache mit den zuständigen Ratsgremien geprüft und gebilligt werden.
 2.3.5. Eröffnungs- und Abschlussveranstaltung
 Auf einer eintägigen Eröffnungsveranstaltung sollen der internationalen Gemeinschaft die Ziele des Projekts vorgestellt und Beiträge der Zivilgesellschaft, von Forschern und NRO eingeholt werden, um Unterstützung für das Projekt zu sichern. Auf einer eintägigen Abschlussveranstaltung sollen die Ergebnisse des Projekts vorgestellt werden. Die endgültigen Veranstaltungsorte werden nach dem gleichen Verfahren bestimmt, wie es für die Auswahl der Veranstaltungsorte für die Regionalseminare vorgesehen ist. Die Eröffnungsveranstaltung könnte, abhängig vom Datum der Annahme dieses Beschlusses am Rande der Tagung des Vorbereitungsausschusses im Juli 2010 stattfinden.
 2.3.6. Nebenveranstaltungen
 Eine erste Nebenveranstaltung wird am Rande der Tagung des Ersten Ausschusses (65. Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen) im Oktober 2010 mit dem Ziel durchgeführt, die in New York versammelten Interessenvertreter für das Projekt zu sensibilisieren und einige konkrete substanzielle Elemente zu erörtern, die für den Prozess zur Ausarbeitung eines Vertrags über den Waffenhandel von Bedeutung sind.
 Eine zweite Nebenveranstaltung wird im Rahmen der für 2011 geplanten vierten Tagung des Vorbereitungsausschusses für den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel in New York organisiert, um den in New York versammelten Interessenvertretern die bis dahin erreichten Ergebnisse des Projekts vorzustellen.
 Eine dritte Nebenveranstaltung wird am Rande der Tagung des Ersten Ausschusses (66. Tagung der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen) im Oktober 2011 organisiert, um den in New York versammelten Interessenträgern die bis dahin erzielten Ergebnisse des Projekts vorzustellen.
 2.4. Verbreitung der Ergebnisse
 VERÖFFENTLICHUNG VON BERICHTEN
 Zu jedem Seminar und jeder Veranstaltung wird eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Diskussionen, der Empfehlungen und Ideen für einen Vertrag über den Waffenhandel sowie der erörterten technischen Aspekte erstellt. Diese in Englisch abgefassten Seminarberichte werden online und auf elektronischen Datenträgern zugänglich gemacht und verbreitet.
 Ferner wird ein Entwurf des Abschlussberichts mit einer Analyse der zusammenfassenden Berichte über die sieben Regionalseminare und die übrigen Veranstaltungen des Projekts erstellt, zu dem auf dem Abschlussseminar Kommentare abgegeben werden können. Der Abschlussbericht wird anschließend zur Verbreitung online und auf elektronischen Datenträgern zugänglich gemacht. Eine Zusammenfassung des Abschlussberichts wird online und als Papierversion zur Verfügung gestellt.
 3. Laufzeit
 Der Durchführungszeitraum des Projekts beträgt 24 Monate ab dem Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses des in Artikel 3 Absatz 3 genannten Finanzierungsabkommens.
 4. Zielgruppen
 Zielgruppen dieses Projekts sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf den staatlichen Stellen, die für die Festlegung der nationalen Politik in Bezug auf den Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zuständig sind, Ausfuhrkontrollbehörden, Zollbehörden und Strafverfolgungsbeamten, die ihre Sachkompetenz verbessern müssen, um im Rahmen eines künftigen Vertrags über den Waffenhandel für einen verantwortungsvollen Waffenhandel zu sorgen und eine verantwortungslose Verbreitung konventioneller Waffen zu verhindern. Die Auswahl bestimmter Zielstaaten wird auf der Grundlage einer von UNIDIR unterbreiteten engeren Auswahl von Zielgruppen erfolgen, die der Hohe Vertreter in Absprache mit den zuständigen Ratsgremien prüfen und billigen muss.
 5. Durchführungsstelle
 Mit der fachlich-technischen Durchführung dieses Beschlusses wird UNIDIR betraut. UNIDIR nimmt diese Aufgabe unter der Verantwortung des Hohen Vertreters wahr. UNIDIR wird mit dem UNODA und den Mitgliedern des Büros des Vorbereitungsausschusses für die Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zu einem Vertrag über den Waffenhandel zusammenarbeiten.
 Gegebenenfalls arbeitet UNIDIR auch mit Einrichtungen wie regionalen Organisationen, Reflexionsgruppen, NRO und der Wirtschaft zusammen. UNIDIR sorgt dafür, dass dem Beitrag der Union die seinem Umfang entsprechende öffentliche Beachtung zuteil wird.
 (1) ABl. L 335 vom 13.12.2008, S. 99.