text:
Hurricane ('Uragano') è il tredicesimo disco dei Pooh uscito nel 1980.
 I Pooh decidono di cantare in inglese alcuni dei loro pezzi estratti dai Lp che vanno dal 1976 al 1978 avvalendosi di Teddy Randazzo (1935-2003), produttore italo-americano che in precedenza aveva collaborato, tra gli altri, con Frank Sinatra.
 Dal punto di vista musicale, ai brani vengono aggiunti qua e là dei nuovi fraseggi e sonorità decorative (con l'aggiunta, in quasi tutti i brani, dell'orchestra sinfonica). Si tratta spesso di abbellimenti che in genere non verranno ripresi nelle successive esecuzioni dei pezzi. Se musicalmente l'album viene caricato di nuovi elementi, vale il discorso inverso per i testi, che si presentano in genere semplificati e sempre rivisti in chiave di prevedibili canzoni d'amore, tanto che il senso originale di alcuni pezzi (Pierre) viene semplicemente stravolto.
 Dato che in precedenza si era del tutto rinunciato a ripubblicare la versione inglese di Linda, le canzoni finiscono per esser tratte, per la maggior parte, dall'album Rotolando respirando.
 Il disco esce per il mercato internazionale nel 1979; secondo alcune fonti l'Italia non sarebbe stata prevista alcuna uscita della raccolta; altri indicano invece l'Italia come principale mercato obiettivo, fermo restando un certo interesse nei confronti del mercato giapponese; pare comunque che alla fine sia stato proprio quello italiano il mercato di maggiore diffusione per il disco.
 Decisamente concepito per l'estero (Giappone) era il brano Love attack; si tratta di quasi nove minuti ispirati alla disco music che Teddy Randazzo aveva fatto suonare ai Pooh per promuovere il disco sul mercato nipponico. Il pezzo ripete parecchie volte testo e melodia di una stessa, brevissima strofa, intervallato da un assolo di basso, uno di tastiere ed uno di chitarra elettrica, per andare avanti nello stesso modo fino al finale, ottenuto in maniera originale combinando il sintetizzatore agli archi dell'orchestra; il gruppo decide di eliminare la canzone dalla versione italiana disco poiché ritenuta poco adatta al mercato Italiano.
 Tracce
 Hurricane (Facchinetti-Negrini-Randazzo) - 5'19" (Rotolando respirando)
 I dedicate my love to you (Battaglia-Negrini-Randazzo) - 3'58" (In diretta nel vento)
 Flow (Battaglia-Negrini-Randazzo) - 4'34" (Ci penserò domani)
 Fade Away (Facchinetti-Negrini-Randazzo) - 4'31" (Pierre)
 A million miles from nowhere (Facchinetti-Negrini-Randazzo) - 4'20" (La città degli altri)
 Care (Facchinetti-Negrini-Randazzo) - 3'30" (Per una donna)
 Give me only this moment (Facchinetti-Negrini-Randazzo) - 4'31" (Dammi solo un minuto)
 Ready, get up and good morning (Facchinetti-D'Orazio-Randazzo) - 4'17" (Pronto, buongiorno è la sveglia)
 Your Love (Facchinetti-D'Orazio-Randazzo) - 3'21" (Che ne fai di te)
 Formazione
 Roby Facchinetti - voce solista, pianoforte, tastiera
 Dodi Battaglia - voce solista, chitarra
 Stefano D'Orazio - voce, batteria, percussioni
 Red Canzian - voce solista, basso
 Note
 Collegamenti esterni


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 5.7.2008
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 171/3
 Sodba Sodišča (četrti senat) z dne 15. maja 2008 (predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe Consiglio di Stato – Italija) – SECAP SpA (C-147/06) proti Comune di Torino, ob udeležbi: Tecnoimprese Srl, Gambarana Impianti Snc, ICA Srl, Cosmat Srl, Consorzio Ravennate, ARCAS SpA, Regione Piemonte, in Santorso Soc. coop. arl (C-148/06) proti Comune di Torino, ob udeležbi: Bresciani Bruno Srl, Azienda Agricola Tekno Green Srl, Borio Giacomo Srl, Costrade Srl
 (Združeni zadevi C-147/06 in C-148/06) (1)
 (Javna naročila gradenj - Oddaja naročil - Neobičajno nizke ponudbe - Načini izključitve - Naročila za gradnje, ki ne dosegajo praga, ki ga določata direktivi 93/37/EGS in 2004/18/ES - Obveznosti naročnika, ki izhajajo iz temeljnih načel prava Skupnosti)
 (2008/C 171/04)
 Jezik postopka: italijanščina
 Predložitveno sodišče
 Consiglio di Stato
 Stranke v postopku v glavni stvari
 Tožeči stranki: SECAP SpA (C-147/06), Santorso Soc. coop. arl (C-148/06)
 Tožena stranka: Comune di Torino
 Ob udeležbi: Tecnoimprese Srl, Gambarana Impianti Snc, ICA Srl, Cosmat Srl, Consorzio Ravennate, ARCAS SpA, Regione Piemonte, in Santorso Soc. coop. arl (C-147/06), Bresciani Bruno Srl, Azienda Agricola Tekno Green Srl, Borio Giacomo Srl, Costrade Srl (C-148/06)
 Predmet
 Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe – Consiglio di Stato – Razlaga člena 30(4) Direktive Sveta 93/37/EGS z dne 14. junija 1993 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil za gradnje (UL L 199, str. 54) in člena 55(1) in (2) Direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2004/18/EGS z dne 31. marca o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev (UL L 134, str. 114) – Neobičajno nizke ponudbe – Obseg obveznosti izvedbe postopka kontradiktornega preizkusa.
 Izrek
 Temeljna pravila Pogodbe ES o pravici do ustanavljanja in prostega pretoka storitev kot tudi splošno načelo nediskriminacije nasprotujejo nacionalni ureditvi, ki – kar zadeva razpise, katerih vrednost je manjša od praga, določenega v členu 6(1)(a) Direktive Sveta 93/37/EGS z dne 14. junija 1993 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil za gradnje, kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 97/52/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. oktobra 1997, in ki imajo določen čezmejni interes – obvezuje naročnike, kadar je veljavnih ponudb več kot pet, naj skladno z matematičnim merilom, ki ga predvideva ta ureditev, samodejno izključijo ponudbe, ki se štejejo za neobičajno nizke glede na gradnje, ne da bi omenjenim naročnikom dajala kakršno koli možnost preveriti sestavne dele teh ponudb, ob tem ko bi se od ponudnikov zahtevale podrobnosti glede ponudbe. To ne bi veljalo, če nacionalna ali lokalna ureditev ali celo sam zadevni naročnik zaradi prevelikega števila ponudb, glede na to, da bi se zaradi obveze naročnika, naj kontradiktorno preveri nekatere od teh množičnih ponudb, preseglo upravne zmožnosti omenjenega naročnika ali bi bila lahko zaradi zamude, ki bi jo povzročilo to preverjanje, v nevarnosti uresničitev projekta, določi razumen prag, pod vrednostjo katerega bi se uporabila samodejna izključitev neobičajno nizkih ponudb.
 (1) UL C 143, 17.6.2006.
 UL C 154, 1.7.2006.


text:
 30.4.2011
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 130/15
 Acțiune introdusă la 16 februarie 2011 — Apollo Tyres/OAPI — Endurance Technologies (ENDURACE)
 (Cauza T-109/11)
 2011/C 130/28
 Limba în care a fost formulată acțiunea: engleza
 Părțile
 Reclamantă: Apollo Tyres AG (Baden, Elveția) (reprezentant: S. Szilvasi, lawyer)
 Pârât: Oficiul pentru Armonizare în cadrul Pieței Interne (mărci, desene și modele industriale)
 Cealaltă parte în procedura care s-a aflat pe rolul camerei de recurs: Endurance Technologies Pvt Ltd (Aurangabad, India)
 Concluziile reclamantei
 —
 Anularea deciziei Camerei întâi de recurs a Oficiului pentru Armonizare în cadrul Pieței Interne (mărci, desene și modele industriale) din 25 noiembrie 2010 în cauza R 625/2010-1;
 —
 obligarea celeilalte părți în procedura care s-a aflat pe rolul camerei de recurs la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 Motivele și principalele argumente
 Solicitantul mărcii comunitare: reclamanta.
 Marca comunitară vizată: marca verbală „ENDURACE” pentru produse din clasa 12 și servicii din clasele 35 și 37 — cerere de înregistrare a mărcii comunitare nr. 6419824.
 Titularul mărcii sau al semnului invocat în sprijinul opoziției: cealaltă parte în procedura care s-a aflat pe rolul camerei de recurs.
 Marca sau semnul invocat în sprijinul opoziției: înregistrarea mărcii comunitare nr. 5819149 a mărcii figurative „ENDURANCE”și a desenului în culori pentru produse din clasa 12.
 Decizia diviziei de opoziție: respinge în parte cererea de înregistrare a mărcii comunitare.
 Decizia camerei de recurs: respinge acțiunea, admite în parte cererea de opoziție introdusă în temeiul articolului 8 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 216/96 (1) și, în consecință, respinge în parte cererea de înregistrare a mărcii comunitare.
 Motivele invocate: încălcarea articolului 8 alineatul (1) litera (b) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 207/2009 al Consiliului, în măsura în care camera de recurs a concluzionat, în mod eronat, că există un risc de confuzie.
 (1) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 216/96 al Comisiei din 5 februarie 1996 de stabilire a regulamentului de procedură al camerelor de recurs ale Oficiului pentru Armonizare în cadrul Pieței Interne (mărci și desene și modele industriale), modificat prin Regulamentul (CE) nr. 2082/2004 din 6 decembrie 2004.


text:
 28.4.2007
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 C 96/39
 Rozsudek Soudu pro veřejnou službu (třetího senátu) ze dne 29. března 2007 – Cwik v. Komise
 (Věc F-31/05) (1)
 (Úředníci - Hodnocení - Posudek o vývoji služebního postupu - Hodnotící období 2003 - Žaloba na neplatnost - Námitka protiprávnosti - Zjevně nesprávné posouzení)
 (2007/C 96/80)
 Jednací jazyk: francouzština
 Účastníci řízení
 Žalobce: Michael Cwik (Tervuren, Belgie) (zástupce: N. Lhoëst, advokát)
 Žalovaná: Komise Evropských společenství (zástupci: L. Lozano Palacios a J. Currall, zmocněnci)
 Předmět věci
 Žalobce navrhuje jednak zrušení posudku o vývoji služebního postupu vypracovaného za období od 1. ledna do 31. prosince 2003 a, v případě potřeby, rozhodnutí ze dne 24. ledna 2005, jímž se zamítá jeho stížnost, kterou napadl posudek o vývoji služebního postupu 2003, a jednak navrhuje, aby Komisi byla uložena povinnost zaplatit částku jedno euro jako symbolickou náhradu škody.
 Výrok rozsudku
 1)
 Žaloba se zamítá.
 2)
 Každý z účastníků řízení ponese vlastní náklady řízení.
 (1) Úř. věst. C 193, 6.8.2005 (věc původně zapsaná u Soudu prvního stupně Evropských společenství pod číslem T-200/05 a předaná Soudu pro veřejnou službu Evropské unie usnesením ze dne 15.12.2005).


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' AUDIT OF\n COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS\n GOVERNING COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM\nACTIVITIES AT THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE\n DEPARTMENT\xe2\x80\x99S FORENSIC LABORATORY\n LAS VEGAS, NEVADA\n\n U.S. Department of Justice\n Office of the Inspector General\n Audit Division\n\n Audit Report GR-90-12-002\n July 2012\n\x0c AUDIT OF\n COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS\n GOVERNING COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM\n ACTIVITIES AT THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE\n DEPARTMENT\xe2\x80\x99S FORENSIC LABORATORY\n LAS VEGAS, NEVADA\n\n EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Audit\nDivision, has completed an audit of compliance with standards governing\nCombined DNA Index System (CODIS) activities at the Las Vegas\nMetropolitan Police Department\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic Laboratory (LVMPD Laboratory) in\nLas Vegas, Nevada.\n\nBackground\n\n The Federal Bureau of Investigation\xe2\x80\x99s (FBI) CODIS program combines\nforensic science and computer technology to provide an investigative tool to\nfederal, state, and local crime laboratories in the United States, as well as\nthose from select international law enforcement agencies. The CODIS\nprogram allows these crime laboratories to compare and match DNA profiles\nelectronically to assist law enforcement in solving crimes and identifying\nmissing or unidentified persons. 1 The FBI\xe2\x80\x99s CODIS Unit manages CODIS, as\nwell as develops, supports, and provides the program to crime laboratories\nto foster the exchange and comparison of forensic DNA evidence.\n\n The FBI implemented CODIS as a distributed database with\nhierarchical levels that enables federal, state, and local crime laboratories to\ncompare DNA profiles electronically. The hierarchy consists of three distinct\nlevels that flow upward from the local level to the state level and then, if\nallowable, the national level. The National DNA Index System (NDIS), the\nhighest level in the hierarchy, contains DNA profiles uploaded by law\nenforcement agencies across the United States and is managed by the FBI.\nNDIS enables the laboratories participating in the CODIS program to\nelectronically compare DNA profiles on a national level. The State DNA\nIndex System is used at the state level to serve as a state\xe2\x80\x99s DNA database\n\n\n 1\n DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is genetic material found in almost all living cells\nthat contains encoded information necessary for building and maintaining life.\nApproximately 99.9 percent of human DNA is the same for all people. The differences found\nin the remaining 0.1 percent allow scientists to develop a unique set of DNA identification\ncharacteristics (a DNA profile) for an individual by analyzing a specimen containing DNA.\n\x0cand contains DNA profiles from local laboratories and state offenders. The\nLocal DNA Index System is used by local laboratories.\n\nOIG Audit Objectives\n\n Our audit generally covered the period from September 2009 through\nAugust 2011. The objectives of our audit were to determine if the:\n(1) LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the NDIS participation\nrequirements; (2) LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the Quality\nAssurance Standards (QAS) issued by the FBI; and (3) LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\nforensic DNA profiles in CODIS databases were complete, accurate, and\nallowable for inclusion in NDIS.\n\n Our review determined the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the NDIS\n participation requirements we tested, including: (1) current NDIS\n eligibility training for LVMPD Laboratory personnel; (2) availability\n and accessibility of NDIS procedures for CODIS users; and\n (3) adequate security for CODIS equipment that was located in a\n controlled laboratory space.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the QAS we\n reviewed, including: (1) completion of periodic internal and\n external QAS reviews; (2) implementation of corrective actions\n presented by internal and external reviews; and (3) had procedures\n in place to help ensure that access to the Laboratory was controlled\n and limited to authorized personnel. Finally, at the time of our\n audit, we found the LVMPD Laboratory did not outsource the\n analysis of its forensic DNA samples to another laboratory.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 We reviewed 100 of the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s 2,650 forensic profiles\n that have been uploaded to NDIS as of August 26, 2011. Of the\n 100 forensic profiles sampled, we found that 91 profiles were\n complete, accurate, and allowable. However, we also found\n seven profiles that were unallowable and two more profiles were\n deemed inappropriate for inclusion in NDIS. Specifically, we\n identified the following unallowable profiles: (1) one profile that\n matched the victim\xe2\x80\x99s DNA profile, (2) three profiles that were\n obtained from the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s person or residence, (3) one profile\n uploaded that was not attributable to a putative perpetrator, and\n (4) two profiles that pertained to an item that was not connected to\n a crime. Another profile was deemed inappropriate for inclusion in\n NDIS because the laboratory had not yet attempted to gain an\n\n\n - ii -\n\x0c elimination standard to rule out the victim. The LVMPD agreed and\n removed this profile. Finally, the LVMPD removed one more profile\n deemed inappropriate because it was based on a mixture containing\n DNA from several individuals with no major contributor. In addition\n to these nine profiles, the LVMPD Laboratory removed another\n two profiles from NDIS that were not part of our sample, but were\n associated with the sample profiles tested. In total, the LVMPD\n removed 11 profiles from NDIS as a result of our review.\n\n The results of our audit are discussed in detail in the Findings section\nof the report. Our audit objectives, scope, and methodology are detailed in\nAppendix I of the report and the audit criteria are detailed in Appendix II.\n\n We discussed the results of our audit with LVMPD Laboratory officials\nand have included their comments in the report as applicable. In addition,\nwe requested from the LVMPD Laboratory and the FBI written responses to a\ndraft copy of our audit report. We received those responses and they are\nfound in Appendices III and IV, respectively. Based on our report that\ncontained no recommendations and the responses that we received, we\nissue this final report closed.\n\n\n\n\n - iii -\n\x0c TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nINTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1\n Background ................................................................................. 1\n OIG Audit Objectives .................................................................... 1\n Legal Foundation for CODIS .......................................................... 2\n CODIS Structure .......................................................................... 2\n Laboratory Information ................................................................. 6\n\nFINDINGS ......................................................................................... 7\nI. Compliance with NDIS Participation Requirements ............................ 7\n Results of the OIG Audit ........................................................... 7\n Conclusion .............................................................................. 9\nII. Compliance with Quality Assurance Standards ............................... 10\n Results of the OIG Audit ......................................................... 10\n Conclusion ............................................................................ 13\nIII. Suitability of Forensic DNA Profiles in CODIS Databases .................. 14\n Results of the OIG Audit ......................................................... 15\n Conclusion ............................................................................ 17\n\nAPPENDICES:\n\nI. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ............................. 18\nII. AUDIT CRITERIA .................................................................... 21\nIII. AUDITEE RESPONSE ............................................................... 25\nIV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RESPONSE..................................... 26\n\x0c AUDIT OF\n COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS\n GOVERNING COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM\n ACTIVITIES AT THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE\n DEPARTMENT\xe2\x80\x99S FORENSIC LABORATORY\n LAS VEGAS, NEVADA\n\n INTRODUCTION\n\n The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Audit\nDivision, has completed an audit of compliance with standards governing\nCombined DNA Index System (CODIS) activities at the Las Vegas\nMetropolitan Police Department\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic Laboratory (LVMPD Laboratory) in\nLas Vegas, Nevada.\n\nBackground\n\n The Federal Bureau of Investigation\xe2\x80\x99s (FBI) CODIS provides an\ninvestigative tool to federal, state, and local crime laboratories in the United\nStates using forensic science and computer technology. The CODIS program\nallows these laboratories to compare and match DNA profiles electronically,\nthereby assisting law enforcement in solving crimes and identifying missing\nor unidentified persons. 1 The FBI\xe2\x80\x99s CODIS Unit manages CODIS and is\nresponsible for its use in fostering the exchange and comparison of forensic\nDNA evidence.\n\nOIG Audit Objectives\n\n Our audit covered the period from September 2009 through August\n2011. The objectives of our audit were to determine if the: (1) LVMPD\nLaboratory was in compliance with the National DNA Index System (NDIS)\nparticipation requirements; (2) LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with\nthe Quality Assurance Standards (QAS) issued by the FBI; and (3) LVMPD\nLaboratory\xe2\x80\x99s forensic DNA profiles in CODIS databases were complete,\naccurate, and allowable for inclusion in NDIS. Appendix I contains a detailed\ndescription of our audit objectives, scope, and methodology; and\nAppendix II contains the criteria used to conduct the audit.\n\n\n 1\n DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is genetic material found in almost all living cells\nthat contains encoded information necessary for building and maintaining life.\nApproximately 99.9 percent of human DNA is the same for all people. The differences found\nin the remaining 0.1 percent allow scientists to develop a unique set of DNA identification\ncharacteristics (a DNA profile) for an individual by analyzing a specimen containing DNA.\n\x0cLegal Foundation for CODIS\n\n The FBI\xe2\x80\x99s CODIS program began as a pilot project in 1990. The DNA\nIdentification Act of 1994 (Act) authorized the FBI to establish a national\nindex of DNA profiles for law enforcement purposes. The Act, along with\nsubsequent amendments, has been codified in a federal statute (Statute)\nproviding the legal authority to establish and maintain NDIS. 2\n\nAllowable DNA Profiles\n\n The Statute authorizes NDIS to contain the DNA identification records\nof persons convicted of crimes, persons who have been charged in an\nindictment or information with a crime, and other persons whose DNA\nsamples are collected under applicable legal authorities. Samples voluntarily\nsubmitted solely for elimination purposes are not authorized for inclusion in\nNDIS. The Statute also authorizes NDIS to include analysis of DNA samples\nrecovered from crime scenes or from unidentified human remains, as well as\nthose voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons.\n\nAllowable Disclosure of DNA Profiles\n\n The Statute requires that NDIS only include DNA information that is\nbased on analyses performed by or on behalf of a criminal justice agency \xe2\x80\x93\nor the U.S. Department of Defense \xe2\x80\x93 in accordance with QAS issued by the\nFBI. The DNA information in the index is authorized to be disclosed only:\n(1) to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes;\n(2) in judicial proceedings, if otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable\nstatutes or rules; (3) for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant who shall\nhave access to samples and analyses performed in connection with the case\nin which the defendant is charged; or (4) if personally identifiable\ninformation (PII) is removed for a population statistics database, for\nidentification research and protocol development purposes, or for quality\ncontrol purposes.\n\nCODIS Structure\n\n The FBI implemented CODIS as a distributed database with\nhierarchical levels that enables federal, state, and local crime laboratories to\ncompare DNA profiles electronically. CODIS consists of a hierarchy of three\ndistinct levels: (1) NDIS, managed by the FBI as the nation\xe2\x80\x99s DNA database\ncontaining DNA profiles uploaded by participating states; (2) the State DNA\nIndex System (SDIS) which serves as a state\xe2\x80\x99s DNA database containing\nDNA profiles from local laboratories within the state and state offenders; and\n\n 2\n 42 U.S.C.A. \xc2\xa7 14132 (2006).\n -2-\n\x0c(3) the Local DNA Index System (LDIS), used by local laboratories. DNA\nprofiles originate at the local level and then flow upward to the state and, if\nallowable, national level. For example, the local laboratory in the Palm\nBeach County, Florida, Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Office sends its profiles to the state\nlaboratory in Tallahassee, which then uploads the profiles to NDIS. Each\nstate participating in CODIS has one designated SDIS laboratory. The SDIS\nlaboratory maintains its own database and is responsible for overseeing\nNDIS issues for all CODIS-participating laboratories within the state. The\ngraphic below illustrates how the system hierarchy works.\n\n Example of System Hierarchy within CODIS\n\n NDIS\n Maintained by the FBI\n\n\n\n\nSDIS SDIS SDIS\nLaboratory Laboratory Laboratory\nRichmond, CA Springfield, IL Tallahassee, FL\n\n\n\n LDIS Laboratories (partial list):\n DuPage County Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Office\n Illinois State Police, Chicago\n Illinois State Police, Rockford\n\n LDIS Laboratories (partial list): LDIS Laboratories (partial list):\n Orange County Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Department Broward County Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Office\n San Bernardino County Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Department Miami-Dade Police Department\n San Diego Police Department Palm Beach County Sheriff\xe2\x80\x99s Office\n\n\n\n\nNational DNA Index System\n\n NDIS, the highest level in the CODIS hierarchy, enables laboratories\nparticipating in the CODIS program to electronically compare DNA profiles on\na national level. NDIS does not contain names or other PII about the\nprofiles. Therefore, matches are resolved through a system of laboratory-\nto-laboratory contacts. NDIS contains the following eight searchable\nindices:\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Convicted Offender Index contains profiles generated from persons\n convicted of qualifying offenses. 3\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Arrestee Index is comprised of profiles developed from persons who\n have been arrested, indicted, or charged in an information with a\n crime.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Legal Index consists of profiles that are produced from DNA\n samples collected from persons under other applicable legal\n authorities. 4\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Detainee Index contains profiles from non-U.S. persons detained\n under the authority of the U.S. and required by law to provide a\n DNA sample for analysis and entry into NDIS.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Forensic Index profiles originate from, and are associated with,\n evidence found at crime scenes.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Missing Person Index contains known DNA profiles of missing\n persons and deduced missing persons.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Unidentified Human (Remains) Index holds profiles from\n unidentified living individuals and the remains of unidentified\n deceased individuals. 5\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Relatives of Missing Person Index is comprised of DNA profiles\n generated from the biological relatives of individuals reported\n missing.\n\n Given these multiple databases, the main functions of CODIS are to:\n(1) generate investigative leads that may help in solving crimes, and\n(2) identify missing and unidentified persons.\n\n The Forensic Index generates investigative leads in CODIS that may\nhelp solve crimes. Investigative leads may be generated through matches\nbetween the Forensic Index and other indices in the system, including the\nConvicted Offender, Arrestee, and Legal Indices. These matches may\n\n 3\n The phrase \xe2\x80\x9cqualifying offenses\xe2\x80\x9d refers to local, state, or federal crimes that\nrequire a person to provide a DNA sample in accordance with applicable laws.\n\n 4\n An example of a Legal Index profile is one from a person found not guilty by\nreason of insanity who is required by the relevant state law to provide a DNA sample.\n\n 5\n An example of an Unidentified Human (Remains) Index profile from a living person\nis a profile from a child or other individual, who cannot or refuses to identify themselves.\n -4-\n\x0cprovide investigators with the identity of suspected perpetrators. CODIS\nalso links crime scenes through matches between Forensic Index profiles,\npotentially identifying serial offenders.\n\n In addition to generating investigative leads, CODIS furthers the\nobjectives of the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s National Missing Person DNA Database program\nthrough its ability to identify missing and unidentified individuals. For\ninstance, those persons may be identified through matches between the\nprofiles in the Missing Person Index and the Unidentified Human (Remains)\nIndex. In addition, the profiles within the Missing Person and Unidentified\nHuman (Remains) Indices may be vetted against the Forensic, Convicted\nOffender, Arrestee, Detainee, and Legal Indices to provide investigators with\nleads in solving missing and unidentified person cases.\n\nState and Local DNA Index Systems\n\n The FBI provides CODIS software free of charge to any state or local\nlaw enforcement laboratory performing DNA analysis. Laboratories are able\nto use the CODIS software to upload profiles to NDIS. However, before a\nlaboratory is allowed to participate at the national level and upload DNA\nprofiles to NDIS, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) must be signed\nbetween the FBI and the applicable state\xe2\x80\x99s SDIS laboratory. The MOU\ndefines the responsibilities of each party, includes a sublicense for the use of\nCODIS software, and delineates the standards laboratories must meet in\norder to utilize NDIS. Although officials from LDIS laboratories do not sign\nan MOU, LDIS laboratories that upload DNA profiles to an SDIS laboratory\nare required to adhere to the MOU signed by the SDIS laboratory.\n\n States are authorized to upload DNA profiles to NDIS based on local,\nstate, and federal laws, as well as NDIS regulations. However, states or\nlocalities may maintain NDIS-restricted profiles in SDIS or LDIS. For\ninstance, a local law may allow for the collection and maintenance of a\nvictim profile at LDIS but NDIS regulations do not authorize the upload of\nthat profile to the national level.\n\n CODIS becomes more useful as the quantity of DNA profiles in the\nsystem increases because the potential for additional leads rises. However,\nthe utility of CODIS relies upon the completeness, accuracy, and quantity of\nprofiles that laboratories upload to the system. Incomplete CODIS profiles\nare those for which the required number of core loci were not tested or do\nnot contain all of the DNA information that resulted from a DNA analysis and\nmay not be searched at NDIS. 6 The probability of a false match among DNA\nprofiles is reduced as the completeness of a profile increases.\n\n 6\n A \xe2\x80\x9cloci\xe2\x80\x9d is a specific location on a chromosome. The plural form of locus is loci.\n -5-\n\x0cInaccurate profiles, which contain incorrect DNA information or an incorrect\nspecimen number, may generate false positive leads, false negative\ncomparisons, or lead to the misidentification of a sample. Further, laws and\nregulations exclude certain types of profiles from being uploaded to CODIS\nto prevent violations to an individual\xe2\x80\x99s privacy and foster the public\xe2\x80\x99s\nconfidence in CODIS. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the LVMPD\nLaboratory to ensure that it is adhering to the NDIS participation\nrequirements and the profiles uploaded to CODIS are complete, accurate,\nand allowable for inclusion in NDIS.\n\nLaboratory Information\n\n According to Laboratory officials, the LVMPD Laboratory annually\nserves more than 30 different law enforcement agencies located throughout\nSouthern Nevada. In total, the LVMPD Laboratory serves a population size\nof 1.9 million people in Clark County, Nevada, another half a million people\nfrom neighboring counties (made up of Nye, Lincoln, and Esmeralda), and\nup to 3 million tourists who visit Las Vegas each month. The LVMPD\nLaboratory participates in the CODIS program as a LDIS laboratory. In\naddition to maintaining a Forensic database, the LVMPD Laboratory also\nmaintains a Convicted Offender database. The LVMPD Laboratory began\nanalyzing DNA in 1997, and began processing evidence in criminal cases and\nuploading forensic profiles into NDIS in 2001.\n\n The LVMPD Laboratory was last accredited for 5 years by the American\nSociety of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board\n(ASCLD/LAB) in July 2008. Thus, the LVMPD Laboratory is up for renewal in\nJune 2013.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\x0c FINDINGS\n\n I. Compliance with NDIS Participation Requirements\n\n The LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with NDIS\n participation requirements regarding updated NDIS\n eligibility training for its personnel, maintenance of\n CODIS-related training and proficiency- testing\n records for CODIS users, timeliness of NDIS\n matches, backing up the CODIS server in accordance\n with NDIS requirements, and timely submission of\n external audits to the FBI.\n\n The NDIS participation requirements, which consist of the MOU and\nthe NDIS Procedure Manual, establish the responsibilities and obligations of\nlaboratories that participate in the CODIS program at the national level. The\nMOU describes the CODIS-related responsibilities of both the LVMPD\nLaboratory and the FBI. The NDIS Procedure Manual is comprised of the\nNDIS operational procedures and provides detailed instructions for\nlaboratories to follow when performing certain procedures pertinent to NDIS.\nThe NDIS participation requirements we reviewed are listed in Appendix II of\nthis report.\n\nResults of the OIG Audit\n\n We found that the LVMPD Laboratory complied with the NDIS\nparticipation requirements we reviewed. Specifically, we found that the\nLVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with NDIS participation requirements\nregarding updated NDIS eligibility training for its personnel, maintenance of\nCODIS-related training and proficiency-testing records for CODIS users,\ntimeliness of NDIS matches, backing up its CODIS server in accordance with\nNDIS requirements, and timely submission of external audits to the FBI.\nThese results are described in more detail below.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The NDIS General Responsibilities Operational Procedures manual\n in effect during our audit required that participating laboratories\n ensure that CODIS users are notified of and provided access to\n revised NDIS Operational Procedures and other documentation\n necessary to properly participate in NDIS. All LVMPD Laboratory\n forensic personnel have access to the manual on the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s Criminal\n Justice Information System\xe2\x80\x94Wide Area Network (CJIS-WAN). In\n addition, the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s CODIS Administrator stated that\n she also keeps a copy of the NDIS procedure manual on her desk\n where it is available to be perused by her staff. We selected 2 of\n\n -7-\n\x0c the 10 CODIS users to interview and determined that both users\n were aware of the NDIS procedures and could access the\n procedures on the CJIS-WAN.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s CODIS users are required to complete annual\n DNA Records Acceptance training. The FBI provided a list of LVMPD\n Laboratory personnel who had received this mandatory annual\n training, which we compared to a similar list provided by the LVMPD\n Laboratory. We found that all authorized personnel on the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s list\n have successfully completed the annual training in 2011.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 For each CODIS user, the FBI requires that a participating\n laboratory submit fingerprint cards, background information, CODIS\n user information, and other appropriate documentation to the FBI.\n We verified that all necessary documents were provided to the FBI\n for all 10 LVMPD Laboratory CODIS users.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 At the time of our audit, the NDIS General Responsibilities\n Operational Procedures manual required participating laboratories\n to maintain records of CODIS users, including reports concerning\n proficiency testing, and any other reports or audits required by the\n FBI. The LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s policy requires that for its CODIS\n users personnel files are to be maintained for 30 years after the\n employee has left the Laboratory and training files are to be\n maintained for 5 years after the employee has left the Laboratory,\n this local policy was in compliance with the NDIS Operational\n Procedures.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The NDIS Interstate Candidate Match Operational Procedures\n provides guidance for participating laboratories to follow when\n confirming matches that are identified in the CODIS system. We\n reviewed a sample of five NDIS matches and determined:\n\n o The LVMPD Laboratory sent confirmation requests in a timely\n manner for all five matches;\n\n o Confirmation generally took place within 30 days after the\n originating laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s request was sent out for four of the five\n matches. For the one late match confirmation, the process took\n 115 days because another laboratory did not confirm the match\n request submitted by the LVMPD Laboratory in a timely\n manner; and\n\n o The LVMPD Laboratory notified investigators of match\n confirmation within 2 weeks for all five matches.\n -8-\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 The NDIS Security Requirements state the CODIS server shall be\n electronically safeguarded from unauthorized use and be only\n accessible to a limited number of approved personnel. We found\n that only CODIS users within the LVMPD Laboratory had access to\n CODIS. Access to the CODIS database is further limited, as only\n authorized personnel had access to the locked room that contained\n the CODIS terminals and server. We were informed that all LVMPD\n CODIS users had their own CODIS accounts, unique passwords, and\n must undergo annual CODIS training. Moreover, the LVMPD\n Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s in-house policy limited access to the CODIS database\n to CODIS users only, required daily backups of its CODIS server,\n and required that the backed up material be transferred off-site on\n a monthly basis.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The NDIS Security Requirements state that only authorized\n personnel shall have physical access to the CODIS server, and that\n locating a CODIS terminal and server in a common data center may\n be permitted as long as the data center is located within the\n criminal justice agency and has physical security. The CODIS\n server was stored in a room in the forensic laboratory behind\n cipher-locked doors. Access to CODIS terminals and the server was\n currently limited to CODIS users. We observed the location and\n accessibility of the CODIS server and found it to be in compliance\n with NDIS Security Requirements.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The NDIS operational procedure entitled External Audit Review\n Procedures requires that an external quality assurance review be\n forwarded to the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s NDIS Custodian within 30 days of the\n participating laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s receipt of the report. We reviewed the\n submission of the most recent external review and found that the\n report was submitted to the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s NDIS Custodian within 30 days.\n\nConclusion\n\n We found that the LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with NDIS\nparticipation requirements regarding updated NDIS eligibility training for\nLVMPD Laboratory personnel, maintenance of training and proficiency-\ntesting records for CODIS users, timeliness of NDIS matches, creating\nbackups of its CODIS server on a daily basis and transferring the backed up\nmaterial off-site on a monthly basis, and timely submitted external audits to\nthe FBI. Based on our review, we made no recommendations concerning the\nLVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s compliance with the NDIS participation requirements.\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\x0c II. Compliance with Quality Assurance Standards\n\n We found that the LVMPD Laboratory complied with\n the Quality Assurance Standards (QAS) issued by the\n FBI. Specifically, we found that the LVMPD\n Laboratory: (1) followed protocols with regard to\n amplified samples being maintained in separate\n rooms from the evidence examination, DNA\n extraction, and PCR setup areas, (2) underwent\n Quality Assurance Standard reviews within\n designated timeframes, and (3) had procedures in\n place to help ensure that access to the Laboratory\n was controlled and limited to authorized personnel.\n\n During our audit, we considered the Forensic QAS issued by the FBI. 7\nThese standards describe the quality assurance requirements that the\nLVMPD Laboratory must follow to ensure the quality and integrity of the data\nit produces. We also assessed the two most recent QAS reviews that the\nLVMPD Laboratory underwent. 8 The QAS we reviewed are listed in\nAppendix II.\n\nResults of the OIG Audit\n\n We found that the LVMPD Laboratory complied with the QAS issued by\nthe FBI. Specifically, we found that the LVMPD Laboratory: (1) followed\nprotocols with regard to amplified samples being maintained in separate\nrooms from the evidence examination, DNA extraction, and PCR setup\nareas; (2) underwent QAS reviews within designated timeframes; and\n(3) had procedures in place to help ensure that access to the Laboratory was\ncontrolled and limited to authorized personnel. These results are described\nin more detail below.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The QAS requires amplified DNA to be maintained at separate times\n or in separate spaces from the evidence examination, DNA\n\n 7\n Quality Assurance Standards refer to the Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic\nDNA Testing Laboratories and DNA Databasing Laboratories, effective July 1, 2009.\n 8\n The QAS require that laboratories undergo annual audits. Every other year, the\nQAS requires that the audit be performed by an external agency that performs DNA\nidentification analysis and is independent of the laboratory being reviewed. These audits\nare not required by the QAS to be performed in accordance with the Government Auditing\nStandards (GAS) and are not performed by the Department of Justice Office of the\nInspector General. Therefore, we will refer to the QAS audits as reviews (either an internal\nlaboratory review or an external laboratory review, as applicable) to avoid confusion with\nour audits that are conducted in accordance with GAS.\n - 10 -\n\x0c extraction, and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) setup processes.\n We observed that the LVMPD Laboratory had separate rooms for\n DNA examination and extraction, PCR setup, and DNA amplification.\n Known and unknown samples were separated by time and space\n during the PCR setup and all evidence flowed one-way to avoid\n amplified DNA from being introduced into Pre-PCR areas of the\n laboratory. When we visited the LVMPD Laboratory, doors in the\n post-PCR areas of the laboratory were closed. Based upon our\n observations, we did not identify any material deficiencies with\n regard to the LVMPD Laboratory performing various DNA analysis\n processes in separate times and separate spaces.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 We reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s policy for evidence sample\n control, which states that evidence is to be secured off-site at the\n Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department\xe2\x80\x99s Criminalistics Bureau\n Vault and brought over when needed to the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s on-\n site vault. When we visited the LVMPD Laboratory, we observed\n that the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s on-site vault was secure and access\n was limited by key cards issued only to Laboratory Managers,\n Evidence Technicians, and Laboratory Aides. In addition, the chain\n of custody was documented in the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s evidence\n retrieval system known as WinACE. The electronic log identified\n where and with whom each piece of evidence was located in the\n LVMPD Laboratory. For example, to retrieve evidence from the off-\n site Criminalistics Bureau Vault DNA Analysts were required to\n submit an electronic request into WinACE. Upon retrieval, DNA\n Analysts are required to sign a list affixed to the outside of each\n evidence package each time the evidence is checked out. During\n testing and while the evidence is not in custody of the DNA Analyst,\n DNA Analysts are required to secure the evidence in individually\n assigned locked storage spaces. Upon completion of DNA analysis,\n the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s procedure is to return the evidence to the\n off-site Criminalistics Bureau Vault. Based on these procedures, the\n integrity of physical evidence is maintained by the LVMPD\n Laboratory in accordance with the QAS requirements that we\n tested.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 We learned that as of September 2011, the LVMPD Laboratory did\n not outsource the analysis of its forensic DNA or convicted offender\n samples to another laboratory and has not done so in the past\n 2 years.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The QAS requires laboratories to undergo an annual review,\n including an external review every 2 years. During our fieldwork in\n September 2011, we found that the LVMPD Laboratory had an\n - 11 -\n\x0c external QAS review performed in May 2010 and an internal QAS\n review performed in March 2011 in accordance with the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s\n requirement.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 We reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s prior 2 years of QAS review\n reports. Both the internal and external reviews were conducted\n using the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s QAS Review Document. The FBI confirmed that at\n least one of the QAS reviewers for both reviews had successfully\n completed the FBI QAS Review training course.\n\n o The external QAS review conducted in May 2010, noted that\n LVMPD Laboratory did not: (1) calibrate its UV Crosslinkers\n timely; (2) conduct annual preventative maintenance for the\n 3130XL timely; (3) perform monthly rebooting of computers and\n checking of available disk space in a timely manner; and\n (4) ensure the team that performed the previous internal audit\n contained a qualified analyst from a databasing laboratory, as\n required. We reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s corrective\n actions that it took to remedy these findings, including: the\n establishment of new policies and procedures to ensure\n calibration and timely rebooting of computer systems; the\n creation of a master calendar listing all equipment in the\n laboratory requiring maintenance or calibration; and the\n issuance of administrative directives to ensure all members of\n the audit team are qualified to audit a databasing laboratory.\n We found, that the LVMPD Laboratory addressed all the findings\n in the May 2010 external review.\n\n o The internal QAS review conducted in March 2011, noted that\n the LVMPD Laboratory: (1) did not check available disk space in\n a timely manner; (2) failed to properly approve revised policies\n and procedures in the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic Handbook;\n (3) did not have a clearly written policy for the retention of\n sample receipts, processing records, sample retention or hit\n confirmations; (4) did not adequately safeguard the key to the\n lock box containing the evidence locker keys; and (5) failed to\n safeguard evidence locker keys against loss or unauthorized use.\n We reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s corrective actions that it\n took to remedy these findings including: the establishment of\n new policies and procedures to check available disk space in a\n timely manner, and the creation of a maintenance log to track\n and ensure timely checks of available disk space. The LVMPD\n Laboratory approved and updated the policy for the retention of\n sample receipts, processing records, and hit confirmations in the\n LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic Handbook. The LVMPD Laboratory\n - 12 -\n\x0c restricted access to the evidence locker keys by removing the\n key to the lock box, making copies of the restricted access\n evidence locker key and distributed the keys only to LVMPD\n Laboratory management. We found that the LVMPD Laboratory\n addressed the findings in the March 2011 internal review.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 We also asked each of the QAS reviewers who conducted the most\n recent external QAS reviews to certify that they had no\n impairments to independence. All QAS reviewers provided us with\n this certification.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 We reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s policies on physical security of\n the facility, as well as the cipher locks and key card assignments to\n LVMPD Laboratory personnel for access to the secured areas of the\n Laboratory. We observed during our tour, that the facility was\n locked and closed off to the public. We also observed that\n authorized LVMPD Laboratory personnel entered the laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\n facility using their key cards. All other visitors were required to\n push the call button and speak to a receptionist in order to gain\n entry through the front doors of the building. Once inside in the\n administrative office space, visitors were required to sign a log-in\n sheet in order to obtain a badge and they were required to be\n escorted by a staff member at all times while in the LVMPD\n Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s facilities. The doors leading into the interior\n laboratories were secure with cipher combination locks and were\n limited only to authorized personnel. We found that overall\n external and internal security at the LVMPD Laboratory to be\n adequate and in compliance with the QAS requirements we tested.\n\nConclusion\n\n We found that the LVMPD Laboratory complied with the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic\nQAS that we tested. Specifically, we found that the LVMPD Laboratory:\n(1) followed protocols with regard to amplified samples being maintained in\nseparate rooms from the evidence examination, DNA extraction, and PCR\nsetup areas; (2) underwent QAS reviews within designated timeframes; and\n(3) had procedures in place to ensure that access to the Laboratory was\ncontrolled and limited to authorized personnel. Based on our review, we\nmade no recommendations concerning the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s compliance\nwith QAS.\n\n\n\n\n - 13 -\n\x0c III. Suitability of Forensic DNA Profiles in CODIS Databases\n\n We found that 7 of the 100 forensic DNA profiles we\n reviewed did not meet NDIS standards and two more\n profiles were deemed inappropriate for inclusion in\n NDIS. Specifically, we identified the following\n unallowable profiles: (1) one profile matched the\n victim\xe2\x80\x99s DNA profile; (2) three profiles were obtained\n from the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s person or residence; (3) one\n profile was not attributable to a putative perpetrator;\n and (4) two profiles were obtained from items that\n were not connected to a crime. An additional profile\n was deemed inappropriate for inclusion in NDIS\n because the laboratory had not yet attempted to\n obtain an elimination standard to rule out the victim\n as the source of the DNA. The LVMPD Laboratory\n deemed yet another profile inappropriate for NDIS\n because the profile was based on a mixture\n containing DNA from several individuals with no\n major contributor. In addition to the nine profiles\n removed, the LVMPD Laboratory removed another\n two profiles that were not part of our sample, but\n were associated with the profiles we tested in our\n sample. In total, the LVMPD Laboratory removed\n 11 profiles from NDIS.\n\n We reviewed a sample of the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s Forensic DNA\nprofiles to determine whether each profile was complete, accurate, and\nallowable for inclusion in NDIS. To test the completeness and accuracy of\neach profile, we established standards that require a profile include all the\nloci for which the analyst obtained results, and that the values at each locus\nmatch those identified during analysis. Our standards are described in more\ndetail in Appendix II of this report.\n\n The FBI\xe2\x80\x99s NDIS operational procedures establish the DNA data\nacceptance standards by which laboratories must abide. The FBI also\ndeveloped a flowchart as guidance for the laboratories for determining what\nis allowable in the forensic index at NDIS. Laboratories are prohibited from\nuploading forensic profiles to NDIS that clearly match the DNA profile of the\nvictim or another known person that is not a suspect. A profile at NDIS that\nmatches a suspect may be allowable if the contributor is unknown at the\ntime of collection, however, NDIS guidelines prohibit profiles that match a\nsuspect if that profile could reasonably have been expected to be on an item\nat the crime scene or part of the crime scene independent of the crime.\nFor instance, a profile from an item that was seized from the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s\n - 14 -\n\x0cperson, such as a shirt, or that was in the possession of the suspect when\ncollected is generally not a forensic unknown and would not be allowable for\nupload to NDIS. The NDIS procedures we reviewed are listed in Appendix II\nof this report.\n\nResults of the OIG Audit\n\n We selected a sample of 100 profiles out of the 2,650 forensic profiles\nthat the LVMPD Laboratory had uploaded into NDIS as of August 26, 2011.\nOf the 100 forensic profiles sampled, we found that 7 profiles were\nunallowable for upload to NDIS and another two profiles were deemed\ninappropriate for upload to NDIS. The remaining profiles sampled were\ncomplete, accurate, and allowable for inclusion in NDIS. In addition to our\nsampled profiles, we found two more unallowable profiles uploaded to NDIS\nthat were associated with the unallowable profiles we identified as part of\nour sample testing. In total, the LVMPD Laboratory removed 11 profiles\nfrom NDIS. The specific exceptions are explained in more detail below.\n\nSample Number NV-18\n\n Sample NV-18 was taken from an empty whiskey bottle found near the\ncrime scene of a homicide. We deemed this profile to be unallowable\nbecause it was developed from the whiskey bottle, which the police could not\nconnect to the crime. In addition, the profile did not contain the required\n10 core loci to be auto-searched in NDIS. We presented this to the LVMPD\nLaboratory CODIS Administrator, who agreed that since the profile was not\ndeveloped from evidence connected to the crime and since the profile did\nnot have the required 10 core loci; the profile was unallowable and the\nLVMPD Laboratory removed it from CODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-25\n\n Sample NV-25 was taken from a trash can found in the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s\nresidence where a sexual assault occurred. We deemed this profile to be\nunallowable because it was taken from the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s residence and is not a\nforensic unknown profile, but rather a deduced suspect profile. Deduced\nsuspect profiles are not allowed to be uploaded to CODIS. We presented\nthis to the LVMPD Laboratory CODIS Administrator, who agreed that this\nprofile was unallowable and the LVMPD Laboratory removed it from CODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-28\n\n Sample NV-28 was taken from a male victim\xe2\x80\x99s shorts obtained during\nthe investigation of a sexual assault. After reviewing this profile that was\nuploaded to NDIS, we deemed it to be unallowable because the profile\n - 15 -\n\x0cmatched the victim\xe2\x80\x99s profile. Victim profiles are unallowable for upload\nto CODIS. We presented this to the CODIS Administrator, who agreed that\nthis profile was unallowable and the LVMPD Laboratory removed it from\nCODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-44\n\n Sample NV-44 was a blood swab taken from the concrete surface of an\napartment parking lot where a homicide had occurred. The suspects in the\ncase shot and killed one victim, and hit another victim in the head with a\nweapon. The LVMPD Laboratory processed an elimination standard for the\ndeceased victim; however it did not attempt to obtain an elimination\nstandard for the injured victim. We presented this to the LVMPD Laboratory\nCODIS Administrator, who removed the inappropriate profile and one other\nrelated profile taken from the same crime scene from CODIS. The LVMPD\nLaboratory CODIS Administrator stated she would attempt to obtain an\nelimination standard from the injured victim in order to verify that neither of\nthe two victims was uploaded into CODIS. If the LVMPD Laboratory verifies\nthat the profile does not belong to the other victim, then this profile could be\nplaced back in to CODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-58\n\n Sample NV-58 was taken from the cigarette butt found on the sidewalk\nlocated near an apartment complex. The crime being investigated was a\nhomicide which occurred inside one of the apartments. The cigarette butt\nwas found near the apartment\xe2\x80\x99s covered parking spaces and trash\ndumpsters. We deemed this profile to be unallowable because the\ninformation in the case file did not connect the item to a putative\nperpetrator. We presented this to the LVMPD Laboratory CODIS\nAdministrator, who agreed that this profile was unallowable and the LVMPD\nLaboratory removed it from CODIS. Further, the LVMPD Laboratory\nremoved an additional profile from CODIS that had been taken from another\ncigarette butt found in the same location.\n\nSample Number NV-59\n\n Sample NV-59 was taken from a tissue found at the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s\nresidence. We deemed this profile to be unallowable because it was taken\nfrom the suspect\xe2\x80\x99s residence and it was not a forensic unknown profile, but\nrather a deduced suspect profile. Deduced suspect profiles are not allowable\nfor upload to CODIS. We presented this to the LVMPD Laboratory CODIS\nAdministrator, who agreed that this profile was unallowable and the LVMPD\nLaboratory removed it from CODIS.\n\n - 16 -\n\x0cSample Number NV-68\n\n Sample NV-68 was taken from an orange cigarette filter found at the\ncrime scene of a suspicious death investigation. The LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\ncase file lacked information regarding the location of the cigarette filter\nrelative to the scene of the suspicious death. In addition, this cigarette butt\nwas collected 11 days after the suspicious death, the crime scene had been\nunsealed, and the residence (the location of the crime scene) had been\ncleaned. Therefore, we deemed this profile unallowable because we could\nnot connect it to a crime. We presented this to the LVMPD Laboratory\nCODIS Administrator, who agreed that this profile was unallowable and the\nLVMPD Laboratory removed it from CODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-75\n\n Sample NV-75 was taken from a swab of the trigger of a handgun that\nwas used in an assault and robbery. The LVMPD Laboratory deemed this\nprofile inappropriate for CODIS because it was a mixture of three individuals\nwith no major contributor. The Laboratory removed the profile from CODIS.\n\nSample Number NV-79\n\n Sample NV-79 was taken from a white sock collected directly from the\nsuspect. We deemed this profile to be unallowable because it is not a\nforensic unknown profile, but rather a deduced suspect profile. We\npresented this to the LVMPD Laboratory CODIS Administrator, who agreed\nthat this profile was unallowable and the LVMPD Laboratory removed it from\nCODIS.\n\nConclusion\n\n Based on our testing of 100 sample forensic profiles that the LVMPD\nLaboratory uploaded to NDIS, we found 91 profiles were complete, accurate,\nand allowable for inclusion in NDIS, but we questioned the Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\nupload of 7 forensic profiles that do not meet the standards for NDIS. The\nLaboratory agreed and removed all seven unallowable profiles. We also\nconfirmed that the LVMPD Laboratory removed two more profiles from our\nsample that we deemed inappropriate for CODIS, as well as an additional\ntwo profiles associated, but not part of our sample of 100 forensic profiles.\nBecause the LVMPD Laboratory took corrective action on all 11 profiles, we\nmake no recommendations concerning the suitability of LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\nforensic DNA profiles that are in CODIS.\n\n\n\n\n - 17 -\n\x0c APPENDIX I\n\n OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY\n\n We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally\naccepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we\nplan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to\nprovide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our\naudit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a\nreasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit\nobjectives.\n\n Our audit generally covered the period from September 2009 through\nAugust 2011. The objectives of the audit were to determine if the:\n(1) LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the NDIS participation\nrequirements; (2) LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the Quality\nAssurance Standards (QAS) issued by the FBI; and (3) LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s\nforensic DNA profiles in CODIS databases were complete, accurate, and\nallowable for inclusion in NDIS. To accomplish the objectives of the audit,\nwe:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Examined internal and external Laboratory QAS review reports and\n supporting documentation for corrective action taken, if any, to\n determine whether: (a) the LVMPD Laboratory complied with the\n QAS, (b) repeat findings were identified, and (c) recommendations\n were adequately resolved.9\n\n In accordance with the QAS, the internal and external laboratory\n review procedures address, at a minimum, a laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s quality\n assurance program, organization and management, personnel\n qualifications, facilities, evidence control, validation of methods and\n procedures, analytical procedures, calibration and maintenance of\n instruments and equipment, proficiency testing of analysts, corrective\n action for discrepancies and errors, review of case files, reports,\n safety, and previous audits. The QAS require that internal and\n external reviews be performed by personnel who have successfully\n completed the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s training course for conducting such reviews.\n\n 9\n The QAS require that laboratories undergo annual audits, which every other year,\nmust be performed by an external agency that performs DNA identification analysis and is\nindependent of the laboratory being reviewed. The QAS does not require these audits to be\nperformed in accordance with the Government Auditing Standards (GAS) and they are not\nperformed by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General. Therefore, we\nrefer to the QAS audits as either internal or external laboratory reviews, as applicable, to\navoid confusion with our audits that are conducted in accordance with GAS.\n - 18 -\n\x0c As permitted by Government Auditing Standards (GAS) 7.42 (2007\n revision), we generally relied on the results of the LVMPD\n Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s external laboratory review to determine if the LVMPD\n Laboratory complied with the QAS. In order to rely on the work of\n non-auditors, GAS requires that we perform procedures to obtain\n sufficient evidence that the work can be relied upon. Therefore,\n we: (1) obtained evidence concerning the qualifications and\n independence of the individuals who conducted the review; and\n (2) determined that the scope, quality, and timing of the audit work\n performed was adequate for reliance in the context of the current\n audit objectives by reviewing the evaluation procedure guide and\n resultant findings to understand the methods and significant\n assumptions used by the individuals conducting the reviews. Based\n on this work, we determined that we could rely on the results of the\n LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s external laboratory review.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Interviewed LVMPD Laboratory officials to identify management\n controls, LVMPD Laboratory operational policies and procedures,\n LVMPD Laboratory certifications or accreditations, and analytical\n information related to DNA profiles.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Toured the LVMPD Laboratory to observe facility security measures\n as well as the procedures and controls related to the receipt,\n processing, analyzing, and storage of forensic evidence and convicted\n offender DNA samples.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed the LVMPD Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s written policies and procedures\n related to conducting internal reviews, resolving review findings,\n expunging DNA profiles from NDIS, and resolving matches among\n DNA profiles in NDIS.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed supporting documentation for 5 of 391 NDIS matches to\n determine whether they were resolved in a timely manner. The\n LVMPD Laboratory provided the universe of NDIS matches as of\n September 26, 2011. The sample was judgmentally selected to\n include both case-to-case and case-to-offender matches. This non-\n statistical sample does not allow projection of the test results to all\n matches.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed the case files for selected forensic DNA profiles to\n determine if the profiles were developed in accordance with the\n Forensic QAS and were complete, accurate, and allowable for\n inclusion in NDIS.\n\n\n\n - 19 -\n\x0c Working in conjunction with the contractor used by the FBI, we\n obtained an electronic file identifying the 2,650 (STR) forensic\n profiles the LVMPD Laboratory had uploaded to NDIS as of August 26,\n 2011. We limited our review to a sample of 100 profiles. This\n sample size was determined judgmentally because preliminary audit\n work determined that risk was not unacceptably high.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Using the judgmentally-determined sample size, we randomly\n selected a representative sample of labels associated with specific\n profiles in our universe to reduce the effect of any patterns in the list\n of profiles provided to us. However, since the sample size was\n judgmentally determined, the results obtained from testing this\n limited sample of profiles may not be projected to the universe of\n profiles from which the sample was selected.\n\n The objectives of our audit concerned the LVMPD Laboratory\'s\ncompliance with required standards and the related internal controls.\nAccordingly, we did not attach a separate statement on compliance with laws\nand regulations or a statement on internal controls to this report. See\nAppendix II for detailed information on our audit criteria.\n\n\n\n\n - 20 -\n\x0c APPENDIX II\n\n AUDIT CRITERIA\n\n In conducting our audit, we considered the NDIS participation\nrequirements and the Quality Assurance Standards (QAS). We did not test\nfor compliance with elements that were not applicable to the LVMPD\nLaboratory. In addition, we established standards to test the completeness\nand accuracy of DNA profiles as well as the timely notification of DNA profile\nmatches to law enforcement.\n\nNDIS Participation Requirements\n\n The NDIS participation requirements, which consist of the\nMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the NDIS operational procedures,\nestablish the responsibilities and obligations of laboratories that participate\nin NDIS. The MOU requires that NDIS participants comply with federal\nlegislation and the QAS, as well as NDIS-specific requirements\naccompanying the MOU in the form of appendices. We focused our audit on\nspecific sections of the following NDIS requirements.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DNA Data Acceptance Standards\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DNA Data Accepted at NDIS\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Quality Assurance Standards (QAS) Reviews\n \xe2\x80\xa2 NDIS DNA Autosearches\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Confirm an Interstate Candidate Match\n \xe2\x80\xa2 General Responsibilities\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Initiate and Maintain a Laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s Participation in NDIS\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Security Requirements\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CODIS Users\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CODIS Administrator Responsibilities\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Access to, and Disclosure of, DNA Records and Samples\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Upload of DNA Records\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Expunge a DNA Record\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The FBI Flowchart: A Guide to Determining What is Allowable in\n the Forensic Index at NDIS 10\n\n\n\n\n 10\n The FBI Flowchart is guidance issued to NDIS-participating laboratories separate\nfrom the MOU and NDIS operational procedures. The flowchart is contained in the 2010\nCODIS Administrator\xe2\x80\x99s Handbook and has been provided to laboratories in forums such as\nCODIS conference.\n - 21 -\n\x0cQuality Assurance Standards\n\n The FBI issued two sets of Quality Assurance Standards (QAS): QAS\nfor Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, effective July 1, 2009 (Forensic QAS);\nand QAS for DNA Databasing Laboratories, effective July 1, 2009\n(Offender QAS). The Forensic QAS and the Offender QAS describe the\nquality assurance requirements that the LVMPD Laboratory should follow to\nensure the quality and integrity of the data it produces.\n\n For our audit, we generally relied on the reported results of the LVMPD\nLaboratory\xe2\x80\x99s most recent annual external review to determine if the LVMPD\nLaboratory was in compliance with the QAS. Additionally, we performed\naudit work to verify that the LVMPD Laboratory was in compliance with the\nQAS listed below because they have a substantial effect on the integrity of\nthe DNA profiles uploaded to NDIS.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Facilities (Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 6.1): The laboratory shall\n have a facility that is designed to ensure the integrity of the\n analyses and the evidence.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Evidence Control (Forensic QAS 7.1): The laboratory shall have and\n follow a documented evidence control system to ensure the integrity\n of physical evidence. Where possible, the laboratory shall retain or\n return a portion of the evidence sample or extract.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Sample Control (Offender QAS 7.1): The laboratory shall have and\n follow a documented sample inventory control system to ensure the\n integrity of database and known samples.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Analytical Procedures (Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 9.5): The\n laboratory shall monitor the analytical procedures using [appropriate]\n controls and standards.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Review (Forensic QAS 12.1): The laboratory shall conduct\n administrative and technical reviews of all case files and reports to\n ensure conclusions and supporting data are reasonable and within\n the constraints of scientific knowledge.\n\n (Offender QAS Standard 12.1): The laboratory shall have and follow\n written procedures for reviewing DNA records and DNA database\n information, including the resolution of database matches.\n\n\n\n\n - 22 -\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviews (Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 15.1 and 15.2): The\n laboratory shall be audited annually in accordance with [the QAS].\n The annual audits shall occur every calendar year and shall be at\n least 6 months and no more than 18 months apart.\n\n At least once every 2 years, an external audit shall be conducted by\n an audit team comprised of qualified auditors from a second\n agency(ies) and having at least one team member who is or has\n been previously qualified in the laboratory\xe2\x80\x99s current DNA\n technologies and platform.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Outsourcing (Forensic QAS and Offender QAS Standard 17.1): A\n vendor laboratory performing forensic and database DNA analysis\n shall comply with these Standards and the accreditation requirements\n of federal law.\n\n Forensic QAS 17.4: An NDIS participating laboratory shall have and\n follow a procedure to verify the integrity of the DNA data received\n through the performance of the technical review of DNA data from a\n vendor laboratory.\n\n Offender QAS Standard 17.4: An NDIS participating laboratory shall\n have, follow and document appropriate quality assurance procedures\n to verify the integrity of the data received from the vendor laboratory\n including, but not limited to, the following: Random reanalysis of\n database, known or casework reference samples; Inclusion of QC\n samples; Performance of an on-site visit by an NDIS participating\n laboratory or multi-laboratory system outsourcing DNA sample(s) to\n a vendor laboratory or accepting ownership of DNA data from a\n vendor laboratory.\n\nOffice of the Inspector General Standards\n\n We established standards to test the completeness and accuracy of\nDNA profiles as well as the timely notification of law enforcement when DNA\nprofile matches occur in NDIS. Our standards are listed below.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Completeness of DNA Profiles: A profile must include each value\n returned at each locus for which the analyst obtained results. Our\n rationale for this standard is that the probability of a false match\n among DNA profiles is reduced as the number of loci included in a\n profile increases. A false match would require the unnecessary use\n of laboratory resources to refute the match.\n\n\n\n - 23 -\n\x0c\xe2\x80\xa2 Accuracy of DNA Profiles: The values at each locus of a profile\n must match those identified during analysis. Our rationale for this\n standard is that inaccurate profiles may: (1) preclude DNA profiles\n from being matched and, therefore, the potential to link convicted\n offenders to a crime or to link previously unrelated crimes to each\n other may be lost; or (2) result in a false match that would require\n the unnecessary use of laboratory resources to refute the match.\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Timely Notification of Law Enforcement When DNA Profile Matches\n Occur in NDIS: Laboratories should notify law enforcement\n personnel of NDIS matches within 2 weeks of the match\n confirmation date, unless there are extenuating circumstances. Our\n rationale for this standard is that untimely notification of law\n enforcement personnel may result in the suspected perpetrator\n committing additional, and possibly more egregious, crimes if the\n individual is not deceased or already incarcerated for the\n commission of other crimes.\n\n\n\n\n - 24 -\n\x0c APPENDIX III\n\n\n AUDITEE RESPONSE\n\n\n\n\nApril 19, 2012\n\n\nMr. David J Gaschke\nRegional Audit Manager\nU.S. Department of Justice\nOffice of the Inspector General (DIG)\nSan Francisco Regional Audit OffICe\n1200 Bayh~1 Drive # 201\nSan Bruno, CA 94066\n\n\nDear Mr. Gaschke:\n\nThis letter is in response to the DIG draft report on the Audit of Compliance with\nStandards Goveming Combined DNA Index System Activities at the Las Vegas\nMetropolitan Police Departmenfs (LVMPD) Forensic laboratory.\n\nThe LVMPD reviewed the draft audit report and has no commenlS to provide regarding\nthe report.\n\nThe LVMPD appreciates the opportunity to respond to the DIG draft audit report. If you\nhave any questions, please feel free to contact me.\n\n\n Sincerely,\n\n\n DOUGLAS C. GILLESPIE, SHERIFF\n\n\n =--=C;;;;;.; ,~\n BY: Tracy Bir \xe2\x80\xa2 Director\n Forensic Laboratory\n Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.\n 5605 W . Badura Ave. Suite 120 B\n Las Vegas, NV 89118-4705\n T2742B@lvmpd.com\n (702) 828-3932\n FAX (702) 828-3948\n\n\nCC: Doug Hares - FBI laboratory\n\n\n\n\n 400 S!-..rt A-."" \xe2\x80\xa2 lot Vegoll, Ne<.<odo 89101 -2984 \xe2\x80\xa2 (702) 795-3111\n www.lvmpd.com \xe2\x80\xa2 www.prOltodlhecity.c:om\n\n\n\n - 25 - \n\n\x0c APPENDIX IV\n\n\n DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RESPONSE\n\n\n\n\n\n u.s. Dt>partment or Ju st ioe\n\n Federal Bureau ofln\\\'es1igali(m\n\n\n\n w..ninilOO- D.C. 10515..0001\n\n May 2,2012\n\n\nDavid J. Gaschke\nRegional Audit Manager\nSan Francisco Regional Audit Office\nOffice ofthe Inspector General\n1200 Bayhill Drive, Suite 201\nSan Bruno, CA 94066\n\n\n\nDear Mr. Gaschke:\n\n Your memorandum to Director Mueller forwarding the draft audit report for the\nLas Vegas Metropolitan Police Department\'s Forensic Laboratory, Las Vegas, Nevada\n(Laboratory), has been referred to me for response.\n Your draft report contained no recommendations relating to the laboratory\'s\ncompliance with the FBI\'s Memorandum of Understanding and Qllality Assllrance Slandards\nDNA Tes/ing Labora/oriesand DNA Dalabasing Laboratories. The CODIS Unit reviewed the\ndraft report and since it appears that Ihe Laboratory is in compliance with NO IS participation\nrequirements, the COOlS Unit has no significant comments to provide about the draft report.\n Thank you for sharing the draft audit report with us. If you have any questions,\nplease feel free to contact Jennifer Wendel, Chief of the COOlS Unit, at (703) 632\xc2\xb78315.\n\n Sincerely,\n\n\n\n\n Anthony J. Onorato\n Acting Section Chief\n Biometrics Analysis Section\n FBI Laboratory\n\n\n\n\n - 26 - \n\n\x0c'


type: contracts

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 Avis juridique important
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 22000D1123(08)
 Απόφαση της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ αριθ. 83/1999 της 25ης Ιουνίου 1999 για τροποποίηση του πρωτοκόλλου 37 και του παραρτήματος ΧΙ (υπηρεσίες τηλεπικοινωνιών) της συμφωνίας για τον ΕΟΧ
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 296 της 23/11/2000 σ. 0041 - 0043
 Απόφαση της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧαριθ. 83/1999της 25ης Ιουνίου 1999για τροποποίηση του πρωτοκόλλου 37 και του παραρτήματος ΧΙ (υπηρεσίες τηλεπικοινωνιών) της συμφωνίας για τον ΕΟΧΗ ΜΕΙΚΤΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΟΧ,Έχοντας υπόψη:τη συμφωνία για τον Ευρωπαϊκό Οικονομικό Χώρο, όπως τροποποιήθηκε από το πρωτόκολλο προσαρμογής της συμφωνίας για τον Ευρωπαϊκό Οικονομικό Χώρο, εφεξής καλουμένη "η συμφωνία", και ιδίως τα άρθρα 98 και 101,Εκτιμώντας τα ακόλουθα:(1) Το πρωτόκολλο 37 της συμφωνίας τροποποιήθηκε με την απόφαση της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ αριθ. 74/1999, της 28ης Μαΐου 1999(1).(2) Το παράρτημα ΧΙ της συμφωνίας τροποποιήθηκε με την απόφαση της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ αριθ. 37/1999, της 30ής Μαρτίου 1999(2).(3) Το παράρτημα ΧΙ της συμφωνίας μπορεί να περιλαμβάνει πράξεις σχετικά με την προστασία των προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα και, για να διασφαλιστεί η διαφάνεια, οι υπότιτλοί του πρέπει να επεκταθούν αναλόγως.(4) Πρέπει να ενσωματωθεί στη συμφωνία η οδηγία 95/46/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 24ης Οκτωβρίου 1995, για την προστασία των φυσικών προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα(3) και για την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των δεδομένων αυτών. Το κεφάλαιο IV της εν λόγω οδηγίας πρέπει να προσαρμοστεί για τους σκοπούς της συμφωνίας.(5) Για την ορθή λειτουργία της συμφωνίας, ιδίως όσον αφορά τη διαβίβαση δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα στις τρίτες χώρες, το πρωτόκολλο 37 της συμφωνίας πρέπει να επεκταθεί στην ομάδα προστασίας των προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα, που συνεστήθη από την οδηγία 95/46/ΕΚ, και το παράρτημα ΧΙ πρέπει να τροποποιηθεί ώστε να διευκρινίζει τις λεπτομέρειες σύνδεσης με την εν λόγω ομάδα εργασίας,ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΖΕΙ:Άρθρο 1Στο πρωτόκολλο 37 της συμφωνίας, προστίθεται το ακόλουθο σημείο μετά το σημείο 12 (επιτροπή επαφών για τις τηλεοπτικές δραστηριότητες): "13. Ομάδα προστασίας των προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα (οδηγία 95/46/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου)".Άρθρο 2Στο παράρτημα ΧΙ της συμφωνίας, προστίθεται το ακόλουθο κείμενο μετά το σημείο 5δ (οδηγία 97/67/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου): "Προστασία των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα5ε. 395 L 0046: οδηγία 95/46/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 24ης Οκτωβρίου 1995, για την προστασία των φυσικών προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα και για την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των δεδομένων αυτών (EE L 281 της 23.11.1995, σ. 31).Για τους σκοπούς της παρούσας συμφωνίας, οι διατάξεις της οδηγίας προσαρμόζονται ως εξής:α) Στο πλαίσιο της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ, τα συμβαλλόμενα μέρη ανταλλάσσουν τις πληροφορίες που αναφέρονται στα άρθρα 25 παράγραφος 3 και 26 παράγραφος 3 πρώτο εδάφιο.β) Αν, κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 25 παράγραφοι 4 και 6, του άρθρου 26 παράγραφος 3 δεύτερο εδάφιο ή του άρθρου 26 παράγραφος 4, η Επιτροπή σκοπεύει να θεσπίσει μέτρα σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31, τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ ενημερώνονται κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο που ενημερώνονται και τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ. Αν η Επιτροπή κοινοποιήσει τα μέτρα στο Συμβούλιο σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31, τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ ενημερώνονται σε εύθετο χρόνο σχετικά με τη διαδικασία αυτή. Τα τυχόν μέτρα που θεσπίζονται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31 κοινοποιούνται στα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο που κοινοποιούνται στα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ. Μέχρι να αποφασίσει η Μεικτή Επιτροπή του ΕΟΧ να ενσωματώσει στη συμφωνία τα μέτρα που θεσπίζονται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31, τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ αποφασίζουν αν θα εφαρμόσουν ή όχι τα μέτρα αυτά και ενημερώνουν σχετικά την Επιτροπή πριν από την έναρξη της ισχύος τους.Αν κάποιο από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ δεν έχει λάβει μια τέτοια απόφαση, εφαρμόζει τα μέτρα που θεσπίζονται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31 συγχρόνως με τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ.Αν, στο πλαίσιο της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ, δεν μπορέσει να επιτευχθεί συμφωνία σχετικά με την ενσωμάτωση στη συμφωνία ΕΟΧ των μέτρων που θεσπίζονται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31 εντός δώδεκα μηνών από την έναρξη ισχύος των μέτρων αυτών, ένα από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ μπορεί να αναστείλει την εφαρμογή των εν λόγω μέτρων και ενημερώνει αμέσως την Επιτροπή σχετικά.Κατά παρέκκλιση του άρθρου 1 παράγραφος 2 της οδηγίας, τα λοιπά συμβαλλόμενα μέρη μπορούν να περιορίσουν ή να απαγορεύσουν την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα σε κάποιο από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ το οποίο δεν εφαρμόζει τα μέτρα που θεσπίζονται σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 31, κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο που τα μέτρα αυτά εμποδίζουν τη μεταφορά των εν λόγω δεδομένων σε τρίτη χώρα.γ) Με την επιφύλαξη των διαπραγματεύσεων της Επιτροπής κατά την έννοια του άρθρου 25 παράγραφος 5, οποιοδήποτε από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ μπορεί να αρχίσει διαπραγματεύσεις για λογαριασμό του. Η Επιτροπή και τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ ανταλλάσσουν πληροφορίες και, εφόσον ζητηθεί αυτό, διεξάγουν διαβουλεύσεις σχετικά με τις διαπραγματεύσεις αυτές εντός του πλαισίου της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ.Όροι σύνδεσης του Λιχτενστάιν, της Ισλανδίας και της Νορβηγίας σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 101 της παρούσας συμφωνίας:Καθένα από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ μπορεί, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 29 παράγραφος 2 δεύτερο εδάφιο της οδηγίας 95/46/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, να ορίσει ένα πρόσωπο το οποίο εκπροσωπεί την ή τις αρχές ελέγχου που υποδεικνύει καθένα από τα κράτη ΕΖΕΣ με σκοπό τη συμμετοχή αυτού ως παρατηρητή, χωρίς δικαίωμα ψήφου, στις συνεδριάσεις της ομάδας προστασίας των προσώπων έναντι της επεξεργασίας των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα.Η Επιτροπή ενημερώνει σε εύθετο χρόνο τους συμμετέχοντες για τις ημερομηνίες των συνεδριάσεων της ομάδας και τους διαβιβάζει τις σχετικές πληροφορίες."Άρθρο 3Τα κείμενα της οδηγίας 95/46/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου στην ισλανδική και νορβηγική γλώσσα, τα οποία περιλαμβάνονται στο παράρτημα των αντίστοιχων γλωσσικών εκδόσεων της παρούσας απόφασης, είναι αυθεντικά.Άρθρο 4Η παρούσα απόφαση αρχίζει να ισχύει στις 26 Ιουνίου 1999, υπό την προϋπόθεση ότι έχουν πραγματοποιηθεί προς τη Μεικτή Επιτροπή του ΕΟΧ όλες οι κοινοποιήσεις που προβλέπονται στο άρθρο 103 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας.Άρθρο 5Η παρούσα απόφαση δημοσιεύεται στο τμήμα ΕΟΧ και στο συμπλήρωμα ΕΟΧ της Επίσημης Εφημερίδας των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων.Βρυξέλλες, 25 Ιουνίου 1999.Για τη Μεικτή Επιτροπή του ΕΟΧΟ ΠρόεδροςF. Barbaso(1) EE L 284 της 9.11.2000.(2) EE L 266 της 19.10.2000.(3) EE L 281 της 23.11.1995, σ. 31.


type: legislation

text:
26 . 6 . 71 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 140/27
 REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 1344/71 DELLA COMMISSIONE
 del 25 giugno 1971
 relativo a talune misure da adottare nel settore dello zucchero a seguito della svaluta
 zione del franco francese
 LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, e di sciroppi, superiori a 5.000 chilogrammi per
 ogni proprietario dei prodotti in causa, che alle
 visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica ore 0,00 del 1° luglio 1971 si trovano in libera
 europea , pratica nel suo territorio e dei quantitativi che si
 trovano in corso di trasporto, qualora trattisi di
 visto il regolamento ( CEE) n . 1586/ 69 del Consiglio, zucchero proveniente dai dipartimenti francesi
 dell'I 1 agosto 1969, relativo a talune misure di d'oltremare diretto in Francia metropolitana .
 politica di congiuntura da applicare nel settore
 agricolo in seguito alla svalutazione del franco 2. Sui quantitativi di cui al paragrafo 1 , è riscossa
 francese (*), modificato dal regolamento ( CEE) n . una tassa pari a :
 677/70 ( 2), in particolare l'articolo 8 , — 10,70 FF per 100 chilogrammi di zucchero
 considerando che, in conformità del disposto del bianco,
 l'articolo 1 del regolamento ( CEE ) n . 1432/70 del — 9,30 FF per 100 chilogrammi di zucchero
 Consiglio, del 20 luglio 1970, relativo all'adegua greggio,
 mento dei prezzi d'intervento o di acquisto che la — 0,1070 FF per l'I °/o di contenuto di saccarosio
 Francia deve pagare, diminuiti in seguito alla svalu per 100 chilogrammi netti di sci
 tazione del franco francese ( 3), i prezzi d'intervento roppi .
 nel settore dello zucchero sono diminuiti in Francia
 del 9,33 °/o sino al termine della campagna saccari 3. Tuttavia la riscossione della tassa di cui al
 fera 1970/ 1971 ; paragrafo 2 non viene effettuata sui quantitativi di
 cui al paragrafo 1 , che
 considerando che è indispensabile prevedere la
 riscossione di una tassa sulle giacenze accertate al a ) si trovano all'intervento,
 1° luglio 1971 al fine di evitare perturbazioni nel b ) se trattasi di giacenze all'intervento, sono venduti ,
 mercato interno della Comunità ; con destinazione all'esportazione, a seguito di un
 atto comunitario in cui il prezzo di vendita è
 considerando che è necessario che la liquidazione indicato in unità di conto .
 delle operazioni riguardanti la campagna saccarifera
 1970/ 1971 , anche se essa ha luogo successivamente Inoltre, la riscossione della tassa non viene effettuata
 al 1° luglio 1971 , venga effettuata in conformità sulle giacenze considerate scorte di esercizio degli
 delle disposizioni in vigore durante detta cam utilizzatori che trasformano lo zucchero in altri
 pagna ; che inoltre si deve abrogare il regolamento prodotti ad esclusione di quelli delle voci tariffarie
 ( CEE) n . 1507/70 della Commissione, del 28 luglio 17.01 , 17.02 e 17.05 , degli alimenti composti e dei
 1970, relativo a talune misure da adottare nel settore prodotti chimici che figurano negli allegati del
 dello zucchero a seguito della svalutazione del franco regolamento ( CEE) n. 765/68 ( 6).
 francese (4), modificato per ultimo dal regolamento
 ( CEE) n . 368/71 (5 ) ; Tuttavia , il quantitativo totale delle scorte di eser
 cizio esonerate dalla tassa in causa non può supe
 considerando che le misure previste nel presente rare 20.000 tonnellate. La Francia, nel ripartire detto
 regolamento sono conformi al parere del Comitato quantitativo, adotta le misure necessarie onde evitare
 di gestione per lo zucchero, una differenza di trattamento tra gli interessati .
 Articolo 2
 HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO :
 Agli importi relativi alla partecipazione alle spese
 di magazzinaggio che i fabbricanti di zucchero
 Articolo 1
 possono esigere dai produttori di barbabietole e di
 canne in caso di riporto alla campagna saccarifera
 1. La Francia procede ad una rilevazione dei 1971 / 1972, nonché all'importo provvisorio e all'im
 quantitativi di zucchero bianco, di zucchero greggio porto definitivo del contributo gravante sulla pro
 duzione applicabili alla produzione della campagna
 (») GU n. L 202 del 12. 8 . 1969, pag. 1 . saccarifera 1970/ 1971 , viene applicato in Francia
 (2) GU n. L 84 del 16. 4. 1970, pag. 1 . un coefficiente di 0,9067.
 (3) GU n. L 159 del 21 . 7. 1970, pag. 20.
 (4) GU n. L 166 del 29. 7. 1970, pag. 46.
 (5) GU n. L 42 del 20. 2. 1971 , pag. 17. («) GU n. L 143 del 25 . 6 . 1968, pag. 1 .
 ---pagebreak--- N. L 140/28 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 26 . 6 . 71
 Articolo 3 Articolo 4
 1. La restituzione alla produzione, fissata ante Ai prezzi, alle maggiorazioni ed alle riduzioni nonché
 riormente al 1° luglio 1971 , per lo zucchero sotto agli altri importi applicabili all'acquisto di zucchero
 posto alla tassa di cui all'articolo 1 e utilizzato dopo portato all'intervento nel corso della campagna
 tale data nella fabbricazione dei prodotti che figu saccarifera 1970/1971 , viene applicato in Francia
 rano : un coefficiente di 0,9067.
 — nell'allegato I del regolamento ( CEE) n. 765 /68 ,
 è aumentata in Francia di 8,16 FF per 100 Articolo 5
 chilogrammi,
 — negli allegati II e III del suddetto regolamento, Ai prezzi minimi della barbabietola applicabili alla
 è aumentata in Francia di 10,70 FF per 100 produzione della campagna saccarifera 1970/1971 ,
 chilogrammi. viene applicato in Francia un coefficiente di 0,9067.
 Se lo zucchero è utilizzato nel mese di luglio 1971
 per la fabbricazione dei prodotti elencati nell'alle Articolo 6
 gato I del suddetto regolamento, la restituzione alla
 produzione subisce un'ulteriore aumento di 2,28 FF. Il regolamento (CEE) n. 1507/70 è abrogato.
 2. Al premio di denaturazione che figura in un
 titolo di premio di denaturazione rilasciato anterior Articolo 7
 mente al 1° luglio 1971 , per zucchero denaturato
 dopo tale data, viene applicato in Francia un coeffi Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1° luglio
 ciente di 1,1 - 1971 .
 Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile
 in ciascuno degli Stati membri.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 25 giugno 1971 .
 Per la Commissione
 Il Presidente
 Franco M. MALFATTI