jurisdiction: US

text: b' RESOURCES OF DOD ADJUDICATION FACILITIES\n\n\n\nReport No. D-2001-008 October 30, 2000\n\n\n\n Office of the Inspector General\n Department of Defense\n\x0c Additional Copies\n\n To obtain additional copies of this audit report, visit the Inspector General, DoD,\n Home Page at: www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports or contact the Secondary\n Reports Distribution Unit of the Audit Followup and Technical Support\n Directorate at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932.\n\n Suggestions for Future Audits\n\n To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Audit Followup and\n Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8940 (DSN 664-8940) or\n fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:\n\n OAIG-AUD (ATTN: AFTS Audit Suggestions)\n Inspector General, Department of Defense\n 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)\n Arlington, VA 22202-2885\n\n Defense Hotline\n\n To report fraud, waste, or abuse, contact the Defense Hotline by calling\n (800) 424-9098; by sending an electronic message to Hotline@dodig.osd.mil; or\n by writing to the Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1900.\n The identity of each writer and caller is fully protected.\n\n\n\n\nAcronyms\nASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,\n Communications, and Intelligence)\nCAF Central Adjudication Facility\nCCMS Case Control Management System\nDCII Defense Clearance and Investigations Index\nDSS Defense Security Service\nJPAS Joint Personnel Adjudication System\nNACLC National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit\n Check\nOPM Office of Personnel Management\n\x0c\x0cDISTRIBUTION:\n\nUNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)\nASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL,\nCOMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE)\nGENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\nASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT\nAND COMPTROLLER)\nDIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nDIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE\nDIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY\nDIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICE\nDIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF\nNAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL\nAUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\n\x0c Office of the Inspector General, DoD\nReport No. D-2001-008 October 30, 2000\n (Project No. D1999-AD-0079.01) (Formerly Project No. 9AD-0046.01)\n\n Resources of DoD Adjudication Facilities\n\n Executive Summary\n\nIntroduction. This report is the fourth in a recent series of audit reports addressing\nsecurity clearance and access issues. The audit became a congressional request in\nMarch 2000 when the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Armed\nServices requested further review of the security clearance process.\n\nObjectives. During our audit to determine the status of actions taken within DoD\nrelating to access reciprocity between special access programs, we identified problems\nwith obtaining security clearances that affected individuals\xe2\x80\x99 access to special access\nprograms and other DoD operations. This report addresses the resources required to\nadjudicate security clearances efficiently and effectively. See Appendix B for prior\ncoverage.\n\nResults. The number of cases requiring adjudication was rising at a rate faster than\nmost central adjudication facilities\xe2\x80\x99 ability to process adjudicative decisions in a timely\nmanner, because the facilities\xe2\x80\x99 resource requirements had not been fully identified and\nbudgeted. Without corrective action, obtaining a security clearance could become an\nincreasingly lengthy process for DoD personnel and contractors and DoD may be\nsubjected to a higher risk of compromise. For details of the audit results, see the\nFinding section of this report.\n\nSummary of Recommendations. We recommend that:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Directors and Chiefs of the DoD eight central adjudication facilities\n determine the resources required, considering all factors that affect the\n adjudication and appeals processes;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the\n Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the\n Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, the National Security Agency, and the\n Washington Headquarters Service provide sufficient resources to adjudicate and\n process appeals for the projected security clearance requests;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\n Intelligence), in conjunction with the Directors and Chiefs of the eight central\n adjudication facilities, analyze the impact and determine the appropriate\n implementation date for the Joint Personnel Adjudication System; and\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of\n Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) review the\n DoD Components\xe2\x80\x99 budget submission to ensure that the DoD budget for\n FY 2002 and outyears enables the central adjudication facilities to meet\n forecasted workload requirements.\n\nManagement Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence); the Army; the Air Force; the Defense Security Service; the National\nSecurity Agency; the Joint Staff; and the Washington Headquarters Service generally\nconcurred with the finding and recommendations. The Navy took exception to the\nrecommendation to analyze all factors and determine the resources required, stating that\nthe Most Efficient Organization Study completed in July 1999 already addressed all\nfactors impacting the workload and resources. In addition, the Navy called attention to\nrecent program resource increases. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals and\nthe Defense Intelligence Agency did not comment on a draft of this report issued on\nAugust 25, 2000. A discussion of the management comments is in the Finding section\nof the report and the complete text is in the Management Comments section.\n\nAudit Response. The Navy comments were not fully responsive to the\nrecommendation to analyze all factors and determine the resources required. We\nacknowledge the significant resource adjustment made by the Navy; however, we still\nquestion whether all workload factors have been considered. The Navy\'s Most\nEfficient Organization Study was based on the problems with the Defense Security\nService Case Control Management System and Enterprise System being resolved and\nthe Joint Personnel Adjudication System being operational; delays have been\nexperienced in both areas. We request that the Director, Department of the Navy\nCentral Adjudication Facility respond to the finding about assessing all factors and\ndetermining the resources required. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals and\nthe Defense Intelligence Agency did not comment; therefore, we request that they\nprovide comments on this final report by November 30, 2000.\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\x0cTable of Contents\n\nExecutive Summary i\n\nIntroduction\n Background 1\n Objectives 3\n\nFinding\n Issues Affecting Personnel and Resources 4\n\nAppendixes\n A. Audit Process\n Scope 22\n Methodology 22\n B. Prior Coverage 24\n C. Factors Affecting Personnel and Resources at Each Facility 26\n D. Insider Threat Mitigation 27\n E. Report Distribution 29\n\nManagement Comments\n Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 33\n Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications,\n and Intelligence) 35\n Department of the Army 38\n Department of the Navy 39\n Department of the Air Force 40\n Defense Security Service 44\n National Security Agency 45\n Joint Staff 48\n Washington Headquarters Service 49\n\x0cBackground\n This report is the fourth in a recent series and discusses the personnel and\n resources required to adjudicate security clearances within DoD. The audit\n became a congressional request in March 2000, when the Chairmen of the\n Senate and House Committees on Armed Services requested further review of\n the security clearance process. The first report discussed the effects of security\n clearances on three special access programs. The second report discussed\n security clearances for personnel in mission-critical and high-risk positions.\n The third report addressed tracking security clearance requests. Subsequent\n reports will address other aspects of the adjudication process, the impact of\n security clearances on special access programs, the status of access reciprocity,\n the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index database, and the acquisition of\n the Case Control Management System (CCMS) and the Joint Personnel\n Adjudication System.\n\n Security Clearances. Personnel security clearance investigations are intended\n to establish and maintain a reasonable threshold for trustworthiness through\n investigation and adjudication before granting and maintaining access to\n classified information. The initial investigation provides assurance that a person\n has not demonstrated behavior that could be a security concern. Reinvestigation\n is an important, formal check to help uncover changes in behavior that may\n have occurred after the initial clearance was granted. The standard for\n reinvestigation is 5 years for Top Secret, 10 years for Secret, and 15 years for\n Confidential clearances. Reinvestigations are even more important than the\n initial clearance investigation because people who have held clearances longer\n are more likely to be working with more critical information and systems.\n\n Clearance Requirements. On March 24, 1997, the President approved the\n uniform Adjudicative Guidelines, and Temporary Eligibility Standards and\n Investigative Standards as required by Executive Order 12968, \xe2\x80\x9cAccess to\n Classified Information.\xe2\x80\x9d The investigative standards dictate that the initial\n investigation and reinvestigation for access to Top Secret and Sensitive\n Compartmented Information are the single-scope background investigation and\n the single-scope background investigation periodic reinvestigation, respectively.\n The investigation and reinvestigation for access to Secret and Confidential\n information consists of a national agency check with local agency checks and a\n credit check (NACLC). Executive Order 12968 specifies that a determination\n of eligibility for access to classified information is a discretionary security\n decision based on judgments by appropriately trained adjudicative personnel.\n Eligibility shall be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate that\n access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security\n interests of the United States, and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the\n national security.\n\n DoD Security Clearances. The process of obtaining a security clearance begins\n with a request from a military commander, contractor, or other DoD official for\n a security clearance for an individual because of the sensitive nature of his or\n her duties. The individual then completes a security questionnaire that is\n 1\n\x0c forwarded to the Defense Security Service (DSS) or the Office of Personnel\n Management (OPM). An investigation is assigned to various investigators who\n seek information about the subject\xe2\x80\x99s loyalty, character, reliability,\n trustworthiness, honesty, and financial responsibility. The investigation must be\n expanded to clarify and resolve any information that raises questions about the\n subject\xe2\x80\x99s suitability to hold a position of trust. DSS and OPM send the\n completed investigation to the appropriate adjudication facility, where the\n decision is made to grant or deny a clearance.\n\n Central Adjudication Facilities. The following eight Central Adjudication\n Facilities (CAFs) in DoD are authorized to grant, deny, or revoke eligibility for\n Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential security clearances and/or Sensitive\n Compartmented Information accesses: Army, Navy, Air Force, Washington\n Headquarters Service, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, Joint Chiefs of\n Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. In addition,\n the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office is authorized to grant security\n clearances to contractor employees.\n\n Adjudication Process. The adjudication process involves neither the judgment\n of criminal guilt nor the determination of general suitability for a given position;\n rather, it assesses a person\xe2\x80\x99s trustworthiness and fitness for a responsibility\n which could, if abused, have unacceptable consequences for the national\n security of the United States. An adjudicating official must review all the\n information provided by the investigation, resolve conflicting reports, and grant\n or deny the type of clearance sought. Eligibility for access is granted only where\n facts and circumstances indicate that access to classified information is clearly\n consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and any doubt\n shall be resolved in favor of the national security.\n\n If the adjudicative decision is to deny or revoke eligibility for a security\n clearance, the adjudicator must prepare a statement of reasons. The statement\n of reasons is provided to the individual involved and contains the rationale for\n the denial or revocation, instructions for responding, and copies of the relevant\n adjudicative guidelines from DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, \xe2\x80\x9cPersonnel Security\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d January 1987. Upon request, the individual must be provided with\n copies of releasable records from the case file. The statement of reasons must\n clearly define the rationale for the denial or revocation with an explanation for\n each relevant issue that is linked to one or more of the 13 adjudicative\n guidelines contained in DoD Regulation 5200.2-R. If a response is received to\n the statement of reasons, the appeals process begins.\n\n Responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,\n Communications, and Intelligence (ASD[C3I]) has primary responsibility for\n providing guidance, oversight, development, and approval for policy and\n procedures governing personnel security program matters within DoD1. The\n ASD(C3I) is responsible for:\n\n1\n The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for policy, guidance, and oversight of Sensitive\n Compartmented Information.\n\n 2\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 providing program management through issuance of policy and\n operating guidance;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 providing staff assistance to the DoD Components and Defense\n agencies in resolving day-to-day security policy and operating\n problems;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 conducting inspections of the DoD Components for implementation\n and compliance with DoD security policy and operating procedures;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 providing policy, oversight, and guidance to Component adjudication\n functions; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 approving, coordinating, and overseeing all DoD personnel security\n research initiatives and activities.\n\n The Heads of the DoD Components are responsible for:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 administering the DoD personnel security program within their area of\n responsibility in a manner consistent with DoD Regulation 5200.2-R;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 assigning a single authority within the office of the head of the DoD\n Component with the responsibility for administering the program\n within the Component; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 providing information and recommendations to ASD(C3I) and the\n General Counsel at their request concerning any aspect of the\n program.\n\n The DSS is responsible for conducting background investigations on military,\n civilian, and contractor employees who require a security clearance, and OPM\n is responsible for conducting background investigations on military and civilian\n employees only. The CAFs\xe2\x80\x99 main responsibility is adjudicating those\n investigations. Although ASD(C3I) has the responsibility for providing guidance\n and policy to the security clearance process, the CAFs are under the direction of\n their respective DoD Components.\n\nObjectives\n During our audit to determine the status of actions taken within the DoD relating\n to access reciprocity between special access programs, we identified problems\n with obtaining security clearances that affected special access programs and all\n DoD operations. Our specific audit objective in this report was to determine\n whether the DoD CAFs have sufficient resources to adjudicate security\n clearances. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and\n methodology. See Appendix B for prior coverage related to the audit\n objectives.\n\n\n 3\n\x0c Issues Affecting Personnel and Resources\n The number of cases requiring adjudication was rising at a rate faster\n than most CAFs\xe2\x80\x99 ability to process adjudicative decisions in a timely\n manner because personnel and resources needed for all CAFs to deal\n with the workload had not been fully identified and budgeted. As a\n result, obtaining a security clearance could become an increasingly\n lengthy process for DoD personnel and contractors and DoD may be\n subjected to a higher risk of compromise.\n\nFactors Affecting the Timeliness of Security Clearance\n Adjudication\n The timeliness of security clearances to be adjudicated is affected by the\n following factors:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 overdue periodic reinvestigations,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 continuing reinvestigation requirements,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 investigations pending at DSS,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 investigations by OPM,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Secret and Confidential clearance requirements,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS),\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII),\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 large percent of workforce to be replaced,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 insider threat mitigation,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 additional functions, and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 issues affecting adjudicative facilities.\n\n Some of the factors are one-time occurrences, but their immediate impact to the\n workload is significant. Other factors will cause an increase in the workload\n that will continue until the security clearance requirements change. The\n combined effect of the factors will place a burden on the CAFs. The eight\n CAFs need to analyze the effect of each factor and the effect that the\n compilation of all factors will have on their personnel and resource requirements\n in both the short term and the long term. Appendix C shows the specific factors\n that affect each CAF.\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0cOverdue Periodic Reinvestigations\n A June 9, 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum stated that\n approximately 500,000 of the 2.4 million clearances for personnel performing\n sensitive and important duties within, or for, DoD were based upon overdue\n investigations. The memorandum directed that requests for periodic\n reinvestigations begin to be submitted immediately. On November 30, 1999,\n the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Personnel Security Overarching\n Integrated Process team to \xe2\x80\x9cPioneer a different path to solve the crisis of the\n continuing personnel security investigations backlog.\xe2\x80\x9d On January 20, 2000,\n the Personnel Security Overarching Integrated Process Team reported that\n 505,786 periodic reinvestigations were overdue (see Table 1).\n\n Table 1. Overdue Periodic Reinvestigations\n\n Requesting Agency Top Secret Secret/Confidential Total\n Army 17,367 145,330 162,697\n Navy 23,533 96,665 120,198\n Air Force 11,407 30,084 41,491\n Contractors 31,999 134,156 166,155\n Defense agencies 9,975 5,270 15,245\n Total 94,281 411,505 505,786\n\n\n The Air Force, the Army, the Washington Headquarters Service, and the\n Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals obtained approval for additional\n personnel for the increased workload caused by the overdue periodic\n reinvestigations. The Air Force CAF added 22 Air Force Reserve and Air\n National Guard personnel to adjudicate their 41,4912 overdue periodic\n reinvestigations in a 2 year period. The Army CAF had approval to use from 9\n to 16 Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel over the next 3 years\n to eliminate its backlog. The Washington Headquarters Service CAF had hired\n two contractor administrative support personnel and estimated a need for\n 5 additional adjudicators to process the overdue periodic reinvestigations. The\n Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals was hiring 12 adjudicators for 3 years.\n The other CAFs were not authorized additional adjudicators to process their\n increased workload.\n\n\n\n\n2\n The Air Force estimated the backlog of overdue periodic reinvestigations to be 52,000 cases when\n computing the personnel billets required for the personnel adjudication security process.\n\n 5\n\x0cContinuing Reinvestigation Requirements\n None of the CAFs identified the increased workload that will remain\n permanently as a result of the change in the continuing reinvestigation\n requirement. Previous reinvestigation requirements were set at 5 years for Top\n Secret and 15 years for Secret; Confidential had no reinvestigation requirement.\n The new reinvestigation requirements for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential\n security clearances are set at 5, 10, and 15 year intervals from the date of the\n previous investigation; therefore, clearances need to be updated at more frequent\n intervals. After the overdue periodic reinvestigations have been updated, the\n continuing requirement will still need to be adjudicated.\n\nInvestigations Pending at the Defense Security Service\n The CCMS was intended to expedite case processing at DSS by linking all\n relevant information critical to a background investigation through a series of\n subsystems; however, the CCMS did not operate as intended. Instead of\n expediting requests for investigations and reports to and from DSS field offices,\n system problems caused serious delays in information processing and resulted in\n a dramatic decrease in case openings, closings, and field investigations.\n Consequently, the problems with the CCMS were a primary driving factor in\n the accumulation of 452,188 cases pending at DSS as of June 30, 2000.\n\n A key DSS productivity goal is to complete the pending cases, as soon as\n possible, and move them onto the CAFs for adjudication. To process\n investigations more timely, DSS was working to improve the CCMS and issued\n five augmentation contracts for contractors to perform the investigations. Also,\n DoD arranged to send civilian and military investigations to OPM, which will\n further increase the timeliness and number of investigations completed, while\n decreasing the workload on DSS.\n\nInvestigations by the Office of Personnel Management\n OPM agreed to complete Secret and Confidential initial and periodic\n reinvestigations and Top Secret initial investigations within 75 days, and Top\n Secret periodic reinvestigations within 180 days.\n\n Civilian Security Clearance Investigations. On October 1, 1999, OPM began\n conducting all security clearance investigations for DoD civilians instead of only\n the initial investigations for Secret and Confidential clearances.\n\n The 75-day and 180-day investigations conducted by OPM resulted in\n quadrupling the number of cases received by the Washington Headquarters\n Service CAF, which adjudicates civilian Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential\n security clearance requests. Cases received monthly by the CAF increased from\n 345 cases in July 1999 to 1,507 cases in June 2000 (see Table 2). The\n Washington Headquarters Service CAF received 3,306 cases in FY 1999 and\n\n 6\n\x0c 12,310 cases in FY 2000 as of June 30. As a result, the Washington\n Headquarters Service CAF had 9203 cases pending adjudication as of June 30,\n 2000.\n\n Table 2. Cases Received by the\n Washington Headquarters Service CAF\n\n Received From July 1999 October 1999 June 2000\n DSS 118 221 299\n OPM 65 245 761\n Other 162 452 447\n Total 345 918 1,507\n\n\n Military Secret and Confidential Clearance Investigations. The Personnel\n Security Overarching Integrated Process Team recommended outsourcing all\n 926,730 Secret and Confidential investigations, except those with overseas\n leads, estimated to be required in the next 2 years, to OPM. The outsourcing\n would allow DSS to focus on the Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented\n Information investigations. In a letter dated March 31, 2000, the Deputy\n Secretary of Defense implemented the recommendations of the Overarching\n Integrated Process Team, but the letter did not include contractor investigations.\n Therefore, 215,513 Secret and Confidential investigations will not be sent to\n OPM, so that only 711,217 military and civilian investigations were scheduled\n to be contracted to OPM in the next 2 years instead of 926,730 investigations\n (see Table 3).\n\n OPM conducting the military investigations will cause a similar increase in the\n number of cases received monthly at the CAFs of the Army, the Navy, the Air\n Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that experienced by the Washington\n Headquarters Service CAF. The significant increase in cases received over a\n short period of time will affect the ability of each CAF to adjudicate them in a\n timely manner. The Navy CAF had 60,345 cases4 pending as of June 30, 2000;\n therefore, an increase in the cases received will also increase the number of\n cases awaiting adjudication and lengthen the time required to obtain a final\n determination. Even the CAFs that do not have cases pending adjudication will\n develop a backlog because they will receive more cases than they can adjudicate\n\n\n3\n The number of pending cases will increase more rapidly. The vast majority of the original cases\n received from OPM were favorable investigations without derogatory information, and the Washington\n Headquarters Service CAF was processing the favorable cases as quickly as possible. With more\n derogatory cases, which take longer to adjudicate, the number of cases being closed with a final\n adjudicative decision has decreased.\n4\n The Navy CAF counts all workload assigned to an adjudicator, but not worked, as backlog. Within the\n 60,345 backlogged cases, there are approximately 16,478 clearance investigations to be adjudicated.\n The remaining 44,967 cases are for a variety of investigations pending an adjudicators review for other\n than an initial or periodic re-investigation for a security clearance.\n\n 7\n\x0c each day. Once the overdue periodic reinvestigations are completed, the\n workflow from OPM will return to a more steady state.\n\n Table 3. Secret and Confidential Investigations to OPM\n\n Dollars\n Requesting Agency Cases to OPM (in millions)\n Army 289,347 $63.7\n Navy 273,472 60.2\n Air Force 141,250 31.1\n Contractors 215,513 47.4\n Defense agencies 7,148 1.6\n Total 926,730 $204.0\n\n Less contractor requests 215,513 47.4\n Total to OPM 711,217 $156.6\n\n\n Security Suitability Investigations Index. All initial investigations performed\n by OPM require the Washington Headquarters Service CAF personnel to enter\n the personal identification data into the Defense Clearance and Investigations\n Index (DCII) after the investigation is closed, rather than DSS personnel\n entering the data when the case is opened. Executive Order 10450, \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity\n Requirements for Government Employment,\xe2\x80\x9d April 24, 1953, requires a\n security investigations index covering all persons who have been investigated by\n any department or agency of the Government. OPM records its investigations\n in the Security Suitability Investigations Index, and DoD records its\n investigations in the DCII. The Washington Headquarters Service CAF had\n always entered the personal identification data into the DCII for initial Secret\n and Confidential clearances. However, the addition of the initial Top Secret\n investigations being sent to OPM since October 1, 1999, affected the CAF\n because of the increase in the number of cases requiring input to the DCII. The\n Washington Headquarters Service CAF explained that the impact per\n investigation was not excessive, but compilation of the additional input for all of\n the clearances was significant.\n\nSecret and Confidential Clearance Requirements\n Investigation Requirements Change. A November 10, 1998, memorandum\n from the ASD(C3I) established that, effective January 1, 1999, DSS would begin\n implementing the NACLC for Secret and Confidential clearances as approved\n by the President on March 24, 1997. However, the investigations conducted by\n OPM\xe2\x80\x94the national agency check with written inquiries and credit check or the\n access national agency check with written inquiries and credit check\xe2\x80\x94would\n continue to serve as the basis for Secret and Confidential clearances for DoD\n\n 8\n\x0c civilian employees. Previously, the investigation for Secret and Confidential\n clearances was a national agency check for the military and contractors.\n\n The investigative scope change from the national agency check to the NACLC\n immediately affected the CAFs\xe2\x80\x99 workload because there was more adverse\n information to review and adjudicate for each case. The change in the\n investigative requirements to a NACLC for Secret and Confidential clearances\n was one cause for 411,505 Secret and Confidential periodic reinvestigations\n being overdue. However, the additional workload incurred from adjudicating\n more adverse information produced by NACLCs will not decrease after the\n overdue periodic reinvestigations are completed.\n\n Security Clearances for Navy and Air Force Military Recruits. An entrance\n national agency check is conducted on all enlisted members of the Armed\n Forces at the time of their initial entry and security clearances are obtained\n when required. The entrance national agency check is a computerized check on\n the person\xe2\x80\x99s name only and has no impact on the investigators\xe2\x80\x99 and adjudicators\xe2\x80\x99\n workload unless issues arise. The Navy and the Air Force decided to\n discontinue the entrance national agency check and use the NACLC for the new\n recruits. Their rationale was that the majority of their new recruits will\n eventually need a security clearance, so it is cheaper to conduct a NACLC\n initially, than to run an entrance national agency check, spend money training an\n individual, and then lose them when a clearance is required.\n\n Security Clearance Implementation. The NACLC implementation for\n new recruits will cause the Navy and the Air Force CAFs to experience an\n increase in their workload because entrance national agency checks require little\n adjudication, while the NACLC contains more information and, therefore,\n requires more adjudicative time. As a result, the Air Force estimated the\n increase to be 34,000 cases per year and authorized 22 adjudicators as\n temporary overhires for FY 2000 and FY 2001. The Air Force also included in\n the Program Objective Memorandum an additional 22 permanent adjudicators\n for FY 2002. Although the Navy CAF requested 21 additional adjudicators for\n FY 2001, the Navy did not program for an increase in adjudicators to handle the\n additional workload.\n\n First-Term Attrition Rates. General Accounting Office Report\n No. NSIAD-00-146, \xe2\x80\x9cMilitary Personnel: Services Need to Assess Efforts to\n Meet Recruiting Goals and Cut Attrition,\xe2\x80\x9d June 23, 2000, states that the latest\n attrition data available indicate that first-term attrition for DoD enlistees has\n reached an all-time high. For enlistees entering the Services in FY 1995 and\n leaving early before the end of FY 1999, the DoD overall separation rate was\n 36.8 percent. The early separation of new recruits is costly to the security\n clearance process because more investigations and adjudicative decisions are\n required for new recruits to replace those who leave early.\n\nJoint Personnel Adjudication System\n JPAS is the DoD personnel security migration system for the CAFs and DoD\n security managers and special security officers. The JPAS represents the virtual\n 9\n\x0c consolidation of the DoD CAFs and ensures the standardization and\n reengineering of core personnel security and adjudication processes. The Air\n Force was designated the Executive Agent, and the 497th Intelligence\n Group/Security and Communications Management was designated the Program\n Management Office on July 10, 1996. In 1998, the Air Force converted to the\n new adjudication management system database, SENTINEL KEY, which was\n the prototype baseline of JPAS. JPAS has two applications: the Joint\n Adjudication Management System for the DoD CAFs only, and the Joint\n Clearance and Access Verification System for approximately 20,000 DoD\n security managers and 10,000 industry security managers. BETA testing, using\n live data as a production system, is scheduled to begin September 2000 with the\n 95 CAFs and 65 CAF customers. DoD-wide implementation of JPAS is\n expected to begin in February 2001 with the unified commands and Defense\n agencies. During BETA testing, the CAFs will be required to use one-third of\n their total workforce and, for most CAFs, all data will have to be entered twice,\n once into the CAF system and once into JPAS.\n\n On May 18, 2000, at the JPAS Executive Steering Committee, some CAFs\n expressed concern about the timing of the implementation of JPAS. The Navy\n CAF stated that it had a backlog of 30,000 cases (see footnote 4 on page 7) as of\n March 2000. The CAF was below minimum staffing, and participation of one-\n third of its personnel in the BETA testing would severely strain its resources and\n add to the backlog. As of June 30, 2000, the Navy CAF\xe2\x80\x99s backlog had risen to\n 60,345 cases. Therefore, the Navy CAF will not use a full one-third of its staff\n for BETA testing, even though, according to DoD information systems\n professionals and two independent contractors, one-third of the CAF\xe2\x80\x99s personnel\n is necessary to adequately perform a complete system test.\n\n The Washington Headquarters Service CAF was also concerned that\n participating in BETA testing would strain its resources and add to the backlog.\n The National Security Agency CAF stated that automation did not decrease the\n need for an adjudication staff. In addition, several CAFs must continue running\n dual systems because the JPAS will not replace several unique functions\n performed by the legacy systems; for example, the capability to process and\n enter into the database the screening mission of approximately 25,000 cases per\n year by the Army CAF.\n\n There was also concern that funding for JPAS may be provided at the expense\n of CAF operations. Program Budget Decision 071, \xe2\x80\x9cWashington Headquarters\n (WHS), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense Legal Services\n Agency (DLSA), and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF),\xe2\x80\x9d\n December 1, 1999, directed that the annual operation and maintenance costs be\n provided from the funds previously programmed by the Components for CAF\n legacy systems. As a result, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army\n assessed the entire JPAS implementation bill against the Army CAF. An\n April 19, 2000, memorandum from the Adjutant General of the Army requested\n that the Deputy Assistant Secretary reverse the decision and provide funding.\n\n5\n The National Reconnaissance Office CAF adjudicates only Sensitive Compartmented Information\n access.\n\n 10\n\x0c The reason for the request was that the impact to the Army CAF would be a\n reduction-in-force of 23 people, when the Assistant Secretary of the Army\n (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) had recently approved an augmentation of\n 16 Reservists to address the overdue periodic reinvestigations.\n\n As a result of the impact of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System on the\n security clearance process, the Audit of the Acquisition Management of the Joint\n Personnel Adjudication System, Project No. D2001AL-0012, was announced\n September 15, 2000. The audit will determine whether the Joint Personnel\n Adjudication System is being cost-effectively acquired, monitored, tested, and\n prepared for deployment and system life cycle support.\n\nDefense Clearance and Investigations Index\n The DCII is the single, automated central repository that identifies investigations\n conducted by DoD investigative agencies and personnel security determinations\n made by DoD adjudicative authorities. DCII is operated and maintained by\n DSS. DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, \xe2\x80\x9cPersonnel Security Program,\xe2\x80\x9d requires each\n adjudicative determination, whether favorable or unfavorable, to be entered into\n the DCII on a daily basis, but in no case to exceed 5 working days from the date\n of determination. However, when the CAFs do not have access to the DCII,\n they do not have the ability to review all investigative entries on indexed\n subjects, other CAFs\xe2\x80\x99 adjudicative decisions, or to enter their adjudicative\n decisions into the system. Consequently, the cases pile up awaiting input of the\n adjudicative decision in the DCII.\n\n Availability. The availability of the DCII had been a continual problem since\n DSS converted to the CCMS in October 1998. In addition to the frequent\n nonavailability of the DCII, when the system is available, there are problems\n with connections being dropped and the system being slow. All access problems\n impede the adjudication process. A June 29, 2000, DSS memorandum\n distributed to DSS customers stated that on June 28, the DSS corporate database\n experienced a problem and was not available. The DSS corporate database\n affects the CCMS and the DCII. Availability was restored July 10, 2000. The\n DCII was also down on June 19 and June 26, which meant that DCII access was\n not available for 8 of the 14 workdays available in a 3 week period.\n\n Security Suitability Investigations Index. When the CAFs cannot\n access the DCII, most also cannot access the Security Suitability Investigations\n Index. A memorandum of understanding between DoD and OPM governs the\n operation and functions involved in the linkage of the DCII and the OPM\n Security Suitability Investigations Index. Authorized DCII users were able to\n obtain a \xe2\x80\x9cread only\xe2\x80\x9d search of the Security Suitability Investigations Index at the\n same time that they conducted a search of the DCII. Although some of the\n CAFs do have direct access to the Security Suitability Investigations Index, most\n are connected through the DCII. The Washington Headquarters Service CAF\n experienced additional nonavailability because of the DCII connectivity to the\n Security Suitability Investigations Index being down. With the increased\n\n\n 11\n\x0c number of investigations being conducted by OPM, access to the Security\n Suitability Investigations Index becomes a greater concern for the CAFs because\n the effect is greater.\n\n Navy Joint Adjudication and Clearance System. The Navy Joint\n Adjudication and Clearance System, the Navy\xe2\x80\x99s adjudicative database, is\n connected to the DSS corporate database, which includes CCMS and the DCII,\n so that when the DCII is not accessible, the Navy system is not accessible. The\n unavailability of DCII and the Navy Joint Adjudication and Clearance System\n contributed to the increase of cases pending (see footnote 4 on page 7) at the\n Navy CAF from 22,000 on September 30, 1999, to 60,345 on June 30, 2000.\n\nLarge Percent of Workforce to be Replaced\n A large percent of the DoD workforce will need to be replaced by FY 2007.\n With the increasing age of the DoD workforce and the growing opportunities for\n advancement in the private sector, the DoD is likely to lose 60 percent of its\n current workforce in the next 7 years. The new hires needed to replace the\n vacated positions will require new security clearances, which will increase the\n normal workload projected for that time period.\n\nInsider Threat Mitigation\n The Chief Information Officer, DoD, issued, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Insider Threat Mitigation\n Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team,\xe2\x80\x9d April 24, 2000,\n which contains 60 recommendations to reduce malicious behavior by insiders.\n The insider is anyone who is or has been authorized access to DoD information\n systems. Two of the six key elements of a strategy to minimize the impact of\n the insider threat are to seek to reduce the threat by establishing a high level of\n assurance in the trustworthiness of people, practices, systems and programs, and\n to strengthen personnel security and management practices.\n\n The report makes five recommendations that will directly impact the security\n clearance process. The recommendations establish a Category 1 information\n technology position, which is the equivalent of a Top Secret clearance or\n Sensitive Compartmented Information access, and a Category 2 information\n technology position, which is the equivalent of a Secret or Confidential\n clearance. If implemented, these recommendations would create the potential of\n requiring most DoD and contractor employees without a current Secret or Top\n Secret security clearance to obtain the equivalent investigation and adjudication.\n See Appendix D for additional details.\n\nAdditional Functions\n Each of the eight CAFs have acquired additional functions that affect the\n adjudicators\xe2\x80\x99 workload beyond adjudicating security clearances. For example,\n Army adjudicators review security files for individuals being considered for\n\n 12\n\x0c promotion to Colonel, General Officer, Senior Executive Service, or selected\n other assignments. The National Security Agency was taking steps to outsource\n pieces of its information technology infrastructure. The National Security\n Agency wanted to structure the contract so that the National Security Agency\xe2\x80\x99s\n information technology workers for this infrastructure would want to transfer\n permanently to the contractor. Consequently, the National Security Agency\n CAF has to review as many as 2,000 personnel files by the end of FY 2000 for\n employees to transfer permanently to a contractor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff\n CAF is a full security office, which requires its adjudicators to also perform the\n initial functions of the security clearance process, such as submitting requests\n for investigation. The Secretaries of the Services and the Directors of the\n Defense agencies need to consider the other functions required by the CAFs\n when determining the appropriate staffing level for the CAFs.\n\nPersonnel Issues Affecting Adjudicative Facilities\n Issues such as the retirement eligibility of the adjudicators and overtime will\n affect all CAFs. The impact of these issues must be assessed for each CAF.\n\n Adjudicators Eligible to Retire. The increasing workload for the CAFs will be\n affected by the large percent of adjudicators who will be eligible to retire by\n FY 2005. The CAFs had not hired new adjudicators because of downsizing in\n the past several years. Of the 191 adjudicators in the 8 CAFs, 65 or 34 percent\n will be eligible to retire by FY 2005 (see Table 4).\n\n Table 4. Adjudicators Eligible to Retire by 2005\n\n Adjudicators Eligible to Retire Percent of\n Central Adjudication Facility (June 2000) by 2005 Workforce\n Army 56 11 20\n Navy 47 12 26\n Air Force 39 15 38\n Washington Headquarters\n Service 11 9 82\n Defense Office of Hearings\n and Appeals 11 6 55\n Joint Chiefs Staff 2 1 50\n Defense Intelligence Agency 10 8 80\n National Security Agency 15 3 20\n Total 191 65 34\n\n\n Overtime. Several CAFs were addressing the increased workload by\n implementing overtime. For example, adjudicators for the National Security\n\n 13\n\x0c Agency CAF worked 506 overtime hours in April, 449 overtime hours in May,\n and 530 overtime hours in June 2000 to process only the current workload, not\n to reduce the cases pending. If this trend continues, it would equate to\n 5,730 hours over 12 months or 2.75 man-years in overtime. However, because\n of the 2,000 additional personnel security files to be reviewed for the contract\n outsourcing information technology, the CAF estimates that the overtime\n required will at least double. The Washington Headquarters Service CAF\n explored overtime as an option and found that it was not an adequate solution\n because the increased workload is a long-term problem, and overtime for an\n extended period burns out personnel.\n\nAssessment of Adjudicative Personnel Requirements\n A June 15, 1999, ASD(C3I) memorandum stated that Components were\n expected to identify the resources necessary to fund the completion of the\n overdue periodic reinvestigations as well as to accomplish the adjudications at\n the end of the process. In the Deputy Secretary of Defense March 31, 2000,\n memorandum, DoD Components were directed to provide the resources\n necessary to fund the Overarching Personnel Security Integrated Process Team\'s\n solution of transferring all Secret and Confidential investigations for military\n and civilian personnel to OPM and any additional costs such as adjudication\n support to handle the surge in the required workload.\n\n Air Force. The Air Force CAF had 39 adjudicators and was bringing 22 Air\n Force Reservists and Air National Guardsmen on board to handle the overdue\n periodic reinvestigations. In addition, the Air Force was hiring 22 temporary\n adjudicators, to be converted to permanent in FY 2002, to assist with the\n increased workload resulting from the change to the NACLC investigation for\n Secret and Confidential clearances and the change from entrance national agency\n check being performed for new recruits to the full NACLC. The CAF was\n restricted by the physical space and the number of computers available, so to\n accommodate the additional personnel, the CAF established a second shift in\n May 2000. The second shift allows the same space and computers to be used\n twice and also allows the new adjudicators\xe2\x80\x99 training to work without the normal\n interruptions of daily operations such as phone calls. The Air Force senior\n leadership acknowledged the importance of the security clearances by providing\n the CAF with the approved funding required to eliminate the overdue periodic\n reinvestigations within a 2 year period, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of\n Defense in a June 9, 1999, memorandum.\n\n Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. The Defense Office of Hearings and\n Appeals CAF requested and received approval for 18 temporary overhires for\n FY 2000 and an additional 4 temporary overhires for FY 2001, which would be\n reduced to 13 temporary overhires in FY 2002. The Defense Office of\n Hearings and Appeals issued a personnel vacancy announcement and planned to\n hire 12 temporary adjudicators; the other authorized positions would be a mix of\n Department Counsel and Administrative Judges. The Defense Office of\n Hearings and Appeals\xe2\x80\x99 request was based on an October 1999 requirements\n assessment. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals planned to do another\n assessment based on current figures and submit a new request, if necessary.\n 14\n\x0c Services and Defense Agencies. The six other CAFs assessed the impact of the\n overdue periodic reinvestigations; however, they were not provided all the\n additional resources they requested. The senior leadership of the Services and\n the Defense agencies needs to provide adequate support to the CAFs. The\n Heads of the DoD Components are responsible for administering the DoD\n personnel security program within their area of responsibility. However, the\n CAFs did not receive the necessary personnel and resources required to\n adjudicate the increased workload of security clearance requirements. The\n Secretaries of the Services and the Directors of the Defense agencies should be\n aware that the resource requirements at the CAFs need to be reassessed because\n of the operational impact of not receiving security clearances timely and because\n of the congressional interest being shown.\n\nConclusion\n The number of cases requiring adjudication was rising at a rate faster than the\n CAFs\xe2\x80\x99 ability to process adjudicative decisions in a timely manner. The\n increase in the number of investigations processed through DSS and OPM was a\n positive step in reducing the number of overdue periodic reinvestigations.\n However, the CAFs will be required to adjudicate a significant number of\n investigative cases; therefore, CAF resources need to be reassessed and\n appropriate actions taken to ensure that the CAFs are able to process timely\n adjudicative decisions. If the adjudicative function is not properly staffed and\n results in delays, causing the adjudicators to adjudicate stale information, the\n effectiveness of the adjudicative process also would be impaired. Therefore, the\n CAFs need to assess short-term and long-term personnel and resource\n requirements, and the Services and Defense agencies need to budget for the\n personnel and financial resources needed to accomplish the adjudications and the\n appeals. It is imperative that these issues be considered during the ongoing\n formulation of the Defense budget for FY 2002 and the outyears.\n\nManagement Comments on the Finding and Audit Response\n The Defense Security Service commented that it had issued five rather than six\n augmentation contracts. Accordingly, we revised the Investigations Pending at\n the Defense Security Service section of the report.\n\n The National Security Agency specified that the Director of Central Intelligence\n is responsible for policy, guidance, and oversight of Sensitive Compartmented\n Information. We added a footnote to the responsibilities section to identify this.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0cRecommendations, Management Comments, and Audit\n Response\n 1. We recommend that the Directors and Chiefs of the eight DoD central\n adjudication facilities:\n\n a. Analyze and assess all factors that affect the adjudication and\n appeals process.\n\n b. Determine the number of personnel and amount of resources that\n will be required.\n\n Department of the Army Comments. The Army concurred with the\n recommendation. The Army will assess the resource requirements for the\n factors identified in the report within 60 days of the final report issuance.\n\n Audit Response. The Army comments were generally responsive, although the\n assessment was needed as soon as the draft audit report was provided in August\n 2000.\n\n Department of the Navy Comments. The Navy took exception to the\n recommendation, stating that the Most Efficient Organization Study completed\n in July 1999 considered and addressed the overdue periodic reinvestigations and\n all other factors impacting the workload and required resources.\n\n Audit Response. The Navy comment was not fully responsive. Although the\n Most Efficient Organization Study did address the overdue periodic\n reinvestigations, it was based on assumptions used for the projected FY 2003\n workload and was premised on the successful operation of numerous automated\n enhancements. As of September 2000, project management had greatly\n improved, but high risks remain in resolving design problems for the Case\n Control Management System. Further, availability of the Navy Joint\n Adjudication and Clearance System is impacted because it is hosted on the Case\n Control Management System and the Enterprise System server. The study also\n assumed that, by FY 2000, the revalidation of collateral security clearances\n would not be required when individuals arrive at their new commands. This\n assumption was based on the Joint Personnel Adjudication System being\n released in FY 2000 to allow the Department of the Navy Central Adjudication\n Facility customers to perform their own status checks. However, the Joint\n Personnel Adjudication System is scheduled for Beta testing from\n November 2000 to March 31, 2001, with the central adjudication facilities and\n 65 customers. Therefore, we believe the assumptions used by the Most\n Efficient Organizational Study are no longer valid for analyzing and assessing\n the resources required by the Department of the Navy Central Adjudication\n Facility, especially in FY 2002. Accordingly, we request that the Navy\n reconsider its position and provide additional comments in response to the final\n report.\n\n\n\n 16\n\x0cDepartment of the Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred with the\nrecommendation. The Air Force plans to hire, by November 31, 2000, the\nresources necessary through FY 2002. The continuing reinvestigation\nrequirements will be evaluated at the end of FY 2002 and any additional\nresources required will be funded. Additionally, the Air Force is establishing an\nelectronic capability at the Office of Personnel Management to allow for\nelectronic submission of investigative requests from Air Force requesters\nworldwide.\n\nDefense Office of Hearings and Appeals Comments. The Defense Office of\nHearings and Appeals did not comment on a draft of this report. We request\nthat the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals provide comments in response\nto the final report.\nDefense Intelligence Agency Comments. The Defense Intelligence Agency did\nnot comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Defense Intelligence\nAgency provide comments in response to the final report.\n\nNational Security Agency Comments. The National Security Agency\nconcurred with the recommendation and stated that it had completed an analysis\nand determined the number of personnel and the amount of resources required.\n\nJoint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation\nand stated that they currently have two trained adjudicators to ensure that\npersonnel in mission-critical and high-risk positions are cleared in a timely\nmanner.\n\nWashington Headquarters Service Comments. The Washington Headquarters\nService concurred with the recommendation and stated that it will continue to\nevaluate the resource levels of personnel security functions.\n\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence) Comments. Although not required to comment, the Director of\nSecurity, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,\nCommunications, and Intelligence), concurred with the recommendation and\nstated that for FYs 2001 and 2002 the Army and the Air Force identified\nresources to work the periodic reinvestigation backlog; the Navy approved a\nplan to provide resources; the Washington Headquarters Service and the\nDefense Office of Hearings and Appeals had finalized their resource plans; and\nthe Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office must develop a plan to ensure\nsufficient resources exist to process cases in a timely manner. In addition, the\nNational Security Council tasked the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with\nthe Defense Security Service and the Office of Personnel Management to\ndevelop an adjudicative "spend plan" for expected monthly input of\ninvestigations to the central adjudication facilities.\n\nDefense Security Service Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nDefense Security Service concurred with the recommendation.\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0c2. We recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the\nAir Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Directors of\nthe Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Office of Hearings and\nAppeals, the National Security Agency, and the Washington Headquarters\nService provide the resources required for the central adjudication facilities\nto adjudicate and process the appeals for the projected security clearance\nrequests.\n\nDepartment of the Army Comments. The Army concurred and stated it\nwould consider additional authorizations if the assessment of the resource\nrequirements determined that the 16 Reservists authorized were not sufficient.\nAlso, the Army requested that we recommend that the Under Secretary of\nDefense (Comptroller) provide supplemental funding.\nAudit Response. We did not recommend supplemental funding because we\ncannot prejudge the outcome of the overall FY 2002 budget review, but we\nbelieve that Recommendation 4 meets the Army\'s concern.\n\nDepartment of the Navy Comments. The Navy concurred and stated that on\nSeptember 15, 2000, funding was provided for 10 additional civilian full time\nequivalents and 30 Reservist billets. Billets for 10 Reservists are funded\nthrough FY 2007 with 20 Reservist scheduled for a two-year period. In\naddition, six vacancies will be filled.\n\nDepartment of the Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred and stated\nthat it anticipates that any forthcoming requirements will be adequately\naddressed by the Air Force. Further, the Air Force had also authorized funding\nto perform the adjudication function identified in an October 1999 Air\nIntelligence Agency manpower study.\n\nDefense Office of Hearings and Appeals Comments. The Defense Office of\nHearings and Appeals did not comment on a draft of this report. We request\nthat the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals provide comments in response\nto the final report.\n\nDefense Intelligence Agency Comments. The Defense Intelligence Agency did\nnot comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Defense Intelligence\nAgency provide comments in response to the final report.\n\nNational Security Agency Comments. The National Security Agency\nconcurred with the recommendation and stated that it was analyzing the National\nSecurity Agency Central Adjudication Facility\'s assessment of the number of\npersonnel and resources required for the adjudication and the appeals processes.\n\nJoint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation.\n\nWashington Headquarters Service Comments. The Washington Headquarters\nService concurred with the recommendation and stated that it has authorized two\nfull-time equivalents in FY 2000 and two additional full-time equivalents in\nFY 2001. In addition, the remaining full-time equivalents will be addressed\nthrough the advance recruitment authority.\n 18\n\x0cAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence) Comments. Although not required to comment on the\nrecommendation, the Director of Security, Office of the Assistant Secretary of\nDefense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), concurred\nand stated that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,\nand the Joint Staff have no appreciable adjudicative backlog.\n\nDefense Security Service Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nDefense Security Service concurred with the recommendation.\n\n3. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,\nControl, Communications, and Intelligence) analyze the impact of the Joint\nPersonnel Adjudication System implementation, in conjunction with the\nDirectors and Chiefs of the eight DoD central adjudication facilities, on the\nDoD central adjudication facilities\xe2\x80\x99 completion of the increased workload\nrequired by the overdue periodic reinvestigations and determine an\nimplementation date.\n\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence) Comments. The Director of Security, Office of the Assistant\nSecretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence),\npartially concurred with the recommendation and acknowledged there would be\ntemporary workload increases during implementation. The Army, the Navy,\nand the Air Force identified additional resources for the central adjudication\nfacilities; however, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, the\nWashington Headquarters Service, and the Defense Industrial Security\nClearance Office are evaluating additional resource requirements. This issue\nwas to be on the agenda for final discussion at the Joint Personnel Adjudication\nSystem Executive Steering Committee meeting in September 2000.\n\nAudit Response. The Director of Security, Office of the Assistant Secretary of\nDefense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), comments are\nresponsive. We agree that the Joint Personnel Adjudication System will be a\nuseful tool to both DoD managers and the central adjudication facilities;\nhowever, the impact of implementing the Joint Personnel Adjudication System\nduring the increased workload required by the overdue periodic reinvestigations\nneeded to be thoroughly analyzed. No further comments are required.\n\nDepartment of the Army Comments. The Army concurred with the\nrecommendation. The Army stated that unless the Joint Personnel Adjudication\nSystem is delayed beyond the elimination of the overdue periodic\nreinvestigations, testing should begin in November 2000, as scheduled.\n\nDepartment of the Navy Comments. The Navy concurred with the\nrecommendation.\n\nDepartment of the Air Force Comments. The Air Force nonconcurred with\nthe recommendation and stated that the consensus was to continue with the Joint\nPersonnel Adjudication System implementation schedule because the workload\n\n\n 19\n\x0cfluctuations will continue for the unforeseeable future and because it is the\npersonnel security management tool that will assist in determining future\ninvestigative requirements.\n\nAudit Response. Despite the nonconcurrence, the Air Force is participating in\nthe Joint Personnel Adjudication System Steering Committee, which was\naddressing the intent of the recommendation. No further comments are\nnecessary.\n\nDefense Office of Hearings and Appeals Comments. The Defense Office of\nHearings and Appeals did not comment on a draft of this report. We request\nthat the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals provide comments in response\nto the final report.\nDefense Intelligence Agency Comments. The Defense Intelligence Agency did\nnot comment on a draft of this report. We request that the Defense Intelligence\nAgency provide comments in response to the final report.\n\nNational Security Agency Comments. The National Security Agency\nconcurred with the recommendation and stated that it will continue to work with\nthe Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence) on the impact of the implementation of the Joint Personnel\nAdjudication System.\n\nJoint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation.\n\nWashington Headquarters Service Comments. The Washington Headquarters\nService did not comment on the recommendation.\n\nAudit Response. Because the Joint Personnel Adjudication System Steering\nCommittee, which includes the Washington Headquarters Service, was\naddressing the recommendation, no comment is required.\n\nDefense Security Service Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nDefense Security Service concurred with the recommendation.\n\n4. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)\nand the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,\nCommunications, and Intelligence) review the DoD Components\xe2\x80\x99 budget\nsubmissions to ensure that the DoD budget for FY 2002 and outyears\nenables the central adjudication facilities to meet forecasted workload\nrequirements.\n\nUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Comments. The Director for\nRevolving Funds, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),\nconcurred with the recommendation and stated that the central adjudication\nfacilities will be included as part of the overall DoD Appropriation budget\nreview and the central adjudication facilities\' execution plans will be coordinated\nwith the execution plans provided by the Defense Security Service and the\nOffice of Personnel Management for processing security clearance\ninvestigations.\n 20\n\x0cAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and\nIntelligence) Comments. The Director of Security, Office of the Assistant\nSecretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence),\nconcurred with the recommendation and stated that the review of budget\nsubmissions is already underway.\n\nDepartment of the Navy Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nNavy concurred with the recommendation.\n\nDepartment of the Air Force Comments. Although not required to comment,\nthe Air Force concurred and stated that the recommendation should be expanded\nto include the designated investigative agencies. The Air Force will monitor\ntrends quarterly.\nDefense Security Service Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nDefense Security Service concurred with the recommendation.\n\nNational Security Agency Comments. Although not required to comment, the\nNational Security Agency concurred with the recommendation and stated that on\nSeptember 22, 2000, it reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense\n(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) that it needed four\nadditional adjudicators and additional funding in FYs 2001 and 2002 in addition\nto the resources identified by the National Security Agency Central Adjudication\nFacility.\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\x0cAppendix A. Audit Process\n\nScope\n Work Performed. We reviewed the personnel, the resources and requested or\n approved increases, the projected workload increase, the effect of the increasing\n workload, and training requirements at the eight DoD CAFs.\n\n DoD-Wide Corporate Level Government Performance and Results Act\n Coverage. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, the\n Secretary of Defense annually establishes DoD-wide corporate level goals,\n subordinate performance goals, and performance measures. This report pertains\n to achievement of the following goal, subordinate performance goals, and\n performance measures:\n\n FY 2001 DoD Corporate Level Goal 2: Prepare now for an uncertain future\n by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative\n superiority in key warfighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting\n the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineering the Department to achieve\n a 21st century infrastructure. (00-DoD-2) Subordinate Performance\n Goal 2.1: Recruit, retain, and develop personnel to maintain a highly skilled\n and motivated force capable of meeting tomorrow\xe2\x80\x99s challenges (00-DoD-2.1)\n FY 2000 Performance Measure 2.1.1: Enlisted Recruiting. (00-DoD-2.1.1)\n Subordinate Performance Goal 2.3: Streamline the DoD infrastructure by\n redesigning the Department\xe2\x80\x99s support structure and pursuing business practice\n reforms. (00-DoD-2.3) FY 2000 Performance Measure 2.3.1: Percentage of\n the DoD Budget Spent on Infrastructure. (00-DoD-2.3.1)\n\n General Accounting Office High-Risk Area. The General Accounting Office\n has identified several high-risk areas in the DoD. This report provides coverage\n indirectly related to the Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition, the Information\n Management and Technology, and the Military Personnel Management high-risk\n areas.\n\nMethodology\n To determine the personnel and resource requirements of the eight CAFS to\n process security clearance requests in a timely manner, we interviewed\n personnel from the eight CAFS to determine how they operated. We also\n compared the cases processed for the period from May 1994 through June 2000\n and determined the factors that would affect the CAFs within the next 5 years.\n\n Use of Computer-Processed Data. We relied on computer-processed data for\n the number of cases that the CAFs receive and adjudicate. We did not perform\n tests of system general and application controls to confirm the reliability of the\n data. We did not establish reliability of the data because there is no other\n source of security clearance investigations to be adjudicated, and DSS cannot\n 22\n\x0cidentify the cases provided to each CAF for adjudication. We believe that any\nerror rate would be insignificant to the finding because the number of cases to\nbe adjudicated is affected by so many factors. Therefore, not establishing the\nreliability of the databases will not materially affect the results of our audit.\n\nAudit Type, Dates, and Standards. We conducted this economy and\nefficiency audit from May 2000 through August 2000, in accordance with\nauditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as\nimplemented by the Inspector General, DoD.\n\nContacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and\norganizations within DoD. Further details are available upon request.\n\nManagement Control Program. We will address the CAFs\' management\ncontrol program in a later report.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\x0cAppendix B. Prior Coverage\n During the last 6 years, the Inspector General, DoD, issued six reports; the\n General Accounting Office issued two reports; the Joint Security\n Commission II, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government\n Secrecy, and the Joint Security Commission issued one report each on security\n clearance background investigations.\n\n\nGeneral Accounting Office\n General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-0012 (OSD Case No. 1901),\n \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Personnel, Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National\n Security Risks,\xe2\x80\x9d October 27, 1999.\n\n General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-00215 (OSD Case No. 2055),\n \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Personnel, More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security\n Clearance Reinvestigations,\xe2\x80\x9d August 24, 2000.\n\n\nInspector General, DoD\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. D-2000-134, \xe2\x80\x9cTracking Security\n Clearance Requests,\xe2\x80\x9d May 30, 2000.\n\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. D-2000-111, \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity Clearance\n Investigative Priorities,\xe2\x80\x9d April 5, 2000.\n\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. D-2000-072, \xe2\x80\x9cExpediting Security\n Clearance Background Investigations for Three Special Access Programs\xe2\x80\x9d (U),\n January 31, 2000. (SECRET)\n\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-124, \xe2\x80\x9cDepartment of Defense\n Adjudication Program,\xe2\x80\x9d April 27, 1998.\n\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-067, \xe2\x80\x9cAccess Reciprocity Between\n DoD Special Access Programs\xe2\x80\x9d (U), February 10, 1998. (CONFIDENTIAL)\n\n Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 97-196, \xe2\x80\x9cPersonnel Security in the\n Department of Defense,\xe2\x80\x9d July 25, 1997.\n\n\nOthers\n Joint Security Commission II, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Joint Security Commission II,\xe2\x80\x9d\n August 24, 1999.\n\n\n 24\n\x0cCommission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Senate\nDocument 105-2, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing\nGovernment Secrecy,\xe2\x80\x9d March 3, 1997.\n\nJoint Security Commission, \xe2\x80\x9cRedefining Security,\xe2\x80\x9d February 28, 1994.\n\n\n\n\n 25\n\x0cAppendix C. Factors Affecting Personnel and\n Resources at Each Facility\n\n Air\n Factors Army Navy Force WHS1 DOHA2 JCS3 DIA4 NSA5\nOverdue periodic reinvestigations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nPeriodic reinvestigations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nInvestigations pending at DSS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nInvestigations by OPM Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No\nSecret and Confidential requirements\n Investigation change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No\n Navy and Air Force recruits No Yes Yes No No No No No\n First-term attrition rates Yes Yes Yes No No No No No\nJoint Personnel Adjudication System Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nDefense Clearance and Investigations Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nLarge percent of workforce to be replaced Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nInsider Threat Mitigation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nAdditional functions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\nIssues affecting adjudicative facilities\n Adjudicators eligible to retire Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\n Overtime No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes\n\n1\n Washington Headquarters Service\n2\n Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals\n3\n Joint Chiefs of Staff\n4\n Defense Intelligence Agency\n5\n National Security Agency\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\x0cAppendix D. Insider Threat Mitigation\n The Chief Information Officer, DoD, issued the \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Insider Threat Mitigation\n Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team,\xe2\x80\x9d April 24, 2000,\n for review and comment. The report results from the actions of the Insider\n Threat Integrated Process Team requested by the Senior Civilian Officer of\n ASD(C3I) and contains 60 recommendations. The team\xe2\x80\x99s charter was \xe2\x80\x9cto foster\n the effective development of interdependent technical and procedural\n safeguards\xe2\x80\x9d to reduce malicious behavior by insiders. The insider is anyone\n who is or has been authorized access to DoD information systems. Inspector\n General, DoD, Report No. 97-049, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Management of Information\n Assurance Efforts to Protect Automated Information Systems,\xe2\x80\x9d September 25,\n 1997, indicated that, for one set of investigations, 87 percent of identified\n intruders into DoD information systems were either employees or others internal\n to the organization. Two of the six key elements of a strategy to minimize the\n impact of the insider threat are:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Establish trustworthiness \xe2\x80\x93 seek to reduce the threat by establishing a\n high level of assurance in the trustworthiness of people, practices,\n systems and programs, and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Strengthen personnel security and management practices.\n\n The insider threat is to closed systems that process classified information and\n open systems that process unclassified information. The report stated that\n ASD(C3I) must develop a Personnel Security Strategic Plan for determining the\n right mix of investigative, adjudicative and continuous monitoring methods\n needed to maintain an acceptable level of assurance in the trustworthiness,\n reliability and loyalty of the workforce (insider).\n\n The report makes five recommendations that will directly impact the security\n clearance process.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Create two distinct categories of information technology insider. The\n proposed differentiation is:\n\n \xe2\x88\x92 Category 1: Positions involving privileged access to DoD\n information technology systems with the capability to alter the\n intended operation or proper configuration of the system.\n\n \xe2\x88\x92 Category 2: Positions involving general access to DoD\n information technology systems with read/write permissions,\n and whose incumbents can receive information from, input\n information to, or modify information on a system without a\n reliable human review. An alternative would be to make this\n the \xe2\x80\x9call other\xe2\x80\x9d category to include everyone with access to\n DoD information systems or networks.\n\n\n\n 27\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Establish, as an investigative prerequisite, the requirement for a\n favorable single scope background investigation completed within the\n past 5 years for Category 1 insiders.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Establish, as the investigative prerequisite, the requirements for a\n NACLC associated with access to Secret or Confidential access for\n Category 2 insiders.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Conduct minimum periodic reinvestigations at the 5-year interval for\n Category 1 information technology positions and a 10-year interval\n Category 2 information technology positions.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Mandate completion of minimum requirements prior to permitting a\n Category 1 insider to assume assigned duties.\nThese recommendations make a Category 1 the equivalent of a Top Secret\nclearance or Sensitive Compartmented Information access and a Category 2 the\nequivalent of a Secret or Confidential clearance. If implemented, these\nrecommendations would create the potential of requiring most DoD and\ncontractor employees without a current Secret or Top Secret security clearance\nto obtain the equivalent investigation and adjudication.\n\n\n\n\n 28\n\x0cAppendix E. Report Distribution\n\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense\nUnder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics\n Director, Special Programs\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)\n Director, Security\n Deputy Director, Personnel Security\nUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)\n Deputy Chief Financial Officer\n Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)\n Director (Program Analysis and Evaluation)\nGeneral Counsel of the Department of Defense\n Deputy General Counsel, Legal Counsel\n Director, Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals\nDirector, Washington Headquarters Service\n Director, Directorate for Personnel and Security\n Chief, Consolidated Adjudication Facility\n\nJoint Staff\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nDirector, Joint Staff\nDirector of Management\n Chief, Joint Staff Security Office\n Chief, Personnel Security Branch\n\nDepartment of the Army\nSecretary of the Army\nChief, Army Technology Management Office\nAuditor General, Department of the Army\nCommander, Total Army Personnel Command\n Adjutant General, The Adjutant General Directorate\n Commander, Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility\n\nDepartment of the Navy\nSecretary of the Navy\nAssistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)\nNaval Inspector General\nDirector, Special Programs Division, Chief of Naval Operations\n\n\n 29\n\x0cDepartment of the Navy (cont.)\nAuditor General, Department of the Navy\nSuperintendent, Naval Post Graduate School\nDirector, Naval Criminal Investigative Service\n Director, Central Adjudication Facility\n\nDepartment of the Air Force\nAssistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)\nAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force\n Director, Security and Special Programs Oversight\n Director, Air Force Central Adjudication Facility\nAuditor General, Department of the Air Force\n\nOther Defense Organizations\nDirector, Defense Intelligence Agency\n Director, Directorate for Administration\n Chief, Counter Intelligence and Security Activities\n Chief, Central Adjudication Facility\n Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency\nDirector, Defense Security Service\n Inspector General, Defense Security Service\n Director, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office\nDirector, National Security Agency\n Director, Security Services\n Chief, Personnel Security Analysis\n Chief, Central Adjudication Facility\n Inspector General, National Security Agency\nInspector General, National Imagery and Mapping Agency\n\nNon-Defense Federal Organization\nOffice of Management and Budget\n\n\n\n\n 30\n\x0cCongressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and\n Ranking Minority Member\nSenate Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Committee on Armed Services\nSenate Committee on Governmental Affairs\nSenate Select Committee on Intelligence\nHouse Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Committee on Armed Services\nHouse Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,\n Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International\n Relations, Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence\n\n\n\n\n 31\n\x0c\x0cUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)\nComments\n\n\n\n\n 33\n\x0c34\n\x0cAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command,\nControl, Communications, and Intelligence)\nComments\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\x0c36\n\x0c37\n\x0cDepartment of the Army Comments\n\n\n\n\n 38\n\x0cDepartment of the Navy Comments\n\n\n\n\n 39\n\x0cDepartment of the Air Force Comments\n\n\n\n\n 40\n\x0c41\n\x0c42\n\x0c43\n\x0c Defense Security Service Comments\n Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\nRevised page 6\n\n\n\n\n 44\n\x0cNational Security Agency Comments\n\n Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Added page 2\n\n\n\n\n 45\n\x0c46\n\x0c47\n\x0cJoint Staff Comments\n\n\n\n\n 48\n\x0cWashington Headquarters Services Comments\n\n\n\n\n 49\n\x0c50\n\x0cAudit Team Members\nThe Acquisition Management Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for\nAuditing, DoD, prepared this report. Personnel of the Office of the Inspector, DoD,\nwho contributed to the report are listed below.\n\nThomas F. Gimble\nMary L. Ugone\nRobert K. West\nLois A. Therrien\nSheri D. Dillard\nSetranique T. Clawson\nEric G. Fisher\nDavid C. Williams\n\x0c'


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 7.5.2008
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 120/18
 BESCHLUSS DER KOMMISSION
 vom 6. Mai 2008
 über den finanziellen Beitrag der Gemeinschaft im Jahre 2008 für die Computerisierung der veterinärrechtlichen Verfahren, das Tierseuchenmeldesystem, die Kommunikationsmaßnahmen, Studien und Bewertungen
 (2008/361/EG)
 DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN —
 gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft,
 gestützt auf die Entscheidung 90/424/EWG des Rates vom 26. Juni 1990 über bestimmte Ausgaben im Veterinärbereich (1), insbesondere auf Artikel 17, 20, 37 Absatz 2 und 37a Absatz 2,
 in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe:
 (1)
 Mit der Entscheidung 90/424/EWG werden die Modalitäten der finanziellen Beteiligung der Gemeinschaft an bestimmten tierärztlichen Maßnahmen, insbesondere im Bereich der Informationspolitik im Bereich der Tiergesundheit, des Tierschutzes, der Lebensmittelsicherheit, der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Maßnahmen und der Überwachung festgelegt.
 (2)
 Gemäß Artikel 37a Absatz 1 Buchstabe b der Entscheidung 90/424/EWG des Rates kann zur Informatisierung der veterinärrechtlichen Verfahren für die Errichtung, Verwaltung und Unterhaltung integrierter EDV-Systeme für das Veterinärwesen, einschließlich etwaiger Schnittstellen mit nationalen Datenbanken, gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe gewährt werden. Folglich sollte für Unterbringung, Betrieb und Pflege des mit der Entscheidung 2003/24/EG der Kommission vom 30. Dezember 2002 über die Entwicklung eines integrierten EDV-Systems für das Veterinärwesen (2) eingeführten integrierten EDV-Systems für das Veterinärwesen TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System) eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe zur Gewährleistung der Verfügbarkeit, Sicherheit und Aktualität des Systems gewährt werden.
 (3)
 Gemäß Artikel 37 Absatz 1 der Entscheidung 90/424/EWG kann für den Aufbau der Systeme zur Identifizierung der Tiere und zur Meldung der Seuchen im Rahmen der Regelung der viehseuchenrechtlichen Kontrollen im innergemeinschaftlichen Handel mit lebenden Tieren im Hinblick auf den gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt eine finanzielle Beteiligung der Gemeinschaft gewährt werden. Folglich sollte eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe für die Aktualisierung des Tierseuchenmeldesystems (ADNS) auf der Grundlage der Entscheidung 2005/176/EG der Kommission vom 1. März 2005 zur Festlegung der Code-Form und der Codes für die Mitteilung von Tierseuchen gemäß der Richtlinie 82/894/EWG (3) des Rates im Hinblick auf die erforderlichen technischen Verbesserungen gewährt werden.
 (4)
 In der Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament, den Rat, den Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss sowie den Ausschuss der Regionen über eine neue Tiergesundheitsstrategie für die Europäische Union (2007—2013) — „Vorbeugung ist die beste Medizin“ (4) („Mitteilung über eine neue Tiergesundheitsstrategie“) wird die Verpflichtung der Kommission festgehalten, die Kommunikation mit den Stakeholdern und Verbrauchern zu verbessern.
 (5)
 Gemäß Artikel 16 der Entscheidung 90/424/EWG des Rates fördert die Gemeinschaft mit einer finanziellen Beteiligung eine Informationspolitik im Bereich der Tiergesundheit, des Tierschutzes und der Sicherheit von Lebensmitteln tierischen Ursprungs. Folglich sollte eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe für die Umsetzung von Maßnahmen für eine verbesserte Kommunikation mit Verbrauchern und Stakeholdern im Bereich Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz in dem in der Mitteilung über eine neue Tiergesundheitsstrategie dargestellten Rahmen gewährt werden.
 (6)
 Gemäß Artikel 19 der Entscheidung 90/424/EWG kann die Gemeinschaft die für die Weiterentwicklung des Veterinärrechts der Gemeinschaft und der Aus- oder Fortbildung im Veterinärbereich notwendigen wissenschaftlichen und technischen Maßnahmen durchführen oder aber die Mitgliedstaaten oder internationale Organisationen bei deren Durchführung unterstützen.
 (7)
 Eines der erwarteten Ergebnisse der Strategie ist die schrittweise Einführung der elektronischen Rinderkennzeichnung. Folglich ist vor der Einführung neuer Rechtsvorschriften in diesem Bereich eine Kosten-Nutzen- und Kostenrentabilitätsanalyse der elektronischen Rinderkennzeichnung erforderlich. Zur Verbesserung der Arbeit der gemeinschaftlichen Referenzlabors ist eine Bewertung ihrer Funktion und Leistung erforderlich. Auf der Grundlage der Ergebnisse dieser Studien und Bewertungen können, sofern erforderlich, die Rechtsvorschriften in diesem Bereich überprüft werden. Folglich sollte sich die Gemeinschaft an der Finanzierung von Studien und Bewertungen in den Bereichen Lebensmittelsicherheit, Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz sowie Tierzucht beteiligen. Es sollte ein Höchstbetrag für die Finanzierung dieser Maßnahmen festgelegt werden. Zu diesem Zweck werden im Jahr 2008 Ausschreibungen für die Durchführung, im Rahmen von Einzelverträgen, von Studien und Bewertungen in den Bereichen Lebensmittelsicherheit, Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz sowie Tierzucht veröffentlicht. Gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1290/2005 des Rates vom 21. Juni 2005 über die Finanzierung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (5) sind Veterinärmaßnahmen aus dem Europäischen Garantiefonds für die Landwirtschaft (EGFL) zu finanzieren. Zu Zwecken der Finanzkontrolle finden die Artikel 9, 36 und 37 dieser Verordnung Anwendung.
 (8)
 Die Finanzhilfe der Gemeinschaft wird davon abhängig gemacht, dass die geplanten Maßnahmen tatsächlich durchgeführt werden und die Auftragnehmer alle erforderlichen Angaben übermitteln.
 (9)
 Die in dieser Entscheidung vorgesehenen Maßnahmen entsprechen der Stellungnahme des Ständigen Ausschusses für die Lebensmittelkette und Tiergesundheit —
 BESCHLIESST:
 Artikel 1
 TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System)
 Es wird eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe für Unterbringung, Betrieb und Pflege des mit der Entscheidung 2003/24/EG eingeführten TRACES-Systems nach einer folgenden Aufschlüsselung der Beträge und Ziele gewährt:
 a)
 1 000 000 EUR für die Unterbringung des Systems;
 b)
 500 000 EUR für den Erwerb der erforderlichen Logistikleistungen im Rahmen der Benutzerunterstützung;
 c)
 300 000 EUR für den Erwerb der zur Anpassung des Systems an rechtliche und technische Entwicklungen erforderlichen Systempflege;
 d)
 200 000 EUR für die erforderlichen Entwicklungen im Bereich der Datenverarbeitung;
 e)
 250 000 EUR für die Entwicklung einer Schnittstelle zwischen den einzelstaatlichen Datenbanken zur Rinderkennzeichnung.
 Artikel 2
 ADNS (Animal disease notification system — Tierseuchenmeldesystem)
 Es wird eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe in Höhe von 270 000 EUR für die Aktualisierung des Tierseuchenmeldesystems gemäß Entscheidung 2005/176/EG gewährt.
 Artikel 3
 Kommunikationsmaßnahmen im Bereich Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz
 Es wird eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe für Kommunikationsmaßnahmen gewährt, die an zuständige Behörden und Bürger gerichtet sind und darauf abzielen, Informationen über Rechtsvorschriften der Gemeinschaft in den Bereichen Tiergesundheit und Tierschutz zu verbreiten. Die Beträge werden folgendermaßen aufgeschlüsselt:
 a)
 2 500 000 EUR für den Bereich Tiergesundheit;
 b)
 150 000 EUR für den Bereich Tierschutz.
 Artikel 4
 Studien und Bewertungen
 Es wird eine gemeinschaftliche Finanzhilfe bis zu einem Betrag von höchstens 300 000 EUR für folgende Studien und Bewertungen gewährt:
 a)
 Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse zum Thema elektronische Rinderkennzeichnung;
 b)
 Bewertung der gemeinschaftlichen Referenzlabors im Bereich Tiergesundheit und Tierzucht.
 Artikel 5
 Mittelzuweisungen
 (1) Die Finanzierung der Beiträge gemäß Artikel 1 bis 4 erfolgt aus der Haushaltslinie 17 04 02 01 des Gesamthaushaltsplans der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2008.
 (2) Die in Artikel 4 erwähnten Maßnahmen werden in der Form von zwei Einzelverträgen durchgeführt. Diese beiden Einzelverträge werden im Laufe des Jahres 2008 unterzeichnet.
 Brüssel, den 6. Mai 2008
 Für die Kommission
 Androulla VASSILIOU
 Mitglied der Kommission
 (1) ABl. L 224 vom 18.8.1990, S. 19. Verordnung zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1791/2006 (ABl. L 363 vom 20.12.2006, S. 1).
 (2) ABl. L 8 vom 14.1.2003, S. 44.
 (3) ABl. L 59 vom 5.3.2005, S. 40. Beschluss geändert durch Beschluss Nr. 2006/924/EG (ABl. L 354 vom 14.12.2006, S. 48).
 (4) KOM(2007) 539 endg.
 (5) ABl. L 209 vom 11.8.2005, S. 1. Verordnung zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1437/2007 (ABl. L 322 vom 7.12.2007, S. 1).


type: contracts

text:
 30.6.2011
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 L 171/7
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS
 nr 10/2011,
 1. aprill 2011,
 millega muudetakse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingu II lisa („Tehnilised normid, standardid, katsetamine ja sertifitseerimine”)
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi „leping”, eriti selle artiklit 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1)
 Lepingu II lisa on muudetud EMP Ühiskomitee 11. juuni 2010. aasta otsusega nr 62/2010 (1).
 (2)
 Lepingusse tuleb inkorporeerida komisjoni 17. augusti 2009. aasta direktiiv 2009/108/EÜ millega muudetakse tehnika arenguga kohandamise eesmärgil Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 97/24/EÜ kahe- või kolmerattaliste mootorsõidukite teatavate osade ja omaduste kohta (2),
 ON TEINUD JÄRGMISE OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Lepingu II lisa I peatüki punkti 45x (Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv 97/24/EÜ) lisatakse järgmine taane:
 „—
 32009 L 0108: komisjoni direktiiv 2009/108/EÜ, 17. august 2009 (ELT L 213, 18.8.2009, lk 10).”
 Artikkel 2
 Direktiivi 2009/108/EÜ islandi- ja norrakeelne tekst, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentsed.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus jõustub 1. mail 2011 tingimusel, et kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõikes 1 ettenähtud teated on EMP Ühiskomiteele esitatud (3).
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 Brüssel, 1. aprill 2011
 EMP Ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja kohusetäitja
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) ELT L 244, 16.9.2010, lk 8.
 (2) ELT L 213, 18.8.2009, lk 10.
 (3) Põhiseadusest tulenevaid nõudeid ei ole nimetatud.