jurisdiction: US

text: b'TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION\n\n\n\n\n The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood\n Caused No Measurable Impact on Tax\n Administration\n\n\n\n February 7, 2007\n\n Reference Number: 2007-30-028\n\n\n\n\n This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process\n and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.\n\n\n\n Phone Number | 202-927-7037\n Email Address | Bonnie.Heald@tigta.treas.gov\n Web Site | http://www.tigta.gov\n\x0c DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY\n WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220\n\n\n\n\nTREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL\n FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION\n\n\n\n\n February 7, 2007\n\n\n MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE\n\n FROM: Michael R. Phillips\n Deputy Inspector General for Audit\n\n SUBJECT: Final Audit Report - The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood\n Caused No Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n (Audit # 20065E015)\n\n This report presents the results of our review of the closing of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)\n National Headquarters building due to a flood. The overall objective of the review, initiated at\n the request of the Ranking Member of the United States Senate Committee on Finance, was to\n determine the extent and nature of disruptions to IRS operations and to identify the functions\n most affected by the flood. The request also asked that we determine the cost and challenges the\n IRS faced in dealing with the flood, how it plans to pay for remediation, and the impact on\n taxpayers and tax administration.\n\n Impact on the Taxpayer\n In June 2006, the subbasement and basement of the IRS National Headquarters building in\n Washington, D.C., were flooded with over 20 feet of water. The IRS responded by\n implementing business resumption plans that contain specific procedures for managing such\n events. While the flood displaced over 2,200 IRS personnel who worked in the building, we\n found no measurable impact on taxpayers and tax administration.\n\n Synopsis\n Heavy rains in the Washington, D.C., area on June 25, 2006, flooded the IRS National\n Headquarters building and caused extensive damage to electrical, heating, and air conditioning\n systems in the subbasement of the building. The water also destroyed offices, vehicles, furniture,\n and computer equipment located in the basement and garage. Damage estimates as of\n September 2006 show the General Services Administration and the IRS expect to spend\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\napproximately $54 million to repair or replace equipment and restore the building to a safe and\nusable condition.\nWhile the flood displaced over 2,200 IRS personnel who worked in the Headquarters building,\nwe found no measurable impact on taxpayers and tax administration. We attribute this to the\nnature of the work performed at this building and the contingency plans the IRS had in place and\nimplemented to manage the crisis. The IRS personnel who work in the Headquarters building\nare involved with strategy, program planning and monitoring, and other activities that do not\nrequire a significant amount of day-to-day contact with taxpayers. The IRS has also developed\nan array of contingency plans that contain specific procedures for managing situations that may\ndisrupt normal operations.\nAlthough we did not conduct indepth evaluations of each of the contingency procedures\nfollowed, we did inspect the damaged areas in the building, survey IRS executives and\nemployees, and review a damage assessment prepared for the General Services Administration.\nIn doing so, we noted considerable evidence that IRS officials closely monitored and coordinated\nefforts to recover from the flood and resume business operations as quickly as possible. A\ncentralized office was established in New Carrollton, Maryland, where IRS officials worked to\ndirect recovery and business resumption activities, coordinate administrative issues, track costs,\nand arrange temporary work space for personnel displaced by the building\xe2\x80\x99s closure.\nThe IRS reported, and we confirmed during a walk-through of the building, that cleanup and\ndecontamination activities were completed by mid-July and dehumidifiers had been put in place\nto dry the building so rebuilding efforts could be promptly started. Notably, IRS top executives\nhave started the process of assuring employees that the building will be returned to a safe and\nusable condition. This is a particularly important topic to continue addressing because our\nsurvey of 209 IRS employees who worked in the building before the flood found that\n116 (56 percent) of the employees have health and safety concerns over returning to the building\ndue to potential mold and other problems related to moisture-damaged areas.\nWhile the IRS successfully continued operations following the flood and closure of its\nHeadquarters building, we have observations in two areas that the IRS may find useful in\npreparing for and responding to future emergencies. Our first observation involves increasing\nthe availability of laptop computers for telecommuting so more IRS personnel can continue\nworking during emergencies. Many IRS personnel who were displaced by the flood were either\nunable to telecommute or unable to do so effectively, which resulted in granting IRS personnel\napproximately 101,000 hours of administrative leave (excused absence from work with no loss\nof pay) that may have otherwise lowered the $4.2 million of salary costs associated with the\nleave.\nOur second observation and possible next step the IRS could take is to complete a\ncomprehensive assessment that captures the overall successes and lessons learned in responding\n\n\n 2\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nto and recovering from the flood. Such an assessment could provide a roadmap for IRS officials\nto use in the future when faced with a similar challenge or one of greater magnitude.\n\nRecommendations\nWe recommended the Chief Human Capital Officer develop a business case for deciding\nwhether to expand telecommuting participation by increasing the availability of laptop\ncomputers for IRS personnel, including comparing the various costs and benefits associated with\nreplacing desktop computers as they reach the end of their useful lives with laptop computers.\nAdditionally, the Chief, Agency-Wide Shared Services, should ensure a comprehensive analysis\nis completed and well documented on the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 overall performance in responding to and\nrecovering from the flood.\n\nResponse\nIRS management partially agreed with the first recommendation and agreed with the second\nrecommendation. The IRS agreed that expanding telecommuting participation and the use of\nlaptops can serve business resumption needs. The IRS noted that, during its incident\nmanagement and business resumption preparedness activities, it will advocate the consideration\nand use of telecommuting as a contingency planning strategy, encourage using laptops in\nemergency situations, and recommend that these decisions be included in its business\nresumptions plans. In its comments, however, the IRS also expressed the position that our first\nrecommendation extended beyond the scope of its Chief Human Capital Officer\xe2\x80\x99s responsibility\nand, therefore, did not commit to developing a business case for deciding whether to expand\ntelecommuting participation by increasing the availability of laptop computers for its personnel.\nAlthough the IRS was not fully responsive to our first recommendation, it was to our second.\nThe IRS indicated it is finalizing a document to capture the analysis conducted and lessons\nlearned from the flood. Management\xe2\x80\x99s complete response to the draft report is included as\nAppendix VI.\nOffice of Audit Comment: We are pleased the IRS recognized the important role that\ntelecommuting and the availability of laptops can play in preparing for and responding to\nemergency events, so the risk of disrupting Federal Government services is minimized. We are\nconcerned, however, about the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 decision to advocate, rather than require, that its business\nunits develop business case analyses for deciding whether to expand telecommuting participation\nby increasing the availability of laptop computers for its personnel. Without such analysis,\nbusiness units may not be as likely to take all the necessary steps to ensure their personnel are\nwell positioned to continue delivering services and performing operations in the event of an\nextended emergency.\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nCopies of this report are also being sent to IRS managers affected by the report\nrecommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or\nDaniel R. Devlin, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate\nPrograms), at (202) 622-5894.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Table of Contents\n\nBackground ..........................................................................................................Page 1\n\nResults of Review ...............................................................................................Page 3\n Contingency Plans Were in Place and Promptly Implemented to\n Help Minimize the Impact on Taxpayers and Tax Administration ..............Page 3\n Issues Identified During the Flood Suggest Possible Next Steps\n for Internal Revenue Service Contingency Planning Efforts........................Page 5\n Recommendation 1:........................................................Page 9\n\n Recommendation 2:........................................................Page 10\n\nAppendices\n Appendix I \xe2\x80\x93 Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology ...............\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6.Page 11\n Appendix II \xe2\x80\x93 Major Contributors to This Report ........................................Page 12\n Appendix III \xe2\x80\x93 Report Distribution List .......................................................Page 13\n Appendix IV \xe2\x80\x93 Employee Survey Results ....................................................Page 14\n Appendix V \xe2\x80\x93 Executive Survey Results......................................................Page 19\n Appendix VI \xe2\x80\x93 Management\xe2\x80\x99s Response to the Draft Report ......................Page 28\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Abbreviations\n\nCOOP Continuity of Operations\nGSA General Services Administration\nIRS Internal Revenue Service\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Background\n\nIn late June 2006, a low-pressure system stalled off the East Coast and produced record rainfall\nin the Washington, D.C., area. According to the National Weather Service, the second greatest\ndaily rainfall ever in Washington, D.C., occurred on June 25, 2006, when 7.09 inches fell in the\ncity. The heavy rains overwhelmed storm water drainage systems and flooded the subbasement\nand basement of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) National Headquarters building with over\n20 feet of water.\nThe water from the storm severely damaged the building\xe2\x80\x99s electrical, heating, and air\nconditioning systems in the subbasement and destroyed offices, vehicles, furniture, and computer\nequipment located in the basement and garage. The approximately 2,200 employees who\nworked in the building, including the top executives of the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 four functional areas, were\nassigned temporary space in other IRS facilities or began telecommuting because of the repair\nand rebuilding efforts. As shown in Figure 1, the Office of Chief Counsel, the Deputy\nCommissioner for Services and Enforcement, and the Deputy Commissioner for Operations\nSupport had the most personnel displaced.\n The flood as well as other more\n Figure 1: IRS Headquarters Employees significant events, such as the terrorist\n Displaced by the Flood attacks on September 11, 2001, and\n Hurricane Katrina in 2005, highlight the\n Commissioner,\n 244, 11% need for the Federal Government to\n Operations\n Support, 514,\n develop and maintain contingency plans\n 23%\n that will ensure essential operations can\n continue to deliver services during a\n wide range of emergencies. To assist\n departments and agencies in this\n Chief Counsel,\n 804, 36% Government-wide Continuity of\n Services and\n Enforcement, Operations (COOP) planning effort, the\n 679, 30%\n Department of Homeland Security has\n outlined required protocols that\n Source: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration departments and agencies are required\n analysis of IRS data. to incorporate into their individual\n COOP plans.\nWe initiated this and another review in response to a Congressional inquiry into the extent and\nnature of disruptions to IRS operations as a result of the flooding. This review focused on the\n\n\n\n Page 1\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\ngeneral business resumption activities; the other review addressed issues associated with IRS\ncomputer operations as well as the protection and restoration of taxpayer data.1 In addition, we\nanticipate conducting a third review to evaluate the contracting and payment disbursement\nprocesses that will be used to pay for the flood damages. Because the procurement activities will\ntake place subsequent to the evaluation of the immediate impact and recovery from the flood, we\ndetermined that a separate evaluation and report on the procurement activities will be issued.\nThis review was performed in the IRS National Headquarters and its office of the Chief,\nAgency-Wide Shared Services, during the period July through October 2006. With the\nexception of evaluating IRS databases to validate the accuracy and reliability of the information,\nthe audit was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. Detailed\ninformation on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major\ncontributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.\n\n\n\n\n1\n The Internal Revenue Service Adequately Protected Sensitive Data and Restored Computer Operations After the\nFlooding of Its Headquarters Building (Reference Number 2007-20-023, dated January 26, 2007).\n Page 2\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Results of Review\n\nContingency Plans Were in Place and Promptly Implemented to Help\nMinimize the Impact on Taxpayers and Tax Administration\nWhile the flood displaced over 2,200 IRS personnel who worked in the Headquarters building,\nwe found no measurable impact on taxpayers and tax administration. We attribute this to the\nnature of the work performed at this building and the contingency plans the IRS had in place and\nimplemented to manage the crisis. The IRS personnel who work in the Headquarters building\nare involved with strategy, program planning and monitoring, and other activities that do not\nrequire a significant amount of day-to-day contact with taxpayers. Most of the IRS employees\nthat interact with taxpayers on a day-to-day basis, such as examiners, collectors, and taxpayer\nservice personnel, work in offices across the country. However, the IRS Office of Chief\nCounsel, whose functions include providing legal interpretation of the internal revenue laws and\nrepresenting the IRS in litigation, maintains a sizeable staff in the Headquarters building. Of\nsignificant note was this Office\xe2\x80\x99s effort to physically move a computer server containing millions\nof documents from the Headquarters building to New York, so the litigation team could resume\nwork on a major tax litigation case by mid-July. This effort helped achieve a $3.4 billion\nsettlement in the case.\nTo ensure the nation\xe2\x80\x99s tax system continues to operate during situations that may disrupt normal\noperations, the IRS has developed an array of contingency plans in accordance with applicable\nDepartment of Homeland Security guidance. At the national level, the IRS COOP plan identifies\nessential functions and the resources necessary to operate the functions. It also identifies the\norder of succession and delegations of authority for decision-making purposes.\nIn addition to the national COOP plan, the IRS maintains four other contingency plans that are\ncollectively referred to as the IRS Business Continuity Plan. The Business Continuity Plan\nconsists of an Occupant Emergency Plan, Incident Management Plan, Business Resumption\nPlan, and Disaster Recovery Plan. The Occupant Emergency Plan is required for all IRS offices\nthroughout the country and is designed to address safety issues of the employees and any visitors\nto a building at the time of an emergency. The remaining three contingency plans contain\nspecific procedures for managing a crisis so business operations can be resumed as quickly as\npossible.\nBecause the flood occurred over a weekend when the building was closed, the Occupant\nEmergency Plan was not implemented, as the safety of employees and visitors was not an issue.\nContrary to reports indicating the national COOP plan was implemented, IRS officials decided\nthe flood did not reach the level of severity to warrant its activation. Instead, IRS officials\n\n Page 3\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nfocused their efforts on implementing contingency plan procedures designed to handle one of the\nbiggest challenges presented by the flood\xe2\x80\x93managing the crisis to minimize its impact on business\noperations.\nAlthough we did not conduct indepth evaluations of each of the contingency procedures\nfollowed, we did inspect the damaged areas in the building, survey IRS executives and\nemployees,2 review a damage assessment prepared for the General Services Administration\n(GSA), and review documentation related to the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 business resumption activities. In doing\nso, we noted considerable evidence that IRS officials closely monitored and coordinated efforts\nto recover from the flood and resume normal business processes as quickly as possible. A\ncentralized office was established in New Carrollton, Maryland, where IRS officials employed\nguidelines developed and used during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to direct recovery and\nbusiness resumption activities, coordinate administrative issues, track costs, and arrange\ntemporary work space for the personnel displaced by the building\xe2\x80\x99s closure.\nThe IRS reported, and we confirmed during our walk-through, that cleanup and decontamination\nactivities were completed by mid-July and dehumidifiers had been put in place to dry the\nbuilding so rebuilding efforts could be promptly started. Notably, IRS top executives have\nstarted the process of assuring employees that the building will be returned to a safe and usable\ncondition. This is a particularly important topic to continue addressing because our survey of\n209 IRS employees who worked in the building before the flood found that 116 (56 percent) of\nthe employees have health and safety concerns over returning to the building due to potential\nmold and other problems related to moisture-damaged areas. As summarized in Figure 2, our\nsurvey of IRS personnel, started the week of August 7, 2006, also surfaced a number of other\nnoteworthy actions the IRS has completed in recovering from the flood and resuming business\noperations.\n\n\n\n\n2\n See Appendices IV and V for details.\n Page 4\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n Figure 2: Noteworthy Actions Completed by the IRS in Resuming Business\n Operations Identified During Our Surveys\n Employee Responses Percentage\n Have full or limited access to normal work tools 99%\n Can do most or all of their job responsibilities 97%\n Communication with my manager has remained the same or improved 91%\n Access to computer information is the same or similar to what it was before the\n 95%\n flood\n Executive Responses\n Can effectively sustain operations for more than a year in current configuration 71%\n The building\xe2\x80\x99s closure disrupted work in terms of quantity and quality to some\n 73%\n or to little or no extent\n The building\xe2\x80\x99s closure had little or no effect on taxpayers served 60%\n Employees and managers that had access to work tools were affected to a\n 78%\n moderate, some, or little or no extent\n Source: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration surveys of employees and executives.\n\nDamage estimates as of September 2006 show the GSA will spend approximately $36.8 million\nto respond to the flood and repair the IRS Headquarters building. The IRS is expecting to spend\nan additional $17.2 million to move personnel to and from temporary rented work space, assist\nwith cleanup efforts, and replace damaged equipment. The IRS intends to pay for the costs\nthrough the use of yearend savings (surpluses) and user fees.3 IRS officials told us they do not\nexpect to make a supplemental budget request or postpone/cancel any tax administration\nactivities to pay for the flood damages.\nIssues Identified During the Flood Suggest Possible Next Steps for\nInternal Revenue Service Contingency Planning Efforts\nWhile we found no measurable impact on the nation\xe2\x80\x99s tax system, we have observations in two\nareas that the IRS may find useful in preparing for and responding to emergencies in the future.\nOur first observation involves increasing the availability of laptop computers for telecommuting\nso more IRS personnel can continue working during emergencies. Another possible next step\nthe IRS could take is to thoroughly analyze and document its overall performance in responding\n\n3\n User fees are defined as charges individuals and businesses are required to pay for special benefits received beyond\nthose received by the general public and, in general, can be used to supplement the funding of a variety of IRS\noperations.\n Page 5\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nto the flood. Such an assessment could provide an important tool for the IRS if it is faced with a\nsimilar or greater challenge in the future.\nIncreasing the availability of laptop computers for telecommuting could further\nstrengthen the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 ability to continue working during emergencies\nCommonly referred to as telecommuting, the practice of enabling employees to work at home or\na location other than their regular office has generated considerable interest in both the private\nsector and Federal Government because of the potential benefits it offers. Telecommuting, if\neffectively implemented, has the potential to enhance COOP efforts so work can continue during\nemergency situations, save the costs of renting and maintaining office space, assist employers in\nattracting and retaining the best possible workforce, and relieve traffic congestion associated\nwith commuting to and from offices.\nTo take advantage of the potential benefits offered, Congress began enacting a series of laws4 in\n1995 that encourage and direct agencies to provide telecommuting solutions for a greater\nnumber of Federal Government employees. Several agencies are also actively involved in\npromoting the use of telecommuting as a best practice in Federal Government COOP planning\nefforts. Office of Personnel Management officials, for example, have reported coordinating\nefforts with GSA officials in making agency visits to reinforce the importance of and\nconnection between telecommuting and COOP planning; they are collecting data on the\nprogress being made in this area for Congress and other stakeholders. Additionally, the Federal\nEmergency Management Agency revised its continuity planning guidance5 to encourage\nagencies Federal Government-wide to add telecommuting to their COOP plans in the future; it\nanticipates making additional changes to further strengthen the guidance.\nThe IRS has a long history of enabling employees to work at home or a location other than their\nregular office. As we reported in 2005,6 the IRS first implemented a telecommuting program\nknown as the Flexiplace Program in 1995, and by 2003 the IRS had estimated there were\napproximately 27,000 employees participating in the Program. Despite the popularity of the\nFlexiplace Program, the IRS Chief Human Capital Officer7 agreed to complete a number of\n\n\n4\n Some of the specific legislation that applies to telecommuting includes Making Appropriations for the Department\nof Transportation and Related Agencies, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes,\nPub. L. No. 106-346, Section (\xc2\xa7) 359 of October 23, 2000; Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural\nDevelopment, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, for the Fiscal Year Ending\nSeptember 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Division B, \xc2\xa7 627 of January 23, 2004; and\nMaking Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending\nSeptember 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Division B, \xc2\xa7 622 of December 8, 2004.\n5\n Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (dated June 15, 2004).\n6\n Improved Policies and Guidance Are Needed for the Telework Program (Reference Number 2005-10-107,\ndated July 2005).\n7\n The IRS Chief Human Capital Officer has certain administrative responsibilities for gathering information about\nthe Flexiplace Program and for monitoring the Program.\n Page 6\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nrecommended actions that the report identified were needed to make the Program more\neffective. However, to date, most of the actions have not been completed. The actions include\none that involves providing needed logistical support and equipment for employees to work\nproductively while telecommuting.\nBecause this and the other issues have yet to be resolved, many IRS personnel who were\ndisplaced by the flood were either unable to telecommute or unable to do so effectively, which\ncreated some hardships on IRS personnel. Approximately 40 percent of the IRS personnel we\nsurveyed are expecting to experience longer commutes and incur additional costs when they are\nno longer reimbursed for reporting to their temporary office sites. Besides creating hardships,\nthe inability to telecommute or do so effectively also resulted in granting IRS personnel\napproximately 101,000 hours of administrative leave (excused absence from work with no loss\nof pay) that otherwise may have been lower.\nThe IRS time reporting system data show that, in the first week following the flood, around\n1,700 IRS personnel8 were placed on administrative leave, which is about 77 percent of the\napproximately 2,200 personnel who were working in the building. Although the analysis in\nFigure 3 shows the amount of administrative leave dramatically decreased in the ensuing weeks\nas alternate working sites were arranged, our analysis shows the administrative leave involved\nsalary costs of approximately $4.2 million.\n Figure 3: Hours and Salary Costs Associated With Administrative Leave Taken\n After Closure of the IRS Headquarters Building\n\n\n Dates of Administrative Leave Hours Involved Salary Cost Involved\n June 26, 2006, through June 30, 2006 68,016 $2,968,832\n\n July 3, 2006, through July 7, 2006 23,726 $966,079\n\n July 10, 2006, through July 14, 2006 5,110 $150,269\n\n July 17, 2006, through July 21, 2006 2,773 $72,772\n\n July 24, 2006, and after 1,643 $49,849\n\n Totals 101,268 $4,207,801\n Source: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration analysis of the IRS Single Entry Time Reporting\n System.\n\n\n8\n We calculated this number by dividing the number of administrative hours taken for the week by 40. However,\nsome employees may have taken fewer than the full 40 hours, so a greater number of employees may have been on\nadministrative leave at least part time.\n Page 7\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nWhen considering the salary costs involved with the administrative leave taken, it is important to\nrecognize what it does and does not represent. The administrative salary costs measure the costs\nassociated with the productivity that may have been achieved had more IRS personnel been\nworking. The administrative salary costs do not represent any additional outlays of funds.\nConsequently, the administrative salary costs are not included in the $17.2 million of estimated\ncosts described earlier in the report.\nAs the IRS moves forward with actions needed to make its telecommuting program more\neffective, available evidence suggests it will be particularly important to increase the availability\nof laptop computers that will give employees the ability to communicate remotely through the\nIRS network systems. We found, for example, that the GSA approved the use of its 14 Telework\nCenters in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area for displaced IRS employees at no cost to the\nIRS. However, the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 ability to use these Centers was limited because only those employees\nwho had laptops with the ability to connect9 to the IRS network were permitted to use the\nCenters. According to a July 14, 2006, IRS report, only four Headquarters employees had used\none of these Centers. Moreover, we noted that a frequent concern expressed by IRS personnel\nduring our survey was the limited availability of laptop computers.\nThe IRS could benefit by thoroughly analyzing and documenting its overall\nperformance in responding to the flood\nThe IRS recognizes, as we have previously reported,10 the need for and importance of conducting\na comprehensive analysis of the successes achieved and problems encountered when handling\nnew challenges. An assessment can provide important lessons learned that can be used in\nresponding to future emergency events. Although the IRS staff under the Chief, Agency-Wide\nShared Services,11 has already started evaluating what went well and what did not, we identified\ntwo areas of concern during our work that the IRS staff may find useful to include in their\nassessment.\nTo its credit, the IRS anticipated the building would not be accessible following the flood and\nrelied on a variety of communication channels to inform its personnel of the building\xe2\x80\x99s closure.\nAs a result, most of the IRS personnel we surveyed avoided the time and expense of reporting to\nthe building. Figure 412 shows the various communication channels used and the relatively low\npercentage of IRS employees (15 percent) and executives (9 percent) in our survey who reported\n\n\n9\n The Enterprise Remote Access Project provides connectivity for the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 remote sites to the IRS Data Centers\nusing Virtual Private Networks technology. This Project supports normal IRS business operations by providing\naccess to standard networked IRS enterprise applications and resources.\n10\n The Internal Revenue Service Successfully Accounted for Employees and Restored Computer Operations After\nHurricanes Katrina and Rita (Reference Number 2006-20-068, dated March 2006).\n11\n The IRS Agency-Wide Shared Services Office, among other things, develops procedures and implements policy\nfor the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 internal real estate and facilities management, personnel, procurement, and customer support activities.\n12\n Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.\n Page 8\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nto the building on the first workday following the flood. Subsequently, the IRS moved quickly\nto establish a web site on its Intranet to keep personnel informed as conditions were identified.\n While the IRS reacted quickly to\n Figure 4: How Employees and Executives\n establish communications channels,\n Learned of the Flood\n ensuring telephone and voice mail\n listings for its personnel are promptly\n 100% Other updated with accurate contact\n 12% 13%\n 80% 15% 9% information following an emergency\n Went to\n Building\n incident is an area of concern. The IRS\n 60% 33% 38%\n News\n telephone and voice mail systems are\n 40%\n 14% Media one of the primary means by which its\n 27% Co-Worker personnel carry on the day-to-day\n 20%\n 25% business of administering our nation\xe2\x80\x99s\n 13%\n 0% Superior tax system. Despite their importance,\n Employee Executive\n IRS officials were unable to provide us\n Source: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration\n with accurate contact information for\n surveys of IRS employees and executives. IRS personnel as of August 2, 2006,\n although most employees had returned to\n work by July 14, 2006.\nThe second area of concern involves ensuring IRS personnel are knowledgeable of their roles\nand responsibilities during emergency events. According to IRS contingency plans, certain IRS\npersonnel are designated to assume responsibility for ensuring critical tax administration work\nprocesses continue to operate during emergency situations. Because of the important role these\npersonnel have in IRS contingency plans, it is very important to ensure they are aware of their\ndesignations during emergencies. Our results from surveying 209 IRS employees found\n58 (28 percent) did not know how they were designated following the flood. Of these\n58 employees, we determined that 19 had in fact been designated as critical.\nIn the situation caused by the flood, the IRS was not adversely affected by the confusion over\nwhich employees were designated as critical. The IRS is fortunate that there was sufficient\ncapability to resume critical administrative and tax administration work processes. However, a\nfuture emergency may require all critical employees to be available. Therefore, it is important\nfor the IRS to ensure all employees understand their roles and responsibilities in an emergency\nand its aftermath.\nRecommendations\nRecommendation 1: The Chief Human Capital Officer should develop a business case for\ndeciding whether to expand telecommuting participation by increasing the availability of laptop\ncomputers for IRS personnel using desktop computers. The business case should include a\ncomparison of the various costs and benefits associated with replacing desktop computers as they\n\n Page 9\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\nreach the end of their useful lives with laptop computers having the capability of remotely\nconnecting with IRS networks.\nManagement\xe2\x80\x99s Response: IRS management partially agreed with this recommendation.\nThe IRS agreed that expanding telecommuting participation and the use of laptops can serve\nbusiness resumption needs. The IRS noted, among other things, that during its incident\nmanagement and business resumption preparedness activities it will advocate the consideration\nand use of telecommuting as a contingency planning strategy, encourage using laptops in\nemergency situations, and recommend that these decisions be included in its business\nresumptions plans. However, the IRS also expressed the position that our recommendation\nextended beyond the scope of its Chief Human Capital Officer\xe2\x80\x99s responsibility and, therefore,\ndid not commit to developing a business case for deciding whether to expand telecommuting\nparticipation by increasing the availability of laptop computers for its personnel.\nOffice of Audit Comment: We are pleased the IRS recognized the important role that\ntelecommuting and the availability of laptops can play in preparing for and responding to\nemergency events, so the risk of disrupting Federal Government services is minimized. We are\nconcerned, however, about the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 decision to advocate, rather than require, that its business\nunits develop business case analyses for deciding whether to expand telecommuting participation\nby increasing the availability of laptop computers for its personnel. Business case analysis is a\nwell-recognized process in the Federal Government and private industry to demonstrate that a\nparticular need exists and how that need can best be satisfied with available resources.\nConsequently, without such analysis, business units may not be as likely to take all the necessary\nsteps to ensure their personnel are well positioned to continue delivering services and performing\noperations in the event of an extended emergency.\nRecommendation 2: The Chief, Agency-Wide Shared Services, should ensure a\ncomprehensive analysis is completed on the IRS\xe2\x80\x99 overall performance in responding to and\nrecovering from the flood. The evaluation should identify all challenges the IRS faced in dealing\nwith the emergency, including the successes and lessons learned. Additionally, the evaluation\nshould be well documented to provide a roadmap for dealing with future emergency situations of\nthis magnitude or greater.\nManagement\xe2\x80\x99s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation. The IRS\nindicated, among other things, it is finalizing a document to capture the analysis conducted and\nlessons learned from the flood.\n\n\n\n\n Page 10\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix I\n\n Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology\n\nThe objective of the review, initiated at the request of the Ranking Member of the United States\nSenate Committee on Finance, was to determine the extent and nature of disruptions to IRS\noperations and to identify the functions most affected by the flood. The request also asked that\nwe determine the cost and challenges the IRS faces in dealing with the flood, how it plans to pay\nfor remediation, and the impact on taxpayers and tax administration. During the review, we\nrelied on databases provided to us by the IRS. We did not determine the accuracy and reliability\nof the information in any of the databases due to time constraints. To meet the objective, we:\nI. Reviewed the flood damage assessment report prepared for the GSA to identify\n preliminary findings and cost estimates associated with flooding.\nII. Reviewed a significant amount of material to gain an understanding of and the need for\n continuity planning. The sources included published literature, the Federal Emergency\n Management Agency Federal Preparedness Circular 65 (dated June 15, 2004), the four\n IRS contingency plans collectively referred to as its Business Continuity Plan, and prior\n Government Accountability Office and Treasury Inspector General for Tax\n Administration reports on continuity preparations.\nIII. Interviewed IRS officials responsible for continuity planning and evaluated supporting\n documentation to determine whether the Business Continuity Plan was developed and\n activated and whether all or a portion of the Plan was implemented.\nIV. Used judgmental sampling (because this method was sufficient to meet our overall\n objective) in surveying 209 IRS employees and 45 executives who, according to IRS\n records, were assigned to the IRS Headquarters building at the time of the flood. We\n used the survey results to help identify the functions most affected by the flooding; the\n challenges the IRS faces in dealing with the damages; and the disruptions, if any, to\n normal operations.\nV. Analyzed supporting documentation and interviewed IRS Real Estate and Facilities\n Management office personnel and GSA officials responsible for assessing the flood\n damage to determine the costs incurred as a result of the flood and how the IRS plans to\n pay for the remediation.\nVI. Reviewed photographs and physically toured the basement level of the building to gain a\n better understanding of the nature and extent of the damages incurred.\n\n\n\n Page 11\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix II\n\n Major Contributors to This Report\n\nDaniel R. Devlin, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Small Business and Corporate\nPrograms)\nPhilip Shropshire, Director\nFrank Dunleavy, Audit Manager\nThomas Dori, Lead Auditor\nEarl Charles Burney, Senior Auditor\nGwendolyn Gilboy, Senior Auditor\nTimothy Greiner, Senior Auditor\nAllen Grey, Senior Auditor\nKaren Stafford, Senior Auditor\nWilliam Tran, Senior Auditor\n\n\n\n\n Page 12\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix III\n\n Report Distribution List\n\nOffice of the Commissioner \xe2\x80\x93 Attn: Chief of Staff C\nDeputy Commissioner for Operations Support OS\nDeputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE\nChief, Agency-Wide Shared Services OS:A\nChief, Mission Assurance and Security Services OS:MA\nChief Counsel CC\nNational Taxpayer Advocate TA\nDirector, Office of Legislative Affairs CL: LA\nDirector, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O\nOffice of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC\nAudit Liaisons:\n Commissioner C\n Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support OS\n Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE\n Chief Counsel CC\n National Taxpayer Advocate TA\n\n\n\n\n Page 13\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix IV\n\n Employee Survey Results\n\nThe following text is the script we used when surveying 209 employees affected by the closure\nof the IRS Headquarters building due to the flood on June 25, 2006. Following the script are the\nsurvey questions and a summary of the responses to these questions.\n\xe2\x80\x9cThe Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), at the request of the Senate\nFinance Committee, is conducting an evaluation of the extent and nature of disruptions to IRS\noperations caused by the flooding at its Headquarters building. As part of the evaluation, we are\nsurveying employees who, according to IRS records, were assigned to the building at the time of\nthe flooding.\nYour participation in the survey will help us identify the functions that were impacted the most\nby flooding. Additionally, it will help identify the challenges [the] IRS faces in dealing with the\ndamages incurred and the disruptions, if any, to normal operations.\xe2\x80\x9d\n1)\xe2\x80\x9cAre you working from?\xe2\x80\x9d1\n IRS Space 90 (43%)\n GSA Space 104 (50%)\n Home 15 ( 7%)\n2)\xe2\x80\x9cHow did you find out the IRS building had been closed because of the flooding?\xe2\x80\x9d\n My manager 53 (25%)\n A co-worker 30 (14%)\n The news media 69 (33%)\n I went to the building 32 (15%)\n Other 25 (12%)\n\n\n\n\n1\n Some percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.\n\n\n\n\n Page 14\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n3)\xe2\x80\x9cAre you classified as a critical or noncritical employee?\xe2\x80\x9d 2\n I am classified as a critical employee 74 (35%)\n I am classified as a noncritical employee 101 (48%)\n I do not know how I am classified 34 (16%)\n4)\xe2\x80\x9cAre you designated as a COOP essential team member?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I am a member of the COOP essential team 21 (10%)\n No, I am not a member of the COOP essential team 162 (78%)\n I do not know if I am a member of the COOP essential team 26 (12%)\n5)\xe2\x80\x9cWhen were you contacted with the arrangements for you to continue working?\xe2\x80\x9d\n The week of June 26th 162 (78%)\n The week of July 3rd 30 (14%)\n The week of July 10th 9 ( 4%)\n The week of July 17th 2 ( 1%)\n th\n The week of July 24 3 ( 1%)\n I have never been contacted 3 ( 1%)\n6)\xe2\x80\x9cDid you telecommute after the event?\xe2\x80\x9d (If yes, continue; if no, skip to question #12)\n Yes, I telecommuted following the flooding 106 (51%)\n No, I did not telecommute following the flooding 103 (49%)\n7)\xe2\x80\x9cWhen was the expectation for you to telecommute communicated to you?\xe2\x80\x9d\n It was communicated to me before the flood 12 (11%)\n It was communicated to me after the flood 78 (74%)\n The expectation was not communicated to me; it was self-initiated 16 (15%)\n\n\n\n\n2\n While the survey responses show that 34 IRS personnel did not know how they were classified, IRS records\nindicate that 24 IRS personnel who responded to our survey mistakenly classified themselves as either a critical or\nnoncritical employee. Consequently, we concluded that 58 of the employees surveyed did not know how they were\ndesignated.\n Page 15\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n8)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate training before telecommuting?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I was provided with adequate training 71 (67%)\n No, I was not provided with adequate training 7 ( 7%)\n No, I was not provided with any training 28 (26%)\n9)\xe2\x80\x9cHad you adequate experience with telecommuting before the flooding situation made it\nnecessary?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I had adequate experience 78 (74%)\n No, I did not have adequate experience 8 ( 8%)\n No, I had no experience with telecommuting 20 (19%)\n10)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate technical tools (such as computers) to telecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d3\n Yes, I was provided with adequate technical tools to telecommute 51 (49%)\n No, I was not provided with adequate technical tools to telecommute 43 (41%)\n I had no need to be provided with technical tools 11 (10%)\n11)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate technical assistance while you telecommuted?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I was provided with adequate technical assistance 45 (42%)\n No, I was not provided with adequate technical assistance 9 ( 8%)\n I had no need for technical assistance 52 (49%)\n12)\xe2\x80\x9c Do you have access to your normal work tools to perform your work with minimal impact?\xe2\x80\x9d\n I have full access to my normal work tools 156 (75%)\n I have limited access to my normal work tools 51 (24%)\n I do not have access to my normal work tools 2 ( 1%)\n I do not need to access normal work tools 0 ( 0%)\n\n\n\n\n3\n One employee surveyed who did telecommute did not respond to this question.\n Page 16\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n13)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent are you able to perform your job responsibilities?\xe2\x80\x9d\n I can fully perform my job responsibilities 160 (77%)\n I can do most of my job responsibilities 43 (21%)\n I can do some of my job responsibilities 6 ( 3%)\n I can do few of my job responsibilities 0 ( 0%)\n I cannot perform my job responsibilities 0 ( 0%)\n14)\xe2\x80\x9cRate the effect of the disruption that the IRS building closure has caused within your work\nunit.\xe2\x80\x9d\n No degree of disruption 14 ( 7%)\n A small degree of disruption 55 (26%)\n Some degree of disruption 82 (39%)\n A great degree of disruption 58 (28%)\n15)\xe2\x80\x9cDescribe the communications you are having with your manager.\xe2\x80\x9d\n I have the usual communications; not much is different 164 (78%)\n The communications are more frequent 26 (12%)\n The communications are less frequent 17 ( 8%)\n I haven\xe2\x80\x99t had much communication 2 ( 1%)\n16)\xe2\x80\x9cDo you have the same or similar access to your computer information?\xe2\x80\x9d\n I have the same or similar access 199 (95%)\n I don\xe2\x80\x99t have the same or similar access, but I can get my work done 10 ( 5%)\n I do not have sufficient access to get my work done 0 ( 0%)\n N/A,4 I don\xe2\x80\x99t usually use a computer to do my work 0 ( 0%)\n\n\n\n\n4\n N/A means not applicable.\n Page 17\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n17)\xe2\x80\x9cAre sufficient office supplies available for you to do your work?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, supplies have been provided 128 (61%)\n Yes, supplies have been provided, but I still need some important items 49 (23%)\n No, I have not received any supplies and I need them to accomplish my\n work 13 ( 6%)\n This is not an issue for me 19 ( 9%)\n18)\xe2\x80\x9cHas the IRS Headquarters closure caused you significant hardship, increasing the time of\nyour commute?\xe2\x80\x9d5\n Yes 75 (36%)\n No 134 (64%)\n19)\xe2\x80\x9cHas the IRS Headquarters closure caused you significant hardship by changing the method\nof your commute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes 48 (23%)\n No 161 (77%)\n20)\xe2\x80\x9cWhen the building has been repaired and is ready to be reoccupied, do you have health and\nsafety concerns?\xe2\x80\x9d\n I am concerned about whether the building will be safe 2 ( 1%)\n I am concerned with the possible health risks 60 (29%)\n I am concerned with both safety and health risks 54 (26%)\n I have no concerns about either 93 (44%)\n\n\n\n\n5\n The survey included 40 IRS personnel who answered \xe2\x80\x9cYes\xe2\x80\x9d to both questions 18 and 19. Consequently,\napproximately 40 percent (83 out of 209) of the IRS personnel surveyed experienced longer commutes and incurred\nadditional costs when reporting to their temporary office sites.\n Page 18\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix V\n\n Executive Survey Results\n\nThe following text is the script we used when surveying 45 executives affected by the closure of\nthe IRS Headquarters building due to the flood on June 25, 2006. Following the script are the\nsurvey questions and a summary of the responses to these questions.\n\xe2\x80\x9cThe Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), at the request of the Senate\nFinance Committee, is conducting an evaluation of the extent and nature of disruptions to IRS\noperations caused by the flooding at its Headquarters building. As part of the evaluation, we are\nsurveying executives who, according to IRS records, were assigned to the building at the time of\nthe flooding.\nYour participation in the survey will help us identify the functions that were impacted the most\nby flooding. Additionally, it will help identify the challenges [the] IRS faces in dealing with the\ndamages incurred and the disruptions, if any, to normal operations.\xe2\x80\x9d\n1)\xe2\x80\x9cHow did you find out the IRS building had been closed because of the flooding?\xe2\x80\x9d1\n My superior 6 (13%)\n A co-worker 12 (27%)\n The news media 17 (38%)\n I went to the building 4 ( 9%)\n Other 6 (13%)\n\n\n\n\n1\n Some percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.\n Page 19\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n2)\xe2\x80\x9cHow were you assured the employees and managers that report to you directly or indirectly\nthrough a lower level manager were advised of the flood?\xe2\x80\x9d 9\n9 Each executive surveyed identified all of the methods used to assure his or her employees were advised of the\nflood. Therefore, the totals of all the responses listed below will exceed 45 (number of executives surveyed).\n\n Telephone/Voice mail 34\n Cell phone 11\n Blackberry 9\n Email 13\n The news media 10\n They went to the building 3\n Relied on lower level managers to advise the employees/other managers 11\n No basis to comment 5\n3)\xe2\x80\x9cWhat communication tools were working and available to you personally upon returning to\nwork immediately following the flood (check all that apply)?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Telephone/Voice mail 3 ( 7%)\n Cell phone 1 ( 2%)\n Blackberry 1 ( 2%)\n Email 0 ( 0%)\n Other 40 (89%)\n4)\xe2\x80\x9cWhat communication tools were working and available to the employees and managers that\nreport to you directly or indirectly through a lower level manager when they returned to work\nimmediately following the flood (check all that apply)?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Telephone/Voice mail were available to those that had\n access to the tools prior to the flood 4 ( 9%)\n Cell phone was available to those that had access to the\n tool prior to the flood 1 ( 2%)\n Blackberry was available to those that had access to the\n device prior to the flood 0 ( 0%)\n Email was available to those that had access to the tool\n prior to the flood 0 ( 0%)\n Other 40 (89%)\n\n Page 20\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n5)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent are you familiar with your agency\xe2\x80\x99s Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan as\nit applies to your operation?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Very familiar 21 (47%)\n More familiar than unfamiliar 13 (29%)\n Neither familiar nor unfamiliar 3 ( 7%)\n More unfamiliar than familiar 6 (13%)\n Very unfamiliar 2 ( 4%)\n No basis to judge 0 ( 0%)\n6)\xe2\x80\x9cOverall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your COOP plan?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Very satisfied 20 (44%)\n More satisfied than dissatisfied 17 (38%)\n Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4 ( 9%)\n More dissatisfied than satisfied 1 ( 2%)\n Very dissatisfied 0 ( 0%)\n No basis to judge 3 ( 7%)\n7)\xe2\x80\x9cOverall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with how your COOP plan was implemented?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Very satisfied 26 (58%)\n More satisfied than dissatisfied 13 (29%)\n Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied \xe2\x80\x93 go to next question 2 ( 4%)\n More dissatisfied than satisfied \xe2\x80\x93 go to next question 0 ( 0%)\n Very dissatisfied \xe2\x80\x93 go to next question 0 ( 0%)\n No basis to judge 4 ( 9%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 21\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n8)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent is your lack of satisfaction due to a poorly conceived COOP plan versus poor\nimplementation of the COOP plan?\xe2\x80\x9d 9\n9 This question received no responses because in the previous question the respondents did not indicate any\ndissatisfaction with how the COOP plan was implemented.\n\n The COOP plan was very poorly conceived 0 (0%)\n The COOP plan was poorly conceived 0 (0%)\n The COOP plan was poorly implemented 0 (0%)\n The COOP plan was very poorly implemented 0 (0%)\n The COOP plan was poorly conceived and poorly implemented 0 (0%)\n9)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if at all, could your COOP plan be improved?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 0 ( 0%)\n To a great extent 3 ( 7%)\n To a moderate extent 15 (33%)\n To some extent 13 (29%)\n To little or no extent 8 (18%)\n Do not know 6 (13%)\n10)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if any, could lessons be learned from implementing your COOP Plan?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 5 (11%)\n To a great extent 5 (11%)\n To a moderate extent 14 (31%)\n To some extent 10 (22%)\n To little or no extent 5 (11%)\n Do not know 6 (13%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 22\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n11)\xe2\x80\x9cIn your opinion, how long can you and your staff effectively sustain operations in your\ncurrent configuration?\xe2\x80\x9d\n 1 month 0 ( 0%)\n More than 1 month but less than 3 months 0 ( 0%)\n 3 \xe2\x80\x93 6 months 9 (20%)\n 6 \xe2\x80\x93 9 months 4 ( 9%)\n 9 \xe2\x80\x93 12 months 0 ( 0%)\n More than a year 32 (71%)\n12)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if at all, did the IRS building closure disrupt your operation\xe2\x80\x99s work in terms\nof its quantity and quality?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 0 ( 0%)\n To a great extent 2 ( 4%)\n To a moderate extent 10 (22%)\n To some extent 20 (44%)\n To little or no extent 13 (29%)\n Do not know 0 ( 0%)\n13)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if at all, did the IRS building closure adversely affect taxpayers served by\nyour operations?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 0 ( 0%)\n To a great extent 1 ( 2%)\n To a moderate extent 0 ( 0%)\n To some extent 4 ( 9%)\n To little or no extent 27 (60%)\n Do not know 0 ( 0%)\n N/A 13 (29%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 23\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n14)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if at all, did the IRS building closure adversely affect the job performance\n(quantity and quality) of the employees and managers that report to you directly or indirectly\nthrough a lower level manager?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 0 ( 0%)\n To a great extent 1 ( 2%)\n To a moderate extent 4 ( 9%)\n To some extent 21 (47%)\n To little or no extent 19 (42%)\n Do not know 0 ( 0%)\n15)\xe2\x80\x9cTo what extent, if at all, did the IRS building closure adversely affect the ability of the\nemployees and managers in your operation to access the work tools they need for performing\ntheir job?\xe2\x80\x9d\n To a very great extent 2 ( 4%)\n To a great extent 8 (18%)\n To a moderate extent 12 (27%)\n To some extent 10 (22%)\n To little or no extent 13 (29%)\n Do not know 0 ( 0%)\n16)\xe2\x80\x9cHow would you rate the communications and assistance you are receiving from personnel in\nthe IRS Agency-Wide Shared Services Office?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Excellent 27 (60%)\n Good 12 (27%)\n Adequate 6 (13%)\n Poor 0 ( 0%)\n Very Poor 0 ( 0%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 24\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n17)\xe2\x80\x9cTaking everything into consideration, how would you rate the quality and amount of the\ninformation you are receiving about the damage done and repairs needed to the building?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Excellent 23 (51%)\n Good 9 (20%)\n Adequate 11 (24%)\n Poor 1 ( 2%)\n Very Poor 1 ( 2%)\n18)\xe2\x80\x9cDid you telecommute after the event?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes 12 (27%)\n No 33 (73%) 9\n9 The 12 executives that responded yes continued; those that answered no skipped down to question\n#24.\n\n19)\xe2\x80\x9cWhen was the expectation for you to telecommute communicated to you?\xe2\x80\x9d\n It was communicated to me before the flood 2 (17%)\n It was communicated to me after the flood 1 ( 8%)\n The expectation was not communicated to me; it was self-initiated 9 (75%)\n20)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate training before you telecommuted?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I was provided with adequate training 10 (83%)\n No, I was not provided with adequate training 0 ( 0%)\n No, I was not provided with any training 2 (17%)\n21)\xe2\x80\x9cDid you have adequate experience with telecommuting before the flooding situation made\ntelecommuting necessary?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, I had adequate experience prior to being asked 11 (92%)\n No, I did not have adequate experience prior to being asked 0 ( 0%)\n No, I had no experience with telecommuting 1 ( 8%)\n22)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate technical tools (such as computers) to telecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes 12 (100%)\n No 0 ( 0%)\n I had no need for such tools 0 ( 0%)\n\n Page 25\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n23)\xe2\x80\x9cWere you provided with adequate technical assistance during the time you were expected to\ntelecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes 8 (67%)\n No 0 ( 0%)\n I had no need for technical assistance 4 (33%)\n24)\xe2\x80\x9c Did any of your employees and managers telecommute after the event?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, all of my employees telecommuted 5 (11%)\n Yes, some of my employees telecommuted 29 (64%)\n None of my employees telecommuted 11 (24%) 9\n9 The remaining questions apply only to those executives that answered yes.\n25)\xe2\x80\x9dWhen did you communicate to your employees and managers the expectation for them to\ntelecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Before the flood 4 (12%)\n After the flood 27 (79%)\n I did not communicate the expectation to them; it was self-initiated 3 ( 9%)\n26)\xe2\x80\x9cIn your opinion, were your employees and managers provided with adequate training before\nthey began telecommuting?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes 29 (85%)\n No 1 ( 3%)\n No, they were not provided with any training 4 (12%)\n27)\xe2\x80\x9cIn your opinion, did your employees and managers have adequate experience with\ntelecommuting before the flooding situation made telecommuting necessary?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, they had adequate experience 31 (91%)\n No, they did not have adequate experience 3 ( 9%)\n No, they had no experience with telecommuting 0 ( 0%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 26\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n28)\xe2\x80\x9cIn your opinion, were your employees and managers provided with adequate technical tools\n(such as computers) to telecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, they were provided with adequate technical tools 20 (59%)\n No, they were not provided with adequate technical tools 11 (32%)\n They did not need to be provided with technical tools 3 ( 9%)\n29)\xe2\x80\x9cIn your opinion, were your employees and managers provided with adequate technical\nassistance during the time they were expected to telecommute?\xe2\x80\x9d\n Yes, they were provided with adequate technical assistance 23 (68%)\n No, they were not provided with adequate technical assistance 1 ( 3%)\n They did not need technical assistance 10 (29%)\n\n\n\n\n Page 27\n\x0c The Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Appendix VI\n\nManagement\xe2\x80\x99s Response to the Draft Report\n\n\n\n\n Page 28\n\x0cThe Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Page 29\n\x0cThe Internal Revenue Service Building Flood Caused No\n Measurable Impact on Tax Administration\n\n\n\n\n Page 30\n\x0c'


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 22.9.2012
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 L 256/19
 ROZPORZĄDZENIE WYKONAWCZE KOMISJI (UE) NR 866/2012
 z dnia 21 września 2012 r.
 ustanawiające standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 KOMISJA EUROPEJSKA,
 uwzględniając Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej,
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1234/2007 z dnia 22 października 2007 r. ustanawiające wspólną organizację rynków rolnych oraz przepisy szczegółowe dotyczące niektórych produktów rolnych („rozporządzenie o jednolitej wspólnej organizacji rynku”) (1),
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie wykonawcze Komisji (UE) nr 543/2011 z dnia 7 czerwca 2011 r. ustanawiające szczegółowe zasady stosowania rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1234/2007 w odniesieniu do sektorów owoców i warzyw oraz przetworzonych owoców i warzyw (2), w szczególności jego art. 136 ust. 1,
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)
 Rozporządzenie wykonawcze (UE) nr 543/2011 przewiduje – zgodnie z wynikami wielostronnych negocjacji handlowych Rundy Urugwajskiej – kryteria, na których podstawie ustalania Komisja ustala standardowe wartości dla przywozu z państw trzecich, w odniesieniu do produktów i okresów określonych w części A załącznika XVI do wspomnianego rozporządzenia.
 (2)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie jest obliczana każdego dnia roboczego, zgodne z art. 136 ust. 1 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, przy uwzględnieniu podlegających zmianom danych dziennych. Niniejsze rozporządzenie powinno zatem wejść w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZE ROZPORZĄDZENIE:
 Artykuł 1
 Standardowe wartości celne w przywozie, o których mowa w art. 136 rozporządzenia wykonawczego (UE) nr 543/2011, są ustalone w załączniku do niniejszego rozporządzenia.
 Artykuł 2
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wchodzi w życie z dniem jego opublikowania w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wiąże w całości i jest bezpośrednio stosowane we wszystkich państwach członkowskich.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 21 września 2012 r.
 W imieniu Komisji, za Przewodniczącego,
 José Manuel SILVA RODRÍGUEZ
 Dyrektor Generalny ds. Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich
 (1) Dz.U. L 299 z 16.11.2007, s. 1.
 (2) Dz.U. L 157 z 15.6.2011, s. 1.
 ZAŁĄCZNIK
 Standardowe wartości w przywozie dla ustalania ceny wejścia niektórych owoców i warzyw
 (EUR/100 kg)
 Kod CN
 Kod państw trzecich (1)
 Standardowa wartość w przywozie
 0702 00 00
 MK
 65,0
 XS
 55,3
 ZZ
 60,2
 0707 00 05
 MK
 23,1
 TR
 102,3
 ZZ
 62,7
 0709 93 10
 TR
 116,4
 ZZ
 116,4
 0805 50 10
 AR
 96,7
 CL
 97,0
 TR
 95,0
 UY
 114,6
 ZA
 89,6
 ZZ
 98,6
 0806 10 10
 MK
 53,3
 TR
 121,5
 ZZ
 87,4
 0808 10 80
 BR
 89,7
 CL
 143,2
 NZ
 121,9
 US
 181,6
 ZA
 116,6
 ZZ
 130,6
 0808 30 90
 CN
 64,9
 TR
 109,5
 ZA
 144,5
 ZZ
 106,3
 0809 30
 TR
 147,2
 ZZ
 147,2
 0809 40 05
 IL
 60,4
 TR
 107,6
 XS
 74,4
 ZZ
 80,8
 (1) Nomenklatura krajów ustalona w rozporządzeniu Komisji (WE) nr 1833/2006 (Dz.U. L 354 z 14.12.2006, s. 19). Kod „ZZ” odpowiada „innym pochodzeniom”.


type: other

text:
286/2002 Sb. Zákon, kterým se mění zákon č. 218/1999 Sb., o rozsahu branné povinnosti a o vojenských správních úř...
 Zákon č. 286/2002 Sb.Zákon, kterým se mění zákon č. 218/1999 Sb., o rozsahu branné povinnosti a o vojenských správních úřadech (branný zákon), ve znění zákona č. 238/2000 Sb. a zákona č. 128/2002 Sb.
 kterým se mění zákon č. 218/1999 Sb., o rozsahu branné povinnosti a o vojenských správních úřadech (branný zákon), ve znění zákona č. 238/2000 Sb. a zákona č. 128/2002 Sb.
 Zákon č. 218/1999 Sb., o rozsahu branné povinnosti a o vojenských správních úřadech (branný zákon), ve znění zákona č. 238/2000 Sb. a zákona č. 128/2002 Sb., se mění takto:
 "(2) O žádosti občana o dobrovolné převzetí branné povinnosti rozhoduje náčelník územní vojenské správy. V řízení o žádosti cizince o dobrovolné převzetí branné povinnosti se postupuje podle § 54 odst. 6.".
 2. V § 4 se na konci odstavce 1 tečka nahrazuje čárkou a doplňuje se písmeno f), které zní:
 "f) osobám, které převzaly dobrovolně brannou povinnost, a to na základě jejich jednostranného prohlášení.".
 "(1) Zřizují se územní vojenské správy jako vojenské správní úřady prvního stupně a Hlavní doplňovací úřad jako vojenský správní úřad druhého stupně.".
 4. V § 7 se na konci odstavce 1 doplňuje věta, která včetně poznámek pod čarou č. 2a) a 2b) zní: "Jestliže je občan zbaven způsobilosti k právním úkonům, vyplní dotazník jeho opatrovník;2a) jestliže je postižen vadou nebo nemocí, pro kterou není schopen dotazník vyplnit, učiní tak za něj osoba blízká.2b)
 2b) § 116 občanského zákoníku.".
 5. V § 7 odst. 2 se slova "datum narození," a slova "a přechodného" zrušují.
 6. V § 9 odst. 1 se slova "velitelství územní obrany" nahrazují slovy "Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu".
 7. V § 9 odst. 3 se slova "datum narození," zrušují.
 8. V § 10 odst. 2 se slova "velitelství územní obrany." nahrazují slovy "Hlavní doplňovací úřad.".
 9. V § 11 se na konci odstavce 1 doplňuje tato věta: "Při odvodu lze pohovorem zjišťovat další znalosti a schopnosti brance a jeho zájem o výkon odborných činností v ozbrojených silách.".
 10. V § 11 odst. 5 se slovo "příslušné" zrušuje.
 11. V § 12 odst. 5 se slova "nevyléčitelnou nebo život ohrožující nemocí" nahrazují slovy "těžkou formou nevyléčitelné nemoci".
 12. V § 12 odst. 6 se slova "zcela neschopných vojenské činné služby" nahrazují slovy "zproštěných povinnosti dostavit se k pravidelnému odvodu".
 13. V § 13 se na konci textu odstavce 2 doplňují tato slova: "nebo cizinci, kterým byl povolen dobrovolný vstup do ozbrojených sil".
 14. V § 14 odst. 1 se slova "u velitelství územní obrany" nahrazují slovy "u Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu" a slova "velitel velitelství územní obrany" se nahrazují slovy "ředitel Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu".
 15. V § 16 odst. 4 se za slova "osobně podle" vkládají slova "svého zdravotního stavu a".
 16. V § 17 odstavec 1 včetně poznámky pod čarou č. 7a) zní:
 "(1) Základní služba trvá 12 měsíců; začíná dnem jejího nastoupení u vojenského útvaru nebo vojenského zařízení anebo vojenského záchranného útvaru7a) (dále jen "vojenský útvar") a končí dnem propuštění od vojenského útvaru.
 7a) § 2 odst. 2 až 4 zákona č. 219/1999 Sb., o ozbrojených silách České republiky, ve znění zákona č. 352/2001 Sb.".
 17. V § 24 odst. 1 se za slovo "Odvedencům" vkládají slova "nebo vojákům, kterým byla přerušena základní služba místo určení k náhradní službě, anebo vojákům, kterým byla přerušena základní nebo náhradní služba (dále jen "odvedenec"),".
 18. V § 24 se za odstavec 4 vkládají nové odstavce 5 a 6, které znějí:
 "(5) Pominou-li důvody, pro které byl odklad základní nebo náhradní služby povolen, náčelník územní vojenské správy povolení odkladu zruší. Odvolání proti rozhodnutí o zrušení odkladu nemá odkladný účinek.
 (6) Odvedenec se povolá do základní nebo náhradní služby nebo k jejímu dokončení v roce, v němž odklad skončil, nebo v roce následujícím.".
 19. V § 24 odst. 7 větě poslední se číslice "4" nahrazuje číslicí "6".
 20. V § 25 odstavec 4 zní:
 "(4) Náčelník územní vojenské správy rozhodnutí o přerušení základní služby zruší, jestliže důvody pominuly nebo důvody nebyly dány anebo došlo-li k neoprávněnému přerušení, a vojáka povolá k dokončení přerušené základní služby. Odvolání proti rozhodnutí o zrušení přerušení základní služby nemá odkladný účinek.".
 21. V § 29 odst. 4 se slova "30 kalendářních dnů" nahrazují slovy "3 měsíce".
 22. V § 30 odst. 7 větě první se slova " , nejdéle však na dobu 8 týdnů" zrušují.
 23. V § 30 se na konci odstavce 7 doplňuje tato věta: "Výjimečné vojenské cvičení lze konat i nad celkový rozsah vojenských cvičení stanovený v odstavci 1, nejvýše však do jednonásobku tohoto rozsahu.".
 24. V § 31 se doplňují odstavce 4 a 5, které znějí:
 "(4) Nahrazování zameškané vojenské činné služby začíná dnem následujícím po dni splnění stanovené délky vojenské činné služby.
 (5) Doba zameškaná výkonem kázeňského trestu vězení nebo svémocným vzdálením v době nahrazování se již nenahrazuje.".
 25. V § 37 se na konci odstavce 1 doplňuje tato věta: "Odvedenec nebo voják, který se dlouhodobě zdržuje v zahraničí, se dostaví k přezkumnému řízení po návratu do České republiky.".
 26. V § 38 odst. 1 se slova "velitelství územní obrany" nahrazují slovy "Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu".
 27. V § 38 odst. 2 větě první se slova "velitelství územní obrany" nahrazují slovy "Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu" a ve větě druhé se slova "velitel velitelství územní obrany" nahrazují slovy "ředitel Hlavního doplňovacího úřadu".
 28. V § 40 odst. 1 se slovo "vedou" nahrazuje slovy "nevedou k neschopnosti k vojenské činné službě, ale".
 29. V § 46 odst. 3 se slova "nebo přechodného" zrušují.
 30. V § 46 odst. 4 se slova "přiměřeně § 12" nahrazují slovy "přiměřeně § 11 a 12".
 "(1) Mimořádná služba končí nejpozději do 30 dnů od zrušení mimořádných opatření nebo od nařízení demobilizace.".
 32. V § 48 odst. 3 se věta druhá zrušuje.
 33. V § 49 se na konci odstavce 4 doplňuje tato věta: "Rozhodnutí o zproštění mimořádné služby se doručuje žadatelům.".
 34. V § 50 odstavec 1 včetně poznámky pod čarou č. 14) zní:
 "(1) Ministerstvo, vojenské správní úřady a vojenské útvary vedou vojenskou evidenci pro potřebu ozbrojených sil v rozsahu osobních údajů stanovených tímto zákonem, přitom postupují podle zvláštního právního předpisu.14) Údaje z vojenské evidence si mohou vzájemně poskytovat. Údaje z vojenské evidence lze poskytovat také orgánům veřejné správy pouze v rozsahu stanoveném zvláštním právním předpisem1) a také na žádost fyzické osoby, o které se vojenská evidence vede.
 14) Zákon č. 101/2000 Sb., o ochraně osobních údajů a o změně některých zákonů, ve znění pozdějších předpisů.".
 35. V § 50 se na konci odstavce 2 doplňuje tato věta: "Zpracováváním vojenské evidence se rozumí vyhodnocování osobních údajů pro rozhodování o schopnosti osob k vojenské činné službě, pro jejich povolávání do ozbrojených sil a zařazování do funkcí v ozbrojených silách.".
 36. V § 51 odst. 3 se slova "skutečnosti důležité pro vojenskou evidenci, zejména" a slova "a přechodného" zrušují.
 37. V § 52 odst. 1 se slova "vojenský průkaz," zrušují.
 38. V § 52 se odstavec 2 zrušuje.
 39. V § 52 odst. 2 se za slova "Vojenská knížka obsahuje" vkládá slovo "fotografii,".
 40. V § 52 odstavec 3 zní:
 "(3) Vojenská knížka se nepřipojuje jako příloha k návrhům a podáním. Voják v činné službě a voják mimo činnou službu je povinen ztrátu nebo poškození vojenské knížky hlásit nadřízenému nebo příslušné územní vojenské správě.".
 41. V § 55 odst. 1 se slova "nebo přechodného" zrušují.
 42. V § 55 odstavec 5 zní:
 "(5) Ministerstvo proplácí náklady na přezkumné řízení, na odvolání proti přezkumnému rozhodnutí a na přezkoušení pravomocného přezkumného rozhodnutí, které se týká vojáků v činné službě.".
 43. V § 56 odst. 4 se za slovo "působnosti" vkládají slova "a orgány územní samosprávy v přenesené působnosti".
 44. V § 56 odst. 6 se slova "územních vojenských správ" nahrazují slovy "lékařů odvodních komisí, vyšší odvodní komise, přezkumných komisí a vyšších přezkumných komisí".
 45. Příloha k zákonu zní:
 "Název, sídla a územní obvody vojenských správních úřadů
 Název Sídlo Územní obvody
 Benešov, Dobříš, Příbram, Sedlčany, Vlašim
 Ivančice, Rosice, Šlapanice, Tišnov, Ž idlochovice
 Břeclav, Hodonín, Hustopeče, Kyjov, Mikulov, Veselí nad Moravou
 Bílovec, Frenštát pod Radhoštěm, Frýdek-Místek, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Jablunkov, Kopřivnice, Nový Jičín, Třinec
 Humpolec, Jihlava, Moravské Budějovice, Náměšť nad Oslavou, Pelhřimov, Telč, Třebíč
 Bystřice pod Hostýnem, Holešov, Kroměříž, Otrokovice, Rožnov pod Radhoštěm, Uherské Hradiště, Uherský Brod, Valašské Klobouky, Valašské Meziříčí, Vsetín, Zlín
 Česká Lípa, Frýdlant, Jablonec nad Nisou, Jilemnice, Liberec, Nový Bor, Semily, Tanvald, Turnov
 Hranice, Konice, Litovel, Olomouc, Prostějov, Přerov, Šternberk, Uničov
 Bruntál, Hlučín, Krnov, Opava, Rýmařov, Vítkov
 Bílina, Děčín, Litoměřice, Lovosice, Roudnice nad Labem, Rumburk, Teplice, Ústí nad Labem
 Česká Třebová, Lanškroun, Litomyšl, Moravská Třebová, Polička, Svitavy, Ústí nad Orlicí, Vysoké Mýto, Žamberk
 Předseda vlády se zmocňuje, aby ve Sbírce zákonů vyhlásil úplné znění zákona č. 218/1999 Sb., o rozsahu branné povinnosti a o vojenských správních úřadech (branný zákon), jak vyplývá z pozdějších zákonů.


type: contracts

text:
 Ważna informacja prawna
 |
 22002D0163
 Dziennik Urzędowy L 038 , 13/02/2003 P. 0020 - 0021
 Decyzja Wspólnego Komitetu EOGnr 163/2002z dnia 6 grudnia 2002 r.zmieniająca załącznik II (Przepisy techniczne, normy, badania i certyfikacja) do Porozumienia EOGWSPÓLNY KOMITET EOG,uwzględniając Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, dostosowane Protokołem dostosowującym Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, zwane dalej Porozumieniem, w szczególności jego art. 98,a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:(1) Załącznik II do Porozumienia został zmieniony decyzją Wspólnego Komitetu EOG nr 13/2001 z dnia 23 lutego 2001 r. [1](2) Dwudziestą szóstą dyrektywę Komisji 2002/34/WE z dnia 15 kwietnia 2002 r. dostosowującą do postępu technicznego załącznik II, III i VII do dyrektywy Rady 76/768/EWG w sprawie zbliżenia ustawodawstw Państw Członkowskich odnoszących się do produktów kosmetycznych [2], należy włączyć do Porozumienia,PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZĄ DECYZJĘ:Artykuł 1W rozdziale XVI pkt 1 (dyrektywa Rady 76/768/EWG) załącznika II do Porozumienia dodaje się następujące tiret w brzmieniu:"— 32002 L 0034: dwudziestą szóstą dyrektywą Komisji 2002/34/WE z dnia 15 kwietnia 2002 r. (Dz.U. L 102 z 18.4.2002, str. 19).".Artykuł 2Tekst dyrektywy 2002/34/WE w językach islandzkim i norweskim, który zostanie opublikowany w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Wspólnot Europejskich, jest autentyczny.Artykuł 3Niniejsza decyzja wchodzi w życie dnia 7 grudnia 2002 r., pod warunkiem że wszystkie notyfikacje na mocy art. 103 ust. 1 Porozumienia zostały dokonane wobec Wspólnego Komitetu EOG [3].Artykuł 4Niniejsza decyzja zostaje opublikowana w Sekcji EOG i w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej.Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia 6 grudnia 2002 r.W imieniu Wspólnego Komitetu EOGKjartan JóhannssonPrzewodniczący[1] Dz.U. L 117 z 26.4.2001, str. 9.[2] Dz.U. L 102 z 18.4.2002, str. 19.[3] Nie wskazano wymogów konstytucyjnych.--------------------------------------------------


type: wikipedia

text:
Milenii: Mileniul I î.Hr. - Mileniul I - Mileniul al II-lea
 Secole: Secolul al IV-lea - Secolul al V-lea - Secolul al VI-lea
 Decenii: Anii 400 Anii 410 Anii 420 Anii 430 Anii 440 - Anii 450 - Anii 460 Anii 470 Anii 480 Anii 490 Anii 500
 Ani: 446 447 448 449 450 - 451 - 452 453 454 455 456
 Evenimente
 Attila a organizat o expediție de jaf în Galia, dar fost învins pe cîmpiile Catalaunice de către generalul german Aetius.
 Bătălia de la Avarayr. Are loc între o armată armeană creștină, condusă de Vardan Mamikonian, și o armată persană sasanidă.
 Arte, științe, literatură și filozofie
 Nașteri
 Decese
 Nestorie, patriarh de Constantinopol (n.c. 386)
 Pei Songzhi, istoric chinez (n. 372)
 Theodoric I, rege al vizigoților (n. 393)
 451


text:
Επιχείρηση Ράινχαρντ (στα γερμανικά Aktion Reinhard ή Einsatz Reinhard) είναι η κωδική ονομασία ενός σχεδίου που είχε σκοπό την εξόντωση όλων των Εβραίων στις περιοχές που βρίσκονταν κάτω από τον έλεγχο του ναζιστικού Γενικού Κυβερνείου (κατεχόμενη Πολωνία) και την αρπαγή των περιουσιών τους. Κατά τη διάρκεια της επιχείρησης αυτής περίπου δύο εκατομμύρια άνθρωποι θανατώθηκαν στο Μπέλζεκ, το Σομπιμπόρ, την Τρεμπλίνκα και το Μαϊντάνεκ, η πλειονότητα των οποίων ήταν Εβραίοι.
 Ονομασία
 Γενικότερα πιστεύεται ότι η επιχείρηση έλαβε το όνομά της από τον δολοφονηθέντα στην Πράγα συνταγματάρχη των SS Ράινχαρντ Χάιντριχ (Reinhard Heydrich), ωστόσο, κατά μια άλλη εκδοχή, το όνομα οφείλεται στον Φριτς Ράινχαρντ (Fritz Reinhardt) (-dt στο τέλος). Επικρατέστερη θεωρείται η πρώτη εκδοχή, αν και σε πολλά επίσημα έγγραφα της εποχής το όνομα του Ράινχαρντ Χάιντριχ εμφανίζεται ως Reinhardt.
 Έναρξη και αποτελέσματα
 Ο σχεδιασμός της επιχείρησης έγινε στη Διάσκεψη της Βάνζεε στις 20 Ιανουαρίου 1942. Ο Χάιντριχ, επιφορτισμένος με το σχέδιο της Τελικής λύσης, έδωσε τις κατευθυντήριες γραμμές για τη δημιουργία γκέτο και στρατοπέδων εξόντωσης. Η δημιουργία αυτών των στρατοπέδων αποφασίστηκε να γίνει εκτός των εδαφικών ορίων της Γερμανίας, ώστε να είναι δυνατή η απόκρυψη των φρικαλεοτήτων που διαπράχθηκαν εκεί από τον εγχώριο πληθυσμό. Επίσης, δεν θα χρειάζονταν μεγάλης έκτασης μεταφορές, καθώς η πλειονότητα των προς εξάλειψη Εβραίων βρισκόταν στην Πολωνία. Επικεφαλής της επιχείρησης ορίστηκε ο ταξίαρχος (Brigadeführer) των SS Οντίλο Γκλομπότσνικ (Odilo Globocnik), τότε επικεφαλής της Αστυνομίας του Γενικού Κυβερνείου (Generalgouvernement) της κατεχόμενης Πολωνίας, με έδρα το Λούμπλιν.
 Για το σκοπό αυτό, ο Γκλομπότσνικ δημιούργησε δύο τμήματα στο επιτελείο του: Το ένα, με επικεφαλής τον ταγματάρχη (Sturmbannführer) των SS Χέρμαν Χέφλε, είχε την ευθύνη του συντονισμού των ανδρών και των μέσων που απαιτούνταν για τις μεταγωγές των θυμάτων. Το δεύτερο τμήμα, με επικεφαλής τον λοχαγό της Αστυνομίας Κρίστιαν Βιρτ (Christian Wirth) ήταν υπεύθυνο για την κατασκευή και συντήρηση των απαιτούμενων εγκαταστάσεων στα τρία κέντρα εξόντωσης (Τρεμπλίνκα, Σομπιμπόρ και Μπέλζεκ).
 Η διαδικασία εξόντωσης ήταν παρόμοια με αυτή που ακολουθείτο ήδη στα στρατόπεδα συγκέντρωσης της Γερμανίας και της Αυστρίας. Στα νεοδημιουργημένα στρατόπεδα, ωστόσο, του Μαϊντάνεκ, του Σομπιμπόρ, του Μπέλζεκ και της Τρεμπλίνκα, απλουστεύθηκε σημαντικά η διαδικασία, ώστε να διευκολύνει τις μαζικές δολοφονίες σε σύντομο χρόνο: Τις περισσότερες φορές, μόλις έφθανε μεταφορικό μέσο φορτωμένο με Εβραίους (συνήθως τρένο), οι νεοαφιχθέντες οδηγούνταν αμέσως στους θαλάμους αερίων, όπου και θανατώνονταν. Προηγουμένως είχαν λεπτομερειακά καταγραφεί (αργότερα συμπληρωνόταν και ο τρόπος θανάτου), είχαν υποχρεωθεί να εκδυθούν τελείως και όλα τους τα κινητά υπάρχοντα κατάσχονταν - σύμφωνα με νόμο τα κατασχεθέντα αντικείμενα γίνονταν ιδιοκτησία της Τράπεζας της Γερμανίας. Υπολογίζεται ότι τα αντικείμενα αυτά, μαζί με τα τεχνητά δόντια από χρυσό, που αφαιρούνταν μετά τον θάνατό τους από συνεργεία άλλων κρατουμένων, απέφεραν στην Τράπεζα (δηλ. στη Ναζιστική Γερμανία) το ποσό των 180.000.000 μάρκων της εποχής (περίπου 550.000.000 σημερινά ευρώ). Ο συνολικός αριθμός των θυμάτων των στρατοπέδων εξόντωσης, που δημιουργήθηκαν στα πλαίσια της Επιχείρησης Ράινχαρντ, υπολογίζεται σε δύο περίπου εκατομμύρια, ενώ, αν υπολογιστούν και τα θύματα του Άουσβιτς, ο αριθμός υπερβαίνει τα τρία εκατομμύρια. Η διαδικασία διέφερε ελαφρά στα στρατόπεδα εξόντωσης: Στο Στρατόπεδο εξόντωσης Κέλμνο χρησιμοποιήθηκαν τα αποκαλούμενα "gas vans", αυτοκίνητα που είχαν μετατραπεί σε θαλάμους αερίων και χρησιμοποιούσαν μονοξείδιο του άνθρακα. Ήταν το μόνο στρατόπεδο με "κινητούς" θαλάμους αερίων - στα υπόλοιπα χρησιμοποιούνταν σταθερές κατασκευές. Στο Μπέλζεκ, το Σομπιμπόρ και την Τρεμπλίνκα, ως μέσο εξόντωσης στους θαλάμους χρησιμοποιήθηκε μονοξείδιο του άνθρακα, στο Μαϊντάνεκ μονοξείδιο του άνθρακα και Κυκλώνας Β και στο Άουσβιτς Κυκλώνας Β
 Το τέλος
 Θεωρητικά, η επιχείρηση έληξε στα τέλη του 1943 και οι βασικοί συντελεστές της (οι επικεφαλής των στρατοπέδων, οι διοικητές των γκέτο κτλ.) μετακινήθηκαν στην Ιταλία, αφού το οργανωτικό μέρος της επιχείρησης είχε ολοκληρωθεί. Ορισμένοι από αυτούς συνελήφθησαν και δικάστηκαν, άλλοι επέζησαν χωρίς να δικασθούν και εργάστηκαν μέχρι το θάνατό τους στη Γερμανία. Φυσικά, η λήξη της Επιχείρησης δεν σήμαινε ότι η εξόντωση των Εβραίων είχε τερματισθεί - συνεχίστηκε μέχρι τον τερματισμό του πολέμου σε όλα τα στρατόπεδα που είχαν παραμείνει σε λειτουργία.
 Πηγές, αναφορές
 Ραινχαρντ
 Ραινχαρντ
 Ραινχαρντ