Taiwan Security Enhancement Act

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Security Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United 
        States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both 
        societies.
            (2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political 
        transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy 
        with a political system separate from and totally unlike that 
        of the People's Republic of China.
            (3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market 
        principles and is separate and distinct from the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States 
        Government withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on 
        Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, neither at that 
        time nor since has the United States Government adopted a 
        formal position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than 
        to state that status must be decided by peaceful means. Any 
        determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must have the 
        express consent of the people on Taiwan.
            (5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the 
        sole legitimate government of all of China.
            (6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states 
        that--
                    (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area 
                are in the political, security, and economic interests 
                of the United States and are of international concern;
                    (B) the decision of the United States to establish 
                diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
                China rests upon the expectation that the future of 
                Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
                    (C) the United States would consider any effort to 
                determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
                means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the 
                peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of 
                grave concern to the United States;
                    (D) the United States will maintain the capacity to 
                resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the 
                security, or the social or the economic system, of the 
                people on Taiwan; and
                    (E) the preservation and enhancement of the human 
                rights of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of 
                the United States.
            (7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations 
        Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing 
        connection with and concern for Taiwan, its people, and their 
        ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free of the 
        use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces 
        adequate for defense and deterrence is in the interest of the 
        United States in that it helps to maintain peace in the Taiwan 
        Strait area.
            (8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed 
        the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have 
        maintained a defense and security relationship that has 
        contributed greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan 
        and the East Asia and Pacific regions.
            (9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint 
        training missions, have no direct military lines of 
        communication, and have only limited military-to-military 
        contacts. This lack of communication and interoperation between 
        the United States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense 
        of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event of future 
        aggression against Taiwan.
            (10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell 
        defensive weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan 
        Relations Act, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its 
        autonomy and freedom in the face of persistent hostility from 
        the People's Republic of China. However, pressures to delay, 
        deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been  prevalent 
since the signing of the August 17, 1982, communique with the People's 
Republic of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions 
could prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capability for self-
defense.
            (11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the 
        executive branch of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan 
        Relations Act take legal precedence over any communique with 
        the People's Republic of China.
            (12) The People's Republic of China has consistently 
        refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has 
        repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan, including implied 
        threats by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on 
        January 10, 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the 
        development of theater missile defense capabilities with the 
        United States.
            (13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China 
        near Taiwan in August 1995 and March 1996 clearly demonstrate 
        the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use 
        forceful tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
            (14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending, 
        the People's Republic of China continues a major and 
        comprehensive military buildup.
            (15) This military buildup includes the development of 
        advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate 
        precision guidance capability and the construction of new 
        imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence 
        satellites that will help target and guide ballistic and cruise 
        missiles. According to the Department of Defense report 
        entitled ``The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait'', 
        submitted to Congress in February 1999, the size of the missile 
        force of the People's Republic of China is expected to grow 
        substantially and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will 
        possess an ``overwhelming advantage'' in offensive missiles 
        vis-a-vis Taiwan. The Department of Defense has also noted that 
        the People's Republic of China may already possess the 
        capability to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is 
        researching advanced anti-satellite lasers that could blind 
        United States intelligence satellites, and is procuring radio 
        frequency weapons that disable electronic equipment. These 
        missile and anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave threat to 
        Taiwan.
            (16) This military buildup also includes the construction 
        or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including 
        Russian Kilo submarines that are difficult to detect, Russian 
        technology to assist the development of new nuclear-powered 
        attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed 
        with supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-
        range, all-weather naval attack aircraft called the JH-7, and 
        new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be 
        launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft. 
        These naval capabilities pose a grave threat of blockade to 
        Taiwan.
            (17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of 
        air combat capabilities by procuring and co-producing hundreds 
        of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian 
        Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with 
        advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile 
        and other precision guided munitions, constructing the 
        indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced 
        airborne warning and control systems from abroad. These 
        capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to Taiwan.
            (18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines 
        into the Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China 
        and the increasing capability of the People's Republic of China 
        to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered 
        submarines in order to maintain a capability to counter a 
        blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for 
        other purposes.
            (19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan 
        and the historically nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it 
        is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use submarines in an 
        offensive manner.
            (20) The current defense relationship between the United 
        States and Taiwan is deficient in terms of its capacity over 
        the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against 
        Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the 
        military departments should make every effort to reserve 
        additional positions for Taiwan officers at the National 
        Defense University, the senior war colleges, and the military 
        academies; and
            (2) the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign 
        military sales to Taiwan--
                    (A) take into account the special status of Taiwan; 
                and
                    (B) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has 
                full and timely access to price and availability data 
                for defense articles and defense services.

SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Increase in Technical Staff of the American Institute in 
Taiwan.--Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
the President shall use funds available to the Department of Defense 
under the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail of 
additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
    (b) Annual Reports.--Beginning 60 days after the next round of arms 
talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter, 
the President shall submit a report to Congress--
            (1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of 
        defense articles and defense services during the one-year 
        period ending on the date of the report;
            (2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as 
        justification for those requests; and
            (3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify 
        any such request that was made during the one-year period 
        ending on the date of the report, the level at which the final 
        decision was made, and a justification for the decision.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Maintenance of Sufficient Self-Defense Capabilities of 
Taiwan.--Congress finds that any determination of the nature or 
quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made available 
to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than the defense needs of 
Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Communique signed with 
the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement, 
order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment 
of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
    (b) Plan.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the 
        enhancement of programs and arrangements for operational 
        training and exchanges of personnel between the armed forces of 
        the United States and Taiwan for work in threat analysis, 
        doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and other areas. 
        The plan shall provide for exchanges of officers up to and 
        including general and flag officers in the grade of O-10.
            (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
        report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form, 
        containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
            (3) Implementation.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
        on which the report described in paragraph (2) is submitted or 
        required to be submitted, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        implement the plan contained in the report.
    (c) Communications Between United States and Taiwan Military 
Commands.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct 
communications between the United States Pacific military command and 
the Taiwan military command.
    (d) Missile Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related items, 
including--
            (1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems; 
        and
            (2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be 
        necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold to 
        Taiwan.
    (e) Satellite Early Warning Data.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, satellite early warning data.
    (f) Air Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including the following:
            (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
            (2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and 
        control systems (AWACS).
            (3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and 
        missile attack.
            (4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated 
        joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
    (g) Naval Defense Systems.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, defensive systems that counter the development by the 
People's Republic of China of new naval capabilities, including defense 
systems such as--
            (1) diesel-powered submarines;
            (2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems, 
        capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear 
        submarines;
            (3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers, 
        capable of defeating Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
            (4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to 
        conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
    (h) Relation to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in this section 
supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export 
Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under 
this section.

Summary: Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign military sales to Taiwan, take into account Taiwan's special status and make every effort to ensure it has full and timely access to price and availability data for defense articles and defense services.
Directs the President, upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to use Department of Defense funds for the assignment of additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
Directs the President to report annually to Congress with respect to Taiwan's defense needs.
Directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for the enhancement of programs for operational training and exchanges of personnel between U.S. armed forces and Taiwanese armed forces for work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and other areas. Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish secure direct communications between the U.S. Pacific military command and the Taiwan military command.
Authorizes the President, subject to the Arms Export Control Act, to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related items, satellite early warning data, modern air-defense equipment, and naval defense systems.