A bill to establish the policy of the United States for reducing the number of nuclear warheads in the United States and Russian arsenals, for reducing the number of nuclear weapons of those two nations that are on high alert, and for expanding and accelerating programs to prevent diversion and proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and nuclear expertise.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 2001''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Purpose.
Sec. 3. Reduction in number of warheads in arsenals of United States 
                            and 
                            Russia.
Sec. 4. Reduction in alert status of nuclear weapons of United States 
                            and 
                            Russia.
Sec. 5. Acceleration of programs to prevent diversion of nuclear 
                            weapons, 
                            materials, and expertise from Russia.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

    The purpose of this Act is to decrease substantially the likelihood 
of the intentional use of nuclear weapons, or their unintentional use 
as a result of accident, miscalculation, unauthorized action, or 
terrorist activity.

SEC. 3. REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN 
              ARSENALS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Repeal of Prohibition Against Reductions.--Section 1302 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 
105-85) is repealed.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
reduce the number of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons delivery 
systems of the United States and Russia, through bilateral agreements 
between the United States and Russia, to the lowest possible number 
consistent with the national security of the United States. Any 
bilateral agreement for purposes of that policy shall provide for 
transparency, predictability, and verification of the reductions.
    (c) Implementation of Reductions.--In effecting any reduction in 
the number of nuclear warheads of the United States, it shall be the 
policy of the United States--
            (1) that such reductions be intended as permanent 
        reductions in the United States nuclear weapons force, in 
        keeping with the purposes and objectives of the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty;
            (2) that if the President makes unilateral reductions in 
        the United States nuclear weapons force, such reductions should 
        be intended to facilitate bilateral agreement with Russia, and 
        the President should undertake diplomatic efforts to convince 
        Russia to undertake parallel or commensurate reductions in its 
        nuclear weapons force; and
            (3) that the President should (A) offer enhanced 
        consultation and cooperation by the United States with Russia 
        in making such reductions, and (B) pursue enhanced transparency 
        and other confidence-building measures to ensure predictable 
        and stable strategic relations between the two nations.
    (d) Policy Regarding Warheads Removed From Weapon Systems.--(1) It 
is the policy of the United States to ensure through formal agreements 
with Russia that any nuclear warhead removed from a weapon system by 
either nation as part of reductions in the number of warheads or 
systems pursuant to the policies in this Act--
            (A) be kept safe and secure;
            (B) be accounted for; and
            (C) eventually be destroyed or eliminated in a manner that 
        is verifiable by the other nation.
    (2) Any such formal agreement shall be entered into either through 
the agreement referred to in subsection (b) or other agreement between 
the United States and Russia.

SEC. 4. REDUCTION IN ALERT STATUS OF NUCLEAR 
              WEAPONS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
pursue with Russia formal arrangements to remove as many nuclear 
weapons of those two nations as possible from immediate, launch-ready 
(or ``high alert'') status, consistent with United States national 
security, beginning with those weapons earmarked for downloading, 
dismantlement, or elimination under the START II treaty. Such 
arrangements should seek to ensure that any change in the alert status 
of such weapons of either nation be transparent and verifiable.
    (b) Implementation of Reduction in Alert Status.--If the President 
makes unilateral changes to the alert status of weapons in the United 
States nuclear arsenal, such changes should--
            (1) be consistent with the national security of the United 
        States; and
            (2) be pursued as part of a broader United States effort to 
        persuade Russia to enter into arrangements as called for in 
        subsection (a).
    (c) Security and Verifiability.--Any formal arrangement that 
results from subsection (a) should include measures to ensure that--
            (1) weapons, including their warheads, that are removed 
        from high alert status are secure and accounted for throughout 
        the process by which they are removed from that status; and
            (2) such accountability measures are verifiable by both 
        nations.

SEC. 5. ACCELERATION OF PROGRAMS TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR 
              WEAPONS, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE FROM RUSSIA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
work cooperatively with Russia to prevent the diversion of nuclear 
weapons, materials, and expertise from Russia. In furtherance of that 
objective, the policy of the United States should include the 
following:
            (1) With respect to the nuclear weapons arsenal of Russia--
                    (A) ensuring that all the elements of that arsenal, 
                including delivery systems, are identified and 
                accounted for;
                    (B) identifying with Russia those elements of that 
                arsenal that are most susceptible to proliferation; and
                    (C) ensuring that the weapons in that arsenal and 
                their components are secured and safeguarded, placing 
                the highest priority on safeguards for those weapons 
                and components that are identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (B) as being those most susceptible to 
                proliferation.
            (2) With respect to Russia's stockpile of nuclear weapons 
        materials (other than materials in Russia's arsenal)--
                    (A) ensuring that all the elements of that 
                stockpile are identified and accounted for;
                    (B) identifying with Russia those elements of that 
                stockpile that are most susceptible to proliferation; 
                and
                    (C) ensuring that the elements of that stockpile 
                are secured and safeguarded, placing the highest 
                priority on safeguards for those elements of that 
                stockpile that are identified pursuant to subparagraph 
                (B) as being those most susceptible to proliferation.
            (3) With respect to nuclear weapons expertise in Russia--
                    (A) identifying and accounting for the extent of 
                that expertise in cities in Russia referred to as 
                ``Nuclear Cities'' and elsewhere in Russia;
                    (B) developing and pursuing programs that make 
                productive use of that expertise inside Russia and help 
                prevent the spread of that expertise outside of Russia; 
                and
                    (C) developing and pursuing initiatives to reduce 
                the Russian nuclear production capacity to a size 
                appropriate to its post-Cold War mission.
            (4) Rendering permanently unusable for weapons purposes all 
        nuclear materials and weapons systems that Russia no longer 
        requires to support its arsenal and forces.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--To carry out activities under 
this Act, cooperative threat reduction programs of the Department of 
Defense under section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2362 note), and other cooperative 
threat reduction, nonproliferation, and related programs, there are 
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 amounts as follows:
            (1) For the Department of Defense $600,000,000.
            (2) For the Department of Energy $1,200,000,000.
            (3) For the Department of State, $200,000,000.
    (c) Plan for Nonproliferation Programs With Russia.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than April 15, 2002, the 
        President shall submit to Congress a plan--
                    (A) to secure and neutralize over the succeeding 
                eight years all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
                nuclear material in Russia that Russia does not retain 
                in its nuclear arsenal; and
                    (B) to prevent the outflow from Russia of 
                scientific expertise that could be used for developing 
                nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, 
                including delivery systems.
            (2) Content of plan.--The plan required by subsection (a) 
        shall include the following:
                    (A) Specific goals and measurable objectives for 
                the programs that are designed to carry out the 
                objectives specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
                paragraph (1).
                    (B) Criteria for success for those programs and a 
                strategy for eventual termination of United States 
                contributions to those programs and assumption of the 
                ongoing support of those programs by Russia.
                    (C) A description of the administrative and 
                organizational changes that the President plans to 
                take, or will have taken, in order to achieve the 
                direction and coordination of those programs that is 
                necessary for their effectiveness.
            (3) Coordination with russia.--In developing the plan 
        required by paragraph (1), the President shall coordinate with 
        Russia to ensure that elements of the plan are practicable.
            (4) Consultation with congress.--In developing the plan 
        required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult with the 
        majority and minority leadership of the appropriate committees 
        of Congress.
    (d) Report on Debt-for-Security Program.--
            (1) Study.--The President shall conduct a study of the 
        feasibility of creating a new source of funds for nuclear 
        nonproliferation programs in Russia through establishment of a 
        program providing for the forgiveness of international debt of 
        Russia in exchange for payments by Russia into an independent 
        fund that, under strict conditions, would support the 
        implementation of agreed-upon nuclear nonproliferation 
        programs.
            (2) Consultation.--In the conduct of the study under 
        paragraph (1), the President shall consult with appropriate 
        representatives of Russia and other nations whose participation 
        in such a program the President determines to be necessary or 
        desirable.
            (3) Report on presidential determinations.--Not later than 
        April 15, 2002, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
        on the study required by paragraph (1). The report shall 
        include the President's determinations, together with 
        supporting facts and reasoning, as to each of the following:
                    (A) The prospects for the participation of creditor 
                nations in addition to the United States in the program 
                of debt forgiveness.
                    (B) The extent to which payments by Russia into a 
                fund described in paragraph (1) should be made in 
                Russian currency.
                    (C) The appropriate ratio between the amount of 
                such payments and the amount of debt forgiven.
                    (D) The purposes for which amounts in the fund 
                should be permitted to be expended.
                    (E) The means for assuring that those amounts are 
                expended for those purposes.
                    (F) The feasibility of establishing such a program.
            (4) Legislative proposal.--The report under paragraph (3) 
        shall include a legislative proposal for implementing any 
        program that the President recommends based on the 
        determinations under that paragraph.

Summary: Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001 - Repeals a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 which provides funding limits for retirement or dismantlement of the B52H bomber, Trident submarines, and Minuteman III and Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles. Declares it to be U.S. policy to: (1) reduce the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems of the United States and Russia, through bilateral agreements, to the lowest possible number consistent with national security, requiring any warhead removed to be kept safe and secure, accounted for, and eventually destroyed or eliminated in a verifiable manner; (2) pursue with Russia formal arrangements to remove as many nuclear weapons of the two nations as possible from immediate, launch-ready status, beginning with those weapons earmarked for downloading, dismantlement, or elimination under the START II Treaty; and (3) work cooperatively with Russia to prevent the diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise.Requires the President to submit to Congress a plan for nonproliferation programs with Russia, as well as a related study.