12 Carrier Act

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``12 Carrier Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The aircraft carrier can fulfill the Navy's core 
        missions of forward presence, sea control, ensuring safe sea 
        lanes, and power projection as well as providing flexibility 
        and versatility to execute a wide range of additional missions.
            (2) Forward airpower is integral to the security and joint 
        forces operations of the United States. Carriers play a central 
        role in delivering forward airpower from sovereign territory of 
        the United States in both permissive and nonpermissive 
        environments.
            (3) Aircraft carriers provide our Nation the ability to 
        rapidly and decisively respond to national threats, as well as 
        conducting worldwide, on-station diplomacy and providing 
        deterrence against threats to the United States allies, 
        partners, and friends.
            (4) Since the end of the cold war, aircraft carrier 
        deployments have increased while the aircraft carrier force 
        structure has declined.
            (5) Considering the increased array of complex threats 
        across the globe, the Navy aircraft carrier is operating at 
        maximum capacity, increasing deployment lengths and decreasing 
        maintenance periods in order to meet operational requirements.
            (6) To meet global peacetime and wartime requirements, the 
        Navy has indicated a requirement to maintain two aircraft 
        carriers deployed overseas and have three additional aircraft 
        carrier capable of deploying within 90 days. However, the Navy 
        has indicated that the existing aircraft carrier force 
        structure cannot support these military requirements.
            (7) Despite the requirement to maintain an aircraft carrier 
        strike group in both the United States Central Command and 
        United States Pacific Command, the Navy has been unable to 
        generate sufficient capacity to support our combatant 
        commanders and has developed significant carrier gaps in these 
        critical areas.
            (8) Because of continuing use of a diminished aircraft 
        carrier force structure, extensive maintenance availabilities 
        result which typically exceed program costs and increase time 
        in shipyards. These expansive maintenance availabilities 
        exacerbate existing carrier gaps.
            (9) Because of maintenance overhaul extensions, the Navy is 
        truncating basic aircraft carrier training to expedite the 
        deployment of available aircraft carriers. Limiting aircraft 
        carrier training decreases operational capabilities and 
        increases sailor risk.
            (10) Despite the objections of the Navy, the Under 
        Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
        directed the Navy on August 7, 2015, to perform shock trials on 
        the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). The Assistant Deputy Chief 
        of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy 
        indicated that this action could delay the introduction of the 
        U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) to the fleet by up to two years, 
        exacerbating existing carrier gaps.
            (11) The Navy has adopted a two-phase acquisition strategy 
        for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), an action that will 
        delay the introduction of this aircraft carrier by up to two 
        years, exacerbating existing carrier gaps.
            (12) Developing an alternative design to the Ford-class 
        aircraft carrier is not cost beneficial. A smaller design is 
        projected to incur significant design and engineering cost 
        while significantly reducing magazine size, carrier air wing 
        size, sortie rate, and on-station effectiveness among other 
        vital factors when compared to the Ford-class. Furthermore, a 
        new design will delay the introduction of future aircraft 
        carriers, exacerbating existing carrier gaps and threatening 
        the national security of the United States.
            (13) The 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment states ``A 
        minimum of 12 aircraft carriers are required to meet the 
        increased warfighting response requirements of the Defense 
        Planning Guidance Defeat/Deny force sizing direction.''
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should expedite delivery of 12 
        aircraft carriers;
            (2) an aircraft carrier should be authorized every three 
        years;
            (3) shock trials should be conducted on the U.S.S. John F. 
        Kennedy (CVN-79), as initially proposed by the Navy;
            (4) construction for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) 
        should be accomplished in a single phase;
            (5) the United States should continue the Ford-class design 
        for CVN-81; and
            (6) bulk procurement initiatives for CVN-80 and CVN-81 
        should be pursued.

SEC. 3. SHOCK TRIALS FOR CVN-78.

    Section 128(b)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 751) is amended by 
striking ``prior to the first deployment of such ship''.

SEC. 4. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE 
              NAVY.

    (a) Increase.--Section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``11 operational aircraft carriers'' and inserting 
``12 operational aircraft carriers''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on September 30, 2023.

Summary: 12 Carrier Act This bill requires the Navy's naval combat forces to include at least 12 (currently, 11) operational aircraft carriers, effective September 30, 2023. The bill amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to eliminate the requirement that the Navy's certification to the congressional defense committees must indicate that the full ship shock trials on the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford will be conducted before the first deployment of such ship.