Nuclear Cruise Missile Reconsideration Act of 2017

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Cruise Missile 
Reconsideration Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States is currently developing a new 
        nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, the long-range 
        standoff weapon.
            (2) When asked by the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate before his confirmation hearing about his support for 
        the long-range standoff weapon, Secretary of Defense James N. 
        Mattis stated, ``I will carefully examine the utility and 
        advisability of this program within existing nuclear 
        doctrine.''.
            (3) When asked during his confirmation hearing whether he 
        would commit to support continued development of the long-range 
        standoff weapon, Secretary Mattis emphasized the need to 
        examine its ``deterrent capability''.
            (4) The United States already plans to construct a new 
        fleet of nuclear-capable penetrating long-range strike bombers, 
        known as the B-21, that will carry the refurbished B61 nuclear 
        gravity bomb.
            (5) The range and lethality of existing United States 
        strategic bombers is being improved by the addition of the 
        Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, a long-range 
        conventionally armed air-launched cruise missile. The B-21 
        bomber will also be armed with this missile.
            (6) According to public reports, the long-range standoff 
        weapon will be a far more precise version of its predecessor.
            (7) General James E. Cartwright, former head of United 
        States Strategic Command, warned in 2016 that ``bring[ing] real 
        precision to [nuclear] weapons'' could ``make them more 
        usable''.
            (8) In a 2014 letter to the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the Senate, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall explained 
        that the long-range standoff weapon could have utility 
        ``[b]eyond deterrence''.
            (9) In a 2016 statement before the Subcommittee on 
        Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert 
        Scher asserted that the long-range standoff weapon would 
        provide the United States with the ability ``to respond 
        proportionately to a limited nuclear attack''.
            (10) In a 2013 article in the Telegraph, Philip Hammond, 
        then-Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom explained, ``A 
        cruise-based deterrent would carry significant risk of 
        miscalculation and unintended escalation.''.
            (11) In a 2015 article in the Washington Post, former 
        Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant 
        Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber wrote, ``Because they can be 
        launched without warning and come in both nuclear and 
        conventional variants, cruise missiles are a uniquely 
        destabilizing type of weapon.''.

SEC. 3. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR LONG-RANGE STANDOFF WEAPON.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any 
fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may not obligate or expend more 
than $95,600,000 on development of the long-range standoff weapon or 
any other nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile, and the 
Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend more than $220,253,000 
on the life extension program for the W80-4 warhead, until the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant 
Federal agencies, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
Nuclear Posture Review that includes a detailed and specific assessment 
of the following:
            (1) The anticipated capabilities of the long-range standoff 
        weapon to hold targets at risk beyond other already existing 
        and planned nuclear-capable delivery systems.
            (2) The anticipated ability of the long-range standoff 
        weapon to elude adversary integrated air and missile defenses 
        compared to the B-21 bomber.
            (3) The anticipated effect of the long-range standoff 
        weapon on strategic stability relative to other nuclear-armed 
        countries.
            (4) The anticipated effect of the long-range standoff 
        weapon on the offensive nuclear weapons capabilities and 
        programs of other nuclear-armed countries.
            (5) The anticipated effect of the long-range standoff 
        weapon on the response of other nuclear-armed countries to 
        proposals to decrease or halt the growth of their nuclear 
        stockpiles.
            (6) The anticipated effect of the long-range standoff 
        weapon on the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.
    (b) Form.--The Nuclear Posture Review required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex.
    (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

Summary: Nuclear Cruise Missile Reconsideration Act of 2017 This bill prohibits the obligation or expenditure of more than specified amounts by the Department of Defense (DOD) on development of the long-range standoff weapon or any other nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile, or by the Department of Energy on the life extension program for the W80-4 warhead, until DOD submits to specified congressional committees a Nuclear Posture Review that includes an assessment of:   the anticipated capabilities of the long-range standoff weapon to hold targets at risk beyond other already existing and planned nuclear-capable delivery systems;  the anticipated ability of such weapon to elude adversary integrated air and missile defenses compared to the B-21 bomber; and  the anticipated effect of such weapon on strategic stability relative to other nuclear-armed countries, on the offensive nuclear weapons capabilities and programs of other nuclear-armed countries, on the response of other nuclear-armed countries to proposals to decrease or halt the growth of their nuclear stockpiles, and on the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.