To continue restrictions against and prohibit diplomatic recognition of the Government of North Korea, and for other purposes.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Sanctions and Diplomatic 
Nonrecognition Act of 2010''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) North Korean negotiators in the Six-Party diplomatic 
        process did not act in good faith by their refusal to agree to 
        a transparent verification process for denuclearization 
        consistent with ``international standards'', including 
        provisions for nuclear sampling, following North Korea's 
        removal on October 11, 2008, from the list of state sponsors of 
        terrorism maintained by the Department of State.
            (2) International press reports indicate that North Korea 
        has continued to provide support to Iran in the areas of 
        missile technology and nuclear development and has provided 
        Iran's surrogates, Hezbollah and Hamas, with both missile 
        technology and training in tunneling techniques with which to 
        attack Israel, an ally of the United States.
            (3) International press reports indicate that North Korea 
        was engaged for a number of years in assistance to Syria in the 
        construction of a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert which 
        was destroyed in a strike by Israeli forces on September 6, 
        2007.
            (4) North Korean negotiators continue to refuse to address 
        in a humane and sincere manner the issue of the abduction of 
        civilians of Japan and the Republic of Korea, both allies of 
        the United States, as well as the abductions of citizens from a 
        number of other countries, including France, Lebanon, Romania, 
        and Thailand.
            (5) Defectors coming out of North Korea have provided 
        testimony that United States permanent resident, Reverend Kim 
        Dong-shik, the spouse and father of United States citizens, was 
        tortured and murdered inside North Korea after his abduction by 
        Pyongyang's agents on the Chinese border in January 2000 and 
        that his remains are currently being held at a military 
        facility inside North Korea.
            (6) Congress authoritatively expressed its view, in section 
        202(b)(2) of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public 
        Law 108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7832(b)(2)) that ``United States 
        nonhumanitarian assistance to North Korea shall be contingent 
        on North Korea's substantial progress'' on human rights 
        improvements, release of and accounting for abductees, family 
        reunification, reform of North Korea's labor camp system, and 
        the decriminalization of political expression, none of which 
        has occurred.
            (7) Congress further authoritatively expressed its view, in 
        section 2 of the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act 
        of 2008 (Public Law 110-346) that ``human rights and 
        humanitarian conditions inside North Korea are deplorable'' and 
        that ``North Korean refugees remain acutely vulnerable''.
            (8) Congress has determined that any missile test or launch 
        conducted by North Korea would be in direct violation of United 
        Nations Security Council resolution 1695, adopted on July 16, 
        2006, which ``condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK (North 
        Korea) of ballistic missiles on July 5 2006 local time'', and 
        United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on 
        October 9, 2006, which ``demands that the DPRK (North Korea) 
        not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic 
        missile'' and ``decides that the DPRK shall suspend all 
        activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in 
        this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a 
        moratorium on missile launching'', and further determines that 
        the resulting sanctions imposed under such resolution 1718 
        would again come into full effect following a missile test or 
        launch.
            (9) Congress has further determined that a return by North 
        Korea to the Six-Party diplomatic process following any missile 
        test or launch by Pyongyang must include a firm and transparent 
        commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
        dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear programs, 
        including those derived both from plutonium as well as highly 
        enriched uranium.
            (10) Japanese press reports have indicated that a 
        delegation of approximately fifteen Iranian missile experts 
        arrived in North Korea in March 2009 ``to help Pyongyang 
        prepare for a rocket launch'', including senior officials with 
        the Iranian rocket and satellite producer Shahid Hemmat 
        Industrial Group, and that they brought with them a letter from 
        their President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to North Korean leader Kim 
        Jong-Il stressing the importance of cooperating on space 
        technology.
            (11) North Korea, in defiance of the international 
        community's efforts to end nuclear proliferation and in 
        violation of its international obligations, conducted a second 
        underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009 (local time), in 
        violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, 
        which resulted in the passage of United Nations Security 
        Council Resolution 1874 on June 12, 2009, which imposed 
        additional sanctions and inspection requirements with regard to 
        North Korea.

SEC. 3. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH 
              KOREA.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that subsequent to the decision of the 
Secretary of State on October 11, 2008, to rescind the designation of 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, North Korea has committed 
acts that can be defined as international terrorism or as highly 
provocative, including--
            (1) the dispatch of a covert team of two North Korean 
        military-trained agents to South Korea with orders to 
        assassinate North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop who were 
        apprehended by South Korean officials in April 2010;
            (2) complicity in the sinking of the South Korean naval 
        vessel Cheonan on March 26, 2010, which resulted in the deaths 
        of 46 South Korean naval personnel; and
            (3) the shipment of weapons by North Korea, seized in 
        Bangkok in December 2009, which were bound for delivery to 
        foreign terrorist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas, according 
        to a statement made by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor 
        Lieberman in Tokyo on May 12, 2010.
    (b) Continuation of Restrictions.--Notwithstanding the decision by 
the Secretary of State on October 11, 2008, to rescind the designation 
of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, and in light of the 
congressional finding described in subsection (a), restrictions against 
the Government of North Korea that were imposed by reason of a 
determination of the Secretary of State that the Government of North 
Korea is a state sponsor of terrorism and that are in effect as of the 
date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect, and shall not 
be lifted, unless the President makes the certification described in 
subsection (c).
    (c) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (b) 
is a certification to Congress containing a determination of the 
President that the Government of North Korea--
            (1) is no longer engaged in the illegal transfer of missile 
        or nuclear technology, particularly to the governments of Iran, 
        Syria, or any other state sponsor of terrorism;
            (2) is no longer engaged in training in combat operations 
        or tunneling, or harboring, supplying, financing, or supporting 
        in any way--
                    (A) Hamas, Hezbollah, the Japanese Red Army, or any 
                member of such organizations;
                    (B) any organization designated by the Secretary of 
                State as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance 
                with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
                Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)); and
                    (C) any person included on the annex to Executive 
                Order 13224 (September 21, 2001) and any other person 
                identified under section 1 of that Executive Order 
                whose property and interests are blocked by that 
                section (commonly known as a ``specially designated 
                global terrorist'');
            (3) is no longer engaged in the counterfeiting of United 
        States currency ``supernotes'';
            (4) is no longer engaged in the international trafficking 
        of illicit narcotics into the United States, Japan, Australia, 
        or other allied countries of the United States;
            (5) has returned the last remains of United States 
        permanent resident, Reverend Kim Dong-shik, to his United 
        States citizen widow, family, and church members, so that he 
        may be provided with a proper Christian burial in Chicago;
            (6) has released the Japanese nationals recognized as 
        abduction victims by the Government of Japan as well as 
        abduction victims recognized by the Government of the Republic 
        of Korea;
            (7) has released an estimated 600 surviving South Korean 
        POWs, and any other surviving POWs from the Korean War, who 
        have been held in North Korea against their will and in 
        violation of the Armistice Agreement since hostilities ended in 
        July, 1953;
            (8) has made concrete provisions for unrestricted family 
        reunification meetings for those individuals among the two-
        million strong Korean-American community who maintain family 
        ties with relatives inside North Korea;
            (9) has opened the North Korean penal system, including the 
        gulag of concentration camps holding an estimated 200,000 
        political and religious prisoners, to unrestricted and regular 
        visits by representatives of the International Committee of the 
        Red Cross (ICRC);
            (10) has made provision for unrestricted and regular access 
        by representatives of the United National High Commissioner for 
        Refugees to refugees forcibly repatriated to North Korea to 
        determine their general health and welfare; and
            (11) has made concrete provisions for unrestricted contact, 
        including direct communications and meetings, between 
        representatives of international and South Korean religious 
        organizations, including Christians and Buddhists, and their 
        co-believers inside North Korea.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, in light 
of the congressional finding described in subsection (a), the Secretary 
of State should redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism 
immediately upon the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (e) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section, the term 
``state sponsor of terrorism'' means any country the government of 
which the Secretary of State determines has repeatedly provided support 
for acts of international terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the 
Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, or any other provision of law.

SEC. 4. CONTINUATION OF DIPLOMATIC NONRECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the United States did not grant 
diplomatic recognition to North Korea upon its establishment as a 
client regime of the former Soviet Union in 1948. The United States has 
consistently continued to withhold such formal diplomatic recognition 
during the 60 years since the sudden and unprovoked attack by North 
Korean forces on the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, an attack 
which led directly to the Korean War and the deaths of over 36,000 
United States military personnel as well as at least 2,000,000 Koreans 
and over 3,000 soldiers from Allied countries.
    (b) Continuation of Diplomatic Nonrecognition.--The diplomatic 
nonrecognition described in subsection (a), including restrictions on 
the establishment of a permanent presence or United States liaison 
office inside North Korea, shall remain in effect, until such time as 
the President certifies to Congress that the Government of North Korea 
has met all of the benchmarks specified in section 3.

SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO A NORTH KOREAN MISSILE LAUNCH OR 
              NUCLEAR TEST.

    In the case of the launch of a missile, rocket, or other airborne 
object by North Korea or the conducting of a nuclear test in violation 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874, 
the President shall instruct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States to secure adoption of a United Nations Security Council 
resolution condemning North Korea's action as a violation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874 and requiring 
the implementation of comprehensive sanctions and an inspection regime 
against North Korea.

Summary: North Korea Sanctions and Diplomatic Nonrecognition Act of 2010 - Continues diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions against the government of North Korea as a supporter of international terrorism until the President certifies to Congress that North Korea: (1) is no longer engaged in the illegal transfer of missile or nuclear technology, particularly to Iran and Syria; (2) is not assisting foreign terrorist organizations, engaged in counterfeiting U.S. currency, or engaged in illicit narcotics traffic; (3) has released specified U.S. citizens, Japanese nationals, and surviving Korean War prisoners of war; and (4) has undertaken specified actions regarding family reunification, penal reforms, refugee access, and religious organization communications.

Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Finds that the United States did not grant diplomatic recognition to North Korea upon its establishment as a client regime of the former Soviet Union in 1948.

Continues diplomatic nonrecognition of North Korea until such benchmarks have been met.

Directs the President, in the case of a North Korean missile, rocket, or other airborne launch or the conducting of a nuclear test in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874, to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use U.S. influence to secure adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning North Korea's action and requiring implementation of comprehensive sanctions against North Korea.