To ensure that the courts of the United States may provide an impartial forum for claims brought by United States citizens and others against any railroad organized as a separate legal entity, arising from the deportation of United States citizens and others to Nazi concentration camps on trains owned or operated by such railroad, and by the heirs and survivors of such persons.

SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

    Congress finds as follows:
            (1) During World War II, more than 75,000 Jews and 
        thousands of other persons were deported from France to Nazi 
        concentration camps, on trains operated for profit by the 
        Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fers Francais (in this Act 
        referred to as ``SNCF''), including deportations to Auschwitz 
        and Buchenwald. Numerous citizens and residents of the United 
        States were among those on the trains or had relatives on the 
        trains. United States servicemen who were pilots shot down over 
        France were also among the persons deported on the SNCF trains 
        to Nazi concentration camps.
            (2) United States citizens and others have sought redress 
        against SNCF by filing a class action suit in the United States 
        District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The named 
        plaintiffs and class members include United States Army Air 
        Force pilots and United States citizens.
            (3) The complaint filed alleges that SNCF, a separate 
        corporate entity which remained independent during World War 
        II, operated the deportation trains for a profit, as ordinary 
        commercial transactions. SNCF remained under French civilian 
        control throughout World War II and is alleged to have 
        collaborated willingly with the German Nazi regime.
            (4) The complaint alleges that SNCF provided the necessary 
        rolling stock, scheduled the departures, and supplied the 
        employees to operate the trains bound for the concentration 
        camps. SNCF allegedly charged an ordinary passenger coach fare 
        for the deportations, calculated per person and per kilometer, 
        and considered these trains as ordinary commercial activities. 
        The plaintiffs further contend that SNCF herded as many people 
        as possible into each car, requiring passengers of all ages and 
        sexes, including the elderly and young children, to stand 
        throughout the trip of several days' duration, with no 
        provision for food or water and no sanitary facilities. The 
        complaint further alleges that SNCF cleaned the trains after 
        each trip, removing the corpses of persons who perished during 
        transit due to the execrable conditions of the train cars. The 
        destination was in each case a camp in which the deportees were 
        to be exterminated, worked to death, or made to suffer terrible 
        and inhuman conditions.
            (5) The complaint contends that SNCF's actions violated the 
        Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950, relating to crimes 
        under international law (earlier recognized by the Martens 
        Clause of the Hague Convention IV of 1907), and aided and 
        abetted the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
        humanity. SNCF has not denied its actions and has never 
        disgorged the money that it was paid for the deportations or 
        otherwise compensated the deportees or their heirs.
            (6) SNCF's records concerning the deportation trains have 
        not been made available to the plaintiffs, and SNCF archives 
        concerning its wartime activities remain closed to the general 
        public.
            (7) SNCF moved to dismiss the lawsuit on a claim of 
        sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
        of 1976 (28 U.S.C. 1330 and 1602 et seq.), even though it is 
        one of the 500 largest corporations in the world, earns 
        hundreds of millions of dollars from its commercial activities 
        in the United States, and is not accorded sovereign immunity 
        under the laws of France. SNCF's motion to dismiss the lawsuit 
        has been granted by the United States District Court for the 
        Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, 
        their appeal was granted, and the case was remanded for further 
        proceedings.
            (8) This lawsuit presents issues of substantial importance 
        to citizens and veterans of the United States and finds that 
        the courts of the United States are a proper forum for this 
        lawsuit and similar suits.
            (9) SNCF is attempting to use the Foreign Sovereign 
        Immunities Act of 1976, enacted 30 years after the events at 
        issue occurred, to evade liability for conduct for which it 
        would otherwise be held accountable, rather than accepting 
        responsibility for its actions. Under the rule of separate 
        entities applicable at the time of the events in question, SNCF 
        would not be immune from suit in United States courts. The 
        Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was not intended to 
        expand the reach of immunity in these circumstances.

SEC. 2. ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS FOR HOLOCAUST DEPORTEES.

    (a) Jurisdiction of District Courts.--The United States district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy, of any civil action for damages for personal injury or 
death that--
            (1) arose from the deportation of persons to Nazi 
        concentration camps during the period beginning on January 1, 
        1942, and ending on December 31, 1944; and
            (2) is brought by any such person, or any heir or survivor 
        of such person, against a railroad that--
                    (A) owned or operated the trains on which the 
                persons were so deported; and
                    (B) was organized as a separate legal entity at the 
                time of the deportation, whether or not any of the 
                equity interest in the railroad was owned by a foreign 
                state.
    (b) Other Laws not Applicable.--Sections 1330 and 1601 through 1611 
of title 28, United States Code, or any other law limiting the 
jurisdiction of the United States courts, whether by statute or under 
common law, shall not preclude any action under subsection (a).
    (c) Inapplicability of Statutes of Limitation.--No action described 
in subsection (a) shall be barred by a defense that the time for 
bringing such action has expired under a statute of limitations.
    (d) Applicability.--This section shall apply to any action pending 
on January 1, 2002, and to any action commenced on or after that date.

Summary: Grants U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action for damages for personal injury or death that: (1) arose from the deportation of persons to Nazi concentration camps between January 1, 1942, and December 31, 1944; and (2) is brought by or on behalf of such person against a railroad that owned or operated the trains on which the persons were deported and that was organized as a separate legal entity.

Provides that: (1) no law limiting the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts shall preclude any such action; and (2) no such action shall be barred because a statute of limitations has expired. Makes this Act applicable to any action pending on or commenced after January 1, 2000.