To provide a strategic approach to the war in Iraq to enhance the national security interests of the United States both at home and abroad, while ensuring the safety of the United States Armed Forces and ensuring stability in Iraq and the Middle East.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Enhancing America's Security through 
Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

    (a) First Principal Finding.--Ending the war in Iraq is necessary, 
however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for United 
States national security, the safety of members of the United States 
Armed Forces currently serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and 
the Middle East.
    (b) Second Principal Finding.--
            (1) Open-ended commitment is unsustainable.--An open-ended 
        United States involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of 
        United States national security, and United States military 
        forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely over-
        strained.
            (2) Supporting facts.--
                    (A) Currently, 40 percent of all United States Army 
                equipment is in Iraq.
                    (B) There is no Army unit currently in the United 
                States in a state of readiness that would permit the 
                unit to deploy anywhere another contingency might occur 
                in the world.
    (c) Third Principal Finding.--
            (1) Lengthy redeployment process.--Redeployment from Iraq 
        will be a lengthy process.
            (2) Supporting facts.--
                    (A) Redeploying approximately 160,000 troops and 
                50,000 civilian contractors from Iraq and closing bases 
                are logistically challenging, especially during 
                conflict.
                    (B) The critical consideration is the closure or 
                turnover of the sixty-five Forward Operating Bases held 
                by the United States Armed Forces in Iraq.
                    (C) It takes on average 100 days to close just one 
                Forward Operating Base, and any decision regarding the 
                number of Forward Operating Bases to close at one time 
                depends on surrounding strife and the fact that 
                receiving facilities in Kuwait to prepare military 
                vehicles for shipment to the United States or elsewhere 
                can handle only 2 to 2\1/2\ brigade combat teams at a 
                time and there are currently 40 brigade combat teams or 
                their equivalent in Iraq.
                    (D) Redeployment is the most vulnerable of military 
                operations, particularly in this case because 
                redeployment will rely on a single road, leading from 
                Iraq to Kuwait.
                    (E) For comparison purposes, the removal of 6,300 
                members of the Armed Forces from Somalia in 1993 took 
                six months and actually required the deployment of 
                another 19,000 troops to protect their withdrawal.
                    (F) In view of the logistical challenges, it will 
                take at least a year, more likely 15 to 20 months to 
                complete redeployment of United States forces from 
                Iraq.

SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

    (a) First Declaration of Policy.--
            (1) Need for comprehensive regional security plan.--
        Congress declares that it is critical that a comprehensive 
        security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts 
        the necessity for a deliberate redeployment of United States 
        forces from Iraq.
            (2) Supporting details.--
                    (A) A comprehensive security plan is necessary for 
                both the safety of United States forces in Iraq and the 
                overall national security of the United States.
                    (B) Redeployment would allow large numbers of 
                members of the United States Armed Forces to return to 
                the United States, while some forces could be deployed 
                to areas, such as Afghanistan, where terrorists pose a 
                threat to the national security of the United States or 
                could remain at existing bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
                United Arab Emirates, or Qatar and on aircraft carrier 
                and amphibious groups, to protect United States 
                interests in the region.
    (b) Second Declaration of Policy.--
            (1) Iraqi assumption of responsibility.--Congress declares 
        that a planned end to United States involvement in Iraq will 
        serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for the 
        security and governance of their country while providing Iran 
        and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by 
        the redeployment of United States forces.
            (2) Supporting details.--
                    (A) The United States intelligence community has 
                found that Iran and Syria, currently involved 
                destructively in the fighting in Iraq want stability in 
                Iraq following redeployment, and can play a 
                constructive role in improving security and stability 
                in Iraq.
                    (B) Because the redeployment of United States may 
                take up to 20 months, there is an opportunity for a 
                strategic approach to work diplomatically for political 
                accommodation in Iraq with Iran and Syria (as well as 
                Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region) during 
                that timeframe.
    (c) Third Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that while a 
``date certain'' deadline for the redeployment of United States forces 
could force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility and provide Iran and 
Syria the incentive to prevent violence that could result from the 
redeployment, a ``goal'' for the redeployment's end instead of a ``date 
certain'' is a necessary compromise in order to ensure a strategic 
approach for United States security and create a greater level of Iraqi 
stability in the aftermath of the redeployment.

SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Redeployment Required.--
            (1) Requirement.--Redeployment of United States Armed 
        Forces serving in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall 
        begin within three months after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act. Within six months after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre-
        surge level of 130,000 troops.
            (2) Goal.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not later 
        than twenty months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        the goal is that all United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq 
        as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall be deployed outside of 
        Iraq, to locations within the Middle East or Southwest Asia 
        regions or to other regions or nations, or returned to the 
        United States.
            (3) Purpose and pace of redeployment.--The redeployment 
        required by this subsection shall be carried out for the 
        purposes of both enhancing global security interests of the 
        United States and improving the military readiness of the 
        United States. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the 
        redeployment is carried out at a deliberate, orderly pace that 
        allows for the full security of members of the Armed Services.
    (b) Exceptions to Redeployment Requirement.--The redeployment 
required by subsection (a) shall not apply to the following:
            (1) Special operations forces and counter-terrorism 
        operations.--Special operations forces assigned outside of Iraq 
        that conduct either targeted counter-terrorism operations or 
        periodic support operations of the Iraqi security forces in 
        Iraq.
            (2) Military liaison teams.--Military or civilian personnel 
        on military liaison teams involved in military-to-military 
        contacts and comparable activities between the United States 
        and Iraq, as authorized under section 168 of title 10, United 
        States Code.
            (3) Air support.--Members of the Air Force, Navy, and 
        Marine Corps assigned to locations outside Iraq for purposes of 
        conducting air operations in Iraq (including air operations in 
        support of combat operations) to support the Iraqi security 
        forces.
            (4) Security for united states diplomatic missions in 
        iraq.--Members of the Armed Forces providing security for the 
        United States Embassy and other United States diplomatic 
        missions in Iraq.
            (5) Defense attache.--Personnel conducting routine 
        functions of the Office of Defense Attache.

SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.

    Effective six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of 
Defense under any provision of law for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not 
be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 members of the 
United States Armed Forces within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for 
troops in Iraq within twenty months after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

SEC. 6. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) United States Leadership.--The United States should take a 
leadership role in diplomatic efforts and negotiations necessary for 
countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to 
ensure the long-term stability of Iraq, which is in the best interests 
of such countries and the United States.
    (b) International Conference.--The United States should convene an 
international conference to bring together countries throughout the 
world to provide economic aid for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq 
and other reconstruction efforts in Iraq that are essential to ensure 
the long-term stability of Iraq and America's national security.

Summary: Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act - Sets forth the following findings: (1) ending the war in Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for U.S. national security, the safety U.S. Armed Forces members serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and the Middle East; (2) an open-ended U.S. involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of U.S. national security and U.S. military forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely overstrained; and (3) redeployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process.

Declares that: (1) it is critical that a comprehensive security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a deliberate U.S. redeployment of forces from Iraq; (2) a planned end to U.S. involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for security and governance while providing Iran and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by the U.S. redeployment; and (3) a "goal" for the redeployment's end rather than a "date certain" end is a necessary compromise to ensure a strategic approach for U.S. security and to create to a greater level of post-redeployment Iraqi stability.

States that: (1) with specified exceptions, redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall begin within three months, and that within six months troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre-surge level of 130,000 troops; and (2) the goal is that all U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall be deployed outside of Iraq within 20 months.

States that funds for the Department of Defense (DOD) for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 U.S. Armed Forces members within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for troops in Iraq within 20 months.

States that the United States should take a leadership role in diplomatic efforts necessary for countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to ensure Iraq's long-term stability of Iraq.