To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and study groups, 
        including the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker III 
        and Lee H. Hamilton, a 2004 working group established under the 
        Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Robert Gates and 
        Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United 
        States Working Group, co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James 
        Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms 
        of dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to achieve United 
        States strategic interests in the Middle East region.
            (2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect or deter 
        Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or pursuing the 
        development of nuclear weapons capabilities, is an important 
        United States strategic interest.
            (3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the Government 
        of Iran and deepening relationships with the Iranian people 
        would help foster greater understanding between the people of 
        Iran and the people of the United States and would enhance the 
        stability and security of the Persian Gulf region, including by 
        reducing the threat of the proliferation or use of nuclear 
        weapons in the region, while advancing other United States 
        foreign policy objectives in that region.
            (4) The Iraq Study Group Report states ``Iran's interests 
        would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy that led to 
        chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state'', 
        and therefore, the Government of the United States should build 
        upon this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue with 
        the Government of Iran concerning deteriorating conditions in 
        Iraq, which can become a basis of broader future United States-
        Iranian engagement.
            (5) Given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear program at sites 
        throughout the country and their proximity to urban centers, 
        the use of military force against Iran would be extraordinarily 
        difficult and probably ineffective, the immediate consequences 
        and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term 
        instability generated would be against long-term United States 
        interests in the region.
            (6) Any military action designed to eliminate Iran's 
        capacity to produce nuclear weapons would run the significant 
        risk of reinforcing and accelerating the desire of the 
        Government of Iran to acquire a nuclear deterrent and 
        compounding nationalist passions in defense of that very 
        course, and would most likely also generate hostile Iranian 
        initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.
            (7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with corresponding 
        multilateral sanctions recently adopted by the United Nations 
        Security Council offer a viable path for steering Iran's 
        nuclear efforts along peaceful lines, provided that there is 
        close multilateral coordination and steadfastness in the 
        adherence to the sanctions and firm United States leadership in 
        support of the multilateral effort.
            (8) According to the most definitive United States 
        intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade away from 
        acquiring the know-how and material to have an option to build 
        a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by 
        outside experts puts the timeline at least three years away, 
        assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which 
        would be unprecedented.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations 
        between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless 
        and until enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent 
        weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the Government of 
        Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but 
        the attainment of these policy objectives should not constitute 
        preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and
            (2) no congressional authorization for the use of military 
        force in any Act of Congress enacted before the date of the 
        enactment of this Act constitutes, either implicitly or 
        explicitly, an authorization for the use of military force 
        against Iran or its nuclear program.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States not to enter into a 
preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and 
then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and 
statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.

    No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department 
of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the 
United States may be used to carry out any covert action for the 
purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military 
action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance 
with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements 
for congressional authorization.

Summary: Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act - Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the government of Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but the attainment of these objectives should not constitute preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and (2) no congressional authorization for the use of military force in any Act enacted before the date of enactment of this Act constitutes an authorization for the use of military force against Iran or its nuclear program.

States as the policy of the United States not to enter into a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an immediate threat, and then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

Prohibits funds available to the Department of Defense (DOD) or any other federal department or agency from being used to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat.