Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act 
of 1993''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States has been a leader in seeking to 
        contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials.
            (2) With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the 
        Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially 
        to countries in unstable regions, is now the leading military 
        threat to the national security of the United States and its 
        allies.
            (3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 
        31, 1992, that ``proliferation of all weapons of mass 
        destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
        security'' and committed to taking appropriate action to 
        prevent proliferation from occurring. The establishment of the 
        United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was an important 
        precedent to that end.
            (4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon states, a 
        number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons 
        capabilities.
            (5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps the most 
        likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons.
            (6) The break-up of the Soviet Union has increased the 
        threat of nuclear proliferation.
            (7) In May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed 
        the protocols to START I and committed to acceding to the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states 
        ``in the shortest possible time''.
            (8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear weapons 
        program which went undetected by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection process and was greatly 
        assisted by dual-use exports from western countries, including 
        the United States.
            (9) North Korea's statement of intent to withdraw from the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its refusal to allow IAEA 
        inspections of all of its known and suspected nuclear 
        facilities, are unprecedented actions which could greatly 
        undermine efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.
            (10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial programs to build 
        nuclear weapons and South Africa has admitted developing and 
        building 6 nuclear weapons, but in response to reduced regional 
        tensions and other factors, all 3 countries have renounced 
        nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safeguards for all of their 
        nuclear facilities, and South Africa has acceded to the Non-
        Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
            (11) United States security interests and current policy 
        and practices are consistent with the terms of the South 
        Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which, like nuclear weapons 
        free zones in Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East 
        that the United States supports, can contribute to efforts to 
        avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races.
            (12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter proliferation, 
        but the effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear 
        materials may be adversely affected by institutional and 
        financial constraints.
            (13) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which codifies 
        world consensus against further nuclear proliferation and is 
        scheduled for review and extension in 1995, should be expanded 
        in membership and extended indefinitely, and additional steps 
        should be taken to strengthen the international nuclear 
        nonproliferation regime.
            (14) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 declared that 
        the United States is committed to continued strong support for 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened and 
        more effective IAEA, and established that it is United States 
        policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer 
        of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.
            (15) The goal of the United States is to end the further 
        spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear 
        proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of 
        nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. To that end the United 
        States should adopt a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation 
        policy.

SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY.

    In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear 
arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be 
the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:
            (1) Encourage Ukraine to join Kazakhstan and Belarus in 
        ratifying the START I treaty and encourage Ukraine and 
        Kazakhstan to join Belarus in voting to accede to the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states in the 
        shortest possible time.
            (2) Encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove 
        all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept IAEA 
        safeguards over all of their nuclear facilities, and implement 
        effective controls on nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use 
        exports.
            (3) Reach an agreement with the Russian Federation--
                    (A) to deactivate and retire from field deployment 
                on an accelerated schedule all weapons to be withdrawn 
                under the START I treaty and the START II treaty;
                    (B) on data exchanges and inspection arrangements 
                to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons 
                scheduled to be withdrawn under the START I treaty and 
                the START II treaty; and
                    (C) to place all fissile material from such weapons 
                under bilateral or international controls, or both.
            (4) Prepare for the ratification of the START II treaty by 
        seeking the exchange of information between the United States 
        and the Russian Federation on nuclear weapons stockpiles and 
        fissile material facilities and inventories as required by the 
        United States Senate as a condition to its approval of the 
        START I Treaty.
            (5) Conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban 
        treaty by early 1995, before the conference to renew and extend 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is held.
            (6) Ratify the START II treaty in the United States and 
        encourage ratification of that treaty by the Russian 
        Federation, and reach agreement with the Russian Federation to 
        end the production of new types of nuclear warheads.
            (7) Conclude a multilateral agreement to reduce the 
        strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian 
        Federation to within a range of 1,000 to 2,000 each, with lower 
        levels for the United Kingdom, France, and the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (8) Conclude additional multilateral agreements to 
        significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear arsenals of 
        all countries through a stage-by-stage process.
            (9) Reach immediate agreement with the Russian Federation 
        to halt permanently the production of fissile material for 
        weapons purposes, and achieve worldwide agreements to--
                    (A) end by 1995 the production of fissile material 
                for any purpose;
                    (B) place existing stockpiles of such materials 
                under bilateral or international controls; and
                    (C) require all countries to place all of their 
                nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under 
                IAEA safeguards.
            (10) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify 
        that countries are complying with their nonproliferation 
        commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, 
        and financial support necessary to implement the necessary 
        safeguard reforms.
            (11) Strengthen nuclear export controls in the United 
        States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions on 
        individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to 
        nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information 
        on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States.
            (12) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue the 
        acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional 
        tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and 
        encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its 
        role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation 
        agreements.
            (13) Support the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and 
        extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign 
        the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime 
        for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and 
        materials.
            (14) Adopt a United States policy of ``no first use'' of 
        nuclear weapons, reach agreement with the other nuclear weapon 
        states to adopt such a policy and to assist immediately any 
        country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty should the use of nuclear weapons be initiated against 
        such country.
            (15) Conclude a verifiable bilateral agreement with the 
        Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from 
        their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and 
        seek to extend to all nuclear weapon states this zero option 
        for tactical nuclear weapons.
            (16) Sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific 
        Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.

    (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and not later than February 1 of each year 
thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on--
            (1) the actions the United States has taken and the actions 
        the United States plans to take during the succeeding 12-month 
        period to implement each of the policy objectives set forth in 
        this Act;
            (2) actions which have been taken by the Russian 
        Federation, by the other former Soviet republics, and by other 
        countries and institutions to achieve those policy objectives; 
        and
            (3) obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to 
        implement those policy objectives.
Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a 
classified appendix if necessary.
    (b) Report on Nuclear Stockpile Information.--The President shall 
submit a report to the Congress on the specific actions that have been 
taken and those that are planned to comply with Condition 8 concerning 
the ``Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement'' of the Senate resolution 
of ratification of the START I treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20 and 102-32).

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this Act--
            (1) the term ``fissile materials'' means highly enriched 
        uranium and plutonium;
            (2) the term ``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium 
        enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235;
            (3) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency;
            (4) the term ``IAEA safeguards'' means the safeguards set 
        forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as 
        authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency;
            (5) a policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons means a 
        commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons;
            (6) the term ``non-nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
        that is not a nuclear weapon state;
            (7) the term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at 
        Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
            (8) the term ``nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
        that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 
        at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
            (9) the term ``START I treaty'' means the Treaty on the 
        Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United 
        States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 31, 
        1991; and
            (10) the term ``START II treaty'' means the Treaty on 
        Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
        signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on 
        January 3, 1993.

Summary: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993 - Declares that, in order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be U.S. policy to pursue the following objectives:  (1) encourage the Ukraine to ratify the START I treaty and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to vote to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states; (2) encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards over nuclear facilities, and implement effective controls on nuclear exports; (3) reach an agreement with the Russian Federation to deactivate weapons to be withdrawn under START I and II, place all fissile material from weapons under bilateral or international controls, and arrange for inspections and data exchanges; (4) prepare for the ratification of START II by seeking the exchange of information; (5) conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by early 1995; (6) ratify START II in the United States and encourage the Russian Federation to do the same; (7) conclude multilateral agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals; (8) reach agreement with the Russian Federation to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other worldwide agreements respecting such materials and the placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; (9) strengthen IAEA safeguards and nuclear export controls; (10) reduce incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions; (11) support the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference; (12) adopt a U.S. policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, reach agreement with other nuclear weapon states to adopt such a policy, and assist any country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should weapons be initiated against such country; (13) conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation to dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons; and (14) sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.