title: Ecological compensation: an evaluation of regulatory compliance in New Zealand

authors: Brown, Marie Amanda

subjects: Compliance

abstract: Ecological compensation is an example of a trade-off whereby loss of natural values is remedied or offset by a corresponding compensatory action on the same site or elsewhere, determined through the process of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Ecological compensation actions are often criticised for having low levels of compliance: meaning that they are achieved only partially or not at all, while development activity proceeds with much greater certainty. Our research investigated compliance with 245 conditions relating to ecological compensation across 81 case studies across New Zealand under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
Our results show that present tools and practice in New Zealand are not adequately securing the necessary benefits from ecological compensation requirements, with 35.2% of requirements not being achieved. Significant variation in non-compliance with ecological compensation occurs between different activities, applicant types and condition types, while critical variables within the planning process influence levels of compliance. Our research demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of non-compliance and of providing a consistent and robust decision-making framework for the consideration of ecological compensation in practice

text: Ecological compensation: an evaluation of regulatory compliance in New Zealand Ecological compensation is an example of a trade-off whereby loss of natural values is remedied or offset by a corresponding compensatory action on the same site or elsewhere, determined through the process of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Ecological compensation actions are often criticised for having low levels of compliance: meaning that they are achieved only partially or not at all, while development activity proceeds with much greater certainty. Our research investigated compliance with 245 conditions relating to ecological compensation across 81 case studies across New Zealand under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
Our results show that present tools and practice in New Zealand are not adequately securing the necessary benefits from ecological compensation requirements, with 35.2% of requirements not being achieved. Significant variation in non-compliance with ecological compensation occurs between different activities, applicant types and condition types, while critical variables within the planning process influence levels of compliance. Our research demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of non-compliance and of providing a consistent and robust decision-making framework for the consideration of ecological compensation in practice

year: 2013

title: Putting the burden of proof in its place: When are differential allocations legitimate?

authors: Dare, Tim

subjects: allocations legitimate

abstract: It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth-directed and non-truth-directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non-truth-directed, and suggest that in truth-directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.

text: Putting the burden of proof in its place: When are differential allocations legitimate? It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth-directed and non-truth-directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non-truth-directed, and suggest that in truth-directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.

year: 2008

title: Lost in translation: western representations of Māori knowledge

authors: Mika, Carl Te Hira

abstract: We recently attended a conference at which a non-Māori presenter, drawing on a particular metaphor already established by Māori writers, related Māori natural world features to a research method. The presentation was useful because it highlighted several issues that call for our concern as Māori philosophers. In this article, we outline these concerns, which are: first, that a blunt response to such a presentation is not undertaken lightly from a Māori viewpoint; and, second, that the presenter’s talk exemplifies a wider problem of warping Māori concepts and labels to fit a Western philosophical approach. We call this latter problem ‘Translation’, because it involves moving the Māori world and its phenomena over into one that is palatable for policy and research. The aim of the article is not to single out the presenter, but rather to refer to his presentation in order to consider the prior issue of Translation. In cases where Translation occurs, a Māori critical philosophical stance is clearly needed, in order to both investigate the warping of Māori thought on which it relies, and review the place of Māori philosophy and philosophical response in the arena of educational research.

text: Lost in translation: western representations of Māori knowledge We recently attended a conference at which a non-Māori presenter, drawing on a particular metaphor already established by Māori writers, related Māori natural world features to a research method. The presentation was useful because it highlighted several issues that call for our concern as Māori philosophers. In this article, we outline these concerns, which are: first, that a blunt response to such a presentation is not undertaken lightly from a Māori viewpoint; and, second, that the presenter’s talk exemplifies a wider problem of warping Māori concepts and labels to fit a Western philosophical approach. We call this latter problem ‘Translation’, because it involves moving the Māori world and its phenomena over into one that is palatable for policy and research. The aim of the article is not to single out the presenter, but rather to refer to his presentation in order to consider the prior issue of Translation. In cases where Translation occurs, a Māori critical philosophical stance is clearly needed, in order to both investigate the warping of Māori thought on which it relies, and review the place of Māori philosophy and philosophical response in the arena of educational research.

year: 2017