title: The future of surrogacy in New Zealand – Beyond the adoption model

authors: van Zyl, Liezl

abstract: Surrogacy in New Zealand is treated as a form of adoption. ACART (2014) proposes that the Health Minister consider compensating women who act as surrogate mothers. We think this is a step in the right direction, but until the adoption model is abandoned surrogacy will not be a safe practice for New Zealanders. ACART’s consultation document does not address the issue of legal parenthood, but it is one that is intimately linked to the issue of compensation to surrogates because the Adoption Act (Section 25) prohibits payments in consideration of adoption. If, as we will argue below, surrogates deserve to be compensated for their labour, it is imperative that we acknowledge that the adoption framework is inappropriate in surrogacy.

text: The future of surrogacy in New Zealand – Beyond the adoption model Surrogacy in New Zealand is treated as a form of adoption. ACART (2014) proposes that the Health Minister consider compensating women who act as surrogate mothers. We think this is a step in the right direction, but until the adoption model is abandoned surrogacy will not be a safe practice for New Zealanders. ACART’s consultation document does not address the issue of legal parenthood, but it is one that is intimately linked to the issue of compensation to surrogates because the Adoption Act (Section 25) prohibits payments in consideration of adoption. If, as we will argue below, surrogates deserve to be compensated for their labour, it is imperative that we acknowledge that the adoption framework is inappropriate in surrogacy.

year: 2015

title: Are the citizens of a democracy a just target for terrorists?

authors: McKeogh, Colm

subjects: civilian

abstract: This article investigates how issues of political responsibility connect to the combatant/civilian distinction in armed conflict. It does so by looking at an attempted moral justification of terrorism in a democracy by a just war theorist. The attempt was by Igor Primoratz, who claims that civilians who actively support injustice do not merit immunity from targeting. Primoratz suggests amending the principle of civilian immunity to permit targeting of civilians who are culpable for an unjust war. This article argues that culpability plays no role in the justification of targeting combatants and cannot be used to justify the targeting of civilians. Combatants may be targeted in war because of a convention-dependent permission that they may be treated as instruments. Civilians may not be targeted in war because no such convention-dependent permission exists (and there are no benefits to creating such a convention). Nor can the justification of self-defence be used to justify the targeting of civilians in armed conflict because there is a threshold of culpability to be met before self-defence is permitted, and the citizens of a democracy do not meet that minimum standard.

text: Are the citizens of a democracy a just target for terrorists? This article investigates how issues of political responsibility connect to the combatant/civilian distinction in armed conflict. It does so by looking at an attempted moral justification of terrorism in a democracy by a just war theorist. The attempt was by Igor Primoratz, who claims that civilians who actively support injustice do not merit immunity from targeting. Primoratz suggests amending the principle of civilian immunity to permit targeting of civilians who are culpable for an unjust war. This article argues that culpability plays no role in the justification of targeting combatants and cannot be used to justify the targeting of civilians. Combatants may be targeted in war because of a convention-dependent permission that they may be treated as instruments. Civilians may not be targeted in war because no such convention-dependent permission exists (and there are no benefits to creating such a convention). Nor can the justification of self-defence be used to justify the targeting of civilians in armed conflict because there is a threshold of culpability to be met before self-defence is permitted, and the citizens of a democracy do not meet that minimum standard.

year: 2011

title: What’s in a name? The sense of reference, the rigidity of designators and the history of causes when determining the names of the two main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand

authors: Parker, Martin

subjects: New Zealand

abstract: The New Zealand Geographic Board recently revealed that the two main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand have never been officially named. The revelation made both national and international news and led to a large number of publicly aired comments on the matter, suggesting that something so fundamental and seemingly innocuous as naming is in fact likely to generate a good deal of controversy, no more so than in a bicultural/bilingual context. This paper will examine the phenomenon of naming from a number of angles. After discussing a layperson’s idea of what is meant by the meaning of names, we shall attempt to apply a number of theoretical models from the field of Language Philosophy to the case of the main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand: the Descriptivist approach of Frege and Russell, Kripke’s Rigid Designators, and Causal Grounding theory. We shall conclude that, in the case of applying the first two of these, there is a question mark over whether any of the current names for the two islands, both Māori and Pākehā, are in fact names at all; in terms of applying the theory of Causal Grounding, we are drawn to the conclusion that in history lies the key to the future.

text: What’s in a name? The sense of reference, the rigidity of designators and the history of causes when determining the names of the two main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand The New Zealand Geographic Board recently revealed that the two main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand have never been officially named. The revelation made both national and international news and led to a large number of publicly aired comments on the matter, suggesting that something so fundamental and seemingly innocuous as naming is in fact likely to generate a good deal of controversy, no more so than in a bicultural/bilingual context. This paper will examine the phenomenon of naming from a number of angles. After discussing a layperson’s idea of what is meant by the meaning of names, we shall attempt to apply a number of theoretical models from the field of Language Philosophy to the case of the main islands of Aotearoa/New Zealand: the Descriptivist approach of Frege and Russell, Kripke’s Rigid Designators, and Causal Grounding theory. We shall conclude that, in the case of applying the first two of these, there is a question mark over whether any of the current names for the two islands, both Māori and Pākehā, are in fact names at all; in terms of applying the theory of Causal Grounding, we are drawn to the conclusion that in history lies the key to the future.

year: 2010-02