title: Marine inequality, borderization, and the radical potential of kinship

authors: McCormack, Fiona

subjects: Aquaculture

abstract: This article utilizes scholarship on borders to interpret the persistence of inequality in Indigenous seascapes, irrespective of moves to redress colonial wrongs or the growing anthropocenic recognition of human-nature interconnectedness. I examine border politics in the context of Māori claims for marine title and rights and the post-settlement development of aquaculture. Drawing on Harsha Walia’s concept of “border imperialism” and Achille Mbembe’s thesis on “borderization,” the article highlights the endurance of colonial forms alongside their neoliberal transformation into the enclosures and entrapments arising in the context of accelerated marine industrialization. By holding in tension the interconnection between marine environments and kinship, on one hand, and scholarship on borders, on the other, the article suggests that Indigenous Māori kinship, expanding through multiple layers of difference, constitutes a site of resistance that has the potential to refute the logic of borderization.

text: Marine inequality, borderization, and the radical potential of kinship This article utilizes scholarship on borders to interpret the persistence of inequality in Indigenous seascapes, irrespective of moves to redress colonial wrongs or the growing anthropocenic recognition of human-nature interconnectedness. I examine border politics in the context of Māori claims for marine title and rights and the post-settlement development of aquaculture. Drawing on Harsha Walia’s concept of “border imperialism” and Achille Mbembe’s thesis on “borderization,” the article highlights the endurance of colonial forms alongside their neoliberal transformation into the enclosures and entrapments arising in the context of accelerated marine industrialization. By holding in tension the interconnection between marine environments and kinship, on one hand, and scholarship on borders, on the other, the article suggests that Indigenous Māori kinship, expanding through multiple layers of difference, constitutes a site of resistance that has the potential to refute the logic of borderization.

year: 2025

title: Weaving kaupapa Māori and e-Learning

authors: Neal, Terry

subjects: New Zealand

abstract: This paper describes the creation and design of an online professional development course that aims to help educators in New Zealand to weave kaupapa Māori and e-Learning approaches together. The team sought to model weaving of kaupapa Māori and e-Learning approaches in how they worked together and the educational design for the material. The authors propose that educators with these skills are crucial if we are to effectively meet the needs of Māori learners, more than that, of all New Zealand learners, in the 21st century.

text: Weaving kaupapa Māori and e-Learning This paper describes the creation and design of an online professional development course that aims to help educators in New Zealand to weave kaupapa Māori and e-Learning approaches together. The team sought to model weaving of kaupapa Māori and e-Learning approaches in how they worked together and the educational design for the material. The authors propose that educators with these skills are crucial if we are to effectively meet the needs of Māori learners, more than that, of all New Zealand learners, in the 21st century.

year: 2006-09

title: The Trolley Problem: A virtue-ethical perspective

authors: van Zyl, Liezl

subjects: applied virtue ethics

abstract: The main reason why virtue ethicists have avoided  the Trolley Debate is that it is, in a sense, "none of our business." The thought experiments are set up to test our intuitions about moral principles (e.g. is the principle, "Do not kill an innocent person" always more stringent than "Rescue people in danger"?) Virtue ethics rejects moral principles and instead focuses the attention on cultivating and exercising the virtues, and asking, "What would a virtuous person do in the circumstances?" To apply this approach to the Bystander and Footbridge cases we have to begin by considering more realistic versions of the two cases, where the available options are not stipulated at the outset. This allows us to see that there is an important difference between the two cases. In Bystander, it requires some quick thinking to realise that he has the option of turning the trolley. Given that he has very little time to make the decision a virtuous person's instincts could prompt him to turn the trolley in an attempt to save the five, or to refrain from doing so in order not to harm the one. In time, and as a benevolent person, he will probably come to believe that turning the trolley was the best thing to do. By contrast, in Footbridge, it will simply not occur to a virtuous person to use someone as a trolleystop. If someone asked him later on, "Why didn't you just push the big man onto the track?" he will reject this suggestion as an impossibility: "No ways!", for it is against the nature of a virtuous person to view and use others as objects.

text: The Trolley Problem: A virtue-ethical perspective The main reason why virtue ethicists have avoided  the Trolley Debate is that it is, in a sense, "none of our business." The thought experiments are set up to test our intuitions about moral principles (e.g. is the principle, "Do not kill an innocent person" always more stringent than "Rescue people in danger"?) Virtue ethics rejects moral principles and instead focuses the attention on cultivating and exercising the virtues, and asking, "What would a virtuous person do in the circumstances?" To apply this approach to the Bystander and Footbridge cases we have to begin by considering more realistic versions of the two cases, where the available options are not stipulated at the outset. This allows us to see that there is an important difference between the two cases. In Bystander, it requires some quick thinking to realise that he has the option of turning the trolley. Given that he has very little time to make the decision a virtuous person's instincts could prompt him to turn the trolley in an attempt to save the five, or to refrain from doing so in order not to harm the one. In time, and as a benevolent person, he will probably come to believe that turning the trolley was the best thing to do. By contrast, in Footbridge, it will simply not occur to a virtuous person to use someone as a trolleystop. If someone asked him later on, "Why didn't you just push the big man onto the track?" he will reject this suggestion as an impossibility: "No ways!", for it is against the nature of a virtuous person to view and use others as objects.

year: 2022