title: Response to letter ‘New Zealand’s shocking diabetes rates can be reduced—9 urgently needed actions’

authors: Pausé, Cat

subjects: New Zealand

abstract: We are writing in response to the letter published in the 12 August 2011 issue of the
New Zealand Medical Journal by Signal et al: http://journal.nzma.org.nz/journal/124-
1340/4822

text: Response to letter ‘New Zealand’s shocking diabetes rates can be reduced—9 urgently needed actions’ We are writing in response to the letter published in the 12 August 2011 issue of the
New Zealand Medical Journal by Signal et al: http://journal.nzma.org.nz/journal/124-
1340/4822

year: 2011-09

title: Law Enforcement Hack-back in New Zealand

authors: Koroniadis, Athanasios

subjects: hack-back

abstract: The Internet brings New Zealand closer to the world, but with this benefit comes increased dependency on its benefits of real time connectivity for individuals, organisations, and Government. The downside to this global communication is the increase in cyber-attacks and the ease a cyber-attacker has in hiding their true identity.
These digital crimes are costing the worldwide economy billions of dollars which has prompted Governments all around the world into taking measures to implement cyber security strategies. While these strategies are passive in nature, they are proving to be of limited effect in addressing these threats to a State economy.
In New Zealand the Minister of Communications in a press release in 2016, stated that “Cyber-crime cost the New Zealand economy $257 million”. Granted that the cyber-crime cost figure is a few years old, but, if compared to 2019, It would be fair to say that the cost of cybercrime to the New Zealand economy would be double the figure today, in the region of $500 million based on the exponential growth of the use of the Internet where 90 percent of New Zealanders are now using the Internet based on recent statistics provided by the Government.
This thesis focuses on legalising Law Enforcement hack-back, with recommendations on law reform to existing law, guidelines and safeguards for its implementation. Law Enforcement hack-back is effectively a form of a digital counterstrike against a cyber-attacker and with the use of traceback this allows Law Enforcement the ability to identify the true TCP/IP address used by the cyber-attacker, once Law Enforcement have identified who the hacker is, they can then be able to prosecute the cyber-attacker based on forensic evidence collected using hack-back.
Why is it important to legalise Law Enforcement hack-back? Referring to the current New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy for 2019 it makes the Governments position cristal clear “New Zealand must be ready to deter and respond to threats”.

text: Law Enforcement Hack-back in New Zealand The Internet brings New Zealand closer to the world, but with this benefit comes increased dependency on its benefits of real time connectivity for individuals, organisations, and Government. The downside to this global communication is the increase in cyber-attacks and the ease a cyber-attacker has in hiding their true identity.
These digital crimes are costing the worldwide economy billions of dollars which has prompted Governments all around the world into taking measures to implement cyber security strategies. While these strategies are passive in nature, they are proving to be of limited effect in addressing these threats to a State economy.
In New Zealand the Minister of Communications in a press release in 2016, stated that “Cyber-crime cost the New Zealand economy $257 million”. Granted that the cyber-crime cost figure is a few years old, but, if compared to 2019, It would be fair to say that the cost of cybercrime to the New Zealand economy would be double the figure today, in the region of $500 million based on the exponential growth of the use of the Internet where 90 percent of New Zealanders are now using the Internet based on recent statistics provided by the Government.
This thesis focuses on legalising Law Enforcement hack-back, with recommendations on law reform to existing law, guidelines and safeguards for its implementation. Law Enforcement hack-back is effectively a form of a digital counterstrike against a cyber-attacker and with the use of traceback this allows Law Enforcement the ability to identify the true TCP/IP address used by the cyber-attacker, once Law Enforcement have identified who the hacker is, they can then be able to prosecute the cyber-attacker based on forensic evidence collected using hack-back.
Why is it important to legalise Law Enforcement hack-back? Referring to the current New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy for 2019 it makes the Governments position cristal clear “New Zealand must be ready to deter and respond to threats”.

year: 2019

title: Maori and goldfields revenue

authors: Hart, Philip

abstract: When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

text: Maori and goldfields revenue When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

year: 2016