title: Coaching in disability sport: from practice to theory

authors: Townsend, Robert C.

subjects: Sports & Recreation

abstract: Understanding the complexity of coaching in disability sport remains a pressing concern. While interest in disability sport continues to grow there is a relative lack of insight into coaching in this context, particularly research which illustrates a ‘grounded’ perspective on practice. As a result, coaching in disability sport is critically under-theorised, and we know comparatively little of the nature of coaching in different disability sport contexts (Townsend, Smith & Cushion, 2016). There have been longstanding calls to understand coaches’ learning and development in disability sport (DePauw, 1986), and as a result there is a small, but growing, body of literature which has begun to explore the unique considerations of coaching in disability sport. Such considerations include the informal and unstructured nature of coach learning (e.g. McMaster, Culver & Werthner,  2012; Duarte & Culver, 2014; Taylor, Werthner & Culver, 2014; Taylor, Werthner, Culver & Callary, 2015), the lack of disability-specific coach education (e.g. Cregan, Bloom & Reid, 2007; Douglas et al., 2016; Douglas & Hardin, 2014), and the complex and multifaceted role of coaches in disability contexts (e.g. Tawse, Bloom, Sabiston & Reid, 2012; DePauw & Gavron, 1991), all of which invite and encourage comparisons with the narrative presented below. More recent research however, has challenged the lack of critical insight in disability coaching research (e.g. Townsend et al., 2016), arguing that the research is characterised by a normative focus that downplays the inter-connections between disability and cultural contexts such as sport. The lack of consideration of disability is an important theoretical ‘gap’, as Smith and Bundon (2016) argue, having a grasp on how disability is explained and understood is vital for individuals working with disabled people in any context, especially in coaching where practice is fundamentally shaped by our working understanding of disability (cf. DePauw, 2000). It is the purpose of this chapter, then, to encourage practitioners and researchers to examine their understandings of disability in the first instance, as a basis for developing coaching practice. What follows are reflections from Derek Morgan, Head Coach of the England Learning Disability Cricket squad, but, first, some context about the team.

text: Coaching in disability sport: from practice to theory Understanding the complexity of coaching in disability sport remains a pressing concern. While interest in disability sport continues to grow there is a relative lack of insight into coaching in this context, particularly research which illustrates a ‘grounded’ perspective on practice. As a result, coaching in disability sport is critically under-theorised, and we know comparatively little of the nature of coaching in different disability sport contexts (Townsend, Smith & Cushion, 2016). There have been longstanding calls to understand coaches’ learning and development in disability sport (DePauw, 1986), and as a result there is a small, but growing, body of literature which has begun to explore the unique considerations of coaching in disability sport. Such considerations include the informal and unstructured nature of coach learning (e.g. McMaster, Culver & Werthner,  2012; Duarte & Culver, 2014; Taylor, Werthner & Culver, 2014; Taylor, Werthner, Culver & Callary, 2015), the lack of disability-specific coach education (e.g. Cregan, Bloom & Reid, 2007; Douglas et al., 2016; Douglas & Hardin, 2014), and the complex and multifaceted role of coaches in disability contexts (e.g. Tawse, Bloom, Sabiston & Reid, 2012; DePauw & Gavron, 1991), all of which invite and encourage comparisons with the narrative presented below. More recent research however, has challenged the lack of critical insight in disability coaching research (e.g. Townsend et al., 2016), arguing that the research is characterised by a normative focus that downplays the inter-connections between disability and cultural contexts such as sport. The lack of consideration of disability is an important theoretical ‘gap’, as Smith and Bundon (2016) argue, having a grasp on how disability is explained and understood is vital for individuals working with disabled people in any context, especially in coaching where practice is fundamentally shaped by our working understanding of disability (cf. DePauw, 2000). It is the purpose of this chapter, then, to encourage practitioners and researchers to examine their understandings of disability in the first instance, as a basis for developing coaching practice. What follows are reflections from Derek Morgan, Head Coach of the England Learning Disability Cricket squad, but, first, some context about the team.

year: 2019-12-17

title: Architects of our own experience: The structure of human freedom

authors: Evans, Jay

subjects: Philosophy of freedom

abstract: The picture of a deterministic universe is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenology of agency, deliberation, and choice. While everyday conceptions of individual freedom and responsibility depend on the pre-theoretical assumption that we have meaningful control over our decisions and volitional actions, if determinism is true, the outcome of any deliberative process is always the only outcome available; the inevitable result of a reasoning sequence that could not have proceeded any other way. However compelling our ordinary sense of agency and control is, determinism gives us reason to doubt that we have the kind of freedom that we intuitively take ourselves to have.

The debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism is a long-running one, traditionally motivated by, and entangled in further disputes about what kind of freedom or control is required for moral responsibility. In a promising and refreshing turn, recent work by philosopher of physics, Jennan Ismael, has significantly advanced the debate. Leaving aside questions about moral responsibility, Ismael’s naturalistic account shows that the freedom we ordinarily take ourselves to have is not threatened by deterministic physics; when determinism is understood on its own terms, stripped of imposed notions of compulsion and necessity, the purported tension between freedom and determinism is resolved. Furthermore, Ismael argues, biological systems with the capacity for representational thought have evolved unified, emergent ‘selves’, and the capacity for self-governance, behavioural flexibility and deliberative control.

Following Ismael’s methodology of naturalistic pragmatism, I aim to enrich her contextualised picture of human agency with a precise, unified account of the nature of agency itself, and to further develop this integrated account of freedom and the structures that underpin freedom. Building on Ismael’s account of the self-governing free agent, I aim to fill out some of the details of the cognitive structures that underpin our first-person experiences of choice and endogenous control of action, and discuss how those structures arise in the natural order. Using the predictive processing framework to explore the structures of agency, choice, and autonomy that underpin self-governance, I argue that our potential for freedom – freedom in its most fully developed manifestation – lies in our capacity for autonomy, which is realized when we act deliberately to modify our own cognitive processes and transform our own minds.

text: Architects of our own experience: The structure of human freedom The picture of a deterministic universe is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenology of agency, deliberation, and choice. While everyday conceptions of individual freedom and responsibility depend on the pre-theoretical assumption that we have meaningful control over our decisions and volitional actions, if determinism is true, the outcome of any deliberative process is always the only outcome available; the inevitable result of a reasoning sequence that could not have proceeded any other way. However compelling our ordinary sense of agency and control is, determinism gives us reason to doubt that we have the kind of freedom that we intuitively take ourselves to have.

The debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism is a long-running one, traditionally motivated by, and entangled in further disputes about what kind of freedom or control is required for moral responsibility. In a promising and refreshing turn, recent work by philosopher of physics, Jennan Ismael, has significantly advanced the debate. Leaving aside questions about moral responsibility, Ismael’s naturalistic account shows that the freedom we ordinarily take ourselves to have is not threatened by deterministic physics; when determinism is understood on its own terms, stripped of imposed notions of compulsion and necessity, the purported tension between freedom and determinism is resolved. Furthermore, Ismael argues, biological systems with the capacity for representational thought have evolved unified, emergent ‘selves’, and the capacity for self-governance, behavioural flexibility and deliberative control.

Following Ismael’s methodology of naturalistic pragmatism, I aim to enrich her contextualised picture of human agency with a precise, unified account of the nature of agency itself, and to further develop this integrated account of freedom and the structures that underpin freedom. Building on Ismael’s account of the self-governing free agent, I aim to fill out some of the details of the cognitive structures that underpin our first-person experiences of choice and endogenous control of action, and discuss how those structures arise in the natural order. Using the predictive processing framework to explore the structures of agency, choice, and autonomy that underpin self-governance, I argue that our potential for freedom – freedom in its most fully developed manifestation – lies in our capacity for autonomy, which is realized when we act deliberately to modify our own cognitive processes and transform our own minds.

year: 2024

title: Te Mata Ono. E tipu atu te kūmara, e ohu mai te anuhe

authors: Pēwhairangi, Te Aorere Tūwhakairiora

subjects: Māori television

abstract: Mai anō, mai anō kua whakapaoho te iwi Māori, tīmata mai ai i te mahi whaikōrero, i te mahi karanga, i te mahi taonga puoro, i te mahi toi, me te mahi waiata. Ko ngā mahi nei he huarahi tuku karere i tētahi takitahi, takitini rānei ki tētahi takitahi, takitini rānei. Mā ēnei mahi e whakawhitiwhiti mōhiohio ai te tangata. Nō te taitanga mai a te Pākehā kua whai huarahi whakapaoho atu anō te iwi Māori i ō rātau mōhiohio, tīmata ana mai i ngā niu pepa, eke ana rā ki ngā reo irirangi, tae noa mai ki te pouaka whakaata me te ipurangi. Ko te rangahautanga nei ka titiro ki tētahi o ngā huarahi mātāmuri e whakapaohotia ai ngā mōhiohio a te Māori, arā te pouaka whakaata. Ka arotaketia ngā mahi tuari mōhiohio a te whare waihanga hōtaka pouaka whakaata nei a Whakaata Māori mā tētahi anga tātai e kīia nei ko Te Mata Ono.

I ngā tau 15 kua pahure ake nei ehara i te mea kua tū a Whakaata Māori hai kaitohatoha mōhiohio Māori, engari hai kaiwhakarauora hoki i te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori. I te tuhinga roa nei ka tirohia ngā huarahi taketake me ngā huarahi hōu o te whakapaoho i ngā mōhiohio o te tangata mā roto i a Whakaata Māori. Mā te whakauruuru i ngā huarahi e rua nei e whakahōuhia ai te ara, e whakapaoho Māoritia ai hoki ngā hōtaka o te wā. 

E ono katoa ngā āhuatanga o te anga e kōrerotia nei. Ko te tuhinga roa nei he haurua o te anga. Nā ngā ture ā-kupu o te tohu paerua nei, ka rangahaua rētōtia e a au ngā wāhanga e toru o te ono e kīia nei ko Te Mata Ako, Te Mata Tikanga, Te Mata Iwi anō hoki. E tuhia ana hoki tētahi atu tuhinga roa i te wā nei e Kimiora Kaire-Melbourne. Kai te titiro ia ki ērā atu wāhanga e toru o te anga, Te Mata Māori, Te Mata Pākehā me Te Mata ō-Tua. Hai te mutunga o ngā tuhinga roa e rua nei, ka whakapiria ai ngā āhuatanga e ono kia waihanga pūmautia ai te anga tātari o Te Mata Ono. Ka piri ana te anga tātari ko te whāinga kia whakahāngaitia ai ki a Whakaata Māori hai tautoko, hai hāpai, hai ārahi hoki i te teihanga ki ngā rā kai te heke mai.

text: Te Mata Ono. E tipu atu te kūmara, e ohu mai te anuhe Mai anō, mai anō kua whakapaoho te iwi Māori, tīmata mai ai i te mahi whaikōrero, i te mahi karanga, i te mahi taonga puoro, i te mahi toi, me te mahi waiata. Ko ngā mahi nei he huarahi tuku karere i tētahi takitahi, takitini rānei ki tētahi takitahi, takitini rānei. Mā ēnei mahi e whakawhitiwhiti mōhiohio ai te tangata. Nō te taitanga mai a te Pākehā kua whai huarahi whakapaoho atu anō te iwi Māori i ō rātau mōhiohio, tīmata ana mai i ngā niu pepa, eke ana rā ki ngā reo irirangi, tae noa mai ki te pouaka whakaata me te ipurangi. Ko te rangahautanga nei ka titiro ki tētahi o ngā huarahi mātāmuri e whakapaohotia ai ngā mōhiohio a te Māori, arā te pouaka whakaata. Ka arotaketia ngā mahi tuari mōhiohio a te whare waihanga hōtaka pouaka whakaata nei a Whakaata Māori mā tētahi anga tātai e kīia nei ko Te Mata Ono.

I ngā tau 15 kua pahure ake nei ehara i te mea kua tū a Whakaata Māori hai kaitohatoha mōhiohio Māori, engari hai kaiwhakarauora hoki i te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori. I te tuhinga roa nei ka tirohia ngā huarahi taketake me ngā huarahi hōu o te whakapaoho i ngā mōhiohio o te tangata mā roto i a Whakaata Māori. Mā te whakauruuru i ngā huarahi e rua nei e whakahōuhia ai te ara, e whakapaoho Māoritia ai hoki ngā hōtaka o te wā. 

E ono katoa ngā āhuatanga o te anga e kōrerotia nei. Ko te tuhinga roa nei he haurua o te anga. Nā ngā ture ā-kupu o te tohu paerua nei, ka rangahaua rētōtia e a au ngā wāhanga e toru o te ono e kīia nei ko Te Mata Ako, Te Mata Tikanga, Te Mata Iwi anō hoki. E tuhia ana hoki tētahi atu tuhinga roa i te wā nei e Kimiora Kaire-Melbourne. Kai te titiro ia ki ērā atu wāhanga e toru o te anga, Te Mata Māori, Te Mata Pākehā me Te Mata ō-Tua. Hai te mutunga o ngā tuhinga roa e rua nei, ka whakapiria ai ngā āhuatanga e ono kia waihanga pūmautia ai te anga tātari o Te Mata Ono. Ka piri ana te anga tātari ko te whāinga kia whakahāngaitia ai ki a Whakaata Māori hai tautoko, hai hāpai, hai ārahi hoki i te teihanga ki ngā rā kai te heke mai.

year: 2019