title: Traces of the secondary Geography curriculum

authors: Chalmers, Lex

subjects: education policy

abstract: Expressions of dissatisfaction about the post-compulsory Geography curriculum in the early 1970s were unusually concerted, leading to the creation of a National Geography Curriculum Committee. This essay reviews this history and the resulting Syllabus for Schools: Geography Forms 5–7  as a prelude to a discussion of contemporary curriculum development. The essay argues that curriculum development from 1975 and the ‘education reforms’ of the late 1980s failed to produce conditions in which satisfactory outcomes for a Geography curriculum can be assured in 2005, and that a new and concerted period of participation in curriculum discussion is required. Some goals for this process are outlined in the final section of the paper.

text: Traces of the secondary Geography curriculum Expressions of dissatisfaction about the post-compulsory Geography curriculum in the early 1970s were unusually concerted, leading to the creation of a National Geography Curriculum Committee. This essay reviews this history and the resulting Syllabus for Schools: Geography Forms 5–7  as a prelude to a discussion of contemporary curriculum development. The essay argues that curriculum development from 1975 and the ‘education reforms’ of the late 1980s failed to produce conditions in which satisfactory outcomes for a Geography curriculum can be assured in 2005, and that a new and concerted period of participation in curriculum discussion is required. Some goals for this process are outlined in the final section of the paper.

year: 2005

title: Oxidation of surface sediment: effects of disturbance depth and seawater flow speed

authors: Vopel, Kay

subjects: cohesive sediment

abstract: Periodic disturbance of surface sediment is a natural feature of marine environments. Following exposure to oxygenated seawater, the disturbed sediment oxidises leading to the recovery of its surface chemistry. Despite its importance for the ecology of the sediment–water interface, the dynamics of this recovery is not well known. We studied the effects of disturbance depth and seawater flow speed on the oxidation of estuarine cohesive sediment in a laboratory flume with microelectrodes. We removed surface sediment to 2 depths (5 and 50 mm) and then observed changes in sediment O₂ distribution and consumption over 1 h under conditions of slow and fast flow (3.5 and 7.5 cm s–1). Measurements were repeated 1 d later. The consumption of O₂ in the treated sediments reached a ‘quasi stable state’ within 7 h (50 mm depth) and 16 h (5 mm depth) characterised by very slow changes due to slow oxidation of reduced solids. Faster flow increased the rate at which sediment from 50 mm depth oxidised but not that of the sediment from 5 mm depth. After 20 to 24 h, sediments disturbed to 50 and 5 mm depths still differed in O₂ distribution and consumption, both from each other and from the pre-treatment sediment. Differences in the response of pore water O₂ distribution to an abrupt increase in flow speed (3.5 to 7.5 cm s–1) were also still evident at this time. Our measurements confirmed the results of previous theoretical analyses in that they indicate that the duration of the recovery of the surface sediment chemistry from disturbance and the chemical properties of the recovering sediment are controlled by the kinetics of solute and solid oxidation. Oxidation of reduced solids in disturbed sediment can result in a characteristic chemical signature at the sediment surface that lasts in the order of at least days.

text: Oxidation of surface sediment: effects of disturbance depth and seawater flow speed Periodic disturbance of surface sediment is a natural feature of marine environments. Following exposure to oxygenated seawater, the disturbed sediment oxidises leading to the recovery of its surface chemistry. Despite its importance for the ecology of the sediment–water interface, the dynamics of this recovery is not well known. We studied the effects of disturbance depth and seawater flow speed on the oxidation of estuarine cohesive sediment in a laboratory flume with microelectrodes. We removed surface sediment to 2 depths (5 and 50 mm) and then observed changes in sediment O₂ distribution and consumption over 1 h under conditions of slow and fast flow (3.5 and 7.5 cm s–1). Measurements were repeated 1 d later. The consumption of O₂ in the treated sediments reached a ‘quasi stable state’ within 7 h (50 mm depth) and 16 h (5 mm depth) characterised by very slow changes due to slow oxidation of reduced solids. Faster flow increased the rate at which sediment from 50 mm depth oxidised but not that of the sediment from 5 mm depth. After 20 to 24 h, sediments disturbed to 50 and 5 mm depths still differed in O₂ distribution and consumption, both from each other and from the pre-treatment sediment. Differences in the response of pore water O₂ distribution to an abrupt increase in flow speed (3.5 to 7.5 cm s–1) were also still evident at this time. Our measurements confirmed the results of previous theoretical analyses in that they indicate that the duration of the recovery of the surface sediment chemistry from disturbance and the chemical properties of the recovering sediment are controlled by the kinetics of solute and solid oxidation. Oxidation of reduced solids in disturbed sediment can result in a characteristic chemical signature at the sediment surface that lasts in the order of at least days.

year: 2010

title: Maori and goldfields revenue

authors: Hart, Philip

abstract: When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

text: Maori and goldfields revenue When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

year: 2016