title: E G Jacoby: A Brief Historiography of New Zealand Demography

authors: Pool, Ian

abstract: Dr "Peter" Jacoby can legitimately be seen as the "founding father" of modern New Zealand demography. It was for this reason that the Population Association of New Zealand, with his widow's permission, have used his name for its student prize. Parenthetically, it can be noted here that the Goethe Society independently set up a Jacoby Prize -- I only learnt about this a year or so ago. In sum then, two professional bodies have recognised the contribution of Dr Jacoby to New Zealand Scholarship. Beyond this, representatives of the state library in the Landt where he had studied -- Schelswig -- came to New Zealand to collect the papers of this notable "native son" for their archives.

text: E G Jacoby: A Brief Historiography of New Zealand Demography Dr "Peter" Jacoby can legitimately be seen as the "founding father" of modern New Zealand demography. It was for this reason that the Population Association of New Zealand, with his widow's permission, have used his name for its student prize. Parenthetically, it can be noted here that the Goethe Society independently set up a Jacoby Prize -- I only learnt about this a year or so ago. In sum then, two professional bodies have recognised the contribution of Dr Jacoby to New Zealand Scholarship. Beyond this, representatives of the state library in the Landt where he had studied -- Schelswig -- came to New Zealand to collect the papers of this notable "native son" for their archives.

year: 2004

title: Future intentions, plans, and the problem of Buridan's Ass

authors: Ulatowski, Joseph W.

abstract: Suppose that:
1. an agent, S, is able to choose only one option, x or y;
2. S prefers neither x nor y in comparison to the other; and
3. S prefers having at least one of x or y to having none.1
Call this “the problem of Buridan’s Ass.” A theory of practical reasoning is supposed to tell us what to do. Which option, x or y, should S choose? Which theory of practical reasoning tells S to choose that option? While we are capable of overcoming the above situation, it seems that our choosing to act did not rely upon a theory of practical reasoning.
In response to the puzzle above, I show how Davidson’s theory faces a pair of difficulties, which are the result of his overly weak conception of the role of intentions and plans in practical reasoning. On one hand, Davidson’s theory seems unable to accommodate the possibility of a future intention in the face of equally desirable future options, and, on the other hand, his theory cannot ensure that rational intentions are agglomerative. Upon further inspection, however, it appears that Davidson’s theory is not an overly weak conception since he does seem to rule out the role of plans in practical reasoning. But even including plans in practical reasoning, as Bratman’s theory of intention does, fails to solve the seemingly insoluble problem of equipollent preference.

text: Future intentions, plans, and the problem of Buridan's Ass Suppose that:
1. an agent, S, is able to choose only one option, x or y;
2. S prefers neither x nor y in comparison to the other; and
3. S prefers having at least one of x or y to having none.1
Call this “the problem of Buridan’s Ass.” A theory of practical reasoning is supposed to tell us what to do. Which option, x or y, should S choose? Which theory of practical reasoning tells S to choose that option? While we are capable of overcoming the above situation, it seems that our choosing to act did not rely upon a theory of practical reasoning.
In response to the puzzle above, I show how Davidson’s theory faces a pair of difficulties, which are the result of his overly weak conception of the role of intentions and plans in practical reasoning. On one hand, Davidson’s theory seems unable to accommodate the possibility of a future intention in the face of equally desirable future options, and, on the other hand, his theory cannot ensure that rational intentions are agglomerative. Upon further inspection, however, it appears that Davidson’s theory is not an overly weak conception since he does seem to rule out the role of plans in practical reasoning. But even including plans in practical reasoning, as Bratman’s theory of intention does, fails to solve the seemingly insoluble problem of equipollent preference.

year: 2021

title: Editorial Introduction: The utility and futility of 'the nation' in histories of Aotearoa New Zealand.

authors: Coleborne, Catharine

subjects: New Zealand

abstract: An introduction is presented which discusses articles in the issue on New Zealand history, including one on interracial rape and sexual violence in the 1860s, one on postcolonial methodology and the historical concept of the British World, and one on Whanganui Māori claims to the Whanganui River.

text: Editorial Introduction: The utility and futility of 'the nation' in histories of Aotearoa New Zealand. An introduction is presented which discusses articles in the issue on New Zealand history, including one on interracial rape and sexual violence in the 1860s, one on postcolonial methodology and the historical concept of the British World, and one on Whanganui Māori claims to the Whanganui River.

year: 2011