title: Special settlements in the Te Aroha district

authors: Hart, Philip

abstract: When negotiations for the Crown purchase of the Aroha Block were nearing completion in the late 1870s, some Englishmen sought land on which to establish special settlements. Local responses ranged from those wishing to see new capital invested and skilled farmers developing new districts to those who feared their apparently philanthropic motives disguised speculation in land. The temperance ‘Broomhall Settlement’, proposed in 1876, was opposed by many colonists, especially Thames miners, who wanted this land for themselves, and by politicians who detected a speculator. Drawn-out negotiations ended with the collapse of this scheme.
 In 1879, the ‘Grant and Foster Settlement’ was proposed. It would bring experienced farmers from Lincolnshire, along with farm labourers who would receive small plots of land and be expected to work for their betters. Land was selected at what became known as Shaftesbury, upstream from Waiorongomai, for this evangelical Christian and temperance settlement. As much of the land was of good quality, in time the farmers who remained there profited, but many departed, notably the labourers, who found better prospects elsewhere. 
In the late 1880s, when the Waiorongomai goldfield was fading, a settlement was established at Gordon, further upstream, for miners. These under-capitalized and often part-time farmers had a great struggle to develop their sections, and some forfeited their land for not complying with the regulations requiring them to live on it and improve it. But once again, some were able, in time, to create profitable farms.

text: Special settlements in the Te Aroha district When negotiations for the Crown purchase of the Aroha Block were nearing completion in the late 1870s, some Englishmen sought land on which to establish special settlements. Local responses ranged from those wishing to see new capital invested and skilled farmers developing new districts to those who feared their apparently philanthropic motives disguised speculation in land. The temperance ‘Broomhall Settlement’, proposed in 1876, was opposed by many colonists, especially Thames miners, who wanted this land for themselves, and by politicians who detected a speculator. Drawn-out negotiations ended with the collapse of this scheme.
 In 1879, the ‘Grant and Foster Settlement’ was proposed. It would bring experienced farmers from Lincolnshire, along with farm labourers who would receive small plots of land and be expected to work for their betters. Land was selected at what became known as Shaftesbury, upstream from Waiorongomai, for this evangelical Christian and temperance settlement. As much of the land was of good quality, in time the farmers who remained there profited, but many departed, notably the labourers, who found better prospects elsewhere. 
In the late 1880s, when the Waiorongomai goldfield was fading, a settlement was established at Gordon, further upstream, for miners. These under-capitalized and often part-time farmers had a great struggle to develop their sections, and some forfeited their land for not complying with the regulations requiring them to live on it and improve it. But once again, some were able, in time, to create profitable farms.

year: 2016

title: Genocide Prevention through Changing the United Nations Security Council Power of Veto

authors: Butters, Michelle

subjects: genocide

abstract: In 1948 the international community in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust sought to eradicate genocide forever by creating the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'.  This Convention criminalised the preparation and act of genocide by international law, making all individuals accountable irrelevant of status or sovereignty.  But the Convention has not been enough to deter the act of genocide from occurring again, and again, and again.  Worst, the international community has been slow to react to cases of genocide.  The problem with preventing and punishing genocide is hindered by the power and right of veto held by permanent members of the UNSC.  The UNSC has been given the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and is the only entity that can mandate an intervention that overrides the principle of non-intervention. The aim of this thesis is to show that the veto has been a crucial factor in stopping the prevention of genocide, thus it is imperative that the veto change.  This study argues that to effectively prevent and punish genocide the veto needs to be barred from use in cases of genocide.  It looks at different cases since the Armenian genocide during WWI through to the Darfur genocide which is still in process.  The case of Armenia is significant because for the first time, members of the international community were prepared to hold leaders of another state accountable for their treatment of their own citizens.  However the collective will to bring justice to those accountable waned coming to an abrupt end in 1923.  The holocaust followed in WWII; six million Jews died, and numerous other groups were targeted under the Nazi's serial genocide.  The shock of the holocaust led to the Genocide Convention.  But thirty years later during the Cold War, Cambodia became embroiled in a genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.  The international community silently stood by.  The USSR, China, and the US all had their reasons to stay out of Cambodia, from supporting a regime with a likeminded political ideology to war weariness from Vietnam.  In the 1990s, genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) followed.  The former was neglected by the US's unwillingness to be involved in another peacekeeping disaster.  The two genocides in the former Yugoslavia were affected by Russia and China's reluctance to use military force even after the clear failure of serial negotiations.  Finally, in 2003 Darfur became the latest tragedy of genocide.  Again, Russia and China have been timid of calling the conflict genocide thus avoiding any affirmative action to stop it.  These cases all show that where one state is unwilling to be involved in stopping genocide, their right and power to the veto stops or delays the international community from preventing and punishing genocide, regardless of whether the veto is used or merely seen as a threat.  Therefore, for future prevention of genocide, the veto needs to be changed to prevent its use in times of genocide.

text: Genocide Prevention through Changing the United Nations Security Council Power of Veto In 1948 the international community in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust sought to eradicate genocide forever by creating the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'.  This Convention criminalised the preparation and act of genocide by international law, making all individuals accountable irrelevant of status or sovereignty.  But the Convention has not been enough to deter the act of genocide from occurring again, and again, and again.  Worst, the international community has been slow to react to cases of genocide.  The problem with preventing and punishing genocide is hindered by the power and right of veto held by permanent members of the UNSC.  The UNSC has been given the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and is the only entity that can mandate an intervention that overrides the principle of non-intervention. The aim of this thesis is to show that the veto has been a crucial factor in stopping the prevention of genocide, thus it is imperative that the veto change.  This study argues that to effectively prevent and punish genocide the veto needs to be barred from use in cases of genocide.  It looks at different cases since the Armenian genocide during WWI through to the Darfur genocide which is still in process.  The case of Armenia is significant because for the first time, members of the international community were prepared to hold leaders of another state accountable for their treatment of their own citizens.  However the collective will to bring justice to those accountable waned coming to an abrupt end in 1923.  The holocaust followed in WWII; six million Jews died, and numerous other groups were targeted under the Nazi's serial genocide.  The shock of the holocaust led to the Genocide Convention.  But thirty years later during the Cold War, Cambodia became embroiled in a genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.  The international community silently stood by.  The USSR, China, and the US all had their reasons to stay out of Cambodia, from supporting a regime with a likeminded political ideology to war weariness from Vietnam.  In the 1990s, genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) followed.  The former was neglected by the US's unwillingness to be involved in another peacekeeping disaster.  The two genocides in the former Yugoslavia were affected by Russia and China's reluctance to use military force even after the clear failure of serial negotiations.  Finally, in 2003 Darfur became the latest tragedy of genocide.  Again, Russia and China have been timid of calling the conflict genocide thus avoiding any affirmative action to stop it.  These cases all show that where one state is unwilling to be involved in stopping genocide, their right and power to the veto stops or delays the international community from preventing and punishing genocide, regardless of whether the veto is used or merely seen as a threat.  Therefore, for future prevention of genocide, the veto needs to be changed to prevent its use in times of genocide.

year: 2007

title: Paradoxical mobilities: sharemilking with Te Raparahi Lands Trust (Wāotū)

authors: Hutcheson, Gail Yvonne

subjects: mobilities

abstract: Mobilities are important for capturing some of the combined movements of people, animals and objects in all of their complex relational dynamics. Sharemilking involves a cascade of mobilities: from the modest journies of the everyday to the upheaval of complete farm moves. Here we examine how sharemilkers are enabled and constrained in different ways by being mobile and landless, but also included are hopeful geographies. The sharemilker's mobile relationship to land, rather than ownership of it, works well with indigenous ideas of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) that is a central feature of multiply owned Māori land trust (Te Raparahi). Combining sharemilker mobility with te Raparahi, and importantly Ngāti Hūri historical and contemporary connections to Te Wāotū in South Waikato, Aotearoa New Zealand, reveals paradoxical mobilities of place.

text: Paradoxical mobilities: sharemilking with Te Raparahi Lands Trust (Wāotū) Mobilities are important for capturing some of the combined movements of people, animals and objects in all of their complex relational dynamics. Sharemilking involves a cascade of mobilities: from the modest journies of the everyday to the upheaval of complete farm moves. Here we examine how sharemilkers are enabled and constrained in different ways by being mobile and landless, but also included are hopeful geographies. The sharemilker's mobile relationship to land, rather than ownership of it, works well with indigenous ideas of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) that is a central feature of multiply owned Māori land trust (Te Raparahi). Combining sharemilker mobility with te Raparahi, and importantly Ngāti Hūri historical and contemporary connections to Te Wāotū in South Waikato, Aotearoa New Zealand, reveals paradoxical mobilities of place.

year: 2017