title: How to Canberra-plan disagreement: platitudes, taste, preferences

authors: Wyatt, Jeremy

abstract: What is disagreement, and how can we come to know what disagreement is? Philosophers from nearly every corner of the discipline have investigated disagreement, so answers to the first question aren’t in short supply. Answers to the second question, though, are harder to come by. In this chapter, I outline an approach to the study of disagreement that is modelled on the Canberra Plan. The core idea behind this approach is to determine the nature of disagreement, we should (i) identify a collection of platitudes about disagreement; (ii) Ramsify over them; and then (iii) use available empirical evidence to determine which relations make the resultant Ramsey sentence true. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of this approach, I show how it can be used to deliver a satisfying and empirically-informed account of the nature of taste disagreement.

text: How to Canberra-plan disagreement: platitudes, taste, preferences What is disagreement, and how can we come to know what disagreement is? Philosophers from nearly every corner of the discipline have investigated disagreement, so answers to the first question aren’t in short supply. Answers to the second question, though, are harder to come by. In this chapter, I outline an approach to the study of disagreement that is modelled on the Canberra Plan. The core idea behind this approach is to determine the nature of disagreement, we should (i) identify a collection of platitudes about disagreement; (ii) Ramsify over them; and then (iii) use available empirical evidence to determine which relations make the resultant Ramsey sentence true. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of this approach, I show how it can be used to deliver a satisfying and empirically-informed account of the nature of taste disagreement.

year: 2022-05-06

title: The reasonable expectation of privacy

authors: Karunaratne, K D Thilini Prathiba

subjects: Privacy

abstract: It is increasingly recognised that privacy is an inherent human value, interest and a right that is worthy of legal protection.  Privacy is no longer simply about being let alone ‘in one’s home’, rather the concept of privacy has evolved in a broader sense and is recongised to be an entitlement of an individual even in public spaces.   
 
With increased surveillance by both state and non-state actors, privacy is more important than ever before.  Various countries across the globe have declared privacy as a constitutional right that must be protected, and in countries where a constitutional right does not exist, the judiciary has stepped in to declare privacy as a right.  Unfortunately, in New Zealand there is no general right to privacy.  Rather, there are specific legal protections that safeguard certain aspects of an individual’s privacy.  For example, certain offences created in the Crimes Act 1961 protects bodily privacy and informational privacy is protected under the Privacy Act 1993.   
 
The New Zealand judiciary has also taken firm stances by creating two privacy torts, namely, tort of publication of private facts and intrusion into seclusion.  However, the question remains whether there is a general right to privacy in New Zealand outside of these privacy protections.  This is precisely what this thesis seeks to answer by looking closer at the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy.  The judiciary has repeatedly used this concept when addressing privacy breaches.  The continued use of this concept is important.  But why?  
 
Rather than just a mere test, the reasonable expectation of privacy has been attributed by the courts as an ‘entitlement’ of the individual. The courts have interpreted and applied the reasonable expectation of privacy in a range of case law such as privacy trots, search and surveillance, and other areas of the law including broadcasting matters.  The courts have found that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy can be breached, and subsequent remedies are available.  This thesis argues that the frequent and sustained use of reasonable expectation of privacy as an entitlement that deserves protection by the common law, is without a doubt sufficient to be an expression or an embodiment of a general right to privacy in New Zealand.

text: The reasonable expectation of privacy It is increasingly recognised that privacy is an inherent human value, interest and a right that is worthy of legal protection.  Privacy is no longer simply about being let alone ‘in one’s home’, rather the concept of privacy has evolved in a broader sense and is recongised to be an entitlement of an individual even in public spaces.   
 
With increased surveillance by both state and non-state actors, privacy is more important than ever before.  Various countries across the globe have declared privacy as a constitutional right that must be protected, and in countries where a constitutional right does not exist, the judiciary has stepped in to declare privacy as a right.  Unfortunately, in New Zealand there is no general right to privacy.  Rather, there are specific legal protections that safeguard certain aspects of an individual’s privacy.  For example, certain offences created in the Crimes Act 1961 protects bodily privacy and informational privacy is protected under the Privacy Act 1993.   
 
The New Zealand judiciary has also taken firm stances by creating two privacy torts, namely, tort of publication of private facts and intrusion into seclusion.  However, the question remains whether there is a general right to privacy in New Zealand outside of these privacy protections.  This is precisely what this thesis seeks to answer by looking closer at the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy.  The judiciary has repeatedly used this concept when addressing privacy breaches.  The continued use of this concept is important.  But why?  
 
Rather than just a mere test, the reasonable expectation of privacy has been attributed by the courts as an ‘entitlement’ of the individual. The courts have interpreted and applied the reasonable expectation of privacy in a range of case law such as privacy trots, search and surveillance, and other areas of the law including broadcasting matters.  The courts have found that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy can be breached, and subsequent remedies are available.  This thesis argues that the frequent and sustained use of reasonable expectation of privacy as an entitlement that deserves protection by the common law, is without a doubt sufficient to be an expression or an embodiment of a general right to privacy in New Zealand.

year: 2020

title: Paradoxical mobilities: sharemilking with Te Raparahi Lands Trust (Wāotū)

authors: Hutcheson, Gail Yvonne

subjects: mobilities

abstract: Mobilities are important for capturing some of the combined movements of people, animals and objects in all of their complex relational dynamics. Sharemilking involves a cascade of mobilities: from the modest journies of the everyday to the upheaval of complete farm moves. Here we examine how sharemilkers are enabled and constrained in different ways by being mobile and landless, but also included are hopeful geographies. The sharemilker's mobile relationship to land, rather than ownership of it, works well with indigenous ideas of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) that is a central feature of multiply owned Māori land trust (Te Raparahi). Combining sharemilker mobility with te Raparahi, and importantly Ngāti Hūri historical and contemporary connections to Te Wāotū in South Waikato, Aotearoa New Zealand, reveals paradoxical mobilities of place.

text: Paradoxical mobilities: sharemilking with Te Raparahi Lands Trust (Wāotū) Mobilities are important for capturing some of the combined movements of people, animals and objects in all of their complex relational dynamics. Sharemilking involves a cascade of mobilities: from the modest journies of the everyday to the upheaval of complete farm moves. Here we examine how sharemilkers are enabled and constrained in different ways by being mobile and landless, but also included are hopeful geographies. The sharemilker's mobile relationship to land, rather than ownership of it, works well with indigenous ideas of kaitiakitanga (guardianship) that is a central feature of multiply owned Māori land trust (Te Raparahi). Combining sharemilker mobility with te Raparahi, and importantly Ngāti Hūri historical and contemporary connections to Te Wāotū in South Waikato, Aotearoa New Zealand, reveals paradoxical mobilities of place.

year: 2017