title: Maori and goldfields revenue

authors: Hart, Philip

abstract: When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

text: Maori and goldfields revenue When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

year: 2016

title: New Zealand’s Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF) model undermines Maori research

authors: Roa, Tom

subjects: Performance Based Research Funding

abstract: The Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF) model was instigated in 2002 to increase “the quality of research through peer assessment and performance indicators” in New Zealand (Ministry of Education 2002: 17). It is used to allocate funding between universities, departments and researchers according to the putative quality and quantity of their research outputs over the preceding 6 years. PBRF is expected to incentivise improved research excellence and efficiency, and allow government to invest research funds where greatest returns will result. This is potentially a huge gain for Māori. However, “by changing the conditions of knowledge production, research assessment exercises may also alter the shape and direction of disciplines by diverting and channelling researchers’ intellectual attention and political engagement, influencing what they study, how they do it, and how they report and write” (Middleton 2009: 194). Indeed, universities repeatedly encourage researchers to focus on activities that will improve their PBRF rankings. We believe that an unintended consequence of PBRF is the creation of significant barriers to increasing the volume, scope and quality of environmental research for Māori.

text: New Zealand’s Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF) model undermines Maori research The Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF) model was instigated in 2002 to increase “the quality of research through peer assessment and performance indicators” in New Zealand (Ministry of Education 2002: 17). It is used to allocate funding between universities, departments and researchers according to the putative quality and quantity of their research outputs over the preceding 6 years. PBRF is expected to incentivise improved research excellence and efficiency, and allow government to invest research funds where greatest returns will result. This is potentially a huge gain for Māori. However, “by changing the conditions of knowledge production, research assessment exercises may also alter the shape and direction of disciplines by diverting and channelling researchers’ intellectual attention and political engagement, influencing what they study, how they do it, and how they report and write” (Middleton 2009: 194). Indeed, universities repeatedly encourage researchers to focus on activities that will improve their PBRF rankings. We believe that an unintended consequence of PBRF is the creation of significant barriers to increasing the volume, scope and quality of environmental research for Māori.

year: 2009

title: Electrical Conductivity of Brain Cortex Slices in Seizing and Non-seizing States

authors: Elbohouty, Maher

subjects: Electrical Conductivity

abstract: The electrical conductivity of thin living slices of mouse cerebral cortex is measured. Two only out of fifteen different attempting ways were effective. I have successfully measured the electrical conductivity of mouse brain cortex in seizing and non-seizing conditions. The first successful approach is called 	the van der Pauw method, where four silver-silver chloride cylindrical wire electrodes were immersed in full length at the corners of the sample. The second is a one-dimensional technique where two flat electrodes were placed on either face of the 400 micrometer thick samples.

In both methods the electrodes were connected to an Agilent E4980A impedance monitor. The conductivity at 10 kHz of each sample was calculated based on measurements of injected current and potential difference between electrodes. Both approaches were validated by measuring electrical conductivities of known solutions. There were two main challenges: the small size of the sample and keeping it alive. I overcame these challenges by suitable electrodes and fast measuring equipment (Agilent E4980A LCR meter). For the one-dimensional technique I also measured the conductivity across the frequency range 20 Hz to 2 MHz.

The results consistently show the mean conductivity of seizing brain tissue is significantly lower than that of non-seizing tissue at 10 kHz. Also, the conductivity of seizing slices is lower than the conductivity of non-seizing slices over the frequency range 20 Hz to 2 MHz. 

These results suggest a link between electrical conductivity and seizure activity. I have not investigated the causes of these differences but explanations consistent with the literature are a change in chemical environment during seizure or a reduction in gap junction connectivity.

text: Electrical Conductivity of Brain Cortex Slices in Seizing and Non-seizing States The electrical conductivity of thin living slices of mouse cerebral cortex is measured. Two only out of fifteen different attempting ways were effective. I have successfully measured the electrical conductivity of mouse brain cortex in seizing and non-seizing conditions. The first successful approach is called 	the van der Pauw method, where four silver-silver chloride cylindrical wire electrodes were immersed in full length at the corners of the sample. The second is a one-dimensional technique where two flat electrodes were placed on either face of the 400 micrometer thick samples.

In both methods the electrodes were connected to an Agilent E4980A impedance monitor. The conductivity at 10 kHz of each sample was calculated based on measurements of injected current and potential difference between electrodes. Both approaches were validated by measuring electrical conductivities of known solutions. There were two main challenges: the small size of the sample and keeping it alive. I overcame these challenges by suitable electrodes and fast measuring equipment (Agilent E4980A LCR meter). For the one-dimensional technique I also measured the conductivity across the frequency range 20 Hz to 2 MHz.

The results consistently show the mean conductivity of seizing brain tissue is significantly lower than that of non-seizing tissue at 10 kHz. Also, the conductivity of seizing slices is lower than the conductivity of non-seizing slices over the frequency range 20 Hz to 2 MHz. 

These results suggest a link between electrical conductivity and seizure activity. I have not investigated the causes of these differences but explanations consistent with the literature are a change in chemical environment during seizure or a reduction in gap junction connectivity.

year: 2013