title: (p -Cymene)thioglycollatoruthenium(II) dimer; a complex with an ambi-basic S,O-donor ligand

authors: Henderson, William

subjects: ruthenium

abstract: The title compound was prepared from the (p-cymene)ruthenium chloride dimer and thioglycollic acid. The structure is a centrosymmetric dimer bridged by the soft-base S atoms, with the hard-base O atoms of the carboxylate group chelating to form a five-membered twisted-ring. The coordination of the ruthenium atoms is completed by a η6-p-cymene ligand, giving an 18-electron count. The Ru–S bonds are essentially equal at 2.396(1) Å.

text: (p -Cymene)thioglycollatoruthenium(II) dimer; a complex with an ambi-basic S,O-donor ligand The title compound was prepared from the (p-cymene)ruthenium chloride dimer and thioglycollic acid. The structure is a centrosymmetric dimer bridged by the soft-base S atoms, with the hard-base O atoms of the carboxylate group chelating to form a five-membered twisted-ring. The coordination of the ruthenium atoms is completed by a η6-p-cymene ligand, giving an 18-electron count. The Ru–S bonds are essentially equal at 2.396(1) Å.

year: 2007

title: Elections and Corruption: Incentives to Steal or Incentives to Invest?

authors: Fazekas, Mihály

abstract: By now, most political systems around the world hold regular multiparty elections of different quality and type. However, we know relatively little about the effect of elections on corruption, especially in high-discretion, public procurement contracts implementing development aid. To address this gap in the literature, we employ unmatched comparisons and matching estimators to analyze a global government contracting dataset that provides an objective proxy for corruption: the incidence of single bidding in competitive markets. We find that, all things being equal, corruption risks increase in the immediate pre-election period: single bidding is higher by 1.3–6.1% points. We demonstrate that the corruption-enhancing effect of elections is stronger under conditions of (i) high electoral competitiveness, (ii) medium-level party institutionalization, and (iii) “localized collective goods” clientelism.

text: Elections and Corruption: Incentives to Steal or Incentives to Invest? By now, most political systems around the world hold regular multiparty elections of different quality and type. However, we know relatively little about the effect of elections on corruption, especially in high-discretion, public procurement contracts implementing development aid. To address this gap in the literature, we employ unmatched comparisons and matching estimators to analyze a global government contracting dataset that provides an objective proxy for corruption: the incidence of single bidding in competitive markets. We find that, all things being equal, corruption risks increase in the immediate pre-election period: single bidding is higher by 1.3–6.1% points. We demonstrate that the corruption-enhancing effect of elections is stronger under conditions of (i) high electoral competitiveness, (ii) medium-level party institutionalization, and (iii) “localized collective goods” clientelism.

year: 2023-01-01

title: The waters of the Maori: Maori law and state law

authors: Durie, Edward Taihākurei

abstract: This paper is for filing in the Waitangi Tribunal in relation to a claim that existing laws do not adequately accommodate the Māori proprietary interest in natural, water resources. The claim was initiated by the New Zealand Māori Council in association with ten tribal groups. It was later accompanied by 166 other Māori groups, whom the Tribunal joined as interested parties.

text: The waters of the Maori: Maori law and state law This paper is for filing in the Waitangi Tribunal in relation to a claim that existing laws do not adequately accommodate the Māori proprietary interest in natural, water resources. The claim was initiated by the New Zealand Māori Council in association with ten tribal groups. It was later accompanied by 166 other Māori groups, whom the Tribunal joined as interested parties.

year: 2017