title: Antarctica: an inchoate threat to New Zealand’s Security: implications for national policy and the Armed Services

authors: Gibbs, Denis Richard

subjects: Antarctica

abstract: National interest has always exerted a significant influence over the geopolitical affairs of Antarctica. During the first half of the twentieth century national interest was fuelled by the inimical politics of whaling, which of itself created tension amongst those states that had a presence on the Antarctic continent. With the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in 1961 international anxiety over the prospect
of Antarctica becoming a superpower playground with nuclear overtones subsided and the world community accepted an obligation to forthwith protect the continent
and its unique environment. However, the advent of the Treaty has not curbed the aspirations of state and non-state parties to exploit Antarctica for both its living and non-living resources. Commercial pressure to gain access to Antarctic resources is likely to intensify in the future once exploitable resources elsewhere in the world become increasingly scarce. Reserves of several strategic resources are projected to reach the point of commercial exhaustion within the first three decades of the 21st century. In the Arctic access to resources such as oil and fish continues to sour relations between otherwise friendly countries and was, in part, is responsible for the militarization of the Arctic Ocean region. If the Arctic
represents Antarctica's prophetic twin then New Zealand will face an international relations dilemma unlike any it has previously confronted: should it defend its territorial claim over the Ross dependency or withdraw northwards to secure a Sub-Antarctic bastion? This is a rhetorical question for without being part of an amiable union of countries, securing the Ross dependency will be impossible for New Zealand to achieve. Given that such a union cannot be assured, it is in New Zealand's national interest to be militarily prepared to defend its Sub-Antarctic
'backyard'. Military preparedness in New Zealand is determined by national policy, an amalgam of foreign affairs and defence considerations, which in recent years have failed to recognise Antarctica as an inchoate security threat.
Consequently, the New Zealand Defence Forces, despite recent capability upgrades, remain inappropriately equipped and ill-prepared to confront any challenge to the territorial integrity of New Zealand's Sub-Antarctic 'backyard' and the resources it may harbour.

text: Antarctica: an inchoate threat to New Zealand’s Security: implications for national policy and the Armed Services National interest has always exerted a significant influence over the geopolitical affairs of Antarctica. During the first half of the twentieth century national interest was fuelled by the inimical politics of whaling, which of itself created tension amongst those states that had a presence on the Antarctic continent. With the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in 1961 international anxiety over the prospect
of Antarctica becoming a superpower playground with nuclear overtones subsided and the world community accepted an obligation to forthwith protect the continent
and its unique environment. However, the advent of the Treaty has not curbed the aspirations of state and non-state parties to exploit Antarctica for both its living and non-living resources. Commercial pressure to gain access to Antarctic resources is likely to intensify in the future once exploitable resources elsewhere in the world become increasingly scarce. Reserves of several strategic resources are projected to reach the point of commercial exhaustion within the first three decades of the 21st century. In the Arctic access to resources such as oil and fish continues to sour relations between otherwise friendly countries and was, in part, is responsible for the militarization of the Arctic Ocean region. If the Arctic
represents Antarctica's prophetic twin then New Zealand will face an international relations dilemma unlike any it has previously confronted: should it defend its territorial claim over the Ross dependency or withdraw northwards to secure a Sub-Antarctic bastion? This is a rhetorical question for without being part of an amiable union of countries, securing the Ross dependency will be impossible for New Zealand to achieve. Given that such a union cannot be assured, it is in New Zealand's national interest to be militarily prepared to defend its Sub-Antarctic
'backyard'. Military preparedness in New Zealand is determined by national policy, an amalgam of foreign affairs and defence considerations, which in recent years have failed to recognise Antarctica as an inchoate security threat.
Consequently, the New Zealand Defence Forces, despite recent capability upgrades, remain inappropriately equipped and ill-prepared to confront any challenge to the territorial integrity of New Zealand's Sub-Antarctic 'backyard' and the resources it may harbour.

year: 2005

title: Response to Questionnaire - Focus: Taiwan

authors: Rolls, Mark G.

abstract: The desire of China to potentially invade Taiwan, mirroring historical actions like the annexation of Tibet, is met with significant challenges due to the unique circumstances surrounding Taiwan's status. Recent incursions into Taiwan's airspace by the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) coincide with domestic and international factors, including President Xi's political positioning and international tensions. Despite President Biden's ambiguous statements, the U.S. exhibits a firm stance in supporting Taiwan, albeit with occasional policy confusion. Japan, recognizing the strategic importance of Taiwan, strengthens ties and prepares for potential conflict. European Union support for Taiwan grows amid concerns about China's global behavior. Taiwan faces external pressure from China to limit its diplomatic ties and international engagement. Efforts by countries like India to strengthen ties with Taiwan risk provoking China and complicating existing regional tensions. Despite international challenges, Taiwan remains resilient, seeking diplomatic support and strategic partnerships to counter Chinese pressure and maintain its sovereignty.

text: Response to Questionnaire - Focus: Taiwan The desire of China to potentially invade Taiwan, mirroring historical actions like the annexation of Tibet, is met with significant challenges due to the unique circumstances surrounding Taiwan's status. Recent incursions into Taiwan's airspace by the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) coincide with domestic and international factors, including President Xi's political positioning and international tensions. Despite President Biden's ambiguous statements, the U.S. exhibits a firm stance in supporting Taiwan, albeit with occasional policy confusion. Japan, recognizing the strategic importance of Taiwan, strengthens ties and prepares for potential conflict. European Union support for Taiwan grows amid concerns about China's global behavior. Taiwan faces external pressure from China to limit its diplomatic ties and international engagement. Efforts by countries like India to strengthen ties with Taiwan risk provoking China and complicating existing regional tensions. Despite international challenges, Taiwan remains resilient, seeking diplomatic support and strategic partnerships to counter Chinese pressure and maintain its sovereignty.

year: 2021

title: Tūhoe on the move: Regional mobility

authors: Guerin, Pauline

abstract: Academic interest in geographic mobility of indigenous peoples has increased in recent years with a corresponding growth in the literature relating to Māori mobility more specifically. With this greater acknowledgement of Māori issues has also come an awareness of the need for iwi-specific research because of the diversity within and between Māori and iwi. The present research contributes to a larger project exploring Tūhoe regional mobility. In this paper, we analyse published data and unpublished census data from 2001 that relate specifically to Tūhoe regional mobility and the relationship between mobility and language. Region of residence in 1996 and 2001 were analysed in relation to age, sex, and broad language groups. Overall, this analysis found important and diverse relationships between age, sex, language, and region of residence in New Zealand among Māori who identify as Tūhoe. For example, patterns of mobility for different age groups and sex had some similarities with other research, such as a higher proportion of “stayers” in older age groups, but differences were also found, such as higher proportions of “movers” among females in some age groups. Interestingly, we found that language between “movers” and “stayers” differed depending on the region of residence. A greater proportion of “movers” were able to converse in Māori in Auckland and the Waikato, but a slightly greater proportion of “stayers” could converse in Māori in the Hawke’s Bay and Bay of Plenty. These results suggest that geographic mobility among Māori, and Tūhoe more specifically, are complex and should not be overly-simplified in more aggregate analyses.

text: Tūhoe on the move: Regional mobility Academic interest in geographic mobility of indigenous peoples has increased in recent years with a corresponding growth in the literature relating to Māori mobility more specifically. With this greater acknowledgement of Māori issues has also come an awareness of the need for iwi-specific research because of the diversity within and between Māori and iwi. The present research contributes to a larger project exploring Tūhoe regional mobility. In this paper, we analyse published data and unpublished census data from 2001 that relate specifically to Tūhoe regional mobility and the relationship between mobility and language. Region of residence in 1996 and 2001 were analysed in relation to age, sex, and broad language groups. Overall, this analysis found important and diverse relationships between age, sex, language, and region of residence in New Zealand among Māori who identify as Tūhoe. For example, patterns of mobility for different age groups and sex had some similarities with other research, such as a higher proportion of “stayers” in older age groups, but differences were also found, such as higher proportions of “movers” among females in some age groups. Interestingly, we found that language between “movers” and “stayers” differed depending on the region of residence. A greater proportion of “movers” were able to converse in Māori in Auckland and the Waikato, but a slightly greater proportion of “stayers” could converse in Māori in the Hawke’s Bay and Bay of Plenty. These results suggest that geographic mobility among Māori, and Tūhoe more specifically, are complex and should not be overly-simplified in more aggregate analyses.

year: 2006