title: Architects of our own experience: The structure of human freedom

authors: Evans, Jay

subjects: Philosophy of freedom

abstract: The picture of a deterministic universe is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenology of agency, deliberation, and choice. While everyday conceptions of individual freedom and responsibility depend on the pre-theoretical assumption that we have meaningful control over our decisions and volitional actions, if determinism is true, the outcome of any deliberative process is always the only outcome available; the inevitable result of a reasoning sequence that could not have proceeded any other way. However compelling our ordinary sense of agency and control is, determinism gives us reason to doubt that we have the kind of freedom that we intuitively take ourselves to have.

The debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism is a long-running one, traditionally motivated by, and entangled in further disputes about what kind of freedom or control is required for moral responsibility. In a promising and refreshing turn, recent work by philosopher of physics, Jennan Ismael, has significantly advanced the debate. Leaving aside questions about moral responsibility, Ismael’s naturalistic account shows that the freedom we ordinarily take ourselves to have is not threatened by deterministic physics; when determinism is understood on its own terms, stripped of imposed notions of compulsion and necessity, the purported tension between freedom and determinism is resolved. Furthermore, Ismael argues, biological systems with the capacity for representational thought have evolved unified, emergent ‘selves’, and the capacity for self-governance, behavioural flexibility and deliberative control.

Following Ismael’s methodology of naturalistic pragmatism, I aim to enrich her contextualised picture of human agency with a precise, unified account of the nature of agency itself, and to further develop this integrated account of freedom and the structures that underpin freedom. Building on Ismael’s account of the self-governing free agent, I aim to fill out some of the details of the cognitive structures that underpin our first-person experiences of choice and endogenous control of action, and discuss how those structures arise in the natural order. Using the predictive processing framework to explore the structures of agency, choice, and autonomy that underpin self-governance, I argue that our potential for freedom – freedom in its most fully developed manifestation – lies in our capacity for autonomy, which is realized when we act deliberately to modify our own cognitive processes and transform our own minds.

text: Architects of our own experience: The structure of human freedom The picture of a deterministic universe is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenology of agency, deliberation, and choice. While everyday conceptions of individual freedom and responsibility depend on the pre-theoretical assumption that we have meaningful control over our decisions and volitional actions, if determinism is true, the outcome of any deliberative process is always the only outcome available; the inevitable result of a reasoning sequence that could not have proceeded any other way. However compelling our ordinary sense of agency and control is, determinism gives us reason to doubt that we have the kind of freedom that we intuitively take ourselves to have.

The debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism is a long-running one, traditionally motivated by, and entangled in further disputes about what kind of freedom or control is required for moral responsibility. In a promising and refreshing turn, recent work by philosopher of physics, Jennan Ismael, has significantly advanced the debate. Leaving aside questions about moral responsibility, Ismael’s naturalistic account shows that the freedom we ordinarily take ourselves to have is not threatened by deterministic physics; when determinism is understood on its own terms, stripped of imposed notions of compulsion and necessity, the purported tension between freedom and determinism is resolved. Furthermore, Ismael argues, biological systems with the capacity for representational thought have evolved unified, emergent ‘selves’, and the capacity for self-governance, behavioural flexibility and deliberative control.

Following Ismael’s methodology of naturalistic pragmatism, I aim to enrich her contextualised picture of human agency with a precise, unified account of the nature of agency itself, and to further develop this integrated account of freedom and the structures that underpin freedom. Building on Ismael’s account of the self-governing free agent, I aim to fill out some of the details of the cognitive structures that underpin our first-person experiences of choice and endogenous control of action, and discuss how those structures arise in the natural order. Using the predictive processing framework to explore the structures of agency, choice, and autonomy that underpin self-governance, I argue that our potential for freedom – freedom in its most fully developed manifestation – lies in our capacity for autonomy, which is realized when we act deliberately to modify our own cognitive processes and transform our own minds.

year: 2024

title: Peirce on Habit, Practice, and Theory: The Priority of Practice and the Autonomy of Theory

authors: Black, Joshua David

subjects: Habit

abstract: Charles Peirce’s thought on the relationship between theory and practice has two seemingly inconsistent thrusts. On one hand, Peirce draws theory and practice together. He understands theory as a particular form of practical interaction with the world. On the other hand, he pulls them apart. He seems to insist that theoretical inquiry is not to affect, or be affected by, our other practices. This thesis uses Peirce’s habit-based account of human activity to show that the two sides of his thought are not inconsistent. Rather, Peirce’s apparent division of theory from practice is a consequence of his understanding of theory as a practice.

Peirce often appeals to a habit-based account of human activity. However, this account is not developed in detail in any one text. The first task of this thesis is to gather together Peirce’s remarks on habit and human activity into a single coherent picture. According to this picture, we are made up of a body of habits which is constantly developing as we interact with the world. This body of habits is only partially subject to self-control, but we use this small window to direct ourselves towards our purposes. That in our body of habits which is subject to control is called the ‘foreground’ and that which is not is called the ‘background’. Agents are said to be ‘in harmony’ with their environment when their habits al- low them to achieve their purposes. In the course of articulating this picture points of critical contact with recent philosophy of action are noted.

The second task of this thesis is to show that Peirce understands theoretical inquiry on this model. Theoretical inquiry is the practice directed to the discovery of truth, where truth is understood as ultimate harmony between beliefs (a kind of habit) and the world. It depends on a background of mostly-instinctive habits, including a collection of indubitable common-sense beliefs, and an attunement with the world that enables us to generate explanatory hypotheses.

The third task is to show that Peirce’s division of theory from our other practices is a consequence of his understanding of the special character of truth. According to Peirce the discovery of truth is a ‘long-run’ goal, which demands very different treatment from the ‘short-run’ goals of our other practices. To allow the needs of other practices to interfere in theoretical inquiry would be to take us off the path of truth. On the other hand, to allow theoretical results and reasoning to directly control our other practices would be to substitute reliable instinct for highly fallible reason. In sum, Peirce insists on the autonomy of theory and practice from one another.

text: Peirce on Habit, Practice, and Theory: The Priority of Practice and the Autonomy of Theory Charles Peirce’s thought on the relationship between theory and practice has two seemingly inconsistent thrusts. On one hand, Peirce draws theory and practice together. He understands theory as a particular form of practical interaction with the world. On the other hand, he pulls them apart. He seems to insist that theoretical inquiry is not to affect, or be affected by, our other practices. This thesis uses Peirce’s habit-based account of human activity to show that the two sides of his thought are not inconsistent. Rather, Peirce’s apparent division of theory from practice is a consequence of his understanding of theory as a practice.

Peirce often appeals to a habit-based account of human activity. However, this account is not developed in detail in any one text. The first task of this thesis is to gather together Peirce’s remarks on habit and human activity into a single coherent picture. According to this picture, we are made up of a body of habits which is constantly developing as we interact with the world. This body of habits is only partially subject to self-control, but we use this small window to direct ourselves towards our purposes. That in our body of habits which is subject to control is called the ‘foreground’ and that which is not is called the ‘background’. Agents are said to be ‘in harmony’ with their environment when their habits al- low them to achieve their purposes. In the course of articulating this picture points of critical contact with recent philosophy of action are noted.

The second task of this thesis is to show that Peirce understands theoretical inquiry on this model. Theoretical inquiry is the practice directed to the discovery of truth, where truth is understood as ultimate harmony between beliefs (a kind of habit) and the world. It depends on a background of mostly-instinctive habits, including a collection of indubitable common-sense beliefs, and an attunement with the world that enables us to generate explanatory hypotheses.

The third task is to show that Peirce’s division of theory from our other practices is a consequence of his understanding of the special character of truth. According to Peirce the discovery of truth is a ‘long-run’ goal, which demands very different treatment from the ‘short-run’ goals of our other practices. To allow the needs of other practices to interfere in theoretical inquiry would be to take us off the path of truth. On the other hand, to allow theoretical results and reasoning to directly control our other practices would be to substitute reliable instinct for highly fallible reason. In sum, Peirce insists on the autonomy of theory and practice from one another.

year: 2013

title: He pakiriha

authors: Temara, Pou

subjects: Tikanga

abstract: Kua tae ki te wā hai kōrero i ētahi tikanga marae, ētahi tikanga kawa e kawa ana ki tā te mātanga titiro. Tērā ētahi tikanga e whakamahia ana e ngā kaumātua o nāianei e uru atu ana ki te pae o rorirori, ka mutu, e ai ki tā ngā kaumātua nei, ko te mutunga mai o te tika ā rātau i whakatau ai. Nā hei whakarāpopoto i te whakaaro whānui, i ētahi wā kāore ko te mea e tika ana ki ō tātau whakaaro te huarahi pai. Ko tā te tikanga he kimi i te huarahi e tika ana, kia kore ai e whara ngā whakaaro o te tangata. Ko te tikanga ehara i te mea i whakairotia ki te kōhatu, engari e taea ana te neke i ngā pae o te tikanga kia pai ai te whakahaere a te tangata i āna mahi, kia tau ai te rangimārie, kia mau tonu ai te mana o te tangata. E whakapae ana ahau e kūmea ana e ētahi kaumātua ētahi tikanga kia hāngai ki tā rātau i whakaaro ai kai te tika, kai te hē rānei. Mā ētahi tauira e mārama ai te kaipānui ki te kaupapa me te whakaaro o te kaituhi.

text: He pakiriha Kua tae ki te wā hai kōrero i ētahi tikanga marae, ētahi tikanga kawa e kawa ana ki tā te mātanga titiro. Tērā ētahi tikanga e whakamahia ana e ngā kaumātua o nāianei e uru atu ana ki te pae o rorirori, ka mutu, e ai ki tā ngā kaumātua nei, ko te mutunga mai o te tika ā rātau i whakatau ai. Nā hei whakarāpopoto i te whakaaro whānui, i ētahi wā kāore ko te mea e tika ana ki ō tātau whakaaro te huarahi pai. Ko tā te tikanga he kimi i te huarahi e tika ana, kia kore ai e whara ngā whakaaro o te tangata. Ko te tikanga ehara i te mea i whakairotia ki te kōhatu, engari e taea ana te neke i ngā pae o te tikanga kia pai ai te whakahaere a te tangata i āna mahi, kia tau ai te rangimārie, kia mau tonu ai te mana o te tangata. E whakapae ana ahau e kūmea ana e ētahi kaumātua ētahi tikanga kia hāngai ki tā rātau i whakaaro ai kai te tika, kai te hē rānei. Mā ētahi tauira e mārama ai te kaipānui ki te kaupapa me te whakaaro o te kaituhi.

year: 2017