title: Some characteristics of a serine proteinase isolated from an extreme thermophile for use in kinetically controlled peptide bond synthesis

authors: Peek, Keith

subjects: Proteinases

abstract: The use of proteinases for the synthesis of peptides and esters has been studied for over 50 years and has increased substantially over recent years. In particular, the use of proteinases in anhydrous organic solvents ( < 0.01% water), where they exhibit novel properties, is gaining momentum.¹ However, most of the work on peptide synthesis has been on the use of proteinases in water-miscible solvents. There are a number of advantages in employing water-miscible solvents.² For example, some amino acid derivatives are poorly soluble in nonpolar solvents and limitations due to the diffusion of substrates in biphasic systems or enzymes suspended in hydrophobic solvents are avoided. The main disadvantage of employing water-miscible solvents is that at high concentrations, many enzymes are relatively inactive or denatured due to the stripping of enzyme-bound water.³ The use of proteinases isolated from extreme thermophiles, with their inherent stability to extremes of pH and temperature and to organic solvents, would seem to be one of the obvious ways of solving these problems. In addition, the reactions could be carried out at higher temperatures, which would result in benefits from increased substrate solubilities, accelerated rates of diffusion, and decreased viscosity.

text: Some characteristics of a serine proteinase isolated from an extreme thermophile for use in kinetically controlled peptide bond synthesis The use of proteinases for the synthesis of peptides and esters has been studied for over 50 years and has increased substantially over recent years. In particular, the use of proteinases in anhydrous organic solvents ( < 0.01% water), where they exhibit novel properties, is gaining momentum.¹ However, most of the work on peptide synthesis has been on the use of proteinases in water-miscible solvents. There are a number of advantages in employing water-miscible solvents.² For example, some amino acid derivatives are poorly soluble in nonpolar solvents and limitations due to the diffusion of substrates in biphasic systems or enzymes suspended in hydrophobic solvents are avoided. The main disadvantage of employing water-miscible solvents is that at high concentrations, many enzymes are relatively inactive or denatured due to the stripping of enzyme-bound water.³ The use of proteinases isolated from extreme thermophiles, with their inherent stability to extremes of pH and temperature and to organic solvents, would seem to be one of the obvious ways of solving these problems. In addition, the reactions could be carried out at higher temperatures, which would result in benefits from increased substrate solubilities, accelerated rates of diffusion, and decreased viscosity.

year: 1992

title: Peirce on Habit, Practice, and Theory: The Priority of Practice and the Autonomy of Theory

authors: Black, Joshua David

subjects: Habit

abstract: Charles Peirce’s thought on the relationship between theory and practice has two seemingly inconsistent thrusts. On one hand, Peirce draws theory and practice together. He understands theory as a particular form of practical interaction with the world. On the other hand, he pulls them apart. He seems to insist that theoretical inquiry is not to affect, or be affected by, our other practices. This thesis uses Peirce’s habit-based account of human activity to show that the two sides of his thought are not inconsistent. Rather, Peirce’s apparent division of theory from practice is a consequence of his understanding of theory as a practice.

Peirce often appeals to a habit-based account of human activity. However, this account is not developed in detail in any one text. The first task of this thesis is to gather together Peirce’s remarks on habit and human activity into a single coherent picture. According to this picture, we are made up of a body of habits which is constantly developing as we interact with the world. This body of habits is only partially subject to self-control, but we use this small window to direct ourselves towards our purposes. That in our body of habits which is subject to control is called the ‘foreground’ and that which is not is called the ‘background’. Agents are said to be ‘in harmony’ with their environment when their habits al- low them to achieve their purposes. In the course of articulating this picture points of critical contact with recent philosophy of action are noted.

The second task of this thesis is to show that Peirce understands theoretical inquiry on this model. Theoretical inquiry is the practice directed to the discovery of truth, where truth is understood as ultimate harmony between beliefs (a kind of habit) and the world. It depends on a background of mostly-instinctive habits, including a collection of indubitable common-sense beliefs, and an attunement with the world that enables us to generate explanatory hypotheses.

The third task is to show that Peirce’s division of theory from our other practices is a consequence of his understanding of the special character of truth. According to Peirce the discovery of truth is a ‘long-run’ goal, which demands very different treatment from the ‘short-run’ goals of our other practices. To allow the needs of other practices to interfere in theoretical inquiry would be to take us off the path of truth. On the other hand, to allow theoretical results and reasoning to directly control our other practices would be to substitute reliable instinct for highly fallible reason. In sum, Peirce insists on the autonomy of theory and practice from one another.

text: Peirce on Habit, Practice, and Theory: The Priority of Practice and the Autonomy of Theory Charles Peirce’s thought on the relationship between theory and practice has two seemingly inconsistent thrusts. On one hand, Peirce draws theory and practice together. He understands theory as a particular form of practical interaction with the world. On the other hand, he pulls them apart. He seems to insist that theoretical inquiry is not to affect, or be affected by, our other practices. This thesis uses Peirce’s habit-based account of human activity to show that the two sides of his thought are not inconsistent. Rather, Peirce’s apparent division of theory from practice is a consequence of his understanding of theory as a practice.

Peirce often appeals to a habit-based account of human activity. However, this account is not developed in detail in any one text. The first task of this thesis is to gather together Peirce’s remarks on habit and human activity into a single coherent picture. According to this picture, we are made up of a body of habits which is constantly developing as we interact with the world. This body of habits is only partially subject to self-control, but we use this small window to direct ourselves towards our purposes. That in our body of habits which is subject to control is called the ‘foreground’ and that which is not is called the ‘background’. Agents are said to be ‘in harmony’ with their environment when their habits al- low them to achieve their purposes. In the course of articulating this picture points of critical contact with recent philosophy of action are noted.

The second task of this thesis is to show that Peirce understands theoretical inquiry on this model. Theoretical inquiry is the practice directed to the discovery of truth, where truth is understood as ultimate harmony between beliefs (a kind of habit) and the world. It depends on a background of mostly-instinctive habits, including a collection of indubitable common-sense beliefs, and an attunement with the world that enables us to generate explanatory hypotheses.

The third task is to show that Peirce’s division of theory from our other practices is a consequence of his understanding of the special character of truth. According to Peirce the discovery of truth is a ‘long-run’ goal, which demands very different treatment from the ‘short-run’ goals of our other practices. To allow the needs of other practices to interfere in theoretical inquiry would be to take us off the path of truth. On the other hand, to allow theoretical results and reasoning to directly control our other practices would be to substitute reliable instinct for highly fallible reason. In sum, Peirce insists on the autonomy of theory and practice from one another.

year: 2013

title: The display and conservation of taonga Māori - establishing culturally appropriate dislay and conversation facilities: Mahi Māreikura - a work in progress

authors: Whaanga, Hēmi

subjects: Māori art objects

abstract: This paper examines issues relating to the appropriate display and conservation of taonga Māori in the context of a discussion of the establishment of Mahi Māreikura, a room in the University of Waikato library that is dedicated primarily to the display and conservation of the collected taonga and works of the late Dr. Pei te Hurinui Jones and a collection of the work of his colleague and close relative, Professor Bruce Biggs.

text: The display and conservation of taonga Māori - establishing culturally appropriate dislay and conversation facilities: Mahi Māreikura - a work in progress This paper examines issues relating to the appropriate display and conservation of taonga Māori in the context of a discussion of the establishment of Mahi Māreikura, a room in the University of Waikato library that is dedicated primarily to the display and conservation of the collected taonga and works of the late Dr. Pei te Hurinui Jones and a collection of the work of his colleague and close relative, Professor Bruce Biggs.

year: 2006