title: A systems engineering approach to supply chain auditing

authors: Childerhouse, Paul

subjects: supply chain management

abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the theoretical foundations, development, and application of the quick scan audit methodology (QSAM) for comparative evaluation of supply chains via uncertainty codification and material flow assessment.
Design/methodology/approach – Charts the evolution of QSAM via the Parnaby concept of a manufacturing system leading to a control model representation of a value stream. Monitoring in process and critical interface material and information flows provide the substantive data to evaluate supply chain health. The authors show how QSAM satisfies the six desirable attributes previously established as advantageous when value stream auditing.
Findings – Basing QSAM on this particular systems approach readily leads to transferability of approach to new market sectors and new companies within the same sector. It ensures comparability via uncertainty levels to be established. Hence, using statistical cluster analysis “best practice” may be identified and annotated.
Research limitations/implications – There may yet be specific supply chain regimens where uncertainty codification is insufficient to reach a definitive conclusion. However, QSAM is now sufficiently mature that it has been applied successfully and widely beyond its original systems-friendly European automotive sector.
Practical implications – A systematic, non-industry-specific audit method based on systems modelling builds confidence into comparability studies and identification of “exemplars” exhibiting best practice. The importance of understanding and satisfying the expectations of the four “players” in the QSAM balanced scorecard is discussed and exemplified.
Originality/value – QSAM is an original contribution which fits well into the spectrum of excellence measurement techniques. The two established extremes are vertical case studies (European style) and horizontal surveys (US style). QSAM brings together certain strengths of each so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

text: A systems engineering approach to supply chain auditing Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss the theoretical foundations, development, and application of the quick scan audit methodology (QSAM) for comparative evaluation of supply chains via uncertainty codification and material flow assessment.
Design/methodology/approach – Charts the evolution of QSAM via the Parnaby concept of a manufacturing system leading to a control model representation of a value stream. Monitoring in process and critical interface material and information flows provide the substantive data to evaluate supply chain health. The authors show how QSAM satisfies the six desirable attributes previously established as advantageous when value stream auditing.
Findings – Basing QSAM on this particular systems approach readily leads to transferability of approach to new market sectors and new companies within the same sector. It ensures comparability via uncertainty levels to be established. Hence, using statistical cluster analysis “best practice” may be identified and annotated.
Research limitations/implications – There may yet be specific supply chain regimens where uncertainty codification is insufficient to reach a definitive conclusion. However, QSAM is now sufficiently mature that it has been applied successfully and widely beyond its original systems-friendly European automotive sector.
Practical implications – A systematic, non-industry-specific audit method based on systems modelling builds confidence into comparability studies and identification of “exemplars” exhibiting best practice. The importance of understanding and satisfying the expectations of the four “players” in the QSAM balanced scorecard is discussed and exemplified.
Originality/value – QSAM is an original contribution which fits well into the spectrum of excellence measurement techniques. The two established extremes are vertical case studies (European style) and horizontal surveys (US style). QSAM brings together certain strengths of each so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

year: 2010

title: Interhemispheric gradient of atmospheric radiocarbon reveals natural variability of Southern Ocean winds

authors: Rodgers, K.B.

subjects: Δ¹⁴C

abstract: Tree ring Δ¹⁴C data (Reimer et al., 2004; McCormac et al., 2004) indicate that atmospheric Δ¹⁴C varied on multi-decadal to centennial timescales, in both hemispheres, over the pre-industrial period AD 950–1830. Although the Northern and Southern Hemispheric Δ¹⁴C records display similar variability, it is difficult from these data alone to distinguish between variations driven by ¹⁴CO₂ production in the upper atmosphere (Stuiver, 1980) and exchanges between carbon reservoirs (Siegenthaler, 1980). Here we consider rather the Interhemispheric Gradient in atmospheric Δ¹⁴C as revealing of the background pre-bomb air-sea Disequilbrium Flux between 14CO₂ and CO₂. As the global maximum of the Disequilibrium Flux is squarely centered in the open ocean regions of the Southern Ocean, relatively modest perturbations to the winds over this region drive significant perturbations to the Interhemispheric Gradient. The analysis presented here implies that changes to Southern Ocean windspeeds are likely a main driver of the observed variability in the Interhemispheric Gradient over 950–1830, and further, that this variability may be larger than the Southern Ocean wind trends that have been reported for recent decades (notably 1980–2004). This interpretation also implies a significant weakening of the winds over the Southern Ocean within a few decades of AD 1375, associated with the transition between the Medieval Climate Anomaly and the Little Ice Age. The driving forces that could have produced such a shift in the winds remain unkown.

text: Interhemispheric gradient of atmospheric radiocarbon reveals natural variability of Southern Ocean winds Tree ring Δ¹⁴C data (Reimer et al., 2004; McCormac et al., 2004) indicate that atmospheric Δ¹⁴C varied on multi-decadal to centennial timescales, in both hemispheres, over the pre-industrial period AD 950–1830. Although the Northern and Southern Hemispheric Δ¹⁴C records display similar variability, it is difficult from these data alone to distinguish between variations driven by ¹⁴CO₂ production in the upper atmosphere (Stuiver, 1980) and exchanges between carbon reservoirs (Siegenthaler, 1980). Here we consider rather the Interhemispheric Gradient in atmospheric Δ¹⁴C as revealing of the background pre-bomb air-sea Disequilbrium Flux between 14CO₂ and CO₂. As the global maximum of the Disequilibrium Flux is squarely centered in the open ocean regions of the Southern Ocean, relatively modest perturbations to the winds over this region drive significant perturbations to the Interhemispheric Gradient. The analysis presented here implies that changes to Southern Ocean windspeeds are likely a main driver of the observed variability in the Interhemispheric Gradient over 950–1830, and further, that this variability may be larger than the Southern Ocean wind trends that have been reported for recent decades (notably 1980–2004). This interpretation also implies a significant weakening of the winds over the Southern Ocean within a few decades of AD 1375, associated with the transition between the Medieval Climate Anomaly and the Little Ice Age. The driving forces that could have produced such a shift in the winds remain unkown.

year: 2011

title: Maori and goldfields revenue

authors: Hart, Philip

abstract: When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

text: Maori and goldfields revenue When gold was first discovered, the Crown accepted that it needed Maori consent to open their land for mining and had to assuage fears of losing their land. Accordingly, officials devised agreements to protect Maori interests and to provide a financial return. Because of what had occurred in other countries after goldfields opened, both Maori and the government agreed that these must be well controlled. Over time, the regulations increasingly favoured the mining industry rather than the original landowners, who were not informed about the true value of their land, auriferous or otherwise. Maori were confused about their financial entitlement because of changes made by the government to the fees payable to them. 
Some rangatira, most notably Wirope Hoterene Taipari of Ngati Maru, saw a chance to obtain unexpected (and unearned) wealth, as shown by his insistence on opening Thames to miners despite the opposition of most of his hapu. Later, other rangatira wanted to open Ohinemuri and other potential fields because of the money they were promised by impatient miners and by more patient officials. For a brief time, some Maori considered controlling the potential Ohinemuri goldfield themselves. The main incentive to opening land was the wealth received by landowners during the early days of the Thames goldfield, but as mining faded later so did goldfields revenue. Changes to mining regulations diminished the amount distributed to Maori in ways that some Pakeha considered unfair, and these provoked complaints from Maori.
A continuing problem for officials was to ensure that revenue was allocated to the right owners. The system was complex, resulting in delays in paying money and in some Maori obtaining too much and others too little (or none at all), an outcome often resulting from rangatira distributing it as they chose rather than caused by government officials, who did their best to ensure fairness. Over time, the government unilaterally made changes to the system. For their part, miners complained about being required to pay for the right to mine, and encouraged the government to acquire the freehold of goldfield land because miners’ rights on Crown land were one-quarter the cost of those on Maori land. 
The revenue received by the landowners soon slipped through their fingers, sometimes in traditionally competitive gatherings such as tangi. It can be argued that Taipari, who very shrewdly adapted to the new economy (and experienced its perils, becoming bankrupt in 1870), used his income not just to give himself a luxurious lifestyle but also to boost the mana of his hapu. The government has been blamed for not insisting that revenue be protected for the use of future generations, a concept that occurred to only a few Pakeha at the time and to no Maori; far from considering the interests of their descendents, cultivating the land decreased while this revenue was received. But due to the nature of mining, by the twentieth century the landowners were lamenting the serious decline in their income from this source; despite having sold so much of their goldfield lands, some complained at not receiving any more revenue. 
Evaluating the outcome, the Waitangi Tribunal indulged in some counter-factual history by suggesting that the government should have encouraged rangatira to set up trusts to protect the income for future generations, but no rangatira had suggested this idea, nor did they ask that they should manage goldfields jointly with the Crown. After imagining that Maori in partnership with Pakeha capitalists could have developed the goldfields without the involvement of the Crown, the Tribunal had to accept that the outcome would have been the same: loss of money (because apart from anything else mining could not remain payable indefinitely) combined with the loss of much of their land.

year: 2016