title: “Just wrong,” “disgusting,” “grotesque,” “offensive”: How to deal with public rejection of new potentially life-saving technologies

authors: Weijers, Dan M.

abstract: New technologies can offer solutions to security concerns, such as preventing terrorist attacks. Many new technologies are criticised on moral grounds, leading some potentially life-saving technologies to be left on the shelf (in a folder marked “rejected ideas”). In this talk, I present a procedural framework for policymakers to use when a potentially beneficial new technology is deemed morally repugnant by members of the public. The framework takes into account the possibility of different and conflicting moral beliefs, and indicates the appropriate response to moral repugnance about potentially beneficial new technologies. The example of “PAM”, the proposed anti-terrorist prediction market is used to illustrate the framework.

text: “Just wrong,” “disgusting,” “grotesque,” “offensive”: How to deal with public rejection of new potentially life-saving technologies New technologies can offer solutions to security concerns, such as preventing terrorist attacks. Many new technologies are criticised on moral grounds, leading some potentially life-saving technologies to be left on the shelf (in a folder marked “rejected ideas”). In this talk, I present a procedural framework for policymakers to use when a potentially beneficial new technology is deemed morally repugnant by members of the public. The framework takes into account the possibility of different and conflicting moral beliefs, and indicates the appropriate response to moral repugnance about potentially beneficial new technologies. The example of “PAM”, the proposed anti-terrorist prediction market is used to illustrate the framework.

year: 2018

title: Tanzania: Civil-military relations and nationalism

authors: Zirker, Daniel

subjects: civil–military relations

abstract: Why have there been no successful military interventions or civil wars in Tanzania’s nearly 60 years of independence? This one historical accomplishment, by itself striking in an African context, distinguishes Tanzania from most of the other post-1960 independent African countries and focuses attention on the possibilities and nature of successful civil–military relations in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to most civil–military relations theory, rather than isolating the military in order to achieve civilian oversight, Tanzania integrated the military, the dominant political party, and civil society in what one observer called a combination of “political militancy” and “antimilitarism,” somewhat akin, perhaps, to the Chinese model. China did provide intensive military training for the Tanzanians beginning in the 1960s, although this could in no way have been expected to ensure successful integration of the military with civil society, nor could it ensure peaceful civil–military relations.

Eight potentially causal and overlapping conditions have been outlined to explain this unique absence of civil–military strife in an African country. Relevant but admittedly partial explanations are: the largely salutary and national developmental role of the founding president, Julius Nyerere; the caution and long-term fear of military intervention engendered by the 1964 East African mutinies; Tanzania’s radical foreign policy as a Frontline State; its ongoing territorial disputes with Uganda and Malawi; concerted efforts at coup-proofing through the co-opting of senior military commanders; and the country’s striking ethnic heterogeneity, in which none of the 125 plus ethnolinguistic tribes had the capacity to assume a hegemonic dominance. Each factor has a role in explaining Tanzania’s unique civil–military history, and together they may comprise a plausible explanation of the over 50 years of peaceful civil–military relations. They do not, however, provide a hopeful prognosis for future civil–military relations in a system that is increasingly challenging the dominant-party state, nor do they account for Tanzania’s subsequent democratic deficit.

text: Tanzania: Civil-military relations and nationalism Why have there been no successful military interventions or civil wars in Tanzania’s nearly 60 years of independence? This one historical accomplishment, by itself striking in an African context, distinguishes Tanzania from most of the other post-1960 independent African countries and focuses attention on the possibilities and nature of successful civil–military relations in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to most civil–military relations theory, rather than isolating the military in order to achieve civilian oversight, Tanzania integrated the military, the dominant political party, and civil society in what one observer called a combination of “political militancy” and “antimilitarism,” somewhat akin, perhaps, to the Chinese model. China did provide intensive military training for the Tanzanians beginning in the 1960s, although this could in no way have been expected to ensure successful integration of the military with civil society, nor could it ensure peaceful civil–military relations.

Eight potentially causal and overlapping conditions have been outlined to explain this unique absence of civil–military strife in an African country. Relevant but admittedly partial explanations are: the largely salutary and national developmental role of the founding president, Julius Nyerere; the caution and long-term fear of military intervention engendered by the 1964 East African mutinies; Tanzania’s radical foreign policy as a Frontline State; its ongoing territorial disputes with Uganda and Malawi; concerted efforts at coup-proofing through the co-opting of senior military commanders; and the country’s striking ethnic heterogeneity, in which none of the 125 plus ethnolinguistic tribes had the capacity to assume a hegemonic dominance. Each factor has a role in explaining Tanzania’s unique civil–military history, and together they may comprise a plausible explanation of the over 50 years of peaceful civil–military relations. They do not, however, provide a hopeful prognosis for future civil–military relations in a system that is increasingly challenging the dominant-party state, nor do they account for Tanzania’s subsequent democratic deficit.

year: 2020

title: Census 2018 and Implications for Māori

authors: Kukutai, Tahu

abstract: The population census is a universal tool of governance but has come under increasing pressure as governments look to reduce costs, gain efficiencies and counter declining response rates. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the census transformation strategy has a short-term focus on modernising the census and a long-term vision of a fully administrative census. The digital-first 2018 Census was an ambitious step towards modernisation but there are growing concerns that it may fail to deliver high-quality data, particularly for Māori and iwi. This research note considers the implications of lower response rates and reflects on the steps that might be taken to retain the trust and confidence of Māori in the census, including possibilities for Māori data governance across the official statistics system.

text: Census 2018 and Implications for Māori The population census is a universal tool of governance but has come under increasing pressure as governments look to reduce costs, gain efficiencies and counter declining response rates. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the census transformation strategy has a short-term focus on modernising the census and a long-term vision of a fully administrative census. The digital-first 2018 Census was an ambitious step towards modernisation but there are growing concerns that it may fail to deliver high-quality data, particularly for Māori and iwi. This research note considers the implications of lower response rates and reflects on the steps that might be taken to retain the trust and confidence of Māori in the census, including possibilities for Māori data governance across the official statistics system.

year: 2018