Soviet ultimatum to Lithuania

The Soviet Union issued an ultimatum to Lithuania before midnight of June 14, 1940. The Soviets, using a formal pretext, demanded that an unspecified number of Soviet soldiers be allowed to enter the Lithuanian territory and that a new pro-Soviet government (later known as the "People's Government") be formed. The ultimatum and subsequent incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union stemmed from the division of Eastern Europe into the German and Soviet spheres of influence agreed in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. Lithuania, along with Latvia and Estonia, fell into the Soviet sphere. According to the Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty of October 1939, Lithuania agreed to allow some 20,000 Soviets troops to be stationed at bases within Lithuania in exchange for receiving a portion of the Vilnius Region (previously Polish territory). Further Soviet actions to establish its dominance in its sphere of influence were delayed by the Winter War with Finland and resumed in spring 1940 when Germany was making rapid advances in western Europe. Despite the threat to the country's independence, Lithuanian authorities did little to plan for contingencies and were unprepared for the ultimatum.

With Soviet troops already stationed in the country in accordance with to the Mutual Assistance Treaty, it was impossible to mount effective military resistance. On the 15th of June, Lithuania unconditionally accepted the ultimatum and lost its independence. The Soviets sought to show the world that this was not a military occupation and annexation, but a socialist revolution initiated by the local population demanding to join the Soviet Union. In conformity with this, the Soviets followed semi-legal procedures: they took control of the governmental institutions, installed a puppet government, and carried out show elections to the People's Seimas. During its first session, the Seimas proclaimed the creation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned to be admitted into the Soviet Union. The petition was officially accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 3 August 1940. At the same time, almost identical processes took place in Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania would not regain its independence until the proclamation of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania on 11 March 1990.

## Background

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were part of the Russian Empire during the 19th century, achieving independence in the aftermath of World War I. The rise of Nazi Germany during the 1930s created Soviet fears of a German invasion, further aggravated by German expansion to the East, such as the ultimatum to Lithuania in March 1939, as a result of which the nation was forced to cede its most industrially developed region, Klaipėda, to the Reich.

The Soviet Union signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Germany in August 1939, in part as an attempt to delay the possibility of invasion. Germany shortly initiated World War II by invading Poland on September 1. Lithuania at first was found to be in Nazi Germany's sphere of influence according to the secret protocol of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, but later German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, divided large portions of northeastern Europe between the two powers, and assigned Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence. A Lithuanian delegation was invited to Moscow, where it signed the Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty on October 10, 1939. According to the treaty, the Soviet Union would cede a portion of the Vilnius Region, including the important city of Vilnius, which it had gained during the invasion of Poland, to Lithuania in exchange for the right to station up to 20,000 (the original bargaining point was 50,000) Soviet troops in Lithuania on a permanent basis. Official Soviet sources claimed that the presence of the Soviet military was necessary to strengthen defenses of a weak nation against possible attacks by Nazi Germany. In reality, it was the first step toward the eventual occupation of Lithuania and was described by The New York Times as a "virtual sacrifice of independence."

Despite the pacts, the Soviet Union's fears continued. In a stance long held by Russian military theorists, control of the Baltic Sea was crucial to the defense of St. Petersburg, the Soviet Union's second-largest city, and the Baltic states offered a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. Pursuing this strategy, the Soviet Union initiated the Winter War in Finland after that country rejected a similar Moscow-offered mutual assistance treaty. Stalin was unnerved by German successes in Europe, since they had taken Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg by spring of 1940. According to Nikita Khrushchev, after the fall of France in May, Joseph Stalin expressed the concern that Adolf Hitler would 'beat our brains in'.

The political situation in Lithuania, however, remained stable between October 1939 and March 1940. The Soviets did not interfere with Lithuania's domestic affairs and the Soviet soldiers were well-behaved in their bases. As late as March 29, 1940, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov delivered a speech before the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union expressing his satisfaction with the execution of the mutual assistance treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. While Lithuanian politicians publicly praised the Soviet Union for its generosity and touted the "traditional Soviet–Lithuanian friendship", in private they understood this treaty was a serious threat to Lithuanian independence. The popular attitude was reflected in the slogan "Vilnius – mūsų, Lietuva – rusų" (Vilnius is ours, but Lithuania is Russia's).

The Lithuanian government had been debating its options and discussing the possibility of occupation since November 1939. At that time, the Lithuanian envoys Stasys Lozoraitis, Petras Klimas, and Bronius Kazys Balutis prepared a memorandum containing contingency plans. They advised strengthening the army, depositing funds abroad, reinforcing the 1934 Baltic Entente alliance with Latvia and Estonia, and investigating the establishment of a government-in-exile. Although various resolutions were forwarded, nothing tangible was accomplished. During winter 1940 the Baltic Entente nations discussed greater cooperation. Mindful of their circumstances, the three governments worded their communications carefully, but the talks would be used as evidence that Lithuania was conspiring with Latvia and Estonia in violation of the mutual assistance treaty.

## Rising tension

### Initial accusations

Tensions between the Soviet Union and Lithuania escalated along with Germany's successes. By mid-March 1940, the Winter War with Finland was over and the Soviets could concentrate their attention on gaining control of the Baltic states. In April, after Germany occupied Denmark, a Lithuanian envoy in Moscow reported rising hostility from Soviet diplomats. During May, while the Battle of France was in full swing, the Soviets intensified their rhetoric and diplomatic pressure. On May 16, shortly after the German invasion of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Soviet official newspaper Izvestia published an article warning that it was naive for a small country to attempt neutrality while giants were fighting for survival. Between May 18 and May 25, Soviet soldiers moved some military equipment from Vilnius to Gaižiūnai, a location much closer to the government seat in Kaunas. The action's proximity to the then-capital carried symbolic weight.

On May 25, the day before the Dunkirk evacuation, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented a diplomatic note that accused the Lithuanian government of abducting three Soviet soldiers stationed in Lithuania in accordance with the terms of the mutual assistance treaty. The note alleged that two soldiers had been tortured to obtain Soviet military secrets but managed to escape, and that the third, Butayev, was murdered. Earlier in May, Butayev had deserted his unit and was searched by the Lithuanian police. When found, he committed suicide. The Lithuanian government replied that the accusations were baseless, but promised a full investigation of the incident and convened a special commission. However, the commission's requests for detailed information, including interviews, photographs, physical descriptions, or other data that could further the investigation, went unanswered. The official Soviet stance was that Lithuania needed to carry out the investigation on its own and that its requests were an attempt to shift responsibility to the Soviets.

### Direct negotiations

On May 30, the accusations were restated, in an official communique, published by TASS, the official Soviet news agency. The same day, Stasys Lozoraitis—the Lithuanian envoy in Rome—was authorized to form a government in exile in case of the Soviet occupation. The Lithuanian police tightened security around Soviet bases and arrested 272 suspicious individuals, but that only drew additional criticism of harassment. Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys offered to settle the matter in direct negotiations in Moscow. Molotov agreed to talk but only with Prime Minister Antanas Merkys. On June 7, Merkys arrived in Moscow. The Soviets repeated the accusations of kidnapping. Other charges were leveled, including the allegation that Minister of the Interior Kazys Skučas and Director of State Security Department Augustinas Povilaitis had provoked Soviet soldiers. During the second meeting on June 9, Molotov also accused the Lithuanian government of conspiring with Latvia and Estonia to establish a secret military union (in reference to the Baltic Entente), thereby violating the mutual assistance pact.

On June 10, the Lithuanian government discussed the new developments. It decided that Merkys should return to Kaunas and Urbšys should deliver a note offering withdrawal from the Baltic Entente, a full investigation of the incident, and dismissal of Skučas and Povilaitis. A personal letter from President Antanas Smetona to Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Kalinin repeated assurances that Lithuania always honored the mutual assistance pact. The third and final meeting between Merkys, Urbšys, and Molotov on June 11 brought no resolution. The Soviets continued to press charges which the Lithuanians could not meaningfully answer and made no more actionable requests. On June 12, Merkys returned to Lithuania and informed the government of the situation. It was decided that Skučas should resign and Povilaitis would be immediately dismissed. The Lithuanian Army was ordered to be alert, but no orders were issued regarding mobilization or preparedness. Lithuanian politicians did not fully understand the gravity of the situation and did not think the results would be catastrophic. Urbšys reported that the Soviets strongly disapproved of Merkys and his cabinet; he suggested that a new government be installed, possibly led by Stasys Raštikis, former Commander-in-Chief of the Lithuanian Army. Such suggestion interfered with Lithuania's domestic affairs.

### Internal crisis

While Merkys and Urbšys negotiated in Moscow, the Lithuanian opposition saw an opportunity to unseat the authoritarian regime of Smetona and his Lithuanian Nationalist Union. On June 12, the Christian Democrats and the Peasant Popular Union met and decided to ask Kazys Bizauskas and Juozas Audėnas to resign from the cabinet, expecting that these resignations would trigger a government crisis. The opposition saw Soviet pressure as a means of ousting Smetona's regime, restoring democracy, and preserving some form of autonomy. The opposition also hoped to persuade Merkys, who had just returned from Moscow, to resign along with the rest of the cabinet. However, Merkys could not be found—he was apparently resting at his estate near Kaunas. This episode was harshly criticized afterwards as an illustration of several weaknesses in the Lithuanian government: it underestimated the threat posed by the Soviet Union, it was disoriented during the crisis, and its members focused on party interests rather than national priorities. Algirdas Julien Greimas later described the opposition's actions as a "joyful dance next to the corpse of the lost state".

### Military movements

Mobilization of the Red Army had begun before the last round of meetings in Moscow. On June 7, the Army was ordered to prepare for an attack against Lithuania. As of June 5, all Soviet forces in the Baltic region were assigned to command of Semyon Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense. The Soviets gathered their forces on Lithuania's eastern border in modern-day Belarus; they consisted of five divisions and supporting units from the 3rd and the 11th Armies. The armies included 221,260 soldiers, operating 1,140 airplanes and 1,513 tanks. Lithuania already housed 18,786 Soviet troops within its territory. At the time the Lithuanian Army comprised 28,005 troops and owned 118 planes. The Soviets readied hospitals for the wounded and prisoner-of-war camps. On June 11, under the command of General Dmitry Pavlov, the Soviets finalized their attack plan and assigned specific tasks to all units. The orders were to cross the border silently, use bayonets as gunshots would be noticed, and to maneuver around defensive forces in order to occupy the territory more quickly. The Soviets expected to take control of the entire territory in three to four days.

On the night of June 14, while the Lithuanian government was discussing the ultimatum, Soviet soldiers began actions at the border. They fired shots at a border post near Alytus and killed policeman Aleksas Barauskas. At other points the Soviets interrogated Lithuanian border guards and harassed civilians, hoping to provoke a retaliation that would serve as a rationale for a full-scale military attack.

## Ultimatum and acceptance

Just before midnight on June 14, while the world was focused on the imminent capitulation of Paris, Molotov presented the ultimatum to Urbšys in Moscow. It reiterated the earlier charges of kidnapping Soviet soldiers and conspiracy with Latvia and Estonia. The ultimatum demanded:

1. That Skučas and Povilaitis be put on trial for ordering the Soviet soldiers to be kidnapped;
2. That a government, more capable of adhering to the Mutual Assistance Pact, be formed;
3. That an unspecified, but "sufficiently large" number of Soviet troops be allowed to enter Lithuanian territory;
4. That an answer be given by 10:00 am the next morning.

The Lithuanian government—given less than 12 hours to respond—debated the ultimatum during the night session. It was clear that no matter how the government responded, the Soviet army would invade Lithuania. President Antanas Smetona agreed only with the demand to form a new government argued for military resistance, even if it were symbolic. Merkys and his deputy Kazys Bizauskas urged acceptance. Soviet troops were stationed in Lithuania since October 1939 and acted honorably – the Soviets would surely continue to be reasonable. Bizauskas, a member of the opposition, saw the ultimatum as an opportunity to get rid of the Smetona regime. Historians cited his attitudes to illustrate his incomprehension of the dire situation. Raštikis, as the potential head of a new government, was invited to the meeting. Both former and current Chief Military Commanders Raštikis and Vincas Vitkauskas reported that mounting an effective armed resistance, when Soviet troops were already in the country and the Lithuanian military was not mobilized, was impossible. The government also rejected a diplomatic protest. In Raštikis' view, such actions were empty and would do no more than anger the Soviets and Urbšys, calling from Moscow, urged not to needlessly antagonize the Soviets. Merkys and his cabinet resigned to make way for a new government led by Raštikis. The session ended at 7 am with a decision to accept all Soviet demands without expressing protest or complaint.

By noon, the Lithuanians received a reply from Moscow stating that Raštikis was not a suitable candidate for Prime Minister. The selection of another candidate would be supervised by Molotov's deputy Vladimir Dekanozov. Merkys continued to act as Prime Minister. Smetona, who continued to disagree with the majority of his government, decided to leave the country in protest and appointed Merkys as acting president. By late evening on June 15, Smetona and Minister of Defense Kazys Musteikis reached Kybartai and crossed the border into Germany, where they were granted temporary asylum. The Lithuanian guards did not allow them to pass; thus, Smetona had to wade across the shallow Liepona rivulet. Smetona's departure worked to the Soviets′ advantage; its indignity opened him to ridicule and they were able to exploit the sentiments against him without fearing that he would be seen as a martyr. By fleeing, Smetona escaped the fate of Latvian President Kārlis Ulmanis and Estonian President Konstantin Päts, who were manipulated by the Soviets and later arrested. Under the Lithuanian constitution, Merkys became acting president.

The Red Army was scheduled to enter Lithuanian territory from three separate directions at 3:00 pm and had orders to take control of Vilnius, Kaunas, Raseiniai, Panevėžys, and Šiauliai. The Lithuanian Army was ordered not to resist and to extend friendly greetings; its air force was ordered to remain on the ground. The Soviets came in great numbers clogging Lithuanian roads. They had an obvious intention to show power and intimidate any resistance. Writer Ignas Šeinius claimed that he observed the same squadron of Soviet planes making the same flight over and over again to create an impression of much larger Soviet Air Forces.

On June 16, nearly identical ultimata were issued to Latvia and Estonia, although they were given only eight hours to respond. With Lithuania already in Soviet hands, armed resistance in Latvia or Estonia was even more futile. All three states were occupied and lost their independence until 1990.

## Aftermath

### Legitimization of the occupation

One of Dekanozov's primary goals was the organization of a puppet government that would legitimize the occupation. On June 16, the Lithuanian government, exceeding its authority, decided that Smetona's emigration was in effect a resignation and granted Merkys full presidential powers. On June 17, Merkys appointed Justas Paleckis the new Prime Minister and confirmed the new government, known as the People's Government. Merkys and Urbšys then resigned; both would later be arrested and deported to Russia. Paleckis assumed the presidency and appointed writer Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius as Prime Minister. The People's Government included several well-known politicians and public figures to reassure the public that the new government was not a tool of Soviet occupation, but a simple replacement of the authoritarian Smetona regime. Since there had been strong opposition to Smetona's rule, it was interpreted by some Lithuanians as a destruction of presidential power rather than as a loss of independence.

On July 1, the People's Government dissolved the Fourth Seimas of Lithuania and announced a show election for a "People's Seimas "to be held on July 14. A new electoral law was adopted on July 5. The law, in violation of the constitution, specified that only candidate could stand for each seat available in the parliament. It was also worded in such a way to effectively limit the field to the Lithuanian Communist Party and its supporters. The official fraudulent results showed a voter turnout of 95.51% and support of 99.19% to the communist delegates. Officially, however, 39 of the elected delegates were Communists and 40 were independents. During its first session on July 21, the parliament proclaimed the creation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to accept this new republic into the Union. A 20-member Lithuanian delegation presented the case for incorporation in Moscow on August 1. The petition was accepted on August 3 and Lithuania became the 14th republic of the Soviet Union.

### Sovietization of Lithuania

Immediately after the occupation, the new government began implementing political, economic, and social Sovietization policies. On July 1, all cultural and religious organizations were closed. The Communist Party of Lithuania—with some 1,500 members,—and its youth branch were designated the only legitimate political entities. Before the elections to the People's Seimas, the Soviets arrested about 2,000 of the most prominent political activists. These arrests paralyzed the opposition. The repressions continued and intensified. An estimated 12,000 individuals were imprisoned as "enemies of the people" during the year following the annexation. Between June 14 and June 18, 1941, less than a week before the Nazi invasion, some 17,000 Lithuanians were deported to Siberia, where many perished due to inhumane living conditions (see the June deportation).

All banks (including all accounts holding over 1,000 litas), real estate holdings larger than 170 m<sup>2</sup> (1,800 sq ft), and private enterprises employing over 20 workers or grossing more than 150,000 litas were nationalized. This disruption in management and operations created a sharp drop in production. The Lithuanian litas was artificially depreciated by three to four times less than its actual value and withdrawn by March 1941. The drop in production, combined with massive spending of appreciated roubles by Soviet soldiers and officials, caused widespread shortages. All land was nationalized; the largest farms were reduced to 30 ha (74 acres), and extra land (some 575,000 ha (1,420,000 acres)) was distributed to small farmers. To turn small peasants against large landowners, collectivization was not immediately introduced in Lithuania. In preparation for eventual collectivization, farm taxes were increased by 50–200% and additional heavy in-kind conscriptions were enacted. Some farmers were unable to pay the exorbitant new taxes, and about 1,100 of the larger ones were put on trial.

### Nazi occupation

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union and within a week took control of all Lithuania. At first the Germans were greeted as liberators from the oppressive Soviet regime. The Lithuanians hoped that the Germans would re-establish their independence or at least allow some degree of autonomy (similar to the Slovak Republic). Organized by the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF), Lithuanians rose in the anti-Soviet and pro-Nazi June Uprising, established the short-lived Provisional Government, and declared independence. However, the Germans did not recognize the Provisional Government and established their own civil administration, the Reichskommissariat Ostland. When the Red Army regained control of Lithuania in summer 1944 – January 1945, the Lithuanian partisans began an armed struggle against the second Soviet occupation. An estimated 30,000 partisans and partisan supporters were killed during the guerrilla warfare between 1944 and 1953.

## Impacts and evaluation

While unsuccessful, the June Uprising demonstrated that many Lithuanians were determined to be independent. Lithuania would become disillusioned with the Nazi regime and organize resistance, notably the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, but the Soviet Union remained "Public Enemy Number One." A Lithuanian perception that Jewish Bolshevism was involved in the occupation strengthened antisemitic attitudes and contributed to Lithuanian participation in the Holocaust.

The acceptance of the ultimatum remains a highly controversial topic in Lithuania. Observers criticize the Lithuanian Army, which had been consuming some 20% of the state budget, for not staging even a symbolic resistance that would have invalidated Soviet claims that the takeover was a "socialist revolution" and a legitimate change of government. Others criticize the government of inaction: there were eight months in which to create contingency plans. Barring armed resistance, diplomatic options remained — the Lithuanian government could have rejected the ultimatum, retreated abroad, and formed a recognized government-in-exile. Historian Alfonsas Eidintas points to a lack of public comprehension of the risk. Negative news about the Soviets was censored and even politicians did not believe the ultimatum would mean a complete loss of independence. Another debate centers on the lack of bloodshed. By accepting the ultimatum, the government may have avoided loss of life at the time, but its submission may also have encouraged later Soviet repressions. Russia, the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, continues to dispute whether the events surrounding the ultimatum and the subsequent years that Lithuania spent as a Soviet Socialist Republic constitute an occupation.

## See also

- Vladimir Putin's December 2021 ultimatum

1940 demand of the Soviet Union


Choral symphony

A choral symphony is a musical composition for orchestra, choir, and sometimes solo vocalists that, in its internal workings and overall musical architecture, adheres broadly to symphonic musical form. The term "choral symphony" in this context was coined by Hector Berlioz when he described his Roméo et Juliette as such in his five-paragraph introduction to that work. The direct antecedent for the choral symphony is Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Beethoven's Ninth incorporates part of the Ode an die Freude ("Ode to Joy"), a poem by Friedrich Schiller, with text sung by soloists and chorus in the last movement. It is the first example of a major composer's use of the human voice on the same level as instruments in a symphony.

A few 19th-century composers, notably Felix Mendelssohn and Franz Liszt, followed Beethoven in producing choral symphonic works. Notable works in the genre were produced in the 20th century by Gustav Mahler, Igor Stravinsky, Ralph Vaughan Williams, Benjamin Britten and Dmitri Shostakovich, among others. The final years of the 20th century and the opening of the 21st century have seen several new works in this genre, among them compositions by Mikis Theodorakis, Peter Maxwell Davies, Tan Dun, Philip Glass, Hans Werner Henze, Krzysztof Penderecki, William Bolcom and Robert Strassburg.

The term "choral symphony" indicates the composer's intention that the work be symphonic, even with its fusion of narrative or dramatic elements that stems from the inclusion of words. To this end, the words are often treated symphonically to pursue non-narrative ends, by use of frequent repetition of important words and phrases, and the transposing, reordering or omission of passages of the set text. The text often determines the basic symphonic outline, while the orchestra's role in conveying the musical ideas is similar in importance to that of the chorus and soloists. Even with a symphonic emphasis, a choral symphony is often influenced in musical form and content by an external narrative, even in parts where there is no singing.

## History

The symphony had established itself by the end of the 18th century as the most prestigious of instrumental genres. While the genre had been developed with considerable intensity throughout that century and appeared in a wide range of occasions, it was generally used as an opening or closing work; in between would be works that included vocal and instrumental soloists. Because of its lack of written text for focus, it was seen as a vehicle for entertainment rather than for social, moral or intellectual ideas. As the symphony grew in size and artistic significance, thanks in part to efforts in the form by Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert it also amassed greater prestige. A concurrent change in attitude toward instrumental music in general also took place, and the lack of text, once seen as a handicap, became considered a virtue.

In 1824, Beethoven redefined the symphony genre in his Ninth by introducing text and voice into a previously instrumental genre. His doing so sparked a debate on the future of the symphony itself. Beethoven's use of words, according to Richard Wagner, had shown "the limits of purely instrumental music" and marked "the end of the symphony as a vital genre". Others were not sure how to proceed—whether to emulate the Ninth by writing symphonies with choral finales, or to develop the symphony genre in a purely instrumental fashion. Eventually, musicologist Mark Evan Bonds writes, the symphony was seen "as an all-embracing, cosmic drama that transcended the realm of sound alone".

Some composers both emulated and expanded upon Beethoven's model. Berlioz showed in his choral symphony Roméo et Juliette a fresh approach to the epic nature of the symphony as he used voices to blend music and narrative but saved crucial moments of that narrative for the orchestra alone. In doing so, Bonds writes, Berlioz illustrates for subsequent composers "new approaches for addressing the metaphysical in the realm of the symphony". Mendelssohn wrote his Lobgesang as a work for chorus, soloists and orchestra. Labeling the work a "symphony-cantata", he expanded the choral finale to nine movements by including sections for vocal soloists, recitatives and sections for chorus; this made the vocal part longer than the three purely orchestral sections that preceded it. Liszt wrote two choral symphonies, following in these multi-movement forms the same compositional practices and programmatic goals he had established in his symphonic poems.

After Liszt, Mahler took on the legacy of Beethoven in his early symphonies, in what Bonds terms "their striving for a utopian finale". Towards this end Mahler used a chorus and soloists in the finale of his Second Symphony, the "Resurrection". In his Third, he wrote a purely instrumental finale following two vocal movements, and in his Fourth a vocal finale is sung by a solo soprano. After writing his Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Symphonies as purely instrumental works, Mahler returned to the vein of "festival-symphonic ceremonial" in his Eighth Symphony, which integrates text throughout the body of the work. After Mahler, the choral symphony became a more common genre, taking a number of compositional turns in the process. Some composers, such as Britten, Rachmaninoff, Shostakovich and Vaughan Williams, followed symphonic form strictly. Others, such as Havergal Brian, Alfred Schnittke and Karol Szymanowski, chose either to expand symphonic form or to use different symphonic structures altogether.

Throughout the history of the choral symphony, works have been composed for special occasions. One of the earliest was Mendelssohn's Lobgesang, commissioned by the city of Leipzig in 1840 to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Johannes Gutenberg's invention of movable type. More than a century later, Henryk Górecki's Second Symphony, subtitled "Copernican", was commissioned in 1973 by the Kosciuszko Foundation in New York to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus. In between these two works, in 1930, conductor Serge Koussevitzky asked Stravinsky to write the Symphony of Psalms for the 50th anniversary of the Boston Symphony Orchestra and, in 1946, composer Henry Barraud, then head of Radiodiffusion Française, commissioned Darius Milhaud to write his Third Symphony, subtitled "Te Deum", to commemorate the end of World War II.

In the final years of the 20th century and the early years of the 21st, more such choral symphonies were written. Mikis Theodorakis's Symphony No. 4: Of the Chorals Odes was for the 150th anniversary of University of Athens. Krzysztof Penderecki's Seventh Symphony was for the third millennium of the city of Jerusalem. Tan Dun's Symphony 1997: Heaven Earth Mankind commemorated the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong that year to the People's Republic of China. Philip Glass's Fifth Symphony as one of several pieces commissioned to celebrate the beginning of the 21st century.

## General features

Like an oratorio or an opera, a choral symphony is a musical work for orchestra, choir and (often) solo voices, although a few have been written for unaccompanied voices. Berlioz, who in 1858 first coined the term when describing his work Roméo et Juliette, explained the distinctive relationship he envisaged between voice and orchestra:

> Even though voices are often used, it is neither a concert opera nor a cantata, but a choral symphony. If there is singing, almost from the beginning, it is to prepare the listener's mind for the dramatic scenes whose feelings and passions are to be expressed by the orchestra. It is also to introduce the choral masses gradually into the musical development, when their too sudden appearance would have damaged the compositions's unity....

Unlike oratorios or operas, which are generally structured dramaturgically into arias, recitatives and choruses, a choral symphony is structured like a symphony, in movements. It may employ the traditional four-movement scheme of a fast opening movement, slow movement, scherzo and finale, or as with many instrumental symphonies, it may use a different structure of movements. The written text in a choral symphony shares equal standing with the music, as in an oratorio, and the chorus and soloists share equality with the instruments. Over time the use of text allowed the choral symphony to evolve from an instrumental symphony with a choral finale, as in the Beethoven's Ninth, to a composition that can use voices and instruments throughout the entire composition, as in Stravinsky's Symphony of Psalms or Mahler's Eighth Symphony.

Sometimes the text can give a basic outline that correlates to the four-movement scheme of a symphony. For instance, the four-part structure of Edgar Allan Poe's The Bells, a progression from youth to marriage, maturity, and death, naturally suggested the four movements of a symphony to Sergei Rachmaninoff, which he followed in his choral symphony of the same name. The text can encourage a composer to expand a choral symphony past the normal bounds of the symphonic genre, as with Berlioz for his Roméo et Juliette, yet stay within the basic structural or aesthetic intent of symphonic form. It can also influence the musical content in parts where there is no singing, as in Roméo et Juliette. There, Berlioz allows the orchestra to express the majority of the drama in instrumental music and saves words for expository and narrative sections of the work.

## Relation of words and music

As in an oratorio, the written text in a choral symphony can be as important as the music, and the chorus and soloists can participate equally with the instruments in the exposition and development of musical ideas. The text can also help determine whether the composer follows symphonic form strictly, as in the case of Rachmaninoff, Britten and Shostakovich, or whether they expand symphonic form, as in the case of Berlioz, Mahler and Havergal Brian. Sometimes the choice of text has led the composer to different symphonic structures, as with Szymanowski, Schnittke and, again, Havergal Brian. The composer can also choose to treat the text fluidly, in a manner more like music than narrative. Such was the case with Vaughan Williams, Mahler and Philip Glass.

### Musical treatment of text

Vaughan Williams' program note for A Sea Symphony discusses how the text was to be treated as music. The composer writes, "The plan of the work is symphonic rather than narrative or dramatic, and this may be held to justify the frequent repetition of important words and phrases which occur in the poem. The words as well as the music are thus treated symphonically." Walt Whitman's poems inspired him to write the symphony, and Whitman's use of free verse became appreciated at a time where fluidity of structure was becoming more attractive than traditional, metrical settings of text. This fluidity helped facilitate the non-narrative, symphonic treatment of text that Vaughan Williams had in mind. In the third movement in particular, the text is loosely descriptive and can be "pushed about by the music", some lines being repeated, some not consecutive in the written text immediately following one another in the music, and some left out entirely.

Vaughan Williams was not the only composer following a non-narrative approach to his text. Mahler took a similar, perhaps even more radical approach in his Eighth Symphony, presenting many lines of the first part, "Veni, Creator Spiritus", in what music writer and critic Michael Steinberg referred to as "an incredibly dense growth of repetitions, combinations, inversions, transpositions and conflations". He does the same with Goethe's text in Part Two of the symphony, making two substantial cuts and other changes.

Other works take the use of text as music still further. Vaughan Williams uses a chorus of women's voices wordlessly in his Sinfonia Antartica, based on his music for the film Scott of the Antarctic, to help set the bleakness of the overall atmosphere. While a chorus is used in the second and third movements of Glass's Seventh Symphony, also known as A Toltec Symphony, the text contains no actual words; the composer states that it is instead formed "from loose syllables that add to the evocative context of the overall orchestral texture".

### Music and words as equals

Stravinsky said about the texts of his Symphony of Psalms that "it is not a symphony in which I have included Psalms to be sung. On the contrary, it is the singing of the Psalms that I am symphonizing". This decision was as much musical as it was textual. Stravinsky's counterpoint required several musical voices to function simultaneously, independent melodically and rhythmically, yet interdependent harmonically. They would sound very different when heard separately, yet harmonious when heard together. To facilitate maximum clarity in this interplay of voices, Stravinsky used "a choral and instrumental ensemble in which the two elements should be on an equal footing, neither of them outweighing the other".

Mahler's intent in writing his Eighth Symphony for exceptionally large forces was a similar balance between vocal and instrumental forces. It was not simply an attempt at grandiose effect, though the composer's use of such forces earned the work the subtitle "Symphony of a Thousand" from his press agent (a name still applied to the symphony). Like Stravinsky, Mahler makes extensive and extended use of counterpoint, especially in the first part, "Veni Creator Spiritus". Throughout this section, according to music writer Michael Kennedy, Mahler displays considerable mastery in manipulating multiple independent melodic voices. Musicologist Deryck Cooke adds that Mahler handles his huge forces "with extraordinary clarity".

Vaughan Williams also insisted on a balance between words and music in A Sea Symphony, writing in his program note for the work, "It is also noticeable that the orchestra has an equal share with the chorus and soloists in carrying out the musical ideas". Music critic Samuel Langford, writing about the premiere of the work for The Manchester Guardian, concurred with the composer, writing, "It is the nearest approach we have to a real choral symphony, one in which the voices are used throughout just as freely as the orchestra."

In his Leaves of Grass: A Choral Symphony, Robert Strassburg composed a symphonic "musical setting" in ten movements for the poetry of Walt Whitman while balancing the contributions of a narrator, a chorus and an orchestra.

### Words determining symphonic form

Rachmaninoff's choral symphony The Bells reflected the four-part progression from youth to marriage, maturity, and death in Poe's poem. Britten reversed the pattern for his Spring Symphony—the four sections of the symphony represent, in its composer's words, "the progress of Winter to Spring and the reawakening of the earth and life which that means.... It is in the traditional four movement shape of a symphony, but with the movements divided into shorter sections bound together by a similar mood or point of view."

The gestation of Shostakovich's Thirteenth Symphony, Babi Yar, was only slightly less straightforward. He set the poem Babi Yar by Yevgeny Yevtushenko almost immediately upon reading it, initially considering it a single-movement composition. Discovering three other Yevtushenko poems in the poet's collection Vzmakh ruki (A Wave of the Hand) prompted him to proceed to a full-length choral symphony, with "A Career" as the closing movement. Musicologist Francis Maes comments that Shostakovich did so by complementing Babi Yar's theme of Jewish suffering with Yevtushenko's verses about other Soviet abuses: "'At the Store' is a tribute to the women who have to stand in line for hours to buy the most basic foods,... 'Fears' evokes the terror under Stalin. 'A Career' is an attack on bureaucrats and a tribute to genuine creativity". Music historian Boris Schwarz adds that the poems, in the order Shostakovich places them, form a strongly dramatic opening movement, a scherzo, two slow movements and a finale.

In other cases, the choice of text has led the composer to different symphonic structures. Havergal Brian allowed the form of his Fourth Symphony, subtitled "Das Siegeslied" (Psalm of Victory), to be dictated by the three-part structure of his text, Psalm 68; the setting of Verses 13–18 for soprano solo and orchestra forms a quiet interlude between two wilder, highly chromatic martial ones set for massive choral and orchestral forces. Likewise, Szymanowski allowed the text by 13th-century Persian poet Rumi to dictate what Jim Samson calls the "single tripartite movement" and "overall arch structure" of his Third Symphony, subtitled "Song of the Night".

### Words expanding symphonic form

A composer may also respond to a text by expanding a choral symphony beyond the normal bounds of the symphonic genre. This is evident in the unusual orchestration and stage directions Berlioz prepared for his Roméo et Juliette. This piece is actually in seven movements, and calls for an intermission after the fourth movement – the "Queen Mab Scherzo" – to remove the harps from the stage and bring on the chorus of Capulets for the funeral march that follows. Berlioz biographer D. Kern Holoman observed that, "as Berlioz saw it, the work is simply Beethovenian in design, with the narrative elements overlain. Its core approaches a five-movement symphony with the choral finale and, as in the [Symphonie] Fantastique, both a scherzo and a march.... The 'extra' movements are thus the introduction with its potpourri of subsections and the descriptive tomb scene [at the end of the work]."

Mahler expanded the Beethovenian model for programmatic as well as symphonic reasons in his Second Symphony, the "Resurrection", the vocal fourth movement, "Urlicht", bridging the childlike faith of the third movement with the ideological tension Mahler seeks to resolve in the finale. He then abandoned this pattern for his Third Symphony, as two movements for voices and orchestra follow three purely instrumental ones before the finale returns to instruments alone. Like Mahler, Havergal Brian expanded the Beethovenian model, but on a much larger scale and with far larger orchestral and choral forces, in his Symphony No. 1 "The Gothic". Written between 1919 and 1927, the symphony was inspired by Goethe's Faust and Gothic cathedral architecture. The Brian First is in two parts. The first consists of three instrumental movements; the second, also in three movements and over an hour in length, is a Latin setting of the Te Deum.

## Symphonies for unaccompanied chorus

A few composers have written symphonies for unaccompanied chorus, in which the choir performs both vocal and instrumental functions. Granville Bantock composed three such works—Atalanta in Calydon (1911), Vanity of Vanities (1913) and A Pageant of Human Life (1913). His Atalanta, called by musicologist Herbert Antcliffe "the most important [work of the three] alike in technical experiment and in inspiration", was written for a choir of at least 200, the composer specifying "'not less than 10 voices for each part,'" a work with 20 separate vocal parts. Using these forces, Bantock formed groups "of different weights and colors to get something of the varied play of tints and perspective [of an orchestra]". In addition, the choir is generally divided into three sections, approximating the timbres of woodwinds, brass and strings. Within these divisions, Antcliffe writes,

> Almost every possible means of vocal expression is employed separately or in combination with others. To hear the different parts of the choir describing in word and tone "laughter" and "tears" respectively at the same time is to realize how little the possibilities of choral singing have as yet been grasped by the ordinary conductor and composer. Such combinations are extremely effective when properly achieved, but they are very difficult to achieve.

Roy Harris wrote his Symphony for Voices in 1935 for a cappella choir split into eight parts. Harris focused on harmony, rhythm and dynamics, allowing the text by Walt Whitman to dictate the choral writing. "In a real sense, the human strivings so vividly portrayed in Whitman's poetry find a musical analog to the trials to which the singers are subjected", John Profitt writes both of the music's difficulty for performers and of its highly evocative quality. Malcolm Williamson wrote his Symphony for Voices between 1960 and 1962, setting texts by Australian poet James McAuley. Lewis Mitchell writes that the work is not a symphony in any true sense, but rather a four-movement work preceded by an invocation for solo contralto. The text is a combination of poems celebrating the Australian wilderness and visionary Christianity, its jagged lines and rhythms matched by the music. Mitchell writes, "Of all his choral works, with the possible exception of the Requiem for a Tribe Brother, the Symphony is the most Australian in feeling".

## Programmatic intent

Some recent efforts have paid less attention to symphonic form and more to programmatic intent. Hans Werner Henze wrote his 1997 Ninth Symphony in seven movements, basing the structure of the symphony on the novel The Seventh Cross by Anna Seghers. The novel recounts the flight of seven fugitives from a Nazi prison camp, the seven crosses symbolizing the seven death sentences; the ordeal of the one prisoner who makes it to freedom becomes the crux of the text. Penderecki's Seventh Symphony, subtitled "Seven Gates of Jerusalem" and originally conceived as an oratorio, is not only written in seven movements but, musicologist Richard Whitehouse writes, is "pervaded by the number 'seven' at various levels." An extensive system of seven-note phrases binds the work together, as well as the frequent use of seven notes repeated at a single pitch. Seven chords played fortissimo bring the work to a close.

Philip Glass's Fifth Symphony, completed in 1999 and subtitled "Requiem, Bardo and Nirmanakaya", is written in 12 movements to fulfill its programmatic intent. Glass writes, "My plan has been for the symphony to represent a broad spectrum of many of the world's great 'wisdom' traditions", synthesizing "a vocal text that begins before the world's creation, passes through earthly life and paradise, and closes with a future dedication". Glass writes that he considered the millennium at the beginning of the 21st century to be a symbolic bridge between past, present and spiritual rebirth.

More recently, Glass based the philosophical and musical structure for his Seventh Symphony on the Wirrarika sacred trinity. Glass wrote about the work's respective movement headings and their relation to the overall structure of the symphony, "'The Corn' represents a direct link between Mother Earth and the well-being of human beings.... 'The Sacred Root' is found in the high deserts of north and central Mexico, and is understood to be the doorway to the world of the Spirit. 'The Blue Deer' is considered the holder of the Book of Knowledge. Any man or woman who aspires to be a 'Person of Knowledge' will, through arduous training and effort, have to encounter the Blue Deer...."

### Words changing programmatic intent

Addition of a text can effectively change the programmatic intent of a composition, as with the two choral symphonies of Franz Liszt. Both the Faust and Dante symphonies were conceived as purely instrumental works and only later became choral symphonies. However, while Liszt authority Humphrey Searle asserts that Liszt's later inclusion of a chorus effectively sums up Faust and makes it complete, another Liszt expert, Reeves Shulstad, suggests that Liszt changed the work's dramatic focus to the point of meriting a different interpretation of the work itself. According to Shulstad, "Liszt's original version of 1854 ended with a last fleeting reference to Gretchen and an ... orchestral peroration in C major, based on the most majestic of themes from the opening movement. One might say that this conclusion remains within the persona of Faust and his imagination". When Liszt rethought the piece three years later, he added a "Chorus mysticus", the male chorus singing the final words from Goethe's Faust. The tenor soloist, accompanied by the chorus, sings the last two lines of the text. "With the addition of the 'Chorus Mysticus' text", Shulstad writes, "the Gretchen theme has been transformed and she no longer appears as a masked Faust. With this direct association to the final scene of the drama we have escaped Faust's imaginings and are hearing another voice commenting on his striving and redemption".

Likewise, Liszt's inclusion of a choral finale in his Dante Symphony changed both the structural and programmatic intent of the work. Liszt's intent was to follow the structure of the Divine Comedy and compose Dante in three movements—one each for the Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso. However, Liszt's son-in-law Richard Wagner persuaded him that no earthly composer could faithfully express the joys of Paradise. Liszt dropped the third movement but added a choral element, a Magnificat, at the end of the second. This action, Searle claims, effectively destroyed the work's formal balance and left the listener, like Dante, to gaze upward at the heights of Heaven and hear its music from afar. Shulstad suggests that the choral finale actually helps complete the work's programmatic trajectory from struggle to paradise.

Conversely, a text can also spark the birth of a choral symphony, only for that work to become a purely instrumental one when the programmatic focus of the work changes. Shostakovich originally planned his Seventh Symphony as a single-movement choral symphony much like his Second and Third Symphonies. Shostakovich reportedly intended to set a text for the Seventh from the Ninth Psalm, on the theme of vengeance for the shedding of innocent blood. In doing this he was influenced by Stravinsky; he had been deeply impressed with the latter's Symphony of Psalms, which he wanted to emulate in this work. While the Ninth Psalm's theme conveyed Shostakovich's outrage over Stalin's oppression, a public performance of a work with such a text would have been impossible before the German invasion. Hitler's aggression made the performance of such a work feasible, at least in theory; the reference to "blood" could then be associated at least officially with Hitler. With Stalin appealing to the Soviets' patriotic and religious sentiments, the authorities were no longer suppressing Orthodox themes or images. Nevertheless, Shostakovich eventually realized that the work encompassed far more than this symbology. He expanded the symphony to the traditional four movements and made it purely instrumental.

### Supplanting text wordlessly

While Berlioz allowed the programmatic aspects of his text to shape the symphonic form of Roméo and to guide its content, he also showed how an orchestra could supplant such a text wordlessly to further illustrate it. He wrote in his preface to Roméo:

> If, in the famous garden and cemetery scenes the dialogue of the two lovers, Juliet's asides, and Romeo's passionate outbursts are not sung, if the duets of love and despair are given to the orchestra, the reasons are numerous and easy to comprehend. First, and this alone would be sufficient, it is a symphony and not an opera. Second, since duets of this nature have been handled vocally a thousand times by the greatest masters, it was wise as well as unusual to attempt another means of expression. It is also because the very sublimity of this love made its depiction so dangerous for the musician that he had to give his imagination a latitude that the positive sense of the sung words would not have given him, resorting instead to instrumental language, which is richer, more varied, less precise, and by its very indefiniteness incomparably more powerful in such a case.

As a manifesto, this paragraph became significant for the amalgamation of symphonic and dramatic elements in the same musical composition. Musicologist Hugh Macdonald writes that as Berlioz kept the idea of symphonic construction closely in mind, he allowed the orchestra to express the majority of the drama in instrumental music and set expository and narrative sections in words. Fellow musicologist Nicholas Temperley suggests that, in Roméo, Berlioz created a model for how a dramatic text could guide the structure of a choral symphony without circumventing that work from being recognizably a symphony. In this sense, musicologist Mark Evans Bonds writes, the symphonies of Liszt and Mahler owe a debt of influence to Berlioz.

More recently, Alfred Schnittke allowed the programmatic aspects of his texts to dictate the course of both his choral symphonies even when no words were being sung. Schnittke's six-movement Second Symphony, following the Ordinary of the Mass of the Roman Catholic Church, works programmatically on two levels simultaneously. While soloists and chorus briefly perform the mass, set to chorales taken from the Gradual, the orchestra provides an extended running commentary that can continue much longer than the section of the mass being performed. Sometimes the commentary follows a particular chorale but more often is freer and wider ranging in style. Despite the resulting stylistic disparity, biographer Alexander Ivashkin comments, "musically almost all these sections blend the choral [sic] tune and subsequent extensive orchestral 'commentary.'" The work becomes what Schnittke called an "Invisible Mass", and Alexander Ivashkin termed "a symphony against a chorale backdrop".

The program in Schnittke's Fourth Symphony, reflecting the composer's own religious dilemma at the time it was written, is more complex in execution, with the majority of it expressed wordlessly. In the 22 variations that make up the symphony's single movement, Schnittke enacts the 15 traditional Mysteries of the Rosary, which highlight important moments in the life of Christ. As he did in the Second Symphony, Schnittke simultaneously gives a detailed musical commentary on what is being portrayed. Schnittke does this while using church music from the Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Orthodox faiths, the orchestral texture becoming extremely dense from the many musical strands progressing at the same time. A tenor and a countertenor also sing wordlessly at two points in the symphony. The composition saves words for a finale that uses all four types of church music contrapuntally as a four-part choir sings the Ave Maria. The choir can choose whether to sing the Ave Maria in Russian or Latin. The programmatic intent of using these different types of music, Ivashkin writes, is an insistence by the composer "on the idea ... of the unity of humanity, a synthesis and harmony among various manifestations of belief".

## See also

- List of choral symphonies

Musical composition for orchestra and choir


Xá Lợi Pagoda raids

The Xá Lợi Pagoda raids ( SAW-LIE) were a series of synchronized attacks on various Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam shortly after midnight on 21 August 1963. The raids were executed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Lê Quang Tung, and combat police, both of which took their orders directly from Ngô Đình Nhu, younger brother of the Roman Catholic President Ngô Đình Diệm. Xá Lợi Pagoda, the largest pagoda in the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon, was the most prominent of the raided temples. Over 1,400 Buddhists were arrested, and estimates of the death toll and missing ranged up to the hundreds. In response to the Huế Vesak shootings and a ban on the Buddhist flag in early May, South Vietnam's Buddhist majority rose in widespread civil disobedience and protest against the religious bias and discrimination of the Catholic-dominated Diệm government. Buddhist temples in major cities, most prominently the Xá Lợi pagoda, became focal points for protesters and assembly points for Buddhist monks from rural areas.

In August, several Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) generals proposed the imposition of martial law, ostensibly to break up the demonstrations, but in reality to prepare for a military coup. Nhu, already looking to arrest Buddhist leaders and crush the protest movement, used the opportunity to preempt the generals and embarrass them. He disguised Tung's Special Forces in army uniforms and used them to attack the Buddhists, thereby causing the general public and South Vietnam's U.S. allies to blame the army, diminishing the generals' reputations and ability to act as future national leaders.

Soon after midnight on 21 August, Nhu's men attacked the pagodas using automatic firearms, grenades, battering rams and explosives, causing widespread damage. Some religious objects were destroyed, including a statue of Gautama Buddha in the Từ Đàm Pagoda in Huế, which was partially leveled by explosives. Temples were looted and vandalized, with the remains of venerated monks confiscated. In Huế, violent street battles erupted between government forces and rioting pro-Buddhist, anti-government civilians.

The Ngô family claimed that the army had carried out the raids, something their U.S. allies initially believed. This was later debunked, but the incident prompted the United States to turn against the regime and begin exploring alternative leadership options, eventually leading to Diệm's overthrow in a November coup. In South Vietnam, the raids stoked widespread anger. Several high-ranking public servants resigned, and university and high school students boycotted classes and staged riotous demonstrations, resulting in further mass incarcerations. As most of the students were from middle-class public service and military families, the arrests caused further upset among the Ngô family's power base.

## Background

In South Vietnam, where the Buddhist majority was estimated to comprise between 70 and 90 percent of the population in 1963, President Ngô Đình Diệm's pro-Catholic policies antagonized many Buddhists. As a member of the Catholic minority, his government was biased towards Catholics in public service, military promotions, the allocation of land, business favors, and tax concessions. Many officers in the ARVN had converted to Catholicism in the belief that their career prospects depended on it, and many were refused promotion if they did not do so. The distribution of firearms to village self-defense militias to repel Việt Cộng guerrillas was done so that weapons were given only to Catholics. Some Catholic priests ran private armies, and in some areas forced conversions; looting, shelling and demolition of pagodas occurred. Some Buddhist villages converted en masse to receive aid or avoid being forcibly resettled by Diem's regime.

The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and the "private" status that was imposed on Buddhism by the French, which required official permission to conduct public activities, was not repealed by Diệm. The land owned by the church was exempt from land reform, and Catholics were also de facto exempt from the corvée labor that the government obliged all other citizens to perform; public spending was disproportionately distributed to Catholic majority villages. Under Diệm, the Catholic Church enjoyed special exemptions in property acquisition, and in 1959, he dedicated the country to the Virgin Mary.

A rarely enforced 1958 law—known as Decree Number 10—was invoked in May 1963 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. The application of the law caused indignation among Buddhists on the eve of the most important religious festival of the year. This was exacerbated as a week earlier Catholics had been encouraged to display Vatican flags at a government-sponsored celebration for Diem's brother, Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục, the most senior Catholic cleric in the country. On 8 May in Huế, a crowd of Buddhists protested against the ban on the Buddhist flag. The police and army broke up the demonstration by firing guns at and throwing grenades into the gathering, killing nine people.

Diệm's denial of governmental responsibility for the incident—he instead blamed the Việt Cộng—added to the anger and discontent of the Buddhist majority. The incident spurred a protest movement against the religious discrimination of the Roman Catholic–dominated Diệm regime, resulting in widespread large-scale civil disobedience among the South Vietnamese public, persisting throughout May and June. This period of political instability was known as the "Buddhist crisis". The objectives of the protests were to have Decree Number 10 repealed and to force implementation of religious equality.

On 11 June, a Buddhist monk, Thích Quảng Đức, self-immolated in downtown Saigon. Images were shown by news outlets across the world, embarrassing Diệm's government and bringing negative global attention. A few days later, under mounting American pressure, Diệm signed the Joint Communique with senior Buddhist leaders, making various concessions to the Buddhists, who in turn agreed to stop the civil unrest and return to normal life.

Neither the Ngô family nor the Buddhists were happy with the agreement, and it failed to solve the dispute. Both sides accused the other of failing to uphold their obligations; the government accused the Buddhists of continuing to vilify them in demonstrations, while the Buddhists accused Diệm of stalling and not acting on his commitments to religious reform, and continuing to detain arrested Buddhist dissidents. The demonstrations and tension continued throughout July and August, with more self-immolations and an altercation (known as the Double Seven Day scuffle) between secret police and American journalists reporting on a Buddhist protest.

## Xá Lợi

The hub of Buddhist activism in Saigon was the Xá Lợi Pagoda. Built in the late 1950s, it was the largest Buddhist temple in the capital and was located in the city center. Many monks from outside Saigon—including prominent Buddhist leaders—had congregated at Xá Lợi since the dispute began and it was used as a venue for press conferences, media interviews, publication of pamphlets and to plan and organize mass demonstrations.

At the time, Ngô Đình Nhu was known to favor an even harder line against the Buddhists. Nhu was the younger brother of President Diệm and his main confidant, and was regarded as the real power behind the Ngô family's rule. There were persistent reports that Nhu was seeking to usurp power from his elder brother and to attack the Buddhists. When interviewed about this, Nhu said that if the Buddhist crisis were not resolved, he would stage a coup and head a new anti-Buddhist government. The news was promptly published, which the American embassy largely disregarded, purportedly unconvinced as to Nhu's seriousness.

Nhu prepared the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces commanded by Colonel Lê Quang Tung—who took his orders directly from Nhu and not the senior generals—for the raids. An American-trained outfit created to fight the Việt Cộng, the Special Forces were better-equipped, better-trained and better-paid than the regular army. They were used by the Ngô family as a private army for repressing dissidents and protecting their rule, rather than fighting for the national interest. As such, they spent the majority of their time in Saigon warding off coup attempts. Tung brought more Special Forces into Saigon, bringing the total from two to four battalions in the capital.

On Sunday, 18 August, the Buddhists staged a mass protest at Xá Lợi, attracting around 15,000 people. The attendance was approximately three times higher than that at the previous Sunday's rally. The event lasted for several hours, as speeches by the monks interspersed religious ceremonies. A Vietnamese journalist said that it was the only emotional public gathering in South Vietnam since Diệm's rise to power almost a decade earlier. David Halberstam of The New York Times speculated that by not exploiting the large crowd by staging a protest march towards Gia Long Palace or other government buildings, the Buddhists were saving their biggest demonstration for the scheduled arrival of new U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. the following week.

## Planning

On the evening of 18 August, ten senior ARVN generals met to discuss the situation regarding the Buddhist unrest and decided martial law was needed. They wanted to disperse the monks who had gathered in Saigon and other regional cities and return them to their original pagodas in the rural areas.

Nhu summoned 7 of the 10 generals to Gia Long Palace on August 20 for consultations. They presented their request for martial law and discussed how to disband the groups of monks and their supporters from the temples in Saigon. Nhu sent the generals to see Diem, and the president listened to the group of seven, led by General Trần Văn Đôn. The group included Army Chief General Trần Thiện Khiêm and General Nguyễn Khánh, commander of the II Corps in the Central Highlands. Also present was Đôn's brother-in-law, General Đỗ Cao Trí, commander of I Corps, which oversaw the northernmost region around Huế, and General Lê Văn Kim, head of the military academy. General Tôn Thất Đính, a brash paratrooper, commanded the III Corps surrounding Saigon. General Huỳnh Văn Cao was the commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta.

Trần Văn Đôn claimed communists had infiltrated the monks at Xá Lợi and warned that ARVN morale was deteriorating because of the civil unrest and consequent disruption of the war effort. He claimed it was possible that the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Diệm agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day, without consulting his cabinet, and troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed as the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in place of General Lê Văn Tỵ, who was terminally ill with cancer and receiving medical treatment abroad. Đôn claimed Diệm was concerned for the welfare of the monks, allegedly telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were then signed and authorized by Đôn.

The real purpose of Đôn asking for martial law was to maneuver troops in readiness for a coup, and he had no concrete plans to send the regular army into the pagodas. Nhu sidestepped him and took the opportunity to discredit the army by using Tung's Special Forces and the combat police to attack the pagodas. Đính, the officer most trusted by the Ngô family, was the only general who was given advance notice of the raids.

With the approval of Diệm, Nhu used the declaration of martial law to order armed men into the Buddhist pagodas. Nhu chose a time when he knew the American Embassy was leaderless. Frederick Nolting had returned to the United States and his successor Lodge was yet to arrive. As the high command of the ARVN worked closely with American military advisers deployed in the country, Nhu used the combat police and Tung's Special Forces, who took their orders directly from him. The men were dressed in standard army uniforms, such as paratroop attire, to frame the regulars for the raids. Nhu's motive was to avoid responsibility for a violent operation — which would anger the Vietnamese public and the American leadership. In falsely implicating the army in the attacks, Nhu intended to dent the confidence of the Vietnamese populace and the Americans in the senior officers who were plotting against him. Nhu evidently hoped the Buddhist majority and the Americans would blame the army for the raids and become less inclined to support a coup by the generals. In the past, Nhu's tactics in playing the generals against one another had kept conspirators off-balance and thwarted coup attempts. The raids were not unexpected, as the Buddhists had prepared themselves for the attacks, as had journalists, who were watching military installations for signs of movement.

## Raids

### Saigon

The Buddhists in Saigon were aware that a raid on the pagodas was imminent. Buddhist relatives of Special Forces and combat police personnel had tipped off the monks, and Buddhists who lived near pagodas had observed them move into the region in the lead-up. American journalists were tipped off and traveled through Saigon to visit the pagodas ahead of the raids. The pagodas had been locked by the monks in preparation for the attacks and the doors were barricaded with furniture and reinforced by nailing wooden planks across them. The monks told members of the U.S. press corps in Saigon that the raids were coming, allowing them to be more prepared for the event than the U.S. embassy.

In the afternoon before the raids, trucks filled with soldiers headed past the offices of media outlets—from where the journalists saw them—destined for the Ấn Quang Pagoda. More troops were seen congregating at police headquarters, ready to board trucks moving towards Xá Lợi. The American-made trucks had been provided as part of the U.S. military aid program for South Vietnam. Late at night, the convoys arrived and surrounded Xá Lợi from several sides, causing a traffic jam in the city center. Several thousand personnel were estimated to have been present. Journalists were informed as soon as the attacks began, even as Nhu's men cut communications lines, and rushed to Xá Lợi.

Squads of Special Forces and combat police flattened the gates and smashed their way into the pagoda at around 00:20 on 21 August as Xá Lợi's brass gong was struck to signal the attack. Nhu's men were armed with pistols, submachine guns, carbines, shotguns, grenades and tear gas. The red-bereted Special Forces were joined by truckloads of steel-helmeted combat police in army camouflage uniforms. Two of Nhu's senior aides were seen outside Xá Lợi directing the operation, while Nhu and his wife, Madame Nhu, watched the action from a nearby tank. Monks and nuns who barricaded themselves behind wooden shields were attacked with rifle butts and bayonets. The sound of the pagoda's gong was largely masked by that of automatic weapons fire, exploding grenades, battering rams, shattering glass and human screaming. The military personnel shouted as they attacked, as did the occupants, in fear.

Tung's men charged forward in a V-shaped riot formation. In the end, it took around two hours to complete the raids because many of the occupants had entrenched themselves inside the various rooms in anticipation of the attacks and doors had to be unhinged to reach them. According to journalist Neil Sheehan, who was at the scene, "The raid on Xá Lợi, like those on the pagodas elsewhere in South Vietnam, was flawlessly executed. It reminded me of a scene from a movie of the French Resistance—the scene when the Gestapo arrive at the Resistance hideout in Paris." William Prochnau said that "Using the elite guard against the Buddhists was analogous to using Green Berets to put down Negro protests at home. It was outrageous."

One monk was thrown from a balcony down to the courtyard six meters below. Nhu's men vandalized the main altar and confiscated the intact charred heart of Thích Quảng Đức, which had failed to burn during his re-cremation. However, some of the Buddhists were able to flee the pagoda with a receptacle containing his ashes. Two monks jumped the back wall of Xá Lợi to enter the grounds of the adjoining United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission, where they were given asylum, despite the presence of troops behind the pagoda walls who opened fire with automatic weapons on any monks who tried to flee by jumping the fence.

Thích Tịnh Khiết, the 80-year-old Buddhist patriarch, was seized and taken to a military hospital on the outskirts of Saigon. As commander of the III Corps, General Đính soon announced military control over Saigon, canceling all commercial flights into the city and instituting press censorship. Later, Thích Quảng Độ, one of the leading arrested monks, explained that the Buddhist leadership did not flee to avoid arrest because they feared it would appear to be an admission of their guilt.

### Huế

The violence was worse in Huế, where the approach of government forces was met by the beating of Buddhist drums and cymbals to alert the populace. The townsfolk left their homes in the middle of the night in an attempt to defend the city's pagodas. At Từ Đàm, the temple of Buddhist protest leader Thích Trí Quang, monks attempted to burn the coffin of a monk who had self-immolated recently. Government soldiers, firing M1 rifles, overran the pagoda and confiscated the coffin. They demolished a statue of Gautama Buddha and looted and vandalized the pagoda. They then set off an explosion, leveling much of the pagoda. Many Buddhists were shot, beheaded, and clubbed to death.

The most determined resistance to the Diệm regime occurred outside the Diệu Đế Pagoda. As troops attempted to stretch a barbed wire barricade across a bridge leading to the pagoda, the crowd tore it down with their bare hands. The protesters fought the heavily armed military personnel with rocks, sticks and their bare fists, throwing back the tear gas grenades that were fired at them. After a five-hour battle, the military finally won control of the bridge by driving armored cars through the angry crowd at sunrise. The defense of the bridge and Diệu Đế left an estimated 30 dead and 200 wounded.

Ten truckloads of bridge defenders were taken to jail and an estimated 500 people were arrested in the city. Seventeen of the 47 professors at Huế University, who had resigned earlier in the week in protest against the dismissal of the rector Cao Văn Luân, a Catholic priest and opponent of Archbishop Thục (elder brother of Diệm and Nhu), were also arrested. The raids were repeated in cities and towns across the country. The total number of dead and disappeared was never confirmed, but estimates range up to several hundred. At least 1,400 were arrested.

## U.S. reaction and sanctuary for monks

The United States became immediately embroiled in the attacks following the escape of the two monks over the back wall of the Xá Lợi pagoda into the adjacent USAID compound. Saigon's police chief, disguised as a member of Nhu's Republican Youth, cordoned off the building. He ordered all Vietnamese inside to leave the area and threatened to storm the building when the Americans denied him entry. Foreign Minister Vũ Văn Mẫu rushed to the scene to stop any physical confrontations but demanded the Americans turn over the monks. William Trueheart, the deputy of the recently relieved U.S. Ambassador Nolting, arrived at the building. As the leading American diplomat in Vietnam in the transition period between ambassadors, Trueheart refused to take action until he received instructions from Washington, but warned Mẫu against violating the diplomatic immunity of the USAID offices. Trueheart knew that handing over the monks would imply American approval of the regime's action. The confrontation soon died down, and the U.S. State Department ordered Trueheart not to release the two monks and to regard the USAID building as being equivalent to the embassy. More monks went on to find sanctuary in the U.S. embassy, which became known as the "Buddhist Hilton".

Lodge was in Honolulu for last minute briefings with Nolting when news filtered through of the pagoda raids. He was given directions to proceed directly to Saigon, and arrived after sunset on 22 August. In the meantime, the State Department denounced the raids as a "direct violation by the Vietnamese government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists". On 23 August, Lodge's first full day in Saigon, he visited the two monks who had taken refuge in the USAID building, and ordered that vegetarian food be made available for them. The meeting was a means of showing that the American government opposed attacks against the Buddhists.

## Diệm reaction

At 06:00 on 21 August 1963, President Diệm broadcast a statement on Radio Saigon in which he said: "under Article 44 of the constitution, I declare a state of siege throughout the national territory. I confer upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the responsibility to restore security and public order so that the state may be protected, Communism defeated, freedom secured, and democracy achieved." Under martial law, the army was given blanket search-and-arrest powers and was empowered to ban all public gatherings, enforce a curfew, restrict press freedom and stop the circulation of all "printed material and other documents harmful to public order and security". The military were given orders to shoot anybody who violated the curfew on sight, and the secret police used the increased powers to raid and vandalize the premises of anyone thought to be unfriendly to the regime.

Government sources claimed that in Xá Lợi, Ấn Quang, and various Theravada pagodas, soldiers had found machine guns, ammunition, plastic explosives, homemade mines, daggers, and Việt Cộng documents. It was later discovered that they had been planted there by Nhu's men. On 29 August, General Đính held a press conference in which he accused the Americans of trying to launch a coup in South Vietnam and took credit for the raids, despite Tung having been the chief military officer in charge.

## Confusion over culpability and army denials

The driving force behind the government assault on the Buddhists appeared to have come from senior military commanders acting without consulting the civilian government. Immediately after the attacks, posters were erected across Saigon under the aegis of ARVN, but the language was recognized as that of Nhu.

The Secretary of State Nguyễn Đình Thuận and Interior Minister Bùi Văn Lương were surprised by the attacks. The initial perception was that the military establishment had suddenly cracked down on the Buddhists because they were deemed to be a threat to the war effort. The government propagated a theory which held that the military felt compelled to take action after pro-Buddhist student unrest on 17–18 August. In Huế, student protestors had turned on an ARVN officer after he fired in their direction. The attacks were preceded by a large rally at Xá Lợi during which some monks had called for the overthrow of the Diệm regime and denounced the anti-Buddhist statements of the de facto first lady Madame Nhu. However, observers dismissed government claims that the raids were spontaneous.

Diệm had long distrusted his generals and frequently played them against each other in a divide and conquer strategy to weaken any chance of a coup attempt. The army also contained substantial numbers of soldiers of Buddhist backgrounds, thus heightening skepticism that they would have attacked the pagodas and monks in such a violent manner. The synchronized military operations throughout the country, the speed at which banners were erected declaring the ARVN resolve to defeat communism, and doctored propaganda photos purporting to show Việt Cộng infiltration of the Buddhists suggested that the actions were long premeditated. In an attempt to maintain secrecy, special printing presses had produced propaganda materials only hours before the raids.

The initial government line was that the regular army had taken the actions. ARVN radio broadcasts bore the influence of Nhu's abrasive tone in directing the Republican Youth to cooperate with the government. Nhu accused the Buddhists of turning their pagodas into headquarters for plotting anti-government insurrections. He claimed the Buddhist Intersect Committee operated under the control of "political speculators who exploited religion and terrorism". Lodge believed Diệm remained in control but that Nhu's influence had risen to unprecedented levels. He thought that Nhu's divide and conquer tactics had split the military into three factions, respectively led by Generals Đôn and Đính, and Colonel Tung. Đôn was believed not to have the allegiance of Đính and Tung, who took their orders directly from Gia Long Palace. The two loyalists had support from various pro-Diệm elements. Lodge predicted that if the army deposed Diệm, fighting could break out within the ARVN.

Initially, the American embassy believed the Ngô family's claims that the regular army was responsible for the raids. Voice of America, which was widely listened to in South Vietnam as the only non-Diệmist news source, initially aired Nhu's version of events, much to the dismay of the generals. The American media thought otherwise and began to debunk this theory, pointing out that the Ngô family constantly sought to undermine the army, and that Madame Nhu's joy over the events suggested the family had neither ceded power nor had their hands forced by the military. Furthermore, they identified Nhu's aides at the site, his idiosyncratic style in the announcements supposedly made by the ARVN, and the fact that the army had little motive to attack the Buddhists.

The New York Times printed two versions of the raids on its front page, one by David Halberstam implicating Nhu for the attacks, and another with the official government version. Sheehan of United Press International also claimed Nhu was responsible for the attacks. At the time, Sheehan and Halberstam were on a Ngô family hit list along with political dissidents because of their exposés of the regime's human rights abuses, and following the raids, they slept at the home of John Mecklin, a U.S. official. They also received information that the Ngos were going to plant bombs in their offices and blame the deaths on the communists.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) went on to report that ARVN officers resolutely denied any involvement in the pagoda raids. They held that Tung's Special Forces had disguised themselves in ARVN uniforms before attacking the pagodas. Further unsubstantiated rumors had spread within the army that the Americans, who trained the Special Forces, had helped to plan the attack. The ARVN leaders were unsure of how to proceed and Don called a staff meeting on the morning of 23 August to discuss impending demonstrations against the raids by university students and the anger of junior ARVN officers about the pagoda attacks. General Dương Văn Minh noted that the ongoing presence of armed military personnel had alienated society by creating an "aura of suppression".

Later in the day, Đôn privately met with CIA officer Lucien Conein and reiterated that the Americans were mistaken in believing that the ARVN was responsible. Đôn insisted that Diem remained in control although Nhu had to approve all of the generals' meetings with Diệm. Đôn insisted Nhu had orchestrated the raids, fearing that the generals had too much power. He asserted that Nhu used the cover of martial law to discredit the generals by dressing the Special Forces in ARVN uniforms. Đôn insisted that he was unaware of the plans and was at Joint General Staff headquarters with Khiêm when he received a radio message informing him of the assaults. Police Commissioner Trần Văn Tu, supported by Tung's men, were in charge of the operation at ground level, and by the time Don arrived, the mission had been completed.

Khiêm had his own meeting with Rufus Phillips at the U.S. Embassy. He bitterly confided that Nhu had tricked the army into imposing martial law and becoming his "puppet". Khiêm asserted that Đính, Đôn and the other generals were not aware of the raids in advance and revealed that the arms and explosives that Nhu claimed were found in the pagodas had been planted. As a result, the Vietnamese people expressed anger at the army and their U.S. backers, strengthening Nhu's position.

## Martial law and riots

Following the raids, tensions were high in the streets of the cities. Police were ordered to shoot those who defied the 21:00 to 05:00 curfew, and troops in full camouflage battle dress guarded every major intersection and bridge with automatic weapons bearing fixed bayonets. The empty pagodas were ringed by troops and armored cars. All outgoing news was censored, forcing reporters to smuggle their copy out with travelers flying to foreign countries. The telephone lines in the homes and offices of all U.S. military and embassy staff were disconnected. The head of the USAID mission, Joe Brant, was stopped and searched while commuting to work, and other American officials had their meetings with Vietnamese officials and applications for permits to travel after the curfew hours delayed. The 14,000 U.S. military advisers in the country were given orders to stay in their homes, and all leave was canceled.

The pagoda raids provoked widespread disquiet among the Saigonese. At midnight on 22 August, Generals Đôn, Đính and Khiêm informed Nhu that student demonstrations were planned for three consecutive days. They recommended that schools be closed, but when Nhu took them to see Diệm, the president refused to close the educational institutions. Diệm decided the students, not usually known for political activism, should be allowed to voice their opinions. Students at Saigon University boycotted classes and rioted, which was met with arrests, imprisonment, and the closure of the campus. These events were repeated at Huế University, which was likewise shut down.

When high school students demonstrated, Diệm had them arrested as well. Two of the detained students were paraded at a press conference in which they falsely admitted to being communists who had brainwashed their entire school, having been tortured to force their confession. At Trung Vuong, an elite girls' high school, the students hung up banners attacking Diệm and the Nhus, while students from the corresponding boys' schools became violent, smashing school windows and erecting banners that insulted Madame Nhu in explicit language. More than 1000 students from Saigon's leading high school, most of them children of public servants and military officers, were sent to re-education camps. The result was that many army officers and senior civil servants had to lobby to have their children or younger siblings released from jail, causing a further drop in morale among government and military officials. Brawls broke out between police officers arresting students and the students' parents, many of whom were military officers and/or public servants.

Foreign Minister Vũ Văn Mẫu resigned, shaving his head like a Buddhist monk in protest. Mẫu had decided to leave the country for a religious pilgrimage to India, but the Ngô family had him arrested before he could depart. General Đính softened the punishment at the behest of a fellow officer and put the former diplomat under house arrest instead of placing him in jail.

Trần Văn Chương, the ambassador to the United States and father of Madame Nhu, resigned in protest, along with all but one of the staff members at the embassy. Chương charged Diệm with having "copied the tactics of totalitarian regimes", and said that as long as Diệm and the Nhus were in power, there was "not once chance in a hundred for victory" against the communists. Madame Chương — who was South Vietnam's observer at the United Nations — resigned and spoke of mass executions and a reign of terror under Diệm and Nhu. She predicted that if Diệm and the Nhus did not leave Vietnam then they would be killed in some sort of uprising.

Voice of America announced that Chương had resigned in protest against the Ngô family's policies, but this was denied by the Saigon government, which asserted the Chươngs had been sacked. Diệm bureaucrats claimed Chương's last telegram had been so critical of the regime that it was determined to be "inadmissible in form and substance" and that after years of privately complaining about his ambassador, Diệm dismissed him. In the meantime, the brothers made selective payments to some generals, hoping to cause resentment and division within the army. Vietnamese civil servants also became more reluctant to do their jobs, especially in conjunction with American advisers. They reasoned that as the Americans were funding Tung's men, they must have been involved in the attacks.

## Change in U.S. policy

Once the U.S. government realized the truth about who was behind the raids, they reacted with disapproval towards the Diệm regime. The Americans had pursued a policy of quietly and privately advising the Ngôs to reconcile with the Buddhists while publicly supporting the partnership, but following the attacks, this route was regarded as untenable. Furthermore, the attacks were carried out by American-trained Special Forces personnel funded by the CIA, and presented Lodge with a fait accompli. One Western ambassador thought that the raids signaled "the end of the gallant American effort here". The U.S. State Department issued a statement declaring that the raids were a "direct violation" of the promise to pursue "a policy of reconciliation".

On 24 August, the Kennedy administration sent Cable 243 to Lodge at the embassy in Saigon, marking a change in American policy. The message advised Lodge to seek the removal of the Nhus from power, and to look for alternative leadership options if Diệm refused to heed American pressure for reform. As the probability of Diệm sidelining the Nhus was seen as virtually nil, the message effectively meant the fomenting of a coup. Voice of America broadcast a statement blaming Nhu for the raids and absolving the army of responsibility. Aware that the Americans would neither oppose a coup nor respond with aid cuts or sanctions, the generals deposed the Ngô brothers, who were arrested and assassinated the next day, 2 November 1963.

1963 attacks on Buddhist pagodas in Vietnam