Narrative progress update: July-December 2018 The following presents a narrative progress overview concerning the project: Contribute to a more inclusive peace process in Yemen, which is undertaken in close coordination with the UN’s Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) tasked with mediating the Yemen crisis. The report covers implementation in the period 01 July -31 December 2018, and analysis of the results and impact hereof. Overall Goal Contribute to a more inclusive peace process in Yemen. Specific Objective UN/Track 1 process has an informed understanding of the issues and actors that affect the south of Yemen and is able to call on southern leaders to participate in the official peace process Outcomes 1. By December 2019, assemble the actors and the issues that affect the south of Yemen and feed them into the UN peace process; 2. Decrease the risk of further polarization and fragmentation of political and military actors in the south of Yemen; Outputs The EIP’s project will have the following outputs: 1.1 Throughout the project period, Issues of common concern to the south are identified and agreed upon by southern leaders; 1.2 Up-to-date overview of actors influential to stability in the south established and available for use by the OSESGY; 2.1 Mediation and facilitated dialogue applied in eight cases to reduce polarization and fragmentation in southern Yemen. 2.2 Throughout the project period, southerners’ political views are channelled into the Yemen national peace process. Context Update The first half of 2018 saw the Special Envoy Martin Griffiths engage in shuttle diplomacy and spend significant time listening to parties and stakeholders, whereas the second half bore witness to two attempts to engage the parties in official consultations. The first such attempt on 6 September collapsed following the unfortunate politicisation of transport for the Ansar Allah (AA) delegation. As such, only government of Yemen (GoY) representatives were present in Geneva to engage with the Special Envoy (SE) and his team. Despite the absence of AA, the SE used the time to discuss confidence building measures such as the re-opening of Sana’a airport to commercial traffic and the exchange of prisoners with those present. In December, a diplomatic breakthrough of sorts occurred in Rimbo, Sweden, when delegations from both AA and GoY gathered and a ceasefire on Hodeida was brokered. Since its implementation on 18 December, small-scale clashes and reports of violations from both sides have been frequent, though have not at time of writing derailed the agreement. On the regional scene, the killing of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October has markedly changed KSA thinking vis-à-vis the Yemen conflict, which is now notably more oriented towards negotiating an end to the conflict and accommodating an AA role during the subsequent transitional period. The southern question, which momentarily became the centre of international attention when fighting broke out between GoY and separatist forces in Aden in January, has once again slipped down the international community’s list of priorities. As southern groups such as Hiraak Al Janoubi have fragmented into a number of splinter groups, the sheer quantity of political parties and disparate aspirations to reconcile is larger than ever. However, the will of southern political groups has significantly shifted in favour of a political transition; whereas a year ago, certain southern groups were not amenable to the concept of negotiations, claiming to be the sole representation for the southern people, an attitude of understanding and willingness to engage has come to the fore. With official UN-led consultations underway, southern actors are aware that the political process will progress, regardless of whether or not they are engaged. This newly-found willing to engage is evident from the more recent rapprochement between the STC, the SNC, and Cairo Conference, sponsored by their respective regional backers. Activities contributing to Outputs 1.1 and 1.2 under Outcome 1 Activity 1: Strategic Dialogues with Southern Leaders: 1. The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Peace and Security On October 10th and 11th 2018, EIP convened a group of 24 community leaders from across all southern governorates. Though diverse in political aspirations, participants were united in their shared commitment to peacebuilding, be it by promoting adherence to UNSCR 1325, implementing local conflict resolution initiatives, or programs which aim to address issues facing youth. Despite these commonalities, it became evident, and noted by participants, that in the south of Yemen there are very few efforts within civil society organisations to coordinate efforts. To mitigate further disparity between initiatives, the group, guided by EIP, jointly devised a number of actionable steps and recommendations. These include the establishment of an independent body to coordinate various efforts to promote peace, the formation of coordination branches for civil society in each governorate, and strengthening ties with the OSESGY (an idea which was encouraged by Mr. Peter Rice of the OSESGY, who was present throughout the session). The comprehensive list of recommendations is as follows: • Unify the vision of peace across the south; • Diversified political representation of the south in all future peace talks; • Encourage local enterprises and products, rather than imports, to stimulate local economy; • Teach people to support themselves, rather than accepting aid (sustainable development); • Encourage weapons- free zones (has shown success in Hadramaut); • Advocate and lobby those in power with messages from constituents for peace – bridge gap between society and govt; • Rehabilitation and empowerment that focusses on youth leaders, women, and marginalized groups. Collaborate with educational and religious institutions to get the message across; • Secure specialized programs to build capacity of local CSOs; • Ensure basic service provision to reduce social tension and suffering; • Awareness raising campaigns to advocate for peace-making efforts by CSOs; • Establish mechanisms for CSO coordination to help tackle our concerns together: - Establish an independent body to coordinate various efforts to promote peace; - Structure with Board of Directors and Supervisory Board; - Obtain the support of broad coalition of civil society; - Coordination branches for civil society in each governorate in the south; - Establish a strategic plan to identify role and objectives of coordination body; - Build and strengthen ties with UN OSESGY, international organizations and local authorities to promote the peace-making work of CSOs. 2. The Role of the Academic Community in Promoting Peace and Security Two months after convening civil society leaders in Amman, and noting their shared concern regarding the education sector (a concern which resonates with the vast majority of Yemeni interlocutors from previous meetings), EIP convened another group of 24 influential southern Yemenis, this time from the academic community. In the immediate wake of the first round of official UN consultations in Sweden, participants were eager to engage with Mr. Peter Rice of the OSESGY, not only concerning the progress made during talks, but also regarding the aspect of southern inclusion, or apparent lack thereof. Mr. Rice clarified the Special Envoy’s stance, and reiterated that the meaningful inclusion of southern actors in the peace process is not being neglected, merely that the SE is obligated to negotiate a cessation of hostilities as a priority. Following an interactive session led by Vanessa Bassil of the Media Association for Peace (MAP), in which the group’s potential influence was explored, participants agreed to establish a media platform to focus upon the values of academia and education, and their role in rebuilding the south1. Other joint recommendations were as follows: • As trusted figureheads, academics and educators are in a position to raise awareness in their communities and spread a culture of peace through inclusion and reconciliation; • Train and empower youth journalists to rebuild an open, objective and free media to reduce effects of sectarian division and promote reconciliation; • Create a media platform that focuses on the values of academia and education and their role in rebuilding the south; • Develop an awareness raising plan for social peace and avoiding future conflicts; • Raising community awareness through information sharing sessions about risks of radicalization and child recruitment in to armed groups; • Collaboration between academics, CSOs and Imams to help combat the recruitment of children in to armed groups; • Pressure legislative authorities to adopt reformed curriculum that prioritizes coexistence and inclusion and strengthens youth resilience to radicalization; • Pressure on government to assure the livelihoods of academics to allow them to practice their professions and benefit society’s youth; • Create open and safe space for positive and constructive dialogue and for all views to be aired and respected; • Involve southern women from academia in all political activities, locally and internationally; • Request UN to hold continuous consultations with southern people to keep the south involved in the peace process and to avoid fueling grievances; • Lobby government to help create new job opportunities for youth; • Establish a strategic partnership with EIP to work toward our joint-goals. 1 Since the close of the reporting period, participants have organised independently of EIP in-country and formed ‘Southern Academics for Peace’, a group which seeks to support the UN peace process by contributing to peace-building efforts in the south. The inaugural event gained traction on numerous media outlets, such as Yemen Akhbar and the Aden Observer. 3. Southern Women for Peace EIP has continued to support the Southern Women for Peace (SWP), who have, in accordance with their original timeframe and budget, completed all of their proposed activities. Following the completion of these activities, the SWP gathered in-country independently of EIP on 29 September to reflect upon lessons learnt and draw up a new plan of action. In line with the outcomes of the strategic dialogue in June, the group decided to focus on expanding their reach by building coalitions, creating alliances with other organisations, and using the media to promote their shared vision. As such, the activities they carried out over the second half of 2018 included a number of meetings with community leaders, civil society organisations, local authorities, and women from various sectors. Already, the SWP have secured buy-in from authorities in Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramaut, with security leaders formally adhering to UNSCR 1325 as a direct result of the group’s campaigning. The SWP continue their work in country, regularly convening workshops, growing their reach, and lobbying authorities to formally adhere to UNSCR 1325. The group’s achievements of 2018 were reflected upon in December 2018, during an event in Aden in which the SWP drew a large crowd of influential figures, including well known community activists, and the governor of Aden. EIP will continue to maintain frequent communication with the SWP to ensure that their needs are heard, and that their activities are being implemented in a manner conducive to their goals. Since the reporting period, EIP has convened the SWP group and worked towards 2019 activities plan. Clockwise from left: Southern Women for Peace end of year ceremony, southern academics gather as part of EIP’s southern strategic dialogue series, the inaugural ceremony of Southern Academics for Peace. Activity 2: Southern Strategic Dialogue Platform: In preparation for an eventual dialogue process which will convene political figures from all main southern groups, EIP continued to engage with the leadership and middle tiers from all relevant southern political parties, ascertaining their respective levels of willingness to participate, and their conditions for engagement. (i) The Southern Transitional Council (STC) On 9 July, EIP met with Ahmed Omar bin Farid (Chairman) and Murad al Halimi (Presidential Council) of the STC, and spent considerable time discussing the southern strategic dialogue platform. The STC found it initially challenging to park their aspirations and focus upon a mechanism for inclusion of southern actors in official talks, though eventually were convinced of its value to peace talks and agreed to participate. EIP continued its engagement with the different levels of the STC presidency council with a view to prepare them for their involvement in the peace process. On the 21st November, EIP met once more with Ahmed Bin Farid. The meeting was designed to gain a better understanding of the seemingly ambivalent position STC leaders hold regarding the UN-led peace process. While the meeting proved very helpful in deepening and maintaining a positive relationship with STC, it was clear that STC lead in Europe can’t influence the leadership decision with regards to the peace process. In Paris, EIP met with Hani bin Breik, vice president of the STC, and his colleague Lufti Shatara, a former influential journalist. Mr. bin Breik proved to be a hardliner and insisted that the STC will be nothing less than the sole representative of the south in any future talks. After a prolonged discussion, the STC VP conceded that there might be a collective representation of the south, provided that the STC was allowed to vet names, a proposition unacceptable to other southerners and the OSESGY. The EIP intends to continue its strategic engagement with the STC given their considerable influence in the south. As the peace process has evolved without southern representation, the STC have, as predicted, moderated their position. (ii) The Inclusive Hadramaut Conference (IHC) On the 8th November in Cairo, EIP met with leaders of the Inclusive Hadramaut Conference to explore their potential involvement in a mechanism to integrate southern voices in the official peace process. The IHC General Secretary Tariq Al Akbari expressed enthusiasm with regards to the proposed southern platform, on the basis on an equal partnership and on the condition that the special status of Hadramaut is recognised. IHC interlocutors also highlighted the importance of a meeting between the prospective partners to agree to a declaration of principles, prior to the formation of the platform. (iii) Hiraak Al Janoubi In Istanbul, on the 26th November, EIP engaged with influential political figure Fouad Rashed, leader of the Supreme Council of Revolutionary Hiraak for the Liberation and Independence of the South (one of Hiraak’s five factions). The engagement with Mr. Rashed proved insightful and informative, with EIP able to engage him on a number of prominent issues, including but not limited to the then-imminent UN talks in Sweden, the implication of an assault on Hodeida for southern politics, and the subtle but significant shifts in regional positioning. (iv) People of the South Conference In Cairo, EIP met with Mohamed Ahmed Ali, leader of the People of the South Conference, who is also a long-standing Hiraaki leader and head of the southern delegation in the NDC before growing disenchanted by what he referred to as ‘’northern strong-arming’’. He spoke of the need to achieve consensus amongst Hiraak’s five factions. In spite of the splintering within Hiraak, Mr. Ali maintains good links with the other four factions, and offered to rally others to attend the southern dialogue. Buy-in was secured from Mr. Ali, who has since reaffirmed his eagerness to participate in a comprehensive dialogue of southern leaders. Activity 3: Continuous Consultations with Southern Yemenis: (i) Islah On 31 July, EIP travelled to Istanbul to meet with Islah (and Islah affiliated) interlocutors to discuss the group’s current state, its relations with other political actors, and its involvement in the peace process. On this occasion, EIP met with former Islah powerbroker Khaled Al-Ansi and Nageeb Ghanem, a Member of Parliament. These engagements provided insights and clarifications concerning the inner workings of Islah, its various ‘wings’, and the group’s concerns surrounding safety issues that could arise at official talks. A full note was circulated to the OSESGY for their consideration. Progress In August, EIP was tasked with convening a southern leaders meeting to precede the UN led Geneva consultations, initially scheduled for early September. The aim of the proposed meeting, to take place in Cairo, was to bring together members of disparate political parties to ensure southern representation at official talks as part of an advisory platform. Preparations were undertaken in close collaboration with the OSESGY, and arrangements were made after buy-in was secured from all relevant parties. Unfortunately, the meeting did not materialise due to the following factors: 1. Despite the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) conversation with EIP on 9 July, whereby their eagerness to engage as part of such a platform was confirmed, the party withdrew their participation just days prior to the event, the exact reason for which remains unclear. EIP maintains good relations with the STC, and plans to convene smaller scale meetings to ascertain why this decision was made. 2. The Egyptian authorities rescinded their approval of the event taking place in Cairo. EIP and the OSESGY explored alternative venues including Brussels and Geneva, but time constraints meant that visas would not be secured in time to precede the official consultations. In spite of these challenges, the Special Envoy’s strong stance on the importance of southern inclusion in official talks has not diminished, and it was agreed between the OSESGY and EIP that when conditions are ripe for intervention, planning for the first southern leaders meeting would resume. At time of writing, the first meeting is scheduled to take place in mid-March, in light of recent rapprochements between southern political groups. EIP has successfully secured and maintained buy-in from the leadership of all relevant groups. Impact Improved coherence within southern groups: During each engagement with southern Yemeni political parties, EIP encourages interlocutors to clearly define the group’s political aspirations, and how they see their group fitting into the fabric of the Yemeni political landscape. EIP has continuously nurtured relations with southern groups and encouraged them of the benefits of engaging in a political process and working collectively towards the creation of a successful mechanism for southern inclusion. Clear and concise meeting notes are frequently channelled to the OSESGY who are able to make informed decision based on up to date and comprehensive analyses. Laid the groundwork for a south-south dialogue: Prior to convening southern leaders in the the South-South Dialogue, EIP has facilitated indirect dialogue between disparate southern groups by passing messages between them and encouraging interlocutors to reciprocate positive steps taken by other groups to foster an atmosphere of understanding and tolerance. In addition, EIP has succeeded in moderating the position(s) of respective southern groups, tempering their expectations ahead of the south-south dialogue with regards to their political aspirations. Interlocutors have all responded positively to EIP’s advice and guidance with regards to what can and cannot be achieved during a transitional period, agreeing to temporarily ‘park’ their political aspirations. Bolstered civil society networks in-country: As the Southern Women for Peace group have consolidated their mission and vision, growing their reach in-country and implementing a number of peace-oriented activities, they have gained positive media traction and are now a widely recognised activist group operating inside Yemen. Their work has inspired the group of academics convened by EIP in December, who have since mobilised as ‘Southern Academics for Peace’, and are now an ally for SWP. Improved understanding of local communities’ demands and positions through convening strategic dialogues based on equal geographical representation: These gatherings serve dual purposes: firstly, they assist communities come to term with the realities of the political landscape and how best they can promote peace and security in their communities. Secondly, they serve to inform the OSESGY/international community of the grass-roots demands and pressure on political leaders from respective constituencies.