29283 Final Report - Support to the Yemen Peace Process Assisting the UN-led mediation process to bring an end to the conflict in Yemen Final Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, Grant 29283 Project recapitulation Below is the summary of the project as per the updated project content agreed upon in October 2016. The objectives, and results of the project “Assist the UN-led mediation process to bring an end to the conflict in Yemen” (Grant number 29283) are outlined below. The Embassy requested a proposal encompassing EIP’s full Yemen file. The grant approved by the embassy provides support for Objective 2 and Result 2.1 only, however. Overall objective The project set out to contribute to a swifter resolution of the political dispute at national level. As such, it would contribute to the end of violent conflict, related loss of life and injuries among the Yemeni population. Specific objectives 1. The EIP will provide advisory support to the Ansar Allah and the Government in-exile and help them articulate their positions and approach for the peace process. 2. The EIP will ensure that the situation in the South is addressed. Upon the request of the United Nations, the EIP will begin engaging with influential southern leaders from different factions, both from armed groups and civil society and will explore potential links with the official UN-led talks. The project was designed to contribute to increased capacities of the parties to the conflict to be political actors. It would help them acquire expertise for design of political agendas, engagement in diplomacy, and involvement in governance. It would increase awareness and ability to deliver on matters of human rights, humanitarian principles and governance. The project would also enhance general capacities of parties to the conflict for non-violent resolution of disputes. Results EIP’s support to the UN-led mediation process was designed to attain the following results: 1.1 By December 2017, AA formulates a coherent political position and implements the commitments made during the political talks. 1.2 By December 2017, the government in-exile formulates a coherent political position and implement the commitments made during the political talks. 2.1 From July 2016 onwards, the views of southern leaders are fed into Track 1 peacemaking in order to enhance the official process. 4 Progress overview September 2016-December 2017 The following presents a progress report of our Yemen interventions under Specific Objective 2 of our programme; the interventions covered by the partnership grant with The Netherlands. In the Impact section of the report, we also capture an appraisal of the extent to which implementation under Specific Objective 2 contributed to achievement of the Overall Objective: contributing to a swifter resolution of the political dispute at national level, and by extension, contribute to the end of violent conflict, related loss of life and injuries among the Yemeni population. The progress report covers the full project period: 16 September 2016-31 December 2017. Specific Objective 2: The EIP will ensure that the situation in the South is addressed. Upon the request of the United Nations, the EIP will begin engaging with influential southern leaders from different factions, both from armed groups and civil society and will explore potential links with the official UN-led talks. Throughout the reporting period, EIP has consistently supported the OSESGY in its pursuit of a more inclusive peace process by carrying out a number of activities detailed further below, such as convening a number of different southern groups and undertaking detailed research into the grievances of southern Yemenis. EIP has engaged members of civil society, with the aforementioned meetings directly giving rise to local initiatives which seek to promote the agenda of southern women. All meetings that form part of the southern strategic dialogue series have included representatives from across the political divide, as to ensure that the outcomes are as all-encompassing as possible. Representatives of the OSESGY were in attendance at all meetings to engage with southern groups and listen to their concerns and recommendations. Insofar as convening representatives from armed groups is concerned, EIP’s efforts were hindered by ground developments such as the death of Saleh and escalations in Aden, making potential engagements with security sector representatives impractical and potentially damaging. Result 2.1: From July 2016 onwards, the views of southern leaders are fed into Track 1 peacemaking in order to enhance the official process Since the initiation of EIP’s activities in the south of Yemen, we have remained in constant communication with the OSESGY in order to maintain a consistent stream of information sharing. The challenges and aspirations of a number of southern communities that emanate from our consultations have been conveyed to the OSESGY, allowing them access to a portfolio of information which can be used to steer the peace process to become more inclusive of the needs of southern Yemenis. 5 Activities contributing to result 2.1: Activity: Mapping In order to reach an improved understanding of the various grievances, interests and concerns of different southern groups, EIP conducted continuous mapping. The mapping (attached as annex 1), has been carried out over the last 18 months with support from the EIP'S Yemen Political Advisor, local expertise, Yemen experts, and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY). In addition to the production of the mapping, insight gained from Yemen experts has informed EIP’s choice of facilitated dialogue participants and topics of focus during meetings and facilitated dialogues. The mapping has been used to inform EIP and partners of the changing political and military scene in Yemen. It is referred to as a tool to inform internal strategizing, decision making and during activities, the selection of participants of key importance. This activity has also entailed building a network of contacts with other agencies engaged in Yemen. EIP has maintained contact with organisations such as Berghof Foundation, Partners Yemen, International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), Search for Common Ground (SfCG), Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), UN OCHA, World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC). Activity: Dialogues with southern leaders (a) Strategic Dialogue Series The strategic dialogues are part of EIP’s efforts to de-escalate tensions in the south and linking the south to the national peace process. They gather influential southern representatives to discuss thematic issues of concern to southerners, including the official peace process and its relation to the South, engagement with the international community as well as local and regional challenges. Over the course of the last 18 months, EIP has convened 6 strategic dialogues with influential leaders from the south of Yemen. These leaders include members of the business community, youth activists, the diaspora community, influential women, and the Southern Front. The dialogues provided an environment in which Yemeni participants were encouraged to partake in frank discussions on the political, social and economic grievances of the south, and to identify issues and priorities which could be fed into the official peace process. Attempts were also made to ascertain what architecture would be necessary for the south to engage in the peace process. After the initial success of the first dialogue in 2016, EIP approached 2017 with the aim of convening 6 subsequent sessions as part of the strategic dialogue series. Due to logistical restrictions and due caution exercised with regards to political developments in-country, EIP was able to convene 5 dialogues, just short of our target. Nevertheless, ‘Southern Women for Peace’, the women’s group set in motion by EIP in early 2017, convened two meetings inside Yemen on their own terms as a result of the strategic dialogue series, maintaining the momentum of their group. With regards to the gender aspect of the series, the aim of involving at least two women at each session was fulfilled, each time surpassing our target by 6 ensuring that at least 30% of participants were women who were able to contribute in terms of bringing women’s issues to the table and offering their unique perspectives. At least one member of the OSESGY was present at all meetings, in order to take information gathered to directly feed into the Track I process. This also encouraged participants to share their comments and feedback with confidence that their input would be directly conveyed to the OSESGY and integrated into the UN-led peace process. This directly contributed to the fulfillment of EIP’s final aim of gathering an improved understanding of the various grievances, interests, and concerns of different southern groups, in terms of ensuring that the outcomes of the dialogues were as inclusive as possible, and that the recommendations produced are reflective of a number of perspectives, which have long been ignored by the international community. Each session resulted in the production of a memorandum, and an activity report. Meeting summaries: All memoranda from the strategic dialogues are attached as Annex 1. Each document captures the vision for the future of Yemen agreed upon by the respective group, and highlights the key challenges that they face in achieving this vision. They also include a list of unanimous recommendations put forward by the group(s) for the consideration of policy makers. 1. Conference of Southern Leaders Beirut, Lebanon 9-10 December 2016 and Salalah, Oman 11-12 December 2016 A workshop was organized for Beirut in December (9-10 & 13-14) 2016, to which a broad range of southern stakeholders were invited. The workshop provided an environment in which Yemeni participants were encouraged to partake in frank discussions on the political, social and economic grievances of the south, and to identify issues and priorities which could be input into the official peace process. Attempts were also made to ascertain what architecture would be necessary for the south of Yemen to engage in the peace process and an eventual constitutional drafting process with the north of the country. The workshop also looked at southern relations with the international community as well as local and regional relationships which might affect their participation in the longer-term reconciliation process within Yemen. Since this initial dialogue, EIP has maintained communication with a number of participants, who have expressed a desire in re-engaging in subsequent EIP initiatives. For example, in early March 2018, we were contacted by a leader of Hiraak who had attended this inaugural workshop with a view to meeting with EIP in an informal setting to discuss developments on the ground, and their impact on the peace process. Meeting with this interlocutor along with others has assisted EIP track mind shifts since this inaugural dialogue and how different groups are adapting to the ever evolving political circumstances. Logistics in and out of southern Yemen remain a major hurdle for EIP’s work. A number of participants had flights out of Aden cancelled at short notice, while others opted to take the land route out of Yemen to Muscat, an arduous 2-3 day drive. This meant that the target audience of the first strategic dialogue 7 round became split, in two separate geographical locations. In an effort to meet with as many of the stakeholders as possible, EIP held one workshop in Beirut and then travelled to Salalah, Oman, to hold the second workshop. Participants: • 25 Yemeni participants (including 6 women) from the south of Yemen; • 4 EIP staff members (Senior Mediation Advisor, Programme Officer, Yemeni support staff) • 1 UN OSESGY Representative (Peter Rice) 2. Southern Yemen: War and Peace – A Woman’s Perspective 11-12 April 2017, Amman, Jordan EIP’s first Strategic Dialogue of 2017 brought together a geographically diverse group of 24 prominent women from the southern governorates of Yemen in Amman, Jordan. The inaugural dialogue proved to be a highly fruitful engagement, providing stimulating debate, a variety of viewpoints and in-depth insight from individuals who understand the realities and consequences of the war in Yemen from a local level. The participants produced a concrete working paper that illustrates their vision for Yemen, the challenges they, as women from the south, face, and joint recommendations to work toward peace. All of the participants were eager to build on the progress made and ensure its impact is sustainable. The EIP ensured that the contact details of everyone present were shared in order to maintain a line of communication outside of dialogues and meetings. Initial feedback from the OSESGY was especially positive. Mr. Gluck stated that the participants were a "particularly interesting group, from prominent families in their respective regions and can talk to their men and leaders" and thanked the EIP for bringing them together, stressing that this dialogue was unique in its geographical and political diversity. Notably all participants are politically/socially active in Yemen, and based in-country. Subsequent to the dialogue, the UN requested a series of meetings with the women and put several women in touch with Amnesty International for follow-up meetings. The participants very much appreciated the opportunity to engage first hand with the UN and took full advantage of their presence. Participants: • 24 female Yemeni participants from the south of Yemen • 4 EIP staff members (Senior Mediation Advisor, Programme Officer, Programme Assistant, Yemeni support staff) • 3 OSESGY representatives (Kenny Gluck, Peter Rice and Radwa Nour) 3. Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Perspective of the Southern Political Diaspora 22-23 May 2017, Beirut, Lebanon. Sixteen prominent members of the southern Yemeni diaspora were convened. A representative of the OSESGY, Mr. Khalid Fattah, provided an overview of the UN-led peace process, including past efforts and the current constraints to restarting the peace process. It was an open and constructive, albeit on occasion 8 heated debate on the political/military situation, including the lack of inclusion of the south in the current peace process. It was agreed the political situation pre-2015 and in the post-2015 period are radically different and a new approach is required, especially as it does not seem possible to unify the polity of the south. However, according to some, there is a sense that the STC is the beginning of a credible, legitimate and representative entity which should become the interlocutor with the north, the region and with the international community. Through this platform, the south could cohere and project itself with a higher degree of unity of voice and purpose than has been the case in the past, but many also fear its detractors will not permit the Transitional Council to establish itself. The disunity in the south was evident in discussions on who or what could lead the south out of war and into a new period of security, reconciliation and eventual rehabilitation. Many argued the new Transitional Council was the obvious platform to push forward the southern cause, while others called into question its legitimacy and effectiveness, while still others argued that there was already the “legitimate” government, warts and all. At one point one interlocutor stated that people should not be raising expectations or “selling unrealistic dreams” because the Transitional Council could not meet the needs of the people. Finally, there was even a call for the “legitimate” government to meet and work with the Transitional Council in an effort to end the crisis in the south. Participants: • 16 Yemeni participants (including 7 women) from the south of Yemen based outside the country • 3 EIP staff members (Senior Mediation Advisor, Programme Assistant, Yemeni support staff) • 1 OSESGY representative (Khaled Fattah) 4. Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Business Community’s Perspective 10-11 October 2017, Amman, Jordan EIP held its third Strategic Dialogue of the year in Amman on 10-11 October 2017. There were 16 participants in attendance, six (38%) of whom were women who came from inside and outside Yemen. A representative of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen (OSESGY) was also in attendance and provided a presentation, followed by a Q&A session, on the current peace process. The participants were encouraged, by the presence of the representative that their messages would forwarded directly to the Special Envoy. Martin Griffiths, Executive Director of the EIP, gave a presentation on the northern warring parties’ perspective on the war in Yemen and ways to relaunch the stalled peace process. A representative of the OSESGY, Mr. Said Boumedouha, provided an overview of the UN-led peace process and announced the impending opening of UN office in Aden. This session provided stimulating debate and an opportunity for the participants to send messages to the Special Envoy and his office. It also set the scene for the subsequent sessions which examined the challenges faced by southerners in having their aspirations integrated into an inclusive peace process and what role the southern business community could play in overcoming these challenges. A memorandum was drafted that included concerns, priorities and recommendations agreed by the group. 9 Participants: • 16 Yemeni participants (including 6 women) from the south of Yemen • 5 EIP staff members (Senior Mediation Advisor, Programme Assistant, Yemeni support staff) • 1 UN OSE Yemen representatives (Said Boumedouha); 1 UK DFID representative (Omar al-Aqel) 5. Southern Yemen: War and Peace – A Woman’s Perspective (The second meeting of Southern Women for Peace convened by EIP) 25-26 October 2017, Amman, Jordan The meeting of the Southern Women for Peace group was held as a follow-up to their first meeting, in Amman in April 2017. The geographically diverse group of southern women activists came together to develop their Plan of Action and a roadmap for their future activities in the southern governorates. A representative of the OSESGY, Mr. Mohamed Khatter, provided an overview of the UN-led peace process. This provided an opportunity for the participants to provide input to the Special Envoy and his office. Ms Radwa Nour agreed that the OSESGY would work to support the group and promised to synergise their work with that of UN Women. The women put forward a draft Plan of Action, written weeks before in Aden. The women then spent the rest of their time together building on and finalizing a complete 2018 Action plan that contained activities to be carried out in 2018 (attached) with the support of EIP. With the UN representatives, the women discussed at length their perspective on the national peace process, and the lack of inclusion of southern Yemen in the topics and in the negotiations of the talks. They also raised concern over the composition and effectiveness of the women’s delegation selected by the UN from the Yemeni Women Pact for Peace and Security (at least one of the delegates chosen is also represented in the EIP-facilitated women’s strategic dialogue on peace in Yemen). The UN Gender expert, acknowledged the weaknesses and said the composition would be reviewed. Participants: • 20 Yemeni participants from the south of Yemen • 4 EIP staff members (Programmes Director, Programme Officer, Programme Assistant, Yemeni support staff) • 3 OSESGY representatives (Mohamed Khatter, Joanne Gomola, Radwa Nour) • 1 UK DFID representative (Sofia Al Saydi, Policy and Programme Officer); 1 Norway MFA representative (Tone Allers-Bꬱkkevold) 10 6. Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Views of Southern Youth 12-13 December 2017, Amman, Jordan. EIP held its final Strategic Dialogue of 2017 in Amman on 12-13 December. There were 20 participants, seven (35%) of whom were women who came from inside and outside Yemen. A representative of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen (OSESGY) was present throughout and provided a presentation. The participants were encouraged, by the presence of the representative that their messages would forwarded directly to the Special Envoy. From the initial discussion, it was clear that the main challenges facing the southern Yemen youth community could be split into three sections; political, economic, and security. Accordingly, the participants, at their request, were split into working groups to each focus on a specific field of concern. Amongst the main challenges agreed upon by the respective groups are the need for political consensus between southern leadership, the lack of functioning banking infrastructure, and the multiplicity of security sector services. A draft memorandum was formed including concerns, priorities, and recommendations. In a similar manner to previous workshops, some interlocutors were pushing for the inclusion of highly charged political demands, namely the call for secession of the south. What ensued was a debate amongst different political streams of the purpose of the memorandum. Some agreed to the document and a small hard-line group refused to accept it without including their demands. We repeatedly informed the parties that this was not a political document but was supposed to about the peace process, their concerns and roles. All participants did eventually produce a concrete working paper illustrating their vision for the future of the south and the challenges they face on getting there, and were unanimously eager to build on the progress made. Participants: • 20 Yemeni participants (including 7 women) from the south of Yemen; • 6 EIP staff members (Senior Mediation Advisor, Programme Officer, Programme Assistant, Programme Trainee, Yemeni support staff); • 2 OSESGY representatives (Said Boumedouha and Peter Rice) • 1 Norwegian MFA representative (Egil Thorsås) 11 (b) Dialogues to influence the Track 1 process The aforementioned dialogues had the objective of ensuring that UN-led process creates much needed space for the concerns and aspirations of the south to be heard and for political actors in the south to broaden and increase their engagement with the international community, which has been very limited to date. Involving Southern leaders in the Track 1 process will contribute to a more comprehensive mediation process. The presence of a UN observer at all meetings and the facilitation of face to face meetings between key southern representatives and members of the OSESGY team during workshop periods has given southern representatives the chance to engage directly with the track 1 process through both formal meetings and side-talks. All jointly-agreed documents have been fed directly to the OSESGY for input into their Track 1 strategy. Bilateral and focus group consultations with southern Yemenis To complement the aforementioned dialogue series, EIP has engaged with a plethora of southern Yemenis, all of whom are key actors in their respective fields, ranging from media to politics. These consultations allow EIP to garner a broader understanding of the conflict from the perspective of stakeholders unable to partake in the strategic dialogue series. Regular communication with southern Yemenis outside of the dialogue series means that we are able to remain abreast of southern aspirations and challenges whilst preparing other activities. During these informal meetings, interlocutors convey to us their aspirations which we are then able to consider when reflecting upon our project. These interlocutors have also been beneficial for extending our networks beyond those convened in dialogues. On more than one occasion they facilitated meetings between EIP and other key players, and providing a continuous source of information updating us on key developments and events not reported on in the media. As a result of these consultations, subsequent meetings have been held with an Executive Board member of the Central Bank of Yemen, the Deputy Governor of Aden and an activist and researcher who specializes in southern issues, and heads a group of youth activists who aim to bring southern issues to the attention of the international community. Most recently, a contact established via these consultations offered to link us with a number of senior STC officials based in the UAE, including Aidroos al Zubaidi, President of the STC. (Meetings have since taken place). With the new UN OSESGY 2018 priority of convening south-south dialogues, the establishment of these contacts will be key to the next phase of EIP’s southern work which will entail both increasing engagement between Track 1 actors and southern Yemenis and bringing different southern actors together to mediate disputes between them. 12 Other work contributing to Result 2.1 (a) Collaboration with OSESGY and international stakeholders EIP has met with the OSESGY on a regular basis. These meetings are part of a continuous process of feeding southern opinions and opportunities for curbing the destabilisation garnered through the strategic dialogues to the UN-led mediation process. EIP met with the Special Envoy Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh, and Kenny Gluck, the former Director and Deputy to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, in New York, Sana’a, and in Amman, as well as through teleconference, on multiple occasions. The OSESGY team has provided updates on the official peace talks as well as input on EIP’s work on the South. The UN also provided a list of southern Yemenis who are well qualified to work with the EIP as field staff, liaising with southern representatives and working to resolve logistical challenges. EIP has hired a local project officer based in Aden upon this recommendation. The OSESGY was present at the strategic dialogue sessions, both presenting on the UN’s role in the peace process and listening to the opinions and concerns posed by Southern representatives. This allowed the UN unique access to southern leaders from regions where the UN has very limited access, thus providing a mechanism for beginning the process of channelling Southern political views into Yemen peace process. EIP remains in contact with the OSESGY on a continuous basis to receive advanced warning in order to mitigate the risk of last-minute cancellation or postponement of activities and put in place alternative plans. We have been working closely with the UK government who have provided advice, contacts and support in securing visas for entry into Yemen. EIP has now secured Government of Yemen visas and is planning a second trip to Sana’a in March 2018 to engage with local authorities in support of the UN Special Envoy. In addition to EIP’s work carried out in the south of Yemen over the course of 2017, EIP held a series of meetings in Sana’a with AA and GPC officials, complemented by a meeting with President Hadi of Yemen in Riyadh and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the UAE and KSA. As a result of these meetings, all AA and GPC representatives expressed support for the resumption of negotiations to resolve the conflict, and agreed to collaborate with EIP to this end. Moreover, UAE/KSA authorities and the Hadi government were clear in giving EIP support to return to Yemen to further engage with the AA-GPC alliance. These meetings will continue over the course of 2018/2019 with a view to nurturing relationships and working steadily towards peace. (b) Building a network in the South EIP has built a rapport with experts on the south of Yemen and maintains contact with organisations such as Berghof Foundation, Search for Common Ground, Partners Yemen, ICRD and CMI. Liaison with southern experts will continue to ensure accurate representation of southerners at facilitated dialogues and to maintain an informed understanding of the south of Yemen. These meetings are part of a continuous process of triangulating reports on southern dynamics and players. EIP has focused on building in-country contacts and networks in order to improve access to all conflict parties. This includes hiring three staff members based in Yemen, who assist EIP with preparations (including suggesting participants, communication with participants and providing updates on the situation 13 in Yemen) for our strategic dialogues as well as conduct consultations with Yemenis in country and begin work on a report that will combine the results of the EIP’s dialogues and consultations. Additionally, in the event that future meetings with southern leaders are prevented due to similar challenges, EIP has setup contingency plans to allow for the continuation of planned activities. This includes holding meetings through a virtual platform, using technology to gather the views of southerners and working more closely with partner organisations with a ground presence. Impact Contribution to the Overall Objective Over the reporting period, EIP has convened the above groups and successfully encouraged southern leaders to find points of convergence to communicate to the international community. By providing the challenges and recommendations that emanate from our engagements with southern Yemenis to the OSESGY, they are able to shape a roadmap to peace that is more inclusive and all-encompassing of the myriad southern views, whilst relying on EIP as a reliable partner to inform their approach with dependable information. This sufficiently decreases the workload of the OSESGY and is therefore conducive to a swifter resolution of the political dispute at national level. As the Track 1 process reinitiates under the direction of the new Special Envoy, EIP will continue to inform the UN led process as requested, continuing to complement the work of the OSESGY. Increased Involvement of Women both on a Track I and Track III level Addressing the UN Security Council on the 27 February 2018, former Special Envoy Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed reiterated the struggle of Yemeni women, who remain at a heightened risk of sexual and genderbased violence as the conflict continues to disproportionately affect the lives of women and girls. Also commenting upon the plight of Yemenis to reclaim their freedom of speech, he mentioned that a number of women feel that they ‘live in a big prison’, unable to express themselves for fear of persecution1. To mitigate further exclusion and marginalization, EIP has heightened the voices of Yemeni women by integrating them into the peace process as to ensure that an eventual political solution is reflective of their challenges and aspirations. Since the initiation of EIP’s Yemen project, we have met with 122 Yemenis, 49 of whom (40%) are women. EIP made sure these took an active part in discussions, including in the interactions with the UNOSESGY. These women, from a number of different governorates, provided meaningful contributions to all seven of our southern strategic dialogues, the comprehensive outcomes of which are reflected in the memoranda. Moreover, EIP has mobilised a group of 22 Yemeni women, collectively known as ‘Southern Women for Peace’. The members of this group consist of journalists, activists, doctors, and other influential professionals from across the political divide. Since its inauguration in April 2017, the group has met three subsequent times, twice inside Yemen, and once more in Jordan (convened by EIP). At the end of each meeting, a consensual document providing constructive recommendations is produced, which is then communicated to the OSEGSY (a member of which has been present at every dialogue). 1 https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/feb_2018_secco_briefing_eng.pdf 14 Having seen the work that this group is carrying out, the UN has identified Southern Women for Peace as a pilot for their direct support for Track III peace initiatives. Consequently, the women’s group can expect to benefit from increased access opportunities, a wider reach, and more prospects to voice their perspectives on an international stage. On a Track III level, Southern Women for Peace continue to uphold the momentum of their group, and have requested additional funds to execute a number of awareness-raising activities which actively promote the involvement of women in politics. EIP is financially supporting these activities, which include holding an art exhibition which will focus on portraying the devastating humanitarian effects of the war, filming a documentary with a similar aim, and holding respectful demonstrations to lobby for peace. According to the Netherlands’ National Action Plan 1325 (2016-2019), women’s rights and security depend on their inclusion in peace processes. Through building inclusion at the Track 1 level, supporting activities at the Track 3 level and by linking the women’s group to UN Women (which also receives support from the Government of the Netherlands), EIP has supported these goals, giving women a voice in the peace process, and augmenting their agency inside Yemen. Increased Involvement of Marginalised Communities on an International level At the beginning of the reporting period, views from the south were not given sufficient space at the Track I level, with the international community heavily focused on the mainstream narrative of AA versus the Saudi-led coalition to reinstate the legitimate government. Since the collapse of the National Dialogue, the process failed to take into consideration the myriad other actors who have and continue to develop significant stakes in the conflict. The Special Envoy highlighted the need to counter this binary approach, stating that “it is essential that this political dialogue also finds ways to ensure more effective participation of women, youth and representatives from the South of the country in determining Yemen’s future2.” Despite this, Track II agencies who sought to respond to this need mainly engaged southerners no longer based in the south, and those still living in southern governorates remained ignored. EIP’s southern approach has been focused on engaging Yemenis based both inside and outside of the country, in order to garner a more well-rounded and comprehensive overview of the needs and aspirations of southern Yemenis. In addition to engaging these southern representatives in the strategic dialogue series, and consultations, EIP has maintained contact with a number of participants, some of whom have proved beneficial in terms of providing esteemed contacts to engage in subsequent events, informing us of developments on the ground, and maintaining the momentum of our southern work. Maintaining this constant channel of communication with a number of interlocutors via WhatsApp means that we are able to send information back and forth easily, constantly increasing coordination between Tracks, and gaining a more well-rounded mutual understanding. The UN has responded accordingly to the increasingly significant role of southerners in the conflict, opening a second local office to Aden. Despite the fact that the peace process has been stalled, once negotiations are reinitiated the OSESGY will be able to refer to the work that EIP has carried out as a foundation for understanding the challenges and aspirations of a number of southern communities. This will ensure that these views are comprehensively channelled into the Track 1 process in a timely manner. Over the coming year, the Track I process is set to reinitiate under the supervision of the new Special Envoy, with due emphasis on principles of inclusion and representation of marginalised groups, including women. During his transition from his post at EIP to the OSESGY, Special Envoy Martin Griffiths explicitly 2 http://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-statements/21062016/yemen 15 expressed his support for EIP’s workplan, and commitment to ensuring the integration of underrepresented voices into the UN-led process. Since the implementation of EIP’s southern activities, the OSESGY has indicated their appreciation of the complexity of the south and recognises how detrimental increased fragmentation could be to prospects for peace. As such, the concept of intra-south dialogue has been put forward as a mechanism for southern representation, forming part of the OSESGY’s 2018 strategy to build cohesion in the south. Financial expenditure analysis EIP received a contribution of 500,000 Euros from The Netherlands for the project period, for delivery on Specific Objective 2 of our operations in Yemen. EIP spent 500,268 Euros on this project component. The organisation has absorbed the overspend. A detailed breakdown and analysis of expenditures against the approved project budget is contained as an Appendix to this report. 16 Annex 1: Memoranda Southern Yemen: War and Peace – a Woman’s Perspective Amman, Jordan, 11-12 April 2017 On the 11-12 April 2017, a politically and geographically diverse group of influential women from the south of Yemen met in Amman, Jordan to address the political, social, and economic grievances of the south, their involvement and input into the official political and reconciliation processes and the architecture necessary for the south of Yemen to engage in an eventual constitutional drafting process with the north of the country. The dialogue took a close look at southern relations with the international community as well as local and regional relationships which concern their participation in the longer-term reconciliation process within Yemen. The inaugural dialogue resulted in a working paper; “The Amman Memorandum”, which outlines a vision for the future of Yemen, the key challenges facing Yemen, steps that can be taken to achieve peace and stability and the role of the international community. Representatives of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen were in attendance to both present on the UN-led peace process and to receive input to be fed into the official peace process. The women delegates from Aden, Lahaj, Abyan, Mahara, Hadramaut and Shabwah together outlined their vision for Yemen: Our Vision for Yemen Our goal is to achieve a secure, peaceful Yemen that serves the interests of all Yemenis. We want to build a nation that is resilient, that has effective institutions, and that is based on power sharing and the equitable distribution of resources. We seek the fair and rigorous application of the rule of law and transitional justice, and respect for human rights in accordance with international standards, including the direct involvement of women in sustainable peacebuilding. We believe in the reconstruction of critical infrastructure that has been destroyed during the war, and the restitution of essential services, including healthcare, education, salaries, and pensions. We also seek to reduce the appeal of armed groups and violent conflict to our youth by creating equal opportunities for employment and education. As a group we are diverse, geographically representing all of the southern governorates and politically representing a plethora of constituencies. Yet, our Pact is one of unity. We seek to speak with one voice and project a strong message for peace that resounds locally, regionally, and internationally. Challenges There are a number of challenges that must be addressed to ensure the achievement of peace and security in the south of Yemen. These include: - Absence of political representation nationally and internationally; - Destabilized security situation and lack of security provision; - Strengthening the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice; - Presence and proliferation of armed groups (including extremist groups) and weapons; - Lack of clear vision for the future of Yemen and the common aspirations of Yemenis; 17 - Arbitrary arrest and detainment of civilians; - Destruction of state institutions, infrastructure, and socio-economic degradation; - Disenfranchisement of youth and lack of opportunities; - Need for a conducive environment for women to engage in local politics. Joint Recommendations 1. Any dialogue must be inclusive of all Yemenis and cannot take place alongside military operations. A ceasefire is a prerequisite. 2. The war of 2015 created a new roadmap for the south with the emergence of new actors, and voices. The framework for engagement has changed and a new means of engagement is required if peace is to be achieved. 3. The lack of unity of purpose in the south has impeded the drive for peace and stability. There is a need for the creation of a unifying entity around which southerners can rally in the cause of local and national reconciliation. 4. The fate of the south must remain the sole responsibility of southerners. 5. As in the National Dialogue, the women of southern Yemen request a seat at any future negotiating table. 6. Request that the United Nations protect the south from foreign interests/interference. 7. No separation, but unity is impossible without a dialogue and agreement on the way forward. 8. The international community to ensure and share a clear vision on ending the violence in Yemen. 9. Rehabilitation and reconstruction programs should begin immediately, providing employment and faith in the future. How the International Community Can Help The political support of the international community for the measures identified above is essential to addressing the threats to further fragmentation in Yemen and to support the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325. We call on member states and regional organizations to use all diplomatic channels for these purposes. And we stand ready to play a constructive role in response to such international efforts. We propose that the international community renews its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to these issues, and for the UN-led peace process to consider the concerns and aspirations of southerners including the participation of women at future peace talks and negotiations. 18 Southern Yemen: War and Peace– The Perspective of the Southern Political Diaspora Beirut, Lebanon, 22-23 May 2017 On the 22-23 May, 2017, the European Institute of Peace (EIP) organized -- as part of its efforts to support the Yemeni peace process -- a workshop in Beirut, Lebanon and invited a diverse group of representatives of the southern political diaspora to discuss the south’s political, social and economic grievances, their input and participation in any political process. The meeting discussed the aspirations of the south and the role of the diaspora in achieving these aspirations. These consultations resulted in the following Memorandum, which outlines the southerner's vision of the future of Yemen, including the main challenges facing Yemen, steps that could contribute to peace and security, as well as the role of the regional and international community in securing peace. The meeting was attended by a representative of the Office of the United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, who gave an explanation of the UN-led peace process in Yemen and received inputs to be fed into the formal talks on the peace process. Challenges There are a number of challenges that must be addressed to achieve peace and security in the south of Yemen. These include: 1. The complexities of the current political and security situation in Yemen represent the greatest challenge to the South's ability to make its case on the regional and international arena. 2. The international community's unwillingness to integrate / involve the South in the international talks. 3. The lack of regional vision to address the humanitarian situation in the liberated areas 4. The war destroyed state institutions and provision of services, including the structures of government and the judiciary. 5. The inability of the legitimate government to rehabilitate education, health and electricity services and to undertake any form of development. 6. The economy is in a state of total collapse. 7. There is a direct link between youth unemployment and the emergence of extremism and the attraction of large numbers of young people to armed movements. 8. The current situation is untenable because its continuation means that young people are increasingly turning to extremist ideas. 19 Recommendations 1. The issue of the South is exclusively a national cause it is not a human rights or social cause. 2. Rehabilitate state institutions and restore the rule of law in the liberated areas. 3. Build the capacities of southern leaders to run state institutions in the south. 4. Invite international and regional organizations to open offices in Aden or Hadramaut. 5. Requested the United Nations to support the Transitional Council in organizing a National Comprehensive Conference for the South. 6. Establish a joint working committee facilitate communication between the Transitional Council and the international community. 7. International community to support southern institutions to counter the threat of terrorism. 8. The participation of southerners who hold the cause of the south in any dialogue or political endeavour. 9. The international community to alleviate human suffering in the liberated and occupied areas. Aspirations A democratic, pluralistic, federal, independent and sovereign decentralised state. The State is to be based on the principles of separation of powers, the peaceful rotation of power and the right to equal citizenship. The state is committed to international conventions and to economic interdependence with its neighbouring countries. 20 Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Business Community’s Perspective Amman, Jordan, 10-11 October 2017 In an effort to support an inclusive political process in Yemen, the European Institute of Peace (EIP) convened representatives of the business community from southern Yemen to review key thematic issues of concern. During the two-day strategic dialogue, the political, social and economic grievances of the south, the involvement and input of the south into the official political and reconciliation processes and finally the role to be played by the business community were discussed. The dialogue took a close look at southern relations with the international community as well as local and regional relationships which may affect their participation in the longer-term reconciliation process within Yemen, in the south and north. The dialogue produced a consensual memorandum which outlines a vision for a peaceful future of Yemen as seen from the south, including the key priorities outlined by the southern Yemeni business community, steps that can be taken to achieve peace and stability and the role of the business community can play. A representative of the OSE was in attendance to both present on the UN-led peace process and to receive input to be fed into the official peace process. Our Vision Our goal is to achieve a politically and economically secure, peaceful southern Yemen that serves the interests of all. We want to rebuild a nation that is resilient, that has effective institutions, and that is based on power sharing and the equitable distribution of resources. We believe in the revitalisation of local businesses and investment, the creation of an effective and functional banking system, the reconstruction of critical infrastructure that has been destroyed during the war, and the restitution of essential services, including healthcare, education, salaries, and pensions. This will be an inclusive project that entails the direct involvement of women in rebuilding the war-torn economy. We also seek to reduce the appeal of armed groups and violent conflict for our youth by creating equal opportunities for employment and education. As a group we are diverse, geographically representing the southern governorates. We seek to speak with one voice and project a strong message from the Yemeni business community that resounds locally, regionally, and internationally. Priorities and Concerns • Southern voices are not being heard by the UN OSE and the international community. As a result, there is a need for a body capable of representing the South in all future talks; • Economic, political, and social stability and development; • There is a need for a functioning banking system in the South; • Entities are inappropriately and ineffectively taking control of national resources; • As a result of poverty and insecurity, the south has experienced an increase in new phenomena, such as instability and extremism; • The perception of insecurity isolates much of the south from the international community and from a permanent presence of the OSE; • The south is resource rich but has not benefitted from this wealth; 21 • Need for job opportunities, especially for youth, to reduce appeal of militia and extremist groups. • Need for technical support in building economic security – jobs and investment opportunities, FDI, etc. • Level of security in ‘liberated’ (improved) vs non-liberated areas (insecure and poverty-stricken); • Lack of guarantees for businesspeople who provide liquidity and investments. • Need to focus on the humanitarian situation to address basic needs; • Lacking technical skills and staff to run ports and refineries. Joint Recommendations • Re-instate a properly staffed banking infrastructure in order to pay salaries, collect taxes, pay for social services, invest in infrastructure, money exchange, lending, and foreign transfers. • Banks to provide insurance on property to allow businesses to function securely; • Empower youth. New faces to represent South and be part of future discussion; • Engagement by government and businessmen to provide jobs for youth in the public and private sectors (help to combat AQAP and other extremist groups and outlawed militia); • Conduct an inclusive National Dialogue to heal social divides; • A Southern delegation to be present at UN talks that contains members of the southern business community; • Build integrated security system/infrastructure in south with help of international community, active both in current phase and in reconstruction phase; • Conference of business leaders to identify most pressing needs and how to address them; • Create a Higher Economic Council of the South to help local business community to identify priorities, establish micro enterprise infrastructure; recovery plans; • Promote investment in SMEs; • Lobby the government to encourage and protect investment and trade; • Crack down on smuggling to increase tax base; • Create new media outlet that is not linked to a political party to provide impartial information to the people; • Reopen and develop the Chambers of Commerce in the south; • Promote and develop training and vocational institutions; • Autonomous and reformed judicial system to resolve trade disputes; • Reactivate universities to educate youth and provide means out of unemployment; • Exploit natural resources, especially the vast oil and natural gas reserves and fisheries for the benefit of the population of the south; • All ports to be run by professional port authorities; • Eliminate corruption. 22 Plan of Action ‘‘Southern Women for Peace’’ Amman, Jordan, 25-26 October, 2017 The meeting of the Southern Women for Peace group was held as a follow-up to their first meeting, in Amman in April 2017. The geographically diverse group of southern women activists came together to develop their Plan of Action and a roadmap for their future activities in the southern governorates. The Plan of Action is based on their perceived need to continue to disseminate the goals and principles of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The complicated security and geographic conditions in the south has ensured that it will not be possible for many women to participate directly in the lead up to peace talks. In light of this, the Southern Women for Peace group met in Amman on 24-25 October 2017, in an effort to prepare an inclusive and comprehensive Plan of Action to be disseminate and implemented by the group. The Plan of Action contains a clear vision and the methodology the group will adopt in its future work. They will accommodate the diverse views of the group members and thereby strengthen its internal dynamics in a way that renders it responsive to the difficult external environment. The group agreed following points: 1) Adopted, as a general objective, a southern dialogue in the Governorate of Aden. This dialogue is to convene the executive authority, security and military authorities, political entities and civil society organizations. The outcome of the dialogue should lay the groundwork for the following: • conducting an urgent advocacy campaign to stop the war, and call on all parties to join the negotiation table and begin taking measures to achieve peace; • the disarmament of the armed groups operating outside the legal framework (militias and other groups); • the integration of all armed militias into the ranks of the army and the security forces; • official military and other security institutions to ensure security and peace in the city of Aden and the rest of the southern governorates; • The southern security apparatus is the sole official lever to provide security and establish order in the south, noting that security is imperative for the resumption of normal life and when achieved many social issues can be addressed; • the main priorities of the dialogue are the promotion of human rights principles, specifically women rights and establishing the rule of law. 2) Publishing leaflets outlining the groups activities, including a roadmap to ensure the adoption of UNSCR1325. 3) Develop and implement awareness-raising programs on issues related to women, peace and security and the associated normative frameworks, including UNSCR1325. 4) Organize 12 workshops, two in each of the southern governorates, where women can engage each other and public opinion makers. 23 5) Undertake programs to educate different segments of society on the important role of women in achieving peace. 6) Training and engagement to create synergies between the Southern Women for Peace to all relevant entities and actors interested in achieving peace. 7) Conducting a signature campaign as an initial proposal to support the resolution (1325) and the role of women in promoting peace and participation in the peaceful political process. Conclusion In order to stop the war, it is imperative that the UN, represented by the Security Council, engage in earnest with all parties engaged in the conflict and its repercussions. In order to achieve peace, security and stability, and based on the Charter of the United Nations, the UN should have a direct and supervisory role on land and sea ports to prevent all parties who oppose peace from exacerbating the situation. In accordance with our declared identity, "Southern Women for Peace", we affirm our commitment to peace and security in accordance with SCR1325. Moreover, we believe there is, thanks to a vibrant civil society, the possibility to implement activities and events to promote the SCR1325. 24 Southern Yemen: Peace, Security, and Stability – The Youth’s Perspective Amman, Jordan, 12-13 December 2017 Our Vision The people of the south will enjoy security, political stability and economic prosperity and play a positive role in ensuring peace and stability in Yemen and the broader region. We believe in the revitalisation of local businesses and investment, the creation of an effective and functional banking system, the reconstruction of critical infrastructure that has been destroyed during the war, and the restitution of essential services, including healthcare, education, salaries, and pensions. This will be an inclusive project that entails the direct involvement of women in rebuilding the war-torn economy. We also seek to reduce the appeal of armed groups and violent conflict for our youth by creating equal opportunities for employment and education. We speak with one voice and project a strong message from the community of youth activists that resounds locally, regionally, and internationally. Challenges for Southern Youth Political: • The need for political consensus between southern leadership • Lack of social and political youth empowerment • Lack of southern representation on the international stage and inclusion of southern voice in peace process by a representative southern leadership • Absence of international ally who is supportive of southern aspirations. • Lack of social justice, equality, and human rights • Endemic corruption and nepotism affecting all levels of society Economic: • Depreciation of the national currency; Lack of functioning banking infrastructure • Cessation of oil extraction and associated revenue • Instability and worsening humanitarian situation • Restricted international maritime and commercial supply/trade routes, restricting business • Lack of jobs and education for youth (70% of the population – have been worst hit by the war) • Continuous deterioration of public services • Delaying payment of public sector salaries for military personnel • Inflation and price hikes / scarcity of food and basic goods • Continued domination of southern commercial activity by northern interests Security: • Multiplicity of security sector services leading to security problems and violations • Absence of unified command structure for security and military forces • Terrorism 25 Joint recommendations of Southern Youth: Political: • Refraining from dictating any political solution that is not accepted by the people of southern Yemen and respecting the right of self-determination • Negotiations between the south and the north – with regional and international mediation – addressing military, economic and political concerns, including prisoner exchange • Need for a sustainable peace and entrenching tolerance and reconciliation • Inter-southern dialogue – inclusive of all parties - with support from the international community • Build a modern federal civil state with effective institutions • Involve youth activists in southern politics and the Track 1 process • Political, economic, and social empowerment of youth • Document human rights violations and communicate them to the OSE – who can play role in monitoring violations • Local-level peace-building efforts – through bottom-up grassroots activism • Increase presence of International and humanitarian organisations and NGO’s in Yemen to better operate and monitor developments • Awareness raising campaigns to draw attention to the causes of the southern youth; Form pressure and lobby groups drawing from civil society • Use dialogue to resolve disputes Economic: • Establish a functioning banking system to support the currency and local commercial activities • Develop and operate sea and land ports and secure trading routes • Sign agreements with foreign oil companies to return to Yemen and develop refineries • Rehabilitation programmes for disenfranchised youth to re-integrate them into society • Rebuild national infrastructure, including ports, electricity grids, sewage, and school, and further develop national institutions, using qualified youth and experts • Job creation to alleviate unemployment Security: • Unify military and security leadership under one national command to maintain peace and security in the region and oversight of forces • Security training to build professional security and intelligence apparatus and regular army with monopoly of the use of power • Help combat terrorism 26 Annex 2: Yemen Mapping Since the initiation of EIP’s Yemen Programme, EIP has conducted 6 southern strategic dialogues, and a number of consultations with southern Yemenis, convening a total number of 122 Yemenis, 49 of whom (40%) are women. The following information is collated from the outcomes of these meetings, as well a number of secondary sources. Drivers of Conflict in the South No monopoly over the use of force (multiplicity of armed groups) With the Houthi advance toward Aden in 2015, most of what was peaceful Hiraak turned into armed actors. The proliferation of armed actors in the south combined with increasing fragmentation added an extra layer of complication. The current two dominant armed groups are the government affiliated presidential guard and UAE-sponsored security belt. Additionally, the south lacks any legitimate consensus amongst political leadership, with the STC wrongly perceived as an entity inclusive of all southern interests. For example, if one were to ask UAE who from the south should be brought to negotiations, they would put the STC forward as an inclusive representation of all southerners. However, there exist a number of southern separatists who for various reasons, do not want to side with the STC. Weak state In testament to their growing influence in the south, Ali Naser Mohamad, who presided over the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen from 1980-1986, issued an 8-point plan for resolving the conflict in which his most unique suggestion was to “initiate a dialogue between all the political forces on the establishment of a two-region federal state.” This was clearly in reference to the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) seizure of Aden, their former capital, from Hadi’s government at the end of January after the internationally recognized leader refused to reform his Cabinet and reportedly ordered that force be used against the protesting Southerners. The country’s internationally recognized government was already expelled from the former territory of North Yemen following the success of the Houthi insurgency in early 2015 and the militants’ subsequent alliance with former President Saleh’s General People’s Congress, and the authorities’ eviction from South Yemen essentially means that it no longer has any formal representation in the nominally unified state, thereby setting the stage for its re-division into its two previously independent constituent halves. Following the 1990 unification between north and south, the Northern elites eviscerated any semblance of state institutions in the south when the Bin Dhager government relocated to the south and announced Aden as the interim capital. However, its access and presence in the south has been intermittent. It is widely believed that VP Ahmar and the Islah party are exercising undue level of influence of Hadi’s government, something that chipped away at the legitimacy of the government Local rivalries One would be remiss in claiming that the north/south is the only geographical division in Yemen. In the seven southern governorates, there exist simmering localized rivalries, for example between Abyan and Shabwa. Hadramaut, Al Mahra, and Socotra operate very differently to the south west, where the 27 STC/Hadi division dominates. Some people from Hadramaut want the province to operate under its own system of governance, to profit more from its natural resources. In Saudi and Emirati eyes, securing Al Mahra’s borders is a necessary geopolitical step to counterbalance Iranian interferences. Reports abound of Iran smuggling missiles to the Houthis, with arms most likely entering through Eastern Yemen. According to the UN, these Iranian-made components were smuggled into Yemen along ‘the land routes from Oman or Ghayda and Nishtun in Al Mahra governorate, after shipto-shore transshipment to small dhows’. This same route has already seen ‘limited seizures of anti-tank guided weapons’. On 27 November, President Hadi replaced the governor of Al Mahra, appointing Rajeh Saidbakrit. the new governor who is known to be pro-KSA. Across the border, Omani authorities sees Al Mahra as its strategic depth and buffer zone that insulates the small sultanate from Yemen turbulence. Oman and KSA don’t necessarily see eye to eye when it comes to Yemen and have adopted divergent approaches to the conflict. The expansion of Coalition-affiliated forces to Al Mahra will undoubtedly fuel further tensions between the two gulf countries, risking further instability. The presence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also further compounds the complexity of the situation. Though the threat of AQAP is widely acknowledged to be overblown, it can contribute to local rivalries by creating tensions in tribal areas. Foreign meddling It appears that the Emiratis are aiming to secure the southern coastline to profit from trade and lessen security threats. With their independent elite groups operating across the south and backing of STC, the UAE has exerted clear influence both politically and militarily. It is important to frame UAE’s plan in a regional context; they sense a US withdrawal from the region, and thus feel exposed and are active in Eritrea, Somaliland, Djibouti and elsewhere. By virtue of its proximity to Yemen, KSA enjoys considerable influence in Yemen. The extent to which it can leverage this influence for its national interest is however dubious. KSA has always been hostile to a unified Yemen and has thus played the north/south split to prevent such an outcome, opposing a split as it would undermine its bid to reinstate the Hadi government over all of Yemen. However, there has been recent speculation that KSA was pursuing the same agenda of UAE; this being their backing of the STC as a way of dropping Hadi and saving face. Spill-over of the northern conflict The south has not been untouched by northern issues, with the following directly impacting the security of the south: - AA advancing toward the south and the ensuing conflict - UAE affiliated forces, Aden declaration that created STC - Relocation of Tareq Saleh to the south and his training camps Lack of Opportunities for Youth The non-payment of public sector salaries, lack of educational opportunities, and consequent youth disenfranchisement have contributed to the bolstering of armed factions who provide income for those left with little prospects as a result of the deterioration of societal infrastructure, prolonging armed warfare. 28 The War Economy Introduction Despite the violent and complex conflict that has seen political and military divisions deepen in Yemen since 2015, the network of war profiteering that has developed has united various factions in their ability to turn profit from the unsteady political climate. By assuming control over natural resources, imposing tax on busy trade routes, and arms dealing, most forces on the ground have de facto brokered a financial arrangement lucrative enough to provide counter-incentives to negotiate a peace deal, and specifically the prospect of a national unity government, which would almost certainly see all revenues from oil and gas exports directed straight to Sana’a. Currency and Banking System The economy in the south is operating as a free market, based entirely on supply and demand, with a severe lack of liquidity contributing to sharp hikes in prices. The Yemeni rial has suffered considerably due to the deterioration of the economy, government services, security and halting of exports. In addition, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) have been increasingly unable to intervene in the market due to its low holdings of foreign currency. On the 17th of January, KSA announced that it was injecting $2 billion into CBY in an attempt to bolster the Yemeni rial, currently estimated by a source on the ground to be at 530:1 (to the US dollar). It remains unclear whether this will lead to salaries being paid. Some expatriate workers are sending money to their families in Yemen via informal hawala transfer networks, a system whereby money is transferred but not physically moved. These networks, increasingly integrated with currency exchange businesses, are proving considerably lucrative for hawala brokers, sometimes profiting up to three times over from their businesses. In October 2017, EIP convened a group of 16 businesspeople, who aired a number of concerns and recommendations relating to the economic situation in southern Yemen, calling for the reinstatement of a properly staffed banking infrastructure in order to pay salaries as well as provide services such as money exchange, lending, and foreign transfers. The group also noted as a concern the lack of guarantees for businesspeople who provide liquidity and investments. Trade (Customs and taxation) Trade has continued to flow across the country, albeit frequently subjected to heavy taxation and custom duties. As a result of the coalition-imposed embargo on sea and air ports, the volume of overland trade from Oman (via Shahen) and KSA (via Al Wadeah) has significantly increased. In addition to the customs duty imposed as drivers enter the country, they are obligated to pay fees at checkpoints as they enter territories governed by different factions. Traders estimate that checkpoint fees alone inflate the prices of basic goods by 10-15 percent. The Hadrami Elite forces, who control Mukalla port, are profiting from its reputation as the most secure and least surveilled port and the heavy stream of revenues that come with it. With the added support of to cash payments from the UAE and income from oil exports, the Hadrami Elite Forces are one of the south’s biggest profiting parties. 29 Smuggling and arms trade Smuggling networks originating in Mukalla have supplied arms and fuel to AA-GPC territory since the start of the conflict, and have remained operational since AQAP were driven out by UAE-backed forces in 2016. Al Mahra is home to five small and poorly overseen ports, which are therefore used for traders to bring in smuggled goods, including arms. Similar tactics are in play in Shabwa and Hadramaut, where in addition to the ports being poorly monitored, members of local groups fear retaliation from smugglers should they move to halt the steady flow of arms. Since the start of the conflict, prices of ammunition have dropped significantly, and the country has witnessed a proliferation of small and medium arms, poorly regulated and widely available. Arms provided to local groups by the coalition are being regularly sold on to AA-GPC forces for profit, perpetuating a sort of underground economic ecosystem profitable to all parties. The group of southern businessmen and women agreed that ports should be run by official port authorities, and smuggling should be addressed to increase the tax base. Southern resources One of the key concerns highlighted by representatives of the southern business community is that despite being rich in resources, the south does not necessarily benefit from this wealth. In addition, they noted that the entities who do have authority over natural resources are dealing with them ineffectively and inappropriately. The conflict has severely affected the production and exportation of oil and gas across the south. Oil and gas production facilities in Shabwa (where key export pipelines have been shut off) and Hadramaut are secured by tribal groups, while UAE-backed paramilitaries have held authority over their export facilities since ousting AQAP in 2016. Members of the southern youth community convened in December 2017 unanimously called for a move to sign agreements with foreign oil companies to return to Yemen and develop refineries. Hadi’s government has taken a financial blow as a direct result of oil and gas production being halted, though he has been quietly looking to profit from the south’s resources by negotiating with a number of factions to resume oil production and exportation in Hadramawt. Potential of increased government income in 2018 if the plan to truck oil produced in Mareb to the south succeeds. Oil decreases Hadi’s dependence on KSA. Military and Territory Introduction In the south, all military and security groups can effectively be split into the following three categories: 30 Ministry of Defence Hadramaut Since 2015, Yemen’s largest governorate has effectively been split into two separate spheres of influence; northern/wadi Hadramaut (1st military zone) and coastal Hadramaut (2nd military zone). Despite a level of relative stability in northern/wadi Hadramaut, recent assassinations indicate that loyalists of Saleh and Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar are beginning to compete for territorial control. Commanders of the first military zone brigades announced their support for Hadi in April 2015. This military zone is commanded by General Mohamed Saleh Taimus from the command centre in Seiyunn. In coastal Hadramaut, Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, also the province’s governor, commands the second military zone from its base in Mukalla. The territory is under the strong influence of the Hadrami Elite Forces (HEF), a military group formed by the Saudi-led coalition and under UAE supervision to oust AQAP from Mukalla in 2016. There are five HEF brigades along the coast. The UAE has been accused of taking advantage of the Yemen conflict to become a more forthcoming regional power. Al-Mahra Al-Mahra, the “eastern gate of Yemen”, bordering Oman, is subject to a number of influences including tribal groups, Islah backed military units, UAE-backed forces, and Oman-backed political actors. Al-Mahra falls under the command of the 2nd military zone. Socotra Also under the command of the 2nd military zone is Socotra, where UAE oversees the military forces, and 31 has built up its influence. There is a UAE-built air-base west of Socotra airport under the supervision of an Emirati officer named Hassan Attar. In addition, roughly 1,000 young people from Socotra have been recruited by Abu Dhabi to undergo intensive training in the UAE for months, before being deployed to various military points in the archipelago. The 1st Brigade Marine Infantry in Socotra was one of the first military forces to stand with Hadi and openly support the reinstatement of the legitimate government. Shabwa Shabwa is one of the two governorates in the third military zone (the other being Marib). Shabwa Elite forces, backed by the UAE, operate in Habban, Al-Rawdha, Mayfa’a, Jardan, and Erma, providing security to the coastal region, the main road that links Shabwa and Hadramaut, and the coastal highway that links Ain Bamabad and Abyan. There are Shabwa Elite checkpoints in some parts of Jardan and Erma. In Ataq, security services are good, particularly in the city. They fulfill their duties despite lack of some capabilities. There are a number of ‘units’3, which are more tribal military groups, all operating in Bayhan (northern Shabwa). Active in Shabwa are those who support legitimate authority (GPC and Islah), southern movement, the STC, and Houthi supporters in Bayhan. Aden The 4th military zone HQ is located in Aden. There are a number of factions vying for control in Aden, the previous capital of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). These include loyalists of the legitimate government, security forces loyal to UAE-backed former governor and head of the STC Aidaroos al-Zubaydi, UAE-led (often Salafist) ‘security belt’ forces, and a number of ‘southern resistance cells’, amongst numerous military units and militias with varying alliances. On January 28th 2018, southern separatists backed by the UAE stormed Aden, seizing control of a number of government buildings. This follows an ultimatum given by the STC to Hadi’s government, demanding that he dismiss prime minister Ahmed bin Dagher and his entire cabinet in seven days, or face an overthrow. Further disparity between UAE/KSA agendas. Abyan Under 4th military zone command4 Lahj Under 4th military zone command Dhale Under 4th military zone command 3 26th Infantry Brigade (Murad tribe of neighbouring Marib governorate, commanded by Staff Brigadier Mufarrih Bahaybah) 19th Infantry Brigade (Bal Harith tribe, commanded by Colonel Alawi bin Ali Nasr al-Harethi) The 5th Battalion, commanded by Colonel Saleh Mosaed Bahaybah-al-Muradi 21st Mechanised Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Jahdal Hanash al-Awlaqi 4 119th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Nasser Hassan Awad al-Jadni 111th Infantry Brigade, based in Ahwar-Al-Mahfad districts, commanded by Salem Atef Laqra 15th Infantry Brigade, located in Zenjubar (capital of governorate) 115th Infantry Brigade, located in Shaoqrah-Lawder districts, commanded by Nasser Abdrabbah al-Dhamjy 103rd Infantry Brigade, located in Gaheen and commanded by Ali Mohammad al-Qomaly 32 33 Source: Chatham House 34 35 Annex 3: Participants lists southern strategic dialogue series Conference of Southern Leaders Beirut, Lebanon 9-10 December 2016 and Salalah, Oman 11-12 December 2016 Abdulaziz Ahmed Ba Hashwan Abduljabar Omar Ba Gubair Abdullah Rageh Al Yahri Abeer Bader Adeeb Al Essi Ahmed Abdullah Al Hassani Ahmed Salem Haidrah Ali Mohammad Al Saya Ali Mohammad Bin Shahna Anwar Al Subahi Ashgan Shiriah Bassam Al Mohdar Eyad Farhan Fadi Hassan Baa'oom Fatymah Maysser Handai Ahmed Othman Hassan Al Batati Hussaen Ben Showaebb Khadoon Al Subahi Mohamood A’wad Radyah Shamsher Rana Ali Mahdi Salah Al Sagladi Salah Rasheed Mohammad Salem Abdullah Bin Al Shaibah Southern Yemen: War and Peace – A Woman’s Perspective5 11-12 April 2017, Amman, Jordan Afraa Khaled Hariri Dr. Amna Saleh Awad El Shehaby Ashgan Shurah Ali Badeaa Awad Ben Jubair Bahia Hassan El Saqaf Boushra Ahmed Thabet Defaa Saleh Nagy Mohamed Ehsan Abeid Saied Elham Ali Salam Hadbaa Yezid El Yazidy Halima Mohamed Ali Hend Salem Arafa El Akbery Heyam Taleb El Karmoshy Kalthoum Nasser Lamees Hassan El Salem El Hamdy Maha Mohamed Awad Nadia Mohamed Nagy Saleh Radia Shamsher Ali Safaa Abdallah Abeid Ahmed Shifa Saeed Bahmeish Soher Ali Ahmed Mohamed Thuraya Salem Megmal Zahraa Abd Ferag ben Saied 5 The women who attended this meeting also comprise the participant list of Southern Yemen: War and Peace – A Woman’s Perspective (The second meeting of Southern Women for Peace) held on the 25-26 October 2017 in Amman, Jordan. 36 Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Perspective of the Southern Political Diaspora 22-23 May 2017, Beirut, Lebanon Abdullah Hussein Ali Abdullah Ali Omar Kifan Ali Al-Khadher Mohammed Al-Khader Musref Dalal Fatehi Ali Hussein Fadl Mohamed Naji Muthana Galal Mohammed Obaidi Hasson Saleh Huda Omer Ahmed Al-Attas Hussein Ahmed Abdullah Laqwer Jack Mohamed Saleh Musaed Manal Kassem Alawi Omer Moayyam Mohamed Al-Abbadi Naseem Aldeeni Rocaya Ali Ahmed Al-Baiti Sanaa Saeed Mubarak Hamedah Waheed Hassan Ahmed Khudabakhash Wesam Abobakr Salem Ba Sondowah Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Business Community’s Perspective 10-11 October 2017, Amman, Jordan Abbod Hboud Abbod Qamseet AbdulGader Al Yafiea AbdulSalam Askar Saleh Al-Gabri Abu Tanaf Shanfary Ahed Abdullah Ahmed Essa Ahmed Eissa Qasem Salem Ahmed Salem Saeed Hubais Ali AbdulBaqi Hussein Al-Maslamani Ali Omer Ali BaThawab Almaamari Harwana Ahmed Saif Altamimi Salem Karama Ahmed Aslaa Aidrous Mohammed Al-Hashemi Awadh Ahmed Abdullah Humran Awadh Yasmin Mohamed Mubarak Faris bin Hilabi Hadeel Gamil Ali Haiyam Sameer Haydarah Heba Faheem Hamood Haidar Jihad Anis Hassan Abbas Khaled AbdulKader Mohamed Ba Haj Khaled Mohammed Omar AlKathiry Khodem Mohammed Khodem Kulthom Mahmood Mohammed Nasser Maria Mohammad AbdulAlran Al-Yafaee Mirfat AbdulMajid Mohammed Al-Absi Mohamed Mahroos Baqadeem Mohamed Salem Thabit Almagfaee Omair Raheel Hussein Qamseet Abbodhbouda Abboud Saleh Hussain Al-Qadhi Salem Ba Hameed Salem Edhah Omer Al-Katheri Yahiya Abdullah Hussain Al-Kathery Zaki Al-Hadhrami Southern Yemen: War and Peace – The Views of Southern Youth 12-13 December 2017, Amman, Jordan Abeer Waked Adwaa Najmi Helal Thabit Alawi Mohamed Aidaroos Ba Haron Arsalan Ahmed Saleh Al Sakkaf Etab Omar Abdullah Al-Amodi Fahmi Nasser Ahmed Al Suhaibi Gamal Haidarah Mutlaq Saleh Kawas Ahmed Mohamed Qasem Khadiga Bin Buraik Moaeen Mahmood Saleh Mohamed Saleh Hussein Abdulrab Muna Abdo Mohammed Abdulmajeed Muthanna Muthanna Awadh Saleh Naser Al Khulaifi Nazar Nasser Ali Haitham Niran Hassan Soki 37 Noor Omer Addullah Suraib Raeida Saeed Rowishd Salem Thabit Al Olaqi Wadhah Nasr Obaid Nasser Consultations with Southern Yemenis Ebrahim Al-Dailani Gamal Saddiq Ghaidaa Salem Murad Al Halimi Shakeeb Hubaisi Wael Al Khalidi Wahib Mohammad Ali Yahya Yahya Ghobar