‘Assist the UN-Led Mediation Process to Bring an End to the Conflict in Yemen’ The following presents a narrative progress overview concerning the project: ‘Assist the UN-Led Mediation Process to Bring an end to the Conflict in Yemen’, which is undertaken in close coordination with the UN’s Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) tasked with mediating the Yemen crisis. The report covers implementation in the period 01 January 2019 – 30 June 2019. 1. Goal, objectives, outcomes and outputs Overall goal Contribute to a more inclusive peace process in Yemen. Specific objective UN/Track 1 process has an informed understanding of the issues and actors that affect the south of Yemen and is able to call on southern leaders to participate in the official peace process Outcomes and outputs 1. By December 2019, assemble the actors and the issues that affect the south of Yemen and feed them into the UN peace process. a. Throughout the project period, Issues of common concern to the south are identified and agreed upon by southern leaders (output 1); b. Up-to-date overview of actors influential to stability in the south established and available for use by the OSESGY (output 2); 2. Decrease the risk of further polarization and fragmentation of political and military actors in the south of Yemen. a. Mediation and facilitated dialogue applied in eight cases to reduce polarization and fragmentation in southern Yemen (output 3); b. Throughout the project period, southerners’ political views are channelled into the Yemen national peace process (output 4). 2. Context update Yemen has been in a state of conflict since 21 September 2014, when the Houthi rebels and elements of the armed forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (GPC) entered the capital Sana’a and seized the government headquarters in an attempt to oust President Hadi and take control over the country. The conflict escalated when on 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and seven Arab, mostly Sunni, states, formed a military coalition with support from the United States, the United Kingdom and France and began air strikes in an attempt to restore the Hadi government. Despite initial expectation of the coalition that the situation would be restored within weeks, the conflict still continues five years later and has become more complex. A variety of regional actors is indirectly engaged, leading to proxy wars throughout the country, especially in the south. In the south, long-standing grievances coupled with a deep resentment of the government of Yemen, exacerbated by the conflicting interventions of regional neighbours, have fuelled fragmentation and violence. The increasing recourse to armed opposition of a variety of pro-independence militias, local tribes, Salafi militias, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-aligned groups threatens to further divide Yemen and undermine efforts to advance the national peace process. These issues have become more prominent since the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) first gained control of Aden in January 2019 and effectively became the south’s de facto governing body. Despite several attempts by Hadi-backed forces to regain control over the city, which had been serving as Yemen’s interim capital since the Houthi’s take-over of Sana’a, the city is still controlled by STC forces as of September 2019. The war itself has had disproportionately impacted civilians. In September 2019, the UNHCR estimated that around three million people had been forced to flee since the war broke out. Around 54% of the population – around 15 million people – are on the brink of starvation, and 400,000 children are estimated to be suffering from severe malnutrition. The humanitarian situation has been exacerbated by an outbreak of cholera yet only 50% of hospitals are operational and throughout the country medicines and medical equipment are in short supply. Yemen’s current situation has repeatedly been called ‘the worst man-made humanitarian crisis’. Issues as the extent to self-governance and secession, the role of the Hadi government, and the presence of Islamist al-Islah figures in key government positions, continue to sow discord. However, despite recent attempts to address the instability in the south and increase involvement of southern issues in the UN-led peace process, northern issues remain at the forefront of international attention. This has the potential to disrupt and spoil efforts to bring peace. EIP’s project intends to engage actors who can represent a significant threat to any opportunity for peace and address their grievances through dialogue. The aim is to continue to identify key southern leaders, or potential future leaders, and develop an inclusive and representative platform from which southern interests can be expressed and in included in future peace agreements. 3. Activities contributing to Outcome 1 Activity 1: Strategic dialogues with southern leaders a) Southern Women for Peace (SWP) On the 14th and 15th February, the SWP congregated in Amman together with EIP to undertake a planning session for their 2019 activities. Ms. Amira Kafi of the OSESGY (gender focal point) joined the group to introduce herself and provide a much-anticipated update on the political process to the SWP, touching on issues such as Hodeida, Taiz, and the prisoner exchange. The SWP then presented a documentary on their work in-country, which was met with great admiration from Ms. Kafi, who proffered her assistance and reiterated the support of the OSESGY. The remainder of the two-day session was spent evaluating the SWP’s proposed activities, and how they could be refined to best support the peace process, and build on existing support to further grow the reach of the SWP. The meeting resulted in a concrete workplan and supporting budget. One such activity outlined in the 2019 workplan (Women’s Peace Tent) has since been implemented, though this was covered by another donor. Photo 1: Meeting with the Southern Women for Peace on 14 and 15 February 2019 Activity 2: Southern strategic dialogue platform Due to unforeseen delays (see section 7), the first Southern Strategic Dialogue (SSD) that was scheduled to take place in March 2019 had to be postponed to 27-28 July. In preparation of these meetings and to ensure continued buy-in from all actors for the Southern Strategic Dialogue following the marked shift in attitudes post-Stockholm, EIP continued to meet with a number of key southern political figures. a) Southern Transitional Council (STC) On January 22nd, EIP met with Murad Al Halimi of the STC in Abu Dhabi to discuss the group’s participation in the proposed SSD series. Commenting that the STC was unsure of the official UN stance towards southern inclusion, Mr Al Halimi raised concerns that the OSESGY had not yet solidified a roadmap for the peace process or indeed the role of the south. This lack of clarity, he said, was contributing to uncertainty within the STC. Despite these qualms, Mr. Al Halimi stated that the STC would be willing to participate in the SSD. Following up from this engagement, EIP also met with STC representatives in Bonn, to ensure that this was the consensus within the party. Photo 2: Meeting with the SNC on 22 January 2019 b) Khaled Bahah On 23rd January, EIP met with former VP and PM Khaled Bahah, who believes that a meeting to determine southern representation is sorely needed. Baha is a firm believer that the post-NDC constitution contains all that is needed to bring about peace in Yemen and should be the basis for all future negotiations. He also provided EIP with a short document outlining his views of the way forward. This was subsequently fed to the OSESGY for consideration. c) Amr Al Bidh Amr Al Bidh, son of former President of the South Ali Salem Al Bidh, and prominent Hiraaki with close links to the STC, was also engaged to discover his analysis on the form a South-South Dialogue should take, and respective parties’ positions. Echoing EIP’s discussion with the STC, Mr. Al Bidh commented that the STC found the OSESGY’s initial offer of a southern leadership conference poorly formulated, and not at all well thought-out. As such, the STC were sceptical to engage, fearing that the OSESGY were merely ‘putting on a show’ to appease southern actors and embroil them in unnecessary talks. d) Southern National Coalition (SNC) On February 13th, EIP met with three members of the Southern National Coalition (SNC): Abdullah M. Baafit, Abdusalam A. Baabood, and Abdulrab Saleh Alsalami. Following a discussion during which interlocutors shared their thoughts on the Stockholm agreement and apparent political impasse, conversation turned to the inclusion of southern actors in the peace process. Recognising that the south has failed to put forward a coherent stance, the SNC representatives commented that the need for southern actors to coalesce around some form of united position is particularly pronounced if they are to achieve the representation in talks that they so desire. As such, the SNC remains amenable to the prospect of engaging in the South-South Dialogue. e) Hiraak, Cairo Conference, and Haider Al Attas* In Cairo, EIP met with three prominent southern Yemenis: Fouad Rashed (Hiraak), Abdulmagid Wahdin (Cairo Conference), and historic leader Haider Al Attas. Interlocutors were engaged separately, and then convened as a group. A number of issues of consensus emerged: all interlocutors agreed that the Stockholm Agreement marked a positive step, though movement on key issues outside the port city remain at an impasse. Until quite recently, most political groups in the south had two, somewhat different, messages: the first for domestic consumption which usually contained lofty statements and promises and; external messages which were somewhat more pragmatic. Southern politicians are coming around to the idea that a new and more pragmatic messaging, more reflective of reality, better suits their political purposes. *EIP met with Haider al Attas in his capacity as former PM, not as the VP of Cairo Conference, the position he holds currently. f) Abdalraouf Zain Al Saqaf, Deputy Governor of Aden On 6 June 2019, the team met with Abdalraouf Zain Al Saqaf, the Deputy Governor of Aden. During this meeting, Mr. Zain provided valuable insights into the history and internal conflicts of Hiraak Al Janoubi, as well as the effect that the influence of outside powers has had on Hiraak’s internal unity and relationship with the Hadi government. The discussion also touched upon the issue of seccession and the extent to which this was a possibility in the current political climate. Mr. Zain provided input on planned EIP activities and suggested for any Southern Strategic Platform to be facilitated by a neutral body as EIP. He believed that the STC should be invited to the inaugural meeting as well and suggested for EIP to pressure the STC through the release of a statement calling on the STC to join subsequent meetings. Mr. Zain also shared valuable suggestions with regards to items to put on the agenda in preparation of the Community Forum on Aden that is to take place in the Autumn (note: this Community Forum took place on 14-15 September in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). Photo 3: Meeting with Abdulraouf Zain Al Saqaf, Deputy Governor of Aden, on 6 June 2019 Activity 3: Consultations with southern Yemenis In order to help build a broader understanding of challenges in the south and expand EIP’s network to include a representative group of southern leaders, EIP has been working with a consultant conducting conflict analysis drawing on both actor mapping and political economy assessments which aid in project risk assessment and the refining of the project’s response to the rapidly changing conflict dynamics in the south. The consultant provides continuous updates on the situation on the ground and remains in contact with Yemeni representatives and identifies influential Yemenis. These updates, which are distributed to the team members on a bi-weekly basis, ensure that the team is always up-to-date on the latest developments on the ground and consequently can use this information to decide on the content and agenda of subsequent meetings, the list of participants, and the political and security challenges involved. 4. Activities contributing to Outcome 2 a) Relations with the OSESGY On 25 January 2019, EIP met with the OSESGY in Amman, Jordan, to exchange recently gathered information on southern parties and their stances, and discuss how the inaugural SSD should be approached. At this point, the OSESGY were unsure that the timing was appropriate, citing their concerns of intervening at an inopportune moment as the reason behind their scepticism. On the 16th February, EIP met with the Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, who, commenting upon the window of opportunity reflected in the eagerness of all southern groups to engage, expressly requested that EIP implement the initial South-South Dialogue. These face-to-face meetings have been complemented by a series of phone calls between EIP and the OSESGY, who continue to nurture a relationship based on trust and knowledge-sharing. b) Meeting with Mohammad Ayesh On 24 June 2019, the team met with Dhammari journalist and Houthi defector Mohammad Ayesh in Brussels, following a first meeting which took place in Cairo in 2018. Mr. Ayesh shared his perceptions on the conflict, calling on international actors for more scrutiny with regards to the involvement of external actors and their roles. Mr. Ayesh further stated that perceptions of southern actors have become more negative as they seem to place their interests above the interest of the country. He believes that a southern independent state would present a threat to North Yemen and the wider region. The current state and future role of the GPC was also discussed, as well as whether EIP should advocate for the inclusion of GPC figureheads into the peace process. 5. Progress • Laid the groundwork for a south-south dialogue and build agreement among southern leaders that EIP would be best-placed to facilitate this. EIP has been facilitating indirect dialogue between disparate southern groups by passing messages between them and encouraging interlocutors to reciprocate positive steps taken by other groups to foster an atmosphere of understanding and tolerance. In addition, EIP has succeeded in moderating the position(s) of respective southern groups, tempering their expectations ahead of the south-south dialogue with regards to their political aspirations. Interlocutors responded positively to EIP’s advice and guidance, agreeing to temporarily ‘park’ their political aspirations, and expressed their desire for EIP to facilitate subsequent meetings. • Improved the understanding of local communities’ demands and positions. Through the series of bilateral meetings that took place in the first half of 2019, EIP has developed a clear understanding of the realities of the political landscape and situation the ground, and ways to promote peace and security among the various southern groups. • Bolstered civil society networks. The SWP group consolidated their mission and vision and has grown its reach in-country. As a result, the group has gained positive media traction and is now a widely recognised activist group operating inside Yemen. Their work inspired a group of academics convened by EIP in December to establish ‘Southern Academics for Peace’, which now works alongside SWP. • Improved coherence within southern groups. Southern groups are increasingly seeing the benefits of engaging in a political process and working collectively towards the creation of a successful mechanism for southern inclusion. • Provided up-to-date intelligence to the OSESGY. EIP maintained regular contact with the key contact person in the OSESGY to provide intelligence on the grass-roots demands. Clear and concise meeting notes are frequently channelled to the OSESGY who are able to make informed decision based on up to date and comprehensive analyses. 6. Impact Throughout the first half of 2019, EIP has expanded its network of southern actors while also maintaining buy-in from the main southern political groups for the Southern Strategic Dialogue, bar the STC who oscillate. At the time of writing (September 2019), the STC suggested to re-engage in the process after their own attempts at setting up a forum failed to gain traction. EIP has therefore managed to keep a broad coalition of actors together while maintaining an opening for the STC and others to engage, which will lead to a diverse representation of senior leaders at our meeting in Brussels in October 2019. In addition, EIP remains in close contact with a number of STC representatives based both in Europe and in the Middle East in order to remain abreast of any shifts within the party. 7. Changes from original intended results Due to an accident of EIP’s Senior Mediation Advisor, the inaugural South-South Dialogue that was scheduled to take place in March 2019 has to be postponed. A new Senior Mediation Advisor was then brought on board to continue with the implementation of this event in July. This meeting took place on 27-28 July 2019 in Amman, Jordan. Consequently, the first half year of 2019 has seen a lower spending rate than initially anticipated. EIP has however maintained regular communication with all relevant groups to ensure their participation in July and all subsequent meetings that are scheduled to take place in the second half of 2019. Furthermore, following a strong indication that this is the preference of the OSESGY as well as of the southern actors indicated above, the project focus has increasingly shifted towards the implementation of a South-South Dialogue. The team was requested by the OSESGY not to engage with Ansar Allah (AA) given that there has already been considerable attention on AA and the North and that it is vital to address issues of the South to increase chances of a successful national peace process. As such, EIP plans to prioritize its engagement with southern actors and make its focus on the South-South Dialogue exclusive in the coming months. Nevertheless, relations with AA figures are being maintained to ensure EIP can pick up these activities when needed. Due to a delay in the implementation of project activities, EIP plans to apply for a six-months no-cost extension. Overall goal Contribute to a more inclusive peace process in Yemen. Specific objective UN/Track 1 process has an informed understanding of the issues and actors that affect the south of Yemen and is able to call on southern leaders to participate in the official peace process Outcomes and outputs 1. By December 2019, assemble the actors and the issues that affect the south of Yemen and feed them into the UN peace process. a. Throughout the project period, Issues of common concern to the south are identified and agreed upon by southern leaders (output 1); b. Up-to-date overview of actors influential to stability in the south established and available for use by the OSESGY (output 2); 2. Decrease the risk of further polarization and fragmentation of political and military actors in the south of Yemen. a. Mediation and facilitated dialogue applied in eight cases to reduce polarization and fragmentation in southern Yemen (output 3); b. Throughout the project period, southerners’ political views are channelled into the Yemen national peace process (output 4).