CO-STABILIZATION RETHINKING SECURITIZED APPROACHES TO STABILIZATION
Few regions illustrate, as well, the failures of military-centric approaches to addressing the root causes of instability as the Sahel. Over the past nine years, the European Union, led by France, and the United States have prioritized counterterrorism as their primary foreign policy objective in the Sahel region. They have made counterterrorism the lens through which the majority of assistance is designed and implemented. This approach has failed to contain the spread ofviolent extremism, and, by virtually every indicator, the security and humanitarian conditions in the region are worse today than in 2013. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad are under military rule, with unclear timelines for transition backto civilian government. Attacks from non-state extremist groups are rising in many parts of the region. The region is facing its worst hunger crisis in over a decade,Open Society Policy Center 3
and the combined impacts of continued conflict, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic have further strained the ability of marginalized populations, particularly in rural areas, to access basic services.
In the face of growing discontent over its prolonged military operation in Mali from both domestic constituencies and the Malian government and civil society, France announced its intention to withdraw its military forces from Mali in April 2022. Although France will maintain a limited presence in the region alongside other European nations and United Nations peacekeeping
forces in Mali, its decision to significantly downsize its military footprint has created fears of a security vacuum. In late 2021, the government of Mali invited the Kremlin-backed Wagner group to support its military operations against violent extremist groups. Civil society monitors and civilian populations report acts of violence against civilians, looting, indiscriminate killings, and
human rights abuses by paramilitary forces believed to be linked to the Wagner group.
The Biden administration is poised to release its Sahel strategy over the coming months. InApril,the Biden administration designed a grouping of coastal West African countries as priority countries for the implementation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA). Partners at USAID, State, and NSC indicate that containing the spread of extremism from the Sahel to coastal West Africa will
be a key component of both GFA implementation and an updated Africa strategy. However, for those most impacted by continued instability inthe Sahel, a strategy of containment is insufficient.
There is a growing recognition among policy makers in the United States, Europe, and West Africa that current approaches to addressing instability in the Sahel have failed. However, no government or multilateral institution has put forward a clear alternative strategy. Rather, existing literature is focusedon “what hasn’t worked” as opposed to identifying and promoting positive alternative models. In the absence of clear alternatives, bureaucracies have defaulted to path
dependency and reliance on old models.
In the absence of a cohesive government or multilateral strategy on alternatives to a militarycentric approach to addressing instability in the Sahel, civil society partners have an opportunity
to fill the gap with creative, evidence-based solutions that center the leadership and perspectives
of civil society and vulnerable communities closest to harm