derek-thomas/squad-v1.1-t5-question-generation huggingface dataset:
In the early 11th century, the Muslim physicist Ibn al-Haytham (Alhacen or Alhazen) discussed space perception and its epistemological implications in his Book of Optics (1021), he also rejected Aristotle's definition of topos (Physics IV) by way of geometric demonstrations and defined place as a mathematical spatial extension. His experimental proof of the intromission model of vision led to changes in the understanding of the visual perception of space, contrary to the previous emission theory of vision supported by Euclid and Ptolemy. In "tying the visual perception of space to prior bodily experience, Alhacen unequivocally rejected the intuitiveness of spatial perception and, therefore, the autonomy of vision. Without tangible notions of distance and size for correlation, sight can tell us next to nothing about such things."

Question: Which 11th century Muslim physicist discussed space perception and its epistemological implications? Question: Which 11th century book discussed space perception and its epistemological implications? Question: Whose definition of topos did Alhazen reject? Question: Alhazen's  experimental proof of the intromission model of vision led to the change of understanding of what? Question: Alhazen stated that without tangible notions of distance and size for correlation, sight can tell us what about spatial perception?
In 1781, Immanuel Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason, one of the most influential works in the history of the philosophy of space and time. He describes time as an a priori notion that, together with other a priori notions such as space, allows us to comprehend sense experience. Kant denies that either space or time are substance, entities in themselves, or learned by experience; he holds, rather, that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to structure our experience. Spatial measurements are used to quantify how far apart objects are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare the interval between (or duration of) events. Although space and time are held to be transcendentally ideal in this sense, they are also empirically real—that is, not mere illusions.

Question: When did Kant publish one of the most influential works in the history of the philosophy of space and time. Question: What was Kant's influential work on the history of the philosophy of space and time titled? Question: What did Kant describe time as? Question: What did Kant say was similar notion to time? Question: What did Kant say time and space allow one to do?
Arguing against the absolutist position, Leibniz offers a number of thought experiments with the purpose of showing that there is contradiction in assuming the existence of facts such as absolute location and velocity. These arguments trade heavily on two principles central to his philosophy: the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles. The principle of sufficient reason holds that for every fact, there is a reason that is sufficient to explain what and why it is the way it is and not otherwise. The identity of indiscernibles states that if there is no way of telling two entities apart, then they are one and the same thing.

Question: What did Leibniz argue against? Question: Which principles did Leibniz's arguments trade heavily upon? Question: Leibnitz held that there is a reason that is sufficient to explain what and why it is the way it is and not otherwise for every what? Question: What states that if there is no way of telling two entities apart, then they are one and the same thing?
The example Leibniz uses involves two proposed universes situated in absolute space. The only discernible difference between them is that the latter is positioned five feet to the left of the first. The example is only possible if such a thing as absolute space exists. Such a situation, however, is not possible, according to Leibniz, for if it were, a universe's position in absolute space would have no sufficient reason, as it might very well have been anywhere else. Therefore, it contradicts the principle of sufficient reason, and there could exist two distinct universes that were in all ways indiscernible, thus contradicting the identity of indiscernibles.

Question: Leibniz's example involves how many universes? Question: Where are Leibniz's universes situated? Question: How far are Leibniz's universes situated apart? Question: What is the only way Leibniz's example would be possible?
Standing out in Clarke's (and Newton's) response to Leibniz's arguments is the bucket argument: Water in a bucket, hung from a rope and set to spin, will start with a flat surface. As the water begins to spin in the bucket, the surface of the water will become concave. If the bucket is stopped, the water will continue to spin, and while the spin continues, the surface will remain concave. The concave surface is apparently not the result of the interaction of the bucket and the water, since the surface is flat when the bucket first starts to spin, it becomes concave as the water starts to spin, and it remains concave as the bucket stops.

Question: What stood out in Clark's response to Leibniz? Question: According to Clark's argument, water in a bucket, hung from a rope and spun, will begin with kind of surface? Question: As the buck spins, what happens to the water? Question: If the buck stops, the water will do what? Question: What is the surface of the water apparently not caused by?
Leibniz describes a space that exists only as a relation between objects, and which has no existence apart from the existence of those objects. Motion exists only as a relation between those objects. Newtonian space provided the absolute frame of reference within which objects can have motion. In Newton's system, the frame of reference exists independently of the objects contained within it. These objects can be described as moving in relation to space itself. For many centuries, the evidence of a concave water surface held authority.

Question: According to Leibniz, what has no existence apart from the existence of objections? Question: Leibniz describes space as existing only as a relation between what? Question: What provides the absolute frame of reference within which objects can have motion? Question: In Newton's system, how does the frame of reference exist between objects within it? Question: For how long did the evidence of a concave water surface hold authority in reference to space?
Mach suggested that thought experiments like the bucket argument are problematic. If we were to imagine a universe that only contains a bucket, on Newton's account, this bucket could be set to spin relative to absolute space, and the water it contained would form the characteristic concave surface. But in the absence of anything else in the universe, it would be difficult to confirm that the bucket was indeed spinning. It seems equally possible that the surface of the water in the bucket would remain flat.

Question: How did Mach describe thought experiments like the bucket argument? Question: What is difficult to confirm about the bucket in the absence of anything else in the universe? Question: What was equally possible about the surface of the water in the bucket?
Mach argued that, in effect, the water experiment in an otherwise empty universe would remain flat. But if another object were introduced into this universe, perhaps a distant star, there would now be something relative to which the bucket could be seen as rotating. The water inside the bucket could possibly have a slight curve. To account for the curve that we observe, an increase in the number of objects in the universe also increases the curvature in the water. Mach argued that the momentum of an object, whether angular or linear, exists as a result of the sum of the effects of other objects in the universe (Mach's Principle).

Question: What did Mach argue about the water experiment in an otherwise empty universe? Question: What did Mach argue would happen if another object were introduce in the bucket's universe? Question: What does the increase in the number of objects in the universe do to the curvature of the water? Question: Mach argued that the momentum of an object exists as a result of the sum of the effects of what? Question: The Mach argument is called what?
Albert Einstein proposed that the laws of physics should be based on the principle of relativity. This principle holds that the rules of physics must be the same for all observers, regardless of the frame of reference that is used, and that light propagates at the same speed in all reference frames. This theory was motivated by Maxwell's equations, which show that electromagnetic waves propagate in a vacuum at the speed of light. However, Maxwell's equations give no indication of what this speed is relative to. Prior to Einstein, it was thought that this speed was relative to a fixed medium, called the luminiferous ether. In contrast, the theory of special relativity postulates that light propagates at the speed of light in all inertial frames, and examines the implications of this postulate.

Question: lbert Einstein proposed that the laws of physics should be based on what principle? Question: The principle of relativity holds that the rules of physics must be the same for who? Question: In all reference frames, how is the the speed of light? Question: Einstein's theory was motivated by who? Question: Before Einstein, speed was though to be relative to what?
In classical physics, an inertial reference frame is one in which an object that experiences no forces does not accelerate. In general relativity, an inertial frame of reference is one that is following a geodesic of space-time. An object that moves against a geodesic experiences a force. An object in free fall does not experience a force, because it is following a geodesic. An object standing on the earth, however, will experience a force, as it is being held against the geodesic by the surface of the planet. In light of this, the bucket of water rotating in empty space will experience a force because it rotates with respect to the geodesic. The water will become concave, not because it is rotating with respect to the distant stars, but because it is rotating with respect to the geodesic.

Question: In classical physics, an inertial reference frame is one in which an object without force does what? Question: What follows a geodesic of space-time? Question: An object in free fall does not experience what? Question: What holds an object standing on earth against the geodesic? Question: Why will water become concave, according to the relativity theory?
Einstein partially advocates Mach's principle in that distant stars explain inertia because they provide the gravitational field against which acceleration and inertia occur. But contrary to Leibniz's account, this warped space-time is as integral a part of an object as are its other defining characteristics, such as volume and mass. If one holds, contrary to idealist beliefs, that objects exist independently of the mind, it seems that relativistics commits them to also hold that space and temporality have exactly the same type of independent existence.

Question: How does Einstein advocate Mach's principle? Question: How Einstein's theory compared to Leibniz's? Question: What is considered contrary to idealist beliefs in regards to space?
Coordinative definition has two major features. The first has to do with coordinating units of length with certain physical objects. This is motivated by the fact that we can never directly apprehend length. Instead we must choose some physical object, say the Standard Metre at the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures), or the wavelength of cadmium to stand in as our unit of length. The second feature deals with separated objects. Although we can, presumably, directly test the equality of length of two measuring rods when they are next to one another, we can not find out as much for two rods distant from one another. Even supposing that two rods, whenever brought near to one another are seen to be equal in length, we are not justified in stating that they are always equal in length. This impossibility undermines our ability to decide the equality of length of two distant objects. Sameness of length, to the contrary, must be set by definition.

Question: Coordinative definition has how many major features? Question: The first feature of Coordinative definition involves what? Question: What is the first feature motivated by? Question: The second feature of Coordinative definition involves what? Question: Sameness of length must be set how?
In the classical case, the invariance, or symmetry, group and the covariance group coincide, but, interestingly enough, they part ways in relativistic physics. The symmetry group of the general theory of relativity includes all differentiable transformations, i.e., all properties of an object are dynamical, in other words there are no absolute objects. The formulations of the general theory of relativity, unlike those of classical mechanics, do not share a standard, i.e., there is no single formulation paired with transformations. As such the covariance group of the general theory of relativity is just the covariance group of every theory.

Question: What else besides  invariance, or symmetry and group part ways in relativistic physics? Question: The symmetry group of the general theory of relativity includes what? Question: Which theory does the relativity depart from? Question: What are not pair with transformations in the theory of relativity? Question: The covariance group of the general theory of relativity is the covariance group of how many theories?
The problem of the direction of time arises directly from two contradictory facts. Firstly, the fundamental physical laws are time-reversal invariant; if a cinematographic film were taken of any process describable by means of the aforementioned laws and then played backwards, it would still portray a physically possible process. Secondly, our experience of time, at the macroscopic level, is not time-reversal invariant. Glasses can fall and break, but shards of glass cannot reassemble and fly up onto tables. We have memories of the past, and none of the future. We feel we can't change the past but can influence the future.

Question: How many contradictory facts does the problem of the direction of time arise from? Question: What kind of physical laws are time-reversal invariant? Question: If if a cinematographic film were taken by means of physical  laws and then played backwards, it would still portray what? Question: How is our experience of time at the macro level? Question: What do we not have memories of?
But in statistical mechanics things get more complicated. On one hand, statistical mechanics is far superior to classical thermodynamics, in that thermodynamic behavior, such as glass breaking, can be explained by the fundamental laws of physics paired with a statistical postulate. But statistical mechanics, unlike classical thermodynamics, is time-reversal symmetric. The second law of thermodynamics, as it arises in statistical mechanics, merely states that it is overwhelmingly likely that net entropy will increase, but it is not an absolute law.

Question: How are things in statistical mechanics? Question: What are superior to classical thermodynamics? Question: In order to explain glass breaking, Fundamental laws of physics can be paired with what? Question: Is statistical mechanics asymmetric or symmetric in regards to time-reversal? Question: What kind of law is the second law of thermodynamics, as it arises in statistical mechanics?
A third type of solution to the problem of the direction of time, although much less represented, argues that the laws are not time-reversal symmetric. For example, certain processes in quantum mechanics, relating to the weak nuclear force, are not time-reversible, keeping in mind that when dealing with quantum mechanics time-reversibility comprises a more complex definition. But this type of solution is insufficient because 1) the time-asymmetric phenomena in quantum mechanics are too few to account for the uniformity of macroscopic time-asymmetry and 2) it relies on the assumption that quantum mechanics is the final or correct description of physical processes.[citation needed]

Question: What does the third type of solution to the problem of the direction of time argue? Question: What is are kind of nuclear force is not time-reversibile? Question: Time asymmetric phenomena in quantum mechanics are to few to account what kind of time-asymmetry?
One recent proponent of the laws solution is Tim Maudlin who argues that the fundamental laws of physics are laws of temporal evolution (see Maudlin ). However, elsewhere Maudlin argues: "[the] passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world... It is the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between sequences that runs from past to future and sequences which run from future to past" [ibid, 2010 edition, p. 108]. Thus it is arguably difficult to assess whether Maudlin is suggesting that the direction of time is a consequence of the laws or is itself primitive.

Question: Who argues that the fundamental laws of physics are laws of temporal evolution? Question: Maudlin argues that the passage of time is what kind of asymmetry? Question: What grounds the distinction between sequences? Question: Whose suggestion is difficult to assess in regards to the direction of time?
The problem of the flow of time, as it has been treated in analytic philosophy, owes its beginning to a paper written by J. M. E. McTaggart. In this paper McTaggart proposes two "temporal series". The first series, which means to account for our intuitions about temporal becoming, or the moving Now, is called the A-series. The A-series orders events according to their being in the past, present or future, simpliciter and in comparison to each other. The B-series eliminates all reference to the present, and the associated temporal modalities of past and future, and orders all events by the temporal relations earlier than and later than.

Question: Who started the discussion within analytic philosophy on the problem of the flow of time? Question: How many "temporal series" did McTaggart propose? Question: What was McTaggart's first series called? Question: The A-Series orders events according to their being in the past, present or future and in comparison to what else? Question: What is McTaggart's second series called?
According to Presentism, time is an ordering of various realities. At a certain time some things exist and others do not. This is the only reality we can deal with and we cannot for example say that Homer exists because at the present time he does not. An Eternalist, on the other hand, holds that time is a dimension of reality on a par with the three spatial dimensions, and hence that all things—past, present, and future—can be said to be just as real as things in the present. According to this theory, then, Homer really does exist, though we must still use special language when talking about somebody who exists at a distant time—just as we would use special language when talking about something far away (the very words near, far, above, below, and such are directly comparable to phrases such as in the past, a minute ago, and so on).

Question: According to what theory is time an ordering of various realities? Question: Presentism states that at a certain time some things do what? Question: Who believes that time is a dimension of reality on a par with the three spatial dimensions Question: According to an Eternalist, what can be said to be just as real as things in the present? Question: According to the Eternalist theory, what must we use to describe Homer?
The positions on the persistence of objects are somewhat similar. An endurantist holds that for an object to persist through time is for it to exist completely at different times (each instance of existence we can regard as somehow separate from previous and future instances, though still numerically identical with them). A perdurantist on the other hand holds that for a thing to exist through time is for it to exist as a continuous reality, and that when we consider the thing as a whole we must consider an aggregate of all its "temporal parts" or instances of existing. Endurantism is seen as the conventional view and flows out of our pre-philosophical ideas (when I talk to somebody I think I am talking to that person as a complete object, and not just a part of a cross-temporal being), but perdurantists have attacked this position. (An example of a perdurantist is David Lewis.) One argument perdurantists use to state the superiority of their view is that perdurantism is able to take account of change in objects.

Question: How similar are the positions on the persistence of objects? Question: Who holds  that for an object to persist through time is for it to exist completely at different times? Question: Who holds for a thing to exist through time is for it to exist as a continuous reality? Question: Which view is seen as conventional? Question: Who is an example of a perdurantist?
However, asymmetry of causation can be observed in a non-arbitrary way which is not metaphysical in the case of a human hand dropping a cup of water which smashes into fragments on a hard floor, spilling the liquid. In this order, the causes of the resultant pattern of cup fragments and water spill is easily attributable in terms of the trajectory of the cup, irregularities in its structure, angle of its impact on the floor, etc. However, applying the same event in reverse, it is difficult to explain why the various pieces of the cup should fly up into the human hand and reassemble precisely into the shape of a cup, or why the water should position itself entirely within the cup. The causes of the resultant structure and shape of the cup and the encapsulation of the water by the hand within the cup are not easily attributable, as neither hand nor floor can achieve such formations of the cup or water. This asymmetry is perceivable on account of two features: i) the relationship between the agent capacities of the human hand (i.e., what it is and is not capable of and what it is for) and non-animal agency (i.e., what floors are and are not capable of and what they are for) and ii) that the pieces of cup came to possess exactly the nature and number of those of a cup before assembling. In short, such asymmetry is attributable to the relationship between temporal direction on the one hand and the implications of form and functional capacity on the other.

Question: How can asymmetry of causation be observed? Question: How many features of asymmetry in the cup example can be viewed? Question: Asymmetry is attributable to a relation of what kind of direction? Question: What else, besides direction, is asymmetry attributable to?
Traditionally considered the last part of the Stone Age, the Neolithic followed the terminal Holocene Epipaleolithic period and commenced with the beginning of farming, which produced the "Neolithic Revolution". It ended when metal tools became widespread (in the Copper Age or Bronze Age; or, in some geographical regions, in the Iron Age). The Neolithic is a progression of behavioral and cultural characteristics and changes, including the use of wild and domestic crops and of domesticated animals.

Question: What era is commonly known as the final phase of the Stone Age? Question: What era preceded the Neolithic? Question: What event is associated with the start of farming? Question: What era saw an increase in metal tool use?