derek-thomas/squad-v1.1-t5-question-generation huggingface dataset:
By spring 1950, Stalin believed the strategic situation had changed. The Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb in September 1949; American soldiers had fully withdrawn from Korea; the Americans had not intervened to stop the communist victory in China, and Stalin calculated that the Americans would be even less willing to fight in Korea—which had seemingly much less strategic significance. The Soviets had also cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with the US embassy in Moscow, and reading these dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation. Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino–Soviet Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Treaty.

Question: When did the Soviets first detonate a nuclear bomb? Question: Who was convinced that the US did was no longer interested in Korea? Question: What country did not prevent a Communist victory in China? Question: Where did Stalin engage in an aggressive political strategy? Question: What treaty did Stalin and China enter into?
In April 1950, Stalin gave Kim permission to invade the South under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if they became needed. Stalin made it clear that Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the Americans. Kim met with Mao in May 1950. Mao was concerned that the Americans would intervene but agreed to support the North Korean invasion. China desperately needed the economic and military aid promised by the Soviets. At that time, the Chinese were in the process of demobilizing half of the PLA's 5.6 million soldiers. However, Mao sent more ethnic Korean PLA veterans to Korea and promised to move an army closer to the Korean border. Once Mao's commitment was secured, preparations for war accelerated.

Question: Who did the Soviets not want to engage in conflict? Question: Who had to agree to send reinforcements for Stalin to give permission for the invasion of Korea? Question: What concern did Mao have about the South Korean invasion? Question: Who needed Soviet financial and military aid? Question: What did Mao's assistance allow North Korea to accelerate?
Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from the Second World War were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. These generals completed the plans for the attack by May. The original plans called for a skirmish to be initiated in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch a "counterattack" that would capture Seoul and encircle and destroy the South Korean army. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants, capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports.

Question: Who did the Soviets send to North Korea? Question: What were the generals sent to North Korea collectively called? Question: When did the generals finalize their attack strategy? Question: Where did the conflict in South Korea begin?
On 7 June 1950, Kim Il-sung called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in Haeju on 15–17 June 1950. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South, as a peace overture that Rhee rejected. On 21 June, Kim Il-Sung revised his war plan to involve general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in the Ongjin peninsula. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change of plan.

Question: Who called for Korean elections in 1950? Question: When did Kim Il-Sung call for the Haeju conference? Question: Who rejected the peace gesture? Question: What did Kim Il-Sung do after the peace overture was rejected? Question: Why did Kim's war plan need revising?
While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.

Question: Who primarily initiated the clashes along the 38th parallel? Question: What group trained the Republic of Korea army? Question: What general had a lot of confidence in the Republic of Korea's army? Question: Who wanted to take over North Korea? Question: Who was the diplomat that visited Korea?
At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

Question: Who provoked a conflict by crossing the 38th parallel? Question: Who was the Korean People's Army trying to execute? Question: Where did the fighting begin? Question: Who questioned the claim that South Korean did not provoke the KPA? Question: Who claimed to have taken control of Haeju?
On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

Question: Who, along with members of the South Korean government, fled South Korea? Question: What day was the city of Seoul captured? Question: What did South Korea do to cause members of the South Korean military unit to become trapped near the Han River? Question: What bridge were refugees attempting to cross when it was blown up by the South Korean Army? Question: How many South Korean National Assemblyman pledged their allegiance to Seoul?
One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

Question: What country was believed to provide a counterbalance to China's and the Soviet Union's involvement in Korea? Question: Which President decided to intervene after realizing that Japan's security would be affected by the hostility in Korea? Question: Why was South Korea important to the US? Question: What affected America's response to the situation in South Korea?
A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

Question: What was the Truman administration concerned about that was preventing them from getting involved in the Korean conflict? Question: Who believed that if the issues in Korea were not dealt with the communist aggression would spread? Question: What agency approved the use of force in South Korea? Question: What resources did the US devote to South Korea after the Security Council approved engaging in an armed conflict? Question: Why did the US not send in ground troops after the United Nations approved the use of force?
On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

Question: Who condemned the actions of North Korea? Question: What did UN Security Council Resolution 82 accomplish? Question: Which permanent member of the UN Security Council boycotted council meetings in protest of Taiwan's seat in the United Nations? Question: What resolution encouraged Security Council Members to send military assistance to the Republic of Korea? Question: Who accused the United States of beginning an armed intervention in South Korea?
The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

Question: What country challenged the legitimacy of the Korean War? Question: Where did the intelligence information that led to the passage of Resolution 83 come from? Question: What charter did the US believe was violated by intervening in the Korean conflict? Question: What type of vote is required for the Security Council to commit to military action in Korea. Question: How many permanent members did the UN Security Council have?
By mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, Chuncheon, Uijeongbu, and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, some 150 Yak fighter planes, 78 Yak trainers, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the invasion force, the North KPA had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as sea-borne artillery for their in-country armies.

Question: What was the maximum number of North Korean troops engaged in the war? Question: How many infantry divisions did N. Korea have engaged in the war? Question: How many reserve soldiers did North Korea have? Question: What type of naval ships did the South and North Koreans have?
In contrast, the ROK Army defenders were relatively unprepared and ill-equipped. In South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), R.E. Appleman reports the ROK forces' low combat readiness as of 25 June 1950. The ROK Army had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-piece air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT6 advanced-trainer airplanes. There were no large foreign military garrisons in Korea at the time of the invasion, but there were large U.S. garrisons and air forces in Japan.

Question: What was the problem with the ROK Army? Question: Who reported that South Korea's military was not ready for combat? Question: Who declined the ROK's request for tanks? Question: In what country did the US maintain air forces and garrisons?
On Saturday, 24 June 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed President Truman that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. Truman and Acheson discussed a U.S. invasion response and agreed that the United States was obligated to act, paralleling the North Korean invasion with Adolf Hitler's aggressions in the 1930s, with the conclusion being that the mistake of appeasement must not be repeated. Several U.S. industries were mobilized to supply materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and other services necessary to support the military objectives of the Korean War. However, President Truman later acknowledged that he believed fighting the invasion was essential to the American goal of the global containment of communism as outlined in the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) (declassified in 1975):

Question: Which Secretary of State did President Truman hold discussions about how the US would respond to the invasion of South Korea? Question: The North Korean invasion of South Korea was compared to what event? Question: What did the US not want to see repeated? Question: The US involvement in the Korean War was important to achieving what goal? Question: What report discussed the United States's goals for containing communism?
As an initial response, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea, and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could be imposed only 'on paper', since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request. In fact, because of the extensive defense cuts and the emphasis placed on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services were in a position to make a robust response with conventional military strength. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was faced with re-organizing and deploying an American military force that was a shadow of its World War II counterpart. The impact of the Truman administration's defense budget cutbacks were now keenly felt, as American troops fought a series of costly rearguard actions. Lacking sufficient anti-tank weapons, artillery or armor, they were driven back down the Korean peninsula to Pusan. In a postwar analysis of the unpreparedness of U.S. Army forces deployed to Korea during the summer and fall of 1950, Army Major General Floyd L. Parks stated that "Many who never lived to tell the tale had to fight the full range of ground warfare from offensive to delaying action, unit by unit, man by man ... [T]hat we were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat ... does not relieve us from the blame of having placed our own flesh and blood in such a predicament."

Question: Why was the US naval blockade not feasible? Question: Who was tasked with reorganization and deploying of the US military? Question: Why was the US not able to provide an adequate response to the Korean invasion? Question: Who was forced to retreat back to the Pusan Peninsula due to unpreparedness? Question: Who stated that winning the war does not excuse putting US troops into a bad situation?
Acting on State Secretary Acheson's recommendation, President Truman ordered General MacArthur to transfer matériel to the Army of the Republic of Korea while giving air cover to the evacuation of U.S. nationals. The President disagreed with advisers who recommended unilateral U.S. bombing of the North Korean forces, and ordered the US Seventh Fleet to protect the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose government asked to fight in Korea. The United States denied ROC's request for combat, lest it provoke a communist Chinese retaliation. Because the United States had sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai criticized both the UN and U.S. initiatives as "armed aggression on Chinese territory."

Question: Who disagreed with the idea of unilaterally bombing the North Korean military? Question: What general provided material to the Republic of Korea and evacuated US nationals? Question: What fleet was sent to the Taiwan Strait? Question: Fearing the provocation of Communist China, what country's request for combat troops did the US deny? Question: Who is the Chinese premier that called the actions of the US and the United Nations an act of aggression?
The Battle of Osan, the first significant American engagement of the Korean War, involved the 540-soldier Task Force Smith, which was a small forward element of the 24th Infantry Division which had been flown in from Japan. On 5 July 1950, Task Force Smith attacked the North Koreans at Osan but without weapons capable of destroying the North Koreans' tanks. They were unsuccessful; the result was 180 dead, wounded, or taken prisoner. The KPA progressed southwards, pushing back the US force at Pyongtaek, Chonan, and Chochiwon, forcing the 24th Division's retreat to Taejeon, which the KPA captured in the Battle of Taejon; the 24th Division suffered 3,602 dead and wounded and 2,962 captured, including the Division's Commander, Major General William F. Dean.

Question: What battle is considered the US's first significant fight in the Korean War? Question: Which infantry division was involved in the Battle of Osan? Question: In what country is the US's Task Force Smith located? Question: Where was the 24th Division forced to retreat to what location? Question: At what Battle did the 24th Infantry Division suffer major losses?
By August, the KPA had pushed back the ROK Army and the Eighth United States Army to the vicinity of Pusan in southeast Korea. In their southward advance, the KPA purged the Republic of Korea's intelligentsia by killing civil servants and intellectuals. On 20 August, General MacArthur warned North Korean leader Kim Il-sung that he was responsible for the KPA's atrocities. By September, the UN Command controlled the Pusan perimeter, enclosing about 10% of Korea, in a line partially defined by the Nakdong River.

Question: Where did the Eighth United States and ROK get pushed back to? Question: How did the KPA hurt the Republic of Korea's intellectual core? Question: Who was held responsible for the actions of the KPA? Question: How much of Korea was under the control of the United Nations? Question: What body of water provided a natural border to the UN command-controlled Pusan perimeter?
Although Kim's early successes had led him to predict that he would end the war by the end of August, Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. To counter a possible U.S. deployment, Zhou Enlai secured a Soviet commitment to have the Soviet Union support Chinese forces with air cover, and deployed 260,000 soldiers along the Korean border, under the command of Gao Gang. Zhou commanded Chai Chengwen to conduct a topographical survey of Korea, and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou's military advisor in Korea, to analyze the military situation in Korea. Lei concluded that MacArthur would most likely attempt a landing at Incheon. After conferring with Mao that this would be MacArthur's most likely strategy, Zhou briefed Soviet and North Korean advisers of Lei's findings, and issued orders to Chinese army commanders deployed on the Korean border to prepare for American naval activity in the Korea Strait.

Question: Even though it was predicted that the Korean War would end in August, who was less than optimistic about the prediction? Question: Why did Zhou Enlai want a commitment the Soviet Union to commit to supporting the Chinese troops? Question: Who helped North Korea prepare for war by surveying the country? Question: Where did North Korea predict that MacArthur would enter Korea? Question: Where did the Chinese military deploy troops in preparation for the arrival of US troops?
In the resulting Battle of Pusan Perimeter (August–September 1950), the U.S. Army withstood KPA attacks meant to capture the city at the Naktong Bulge, P'ohang-dong, and Taegu. The United States Air Force (USAF) interrupted KPA logistics with 40 daily ground support sorties that destroyed 32 bridges, halting most daytime road and rail traffic. KPA forces were forced to hide in tunnels by day and move only at night. To deny matériel to the KPA, the USAF destroyed logistics depots, petroleum refineries, and harbors, while the U.S. Navy air forces attacked transport hubs. Consequently, the over-extended KPA could not be supplied throughout the south. On 27 August, 67th Fighter Squadron aircraft mistakenly attacked facilities in Chinese territory and the Soviet Union called the UN Security Council's attention to China's complaint about the incident. The US proposed that a commission of India and Sweden determine what the US should pay in compensation but the Soviets vetoed the US proposal.

Question: What did the US Air Force's daytime attacks cause the KPA to do? Question: Which army was trying to capture Teague and the Naktong Bulge? Question: Why did the Soviet Union complain about the action of the US to the UN Security Council? Question: Along with India, what other nation was to determine the how much the US would have to compensate China? Question: Why did India and Sweden never determine how much the US would compensate China?
Meanwhile, U.S. garrisons in Japan continually dispatched soldiers and matériel to reinforce defenders in the Pusan Perimeter. Tank battalions deployed to Korea directly from the U.S. mainland from the port of San Francisco to the port of Pusan, the largest Korean port. By late August, the Pusan Perimeter had some 500 medium tanks battle-ready. In early September 1950, ROK Army and UN Command forces outnumbered the KPA 180,000 to 100,000 soldiers. The UN forces, once prepared, counterattacked and broke out of the Pusan Perimeter.

Question: Besides the United States, what other country sent military personnel to Korea? Question: Where in the United States was the tank battalion located? Question: What is Korea's largest port? Question: Who had the fewest number of troops in Korea? Question: Who was able to counterattack and move the KPA away from the Pusan Perimeter?