dedol-hf/india-case-legal-rag huggingface dataset:
on  which the detenue was detained on a former  occasion  is
still available and that there was need for detention on its
basis no mala fides can be attributed to the authority  from
the fact that the ground alleged for the second detention is
the same as that of the first detention.
    Whether  grounds have been communicated "as soon as  may
be" must depend on the facts of each case. No arbitrary time
limit can be laid down.
    The  recent rulings of the Supreme Court  establish  (a)
that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself and  with-
out  leading to an inference of mala fides or lack  of  good
faith  is not a justiciable issue in a court of law for  the
necessity  of  making the order, inasmuch as the  ground  or
grounds on which the order of detention was made is a matter
for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or of  the
detaining authority; (b) that there is nothing in the Act to
prevent  particulars of the grounds being furnished  to  the
detenu  within  a reasonable time so that he  may  have  the
earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the
detention order--what is reasonable time being dependent  on
the facts of each case; (c) that failure to furnish  grounds
with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable
the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportu-
nity  against  the detention order can be  considered  by  a
court of law as an invasion of a fundamental right or  safe-
guard  guaranteed by the Constitution, viz. being given  the
earliest opportunity to make a representation; and (d)  that
no  new grounds could be supplied to strengthen  or  fortify
the original order of detention.
     Where  the  petitioners against whom  detention  orders
were made were given only vague grounds and there was  inex-
cusable delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of  the
particulars, held that their detention was illegal and  they
should be released.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:-Petitions Nos. 149 and
167 of 1950.
758
    Application  under  Art. 32 of the  Constitution  for  a
writ in the nature of habeas corpus I
     Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the  petitioner in  petition
No. 149.
 N.s. Bindra for the petitioner in Petition No. 167.
   B.K.  Khanna,  Advocate-General of the Punjab,  for  the
respondent in both the petitions.
    M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, for the Union
of India (Intervener in Petition No. 149).
1951.   February  23.   The Judgment of  the  Court  was
delivered by
  CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. --The earlier of the two petitions
has been filed by one Ujagar Singh, under article 32 of  the
Constitution  of India, for a writ of habeas corpus and  for
an order of release from detention.  The latter petition  is
a  similar one by one Jagiit Singh.  In both the  petitions,
the respondent is the State of Punjab. The orders of  deten-
tion  were  made under the preventive Detention  Act  IV  of
1950.  The  petitions are not connected  with  each   other,
except that they raise the same grounds.
   In petition No. 149 of 1950, Ujagar Singh was  originally
arrested and detained  under  the East punjab Public  Safety
Act  on 29th September, 1948.He was released on 28th  March,
1949,  but on the same date, there was an  internment  order
against him.  On 29th September, 1949, he was rearrested. On
2nd March, 1950, an order of detention under the  Preventive
Detention  Act, 1950, was served on him, and on  3rd  April,
1950, he was served with the grounds of detention dated 11th
March,  1950.  Both in September, 1949, and in March,  1950,
the ground alleged was ' 'You tried to create public  disor-
der  amongst tenants in Una Tehsil by circulating  and  dis-
tributing  objectionable  literature issued  by  underground
communists." Additional grounds were furnished in July 1950.
   In  petition No. 167 of  1950, Jagjit Singh was  arrested
on 24th July, 1948. under the provisions of the
759
Punjab Safety Act, 1947. After the East Punjab Public Safety
Act,  1949, came into force, a fresh detention  order  dated
14th  May,  1949, was served on him and he continued  to  be
kept in jail.  Grounds of detention were given to him on 7th
September,  1949. A fresh order of detention under the  Pre-
ventive  Detention Act (IV of 1950) dated 2nd  March,  1950,
was  served on 7th March, 1950. Grounds of  detention  dated
11th  March,  1950, were served on him on 3rd  April,  1950.
Both  in September 1949 and April 1950, the same ground  was
given,  i.e., "In pursuance of the policy of  the  Communist
Party, you were engaged in preparing the masses for  violent
revolutionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to
give effect to this programme." Additional or  supplementary
grounds were served on 5th August, 1950.
     Several  contentions  were advanced on  behalf  of  the
petitioners challenging the legality of their detention  and
urging that as the detention was unlawful and the  petition-
ers'  fundamental  right of personal liberty  had  been  in-
fringed, they should be set at liberty.  The points taken on
their  behalf can be briefly summarised as follows_  As  the
ground of detention now mentioned was the same as the ground
specified  in 1948 or 1949, i.e., months earlier  under  the
Provincial Acts, the order of detention was made mechanical-
ly  and  was  really mala fide in the sense  that  there  is
nothing to show that were was any fresh satisfaction on  the
part of the detaining authority that detention was necessary
in the interests of public order. Secondly, the grounds were
not  given  "as  soon as may be", which  is  required  under
section  7  of the Act; and as an unusually long  period  of
time  elapsed between the order of detention and the  giving
of  the grounds, the detention must be held to  be  unlawful
after the lapse of a reasonable time.  Thirdly, the  grounds
given  originally were so vague that they could not be  said
to be grounds at all such as would enable the detenu to make
any representation against the order.  Fourthly,  supplemen-
tary grounds could not be furnished and should not be  taken
into account in considering whether the
760
original  order was lawful, or whether the detention  became
unlawful after a particular period of time. Two other points
of  a  subsidiary nature were also raised, namely  that  the
order  was bad as the period of detention was not  specified
therein as appears to be required by section 12 and that the
grounds  given did not purport to state that  the  authority
making the order was the Governor of the State.
     There  is no substance in the last two points.  Section
12 of the Act does not require that the period of  detention
should be specified in the order itself where the  detention
is  with a view to preventing any person from acting in  any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.   The
section  itself  provides that he can  be  detained  without
obtaining  the  opinion of an Advisory Board  for  a  period
longer than three months but not exceeding one year from the
date of detention.  Normally, the detention period shall not
exceed  three  months,   unless an  Advisory  Board  reports
before  the expiration of the said period that there  is  in
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.  See  arti-
cle  22,  clause (4), sub-clause (a)  of  the  Constitution.
Under sub-clause (7) (a) of the same article, Parliament may
by  law  prescrib,  the circumstances under which,  and  the
class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained
for a period longer than three months under any law  provid-
ing  for preventive detention without obtaining the  opinion
of  an Advisory Board in accordance with the  provisions  of
sub-clause  (a)  of clause (4)."  Therefore,  detention  for
more than three months can be justified either on the ground
of an opinion of the Advisory Board sanctioning or  warrant-
ing longer detention or on the ground that the detention  is
to secure the due maintenance of public order, in which case
it  cannot exceed one year in any event, as stated. in  sec-
tion  12 of the Preventive Detention Act.  It is thus  clear
that the period is not to exceed three months generally, but
may go up to one year in certain special cases.  In view  of
these  provisions,  the non-specification  of  any  definite
period
761
in the detention order is not a material omission  rendering
the order itself invalid.
    Under  section  3 of the Preventive Detention  Act,  the
authority  to make the order is the State Government.   Sec-
tion 166 (1) of the Constitution provides that all executive
action  of the Government of a State, shall be expressed  to
be taken in the name of the Governor.  The orders of  deten-
tion expressly state that the Governor of Punjab was  satis-
fied  of  their  necessity and that they were  made  by  his
order.   The orders are signed no doubt by the  Home  Secre-
tary,  but  this  is no defect.  The  communication  of  the
grounds  need not be made directly by the  authority  making
the  order. Section 7 does not require this. The  communica-
tion  may be through recognized channels prescribed  by  the
administrative rules of business.
    Let  us now turn our attention to the main  contentions.
There is nothing strange or surprising in the fact that  the
same  grounds have been repeated after the lapse of  several
months  in  both the cases, when it is remembered  that  the
petitioners  were  under detention and in  jail  during  the
whole of the intervening period.  No fresh activities  could
be attributed to them.  There could only be a repetition  of
the  original  ground or grounds, whether good or  bad.   It
does  not  follow  from this that the  satisfaction  of  the
detaining authority was purely mechanical and that the  mind
did  not  go with the pen.  The past conduct  or  antecedent
history of a person can be taken into account when making  a
detention  order,  and, as a matter of fact, it  is  largely
from  prior events showing the tendencies or inclinations of
the  man  that  an inference could be drawn  whether  he  is
likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial  to
the maintenance of public order.  If the authority satisfied
himself  that  the original ground was still  available  and
that  there  was need for detention on its  basis,  no  mala
fides  can  be attributed to the authority  from  this  fact
alone.
    The  Act does not fix the time within which the  grounds
should be furnished to the person detained.
762
It merely states that the communication must be "as soon  as
may be". This means reasonable despatch and what is reasona-
ble  must  depend on the facts of each case.   No  arbitrary
time limit can be set down. The delays in the  communication
of  the  grounds in the two petitions have  been  adequately
explained by the Home Secretary who says  in this affidavits
that  grounds had to be supplied to nearly 250  detenus  and
that the printing of the necessary forms occupied some time.
According to him, he made an order even on 11-3-1950 for the
supply of the grounds.
    The  extreme vagueness of the grounds is alone  left  as
the  chief line of attack. As stated already,  the  original
ground  communicated  in  Petition No. 149 of  1950  is  "to
create  public  disorder amongst tenants in  the  Tehsil  by
circulating and distributing objectionable literature issued
by  underground  communists."  In the  other  petition,  the
ground is "In pursuance of the policy of the Communist Party
you were engaged in preparing the masses for violent revolu-
tionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to  give
effect  to  this programme." We shall leave  aside  for  the
moment the supplementary grounds furnished later.
    There  can  be little doubt that in both the  cases  the
grounds  furnished in the first instance were highly  vague.
If we had only Iswar Das's case to go by, Petition No. 30 of
1950, such vagueness by itself would constitute a justifica-
tion for release of the petitioners.  Since the date of that
decision,  however. this Court had to consider the  question
at  great length in two cases from Bombay and  Calcutta  re-
spectively--Cases Nos. 22 and 24 of 1950--where the  subject
of  the  meaning and scope of section 7  of  the  Preventive
Detention Act and article 22, sub-clauses (5) and (6)of  the
Constitution of India. came up for elaborate  consideration.
The  said cases were decided on 25th January, 1951,  and  we
are now governed by the principles laid down in these  judg-
ments.  It was held by a majority of the Judges in Case  No.
22 of 1950
(1) State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya [1951]  S.C.R.
167.
763
(a)  that mere vagueness of grounds standing by  itself  and
without  leading  to an inference of mala fides or  lack  of
good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of law  for
the  necessity of making' the order, inasmuch as the  ground
or  grounds  on which the order of detention was made  is  a
matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government  or
of the detaining authority; (b) that there is nothing in the
Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being furnished to
the detenu within a reasonable time, so that he may have the
earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the
detention  order--what  is  reasonable  time being dependent
on  the  facts  of each case; (c) that  failure  to  furnish
grounds  with  the speedy addition of  such  particulars  as
would  enable  the detenu to make a  representation  at  the
earliest  opportunity  against the detention  order  can  be
considered by a court of law as an. invasion of a  fundamen-
tal right or safeguard guaranteed by the Constitution, viz.,
being  given the earliest opportunity to make a  representa-
tion;and  (d)  that  no new grounds  could  be  supplied  to
strengthen or fortify the original order of detention.
    We are not concerned so much with the earlier history of
the detenus as with what happened to them under the  Preven-
tive  Detention  Act, 1950. OverloOking the  fact  that  the
ground mentioned In March 1950 was the same as that given in
September 1949, and condoning the vagueness in the  original
ground furnished in both the cases to support the making  Of
the  order, it is impossible to justify the delay of  nearly
four  months in furnishing what have been called  additional
or supplementary grounds,
    Let us take up Petition No. 149 first.   In the  grounds
furnished  in  July  1950, there are several  which  do  not
apparently relate to the original ground. "You were  respon-
sible  for  hartal by labourers working on  Bhalera  Dam  in
October  1947"....  "You  instigated  labourers  working  in
Nangal  in 1948 to go on strike to secure the acceptance  of
their demands"    "After release you absconded yourself from
your village and
99
764
remained  untraced for a considerable period"   ....   "When
you  were  re-arrested on 29-9-1949,  lot  of  objectionable
communist  literature  was  recovered  from  your   personal
search"--are  instances of new grounds, and they have to  be
eliminated  therefore from consideration. In Jagjit  Singh's
petition  No. 167 of 1950, the supplemental  grounds,  which
are as many as ten in number, are dated 31-7-1950, but  they
were  served on him on 5-8-1950, that is two days  after  he
had prepared his petition to this court under article 32  of
the  Constitution.  The grounds may be taken as  particulars
of   the  general allegation  made against him  on  3-4-1950
when  the  original grounds of detention were  served.   But
the  time factor to enable him to make a  representation  at
the  earliest opportunity was not borne in mind  or  adhered
to.  In the affidavit of Shri Vishan Bhagwan, Home Secretary
to  the  Punjab Government, dated 6th  September,  1950,  no
explanation has been offered for this abnormal delay in  the
specification of the particulars.  This delay is very unfor-
tunate  indeed. But for its occurrence the petitioner  would
not  have been able to urge that one of the valuable  rights
guaranteed  to him by the Constitution has   been  violated.
It  is not alleged  b.y  the Home Secretary that the  detenu
was  furnished with these particulars when he  was  arrested
and detained under the Provincial Act and that  consequently
it was considered unnecessary to give him the same  particu-
lars  once over.  On the other hand, the detenu's  complaint
has throughout been that he was given no particulars at  all
till the 5th August, 1950.
    As  the petitioners were given only vague grounds  which
were  not  particularised or made specific so as  to  afford
them the  earliest  opportunity  of  making  representations
against their detention orders, and their having been  inex-
cusable  delay in acquainting them with particulars of  what
was alleged. the petitioners have to be released, the  rules
being made absolute.  Ordered accordingly.
765
PATANJALI  SASTRI J.--I concur in the order proposed  by
my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
    DAS J.--In view of the majority decision in Case No.  22
of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I
concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.
           Order accordingly.
Petition No. 194 of 1950
Agent  for  the petitioner: R.R. Biswas.
Agent  for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.
Agent for the intervener: P.A. Mehta.
Petition No. 167 of 1950
Agent for the petition: R.S. Narula.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehla.
PETITIONER:
CHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS
        Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDAAND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
23/02/1951
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
 1951 AIR  199            1951 SCR  221
 CITATOR INFO :
 RF         1961 SC1596  (3)
 E          1985 SC 709  (4,12)
ACT:
    Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates  Control Act
(LVII  of 1947), ss. 12, 50--Application q[ Act  to  appeals
pending when Act came into force--Retrospective operation of
Act, extent of-Construction of ss. 12 and 50.
HEADNOTE:
    The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates  Control
Act, LVII of 1947, which came into force on the 13th  Febru-
ary, 1948, has no application to appeals which were  pending
at the time when the Act came into force.  Its retrospective
effect  is limited to cases mentioned in s. 50 of  the  Act,
that  is to say, to suits and proceedings which were  trans-
ferred  under  the  provisions of the said  section  to  the
courts having jurisdiction under the Act.
    Section  12 of the said Act is in terms prospective  and
not  retrospective  in effect. Sub-section  (2)  relates  to
suits which may be instituted after the Act comes into force
and sub-s. (3) also only applies to such suits.
Nilkanth v. Rasiklal (A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 210) approved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Appeal  (Civil Appeal No.
57 of 1950) from a judgment and decree of the High Court  of
Judicature  at Bombay dated 1st April, 1948, in  Appeal  No.
:365  of 1947 reversing a judgment of the Joint Civil  Judge
at  Ahmedabad, dated 14th October, 1947, in Suit No. 174  of
1945.
    B.   Somayya  (Jindra Lal,  with  him)  for  the  appel-
lants.
    C.K.  Daphtary  (Sri Narain Andley, with  him)  for  the
respondents.
1951. February 23. The judgment of the Court was  deliv-
ered by
    MAHAJAN  J.  - The appellants are owners of  a  property
known as "Bharat Bhuvan Theatre" at Ahmedabad. The  respond-
ents  are the lessees of the said theatre. The term  of  the
lease was to expire on the 2nd
222
    December,  1945,  unless the lessees gave  to  the  land
lords  three  months  previous notice in  writing  of  their
intention of exercising their option of renewal of the lease
for  a further period of two years.  On the  13th  December,
1945, the appellants filed the suit out of which this appeal
arises for ejectment of the respondents and for recovery  of
certain amounts. This suit was decreed on the 14th  October,
1947,  on the following findings: (1) that  the  respondents
had  not exercised the  option of the renewal of  the  lease
according  to the stipulations contained in the  lease,  (2)
that they had committed breaches of the terms of the  lease,
and (3) that they were not protected by the Rent Restriction
Act. An enquiry was directed into the amount of mesne  prof-
its.   The  respondents filed an append in  the  High  Court
against  the  decree of the Joint Civil Judge  on  the  10th
November, 1947.  The appeal was heard by a Bench of the High
Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.) on the 26th February, 1948, and
was decided on the 1st April, 1948.  The judgment and decree
of  the Joint Civil Judge were reversed and the  plaintiff's
suit  was dismissed. The High Court affirmed the finding  of
the  trial  court on the first point and held  in  agreement
with  it that the respondents had not proved that they  gave
three  months previous notice in writing to  the  appellants
for renewal of the lease as required by clause 4 (2) of  the
lease.   It reversed the finding of the trial Judge  on  the
point  that  the respondents had committed breaches  of  the
terms  contained in clause 2 (20) of the lease. Finally,  it
reached  the  conclusion that although the  decree  appealed
from  was right on the date it was made, yet in view of  the
altered  circumstances  created  by reason  of  coming  into
operation of Act LVII of 1947 the appellants were not  enti-
tled to recovery of possession of the suit premises.   Being
aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the  appellants
obtained a certificate and filed an appeal in this court  on
the 7th March, 1949, and it is now before us for decision.
     It was contended before the High Court that the  appeal
being in the nature of a rehearing, it should be
223
decided  in  accordance with the provisions of Act  LVII  of
1947  which came into force on the 13th February, 1948,  and
not in accordance with the provisions of the Act in force at
the  time when the decree was passed by the trial court.  In
other  words,  the contention was that there having  been  a
change in the law after the date of the decree passed by the
trial  Judge and before the appeal was heard, the rights  of
the parties should be determined in accordance with the  law
as  it stood on the date of the hearing of the  appeal.  The
High Court gave effect to this contention and set aside  the
decree made for ejectment of the respondents.
    Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the  deci-
sion of the High Court before us on three grounds: (1)  that
assuming that the appeal had to be decided by the High Court
in  accordance with the provisions of Act LVII of 1947,  the
provisions  of that Act had no application to  pending   ap-
peals   which  had  been excluded from its  ambit;  (9,)that
Act  LVII  of 1947 had been amended by Bombay  Act  III   of
1949  and  that the appeal pending in this court  should  be
decided in accordance  with  the  provisions  of the amended
Act  which excluded pending appeals from the purview of  Act
LVII  of   1947;  and  (3) that the   High   Court   wrongly
reversed  the trial court's finding that the respondents had
committed  breaches of the terms contained in clause 2  (20)
of  the  lease.   The learned counsel  for  the  respondents
besides  controverting the contentions raised on  behalf  of
the  appellants contended that both the courts had erred  in
holding that the respondents had not proved that they  exer-
cised  the option of renewal of the lease according  to  the
stipulations contained therein.
    In  our  opinion,  the decision of  the  appeal  depends
solely on the construction of sections 12 and 50 of Act LVII
of  1947.   The  question to decide is  whether  the  Bombay
Rents,  Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,  LVII  of
1947, which was enacted on the 19th January, 1948, and which
came into force on the 13th February,  1948,  has   applica-
tion to
29
224
pending  appeals  or  whether its  retrospective  effect  is
limited  to cases mentioned in section 50 of the  Act.   The
point   whether   the  option   of   renewal  was  exercised