dedol-hf/india-case-legal-rag huggingface dataset:
March,  they  cannot  support the  detention  on  additional
grounds  which  were not before them on that day  and  which
they set out in the second communication four months  later.
It  was also contended that the fact of  this  communication
showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the origi-
nal grounds and had therefore put forth these  supplementary
grounds  as an afterthought. In our opinion these  arguments
cannot  be accepted. A 'description of the contents  of  the
second  communication  as "supplementary grounds"  does  not
necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has  to
look  at  the  contents to find out  whether  they  are  new
grounds  as  explained  in our judgment in Case  No.  92  of
1950(1).  Examining the contents of the later  communication
in  that way we find that they only furnish details  of  the
second  heads  of the grounds furnished to  the  appropriate
appellant on 14th March, 1950, in respect of his activities.
We are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with
the High Court in its conclusion that these are not fresh or
new grounds.  We do not think it proper to consider the true
effect  of  the communication only by  reading  its  opening
words.  The whole of it must be read and considered  togeth-
er.  The contention that the authorities were not  satisfied
on the original
(1) Supra, p. 167.
218
grounds  and therefore put forth this. communication as  the
supplemental grounds is again unsound.  The fact that  these
details  were communicated later does not  necessarily  show
that  they were not within the knowledge of the  authorities
when  they sent the communication dated the 14th  of  March.
The contention that this communication of the 16th of  July,
1950, was not "as soon as may be", has to be rejected having
regard to the principles set out in our judgment in Case No.
22 of 1950.  The facts in each case have to to be taken into
consideration and if the detained person contends that  this
part  of the procedure prescribed in article 22 (5) was  not
complied with, the authorities will have to place  materials
before the court to refute that contention.  In the  present
case  the High Court has considered that there has  been  no
infringement of this procedural law and we see no reason  to
come to a different conclusion.
It  was next argued that the grounds being  vague,  they
could not be considered as grounds at all and therefore they
could  not be sufficient "to satisfy" the  authorities.   On
this point we have nothing to add to what we have stated  in
our  judgment  in  Case No. 22 of 1950.  We  are  unable  to
accept the contention that "vague grounds" stand on the same
footing  as "irrelevant grounds".  An irrelevant ground  has
no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial
Government  which  makes the  order of  detention.  For  the
reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept
the  contention that if the grounds are vague and no  repre-
sentation  is possible there can be no satisfaction  of  the
authority  as  required under section 3  of  the  Preventive
Detention  Act.  This argument mixes up  two  objects.   The
sufficiency  of the grounds, which gives rise to the  satis-
faction  of the Provincial Government, is not a  matter  for
examination by the court. The sufficiency of the grounds  to
give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make  a
representation  can be examined by the court, but only  from
that  point of view. We are therefore unable to  accept  the
contention that the quality and characteristic of
219
the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the  ques-
tion  of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one  person
may  be,  but  another may not be,  satisfied  on  the  same
grounds.   That aspect however is not for the  determination
of  the court, having regard to the words used in  the  Act.
The second part of the enquiry is clearly open to the  court
under article 22 (5). We are therefore unable to accept  the
argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or  adequate
for  making the representation the grounds cannot be  suffi-
cient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.
    As  regards the grounds furnished by the  Government  in
each  case in its first communication, it is  sufficient  to
notice  that  while the first ground is common  to  all  the
appellants,  the second ground is different in  most  cases.
The High Court has considered the case of each appellant  in
respect of the communication dated the 14th of March,  1950,
sent  to him. In their opinion those grounds are not  vague.
They  have held that the procedural requirement to give  the
detained person the earliest opportunity to make a represen-
tation  has not been infringed by the communication  of  the
grounds of the 14th of March and by the subsequent  communi-
cation  made to the appellants in July.  This point was  not
seriously pressed before us.  After hearing counsel for  the
appellant we see no reason to differ from the conclusion  of
the  High  Court  on this point.   The result  is  that  the
appeal fails and is dismissed.
    PATANJALI  SASTRI J.--This appeal was heard  along  with
Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar
Vaidya)(1),  as the main question involved was the same.  In
the  view I have expressed on that question in  my  judgment
delivered today in that case, this appeal cannot succeed and
I agree that it should be dismissed.
    DAS J.--The same important questions have been raised in
this  appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a  Bench  of
the Calcutta High Court as were raised
(1) Supra, p. 167,
220
by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in  which
judgment  has  just  been delivered.  One  additional  point
raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large  number
of fresh orders of detention were made "overnight" indicates
bad  faith on the part of the authorities, for the  authori-
ties  could not have applied their minds to each  individual
case. I am unable to accept this contention as correct.  The
authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected
activities  of each of the detenus and were  satisfied  that
with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial  act
of  a particular kind it was necessary to make an  order  of
detention  against  them under the local Acts.  There  being
doubt  as to the validity of the local Acts and the  Preven-
tive  Detention Act having been passed in the  meantime  the
question was  to make a fresh order under the new Act.   The
minds  of the authorities having already been made up as  to
the expediency of making an order of detention against them,
an elaborate application of mind, such as is now  suggested,
does not appear to me to be necessary at all. I do not think
there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities
which  will establish bad faith on their part. In  my  view,
for reasons stated in my judgment in the other appeal, there
being no proof of any mala fides on the part of the authori-
ties,  no  fundamental rights of the petitioners  have  been
infringed.  In the case of each of the detenus,  apart  from
the  common ground, there were one or more specific  grounds
of detention which are quite sufficient to enable the detenu
concerned  to make his representation. Therefore, the  ques-
tion of supplementary particulars does not arise at all.  In
my  opinion the  conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J.  were
correct and well-founded, and, therefore, this appeal should
be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P.K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondent: P.K. Bose.
221
PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
        Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
25/01/1951
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
CITATION:
 1951 AIR  157            1951 SCR  167
 CITATOR INFO :
 R          1951 SC 174  (10)
 E          1951 SC 270  (7)
 R          1952 SC 350  (11)
 R          1953 SC 318  (3)
R          1954 SC 179  (8)
 RF         1956 SC 531  (4,5)
 E&D        1957 SC  23  (9)
 E&F        1957 SC 164  (3)
 F          1958 SC 163  (14)
 R          1959 SC1335  (10,13)
 RF         1962 SC 911  (7)
 RF         1964 SC 334  (6)
 R          1966 SC1910  (4,8)
 RF         1967 SC 295  (60)
 R          1970 SC 852  (5,14)
 R          1972 SC2086  (11)
 RF         1973 SC2469  (5)
 R          1974 SC 183  (15,58A,59)
 D          1974 SC 255  (8)
 RF         1976 SC1207  (116)
R          1979 SC1925  (8,17)
 RF         1981 SC  28  (14)
 D          1982 SC1029  (9)
 RF         1982 SC1315  (23,30,32)
 R          1984 SC 444  (14)
ACT:
    Constitution  of  India, Arts.  21,  22  (5)--Preventive
detention-Duty to communicate grounds and to afford opportu-
nity     to    make     representation--Whether     distinct
rights--Ground  supplied vagueNon-supply of  particulars  or
supply of particulars at later stage-Whether vitiates deten-
tion--Jurisdiction  of  court  to  consider  sufficiency  of
grounds--Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), s. 3.
HEADNOTE:
   The  respondent was arrested on the 21st of April,  1950,
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of
168
April. 1950, he was supplied with the ground for his  deten-
tion  which was as follows:  "That you are engaged  and  are
likely to be engaged in promoting acts of sabotage on  rail-
way and railway property in Greater Bombay."  The respondent
filed  a habeas corpus petition contending that  the  ground
supplied was vague as it did not mention the time, place  or
nature of the sabotage or how the respondent promoted it and
that  as the ground gave no particulars, his  detention  was
illegal.  Pending the disposal of the petition, the  Commis-
sioner  of  Police sent a communication  to  the  respondent
giving these further particulars, viz., that the  activities
mentioned in the grounds supplied to him were being  carried
on  by him in Greater Bombay between January, 1950, and  the
date  of his detention and that he will in  all  probability
continue  to  do so. The High Court of Bombay held  that  if
these  particulars had been furnished at the time  when  the
grounds  were  furnished on the 29th of  April,  1950,  very
likely  they  would  have come to the  conclusion  that  the
grounds  were  such as would have led the  detenue  to  know
exactly what he was charged with and to make a proper repre-
sentation, but released the respondent holding that the only
grounds which were furnished in the purported compliance  of
Art. 22 (5) were the grounds furnished on the 29th of April,
1950,  and as these grounds were not such as to  enable  the
detenue to make a proper representation, there was a  viola-
tion  of  a  fundamental right and a  contravention  of  the
statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set  right
by  the detaining authority by amplifying or  improving  the
grounds already given:
     Held by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI
SASTRI,  MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR  JJ).-Under
s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satis-
faction  of the Central Government or the State  Government,
as the case may be, that is necessary, and if the grounds on
which it is stated that the Central Government or the  State
Government are satisfied have a rational connection with the
objects which were to be prevented from being attained,  the
question of satisfaction cannot be challenged in a court  of
law except on the ground of mala fides.
     Held  also  per  KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI,   MUKHERJEA  and
CHANDRASEKHARA  AIYAR  JJ., (PATANJALI SASTRI  and  DAS  JJ.
dissenting).--Clause  (5)of  Art. 22 confers two  rights  on
the  detenue, namely, first, a right to be informed  of  the
grounds  on which the order of detention has been made,  and
secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make  a
representation  against the order; and though  these  rights
are  linked  together,  they are two  distinct  rights.   If
grounds  which have a rational connection with  the  objects
mentioned  in  s.  3 are supplied, the  first  condition  is
complied  with.   But the ,right to  make  a  representation
implies  that the detenue should have information so  as  to
enable him to make a representation, and if the grounds
169
supplied are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make  a
representation, he can rely on the second right.  He may  if
he  likes ask for further particulars which will enable  him
to make a  representation.  On an infringement of either  of
these two rights the detained person has a right to approach
the  court, and even if an infringement of the second  right
under Art. 22 (S) is alone, established he is entitled to be
released.
    Per PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS JJ.--As the power to  issue
a  detention order depends upon the existence of a state  of
mind in the detaining authority, that is, its  satisfaction,
which is purely a subjective condition and judicial  enquiry
into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention
is  thus excluded, it would be wholly inconsistent with  the
scheme  to hold that it is open to the court to examine  the
sufficiency  of  the same grounds to enable the  person  de-
tained  to  make a representation, for, the  grounds  to  be
communicated to the person detained are the grounds on which
the  order has been made.  There is further nothing in  Art.
22,  el. (5), to warrant the view that the grounds on  which
the order of detention has been made must be such, that when
communicated to the person they are found by a court of  law
to  be sufficient to enable him to make what the court  con-
siders to be an adequate representation, or that the  latter
part  of cl. (5) confers a distinct right on the detenue  or
an  independent  obligation on the  detaining  authority  to
furnish the detenue with sufficient particulars and  details
to enable him to make an effective representation.
    Held by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI,  PATANJALI
SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)-In  any
view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement  of
any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention  of
any constitutional  provision as he  had been supplied  with
sufficient  particulars as soon as he raised  the  objection
that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent  was
not, therefore, entitled to be released.
    Per  KANIA C.J., FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and  CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ.)--The "grounds" for making the order which have to
be communicated to the person detained as soon as may be are
conclusions  of facts and not a complete recital of all  the
facts.  These grounds must be in existence when the order is
made.   No part of the 'grounds can be held back, and  after
they have been once conveyed there can be no addition to the
grounds.   All facts leading to the conclusion  constituting
the ground need not, however, be conveyed at the same  time.
If a second communication contains no further conclusion  of
fact but only furnishes some of the facts on which the first
mentioned  conclusion  was rounded it does not amount  to  a
fresh ground. The test therefore is whether what is conveyed
in  the  second  communication is a statement  of  facts  or
events, which facts or
170
events were already taken into consideration in arriving  at
the conclusion constituting the ground already supplied.
    So  long as the later communications do not make  out  a
new  ground, their contents are no infringement of  the  two
procedural  rights of the detenue mentioned in Art. 22,  cl.
(5). They may consist of a narration of facts or particulars
relating  to the grounds already supplied.  But in doing  so
the time factor in respect of second duty, viz., to give the
detained person the earliest opportunity to make a represen-
tation, cannot be overlooked.
    If  on  reading the ground furnished it  is  capable  of
being intelligently understood and is sufficiently  definite
to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a
representation  against  the order it cannot be said  to  be
"vague."   The question whether the vagueness or  indefinite
nature of the statement furnished to the detained person  is
such that he was not given the earliest opportunity to  make
a representation is a matter within the jurisdiction of  the
court's inquiry and subject to the court's decision.
JUDGMENT:
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Case No. 22 of 1950.
Appeal  under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution against  a
judgment  and order of the Bombay High Court dated 1st  Sep-
tember, 1950, in Criminal Application No. 807 of 1950.   The
facts and arguments of counsel are set out in the judgment.
    M.C. Setalvad Attorney-General, (G. N. Joshi, with  him)
for the appellant.
    A.S.R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for the respond-
ent.
    1951.  Jan.  25. The judgment of Kania C.J.,  Fazl  Ali,
Mukherjea  and  Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.  was  delivered  by
Kania C.J.  Patanjali Sastri and  Das JJ. delivered separate
judgments.
    KANIA  C.J.--This  is an appeal from a judgment  of  the
High Court at Bombay, ordering the release of the respondent
who  was  detained in custody under a detention  order  made
under  the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950).   The  re-
spondent  was first arrested on the 18th of December,  1948,
under the Bombay
171
Public Security Measures Act, 1948 (Bombay Act IV of  1947),
but  was  released on the 11th of November,  1949.   He  was
arrested again on the 21st of April, 1950, under the Preven-
tive  Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of April,  1950`,
grounds for his detention 'were supplied to him.  They  were
in the following terms: "That you are engaged and are likely
to  be engaged in promoting acts of sabotage on railway  and
railway property in Greater Bombay."  The respondent filed a
habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in  which,
after  reciting his  previous  arrest and release, in  para-
graphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows :--
    "(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed
out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi.
     (7) On 20th April, 1950, he returned to Bombay and  was
immediately arrested as stated above."
    He  contended  that the sole aim of  the  Government  in
ordering  his detention was not the preservation  of  public
order  or the security of the State, but the locking  up  of
active  trade unionists who belonged to the All-India  Trade
Union  Congress.  He contended that the ground is  "delight-
fully vague and does not mention when, where or what kind of
sabotage or how the applicant promoted it." He further urged
that the ground gave no particulars and therefore was not  a
ground  as  required to be furnished  under  the  Preventive
Detention  Act, 1950.  He stated that the present  appellant
acted mala fide, for a collateral purpose, outside the scope
of the Act, and that the applicant's detention in any  event
was illegal and mala fide. When this petition was  presented
to  the  Court on the 9th of August, 1950, it  directed  the
issue  of a notice to the Commissioner of  Police.   Pending
the  disposal  of the Rule, on the 26th  August,  1950,  the
Commissioner of Police sent a communication to the  respond-
ent as follows:
    "In  pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive  Detention
Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), and in continuation of my commu-
nication No. 227 dated the 29th April,
172
1950, the following further particulars are  hereby communi-
cated  to  you  in connection with the grounds  on  which  a
detention order has been made against you under  sub-section
(1) of section 3 of the said Act :-
    That  the activities mentioned in the grounds  furnished
to  you were being carried on by you in Greater  Bombay  be-
tween  January 1950 and the date of your detention;  and
In all probability you will continue to do so.
    2.   If,  in view Of the particulars now  supplied,  you
wish  to  make a further representation  against  the  order
under which you are detained,  you  should address it to the
Government of Bombay and forward it through the Superintend-
ent of Arthur Road Prison, Bombay."
    On the 30th of August, 1950, the Commissioner of  Police
filed an affidavit against the petition of the respondent in
which  it was stated that the objectionable activities  were
carried  on by the applicant between the months of  January,
1950, and the date of detention.  It further stated that  in
or about the month of January, 1950, there was a move for  a
total strike on the railways in India in the month of March,
1950,  and  the applicant was taking prominent part  to  see
that the strike was brought' about and was successful.  As a
means  to make the strike successful and bring  about  total
cessation  of  work on all railways, the applicant  and  his
associates were advocating sabotage on railways and  railway
property in Greater Bombay.  He further stated that reliable
materials  were put before him of the respondent  being  en-
gaged in such activities by experienced police officers.  He
added  that  although the railways strike in  the  month  of
March  did not materialise, the idea of bringing about  such
strike as soon as convenient continued to be entertained and
the  present  respondent was actively  engaged  in  bringing
about such a strike in the near future.  He then stated that
the  disclosure of further facts relating to the  activities
of  the detenue  was against  public interest.  In  para.  6
there was a specific denial that
173
the  respondent,  after his release in November,  1949,  and
till  20th  April, 1950, was out of Bombay.  It  was  stated
that  he  used to go out of Bombay at times but  during  the
major part of the period he was in the city of Bombay.
When the matter came up before a Bench of the High Court
the  respondent's petition was granted.  In the judgment  of
the  Court, Chagla C.J. observed: "It is clear by reason  of
the view we have taken in several cases under section 491 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, that this is not a ground which
would  enable the detenue to make a representation to  which
he  is entitled both under the Act and under  the  Constitu-
tion."   After noticing the affidavit of the Commisioner  of
Police,  it  was further observed: "We appreciate  the  fact
that,  after our decision was given, Government  decided  to
place  all  the  materials before us so that  we  should  be
satisfied  that what influenced the detaining  authority  in
making the order was not any ulterior motive but that  ample
materials  were at the disposal of the  detaining  authority
which  would  justify the applicant's  detention.   We  have
looked  at  this affidavit and we have also  looked  at  the
particulars  furnished  to us by Mr.  Chudasama.   If  these
particulars had been furnished at the time when the  grounds
were  furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very  likely  we
would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such
as  would have led the detenue to; know exactly what he  was
charged  with  and to make a  proper  representation."   The
judgment is however based on the  following observation   of
the  Chief Justice: "Anew and important question arises  for
our consideration; and that is whether it is permissible  to
the detaining authority to justify the detention by amplify-
ing     and     improving     the     grounds     originally
furnished   .........   The only grounds which  we  have  to
consider  and which were furnished in the purported  compli-
ance  of  article 22(5) were the grounds  furnished  to  the
detenue  on  the 29th of April, 1950; and if  these  grounds
were  not  such as to enable the detenue to  make  a  proper
representation, then there was  a
174
violation  of the fundamental right and a  contravention  of
the  statutory provisions.  That violation and that  contra-
vention  cannot be set right by the detaining  authority  by
amplifying  or improving the grounds already given.   As  we
said  before, the point of time at which we have  to  decide
whether there was a compliance or not with the provisions of
article 22 (5) is the 29th of April, 1950, when the  grounds