dedoc/paragraph_dataset huggingface dataset:
gives only metadata. Might that work?
It will be much harder than it looks. For example, it assumes both that intelligence can be kept
separate from law enforcement and national agencies from each other. Yet in a post-9/11 world
the intelligence task is mostly one of forestalling terrorist attacks – basically a law-enforcement
role, and one in which police agencies such as America’s FBI and the UK Special branch
provide most of the manpower. And most investigations involve more than one country. But the
Dutch police make massive use of wiretaps, so if there’s good police cooperation, what’s to stop
an English copper calling in a favour from a buddy in Amsterdam? And how can a political
leader justify handing over bulk surveillance data on his entire electorate to foreign intelligence
and perhaps police agencies, while denying access to domestic police forces? What happens next
time a child is killed in England, and any intelligence officer in the Netherlands or Sweden or
Israel could have prevented it? The UK security service already says it might have prevented the
terrorist murder of a UK soldier if it had had unrestricted access to the communications of the
perpetrators, who used a US communications service provider [12]. The direction of travel is
clear. The regulation of surveillance is a going to be a global governance problem, which will be
hard to partition along national lines, or into ‘intelligence’ versus ‘law enforcement’.
The privacy of the citizen is just one side of the coin, of course; the other side is the transparency
of the ruler. European states link data protection and freedom of information in an attempt to
push back on the tendency of information to flow from the weak to the strong. Transparency has
clearly increased with search engines and social media and, despite their best efforts, the rulers
lose some of their privacy along with their subjects.
What does this mean for privacy lawyers and activists? We'll have to start thinking more about
network effects, and how these interact with asymmetric information, agency issues and other
effects. We will have to start thinking about the same issues around information monopolies that
are tackled by economists advising competition authorities and regulators. If we end up with a
world surveillance network, in which all the world’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies
swap information on all of us as well as buying or coercing it from service companies (who also
trade information on all of us), what might an effective regulatory framework look like?
5. A global platform?
Security engineers can suffer from the déformation professionelle of seeing only the hazards. Yet
we must not forget that the increasingly networked nature of the modern world brings many
benefits that also impact on public policy. A networked society is increasingly one in which
‘leaders’ actually follow rather than lead. For example, if you were to ask a parliamentarian from
the outgoing UK government in 2010 what they achieved in three terms in office, you’d have got
a long list of reforms from gay marriage to banning smoking in restaurants. Yet these changes
happened in pretty well every other European country too over the same period. So where does
policy actually come from? The best answer is the billions of interactions we all have every day:
the jokes, the calls, the songs, the chats both online and off. Social networks, both physical and
electronic, matter too.
What does this mean for international relations? Many realists in the IR community and among
commentators in the press and academia take an essentially cyclical view of history. The demise
of the US empire is inevitable; but don’t worry: so is the demise of the Chinese empire that will
follow it. The pessimistic view – used to justify military budgets – is that once an authoritarian
country like China surpasses the USA in GDP, and builds more aircraft carriers, then the game is
over for civilisation, for democracy and for freedom. Dare we hope that we won’t all end up
having to learn Mandarin in 20 years’ time? (It’s not the language of course: it’s the fact that
China hasn’t yet made the democratic transition.)
A networked view of the world is much less fearful, and gives much more emphasis to the liberal
view of international relations. ‘Civilisation’ does not just consist of the USA, plus the Five Eyes
allies (or perhaps the NATO allies) simpering at its coat-tails. Civilisation is a network,
consisting not just of the citizens and industries of the USA, the EU and the other developed
countries, but of the middle classes (for want of a better word) in the less developed countries
and in China and Russia too. The US government may occasionally find this annoying – as when
a planned takeover of one US firm by another is blocked by the EU’s competition authorities
despite being approved by the Department of Justice. Yet America should embrace it. Even from
a tactical realist perspective, its central position in networks amplifies America’s power, an
example being the way in which its centrality in payment networks enables it to enforce financial
sanctions against states like Iran and North Korea.
From a strategic perspective, the aim should be much higher. The goal of American foreign and
defence policy should not be to hang on to its empire as long as possible, but to ensure that
America is the last empire. In a rapidly-globalising world, a USA with 300-odd million cannot
hope to dominate forever a planet with over a billion Chinese, over a billion Indians, and even
400 million Arabs. The real long-term interest of the USA is to ensure that its empire is replaced
by a global network of mutually supporting democracies under the rule of law, rather than by
another hegemon.
That may seem a fairly obvious conclusion to an IT industry guy. To a career diplomat, it would
mean the victory of liberals over realists. To figure out it would mean in practice – what policies
should be pursued by leaders in the USA, Europe and other well-intentioned countries – we need
to understand much better how network effects operate within and between governments and the
societies they govern. Policy coordination is notoriously hard – ‘like the Loch Ness Monster –
much discussed but rarely seen’ [13]; but this too may be an aspect of not understanding and
exploiting externalities properly.
6. Conclusion
Power is many things. It’s not just the “hard power” of the number of our aircraft carriers and
nuclear warheads, or even the “soft power” of our movie exports and the number of foreign
students who come to our universities. It’s our “network power”: the way in which our
connectedness enables us to influence others to act as we wish, and to deter them from acting in
ways harmful to our interests.
But what does this mean more closely? You might say it’s about influence in an interconnected
world, but how do you measure that? A network geek might say it’s about a nation’s centrality in
the transactions of interest, but then you have to ask technical questions about what sort of
centrality, and whether it’s static or dynamic. Even network researchers don’t really know how
to measure network power, and the power elite are at best vaguely aware that it exists. There are
perhaps three analogues that politicians may understand: cities, languages and religions. All
outlast their founders and some are more governable than others; but the founders’ view of the
world can exercise huge influence for generations to come
So this paper is more a statement of an important problem than an attempt at a solution. The
message is that it's time that scholars of government to start thinking about information
economics. America is, for now, the beneficiary of the same dominant position that makes the
big fortunes in the Bay Area; so the US government is in a position to draw on the expertise of
business leaders who’ve made their fortunes from understanding network effects, or at least
being slightly less slow learners than their competitors. As for the Chinese government, it would
be rational to study how information monopolies have been overthrown in the past; the history of
Apple may teach at least as much as Sun Tzu or Mao Tse-Tung.
Where does this leave privacy in the age of Snowden? It is very welcome that the NSA review
panel recommended that the USA minimise the data it retains on foreigners and restrict the uses
that will be made of such data. It is heartening that the administration is thinking about it
seriously, and seeking tenders for minimisation software. It is not just an equity issue, as between
attack and defence in an agency with both missions. A network view of the world is that such
standards, if and when they are embedded in architecture and in policy, are likely become the
default surveillance standards for all. What America does to watch users in Britain or Australia
or Germany or India will soon be more or less what Britain and Australia and Germany and India
do to watch users in America.
If the barriers between nations that participate in the intelligence networks are not sustainable in
the long term, and neither are the barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, then what’s
sauce for the goose will be sauce also for the gander. Policymakers should not delude themselves
into believing that a temporary ‘home field advantage’, as NSA Director General Alexander put
it, will last for ever, or even for the lifetime of most of us.
Realising this might lead to a more principled approach to surveillance policy, and one might
suggest for example the ethical principles proposed by John Rawls [14]. In it he suggested that
the lawgiver act as if behind a veil of ignorance as to what member of society he or she was (or
would be reincarnated as); a perspective of fairness can resolve many of the tensions between
freedom and equality. Lawmakers should thus perhaps consider what laws they’d make to
regulate surveillance if they did not know in what country, or with what social status, they’d be
reincarnated. The privacy they grant to a tenant farmer in the Punjab or the Hadhramaut today is
likely to be the privacy their children will enjoy tomorrow.
The regulation of surveillance might therefore be a useful early example of what governance
could look like in a future networked world, and may in fact be one of the hardest such problems
that we face. It contains elements of both fear and hope: fear that an apparatus of global
surveillance might be captured by an oppressive successor empire, and hope that there might be
no successor, but merely civilisation (whatever that means). This asymmetry may introduce the
possibility of new approaches, and nudge realists from selfishness to more enlightened
selfishness. As for liberal thinking, the lesson is that we don’t just have to rely on international
institutions; there are extremely powerful network effects in play, which will be a force for
pacification and stability; we must work with them.
In the longer term, the big question is this: what is civilisation, and how do we contribute to its
construction? Or to bring it closer to home, what legacy will the USA leave behind when it cedes
its leading role in world affairs? Will the world’s future networked civilisation be more like a
technical network – a platform for rapid innovation but prone to monopolistic abuses? Will it be
more like a city, which can be captured by a ruling elite, then flower and decay? Will it be more
like a language, which can link a number of polities and allow ideas good and bad to diffuse
through them? Or will it be like a religion, a cockpit of struggles for ideological dominance, and
vulnerable to violent schism? Quite possibly it will be a mix of all of these. The engineer in me
says that the architecture will matter, and the economist says that the incentives will matter too.
How we tie the two together could have significant consequences for generations to come. We
had better do what we can to ensure that the architecture we create is driven by our hopes rather
than our fears, and embodies our deepest values.
Cambridge, England
Acknowledgement: I have benefited from helpful discussions of an earlier draft with a number
of colleagues: Nick Bohm, Caspar Bowden, Ian Brown, Duncan Campbell, Malcolm Chalmers,
Richard Clayton, David Modic, Bruce Schneier, Peter Swire and Sophie van der Zee. I also
acknowledge helpful comments from the anonymous referees.
[1] Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, ‘Information Rules – A Strategic Guide to the Network
Economy’, Harvard Business School Press (1998)
[2] Ross Anderson, ‘Why Information Security is Hard –An Economic Perspective’, in
Seventeenth Computer Security Applications Conference (2001), pp 358–365
[3] Michelle Baddeley, ‘Information Security: Lessons from Behavioural Economics’, Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security, June 2011
[4] Panagiotis Trimintzios, Chris Hall, Richard Clayton, Ross Anderson and Evangelos
Ouzounis, ‘Resilience of the Internet Interconnection Ecosystem’, European Network and
Information Security Agency, April 2011
[5] Doris Mary Stenton, ‘English Society in the Early Middle Ages’, Pelican 1951
[6] John Scott-Railton, Morgan Marquis-Boire, ‘A Call to Harm: New Malware Attacks Target
the Syrian Opposition’, University of Toronto, 2013
[7] Edin Omanovic, ‘The UK & surveillance exports: A piece of CAEC’, Privacy International,
10 Jan 2014
[8] Alex Henney, Ross Anderson, `Smart Meters – Ed Milliband’s Poisoned Chalice’, 2012
[9] Lawrence Lessig, ‘Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity’ (Penguin Press 2004)
[10] Executive Office of the President of the United States, ‘Big Data and Privacy: a
Technological Perspective’, May 2014
[11] Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore, ‘Security Economics and
the Internal Market’, ENISA 208
[12] David Leppard, ‘MI5 spying on internet ‘might have saved Lee Rigby’’, The Sunday Times,
11 May 2014
[13] Olivier Blanchard, Jonathan Ostry, ‘The Loch Ness consensus’, The Economist, Feb 15
[14] John Rawls, ‘A Theory of Justice’, 1971
ЗАКОН РЕСПУБЛИКИ КРЫМ
О внесении изменения в статью 2 Закона Республики Крым
"Об установлении ставки единого сельскохозяйственного налога
на территории Республики Крым"
Государственным Советом
Республики Крым 21 сентября 2016 года
Внести в статью 2 Закона Республики Крым от 29 декабря 2014 года
№ 60-3РК/2014 "Об установлении ставки единого сельскохозяйственного
налога на территории Республики Крым" (Ведомости Государственного
Совета Республики Крым, 2014, № 6, ст. 685) следующее изменение:
дополнить частью второй следующего содержания:
"В отношении периодов 2017-2021 годов налоговая ставка при
применении системы налогообложения для  сельскохозяйственных
товаропроизводителей (единый сельскохозяйственный налог)
устанавливается в размере 4 процентов.".
Настоящий Закон вступает в силу с 1 января 2017 года.
Глава Республики С. АКСЁНОВ
г. Симферополь,
05 октября 2016 года
№ 279-3РК/2016
ЗАКОН АСТРАХАНСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ
О внесении изменения в статью 3 Закона Астраханской области
«О транспортном налоге»
Принят Думой Астраханской области 13 марта 2018 года
Внести в часть 5 статьи 3 Закона Астраханской области от 22 ноября 2002 г.
№ 49/2002-ОЗ «О транспортном налоге» изменение, изложив предложение первое
в следующей редакции: «Налогоплательщики   физические лица, имеющие право на
налоговые льготы, представляют в налоговый орган по своему выбору заявление
о предоставлении налоговой льготы, а также вправе представить документы, под-
тверждающие право налогоплательщика на налоговую льготу.».
Настоящий Закон вступает в силу на следующий день после дня его офици-
ального опубликования.
Губернатор Астраханской област А.А. Жилкин
г. Астрахань
« 15» марта 2018 г.
Per, № 15/2018-03
займом до | года на 0,2% выше рентабельности. Таким образом, делаем
вывод, что для МСП использование банковского кредитования не может
быть использовано в качестве источника инвестирования.
Однако и для крупных предприятий при ставке кредитования 9,2%
разница с рентабельностью составляет лишь 1,5%, которые не позволяют
обеспечить эффективное функционирование предприятия при использовании
банковских кредитов в иных случаях, кроме как для пополнения оборотного
капитала. Таким образом, делаем вывод, что использование банковского
кредитования в качестве источника инвестирования в инновационные
преобразования также нецелесообразно при данном уровне процентных
ставок.
Кроме того, основываясь на данных отчёта о развитии банковского
сектора и банковского надзора! можно видеть, что основная масса кредитов,
выданных в 2018 году, была выдана на короткий срок до 12 месяцев
(70,17%). Еще 13,95% приходилось кредиты среднего (12-36 месяцев) срока.
И 15,88%   на кредиты долгосрочной перспективы более 36 месяцев.
Аналогично распределены сроки кредитования и по субъектам малого и
среднего предпринимательства: 65,64% кредитов, выданных МСБ, носили
краткосрочный характер, 17,02%
долгосрочный.
Фундаментальное противоречие данной ситуации заключается в
обладании банками избытков ликвидности, что позволяет нам говорить о
диспропорции в обеспечении банковской системой инвестиционных
ресурсов для предприятий и организаций реального сектора
Среди причин возникновения данного противоречия стоит отметить
крайне высокий уровень рисков долгосрочного кредитования реального
сектора, недостаток экономического стимулирования кредитования
+ Отчёт о развитии банковского сектора и банковского надзора в 2018 году. M.: Банк России, 2019. С. 21.
? Старков Р.Ф. Модернизация российской экономики и малый бизнес // Вестник Сибирской академии права,
экономики и управления. 2011. № 2. С. 8 12.
КАРАЧАЕВО-ЧЕРКЕССКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ
О внесении изменений в Закон Карачаево-Черкесской
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