GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-ffp3-3562-8cv3
Package: praisonaiagents (PIP)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.5)
CWE: CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Vulnerable versions: < 4.5.128
Patched in: 4.5.128

Summary: PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands

Details:
## Summary

The approval system in PraisonAI Agents caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments. Once a user approves `execute_command` for any command (e.g., `ls -la`), all subsequent `execute_command` calls in that execution context bypass the approval prompt entirely. Combined with `os.environ.copy()` passing all process environment variables to subprocesses, this allows an LLM agent (potentially via prompt injection) to silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials without further user consent.

## Details

The `require_approval` decorator in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/__init__.py:176-178` checks approval status by tool name only:

```python
@wraps(func)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
    if is_already_approved(tool_name):   # line 177 — checks only tool_name
        return func(*args, **kwargs)     # line 178 — bypasses ALL approval
```

The `mark_approved` function in `registry.py:144-147` stores only the tool name string:

```python
def mark_approved(self, tool_name: str) -> None:
    approved = self._approved_context.get(set())
    approved.add(tool_name)              # stores "execute_command", not args
    self._approved_context.set(approved)
```

The approval context is never cleared during agent execution — `clear_approved()` exists (`registry.py:152`) but is never called in the agent's tool execution path (`agent/tool_execution.py`).

Meanwhile, the `ConsoleBackend` UI at `backends.py:95-96` misleads the user:

```python
return Confirm.ask(
    f"Do you want to execute this {request.risk_level} risk tool?",
    # "this" implies per-invocation approval
)
```

The UI displays the specific command arguments (lines 81-85), creating a reasonable expectation that the user is approving only that specific invocation.

Additionally, `shell_tools.py:77` passes the full process environment to every subprocess:

```python
process_env = os.environ.copy()  # includes OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.
```

There is no command filtering, blocklist, or environment variable sanitization in the shell tools module.

## PoC

```python
from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.tools.shell_tools import execute_command

# Step 1: Create agent with shell tool
agent = Agent(
    name="worker",
    instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
    tools=[execute_command]
)

# Step 2: Agent requests benign command — user sees Rich panel:
#   Function: execute_command
#   Risk Level: CRITICAL
#   Arguments:
#     command: ls -la
#   "Do you want to execute this critical risk tool?" [y/N]
# User approves → mark_approved("execute_command") is called

# Step 3: All subsequent execute_command calls bypass approval silently:
# execute_command(command="env")
#   → returns ALL environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.)
#   → NO approval prompt shown

# Step 4: Targeted extraction also bypasses approval:
# execute_command(command="printenv OPENAI_API_KEY")
#   → returns the specific API key
#