GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-49jc-r788-3fc9
Package: gitoxide (RUST)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.4)
CWE: CWE-67: Improper Handling of Windows Device Names
Vulnerable versions: < 0.36.0
Patched in: 0.36.0

Summary: gix refs and paths with reserved Windows device names access the devices

Details:
### Summary

On Windows, fetching refs that clash with legacy device names reads from the devices, and checking out paths that clash with such names writes arbitrary data to the devices. This allows a repository, when cloned, to cause indefinite blocking or the production of arbitrary message that appear to have come from the application, and potentially other harmful effects under limited circumstances.

### Details

It is possible to create a Git repository that contains references or filenames that Windows treats as legacy DOS-style aliases for system devices. When such a repository is cloned:

- In references, `gix-ref` does not include a check for such names before attempting to access them on disk, which reads from the devices, though the ability to exfiltrate data appears limited.
- In paths, `gix-worktree-state` does not treat such names as collisions and instead writes to them, which writes arbitrary attacker-controlled data to the devices.

Some such device names refer to devices that are often absent or inaccessible. But a few are guaranteed to be available, allowing some attacks to be carried out with low complexity. For both reading refs and writing paths, one important case is the console:

- Reading a ref whose last component (e.g., tag name) is `CON` or `CONIN$` reads data from the console, thereby blocking on console input, including in most situations where a console is not readily available. This may facilitate denial of service attacks.
- Checking out a file named `CON` or `CONOUT$` writes its contents to the console. This allows an untrusted repository to produce arbitrary text that appears to be a message from the application. Such text may facilitate social engineering if it is selected to instruct the user to perform a particular action.

Another potentially important case is serial ports. For example, `COM1` refers to the first serial port, if present. A malicious repository may be able to disrupt intended use of serial ports or attempt to interact with a device. In some configurations, it may be possible to interfere with the operation of a physical or virtual serial console. On Windows, local access to serial ports is often permitted even for limited user accounts without elevation.

[Naming Files, Paths, and Namespaces](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions) covers most reserved names. `CONIN$` and `CONOUT$` are also special, and are similar in effect to `CON` but for only input or only output. These names are case-insensitive and can also be accessed with file extensions (e.g, `CON.txt` is equivalent to `CON`) and with some variations involving added spaces or colons.

### PoC

#### Ref example

Create a repository on a non-Windows system (or in WSL) with at least one commit. Use `git tag CON` to create a lightweight tag named `CON`. Place the repository somewhere it can be cloned on Windows. A `file://` URL is sufficient for testing if a private remote is unavailable.