deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
MITRE ATT&CK:  — Program Organization Units
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: lateral-movement, execution
Platforms: Windows, Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay, Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED

Description:
Program Organizational Units (POUs) are block structures used within PLC programming to create programs and projects. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) POUs can be used to hold user programs written in IEC 61131-3 languages: Structured text, Instruction list, Function block, and Ladder logic. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) Application - 201203 They can also provide additional functionality, such as establishing connections between the PLC and other devices using TCON. (Citation: PLCBlaster - Spenneberg)
  
Stuxnet uses a simple code-prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks (OB). For example, the following sequence of actions is performed when OB1 is infected  (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102):
*Increase the size of the original block.
*Write malicious code to the beginning of the block.
*Insert the original OB1 code after the malicious code.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0823 — Graphical User Interface
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard.

If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.

Mitigation:
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0848 — Rogue Master
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: initial-access
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. 

In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) (Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017)

Mitigation:
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0834 — Native API
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation May 2017) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. 

Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.

Mitigation:
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0826 — Loss of Availability
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: impact
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) 

Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.

In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021)

Mitigation:
Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
MITRE ATT&CK: T0882 — Theft of Operational Information
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: impact
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations.    In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015)

Mitigation:
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0857 — System Firmware
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: persistence, inhibit-response-function
Platforms: None

Description:
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. 

An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Basnight, Zachry, et al.)
MITRE ATT&CK: T0849 — Masquerading
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: evasion
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. 

Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.

Mitigation:
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0843 — Program Download
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: lateral-movement
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. 

Variations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download.

The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controllers user program memory space.  

[Modify Controller Tasking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821) and [Modify Program](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889) represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.

Mitigation:
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0847 — Replication Through Removable Media
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: initial-access
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.     

Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016) (Citation: Trend Micro April 2016) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard April 2016) (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016) (Citation: Peter Dockrill April 2016) (Citation: Lee Mathews April 2016) (Citation: Sean Gallagher April 2016) (Citation: Dark Reading Staff April 2016) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: BBC April 2016) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: ESET April 2016)

Mitigation:
Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0846.002 — Broadcast Discovery
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: discovery
Platforms: 

Description:
Adversaries may perform broadcast discovery requests to enumerate systems and devices on a network. Broadcast discovery works by one system or device sending messages to all systems and devices on a network (or subnet) and then waiting for a response. If a response is received that means the system or device that responded is live and can communicate over that protocol. Adversaries may leverage different protocols supported on the network for sending broadcast messages. 

Some common OT protocols that have broadcast discovery mechanisms are Building Automation and Control Network (BACNet) Who-Is requests, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) List Identity User Datagram Protocol (UDP) broadcast requests, and Siemens S7 broadcast identification requests.(Citation: Broadcasting BACnet)(Citation: Cisco Active Discovery)


Mitigation:
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network.  Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from othe
MITRE ATT&CK: T0852 — Screen Capture
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.

Mitigation:
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0891 — Hardcoded Credentials
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: lateral-movement, persistence
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include:

* Username/Passwords
* Cryptographic keys/Certificates
* API tokens

Unlike [Default Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812), these credentials are built into the system in a way that they either cannot be changed by the asset owner, or may be infeasible to change because of the impact it would cause to the control system operation. These credentials may be reused across whole product lines or device models and are often not published or known to the owner and operators of the asset. 

Adversaries may utilize these hardcoded credentials to move throughout the control system environment or provide reliable access for their tools to interact with industrial assets.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0859 — Valid Accounts
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: persistence, lateral-movement
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. 

Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) 

The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator)  and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.

Mitigation:
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provide sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. (Citation: McCarthy, J et al. July 2018) These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also int
MITRE ATT&CK: T0890 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: privilege-escalation
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) 

When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation)

Mitigation:
Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0846 — Remote System Discovery
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: discovery
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018)

Mitigation:
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various AiTM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
MITRE ATT&CK:  — Engineering Workstation Compromise
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: initial-access
Platforms: Engineering Workstation

Description:
Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0884 — Connection Proxy
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: command-and-control
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.

The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.

The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018)

Mitigation:
Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0843.002 — Online Edit
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: lateral-movement
Platforms: 

Description:
Adversaries may execute an online edit of a PLC to update parts of an existing program. It does not require stopping the PLC which allows it to continue running during transfer and reconfiguration without interruption to process control. Adversaries may leverage this approach to minimize downtime and evade detection. 

The ability to perform an online edit to the PLC typically relies on access to a workstation with the vendor-specific PLC programming software installed.


Mitigation:
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials)
MITRE ATT&CK: T0869 — Standard Application Layer Protocol
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: command-and-control
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port.  Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.

Mitigation:
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network.  Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from othe