CVE: CVE-2022-48901
Published: 2024-08-22
Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: do not start relocation until in progress drops are done

We hit a bug with a recovering relocation on mount for one of our file
systems in production.  I reproduced this locally by injecting errors
into snapshot delete with balance running at the same time.  This
presented as an error while looking up an extent item

  WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1501 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:866 lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680
  CPU: 5 PID: 1501 Comm: btrfs-balance Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8+ #8
  RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680
  RSP: 0018:ffffae0a023ab960 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: [PII_REDACTED] RBX: [PII_REDACTED] RCX: [PII_REDACTED]
  RDX: [PII_REDACTED] RSI:[PII_REDACTED]00000c RDI: [PII_REDACTED]
  RBP: ffff943fd2a39b60 R08: [PII_REDACTED] R09: [PII_REDACTED]
  R10:[PII_REDACTED]152de0 R11: [PII_REDACTED] R12:[PII_REDACTED]d05000
  R13: ffff943fd2a39b60 R14: ffff943fdb96f2a0 R15: ffff9442fc923000
  FS:  [PII_REDACTED](0000) GS:ffff944e9eb40000(0000) knlGS:[PII_REDACTED]
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: [PII_REDACTED]
  CR2: 00007f1157b1fca8 CR3: 000000010f092000 CR4:[PII_REDACTED]350ee0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   insert_inline_extent_backref+0x46/0xd0
   __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.0+0x5f/0x200
   ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0x164/0x190
   __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x561/0xfa0
   ? btrfs_search_slot+0x7b4/0xb30
   ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0
   btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x73/0x1f0
   ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x50/0xa50
   ? btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x122/0x220
   prepare_to_merge+0x29f/0x320
   relocate_block_group+0x2b8/0x550
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1a6/0x350
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0
   btrfs_balance+0x777/0xe60
   balance_kthread+0x35/0x50
   ? btrfs_balance+0xe60/0xe60
   kthread+0x16b/0x190
   ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
   ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
   </TASK>

Normally snapshot deletion and relocation are excluded from running at
the same time by the fs_info->cleaner_mutex.  However if we had a
pending balance waiting to get the ->cleaner_mutex, and a snapshot
deletion was running, and then the box crashed, we would come up in a
state where we have a half deleted snapshot.

Again, in the normal case the snapshot deletion needs to complete before
relocation can start, but in this case relocation could very well start
before the snapshot deletion completes, as we simply add the root to the
dead roots list and wait for the next time the cleaner runs to clean up
the snapshot.

Fix this by setting a bit on the fs_info if we have any DEAD_ROOT's that
had a pending drop_progress key.  If they do then we know we were in the
middle of the drop operation and set a flag on the fs_info.  Then
balance can wait until this flag is cleared to start up again.

If there are DEAD_ROOT's that don't have a drop_progress set then we're
safe to start balance right away as we'll be properly protected by the
cleaner_mutex.
CVSS Score: 5.5 (MEDIUM)
References: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e70bc827b563caf22e1203428cc3719643de5aa; https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6599d5e8bd758d897fd2ef4dc388ae50278b1f7e; https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4be6aefa73c9a6899ef3ba9c5faaa8a66e333ef