deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-x9p2-77v6-6vhf
Package: github.com/dunglas/frankenphp (GO)
Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)
CWE: CWE-1395: Dependency on Vulnerable Third-Party Component
Vulnerable versions: < 1.1.11
Patched in: 1.1.11

Summary: FrankenPHP has delayed propagation of security fixes in upstream base images

Details:
# Delayed propagation of security fixes in upstream base images

## Summary

**Vulnerability in base Docker images (PHP, Go, and Alpine) not automatically propagating to FrankenPHP images.**

FrankenPHP's container images were previously built only when specific version tags were updated or when manual triggers were initiated. This meant that if an upstream base image (such as Alpine Linux or official PHP/Go images) received a security patch under an existing tag, the FrankenPHP image would remain on the older, vulnerable version of those base layers.

## Impact

Users pulling FrankenPHP images may have been running environments with known vulnerabilities in underlying system libraries (e.g., `libcrypto3`) even if they were using the "latest" version of a specific FrankenPHP tag.

Specifically, this includes vulnerabilities recently patched in **Alpine 3.20.9, 3.21.6, 3.22.3, and 3.23.3**, such as **CVE-2025-15467** (Remote Code Execution in `libcrypto3`).

## Details

The issue was a lack of automated "staleness" detection in the CI/CD pipeline.

Unless explicitly told, our build server was building new Docker images only when a new tag for base images was created. However, base images such as Alpine, PHP, and Go usually overwrite existing Docker tags to apply security fixes, which wasn't triggering a new build on our side.

## Patches

As of **February 4, 2026**, the CI/CD pipeline has been updated.

* **Automated Detection:** A daily check is now performed to compare the digest of local base images against upstream registries.
* **Auto-Rebuild:** If a change is detected in base images (even if the tag name remains the same), FrankenPHP images are automatically rebuilt and re-pushed.

**Users are advised to pull the latest versions of their specific tags to receive these updates.**

## Workarounds

You can force a local rebuild of your environment using the `--pull` flag to ensure you are fetching the latest patched base layers:

```bash
docker pull dunglas/frankenphp:latest
# If building your own image based on FrankenPHP
docker build --pull -t my-app .
```

## References

* [Alpine Linux Security Advisories](https://www.alpinelinux.org/posts/Alpine-3.20.9-3.21.6-3.22.3-3.23.3-released.html)
* **CVE-2025-15467** (RCE in libcrypto3)

## Credits

Thanks to [Tim Nelles](https://timnelles.de/) for reporting and fixing this issue.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-g7vp-j25f-h34p
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.7)
CWE: CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]0112-c0c966dc31e2
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]0112-c0c966dc31e2

Summary: EVE Has Partially Predetermined Vault Key

Details:
### Impact

The deriveVaultKey function calls retrieveCloudKey which always returns "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo". When merged with the randomly generated 32-byte key using mergeKeys (16 bytes from each), the last 16 bytes are always "arfoobarfoobarfo". This enables an attacker with physical access to the EVE-OS device to attempt to brute force the remaining 128 bits of key.

### Patches

Fixed in 7.10 and  8.12.1-lts

### Workarounds

None
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-hx74-4wmc-fwvf
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.8)
CWE: CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]0112-c0c966dc31e2
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]0112-c0c966dc31e2

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Has Partially Predetermined Vault Key

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key
would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo".

This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always
return "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo" as the key), and then merges the 32byte
randomly generated key with this key (by takeing 16bytes from each, see "mergeKeys").

This makes the key a lot weaker.

This issue does not persist in devices that were initialized on/after version 7.10, but devices
that were initialized before that and updated to a newer version still have this issue.



Roll an update that enforces the full 32bytes key usage.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-5h7v-g49c-h887
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.7)
CWE: CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: EVE Doesn't Protect Rootfs

Details:
### Impact

Measured boot validates BIOS, grub, kernel cmdline, and initrd but not the entire rootfs. Thus, an attacker can create an EVE-OS rootfs squashfs image with some files modified and take out the disk and replace the existing rootfs image without that being detected by measure boot and remote attestation.

### Patches

Fixed in 8.6.0 and 8.12.1-lts

### Workarounds

None
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-x9mp-jm4h-jjf8
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Doesn't Protect Rootfs

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing
the encrypted data located in the vault.

As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot
process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.

This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,
initrd, and more.

However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the
filesystem and gain control over the system.

As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,
which is easily changeable.

This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes
in it and replace the partition altogether.

This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the
“mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).







An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.



Note:

This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:

• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141

• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.

This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-4jvr-vj2c-8q37
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.7)
CWE: CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash, CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: EVE Seals Vault Key With SHA1 PCRs

Details:
### Impact

The vault key is sealed using SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256 PCRs

Thus an attacker with physical access to an EVE-OS device can try to brute force creating a kernel or rootfs image which produces the same SHA1 PCR but with malicious content.

### Patches

Fixed in 9.4.3-lts and 10.1.0

### Workarounds

None
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-h929-fvvp-882c
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Seals Vault Key With SHA1 PCRs

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs






The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.

Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.

These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.

This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.

This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.

The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.

The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:

• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.

• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.



An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.9)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials, CWE-922: Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: EVE Doesn't Protect Config Partition with Measured Boot

Details:
### Impact
Config partition measurement was moved from PCR 13 to PCR 14 in a commit, but PCR 14 was not added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the vault key. As a result, an attacker can remove the disk, use another server to modify the files in the config partition, and then re-insert the disk.

### Patches

Fixed in EVE version 9.4.3-lts

### Workarounds

None (apart from preventing physical access to the device)

### Resources

https://help.zededa.com/hc/en-us/articles/[PII_REDACTED]8827-TPM-PCR-Index-Security-Implications
https://github.com/lf-edge/eve/commit/d9383a7ee4e1c39f5c8c6d4a63cb2ebd00695e8a
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-3wmx-9qwp-h363
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Doesn't Protect Config Partition with Measured Boot

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs
are used.

In a previous project, CYMOTIVE found that the configuration is not protected by the secure
boot, and in response Zededa implemented measurements on the config partition that was
mapped to PCR 13.

In that process, PCR 13 was added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the key.

In commit “56e589749c6ff58ded862d39535d43253b249acf”, the config partition
measurement moved from PCR 13 to PCR 14, but PCR 14 was not added to the list of
PCRs that seal/unseal the key.

This change makes the measurement of PCR 14 effectively redundant as it would not affect
the sealing/unsealing of the key.



An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-4c4v-42hc-72p6
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.9)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials, CWE-922: Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: EVE's Debug Functions Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot

Details:
### Impact

On boot, Pillar checks for /config/GlobalConfig/global.json and overrides system configuration if present. This allows enabling debug functions like SSH (debug.enable.ssh), USB keyboard (debug.enable.usb), and VNC access (app.allow.vnc) without triggering the measured boot. Thus, a user with physical access can take out the disk and modify the content of this file in the /config partition and then re-insert the disk.

### Patches

Fixed in ​​10.1.0 and 9.4.3-lts

### Workarounds

None
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-6958-8cpr-xgrq
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE's Debug Functions Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-4c4v-42hc-72p6. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”.

If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot.

This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some
debug functions.

This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the
“debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before.

Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb”
key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more.

An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured
boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD”
(“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it
is not encrypted in any way.





An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.




Note:

This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:

• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141

• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.

This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-6jp5-grgh-jw42
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.5)
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: EVE Freely Allocates Buffer on The Stack With Data From Socket

Details:
### Impact

VTPM server listens on port 8877, exposing limited TPM functionality. The server reads 4 bytes as a uint32 size header, then allocates that amount on the stack for incoming data. This allows Denial of Service attacks against the vTPM service.

An workload (a container or VM) running on EVE-OS can use this to generate a DOS against the vTPM service.

### Patches

Fixed in 9.4.3-lts and 10.1.0

### Workarounds

None
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-vpjr-h6fh-mw4p
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0)
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, CWE-789: Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]2751-977f42b07fa9

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Freely Allocates Buffer on The Stack With Data From Socket

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-phcg-h58r-gmcq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port
8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients. 
VTPM allows clients to
execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options”
The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2
parts:

1. Header

2. Data

When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header,
and these 4 bytes would be parsed as uint32 size of the actual data to come.

Then, in the function “handleRequest” this size is then used in order to allocate a payload on
the stack for the incoming data.

As this payload is allocated on the stack, this will allow overflowing the stack size allocated for
the relevant process with freely controlled data.

* An attacker can crash the system. 
* An attacker can gain control over the system, specifically on the “vtpm_server” process
which has very high privileges.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-3mq9-xhgq-r7gj
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.9)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials, CWE-922: Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: EVE: SSH as Root Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot

Details:
### Impact

On boot, the Pillar container checks for /config/authorized_keys. If present with a valid public key, it enables SSH on port 22 with root login. The /config partition is not protected by measured boot, is mutable and unencrypted.

This enables an attacker with physical access to the device to take out the disk, modify the /config partition using a separate server, then insert it, without the inserted key being flagged as an integrity voilation my measured boot and remote attestation.

### Patches

Patched in 9.4.3-lts

### Workarounds

None (apart from preventing physical access to the device)
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-f6wp-8j9r-frrg
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]1648-5fef4d92e758

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE: SSH as Root Unlockable Without Triggering Measured Boot

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-phcg-h58r-gmcq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/authorized_keys”.

If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.

An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”).

This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.




An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.



Note:

This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:

• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141

• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.

This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-phcg-h58r-gmcq
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.2)
CWE: CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash, CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]5759-d9383a7ee4e1
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]5759-d9383a7ee4e1

Summary: EVE Doesn't Measure Config Partition From 2 Fronts

Details:
### Impact
PCR14 is not included in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the vault key. Additionally, the vault key uses SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256.
Thus an attacker with physical access can take out the disk, use a different computer to modify the files in the /config partition, and re-insert the disk and boot without the change being detected by measured boot and remote attestation.

### Patches

Fixed in EVE version 9.4.3-lts

### Workarounds

None (apart from preventing physical access to the device)

### Resources

https://help.zededa.com/hc/en-us/articles/[PII_REDACTED]8827-TPM-PCR-Index-Security-Implications
https://github.com/lf-edge/eve/commit/d9383a7ee4e1c39f5c8c6d4a63cb2ebd00695e8a
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-5jvg-8j6f-vpmc
Package: github.com/lf-edge/eve (GO)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.8)
CWE: CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash, CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Vulnerable versions: < 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]5759-d9383a7ee4e1
Patched in: 0.0.0[PII_REDACTED]5759-d9383a7ee4e1

Summary: Duplicate Advisory: EVE Doesn't Measure Config Partition From 2 Fronts

Details:
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-phcg-h58r-gmcq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

### Original Description
PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but
due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the
problem of the config partition not being measured correctly.

Also, the “vault” key is sealed/unsealed with SHA1 PCRs instead of
SHA256. 
This issue was somewhat mitigated due to all of the PCR extend functions
updating both the values of SHA256 and SHA1 for a given PCR ID.

However, due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, this is no longer the case for PCR14, as
the code in “measurefs.go” explicitly updates only the SHA256 instance of PCR14, which
means that even if PCR14 were to be added to the list of PCRs sealing/unsealing the “vault”
key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured.



An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-5w5r-8xc6-2xhw
Package: github.com/apache/answer (GO)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Vulnerable versions: <= 1.7.1
Patched in: 2.0.0

Summary: Apache Answer Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability

Details:
Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Answer.

This issue affects Apache Answer: through 1.7.1.

An unauthenticated API endpoint incorrectly exposes full revision history for deleted content. This allows unauthorized users to retrieve restricted or sensitive information. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0, which fixes the issue.