deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-02-25

Description:
The following analytic detects instances of Winlogon.exe, a critical Windows process, connecting to public IP addresses. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on network connections made by Winlogon.exe. Under normal circumstances, Winlogon.exe should not connect to public IPs, and such activity may indicate a compromise, such as the BlackLotus bootkit attack. This detection is significant as it highlights potential system integrity breaches. If confirmed malicious, attackers could maintain persistence, bypass security measures, and compromise the system at a fundamental level.

References:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects modifications to the BootExecute registry key, which manages applications and services executed during system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute". This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to this key can indicate attempts to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the boot process. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code at boot, or disrupt system operations.

References:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with 30 unique users. It leverages Windows Event 4625 with Logon Type 3, indicating remote authentication attempts. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack, where an adversary attempts to gain initial access or elevate privileges in an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of sensitive information. This detection is crucial for real-time security monitoring and threat hunting.

References:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
  - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-05-04

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of "wevtutil.exe" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.

References:
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Raven Tait, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-13

Description:
Detects execution of known Potato-family privilege escalation tools based on original file name, process name, or binary path.
A tool class that has been a dominant post-compromise privilege escalation method for over a decade and remains actively used by ransomware operators, red teams, and nation-state actors alike.
The Potato family exploits Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse to escalate from a service account, IIS worker process, or other restricted context to SYSTEM.
The core abuse chain across most variants involves tricking a SYSTEM-level process into authenticating to an attacker-controlled endpoint, capturing that authentication, and impersonating the resulting SYSTEM token to spawn an elevated process.

References:
  - https://hideandsec.sh/books/windows-sNL/page/in-the-potato-family-i-want-them-all
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It leverages logs capturing script block text to identify attempts to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to detailed knowledge of domain security settings, aiding in privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.

References:
  - https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet
  - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: David Dorsey, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the deletion of the USN Journal using the fsutil.exe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because the USN Journal maintains a log of all changes made to files on the disk, and its deletion can be an indicator of an attempt to cover tracks or hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to obscure their activities, making it difficult to trace file modifications and potentially compromising incident response efforts.

References:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for reconnaissance and system information discovery on Windows endpoints.
It identifies command-line queries targeting common Win32 WMI classes such as Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, csproduct, Win32_DiskDrive, and Win32_PhysicalMemory, which are frequently leveraged to enumerate hardware, operating system details, and system configuration. Adversaries often use these queries during post-exploitation to fingerprint hosts, assess virtualization, and tailor follow-on activity. While WMIC usage can be legitimate for administrative and inventory tasks, suspicious or unexpected execution—particularly by non-administrative users or uncommon parent processes—may indicate malicious reconnaissance aligned with system discovery techniques.


References:
  - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/py.blankgrabber
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Bryan Pluta, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic is to leverage alerts from CrowdStrike Falcon Event Stream. This query aggregates and summarizes DetectionSummaryEvent and IdpDetectionSummaryEvent alerts from CrowdStrike Falcon Event Stream, providing details such as destination, user, severity, MITRE information, and Crowdstrike id and links. The evals in the search do multiple things to include align the severity, ensure the user, dest, title, description, MITRE fields are set properly, and the drilldowns are defined based on the type of alert. The search is highly dynamic to account for different alert types in which some fields may or may not be populated. Having all these fields properly set ensure the appropriate risk and analyst queue fields are correctly populated.

References:
  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/resources/guides/crowdstrike-falcon-event-streams-add-on-for-splunk-guide-v3/
  - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5082
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the addition of Service Principal Names (SPNs) HOST and RestrictedKrbHost to a computer account, indicative of KrbRelayUp behavior. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify changes in SPNs. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Kerberos-based attacks, which can be used to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to impersonate services, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources.

References:
  - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/an-attack-path-mapping-approach-to-cves-2021-42287-and-2021-42278
  - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications or new entries in the Print Processor registry path. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes in the specified registry path. This activity is significant because the Print Processor registry is known to be exploited by APT groups like Turla for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute a malicious DLL payload by restarting the spoolsv.exe process, leading to potential control over the compromised machine.

References:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-05-04

Description:
The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe`, a command-line utility used to terminate processes. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on instances where `taskkill.exe` is executed ten or more times within a one-minute span. This behavior is significant as adversaries often use `taskkill.exe` to disable security tools or other critical processes to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to bypass security defenses, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.

References:
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
  - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Date: 2026-02-25

Description:
The following analytic detects suspicious usage of BitLockerToGo.exe, which has been observed being abused by Lumma stealer malware. The malware leverages this legitimate Windows utility to manipulate registry keys, search for cryptocurrency wallets and credentials, and exfiltrate sensitive data. This activity is significant because BitLockerToGo.exe provides functionality for viewing, copying, and writing files as well as modifying registry branches - capabilities that the Lumma stealer exploits for malicious purposes. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active data theft campaign targeting cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, and password manager archives. The detection focuses on identifying BitLockerToGo.exe execution patterns that deviate from normal system behavior.

References:
  - https://any.run/report/5e9ba24639f70787e56f10a241271ae819ef9c573edb22b9eeade7cb40a2df2a/66f16c7b-2cfc-40c5-91cc-f1cbe9743fa3
  - https://securelist.com/fake-captcha-delivers-lumma-amadey/114312/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of msiexec.exe with an HTTP or
HTTPS URL in the command line, indicating a remote file download attempt. This detection
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process
execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as
it may indicate an attempt to download and execute potentially malicious software
from a remote server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code
execution, system compromise, or further malware deployment within the network.


References:
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.

References:
  - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
  - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
  - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-DomainTrust command from PowerView using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed inspection. Identifying this activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to gather domain trust information, which is often a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable an attacker to map trust relationships within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation and compromise of additional systems.

References:
  - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
  - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
  - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
  - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b[PII_REDACTED]e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/[PII_REDACTED]77/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies the resizing of shadow storage volumes, a technique used by ransomware like CLOP to prevent the recreation of shadow volumes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "vssadmin.exe" with parameters related to resizing shadow storage. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to hinder recovery efforts by manipulating shadow copies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to successful ransomware deployment, making data recovery difficult and increasing the potential for data loss.

References:
  - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft
  - https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
  - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin-resize-shadowstorage
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies the execution of ping sleep batch commands.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process command-line details.
This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to delay malicious code execution, potentially evading detection or sandbox analysis.
If confirmed malicious, this technique allows attackers to bypass security measures, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities, thereby increasing the risk of prolonged unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.

References:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with parameters used to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies specific script block text patterns associated with remote process instantiation. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.

References:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies process executions originating from RDP shares on Windows endpoints.
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) shares, typically accessed via the "tsclient" path, allow users to share files between their local machine and a remote desktop session. However, threat actors may exploit RDP shares to execute malicious processes or transfer harmful files onto a compromised system.
This detection focuses on identifying any process executions that originate from RDP shares, which could indicate unauthorized access or malicious activity.
Security teams should investigate any instances of such process executions, especially if they are found on systems that should not be using RDP shares or if the executed processes are unfamiliar or suspicious.


References:
  - https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2024/pdf/JSAC2024_2_7_hara_shoji_higashi_vickie-su_nick-dai_en.pdf
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/04/gogoogle-ransomware/
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/09/30/amazon-themed-campaigns-lazarus-netherlands-belgium/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.

References:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
  - https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound
  - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors
  - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of the Composer tool with elevated privileges on a Linux system. It identifies instances where Composer is run with the 'sudo' command, allowing the user to execute system commands as root. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized root access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain full control over the system, execute arbitrary commands, and compromise sensitive data.

References:
  - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/composer/
  - https://getcomposer.org/doc/00-intro.md
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of the `Set-ADAccountControl` PowerShell cmdlet with parameters that disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific command execution. Disabling Kerberos Pre-Authentication is significant because it allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks against user passwords using the AS-REP Roasting technique. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.

References:
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties
  - https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
  - https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects DLL search order hijacking involving iscsicpl.exe. It identifies when iscsicpl.exe loads a malicious DLL from a new path, triggering the payload execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on child processes spawned by iscsicpl.exe. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential attempt to execute unauthorized code via DLL hijacking. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.

References:
  - https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC
  - https://github.com/422926799/csplugin/tree/master/bypassUAC