OWASP Secure Coding Cheat Sheets: File Upload Cheat Sheet

# File Upload Cheat Sheet

## Introduction

File upload is becoming a more and more essential part of any application, where the user is able to upload their photo, their CV, or a video showcasing a project they are working on. The application should be able to fend off bogus and malicious files in a way to keep the application and the users safe.

In short, the following principles should be followed to reach a secure file upload implementation:

- **List allowed extensions. Only allow safe and critical extensions for business functionality**
    - **Ensure that [input validation](Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.md#file-upload-validation) is applied before validating the extensions.**
- **Validate the file type, don't trust the [Content-Type header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Type) as it can be spoofed**
- **Change the filename to something generated by the application**
- **Set a filename length limit. Restrict the allowed characters if possible**
- **Set a file size limit**
- **Only allow authorized users to upload files**
- **Store the files on a different server. If that's not possible, store them outside of the webroot**
    - **In the case of public access to the files, use a handler that gets mapped to filenames inside the application (someid -> file.ext)**
- **Run the file through an antivirus or a sandbox if available to validate that it doesn't contain malicious data**
- **Run the file through CDR (Content Disarm & Reconstruct) if applicable type (PDF, DOCX, etc...)**
- **Ensure that any libraries used are securely configured and kept up to date**
- **Protect the file upload from [CSRF](Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md) attacks**

## File Upload Threats

In order to assess and know exactly what controls to implement, knowing what you're facing is essential to protect your assets. The following sections will hopefully showcase the risks accompanying the file upload functionality.

### Malicious Files

The attacker delivers a file for malicious intent, such as:

1. Exploit vulnerabilities in the file parser or processing module (_e.g._ [ImageTrick Exploit](https://imagetragick.com/), [XXE](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_%28XXE%29_Processing))
2. Use the file for phishing (_e.g._ careers form)
3. Send ZIP bombs, XML bombs (otherwise known as billion laughs attack), or simply huge files in a way to fill the server storage which hinders and damages the server's availability
4. Overwrite an existing file on the system
5. Client-side active content (XSS, CSRF, etc.) that could endanger other users if the files are publicly retrievable.

### Public File Retrieval

If the file uploaded is publicly retrievable, additional threats can be addressed:

1. Public disclosure of other files
2. Initiate a DoS attack by requesting lots of files. Requests are small, yet responses are much larger
3. File content that could be deemed as illegal, offensive, or dangerous (_e.g._ personal data, copyrighted data, etc.) which will make you a host for such malicious files.

## File Upload Protection

There is no silver bullet in validating user content. Implementing a defense in depth approach is key to make the upload process harder and more locked down to the needs and requirements for the service. Implementing multiple techniques is key and recommended, as no one technique is enough to secure the service.

### Extension Validation

Ensure that the validation occurs after decoding the filename, and that a proper filter is set in place in order to avoid certain known bypasses, such as the following:

- Double extensions, _e.g._ `.jpg.php`, where it circumvents easily the regex `\.jpg`
- Null bytes, _e.g._ `.php%00.jpg`, where `.jpg` gets truncated and `.php` becomes the new extension
- Generic bad regex that isn't properly tested and well reviewed. Refrain from building your own logic unless you have enough knowledge on this topic.

Refer to the [Input Validation CS](Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.md) to properly parse and process the extension.

#### List Allowed Extensions

Ensure the usage of _business-critical_ extensions only, without allowing any type of _non-required_ extensions. For example if the system requires:

- image upload, allow one type that is agreed upon to fit the business requirement;
- cv upload, allow `docx` and `pdf` extensions.

Based on the needs of the application, ensure the **least harmful** and the **lowest risk** file types to be used.

#### Block Extensions

Identify potentially harmful file types and block extensions that you regard harmful to your service.

Please be aware that blocking specific extensions is a weak protection method on its own. The [Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload) article describes how attackers may attempt
to bypass such a check.

### Content-Type Validation

_The Content-Type for uploaded files is provided by the user, and as such cannot be trusted, as it is trivial to spoof. Although it should not be relied upon for security, it provides a quick check to prevent users from unintentionally uploading files with the incorrect type._

Other than defining the extension of the uploaded file, its MIME-type can be checked for a quick protection against simple file upload attacks.

This can be done preferably in an allowlist approach; otherwise, this can be done in a denylist approach.

### File Signature Validation

In conjunction with [content-type validation](#content-type-validation), validating the file's signature can be checked and verified against the expected file that should be received.

> This should not be used on its own, as bypassing it is pretty common and easy.

### Filename Safety

Filenames can endanger the system in multiple ways, either by using non acceptable characters, or by using special and restricted filenames. For Windows, refer to the following [MSDN guide](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file?redirectedfrom=MSDN#naming-conventions). For a wider overview on different filesystems and how they treat files, refer to [Wikipedia's Filename page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filename).

In order to avoid the above mentioned threat, creating a **random string** as a filename, such as generating a UUID/GUID, is essential. If the filename is required by the business needs, proper input validation should be done for client-side (_e.g._ active content that results in XSS and CSRF attacks) and back-end side (_e.g._ special files overwrite or creation) attack vectors. Filename length limits should be taken into consideration based on the system storing the files, as each system has its own filename length limit. If user filenames are required, consider implementing the following:

- Implement a maximum length
- Restrict characters to an allowed subset specifically, such as alphanumeric characters, hyphen, spaces, and peri