OWASP Secure Coding Cheat Sheets: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet

# SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet

## Introduction

This cheat sheet will help you prevent SQL injection flaws in your applications. It will define what SQL injection is, explain where those flaws occur, and provide four options for defending against SQL injection attacks. [SQL Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/SQL_Injection) attacks are common because:

1. SQL Injection vulnerabilities are very common.
2. The application's database is a frequent target for attackers because it typically contains sensitive or critical data.

## What Is a SQL Injection Attack?

Attackers can use SQL injection on an application if it has dynamic database queries that use string concatenation and user-supplied input. To avoid SQL injection flaws, developers need to:

1. Stop writing dynamic queries with string concatenation.
2. Prevent malicious SQL input from being included in executed queries.

There are simple techniques for preventing SQL injection vulnerabilities, and they can be used with practically any kind of programming language and any type of database. While XML databases can have similar problems (e.g., XPath and XQuery injection), these techniques can be used to protect them as well.

## Anatomy of a Typical SQL Injection Vulnerability

A common SQL injection flaw in Java is shown below. Because its unvalidated "customerName" parameter is simply appended to the query, an attacker can enter SQL code into that query and the application would take the attacker's code and execute it on the database.

```java
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = "
             + request.getParameter("customerName");
try {
    Statement statement = connection.createStatement( ... );
    ResultSet results = statement.executeQuery( query );
}

...
```

## Primary Defenses

- **Option 1: Use of Prepared Statements (with Parameterized Queries)**
- **Option 2: Use of Properly Constructed Stored Procedures**
- **Option 3: Allow-list Input Validation**
- **Option 4: STRONGLY DISCOURAGED: Escaping All User Supplied Input**

### Defense Option 1: Prepared Statements (with Parameterized Queries)

When developers are taught how to write database queries, they should be told to use prepared statements with variable binding (aka parameterized queries). Prepared statements are simple to write and easier to understand than dynamic queries, and parameterized queries force the developer to define all SQL code first and pass in each parameter to the query later.

If database queries use this coding style, the database will always distinguish between code and data, regardless of what user input is supplied. Also, prepared statements ensure that an attacker cannot change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker.

#### Safe Java Prepared Statement Example

In the safe Java example below, if an attacker were to enter the userID as `tom' or '1'='1`, the parameterized query would look for a username that literally matches the entire string `tom' or '1'='1`. Thus, the database would be protected against injections of malicious SQL code.

The following code example uses a `PreparedStatement`, Java's implementation of a parameterized query, to execute the same database query.

```java
// This should REALLY be validated too
String custname = request.getParameter("customerName");
// Perform input validation to detect attacks
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? ";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement( query );
pstmt.setString( 1, custname);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );
```

#### Safe C\# .NET Prepared Statement Example

In .NET, the creation and execution of the query doesn't change. Just pass the parameters to the query using the `Parameters.Add()` call as shown below.

```csharp
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ?";
try {
  OleDbCommand command = new OleDbCommand(query, connection);
  command.Parameters.Add(new OleDbParameter("customerName", CustomerName Name.Text));
  OleDbDataReader reader = command.ExecuteReader();
  // …
} catch (OleDbException se) {
  // error handling
}
```

While we have shown examples in Java and .NET, practically all other languages (including Cold Fusion and Classic ASP) support parameterized query interfaces. Even SQL abstraction layers, like the [Hibernate Query Language](http://hibernate.org/) (HQL) with the same type of injection problems (called [HQL Injection](http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html))  support parameterized queries as well:

#### Hibernate Query Language (HQL) Prepared Statement (Named Parameters) Example

```java
// This is an unsafe HQL statement
Query unsafeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Inventory where productID='"+userSuppliedParameter+"'");
// Here is a safe version of the same query using named parameters
Query safeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from Inventory where productID=:productid");
safeHQLQuery.setParameter("productid", userSuppliedParameter);
```

#### Other Examples of Safe Prepared Statements

If you need examples of prepared queries/parameterized languages, including Ruby, PHP, Cold Fusion, Perl, and Rust, see the [Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet](Query_Parameterization_Cheat_Sheet.md) or this [site](http://bobby-tables.com/).

Generally, developers like prepared statements because all the SQL code stays within the application, which makes applications relatively database independent.

### Defense Option 2: Stored Procedures

Though stored procedures are not always safe from SQL injection, developers can use certain standard stored procedure programming constructs. This approach has the same effect as using parameterized queries, as long as the stored procedures are implemented safely (which is the norm for most stored procedure languages).

#### Safe Approach to Stored Procedures

If stored procedures are needed, the safest approach to using them requires the developer to build SQL statements with parameters that are automatically parameterized, unless the developer does something largely out of the norm. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the SQL code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, then called from the application. Since prepared statements and safe stored procedures are equally effective in preventing SQL injection, your organization should choose the approach that makes the most sense for you.

#### When Stored Procedures Can Increase Risk

Occasionally, stored procedures can increase risk when a system is attacked. For example, on MS SQL Server, you have three main default roles: `db_datareader`, `db_datawriter` and `db_owner`. Before stored procedures came into use, DBAs would give `db_datareader` or `db_datawriter` rights to the webservice's user, depending on the requirements.

However, stored procedures require execute rights, a role not available by default. In so