CWE-1269: Product Released in Non-Release Configuration

Description:
The product released to market is released in pre-production or manufacturing configuration.

Extended Description:
Products in the pre-production or manufacturing stages are configured to have many debug hooks and debug capabilities, including but not limited to: 
				 
				 Ability to override/bypass various cryptographic checks (including authentication, authorization, and integrity) 
				 Ability to read/write/modify/dump internal state (including registers and memory) 
				 Ability to change system configurations 
				 Ability to run hidden or private commands that are not allowed during production (as they expose IP). 
				 The above is by no means an exhaustive list, but it alludes to the greater capability and the greater state of vulnerability of a product during it's preproduction or manufacturing state. 
				 Complexity increases when multiple parties are involved in executing the tests before the final production version. For example, a chipmaker might fabricate a chip and run its own preproduction tests, following which the chip would be delivered to the Original Equipment Manufacturer 

Affected languages: VHDL, Verilog, Compiled
Affected technologies: Other, Not Technology-Specific
Parent weaknesses: CWE-693

Consequences:
  - Confidentiality: Other

Mitigations:
  - [Implementation] Ensure that there exists a marker for denoting the Manufacturing Complete stage and that the Manufacturing Complete marker gets updated at the Manufacturing Complete stage (i.e., the Manufacturing Complete fuse gets blown).
  - [Integration] Ensure that there exists a marker for denoting the Manufacturing Complete stage and that the Manufacturing Complete marker gets updated at the Manufacturing Complete stage (i.e., the Manufacturing Complete fuse gets blown).
  - [Manufacturing] Ensure that there exists a marker for denoting the Manufacturing Complete stage and that the Manufacturing Complete marker gets updated at the Manufacturing Complete stage (i.e., the Manufacturing Complete fuse gets blown).

Demonstrative examples:
This example shows what happens when a preproduction system is made available for production.
An attacker will now be able to scan all the internal memory (containing chipmaker-level secrets).
Suppose the chipmaker has a way of scanning all the internal memory (containing chipmaker-level secrets) during the manufacturing phase, and the way the chipmaker or the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) marks the end of the manufacturing phase is by blowing a Manufacturing Complete fuse. Now, suppose that whoever blows the Manufacturing Complete fuse inadvertently forgets to execute the step to blow the fuse.
Blow the Manufacturing Complete fuse.

Real-world examples:
  - CVE-2019-13945: Regarding SSA-686531, a hardware based manufacturing access on S7-1200 and
S7-200 SMART has occurred. A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All ver
  - CVE-2018-4251: Laptops with Intel chipsets were found to be running in Manufacturing Mode. After this information was reported to the OEM, the vulnerability (CVE-2018-4251) was patched disallowing access to the inte