Penetration Test Report (NCCGroup): NCC Group Dell DELL195 PublicReport 2021 04 30 v1.0

Secured Component Verification
Dell Technologies
April 30, 2021 – Version 1.0
Preparedfor
DellTechnologies
Preparedby
NCCGroup
Executive Summary
Synopsis
During February 2021, Dell engaged NCC Group to conduct a security assessment of their supply chain security
functionalityandrelatedandsupportivefoundationalsecurityfunctionalityon14thand15thgenerationDellservers.
Documentationandsourcecodewasprovidedaswellasaccesstoarunninglabservervianetworkaccess,withaccess
toboththeDellintegratedremoteaccesscontroller,iDRACwhichistheBMCandserverhostnetworkinterfaces. The
assessmentwascarriedoutbyspecializedconsultantsfromNCCGroup’sHardwareandEmbeddedSystemspractice
whohaveexpertiseinareasofsecureproductmanufacturingsystems.
NCCGroupisaglobalinformationassurancefirmthatspecializesinapplication,mobile,network,host,andproduct
security. Security conscious companies use NCC Group to verify product attributes in view of current security best
practices,standardsecurityfunctionality,andproductprotection. MoreinformationabouttheGroup’sprocessesand
productscanbefoundathttps://nccgroup.com/us.
Itisimportanttonotethatthisdocumentrepresentsapoint-in-timeevaluationofsecurityposture.Securitythreatsand
attackertechniquesevolverapidly,andtheresultsofthisassessmentarenotintendedtorepresentanendorsement
oftheadequacyofcurrentsecuritymeasuresagainstfuturethreats. Thisdocumentnecessarilycontainsinformation
insummaryformandisthereforeintendedforgeneralguidanceonly; itisnotintendedasasubstitutefordetailed
researchortheexerciseofprofessionaljudgment. Anymentionofeffortorlengthofengagementisnotintendedto
conveycoverage;specifically,NCCGroupmakesnoclaimofcompletecoverageofthetarget(s)ofthisdocument. The
informationpresentedhereshouldnotbeconstruedasprofessionaladviceorservice.
Scope
ThegoalofthisassessmentwastodeterminethedegreetowhichtheSecuredComponentVerification(SCV)feature
succeedsinprovidingassuranceofabuild-timecomponentinventoryandtohighlightthethreatsitprotectsagainst.
ThisassessmentwasperformedbyNCCGroupundertheguidelinesprovidedinthestatementofworkfortheengage-
ment.Thescopeforattackscenarioswewerecommissionedtoassessweresupplychaininterdictionattacksassuming
temporarypossessionofthehardwareduringtransport. ThisincludedareviewofSCVprovisioningprocessesinthe
factorythroughtoproductdeliveryandtheuseofSCVforsystemvalidation. Ourapproachincludedtwophases:
1. ReviewoftheSCVsystemdesignandimplementation,andenumerationsofdependencies
2. ReviewofvarioustechnologiesthatsupportSCV
Compromisesofthefactoryinfrastructurewerenotconsideredtobewithinscopeforthisassessment,howeverDell
doesmakeadditionalinformationinthisareaavailableontheirwebsite.1 Alsooutofscopeforthisengagementwere
possiblycompromisedcomponentsupplychainspriortothefactorybuildprocess. However,wewereprovidedwith
documentationandaninteractiveworkshopwithkeyengineersdiscussingtechnicaldetailsofinternalprocessesfor
buildingandprovisioningDellservers,aswellasgenerating,signingandinstallingtheSCVinventorycertificateson
theserverwithfollowupsupportforsubsequentquestionsraised. Finally,thescopedidnotincludeareviewofany
logisticalsecuritycontrolsthatexistintheshippingprocesssuchassealedcontainers,GPStracking,trustedescorts,
andothermeasuresdiscussedintheDellsupplychainassurancewhitepaperwhichmayfurtherfrustrateanattacker.
KeyFindings
ItisNCCGroup’sopinion,thatDellhasamatureproductsecurityprogram. Theyhavealonghistoryofengagingwith
externalsecuritypartnerslikeNCCGrouptoperformsecurityreviewsoftheirsystems,andnewfeaturesastheyare
developed. TheirSecureDevelopmentLifecyclecontinuestoconsidersecuritythroughouttheproductdevelopment
process,wheresecuritycanbebuiltintotheproductfromtheearlieststages.
The SCV feature is a system identity framework. This framework is an ideal architecture for strong system identity
attestation that puts Dell in position to effectively make use of several emerging standards for device attestation.
DuringourbackgroundresearchitbecameclearthatDellisproactiveandinvolvedinthedevelopmentofmanyofthese
emergingstandards. Asthesestandardsmaturetheywill enablethirdparty componentvendorsto providestrong
1https://i.dell.com/sites/csdocuments/CorpComm_Docs/en/supply-chain-assurance.pdf
2 | DellTechnologiesSecuredComponentVerification DellTechnologies/NCCGroupConfidential
componentattestationguaranteesthatmanydonothavetoday,andSCVispoisedtoleveragesuchimprovementsas
theybecomeavailable.
Intel BootGuard and AMD Platform Secure Boot are host processor features that provide strong firmware integrity
guarantees,preventingfirmwareotherthanthatauthorizedbytheOEMfromexecutingonthesystem. Byenabling
theseasadditionaldefense-in-depthmeasures,certainclassesofphysicalattacksaremitigated,suchasflashmemory
replacementorreprogramming,andTime-of-Check-Time-of-Use(TOCTOU)raceconditions. Allcombined,theRootof
TrustfeaturesinthesystemmakecompromiseoftheTCBdifficult.
TheSCVframeworkleverageswellestablishedcryptographicconstructionsthroughouttheimplementation. Inpar-
ticular,theProofofPossessionandRemoteAttestationprocessesprovidestrongcryptographicguaranteesofsystem
identityandcertainvitalcomponentsofthesystembuildthattiethemstronglytotheplatformRootofTrustinthe
iDRAC.Overall, wefoundthatcryptographicmeasuressuchasdevicespecifichardwarerootkeys(HRK)areusedin
wayswhichwillsubstantiallyincreasethedifficultyofextractingandcloningcredentials. Sensitivekeymanagement
functionsaredesignedaroundamaturePKIthatleveragesHSMs,whichisalreadyinuseintheDellfactories.
SCVverifiesthesecurityoftheiDRACsubsystemearlyinitsvalidationprocessusingastrongattestationprotocolbefore
performinganyothercomponentvalidation. Thisensuresthatinventoryvalidationishappeningonlyafterthetrust
anchor is confirmed, ensuring that the report doesn’t falsely report valid matches in the instance where the iDRAC
is itself not verifiable. This is particularly important as the SCV inventory itself has no challenge response protocol
intrinsic to it - SCV has a trust relationship with iDRAC, as it reports on the state of hardware components, and the
attestation-testingfirstgivesitabasisforthistrust.
SCVrepresentsasignificantstepfromwhichtobuildacomprehensive,trustedandauthenticatedcomponentinven-
tory.Asmorethirdpartycomponentvendorsimplementstrongattestationmechanisms,theassurancethatSCVoffers
tocustomerswillonlyincrease. Dellisengagedwithpartnersintheecosystemtoenabletheongoingimprovements
necessarytoprovidesuchcomponent-levelassurances,andtheSCVframeworkeasilysupportssuchimprovements.
Finally, severalotheropportunitiesforsystemimprovementwerereportedtoDellalongwithrecommendations, in-
cludingimprovedDMAprotections,andsomerecommendationsforimprovedcustomerguidancewhenperforming
SCVvalidation.
3 | DellTechnologiesSecuredComponentVerification DellTechnologies/NCCGroupConfidential
Secured Component Verification
SecuredComponentVerificationisaDellsystemintendedtoprovidelast-legassuranceofproductintegrityfromorder
fulfillment at the Dell factory through to end-user delivery. To accomplish this, after a server has been built in the
factory,applicationsareexecutedonthehostwhichcollectamanifestofinstalledcomponents,andcryptographically
signthemusingDell’sPKI.ThissignedmanifestisthenstoredsecurelywithintheiDRACBMCsubsystem. Later,upon
delivery,themanifestdatacollectionisrepeatedbythecustomer,andcomparedagainstthedatastoredinthesigned
certificatewhichwillrevealsystemmodifications.
HighLevelProcessFlow
TheSCVprocessbeginswhenacustomerplacesanorderforasystem:
1. Dellreceivesanorder,andstartsbuildingthesystemtothespecificationsofthatorder
2. Afterthisdeviceisbuilt,acollectionscriptisexecutedonthehost OS,gatheringidentifyingcharacteristicsofthe
varioussystemcomponentsasdescribedabove.
3. ThisdevicehardwareinventoryiscryptographicallysignedusinganintermediatecertificatebyDell’sPKItoproduce
aninventorycertificate.
4. TheinventorycertificateisstoredintheiDRAC,viatheRACADMinterface.
5. TheinventoryisvalidatedagainusingtheSCVprocessbeforebeingshippedfordelivery.
Afterdeliveryoftheproductthroughsomeuntru