deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
MITRE ATT&CK: T1556.001 — Domain Controller Authentication
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: defense-impairment, persistence, credential-access
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. 

Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)

Mitigation:
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measure
MITRE ATT&CK: T1537 — Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: exfiltration
Platforms: IaaS, Office Suite, SaaS

Description:
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.

A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.(Citation: TLDRSec AWS Attacks)

Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature)

Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) 

Mitigation:
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) involves implementing strategies and technologies to identify, categorize, monitor, and control the movement of sensitive data within an organization. This includes protecting data formats indicative of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), intellectual property, or financial data from unauthorized access, transmission, or exfiltration. DLP solutions integrate with
MITRE ATT&CK: T1027.006 — HTML Smuggling
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)

Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.

For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)

Mitigation:
Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The goal is to contain threats and minimize
MITRE ATT&CK: T1556.005 — Reversible Encryption
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: defense-impairment, persistence, credential-access
Platforms: Windows

Description:
An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)

If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:

1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>
2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>
3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)
4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)

With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)

An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.

Mitigation:
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measure
MITRE ATT&CK: T1027.010 — Command Obfuscation
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)) or interactively via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: Akamai JS)(Citation: Malware Monday VBE)

For example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing,  `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality.(Citation: RC PowerShell) Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShellB64) Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`“Wor”+“d.Application”`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.(Citation: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators)(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)

Adversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\voi\pcw\..\..\Windows\tei\qs\k\..\..\..\system32\erool\..\wbem\wg\je\..\..\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).(Citation: Twitter Richard WMIC)

Tools such as <code>Invoke-Obfuscation</code> and <code>Invoke-DOSfucation</code> have also been used to obfuscate commands.(Citation: Invoke-DOSfuscation)(Citation: Invoke-Obfuscation)

Mitigation:
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack
MITRE ATT&CK: T1130 — Install Root Certificate
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS

Description:
Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.

Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)

Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)

Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)

In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1022 — Data Encrypted
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: exfiltration
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.

Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1070.004 — File Deletion
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include <code>del</code> on Windows, <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1498 — Network Denial of Service
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: impact
Platforms: Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Containers

Description:
Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)

A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).

To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.

Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.

For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).

Mitigation:
Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Ingress Traffic Filtering:

- Use Case: Conf
MITRE ATT&CK: T1651 — Cloud Administration Command
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: IaaS

Description:
Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. (Citation: AWS Systems Manager Run Command)(Citation: Microsoft Run Command)

If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) to execute commands in connected virtual machines.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)

Mitigation:
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measure
MITRE ATT&CK: T1546.016 — Installer Packages
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: privilege-escalation, persistence
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.(Citation: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton)

Using legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)) with the elevated permissions.(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)(Citation: wardle evilquest parti)(Citation: Windows AppleJeus GReAT)(Citation: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts)

Depending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.

For Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.(Citation: Microsoft Installation Procedures)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1595.001 — Scanning IP Blocks
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: reconnaissance
Platforms: PRE

Description:
Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.

Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).

Mitigation:
Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct succes
MITRE ATT&CK: T1158 — Hidden Files and Directories
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth, persistence
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

Description:
To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).

Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.

### Windows

Users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.

### Linux/Mac

Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.

### Mac

Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).
Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.