CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic

Description:
The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.

Extended Description:
Depending on the capabilities of the query language, an attacker could inject additional logic into the query to: 
                
                   Modify the intended selection criteria, thus changing which data entities (e.g., records) are returned, modified, or otherwise manipulated 
                   Append additional commands to the query 
                   Return more entities than intended 
                   Return fewer entities than intended 
                   Cause entities to be sorted in an unexpected way 
                
             The ability to execute additional commands or change which entities are returned has obvious risks. But when the product logic depends on the order or number of entities, this can also lead to vulnerabilities. For example, if the query expects to return only one entity that specifies an administrative user, but an attacker can change which entities are returned, this could cause the logic to return information for a regular user and in

Affected languages: Not Language-Specific
Parent weaknesses: CWE-74

Consequences:
  - Confidentiality: Bypass Protection Mechanism

Detection methods:
  - Automated Static Analysis: Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without havin

Demonstrative examples:
The following code dynamically constructs and executes a SQL query that searches for items matching a specified name. The query restricts the items displayed to those where owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
The query that this code intends to execute follows:
... string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName(); string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" + userName + "' AND itemname = '" + ItemName.Text + "'"; sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn); DataTable dt = new DataTable(); sda.Fill(dt); ...
SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = <userName> AND itemname = <itemName>;

The code below constructs an LDAP query using user input address data:
Because the code fails to neutralize the address string used to construct the query, an attacker can supply an address that includes additional LDAP queries.
context = new InitialDirContext(env); String searchFilter = "StreetAddress=" + address; NamingEnumeration answer = context.search(searchBase, searchFilter, searchCtls);

Real-world examples:
  - CVE-2024-50672: NoSQL injection in product for building eLearning courses allows password resets using a query processed by the Mongoose find function
  - CVE-2021-20736: NoSQL injection in team collaboration product
  - CVE-2020-35666: NoSQL injection in a PaaS platform using a MongoDB operator
  - CVE-2014-2503: Injection using Documentum Query Language (DQL)
  - CVE-2014-2508: Injection using Documentum Query Language (DQL)