deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
MITRE ATT&CK: T0805 — Block Serial COM
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: inhibit-response-function
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. 

A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0894 — System Binary Proxy Execution
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: evasion
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. (Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands. (Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)

Adversaries may abuse application binaries installed on a system for proxy execution of malicious code or domain-specific commands. These commands could be used to target local resources on the device or networked devices within the environment through defined APIs ([Execution through API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0871)) or application-specific programming languages (e.g., MicroSCADA SCIL). Application binaries may be signed by the developer or generally trusted by the operators, analysts, and monitoring tools accustomed to the environment. These applications may be developed and/or directly provided by the device vendor to enable configuration, management, and operation of their devices without many alternatives. 

Adversaries may seek to target these trusted application binaries to execute or send commands without the development of custom malware. For example, adversaries may target a SCADA server binary which has the existing ability to send commands to substation devices, such as through IEC 104 command messages. Proxy execution may still require the development of custom tools to hook into the application binary’s execution.



Mitigation:
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
MITRE ATT&CK:  — Role Identification
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: Windows, Human-Machine Interface, Control Server, Data Historian, Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED

Description:
Adversaries may perform role identification of devices involved with physical processes of interest in a target control system. Control systems devices often work in concert to control a physical process. Each device can have one or more roles that it performs within that control process. By collecting this role-based data, an adversary can construct a more targeted attack.

For example, a power generation plant may have unique devices such as one that monitors power output of a generator and another that controls the speed of a turbine. Examining devices roles allows the adversary to observe how the two devices work together to monitor and control a physical process. Understanding the role of a target device can inform the adversary's decision on what action to take, in order to cause Impact and influence or disrupt the integrity of operations. Furthermore, an adversary may be able to capture control system protocol traffic. By studying this traffic, the adversary may be able to determine which devices are outstations, and which are masters. Understanding of master devices and their role within control processes can enable the use of Rogue Master Device
MITRE ATT&CK: T0807 — Command-Line Interface
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.

CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP.  Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes.

Mitigation:
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0861 — Point & Tag Identification
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. 

Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.

Mitigation:
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies.  Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within
MITRE ATT&CK: T0816 — Device Restart/Shutdown
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: inhibit-response-function
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands.

Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states.

A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.

Mitigation:
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the  application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in [Filter Network Traffic](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937) mitigation.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0863 — User Execution
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. 

Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) 

A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021)

Mitigation:
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0860 — Wireless Compromise
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: initial-access
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014) (Citation: Alexander Bolshev March 2014) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. 

A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the trams network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: John Bill May 2017)

Mitigation:
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0858 — Change Operating Mode
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution, evasion
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download.   Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:  

* Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017)  
* Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)  (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021)   
* Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021)    
* Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)   
* Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)   
* Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron)

Mitigation:
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0878 — Alarm Suppression
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: inhibit-response-function
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole.

A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:  

* An alarm raised by a protocol message 
* An alarm signaled with I/O 
* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) 

In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019)  Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.

Mitigation:
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various AiTM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0868 — Detect Operating Mode
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g.,  run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:  

* Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017)  
* Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic.[Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)  (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021)   
* Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021)    
* Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)   
* Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007)   
* Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron)

Mitigation:
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0837 — Loss of Protection
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: impact
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. 

Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. 

Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0801 — Monitor Process State
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.

Mitigation:
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0853 — Scripting
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: execution
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. 

In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.

Mitigation:
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0888 — Remote System Information Discovery
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: discovery
Platforms: None

Description:
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system's operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary's operational objectives. In addition, the system's configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. 

Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system's API.

Mitigation:
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various AiTM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0845 — Program Upload
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: collection
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.

Mitigation:
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
MITRE ATT&CK: T0819 — Exploit Public-Facing Application
Domain: ics-attack
Tactics: initial-access
Platforms: None

Description:
Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility.

An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.

Mitigation:
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.