GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-wxjx-r2j2-96fx
Package: wwbn/avideo (COMPOSER)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 4.9)
CWE: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerable versions: <= 26.0
Patched in: unpatched

Summary: AVideo: Full-Read SSRF Through Unvalidated statsURL Parameter in plugin/Live/test.php

Details:
## Summary

The `plugin/Live/test.php` endpoint accepts a URL via the `statsURL` parameter and fetches it server-side using `file_get_contents()`, `curl_exec()`, or `wget`, returning the full response content in the HTML output. The only validation is a trivial regex (`/^http/`) that does not block requests to internal/private IP ranges or cloud metadata endpoints. The codebase provides `isSSRFSafeURL()` which blocks private IPs and resolves DNS to prevent rebinding, but this endpoint does not call it. An authenticated admin can read responses from cloud metadata services, internal network services, and localhost endpoints.

## Details

The vulnerable code path is in `plugin/Live/test.php`:

**User input (line 11):**
```php
$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'];
if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) {
    _log('this is not a URL ');
    exit;
}
```

The regex `/^http/` only verifies the URL starts with "http" — it does not validate the host, resolve DNS, or check against private/reserved IP ranges.

**Sink — file_get_contents (line 58-68):**
```php
if (ini_get('allow_url_fopen')) {
    try {
        $tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
        _log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp));
```

**Sink — curl_exec (line 73-94):**
```php
} elseif (function_exists('curl_init')) {
    $ch = curl_init();
    // ...
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0);
    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0);
    // ...
    $output = curl_exec($ch);
    // ...
    _log('curl_init:: '.htmlentities($output));
```

**Sink — wget (line 114):**
```php
if (wget($url, $filename)) {
    $result = file_get_contents($filename);
    _log('wget:: '.htmlentities($result));
```

All three code paths output the full response content to the user via `_log()`, which echoes to the HTML response (line 155-160).

The codebase provides `isSSRFSafeURL()` at `objects/functions.php:4025` which validates URL scheme, resolves DNS hostnames to IP addresses, and blocks private/reserved IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, and IPv6 equivalents). This function is used in 7 other endpoints including the previously-reported `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`, but `plugin/Live/test.php` does not call it.

Additionally, SSL certificate verification is disabled on both the `file_get_contents` stream context (lines 45-49) and the curl handler (lines 79-80), allowing MITM attacks against HTTPS targets.

The endpoint also lacks CSRF token validation while accepting GET requests via `$_REQUEST`, making it susceptible to cross-site request forgery against authenticated admins, although the CSRF-triggered variant is blind (attacker cannot read the response cross-origin).

## PoC

**Step 1: Authenticate as admin and obtain session cookie**
```bash
# Login to obtain PHPSESSID
PHPSESSID=$(curl -s -c - 'https://target.com/objects/userLogin.json.php' \
  -d 'user=admin&pass=adminpass' | grep