deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
MITRE ATT&CK: T1127 — Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth, execution
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.

Smart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them.(Citation: Microsoft Smart App Control) However, adversaries may leverage "reputation hijacking" to abuse an operating system’s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127) to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs)

Mitigation:
Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Control:

- Use Case: Use tools like
MITRE ATT&CK: T1529 — System Shutdown/Reboot
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: impact
Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows

Description:
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.

Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.

Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
 In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. 

Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1218.014 — MMC
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)

For example, <code>mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. 

Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)

Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)

Mitigation:
Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: 

Remove Legacy Softwa
MITRE ATT&CK: T1564.010 — Process Argument Spoofing
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)

Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)

Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1077 — Windows Admin Shares
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: lateral-movement
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>. 

Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)

The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
MITRE ATT&CK: T1574.012 — COR_PROFILER
Domain: enterprise-attack
Tactics: stealth, execution
Platforms: Windows

Description:
Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and impair defenses provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

Mitigation:
Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. This mitigation can be implemented through the following
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Indrik Spider
Aliases: Indrik Spider, Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest, DEV-0243, UNC2165

[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: LuminousMoth
Aliases: LuminousMoth

[LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. [LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between [LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) and [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Medusa Group
Aliases: Medusa Group

[Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” (Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) (Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. (Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024) For initial access, [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. (Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Wizard Spider
Aliases: Wizard Spider, UNC1878, TEMP.MixMaster, Grim Spider, FIN12, GOLD BLACKBURN, ITG23, Periwinkle Tempest, DEV-0193, Pistachio Tempest, DEV-0237

[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Elderwood
Aliases: Elderwood, Elderwood Gang, Beijing Group, Sneaky Panda

[Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Frankenstein
Aliases: Frankenstein

[Frankenstein](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0101) is a campaign carried out between January and April 2019 by unknown threat actors. The campaign name comes from the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated components.(Citation: Talos Frankenstein June 2019)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: FIN7
Aliases: FIN7, GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14, Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, Sangria Tempest

[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: UNC3886
Aliases: UNC3886

[UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. [UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Velvet Ant
Aliases: Velvet Ant

[Velvet Ant](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1047) is a threat actor operating since at least 2021. [Velvet Ant](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1047) is associated with complex persistence mechanisms, the targeting of network devices and appliances during operations, and the use of zero day exploits.(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024A)(Citation: Sygnia VelvetAnt 2024B)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: WIRTE
Aliases: WIRTE, Ashen Lepus

[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)(Citation: Check Point Wirte NOV 2024)(Citation: Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Star Blizzard
Aliases: Star Blizzard, SEABORGIUM, Callisto Group, TA446, COLDRIVER

[Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Dragonfly
Aliases: Dragonfly, TEMP.Isotope, DYMALLOY, Berserk Bear, TG-4192, Crouching Yeti, IRON LIBERTY, Energetic Bear, Ghost Blizzard, BROMINE

[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: APT-C-36
Aliases: APT-C-36, Blind Eagle, TAG-144, AguilaCiega, APT-Q-98

[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. [APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.(Citation: QiAnXin APT-C-36 Feb2019)(Citation: Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024)(Citation: Check Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025)(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: OilRig
Aliases: OilRig, COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, APT34, Helix Kitten, Evasive Serpens, Hazel Sandstorm, EUROPIUM, ITG13, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, TA452

[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)
MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group: Equation
Aliases: Equation

[Equation](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0020) is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)