GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-96xm-fv9w-pf3f
Package: soroban-sdk (RUST)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 5.3)
CWE: CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Vulnerable versions: < 22.0.9
Patched in: 22.0.9

Summary: soroban-sdk has overflow in Bytes::slice, Vec::slice, GenRange::gen_range for u64

Details:
### Impact

Arithmetic overflow can be triggered in the `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice`, and `Prng::gen_range` (for `u64`) methods in the `soroban-sdk` in versions prior to and including `25.0.1`.

Contracts that pass user-controlled or computed range bounds to `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice`, or `Prng::gen_range` may silently operate on incorrect data ranges or generate random numbers from an unintended range, potentially resulting in corrupted contract state.

Note that the best practice when using the `soroban-sdk` and building Soroban contracts is to always enable `overflow-checks = true`. The `stellar contract init` tool that prepares the boiler plate for a Soroban contract, as well as all examples and docs, encourage the use of configuring `overflow-checks = true` on `release` profiles so that these arithmetic operations fail rather than silently wrap. Contracts are only impacted if they use `overflow-checks = false` either explicitly or implicitly. It is anticipated the majority of contracts could not be impacted because the best practice encouraged by tooling is to enable `overflow-checks`.

### Detail

When compiled with `overflow-checks = false` (the default for release builds), the bare arithmetic in those functions silently wraps on boundary values like `u32::MAX` or `u64::MAX`. This causes the range passed to the host to differ from the caller's intent:

`Bytes::slice`:
- `Bytes::slice(0..=u32::MAX)` — end `u32::MAX + 1` wraps to `0`, producing `slice(0..0)` returning empty instead of the full range.
- `Bytes::slice((Bound::Excluded(u32::MAX), Bound::Unbounded))` — start `u32::MAX + 1` wraps to `0`, producing `slice(0..)` instead of an empty/invalid range.

`Vec::slice`:
- `Vec::slice(0..=u32::MAX)` — same as `Bytes`, end wraps to `0`, returning empty.
- `Vec::slice((Bound::Excluded(u32::MAX), Bound::Unbounded))` — same as `Bytes`, start wraps to `0`.

`Prng::gen_range`:
- `Prng::gen_range((Bound::Unbounded, Bound::Excluded(0)))` — end `0 - 1` wraps to `u64::MAX`, producing range `0..=u64::MAX` instead of an empty/invalid range.
- `Prng::gen_range((Bound::Excluded(u64::MAX), Bound::Unbounded))` — start `u64::MAX + 1` wraps to `0`, producing range `0..=u64::MAX` instead of an empty/invalid range.

Note that some cases where the overflow was permitted and wrapped on the guest side are caught by the Soroban Env Host and cause a trap host side with error `HostError: Error(Object, IndexBounds)` `object index out of bounds`, because the wrapped values create invalid inputs:
- `Bytes::slice(u32::MAX..=u32::MAX)` — both start `u32::MAX + 1` and end `u32::MAX + 1` wrap to `0`, producing `slice(0..0)`.
- `Vec::slice(u32::MAX..=u32::MAX)` — same as `Bytes`, both wrap to `0`.


### Patches

The fix replaces bare arithmetic with `checked_add` / `checked_sub`, ensuring overflow traps regardless of the `overflow-checks` profile setting.

### Workarounds

Contract workspaces can be configured with the following profile to enable overflow checks on the ari