deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Raven Tait, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-13

Description:
Detects where a process writes to critical EFI bootloader files (bootmgfw.efi or bootx64.efi) within the \EFI\Boot\ directory.
These files are responsible for initializing the Windows Boot Manager during system startup.
Modification or replacement of these files is highly unusual in normal operations and may indicate an attempt to install a bootkit, persist malicious code at the firmware level, or otherwise tamper with the system boot process.

References:
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hybridpetya-ransomware-can-bypass-uefi-secure-boot/
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/under-cloak-uefi-secure-boot-introducing-cve-2024-7344/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-ForestDomain` cmdlet, a component of the PowerView toolkit used for Windows domain enumeration. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. Detecting `Get-ForestDomain` is significant because adversaries and Red Teams use it to gather detailed information about Active Directory forest and domain configurations. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to understand the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation within the environment.

References:
  - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestDomain/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
  - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-05-04

Description:
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the EventLog security descriptor registry value for defense evasion. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CustomSD" value within the "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog\<Channel>\CustomSD" path. This activity is significant as changes to the access permissions of the event log could blind security products and help attackers evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to block users and security products from viewing, ingesting and interacting event logs.

References:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/[PII_REDACTED]1255/https://blog.minerva-labs.com/lockbit-3.0-aka-lockbit-black-is-here-with-a-new-icon-new-ransom-note-new-wallpaper-but-less-evasiveness
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Steven Dick
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of the Certipy tool to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments by identifying unique file modifications. It leverages endpoint process and filesystem data to spot the creation of files with specific names or extensions associated with Certipy's information gathering and exfiltration activities. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance and data exfiltration efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive AD CS information, enabling further attacks or privilege escalation within the network.

References:
  - https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: David Dorsey, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of sdbinst.exe with parameters indicative of silently creating a shim database. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because shim databases can be used to intercept and manipulate API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or achieve persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access to the compromised system.
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects use of container images that fall outside an approved
allowlist, leveraging Cisco Isovalent/Tetragon runtime telemetry (image name and
workload identity). Adversaries commonly introduce untrusted or newly published
images to deploy tooling, establish persistence, or abuse supply‑chain trust. This
behavior may indicate image pulls from unauthorized registries, execution of
unvetted software, or a drift from established deployment baselines. Extra scrutiny
is warranted for namespaces and workloads that normally source images from restricted
registries, and for pods that suddenly begin running images outside expected
prefixes.
Maintain an environment‑specific allowlist via the macro `cisco_isovalent_allowed_images`
(for example, allow trusted registries/prefixes such as ImageName="gcr.io/org/*",
"registry.local/*", or "myco/*") and keep it updated as new baseline images are
introduced. This analytic alerts on images NOT matching the allowlist.


References:
  - https://dev.to/thenjdevopsguy/attacking-a-kubernetes-cluster-enter-red-team-mode-2onj
  - https://www.reddit.com/r/kubernetes/comments/l6e5yr/one_of_our_kubernetes_containers_was_compromised/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-16

Description:
The following analytic identifies instances where the PowerShell executable has been renamed and executed under an alternate filename. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to evade security controls or bypass logging mechanisms that monitor standard PowerShell usage. While rare in legitimate environments, renamed PowerShell binaries are frequently observed in malicious campaigns leveraging Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) and fileless malware techniques. This detection flags executions of PowerShell where the process name does not match the default powershell.exe or pwsh.exe, especially when invoked from unusual paths or accompanied by suspicious command-line arguments.

References:
  - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.xworm
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of `GetProcAddress` in PowerShell script blocks, leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, which is then logged in Windows event logs. The presence of `GetProcAddress` is unusual for typical PowerShell scripts and often indicates malicious activity, as many attack toolkits use it to achieve code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise. Analysts should review parallel processes and the entire logged script block for further investigation.

References:
  - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
  - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
  - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b[PII_REDACTED]e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/[PII_REDACTED]77/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
  - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: David Dorsey, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the creation of shim database files (.sdb) in default directories using the sdbinst.exe application. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file writes to the Windows\AppPatch\Custom directory. This activity is significant because shims can intercept and alter API calls, potentially allowing attackers to bypass security controls or execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of a Unix shell command designed to wipe root directories on a Linux host. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on the 'rm' command with force recursive deletion and the '--no-preserve-root' option. This activity is significant as it indicates potential data destruction attempts, often associated with malware like Awfulshred. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to severe data loss, system instability, and compromised integrity of the affected Linux host. Immediate investigation and response are crucial to mitigate potential damage.

References:
  - https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487
  - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.

References:
  - https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350
  - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/Legacy-AzureHound.ps1/blob/master/AzureHound.ps1
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Rod Soto, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies the use of certutil.exe with arguments indicating the manipulation or extraction of certificates.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant because extracting certificates can allow attackers to sign new authentication tokens, particularly in federated environments like Windows ADFS.
If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to forge authentication tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.

References:
  - https://blog.sygnia.co/detection-and-hunting-of-golden-saml-attack
  - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/certutil.exe-09A8A29BAA3A451713FD3D07943B4A43.html
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-05-04

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of a PowerShell commandlet to import an AppLocker XML policy. This behavior is identified by monitoring processes that execute the "Import-Module Applocker" and "Set-AppLockerPolicy" commands with the "-XMLPolicy" parameter. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to disable or bypass security controls, as seen in the Azorult malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to disable antivirus products, leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.

References:
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-02-25

Description:
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments invoking the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use this method to identify the logged-in user on a compromised endpoint, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, potentially facilitating further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.

References:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects suspicious remote thread execution in processes such as Taskmgr.exe, calc.exe, and notepad.exe, which may indicate process injection by malware like Qakbot. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify remote thread creation in specific target processes. This activity is significant as it often signifies an attempt by malware to inject malicious code into legitimate processes, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised host.


References:
  - https://twitter.com/pr0xylife/status/[PII_REDACTED]41031680?s=46&t=Dc3CJi4AnM-8rNoacLbScg
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: experimental
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-03-10

Description:
The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in specific directories associated with Exchange exploitation by the HAFNIUM group and the ProxyShell vulnerability. It detects this activity by monitoring the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process, which typically does not write .aspx files. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an active exploitation attempt on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further compromise.

References:
  - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Dean Luxton
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.

References:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/1522b774-6464-41a3-87a5-1e5633c3fbbb
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/29a5c62784faf986dc03952ae3e90e3df3294284/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml
  - https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the use of the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility, which initiates a callback to a remote Command and Control (C2) server. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on PowerShell processes that include specific .NET classes like Net.Sockets.TCPClient and System.Text.ASCIIEncoding. This activity is significant as it indicates potential remote control or data exfiltration attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized remote access, data theft, or further compromise of the affected system.

References:
  - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1
  - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
  - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
  - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2025-12-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies the execution of the dxdiag.exe process with specific command-line arguments, which is used to gather system information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line details. This activity is significant because dxdiag.exe is rarely used in corporate environments and its execution may indicate reconnaissance efforts by malicious actors. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to collect detailed system information, aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.

References:
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry setting for EnableLinkedConnections. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes where the registry path is "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLinkedConnections" and the value is set to "0x00000001". This activity is significant because enabling linked connections can allow network shares to be accessed with both standard and administrator-level privileges, a technique often abused by malware like BlackByte ransomware. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive network resources, escalating the attacker's privileges.

References:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects modifications to theregistry related to ValleyRAT C2 configuration. Specifically,  it monitors changes in registry keys where ValleyRAT saves the IP address and port information of its command-and-control (C2) server. This activity is a key indicator of ValleyRAT attempting to establish persistent communication with its C2 infrastructure. By identifying these unauthorized registry modifications, security analysts can quickly detect malicious configurations and investigate the associated threats. Early detection of these changes helps prevent further exploitation and limits the malware’s ability to exfiltrate data or control infected systems.

References:
  - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/chinese-malware-appears-earnest-across-cybercrime-threat-landscape
  - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/valleyrat-campaign-targeting-chinese-speakers
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: David Dorsey, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Get-DomainTrust command from PowerView using PowerShell, which is used to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by an adversary to understand domain trust relationships, which can inform lateral movement strategies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map out the network, identify potential targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising additional systems within the domain.

References:
  - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects modifications to the SID History attribute in Active Directory by leveraging event code 5136. This detection uses logs from the `wineventlog_security` data source to identify changes to the sIDHistory attribute. Monitoring this activity is crucial as the SID History attribute can be exploited by adversaries to inherit permissions from other accounts, potentially granting unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and escalate privileges within the domain, posing a significant security risk.

References:
  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-sidhistory?redirectedfrom=MSDN
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unsecure-sid-history-attribute
  - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection
Sigma Detection Rule: 
Repository: splunk/security_content
Status: production
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Date: 2026-04-15

Description:
The following analytic detects a suspicious process accessing the registry entries for default internet browsers. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify access attempts to these registry paths. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit this registry key to gather information about installed browsers and their settings, potentially leading to the theft of sensitive data such as login credentials and browsing history. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information and compromise user accounts.

References:
  - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer