GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp
Package: Magick.NET-Q8-x64 (NUGET)
Severity: MODERATE (CVSS 4.7)
CWE: CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer, CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound), CWE-369: Divide By Zero
Vulnerable versions: <= 14.9.0
Patched in: unpatched

Summary: ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)

Details:
## Summary

A single root cause in the CLAHE implementation — tile width/height becoming zero — produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors.
Vulnerabilities exists in the `CLAHEImage()` function of ImageMagick’s `MagickCore/enhance.c`.

1. Unsigned integer underflow → out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when `tile_info.height == 0`, the expression `tile_info.height - 1` (unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion).
2. **Division/modulus by zero**: where code performs `... / tile_info.width` or `... % tile_info.height` without re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers or `abort` at runtime.

Both behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact `-clahe 0x0!` or automatic tile derivation `dim >> 3 == 0` for very small images). 

---

## Details

### **Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)**

- Location: `MagickCore/enhance.c`, around line 609
- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
- Vulnerable code
    
    enhance.c: 609
    
    ```c
    p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * (tile.height - 1);
    ```
    
- Root Cause
    - If `tile.height == 0`, then `(tile.height - 1)` underflows to `UINT_MAX`.
    - Multiplication with `clahe_info->width` yields a huge value close to `SIZE_MAX`.
    - Adding this to `p` causes pointer arithmetic underflow.

### **Division-by-zero**

- File / Location: `MagickCore/enhance.c`, around line 669
- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). /UBSan build)
- vulnerable code
    
    enhance.c: 669-673
    
    ```c
     if ((image->columns % tile_info.width) != 0)
        tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image->columns % tile_info.width));
      tile_info.y=0;
      if ((image->rows % tile_info.height) != 0)
        tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image->rows % tile_info.height));
    ```
    
- Root cause
    
    Missing input validation / bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:
    
    If either `tile_info.width` or `tile_info.height` is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:
    
    1. Exact tiles: CLI `clahe 0x0!` (the `!` forces zero to be used verbatim).
    2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is `0` (no `!`), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., `dim >> 3`). For images with `dim < 8`, this result is 0 unless clamped.

---

## Reproduction

### **Unsigned underflow**

**Environment**

Built with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.

```c
export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
export ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0
```

**Command**

```bash
./magick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:
```

**Output**

```
MagickCore/enhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed
SUMMARY: UndefinedBe