FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS (SECTIONS A-C)
Document: (27 February 2007) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Exhibits  135 A. G ENERAL QUESTIONS  136 B. Q UESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BRAZIL'S REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 13.1 DSU  137 C. Q UESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE UNITED STATES  141
Date: 27 February 2007
Document codes: WT/DS267/RW
Complainant: Brazil
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad, China, Taiwan, EU, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Japan, Thailand
Dispute stage: Mutually Agreed Solution
Agreements cited: Art. 3, 5, 6  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)Art. 3.3, 7.1, 8, 9.1, 10.1  AgricultureArt. III:4, XVI  GATT 1994

Table of Exhibits

Exhibit US- Title
112 CCC Commodity Estimates Book, Feb. 5, 2007 (Program Yields)

A. G
ENERAL QUESTIONS

Questions to both parties

1. Is Brazil/US of the view that a party to a dispute referred to a panel established
under Article 21.5 of the DSU (a party in a compliance panel) can make the same
legal argument as it did in the original Panel proceedings?

1. Article 21.5 "compliance" proceedings are limited in terms of the claims that can be made and
the measures in respect of which the claims can be made . As the Appellate Body has explained,
"[p]roceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather,
Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those 'measures taken to comply with the recommendations
and rulings' of the DSB."1 Moreover, "[i]f a claim challenges a measure which is not a 'measure taken
to comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings." 2 While Article 21.5 of
the DSU does not set out any similar express limitation on the legal arguments that can be made in a
compliance proceeding, the necessary implication of the limitation on claims and measures is that, for
legal arguments to be relevant in a compliance proceeding, they must relate to claims and measures
that are properly within the scope of DSU Article 21.5.

2. The Appellate Body has explai ned that "Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in principle, not the
original measure, but rather a new and different measure which was not before the original panel."
3
Accordingly, it is not clear that parties would make exactly the same legal arguments in a compliance
proceeding ( i.e., in support of claims against measures taken to comply) as those it made in the
original proceeding ( i.e., in support of original claims agains t original measures). Nonetheless,
nothing in Article 21.5 of the DSU pr ecludes parties from applying the same logic or reasoning in the
two different contexts. Indeed, the situation with Brazil in this proceeding, where it has made one set
of arguments in the original proceeding and then made directly contradictory arguments in the
compliance proceeding – for example, regarding the effects of the Step 2 Program and the
appropriateness of the FAPRI approach to modeli ng – would appear to be exceptional and not the
approach required by Article 21.5 of the DSU.

2. Could each party explain its view on the question of whether, and to what extent,
this Panel must rely on the legal and factual analysis underlying the original
panel's findings? What are the relevant provisions of the DSU in this regard?

3. The relevance of an original panel's legal a nd factual analysis to the resolution of the matter
presented to a compliance panel depends on the measure challenged in the compliance proceeding.

4. Where a complaining party claims that a Member has failed to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB – i.e., that no measure taken to comply exists – the original
panel's analysis (as modified by the Appellate B ody) is a key consideration. In that case, it is
important to examine the DSB's recommendations a nd rulings in order to determine whether the
responding Member was, in fact, required to take me asures to come into compliance and, if so, the
scope of the obligation to do so. As the DSB's re commendations and rulings are based on the original
panel's analysis (as modified by the Appellate Body), that analysis is important in discerning what the
DSB's recommendations and rulings actually are in the particular dispute.
4
5. The second case is one in which the complain ing party agrees that a Member has taken
measures to comply with the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB but challenges its "consistency

1 Canada – Aircraft (21.5 Brazil) (AB), para. 36 (italics in original; underlining added).
2 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).
4 See e.g., United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination (21.5 – Canada) (AB), para. 68.

with a covered agreement." In that case, the origin al panel's legal and factua l analysis may be much
less important. As the Appellate Body reasoned in Canada – Aircraft (21.5 – Brazil ), "Article 21.5
proceedings involve, in principle, not the original measure, but rather a new and different measure
which was not before the original panel."
5 Accordingly, "the relevant facts bearing upon the 'measure
taken to comply' may be different from the relevant facts relating to the measure at issue in the
original proceedings." 6 Moreover, "the claims, arguments and factual circumstances which are
pertinent to the 'measure taken to comply' will not, necessarily, be the same as those which were
pertinent in the original dispute."7 The Appellate Body has, therefore, clarified that:

the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 of the DSU would be seriously
undermined if a panel were restricted to examining the new measure from the
perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances that related to the
original measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then be unable to examine
fully the 'consistency with a covered agreem ent of the measures taken to comply,' as
required by Article 21.5 of the DSU.
8
6. The same reasoning precludes "restricting" a panel to following the exact same legal and
factual reasoning as the original panel. 9 However, under DSU Article 11, the task of a compliance
panel – like that of an original panel – is to make an " objective assessment of the matter before it,
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements." In so doing, it may well consider that the reasoning of the original
panel to be persuasive on points that are a pposite. The Appellate Body confirmed this in
United States – Shrimp (21.5 – Malaysia) , where the Appellate Body found that the compliance panel
was justified in "taking into account the reasoning" in the adopted Appellate Body report from the
original proceeding. The Appellate Body recalled, in this regard that a dopted panel and Appellate
Body report "are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent
panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken
into account where they are relevant to any dispute."10

B. Q UESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BRAZIL'S REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 13.1

Questions to the US

3. Is the United States arguing that Brazil must identify the subsidized product for
each of the types of subsidies from whic h it claims serious prejudice? Is the United
States arguing that payments which permit planting flexibility are not tied to the
production of upland cotton, so that th ey must be allocated by Brazil across the
total value of production of each recipient?

7. The United States does consider that Brazil must identify the subsidized product for each of
the types of subsidies from which it claims serious pr ejudice. As the Appellate Body explained in the
original proceeding, this is a requirement of Article 6.3(c) itself:

the 'subsidized product' must be properly identified for purposes of significant price
suppression under Article 6.3(c) of the SC M Agreement. And if the challenged

9 This is also consistent with the fact that there is no principle of stare decisis applicable in WTO
dispute settlement.
10 United States – Shrimp (21.5 – Malaysia) (AB) , para. 108 (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (AB)
at 108).

payments do not, in fact, subsidize that product, this may undermine the conclusion
that the effect of the subsidy is significant suppression of prices of that product in the
relevant market.
11
8. The same requirement exists with respect to Article 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement , which
specifically refers to "subsidized primary product or commodity."12

9. Brazil and the United States agreed in the orig inal proceeding – and the original panel found –
that the "subsidized product" was upland cotton lint. 13 Brazil has signaled that it considers that the
same "subsidized product" is at issu e here in this compliance proceeding. 14 Under the Appellate
Body's reasoning it is necessary to ensure that "the challenged payments do . . . , in fact, subsidize that
product."15 The challenged payments, in the case of c ounter-cyclical payments, are payments in
respect of upland cotton base acres. 16 The United States maintains that the appropriate allocation
methodology for payments such as the counter-c yclical payments – which are not tied to the
production or sales of any particular produc t – can be found in Annex IV of the SCM Agreement .
That Annex sets out methodologies for determining th e rate of "subsidization" of a "product" for
purposes of the now-defunct Article 6.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.

10. Annex IV does not apply directly to the seri ous prejudice determinations under Articles 5(c)
and 6.3(c). However, as it is the only allocatio n methodology that Members have agreed in the
SCM Agreement and deals specifically with the question of how to allocate subsidies that are not tied
to production or sale of a given product, it provides essential context.
17
11. Under paragraph 2 of Annex IV , "the value of the product" that is subsidized in the case of
subsidies that are not tied to production or sales is equal to "the total value of the recipient firm's
sales."18 (By way of contrast, where a "subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a given product, the
value of the [subsidized] product shall be calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's sales of

11 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 472.
12 Article 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement provides that "the effect of th e subsidy is an increase in the
world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity as
compared to the average share it had during the previous period of thr ee years and this increase follows a
consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted." (Footnote omitted).
13 See Upland Cotton (AB), para. 407, nn. 450-451 (stating that "the subsidized product is United States
upland cotton lint. (Panel Report, paras. 7.139, 7.1221-7.1224 and footnote 191 to para. 7.139)" and "[t]he
United States and Brazil confirmed during the oral hearing that they do not contest this identification of the
subsidized product.")
15 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 472.
16 As the United States explained in its letter dated January 19, 2007 and again in its rebuttal
submission "support-conferring measures with respect to non-cotton historical base acres" were not included in
the support found to exceed the limitation in the Peace Clause proviso, such m easures were exempt by virtue of
the Peace Clause in the Agreement on Agriculture from actions, including Brazil's serious prejudice claims.
Therefore, there could have been no, and there were no, DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to such
measures, and counter-cyclical paymen ts for non-cotton base acres are not "measures taken to comply" within
the meaning of DSU Article 21.5.
17 While this methodology was not applied in the or iginal proceeding, the pr imary reason was Brazil's
insistence that no precise calculation need be undertake n in the context of claims under Part III of the
SCM Agreement. See e.g., Upland Cotton (AB), paras. 98 ("the remedy under Part III focuses on the effects of
the subsidy, rather than the impos ition of duties, and, according to Br azil, the size of a subsidy does not
necessarily determine its effects") and 467. To the extent that calculation of the precise amount of the subsidy is
undertaken – and the United States continues to believe that it is important that this be done – it is appropriate to
use the allocation methodology in Annex IV.
18 SCM Agreement, Annex IV, para. 2 (footnote omitted).

that product."19) Thus, Annex IV suggests a methodology for determining the amount of a non-tied
subsidy that benefits a given prod uct: the subsidy would be allocated to the product according to the
ratio of the value of sales of that product to the tota l value of the recipient firm's sales. In this way,
the Annex IV methodology recognizes that a payment that is not tied to the production or sale of a
given product benefits all of the products the recipient produces. Allocating such a non-tied payment
exclusively to one product over another would be ec onomically arbitrary. Annex IV indicates an
economically neutral methodology to allocate the be nefits of non-tied subsidies to which Members
have agreed.

12. Applying that methodology in the present circumstance yields the following results:

Value of cotton production for farm household that harvested cotton (2003-2005)

 2003 2004 2005 2003-2005 average
Total value of farm production 388,720 367,634 406,181 387,512
Total value of cotton 162,379 198,276 189,831 183,495
Cotton as percent of total 41.8% 53.9% 46.7% 47.4%
Source: 2003-05 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey.

Allocating counter-cyclical payments (million dollars)

 2003 2004 2005
Total CCP payments (A) 392 1,375 1,375
Ratio of total cotton base acres up to cotton
planted acres to total cotton base acres (B)1/ 59.1% 59.0% 60.2%
CCP payments paid on total cotton base acres
on farms that planted cotton (C = A * B)
231.7 811.3 827.8
Cotton as percent of total on farms that
harvested cotton (D)
41.8% 53.9% 46.7%
CCP payments allocated based on cotton's
share of total crop value
(E = D * C)
96.8 437.3 386.6
As percent of total CCPs (F= E/A) 24.7% 31.8% 28.1%
 1/ U.S. First Written Submission, para 224

19 SCM Agreement, Annex IV, para. 3 [italics added].

4. Does the United States contest the accuracy of the figures for 2003 – 2005 cited in
"Table 6" of Brazil's first submission and "Table 5" of Brazil's rebuttal
submission? If so, please provide the accura te figures, or the figures the US deems
to be more accurate.

13. The United States does not agree that the figures in "Table 6" of Brazil's first written
submission for MY2004 and MY2005 are accu rate for marketing loan payments.
20 These payments
are composed of three separate components – loan deficiency payments ("LDP"), marketing loan
gains ("MLG"), and certificate exchange gains (" CEG"). As Brazil notes, USDA budget projections
now include a "stochastic add-on" to account for variability in the projections. 21 But this "add-on" is
done only for projection purposes. Brazil has incorr ectly included the projected figures – including
the "add-on" for MY 2004 and MY 2005.22

14. The actual outlays for MY 2004 and MY 2005 are the following:

 MY2004 MY2005
LDP 374 256
MLG 10 8
CEG 1,396 1,005
TOTAL 1,780 1,269

15. The United States understands that Brazil inte nds the counter-cyclical payment figures shown
in "Table 5" of Brazil's rebuttal submission to supercede the counter-cyclical payment figures shown
in "Table 6" of its first written submission. Braz il has sought to allocate counter-cyclical payments in
respect of upland cotton base acres using the so-called "cotton-to-cotton" methodology.
23 For the
reasons discussed in response to question 3 above, the United States considers that the methodology
set out in Annex IV of the SCM Agreement is the more accurate and more appropriate approach.

16. Nonetheless, the United States has attempted to test the calculations conducted by Brazil in
Table 5 of its Rebuttal Submission. Brazil cites Exhibit BRA-567 (Agricultural Outlook Indicators,
Table 19) as the source of payments rates and paym ents yields. However, this source only includes
data through MY 2002. The United States has used publicly available data to try and replicate
Brazil's figures. These figures are shown below:

20 The United States considers that only the MY 2005 data is relevant for purposes of Brazil's "present"
serious prejudice claims. Nonetheless, for sake of completeness, the United States has tested that figures for
MY 2003-2005. The United States has not tested the figures shown for crop insurance payments, direct
payments, PFC payments, MLA payments, or cottonseed pa yments, as these are not at issue in the present
proceeding.
21 Budget Estimates from USDA's Mid-Session Review (Exhibit BRA-456).
22 See Budget Estimates from USDA's Mid-Session Review (Exhibit BRA-456).
23 The Appellate Body indicated that the so-called cotton-to-cotton methodology was appropriate for
the Peace Clause analysis. See Upland Cotton (AB) , para. ("for purposes of the comparison envisaged by
Article 13(b)(ii), the values of the four measures, name ly, production flexibility contract payments, market loss
assistance payments, direct payments and counter-cyclical payments in the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002
are properly determined by using the "cotton to cotton" methodology. . . .")

Item MY2003 MY2004 MY2005
Total cotton base acres up to cotton planted acres (a) 1/ 11,108 11,041 11,155
Payment acres (b) 2/ 9,442 9,385 9,482
Program yield (c) 3/ 639 636 634
Payment rate (d) 4/ .0393 .1373 .1373
CCP payment (e) 5/ 237 820 825
1/ U.S. First Written Submission, December 15, 2007, para. 224.
2/ 85 percent of cotton base acres (a).
3/ Data for MY 2002 is from Budget Estimates from USDA's Mid-Session Review (Exhibit BRA-456). Other
years are from CCC Commodity Estimates Book, Feb. 5, 2007, page 202 (Exhibit US-112).
4/ MY2003 is from FSA Press Release 0455.04, available at http://content.fsa.usda.gov/pas/FullStory.asp?StoryID=1897.
5/ The CCP payments (e) are equal to b*c*d.

Question to Brazil

5. The Panel refers to Brazil's communi cation dated 22 January 2007 concerning its
request in relation to Article 13.1 of the DSU. Is it correct for the Panel to
understand that as far as data for 2005 is concerned, data included in
Exhibit US-64 satisfies all of the requests Brazil made in Part A of Annex 1 of its
1 November communication?

C.
 Q UESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE
UNITED STATES

1. Preliminary objections of the United States in respect of claims of Brazil regarding
export credit guarantees in respect of pig meat and poultry meat

Question to both parties

6. The parties disagree with respect to whet her in a proceeding under Article 21.5 of
the DSU a party may present a claim that wa s raised in the original proceeding but
on which no finding of WTO-inconsistency was made due to the fact that the
Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis.

a. Could the parties explain the legal basis in the text of Article 21.5 of the
DSU and other relevant provisions of the DSU for their position on this
question?

b. Could the parties explain whether and how their position on this issue is
consistent with prior panel and Appellate Body reports?

17. Where there is no finding of WTO-inconsiste ncy with respect to a measure – whether it is
because the panel or Appellate Body was unable to make proper findings, because the complaining
party failed to make a prima facie case, or some other reason – there are no DSB recommendations
and rulings in respect of the measure. As the measure has never been found to be out of compliance
with any covered agreement there logically is no question of bringing it into compliance. A WTO
panel is not permitted to presume that a Member is out of compliance and there is no basis to expect
that a Member should do so despite its own carefully considered views of what its WTO obligations

entail.
24 Simply put, an implementation obligatio n arises only when DSB recommendations and
rulings exist that require implementation.

18. Under Article 21.5 of the DSU, "complian ce" proceedings may address two categories of
matters: (a) that measures taken to comply w ith recommendations and rulings of the DSB do not
exist; and (b) that (extant) measures taken to co mply with recommendations and rulings of the DSB
are not consistent with a covered agreement.
25 In both cases, a necessary pr edicate is that there be
DSB recommendations and rulings.
19. Where a measure is not subject to any DS B recommendations and rulings because no finding
of WTO-inconsistency has been found in respect of it, there is, logically, no basis for any claim that a
Member has not implemented the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings in respect of the measure ( i.e.,
that no measure taken to comply exists with respect to the measure). Moreover, unless the original
measure is itself considered to be a measure taken to comp ly with other recommendations and rulings
– and any such determination must be compelled by the particular the recommendations and rulings
that are issued, not the unilateral assertions of th e complaining party – there is no basis for claims to
be made against the measure in a compliance proceeding alleging that it is inconsistent with a covered
agreement. In short, the measure would not be the type of measure properly within the scope of
Article 21.5 and the claims that could be made ag ainst it would not be the type of claims properly
within the scope of that provision.

20. This reasoning is consistent with the reas oning in prior Appellate Body reports interpreting
the scope of Article 21.5. For example, in Canada – Aircraft (21.5 – Brazil) , the Appellate Body
clarified that:

[p]roceedings under Article 21.5 do not concer n just any measure of a Member of the
WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those "measures taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings " of the DSB. In our view, the phrase
"measures taken to comply" refers to measu res which have been, or which should be,
adopted by a Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.
26
21. The Appellate Body, thus, c onfirmed that the focus of compliance proceedings is on the
DSB's recommendations and rulings – whether they ha ve been complied with and, if so, whether the
compliance measures are themselves consistent with the covered agreement.

22. The Appellate Body's (consistent) reasoning in EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) is even more
salient. There the Appellate Body confirmed again that "the mandate of Article 21.5 panels is to
examine either the 'existence' of 'measures taken to comply' or, more frequently, the 'consistency with

24 It is well-established that Members' measures cannot be presumed to be WTO-inconsistent. See e.g.,
United States – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 173 ("The presumption that WTO Members act in
good faith in the implementation of their WTO commitments is particularly apt in the
context of measures challenged 'as such.'")
25 The fact that "compliance" proceedings deal with implementation of recommendations and rulings is
apparent not only from the text of Article 21.5 but also its context; for example, the fact that it is part of
Article 21, which deals in the whole with "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings."
The first paragraph of DSU Article 21.1 provides that "prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of
the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolutio n of disputes to the benefit of all Members." And the
provisions that follow all relate to implementation. Fo r example, Articles 21.3 and 21.4 of the DSU deal with
rules and procedures for establishing a reasonable period of time to implement the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB. Article 21.5 deals with the dispute settlement procedures available when there is a disagreement as
to whether a Member has implemented DSB recomme ndations and rulings consistently with its WTO
obligations. And Article 21.6 deals with surveillance by the DSB of implementation by Members.
26 Canada – Aircraft (21.5 – Brazil) (AB), para. 36 (emphasis added).

a covered agreement' of implementing measures ."27 The Appellate Body acknowledged that the
Article 21.5 panel proceeding was not intended to provide complaining parties with a "second chance"
to reassert claims that had been uns uccessful in the original proceeding. 28 Indeed, there the Appellate
Body rejected India's attempt to reassert the same claim against an aspect of an antidumping
determination (the "other factors" analysis) that had been dismissed by the original panel for failure to
make a prima facie case.29

23. In doing so, the Appellate Body tracked precisely the reasoning set out above as to why
measures are outside the scope of Article 21.5 proceed ings when they have never been found to be
WTO-inconsistent and are not themselves measures taken to comply. Specifically, the Appellate
Body concluded, first, that "the investigati ng authorities of the European Communities were not
required to change the determinati on as it related to the 'effects of other factors' in this particular
dispute."
30 In other words, the Appellate Body re cognized that there was no basis for a claim
regarding the existence of measures taken to comply in respect of that aspect of the determination.
Next, the Appellate Body noted that "we do not see wh y that part of the redetermination that merely
incorporates elements of the original determination on 'other factors' would constitute an inseparable
element of a measure taken to comply with the DSB rulings in the original dispute."31 In other words,
the Appellate Body determined that the "other factors" determination was not itself a measure taken to
comply with any DSB recommendations and rulings.

24. Although EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) involved slightly different facts than those at issue
here – namely, there, a finding of WTO-incons istency was made because of a failure by the
complaining party to make a prima facie case rather than because the Appellate Body had insufficient
facts before it to determine whether the measures at issue were WTO-inconsistent – the reasoning in
both cases is the same. Where there is neither a basis for a claim of existence of measures taken to
comply (because there are no DSB recommendations and rulings that must be implemented with
respect to the measure) nor a claim of consistency with a covered agreement (because the measure is
not a measure taken to comply with other DSB recommendations and rulings), neither the measure
nor any claims against it are properly within the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding.

Questions to Brazil

7. Is Brazil of the view that it is only in the circumstances identified by the Appellate
Body in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) that the scope of Article 21.5
proceedings is limited by the scope of th e original proceedings? [Paragraphs 11-15
of Submission of Brazil to the Panel Regarding US Requests for Preliminary
Ruling]

8. How does Brazil respond to the arguments of the United States that Brazil
"incorrectly assumes that the standard is one of whether there has been a 'final
resolution' of the issue in the original proceeding" and that Brazil misreads the
Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) and confuses the
issue of "the scope of a compliance proceeding pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU" and the distinct issue of "when a claim against a specific measure or aspect
of a measure can be considered to be 'finally resolved' for purposes of WTO dispute
settlement"? [Paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Rebuttal Submission of the United
States]

27 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 79 (emphasis added).
28 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 74.
29 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 87.
30 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 86.
31 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 86.

9. What are the comments of Brazil on the arguments in footnote 22 of the United
States' rebuttal submission?

Question to the US

10. Could the United States explain why it consid ers that what it describes as the "final
resolution" standard is not the correct stan dard to decide whether Brazil's claims
regarding export credit guarantees for pig meat and poultry meat are within the
scope of this proceeding?
25. Article 21.5 of the DSU defines the scope of compliance proceedings conducted pursuant to
that provision. It defines the measures that are properly within the scope of a compliance proceeding
– "measures taken to comply with the recommendati ons and rulings of the DSB." And it defines the
claims that can be made in respect of such measures – (a) claims regarding the "existence" of
measures taken to comply and (b) claims regardi ng the "consistency with a covered agreement" of
measures taken to comply. Article 21.5 does not defi ne the scope of claims properly reviewed in a
compliance proceeding in terms of whether or not the claims have been finally resolved.

26. Whether or not a claim has been finally reso lved between parties to a dispute is a separate
question. As the Appellate Body explained in EC - Bed Linen , that question is governed by
Article 17.14 of the DSU, which provides that "an Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB
and unconditionally accepte d by the parties to the dispute . . . ."
32 The Appellate Body clarified that
the same reasoning applies also with respect to any unappealed finding included in an adopted panel
report.33 Where a particular claim has been finally reso lved with respect to a particular measure (or
component of a measure) that was the subject of the claim, that particular resolution is binding on the
parties and cannot be raised again on the basis of the same facts and arguments in any other
proceeding. By contrast, even where a claim is outside the limited scope of a "compliance"
proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU, it may well be raised in a separate proceeding.

2. Preliminary objections of the United States with respect to claims of Brazil regarding
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs

Questions to Brazil

11. Is Brazil of the view that a finding under Article 6 of the SCM Agreement that a
"subsidy" is causing serious prejudice necessarily always applies to both the
subsidy "payments" and the subsidy "program"? [Paragraphs 31-35 of Submission
of Brazil Regarding US Requests for Preliminary Ruling and paragraph 38 of the
Rebuttal Submission of Brazil]

12. In paragraph 44 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil states:

"Accordingly, there is no need fo r Brazil to challenge per se the
FSRI Act of 2002. Nor does it assert an 'as applied' challenge to
the FSRI Act of 2002. Rather, Brazil challenges the counter-
cyclical and marketing loan Programs in the FSRI Act of 2002 and
the payments that such programs require to U.S. upland cotton
farmers, as they cause adverse effects." (emphasis added)

32 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 91.
33 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB) , para. 93 ("an unappealed finding included in a panel report that
is adopted by the DSB must be treated as a final resolu tion to a dispute between the parties in respect of the
particular claim and the specific component of a measure that is the subject of that claim.")

 Could Brazil please explain:

a. How its claims against "programs and payments... as they cause adverse
effects" differ from claims against programs as such?

 b. How these claims differ from claims against programs as applied?

13. In paragraph 45 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil refers to the failure of the
United States "to implement the original recommendation of the DSB requiring the
United States to take actions concerning its present statutory and regulatory
framework providing for marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments".

a. Does Brazil consider that the statement in paragraph 7.1501 of the original
panel report that "the United States is obliged to take action concerning its
present statutory and regulatory framework..." forms an integral part of the
recommendation made by the original panel in paragraph 8.3(d) of its
report?

b. Does Brazil consider that the absence of actions by the United States
"concerning its present statutory and regulatory framework providing for
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments" is in itself a sufficient basis
for this Panel to find that the United States has not complied with the DSB
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement?

c. Is there any difference, in Brazil's view, between, on the one hand, the
nature of the action the United States was obliged to take with respect to its
statutory and regulatory framework as a consequence of the
recommendation in paragraph 8.3(d) of the original panel report and, on
the other, the nature of the action the United States would have been
obliged to take if the original panel had found that the relevant provisions
of this statutory and regulatory framework were WTO-inconsistent as
such?

14. Could Brazil please explain how this Panel should interpret the relationship
between the three categories of measures identified in paragraph 3.1(v),(vii) and
(viii) of the original panel report? Is it the view of Brazil that "subsidies provided"
or "subsidies mandated to be provided" must be interpreted to encompass both
payments of subsidies and the regulato ry provisions pursuant to which such
payments were "provided" or "mandated to be provided"?

15. Does Brazil agree or disagree with the United States that the listing of certain
legislative and regulatory provisions in paragraph 7.1107 of the original panel
report reflects the original panel's view that "payments under a program constitute
programs 'as applied'"? [Paragraphs 46-47 of the Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]

16. Could Brazil clarify whether or not its claim in this Article 21.5 proceeding
regarding a threat of serious prejudice caused by marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments is a claim with respect to the marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payment programs as such? [Paragraphs 237-314 of the First Written Submission
of Brazil]

Questions to the United States

17. The United States argues in paragraph 16 of its Rebuttal Submission that
"[a]ccording to Brazil, its claims apply not only to the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payment Programs, as such, bu t to the Programs in addition to all
payments authorized under the Programs" (o riginal emphasis). The United States
also argues in this respect that "it is abundantly clear that the original panel did
not make any finding under Article 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement against
the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment Programs, as such, whether
alone or in addition to payments". [P aragraph 43 of Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
a. How does the United States respond to the argument of Brazil that the
United States mischaracterizes Brazil's claims in these proceedings in that
Brazil is not challenging the subsidy programs at issue as such?
[Paragraph 31 of Submission of Brazil to the Panel Regarding US Requests
for Preliminary Ruling; paragraph 33 of Rebuttal Submission of Brazil]

27. Brazil asserts in paragraph 31 of its submissi on regarding the U.S. preliminary ruling requests
– the same paragraph noted by the Panel above – that it is "challenging in this proceeding the U.S.
subsidies inasmuch as they cause advers e effects." According to Brazil "the measures that constitute
these "subsidies" are the statutory and regulatory provisions of the FSRI Act of 2002 that relate to
upland cotton, i.e., the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment provisions" as well as payments
under the Program that allegedly "have been and w ill continue to be made over the lifetime of the
FSRI Act of 2002, i.e., until MY 2007. . . ."
34 Therefore, Brazil contradicts its own statement that it is
not challenging the marketing loan and counter-c yclical payment Programs "as such." As the
Appellate Body explained in United States – Sunset Reviews on OCTG from Argentina : "[b]y
definition, an "as such" claim challenges laws, regul ations, or other instruments of a Member that
have general and prospective appli cation, asserting that a Member's conduct – not only in a particular
instance that has occurred, but in fu ture situations as well – will neces sarily be inconsistent with that
Member's WTO obligations."35

28. Brazil's statement cited above indicates that it is not seeking to challenge the marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payment only "as such," and that it is seeking to also challenge the Programs "as
applied" (i.e., the payments under the Program). However, tacking on claims "as applied" does not
relieve Brazil of proving its claims against the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment Programs
"as such." This includes the obligation of proving th at application of "the statutory and regulatory
provisions of the FSRI Act of 2002 that relate to upland cotton, i.e., the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payment provisions" "will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member's WTO
obligations."
36 Indeed, as the Appellate Body has emphasized:

In our view, "as such" challenges agains t a Member's measures in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings are serious challe nges. . . .In essence, complaining parties
bringing 'as such' challeng es seek to prevent Members ex ante from engaging in
certain conduct. The implications of such challenges are obviously more far-reaching
than "as applied" claims. We also e xpect that measures subject to "as such"
challenges would normally have undergone, under municipal law, thorough scrutiny
through various deliberative processes to ensure consistency with the Member's
international obligations, including those f ound in the covered agreements, and that
the enactment of such a measure would im plicitly reflect the conclusion of that

34 Brazil Submission Regarding U.S. Requests for Preliminary Rulings, para. 31.
35 United States – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.
36 United States – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.

Member that the measure is not inconsistent with those obligations. The presumption
that WTO Members act in good faith in the implementation of their WTO
commitments is particularly apt in the context of measures challenged "as such."
37
b. Could the United States also comment in this regard on the arguments in
paragraph 31 of the Third Party Submission of Chad? Does the United
States agree or disagree with the proposition that statutory or regulatory
provisions can be challenged on an as applied basis and that Brazil's
claims in the original proceeding "were as applied claims regarding
measures that included legislative and regulatory provisions"?

29. To the extent that Chad is arguing that Br azil's claims in the original proceeding were limited
to "as applied" claims, the United States respectfull y disagrees. That argument cannot be reconciled
with the original panel's own explanation of the cl aims made by Brazil in the original proceeding.
Specifically, the original panel explained that "concerning selected provisions of the FSRI Act
of 2002 and the ARP Act of 2000," Brazil was cha llenging "the following sections" as "violat[ing], as
such, Articles 5(c), 6.3(c), 6.3(d) of the SCM Ag reement and Articles XVI: 1 and 3 of the
GATT 1994 to the extent that they relate to upland cotton . . . ."
38

30. On the question of whether the application of statutory and regulatory provisions can be
challenged in WTO dispute settlement, the Unite d States agrees that statutory and regulatory
provisions can be challenged "as applied." Indeed, in the original dispute, Brazil challenged payments
made under, inter alia , the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment Program in
MY 1999-2002 as having caused significant price suppressi on and serious prejudice to the interests of
Brazil within the meaning of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement .
39 That constituted a
challenge to the application of the Programs in those years. And Brazil prevailed on that claim:

[i]n conclusion, in light of all of these c onsiderations, we find that the effect of the
mandatory, price contingent United States subsidies at issue – that is, marketing loan
program payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments and MLA payments and CCP
payments – is significant price suppression in the same world market for upland
cotton in the period MY 1999-2002 within the meaning of Articles 6.3(c) and 5(c) of
the SCM Agreement.
40
31. Brazil did not prevail, however, on its claims regarding payments allegedly "mandated" to be
provided in MY 2003-2007 ( i.e., the (alleged) application of th e Programs in future marketing
years).41 Nor did Brazil prevail on its claims regarding, inter alia, the Step 2, marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payment program per se.42 The question is whether Brazil has any basis now, in this
"compliance" proceeding, to make claims in respect of those measures again.

32. There is no such basis. Under the express terms of Article 21.5 of the DSU, a "compliance"
proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU provides for an assessment of whether a Member has
complied with the recommendations and rulings of th e DSB consistently with its WTO obligations.
Where there are no DSB recommendations and ruli ngs in respect of statutory and regulatory
provisions as such, and there are no DSB recommendations and rulings in respect of the application of
those provisions in future years, there is no implem entation obligation in respect of those measures.
Therefore, there is no basis for a claim that measures taken to comply do not exist with respect to

37 United States – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.
39 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(vi) (emphasis added).
40 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1416 (emphasis added).
41 Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 7.1503-7.1505.
42 Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 7.1511.

them. Moreover, where the measures have not been changed in order to comply with any
recommendations and rulings, there is no basis for cl aims regarding their "consistency with a covered
agreement." The fact that the application of statutory and regulatory provisions can be challenged
does not change that analysis.

18. The United States submits that the only measures subject to the DSB's
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement are payments made
under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment programs
in 1999-2002. The United States also asserts, in this regard, that Brazil fails to
submit evidence "as to the present effects, if any, of the measures that were subject
to the original panel's actionable subsidy finding".

a. Do these statements mean that th e United States considers that the DSB
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement only obliged the
United States to ensure that payments made in 1999-2002 would no longer
have any adverse effects?

33. The recommendation of the original panel – which was adopted by the DSB – was that the
United States was "under an obligation to 'take appropr iate steps to remove the adverse effects or ...
withdraw the subsidy.'"
43 Therefore, consistent with Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, the United
States had a choice between withdrawing the "subsi dy" subject to the original panel's "present"
serious prejudice finding or removing its adverse effects.

34. The subsidies that were subject to Brazil's claim of "present" serious prejudice were "the
subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002,"
44 including Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical
payments.45 The panel concluded that these subsidies caused "present" serious prejudice in the years
MY 1999-2002:

[i]n conclusion, in light of all of these c onsiderations, we find that the effect of the
mandatory, price contingent United States subsidies at issue – that is, marketing loan
program payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments and MLA payments and CCP
payments – is significant price suppression in the same world market for upland
cotton in the period MY 1999-2002 within the meaning of Articles 6.3(c) and 5(c) of
the SCM Agreement
46
35. It was these subsidies that were, thus, also the subject to the U.S. "obligation to 'take
appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or ... withdraw the subsidy.'"47
b. Could the United States comment on the argument of New Zealand in
paragraph 4.08 of the Third Party Submission of New Zealand?

36. New Zealand argues in paragraph 4.08 of its third party submission that "the United States
distinction between payments and programs lead s to an absurd result" because, according to
New Zealand, "serious prejudice would have to prov ed annually in the light of payments that have
been made by which time the adverse effects have already occurred and it would be too late to

44 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(vi). See also Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1108 ("Brazil claims
that United States subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 have caused, cause and continue to cause "serious
prejudice" to Brazil's interests. . . .")
45 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1120.
46 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1416 (emphasis added).

withdraw the measure that caused them."48 New Zealand's argument appears to be based on a number
of incorrect assumptions that do not square even with the facts of this dispute.

37. First, New Zealand assumes that the distin ction between the payments and Programs is a
"United States distinction."
49 In fact, the distinction between payments and Programs is one of fact
that Brazil recognized when it brought separate clai ms against particular pa yments and the Programs
themselves in the original proceeding.50 The original panel recognized this distinction in its resolution
of the separate claims raised by Brazil. 51 And the distinction has been recognized and respected in
other disputes.52

38. Second, New Zealand appears to assume incorrectly that recognizing the fact that payments
are measures distinct from the statutory and regulator y provisions that authorize them means that the
latter cannot be challenged in WTO dispute settle ment. That is not a necessary implication of
recognizing that payments and Programs are distinct measures. Indeed, this dispute is a case in point
that Programs can be challenged as such. 53 Brazil simply did not prevail on the claims against the
Programs as such. The fact is, however, that Brazil only prevailed on its claims regarding particular
payments made in MY 1999-2002.

39. Third, New Zealand appears to ignore the fact that a complaining Member may make claims
of "threat" of serious prejudice about payments in future years (or, indeed, regarding the Program
authorizing the payments) should it not want to make claims of "present" serious prejudice against
particular payments that have been made or claims against the Programs, per se . This, too, is
illustrated in this dispute.

40. Fourth, New Zealand appears to assume that the effects of a recurring payment are limited to
the year in which the subsidy is paid so that "the subsidy is over and the subsidizing effect is past"
"annually." This argument was rejected by the Appe llate Body in this dispute: "The context of
Article 6.3(c) within Part III of the SCM Agreement does not support the suggestion that the effect of
a subsidy is immediate, short-lived, or limited to one year, regardless of whether or not it is paid every
year."
54 Indeed, the Appellate Body used this reasoni ng to conclude that Brazil could challenge U.S.
payments made in MY 1999-2001, not just the payments in MY 2002, the year in which Brazil
initiated the original proceeding.
55 Here, again, New Zealand's argument is contradicted by the facts
of this dispute.

19. Regarding the argument of the United States that the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments programs are not measures "taken to comply", is it the view of
the United States that Article 21.5 of the DSU only applies to measures actually
taken by a party to comply and does not apply to measures that a Member should
have taken to comply?
41. The United States considers that Article 21.5 of the DSU provides two categories of claims:
(a) claims that no measure taken to comply exist a nd (b) claims that measures taken to comply exist
but that these measures are not consistent with a cove red agreement. In the first case, there is – by
definition – no measure taken to comply and, in that sense, the "measure" could be the absence of

48 New Zealand Third Party Submission, para. 4.08.
49 New Zealand Third Party Submission, para. 4.08.
50 See Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 3.1(vi)-(viii) and U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras. 30-37.
51 New Zealand Third Party Submission, para. 4.08.
52 See e.g., Brazil – Aircraft (21.5 II – Canada), para. 2.1.
53 See Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 3.1(vi)-(viii) and U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras. 30-37.
54 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 477.
55 Upland Cotton (AB), paras. 484.

"measures that a Member should have taken to comp ly." In the second case, there is a measure taken
to comply and that is the only proper subject of any WTO-inconsistency in the proceeding.

20. How does the United States respond to the argument in the Third Party Submission
of Japan that the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)
does not support the argument of the United States that the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payments programs are not within the scope of this Article 21.5
proceeding?

42. Japan appears to misunderstand the U.S. ar gument. Contrary to Japan's assertion, the
United States has not argued that a complaining Member is "cut[] off" from "access to review under
Article 21.5" where the responding Member has take n no action to comply with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB.
56 To the contrary, the United States notes that Article 21.5 specifically
contemplates that a complaining Member can i nvoke "compliance" review under that provision
"where there is disagreement as to the existence . . . of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings." (Emphasis added) The United States considers that this covers the
situation where a Member has taken no measures to comply with recommendations and rulings.

43. The U.S. arguments to which Japan refers de al with the question of what measures may be
subject to new or renewed "claim s of consistency with a covered agreement" in an Article 21.5
proceeding. Article 21.5 of the DSU provides that such claims can only be made in respect of
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In the present case,
neither the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment Programs – nor the Programs and "all
payments" thereunder – are measures taken to comp ly with any DSB recommendations and rulings.
The fact that they have not been changed, either to implement any DSB recommendations and rulings
or for any other reason, confirms this. And as these measures are not "measures taken to comply,"
they cannot – under the express terms of Article 21. 5 – be subject to new and renewed "claims of
consistency with a covered agreement."

44. The Appellate Body's reasoning in EC – Bed Linens is entirely consistent with the U.S.
argument. The Appellate Body recognized there that "[i]f a claim challenges a measure which is not a
'measure taken to comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings."
57 I n
other words, an Article 21.5 proceeding is a bout whether implementation of DSB recommendations
and rulings is consistent with a Member's WTO ob ligations. As the Appellate Body recognized, it
does not provide complaining Members with a "sec ond chance" to make "claim[s] which, as a legal
and practical matter, could have been raised and pursued in the original dispute."58

3. Claim of Brazil regarding the failure of th e United States to comply with the DSB
recommendations between 21 September 2005 and 1 August 2006

Questions to Brazil

21. Could Brazil please explain whether its request for a finding that the United States
failed to comply with the DSB recomm endations between 21 September 2005 and
1 August 2006 is supported by prior panel practice in Article 21.5 proceedings?
[Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States]

22. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the European Communities that "the
lack of positive action taken by the United States to comply with the panel and
Appellate Body's findings and recommen dations between the implementation date

57 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 78.
58 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 74.

of 21 September 2005 and 31 July 2006 is no t necessarily fatal to its defence"?
[Paragraph 48 of the Third Party Submission of the European Communities]

Question to the United States

23. Does the United States consider that the text of Article 21.5 of the DSU should be
interpreted to mean that a compliance pan el may only review the "existence" or
"consistency" with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply as of the date
that the matter was referred to the panel and not as of the date of the end of the
implementation period? [Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
45. In paragraph 68 of the U.S. rebuttal submi ssion, the United States explained that Brazil has
not identified any textual basis for making both (a) a claim about "existence" of measures taken to
comply with a recommendation of the DSB relating to factual circumstances that both parties agree no
longer even exist and (b) a claim about "measures taken to comply" with respect to the same
recommendation of the DSB under factual circumstances that both parties agree do actually exist.

46. To the contrary, as the panel recognized in United States – Shrimp (21.5 Malaysia) , a finding
such as the one described in (a ) above regarding superceded f acts does not "favour[] a prompt
settlement of the dispute."
59 Similarly, the panel in EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) declined to "make
two decisions on the existence or consistency of meas ures taken to comply – one as of the end of the
reasonable period of time, and one as of the date of establishment of the Panel"60 because "[w]e do not
consider that it would be either necessary or appropriate, as a matter of judicial economy, to first
examine whether compliance had occurred as of the end of the reasonable period of time, and second
consider compliance as of the later date."
61 This clarification by the EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India)
panel – that the issue is one of "judicial economy" – is especially helpful. "Judicial economy" refers
to the principle that panels have to "[make] findi ngs only on those claims that such panels concluded
were necessary to resolve the particular matter." 62 In EC – Bed Linens, the complaining party did not
show that findings regarding compliance as of the end of the implementation period would be
"necessary or appropriate" to resolving the particular matter before the panel. Similarly, here, Brazil
has not shown that the requested findings regard ing compliance under the superceded facts that
existed on the date of implementation are necessary or appropriate to resolving the particular matter
before this Panel.

59 United States – Shrimp (21.5 – Malaysia) (AB), para. 5.12.
60 EC – Bed Linen (Panel) (21.5 – India), para. 6.28.
61 EC – Bed Linen (Panel) (21.5 – India), para. 6.28.
62 United States – Shirts and Blouses (21.5 – India) (AB), p. 18.

Table of Exhibits

Exhibit US- Title
125 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3206, Volume 2, (1993 Edition)
126 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3050, Volume 2, (1993 Edition)
127 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 2543, Volume 2, (1993 Edition)
128 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 103, Volume 1, (1993 Edition)
129 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1421, Volume 1, (1993 Edition)
130 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 195, Volume 1, (1993 Edition)

D. C
LAIMS OF BRAZIL REGARDING PRESENT SERIOUS PREJUDICE

1. General

Questions to both parties

24. Could the parties explain how they interpret the phrases "take appropriate steps to
remove the adverse effects" and "withdraw the subsidy" in Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement ?

1. "[T]ake appropriate steps to remove the a dverse effects" and "withdraw the subsidy" in
Article 7.8 refer to the two options available to a responding Member "where a panel report or an
Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy [of the responding
Member] has resulted in adverse effects to the inte rests of another Member within the meaning of
Article 5." To interpret these two phrases, it is ne cessary to examine the "ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
1

2. With respect to the first option – "take appr opriate steps to remove the adverse effects" –
"take" refers, inter alia , to "undertake and perform" "make oneself responsible for (a duty etc.)"
"adopt or choose for a particular purpose" or "r eceive or obtain (something given, bestowed, or
administered).
2 "Steps" – especially in the sense of "taking steps" – refers to "an action, measure, or
proceeding, esp. one of a series, which leads towards a result."3

3. In the context of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement , the particular "result" towards which
steps are to be taken is the removal of adverse effects. "Remove" is defined, inter alia, as "the action
of taking away or getting rid of a thing."
4 The thing to be "removed," under Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement, is "the adverse effects." Although Article 7.8 does not specify that it is the adverse
effects of the subsidy , as found in the adopted panel report or Appellate Body report, that should be
"removed," this is apparent from the context.5

4. Article 7.8 does not specify what precise steps ar e to be taken to "remove the adverse effects."
But it does provide that these steps must be "appropriat e." In other words, they must be "specially
suitable (for, to)" the removal of the adverse effects found to exist in the panel and Appellate Body
reports.
6 This confirms the fact-specific nature of adverse effects findings and remedies in respect
thereof. What is "appropriate" – i.e., "specially suitable ( for, to)" – for removing the adverse effects
in a particular case will depend on the facts of the s ituation and the particular adverse effects found to
exist.

5. With respect to the second option – "withdraw the subsidy" – "withdraw" means, among other
things, "cause to decrease or disappear" and "take back or away (something bestowed or enjoyed)." 7
According to Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, the thing to be "caused to decrease or disappear" or
"taken back or away" is the "subsid y." Again, the context makes clear that the "subsidy" at issue is
the one identified in the panel or Appellate Body re port as resulting in adverse effects to the interests
of another Member within the meaning of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.

1 See e.g., EC – Chicken Classification (AB), paras. 175.
2 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3206, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-125).
3 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3050, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-126).
4 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 2543, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-127).
5 For example, the very next provision, Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement , discusses the situation
where a Member "has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy. . . ."
6 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 103, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-128).
7 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3704, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-118).

25. How do the parties interpret the relationship between Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement and Article 21.5 of the DSU?

6. Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement establishes the obligation of a responding Member "where
a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy [of
the responding Member] has resulted in adverse effect s to the interests of another Member within the
meaning of Article 5." In that situation, th e responding Member has two available options under
Article 7.8. As discussed above, the Member may either (a) "take appropriate steps to remove the
adverse effects" or (b) may "withdraw the subsidy."

7. Article 21.5 of the DSU deals with the u se of dispute settlement procedures to decide
disagreements about the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

8. There is no cross-reference in either Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement or Article 21.5 of the
DSU to the other provision. However, given th e obligation under Article 7.8 to either "take
appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects" or "withdraw the subsidy,"to the extent there is
disagreement as to whether the responding Member h as satisfied its obligations, Article 21.5 of the
DSU provides for dispute settlement procedures to decide the disagreement. In other words, a
complaining party could have recourse under Arti cle 21.5 of the DSU to claim that there is no
measure taken to comply by the Member concerned (i.e., the adverse effects have not been removed
or the subsidy not withdrawn) or that the measure taken to comply is not co nsistent with a covered
agreement.

26. Could the parties explain whether they agree or disagree with the arguments of
New Zealand in its Third Party Submission that Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement
has certain consequences for the burden of proof in an Article 21.5 proceeding?
[Paragraphs 5.04-5.06 of the Third party Submission of New Zealand]

9. The United States disagrees with New Zeal and's argument that "Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement operates to distribute the burden of proof somewhat differently" in a compliance
proceeding.
8 That argument has no legal basis. Article 7.8 provides the following:

Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined
that any subsidy has resulted in adverse e ffects to the interests of another Member
within the meaning of Article 5, the Memb er granting or maintaining such subsidy
shall take appropriate steps to remove th e adverse effects or shall withdraw the
subsidy.
10. This provision says nothing about the burden of proof in Article 21.5 proceedings, let alone
that it reverses the well-established rule that a comp laining party – whether in an original proceeding
or a compliance proceeding – bears the burden of proving its claims.9 Just as in any other Article 21.5
proceeding, the complaining party continues to ha ve the burden to prove its claim that a measure

8 New Zealand Third Party Submission, para. 5.06.
9 See e.g., Canada – Dairy (21.5 – U.S. and New Zealand), para. 6.4 ("The Panel does not consider that
the rules on the allocation of the bur den of proof change simply because a claim is made in the context of
Article 21.5 DSU proceedings.") (citin g to Appellate Body report in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5 – Canada) ,
para. 66). The United States also notes that New Zeal and's argument is based on a flawed reading of the
findings in the original proceeding. New Zealand assumes that the original panel found the marketing loan,
counter-cyclical payment and step 2 "p rograms" to be causing serious prejudi ce. However, as is clear from the
original panel report, the original panel expressly stated it was declining to do so. See U.S. First Written
Submission, paras. 31-44; U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras. 16-63.

taken to comply does not exist (i.e., the adverse ef fects have not been removed or the subsidy not
withdrawn) or that a measure taken to comply is not consistent with a covered agreement.

27. Could the parties comment on the following statement of the European
Communities:

"The text of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement does not state
expressly that a Member that has been requested by the DSB to
implement its recommendations an d rulings under Article 7.8 of
the SCM Agreement has to do anything" (original emphasis)
11. The United States agrees with the European Communities' statement to the extent that it
means that Article 7.8 does not specify any particular steps for removing the adverse effects of a
subsidy or withdrawing a subsidy. The decision is left to the responding Memb er. In the case of the
first option (removing the adverse effects), the only guidance provided in the text is that the steps
taken must be "appropriate."
10 What is "appropriate" in a particular case is to be determined on a fact-
specific basis given the particular subsidy, adverse effects, and other circumstances at issue. In the
case of the second option (withdrawing the subsidy) , there is no limitation whatsoever on how to
remove the subsidy. And it may not always be nece ssary to change the measure itself. It is possible
that market or other conditions may change such th at a subsidy is no longer causing adverse effects or
the measure is no longer a subsidy (e.g., because it no longer confers a benefit).

28. The parties present divergent views with resp ect to the relevant marketing year to be
considered by the panel in its analysis of Brazil's serious prejudice claims.

a. Could the parties explain what th ey consider to be the relevant legal
considerations by which the Panel should be guided in determining
whether MY 2005 or MY 2006 is the appropriate marketing year?

12. The United States considers that the present marketing year – MY 2006 – is the relevant
period to consider whether the present "effect" of any subsidy "is . . . significant price suppression in
the same market" within the mean ing of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. This is compelled by
the use of the present-tense term "is" in that provisio n. "Is" means "that which exists, that which is;
the fact or quality of existence." 11 "Is" comes from the verb "to be," which itself means, inter alia,
"have place in the realm of fact, exist, live" "be the case or the fact; obtain." 12 To determine the
effect (if any) of a subsidy that "exists" at presen t, it is plainly necessary to look at the present period
(or marketing year). It is possible that certain data for MY 2006, the present marketing year, may not
be available. In that circumstance, it is appropriate to look at historical data as a proxy for the
"present" period.13 However, where reliable data is availa ble for MY 2006, or any part thereof, the
Panel should consider that data in assessing Brazil's "present" serious prejudice claims. This is
especially apt where the particular data for MY 2006 is available and complete, including, for
example, futures data that would have been consid ered by U.S. producers at the time of planting for
MY 2006 (i.e., in the period January-March 2006).

10 See discussion of "appropriate" in response to Question 24 above.
11 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1421, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-129).
12 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 195, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-130).
13 See Brazil First Written Submission, para. 49 ("Full-year data on marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payments to U.S. upland cotton farmers for MY 2006 – th e first year in which Step 2 is not provided – will not
be available until September 2007. Nevertheless, the compliance Panel can determine whether the repeal of the
Step 2 program is sufficient to bring the new "basket of measures" supporting U.S. upland cotton farmers into
conformity with the covered agreements, based on data covering the full 2005 marketing year.") (emphasis
added)

b. Do the parties agree or disagree w ith the argument of the European
Communities that in a dispute involving a claim of present serious
prejudice the parties must provide th e "most recent reasonably available"
data? [Paragraphs 43 and 54-55 of the Third Party Submission of the
European Communities]

13. As noted above, the United States agrees that, for a claim of "present" serious prejudice, the
present marketing year and any (reliable) data relating to that marketing year are the most relevant.
14

Questions to the United States

29. Does the United States contest the fact that a "strong positive relationship between
upland cotton (base acre) producers receivi ng annual payments and upland cotton
production" exists? 15 In particular, does the US disagree with the following
statements16:

• a very large proportion of farms with up land cotton base acres continue to
plant upland cotton in the year of payment;

• the overwhelming majority of farms enrolled in the programs which plant
upland cotton also hold upland cotton base;

14. To clarify, the United States considers "strong positive relationship" to be a characterization
of facts, rather than facts themselves. The facts are the following.

• On farms that have upland cotton base acr es (and thus may receive cotton counter-
cyclical payments), the ratio of cotton planted acres to total upland cotton base
 acres was only 60 percent in MY 2002-2005. In other words, U.S. upland cotton
farmers were planting only approximately 60 percent of the cotton acres that they
planted in the historical period used to calculate base acres.

• Second, a significant portion of U.S. upland cotton planted acreage (over MY 2002-
2005, an average of about 17 per cent) is on farms with cotton planted acreage that
exceeds cotton base acres, or, indeed, on farms with no cotton base acres at all.

15. The debate between the parties is as to wh at these facts signify. In the view of the
United States, these facts support a number of the U. S. arguments. For example, these facts confirm
that U.S. farmers do, in fact, use the planting flex ibility afforded by the direct and counter-cyclical
payment programs. By contrast, Brazil argues that U.S. farmers are somehow induced to plant upland
cotton simply because they hold base acres on whic h they may receive payments based on upland

14 The United States does not necessarily endorse, however, all of the additional positions that the
European Communities takes regarding the alleged "obligation" of a responding party to refer to the most
recently-available data in its first written submission, regardless of what the complaining party argues. See
European Communities' Third Party Subm ission, para. 55. These additional arguments appear to touch on the
issue of burden of proof in an Article 21.5 proceeding. As the United States notes above, the burden in a DSU
Article 21.5 proceeding is on a complaining party to prove a breach of the iden tified covered agreements; it
does not fall in the first instance on the responding party.
15 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: See para. 131 of Brazil's first submission. The Panel clarifies that this
phrase refers to the fact that "the recipients who hold upland cotton base acres" and "those who continue to
plant upland cotton" overlap with each other to a great extent. (See para. 7.637 of the report of the original
panel.) The Panel understands that Brazil uses this phrase in the same sense.]
16 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: These passages are reproduced from para. 7.636 of the report of the
original panel.]

cotton payment rates. But Brazil has not explained wh y, if this is so, payment recipients are planting
40 percent fewer acres than they planted in the historical period used to calculate base acres.

16. The second fact is also notable in the U.S. view. It shows that a significant – and growing
percentage – of cotton is gr own on farms that do not hold any upland cotton base acreage or on
planted acreage that is in excess of the upland cotton base acreage held by a farm. That is, for these
cotton farmers, there can be no link – even allege d – between cotton base counter-cyclical payments
and current production because these farmers are growing cotton on acreage beyond their cotton base
acreage, if any. This data reinforces other evidence submitted by the United States; for example, data
regarding cost of production shows that most U.S. production (at least 92 per cent) market revenue
not only covers variable costs of production but also all total costs of production. Thus, even on
Brazil's own theory, counter-cyclical payments play no part in inducing continued cotton production
for the vast majority of U.S. cotton production. And, as for the other 8 percent of U.S. production,
Brazil has not even related its theory to them, to show any "significant" price suppression resulting
from marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments.

17. These are the facts that the United States consid ers to be the most relevant because they focus
on the level of upland cotton planting and production and the relationship that these bear – if any – to
payments. The United States recalls in th is regard that Brazil's claim focuses on precisely this same
relationship. Yet, inexplicably, Brazil seeks to dismiss these facts as "unimportant statistics."
17
Rather, Brazil argues that the focu s should be on whether upland cotton is grown on farms that hold
even one base acre of upland cotton. Brazil notes, in this regard, that "95 percent of actual U.S.
upland cotton planted acreage was planted on farm s that received upland cotton counter-cyclical
payments in MY 2005."18

18. The United States does not contest this figure but strongly disagrees with the conclusions that
Brazil asks the Panel to draw from this; namely, that this is somehow evidence of the allegedly
production-inducing effects of the counter-cyclical payment prog ram. In fact, Brazil appears to
confuse cause and effects.

19. Upland cotton is grown in a limited number of areas in the United States, primarily in a few
southern and western states, where the weather and other conditions are ideal for upland cotton
production. Upland cotton was grown in these ar eas well before the counter-cyclical payment
program came into effect and continues to be gr own there now. Continued planting of upland cotton
on this farmland is not the effect of any government payment; it is a function of the fact that upland
cotton can be grown easily in these areas but cannot be grown in others (for example, cotton seedlings
would likely freeze if planted in April in Montana bu t flourish in the warmer temperatures in Texas at
that time). As shown in the maps below, cotton is grown in the same states and – in large part – the
same counties in 2005 as it was in 1992, well before th e counter-cyclical payments came into effect.
The same would be true if one were to go back even decades earlier in time.

17 Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 157.
18 Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 157.

20. Base acres were assigned based on what U.S. fa rmers were producing in a historical period.
If U.S. farmers were planting upland cotton in the hi storical period, they were able to enrol upland
cotton base acres for purposes of the direct and count er-cyclical payment programs. Many farmers in
the southern United States were planting upland cott on – often, as one in a rotation of crops – in the
historical period because it made sense for them to do so as an agronomical matter. Many of the same
farms produce some upland cotton today for the same reasons that they did so at the time that base
acres were enrolled – farmers have experience and expertise growing upland cotton in those areas,
they have equipment that they can use in that production, and they know they can grow upland cotton
with good results given the particular growing conditions in the region.

21. Brazil seeks to claim whatever planting con tinuity exists as evidence that counter-cyclical
payments cause U.S. producers to plant upland cotto n where they would otherwise not have done so.

But there is no basis for such a conclusion. That is the equivalent of claiming as "evidence" of the
effects of subsidies that wine grapes have historica lly been grown and continue to be grown today in
certain regions of France, or that olives have been grown and are grown today in certain
Mediterranean regions. The fact that some amount of farmland historically used to produce cotton
continues to be good – from an agronomical standpoint – for the production of that crop and
continues to be used to grow that crop is hardly remarkable and is not evidence of any production-
inducing effects of the counter-cyclical payment program.

22. In short, Brazil has yet to establish either th e relevance of the farm data it seeks to have the
Panel consider or why the other – more relevant – acreage data pre sented by the United States should
be ignored. Brazil's only argument appears to be that the original panel considered similar data to that
pressed by Brazil in the panel's assessment of paymen ts made in MY 1999-2002. But this argument
does not withstand scrutiny. The original panel may have looked at how much upland cotton is grown
on farms today that historically produced cotton. However, it could not have considered this to be
persuasive evidence of any alleged production-indu cing effects of the U.S. government payments
because it did not find direct payments (or, in earlier years, the production flexibility contract
payments) to have significant production and price effects. The exact same relationship exists
between counter-cyclical payments and upland cott on base acreage as between direct payments and
upland cotton base acreage. Indeed , the base acreage is exactly the same for both programs. If this
relationship was strong evidence of production and pri ce effects, as Brazil alleges, there would have
been little basis for the original panel to find against the counter-cyclical/market loss assistance
payments, but not direct/production flexibility contra ct payments, made in MY 1999-2002. The fact
that the panel did not make the same finding of significant price suppression with respect to
direct/production flexibility contract payments confir ms that the relationship to base acreage is not
persuasive evidence of any price-inducing effects of e ither program. It is simply evidence that certain
regions in the United States are well-suited to growing upland cotton. Cotton was a viable crop for
most farmers to include in their rotation before the counter-cyclical payment program (and direct
payment program) came into effect and it continues to be a viable crop now.

23. Turning back to the question regarding th e two statements above, for the reasons just
explained, the United States considers that the re levant question for assessing the effects of counter-
cyclical payments is not the percentage of farms, but the level of acreage planted to upland cotton
(vis-a-vis upland cotton base acres). The data regarding such planted acreage are consistent with the
fact that farmers use the planting flexibility affo rded by the counter-cyclical payment program and
make choices based on market considerations, not any "inducement" by counter-cyclical payments.

Question to Brazil

30. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the United States that "whether or not
the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs or payments under the
programs cause significant price suppression is a question of first impression"?
[Rebuttal Submission of the United States, paragraph 219]

2. The structure, design and operation of the countercyclical and marketing loan payment
programs

Question to the United States

31. Brazil claims that the structure, design and operation of US counter-cyclical
payments stimulate US upland cotton production. Both Brazil and the United
States have referred to the Westcott (2005)
19 study to provide support for their

19 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: Paul A. Westcott, "C ounter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm
Act: Production Effects Likely to be Limited" (Exhibit US-35).]

opposing analysis of the possible productio n impact of counter-cyclical payments.
In its rebuttal, Brazil quotes the following passage from Westcott:

So where do CCPs fit compared with other farm commodity
programs in the 2002 Farm Act? Marketing loans are fully
coupled since they are available on all production and their link to
market prices means they affect production decisions of farmers.
Direct payments are mostly decoupled, since they are paid on a
fixed, historically-based quantity rather than on current production
and are not dependent on market prices or other factors that would
affect production. …
CCPs fall in between these two programs, having some properties
similar to mostly decoupled direct payments and other properties
similar to fully coupled marketing loans. Like direct payments,
CCPs do not depend on current production since they are paid on a
fixed, historically-based quantity. However, similar to marketing
loans, CCPs are linked to market prices so there may be some
influence on current production decisions of farmers, which would
potentially make CCPs at least partially or somewhat coupled.
a. Does the United States agree with this characterization of the CCP?

24. The United States agrees that counter-cyclical payments differ from direct payments in one
respect; namely, they are provided on the basis of historical base acres and payment yields when the
season-average farm price falls below a certain threshold . Direct payments, by contrast, are paid
regardless of prices on the basis of historical base acres and payment yields. The United States also
agrees that, to the extent that payments under the counter-cyclical payment program are provided only
when certain price conditions prevail, this cond itionality is an aspect in which counter-cyclical
payments are similar to marketing loan payments.

25. That said, the question under Articles 5 and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement is not on the form
of subsidies but their effects. And, as the United States has explained, the possible effects of
payments under the counter-cyclical payment program on acreage decisions are much closer to those
of direct payments than marketing loan payments. As discussed below, marketing loan payments are
paid in respect of actual production. By contrast, "farmers retain nearly full planting flexibility
and may receive CCPs for the base acreage crop regardless of whether that crop (or any crop) is
planted on those acres."
20 This is precisely the same as for direct payments.

26. Given that the only salient difference between the structure of direct payments and counter-
cyclical payments is that the latter are only provid ed when certain market co nditions prevail, rather
than automatically in each year, the question is whether this fact somehow results in a production
effect in the case of the latter that does not obtai n in the case of the former. Some researchers –
including Westcott – conclude that the link to pri ces may, in some circumstances result in indirect
production effects stemming primarily from lowered risk of price volatility. The United States agrees.
However, the United States also agrees with West cott and others that the degree of any such
production effects is likely to be minimal and mitig ated by a number of factors. For example,
Westcott notes in this regard that:

20 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 202 (Exhibit US-35).

(a) where prices are expected to be above maximum threshold – counter-cyclical
payments behave just like the fixed direct payments
21;
(b) "cross-commodity effect[s] suggest[] th at CCPs may provide a general reduction in
revenue risks rather than a crop-specific effect. Net returns among alternative crops
would remain the primary consideration underlying production choices;"22

(c) "while a number of studies indicate that farmers are risk averse (Chavas and Holt,
1990, 1996, for example), other risk reducti on instruments already exist to manage
risks. Thus, with revenue risk reduction now provided by CCPs as part of farm
programs, farmers may adjust their use of these other farm and nonfarm risk
management strategies;"23 and

(d) "a large portion of output in the U.S. agri cultural sector is produced by a small share
of large producers. . . . Evidence that risk aversion decreases as income rises (Chavas
and Holt, 1990, 1996) suggests that risk av ersion may also tend to decline as the size
of farms increases. Thus, with larger fa rms that account for most production being
less averse to facing risk, this lowers potential production effects of CCPs due to risk
reduction. And while smaller fa rms may be more risk averse in their farm enterprise,
off-farm income may reduce the overall level of household income risk."
24

27. On the basis of these and other factors, West cott concludes that "there are several mitigating
factors which suggest that overall production effect s of CCPs through revenue risk reduction are
likely to be limited."
25 The United States agrees with that assessment. Other studies submitted by the
United States examining the empirical evidence of production effects – for example, a 2007 study by
Lin & Dismukes in which the authors found that "[t]he effect of CCPs on producers' planting
decisions . . . appears to be very negligible – an increase in the acreage of major field crops of less
than 1% . . . ."26 – confirm that the effects of the counter-cyclical payments are, in fact, very limited.

b. How would the United States respond to the argument that, by design,
counter-cyclical payments are in some measure coupled to production
decisions because part of the payments is contingent on the actual
realization of market prices?

28. The United States does not consider counter-cyc lical payments to be "coupled to production
decisions" at all because, as Westcott notes, "farme rs retain nearly full planting flexibility and may
receive CCPs for the base acreage crop regardless of whether that crop (or any crop) is planted on
those acres."
27 A farmer simply does not have to pr oduce upland cotton to get payments on upland
cotton base acres. Indeed, the question reflects this because it notes that the contingency is realization

21 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 203 (Exhibit US-35).
22 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 204 (Exhibit US-35).
23 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 204 (Exhibit US-35).
24 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 204 (Exhibit US-35).
25 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 205 (Exhibit US-35).
26 Lin, William and Dismukes, Robert. "Supply Response Under Risk: Implications for Counter-
cyclical Payments' Production Impacts ," Review of Agricultural Ec onomics–Volume 29, Number 1–
Pages 64-86, forthcoming, p. 83 (Exhibit US-85) (emphasis added).
27 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 202 (Exhibit US-35).

of particular market prices, not the realization of any production by an individual producers. The
market price is an independent trigger.

29. Nonetheless, as noted above, the United States agrees that counter-cyclical payments – like
direct payments – may have some limited effects on ri sk and wealth which in tu rn translate into some
limited effect on production. For example, the link between counter-cyclical payments and season-
average farm prices may, in some circumstances, result in indirect production effects stemming from
lowered risk of price volatility. This question of effects is the one that is important under
Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. And, in that context, the question is one of degree – i.e.,
whether any risk and wealth effects are such that they are substantially impacting production, and
exports, and, ultimately, suppressing world market pr ices to a "significant" degree. The evidence
before the Panel confirms that they are not. Indeed, as Westcott concluded, "there are several
mitigating factors which suggest that overall produc tion effects of counter-cyclical payments through
revenue risk reduction are likely to be limited."
28 This is confirmed by recent empirical studies
examining the effects of counter-cyclical payments.29

3. Economic simulation model

Question to the United States

32. Brazil has presented a partial equilibrium model to simulate the effects of
eliminating US upland cotton payments, par ticularly the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments. In both its submission and rebuttal, the United States has provided
reactions to the simulation model.

a. Would it be accurate to describe the United States' response as constituting
a general acceptance of the framework of analysis adopted by Brazil but
contesting the assumptions made regar ding the values of the parameters,
the supply and demand elasticities and the "coupling factor", used in the
model? (The coupling factor is the am ount by which the expected price is
increased by each dollar per unit of subsidy payments.)

30. Before addressing the Panel's question, the Un ited States clarifies that the coupling factor, as
used in FAPRI models and the Sumner II model, are coefficients used in an effort to compare the
effects of payments that are not coupled to any production (such as direct payments and counter-
cyclical payments) with the effects of other payments (for example, market revenue), which are made
directly in respect of production. In the case of direct payments and counter-cyclical payments, most
of the coupling factors currently used have been ba sed on the analyst's judgment. As more empirical
data become available, the data provide a guide fo r analysts in determining the appropriate coupling
factor to assign.

31. Turning to the Panel's questi on, although the United States considers that a partial equilibrium
model may be an appropriate tool for conducting an assessment of the effects of the Step 2, marketing
loan, and counter-cyclical payment programs on world market prices, the United States does not
consider that Brazil's new model is appropriate . The United States has identified a number of
important flaws in the model, including that the model:

• lacks cross-commodity impacts and cross- price elasticities, potentially leading to
biased price effects;

28 Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely
to be Limited" at 205 (Exhibit US-35).
29 See U.S. First Written Submission, paras. 207-214; U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras. 226-252.

• is static with no explicit re lationships for changes in cott on stock levels and no stocks
equation;

• contains foreign supply elasticities that are different from FAPRI that underestimate
the response of foreign producers to changes in world prices;

• treats production flexibility payments and direct payments differently even though
they operate in the same way;

• incorporates Step 2 payments directly into the producer revenue function as fully
coupled payment, and

• appears to ignore statutory parameters, for example by including counter-cyclical
payment rates in each of the various pri ce expectations that sometimes exceed the
statutory maximum.30

32. These are some of the problems that arise as a result of the general structure of the model
itself, and the simplified, reduced nature of the ass essment it attempts to conduct. Further, and even
more substantial, biases result from the flawed econo metric parameters used by the model. These
have been addressed in detail in the U.S. submissions.

33. Not only does the United States not accept the particular model used by Brazil and the
parameters and assumptions that it utilizes, but the United States disagrees with Brazil regarding the
question that the model aims to address. Brazil appears to assume that the question before the Panel is
the "short-run" impact of "shocking" the system with complete elimination of the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payment programs.
31 It is not. Under Article 6.3(c) the question is what, if any,
degree of price suppression exists presently as a result of the marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payments and whether this degree of price suppression is "significant." To the extent a counterfactual
assessment is undertaken, it is onl y to assess what the price equilibrium would be at present if
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments had been lower, different, or did not exist. The
question is not what prices will look like in the s hort-run adjustment period if the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payments are suddenly eliminated . Indeed, Members are not even required to
eliminate measures found to be actionable subsidies; they are given a choice between "withdrawing"
the subsidy or removing its adverse effects. Thus, in addition to the fact that the economic literature
supports a long-term assessment, Brazil's argument that it is necessary to look at the short-run effects
of total elimination of the programs is incorrect as a matter of textual interpretation.

30 The maximum counter-cyclical payments paid on 85 percent of base and program yields can not
exceed 13.73 cents. Yet Dr. Sumner incorporates a value as high as 19.10 cents, which is 39 percent greater than
the maximum allowed rate. Brazil attempts to explain this away at the Panel meeting are unavailing. Brazil
explained that Dr. Sumner divided total counter-cyclical payments by production to determine a per-pound rate.
But this does not track how farmer s view counter-cyclical payments. The question if one of farmers'
expectations and farmers do not enter the planting season with an assumption that the counter-cyclical payment
rate could be as much as 30% above the statutory ma ximum. Moreover, all upland cotton base acres are not
planted to upland cotton. Brazil's approach fails to take that fact into account. It should also be noted that
Brazil chose not to adopt this approach in the cost-of-produ ction analysis included in Brazil's oral statement. In
that analysis, Brazil correctly used the statutory maximum rate for counter-cyclical payments.
31 See e.g., Brazil First Written Submission, Annex I, para s. 28-29. Brazil's economist attempts to
justify, for example, the use of an unrealistic and disp roportionately small rest-of-world supply elasticity on the
basis that Brazil is seeking to assess the short-run effects of "the shock of removing U.S. cotton subsidies." See
Brazil First Written Submission, Annex I, para. 28. It is puzzling, therefore, that Brazil's economist denied in
the meeting with the Panel that Brazil had used such language or such an approach.

34. The total effect of all of these flaws in Br azil's model is to grossly overstate any possible
effects of the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments. The United States demonstrated that
without changing the structural flaws in the model, but simply re-calibrating the "key elasticities" and
some other basic assumptions to reflect FAPRI an d other well-established parameters – many of
which Brazil acknowledged and used in the original proceeding – the effects estimated by Brazil's
new model decline sharply. Complete removal of the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment
programs results in world prices increasing by onl y 1.41 percent over baseline levels over the period
MY 2002-2005 and 0.96 percent over the period MY 2006-2008. Long-run values for supply and
demand elasticities taken from the UNCTAD-FAO A TPSM model shows removal of marketing loans
and counter-cyclical programs resulting in an increase in world prices of 2.26 percent over the period
MY 2002-2005 and 1.52 percent over the period MY 2006-2008. These dramatically lower price
impacts result from only some very basic, pre liminary adjustments to Dr. Sumner's model . More
detailed analysis and re-calibration would reduce the price effects even more.

35. It is critical that the Panel understand the flaws in the Sumner II model and their significance
to this dispute because Brazil has submitted virtually no valid empirical evidence to support its claims
that the U.S. marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs are causing "present" significant
price suppression. Rather, Brazil's claim depe nds, critically, on the new econometric modeling
conducted for purposes this dispute. The fact that even this econometric modeling is fundamentally
flawed confirms that Brazil has no basis for its claims.

b. In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States
uses the same value of 1 that Brazil ad opts for the coupling factor assigned
to marketing loan payments. Does this imply an acceptance by the
United States that, by design, marketing loan payments provide a one-for-
one incentive to upland cotton production?

36. The United States does not agree with the ch aracterization that marketing loan payments
provide a "one-for-one incentive to production." This may be understood to suggest that every dollar
of marketing loan expenditures in a particular y ear can be assigned a production effect, which is not
the case. As the United States has argued, whether or not the marketing loan creates any incentive to
produce depends upon the expected prices that exis t at planting time. Even Brazil, through its
economic model, accepts – and ostensibly attempts to implement – this principle in this proceeding.
32

37. Nonetheless, the fact that a coupling factor of 1 is attributed to marketing loan payments
means that a dollar anticipated under the marketing lo an program is expected to have the same effect
in respect of production as a dollar anticipated in market revenue. As payments are made on a per-
unit basis with respect to upland cotton that is ultimately produced, a common modeling convention is
to assume a coupling factor of 1 for the marketing loan program. The United States has not disputed
the use of this coupling factor by Brazil in this proceeding.
c. In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States
used a non-zero value of 0.25 (not much lower from the 0.4 that Brazil
adopts) for the coupling factor assigned to counter-cyclical payments. Does
this imply an acceptance by the United States that, by design, counter-
cyclical payments are partially tied to upland cotton production, and of a

32 See Brazil First Written Submission, Annex I, pa ra. 36 ("U.S. cotton producers respond to the
expected prices and expected rates of subsidy that apply at the time planting and other key decisions are made in
the production cycle") (emphasis added) and Brazil First Written Submission, Annex I, para. 58 ("[t]he
magnitude of the impact on incentives to produce cotton is equal to the expected difference between the loan
rate, which is known at planting time, and the grower's expectations at the time of planting about the AWP for
cotton that will apply when the grower makes that ma rketing loan transaction.") (emphasis added). Brazil
Further Submission, Annex I, paras. 17-18.

magnitude (25 cents to a dollar of counter-cyclical payments) not very far
from Brazil's own estimate (of 40 cent s to a dollar of counter-cyclical
payments)?

38. No. 0.25 percent was the coupling factor used in the FAPRI model, which was originally
relied upon by Brazil itself and was lauded by Brazil as follows:

The FAPRI model has been widely used fo r policy analysis in the United States and
elsewhere for almost 20 years. U.S. commodity groups, including the U.S. cotton
industry, have regularly used the FAPRI model to analyze farm commodity program
options. The FAPRI model is also the key model used by the U.S. Congress in
considering farm program options. For almost two decades the U.S. Congress has
provided special appropriations to support th e continued use and development of the
FAPRI model. In both the 1996 and the 2002 Farm Bill processes, the FAPRI model
provided the most influential projections of likely program impacts.
33
FAPRI is the most influential organization in the United States analyzing farm policy
and its effects on U.S. and world commodity markets, i.e., that has the highest
reputation and experience in answering the ki nd of "but for" questions faced by this
Panel.34
39. FAPRI assumes a 0.25 coupling factor for counter-cyclical payments on the following basis:

Because CCPs are made on a fixed base, they can be considered at least partially
decoupled from production decisions (thus their inclusion in the decoupled payment
term in the area equations). However, CCPs do depend on prices, and risk-averse
producers may have a positive supply response to the price insurance offered by the
program. The 0.25 parameter is based on analyst judgment, reflecting the notion that
the crop-specific effect of CCPs on production is likely to be positive, but modest.
35
40. The United States adopted the FAPRI coupling factor because of Brazil's express
acknowledgment of the expertise a nd reputation of FAPRI researchers in assessing "likely program
impacts" and "in answering the kind of 'but for' questions faced by this Panel." 36 But the United
States considers that this coupling factor is high. In fact, the empirical research supports a lower
coupling factor, closer to zero. For example, the United States has discussed a 2007 study by Lin &
Dismukes in which the authors exam ined the following question: "[g] iven the market price scenario
for major field crops [corn, wheat, and soybeans] perceived by producers at planting decision times,
how would CCPs have affected plantings of 2005 major field crops in the North Central region.." 37
The authors found that "[t]he effect of CCPs on pr oducers' planting decisions . . . appears to be very
negligible – an increase in the acreage of major field crops of less than 1% . . . ."38

33 Brazil Further Submission, para. 214.
34 Answers of Brazil to Questions from the Panel After 2nd Meeting, paras. 21-24 (22 December 2003).
35 Westhoff, Patrick, Scott Brown and Chad Hart. "When Point Estimates Miss the Point: Stochastic
Modeling of WTO Restrictions" FAPRI Policy Workin g Paper #01-05, December 2005, page 6 (Exhibit
US-58).
36 Answers of Brazil to Questions from the Panel After 2nd Meeting, paras. 21-24 (22 December 2003).
37 Lin, William and Dismukes, Robert. "Supply Response Under Risk: Implications for Counter-
cyclical Payments' Production Impacts ," Review of Agricultural Ec onomics–Volume 29, Number 1–
Pages 64-86, (Spring 2007), p. 81 (Exhibit US-85). See U.S. Rebuttal Submission, para. 229-234.
38 Lin, William and Dismukes, Robert. "Supply Response Under Risk: Implications for Counter-
cyclical Payments' Production Impacts ," Review of Agricultural Ec onomics–Volume 29, Number 1–
Pages 64-86, forthcoming, p. 83 (Exhibit US-85) (emphasis added).

41. Similarly, the United States discussed a 2005 st udy by Goodwin & Mishra reported the results
of a survey of farmers asking them to rate the f actors important to their acreage decisions on a 5-point
scale ranging from "not at all important" to "very important." 39 The study finds that almost half of
farmers surveyed (44 per cent) – in a nationwide survey comprising about 4,125 observations –
indicated that counter-cyclical payments were st rongly "not at all important" to their acreage
decisions. The other substantial percentage (43 pe r cent) indicated either ambivalence (that counter-
cyclical payments were "neither important or unim portant") or that counter-cyclical payments were
"unimportant" to their acreage decisions. This too confirms that counter-cyclical payments have
minimal effects on production.

42. Although these studies and the others discussed in the U.S. submissions support a coupling
factor much lower than 0.25, the United States has used that factor as a conservative measure and to
illustrate the grossly exaggerated nature of Brazil' s modeling results. Brazil does not even use this
0.25 factor, which may be too high in and of itself. Rather, Brazil has used a much higher 0.40 factor
that finds no support in empirical research or the economic litera ture. The 0.40 factor is not – in the
U.S. view – close to the 0.25 factor used by FAPRI, as suggested in the question above. Indeed,
Brazil's coupling factor is more than 60 percent hi gher than the FAPRI factor, and it is without any
legitimate basis in the economic literature or in empirical analysis. This, once again, confirms that the
econometric modeling upon which much of Brazil's case depends is flawed and not capable of
supporting Brazil's claims of significant price suppression.

E. E
XPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES

1. Permissibility of an a contrario interpretation of item (j) of the Illustrative List

Questions to the United States

33. Please discuss whether (and if so, how) the panel rulings in Korea – Vessels and
Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (I and II) affect the United States' approach to the
interpretation of the relationship between item (j) of the Illustrative List and
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.

43. As the Panel's questions 33 and 34 both deal with the question of the proper interpretation of
item (j) and Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement , and the relationship between those
provisions, the United States addresses the questions together here.

44. At the outset, the United States recalls that the issue is whether item (j) of the Illustrative List
demonstrates definitively how the general definiti onal elements in Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement apply in the case of the export credit guarantees. The text of the SCM Agreement
confirms that it does. As the United States has explained
40, item(j) "illustrates" the application of the
general definition of "export subsidy" set out in Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a) to the specific context of
export credit guarantees. "Illustrate," means, inter alia, "shed light on, light up, illumine" and "make
clear, elucidate, explain; esp. clarify or support using examples, give an example or illustration of,
exemplify."41 According to the ordinary meaning of the term "illustrate," therefore, item (j) "makes
clear" how the Article 1/3.1(a) definition applies in r espect of each particular type of measure set out
in the Illustrate List. It clarifies which export credit guarantees do provide export subsidies within the
meaning of Article 1.1 and 3.1(a) and those that do not. The distinguishing factor – under item (j) – is

39 Goodwin, B. and A. Mishra. "Another Look at Decoupling: Additi onal Evidence on the
Production Effects of Direct Payments." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(5):1200-1210,
2005 (Exhibit US-41).
40 U.S. First Written Submission, paras. 62-70
41 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1311, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-24).

whether the premium rates charged under the export credit guarantee program are inadequate to cover
the long-term operating costs and losses of the program.

45. This interpretation of item (j ) is supported not only by the ordinary meaning of the term
"illustrate" but also by other provisions relating to the relationship between item (j) and the general
definition in Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. Thus, for example, Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement provides that "[f]or the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if . .
. there is a financial contribution by a governme nt . . . and a benefit is thereby conferred."
42
Moreover, Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement expressly includes as subsidies "within the meaning
of Article 1" any "subsidies conti ngent . . . upon export performance, including those illustrated in
Annex I."43 It is, therefore, plain that item (j) applies the general definition of "export subsidy" set out
in 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. It does not establish any second or alternative standards for
"export subsidy" as Brazil has argued in this dispute.

 A. Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement is enti rely consistent with the U.S. interpretation

46. Brazil argues, nonetheless, that footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement somehow erases all of the
textual guidance discussed above. Specifically, Braz il argues that the U.S. approach would require
what Brazil terms an " a contrario" reading of item (j) and, according to Brazil, such an interpretation
is "definitively foreclose[d]" by footnote 5.
44 This argument does not withstand scrutiny, as Brazil
has itself recognized in other disputes.45

47. Footnote 5 – which modifies the prohibition on ex port subsidies contained in Article 3.1(a) –
provides that "[m]easures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be
prohibited under this or any other provision of th is Agreement." As such, Footnote 5 confirms two
things – first, that Annex I is relevant in determining whethe r or not measures constitute "export
subsidies" and, second, that where Annex I "refer[s ] to" measures as not constituting export subsidies,
no further analysis is necessary to determine wh ether the measures are prohibited subsidies under
Article 3.1(a).

48. Brazil's argument – for purposes of this dispute – is that, under footnote 5, item (j) can only
be understood to provide dispositive clarification as to what constitutes an "export subsidy" in the
case of export credit guarantees if it were to include an "affirmative statement" about the conditions
under which export subsidies do not exist.
46 However, footnote 5 says nothing about an "affirmative
statement." Nor is an "affirmative statement" required under the ordinary meaning of the term "refer."
Indeed, "refer" means, inter alia , "to make reference or allusion or direct the attention to
something."47 And "allusion," in turn, means "[a] cove rt, passing, or indirect reference (to);
popularly any reference to." 48 It is, thus, clear that measures "referred to" in Annex I as not
constituting export subsidies can include both measures that are expressly referred to as not
constituting export subsidies (though there is actually only one such measure, described in the second
paragraph of item (k)) 49 and measures that are implicitly referred to as not constituting export

42 Emphasis added.
43 Emphasis added.
44 Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para.563.
45 See e.g., Brazil – Aircraft (AB), paras. 14 and 19.
46 See Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 465 and 467.
47 See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 2520, Volume 1, (1993 Edition)
(Exhibit US-116).
48 See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 57, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-117)
(emphasis in original).
49 The second paragraph of item (k) provides that "if a Member is a party to an international
undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as
of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in
practice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice

subsidies, such as the provision of export cr edit guarantee programs at premium rates which are
adequate to cover the long-term operating costs a nd losses of the programs. Brazil confirmed to the
Appellate Body in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) that item (j) contains just such an implicit reference:

Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement specifies that Annex I contains not only a list of
prohibited export subsidies, but also measur es that do not constitute export subsidies,
such as in items (b), (h), (i) and (k). Co mparing the structure of item (j) and item (k),
the two provisions share a similar structure in that they define practices that constitute
prohibited export subsidies with language that limits the sc ope of the definition. In
the case of item (j) regarding export credit guarantee or insurance programs, the
limiting language is "premium rates whic h are inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses of the programs."50
49. Because Brazil ultimately argued that its lega l theory in that dispute was grounded "on an
'a contrario' interpretation of the text of the first para graph of item (k)," and not footnote 5, the
Appellate Body did not end up interpreting that provision. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body did
indicate that it accepted Brazil's argument that the first paragraph of item (k) could be read a contrario
to determine when measures are "justified."51 That result is equally appropriate here.

50. There are also other factors that undermine Brazil's interpretation of footnote 5 of the
SCM Agreement. For example, Brazil's interpretation is undermined by the negotiating history of the
provision. The negotiating history shows that Me mbers agreed to delete from an earlier draft
language that would have required an express reference in order for the provisions of the footnote to
apply. Specifically, footnote 5 first appeared in the third draft agreement prepared by the Chairman of
the Negotiating Group on Subsidies.
52 In that draft, footnote 5 read as follows: "[m]embers expressly
referred to in the Illustrative List as not constituti ng export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this
or any other provision of this Agreement." 53 The word "expressly" was not retained, however. In the
very next draft, the word was deleted from the footnote, 54 demonstrating that th e drafters intended to
expand the scope of footnote 5 beyond those measur es containing an "affirmative statement" that
particular measures do not constitute export subsidies.
51. The U.S. interpretation of item (j) and the re lationship between that provision and the general
definition of "export subsidy" in Article 1.1 and 3.1(a) is not only textually s ound and consistent with
the negotiating history, it is the only logical interpretation. 55 There is no reason why drafters would
have gone to the trouble of crafting in the Illustrative List specific and detailed rules for particular

which is in conformity with those provisions shall no t be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this
Agreement."
50 Brazil – Aircraft (AB), para. 19 (emphasis added).
51 Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (AB) , para. 80 (arguing that, if Brazil had made the correct factual showing
under paragraph 1, "we would have been prepared to find that the payments made under the revised PROEX are
justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List.")
52 MTN.GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev. 2 (2 November 1990).
53 MTN.GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev. 2 (2 November 1990) (emphasis added).
54 MTN.GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev. 3 (6 November 1990).
55 The United States notes, in this regard, the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant , which
holds that "a matter governed by a specific provision, dealing with it as such, is thereby taken out of the scope of
the general provision dealing with the category of subject to which that matter belongs, and which otherwise
might govern it as part of that category." Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Court of
International Justice, 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points , 1957 British Y.B. Int'l L. 236;
see also Case Concerning Payment of Serbian Loans, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 20/21, page 30; and Grotius, De Iure
Belli Ac Pacis, Lib. II, Cap. XVI, XXIX (Classics, 3, 1929). While the United States does not suggest that this
principle applies directly here, the United States finds the logic of the principle compelling and notes that the
U.S. interpretation of Articles 1, 3.1(a), and item (j), discussed above, is consistent with this logic.

types of measures, such as those for export credit guarantees in item (j), if those rules could be
ignored in favour of more general rules elsewhere in the SCM Agreement.

52. By contrast, Brazil's interpretation ignores the textual guidance in the SCM Agreement
regarding the relationship between Articles 1.1/3.1(a) and item (j), but it would – if applied – nullify
or render redundant a number of provisions of the SCM Agreement . For example, under Brazil's
interpretation, footnote 5 would become largely redundant. Specifically, Brazil's argument assumes
that footnote 5 only exempts from the prohibition on export subsidies those measures that are
expressly referred to in the Illustrative List as not constituting export subsidies. However, to the
extent that measures are expressly referred to as not constituting export subsidies in the Illustrative
List, they are not subject to the prohibition on "expor t subsidies" in any event. In other words, the
language of Articles 1, 3.1(a), and the Illustrative List would be sufficiently clear – without footnote 5
– to establish that measures expressly identified as not constituting export subsidies will not be subject
to prohibitions on export subsidies. If – as Brazil argues – the point of footnote 5 is simply to reiterate
that point, footnote 5 would serve a purely redundant function. Such an interpretation is disfavoured
under customary rules of treaty interpretation. As th e Appellate Body has explained, "[a]n interpreter
is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to
redundancy or inutility."
56

53. Similarly, Brazil's interpretation would call into question the need for item (d) of the
Illustrative List.
57 Brazil contends that Articles 1 and 3.1(a) provide an independent basis to challenge
as an export subsidy any export-contingent financial contribution that places the recipient in a better
position than in the market. Item (d), however, establishes a two part test that requires both a showing
of preferential treatment of products for expor t vis-a-vis products for domestic consumption and, in
the case of goods, a showing that goods are being provided on terms and conditions more favourable
than those available in the market. In the case of goods, the showing that woul d have to be made to
satisfy the second part of the two-part test appear s to be exactly the same showing that, under Brazil's
interpretation, would – alone – be sufficient to de monstrate the existence of an export subsidy under
Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. Why would any rational complaining party choose to
use the two-part test in item (d) if it could simp ly demonstrate the existence of an export subsidy
under Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a) on the basis of one of the two parts? Again, Brazil's interpretation
simply leads to manifestly absurd results.

54. For the reasons above, the more plausible te xtual interpretation is that there is only one
definition of "export subsidy" in the SCM Agreement – its elements are laid out in Articles 1.1
and 3.1(a) – and item (j) of the Illustrative List c ontrols on the question of how that definition applies
in the case of export credit guarantees.

B. The panel reports in Korea – Ships an d Brazil – Aircraft do not detract from the
proper interpretation of item (j)

55. The panel reports in Brazil – Aircraft and Korea – Ships do not detract from the proper
interpretation of item (j) of the Illustrative List di scussed above. For one, all of these reports consider
the relevant question to be whether the items of th e Illustrative List are available as an "affirmative
defense;" in other words, whether measures fo und to be "export subsidies" under the general
definitional elements set out in Articles 1.1 and 3. 1(a) can nonetheless be excused if the conditions in

56 United States – Gasoline (AB), p. 23.
57 Item (d) of the Illustrative List identifies as an export subsidy "[t]he provision by governments or
their agencies . . . of imported or dome stic products or services for use in the production of exported goods, on
terms or conditions more favourable than for provision of like or directly competitive products or services for
use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions
are more favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their exporters." (Emphasis added)

the Illustrative List are satisfied.58 The United States does not consider this to be the relevant question
here. Indeed, the United States has never argued th at item (j) constitutes an "affirmative defense."
Rather, as explained above, the United States view is that item (j) "clarifies" dispositively how the
elements of "export subsidy" in Ar ticles 1.1 and 3.1(a) apply in th e case of export credit guarantees.
The suggestion that item (j) provides an "affirmativ e defense" suggests that the standard contained
therein is different from the standard in Articles 1.1 and 3.1(a); an argument that Brazil – not the
United States – has made in this proceeding. Th is is an argument with which the United States
disagrees. And, in that limited sense, the U.S. pos ition is consistent with that of the panels in Brazil –
Aircraft and Korea – Ships.

56. The United States does not, however, consider that the panels in Brazil – Aircraft and Korea –
Ships properly interpreted footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement. In particular, neither panel considered
the full breadth of the ordinary meaning of the term "r eferred to" in footnote 5; namely, the fact that
the term may well encompass both measures that are expressly referred to as not constituting export
subsidies and measures that are implicitly referred to as not constituting export subsidies. Indeed, in
Korea – Ships, even the European Communiti es – the complaining party in that dispute – agreed that
"in law item (j) could be read to include a proviso , and thereby 'refer' to export credit guarantees as
not constituting export subsidies to the extent that the premium rates cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of the programs." 59 This is the same point made by Brazil in the Brazil – Aircraft
dispute about the implicit reference in item (j) to measures that do not constitute prohibited export
subsidies:

Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement specifies that Annex I contains not only a list of
prohibited export subsidies, but also measur es that do not constitute export subsidies,
such as in items (b), (h), (i) and (k). Co mparing the structure of item (j) and item (k),
the two provisions share a similar structure in that they define practices that constitute
prohibited export subsidies with language that limits the sc ope of the definition. In
the case of item (j) regarding export credit guarantee or insurance programs, the
limiting language is "premium rates whic h are inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses of the programs."
60
57. The United States agrees with Brazil's – a nd the European Communities' – assessment of
item (j) and the implicit reference therein to th e measures that do not constitute prohibited export
subsidies.

58. The United States also considers that the panels in Brazil – Aircraft and Korea – Ships failed
to give due consideration to th e Appellate Body's analysis in Brazil – Aircraft in which it indicated
that it accepted Brazil's argument that the first paragraph of item (k) can be read in an a contrario
fashion.
61 Brazil concedes that the Appellate Body made this finding but argues that such an a

58 See e.g., Brazil – Aircraft (21.5 II – Canada) , paras. 5.272 ([t]he question before us is whether a
measure which has been found to be a subsidy contingent upon export performance within the meaning of
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement is nevertheless not prohibited if it is a 'payment' which is not 'used to
secure a material advantage in the field of export cred it terms' within the meaning of the first paragraph of
item (k).") and 5.276 ("[w]e have concluded that . . . the first paragraph of item (k) cannot, as a legal matter, be
invoked as an affirmative defence."); Korea – Ships (21.5 – EC) , para. 7.193 ("[i]n light of out findings that
certain [guarantees] constitute subsidies, and that such su bsidies are contingent on export performance, we will
be required to find that such [guarantees] are inconsistent with Article s 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement
unless we uphold Korea's claim that they benefit from a safe haven pursuant to item (j) of the Illustrative List.")
59 Korea – Ships (21.5 – EC), para. 7.1299. The EC simply "reject[ed] the application of item (j) on the
facts of [that] case." Korea – Ships (21.5 – EC), para. 7.1299.
60 Brazil – Aircraft (AB), para. 19 (emphasis added).
61 Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (AB) , para. 80 (arguing that, if Brazil had made the correct factual showing
under paragraph 1, "we would have been prepared to find that the payments made under the revised PROEX are
justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List.")

contrario reading must be limited to the first paragraph in item (k).
62 There is no legitimate or
principled basis for that assertion and, in fact, Brazil expressly argued in the Brazil – Aircraft dispute
that "[t]here is nothing in the text of either item (j) or (k) to support the conclusion that an a contrario
argument is permitted in one but not the other ."63 If item (k) can be read a contrario – and Brazil has
conceded that it can – then item (j) can be read a contrario as well.

34. Does the United States considers that item (j) of the Illustrative List is one of the
provisions to which footnote 5 of th e SCM Agreement applies? What impact does
this have for the United States' interpretatio n of the interaction between item (j) of
the Illustrative List and Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement?

59. Please see response to Question 33 above.

35. How does the United States address Brazil's argument that permitting an a
contrario reading of item (j) would prevent a Member from challenging specific
export credit guarantees or cohorts of such guarantees granted by a Member, as
opposed to export credit guarantee programs [see paragraphs 472 ff. of Brazil's
Rebuttal]

60. Brazil appears to confuse the question of the measures that may be challenged as providing
prohibited export subsidies and the standard for wh ether the measures are prohibited export subsidies
in item (j). WTO Members agreed, in item(j), th at a prohibited export subsidy would exist when
premia under an export credit guarantee program are not adequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of the program. This is the test to apply in considering whether export credit
guarantees are prohibited export subsidies or not. This test applies regardless of whether a Member
chooses to challenge all guarantees under a program or particular guarantees. Indeed, the United
States recalls, in this regard, that Brazil only successf ully challenged those export credit guarantees in
respect of exports of unscheduled products and rice in the original proceeding. Therefore, even the
facts of this dispute undermine Brazil's assertion that a complaining Member could only challenge an
export credit guarantee program as a whole, not an y subset of guarantees. A complaining Member
may challenge whatever guarantees it chooses, but to establish whether or not they are prohibited
export subsidies, the relevant cons ideration is whether the program is being operated in such a way
that the premiums collected are inadequate to cover the long-term costs and losses of the program.

61. Brazil suggests that the U.S. interpretation is "not compatible with Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)"
because that provision identifies loan guarantees and not export credit guarantee programs as
financial contributions.
64 Here, again, Brazil's argument incorrectly conflates the measures that can be
challenged as conferring export subs idies and the standard for whethe r those measures do, in fact, do
so. The fact that loan guarantees – or more specifically, export credit guarantees – constitute financial
contributions does not change the analysis of th e conditions under which those guarantees may be
deemed to be prohibited export subsidies for purposes of the SCM Agreement.65
Questions to Brazil

36. What is Brazil's reading of the Appellate Body's statement in paragraph 80 of its
Report in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) that it " ... would have been prepared to find that

62 See e.g., Brazil Oral Statement, para. 235 ("Brazil's pos ition is not inconsistent with the Appellate
Body's dicta, in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 proceeding) , that it 'would have been prepared,' in effect, to
accept an a contrario reading of the first paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative List.")
63 See Brazil – Aircraft (21.5 – Canada) , para. 6.59, n. 58 (quoting Oral Statement of Brazil at the
Meeting of the Panel, para. 34) (underlining added).
65 The same flaw is apparent in Brazil's arguments relating to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.

the payments made under the revised PROEX are justified under item (k) of the
Illustrative List"? Should the Panel take this statement into account in deciding
whether item (j) can be interpreted a contrario?

2. Outstanding export credit guarantees / measures taken to comply

Questions to Brazil

37. Brazil relies on the panel and Appellate B ody Reports in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) in
support of its arguments that the United States has not "withdrawn" the subsidy
and is, "[a]t a minimum... prohibited from making 'payments' on claims against"
any outstanding export credit guarantees [Paragraph 397 of Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission]. Please discuss how the findings of the panel and Appellate Body in
that case apply to the provision of the US export credit guarantees at issue.

3. "Benefit" under Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement

Question to the United States

38. Please discuss the relevance of the original panel's characterization, in
paragraph 6.31 of its report, of Brazil's reliance on Ar ticles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement as "not a separate claim, but merely another argument" on the
United States' view in this respect (and notably the United States statement, in
paragraph 67 of its First Written Submission, that "... the panel in the original
proceeding specifically declined to add ress Brazil's alleged 'claim' under Articles 1
and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement")?

62. As reflected in the U.S. statement quoted by the Panel above, Brazil has erroneously alleged
both in this proceeding and in the original proceed ing that it presents separate "claims" under item (j)
of the Illustrative List on the one hand and Articl es 1 and 3.1(a) on the other, regarding whether the
export credit guarantees at issue are prohibited expor t subsidies. The original panel disagreed.
Instead, the original panel found that "Brazil's allegation invoking the elements of Articles 1
and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement is not a separate claim, but merely another argument, on a different
factual basis, as to how the United States export credit guarantee programs would meet the definition
of an export subsidy in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement."
66

63. The original panel then went on to decline to address what Brazil had alleged was its "claim"
– and what the panel properly re-classified as an "argument" – under Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement. The original panel explained that "[g] iven our finding in paragraphs 7.946-7.948
[regarding item (j)], we do not believe that it is necessary to address Brazil's additional arguments
about how the Article 3.1(a) defin itional elements would be fulfilled on another factual basis in order
to resolve this dispute."
67 In other words, it was the original pa nel's view that this dispute could and
should be resolved through implementation of th e recommendations and rulings of the DSB based on
the factual findings under item (j).

64. The same views were shared by the Appellate Body, which rejected Brazil's arguments that
the "[original] Panel's failure 'to examine Brazil's claim [or, argument, according to the original panel]
. . . leaves open a dispute and creates uncertainty concerning the scope of the United States'
obligations, and the consistency of its existing measures with those obligations."
68 According to the
Appellate Body, "[t]he Panel found that the Unite d States' export credit guarantee programs constitute

66 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 6.31.
67 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 6.31.
68 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 727.

a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) because they do not meet the criteria in item (j) of the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. This finding, in our view, is sufficient to resolve the matter."
69

65. The United States has implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings relating to export
credit guarantees; in particular, paying close atten tion to the guidance provided by the original panel
regarding the standard in item (j) of the SCM Agreement . As the United States has shown, export
credit guarantees under the GSM 102 program are provided at premium rates that are more than
adequate to cover the long-term costs and losses of the program. The panel and Appellate Body
properly found that this inquiry r esolved the dispute in the original proceeding. The same result is
appropriate here as well for all the reasons discussed above.

Questions to Brazil

39. The Panel understands the United States to argue that it has relied on the Panel's
findings under item (j) to implement the DSB recommendations with respect to
export credit guarantees. How would this, in Brazil's view, affect the compliance
panel's role in this proceeding? Was the United States also expected to implement
changes in order to make its export cred it guarantee programs consistent with
article 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, even though there were no findings of
the original panel in this respect?

40. In paragraph 410 of its Rebuttal, Braz il refers to paragraph. 7.398 of the Panel
Report in Canada – Aircraft II. The Panel notes, however, that in the same
paragraph, the Canada -- Aircraft II panel also indicated that there would be a
"'benefit' when the cost-saving for a Bombardier customer for securing a loan with
an IQ loan guarantee is not offset by IQ's fees". Please discuss, in light of this
sentence, whether the Panel should read th e Canada – Aircraft II panel as having
rejected the "total cost of funds" as the proper benchmark under Article 14(c) of
the SCM Agreement.

Questions to both parties

41. What are the relevant considerations to gu ide the Panel in the selection of a market
benchmark in this case?:

a. That the institution that provides the product is, on the whole, or on a
program or product-specific basis, pr ofitable? If so, is "any" profit
sufficient to qualify an institution/ product/program as a relevant "market
benchmark" or must the institutio n/product/program achieve a certain
level of profit? Must the Panel conduct an examination of the level of profit
achieved by commercial or private actors operating in the field?
b. Are the institution/program/products' stated goals relevant in assessing
whether they can be used as a "market benchmark"?

 c. Is the "governance" of the institution relevant?

 d. What other factors are relevant?

66. The issue of what is an appropriate benchm ark cannot be addressed in the abstract. It is
necessary to determine, first, what the text of the SCM Agreement provides about the particular
benchmark to be selected in the circumstances of the particular case. If the question presented is

69 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 732.

whether export credit guarantees provided prohibited export subsidies within the meaning of the
SCM Agreement, the precise measure by which this is determined is set out in item (j) of the
Illustrative List in Annex I. That provision clarifi es that the relevant consideration is the long-term
operating costs and losses of a program. Where the pr emiums collected are inadequate to cover the
long-term operating costs and losses of a program, the export credit guarantees confer prohibited
export subsidies. Where the premiums collected are not inadequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of a program, the export credit guarantees do not confer prohibited export subsidies.

67. Brazil argues that Article 1.1 and 3.1(a) establish a second, alte rnative benchmark for
prohibited export subsidies. For the reasons discu ssed above, the United States strongly disagrees.
Nonetheless, even under Brazil's (incorrect) argument, it is the text of the SCM Agreement from
which one can draw guidance as to the particular "b enchmark" to be used. Specifically, Article 14 of
the SCM Agreement interprets and applies the definition of "benefit" set out in Article 1.1 and has
been relied upon by the Appellate Body as important contextual guidance in interpreting "benefit" for
purposes of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
70 Indeed, it has even been invoked by Brazil to justify
its arguments in this proceeding. 71 Article 14 specifically identifies the different benchmarks that are
relevant with respect to different types of government-provided measures.

68. Article 14(c) deals with loan guarantees and provides that the proper comparison – in
assessing whether a benefit has been conferred (and the amount thereof) – is between "the amount that
the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan gua ranteed by the government and the amount that the
firm would pay on a comparable commercial lo an absent the government guarantee." Under
Article 14(c), the "market benchmark" that must be sought is, thus, a commercially-available loan that
could be obtained without the government guarantee. A "benefit" is deemed to be conferred pursuant
to Article 14(c) where there is a positive differen ce between "the amount that the firm receiving the
guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay on a
comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee."

69. The question, then, is how to identify a "com parable commercial loan" within the meaning of
Article 14(c). As the text indicates, the focus of the analysis is on the loan itself – it is the loan that
must be "commercial" and "comparable." The char acteristics of the entity providing the loan are not
necessarily determinative as to whether or not the loan itself is "commercial" and, therefore,
appropriate for use as a benchmark under Article 14(c). While these characteristics may well be
relevant considerations in assessing whether the loan itself is a "commercial" loan in a particular case,
factors such as the overall profitability of a particular institution or its stated goals, or the manner of
its governance, may not necessarily – and in all cases – correlate to whether the loan is "commercial."
In short, the question of what constitutes an appropriate "market benc hmark" – a "comparable
commercial loan" under Article 14(c) – is a fact-spe cific question that looks to the (non-government
guaranteed) loans that a particular obligor is actually able to obtain on the market.

70. Although Brazil bears the burden of proof, it h as not even attempted to make the kind of
particularized showing contemplated under Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement ; it has not shown
that the overall cost, including fees, of each of the loans guaranteed by the government is less than
overall cost of a comparable comme rcial loan that could actually be obtained without a government
guarantee. Instead, Brazil has relied on sweeping and erroneous assertions that obligors on loans
guaranteed under the GSM 102 program can never obtain any other financing of any kind and that the
United States could never provide an export credit guarantee without also providing an export
subsidy. These arguments simply do not square w ith the evidence submitted by the United States
showing that such obligors are in fact able to obtain financing even without GSM 102 guarantees and
on terms better than those available with GSM 102 guarantees. The declining level of use of the
GSM 102 program in recent years is even further evidence of this.

70 Canada – Aircraft (AB), para. 155.
71 Brazil First Written Submission, paras. 371-375

4. Claims under item (j) of the Illustrative List

Question to the United States

42. How does the United States address Brazil's arguments with respect to the MPRs
under the OECD Arrangement?

71. There is no merit to Brazil's argument that GSM 102 export credit guarantees should be
deemed to fail to meet the standard in item (j) of the Illustrative List because – allegedly – "the fees
for GSM 102 [export credit guarantees] fall below th e minimum premium rates ('MPRs') provided in
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De velopment's ('OECD') Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits . . ."
72 First, item (j) of the SCM Agreement clearly provides that the proper
comparison is between the "premium rates" charge d under the particular programs and "the long-term
operating costs and losses" of the programs themselves. The text of the SCM Agreement does not
provide that the Arrangement on Officially Suppor ted Export Credits sets the standard by which to
assess whether export credit guarantees constitute export subsidies under item (j) of the
SCM Agreement.

72. Indeed, this is in contrast to the very next item in the Illustrative List – item (k), dealing with
export credits – which does expressly refer to such an Arrangement
73 and does provide that it
establishes a basis for determining whether or not a measure constitutes a prohibited export subsidy.
It is, therefore, clear that when the drafters in tended that a separate undertaking establish a standard
for assessing WTO-consistency, they knew precisely how to reflect this in the text. The fact that no
such reference is found in item (j) is clear evidence that the OECD Arrangement does not establish the
standard for the fees that ought to be charged for export credit guarantees in order to meet the
standard set in item (j).

Question to Brazil

43. What is Brazil's reaction to paragr aph 25 of Japan's Third Party Submission?

73 Item (k) refers to "an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve
original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been
adopted by those original Members)." The Appellate Body explained in Brazil – Aircraft that "[t]he OECD
Arrangement is an 'international undertaking on official export credits' that satisfies the requirements of the
proviso in the second paragraph in item (k).")

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Arrangement OECD Arrangement on Offi cially Supported Export Credits
AWP Adjusted World Price
CCPs Counter-Cyclical Payments
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Proce dures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
ECG Export Credit Guarantee
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FAIR Act Federal Agricultural Im provement and Reform Act of 1996
FAPRI Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
FSRI Act Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
FY Fiscal Year
GSM 102 General Sales Manager 102
GSM 103 General Sales Manager 103
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFC International Finance Corporation
MPRs Minimum Premium Rates
MY Marketing Year
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
SCGP Supplier Credit Guarantee Program
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
U.S. United States
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
WTO World Trade Organization

TABLE OF CASES
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW, adopted
20 March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, 2031
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1161
Brazil – Aircraft
(21.5)
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft
 – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of th e DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW,
adopted 4 August 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 4067
Brazil – Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse
by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS46/RW, adopted 4 August
2000, modified by Appellate Bo dy Report, WT/DS46/AB/RW,
DSR 2000:IX, 4093
Canada – Aircraft
(21.5)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU ,
WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, DSR 2000:IX, 4299
Canada – Aircraft
Credits and Guarantees
Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and L oan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft, WT/DS222/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 February 2002,
DSR 2002:III, 849
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Rec ourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003,
DSR 2003:III, 965
EC – CVDs on DRAMs
Panel Report, European Communities – Countervailing Measures on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea , WT/DS299/R,
adopted 3 August 2005
EC – Selected Customs
Matters
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs
Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2006
Indonesia – Autos
Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1,
2, 3 and 4, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998:VI, 2201
Korea – Commercial
Vessels
Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels ,
WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005
U.S. – Gasoline
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996,
DSR 1996:I, 3
U.S. – Shrimp (21.5)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Prod ucts – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII,
6481
U.S. – Softwood
Lumber IV (21.5)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Ce rtain Softwood Lumber from Canada –
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS257/AB/RW,
adopted 20 December 2005
U.S. – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton ,
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005

Short Title Full Case Title and Citation
U.S. – Upland Cotton
Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , WT/DS267/R,
and Corr.1, adopted 21 March 2005, modi fied by Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS/267/AB/R
U.S. – Wool Shirts and
Blouses
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1,
adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323

TABLE OF EXHIBITS
Calculation of Total MY 2005 Count er-Cyclical Payments On Farms
Growing Upland Cotton
Exhibit 670
U.S. Department of Agriculture's 2007 Farm Bill Proposal Exhibit 671
Rangarajan Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1996) at Appendix A, Set Theory and Logic: An Introduction
Exhibit 672

A. G
ENERAL QUESTIONS
Questions to both parties
1. Is Brazil/US of the view that a party to a dispute referred to a panel established under
Article 21.5 of the DSU (a party in a compliance panel) can make the same legal argument as it did in
the original Panel proceedings?
1. Generally Brazil agrees with the United States' view regarding the legal arguments that can be
made in Article 21.5 proceedings. However, the United States suggests that Brazil's approach in these
proceedings contradicts its approach in the original proceeding with respect of the Step 2 program and
the appropriateness of the FAPRI approach to modeli ng. Brazil has explained that its Step 2-related
arguments in these proceedings are consistent with its arguments in the original proceeding. 1
Moreover, Professor Sumner and Brazil have explaine d that the new model is more appropriate to
assess the question before this compliance Panel.2
2. Could each party explain its view on the ques tion of whether, and to what extent, this Panel
must rely on the legal and factual analysis underlying the original panel's findings? What are the
relevant provisions of the DSU in this regard?
2. Brazil refers the compliance Panel to its r esponses to questions 2 and 30, which address the
relevant legal provisions of the DSU, applicable jurisprudence, as well as the application of those
provisions and jurisprudence to the facts of this case. Contrary to the U.S. response, Appellate Body
and panel rulings suggest that where a compliance panel examines the effects of one or more identical
subsidies challenged in the original proceeding, it must rely on and accept any relevant findings of the
original panel, as modified by the Appellate B ody, absent a fundamental change in the underlying
conditions of competition.
B. Q
UESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BRAZIL'S REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 13.1 DSU
Questions to the US
3. Is the United States arguing that Brazil must identify the subsidized product for each of the
types of subsidies from which it claims serious p rejudice? Is the United States arguing that payments
which permit planting flexibility are not tied to the production of upland cotton, so that they must be
allocated by Brazil across the total value of production of each recipient?
3. Brazil agrees with the United States that the subsidized product at issue in this dispute is
upland cotton lint.3 Brazil also agrees with the United Stat es that, as a matter of fact, the challenged
measures should subsidize the product at issue to support a finding that they cause the adverse effects
claimed.4 Finally, Brazil agrees with the United States that counter-cyclical subsidies benefit the
production of upland cotton.5
4. The disagreement between the parties concerns two issues: first, the methodology by which
to quantify the general order of magnitude of the c ounter-cyclical subsidies benefiting upland cotton;
second, whether counter-cyclical subsidies paid on base other than upland cotton base are properly
before the compliance Panel.

1 Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 48-90; Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 135-144.
2 Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, Annex I; Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 92-121; Exhibit Bra-659
(Statement of Professor Sumner Concerning Various U.S. Arguments).
3 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, paras. 7-9.
4 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, para. 9.
5 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, para. 9.

5. First, the United States continues to advo cate the use of the methodology provided for in
Annex IV of the SCM Agreement to allocate the amount of counter-cyclical subsidies benefiting
upland cotton. 6 Both the original panel and the Appella te Body rejected the applicability of that
methodology in the original dispute. 7 Indeed, Annex IV provides for a methodology to precisely
quantify the magnitude of subsidies, in terms of their cost to the government, for the express purposes
of the now expired rebuttable presumption of serious prejudice under Article 6.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement. By contrast, under Articles 5(c) and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement , the compliance
Panel is called to make an assessment of "the effect of the subsidy". This requires, to some extent, a
more qualitatively and less quantitative assessment of the economic reality of how U.S. counter-
cyclical subsidies support the production of upland cotton, not application of a one-size fits all
methodology.8 Indeed, the Appellate Body pointed out th at these provisions "suggest that a panel has
a certain degree of discretion in selecting the appropriate methodology for determining whether the
'effect' of a subsidy is significant price suppression".
9 In other words, Article 6.3 provides the
necessary flexibility for a panel to take into account the economic reality of the measures, products
and markets at issue.
6. As Brazil has explained in numerous instances, U.S. upland cotton production is
economically viable only due to counter-cyclical subs idies. Moreover, as discussed in more detail in
Brazil's comments to the U.S. response to question 29, there is a strongly positive correlation between
upland cotton planting and ho lding upland cotton base. In fact, in MY 2005, 95 percent of U.S.
upland cotton production took place on farms holding upland cotton base. This economic reality
remains the same as the economic reality in MY 2002.
7. Any methodology to allocate counter-cyclical subsidies to upland cotton that serves as the
basis for assessing "the effect of the subsidy" must take these economic realities into account. Brazil's
methodology does so. Indeed, the original panel co nfirmed that it was "appropriate" and might even
understate the real amount of support provided by counter-cyclical subsidies to upland cotton. 10
Brazil therefore maintains that the compliance Panel should adopt the Brazil's approach to
determining the magnitude of the subsidies at issue.
8. Second, the United States asserts that the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB related to
counter-cyclical payments made only on upland cott on base. This is allegedly because the Appellate
Body, in selecting a methodology for determining th e amount of "support" "grant[ed]" in MY 2002 to
upland cotton, within the meaning of Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture , relied on the
amount of upland cotton counter-cyclical payments.11 Again, the United States errs.
9. The findings of the original panel and the Appellate Body under Article 13(b)(ii) of the
Agreement on Agriculture relate to the question whether support granted to upland cotton in MY 2002
exceeded support decided in MY 1992. The Appellate Body is clear that it applies a "methodology"
for assessing whether U.S. measures are covered by Article 13(b)(ii). 12 While the methodology
applied by the Appellate Body might have related to counter-cyclical payments with respect to upland
cotton base only, the corresponding finding is that "support to" upland cotton exceeded support
decided in 1992. In other words, any support for upland cotton was subject to the original panel's
assessment under Part III of the SCM Agreement. Consequently, the original panel's findings and the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB are not li mited to counter-cyclical payments for upland

6 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, paras. 9-11.
7 See Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton , paras. 7.1183-7.1190; Appellate Body Report, U.S. –
Upland Cotton, paras. 461-467.
8 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, paras. 7.1183-7.1190.
9 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 436.
10 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.646.
11 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, para. 9 and footnote 16.
12 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, paras. 377-380.

cotton base only. They cover any counter-cyclical payments that support the production of upland
cotton, which are therefore properly before this compliance Panel.
10. Finally, Brazil corrects errors in the U.S. cal culation, under the inapplicable Annex IV, of the
amount of counter-cyclical subsidies allocated to upl and cotton. First, rather than allocating all
upland cotton base related counter-cyclical payments received by farms producing upland cotton, the
United States only allocates those received up to the amount of upland cotton planted acres on the
farm – in other words the basis for the Cott on-to-Cotton Methodology. The United States thus
ignores a portion of upland cotton counter-cyclical payments received by farms producing upland
cotton and that very likely supports the production of upland cotton. Brazil corrects this error in the
table below, which otherwise reproduces the second U.S. table at paragraph 12 of its response.
Table 1. – Allocating Cotton Counter-Cyclical Payments
 2003 2004 2005
Total CCP payments (A) $392 m illion $1,375 million $1,375 million
Upland cotton base acres on farms that
plant upland cotton (B)13
NA NA 13,470,412 acres
Total upland cotton base acres (C)14 NA NA 18,474,000 acres
Ratio of upland cotton base acres on
farms that plant upland cotton (D=B/C) NA NA 72.92%
CCP payments to farms that planted
cotton (E=A*D)
$286 million $1,003 million $1,003 million
Cotton as percent of total on farms that
harvested cotton (F)15
41.80% 53.90% 46.70%
CCP payments allocated based on
cotton's share of total crop value
(G=E*F)
$119 million $540 million $468 million
As percent of total CCPs (H= G/A) 30.48% 39.30% 34.05%

11. Second, Brazil uses the USDA base and plan ted acreage data provided for MY 2005 only to
determine the amount of total counter-cyclical pa yments received by farms producing upland cotton
and allocates them, under the inapplicable Annex IV methodology, to upland cotton based on the
share of the value of the upland cotton crop of total farm production.16

13 Exhibit Bra-625 (Calculation of MY 2005 Counter-Cyclical Payments Allocated to Upland Cotton)
14 Exhibit Bra-639 (Commodity Estimates Book for FY 2008 President's Budget, p. 190)
15 U.S. 27 February response to question 3, para. 12.
16 Brazil notes that the data presented by the United States in the first table at paragraph 12 of its
27 February response to question 3 does not indicate whether it is applicable to all farms producing upland
cotton. Brazil therefore has not means to determine the reliability of this data.

Table 2. – Allocating Total Counter-Cyclical Payments
 2005
Total cotton CCP payments (A) $1,375 million
Cotton CCP payments on farms that plant cotton (B)17 $1,011 million
Other CCP payments on farms that plant cotton (C)18 $224 million
Total CCP payments on farms that plant cotton (D=B+C) $1,235 million
Cotton as percent of total on farms that harvested cotton (E) 46.70%
CCP payments allocated based on cotton's share of total crop
value (F=D*E)
$577 million
As percent of total CCPs (G= F/A) 41.95%

12. Brazil reiterates that, while pointing out th ese errors in the U.S. implementation of the
inapplicable Annex IV methodology, it maintains th at the compliance Panel should adopt the Brazil's
approach to determining the magnitude of the subsidies at issue.
4. Does the United States contest the accura cy of the figures for 2003 – 2005 cited in
"Table 6"19 of Brazil's first submission and "Table 5" 20 of Brazil's rebuttal submission? If so, please
provide the accurate figures, or the figures the US deems to be more accurate.
13. The United States' objections to the data in Table 6 of Brazil's First Written Submission and
Table 5 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission are inconsequential, and in many instances, incorrect.
14. First, the "actual outlays" presented by the Un ited States are very similar to those in Table 6
of Brazil's First Written Submission. In fact, the United States reports greater marketing loan subsidy
outlays in MY 2005 ($1,269 million) 21 than those reported in Table 6 of Brazil's First Written
Submission ($1,257 million). In any event, USDA released updated budget information in
February 2007.22 The new marketing loan subsidy totals ar e very similar to those reported in Table 6
of Brazil's First Written Submission:
Figure 3. – Marketing Loan Payments in MY 2004-200523
 MY 2004 MY 2005
LDP $387 $256
MLG $10 $8
CEG $1,415 $1,005
TOTAL $1,812 $1,269

17 Sum of cotton counter-payments on category A and B farms, see Exhibit Bra-670 (Calculation of
Total MY 2005 Counter-Cyclical Payments On Farms Growing Upland Cotton).
18 Sum of non-cotton counter-cyclical payments on category A, B and C farms. See Exhibit Bra-670
(Calculation of Total MY 2005 Counter-Cyclical Payments On Farms Growing Upland Cotton).
19 Immediately preceding para. 112 of Brazil's first submission.
20 Immediately following para. 173 of Brazil's rebuttal submission.
21 U.S. 27 February response to question 4, para. 14.
22 Exhibit Bra-639 (Commodity Estimates Book for FY 2008 President's Budget, p. 190).
23 Exhibit Bra-639 (Commodity Estimates Book for FY 2008 President's Budget, p. 190).

15. Contrary to what the Untied States "understands,"
24 Brazil does not intend that the figures in
Table 6 of its First Written submission be supe rseded by the figures in Table 5 of its Rebuttal
Submission. The figures in Table 6 of Brazil's First Written Submission are based on the ratio of
counter-cyclical subsidies under "Brazil's allocation methodology" to total counter-cyclical subsidies
in MY 2002.
25 By contrast, the figures in Table 5 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission are based on the
"Cotton-to-Cotton Methodology."26
16. Applying Brazil's Methodology to USDA's MY 2005 base and planted acreage data, the only
data provided by the United States, results in MY 2005 counter-cyclical subsidies allocated to upland
cotton in the amount of $868 million, about $45 million less than what was estimated in Table 6 of
Brazil's First Written Submission. Brazil is not ab le to calculate counter-cyclical subsidies under
Brazil's allocation methodology in MY 2003-2004 because the United States has still not provided
data on planted acreage and base acreage.
27
17. As the original panel pointed out, Br azil recalls that both the "Cotton-to-Cotton
Methodology" and "Brazil's Methodology" are conservative. 28 Under both methodologies, million of
dollars of counter-cyclical subsidies paid to upland cotton farmers are not counted as support to
upland cotton. Consider a typical cotton farm with 2,000 acres planted to upland cotton. If a farmer
has 2,500 upland cotton base acres, the counter-cyclical payments tied to those 500 "extra" base acres,
up to $37,000 per year29, are not allocated as support to upland cotton. In reality, it is very likely that
some or all of these "extra" payments support the production of upland cotton.
18. Finally, the United States "test" of the calcula tions in Table 5 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission
is curious, considering that Table 5 is based directly on data submitted by the United States. 30 In any
event, the amounts calculated by the United States ar e not significantly different from the figures in
Table 5 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission.
Question to Brazil
5. The Panel refers to Brazil's communication dated 22 January 2007 concerning its request in
relation to Article 13.1 of the DSU. Is it correct for the Panel to understand that as far as data
for 2005 is concerned, data included in Exhibit US- 64 satisfies all of the requests Brazil made in
Part A of Annex 1 of its 1 November communication?
C. Q UESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE
UNITED STATES
1. Preliminary objections of the United States in respect of claims of Brazil regarding
export credit guarantees in respect of pig meat and poultry meat
Question to both parties
6. The parties disagree with respect to whether in a proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU a
party may present a claim that was raised in the original proceeding but on which no finding of

24 U.S. 27 February response to question 4, para. 15.
25 Brazil's First Written Submission, para. 116-118.
26 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.642.
27 Brazil originally requested data on base and planted acreage for MY 2002-2006 on 29 June 2006.
See Question 3 of Annex 2b of Brazil's data request submitted on 1 November 2006.
28 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.646.
29 500 base acres * 634 pounds per acre * 0.1373 dollars per pound * 0.85 = $37,000, see U.S.
30 Table 5 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission is directly based off of the information in the U.S. First
Written Submission, para. 224.

WTO-inconsistency was made due to the fact that the Appellate Body was unable to complete the
analysis.
a) Could the parties explain the legal basis in the text of Article 21.5 of the DSU and
other relevant provisions of the DSU for their position on this question?
b) Could the parties explain whether and how their position on this issue is consistent
with prior panel and Appellate Body reports?
19. The United States notes in its response that co mpliance panels are restricted to review of
"measures taken to comply" and argues, more specifi cally, that such panels are limited to examining
elements or aspects of "measures taken to comply" that are in some sense changed from the measure
at issue in the original proceedings.
20. However, as Brazil noted in its own r esponse to question 6, even assuming that the
United States is correct, it does not mean that Br azil's claims concerning GSM 102 export credit
guarantees ("ECGs") pig meat and poultry meat are outside the scope of this Panel's review.
21. In its claims concerning pig meat and poultr y meat, Brazil is indeed challenging a "measure
taken to comply". While the United States describes the "measure" subject to Brazil's claim as "pig
meat and poultry meat GSM 102 guarantees"
31, no such measure has ever existed, either in the
original proceedings or following the impl ementation deadline. While Brazil's claims of
inconsistency are product-specific with respect to scheduled products, the measure subject to those
claims is not product-specific, as the United States a sserts. Instead, the measure subject to Brazil's
claims of WTO-inconsistency, "in its totality" 32, is the GSM 102 program as amended by the
United States' "measures taken to comply", in particular the modified GSM 102 fee schedule
(including the removal of certain risk categories from eligibility).33
22. As Brazil noted in its response to question 6, there is no factual basis for the United States to
characterize the measure subject to Brazil's claims of inconsis tency as "the pig meat and poultry meat
GSM 102 guarantees". 34 Neither the amended GSM 102 program in its totality, nor the individual
amendments, set out terms or conditions that differ as between differe nt eligible products. 35 T h e
measure does not apply on a product-specific basis; the terms and conditions for ECGs under the
GSM 102 program as amended by the modified GSM 102 fee schedule are the same for pig meat,
poultry meat, and all other eligible scheduled as well as unscheduled products.
23. Thus, Brazil's challenge concerning pig meat and poultry meat relates to a new
 aspect of a
new measure – the modified fee schedule that is pa rt of the amended GSM 102 program. In that
situation, none of the limits on the scope of Article 21.5 proceedings discussed by the United States in
its response (or, indeed, any other limits) apply.

31 U.S. Rebuttal Submission, para. 10 ("In other words, as Brazil expressly concedes, there have never
been any findings of WTO inconsistency against the pig meat and poultry meat GSM 102 guarantees , and
consequently there were no DSB recomme ndations and rulings against these measures with which the United
States was obligated to comply.") (emphasis added). See also Id., paras. 14, 15.
32 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5), para. 67; Appellate Body Report, U.S. –
Shrimp (21.5), para. 87.
33 See WT/DS267/30, paras. 8 ((ii) and (iii)), 26. Throughout its response, Brazil will refer to the
measure subject to its claims as "the GSM 102 program as amended by the modified GSM 102 fee schedule".
35 Brazil's 26 February response to question 6, para. 29. The same can be said of the "old" GSM 102,
before it was amended on 1 July 2005.

24. A similar situation arose in Canada – Aircraft (21.5) . In that dispute, Canada amended the
terms and conditions of an export subsidy program.
36 The Appellate Body held that the "measure
taken to comply" was "a new measure, the revised TPC program", which was "separate and distinct "
from the original TPC program.37 Similarly, in this dispute, the United States also amended the terms
and conditions of an export subsidy program. The "measure taken to comply" is, therefore, "a new
measure, the revised [GSM 102] program".
25. With respect to a new measure, the Appellate Body held that a compliance panel operating
under the authority of Article 21.5 "is not confined to examining the 'measures taken to comply' from
the perspective of the claims, arguments and factua l circumstances that related to the measure that
was the subject of the original proceedings." 38 Thus, a compliance panel can assess any claims made
with respect to the new measure.
Questions to Brazil
7. Is Brazil of the view that it is only in the ci rcumstances identified by the Appellate Body in EC
– Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) that the scope of Article 21.5 pro ceedings is limited by the scope of
the original proceedings? [Paragraphs 11-15 of Submission of Brazil to the Panel Regarding US
Requests for Preliminary Ruling]
8. How does Brazil respond to the arguments of the United States that Brazil "incorrectly
assumes that the standard is one of whether there has been a 'final resolution' of the issue in the
original proceeding" and that Brazil misreads the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India) and confuses the issue of "the scope of a compliance proceeding pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU" and the distinct issue of "when a claim against a specific measure or aspect
of a measure can be considered to be 'finally resolved' for purposes of WTO dispute settlement"?
[Paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States]
9. What are the comments of Brazil on the arguments in footnote 22 of the United States'
rebuttal submission?
Question to the US

10. Could the United States explain why it cons iders that what it describes as the "final
resolution" standard is not the correct standard to decide whether Brazil's claims regarding export
credit guarantees for pig meat and poultry meat are within the scope of this proceeding?
26. Brazil refers to compliance Panel to its comment on the U.S. response to question 6, above.
2. Preliminary objections of the United States with respect to claims of Brazil regarding
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programmes
Questions to Brazil
11. Is Brazil of the view that a finding under Ar ticle 6 of the SCM Agreement that a "subsidy" is
causing serious prejudice necessarily always applies to both the subsidy "payments" and the subsidy
"programme"? [Paragraphs 31-35 of Submission of Brazil Regarding US Requests for Preliminary
Ruling and paragraph 38 of the Rebuttal Submission of Brazil]
12. In paragraph 44 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil states:

36 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5), para. 34.
37 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5), para. 36 (italics in original, underlining added).
38 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5), para. 41.

"Accordingly, there is no need for Brazil to challenge per se the FSRI Act of 2002 .
Nor does it assert an 'as applied' challenge to the FSRI Act of 2002. Rather, Brazil
challenges the counter-cyclical and marketing loan programs in the FSRI Act of 2002
and the payments that such programmes re quire to U.S. upland cotton farmers, as
they cause adverse effects." (emphasis added)
Could Brazil please explain:
a) How its claims against "programmes and payments... as they cause adverse effects"
differ from claims against programmes as such?
b) How these claims differ from cl aims against programmes as applied?
13. In paragraph 45 of its Rebuttal Submission, Br azil refers to the failure of the United States
"to implement the original recommendation of the DSB requiring the United States to take actions
concerning its present statutory and regulatory fr amework providing for marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments".
a) Does Brazil consider that the statement in paragraph 7.1501 of the original panel
report that "the United States is oblig ed to take action concerning its present
statutory and regulatory framework..." form s an integral part of the recommendation
made by the original panel in paragraph 8.3(d) of its report?
b) Does Brazil consider that the absence of actions by the United States "concerning its
present statutory and regulatory framework providing for marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payments" is in itself a sufficient basis for this Panel to find that the
United States has not complied with the DSB recommendation under Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement?
c) Is there any difference, in Brazil's view, between, on the one hand, the nature of the
action the United States was obliged to take with respect to its statutory and
regulatory framework as a consequence of the recommendation in paragraph 8.3(d)
of the original panel report and, on the other, the nature of the action the
United States would have been obliged to take if the original panel had found that the
relevant provisions of this statut ory and regulatory framework were WTO-
inconsistent as such?
14. Could Brazil please explain how this Panel should interpret the relationship between the
three categories of measures identified in paragraph 3.1(v),(vii) and (viii) of the original panel
report? Is it the view of Brazil that "subsidies provided" or "subsidies mandated to be provided" must
be interpreted to encompass both payments of s ubsidies and the regulatory provisions pursuant to
which such payments were "provided" or "mandated to be provided"?
15. Does Brazil agree or disagree with the United States that the listing of certain legislative and
regulatory provisions in paragraph 7.1107 of the original panel report reflects the original panel's
view that "payments under a programme constitute programmes 'as applied'"? [Paragraphs 46-47 of
the Rebuttal Submission of the United States]
16. Could Brazil clarify whether or not its cl aim in this Article 21.5 proceeding regarding a
threat of serious prejudice caused by marketing l oan and counter-cyclical payments is a claim with
respect to the marketing loan and counter- cyclical payment pr ogrammes as such?
[Paragraphs 237-314 of the First Written Submission of Brazil]

Questions to the United States

17. The United States argues in paragraph 16 of its Rebuttal Submission that "[a]ccording to
Brazil, its claims apply not only to the marketi ng loan and counter-cyclical payment programs, as
such, but to the programs in addition to all pay ments authorized under the programs" (original
emphasis). The United States also argues in this resp ect that "it is abundantly clear that the original
panel did not make any finding under Article 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement against the
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs, as such, whether alone or in addition to
payments". [Paragraph 43 of Rebuttal Submission of the United States]
a) How does the United States respond to the argument of Brazil that the United States
mischaracterizes Brazil's claims in these proceedings in that Brazil is not challenging
the subsidy programmes at issue as such? [Paragraph 31 of Submission of Brazil to
the Panel Regarding US Requests for Preliminary Ruling; paragraph 33 of Rebuttal
Submission of Brazil]
b) Could the United States also commen t in this regard on the arguments in
paragraph 31 of the Third Party Submission of Chad? Does the United States agree
or disagree with the propos ition that statutory or regul atory provisions can be
challenged on an as applied basis and that Br azil's claims in the original proceeding
"were as applied claims regarding measures that included legislative and regulatory
provisions"?
27. Brazil has addressed the United States' arguments in its 26 February 2007 replies to
Questions 11 and 15. In addition, Brazil disagrees with the United States continued efforts to label
and compartmentalize Brazil's claims in this Article 21.5 proceeding as "as applied" or "per se."
These terms are not found in the compliance Panel's te rms of reference. Nor did the original Panel
use these terms in making its "present" (as op posed to "threat") findings, conclusions and
recommendations. The Appellate Body recently reli ed upon the U.S. assertion that certain claims
under the covered agreements are "not readily classi fiable in the categories of 'as such' and 'as
applied.'"
39 Indeed, claims under Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement are just the type of WTO
provisions that are not readily classifiable into such arbitrary classifications.
28. Claims under Article 5(c) and 6.3 d eal with the "effects" of "subsidies." 40 These provisions
oblige subsidizing Members not to cause serious pr ejudice to the interests of another Member through
the "use of any subsidy." Nowhere does Article 5 or 6.3 require "subsidies" to be broken down into
"legislative and regulatory" subsid ies and "payment subsidies", nor do these provisions require that
these subsidies be assessed separately. When a legislative and regulator y program of subsidies
mandates payments – such as the marketing loan and CCP provisions of the FSRI Act of 2002 – an
examination of the "effects" of the "program " subsidy necessarily includes an assessment of the
circumstances in which mandatory subsidy paymen ts are made, the nature and operation of the
payment subsidies, the recipients and magnitude of the subsidy payments, and the impact of those
subsidy payments in the marketplace.
41 In this dispute, Brazil's claims have always extended to the
subsidy programs and subsidy payments.
29. Nor do Articles 5 and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement anticipate that the operation of legislative
and regulatory subsidy frameworks must be challenged in "as applied" or "per se" claims. As the
United States itself has argued, these Articles requi re panels to address "present" – as opposed to
"threat" – serious prejudice caused by the effects of any subsidy. 42 Assessment of "present" serious

39 Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 165 (quoting U.S. argument).
40 Brazil's 16 January Response to U.S. Request for Preliminary Rulings, paras. 31-34.
41 Brazil's 26 February response to question 11, paras. 83-84.
42 U.S. 6 March response to question 28, para. 12.

prejudice requires the use of a historical "refer ence period" to assess the causal connection between
subsidies and adverse effects. When adverse e ffects findings, conclusions, and recommendations are
made, affirmed on appeal, and adopted by the DSB, they remain "present" serious prejudice findings,
conclusions and recommendations. After the six m onth period anticipated by Article 7.9 of the
SCM Agreement, the adverse effects subject to the fi ndings, conclusions, and recommendations
continue to be "present" adverse effects . This means the appropriate steps under Article 7.8 must
fully withdraw the "present" and "ongoing" adverse e ffects caused by the subsidies. That includes
effects caused by subsidy legislation and regulat ory provisions as well as subsidy payments mandated
by such provisions.
30. Such ongoing "present" serious prejudice findi ngs were made by the original Panel. It
described its findings in June 2004 as "present serious prejudice."
43 ( T h e Indonesian Autos panel
made similar findings in using the term " actual serious prejudice" to distinguish a claim of " threat of
serious prejudice."44) The original panel's serious prejudice conclusions, also made in June 2004, did
not include any timeframe and used the present tense phrase to describe the effects of the contested
subsidies: "is significant price suppression. . . ." 45 The adverse effect that the United States was
required to remove under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, by 21 September 2005, "is significant
price suppression", i.e., present serious prejudice.
31. Thus, the original panel's "present" serious prejudice findings – not framed in terms of "as
applied" or "per se" – were entirely consistent with an assessment of "effects" in serious prejudice
claims under Articles 5 and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement. The original panel's "present" serious
prejudice findings fully explains why it found that the United States was obligated to make changes to
its statutory and regulatory framework. 46 As explained in Brazil's 26 February reply to Question 11
and its earlier submissions, this is because the origin al panel considered that the U.S. statutory and
regulatory framework, which woul d last until the end of MY 2007 47, were found to cause present
serious prejudice, and because those findings reflect ongoing present serious prejudice. The original
panel correctly concluded that the only way to remove adverse effects from ongoing mandatory,
price-contingent subsidies that continue to cause "p resent" serious prejudice is to change the statutory
and regulatory framework.48
18. The United States submits that the only meas ures subject to the DSB's recommendation under
Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement are payments m ade under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-
cyclical payment programmes in 1999-2002. The Unite d States also asserts, in this regard, that
Brazil fails to submit evidence "as to the present effects, if any, of the measures that were subject to
the original panel's actionable subsidy finding".
a) Do these statements mean that the United States considers that the DSB
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement only obliged the
United States to ensure that payments made in 1999-2002 would no longer have any
adverse effects?
b) Could the United States comment on the ar gument of New Zealand in paragraph 4.08
of the Third Party Submission of New Zealand?
32. Brazil notes that the United States answer to these questions are premised on the incorrect
view that the original Panel found only that th e subsidies causing "present" serious prejudice were

43 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1499-7.1503.
45 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 8.1(g)(i).
46 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1499-7.1503.
47 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1500.
48 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1501.

payments made within a defined period. In fact, as Brazil explained in reply to Question 11, in its
earlier submissions, and at the meeting with the Pa nel, the original panel found that the subsidy
programs and the subsidy payments mandated by those programs were causing serious prejudice. The
United States' arguments that its implementation oblig ations pertain solely to past payments are,
therefore, misplaced.
19. Regarding the argument of the United States that the marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payments programmes are not measures "taken to comply", is it the view of the United States that
Article 21.5 of the DSU only applies to measures ac tually taken by a party to comply and does not
apply to measures that a Member should have taken to comply?
33. The United States agrees that Article 21.5 proceedings concern either measures taken to
comply or the absence of such measures. In this dispute, the original panel found that marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payments pr ograms, and mandatory payments made under these programs, were
part of the "basket of measures" that causes "prese nt" serious prejudice. The United States "measures
taken to comply" – i.e., the repeal of the Step 2 program and the continuation of the marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payments progr ams – continue to cause "present" serious prejudice. Hence, the
United States has failed (1) to withdraw the subsidy or (2) to take appropriate steps to remove the
present adverse effects found to exist.
20. How does the United States respond to the argument in the Third Party Submission of Japan
that the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) does not support the argument
of the United States that the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments programmes are not
within the scope of this Article 21.5 proceeding?
34. Brazil refers to its comments on the United States' answer to Question 19. Brazil also notes
that, in paragraph 44 of its answers, the United St ates quotes from the panel in EC – Bed Linen (India
– Article 21.5) to the effect that Members do not have a second chance, in Article 21.5 proceedings, to
raise claims that could have been raised in the original proceedings. The United States mistakenly
attributes this quote to the Appellate Body. In f act, the Appellate Body merely included the Panel's
statement in its summary of those findings.
49 However, the Appellate Body's own ruling in that
dispute was considerably narrower than the panel's. The Appellate Body ruled that the complainant
does not have a second chance, in Article 21.5 proceedings, to raise claims that were finally resolved
in the original proceedings.50
3. Claim of Brazil regarding the failure of the United States to comply with the
DSB recommendations between 21 September 2005 and 1 August 2006
Questions to Brazil
21. Could Brazil please explain whether its request for a finding that the United States failed to
comply with the DSB recommendations between 21 September 2005 and 1 August 2006 is supported
by prior panel practice in Article 21.5 proceedings ? [Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
22. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the European Communities that "the lack of
positive action taken by the United States to comply with the panel and Appellate Body's findings and
recommendations between the implementation dat e of 21 September 2005 and 31 July 2006 is not
necessarily fatal to its defence"? [Paragraph 48 of the Third Party Submission of the European
Communities]

49 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (21.5), para. 74.
50 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (21.5), para. 96.

Question to the United States
23. Does the United States consider that the text of Article 21.5 of the DSU should be interpreted
to mean that a compliance panel may only review the "existence" or "consistency" with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comp ly as of the date that the matter was referred to the panel and
not as of the date of the end of the implementation period? [Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission
of the United States]
35. In its 27 February response, the United Stat es reiterates its position that the compliance Panel
is legally precluded from making a finding that th e United States failed to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB between 21 September 2005 and 31 July 2006. 51 As
support, the United States refers to the panel reports in U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) and EC – Bed
Linen (21.5).52
36. Brazil notes, first, that the circumstances in th is dispute are distinct from the circumstances in
the two disputes cited: while there was no Article 22.6 arbitration pending in these two disputes, there
are two DSU Article 22.6 arbitrations pending in the present dispute – one in connection with the
recommendations under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement and one in connection with the
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the Agreement. The circumstances of this dispute, therefore,
resemble the circumstances faced by the panel in Australia – Salmon (21.5) . That panel made a
finding with respect to past non-compliance.53 This compliance Panel should do the same.
37. The United States refers to the concept of judicial economy, relied on by the panels in U.S. –
Shrimp (21.5) and EC – Bed Linen (21.5) , as allegedly supporting its position that the compliance
Panel should refrain from making such a finding. 54 However, the basis cited by the United States for
the exercise of judicial economy does not exist. Brazil explained, in its response to Panel question 21,
that a finding by the compliance Panel regarding th e U.S. failure to implement between 21 September
2005 and 31 July 2006 will assist the arbitrator in the pending arbitration under Article 7.10 of the
SCM Agreement and Article 22.6 of the DSU in performing their assessment of the countermeasures
requested by Brazil. 55 A finding of non-compliance is therefore "necessary to resolve the particular
matter."56
38. The United States points out that there is no di sagreement between the parties as the failure of
the United States to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB between 21 September
2005 and 31 July 2006. In these circumstances, it is puzzling that the United States argues against a
finding by the compliance Panel to this effect – a finding that will assist the parties in their pending
arbitration and, thus, serves to the goal of "pro mpt settlement of situations in which a Member
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are
being impaired," within the meaning of Article 3.3 of the DSU.
D. C
LAIMS OF BRAZIL REGARDING PRESENT SERIOUS PREJUDICE
1. General
Questions to both parties
24. Could the parties explain how they interpret the phrases "take appropriate steps to remove
the adverse effects" and "withdraw the subsidy" in Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement?

51 U.S. 27 February response to question 23, para. 45.
52 U.S. 27 February response to question 23, para. 46.
53 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.30, 8.1(i).
54 U.S. 27 February response to question 23, para. 46.
55 Brazil's 26 February response to question 21, paras. 154-157.
56 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Shirts and Blouses, p. 18.

39. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of its response, the Unite d States states that an "appropriate step" under
Article 7.8 is one involving the "removal of the adverse effects found to exist in the panel and
Appellate Body reports." This implies that the "r emoval of adverse effects" language in Article 7.8
only addresses past adverse effects, not present, ongoing and future adverse effects. Such an
erroneous interpretation of Article 7.8 foll ows logically from the equally erroneous U.S.
interpretations that (a) "present" (as opposed to "threat") Article 6.3 claims are necessarily "as
applied" claims that involve adverse effects occurring in a historical period of time, and (b) only "per
se" challenges to subsidies can result in any prospective relief from the effects of subsidies. From this
logic, the United States implies that the "appropriate steps" of subsidizing Member need only involve
an appropriate period of time for the effects of past subsidies to dissipate.
40. Brazil refers the Panel to its 26 February answer to Question 11, as well as its comments on
the U.S. 27 February 2007 responses to Question 17 set out above. Brazil's earlier submissions
demonstrated the fallacy of the U.S. assertions as well as their inconsistency with the findings and
conclusions of the original panel, as affirmed by the Appellate Body and adopted by the DSB.
57 In
these findings and conclusions, the orig inal panel held that the U.S. subsidy programs, together with
the payments mandated by these programs, cause seri ous prejudice, and the original panel expressly
stated that the United States was obliged to take a ppropriate steps to change its "present statutory and
regulatory framework."58
25. How do the parties interpret the relationshi p between Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement and
Article 21.5 of the DSU?
41. Brazil refers the Panel to its response to Question 25 while noting that the more limited
response of the United States does not appear to co nflict with the interpretation of Articles 21.5 and
Article 7.8 advanced by Brazil.
26. Could the parties explain whether they agree or disagree with the arguments of New Zealand
in its Third Party Submission that Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement has certain consequences for the
burden of proof in an Article 21.5 proceeding? [Par agraphs 5.04-5.06 of the Third party Submission
of New Zealand]
42. Brazil refers the Panel to its response to Question 26 while noting that the more limited
response of the United States is consistent with pa ragraphs 20-21 of Brazil's response. Brazil also
notes that the United States does not address the hypothetical set out in paragraph 22 of Brazil's
response which appears to be relevant to the point raised by New Zealand.
27. Could the parties comment on the following statement of the European Communities:
"The text of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement does not state expressly that a
Member that has been requested by the DSB to implement its recommendations and
rulings under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement has to do anything" (original
emphasis)
43. Brazil disagrees with the United States, and re fers the Panel to its 26 February answer to
Question 22, which addresses a similar statement made by the European Communities. In sum,
Article 7.8 requires action, not inaction, no later th an the end of the six-month implementation period
following adoption by the DSB of the panel or Appella te Body report contemplated by Article 7.9 of
the SCM Agreement. Doing nothing is not undertaking action. Having taken no action whatsoever by
21 September 2005, the United States had "not taken a ppropriate steps to remove the adverse effects

57 Brazil's 26 February response to question 11, para. 99-108; 134-150; Brazil's Rebuttal Submission,
paras. 33-45; Brazil's 16 January Response to U.S. Requests for Preliminary Rulings, paras. 31-34.
58 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1501.

of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB adopts the
panel report and the Appellate Body report". Furt her, with respect to the specific action required
under Article 7.8 in this case, Brazil refers the Pane l to its comments above on the U.S. responses to
Questions 17(a) and (b).
28. The parties present divergent views with respect to the relevant marketing year to be
considered by the panel in its analysis of Brazil's serious prejudice claims.
a) Could the parties explain what they cons ider to be the relevant legal considerations
by which the Panel should be guided in de termining whether MY 2005 or MY 2006 is
the appropriate marketing year?
b) Do the parties agree or disagree with the argument of the European Communities
that in a dispute involving a claim of present serious prejudice the parties must
provide the "most recent reasonably availabl e" data? [Paragraphs 43 and 54-55 of
the Third Party Submission of the European Communities]
44. Both Brazil and the United States appear gene rally to agree that the Panel should examine
data from both MY 2005 and MY 2006 in assessing Brazil's claims of serious prejudice as well as
Brazil's claims of threat of serious prejudice. Because MY 2006 data will remain incomplete
throughout the Panel's consideration of Brazil's claims, it is necessary for the Panel to rely primarily
on MY 2005 data.
45. Brazil notes that the United States does not re fer to the methodological tool of a "reference
period" in its response to this question. This is the tool used by the original panel in assessing
Brazil's "present" (as opposed to "threat") serious prejudice claims. 59 The U.S. argument in
paragraph 12 of its answer to question 28 implies that only effects of marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payment programs and payments exis ting in MY 2006 would be subject to any
implementation obligation of the United States in th is proceeding. However, the necessary use of a
particular time period to assess the existence of serious prejudice does not limit or otherwise
circumscribe the measures at issue before a panel. Nor does it limit the implementation obligations of
a subsidizing Member to removing the adverse effects caused during the reference period.
Questions to the United States
29. Does the United States contest the fact that a "strong positive relationship between upland
cotton (base acre) producers receiving annual payments and upland cotton production" exists? 60 In
particular, does the US disagree with the following statements61:
 • a very large proportion of farms with upland cotton base acres continue to plant
upland cotton in the year of payment;
 • the overwhelming majority of farms enro lled in the programs which plant upland
cotton also hold upland cotton base?
46. To begin, Brazil disagrees w ith the United States' assertion that the existence of a "strong
positive relationship between cotton (base acre) pr oducers receiving annual payments and upland

59 Brazil's 6 March 2007 response to question 28.
60 See para. 131 of Brazil's first submission. The Panel clarifies that this phrase refers to the fact that
"the recipients who hold upland cotton base acres" and "those who continue to plant upland cotton" overlap with
each other to a great extent. ( See para. 7.637 of the report of the original panel.) The Panel understands that
Brazil uses this phrase in the same sense.
61 These passages are reproduced from para. 7.636 of the report of the original panel.

cotton production" is a characterization of facts.
62 As the compliance Panel's question suggests, it is a
fact. Moreover, it is a fact that the United States cannot make vanish by pointing out two other facts.
Indeed, Brazil welcomes that the United States does not contest, as it cannot, that 95 percent of U.S.
upland cotton acreage was on farms holding upland cotton base.
63 The parties disagreement relates to
the relative importance of certain facts, includi ng the "strong positive relationship between cotton
(base acre) producers receiving annual payments an d upland cotton production" , and their relevance
for Brazil's arguments.
47. Brazil's claims in this dispute relate, inter alia, to the effect of counter-cyclical subsidies in
sustaining – not necessarily inducing additional acr eage, as the United States erroneously claims 64 –
current U.S. upland cotton production. In other words, Brazil looks to current producers of upland
cotton and the relationship between current upl and cotton production and upland cotton counter-
cyclical subsidies. The facts show that the ove rwhelming majority of current U.S. upland cotton
production is undertaken by historic upland cotton producers receiving upland cotton counter-cyclical
payments. By contrast, the U.S. arguments focus so lely on facts regarding this relationship from the
perspective of historic, not current, producers of upland cotton, pointing out that some historic upland
cotton producers receiving upland cotton counte r-cyclical payments do no longer produce upland
cotton.
65 This different focus explains much of the divergence between the parties.
48. In particular, the United States argues that a "significant portion" of upland cotton planted
acreage was not on upland cotton base acreage. Vi ewed from the relevant perspective of current
upland cotton production, the relevant figures tell a very different story. In MY 2005, 83 percent of
cotton planted acreage was on cotton base acreage. Th is is the more significant portion of U.S.
upland cotton acreage. Moreover, of the remaining 17 percent, 12 percent was on farms that
"overplanted" their cotton base acreage and 5 percent was on farms that did not have any upland
cotton base acreage.66 In other words, 95 percent of U.S. upland cotton acreage is on farms that hold
upland cotton base. These facts demonstrate that there continues to be a "strong positive relationship
between upland cotton (base acre) producers recei ving annual payments and upland cotton
production."67 Indeed, these percentages remain essentia lly unchanged from the same ratios that the
original panel assessed for MY 2002 and based on which it made this finding. 68 T h e " g r o w i n g "
percentage of historic upland cotton farms that exit upland cotton production – referred to by the
United States69 – simply does not exist.
49. The United States makes a great deal of the f act that 40 percent of upland cotton base acres
are not currently planted to upland cotton. 70 First, Brazil notes that at no time in recent history has
U.S. upland cotton acreage been 18.4 million acres – the amount of upland cotton base. The high
level of upland cotton base relative to production refl ects the fact that with consecutive base updates,
U.S. farms elected to update only if that would increase their high payment upland cotton base. In
case an update would have decreased high payment upl and cotton base in favour of lower payment
crop base, U.S. farms declined to update. Thus, U.S. upland cotton base acres are not a reliable
measure to compare to annual U.S. upland cotton acreage.

62 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 14.
63 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 18.
64 It is telling that the United States does not footnote to any of Brazil's submissions. As Brazil has
clarified, it is not arguing that counter-cyclical subs idies induce production. Rather, Brazil argues that it
maintains production by keeping current producers of upland cotton in business.
65 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 14.
66 Exhibit US-64 (2005 Crop Year Subcategories).
67 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1302.
68 Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 153-163.
69 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 16.
70 See, e.g., U.S. 6 March response to question 29, paras. 14-15.

50. Brazil has never disputed that some farmers have used their planting flexibility and collect
upland cotton counter-cyclical subs idies without growing upland cotton. The same basic percentage
of use of planting flexibility (40 percent) was the situ ation before the original panel. Contrary to the
U.S. assertions, this is irrelevant to Brazil's advers e effects claims. Brazil claims are that counter-
cyclical subsidies received by current producers of upland cotton are critical to ensure a profit for
those farms that currently do produce upland cotton. Th e fact that there are other farms that decide to
put these funds to other uses is irrelevant to Braz il's claim today, exactly as it was irrelevant to
Brazil's claims in 2003 before the original panel.
51. Moreover, the United States asserts out that it is not surprising that much of U.S. upland
cotton production continues to be on farms that hold upland cotton base because growing upland
cotton is possible only in certain regions. 71 It may not be surprising to the United States, but it is
strong evidence of a strongly positive relationship. Despite the U.S. claims that these subsidies are
"decoupled," the fact that 95 percent of U.S. upl and cotton is grown on farms that hold upland cotton
base shows just how coupled these subsidies, as well as direct payments, are.
52. The U.S. Congress provided for counter-cyclical payments rates for historic producers of
upland cotton for exactly the same reason that the United States notes here: historic producers of
upland cotton would be current producers of upland cotton; and those continuing producers would
have high costs requiring counter-cyclical subsid ies to grow upland cott on profitably (and avoid
bankruptcy). Thus, counter-cyclical subsidi es are a means to support current upland cotton
production. As the United States argues, given clim atic and other conditions, historic producers are
likely to continue to grow upland cotton. As Brazil has argued and established throughout these
proceedings, U.S. upland cotton producers "can grow upland cotton with good results given the
particular growing conditions in the region" 72 only in light of mandated marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments. Historically, U.S. producers were ab le to do so in light of at least 70 years of U.S.
subsidization of U.S. upland cotton production with federal funds.
53. Finally, Brazil notes that the compliance Pane l's question refers to the proportion of farms
with upland cotton base acres that continue to plant cotton. In MY 2005, the only year for which the
United States produced data, this proportion was 73 percent. 73 Instead of presenting the figure in
question, the United States provides "the ratio of cotton planted acres to total planted acres" 74 on
farms that have upland cotton base acres. This ratio, calculated under the "Cotton-to-Cotton
Methodology," allocates counter-cyclical payment on a one base acre to one planted acre basis. 75 The
"Cotton-to-Cotton Methodology" does not cove r 13 percent of counter-cyclical subsidies –
$179 million – in MY 2005 that are paid to currently upland cotton producing farms, but relate to base
acres in excess of planted acres. These payments could be considered to support upland cotton
production.
54. With respect to the U.S. direct payment rela ted arguments, Brazil refers the compliance Panel
to its comments on the U.S. answer to question 31, below.
Question to Brazil
30. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the United States that "whether or not the
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment pr ograms or payments unde r the programs cause
significant price suppression is a question of fi rst impression"? [Rebuttal Submission of the
United States, paragraph 219]

71 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 19-21.
72 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 20.
73 See Table 2, above.
74 U.S. 6 March response to question 29, para. 14.
75 See Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.641.

2. The structure, design and operation of the countercyclical and marketing loan payment
programs
Question to the United States

31. Brazil claims that the structure, desi gn and operation of US counter-cyclical payments
stimulate US upland cotton production. Both Brazil and the United States have referred to the
Westcott (2005) 76 study to provide support for their opposing analysis of the possible production
impact of counter-cyclical payments. In its rebut tal, Brazil quotes the following passage from
Westcott:
So where do CCPs fit compared with other farm commodity programs in the 2002 Farm Act?
Marketing loans are fully coupled since they are available on all production and their link to
market prices means they affect production decisi ons of farmers. Direct payments are mostly
decoupled, since they are paid on a fixed, hi storically-based quantity rather than on current
production and are not dependent on market pr ices or other factors that would affect
production. …
CCPs fall in between these two programs, having some properties similar to mostly
decoupled direct payments and other properties similar to fully coupled marketing loans.
Like direct payments, CCPs do not depend on current production since they are paid on a
fixed, historically-based quantity. However, similar to marketing loans, CCPs are linked to
market prices so there may be some influe nce on current production decisions of farmers,
which would potentially make CCPs at least partially or somewhat coupled

 a) Does the United States agree with this characterization of the CCP?
55. The United States understandably continues to downplay the significance of the direct link
between upland cotton prices and counter-cyclical s ubsidies, arguing that any production effects are
mitigated by a number of factors. 77 Brazil has already responded to a number of these arguments,
including the incorrect assertion that counter-cycli cal subsidies behave like direct payments when
prices are "expected" to be above 65.73 cents per pound. 78 The past four years (MY 2002-2005)
illustrate that expectations are not good indicators of actual outcomes. 79 Farmers recognize this, and
assign some probability that prices will be lower, or higher than they expect.
56. The second mitigating factor cited by the Unite d States, that "net returns among alternative
crops would remain the primary consideration underlying production choices," ignores the importance
of planting restrictions and the potential for base acre updates as well as the effect of risk reduction on
expected net returns. As discussed further below, planting the base crop, in this case upland cotton,
significantly reduce uncertainty about revenue. This is because market revenue and counter-cyclical
subsidies are inversely related for upland cotton, whereas there is no such relationship between upland
cotton counter-cyclical subsidies and the planting of other crops. In that case, farmers risk low market
prices for the crop planted and high upland cotton prices, resulting in low or no counter-cyclical
subsidies. The risk reduction effect, thus, has a significant impact on the expected net returns from
planting the base crop or alternative crops. Furthe r, the empirical literature confirms that the 2002

76 Exhibit US-35 (Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act:
Production Effects Likely to be Limited").
77 U.S. 6 March response to question 31(b), para. 26.
79 As Brazil explained in its Rebuttal Submission, expectations were significantly wrong in both
MY 2003 and 2004. See Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, para. 131.

base acre update and the potential for future base acre updates sustains and even increases program
crop acreage.80
57. Brazil further recalls that counter-cyclical subsid ies are part of a structured basket of policies
that guarantee holders of upland cotton base (and 83 percent of cotton acres) an institutional price
of 72.4 cents per pound of upland cotton. There are, of course, important caveats to this policy, such
as the fact that direct and counter-cyclical subsid ies are made on 85 percent of historic acreage and
fixed yields. However, the compliance Panel should not lose sight of the fact that upland cotton
counter-cyclical subsidies are based on a target price for upland cotton, not some other crop, or some
measure of a farmer's income. The original panel observed that "in the price range from the loan rate
up to the target price minus the DP payment rate , changes in producer revenues due to changes in
market prices are partly offset by the countercyc lical payments if the base acreage crop is planted,
thereby reducing total revenue risk associated with price variability."
81 Throughout this proceeding,
the United States has attempted to divorce counter-cyclical subsidies from their direct link to the
market for upland cotton.
58. The United States also argues that counter-cyc lical subsidies might simply replace other risk
management instruments employed by farmers.
82 Brazil notes that farmers will naturally use risk
reduction tools that are the most cost effective. By providing a risk reduction tool for free, i.e.,
counter-cyclical subsidies, farmers plant more of the program crop for two reasons. First, they are
allowed to achieve lower risk than would be accept ed with other costly risk reduction instruments
(such as diversification or more conservative use of credit). Farmers therefore plant more than they
otherwise would because one of the risk manageme nt instruments, a required "input" into upland
cotton production, is cheaper. Second, with risk for upland cotton mitigated by upland cotton
counter-cyclical subsidies, farmers fa ce less risk than they otherwise would if they had to resort to
other risk management tools. Therefore, risk averse farmers plant more upland cotton and their
bankers and landlords encourage pl anting upland cotton because this reduces their risk of default by
the farmer.
59. Next, the United States argues that upland cotton farms are large and that large farms are less
risk averse than small farms, suggesting that, ther efore, upland cotton counter-cyclical subsidies have
no appreciable effects.
83 However, the notion that large commercial growers of upland cotton are less
risk averse in the their upland cotton enterprises is not established by any data or other sources. In
fact, there are a few facts that would tend to suggest otherwise. Large upland cotton growers are more
likely to have more of their total resource base tied to upland cotton and, thus, have a stronger
incentive to mitigate against revenue losses from low pr ices. This is precisely the benefit that the
counter-cyclical subsidies provide. Furthermore, larg e growers are more likely to use substantial debt
in financing their operation than small growers. Lenders in turn are more likely to limit the credit line
available unless a grower can assure repayment even when market prices are low. Again, this is
precisely the benefit that counter-cyclical subsidies provide. Thus, the notion that large upland cotton
growers will exhibit less risk aversion than smaller growers has no factual basis and seems
inconsistent with certain facts characterizing U.S. upland cotton production.
60. Aside from these more specific points, Brazil notes that Westcott and the United States accept
the fact that counter-cyclical subsidies reduce the ri sk of upland cotton production and that this risk

80 See Exhibit Bra-565 (McIntosh, Christopher R., Jason F. Shogren and Erik Dohlman, "Supply
Response to Counter-Cyclical Payments and Base Acre Updating under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study,"
forthcoming paper in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 2006) and Exhibit Bra-568
(O'Donoghue, Erik J. and James Whitaker, "How distorting are direct payments?," Paper prepared for
presentation at the 2006 American Ag ricultural Economics Association in Long Beach, CA, p. 2-3, accessed
December 2006 at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=21797).
81 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1302.
82 U.S. 6 March response to questions 31, paras. 26-27.
83 U.S. 6 March response to questions 31, paras. 26-27.

reduction provides incentive to grow more upland cotton than in their absence. The U.S. attempts to
minimize this effect are off the mark. Rather, th e evidence supports Brazil's argument that the risk-
mitigating benefits of counter-cyclical subsidies ar e significant, and that they provide a substantial
additional incentive to maintain upland cotton acreage.
61. The United States asserts that counter-cyclical pa yments have effects closer to those of direct
payments than marketing loan payments. For th e reasons set out above, Brazil does not agree with
this characterization. Yet, contrary to the U.S. assertion, the original panel did not find that direct
payments were decoupled from production. It foun d that, because they were not price-contingent,
they did not contribute to significant price suppression in the same manner as the price-contingent
U.S. subsidies.
84 Moreover, it held that they can have production effects when
considered in conjunction with the mark et loss and countercyclical component,
respectively. We incorporate our description of the measure in Section VII:C,
including the requirement to use the land for an agricultural use or conserving use.
These [direct] payments provide an incentive to maintain land in agricultural use.
Moreover, while a producers has the ability to vary production among crops, the
strongly positive relationship between upl and cotton (base acre) producers receiving
annual payments and upland cotton production shows that they are, to a certain
degree, an incentive for continui ty. We also refer to and incorporate our findings on
these measures in Section VII:D.
85
62. In others words, the original panel found that these payments have production effects and
maintain farmers in the production of upland cotton. This is consistent with the evidence that direct
payments contribute significantly to covering upland cotton producers' cost of production and that
over 90 percent of upland cotton production takes place on farms that hold upland cotton base.86
63. In commenting on the original panel's finding regarding direct payments, the Appellate Body
held that "subsidies that are not price-contingent … could have some eff ect on production and exports
and contribute to price suppression." 87 Thus, direct payments are capable of contributing and do
contribute to serious prejudice. Westcott concedes this point, finding "direct payments may still have
some influence on production, reflecting general w ealth effects, changes in risk attitudes, and
providing liquidity to farmers."88 However, Westcott does not fully consider the production effects of
counter-cyclical subsidies, as he does not consider two of the most important factors contributing to
their production effects: (i) planting restrictions and (ii) the potential for base updates.89
64. In this context, Brazil recalls the survey results of Goodwin and Mishra (2005), that
questioned what farmers intend to do with direct payments. If direct payments were truly "decoupled"
and did not affect production decisi ons, one would expect that they would be used toward family
savings, consumption and other non-farm uses. This is not what the survey results reveal. Instead,
68 percent of farmers reported that they intend to use direct payments on the farm. Even more

84 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, para. 7.1307.
85 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, footnote 1417.
86 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, Attachment to Section VII:D.
87 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton, footnote 589.
88 Exhibit US-35 (Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act:
Production Effects Likely to be Limited").
89 Brazil notes that, in 2002 for example, farmers we re allowed to update not only program acres for
both the direct and counter-cyclical payment program, but also program yields for the counter-cyclical payment
program only.

troubling, 34 percent indicated that they intend to devote direct payments to covering their operating
costs of production.90
65. USDA's 2007 farm bill proposal sheds further light on the importance of direct payments for
upland cotton as opposed to other program crops. The proposal calls for an immediate 66 percent
increase in direct payments for upland cotton, with much more modest increases in direct payments
for other program crops. The USDA explains the rational for drastically increasing cotton direct
payments by explaining that
While program crop prices are generally expected to remain firm or increase over the
next few years, upland cotton is an exception. The combination of increases in
upland cotton yields per acre and declini ng U.S. upland cotton textile production is
expected to limit price gains and result in substantial cotton program expenditures,
compared to other commodities.
91
66. This explanation of the "problem" facing upl and cotton farmers clearly demonstrates that the
proposed large increase in upland cotton direct pa yments are designed to support upland cotton
production. As USDA's data demonstrates and as th e United States admits, historic producers are
often current producers of upland cotton. If direct payments were truly dec oupled, and did not affect
production, why would USDA propose to drastically increase direct payments for upland cotton and
not other program crops? The reason is, of cour se, that USDA proposes to compensate for possible
income losses of current upland cotton producers that may result from proposed changes in other
programs. The fact that USDA considers compensating them by increasing the direct payments paid
to historic producers of upland cotton is further demonstration of the "str ong positive relationship
between upland cotton (base acre) producers recei ving annual payments and upland cotton
production." That strong positive relationship is not likely to change simply because future legislation
may change the name of the payments from "counter-cyclical" to "direct."
67. The 2007 USDA farm bill proposal also calls for an increase in direct payments for beginning
farmers. The rational for this proposal once again sheds light on how direct payments, and
presumably counter-cyclical payments, are used to expand production. USDA explains that "to better
prepare beginning farmers to face the initial fina ncial burdens associated with entering production
agriculture, the Administration recommends that be ginning farmers receive an increased direct
payment rate."
92 This USDA explanation is yet another f act demonstrating that direct payments are
not decoupled from production. Instead, direct paym ents are designed to help farmers finance capital
investments in "equipment, including planting, cultivation and harvest machinery, [which]
exemplifies the financial barriers to entering production agriculture."93
68. In sum, unlike direct payments, counter-cyc lical subsidies are dependent on the price of
upland cotton. This makes counter-cyclical subsidies more coupled to the production of upland cotton
than direct payments. The fact that counter-cyclical subsidies have other attributes similar to direct
payments does not diminish their ability to affect production.

90 Exhibit US-41 (Goodwin B.K. an d Mishra A. "Another Look at Decoupling: Additional Evidence
on the Production Effects of Direct Payments." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(5):1200-1210
(2005), Table 3 at p. 1206).
91 Exhibit Bra-671 (U.S. Departme nt of Agriculture's 2007 Farm Bill Proposal, p. 14, accessed
March 2007 at http://www.usda.gov/documents/07finalfbp.pdf).
92 Exhibit Bra-671 (U.S. Departme nt of Agriculture's 2007 Farm Bill Proposal, p. 16, accessed
March 2007 at http://www.usda.gov/documents/07finalfbp.pdf).
93 Exhibit Bra-671 (U.S. Departme nt of Agriculture's 2007 Farm Bill Proposal, p. 16, accessed
March 2007 at http://www.usda.gov/documents/07finalfbp.pdf).

b) How would the United States respond to the argument that, by design, counter-
cyclical payments are in some measure coupl ed to production decisions because part
of the payments is contingent on the actual realization of market prices?
69. The United States asserts that "the market pri ce is an independent trigger" for counter-cyclical
subsidies.
94 This is a remarkable assertion in view of the structure, design and operation of counter-
cyclical subsidies. Brazil recalls that counter-cycli cal subsidies are made with respect to a particular
commodity on the basis of an ins titutional target price. When th e market price of that commodity
falls below the trigger price, counter-cyclical subs idies result. Far from being independent, market
prices directly link counter-cyclical subsidies to upl and cotton production. As explained above, this
link is crucial for the risk reduction function of co unter-cyclical subsidies. The notion that market
price are an "independent trigger" is inconsistent Westcott's finding that "CCPs are linked to market
prices so there may be some influence on current production decisions of farmers."95
70. Contrary the U.S. assertion 96, however, the evidence demonstrates that counter-cyclical
subsidies not only have the potential to cause adverse e ffects, but that they do cause adverse effects.
Brazil has addressed the alleged "mitigating factors" in its comments on the U.S. response to the
previous question.
3. Economic simulation model
Question to the United States
32. Brazil has presented a partial e quilibrium model to simulate the effects of eliminating US
upland cotton payments, particularly the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments. In both its
submission and rebuttal, the United States has provided reactions to the simulation model.
a) Would it be accurate to describe the Un ited States' response as constituting a general
acceptance of the framework of analysis adopted by Brazil but contesting the
assumptions made regarding the values of the parameters, the supply and demand
elasticities and the "coupling factor", used in the model? (The coupling factor is the
amount by which the expected price is increa sed by each dollar per unit of subsidy
payments.)
71. In its response, the United States identifi es a number of "important flaws" in Professor
Sumner's model.
97 These are the same criticisms rai sed in the U.S. Oral Statement 98 and the U.S.
Rebuttal Statement.99 Professor Sumner addressed each of these issues in Brazil's Comments on the
U.S. Oral Statement.100 Brazil will not repeat these arguments here.
72. The United States also criticizes the counte r-factual question that Professor Sumner's model
was designed to address, i.e., what would happen if marketing loan and counter-cyclical subsidies
were eliminated? The United States incorrectly asser ts that "to the extent that a counterfactual
assessment is undertaken, it is onl y to assess what the price equilibrium would be at present if
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments had been lower, different, or did not exist ."101 First,
Article 6.3 requires an counterfactual examination of effects but for "the subsidy." This does not

94 U.S. 6 March response to question 31(b), para. 28.
95 Exhibit US-35 (Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the 2002 Farm Act:
Production Effects Likely to be Limited").
96 U.S. 6 March response to question 31(b), para. 29.
97 U.S. 6 March answer to question 32(a), para. 31.
98 U.S. Oral Statement, Statement of Dr. Glauber, para. 3.
99 U.S. Rebuttal Submission, Annex I, para. 4.
100 Brazil's 16 January Comments on the U.S. Oral Statement, paras. 35-56.
101 U.S. 6 March answer to questions 32(a), para. 33 (emphasis added).

involve assessing effects of a "lower" or "changed" subsidy, but "effects" of "the subsidy." Article 6.3
also requires assessing whether "the effect of the subsidy" "is " "significant price suppression." From
a textual point of view, this requires assessment of the existence of present "significant price
suppression" under market conditions during the refere nce period – not those that would exist over a
sufficiently long time for any shock to result in a new equilibrium. Thus, the assessment of the effects
of a subsidy is short-term and does not involve a long-term analysis.
73. These general principles are even more applicable in an Article 21.5/Article 7.8 proceeding.
Any Member that makes changes to reduce or li mit the subsidy still maintains the "subsidy."
Articles 7.8 and 7.9 of the SCM Agreement require the full removal of all adverse effects (assuming
no withdrawal of the subsidy) within only six months. This short time period also reflects the fact that
the complaining Member has already endured years of market distortions through adverse effects. As
a textual matter, it is thus entirely appropriate for the compliance Panel to examine the adverse effects
of "the subsidy" through a counter-factual that assesses the present effects of eliminating the subsidy.
74. Finally, the United States concludes that Professor Sumner's model "grossly overstate[s] any
possible effects of the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments," 102 and are considerably higher
than the U.S. estimates applying Professor Sumn er's model to others sets of parameters. 103 A s
explained in Brazil's Closing Statement, Professor Sumner's findings are consistent with the academic
literature. The United States simulation results, on the other hand, are smaller than any other study
that has examined the effects of U.S. upland cotton subsidies on world market prices.
104
b) In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States uses the
same value of 1 that Brazil adopts for the coupling factor assigned to marketing loan
payments. Does this imply an acceptan ce by the United States that, by design,
marketing loan payments provide a one-for-one incentive to upland cotton
production?
75. Brazil welcomes the United States acceptance of a coupling factor of 1 for marketing loan
subsidies. Brazil agrees with the United States that expectations of marketing loan subsidies are what
ultimately drives their production effects.
105 Brazil recalls that upland cotton farmers have expected
to receive marketing loan subsidies in every year under the FSRI Act of 2002. 106 Even if farmers did
not "expect" to receive marketing loan subsidies ( i.e., farmers expected the AWP to be above the loan
rate), the marketing loan program would still provide a benefit to upland cotton farmers by
eliminating the risk of lower than expected prices.107
76. Furthermore, as explained by Professor Sumner in his Annex I analysis 108, the impact of a
reduction in expected marketing loan subsidies is at least as large as a decrease in the expected market
price. In addition to the direct incentive effect , marketing loan subsidies function as a hedge against
a fall in market prices. Farmers generally respond to less risk by expanding output. By this logic, it
would be appropriate to assign marketing loan payments a coupling factor of greater than 1.
c) In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States used a
non-zero value of 0.25 (not much lower from the 0.4 that Brazil adopts) for the

102 U.S. 6 March answer to question 32(a), para. 34.
103 U.S. 6 March response to question 32(a), para. 34.
104 Brazil's Closing Statement, para. 23. See also Exhibit Bra-659 (Statement of Professor Sumner
Concerning Various U.S. Arguments).
105 U.S. 6 March answer to question 32(b), para. 36.
106 Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 106-107.
107 See Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 80-82. See also Exhibit Bra-659 (Statement of Professor Sumner
Concerning Various U.S. Arguments, paras. 48-56).
108 See "Analysis of Effects of U.S. Upland Cotton Subsidies on Upland Cotton Prices and Quantities
by Daniel Sumner," Brazil's First Written Submission, Annex I, para. 58.

coupling factor assigned to counter-cyclical payments. Does this imply an
acceptance by the United States that, by design, counter-cyclical payments are
partially tied to upland cotton production, and of a magnitude (25 cents to a dollar of
counter-cyclical payments) not very far from Brazil's own estimate (of 40 cents to a
dollar of counter-cyclical payments)?
77. In its response, the United States asserts that "the empirical research supports a lower
coupling factor, closer to zero."
109 Brazil disagrees.
78. The study cited by the United States to support this assertion examines corn, wheat and
soybean acreage in the North Central region. Up land cotton is not produced in the North Central
region. Most upland cotton producing regions, in cluding the Southeast, Delta and Far West, are
suitable for a number of substitute crops, such as s oybeans, rice, peanuts, corn, sorghum, hay, fruits,
nuts and vegetables. By contrast, the North Central region grows almost exclusively three crops –
wheat, corn and soybeans. In addition, the si mulation conducted by Lin and Dismukes does not
examine removing the counter-cyclical subsidies for a single crop, but examines the simultaneous
removal of counter-cyclical subsidies for all crops. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
Lin and Dismukes find small acreage impacts from counter-cyclical subsidies.
110
79. As in other studies that examine field crops in U.S. Midwest, the low acreage response to
counter-cyclical subsidies is most likely driven by low elasticities of supply for wheat, corn and
soybeans. This study does not examine whether counter-cyclical subsidies are decoupled from
production. Instead, it examines whether counter-cyc lical subsidies increase acreage for corn, wheat
and soybeans in the North Central Region. This question has two parts. First, how coupled to
production are counter-cyclical subsidies ( i.e., what is the coupling factor)? Second, what is the
elasticity of supply for soybeans, wheat and corn in this region? The impact of counter-cyclical
subsidies on acreage is a product of these two effect s. Goodwin and Mishra's 2005 study, also cited
by the United States, confirms that the elasticities of supply for soyb eans, wheat and corn are low.
Therefore, the effect of counter-cyclical subsid ies on acreage is bound to be low, independent of
whether or not counter-cyclical subsidies are coupled to production.
80. Finally, Brazil notes that this study examines only a few of the many mechanisms through
which counter-cyclical subsidies might effect pr oduction. As explained by Professor Sumner, it
focuses on the truncation of the effective price di stribution and how an increase in wealth might
reduce risk aversion, and, increase quantity supp lied. The study does not examine how increased
wealth might increase on-farm investment, or ho w counter-cyclical subsidies constrain planting
choices and increase incentives to plant because of potential base updating.
81. The United States next cites the survey resu lts in a 2005 study by Goodwin and Mishra to
support its assertion that the CCP coupling factor is "closer to zero."
111 The United States seizes on
the results that show that 44 percent of farmers think counter-cyclical subsidies are "not at all
important" to acreage decisions. 112 As Professor Sumner explained in Exhibit Bra-659, this result is
unremarkable. This is because, as the United States fails to mention, the exact same percentage of
farms surveyed, 44 percent, did not have any base acres. In other words, they were not entitled to
receive counter-cyclical subsidies.
113

109 U.S. 6 March answer to question 32(c), para. 40.
110 Exhibit Bra-659 (Statement of Professor Sumner Concerning Various U.S. Arguments, para. 20).
111 U.S. 6 March response to question 32(c), para. 40.
113 Exhibit US-41 (Goodwin B.K. and Mishra A. "Another Look at Decoupling: Additional Evidence
on the Production Effects of Direct Payments." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(5):1200-1210
(2005), Table 3 at p. 1206).

82. Yet, the survey does allow a comparison of th e relative importance of different variables that
may affect production decisions. In this regard, Brazil notes that 23 percent of farmers also thought
that expected commodity prices were "not at all important" and 20 percent thought that the cost of
inputs were "not at all important." In relation to these findings, the survey results show that variable
factors like counter-cyclical and direct payments are about half as important as the cost of inputs and
the expected commodity price. That suggests a coupling factor of about 0.5, higher that what
Professor Sumner uses in his model.
83. Brazil also notes that the survey is based on a national sample of farms. In 2002 and 2003,
the years in which the survey was conducted, coun ter-cyclical subsidies were only made for rice,
upland cotton and peanut base acres, a small subset of U.S. base acreage. Given that most farmers
had not received counter-cyclical subsidies, it is reas onable that many of them indicated that counter-
cyclical subsidies were "neither important nor unimportant." The fact that even some of those farmers
thought that counter-cyclical subs idies were important to acreage decisions suggests their potential
supply effects for crops like cotton, where the paym ents are large, made on a consistent basis and
necessary to cover costs of production.
84. The importance of counter-cyclical subsidies in the sub-sample of upland cotton farms would
be much higher than the national average, given that they are the ones who actually received the
payments. Brazil recalls that when arguing for the institutionalizati on of counter-cyclical subsidies,
the former Chairman of the National Cotton Council of America testified that "during the past three
years, many cotton farmers have avoided ba nkruptcy only because Congress has authorized
emergency relief to supplement the FAIR Act's inadequate fixed payments."
114 Emergency market
loss assistance subsidies were the predecessor to counter-cyclical subsidies.
85. Contrary to United States arguments, the empirical literature does not support a coupling
factor below 0.25. As Brazil has long maintained, even a coupling factor for upland cotton of 0.4 is
decidedly conservative. Brazil refers the Pane l to the ample evidence provided in its written
submissions115 and those of its economic expert, Professor Sumner116, to support this position.
E. E XPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES
1. Permissibility of an a contrario interpretation of item (j) of the Illustrative List
Questions to the United States
33. Please discuss whether (and if so, how) the panel rulings in Korea – Vessels and Brazil –
Aircraft (21.5) (I and II) affect the United States' a pproach to the interpreta tion of the relationship
between item (j) of the Illustrative List and Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
86. Brazil refers the compliance Panel to its comme nt on the U.S. response to question 34, below.
34. Does the United States considers that item (j) of th e Illustrative List is one of the provisions to
which footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement applies? W hat impact does this have for the United States'
interpretation of the interaction between item (j) of the Illustrative List and Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement?

114 Panel Report, U.S. – Upland Cotton , footnote 1471, referring to Exhibit Bra-109 (Testimony (Full)
of Robert McLendon, Chairman, NCC Executive Committee, Before the House Agricultural Committee.
National Cotton Council (NCC)).
115 Brazil's First Written Submission, paras. 128-131; Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 111-166;
and Brazil's Opening Statement, paras. 40-53.
116 Annex I to Brazil's First Written Submission, paras. 59-66; Annex I to Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission, paras. 30-39; Exhibit Bra-659 (Statement of Professor Sumner Concerning Various U.S.
Arguments, paras. 17-41).

87. Brazil has already explained in some deta il its understanding of the interrelationship among,
and proper reading of, Articles 1.1 and 3.1, the Illustrative List, and footnote 5 of the
SCM Agreement.
117 Brazil has explained that the United States seeks an a contrario reading of the
Illustrative List, and of item (j) in particular, and that that reading is not only incorrect, but has been
rejected by both of the panels that have directly considered the United States' argument. Brazil will
not repeat those arguments here, but rather incor porates them by reference, and focuses instead on
aspects of the U.S. argument that have been articulat ed for the first time in these proceedings in the
United States' answers to the Panel's questions.
88. The United States' position that item (j) "demonstrates definitively how the general
definitional elements in Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement apply in the case of export credit
guarantees"118 rests on a textually and logically flawed understanding of the Illustrative List.
89. First, the United States maintains that each "type" of measure identified in an item –
apparently any item – on the Illustrative List is de fined as an export subsidy (or not) by the terms of
that item's description in the Illustrative List. Fo r example, according to the United States, item (j)
"'makes clear' how the Article 1/3.1(a) definition applies in respect of each particular type of measure
set out in the Illustrative List."119
90. This reading, however, imports into Article 3. 1(a) terms that are nowhere to be found there.
Article 3.1(a) specifies that subsidies contingent upon export performance "including those [export-
contingent subsidies] illustrated in Annex 1" are prohibited. It does not say "those types [of export-
contingent subsidies] defined in Annex 1" are prohibited. Yet the United States would have this Panel
read such additional, and different, terms into the SCM Agreement . Instead of understanding the
Illustrative List to comprise illustrations, or examples, of prohibited export subsidies, the
United States wishes the Illustrative List to be read as definitions of types of prohibited export
subsidies. That wish is without textual foundation.
91. Second, while the United States asserts that its reading of footnote 5 and the Illustrative List
"is the only logical interpretation," 120 in setting out that reading, the United States commits an
elementary mistake of logic.
92. The Panel will recall that while Article 3.1( a) describes Annex I as illustrating measures that
are export-contingent subsidies, footnote 5 indicat es that Annex I may under certain conditions refer
to measures that are not export subsidies. The United States collapses these two principles, assuming
that when an item in the Illustra tive List describes the circumstances in which a type of measure is an
export subsidy, by automatic implication it also d escribes the circumstances in which that type of
measure is not an export subsidy, i.e., where the circumstances set out in the item are not met. For
example, the United States argues that item (j) "clarifies which export credit guarantees do provide
export subsidies within the meaning of Article 1/3.1(a) and those that do not"121, and that "Annex I is
relevant in determining whether or not measures constitute 'export subsidies'". 122 In other words, on
the United States' view, every item in the Illustrative List not onl y identifies measures that are export
subsidies, but also simultaneously identifies, by negative implication, measures that are not export
subsidies.

117 See, e.g., Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 451-481; Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 233-238;
Brazil's 6 March response to question 36, paras. 37-43.
118 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 44.
119 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 44.
120 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 51.
121 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 54 (italics in original, underlining added).
122 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 47 (underlining added).

93. The premise to the United States' argument – that a statement of circumstances in which a
measure constitutes an export subsidy also automati cally illustrates circumstances in which a measure
does not constitute an export subsidy – involves a serious logical flaw. Assume two propositions – P
and Q. The statement "If P, then Q" means that if proposition P is true, then proposition Q is also
true. On its own, the statement "If P, then Q" says nothing about the situation in which P is not true;
where P is not true, Q is not necessarily false. 123 Consider a simple illustration. The statement that a
cow is a quadruped ("If cow, then quadruped") is true. But it would be incorrect to assume that
because an animal is not a cow, it is not a quadruped ("If not cow, then not quadruped").
94. Footnote 5 is consistent with this fundamental logical principle, by specifying that the
Illustrative List only identifies measures that are not export subsidies where a measure is "referred to
. . . as not constituting" an export subsidy ("If not P , t h e n n o t Q"). Otherwise, an item in the
Illustrative List does nothing more than id entify circumstances under which a measure is an export
subsidy ("If P, then Q").
95. Along with being logically invalid, the United States' view leaves no role at all for footnote 5
of the SCM Agreement. If every item of the Illustrative List can be interpreted a contrario, it is the
United States, and not Brazil, that would have th is Panel "adopt a reading that would result in
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility". 124 Footnote 5 serves no
purpose if a type of measure will always be deemed to be " implicitly referred to as not constituting
[an] export subsid[y]" 125 whenever the definitional elements of an item on the Illustrative List
covering that type of measure are not met.
96. In its response, the United States argues that if footnote 5 is read consistent with its ordinary
meaning – i.e. as labelling "not prohibited" measures that are "referred to . . . as not constituting
export subsidies" – then it would be redundant and ineffective because a measure that is not an export
subsidy already would not be prohibited under Articles 1 and 3.1(a).126
97. The United States fails to recognize, however, that this argument is answered by its own
proposition – that the term "referred to" in footno te 5 could be read to encompass more than
affirmative statements that a me asure is not an export subsidy. 127 The phrase "referred to" may
potentially encompass less explicit references than that of the second paragraph of item (k), such as
items (h) and (i)'s "provided that" clauses or the first and last sentences of Footnote 59. The panel in
Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) also embraced that possibility.
128 Where Brazil parts ways with the United
States is at the U.S. suggestion that all measures of the types referred to in items on the list are
"implicitly referred to" whenever they fall short of the items' terms. This renders the action verb
"refer" completely passive. The U.S. position reads out any requirement whatsoever that the text of
an item in the Illustrative List contain an actual "reference", i.e., a positive or deliberate signal by
WTO Members that a measure is being characterized as not being an export subsidy.

 123 See, e.g. , "Critical Thinking and Argumentation" (Identifies one of the "most common logical
errors" as "If A then B, then it is not the case that If Not A then Not B".), available at
http://www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/humanities_and_soc_sciences/philosophy/.resource/critthink.html
. See also
Exhibit Bra-672 (Rangarajan Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)
at Appendix A, Set Theory and Logic: An Intro duction, p. 245) ("Given two propositions P and Q, the
statement 'If P then Q" is interpreted as the statement th at if the proposition P is true, then the statement Q is
also true. ... We stress the point that ['If P then Q] only says that if P is true, then Q is also true. It has nothing
to say about the case where P is not true; in this case, Q could be either true or false.").
124 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Gasoline, p. 23.
125 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 48.
126 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 52.
127 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 48.

98. The same observation, that footnote 5 poten tially extends beyond item (k), second paragraph,
also answers a U.S. assertion regarding the negotiating history of footnote 5.
129 According to the
United States, the negotiating history leads to the c onclusion that "referred to" requires no "reference"
at all – i.e. no affirmative statement or indication that a measure is not an export subsidy. The
United States rests this conclusion on the fact that an earlier text of Footnote 5 included the word
"expressly" before "referred to", while the final version uses only "referred to".
99. But the panels in both Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) and Korea – Vessels considered this very same
argument, and the very same negotiating history, and rejected the reading that the United States here
puts forward.130 Those panels concluded that although th e change may have broadened the scope of
footnote 5, perhaps to reach provisions like items (h ) and (i)'s proviso clauses, it cannot be read as
broadly as the United States proposes. The panels cons idered that the negotiating history was at most
inconclusive, and that it could not drive them to di sregard the plain meaning of footnote 5's "referred
to" requirement.
100. As Brazil has explained, the items on the Illustrative List offer claimants a per se evidentiary
path to establish that a measure is an export s ubsidy prohibited under Articles 1 and 3.1(a). The
United States has objected that on this approach, ite m (d) would be rendered inutile; according to the
United States, claimants would never use item (d) to prove the existence of an export subsidy, because
item (d) requires not only proof of the same "ben efit" that would have to be established under
Articles 1 and 3.1(a), but also further proof of preferential treatment of exports relative to products for
domestic consumption.
101. The United States' view rests on too narrow a reading of Articles 1 and 3.1(a), however. In
fact, both parts of item (d) track the showing that would need to be made under Articles 1 and 3.1(a)
directly: the preferential treatment requirement that the United States claims is additive can rather be
seen as the parallel to Article 3.1(a)'s export contingency requirement, but without the specific
Article 1 elements of proof such as "financial cont ribution." Thus, item (d) does still provide a useful
per se evidentiary path for establishing a violation of Articles 1 and 3.1(a).
102. For the reasons above, and those set forth in Brazil's earlier submissions, the United States'
advocacy of an a contrario reading of item (j) should be rejected.
35. How does the United States address Brazil's ar gument that permitting an a contrario reading
of item (j) would prevent a Member from challengi ng specific export credit guarantees or cohorts of
such guarantees granted by a Member, as opposed to export credit guarantee programs [see
paragraphs 472 ff. of Brazil's Rebuttal]
103. The United States has advanced the remarkable proposition that the only measure of an ECG's
consistency with the SCM Agreement is whether the ECG program under which that guarantee is
issued charges premia that cover its long-term operating costs and losses. Thus, the United States
maintains that a complaining Member can only suc ceed in establishing that individual ECGs are
contrary to the prohibited subsidy disciplines of the Agreement if those ECGs were granted under an
ECG program that does not break even.131
104. Brazil has explained that this interpretation c onflicts with the text of Articles 1 and 3.1, and
that it is not plausible that the U.S. approach reflects the Members' in tent in this regard. 132 Brazil

129 U.S. 6 March response to question 33, para. 50.
130 Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) , paras. 6.39-6.41; Panel Report, Korea – Vessels ,
paras. 7.200-7.201.
131 U.S. 6 March response to question 35, para. 60.
132 Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, paras. 472-476.

would only note here that the U.S. approach is inconsistent with the United States' own position
regarding the proper application of item (j) of the Illustrative List.
105. The United States has explained its view that fo r "each particular type of measure set out in
the Illustrate [ sic] List", the item constitutes the exclusiv e and definitive means for determining
whether the measure is or is not a prohibited e xport subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1
and 3.1(a).133
106. Even accepting that an item in the Illustrative List fully occupies the field for the "type" of
measure addressed in the item (a proposition that Braz il rejects), the "type" of measure identified in
item (j) is "export credit guarantee or insurance programmes " or "exchange risk programmes ". Thus,
by the United States' own reasoning, challenges to individual ECGs should not be governed by
item (j) at all, as that item deals only with the "p rogrammes." In support of its product-specific
circumvention claims under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture , Brazil has established the
existence of an export subsidy in several ways. For instance, Brazil has demonstrated that under a
country-by-country, tenor-by-tenor benchmarki ng analysis, GSM 102 ECGs constitute export
subsidies because they are export-contingent financ ial contributions offered on terms that confer
"benefits".
107. Even if item (j) occupies the field, by the terms of the U.S. argument, it does so only with
respect to the measures it addresses – "expor t credit guarantee or insurance programmes " and
"exchange risk programmes ". It says nothing about the circumstances under which, for example,
individual ECGs constitute export subsidies, and thus does not address the demonstration described
by Brazil in the previous paragraph. Specifically, Brazil's approach under Articles 1/3.1(a) proves
that GSM 102 ECGs are export subsidies, country-by-country, and tenor-by-tenor. Brazil's approach
under item (j) proves that the GSM 102 program is an export subsidy.
Questions to Brazil
36. What is Brazil's reading of the Appellate B ody's statement in paragraph 80 of its Report in
Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) that it "... would have been p repared to find that the payments made under the
revised PROEX are justified under item (k) of the I llustrative List"? Should the Panel take this
statement into account in deciding whether item (j) can be interpreted a contrario?
2. Outstanding export credit guarantees / measures taken to comply
Questions to Brazil
37. Brazil relies on the panel and Appellate Body Re ports in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) in support of
its arguments that the United States has not "wit hdrawn" the subsidy and is, "[a]t a minimum...
prohibited from making 'payments' on clai ms against" any outstanding export credit guarantees
[Paragraph 397 of Brazil's Rebuttal Submission]. Please discuss how the findings of the panel and
Appellate Body in that case apply to the provision of the US export credit guarantees at issue.
3. "Benefit" under Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement
Question to the United States
38. Please discuss the relevance of the original panel's characterization, in paragraph 6.31 of its
report, of Brazil's reliance on Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement as "not a separate claim,
but merely another argument" on the United States' view in this respect (and notably the United States
statement, in paragraph 67 of its First Written Submission, that "... the panel in the original

133 U.S. 6 March response to question 35, para. 44.

proceeding specifically declined to address Brazil's alleged 'claim' under Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement")?
108. The lack of precision in the United States' re sponse is alarming. To be precise, Brazil is
making two claims. First, Brazil claims that the United States applies export subsidies in a manner
that results in circumvention of its export subs idy commitments for unscheduled products, and for
rice, pig meat and poultry meat, in contravention of Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Second, and as a result of the first viol ation, Brazil claims that the United States
maintains export subsidies, in contravention of Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
109. As one element of these claims, Brazil must de monstrate the existence of an export subsidy.
It has done so in two ways. First, invoking the elements of Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement, Brazil has demonstrated that GSM 102 EC Gs are export subsidies because they are
export contingent financial contri butions provided to recipients on below-market terms. Second,
invoking the elements of item (j) of the Illustrative List in the alternative, Brazil has demonstrated that
the GSM 102 program is an export subsidy because the Commodity Credit Corporation fails to charge
premia sufficient to meet its long-term operating costs and losses.
110. Whether these are separate claims, or instead separate arguments, is irrelevant in the
circumstances of these Article 21.5 proceedings. In Canada – Aircraft (21.5) , the Appellate Body
concluded that the claims and arguments at issue in Article 21.5 proceedings will naturally differ from
the claims and arguments at issue in the original proceedings:
[I]n carrying out its review under Article 21.5 of the DSU, a panel is not confined to
examining the "measures taken to comply " from the perspective of the claims,
arguments and factual circumstances that relat ed to the measure that was the subject
of the original proceedings. Although these may have some relevance in proceedings
under Article 21.5 of the DSU, Article 21.5 proceedings involve, in principle, not the
original measure, but rather a new and di fferent measure which was not before the
original panel. In addition, the relevant facts bearing upon the "measure taken to
comply" may be different from the relevant facts relating to the measure at issue in the
original proceedings. It is natural, therefore, that the claims, arguments and factual
circumstances which are pertinent to the "measure taken to comply" will not,
necessarily, be the same as those which were pertinent in the original dispute .
Indeed, the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 of the DSU would be
seriously undermined if a panel were restricted to examining the new measure from
the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances that related to the
original measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then be unable to examine fully
the "consistency with a covered agreement of the measures taken to comply," as
required by Article 21.5 of the DSU.
134
111. If invoking the elements of Articles 1 and 3.1( a), on the one hand, and of item (j), on the
other, are separate claims, Brazil has demonstrated that none of the limits subsequently imposed by
the Appellate Body on the claims properly subject to Article 21.5 review apply.135
112. As argued on appeal in the original proceedi ngs, Brazil considers that invoking the elements
of Articles 1 and 3.1(a), on the one hand, and of it em (j), on the other, are indeed separate claims.
Among other reasons, Brazil notes that the approaches i nvolve the proof of separate things. As noted
in Brazil's comment on the U.S. response to question 35, Brazil's approach under Articles 1 and 3.1(a)
proves that GSM 102 ECGs are export subsidies, country-by-country, and tenor-by-tenor.

134 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5), para. 41 (emphasis added).
135 Brazil's 26 February response to question 6, paras. 10-62.

Nonetheless, if, as the United States insists 136, invoking the elements of Articles 1 and 3.1(a), on the
one hand, and of item (j), on the other, are separate arguments, the Appellate Body's statements in
Canada – Aircraft (21.5) leave Brazil free to pursue both arguments in these Article 21.5 proceedings,
and no subsequent jurisprudence holds otherwise.
113. The United States' proposition that because the recommendation and ruling of the DSB to
"withdraw the subsidy" was based on a finding by the original panel and the Appellate Body that the
GSM 102 program constitutes an export subsidy unde r item (j), the compliance Panel's assessment
should both start 137 and, indeed, end 138 with an assessment of the GSM 102 program under item (j),
should be rejected. The U.S. view enjoys no support in the covered agreements or the jurisprudence.
114. To leave not a shadow of doubt, Brazil has requested review by the compliance Panel of
Brazil's evidence and argument under item (j) solely if the compliance Panel does not consider
sufficient the evidence and argument raised by Brazil under Articles 1 and 3.1(a). 139 As previously
noted by Brazil, this position applies whether or not the Articles 1/3.1(a) and the item (j) approaches
are separate claims, or instead separate arguments.140
115. First and foremost, Brazil seeks a finding that GSM 102 ECGs constitute export contingent
financial contributions provided to recipients on be low-market terms. Given the low cost of funds
enjoyed by the CCC and the backing offered the GSM 102 program by the U.S. Treasury, merely
charging premia sufficient to break even is insufficient. 141 Recipients of GSM 102 ECGs are
receiving guarantees on terms that are well below ma rket. By arguing item (j) strictly in the
alternative, Brazil seeks to avoid a repeat of the or iginal proceedings, where the dispute was evidently
not, as the United States' alleges, "resolved".142
116. The United States asserts that "this di spute could and should be resolved through
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB based on the factual findings under
item (j) ."143 This assertion reflects a fundamental misunde rstanding of the nature of Article 21.5
proceedings. As Brazil has noted elsewhere, th e United States cannot escape its obligations by
arguing that it relied on the factual and legal basi s for the original panel's finding that the GSM 102
program constitutes an export subsidy – item (j) of the Illustrative List. The question in these
compliance proceedings is not limited to whether the United States has cured the basis on which the
original panel found a violation. Instead, the Appe llate Body has emphasized that the question for a
compliance panel is whether the "new measure" is consistent with all oblig ations in the covered
agreements.144

136 U.S. 6 March response to question 38, paras. 62-63. See also U.S. First Written Submission,
para. 64 (footnote 97).
137 U.S. First Written Submission, paras. 66, 67.
138 U.S. 6 March response to question 38, para. 65.
139 Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 225-227; Brazil's First Written Submission, para. 363.
140 Brazil's First Written Submission, para. 363.
141 Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 228 ("The CCC enjoys a low cost of funds, by virtue of the fact that it
borrows from the U.S. Treasury and benefits from the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. It is entirely
possible that the GSM 102 program could charge fees that meet its costs and losses, but that are, at the same
time, below what would be charged by a market-based entity.")
142 U.S. 6 March response to question 38, para. 65.
143 U.S. 6 March response to question 38, para. 63 (emphasis added).
144 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (21.5) , para. 40. See also Id ., para. 41 (In Article 21.5
proceedings, "a panel is not confined to examining the 'measures taken to comply' from the perspective of the
claims, arguments and factual circumst ances that related to the measure that was the subject of the original
proceedings.").

117. In any event, the Panel will recall that "full withdrawal of a prohibited subsidy within the
meaning of Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement cannot be achieved by a 'measure taken to comply' that
replaces the original subsidy with yet another subsidy found to be prohibited."
145
118. Even had the United States withdrawn the elements of the GSM 102 program that made it an
export subsidy under item (j), it would not have achieved full withdrawal of the subsidy in the present
circumstances, since it has "replace [d] the original subsidy with yet another" prohibited subsidy – the
provision of export-contingent GSM 102 ECGs at below-market fees. It has, therefore, failed to
achieve "full withdrawal" of the subsidy, consiste nt with the Article 4.7 recommendation. In urging
the Panel not to examine whether its compliance m easure confers export-contingent "benefits", the
United States seeks precisely to escape its obligation to fully withdraw the prohibited subsidy.
Questions to Brazil
39. The Panel understands the United States to ar gue that it has relied on the Panel's findings
under item (j) to implement the DSB recommendations with respect to export credit guarantees. How
would this, in Brazil's view, affect the complian ce panel's role in this proceeding? Was the United
States also expected to implement changes in order to make its export credit guarantee programmes
consistent with article 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, even though there were no findings of
the original panel in this respect?
40. In paragraph 410 of its Re buttal, Brazil refers to paragraph. 7.398 of the Panel Report in
Canada – Aircraft II. The Panel notes, however, that in the same paragraph, the Canada – Aircraft II
panel also indicated that there would be a "'benefit ' when the cost-saving for a Bombardier customer
for securing a loan with an IQ loan guarantee is not offset by IQ's fees". Please discuss, in light of
this sentence, whether the Panel should read the Canada – Aircraft II panel as having rejected the
"total cost of funds" as the proper benchmark under Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement.
Questions to both parties
41. What are the relevant considerations to guide the Panel in the selection of a market
benchmark in this case?:
a) That the institution that provides the product is, on the whole, or on a program or
product-specific basis, profitable? If so, is "any" profit sufficient to qualify an
institution/ product/program as a relevant "market benchmark" or must the
institution/product/program achieve a certain l evel of profit? Must the Panel conduct
an examination of the level of profit ac hieved by commercial or private actors
operating in the field?
b) Are the institution/program/products' stat ed goals relevant in assessing whether they
can be used as a "market benchmark"?
c) Is the "governance" of the institution relevant?
d) What other factors are relevant?

145 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – FSC (21.5 II) , para. 83 (italic emphasis in original; underlining
supplied).

119. In its response, as elsewhere in these proceed ings, the United States asserts that the only way
to assess the WTO consistency of an ECG program is under the "cost to government" standard in
item (j).146 Brazil has rebutted this assertion elsewhere, and will not repeat those arguments here. 147
As noted above in comments on the U.S. response to question 35, however, even if item (j) satisfies
the terms of footnote 5 to the SCM Agreement, it would serve as no defens e to Brazil's demonstration
that GSM 102 ECGs (rather than the GSM 102 program) constitute export subsidies.
120. The United States also asserts that even if the "cost to government" standard under item (j) is
not determinative, the only way to determine the existence of a "benefit" from an ECG in an export
subsidy case is through a quantita tive assessment under what it deems the "total cost of funds"
approach in Article 14(c). 148 Again, Brazil has rebutted this assertion elsewhere, given the
circumstances of this dispute, and will not repeat those arguments here.149
121. Brazil notes, however, that the United States gr ossly misrepresents the findings of two panels
that have applied a fee-based comparison as an expression of the standard in Article 14(c). In
describing the analysis in EC – DRAMS
150, the United States ignores a critical passage from the panel
report:
One possible approach … would be to compare the guarantee provided by the
government with a comparable guarantee provided by the market. If the government
charges less than a market fee for its guarant ee in light of the specific circumstances
of the case, there would be a benefit to the recipient.151
122. Moreover, the United States misrepresents the finding of the panel in Canada – Aircraft
Credits and Guarantees . The panel in that dispute indeed conc luded that "it is safe to assume that
such cost difference would not be covered by [guara ntee] fees if it is established that [the guarantee]
fees are not market-based."152 The panel did not, as the United States asserts, "require[] Brazil, as the
complaining party, to provide 'arguments or inform ation regarding what the [airline] might have had
to pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the IQ loan guarantee.'" 153 Rather, the panel found
that Brazil had not made a showing either that the airline secured better terms on a commercial loan
with the government guarantee, or that "IQ's fee for its loan guarantee to [the airline] is not market
based."154 The panel report does not support the conclusion drawn by the United States – that the
"total cost of funds" approach suggested by the Un ited States is "required" as the sole, determinative
standard. In fact, the panel report supports Br azil's position, which is that in light of the

146 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 66.
147 Brazil's Closing Statement, para. 24; Brazil's Or al Statement, paras. 225-238; Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission, paras. 454-481.
148 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, paras. 67-70; U.S. Opening Statement (Check against
delivery version), paras. 31-39; U.S. Rebuttal Submi ssion, paras. 137-144; U.S. First Written Submission,
paras. 107, 133-134, 138.
149 Brazil's Closing Statement, paras. 28-29; Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 193-208; Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission, paras. 400-413.
150 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 17.
151 Panel Report, EC – CVDs on DRAMs, para. 7.189 (emphasis added). Under its fee-based approach,
the panel continued to find a per se basis on which to establish that a government guarantee confers a "benefit".
See Id. ("We note in this respect, that none of the parties (...) before us in the course of the panel proceedings
has argued that a private market operator would have provided an export guarantee similar to the one that was
provided by the KEIC so that the fees could be compared . This implies that, if one opts to examine benefit by
looking at the difference between the government providing a financial contribution, and the market doing so,
then it would be clear that a benefit was provided, as no private market operator was even argued to have been
willing to provide such a guarantee.") (emphasis added).
152 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para. 7.345.
153 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 18 (emphasis in original).
154 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para. 7.399.

circumstances, a fee-based comparison is one acceptable means of showing the "benefit" from a
government guarantee.
123. Turning to the remainder of the U.S. res ponse, Brazil notes its general agreement with the
United States' observation that "factors such as the over all profitability of a particular institution or its
stated goals, or the manner of its governance, may not necessarily – and in all cases – correlate to
whether the loan is 'commercial'".
155 However, this observation is c onsiderably more muted than the
United States' categorical observation, when measures ot her than its own were at issue, that evidence
regarding an entity's profitability is "irrelevant" to the assessment of "benefit" under Article 1.1(b). 156
Brazil tends to agree with this latter, stronger sentim ent, for the reasons stated in its own response to
question 41.157
124. Brazil turns to comments on the "evidence" offered by the United States in an attempt to rebut
Brazil's showing that GSM 102 ECGs are unique fina ncing instruments with no parallel at market,
and that the entire purpose of the GSM 102 program is to facilitate credit for foreign obligors that do
not enjoy other options at market. In these circumstances, Brazil argues that GSM 102 ECGs confer
"benefits" and constitute subsidies per se . (Brazil has also demonstr ated, country by country, and
tenor by tenor, that GSM 102 fees are dramatically below even non-market benchmarks, and therefore
confer "benefits" on U.S. exporters.
158)
125. First, the Panel will recall Professor Sundaram's conclusion that there is no commercial credit
protection product available in the marketplace that is comparable to a GSM 102 ECG. 159 The Panel
will note that the United States has not provided a single example of a product offered by a market-
based entity that imparts the essential qualities of a GSM 102 ECG cited by Professor Sundaram.
126. The United States attempts to draw support from Brazil – Aircraft for its position that
government guarantees cannot confer "benefits" per se , just because they are unique financial
instruments with no parallel at market. The Unite d States argues that this position must be correct,
because in Brazil – Aircraft , "[t]he panel did not consider whet her PROEX payments were a 'unique
financial instrument'."
160 As is evident from a cursory review of the report, however, the panel did not
undertake this consideration because the complaining Member, Canada, did not make such a claim.
In those circumstances, it is not surprising that the panel did not consider it. Indeed, in those
circumstances, it would have constituted reversible error for the panel to have done so.
127. In any event, Brazil finds the U.S. position most surprising. The United States has recently
argued that unique support without any parallel at market, provided to recipients who are not
otherwise creditworthy, should not only be considered a subsidy, but should be a prohibited subsidy
per se . The United States has argued that prohibited subsidies should include "… egregious
government intervention such as … lending to … companies with poor financial prospects unable to
attract commercial financing or other funding of companies or projects that would not otherwise
receive conventional commercial financing."
161 Moreover, in Canada – Aircraft Credits and

155 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 69.
156 Response of the United States to Questions from the Parties, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in
Commercial Vessels , 22 March 2004, paras. 6-7, accessed February 2007 at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Set
tlement_Listings/asset_upload_file769_5561.pdf.
157 Brazil's 6 March response to question 41, paras. 58-66.
158 Brazil's First Written Submission, paras. 381-406. See also Id., Annexes III (Statement of Professor
Rangarajan Sundaram) and IV (Methodology for Comparison of GSM 102 Fees with Fees for ExIm Bank
Products), and Exhibits Bra-536 and Bra-537.
159 Brazil's First Written Submission, paras. 377-3 78, and Annex III (Statement of Professor
Rangarajan Sundaram), para. 7.
160 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 22.
161 TN/RL/GEN/94 (16 January 2006).

Guarantees, the United States similarly argued that where the government offers a unique product that
can not be replicated at market, a benefit is conferred per se.162
128. Second, the Panel will recall the statement in the GSM 102 regulations that the program
operates "where U.S. financial institutions would be unwilling to provide financing without CCC's
guarantee," and "where the guarantee is necessary to secure financing of the export."163 Similarly, in a
self-assessment of the program, USDA's Foreign Agri culture Service ("FAS") repeatedly notes that
"[t]he program is primarily targeted to countries not considered to be investment grade", and that it is
in place to "make commercial credit available at a reduced cost to higher risk markets." 164 In fact,
GSM 102 administrators consider the program to be successful if, among other things, foreign
obligors in countries that have improved their fina ncial standing and reached investment grade stop
using the program.165
129. In these circumstances, where no financing would be available without a government
guarantee, the guarantee confers a "benefit" per se. As noted by the panel in EC – DRAMS, where no
commercial loan could be secured by a recipient in the absence of a government guarantee, a benefit
exists per se.
166
130. To support its per se claim, Brazil has relied on Professor Sundaram's statement 167 and the
types of normative statements made by the U.S. government concerning the GSM 102 program,
quoted above. Nonetheless, the United States consid ers that "[t]hese arguments do not square with
the evidence submitted by the United States showing that such obligors are in fact able to obtain
financing even without GSM 102 guarantees a nd on terms better than those available with GSM 102
guarantees."168
131. In this sentence, the United States employ s a sleight of hand with its use of the words
"evidence" and "such" – meaning presumably GSM 102 – obligors.
132. The United States does not cite to the "eviden ce" it has offered in this regard. The United
States may be referring to the three examples of syndicat ed loans described in a letter from [[ ]], a
U.S. bank and significant participant in the GSM 102 program. 169 This letter and these loans hardly
meet the standard of "evidence", for a number of reasons.

162 Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees , Annex C-2 (para. 7) ("If the commercial
market does not offer a particular bo rrower the exact terms offered by th e government, then the government is
providing a benefit to the recipient whenever those term s are more favourable than the terms that are available
in the market.").
163 Exhibit Bra-519 (7 C.F. R. § 1493.10(a)(2), GP O Access Online, January 2006, accessed July 2006
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html) (emphasis added).
164 Exhibit Bra-588 (Agricultural Export Credit Guarantee Program s Assessment, ExpectMore.gov,
Section 5.1, accessed January 2007 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/expectmore/detail.10002020.2005.html). For other similar excerpts, see
165 Exhibit Bra-588 (Agricultural Export Credit Guarantee Program s Assessment, ExpectMore.gov,
pg. 10 (section regarding "P rogram Performance Measures "), accessed January 2007 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/expectmore/detail.10002020.2005.html) ("measures how much export credit
guarantee use declines per year in countries that reach investment grade and how much U.S. agricultural exports
increase to those countries").
166 Panel Report, EC – CVDs on DRAMs, para. 7.190.
167 Brazil's First Written Submission, Annex III (Statement of Professor Rangarajan Sundaram),
para. 7.
168 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 70 (bold and underline added; italics in original).
169 U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras. 146-153; U. S. First Written Submission, paras. 119-131;
Exhibit US-22.

133. The United States has not provided any documentary evidence at all to establish any of the
facts of these alleged transactions; in Exhibit US-22, it relies instead on a single secondary source, a
brief statement by an [[ ]] to characterize them. The
absence of such documentary evidence deprives the compliance Panel of the opportunity to examine
the validity, much less the representativeness, of the only three data points that the United States
offers. In contrast, Brazil has offered exhaustiv e analyses of GSM 102 and ExIm fees based on over
one thousand data points, all of which are transpar ent and readily replicable by the United States and
this compliance Panel.
134. What little we know about the three examples offered by the United States does not inspire
confidence in the quality of the "evidence". One of the three examples, that of the [[ ]] bank,
shows that GSM 102 places the bank in a better
 position than it would have been in the market. 170
This "evidence" quite evidently does not establish, as the United States asserts in its response to
question 41, that GSM 102 foreign obligors are ab le to obtain commercial financing without GSM
102 guarantees, "on terms better than those available with GSM 102 guarantees." 171 The second of
the three examples, concerning the [[ ]] banks, is not a real example at all, since [[ ]] tells us it
"[[ ]]."172
135. That leaves precisely one data point, the example concerning the [[ ]] bank.
Apparently on the basis of this one data point , the United States remarkably believes that it has
demonstrated that a "large number of investment-grade participants " can obtain financing at lower
annualized costs than under GSM 102.173
136. This one data point does not, as the United States asserts, constitute " evidence" that " such
[i.e., GSM 102 foreign] obligors are in fact able to obtain financing even without GSM 102
guarantees and on terms better than those available with GSM 102 guarantees." 174 The United States
has not demonstrated that the [[ ]] bank – or, indeed, the banks in the other two examples –
are GSM 102 foreign obligors. 175 The United States has not identified the bank (much less provided
the loan documents 176), to allow Brazil and the Panel to dete rmine whether the bank indeed features
on the list of CCC-approved foreign ob ligors published on the GSM 102 website. 177 Thus, while the
United States asserts that it has provided "eviden ce" regarding "such" GSM 102 foreign obligors, it
has done no such thing.
137. What is more, the United States has failed to show that the banks in its examples are even
similar to GSM 102 foreign obligors. The United States has stated that the [[ ]] and [[ ]]
banks are investment grade. 178 As noted above, the entire objective of the GSM 102 program is to

171 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 70.
172 Exhibit US-22.
173 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 15 (emphasis added).
174 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 70 (bold and underline added; italics in original).
175 For similar reasons, it is false for the United Stat es to assert that it has provided evidence "showing
that commercial lenders regularly involved in both the GSM-102 program and other lending ... do provide – and
have provided – unsecured financing to fo reign banks that are CCC-approved obligors ...." U.S. Comments on
Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 12 (emphasis added).
176 By refusing to provide the loan documents, the United States has deprived Brazil and the Panel of
the opportunity to test the many assertions made by the United States regarding factual elements of the loans in
paragraphs 119-130 of its First Written Submission, and paragraphs 146-153 of its Rebuttal Submission. In
fact, in its Rebuttal Submission, the United States fails to offer even indirect evidence to support its assertions;
while it appears to quote from a second [[ ]] communication, it does not even provide that communication
(though as noted above, the communication in itself would be insufficient). U.S. Rebuttal Submission, paras.
149, 150.
177 See http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/foreignbanks.html.

provide cover for, and therefore to enable credit in, countries that are below investment grade. In its
self-assessment of the program, USDA goes out of its way to emphasize, in passage after passage, that
the program is primarily targeted to non-investment grade countries.179 The examples provided by the
United States do not prove anything about the abilit y of foreign obligors like those targeted by GSM
102 "to obtain financing even without GSM 102 guarantees."180
138. Moreover, the United States inaccurately asserts th at Brazil "acknowledges" that the [[ ]]
examples show lower annualized costs than under GSM-102 181, Brazil recalls that it has heavily
criticized the [[ ]] examples, both for lack of evidentiary veracity and as not offering a valid
comparison.182
139. In addressing Professor Sundaram's critique of the U.S. "average life" approach, the United
States asserts that short- and long-term ratings are the same; as a result, the United States argues that
if it shows that the short-term borrowing cost is lo wer than some threshold amount, it follows that the
long-term borrowing costs are also lower. 183 This is false. For the "same" rating category, borrowing
rates vary substantially based on maturity. 184 The correlation between shor t- and long-term rates for
borrowers in a single rating category is not as suggested by the United States.
140. The United States erroneously argues that in its critique of the [[ ]] examples, Brazil
ignores "the pricing of risk inherent in the transactions". 185 The United States mischaracterizes
Brazil's critique. Brazil's critique is simple: that bullet loans (such as those in the [[ ]] examples)
and amortizing loans (such as those backed by GSM 102 ECGs) are not comparable, because they
involve different patterns of default exposure. 186 The United States' comments are not responsive to
this critique. Rather, the United States asserts th at bullet loans and amortizing loans are comparable,
because in an amortizing loan, one third of the principal gets paid earlier, and one third gets paid later,
than the bullet loan.187 This argument merely reinforces Brazil's critique – the patterns of exposure in
these two different types of loans are different, making the comparison the United States seeks to
make invalid.
4. Claims under item (j) of the Illustrative List
Questions to the United States
42. How does the United States address Brazil's argum ents with respect to the MPRs under the
OECD Arrangement?
141. The United States' response fails to a ddress the purpose for which Brazil offered the
comparison between OECD MPRs and GSM 102 fees. As noted in its response to question 43, Brazil
does not contend that the OECD MPRs constitute a strict quantitative benchmark for analysis of the
U.S. upland cotton ECG fees. Rather, this comparison offers the compliance Panel a qualitative
reference point for appreciating the degree to which GSM 102 fees fall below internationally-accepted

179 See Brazil's Rebuttal Submission, para. 418.
180 U.S. 6 March response to question 41, para. 70 (bold and underline added; italics in original).
181 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 12.
182 Brazil's Closing Statement, para. 26; Brazil's Or al Statement, paras. 209-223; Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission, paras. 420-432.
183 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 14.
 184 S. Trück et al, "The Term Structure of Credit Spreads and Credit Default Swaps – an empirical
investigation", September 2004, available at http://w ww.pstat.ucsb.edu/research/papers/spreads200904.pdf
(finding a positive relationship between maturity and spreads could be observed for investment grade debt).
185 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 15.
186 Brazil's Oral Statement, paras. 211-215, 219-222.
187 U.S. Comments on Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 15.

standards for ECG programs that are, according to the OECD, structured and designed to break
even.
188
142. The United States asserts that use of any ex ternal reference point, like the OECD MPRs, to
determine whether an ECG program breaks even is not permitted. According to the United States, use
of any such external reference point is only allowe d if the particular reference point is specifically
mentioned in "[t]he text of the SCM Agreement . . ."189
143. The U.S. position is untenable. The original panel noted that "item (j) does not set forth, or
require us to use, any one particular met hodological approach nor accounting philosophy in
conducting our examination." 190 Despite this fact, the original panel referred to, and the Appellate
Body confirmed, reliance on a numbe r of different external refere nce points, including one supported
by the United States in these Article 21.5 proceedi ngs – the net present value methodology required
by the U.S. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 ("FCRA") . The FCRA is not, of course, referred to in
the text of the SCM Agreement.
144. Panels and the Appellate Bo dy have frequently relied on re ference points and benchmarks
external to and not specified in the text of the SCM Agreement. Virtually every benchmark used for
the purposes of assessing the "benefit" flowing from a government financial contribution will be
drawn from sources external to the SCM Agreement . The U.S. position notwithstanding, the
Appellate Body has even relied on reference poi nts or benchmarks drawn from the OECD Export
Credit Arrangement, even where the provision of the SCM Agreement at issue did not specifically
direct the interpreter to do so. In interpreting th e phrase "used to secure a ma terial advantage in the
field of export credit terms", from paragraph 1 to ite m (k) of the Illustrative List, the Appellate Body
concluded that
the OECD Arrangement can be appropriately viewed as one example of an
international undertaking providing a specifi c market benchmark by which to assess
whether payments by governments, coming within the provisions of item (k), are
"used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms".191
145. Here, as in Brazil – Aircraft , the context suggests that the OECD Arrangement is an
appropriate reference point. Para graph 1 of item (k) – like item (j) – speaks to export credits, which
are, after all, covered by the OECD Arrangement . In that circumstance, the Appellate Body found
that paragraph 2 of item (k), and the reference th erein to the OECD Arrangement, formed relevant
context for the identification of a benchmark for the purposes of paragraph 1 of item (k), even if
paragraph 1 did not specifically mention the Arrange ment. Similar consider ations could apply to
item (j), which similarly addresses export credits covered by the OECD Arrangement.
146. The OECD Arrangement does not establish the only standard for the fees that ought to be
charged for export credit guarantees in order to meet the standard set in item (j). This, however, does
not invalidate the use of the OECD MPRs as useful reference points for a showing that GSM 102 fees
are not designed to cover long-term operating costs and losses of the program. The United States'

188 Brazil's 6 March response to question 43, para. 69; Brazil's Oral Statement, para. 51.
189 U.S. 6 March response to question 42, para. 71.
190 Panel Report, U.S. – Cotton Subsidies, para. 7.804.
191 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft , para. 181. See also Appellate Body Report, Brazil –
Aircraft (21.5), paras. 61, 64.

assertion that reference points or benchmarks external to the SCM Agreement – including the OECD
Export Credit Arrangement – are irrelevant unless th ey are specifically mentioned, is in error and
should be rejected.
Question to Brazil
43. What is Brazil's reaction to paragraph 25 of Japan's Third Party Submission?

1. The United States provides comments on certain of Brazil's responses to the first set of
questions from the Panel below. The absence of a comment with respect to any particular response by
Brazil should not be understood to imply that the United States agrees with Brazil's response.
A. G
ENERAL QUESTIONS
Questions to both parties
1. Is Brazil/US of the view that a party to a dispute referred to a panel established
under Article 21.5 of the DSU (a party in a compliance panel) can make the same
legal argument as it did in the original Panel proceedings?
2. Could each party explain its view on the question of whether, and to what extent,
this Panel must rely on the legal and factual analysis underlying the original
panel's findings? What are the relevant provisions of the DSU in this regard?
2. The United States agrees to the extent that Brazil acknowledg es that where the claim in a
proceeding pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") is one of the consistency of a measure taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settleme nt Body ("DSB"), the prior adopted panel and
Appellate Body reports in the dispute "should be taken into account where they are relevant."
1
However, the United States strongly disagrees with an y suggestion by Brazil that this consideration
applies any differently – or more strongly – in Artic le 21.5 proceedings that in original proceedings. 2
Contrary to Brazil's assertions, the Appellate Body has never stated that "the objective of 'security and
predictability' applies with particular force in Article 21.5 proceedings.'" 3 As an initial matter, the
United States notes that "security and predictability" is not the objective of the DSU in the sense of
interpreting a treaty in light of the treaty's object and purpose. Rather security and predictability are
the result of the correct operation of the DSU. Furt hermore, it is clear why the Appellate Body would
not make such a statement, since it would elev ate Article 21.5 proceedings above all others.
Moreover, Brazil's citation to U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5 ) in support of this proposition is
misplaced.
3. U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5 ) involved an Article 21.5 panel's review of a
redetermination of injury by the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"). The Appellate Body
considered, there, the extent to which the Article 21.5 panel would need to rely on the findings of the
original panel regarding the ITC's original determin ation. Both the ITC's original determination and
its redetermination related to the exact same factual situation – i.e., the impact of the same subsidized
imports in the same period on the same industry. The question in the Article 21.5 proceeding was
whether the ITC's reassessment of the evidence in regard to that f actual situation was consistent with
the WTO provisions cited by Canada.
4. The Appellate Body noted that Canada's arguments "seem to assume that a panel is required
to evaluate the facts in an Article 21.5 proceeding in exactly the same way as it evaluated those facts
in the original panel proceedings, and to hold an investigating authority making a redetermination to
the inferences that it drew from the same evidence in the original determination."
4 The Appellate
Body explained that this was not the case. It noted that the ITC had provided additional reasoning and
explanation and had also reopened the record to co llect more information about the impact of the

1 United States – Shrimp (21.5 – Malaysia) (AB) , para. 108 (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (AB)
at 108).
2 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 4 (February 26, 2007).
3 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 4 (February 26, 2007).
4 U.S. – Softwood Lumber (21.5), para. 101 (emphasis in original).

subsidized imports. The Appellate Body explained that "in these circumstances, we do not see why
the Panel would be bound by the findings of the original panel."
5
5. Brazil neglects to note this primary reasoni ng of the Appellate Body and, instead, cites
(selectively) to the Appellate Body's clarification that "[t]his does not mean that a panel operating
under Article 21.5 of the DSU should not take account of the reasoning of an investigating authority
in an original determination, or of the reasoning of the original panel."
6 The language cited by Brazil
is simply an application of the general principle that prior adopted panel a nd Appellate Body reports
in the dispute "should be taken into account where they are relevant."7
6. Further, contrary to Brazil's assertions, the Appellate Body did not state in U.S. – Softwood
Lumber IV (21.5 ) that "[i]f a compliance panel 'deviate[d] from the original panel's findings on a
'specific issue,' without a fundamental change in the domestic legal framework and/or facts warranting
this deviation, it would suggest that the compliance panel is acting in an arbitrary fashion that does
not meet the requirements of an 'objective assessment." 8 To the contrary, if such reasoning had been
applied in U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5 ), it would have directly undermined the Appellate Body's
analysis therein. The ITC's injury redeterminati on in that dispute did not – and could not – involve
any "fundamental change in the domestic legal frame work and/or facts." Both the ITC's original
determination and redeterminati on (and, thus, the original panel proceeding and Article 21.5
proceeding) related to the impact of the same subsidized imports in the same period on the same
industry. Thus, the reasoning asserted by Brazil w ould have, in fact, bound the compliance panel to
the original panel's findings, in direct contradictio n to the Appellate Body's clarification that the
compliance panel was not so bound.
7. Moreover, the contrast between the facts of the U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) dispute and
this one illustrates the unreasonableness of Brazil's effo rts to bind this Panel's hands in its assessment
of the issues before it. Unlike in U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5 ), the present dispute does not
involve a redetermination of the impact of the same subsidized imports in the same period on the
same industry. Rather, Brazil is attempting to advance claims in this proceeding against measures that
were not subject to recommendations and rulings in the or iginal dispute. Further, Brazil is asserting
here price suppressive and world market share effect s in a time period, and under market conditions,
never assessed by the original panel. The reasoning asserted by Brazil – that an Article 21.5 panel is
allegedly not permitted to 'deviate from the original panel's findings on a 'specific issue,' without a
fundamental change in the domestic legal framework and/or facts" 9 – makes even less sense in the
circumstances of this dispute (where there is a cha nge in the relevant measur es and in the relevant
facts) than in U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5 ) (where there was no such change). By its nature, a
serious prejudice claim will depend on the facts applicable to a particular period, such as the existence
of displaced sales or price undercutting. Accordi ngly, an Article 21.5 panel will need to assess the
facts applicable to the period at issue in the Article 21.5 proceeding and will not necessarily be able to
rely on the original panel's findings.
B. Q UESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BRAZIL'S REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 13.1 DSU
Questions to the US
3. Is the United States arguing that Brazil must identify the subsidized product for
each of the types of subsidies from wh ich it claims serious prejudice? Is the

5 U.S. – Softwood Lumber (21.5), para. 102 (emphasis added).
7 United States – Shrimp (21.5 – Malaysia) (AB) , para. 108 (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (AB)
at 108).
8 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 5 (February 26, 2007).
9 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 5 (February 26, 2007).

United States arguing that payments which permit planting flexibility are not tied to
the production of upland cotton, so that th ey must be allocated by Brazil across the
total value of production of each recipient?
4. Does the United States contest the accuracy of the figures for 2003 – 2005 cited in
"Table 6" of Brazil's first submission and "Table 5" of Brazil's rebuttal
submission? If so, please provide the accu rate figures, or the figures the US deems
to be more accurate.
Question to Brazil
5. The Panel refers to Brazil's communi cation dated 22 January 2007 concerning its
request in relation to Article 13.1 of the DSU. Is it correct for the Panel to
understand that as far as data for 2005 is concerned, data included in Exhibit US-
64 satisfies all of the requests Brazil made in Part A of Annex 1 of its 1 November
communication?
C. Q
UESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE
UNITED STATES
1. Preliminary objections of the United States in respect of claims of Brazil regarding
export credit guarantees in respect of pig meat and poultry meat
Question to both parties:
6. The parties disagree with respect to whet her in a proceeding under Article 21.5 of
the DSU a party may present a claim that wa s raised in the original proceeding but
on which no finding of WTO-inconsistency was made due to the fact that the
Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis.
a. Could the parties explain the legal bas is in the text of Article 21.5 of
the DSU and other relevant provisions of the DSU for their position on this
question?
b. Could the parties explain whether and how their position on this issue is
consistent with prior panel and Appellate Body reports?
8. Rather than responding to the specific ques tions asked by the Panel above, Brazil expounds
over 15 pages on why its claims with respect to GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of pig
meat and poultry meat are within the scope of this proceeding. Leaving aside that Brazil's response is
not, in fact, directly responsive to the question posed, it also fails to withstand scrutiny.
A. Specific Export Credit Guarantees Are Me asures And Those Guarantees Provided
In Support of Exports of Pig Meat, Pou ltry Meat, And Other Scheduled Products
(Other that Rice) Have Never Been Sub ject to Any DSB Recommendations and
Rulings
9. Brazil argues, first, that (a) "no such 'm easure' [as export credit guarantees in respect of
exports of pig meat and poultry meat] exists;" (b ) the only "measure" capable of being subject to
Brazil's claims of WTO-inconsistency is the GSM 102 program in its entirety; and (c) it is simply
Brazil's claims under Articles 10 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement that are limited to specific products. These arguments lack merit.

10. First, it is surprising to find Brazil arguing now that specific GSM 102 guarantees – in this
case, those guarantees issued in support of export tr ansactions involving pig meat and poultry meat –
do not constitute "measures." This argument is at odds with Brazil's arguments elsewhere that an
a contrario reading of item (j) would prevent a Member from challenging specific export credit
guarantees ( i.e., as opposed to the export credit guarantee programs generally ).
10 If specific
guarantees cannot even constitute "measures," as Braz il now asserts, Brazil's complaints about being
able to make claims against specific guarantees would be entirely moot.11
11. In any event, Brazil provides no basis for its assertion that export cred it guarantees in respect
of exports of pig meat and poultry meat are not "measures." Certainly, Brazil makes no effort to
reconcile its argument with the clarification by th e Appellate Body that a "measure" for purposes of
WTO dispute settlement may encompass "[i]n principle, any act or omission attributable to a
WTO Member. . . ."
12 The provision of specific guarantees would certainly seem to fit within this
broad scope of "measure."
12. Second, Brazil's assertion that its export subsidy-related claims in the original and present
proceeding apply with respect to the GSM 10 2 program, as such, rather than to the application of the
program in particular cases ( i.e., particular export credit guarantees) is inconsistent with Brazil's prior
arguments and the original panel's resolution of Br azil's claims. The United States recalls that, in
order to avoid the mandatory-discretionary distinction in the original panel proceeding, Brazil
expressly stated that its claims of actual circumvention under the Agreement on Agriculture were
"akin to . . . 'as applied' claim[s]" with respect to the export credit guarantees themselves, and were
not against the programs under which they were provided.
13 The scope of measures subject to Brazil's
claims under the SCM Agreement was necessarily circumscribed to the same extent because, by virtue
of the Peace Clause 14, only those export subsidies inconsistent with the circumvention provisions of
the Agreement on Agriculture would even be subject to claims under the SCM Agreement.
13. Consistent with this, the original panel found that:
in respect of exports of upland cotton a nd other unscheduled agricultural products
supported under the programmes, and in resp ect of one scheduled product (rice) . . .
United States export credit guarantees under the GSM 102, GSM 103 and SCGP
export credit guarantee programmes are expor t subsidies applied in a manner which
results in circumvention of United States ' export subsidy commitments, within the

10 See Panel's Question 35 to Brazil below and Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 472.
11 Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that a request for panel establishment identify both the "specific
measures at issue" and provide "a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint" (i.e., the claim). If specific
guarantees cannot even be measures, as Brazil alleges, no claim could ever be made with respect to them in
WTO dispute settlement.
12 United States – Corrosion-Resistant Steel (AB), para. 81.
13 See Brazil's Answers to Additional Questions Following Second Panel Meeting, para. 11 (according
to Brazil "it is therefore not relevant to this claim whether the CCC programs are mandatory or discretionary.")
Indeed, had Brazil's claims been with respect to the programs, they would have failed because the programs
themselves are clearly not mandatory. If they had been, the Unite d States certainly could not have ceased
issuing GSM 103 and SCGP guarantees – as it has done – nor could the United States have removed from
eligibility obligations in certain higher-risk countries under the GSM 102 program.
14 Under the Peace Clause of the Agreement on Agriculture, "export subsidies that conform fully to the
provisions of Part V of this Agreement . . . shall be . . . exempt from actions based on Articles XVI of
GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Subs idies Agreement." Article 13(c)(ii) of the Agreement on
Agriculture. An export subsidy found to be inconsistent with Articles 10 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture
would not "conform fully to the provisions of Part V of this Agreement" and, thus, would not be "exempt from
actions based on Articles XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement."

meaning of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and they are therefore
inconsistent with Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
15
14. As is clear from the language cited above, the original panel considered guarantees to
constitute export subsidies. And it was only those guarantees "in respect of exports of upland cotton
and other unscheduled agricultural products supporte d under the programmes, and in respect of one
scheduled product (rice)" to which the finding of actual circumvention applied. Because the panel
found that these measures did not "conform fully to the provisions of Part V of the Agreement on
Agriculture," the guarantees were also subject to – an d ultimately found to be inconsistent with – the
prohibition on export subsidies in the SCM Agreement.16
15. Brazil has no basis to assert now that its claims in the original proceeding, and the original
panel's findings, were actually against the expor t credit guarantee programs themselves and that the
particular application of the programs to certain export transactions ( i.e., particular guarantees) does
not even constitute a "measure." This even contradicts Brazil's own clarification in its rebuttal
submission that " Brazil does not assert that the GSM 102 program itself circumvents the United
States' export subsidy commitments, within th e meaning of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture."17 Rather, according to Brazil, its claim is that "the United States has applied the GSM
102 program in a manner that circumvents U.S. export subsidy commitments with respect to
unscheduled products, and with respect to three scheduled products – rice, pig meat and poultry
meat."18 The United States regrets that, even at this la te stage, Brazil continues to shift its arguments
on such fundamental issues as the measures subject to its claims.
16. Third, Brazil's assertion that its claims are product-specific does not alter the analysis. That
just means that Brazil's claims relate to guarant ees provided in respect of exports of particular
products. Calling these claims "product-specific" does not change the fact that only particular
guarantees – those provided in respect to the partic ular "product" at issue – are the subject of the
claims. Where those guarantees were not the subject of any DSB recommendations and rulings and
are not measures taken to comply with any DSB recommendations and rulings, there is no basis for a
claim to be considered with respect to them in a DSU Article 21.5 proceeding. That is the situation
here.
17. Fourth, the analysis would not change even if one were to assume – incorrectly – that export
credit guarantees are not specific measures and that the orig inal panel's findings applied to the GSM
102 program itself. Even then, to give meaning to the original panel's analysis under Articles 10.1
and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Peace Clause, one must acknowledge that the original
findings of WTO-inconsistency did not apply to the entire program but rather those aspects of it that
related to guarantees "in respect of exports of upland cotton and other unscheduled agricultural
products supported under the programmes, and in respect of one scheduled product (rice)." The
question in an Article 21.5 proceeding, then, is wh ether the complaining party has shown that proper
implementation measures have been taken with respect to that aspect of the measure found to be

15 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 8.1(d)(i) (emphasis added).
16 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 8.1(d)(i). By contrast, the original panel specifically found "in respect
of exports of unscheduled agricultural products not supported under the programmes and other scheduled
agricultural products," including pig meat and poultry meat, that "export credit guarantees under the GSM 102,
GSM 103 and SCGP export credit guarantee programmes have not been applied in manner which either results
in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of United States export subsidy commitments within the
meaning of Article 10.1 and that th ey therefore are not inconsistent w ith Article 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 8.1(d)(ii) (empha sis added). As such, the Peace Clause applied and
the panel "treat[ed] them as if they are exempt from actions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 and
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement in this dispute." Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 8.1(d)(ii)
17 Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 378 (emphasis added).
18 Brazil Rebuttal Submission, para. 378 (emphasis added).

WTO-inconsistent. As the Appellate Body recognized in EC – Bed Linen (21.5) , the mandate of a
DSU Article 21.5 panel does not extend to examin ing even those aspects of a measure that were not
found to be WTO-inconsistent in the original proceeding.
19 Although the EC – Bed Linen dispute
involved a situation where – except for a "minor change"20 – the challenged aspect of the measure had
remained more or less unchanged between the original proceeding and the compliance proceeding, the
reasoning therein applies with equal force to the GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of
poultry meat and pig meat. The United States turn s to that issue and, more generally, Brazil's
(incorrect) assertions that the GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of exports of pig meat and
poultry meat are measures taken to comply next.
B. GSM 102 Guarantees Provided In Support of Exports of Pig Meat, Poultry Meat,
And Other Scheduled Products (Other that Rice) Are Not Measures Taken To
Comply With Any DSB Recommendations and Rulings
18. For the reasons above, export credit guarantees in respect of exports of pig meat and poultry
meat clearly are measures for purposes of WTO dispute settlement. However, they are not measures
that were ever subject to any DSB recommendations and rulings.
19. Recall that there are two categories of claims that may be made in Article 21.5 proceedings –
regarding (a) the existence of measures taken to co mply in respect of original measures or (b) the
consistency of measures taken to comply with a c overed agreement. Because GSM 102 export credit
guarantees in respect of exports of pig meat and poultry meat are not original measures that were
subject to any DSB recommendations and rulings, Br azil has no basis to make claims in the first
category with respect to those guarantees. The United States could not have taken any measures to
comply with respect to DSB recommendations and rulings in respect of those guarantees because
there are no DSB recommendations and rulings in respect of those guarantees.
20. The question, then, is whether Brazil has an y basis to make claims in the second category
with respect to those guarantees ( i.e., claims that GSM 102 guarantees in respect of exports of pig
meat and poultry meat are not consistent with a c overed agreement). Under Article 21.5 of the DSU,
Brazil could only do so if these guarantees were themselves measures taken to comply with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Contrary to Brazil's assertions, however, they are not.
21. Brazil argues that GSM 102 guarantees in resp ect of pig meat and poultry meat became
measures taken to comply with the DSB's recomme ndations and rulings simply because they were
affected by some of the changes made by the United States in respect of the measures that were
subject to the DSB's recommendations and rulings ( i.e., GSM 102, GSM 103, and SCGP guarantees
"in respect of exports of upland cotton and othe r unscheduled agricultural products supported under
the programmes, and in respect of one scheduled product (rice)").21

19 EC – Bed Linen (AB) (21.5 – India), para. 86.
20 According to the Appellate Body, the European Communities did "expand[] its findings in the
redetermination with respect to the development of c onsumption of bed linen in order to take into account
slightly different figures on domestic industry sales." EC – Bed Linen (21.5) (AB) , para. 72, n. 67. However,
India's claim in the Article 21.5 proceedings apparently "did not rely on this minor change." EC – Bed
Linen (21.5) (AB), para. 72, n. 67.
21 For example, the United States did not cease issuing GSM 103 and SCGP guarantees only "in
respect of exports of upland cotton and other unscheduled agricultural products supported under the
programmes, and in respect of one scheduled product (rice)." The United States did not narrowly limit
application of the new risk-based fee schedule to GSM 102 guarantees "in respect of exports of upland cotton
and other unscheduled agricultural products supported under the programmes, and in respect of one scheduled
product (rice)" the application of the new risk-based fee schedule implemented to address the original panel's
findings. Nor did the United States r eclassify certain high-risk countries into ineligible categories solely with

22. Brazil makes the remarkable assertion that b ecause the United States went above and beyond
its WTO obligations it should be subject to great er exposure to challenge in an Article 21.5
proceeding than if it had narrowly circumscribed its changes so they applied solely to export credit
guarantees "in respect of exports of upland cotto n and other unscheduled agricultural products
supported under the programmes, and in respect of one scheduled product (rice)":
During implementation, the United States c ould have taken steps to amend the GSM
102 program exclusively with respect to the terms and conditions applicable to rice
and unscheduled products. However, it did not do so. Instead, it revised the general
terms and conditions of the program, incl uding the guarantee fee schedule, adopting
an amended GSM 102 program that still applies on a non-product-specific basis.22
23. In other words, Brazil admits that the United States had no WTO obligation to take any action
with respect to guarantees under the program in respect of exports of products other than "rice and
unscheduled products." Brazil also effectively admits that, if the terms and conditions applicable in
respect of those guarantees had remained precisely the same as before, those guarantees could not be
the subject of the present Article 21.5 proceeding regardless of whether those terms and conditions
were consistent with any covered agreement. Br azil's contention is, however, that those guarantees
come within the scope of this compliance proceed ing simply because the United States did not wall
them off from changes affecting guarantees in respect of exports of rice and unscheduled products.
This argument does not make sense either from a textual or a practical standpoint.
24. The measures taken by the United States to comply with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB are the various changes made by the Un ited States – including the changes to the fee
schedule and the conditions for eligibility – to the measures that were subject to the original export
subsidy finding to bring them into compliance . The question presented to the Panel is whether Brazil
has proven that these U.S. ch anges have failed to bring those measures into compliance with the
recommendations and rulings (and the other provisions of the covered agreements cited by Brazil).
The question is not what effect the changes might have had on other measures that were not required
to be brought into compliance with any DSB recommendations and rulings.
25. The fact that the changes made to transfor m the original measures into measures taken to
comply may affect more than just the original measures does not render all other affected measures
themselves measures taken to comply. That would effectively treat any changed measure as a
"measure taken to comply" regardless of whether it is actually changed to comply with any DSB
recommendations or rulings or – as in the presen t case, where changes were applied on a program-
wide basis for ease of administration and to impr ove the programs generally – for other reasons
entirely. This would not only read "taken to comply" out of Article 21.5 of the DSU altogether but
would have entirely undesirable implications. A Member would be forced to create a tangle of
separate regimes to address the application of a m easure in different situations simply to avoid
exposure to a dispute settlement challenge under the expedited procedures of an Article 21.5
proceeding with the accompanying disadvantages. Moreover, the incentive would be for Members to
make the most limited changes possible and to reta in the status quo – even at the cost of general
improvements – because any broader approach would si mply be rewarded with exposure to challenge
in Article 21.5 proceedings.
26. Nothing in the WTO Agreement compels su ch a result. Moreover, none of the prior
Appellate Body reports discussed by Brazil even addr ess this particular situation, let alone suggest
that Brazil's approach is appropriate.

respect to export credit guarantees "in respect of exports of upland cotton and other unscheduled agricultural
products supported under the programmes, and in respect of one scheduled product (rice)."

C. The Reasoning in Prior Disputes Conf irms that Brazil Cannot Impermissibly
Extend the Scope of this Proceeding to GSM 102 Guarantees In Respect of Exports
of Pig Meat and Poultry Meat
27. Contrary to Brazil's assertions, the reasoning in prior disputes does not support Brazil's efforts
impermissibly to extend the scope of this proceed ing to claims against measures that were never
subject to any DSB recommendations and rulings and that are not measures taken to comply with any
such recommendations and rulings. Nor could it. This limitation is established by Article 21.5 of the
DSU itself.
28. To the contrary, the Appellate Body has expressly acknowledged that "[p]roceedings under
Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather, Article 21.5
proceedings are limited to those 'measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings' of
the DSB."23 Moreover, "[i]f a claim challenges a measure which is not a 'measure taken to comply,'
that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings." 24 This reasoning applies regardless
of whether a complaining party attempts to make the "same" claim or a "new" claim in an Article 21.5
proceeding – if the measure subject to the clai m is "not a 'measure taken to comply,' that claim cannot
properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings."25
29. Nothing in the prior Appellate Body reports discussed by Brazil undermines this reasoning or
supports Brazil's attempts to challenge the GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of exports of
pig meat and poultry meat. Indeed, much of Brazil's analysis continues to rely on the fundamentally
flawed assertion that a "final resolution" standard governs the claims that are properly within the
scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding.
26 As the United States has explained 27, this is not the proper
standard set out in the text of Article 21.5.
30. EC – Bed Linen (21.5): Brazil argues, for example, that "the circumstances that prevented
India from renewing, in Article 21.5 proceedings in EC – Bed Linen, the same claim it had pursued in
the original proceedings, are not present in the current dispute." 28 This is not true. In the EC – Bed
Linen dispute, the Appellate Body found that Indi a was precluded from raising certain claims in
respect of the "other factors" assessment in a du mping redetermination on tw o different grounds: (a)
it was not a part of the "implementation measure" a nd, thus, was outside the scope of an Article 21.5
proceeding and (b) by failing to appeal the original pane l's rejection of the same claim against the
exact same aspect of the measure taken to comply in the original proceeding, India had accepted the
rejection of the claims by the original panel as a "f inal resolution" of the dispute between the parties
and therefore could not raise it again in any subsequent proceeding.29
31. Brazil correctly observes that the present dispute is not identical to EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India) on the question of whether or not the origin al panel's rejection of Brazil's claims
against the pig meat and poultry meat constitutes a "final resolution" of the matter for purposes of
WTO dispute settlement; certainly, Brazil is not pr ecluded from challenging those measures in a new
dispute. However, on the question of wh ether the claims are subject to review in an Article 21.5
proceeding, the outcome in this dispute is the same as in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) . Like
the claims made by India in that dispute, Brazil' s claims here against the pig meat and poultry meat

23 Canada – Aircraft (21.5 Brazil) (AB), para. 36 (italics in original; underlining added).
24 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).
25 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).
26 See e.g., Brazil's assertions that EC – Bed Linen
27 Including in response to the Panel's Question 10, see U.S. Answers to Parts A-C of First Set of Panel
Questions, paras. 25-26 (February 27, 2007).
28 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 47 (February 26, 2007).
29 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), paras. 32-35 and 87-95.

GSM 102 guarantees are not claims against a "measure taken to comply" and, as such, are outside the
scope of this proceeding by operation of the express limitations in Article 21.5 of the DSU.
32. Brazil also asserts that the Appellate Body reached certain "conclusions" about the situations
in which claims could be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings where an original proceeding involves an
exercise of false judicial economy. According to Brazil, the circumstances in the present dispute are
"similar" to the exercise of false judicial econom y because the "original panel erroneously excluded
[export credit guarantees] for pig meat and poultry meat from its findings regarding Brazil's
circumvention claim."
30 Not only does Brazil's argument simply presume that the original Panel's
findings would have extended to export credit gua rantees for pig meat and poultry meat – a finding
that the Appellate Body specifically found was not supported by sufficient uncontested facts on the
record before it – but Brazil attempts to equate two fundamentally different things.
33. The Appellate Body has explained that j udicial economy "allows a panel to refrain from
making multiple findings that the same measure is inc onsistent with various provisions when a single,
or a certain number of findings of inconsiste ncy, would suffice to resolve the dispute." 31 Here, b y
contrast, the Appellate Body did not decline to make findings b ecause other findings existed with
respect to GSM 102 export credit guarantees. Rather, it did not find sufficient facts to make any
finding of WTO-inconsistency with respect to th e GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of
exports of pig meat and poultry meat. This distinction is an important one. This is not a situation
where the United States had an obligation to im plement DSB recommendations and rulings with
respect to those guarantees on the basis of certain WTO provisions but not others with respect to
which the original panel/Appellate Body had exercised judicial economy. The United States simply
had no implementation obligations whatsoever in respect of those measures. Moreover, as explained
above, the GSM 102 export credit guarantees in respect of exports of pig meat and poultry meat are
not measures taken to comply with any recomme ndations and rulings. In these circumstances,
Article 21.5 of the DSU does not permit claims against those measures in a compliance proceeding.
34. In any event, contrary to Brazi l's assertions, the Appellate Body did not conclude that claims
with respect to which an original panel had exercised false judicial economy could automatically be
reasserted in an Article 21.5 proceeding. This is evident even from the language cited by Brazil from
that dispute: "in a situation where a panel, in d eclining to rule on a certain claim, has provided only a
partial resolution of the matter at issue, a complain ant should not be held responsible for the panel's
false exercise of judicial economy, such that a complainant would not be prevented from raising the
claim in a subsequent proceeding ."32 This discussion does not deal with the scope of an Article 21.5
proceeding. Indeed, this language is part of the Appellate Body's separate discussion of what claims
can be considered to be "finally resolved" such that they could not be the subject of any subsequent
WTO dispute settlement proceeding. On the question of the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding, the
Appellate Body was unequivocal: "[i]f a claim cha llenges a measure which is not a 'measure taken to
comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings."33
35. Canada – Aircraft (21.5): Brazil asserts that "[t]he situation in these Article 21.5 proceeding
is very similar to the situation that arose in the Article 21.5 proceeding in Canada – Aircraft ."34
According to Brazil, Canada "amended the terms an d conditions of an expor t subsidy program" and,
thus, the Appellate Body found that the "measure taken to comply" was the revised export subsidy
program.35 Brazil argues that the same reasoning appli es here and militates in favor of finding the

30 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 46 (February 26, 2007).
31 Canada – Wheat (AB), para. 133.
32 EC – Bed Linen (AB), para. 96, n. 115.
33 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 78.
34 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 36 (February 26, 2007).
35 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 36 (February 26, 2007).

entire GSM 102 program to be the measure taken to comply in this dispute.
36 What Brazil fails to
acknowledge is that the scope of the measure take n to comply with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB is determined by reference – logically – to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
As the Appellate Body explained:
A . . . feature of the first sentence of Article 21.5 is the express link between the
"measures taken to comply" and the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB.
Accordingly, determining the scope of "mea sures taken to comply" in any given case
must also involve examination of the recommendations and rulings contained in the
original report(s) adopted by the DSB. Because such recommendations and rulings
are directed at the measures found to be inc onsistent in the original proceedings, such
an examination necessarily involves consideration of those original measures.
37
36. In Canada – Aircraft (21.5), Canada was required to withdraw the subsidy with respect to all
"[Technology Partnerships Canada or "TPC"] assistance to the Ca nadian regional aircraft industry"
consistent with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.38 Unlike the recommendations and rulings in the
present dispute, Canada was not required to withdraw the subsidy only with respect to a subset of the
TPC assistance. It is only natural, therefore, that the "measure taken to comply" in that dispute would
be the changes made with respect to all TPC assistance, rather than some subset thereof. By contrast,
here, it is to be expected that the "measure taken to comply" encompasses only the changes made with
respect to that subset of measures with respect to which the United States had an implementation
obligation. Thus, far from supporting Brazil's argument that the entire GSM 102 program is suddenly
somehow a "measure taken to comply," the reasoning in Canada – Aircraft (21.5) confirms that
Brazil's argument is not tenable.
37. U.S. – Shrimp (21.5): Brazil notes that in U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) , the Appellate Body found
that claims were not properly part of an Article 21.5 proceeding where they challenged an aspect of a
measure that was found to be WTO-consistent in an original proceeding and remained unchanged
between the original and compliance proceeding. 39 Brazil correctly observes that those are not the
precise circumstances at issue here.40 However, the outcome in that dispute is consistent with the U.S.
position that – where there is no finding of WT O-inconsistency with respect to a measure and the
measure is not taken to comply with any DSB recommendations and rulings – neither the measure nor
any claims with respect to it are properly the subject of a DSU Article 21.5 proceeding.
38. Canada – Dairy (21.5 II): Brazil asserts that the factual situation in Canada – Dairy (21.5 II)
is "precisely the situation in which Brazil finds itself." 41 However, even Brazil's explanation of the
facts of that dispute confirms that this is not a correct statement. As Brazil acknowledges, Canada –
Dairy (21.5 II) involved the question of whether a second Article 21.5 proceeding could be initiated
"where the Appellate Body was unable to reach a decision [in an earlier proceeding] regarding the
WTO-consistency of certain Canadian measures taken to comply because of a lack of sufficient
facts."42 There is no question before this Panel of whether a second Article 21.5 proceeding is
permissible. Nor has the Appellate Body been ask ed to address, in this dispute, the question of
whether any U.S. measures taken to comply are WTO-inconsistent. Indeed, it is not clear how the
Appellate Body would have reached such an issue without this Panel having even completed a first
Article 21.5 proceeding. Rather, the question impli cated by Brazil's claims in this proceeding is

36 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 36 (February 26, 2007).
37 United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination (21.5 – Canada) (AB), para. 68.
38 Canada – Aircraft (21.5) (AB), para. 2.
39 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, paras. 48-51 (February 26, 2007).
40 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, paras. 48-51 (February 26, 2007).
41 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 52 (February 26, 2007).
42 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 52 (February 26, 2007) (quoting U.S.
Rebuttal Submission, para. 13, n. 19) (emphasis added).

whether those claims "challenge[] a measure wh ich is not a 'measure taken to comply.'" 43 If they do,
they are not properly within the scope of this proceed ing. Neither that question – nor one similar to it
– was at issue in Canada – Dairy (21.5 II) . To the contrary, all the parties to that dispute agreed that
the Canadian measures at issue were "taken to comply" with the DSB recommendations and rulings in
that dispute. The only question there was whet her the WTO dispute settlement provisions would
permit a second Article 21.5 proceeding.
39. Conclusion: The reasoning in the reports examined by Brazil does not support its efforts to
draw into the scope of this proceeding claims with respect to GSM 102 guarantees in respect of
exports of pig meat and poultry meat.
Questions to Brazil
7. Is Brazil of the view that it is only in the circumstances identified by the Appellate
Body in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) that the scope of Article 21.5
proceedings is limited by the scope of th e original proceedings? [Paragraphs 11-15
of Submission of Brazil to the Panel Regarding US Requests for Preliminary
Ruling]
8. How does Brazil respond to the arguments of the United States that Brazil
"incorrectly assumes that the standard is one of whether there has been a 'final
resolution' of the issue in the original proceeding" and that Brazil misreads the
Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) and confuses the
issue of "the scope of a compliance proceeding pursuant to Article 21.5 of the
DSU" and the distinct issue of "when a claim against a specific measure or aspect
of a measure can be considered to be 'finally resolved' for purposes of WTO dispute
settlement"? [Paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
40. Brazil's response to this question suggests th at Brazil misunderstands the U.S. position.
Contrary to Brazil's suggestions, the United States does not agree that the scope an Article 21.5
proceeding is determined by reference to whether or not claims have been "finally resolved." The
United States considers that to be a distinct question regarding the circumstances under which a
particular matter can no longer be the subject of any subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
41. By contrast, the scope of a proceeding pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU is established by
Article 21.5 itself. As is clear from the text, such proceedings are limited in terms of the claims that
can be made and the measures in respect of which the claims can be made. Examining the text, the
Appellate Body has explained, "[p]roceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a
Member of the WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited
 to those 'measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings' of the DSB." 44 Moreover, "[i]f a claim challenges a measure
which is not a 'measure taken to comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5
proceedings."45
42. Brazil incorrectly suggests in its response to th is question that the U.S. objection is limited to
the measure that Brazil challenges in this Article 21.5 proceeding but that the United States accepts
that Brazil claims can be made in this pro ceeding. In fact, the U.S. objection is to both the measures
challenged by Brazil – GSM 102 export credit guarant ees in respect of pig meat and poultry meat
which were not subject to the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings and are not measures taken to
comply with any such recommendations and rulings – as well as all claims in respect of those

43 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 – India) (AB), para. 78.
44 Canada – Aircraft (21.5 Brazil) (AB), para. 36 (italics in original; underlining added).
45 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).

measures. As the Appellate Body has made clear, "[i]f a claim challenges a measure which is not a
'measure taken to comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings."
46
9. What are the comments of Brazil on the arguments in footnote 22 of the United
States' rebuttal submission?
43. Brazil appears to argue that it is entitled to i gnore the Appellate Body's finding that there were
insufficient uncontested facts to support any finding of WTO-inconsistency with respect to GSM 102
export credit guarantees in respect of exports of pig meat and poultry meat. According to Brazil, the
present situation is "the effective equivalent of the exercise of judicial economy." 47 And, in Brazil's
view, the Appellate Body "concluded" in EC – Bed Linen (21.5) that "the exercise of judicial
economy with respect to a claim raised in the original proceedings does not bar a complaining
Member from reasserting that same claim in Article 21.5 proceedings." 48 The United States disagrees
with Brazil both as to its assertion that the present ci rcumstance is the "effective equivalent" of the
exercise of judicial economy and its argument th at the Appellate Body somehow indicated that a
complaining party could simply reassert in an Article 21.5 proceeding any claims with respect to
which an original panel had exercised false judi cial economy. Judicial economy occurs when the
arbitral body decides it need not r each an issue in order to resolve a dispute, but here the Appellate
Body did not decide it need not r each the issue. Rather, the Appe llate Body found that it lacked
sufficient basis to make a finding on the claim. These two situations are not "effectively equivalent" –
they are quite different.
44. As explained above, Brazil pers ists in ignoring (a) the actual arguments made by the EC in
EC – Bed Linens (21.5) , (b) the fact that the EC and the Appellate Body distinguished between
arguments regarding the scope of a DSU Article 21.5 proceeding and those regarding claims "finally
resolved" for purposes of WTO dispute settlement , and (c) the Appellate Body's unequivocal
clarification that, in terms of the former, the salie nt question under Article 21.5 is whether the claims
presented relate to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. As the Appellate Body explained "[i]f a claim
challenges a measure which is not a 'measure taken to comply,' that claim cannot properly be raised in
Article 21.5 proceedings." 49 It did not qualify this in any way or suggest that this was subject to a
further consideration of whether false judicial economy had been exercised with respect to the claim.
Question to the US
10. Could the United States explain why it consid ers that what it describes as the "final
resolution" standard is not the correct stan dard to decide whether Brazil's claims
regarding export credit guarantees for pig meat and poultry meat are within the
scope of this proceeding?
2. Preliminary objections of the United States with respect to claims of Brazil regarding
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programmes
Questions to Brazil
11. Is Brazil of the view that a finding under Article 6 of the SCM Agreement that a
"subsidy" is causing serious prejudice necessarily always applies to both the
subsidy "payments" and the subsidy "programme"? [Paragraphs 31-35 of

46 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).
47 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 71 (February 26, 2007).
48 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 70 (February 26, 2007).
49 EC – Bed Linen (21.5 India) (AB), para. 78 (emphasis in original).

Submission of Brazil Regarding US Requests for Preliminary Ruling and
paragraph 38 of the Rebuttal Submission of Brazil]
45. The Panel's question is specific, asking for Brazil's views as to whether serious prejudice
findings are such that they must "necessar ily always" apply simultaneously to the
legislative/regulatory provisions authorizing paym ents and payments themselves. Brazil uses the
opportunity, however, to attempt to shore up its unf ounded arguments that the Panel should disregard
the original panel report and find that the findings of "present" serious prejudice therein applied to
Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical pa yment programs as well as payments thereunder (a
"measure" that was never even subject to a claim of "present" serious prejudice in the original
proceeding).
46. The United States addresses what appears to be Brazil's response to the specific question,
first, and then addresses Brazil's post hoc attempts to change the findings of the original panel and the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
A. There Is No Basis For Brazil's New Argument that Any Finding that Particular
Payments Are Causing Serious Prejudice Necessarily Means that the Program
Providing for the Payment is Per Se WTO-Inconsistent
47. Brazil appears to argue that whenever paymen ts are made pursuant to a program, any finding
that particular payments are causing serious prej udice necessarily redounds to the program as such, so
that the 'legal/regulatory provisions' for th e grant or maintenance of the subsidies 50 must be treated as
being WTO-inconsistent as such. Brazil identifie s no citation, support, or other basis for this
argument. Nor can it.
48. The Appellate Body has clarified that:
"[A]s such" challenges against a Member 's measures in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings are serious challenges. By definition, an "as such" claim challenges
laws, regulations, or other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective
application, asserting that a Member's conduct – not only in a particular instance that
has occurred, but in future situations as well – will necessarily be inconsistent with
that Member's WTO obligations. In essence, complaining parties bringing 'as such'
challenges seek to prevent Members ex ante from engaging in certain conduct.
The implications of such challenges are obviously more far-reaching than "as
applied" claims. We also expect that me asures subject to 'as such' challenges would
normally have undergone, under municipal la w, thorough scrutiny through various
deliberative processes to ensure consiste ncy with the Member's international
obligations, including those found in the cove red agreements, and that the enactment
of such a measure would implicitly reflect the conclusion of that Member that the
measure is not inconsistent with those obligations. The presumption that WTO
Members act in good faith in the implementation of their WTO commitments is
particularly apt in the context of measures challenged "as such.
51
49. Brazil's newly-asserted approach would flout the "serious" nature of challenges to a Members'
"laws, regulations, or other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective application"
by permitting a finding of WTO-inconsistency against such measures without any actual showing that
"a Member's conduct – not only in a particular instan ce that has occurred, but in future situations as

50 Brazil's Answers to Additional Questions Following Second Panel Meeting, para. 31-32 (20 January
2004).
51 U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.

well – will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member's WTO obligations."
52 Under Brazil's
approach a showing about "a particular instance" would automatically be sufficient for a finding that
"a Member's conduct . . . in [all] future situations . . . will necessarily be inconsistent with that
Member's WTO obligations." Brazil has identified nothing in Article 6 of the SCM Agreement – or
any other provision of the WTO agreement – that permits such an approach.
50. The sole justification that Brazil appears to offer is an assertion that because a challenge to
particular payments may require an assessment of how the program operates and, conversely, because
a challenge to a program requires an assessment of th e effects of particular payments, any distinction
between the WTO-consistency of progr ams and payments is "artificial." 53 This argument makes little
sense. It is hardly remarkable that it may be necessary to examine the "laws, regulations, or other
instruments of a Member" in determining whether their application in a particular instance is
WTO-consistent. Nor is it remarkable that an exam ination of the application of "laws, regulations, or
other instruments of a Member" is necessary to determine whether those measures are themselves
WTO-consistent. This is true in any circumstan ce where either the "laws, regulations, or other
instruments of a Member" or their application are at issue; it is not unique to claims under Article 6
of the SCM Agreement. Brazil fails to explain why this renders any distinction between the
WTO-consistency of the "laws, regulations, or ot her instruments of a Member" themselves and their
application in particular circumstances "artificia l." Indeed, Brazil's argument would undermine the
clear distinction drawn by the Appellate Body in U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews and scores
of other disputes between claims against these distinct measures.
51. In any event, the United States does not recall that Brazil clarified it was making an
"artificial" distinction between pr ograms and payments in the original dispute when it made separate
serious prejudice claims relating to payments made in MY 1999-2002, future payments allegedly
mandated to be made in MY 2003-2007, and speci fic provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act and the 2000
Agricultural Risk Protection Act. Nor does the Un ited States recall Brazil arguing that the original
panel was making an "artificial" distinction be tween payments and programs when – tracking the
claims presented to it – the original panel set out to separately address the effects of payments made in
MY 1999-2002, the effects of payments allegedly ma ndated to made in future marketing years, and
the effect of specific provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act.
52. To the contrary, Brazil specifically acknowle dged that a claim against the specific provisions
of the 2002 FSRI Act and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act would have different
implications and requirements than a claim against specific payments thereunder. For example, Brazil
made separate claims of threat of serious prejudice
54 against payments allegedly "mandated" to be
made in MY 2003-2007 55 and the legal regime providing for these payments. 56 In so doing, Brazil
expressly acknowledged to the original panel that th e claims were comprised of distinct elements
because of the different measures at issue. 57 Indeed, in the case of its threat claims against the

52 U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.
53 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 84 (February 26, 2007).
54 The claims were under Artic les 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, Articles 5(c) and 6(d) of the
SCM Agreement, and Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994.
56 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(viii). These claims too were under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement, Articles 5(c) and 6(d) of the SCM Agreement, and Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994.
57 To take just one example, Brazil explained how a showing of the mandatory nature of the
statutory/regulatory provisions was a "required element" for its per se claims but not for the "threat" of serious
prejudice claims "that do not involve claims regarding the 'per se' validity of the statutes":
The mandatory nature of the U.S. subsidies is relevant to (a) Brazil's "per se" claims as well as
(b) Brazil's threat of serious prejudice claims that do not involve claims regarding its "per se"
validity of the statutes. The evidence of mandatory (or "norma tive") measures is a required
element for Brazil's "per se" claims. And a th reat of serious prejudice under Article 6.3

programs as such, Brazil asked the original panel to find that the "provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act
and the 2000 ARP Act together with their implementing regulations, as listed above, cannot be
applied in a WTO consistent manner."58 This echoes precisely the Appellate Body's reasoning in U.S.
– Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews that "[b]y definition, an "as such" claim challenges laws,
regulations, or other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective application, asserting
that a Member's conduct – not only in a particular in stance that has occurred, but in future situations
as well – will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member's WTO obligations."59
53. Moreover, Brazil argued that payments could have adverse effects even when the programs
that authorized them were no longer in existence 60 and that programs could have adverse effects even
when no payments were be ing made under the programs. 61 In other words, Brazil argued that the
effects of the programs and the payments could well be distinct.
54. Brazil's new argument for purposes of this pr oceeding that a finding under Articles 5 and 6 of
the SCM Agreement automatically applies to both programs and the payments made thereunder is
inconsistent with all of Brazil's prior arguments noted above and is unsupported by the text of any
covered agreement.
B. Brazil's Efforts to Expand the Original Panel's Findings of WTO-Inconsistency
and the DSB's Recommendations and Rulings are Unavailing
55. Not only does Brazil fail to show that findi ngs under Articles 5 and 6 necessarily apply to
both programs and payments, as a general matter, but it identifies no basis to expand the original
panel's findings of "present" serious prejudice to the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical
payment programs and all payments thereunder.
(1) Brazil continues to ignore the eviden ce showing that it only challenged –
and the original panel only found – "present" serious prejudice with
respect to a package of payments made in MY 1999-2002
56. The United States recalls that in the section of the original panel report entitled "Parties'
Requests for Findings and Recommendations," the pa nel set out the claims presented by Brazil as
follows:

and 5(c) will be more likely to exist if the subsidies are mandatory, i.e., that the subsidies must
be paid to eligible producers, exporters, and users.
Brazil's Answers to Additional Questions Following S econd Panel Meeting, para. 18 (20 January 2004).
Brazil's explanation shows not only that Brazil separately challenged the "per se" validity of the statutes and the
payments authorized to be made under the statutes – despite its argument now that no distinction can be drawn
between them "in the circumstances of th is dispute" – but that it considered the claims to entail distinct factual
showings.
58 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 435 (emphasis added).
59 U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172 (emphasis added).
60 See Upland Cotton (Panel) , paras. 7.105, 7.107-7.122. Brazil argued that, even though, the
legislation providing for PFC and MLA payments had expired, it "pursues claims . . . in respect of the subsidies
and domestic support provided under the expired programmes and authorizing legislation, in other words, the
payments themselves " because, according to Brazil, these payments continued to cause adverse effects to its
interests. Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.108 (emphasis added).
61 For example, Brazil argued that "the very exis tence of the mandatory marketing loan, Step 2 and
counter-cyclical payment program alone impacts farmers' planting decisions" even when no payments were
being made under them. Brazil's Answers to Additional Questions Following Second Panel Meeting, para. 20
(20 January 2004)

• claims of "present" serious prejudice with respect to "U.S. subsidies provided during
MY 1999-2002"62;
• claims of threat of serious prejudice with respect to "U.S. subsidies mandated to be
provided in MY 2003-2007;"63 and
• per se claims of threat of serious prejudice 64 against "selected provisions of the FSRI
Act of 2002 and the ARP Act of 2000" providing for these subsidies, to the extent
relevant to upland cotton, and their implementing regulations.
65
57. The original panel did not identify a "present" serious prejudice claim under Article 5(c)
and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement as one of the claims "concerning selected provisions of the FSRI
Act of 2002 and the ARP Act of 2000." 66 Nor did the original panel identify "selected provisions of
the FSRI Act of 2002 and the ARP Act of 2000" as part of the measures subject to Brazil's claims of
"present" serious prejudice under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.
67
58. To the contrary, the original panel iden tified only "the subsidies provided during
MY 1999-2002" as the measures subject to Brazil's claim of "present" serious prejudice under
Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.68 The original panel then identified the "challenged
measures" that were alleged to be the "subsidies" for purposes of that claim 69; these were the "user
marketing (Step 2) payments to domestic users and exporters; marketing loan programme payments;
PFC payments; MLA payments; DP payments; CCP payments; crop insurance payments; and
cottonseed payments."70 The original panel found that these constituted "subsidies" within the
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement because they were "financial contributions" (mostly in
the form of "grants") conferring a "benefit." 71 The original panel did not consider whether the
statutory/regulatory provisions authorizing these payments were also "subsidies."

62 Upland Cotton (Panel) , para. 3.1(vi)). In the case of Braz il's "present" serious prejudice claims
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement, the Panel understood Brazil as alleging that the relevant
period was MY 1999 through MY 2001.
63 Upland Cotton (Panel) , para. 3.1(vii)). In the case of Braz il's threat of serious prejudice claims
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement, the Panel understood Brazil as alleging that the relevant
period was MY 2002-2007.
64 The original panel clarified that Brazil's claims against the programs per se were ones of threat of
serious prejudice in Upland Cotton (Panel) , para. 7.1507. Brazil confirms in its response to the U.S.
preliminary ruling requests that its "'per se' claim before the original panel was raised as a claim of 'threat of
serious prejudice.'" See Brazil Submission Regarding U.S. Requests for Preliminary Rulings, para. 70, n. 94.
68 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(vi). See also Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1108 ("Brazil claims
that United States subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 have caused, cause and continue to cause "serious
prejudice" to Brazil's interests. . . .") and para. 7.1112 ("Brazil alleges that all of the challenged measures
constitute "subsidies". According to Brazil, most of them – user marketing (Step 2) payments to domestic users
and exporters; marketing loan programme payments; production flexibility contract payments; market loss
assistance payments; direct payments ; counter-cyclical payments; cr op insurance subsidies1248; and
cottonseed payments – provide "financial contributions" in the form of "grants" to participating United States
producers, processors, users or exporters of upland cotton within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the
SCM Agreement.")
69 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1112-7.1120.
70 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1120.
71 Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 7.1112-7.1120.

59. The original panel then found that only certain of the identified "subsidies" – namely, Step 2
payments, marketing loan payments, and counter-c yclical/market loss assistance payments provided
in MY 1999-2002 – caused serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c):
[i]n conclusion, in light of all of these c onsiderations, we find that the effect of the
mandatory, price contingent United States subsidies at issue – that is, marketing loan
programme payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments and MLA payments and
CCP payments – is significant price suppression in the same world market for upland
cotton in the period MY 1999-2002 within the meaning of Articles 6.3(c) and 5(c) of
the SCM Agreement.
72
60. As shown in the table below, the original panel did not make any further finding of WTO
inconsistency with respect to Brazil's claims.
Measure
Challenged
Claim
Made
Resolution by
Original Panel
Paragraph in
Panel Report
"U.S. subsidies
provided during
MY 1999-2002"
"Present" serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c)
of the SCM Agreement
Finding of WTO-inconsistency against
Step 2, marketing loan, and
counter-cyclical/market loss assistance
programs
7.14168.1(g)(i)
"U.S. subsidies
provided during
MY 1999-2001"
"Present" serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(d)
of the SCM Agreement
Rejected for failure to make prima
facie case
7.14658.1(g)(ii)
"U.S. subsidies
provided during
MY 1999-2002"
"Present" serious prejudice
under Articles XVI:1 and
XVI:3 of the GATT 1994
Declined to address, inter alia, because
of finding of inconsistency with
Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement
7.1476
"U.S. subsidies"
allegedly
"mandated" to be
provided during
MY 2003-2007
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c)
of the SCM Agreement
Declined to address in light of finding
of inconsistency with Articles 5(c)
and 6.3(c) and 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement
7.1503
"U.S. subsidies"
allegedly
"mandated" to be
provided during
MY 2002-2007
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(d)
of the SCM Agreement
Rejected for failure to make prima
facie case
7.1504
"U.S. subsidies"
allegedly
"mandated" to be
provided during
MY 2003-2007
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles XVI:1
and XVI:3 of the GATT 1994
Declined to address, inter alia, because
of finding of inconsistency with
Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement
7.1505
"selected
provisions of the
FSRI Act of 2002
and the ARP Act
of 2000"
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c)
of the SCM Agreement
Declined to address in light of findings
regarding export subsidies, import
subsidies, "present" serious prejudice,
and "threat" of serious prejudice
7.1511
"selected
provisions of the
FSRI Act of 2002
and the ARP Act
of 2000"
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(d)
of the SCM Agreement
Same as above 7.1511

72 Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 7.1416 (emphasis added).

Measure
Challenged
Claim
Made
Resolution by
Original Panel
Paragraph in
Panel Report
"selected
provisions of the
FSRI Act of 2002
and the ARP Act
of 2000"
"Threat" of serious prejudice
under Articles XVI:1 and
XVI:3 of the GATT 1994
Same as above 7.1511

61. Upon appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the original panel's finding "that the effect of
marketing loan program payments, Step 2 paymen ts, market loss assistance payments, and counter-
cyclical payments is significant price suppression within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement."73 Brazil did not appeal the panel's decisions to reject or decline to address its
claims regarding "U.S. subsidies" allegedly "m andated" to be provided in MY 2003-2007 or the
per se claims with respect to the programs. More over, Brazil's arguments to the Appellate Body
reflected the understanding that the original pane l's "present" serious prejudice finding applied only
with respect to subsidies provided in MY 1999-2002.74
62. On 21 March 2005, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the original panel report,
as modified by the Appellate Body report. 75 This included adoption of the single actionable-subsidy
related finding that "the effect of the mandatory, price contingent United States subsidies at issue –
that is, marketing loan programme payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments and MLA payments
and CCP payments – is significant price suppression in the same world market for upland cotton in the
period MY 1999-2002 within the meaning of Articles 6.3(c) and 5(c) of the SCM Agreement."76
63. Brazil has not even attempted to reconcile its argument that the original panel's findings of
"present" serious prejudice applied to the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payments with
all of the facts above. Nor has Brazil addressed the ot her clear textual signals that – consistent with
the claims presented to it – the original panel's findi ngs of "present" serious prejudice were made with
respect to payments made in MY 1999-2002. For example:
• The fact that the panel's prohibited subs idy-related conclusions and recommendations
regarding the Step 2 program, as such, expressly refer to "section 1207(a) of the FSRI
Act of 2002 providing for user marketing (S tep 2) payments to exporters of upland
cotton"77 and "section 1207(a) of the FSRI Act of 2002 providing for user marketing
(Step 2) payments to domest ic users of upland cotton." 78 If the findings and
conclusions in paragraphs 8.3(d) and 8.1( g)(i) of the original panel report also
pertained to the Step 2 program, as such, together with the marketing loan program
and counter-cyclical payment program, the pa nel would certainly have included the
same specific kind of reference, rather than a reference to payments.
• The fact that in Section VII:D of the Pa nel Report, dealing with the evaluation of
domestic support measures under Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture , the
original panel expressly stated that, "[i]n this Section of our report, the Panel will
consider the current programmes 'as applie d' and 'as such' together. Therefore,
references to marketing loan programme , user marketing (step 2), direct,

73 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 496.
74 See e.g., Upland Cotton (AB), para. 529.
75 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DS267/20.
76 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1416.
77 See Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 8.3(b) and 8.1(e).
78 See Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 8.3(c) and 8.1(f).

counter-cyclical and crop insurance 'payments' include the legislative and regulatory
provisions authorizing those payments unless otherwise indicated."
79 N o s i m i l a r
statement can be found in Section VII:G, which is the section including the original
panel's analysis of the effects of the subsidi es alleged to be causing serious prejudice.
In fact, the original panel in Section VII:G clearly distinguishes payments from
provisions providing for those payments. No r is there any similar statement made in
connection with the recommendation in para graph 8.3(d) of the panel report (or
paragraph 8.1(g)(i), which contains the conclusion on actionable subsidies to which
the recommendation relates).
64. For the reasons above, it is cl ear that the original panel did not make any finding under
Article 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement against the marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payment programs, as such, whether alone or in addition to payments.
(2) Brazil seeks to read aspects of the original panel report out of context
and inconsistently with the clear ev idence that the findings of "present"
serious prejudice were with respect to a package of payments made in
MY 1999-2002
65. Brazil's arguments to the contrary grasp at isol ated statements in the original panel report and
attempt to attribute to them meaning that is direc tly undermined by all of the evidence above. First,
Brazil argues that the original panel found both paym ents and programs to be part of its terms of
reference and that "[t]he United States did not appeal these findings."
80 This argument is irrelevant.
The United States does not dispute that the original panel considered both pr ograms and payments to
be within its terms of reference. The question is what measures were subject to the original panel's
finding of "present" serious prejudice.
66. Second, Brazil attempts to attach significance to the fact that the listing of the "measures at
issue" in paragraph 7.1107 does not include a "temporal limitation." Brazil argues that this means that
the original panel was disregarding its own clear acknowledgment:
• in the very next paragraph – under the h eading "Overview of Brazil's present serious
prejudice claims under the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994" – that "Brazil claims
that United States subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 have caused, cause and
continue to cause 'serious prejudice' to Brazil's interests by [ inter alia ] . . .
significantly suppressing upland cotton prices in the United States, world and
Brazilian markets in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement;" 81
and
• in paragraph 3.1(vi) that "Brazil requests that the Panel make the following findings
. . . concerning present serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil: the subsidies
provided during MY 1999-2002 caused and continue to cause serious prejudice to the
interests of Brazil by suppressing upland cotton prices in the U.S., world, and
Brazilian markets for upland cotton in viola tion of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement."82
67. According to Brazil, by not including a "temporal limitation" in paragraph 7.1107, the
original panel was also ignoring Brazil's repeated cl arifications in the original proceeding that its
claims of "present" serious prejudice applied to subsidies provided in MY 1999-2002:

79 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.337(ix), n. 466.
80 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 86-87 (February 26, 2007).
81 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1108.
82 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(vi) (emphasis added).

• "Brazil's actionable subsidy claims" comprise "first, claims of present serious
prejudice resulting from subsidies provided in MY 1999-2002;"83
• "The U.S. subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 cause present significant price
suppression in the world and Brazilian market, as well as in markets where Brazilian
producers export."84
• "Brazil's first serious prejudice claim relates to the significant price suppression
caused by U.S. actionable subsidies in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement. The measures involved are subsidies provided in each year
between MY 1999-2002, under the 1996 FAIR Act, the 2000 ARP Act and the 2002
FSRI Act."
85
• "The first [Brazilian adverse effects claim] is that the effect of the U.S. subsidies
provided during each of the MY 1999-2002 have caused and continue to cause
significant price suppression in the U.S., Brazilian, and other world markets for
upland cotton."
86
• "Brazil sets forth evidence below from which the Panel may conclude that the effects
of the U.S. subsidies in MY 1999-2002 is significant price suppression in MY 1999-
2002 in the U.S., world and Brazilian market , as well as in third country markets
where Brazil exported its upland cotton."87
• "Based on the arguments and evidence presen ted above, Brazil requests that this
Panel make the following findings and recommendations . . . The U.S. subsidies
provided during MY 1999-2002 caused and continue to cause serious prejudice to the
interest of Brazil by suppressing upland cott on prices in the U.S., world and Brazilian
markets for upland cotton in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement."
88
• "First, I will discuss Brazil's present serious prejudice claims that relate to U.S.
subsidies provided for the production, export and use of U.S. upland cotton during the
period MY 1999-2002. The four-year peri od in which these subsidies were provided
is both the period of time covering the measu res challenged by Brazil as well as the
period of investigation to examine presen t serious prejudice caused by the U.S.
subsidies under Articles 5(c) and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement."89
68. Brazil's argument regarding the absence of a "temporal limitation" in paragraph 7.1107 is
simply not credible. Rather, the more logical explan ation is that the original panel was identifying in
paragraph 7.1107 the types of measures at issue in the case of Brazil's "present" serious prejudice
claims – specifically, payments and, thus, the application of the "legislative and regulatory
provisions" providing for such payments. The origin al panel then went on to explain and address the
specific payments ( i.e., application of the "legislative and regulatory provisions" in particular years)
that were subject to the claims of "present" serious prejudice.

83 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 9 (emphasis added).
84 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 14 (emphasis added).
85 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 71 (emphasis added).
86 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 100 (emphasis added).
87 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 104 (emphasis added).
88 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 471 (emphasis added).
89 Brazil's 7 October 2003 Second Statement at First Panel Meeting, para. 3 (emphasis added).

69. Third, Brazil argues that MY 1999-2002 w as simply a "reference period" and did not
"circumscribe[] the measures involved in Brazil's present serious prejudice claims." 90 This is directly
contradicted by Brazil's own repeated reference to "subsidies provided in MY 1999-2002" as the
measures subject to its "present" serious prejudice claims, as well as its own express acknowledgment
that:
Brazil's present serious prejudice claims . . . relate to U.S. subsidies provided for the
production, export and use of U.S. upla nd cotton during the period MY 1999-2002.
The four-year period in which these subsidies were provided is both the period of
time covering the measures challenged by Brazil as well as the period of investigation
to examine present serious prejudice caused by the U.S. subsidies under Articles 5(c)
and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement."
91
70. Fourth, Brazil asserts as "evidence" that th e "present" serious prejudice claims applied to
programs, not payments, the fact that the or iginal panel decided not to apply the precise
quantification rules in Part V of the SCM Agreement. According to Brazil, "[i]f the original panel's
findings had related to 'payments' alone, and not to the subsidy program, its reasoning would have
been very different indeed."92 Brazil's argument, again, makes little sense. As Brazil well knows, the
original panel declined to apply the precise quantif ication rules in Part V because it found that this
was not required in the case of any claims under Part III of the SCM Agreement, not because it was
examining the effects of programs, as Brazil asserts:
In view of the contrast in the text, context, legal nature and rationale of the provisions
in Part III of the SCM Agreement relating to a multilateral assessment as to whether a
Member is causing, through the use of any subsidy, "adverse effects" in the form of
"serious prejudice to the interests of another Member" and Part V of the Agreement
relating to obligations of a Member in conducting a unilateral countervailing duty
investigations, we decline to transpose directly the quantitative focus and more
detailed methodological obligations of Part V into the provisions of Part III of the
SCM Agreement.
93
71. Nor is it surprising that the original panel would have looked to how the Step 2, marketing
loan, and counter-cyclical payment programs opera te generally in assessing whether particular
payments under those programs were causing adverse effects. Payments are the application of
programs in particular circumstances. It is absu rd for Brazil to suggest that a finding of "present"
serious prejudice could only be unde rstood to have been made with respect to specific payments, if
the original panel had put on blinders regarding the structure, nature, and operation of programs
pursuant to which the payments were provided.
72. Finally, Brazil again underscores the statem ent by the original panel that "[b]ecause the
Panel's 'present' serious prejudice finding deal w ith the FSRI Act of 2002 and subsidies granted
thereunder in MY 2002, the United States is obliged to take action concerning its present statutory and
regulatory framework as a result of our 'present' serious prejudice finding."94 As the United States has
explained, however, Brazil's reliance on this language is misplaced. The panel states that its "present"
serious prejudice findings "deal with" the statute; it does not state that it found the statutory
provisions to be WTO-inconsistent, as such, as Br azil suggests. Indeed, the panel's statement is
properly understood as reflecting the panel's view th at payments under a program constitute programs
"as applied" and, thus, a finding against payments is a finding against programs "as applied."

90 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 136 (February 26, 2007).
91 Brazil's 7 October 2003 Second Statement at First Panel Meeting, para. 3 (emphasis added).
92 Brazil's 7 October 2003 Second Statement at First Panel Meeting, para. 96 (emphasis added).
93 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.177.
94 Brazil Submission Regarding U.S. Requests for Preliminary Rulings, para. 63.

73. Moreover, regarding the original panel's statem ent that the United States would be "obliged to
take action concerning" the statutory/regulatory provisions as a result of the "present" serious
prejudice finding, the United States notes, first, that this is not a recommendation
95 and Brazil has
conceded as much. 96 Rather, this appears to be a statement of the original panel's views as to what
would be a likely response of the United States to the recommendation that the original panel did
make to remove the adverse effects of, or wit hdraw, the "subsidy" that the original panel had
identified. And the United States did indeed take action to repeal the Step 2 program. While the
original panel may have considered that the adve rse effects of the "subsidy" it was examining would
be eliminated through "action concerning" the statutory provisions authorizing the payments, this does
not change the fact that the "subsidy" it was examining was a package of payments made in
MY 1999-2002 under the Step 2, marketing loan, an d counter-cyclical payment programs, and not the
programs, as such, or the programs in addition to payments thereunder.
 (3) Conclusion
74. As shown above and in the U.S. submissions, there is no basis for Brazil's efforts to rewrite
the original panel report. Brazil demands that this Panel find that the original panel acted
inappropriately; that the original panel disregarded the very matter that it expressly recognized Brazil
as having presented 97 and made findings on different matters not before it without so much as an
explanation or any identification of the legal basis for such action, and in complete disregard of the
fact that similar action has been found impermissible in other disputes. 98 Moreover, Brazil asks the
Panel to believe that the original panel made findings of WTO-inconsistency against certain
programs, as such, and against payments allegedl y mandated to be made in certain future years
without even addressing the extensive arguments that the parties made in respect of those claims, and
without making any of the factual findings that Brazil conceded would be necessary to support an
affirmative finding of WTO-inconsistency. 99 Nothing in the original panel report compels such a
result.

95 The original panel's recommendations simply provide, in relevant part, that "upon adoption of this
report, the United States is under an obligation to 'take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or ...
withdraw the subsidy'" subject to the conclusion in paragraph 8.1(g)(i). Paragraph 8.1(g)(i) provides that "the
effect of the mandatory price-contingent United States subsidy measures – marketing loan programme
payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments, MLA payments and CCP payments – is significant price
suppression in the same world market within the mean ing of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement constituting
serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil w ithin the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement." Upland
98 See e.g., Chile – Price Bands (AB), para. 173 (finding that, by making a finding on a mater that was
not before it, the Panel acted ultra petita and inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.") Chile – Price
Bands (AB), para. 173.
99 For example, in the case of its cl aims against the challenged programs, per se , Brazil asked the
Panel "to find that the mandatory provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act and the 2000 ARP Act together with their
implementing regulations, as listed above, cannot be applied in a WTO consistent manner ." Brazil's
9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 435-436. Explaining what this would mean in the context of this
dispute, Brazil argued "[f]irst, the Panel needs to evaluate whether the U.S. subsidies will necessarily threaten to
cause serious prejudice at price levels below the trigger pr ices of the U.S. subsidies. Second, the Panel needs to
consider whether the U.S. subsidies threaten to cause serious prejudice even at price levels at which only crop
insurance subsidies and direct payments are made ." Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 426
(emphasis added). The original panel did not conduct the requested evaluation and did not make the requested
findings.

12. In paragraph 44 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil states:
"Accordingly, there is no need fo r Brazil to challenge per se the
FSRI Act of 2002. Nor does it assert an 'as applied' challenge to
the FSRI Act of 2002. Rather, Brazil challenges the counter-
cyclical and marketing loan programs in the FSRI Act of 2002 and
the payments that such programmes require to U.S. upland cotton
farmers, as they cause adverse effects." (emphasis added)
 Could Brazil please explain:
a. How its claims against "programmes and payments... as they cause adverse
effects" differ from claims against programmes as such?
 b. How these claims differ from claims against programmes as applied?
75. First, Brazil's response to these questions – in particular, its acknowledgment that there is no
"practical difference between challenging the pr ograms and payments, and challenging the programs
as such" – confirm that Brazil is attempting to make an "as such" challenge without establishing any
of the necessary facts. Again, the United States reiterates the Appellate Body's caution that:
"[A]s such" challenges against a Member 's measures in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings are serious challenges. By definition, an "as such" claim challenges
laws, regulations, or other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective
application, asserting that a Member's conduct – not only in a particular instance that
has occurred, but in future situations as well – will necessarily be inconsistent with
that Member's WTO obligations. In essence, complaining parties bringing 'as such'
challenges seek to prevent Members ex ante from engaging in certain conduct.
The implications of such challenges are obviously more far-reaching than "as
applied" claims. We also expect that me asures subject to 'as such' challenges would
normally have undergone, under municipal la w, thorough scrutiny through various
deliberative processes to ensure consiste ncy with the Member's international
obligations, including those found in the cove red agreements, and that the enactment
of such a measure would implicitly reflect the conclusion of that Member that the
measure is not inconsistent with those obligations. The presumption that WTO
Members act in good faith in the implementation of their WTO commitments is
particularly apt in the context of measures challenged "as such.
100
76. Consistent with the very "definition" of as such challenges, to successfully prosecute this type
of challenge, a complaining party must show that "a Member's conduct – not only in a particular
instance that has occurred, but in fu ture situations as well – will neces sarily be inconsistent with that
Member's WTO obligations." 101 Brazil has recognized this both in this dispute 102 and others." 103
Brazil has argued that "[i]t is established under WT O law that a Member can only challenge measures

100 U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172-173.
101 U.S. – Argentina OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), paras. 172.
102 Brazil First Submission in Original Panel Proceding, para. 244 (citing US – 1916 Act (AB) ,
para. 88).
103 See e.g., Canada – Aircraft II (Panel), paras. 7.56-7.58 ("Given that Brazil's claims are in respect of
the programmes as such, the mandatory/discretionary distinction would traditionally apply. . . .There is . . . no
disagreement between the parties regarding the applicability of the mandatory/discretionary distinction.").

of another Member per se if such measures mandate a violation of the WTO Agreement."
104 T h e
United States agrees fully.
77. Indeed, in the original proceeding, Brazil ha d argued that, in order to make an affirmative
finding of WTO-inconsistency against the challenged programs, per se:
[T]he Panel needs to evaluate whether the U.S. subsidies will necessarily threaten to
cause serious prejudice at price levels below the trigger prices of the U.S. subsidies.
Second, the Panel needs to consid er whether the U.S. subsidies threaten to cause
serious prejudice even at price levels at which only crop insurance subsidies and
direct payments are made."105
78. Similarly, Brazil asked the Panel "to find th at the mandatory provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act
and the 2000 ARP Act together with their implementing regulations, as listed above, cannot be
applied in a WTO consistent manner."106
79. The fact that the original panel neither conducted the requested evaluations, nor made any
findings along the lines requested by Brazil confirms – once again – that the panel made no adverse
effects finding with respect to the Step 2, marke ting loan, and counter-cyclical payment programs as
such (either alone or in addition to any payments ). Moreover, Brazil's express acknowledgment of its
obligations in making an as such claim in the original proceeding underscores the unreasonableness of
its efforts to evade those obligations here.
80. Second, it is remarkable that having carefully set out "as applied" and "as such" claims in the
original proceeding, Brazil now asserts that "seri ous prejudice claims are among those that cannot be
readily classifiable as 'as such' and 'as applied.'"
107 Brazil asserted no difficulty in "classifying" the
claims in the original proceeding. The original pa nel had no difficulty in resolving Brazil's claims as
so "classified." And panels in other disputes have not had such difficulty either. 108 Brazil's assertion
of such difficulties for the first time in this proceed ing – and with the aim of impermissibly expanding
the scope of this proceeding – are not credible.
13. In paragraph 45 of its Rebuttal Submission, Brazil refers to the failure of the
United States "to implement the original recommendation of the DSB requiring the
United States to take actions concerning its present statutory and regulatory
framework providing for marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments".
a. Does Brazil consider that the statement in paragraph 7.1501 of the original
panel report that "the United States is obliged to take action concerning its
present statutory and regulatory framework..." forms an integral part of the
recommendation made by the original panel in paragraph 8.3(d) of its
report?
b. Does Brazil consider that the absence of actions by the United States
"concerning its present statutory and regulatory framework providing for
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments" is in itself a sufficient basis

104 Brazil First Submission in Original Panel Proceding, para. 244 (citing US – 1916 Act (AB) ,
para. 88).
105 Brazil Further Submission, para. 426 (9 September 2003) (emphasis added).
107 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, paras. 114 and 118 (February 26, 2007).
108 See e.g., Korea – Ships (Panel) , para. 7.679 (examining serious prejudice from "a relative handful
of individual subsidized transactions" and not the programs providing for the subsidization as such).

for this Panel to find that the United States has not complied with the DSB
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement?
c. Is there any difference, in Brazil's view, between, on the one hand, the
nature of the action the United States was obliged to take with respect to its
statutory and regulatory framework as a consequence of the
recommendation in paragraph 8.3(d) of the original panel report and, on
the other, the nature of the action the United States would have been
obliged to take if the original panel had found that the relevant provisions
of this statutory and regulatory framework were WTO-inconsistent as
such?
81. The United States offers two comments in regard to Brazil's responses to these questions.
82. First, the United States notes that having con ceded that the language in paragraph 7.1501 was
not part of any recommendation by the original panel
109, Brazil now changes its position and asserts
that "the statement in paragraph 7.1501 of the or iginal panel report forms an integral part of the
recommendation made by the original pane l in paragraph 8.3(d) of its report." 110 Indeed, Brazil goes
even further and argues now that the panel's r ecommendation required the United States to take
"actions . . . 'concerning its present statutory and regulatory fr amework providing for marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payments'" even though paragraph 7.1501 states no such thing.111
83. These assertions are fundamentally at odds with DSU Article 19.1. Article 19.1 of the DSU
controls on the question of the recommendations th at a panel can make where it "concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agre ement." In those circumstances, the panel " shall
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement." The
term "shall" confirms that this is the required recommendation; a panel is not free to recommend
something else. Contrary to Brazil's allegations, th e Appellate Body has clarified that panels do not
have authority to dictate to Members the specific way to "bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement."112 It is left to the discretion of the Member concerned to determine how best to do so.
84. The same result obtains upon an analysis of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement , which
establishes the obligations of a Member "where a pa nel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted
in which it is determined that any subsidy [of the responding Member] has resulted in adverse effects
to the interests of [another] Member within the me aning of Article 5." In those circumstances, the
responding Member may either "take appropriate step s to remove the adverse effects" or "withdraw
the subsidy." Article 7.8 of SCM Agreement does not provide that a panel may dictate precisely how
the Member is to meet these oblig ations. And, indeed, were a panel to do so, it would raise serious
concerns under that provision, Article 3.2 of th e DSU, which provides that "[r]ecommendations and
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish th e rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements," and Article 19.2 of the DSU, which provides that "in [its] findings and
recommendations, the panel . . . cannot add to or di minish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements."
85. Thus, the United States does not consider that it is appropriate to interpret the language in
paragraph 7.1501 in the manner asserted by Brazil, wh ich would attribute to the original panel action
inconsistent with Article 19.1 of the DSU and Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement . Rather, the

110 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 119 (February 26, 2007).
111 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 120 (February 26, 2007).
112 See e.g., EC – Customs (AB) , para. 134. Indeed, while Article 19.1 of the DSU permits panels to
"suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations," it is clear from the text
that such a suggestion is not a recommendation and is not binding.

United States considers that the more logical unde rstanding of the language in paragraph 7.1501 is
that it is a statement of the original panel's views as to what would be a likely response of the
United States to implement the recommendation to remove the adverse effects of, or withdraw, the
"subsidy" that the original panel had identified, partic ularly in light of the fact that the original panel
was at the same time making a finding that the St ep 2 program was a prohibited subsidy and so the
United States would in fact be obliged to change its statutory and regulatory framework as part of its
response to that prohibited subsidy finding.
86. Second, the United States disagrees with Brazi l's assertion that "the action required by the
United States would have been the same" if the recommendation in paragra ph 8.3(d) of the panel
report had applied to the Step 2, counter-cyclical payment, and marketing loan programs, as such,
rather than against particular payments made under those programs in MY 1999-2002, as was the
case. If the recommendation had applied to progr ams, as such, the "action required by the
United States" would have been to either (a) w ithdraw the programs themselves or (b) remove the
adverse effects of the programs. As the reco mmendation applied to certain payments made in
MY 1999-2002, the "action required by the United Stat es" was to either (a) wi thdraw the particular
payments; or (b) remove the adverse effects of the specific payments. While it is conceivable that the
United States could choose to take the same or similar steps in both cases, this does not mean that the
"action required by the United States" would be the same.
14. Could Brazil please explain how this Panel should interpret the relationship between the
three categories of measures identified in paragraph 3.1(v),(vii) and (viii) of the original panel
report? Is it the view of Brazil that "subsidies provided" or "subsidies mandated to be provided"
must be interpreted to encompass both payment s of subsidies and the regulatory provisions
pursuant to which such payments were "provided" or "mandated to be provided"?
87. Please see the U.S. comments regarding Br azil's response to Question 11 above. The
United States notes, in addition, that Brazil provid es no citation or other basis for its assertion that
"the measures identified in para graphs 3.1(vi) and 3.1(vii)" – i.e., "U.S. subsidies provided during
MY 1999-2002" and "U.S. subsidies mandated to be provided in MY 2003-2007" – "must be
interpreted to encompass the statutory and legisl ative framework establishing the contested subsidy
programs, as well as payments mandated by those programs."
113
88. Brazil's argument is also inconsistent with its own clarification in the original proceeding that:
Brazil's . . . Panel Request . . . challeng es two types of domestic support 'measures'
provided to upland cotton and various differe nt types of export subsidy measures.
The first type of domestic support "measure" is the payment of subsidies for the
production and use of upland cotton. These payments were and continue to be made
between MY 1999 to the present (and will be made through MY 2007) through the
various statutory and regulatory instrume nts listed on pages 2-3 of Brazil's Panel
Request. Brazil referred to these payments at pages 2-3 of the Panel Request as
'subsidies and domestic support provided und er' or 'mandated to be provided' under
the various listed statutory and regulatory instruments . . . .Brazil's "Further
Submission" on 9 September 2003 will provi de considerable detail concerning the
effects of the subsidies provi ded and mandated to be provi ded by the United States.
It is these effects in respect of which Brazil seeks relief with respect to the first type of
domestic support measures.
A second type of domes tic support "measure" ch allenged by Brazil are legal
instruments as such . The "legislative and regulatory provisions, by number and

113 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 119 (February 26, 2007).

letter, in respect of which Brazil seeks relief" are those involving the 2002 FSRI Act
and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act . . . .
114
89. Brazil's new argument is also inconsistent with the original panel's analysis of the subsidies
subject to Brazil's "present" serious prejudice claims. As noted above, the original panel identified as
the "challenged measures" that were alleged to be the "subsidies" for purposes of Brazil's "present"
serious prejudice claims the following – "user marketing (Step 2) payments to domestic users and
exporters; marketing loan programme payments; PFC payments; MLA payments; DP payments;
CCP payments; crop insurance payments; and cottonseed payments."115 The original panel found
that these constituted "subsidies" within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement because they
were "financial contributions" (mostly in th e form of "grants") conferring a "benefit." 116 The original
panel did not consider whether th e statutory/regulatory provisions authorizing these payments were
also "subsidies."
90. Finally, Brazil's argument makes little sense in light of the fact that Brazil made separate
claims of threat of serious prejudice "concerning selected provisions of the FSRI Act of 2002 and the
ARP Act of 2000." 117 Brazil tries to explain this away by arguing that it was simply being "over-
inclusive."118 Brazil provides no explanation of why it w ould be "over-inclusive" in the case of its
threat claims but not when it came to the "pr esent" serious prejudice claims. These arguments are
nothing more than post hoc attempts to change the claims Braz il presented in the original proceeding
and the resolution thereof.
15. Does Brazil agree or disagree with the United States that the listing of certain
legislative and regulatory provisions in paragraph 7.1107 of the original panel
report reflects the original panel's view that "payments under a programme
constitute programmes 'as applied'"? [Paragraphs 46-47 of the Rebuttal
Submission of the United States]
91. For the reasons set out in prior U.S. subm issions and the U.S. comments regarding Brazil's
response to Question 11 above, there is no merit to Brazil's assertion that the original panel's finding
of "present" serious prejudice applied to the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs and all payments thereunder. The further bases asserted by Brazil in response to this
question also fail to withstand scrutiny.
92. First, Brazil argues that "[t]he United States' 'as applied' argument incorrectly transforms the
original panel's decision to use MY 2002, and the longer period of MY 1999 – MY 2002, as 'reference
periods,' into a period that circumscribes the measures involved in Brazil's present serious prejudice
claims."
119 Yet this is precisely what Brazil clarified in the resumed session of the first meeting with
the panel in the original proceeding:
First, I will discuss Brazil's present serious prejudice claims that relate to U.S.
subsidies provided for the production, export and use of U.S. upland cotton during the
period MY 1999-2002. The four-year period in which these subsidies were provided
is both the period of time covering the measu res challenged by Brazil as well as the

114 Answers of Brazil to Questions from the Panel, para. 15-16 (11 August 2003).
115 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1120.
116 Upland Cotton (Panel), paras. 7.1112-7.1120.
118 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 132 (February 26, 2007).
119 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 135(February 26, 2007).

period of investigation to examine presen t serious prejudice caused by the U.S.
subsidies under Articles 5(c) and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.
120
93. Brazil cannot explain this away by asserting that this was a unique statement by Brazil and
not representative of Brazil's actual position (as it attempted to do in the meeting with the Panel). It is
difficult to credit that in the presentation of it case to the original panel, Brazil would provide an
incorrect statement on an issue as fundamental as the measures subject to its claims of "present"
serious prejudice. In any event, other assertions by Brazil in the original proceeding fully confirm
that the measures subject to Brazil's "present" ser ious prejudice claim – and, hence, the original
panel's finding of "present" serious prejudice – were subsidies provide d in MY 1999-2002, not
subsidies allegedly "mandated" to be provided in later years and not the statutory/regulatory
provisions authorizing the payments:
• "Brazil's actionable subsidy claims" comprise "first, claims of present serious
prejudice resulting from subsidies provided in MY 1999-2002;"121
• "The U.S. subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 cause present significant price
suppression in the world and Brazilian market, as well as in markets where Brazilian
producers export."122
• "Brazil's first serious prejudice claim relates to the significant price suppression
caused by U.S. actionable subsidies in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement. The measures involved are subsidies provided in each year
between MY 1999-2002, under the 1996 FAIR Act, the 2000 ARP Act and the 2002
FSRI Act."
123
• "The first [Brazilian adverse effects claim] is that the effect of the U.S. subsidies
provided during each of the MY 1999-2002 have caused and continue to cause
significant price suppression in the U.S., Brazilian, and other world markets for
upland cotton."124
• "Brazil sets forth evidence below from which the Panel may conclude that the effects
of the U.S. subsidies in MY 1999-2002 is significant price suppression in MY 1999-
2002 in the U.S., world and Brazilian market , as well as in third country markets
where Brazil exported its upland cotton."125
• "Based on the arguments and evidence presen ted above, Brazil requests that this
Panel make the following findings and recommendations . . . The U.S. subsidies
provided during MY 1999-2002 caused and continue to cause serious prejudice to the
interest of Brazil by suppressing upland cott on prices in the U.S., world and Brazilian
markets for upland cotton in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM
Agreement."
126
94. Second, as discussed above, the fact that there is no "temporal limitation" in paragraph 7.1107
is not remarkable. That paragraph simply describes the types of measures at issue. In the very next

120 Brazil's 7 October 2003 Second Statement at First Panel Meeting, para. 3 (emphasis added).
121 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 9 (emphasis added).
122 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 14 (emphasis added).
123 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 71 (emphasis added).
124 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 100 (emphasis added).
125 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 104 (emphasis added).
126 Brazil's 9 September 2003 Further Submission, para. 471 (emphasis added).

paragraph – under the heading "Overview of Braz il's present serious prejudice claims under the
SCM Agreement and GATT 1994" – the panel expressly clarified that "Brazil claims that
United States subsidies provided during MY 1999-2002 have caused, cause and continue to cause
'serious prejudice' to Brazil's interests by [inter alia] . . . significantly suppressing upland cotton prices
in the United States, world and Brazilian markets in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement;"127 This is consistent with paragraph 3.1(vi), in which the original panel set out the
claim presented as follows:
Brazil requests that the Panel make the following findings . . . concerning present
serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil: the subsidies provided during MY 1999-
2002 caused and continue to cause serious prej udice to the interests of Brazil by
suppressing upland cotton prices in the U.S., world, and Brazilian markets for upland
cotton in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement.128
95. Similarly, there is no merit to Brazil's efforts to claim the absence of a temporal limitation in
paragraph 8.1(g) as evidence that the finding of "present" serious prejudice applies to Step 2,
marketing loan, and counter-cyclical programs and all payments thereunder. There was no reason for
the panel to have included such a limitation in that paragraph given that:
• the panel had already explained earlier in its report what the "subsidies" were (certain
payments)129 and that Brazil's claims of serious prejudice only applied to "subsidies
provided during MY 1999-2002;"130 and
• the only "subsidies" that were even capab le of causing "present" serious prejudice
were the ones provided in MY 1999-2002 and not the ones allegedly "mandated" to
be provided in MY 2003-2007.
The latter not only were not the subject of Brazil's present serious prejudice claims but also were not
yet even in existence at that time. Thus, the original panel may reasonably have considered it
unnecessary to specify that the particular payments to which the finding of "present" serious prejudice
applied were the payments that had actually been made in MY 1999-2002.131
96. Third, Brazil argues that the use of the presen t tense in Article 8.1(g) – "the effect of
mandatory price-contingent Unite d States subsidy measures . . . is significant price suppression" –
signals that the "subsidy measures" could not have been payments made in the past. This argument is
flawed for a number of reasons. First, the origin al panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.1416, on which
the finding in paragraph 8.1(g) is based, expressly states that "the effect ... is significant price
suppression ... in the period MY 1999-2002." Thus, Brazil's argument does not even comport with the
panel's own express conclusions.
97. Second, Brazil's argument assumes that paymen ts made in the past could not be causing
present significant price suppression. This is undermined by the Appellate Body finding precisely to
the contrary – "the effects of a 'recurring' subsidy may continue after the year in which it is paid." 132

127 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1108.
128 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 3.1(vi) (emphasis added).
129 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1120.
130 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1108.
131 Indeed, the conclusion of the panel's report necessarily is based on and reiterates the panel's findings
as set out previously in the report. See Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1416. The conclusion could not alter that
previous finding since the panel then would not have set out the basic rationale behind its findings as required
DSU Article 12.7.
132 Upland Cotton (AB) , para. 484, although the Appellate Body did not explain that in fact in this
instance the effects did indeed persist nor what these effects were nor how they persisted.

Indeed, it is surprising that Brazil would assert otherwise given that it forcefully argued before the
Appellate Body that subsidies provided in MY199 9-2002 must be found to be capable of having
"present" effects at the time of the appeal (i.e., in late 2004 to 2005) in order for it to have any remedy
in the dispute. Brazil argued, specifically, that if the U.S. arguments to the contrary were credited
"Brazil will have no remedy under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement for its serious prejudice, since it
is allegedly legally impossible for the MY 2002 pr ice-contingent recurring subsidies to have any
adverse effects after 31 August 2003 (the close of MY 2002)."
133 It is difficult to see how Brazil
could claim to have "no remedy" if, as Brazil attemp ts to argue now, the original panel had actually
made a "serious prejudice" finding not only against the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical
payments made in MY 1999-2002 but also the pr ograms themselves and all payments (including
future payments) allegedly "manda ted" to be made under the programs. Indeed, Brazil's argument
only makes sense if – as is actually the case – the orig inal panel's serious prejudice finding applied in
respect of payments made in MY 1999-2002.
98. Fourth, Brazil argues again that the original pa nel would not have stated that the United States
was obligated to take action concerning its "p resent statutory and regulatory framework" unless the
statutory and regulatory framework was, as such, the me asure subject to the original panel's finding of
"present" serious prejudice. This is simply incorrect. Brazil attempts to conflate two distinct issues:
(a) what measures were subject to findings/DSB recommendations and rulings and (b) what the
United States could to do to implement the findi ngs. The original panel may reasonably have
considered that, because of both the export subsidy findings against the Step 2 program as such and
the adverse effects findings against the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs as applied in particular years, the Unite d States would take action with respect to the
statutory/regulatory framework. But this does not change the fact that the adverse effects findings
were made with respect to the application of the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs in MY 1999-2002, not the programs as such.
99. In conclusion, there is no basis for Brazil's reading of the original panel's report that would,
rather, re-write what is found there. To the contrary, the evidence – including, inter alia, Brazil's own
explanation of its claims in the original proceedi ng, the original panel's e xplanation of the claims
presented to it, the original panel's resolution of those claims (and, in particular, its rejection or refusal
to address all but the single "present" serious pr ejudice claim in respect of payments made in
MY 1999-2002), the absence of factual findings that Brazil expressly stated would be necessary for
an "as such" adverse effects finding against the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs, and Brazil's own explanation to the Appell ate Body that it would have a "remedy" only to
the extent that payments made in MY 1999-2002 were considered to have continuing effects past the
year in which they were made – confirm that the original panel made a finding of "present" serious
prejudice with respect to payments made under th e Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical
payment programs in MY 1999-2002, not with respect to any future payments and not with respect to
the programs per se.
100. Finally, there is no merit to Brazil's argument that "even assuming that the original panel's
findings of present serious prejudice were 'as applie d' findings limited to marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments made during a particular historical period ( quod non), subsequent payments made
under the same program are also subject to the United States' implementation obligations." 134 Brazil
cites to U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) to support this argument. However, that dispute said
nothing about whether a complaining party could, in post hoc fashion, attempt to add to the measures
found to be WTO-inconsistent by asserting that other measures not found to be WTO-inconsistent are
similar. Rather, that dispute addressed the distinct issue of what measures could be considered to be
part of the measure taken to comply . Future payments in MY 2003-2007 are not measures taken to
comply with any recommendations and rulings. To the contrary, they were original measures that

133 Upland Cotton (AB), para. 529.
134 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 145 (February 26, 2007).

were challenged by Brazil but against whic h the original panel made no finding of
WTO-inconsistency. The reasoning in U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) does not allow Brazil to
escape that fact.
101. There is similarly no merit to Brazil's assertion that, if its arguments were not credited, "WTO
dispute would dissolve into a 'Groundhog Day' situ ation, with no remedy available to Members
suffering adverse effects."135 That is, in fact, an absurd assertion. Under the reasoning of the original
panel, nothing prevents Members from challengi ng present adverse effects of past or current
payments, threat of serious prejudice of past, current, or future payments, or present adverse effects or
threat of serious prejudice from payment programs as such. Indeed, Brazil availed itself of many of
those opportunities in the present dispute. The ob ligations of a responding Member depend on what
the outcome is of those challenges. Where, as here, a complaining Member only prevails on one
claim – that of "present" serious prejudice with respect to particular payments made in particular years
– the Member is bound by that outcome. It ca nnot seek to avoid that outcome either through post hoc
attempts to rewrite the original panel report, or by asserting in a compliance proceeding that other
measures are like the ones subject to the original panel's findings.
16. Could Brazil clarify whether or not its claim in this Article 21.5 proceeding
regarding a threat of serious prejudice caused by marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments is a claim with respect to the marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payment programmes as such? [Par agraphs 237-314 of the First Written
Submission of Brazil]
102. The United States offers two comments in respect of Brazil's response to this question. First,
Brazil suggests that the Panel "follow[] the approach of the original panel, as upheld by the Appellate
Body" in assessing Brazil contingent claim of threat of serious prejudice.
136 This suggestion is
baseless, of course, because the original panel declined to address Brazil's claims of threat of serious
prejudice both with respect to payments allegedly ma ndated to be provided in future marketing years
under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment programs 137 as well as the "selected
provisions of the FSRI Act of 2002 and the ARP Act of 2000" allegedly mandating those payments.138
There was, thus, no "approach" taken by the original panel with respect to any threat claims and no
such "approach" was upheld by the Appellate Body. The question of how to assess those claims is,
thus, a question of first impression before this Panel.
103. Second, Brazil asserts that it "considers that serious prejudice claims are among those that
cannot be readily classifiable as 'as such' and 'as applied.'" 139 The United States notes, again, that
Brazil asserted no difficulty in "classifying" the claims in the original proceeding. The original panel
had no difficulty in resolving Brazil's claims as so "c lassified." And panels in other disputes have not
had such difficulty either.140 Brazil's assertion of such difficulties for the first time in this proceeding
are simply not credible.
Questions to the United States
17. The United States argues in paragraph 16 of its Rebuttal Submission that
"[a]ccording to Brazil, its claims apply not only to the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payment programs, as such, but to the programs in addition to all payments

135 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 149 (February 26, 2007).
136 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 152 (February 26, 2007).
137 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1503-7.1505.
138 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.1511.
139 Brazil Responses to Panel Section A-C Questions, para. 153 (February 26, 2007).
140 See e.g., Korea – Ships (Panel) , para. 7.679 (examining serious prejudice from "a relative handful
of individual subsidized transactions" and not the programs providing for the subsidization as such).

authorized under the programs" (original emphasis). The United States also
argues in this respect that "it is abundantly clear that the original panel did not
make any finding under Article 5(c) an d 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement against the
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs, as such, whether alone or
in addition to payments". [Paragraph 43 of Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
a. How does the United States respond to the argument of Brazil that the
United States mischaracterizes Brazil's claims in these proceedings in that
Brazil is not challenging the subsidy programmes at issue as such?
[Paragraph 31 of Submission of Brazil to the Panel Regarding US Requests
for Preliminary Ruling; paragraph 33 of Rebuttal Submission of Brazil]
b. Could the United States also comment in this regard on the arguments in
paragraph 31 of the Third Party Submission of Chad? Does the
United States agree or disagree with the proposition that statutory or
regulatory provisions can be challenged on an as applied basis and that
Brazil's claims in the original proceeding "were as applied claims
regarding measures that included legislative and regulatory provisions"?
18. The United States submits that the only measures subject to the DSB's
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement are payments made
under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment programmes in
1999-2002. The United States also asserts, in this regard, that Brazil fails to submit
evidence "as to the present effects, if any, of the measures that were subject to the
original panel's actionable subsidy finding".
a. Do these statements mean that th e United States considers that the DSB
recommendation under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement only obliged the
United States to ensure that payments made in 1999-2002 would no longer
have any adverse effects?
b. Could the United States comment on the argument of New Zealand in
paragraph 4.08 of the Third Party Submission of New Zealand?
19. Regarding the argument of the United States that the marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments programmes are not measur es "taken to comply", is it the view
of the United States that Article 21.5 of the DSU only applies to measures actually
taken by a party to comply and does not apply to measures that a Member should
have taken to comply?
20. How does the United States respond to the argument in the Third Party Submission
of Japan that the Appellate Body report in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)
does not support the argument of the United States that the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payments programmes are not within the scope of this Article 21.5
proceeding?
3. Claim of Brazil regarding the failure of th e United States to comply with the DSB
recommendations between 21 September 2005 and 1 August 2006
Questions to Brazil

21. Could Brazil please explain whether its request for a finding that the United States
failed to comply with the DSB recomm endations between 21 September 2005 and

1 August 2006 is supported by prior panel practice in Article 21.5 proceedings?
[Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission of the United States]
104. Brazil argues that the Panel should attach significance to the fact that Australia –
Salmon (21.5) involved a suspended arbitration and that the two disputes discussed by the
United States – EC – Bed Linen (21.5) and U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) – did not. The United States recalls
that in the more recent disputes discu ssed by the United States, the pa nels properly determined that it
was appropriate to review the "existence" or "c onsistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply as of the date that the matter was re ferred to it, not as of the date of the end of any
implementation period:
• In United States – Shrimp (21.5) the panel considered "that it should take into account
all the relevant facts occurring until the date the matter was referred to it. By applying
this approach, an Article 21.5 panel can reach a decision that favours a prompt
settlement of the dispute. Indeed, it avoi ds situations where implementing measures
allowing for compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings would be
disregarded simply because they occur after the end of the reasonable period of
time.
141
• In EC – Bed Linen (21.5) , the panel noted that "[i]t appears India considers that we
must make two decisions on the existence or consistency of measures taken to comply
– one as of the end of the reasonable period of time, and one as of the date of
establishment of the Panel. We do not c onsider that it would be either necessary or
appropriate, as a matter of judicial economy, to first examine whether compliance had
occurred as of the end of the reasonable period of time, and second consider
compliance as of the later date.
142
105. The distinction that Brazil attempts to draw between the present dispute and EC – Bed
Linen (21.5) and U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) is meaningless. In the United States – Shrimp dispute, the
United States and Malaysia entered into a "sequenci ng agreement" very similar to the one that exists
in this proceeding between Brazil and the United St ates which would permit Malaysia to request DSB
authorization to suspend concessions pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU – and would permit the
United States to refer the matter to arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 – at any time following the
completion of the Article 21.5 proceeding.143 In EC – Bed Linen (21.5), the EC and India entered into
a similar sequencing agreement with virtually identical language. 144 Hence, the outcome of the EC –
Bed Linen and U.S. – Shrimp Article 21.5 proceedings could have had exactly the same implication
for an Article 22.6 arbitration as in this dispute or in Australia – Salmon (21.5).

141 United States – Shrimp (Panel) (21.5 – Malaysia), para. 5.12.
142 EC – Bed Linen (Panel) (21.5 – India), para. 6.28.
143 See Understanding between Malaysia and the United States Regarding Possible Proceedings under
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, WT/DS58/16 (circulated Ja nuary 12, 2000) ("If on the basis of the proceedings
under Article 21.5 Malaysia decides to initiate proceedi ngs under Article 22, the United States will not assert
that Malaysia is precluded from obtaining DSB authorization because Malaysia's request was made outside the
30-day time period specified in the first sentence of Article 22.6. This is without prejudice to the rights of the
United States to have the matter referred to arbitration in accordance with Article 22.6.")
144 See Understanding between India and the Europe an Communities Regarding Procedures under
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, WT/DS141/11 (circulated September 21 2001) ("If on the basis of the results of
proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU that might be initiated by India no later than 31 March 2002, India
decides to initiate proceedings under Article 22 of the DS U, the EC will not assert that India is precluded from
obtaining DSB authorization because In dia's request was made outside the 30 day time-period specified in the
first sentence of Article 22.6 of the DSU.")

106. This fact did not compel the EC – Bed Linen (21.5) and U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) panels to assess
compliance at of the moment of the termination of the reasonable period of ti me for implementation.
And there is even less basis for such an assessment here given that this would require an assessment
of a factual scenario that the parties agree no longer exists.
107. Considerations of suspension of concessi ons/countermeasures are not only inappropriate
guides for a compliance panel's assessment of the matters referr ed to it but such considerations do not
support Brazil's position regarding findings of co mpliance in past periods. Suspension of
concessions/countermeasures are not available retroactiv ely; they may only be invoked so long as a
breach exists under the present factual circumstances.
145 The approach taken by the panels in EC –
Bed Linen (21.5) and U.S. – Shrimp (21.5) respect and are fully consistent with this fact. The same
approach is appropriate in this dispute.
22. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the European Communities that "the
lack of positive action taken by the United States to comply with the panel and
Appellate Body's findings and recommen dations between the implementation date
of 21 September 2005 and 31 July 2006 is no t necessarily fatal to its defence"?
[Paragraph 48 of the Third Party Submission of the European Communities]
108. The United States disagrees with Brazil's argu ment that – in all cases – some positive action
by a responding Member is required in order to satisfy an obligation under Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement to "take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects" or "withdraw the subsidy."
109. Contrary to Brazil's arguments, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "take appropriate steps" is
sufficiently broad to encompass situations where ch anges are brought about not by particular actions
by the responding Member itself but by other factor s (for example, changes in market conditions, the
passage of time, or some other extraneous change). As the United States explained in its response to
Question 24 from the Panel, "take" means both "und ertake and perform" – as Brazil asserts – but also
"receive or obtain (something given, bestowed, or administered).
146 This term is, thus, entirely
capable of encompassing both an active or a pass ive role on the part of a responding Member.
"Steps" – especially in the sense of "taking steps" – refers to "an action, measure, or proceeding, esp.
one of a series, which leads towards a result." 147 Together these terms recognize that some positive
change must come about. But, they do not require that the change be solely attributable to actions by
the responding Member.
110. Brazil not only reads "take" "steps" too narrowly but it reads out of Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement the term "appropriate," which is the speci fic guidance provided in that provision as
to the nature of the steps to be taken. "Appropriate" means, inter alia, be "specially suitable (for, to)"
the removal of the adverse effects found to ex ist in the panel and Appellate Body reports. 148 There is
no basis to exclude the possibility a priori that – given the particular adverse effects found to exist in
the panel and Appellate Body repor ts – a responding Member may not need to take positive steps in
order to "remove the adverse effects." Indeed, th e original panel specifically allowed for such a
possibility in recognizing that the effects of subsidies dissipate over time.149 Under the particular facts

145 Thus, for example, Article 22.8 of the DSU clarifies that "[t]he suspension of concessions or other
obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent
with a covered agreement has been re moved, or the Member that must implement recommend or rulings proves
a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached."
146 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3206, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-125).
147 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3050, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-126).
148 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 103, Volume 1, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-128).
149 Upland Cotton (Panel) , para. 7.1179, n. 1298 ("We do not disagree with the general proposition
underlying . . . [the] "expensing" rules [in Part V of the SCM Agreement], which we understand to be that, with

of a dispute – for example, the present dispute in which the subsidies challenged and found to be
WTO-inconsistent were payments made under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical
payment programs in MY 1999-2002 – it may well be th at any adverse effects have dissipated and no
further steps need to be taken to remove them. In those circumstances, it could be "appropriate" for a
Member not to take any further steps to remove th e adverse effects. Certainly, Brazil has not shown
that any adverse effects of the package of payments made in MY 1999-2002 remain today that the
United States has an outstanding obligation to remove.
111. A similar analysis could apply with respect to the obligation to "withdraw the subsidy." As
explained in the U.S. response to Question 24, "withdraw" means, among other things, "cause to
decrease or disappear" and "take back or away (something bestowed or enjoyed)." 150 According to
Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, the thing to be "caused to decrease or disappear" or "taken back or
away" is the "subsidy." Depending on the circumst ances, extraneous factors may have caused the
subsidy to "decrease or disappear" or be "taken away" without specific action by the responding
Member itself. There is no reason to assert that the Member could not, in such a circumstance, be
found to have fulfilled its obligations under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement.
Question to the United States

23. Does the United States consider that the text of Article 21.5 of the DSU should be
interpreted to mean that a compliance pan el may only review the "existence" or
"consistency" with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply as of the date
that the matter was referred to the panel and not as of the date of the end of the
implementation period? [Paragraph 68 of the Rebuttal Submission of the
United States]
D. C
LAIMS OF BRAZIL REGARDING PRESENT SERIOUS PREJUDICE
1. General
Questions to both parties
24. Could the parties explain how they interpret the phrases "take appropriate steps to
remove the adverse effects" and" withdraw the subsidy" in Article 7.8 of the SCM
Agreement?
112. The United States has addressed a number of the interpretive flaws in Brazil's analysis above
in response to Question 22 and refers the Panel to the discussion there.
113. The United States notes, in addition, that Brazil is wrong to assert that the original findings of
WTO-inconsistency apply with respect to the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs and all payments thereunder. As such, Brazil's arguments about what "appropriate steps"
were available to the United States with in the meaning of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement are also
off the mark.
114. The United States also disagrees with Br azil's assertion that the original panel dictated what
the particular "appropriate steps" must be pursuant to Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement.151 Contrary

the passage of time, a subsidy's effects may diminish. For example, a subsidy granted 9 or 10 years ago would
indubitably be less likely to affect producers decisions now than it did 8 years ago.")
150 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 3704, Volume 2, (1993 Edition) (Exhibit US-118).
151 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 7 (March 6, 2007) ("the original panel
identified the particular appropriate step under Article 7.8 that the United States must take regarding the 'basket'
of price-contingent and mandatory subsidies found to cause present significant price suppression. . . .").

to Brazil's assertion, nothing in Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement – or any other provision of the
WTO agreement – provides a reviewing panel with such authority. Indeed, unlike Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement or Article 19.1 of the DSU, Article 7.8 does not even discuss the recommendation
that a panel must make where it determines that a subsidy is causing adverse effects within the
meaning of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. It simply sets out the general obligation on a Member
that find itself in the situation "where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it
is determined that any subsidy [of the Member] ha s resulted in adverse effects to the interests of
[another] Member within the meaning of Article 5." This obligation is either to "take appropriate
steps to remove the adverse effects" of the subsidy or "withdraw the subsidy." Nothing in Article 7.8
of the SCM Agreement binds the Members' discretion in this regard.
115. Moreover, the United States does not consider that the panel intended to dictate "appropriate
steps" in noting that the United States would be "obliged to take action concerning" the
statutory/regulatory provisions as a resu lt of the "present" serious prejudice finding.
152 Indeed, Brazil
has acknowledged before that this does not constitute a recommendation. 153 Rather, this appears to be
a statement of the original panel's views as to what would be a likely response of the United States to
the recommendation that the original panel did make ( i.e., to remove the adverse effects of, or
withdraw, the "subsidy" that the original panel ha d identified). And, indeed, the United States did
"take action concerning" the statutory/regulatory provisions when it terminated the Step 2 program.
116. While the original panel may have considered that the adverse effects of the "subsidy" it was
examining would be eliminated through "action con cerning" the statutory provisions authorizing the
payments, this does not change the fact that the "subsidy" it was examining was a package of
payments made in MY 1999-2002 under the Step 2, marketing loan, and counter-cyclical payment
programs, and not the programs, as such, or the pr ograms in addition to payments thereunder. Nor
does it change the fact that – under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement – other actions or changes
might also have been appropriate to "remove the adve rse effects or . . . withdraw the subsidy'" subject
to the conclusion in paragraph 8.1(g)(i) of the original panel report.
25. How do the parties interpret the relatio nship between Article 7.8 of the SCM
Agreement and Article 21.5 of the DSU?
117. The United States agrees that Article 21.5 of the DSU permits review of a disagreement as to
whether a Member has implemented the oblig ations set out in Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement .
However, the United States disagrees with Brazil's ou tline of the steps this Panel allegedly "must"
take under these provisions. In particular, there is no basis for Brazil's assertion that "the compliance
Panel, under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement and Article 21.5 of the DSU, must first assess Brazil's
claims that no measures taken to comply exi st with respect to the period 21 September 2005 and
1 August 2006"154 As the United States has explained, neither Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement nor
Article 21.5 of the DSU – nor any other provision of the WTO agreement – requires making findings
of compliance as of the end of the six-month period set out in Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement .
Moreover, prior panels in EC – Bed Linen and U.S. – Shrimp have properly determined that it was
appropriate to review the "existence" or "consistency with a covered agreement" of measures taken to

152 The original panel's recommendations simply provide, in relevant part, that "upon adoption of this
report, the United States is under an obligation to 'take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or ...
withdraw the subsidy'" subject to the conclusion in paragraph 8.1(g)(i). Paragraph 8.1(g)(i) provides that "the
effect of the mandatory price-contingent United States subsidy measures – marketing loan programme
payments, user marketing (Step 2) payments, MLA payments and CCP payments – is significant price
suppression in the same world market within the mean ing of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement constituting
serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil w ithin the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement." Upland
154 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 19 (March 6, 2007) (emphasis added).

comply as of the date that the matter was referred to it, not as of the date of the end of any
implementation period.
155 As discussed above, this approach is equally appropriate here (if not more
so given that the parties agree that the facts and circumstances have changed since the end of the six-
month period set out in Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement).
26. Could the parties explain whether they agree or disagree with the arguments of
New Zealand in its Third Party Submission that Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement
has certain consequences for the burden of proof in an Article 21.5 proceeding?
[Paragraphs 5.04-5.06 of the Third party Submission of New Zealand]
 27. Could the parties comment on the following statement of the European
Communities:
"The text of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement does not state
expressly that a Member that has been requested by the DSB to
implement its recommendations an d rulings under Article 7.8 of
the SCM Agreement has to do anything" (original emphasis)
118. Please see the U.S. comments regarding Brazi l's response to Questions 22 and 24 above.
28. The parties present divergent views with resp ect to the relevant marketing year to be
considered by the panel in its analysis of Brazil's serious prejudice claims.
a. Could the parties explain what th ey consider to be the relevant legal
considerations by which the Panel should be guided in determining
whether MY 2005 or MY 2006 is the appropriate marketing year?
119. Brazil devotes its entire response to arguing that the proper "reference period" for the Panel's
analysis is MY 2005. However, the Panel's questi on does not ask for an identification of a "reference
period;" it asks what "the relevant marketing year" is for purposes of Brazil's serious prejudice
claims. The United States maintains that the two are distinct questions.
120. On the question of the relevant marketing year for purposes of Brazil's serious prejudice
claims, the United States maintains that, under the text of Articles 6.3(c) and 6.3(d), the proper inquiry
is as to the present effect of any challenged measures. A ccordingly, the present period (or marketing
year) – in this case MY 2006 – is the relevant one . While the United States does not disagree that
data from earlier marketing years may be consider ed where reliable data regarding MY 2006 is not
available (as a proxy), this cannot obscure the fact that the relevant query is as to effects given present
facts and circumstances.
121. This is especially true given that – as Brazil finally acknowledges – a comparison to
"historical data shows that there have been fairly significant shifts of prices, demand, [and] supply
based on a number of different factors."
156 The United States appreciates this acknowledgment that,
in fact, market and production conditions have changed substantially, especially since the termination
of the Step 2 program. As the United States has explained, since the term ination of the Step 2
program:

155 United States – Shrimp (Panel) (21.5 – Malaysia) , para. 5.12; EC – Bed Linen (Panel) (21.5 –
India), para. 6.28.
156 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 24 (March 6, 2007) (emphasis added).

• U.S. exports for MY 2006 are down 30 percent from the levels observed at the same
time last year.157
• Weekly cotton sales are 31 percent below the 5-year average.158
• And total U.S. export commitments are currently approximately 40 percent below last
year's level and 27 percent below the 5-year average.159
• Forecasts for the future are similarly gloomy. As the United States explained in the
meeting with the Panel, in February of this year, USDA lowered the U.S. cotton
export forecast for MY 2006 by nearly 8 percent, following a 2 percent downward
revision in January.
160
• These downward revisions are taking place at the same time that USDA estimates
record high foreign cotton mill use, which means that U.S. share of foreign
consumption is expected to drop from 16 percent in MY 2005 to 12 percent in
MY 2006.
• Moreover, U.S. share of world exports is expected to drop from 40 percent in
MY 2005 to 36 percent in MY 2006.
• U.S. domestic mill use for MY 2006 is projected at just 5 million bales, the lowest
since MY 1931.
• And the declining demand for U.S. upland co tton is also being reflected in planting
and production decisions. The annual survey of planting intentions conducted by the
National Cotton Council indicates that U.S. upland cotton plantings are likely to be
down an average of 14 percent in MY 2007 from 2006 levels.
161
122. Under these conditions, it is the historical data that Brazil presses that should be viewed with
caution. Whatever the data say about any effects that existed in the historical period is unlikely to be
true under the very different conditions that exist at present. While the Panel may – in some cases –
have to rely on that data because reliable or comp lete data does not exist for the present marketing
year, it is appropriate to keep in mind the different conditions that exist at present in assessing Brazil's
claims.
b. Do the parties agree or disagree w ith the argument of the European
Communities that in a dispute involving a claim of present serious
prejudice the parties must provide th e "most recent reasonably available"
data? [Paragraphs 43 and 54-55 of the Third Party Submission of the
European Communities]
123. Please see the U.S. response to Question 28 an d comments above regarding Brazil's response
to Question 28(a).

157 Weekly Export Performance Report for week ending February 15, 2007 (Exhibit US-113).
158 Weekly Export Performance Report for week ending February 15, 2007 (Exhibit US-113).
159 Weekly Export Performance Report for week ending February 15, 2007 (Exhibit US-113).
160 February 2007 World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) Report
(Exhibit US-114).
161 National Cotton Council Planting Intentions Survey MY 2007 (Exhibit US-115).

Questions to the United States
29. Does the United States contest the fact that a "strong positive relationship between
upland cotton (base acre) producers receivi ng annual payments and upland cotton
production" exists? 162 In particular, does the US disagree with the following
statements163:
• a very large proportion of farms with up land cotton base acres continue to
plant upland cotton in the year of payment;
• the overwhelming majority of farms enrolled in the programs which plant
upland cotton also hold upland cotton base;
Question to Brazil
30. How does Brazil respond to the argument of the United States that "whether or not
the marketing loan and counter-cyclical payment programs or payments under the
programs cause significant price suppression is a question of first impression"?
[Rebuttal Submission of the United States, paragraph 219]
124. The United States welcomes Brazil's acknowledgmen t that whether or not the marketing loan
and counter-cyclical payment programs or paym ents under the programs cause significant price
suppression is a question of first impression. The United States respectfully requests that the Panel
bear this in mind as it addresses Brazil's repeated assertions that the U.S. arguments have all been
rejected – and the issues before this Panel have all been decided – by the original panel.
125. The United States does offer two brief clarificati ons, however, in this regard. First, contrary
to Brazil's assertions, the United States does not ta ke the position that all of the findings of the
original panel are "irrelevant." Indeed, Brazil' s failure to provide even a single citation to a
U.S. submission in support of this assertion confirms that it is unfounded.
126. Second, Brazil assumes that the sole reason th at the question above is one of first impression
is because the original panel did not consider whether these particular measures caused significant
price suppression. This is not the only basis. The original panel also did not consider what the effects
of any measures would be in the present period and under the kind of market conditions that exist at
present. To the contrary, as discussed above, the measure s subject to the original panel's analysis
were certain payments made in MY 1999-2002 and th e question examined by the panel was as to the
effects that those payments had in MY 1999-2002. These limitations cannot be ignored in assessing
the relevance of findings made by the original panel.
2. The structure, design and operation of the countercyclical and marketing loan payment
programs
Question to the United States

31. Brazil claims that the structure, design and operation of US counter-cyclical
payments stimulate US upland cotton production. Both Brazil and the United

162 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: See para. 131 of Brazil's first submission. The Panel clarifies that
this phrase refers to the fact that "the recipients who hold upland cotton base acres" and "those who
continue to plant upland cotton" overlap with each other to a great extent. (See para. 7.637 of the report of
the original panel.) The Panel understands that Brazil uses this phrase in the same sense.]
163 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: These passages are reproduced from para. 7.636 of the report of the
original panel.]

States have referred to the Westcott (2005)
164 study to provide support for their
opposing analysis of the possible productio n impact of counter-cyclical payments.
In its rebuttal, Brazil quotes the following passage from Westcott:
So where do CCPs fit compared with other farm commodity
programs in the 2002 Farm Act? Marketing loans are fully
coupled since they are available on all production and their link to
market prices means they affect production decisions of farmers.
Direct payments are mostly decoupled, since they are paid on a
fixed, historically-based quantity rather than on current production
and are not dependent on market prices or other factors that would
affect production.
…
CCPs fall in between these two programs, having some properties
similar to mostly decoupled direct payments and other properties
similar to fully coupled marketing loans. Like direct payments,
CCPs do not depend on current production since they are paid on a
fixed, historically-based quantity. However, similar to marketing
loans, CCPs are linked to market prices so there may be some
influence on current production decisions of farmers, which would
potentially make CCPs at least partially or somewhat coupled.
 a. Does the United States agree with this characterization of the CCP?
b. How would the United States respond to the argument that, by design,
counter-cyclical payments are in some measure coupled to production
decisions because part of the payments is contingent on the actual
realization of market prices?
3. Economic simulation model
Question to the United States

32. Brazil has presented a partial equilibrium model to simulate the effects of
eliminating US upland cotton payments, particularly the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical payments. In both its submission and rebuttal, the United States
has provided reactions to the simulation model.
a. Would it be accurate to describe the United States' response as constituting
a general acceptance of the framework of analysis adopted by Brazil but
contesting the assumptions made regar ding the values of the parameters,
the supply and demand elasticities and the "coupling factor", used in the
model? (The coupling factor is the am ount by which the expected price is
increased by each dollar per unit of subsidy payments.)
b. In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States
uses the same value of 1 that Brazil ad opts for the coupling factor assigned
to marketing loan payments. Does th is imply an acceptance by the United
States that, by design, marketing loan payments provide a one-for-one
incentive to upland cotton production?

164 [ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE: Paul A. Westcott, "Counter-Cyclical Payments Under the
2002 Farm Act: Production Effects Likely to be Limited" (Exhibit US-35).]

c. In its First Written Submission and Rebuttal Submission, the United States
used a non-zero value of 0.25 (not much lower from the 0.4 that Brazil
adopts) for the coupling factor assigned to counter-cyclical payments. Does
this imply an acceptance by the United States that, by design, counter-
cyclical payments are partially tied to upland cotton production, and of a
magnitude (25 cents to a dollar of counter-cyclical payments) not very far
from Brazil's own estimate (of 40 cent s to a dollar of counter-cyclical
payments)?
E. E
XPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES
1. Permissibility of an a contrario interpretation of item (j) of the Illustrative List
Questions to the United States
33. Please discuss whether (and if so, how) the panel rulings in Korea – Vessels and
Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (I and II) affect the United States' approach to the
interpretation of the relationship between item (j) of the Illustrative List and Article
3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
34. Does the United States considers that item (j) of the Illustrative List is one of the
provisions to which footnote 5 of th e SCM Agreement applies? What impact does
this have for the United States' interpretatio n of the interaction between item (j) of
the Illustrative List and Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement?
35. How does the United States address Brazil's argument that permitting an a
contrario reading of item (j) would prevent a Member from challenging specific
export credit guarantees or cohorts of such guarantees granted by a Member, as
opposed to export credit guarantee programs [see paragraphs 472 ff. of Brazil's
Rebuttal].
Questions to Brazil

36. What is Brazil's reading of the Appellate Body's statement in paragraph 80 of its
Report in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) that it " ... would have been prepared to find that
the payments made under the revised PROEX are justified under item (k) of the
Illustrative List"? Should the Panel take this statement into account in deciding
whether item (j) can be interpreted a contrario?
127. Brazil's response to this question does not withstand scrutiny. Nor is Brazil's response
credible in light of the directly contradictory positions taken by Brazil where its measures were at
issue and an a contrario interpretation of item (k) would have accrued to its benefit.
128. The United States recalls that in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) , Brazil expressly argued that an
a contrario interpretation of items in the Illustrativ e List was possible entirely separate from any
application of footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement.
165 Following from this, the Appellate Body noted
that it was not interpreting footnote 5 but that it, nonetheless, was prepared to accept Brazil's
argument that the first paragraph of item (k) could be read a contrario to determine when measures

165 Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (AB) , para. 57 ("Brazil emphasizes, first of all, that its argument that
subsidies under the revised PROEX are 'permitted' was not based on footnote 5 but rather on an 'a contrario'
interpretation of the text of the first paragraph of item (k).")

are "justified."
166 The Appellate Body's silence as to footnote 5 simply derived from Brazil's own
arguments in that dispute, it was not a signal that footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement does not apply to
item (j) or item (k).
129. Moreover, the United States recalls, again, Brazi l's argument in that dispute that footnote 5
did in fact apply to items (j) and (k) and that both contained the kind of limitation encompassed by
footnote 5:
Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement specifies that Annex I contains not only a list of
prohibited export subsidies, but also measur es that do not constitute export subsidies,
such as in items (b), (h), (i) and (k). Co mparing the structure of item (j) and item (k),
the two provisions share a similar structure in that they define practices that constitute
prohibited export subsidies with language that limits the sc ope of the definition. In
the case of item (j) regarding export credit guarantee or insurance programs, the
limiting language is "premium rates whic h are inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses of the programs."167
130. In light of those arguments, it is curious that Brazil now suggests that "item (k) is
substantively distinct from other Illustrative List ite ms" such that the Appellate Body's acceptance of
an a contrario reading "would not extend beyond item (k)." 168 Brazil asserts that this is because the
"material advantage" clause in the first paragraph of item (k) is allegedly "closely related" to the
'benefit' standard under Article 1.1. Brazil asserts that, by contrast, item (j) "tells one nothing about
whether [export credit guarantees] confer benefits on recipients relative to market benchmarks" and
would allegedly "eliminate any consid eration of that 'benefit'." Importantly, none of this was set out
by the Appellate Body to explain its decision to accept an a contrario interpretation of item (k).
Instead, it is simply post hoc reasoning by Brazil to avoid application of the same interpretive
considerations to the U.S. measures th at Brazil would have benefitted from in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5)
had it made the proper factual showing.
131. The Appellate Body did not indicate that the permissibility of an a contrario interpretation
depended on the proximity of the standard set out in the Illustrative List to the one asserted by Brazil
as being the sole standard of "benefit" under Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement . Nor has the
Appellate Body stated that "benefit" under Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement must be understood
to require an assessment of "benefit to the recipient" even where the drafters specifically agreed in the
Illustrative List that a different approach is a ppropriate in assessing whether particular measures are
prohibited export subsidies. Indeed, if it had done so, the Appellate Body would effectively have
rendered inutile footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement. That footnote recognizes that – for provisions of
the Illustrative List, which either explicitly or implicitly limit the measures that may be deemed export
subsidies – it is the Illustrative List itself that de finitely clarifies the conditions under which the listed
measures will be considered "subsidies" within the meaning of Article 1.1 that are "export contingent"
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a).
2. Outstanding export credit guarantees / measures taken to comply
Questions to Brazil
37. Brazil relies on the panel and Appellate B ody Reports in Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) in
support of its arguments that the United States has not "withdrawn" the subsidy

166 Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (AB) , para. 80 (arguing that, if Brazil had made the correct factual showing
under paragraph 1, "we would have been prepared to find that the payments made under the revised PROEX are
justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List.")
167 Brazil – Aircraft (AB), para. 19 (emphasis added).
168 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 40 (March 6, 2007) (emphasis added).

and is, "[a]t a minimum... prohibited from making 'payments' on claims against"
any outstanding export credit guarantees [Paragraph 397 of Brazil's Rebuttal
Submission]. Please discuss how the findings of the panel and Appellate Body in
that case apply to the provision of the US export credit guarantees at issue.
132. As the United States explained in its oral st atement before the Panel, the reasoning in the
Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) dispute does not support Brazil's arguments that the United States has not
"withdrawn" the subsidy with respect to the ch allenged export credit guarantees or Brazil's assertions
about "performing on" export credit guarantees.
133. Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) involved the issuance by Brazil of WTO-inconsistent bonds. Brazil
asserted the right, in that dispute, to continue to issue these WTO-inconsistent bonds even after the
end of the reasonable period of tim e to "withdraw" them simply because it had entered into letters of
commitment to provide them prior to the end of the reasonable period of time. The Appellate Body
disagreed with Brazil. The Appellate Body noted that:
The existence of a "subsidy" was not contested by Brazil in the proceedings before
the original panel; and Brazil also conceded before the original panel that subsidies
under PROEX were export contingent. The onl y issue before us now is whether the
continued issuance of NTN-I bonds by Brazil after 18 November 1999, pursuant to
letters of commitment issued before 18 November 1999, is c onsistent with the
recommendation of the DSB to "withdraw" the prohibited export subsidies within
90 days.
169
134. In the Appellate Body's view, continuing to provide WTO-inconsistent bonds on precisely the
same terms and conditions as before was not cons istent with Brazil's obligation to withdraw the
export subsidy.
135. The U.S. export credit guarantees are not like Brazil's WTO-inconsistent bonds. Brazil's
bonds continued to be prohibited export subsidies both before and after the date of implementation.
By contrast, since July 1, 2005 (and, indeed, even before that time), U.S. export credit guarantees
ceased being part of any program that is bei ng operated at a "net cost to the government." 170 Thus,
unlike Brazil, the United States has not attempted to continue providing pr ohibited export subsidies
past the date of implementation. Unlike Brazil, the United States has withdrawn the subsidy that was
found to exist with respect to any export cr edit guarantees outstanding at the end of the
implementation period and all export credit guarantees issued thereafter.
3. "Benefit" under Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement
Question to the United States
38. Please discuss the relevance of the original panel's characterization, in
paragraph 6.31 of its report, of Brazil's reliance on Ar ticles 1 and 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement as "not a separate claim, but merely another argument" on the
United States' view in this respect (and notably the United States statement, in
paragraph 67 of its First Written Submission, that "... the panel in the original
proceeding specifically declined to add ress Brazil's alleged 'claim' under Articles 1
and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement")?

169 Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (AB), para. 44.
170 Upland Cotton (Panel), para. 7.804.

Questions to Brazil

39. The Panel understands the United States to argue that it has relied on the Panel's
findings under item (j) to implement the DSB recommendations with respect to
export credit guarantees. How would this, in Brazil's view, affect the compliance
panel's role in this proceeding? Was the United States also expected to implement
changes in order to make its export cred it guarantee programmes consistent with
article 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, even though there were no findings of
the original panel in this respect?
136. Brazil's assertion that the U.S. reliance on the original Panel's findings under item (j) "should
not affect the compliance Panel's role in these Artic le 21.5 proceedings" is regrettable and incorrect.
As the United States explained in response to Qu estion 2, it is important to examine the DSB's
recommendations and rulings – and the factual findi ngs underpinning them – in order to determine
whether the responding Member was, in fact, required to take measures to come into compliance and,
if so, the scope of the obligation to do so.
171 Contrary to Brazil's assertion, this Panel's role
specifically includes looking to the DSB's recommendations and rulings and the findings in the
original dispute and determining whether the United States has heeded them. It clearly has done so
here.
137. Brazil's asserts that, to the extent the Unite d States "somehow relied" on the findings of the
panel and Appellate Body in the original dispute, the United States is seeking to "escape the export
subsidy disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement."172 This accusation is
baseless. Moreover, it assumes Brazil's own arguments that there is a separate standard for what is a
prohibited export subsidy exists unde r Article 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and that different
standard involves different impl ementation obligations from which the United States is seeking to
"escape." That Brazil specifically made the same arguments to the panel and Appellate Body and that
they nevertheless declined to address any separate "claims" or "arguments" under the allegedly
different standard in Article 1.1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement is consistent with the fact that no
such different standard exists.
40. In paragraph 410 of its Rebuttal, Braz il refers to paragraph. 7.398 of the Panel
Report in Canada – Aircraft II. The Panel notes, however, that in the same
paragraph, the Canada -- Aircraft II panel also indicated that there would be a
"'benefit' when the cost-saving for a Bombardier customer for securing a loan with
an IQ loan guarantee is not offset by IQ's fees". Please discuss, in light of this
sentence, whether the Panel should read th e Canada – Aircraft II panel as having
rejected the "total cost of funds" as the proper benchmark under Article 14(c) of
the SCM Agreement.
138. Brazil concedes in response to this question that the panel in Canada – Aircraft II did not
reject the standard in Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement , but that it simply found that – in the
particular circumstances of that dispute – it was "safe to assume" that the test in Article 14(c) would
be satisfied if the fees charged for the IQ loan guarantees were not "market based."
173 In fact, even
while the panel asserted that it was "safe" to make such an assumption, the panel actually required
Brazil to provide "arguments or in formation regarding what the [airlin e] might have had to pay on a
comparable commercial loan absent the IQ loan guarantee."174 The panel noted that:

171 See e.g., United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination (21.5 – Canada) (AB), para. 68.
172 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 48 (March 6, 2007) (emphasis added).
173 Canada-Aircraft II, para. 7.399 (emphasis added).
174 Canada-Aircraft II, para. 7.399 (emphasis added).

Brazil has made no arguments to the effect that 'there is a difference between the
amount that the [Mesa Air Group] pays on a loan guaranteed by [IQ] and the amount
that the [Mesa Air Group] would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the
[IQ] guarantee', adjusted for any differen ce in fees. In particular, although Brazil
does not deny that loan guarantees are av ailable on a commercial basis, Brazil has
failed to adduce any arguments or inform ation regarding what Mesa Air Group might
have had to pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the IQ loan guarantee.
175
139. On the basis of that failure on the part of Brazil – as well as Brazil's failure to "make any
other argument to the effect that IQ's fee for its loan guarantee to Mesa Air Group is not market
based" – the panel "reject[ed] Brazil's claim that the IQ loan guarantee to Mesa Air Group confers a
'benefit.'"176
140. In this dispute, Brazil has again failed to make the kind of particularized showing
contemplated under Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement ; it has not shown that the overall cost,
including fees, of each of the loans guaranteed by the government is less than overall cost of a
comparable commercial loan that could be obtaine d without a government guarantee. Nor has Brazil
provided any basis why it would be "safe to assume" that the test in Article 14(c) would be satisfied in
the present dispute simply by showing a differe nce in fees between GSM 102 guarantees and other
commercially-available guarantees. Indeed, give n the evidence submitted by the United States
showing that – contrary to Brazil's assertions – fore ign obligors are in fact able to obtain financing
even without GSM 102 guarantees and on terms better than those available with GSM 102 guarantees,
it is clear that it is not safe to make such an assumption here.
Questions to both parties
41. What are the relevant considerations to gu ide the Panel in the selection of a market
benchmark in this case?:
a. That the institution that provides the product is, on the whole, or on a
program or product-specific basis, pr ofitable? If so, is "any" profit
sufficient to qualify an institution/ product/program as a relevant "market
benchmark" or must the institutio n/product/program achieve a certain
level of profit? Must the Panel conduct an examination of the level of profit
achieved by commercial or private actors operating in the field?
b. Are the institution/program/products' stated goals relevant in assessing
whether they can be used as a "market benchmark"?
 c. Is the "governance" of the institution relevant?
 d. What other factors are relevant?
141. The United States disagrees with Brazil's arguments in response to this question on the
threshold matter of what benchmark is needed for purposes of this case. Contrary to Brazil's
assertions, the proper "benchmark" is not a commercially-available guarantee similar to GSM 102.
This is not the relevant consideration under either item (j) of the Illustrative List or Article 14(c) of
the SCM Agreement . Under item (j), to determine whether an export subsidy exists in the case of
export credit guarantees, the proper consideration is whether premiums charged are inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of a program. That is the standard for assessing
whether export credit guarantees are export subsidies for purposes of the SCM Agreement. Moreover,

175 Canada-Aircraft II, para. 7.399.
176 Canada-Aircraft II, para. 7.399.

under Article 14(c), the proper consideration of "b enefit" is whether and how much the guarantees
affect the terms of the underlying loans. Brazil has no basis to ask this Panel to ignore all of the
textual provisions dealing with export credit and lo an guarantees and to adopt out of whole cloth a
standard that looks simply to fees for different guarantees.
142. Indeed, as the United States has explained, Brazil's asserted approach would undermine the
express recognition of Members in Article 14(c) of the SCM Agreement that provision of loan
guarantees are fundamentally different from the provision of other government services.
177 In the case
of government services, Article 14(d) applies and provides that a "benefit" may be calculated only
where "the provision [of the service] is made for le ss than adequate remune ration" which "shall be
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the . . . service in question in the country of
provision (including price, quality, availability, ma rketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase. . .)." In that context, a comparison of fees for a government service against the fees charged
in the market for a comparable service is the prope r approach. However, Article 14(c) specifically
precludes such an approach for loan gu arantees. Recognizing that a loan guarantee is made for the
sole purpose of supporting a loan transaction and becomes an integral part of that transaction,
Article 14(c) requires an assessment of the total cost s of the transaction to assess whether a "benefit"
is actually conferred by the guarantee.
143. For these reasons, the United States consid ers that Brazil's arguments regarding the
appropriate benchmark in this case are flawed at th e outset. Nonetheless, Brazil's clarifications in
response to this question are useful insomuch as they confirm the unreasonable – not to mention
unsupported – approach advanced by Brazil.
144. Specifically, Brazil clarifies that it is advancing a one-way theory under which it may use
government-provided guarantees as a benchmark to show that GSM 102 guarantees are
WTO-inconsistent but the United States may never use guarantees provided by a government or so-
called "public" entity to show that the GSM 102 guarantees are WTO-consistent. Brazil argues that no
government/public entity could ever supply a market benchmark – regardless of its profitability,
stated goals, or any other factor, and regardless of whether the particular product that provides the
benchmark is offered on market terms. In Brazil's view, this is necessary "to avoid circumvention of
the disciplines in the SCM Agreement."
178
145. At the same time, however, Brazil states th at it is "willing to accept" government-provided
guarantees as a benchmark "[i]n the circumstances of these particular proceedings" to demonstrate
WTO-inconsistency. Brazil then proceeds to ask the Panel to assume that Ex-Im Bank guarantees are
provided at below-market rates and to find that any guarantees under the GSM 102 program confer a
benefit simply if the fees for the particular guara ntees are lower to any extent that the allegedly
"comparable" Ex-Im Bank guarantees. This is nothing more than an exercise in circular logic. Brazil
has not shown that (a) a consideration of fees al one is appropriate in de termining whether export
credit guarantees or loan guarantees confer a bene fit; (b) Ex-Im Bank guarantees are provided at
below-market rates; or (c) fees for GSM 102 guarantees would be provided at below-market rates
simply if they were below the fees charged by another government agency.
146. Indeed, Brazil's approach would lead to absurd results. For example, unless all government-
provided guarantees are provided at precisely the same level of fees, a complaining Member like
Brazil could simply point to the guarantees with the highest fees, assert that these guarantees are
themselves provided at below-market rates becaus e they are government-provided, and then seek
export subsidy findings with respect to all the re st simply on their relative position vis-a-vis the

177 The " financial contribution " by the government is itself different in the two contexts. The
"financial contribution," in the case of a loan guarantee is "the potential direct transf er[] of funds or liabilities."
In the case of other kinds of services, the provision of the service itself is the "financial contribution."
178 Brazil Responses to Panel Section D-E Questions, para. 62 (March 6, 2007)

guarantees with the highest fees. In fact, that is effectively what Brazil is seeking to do here. There is
no basis in the text for Brazil's approach.
147. The unreasonableness of Brazil's approach conf irms once again that Brazil is attempting to
unilaterally reclassify export credit guarantees as per se prohibited export subsidies, in disregard of
the specific provisions agreed to by the Members Articles 1.1, 3.1(a), and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement
and item (j) of the Illustrative List, as well as Articles 10.1, 10.2 and 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
4. Claims under item (j) of the Illustrative List
Question to the United States
42. How does the United States address Brazil's arguments with respect to the MPRs
under the OECD Arrangement?
Question to Brazil
 43. What is Brazil's reaction to paragr aph 25 of Japan's Third Party Submission?
148. Although the United States does not agree fully with Japan's analysis, it concurs that MPRs
under the OECD Arrangement are not an appropria te consideration in assessing whether guarantees
under the U.S. export credit guarantee programs have b een provided consistently with item (j) of the
Illustrative List. The United States does not consider that this turns on any factual distinctions
between MPRs and fees charged under the f ees charged under the GSM 102 program (though the
United States agrees that there are many such distin ctions that would render them not comparable, in
any event). Rather, as the United States explained in its response to Question 42, item (j) of the
SCM Agreement clearly provides that the proper comparison is between the "premium rates" charged
under the particular programs a nd "the long-term operating cost s and losses" of the programs
themselves. The text of the SCM Agreement does not provide that the Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits sets the standard by wh ich to assess whether export credit guarantees
constitute export subsidies under item (j) of the SCM Agreement.
149. Thus, Brazil's assertion that its discussion of MPRs "offers the compliance Panel a qualitative
reference point for appreciating the degree to which GSM 102 fees fall below internationally-accepted
standards for [export credit guarantee] programs that are, according to the OECD, structured and
designed to break even" – even if true (and given th e factual distinctions between the two contexts, it
is not) – is irrelevant. Item (j) looks to the programs themselves, not any alleged "internationally-
accepted standards." This is in contrast to the very next item in the Illustrative List – item (k), dealing
with export credits – which does contemplate consideration of "int ernationally-accepted standards."
The absence of such a reference in item (j) confir ms what the text already states – the appropriate
comparison is between the premiums and long-term operating costs and losses of the actual programs
themselves.
150. As discussed in the U.S. submissions, the cu rrent United States budget data now reflects that
the U.S. export credit guarantees have been provi ded at premiums well in excess of the long-term
operating costs of the programs. For cohorts 1992-2002, subsidy estimates and re-estimates by
cohort, show a negative subsidy net of all re-est imates, of US$762,676,594. For cohorts 1992-2005,
the figure is also a negative subsidy: US$166,549,780. These numbers indicate that the United States
has earned a profit on its programs in these amounts. In addition, with respect to the only extant

export credit guarantee program (GSM-102), the budget da ta also reflects that for every fiscal year
cohort since 1992 the net lifetime re-estimates have been negative.
179
151. The current aggregate U.S. budget accounting data for all programs shows that, for the
fourteen-year period commencing with fiscal year 1992, the export credit guarantee programs, under
the fee structure preceding the changes implemented on July 1, 2005, received hundreds of millions of
dollars more in premia and interest than required to pay out in operating costs and losses, including
interest. The financial strength of the GSM 102 program has only been further enhanced by the
changes made by the United States to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.

179 2007 U.S. Government Budget Credit Supplement: Table 8 – Loan Guarantees: Subsidy
Reestimates, p. 43 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/cr_supp.pdf (Exhibit US-5).