UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES
Document: Report of the Panel
Date: 10 November 2004
Document codes: WT/DS285/R
Complainant: Antigua and Barbuda
Respondent: U.S.
Third parties: Canada, Taiwan, EU, Japan, Mexico, China
Dispute stage: Implementation & Compliance
Agreements cited: Art. VI, VIII, XVI, XVII, XI  Services (GATS)

UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE
CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF GAMBLING
AND BETTING SERVICES

Report of the Panel

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 In a communication dated 13 March 2003, Antigua and Barbuda (hereinafter also "Antigua")
requested consultations with the United States, pur suant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article XXIII of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) regarding measures applied by central, regional and local
authorities in the United States of America that affected the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services. 1 Antigua attached to its communicati on an Annex listing US Federal and State
measures whose cumulative impact resulted, accord ing to Antigua, in making unlawful the supply of
gambling and betting services on a cross-border basi s. In a communication dated 1 April 2003,
Antigua issued a communication containing a corrected Annex aiming at clarifying "some of the
references to the US legislation" which were contained in the original Annex.2
1.2 Antigua and the United States held consultations on 30 April 2003, but these consultations did
not resolve the dispute. Consequently, in a communication dated 12 June 2003, Antigua requested the
DSB to establish a Panel. 3 At its meeting on 21 July 2003, the DSB established a Panel pursuant to
the request of Antigua in document , in accordance with Article 6 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. At that meeting, the pa rties to the dispute agr eed that the Panel should
have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited
by Antigua and Barbuda in document WT/D S285/2, the matter referred to the DSB
by Antigua and Barbuda in that document, and to make such findings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
those agreements."
1.3 On 15 August 2003, Antigua requested the Direct or-General to determine the composition of
the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. This paragraph provides:
"If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the
establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council
or Committee, shall determine the com position of the panel by appointing the
panelists whom the Director-General consid ers most appropriate in accordance with
any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or
covered agreements which are at issue in th e dispute, after consulting with the parties
to the dispute. The Chairman of th e DSB shall inform the Members of the
composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the
Chairman receives such a request."
1.4 On 25 August 2003, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:
Chairman: Mr. B.K. Zutshi

 Members: Mr. Virachai Plasai
 Mr. Richard Plender

1.5 Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Mexi co and Chinese Taipei reserved their rights
to participate in the Panel proceedings as a third party.

1 WT/DS285/1 – S/L/110, dated 27 March 2003.
2 WT/DS285/1/Add.1 – S/L/110/Add.1, dated 10 April 2003.
3 WT/DS285/2, 13 June 2003.

1.6 On 5 September 2003, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures (Annex A).
1.7 On 17 October 2003, the United States made a request for preliminary rulings, pursuant to
paragraph 11 of the Working Procedures. On 20 October 2003, the Panel invited Antigua and
Barbuda and the third parties to comment on th e US request (Annex B). Antigua submitted its
response on 23 October 2003, the European Comm unities and Japan on 24 October 2003. Chinese
Taipei, Mexico and Canada informed the Panel th at they would not submit any comments to the US
request for preliminary rulings (Annex B). On 29 October 2003, the Panel replied to the US request
in a communication to the parties, with copy to the third parties on 29 October 2003 (Annex B).
1.8 The Panel held the first substantive meeting w ith the parties from 10 to 12 December 2003.
The session with the third parties took place on 11 December 2003. The second substantive meeting
was held on 26 and 27 January 2004.
1.9 On 20 February 2004, the Panel issued the De scriptive Part of its Panel Report. On
27 February 2004, the parties and third parties provided their comments on the draft Descriptive Part.
1.10 Factual and legal arguments by the parties are re flected in Section III. In addition, Antigua
and the United States have submitted a series of exhibits in support of their factual and legal
allegations. These exhibits have been considered by the Panel in its findings in Section VI below. A
list of these exhibits is contained in Annex G of th is Report. Annex C to the Report contains written
questions posed by the Panel to the parties durin g the first and second panel meetings, as well as
questions posed to third parties during the first panel meeting.
1.11 On 24 March 2004, the Panel transmitted its Interi m Report to the parties. On 7 April 2003,
the parties provided their comments on the Interim Re port. None of the parties requested that the
Panel hold a further meeting with the parties to re view part(s) of the Panel's Report. On 16 April
2003, the parties submitted further written comments on the comments that had already been provided
on the Panel's Interim Report on 7 April 2003.
1.12 The Final Report of the Panel was issued to the parties on 30 April 2004.
II. CONCLUSIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES
2.1 Antigua and Barbuda requests the Panel to find that th e United States' prohibition on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services and its measures restricting international money
transfers and payments relating to gambling and betting services are inconsistent with:
(a) the United States' Schedule of specific commitments under the GATS; and
(b) Articles XVI:1, XVI:2, XVII:1, XVII:2, XVII:3, VI:1, VI:3 and XI:1 of the GATS.
2.2 The United States requests the Panel to reject Antigua and Barbuda's claims in their entirety.
III. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
A. F
ACTUAL ARGUMENTS
3.1 Antigua submits that a vast array of gambling and betting games and services are offered on
a commercial basis in the United States and elsewhere. These games can typically be categorized into
one of the following three broad categories: (i ) betting on the outcome of events in which the
gamblers do not participate, such as sports contests (for example, horse races, soccer, American
football, basketball, and cricket); (ii) card ga mes involving monetary stakes (such as poker, black

jack and baccarat);4 and (iii) random selection games which are games of chance based on the random
selection of numbers or other signs and where the random selection is performed by a machine or the
casting of dice. This type of gambling takes various forms, including lotto, keno and bingo; instant
lotteries or "scratch card games"; gambling machines; and "table games" such as roulette or "craps".
Antigua notes that "gambling," "gaming," "wagering" and "betting" are different terms for the same
basic activity. While these terms are generally used interchangeably by the industry and by Antigua
in its arguments to the Panel, the industry typically refers to itself as the "gaming industry" and terms
such as "gambling and betting" more often refer to the activity.
3.2 The Antiguan government has taken steps since the mid 1990s to build up a primarily
Internet-based, "remote-access" gaming industry as part of its economic development strategy. As the
cross-border gaming industry in Antigua has devel oped and matured, the government believes that a
standard business model has evolved that succes sful operators more or less conform to.
5 Antiguan
regulation provides for two kinds of gambling and betting licen ces – interactive gaming and
interactive wagering. The gaming licence is for casino-type, random selection and card games and the
wagering licence is for sports betting. Some operators possess both licences and players can access
either type of service from one Internet site 6, while other operators offer only one service. 7 Casino
game operators create "virtual casinos" on their we b sites with detailed graphics and enhancements
designed to mimic land-based casino settings. These sites offer a variety of card and dice games such
as poker, black jack, craps and keno, as well as arcade -type games that provide virtual imitations of
video poker terminals, slot machines and other ga mbling machines. Because of the highly visual
aspect of the casino-type games, these services are ope rated exclusively through Internet connection.
The sports betting operators offer the chance to wager on the outcome of sporting contests in a
number of different ways, such as straight wagers on match results, transacting in futures markets in
player performances, team performances and outco mes of political campaigns and other uncertain
future events, and other forms of traditional as well as inventive methods of wagering. All Antiguan
sports book operators maintain an Internet web site on which players may place wagers, but many
operators also make extensive use of telephone betting, as betting on contests or performances to
occur in the future does not need to be visual and the events are independent of the operator's web
site.
3.3 With respect to player accounts and player due diligence, the gambling and betting service
providers in Antigua offer what is called "account betting" where a player must fund an account with
money before being able to enter into wagers. The amount of a wager cannot exceed the funds on
deposit in the account and players are not offered credit on which to gamble. 8 If a wager is lost, the
amount of the bet is taken from the player's account for the benefit of the operator. If the player wins,
the winnings are credited to the account. To realize on their winnings players may request that all or
any portion of the funds in their account are dire cted back to them. In practice as well as by
requirement of Antiguan law, winnings and the ba lance of deposits are transmitted back to the
account from which the initial deposit came or, if th e deposit was by credit card, sometimes by credit
back to the same credit card. In some cases, amounts are paid to players by cheque. To open an
account with an operator, prospective players typically fill in a form and submit information directly
on-line. The precise information requested at the time of establishing a new account differs from site
to site, but the basic objective is to obtain enough information regarding the new player to allow the

4 Antigua notes that, in the context of a casino these will often be referred to as part of a wider group of
"table games" also including random selection games such as roulette or craps.
5 Antigua indicates that the discussion in paras. 3.2 and 3.4 is based upon the experience and the
records of the Antiguan Directorate of Offshore Gaming.
6 See, e.g., www.intertops.com; www.wsex.com.
7 See, e.g., www.gamebookers.com; www.bingomania.net.
8 Antigua notes that this is unlike many land-based casinos in the United States, which will offer some
customers the ability to gamble on credit with funds adva nced by the casino. Advancing of credit for gaming
transactions is against Antiguan law.

operator to perform its own due diligence into the id entity of a player. While almost every operator
will let a person open an account without the opera tor having gone through the due diligence process,
funding an account and commencing gambling or bet ting on the account cannot be done without the
completion of the process. There are several common methods used by players to fund accounts with
Antiguan gaming operators. These include payment by cheque drawn on a bank account or a bank
certified or cashier's cheque, wire transfer, electronic transfer to money remittance service providers
and credit card. The methods used by operators to perform due diligence on players differ from site to
site, but all operators undertake some form of iden tity verification to come to a reasonable assurance
of the identity of the player. In addition to sa tisfying Antigua's regulatory requirements for identity
verification, anti-fraud prevention motivates operators to ensure identification. A number of operators
use commercially available databases where large amounts of information on persons can be found,
including dates of birth and employment, criminal records, credit history and residential addresses.
Operators can also easily determine the location of a player through the tracing of the Internet service
provider number generated by the person's computer.
3.4 Concerning fraud prevention, each Antiguan oper ator maintains an "anti-fraud" department
with the objective of preventing abuses of the ga ming systems, collusion among players, financial
fraud and credit card abuse, under age playing and other occurrences which can result in financial
losses to the operator. In general, anti-fraud depa rtments perform the identity checks on prospective
players, investigate suspicious conduct and devel op strategies to deal with illegal or dishonest
practices. It is obvious to the government through its oversight of the industry that with experience,
operators have become extremely capable of discer ning potentially fraudulent or dishonest players or
conduct in a number of ways and mostly by recogni sable patterns that have built up over the years.
Under age gambling is expressly prohibited by Antig uan law. Experience has shown that under age
gambling with Antiguan operators is relatively rare for several reasons. The first obstacle to gambling
and betting by minors is the age verification that fo rms a part of the identification process. A second
material obstacle is the need to fund an account before any wagering can commence, which requires
access to financial instruments su ch as cheques and a funded bank account, the ability to send funds
by wire transfer from a funded bank account or acce ss to a valid credit card. This is a significant
barrier which most minors are unable to overcome, pa rticularly given the practice in the industry to
either send winnings and deposits directly back to the account from which deposits were received or
crediting winnings directly back to the appli cable credit card – in essence denying the minor the
ability to access any gaming rewards. Another obstacle to play by minors is market driven – in the
rare cases where minors have been able to gamble the result has almost invariably been a refund to the
parent or a credit back on a credit card. Another method of restricting the ability of minors to wager
on operator web sites can be imposed at the user's end. In practice, many Antiguan operators provide
direct links from their web sites to parental contro l providers such as "Cybersitter," "Net Nanny" and
"Surf Watch." Some specifically register themselv es with these parental control providers to ensure
that access to their sites will be automatically blocked to subscribers. Finally, it is a requirement of
Antiguan law that operators display on their sites a warning of the addiction possibilities of gambling
and information to assist compulsive gamblers. In practice, this is usually done by a reference and
link to organizations such as "Gamblers Anonymous ." Furthermore, the government has found that
the cross-border gaming industry in Antigua is gene rally adverse to gambling and betting by problem
gamblers. Not only do these people tend to be more problematic for operators – demanding credit and
refunds and occupying a disproportionate amount of personnel attention – but their conduct also
frequently results in charge-backs on credit cards and reversals of financ ial transactions. Most
operators appear to be able to detect patterns of problem gamblers either at the sign-up stage (where
the operators refuse to authorize funding of or pl aying on an account) or later on during the course of
the relationship with the player, in which event the person's account will often be closed and the
balance returned to the player.
3.5 Antigua submits that, from a high of up to 119 licensed operators, employing around 3,000
and accounting for around ten per cent of GDP in 1999, by 2003 the number of operators has declined
to 28, employing fewer than 500. The government belie ves that material factor s in the decline of the

industry are the increased standards of regulation in Antigua and an increasingly aggressive strategy
on the part of the United States to impede the oper ation of cross-border gaming activities in Antigua.
Antigua's regulatory framework for the remote-access gaming industry has two components. The first
is the Gaming Regulations 9, adopted on 22 May 2001, which set out, inter alia , requirements for
operators to have valid licences, the applications for which are subject to rigorous scrutiny by the
Gaming Directorate. The Gaming Regulations also : (i) forbid under age gaming; (ii) contain
provisions aimed at promoting responsible gami ng (including rules requiring warnings of the
addictive effects of gambling on operator's website s); (iii) oblige operators to conduct full identity
verification checks on prospective players; (iv) prohibit the receiving of payments in cash; and
(v) provide that funds can only come from prope rly verified accounts in regulated financial
institutions and that, if possible, winnings must be paid back to that sa me account. Licensees are
obliged to report all suspicious activities to the Di rectorate. The Directorate itself has investigatory
powers under the Gaming Regulations, and oversees, supervises and monitors licensees, key
personnel and games offered by licensees. In prac tice, these powers are regularly used. The Gaming
Regulations also address standards in advertising, requiring, among other things, that advertising not
be false, deceptive or misleading and not contain indecent, pornographic or offensive content.
3.6 The second component of the regulatory scheme in Antigua is the anti-money laundering
efforts of the government, evidenced principa lly by the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 10, the
Money Laundering Regulations11, the Money Laundering Guidelines12 and the actions of the Office of
National Drug and Money Laundering C ontrol Policy ("ONDCP"). Antigua is a member state of the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force created under the auspices of the Financial Action Task Force
on Money Laundering established by the G-7 in 1989. The Money Laundering Act is a
comprehensive, up-to-date statute that crimina lizes money laundering and sets up the regulatory
authority and powers of the ONDCP. For a variety of reasons, Antigua does not consider the cross-
border gambling and betting industry in Antigua as particularly suscep tible to money laundering or
other forms of financial or organized crime. In particular, operators in Antigua are prohibited from
taking cash from players and are required to establish th eir identity. This is in stark contrast to land-
based casinos and other gaming outlets in the Unite d States, where not only can players wager with
complete anonymity but also gamble almost exclusively with cash.
3.7 Antigua submits that commercial gambling is an enormous industry in the United States. In
1999 gamblers in the United States wagered more than US $630 billion in state-sanctioned gambling
activities and lost US $50 billion in the process. 13 In 1998, 68 per cent of Americans gambled at least
once and 86 per cent of Americans have gambled at least once in their lifetime. 14 In 1999, a federal
commission, the United States National Gambling Impact Study Commission (hereinafter, "NGISC"),
completed a lengthy detailed study on gambling in the United States. The NGISC concluded that:
"Commercial gambling has become an i mmense industry. Governments are now
heavily involved and increasingly active in pursuit of gambling revenues, either

9 Statutory Instruments Antigua and Barbuda, 2001 No 16, "The Interactive Gaming and Interactive
Wagering Regulations of 2001".
10 Acts of Antigua and Barbuda, No 9 of 1996.
11 Statutory Instruments Antigua and Barbuda, 1999 No 35.
12 The Money Laundering Guidelines for Financial Institutions issued by the ONDCP under Section 10
of the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 1996, 9 September 2002.
13 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report (Hereinafter "NGISC Final Report"),
18 June 1999, p. 7-1, and George Will, "Gambler Nation," The Washington Post, 27 June 1999.
14 Ibid., p. 1-1, citing National Opinion Research Center Gambling Impact and Behavior Study, Report
to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1 April 1999, p. 6.

directly through state-owned lotteries and Native American tribal gambling or
through the regulation and taxation of commercial operators.
15
There was no single, overarching national d ecision to turn the United States into a
world leader in gambling. Rather, games of chance spread across the map as a result
of a series of limited, incremental decisions made by individuals, communities, states
and businesses.16
In the next 25 years, gambling could, at its present rate of growth, become more and
more like other common and legal, but some what restricted, business activities, such
as the sale of alcohol or cigarettes. Of course, over time, the basic rules of our
economic system would be expected to play a greater role in shaping the pattern of
gambling, as the quasi-monopolistic circumst ances of the present are replaced by
more routine competition."17
3.8 Since 1999 state-sanctioned gambling in the United States has continued its expansion at an
unprecedented rate, being available in 48 states and covering activities includ ing bingo, horse race
betting and other sports gambling, commercial casinos and state-operated lotteries. The omnipresence
of fully lawful, state-sanctioned gambling make s the United States the largest national gambling
market in the world. The US $630 billion in to tal amount wagered reported by the NGISC in 1998
and 1999 excludes the most widespread and popular form of gambling in the United States: non-
sanctioned or "illegal" sports betting. The NGI SC estimated that as much as US $380 billion in
illegal wagers are placed annually by American gamblers on professional and amateur sporting
events.18 Despite the enormous growth of this non-sanc tioned gambling, the United States' efforts to
crack down on illegal bookmakers in the United States have dwindled over the last 40 years. In the
NGISC Final Report, the NGISC conc luded that illegal sports betting in the United States is "easy to
participate in, widely accepted, very popular, and, at present, not likely to be prosecuted."19
3.9 Antigua further submits that many of the la rgest gaming companies in the world are of
United States origin and many have overseas inte rests. These companies us e sophisticated remote
computer technology to control and monitor overseas operations via the Internet. 20 United States
gambling operators are allowed to advertise without restrictions throughout the United States. The
NGISC described the advertising of lotteries in the United States as "deceptive", "misleading" and
"manipulative."
21 United States casinos, such as in Nevada and Atlantic City (New Jersey), use
sophisticated marketing techniques, including direct marketing based on electronically collected data
on the gambling behaviour of individual players. For instance, Nevada's modern casinos, especially
those on the main casino area in Las Vegas – the so-called "Las Vegas Strip" – are self-contained
mini-cities designed to offer non-stop gambling. For instance, the casino floor in the MGM Grand
casino is over 170,000 square feet (approximately 16,000 square metres) a nd holds approximately
3,200 slot machines, 164 table ga mes and a sports betting facility.
22 In order to attract customers,
Nevada casinos widely advertise discount travel fa res, inexpensive hotel rooms, bargain meals, low-

15 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report – Executive Summary (hereinafter,
"NGISC Executive Summary"), 18 June 1999, p. 1.
16 Ibid., p. 1.
17 Ibid., pp.1-2.
18 NGISC Final Report, p. 2-14.
19 NGISC Final Report, p. 2-14.
20 Rod Smith, "Casino Industry Technology: Open Wide, New Progressive Slot System Lets Las Vegas
Company Serve Russian Gamblers," Las Vegas Review Journal (2 September 2003).
21 NGISC Final Report, pp. 3-15, 3-16.
22 Jason N. Ader, Bears Stearns 2002-03 North American Gaming Almanac , Huntington Press,
Las Vegas, Nevada, p. 36.

cost entertainment and other special events. 23 Some casinos even offer free travel to preferred
customers. Under United States law, casinos are pe rmitted to advertise gambling in every state of the
nation, even within states which do not permit casino gaming. 24 One particularly successful
marketing tool of the Las Vegas casinos is to offer entertainment in the form of shows by major stars,
Broadway-style musicals, revue spec taculars and a variety of lounge acts. All of this entertainment
has a single purpose – to bring customers into the c asino. Entertainment events that boost a casino's
gambling winnings are frequently held over, wh ereas those which do not, regardless of how many
tickets are sold, are generally discontinued. 25 The Las Vegas-style casinos are made to keep visitors
in the resort complex and near the tables and slot machines. 26 Pathways through a casino are built to
emphasize the gambling equipment rather than directing visitors to exits. 27 Gaming equipment is
carefully arranged in a compact layout to provide secluded, intimate gambling areas, with the
gambling equipment the dominant décor on the casino floor. 28 The gambling areas of casinos are also
designed to detach visitors from their daily rout ine and release their inhibitions and conventional
responsibilities.29 The unusual noise and visual effects of the casino floor purposefully create a
sensation which heightens the thrill and pleasant tension of gambling.30
3.10 Additionally, most casinos are open 24-hours a day and use a number of techniques to
diminish a player's sense of time and money. 31 There are generally no clocks or views to the outside,
making it difficult for gamblers to know the time. 32 The casinos convert cash into readily-expendable
chips at gaming tables, which has the effect of detaching gamblers from their customary value of
money.
33 To further encourage unchecked gambling, casinos offer free alcoholic beverages to anyone
who is gambling. 34 For ready access to cash, casinos house ba nks, automated teller machines, credit
card cash machines and offer lines of credit on the casino floor. 35 Gambling operators also use a
variety of inducements to keep gamblers in the casino. Winning gamblers are commonly awarded
free dinners, over-night stays and entertainment. The motive is quite simple–given a long enough
stay, winning gamblers will inevitably return to the tables where the law of probability will ultimately
catch up with them. Casinos also maintain elect ronic databases with data on the gambling behaviour
of their individual customers.
36 These data are used for direct marketing to the individual gamblers. 37

23 John M. Findlay, People of Chance: Gambling in American Society from Jamestown to Las Vegas ,
Oxford University Press (1986) (hereinafter "People of Chance"), p. 157.
24 See the decision of the Unite d States Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc.,
Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999) (stating that the United States government's efforts to enforce an
antiquated ban on broadcasting advertising of casino gambling was so pierced by governmental exemptions and
inconsistencies that the United States government "could not hope to exonerate" the reasons for the ban and
further holding that a Louisiana-based casino could lawfully broadcast advertising in neighbouring Texas, where
casino gambling was illegal).
25 David G. Schwartz, Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Stripe and Beyond ,
Routledge (2003), p. 95.
26 People of Chance, op. cit. footnote 23, p. 158.
27 Bill Friedman, Designing Casinos to Dominate the Competition: The Friedman International
Standards of Casino Design, University of Nevada Reno (2000), pp. 15-18.
28 Ibid.
29 People of Chance, op. cit. in footnote 23, p. 147.
30 Ibid ., pp. 133-34, citing Robert D. Herman, Gamblers and Gaming: Motives, Institutions and
Controls, Lexington, Massachusetts (1976), pp. 84 - 88.
31 Ibid., p. 148.
32 Ibid., p. 147.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 157. See also Am erican Gaming Association, "Fact Sheet: Casino Alcohol Policies"
(www.americangaming.org/casino_entertainment/aga_facts/facts.cfm/id/31).
35 American Gaming Association, "Fact Sheet: ATMS/Credit in Casinos"
(www.americangaming.org/casino_entertainment/aga_facts/facts.cfm/id/5).
36 David G. Schwartz, Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Stripe and Beyond ,
Routledge (2003), p. 7. An example is the "customer loyalty schemes" of the major casino companies. For
instance, Harrah's has developed a sophisticated direct ma rketing system based on a "national patron database."

Casinos also exchange these data between each other.
38 As of 2003, Nevada has over 2,100 licensed
casinos that offer virtually every popular form of state-sanctioned gambling. These casinos host an
aggregate of 189,193 slot machines and 6,358 tables for blackjack, craps, roulette and other table
games
39 and generate state-wide gaming re venues of US $9.5 billion per year. 40 Las Vegas itself has
hosted over 30 million visitors each year since 1997, w ith more than 35 million visitors in each of the
past three years. 41 Approximately 90 per cent of visitors come from places other than Nevada,
including all other regions of the United States as well as from foreign countries. 42 In addition to the
well-recognised casino operations in Nevada and New Jersey, a number of other states offer casino
gambling opportunities as well, including Louisiana, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Mississippi, South
Dakota, Colorado and Michigan. Further, thr oughout the United States there are over 340 casino
facilities owned by various Native American tribes w ho, through exemptions under federal law and in
many cases with federal assistance, are permitted to offer a wide scope of gambling opportunities at
facilities located on tribal lands. Even the Un ited States federal government operates gaming
facilities, with about 8,000 slot machines and video poker electronic gaming devices located on 94
United States military bases and installations located outside the United States.
3.11 Antigua submits that the United States horse ra ce betting industry has successfully used
advances in communications technology to expand gambling opportunities. As a result, 85 per cent of
bets on horse races are made away from the track where the race is run by means of "simulcasting," or
the live broadcasting of horse races via satellite communication or other remote means.
43 T h i s
includes broadcasting to the television in the home with an opportunity to gamble from home via the

See www.harrahs.com/e-totalrewards/overview.html. Harrah's customers can earn "reward credits" by gambling
in one of Harrah's casinos. To earn these credits a gambler must use a magnetic card that identifies him and
allows Harrah's to collect data on where, when and how much the specific customers gamble. This information
is then used to develop targeted direct marketing initiatives. Customers can earn "reward credits" in all of
Harrah's 24 casinos which are located in several markets in the United Stat es. Rewards include, inter alia ,
"airfare to other Harrah's casinos like Las Vegas or New Orleans." Members of the customer loyalty program
can consult their account on Harrah's website. The latte r also contains a "Play for Fun" section where players
can "learn to play a new game or check out one of [their] favourites." Playing these free games is only possible
when you log in as a member of the customer loyalty program, thus revealing your identity. In an interview
published in Casino Journal of January 2003 Mr. Phil Satre, then Chief Executive Officer of Harrah's, explained
how such customer tracking programs have been a key element of Harrah's marketing strategy since at least
1978. Even then "reward credits" earned by gambling n eeded to be exchanged at gambling facilities so that
"obviously that makes a visit to the property."
37 Mr Gary Loveman, Harrah's President and Chief Oper ating Officer stated that "[O]ur website is just
one example of how we're revolutionizing the way the casino industry utilizes technology". (…) It enables us to
communicate directly with our customers and potential customers outside of the casino environment, expanding
our marketing reach through effective, efficient appli cation of information technology." See "Casino player
awards record 251 Honors to Harrah's" (5 July 2001) at www.gamblingmagazine.com.
38 For instance the Las Vegas based Mandalay has recen tly concluded an agreement to share customer
data with the Mohegan Sun casino in Connecticut (an "Indian casino" and the second largest casino in the
world). Mandalay will send direct ma rketing pitches to customers of the Mohegan Sun living within 350 miles
from the Mohegan Sun (which includes cities such as New York, Philadelphia and Boston). The Mohegan Sun
will do likewise with Mandalay customers. Casinos that enter into such agreements will, for instance, offer high
spending gamblers a free weekend trip to the more remote casino. See "Mandalay Bay, Conn. casino in deal for
39 Jason N. Ader, Bears Stearns 2002-03 North American Gaming Almanac , Huntington Press,
40 Ibid. (2001 figures).
41 Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority, Historical Las Vegas Visitor Statistics: 1970 to 2002
(www.lvcva.com/pdf/historical_visitor_statistics.pdf).
42 Ibid., see also Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority, Frequently Asked Research Questions
(www.lvcva.com/press/faq.html).
43 See the chart "US Horseracing Statistics", from the Jockey Club, 2003 Factbook Statistical Data.

Internet, the telephone or other means of communi cation. In 2000, the United States amended the
Interstate Horseracing Act44 to permit betting on horse races over the Internet.45
3.12 Antigua also notes that, as of 2002, Nevada had 160 licensed and regulated "bookmakers"
which hosted wagering on all prof essional and amateur sports. When betting with a bookmaker a
gambler bets against the bookmaker as opposed to betting against the other gamblers, as is the case
with pari-mutuel betting. The most popular sports on which bets are made with Nevada bookmakers
are American football, basketball and baseball. 46 Wagers are also accepted on hockey, golf, auto
racing, soccer and other sports and athletic events. 47 In fiscal year 1998, sports betting in Nevada
reached a high of US $2.3 billion (total amount wagered), generating US $77.4 million in revenues
(profits).48 Primarily due to competition from foreign sports gambling operators, the total amount
wagered with Las Vegas bookmakers has slightly decreased since 1998. 49 In 2002, the total amount
wagered was US $1.9 billion and industry profits were US $110 million. 50 Nevada bookmakers offer
their services to home users via the Internet and the telephone.51
3.13 Antigua further submits that the lotteries offer a wide range of games including: (i) instant or
scratch-card games, which are offered in all states with lotteries in a huge variety. 52 For example, the
California Lottery currently has 39 separate scratch-card lottery games 53 while the Georgia Lottery
offers 80 such games; 54 (ii) Lotto is also offered in almost every state with a lottery and typically
involves a very high money prize or "jackpot". The current record prize in the United States for one
winning lotto entry is US $ 296 million;
55 (iii) keno, which exists in two different types. 56 The first
type is a regular periodic drawing one or two times per week. The other type of keno lottery is known
as "fast draw" keno, where drawings occur on an elect ronic monitor every five minutes. As of 2002,
keno games were operated by lo ttery operators in 11 states; 57 (iv) daily numbers games which, like
lotto and keno, are a variety of random selection nu mber games. The daily numbers games require
players to make a three- or four-digit selection on a daily basis to win a fixed prize in the range of US

44 Regulation of Interstate Off-track Wagering, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007, (hereinafter "Interstate
Horseracing Act").
45 Antigua notes that, in December 2000, the definition of off-trac k wager was amended to include
"pari-mutuel wagers, where lawful in each state involved, placed or transmitted by an individual in one State via
telephone or other electronic media and accepted by an off- track betting system in the same or another State, as
well as the combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools." See United States General Accounting Office,
GAO – 03-89, Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues, December 2002 (hereinafter, "GAO Report"),
p. 43.
46 Anthony N. Cabot and Robert D. Faiss, "Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era," 5 Chapman Law
Review 1, Spring 2002, p. 7, footnote 33.
47 Ibid.
48 NGISC Final Report, p. 2-14, citing Robert Macy, "Ban on college Sports Betting Could Cost State
Books Millions", Las Vegas Review – Journal (18 May 1999), 4A. The state-sanctioned sports betting market
in Nevada makes up only a small fraction, about two per cent, of the total gaming revenues generated in
Nevada.
49 See the statements of Mr Joe Lupo, manager of a bookmaker in Las Vegas, reported in Michael
Kaplan, op. cit. footnote 184, pp. 72-73.
50 Nevada State Gaming Control Board, Gaming Revenue Report for the year ending
31 December 2002.
51 See the advertisement of "Station Casino" for online sports betting in Nevada, in the Las Vegas
Review Journal (28 August 2003).
52 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac, p. 21.
53 See California Lottery's website, http://www.calottery.com/games/scratchers/scratchers.asp .
54 See Georgia Lottery's website, www.galottery.com/stc/games/instantgamesCurrent.jsp?focus=games.
55 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac, p. 6.
56 Ibid., p. 13.
57 Ibid., p. 21. Examples of online promotions and instructions on how to play electronic keno can be
viewed at: www.oregonlottery.org/keno/otherplay.shtml.

$500 to US $2,500.
 58 Some states hold numbers drawings as often as four times per day. Daily
numbers games are offered in almost every state with a lottery; 59 (v) video lottery terminals (VLTs),
which are the newest and fastest growing type of gambling offered by lottery operators in the United
States.60 South Dakota introduced the first VLT network in the United States in 1989. Prior to the
introduction of VLTs, the South Dakota lottery was struggling with total sales of US $21 million per
year. A decade after introducing VLTs, the S outh Dakota lottery had grown to over US $500 million
in annual total sales. 61 Currently VLTs are operated in the States of Delaware, Oregon, New York,
South Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Louisiana and Montana. 62 As of 2000, there were over
60,000 VLTs in the United States with net sales of US $2.3 billion and profits of US $685 million. 63
In the United States, VLTs are viewed as a complementary product to traditional lottery games
because they are often located in bars and tavern s, establishments which have not been successful as
retailers for lottery tickets in the past.64 Historically, the primary opposition to the expansion of VLTs
came from the horse race betting industry, which feared VLTs would reduce their turnover. 65
However, with the successful installation of VLTs at racetracks in Delaware, Louisiana, New York,
Rhode Island and West Virginia, the horse race betting industry has become an active proponent of
video gambling and actively lobbies for the legalization of VLTs at racetracks; 66 and (v) Sports
betting. For instance, the Oregon lottery offers a sports betting game called "Sports Action".67
3.14 Finally, Antigua stresses that it is important to keep in mind what this dispute is not about.
First, it is not about the Internet gaming industry in general. This proceeding is being brought by the
government of Antigua and Barbuda on behalf of its domestic industry and for no other. Second, this
is not about unregulated, "free for all" gambling. An tigua is a regulated jurisdiction. When it started
developing this industry some eight or more years a go, it did so in a regulated context. Since then,
Antigua has overhauled its regulatory scheme twice – most recently with direct participation and
assistance from US gambling law experts. And it continues to work on refinements of and
improvements to its regulatory scheme. Antigua belie ves that any resolution of this dispute between
Antigua and Barbuda and the United States should take place in an agreed regulatory context. In the
consultations with the United States, Antigua and Barbuda expressed its willingness to cooperate with
the United States on a mutually agreeable regulatory scheme. The United States showed no interest in
doing so, saying only that Internet-based gaming cannot be regulated. Antigua disagrees, as do others
– the United Kingdom for example.

58 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac , p. 12. Examples on online promotions and instructions on
how to play daily number games, as well as to r eceive updates on winning numbers, can be viewed at
www.oregonlottery.org/pick4/index_beer.shtml.
59 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac, p. 21.
60 Ibid., p. 14.
61 Ibid., p. 14.
62 Ibid., p. 14 . The Oregon legislature began offering video lottery gaming in 1991 in order to replace
the 10,000 gaming machines operating in the grey market. The Oregon legislat ure contends that the benefits of
state-run VLTs include the generation of revenue for state programs, ensuring VLTs were run honestly and
fairly and ensuring that taxes were paid on VLT winnings (www.oregonlottery.org/video/aboutvideo.shtml).
63 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac, p. 31.
64 La Fleur's 2001 World Lottery Almanac, p. 14.
65 Ibid., p. 14.
66 Ibid., p. 14. See also "Match Made in heaven–L otteries and tracks have proven to be a great
partnership with VLTs", International Gaming and Wagering Business , July 2003. In this Article Mr John
Musgrave of the West Virginia Lottery is quoted as follo ws: "A great deal of the success that can be found in
West Virginia's racetrack video lotte ry is the result of the foresight he ld by lawmakers who recognized the
virtue of allowing private businesses to undertake the cost and risk of development and general operation while
giving the lottery a regulatory role."
67 Oregon Lottery, www.oregonlottery.org/sports/.

3.15 The United States replies that the recent growth in the remote supply 68 of gambling raises
serious regulatory concerns for the Government of the United States. New technologies, including
high-speed telecommunications and the Internet, have facilitated explosive growth in remote supply
of gambling over the past decade. This dramatic increase, whatever its origin, has raised serious
regulatory and law enforcement concerns in th e United States, where authorities throughout US
history have consistently imposed tight regulati on on gambling and the remote supply of gambling.
Gambling has been one of the staple activities of organized crime syndicates. Law enforcement
authorities in North America have seen evidence that organized crime plays a growing part in remote
supply of gambling, including Internet gambling. In 1999, the Racketeering Records Analysis Unit of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided an analysis to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
confirming that "organized crime groups are 'heavily involved' in offshore gambling." 69 On April 29,
2003, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Malcol m testified at a Congressional hearing that the
"Department of Justice is concerned about the poten tial involvement of organized crime in Internet
gambling. ... We have now seen evidence that orga nized crime is moving into Internet gambling." 70
The Canadian Criminal Intelligence Service has co nfirmed the involvement of organized crime in
Internet gambling, and expects that it will furthe r develop the criminal opportunities associated with
Internet gambling.71
3.16 Remote supply gambling businesses provide criminals with an easy vehicle for money
laundering, due in large part to the volume, spee d, and international reach of the transactions
involved, as well as the offshore locations of most re mote suppliers. The industry is far more cash-
intensive than conventional forms of telephone or Internet commerce, yet it lies outside the special
regulatory and monitoring structures developed for fi nancial services. Indivi duals seeking to launder
ill-gotten gains through remote s upply gambling operations can do so in a variety of ways. The
anonymous nature of the interactions and the use of encryption make such transactions difficult to
trace. The NGISC, a body established by the US Congress with a mandate to conduct a
comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts of gambling, observed in 1999 that:
"[G]ambling on the Intern et may provide an easy means for money laundering.
Internet gambling provides anonymity, remote access, and encrypted data. To
launder money, a person need only deposit m oney into an offshore account, use those
funds to gamble, lose a small per cent of the original funds, then cash out the
remaining funds. Through the dual protection of encryption and anonymity, much of
this activity can take place undetected."
72

68 The United States notes that Antigua refers to the supply of gambling services using communications
technologies as "cross-border" supply. In the context of this dispute, ov eruse of the term "cross-border" may
create confusion. In fact, a particular activity, such as placing a bet by telephone, may or may not involve
communication across a national border. For greater clarity, the United States will therefore refer to supply of
gambling services by telephone, Internet or other forms of distance communications as "remote supply" of
gambling services. The United States will refer to "cross-border" supply only in the strict sense of GATS
Article I:2(a), meaning supply of a service "from the terr itory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member."
69 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, Senate Report No. 106-121, p. 16 (1999).
70 Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act and the Internet Gambling Licensing and
Regulation Commission Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Congress 10 (2003) (statement of John G. Malcolm).
71 Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2003 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,
pp. 16-17.
72 NGISC Final Report, p. 5-6 (June 1999). See also Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money
Laundering Typologies 2000-2001 at para. 16 (2001) ("It seems that Internet gambling might be an ideal
web-based 'service' to serve as a cover for a money lau ndering scheme through the net. There is evidence in
some FATF jurisdictions that criminals are using the Internet gambling industry to commit crime and to launder
the proceeds of crime...").

3.17 Gambling is also linked to other types of criminal activities, such as fraud schemes. Criminal
fraud schemes have been committed by both the ope rators of the gambling activity and by the
customers of the gambling activity. A prominent example is the problem of fraudulent lotteries, many
of which are offered to remote purchasers. The l eading US consumer protection agency, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), has warned citizens in the United States about criminal operators that use
telephone and mail solicitations to se ll fraudulent foreign lottery tickets.
73 In 2002, fraudulent prizes,
sweepstakes, and lotteries were among the t op ten consumer complaints to the FTC. 74 The FTC has
found that most promotions for foreign lotteries are fraudulent.75 The potential for fraud is heightened
when gambling opportunities are supplied from remote locations. The barriers to establishing an
online gambling operation are low and unscrupulou s operators can appear and disappear within
minutes. Criminal firms can obtain customer credit card numbers, take money to open wagering
accounts, and then shut down without paying winn ings. Moreover, unscrupulous operators can
tamper with software in order to manipulate games in their favour. Computer hackers can also alter
software to the detriment of consumers.76
3.18 The availability of commercial gambling in hom es, schools, and other environments where it
has traditionally been absent raises special concerns, including concer ns relating to the protection of
the young. US law regards gambling as an adult ac tivity. However, young people use the Internet
more frequently than any other segment of the pop ulation. The NGISC reported that more than
69 per cent of 18- to 24-year-olds in the United Stat es use computers for an average of four hours per
day.77 Children make easy targets for remote supplie rs of gambling: "[M]any of these gambling web
sites have been designed to resemble video games, and therefore are especially attractive to
children."78 The NGISC also found that "[b]ecause the Internet can be used anonymously, the danger
exists that access to Internet gambling will be abused by under age gamblers." 79 The American
Psychiatric Association has similarly warned that "[y]oung people are at special risk for problem
gambling and should be aware of the hazards of this activity, especially the danger of Internet
gambling, which may pose an increased risk to high school and co llege-aged populations."80 A US
Senate Committee considering Internet gambling le gislation in 1999 was "particularly concerned
about the growth of Internet gambling because young people have been shown, in recent studies, to
have significant and growing problems with sports betting. For example, a 1998 study at the
University of Michigan found that 35 per cent of student-athletes gambled on sports while attending
college."
81 A "growing consensus of research reveals that the rates of pathological and problem
gambling among college students are higher than an y other segment of the population," the report
found.82 The US Supreme Court has more generally found that "[g]ambling . . . falls into a category
of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether." 83 As the explosion in
remote supply of gambling has re ached homes, schools, workplaces – indeed, any location with an
Internet connection – it has provoked greater concern than more isolated forms of gambling because it

73 FTC Consumer Alert, International Lottery Scams (January 2000).
74 Federal Trade Commission, A Positive Agenda For Co nsumers: The FTC Year in Review at p. 13,
box 4 (April 2003).
75 FTC Consumer Alert, International Lottery Scams, January 2000.
76 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary (statement of John G. Malcolm),
p. 10.
77 NGISC Final Report, p. 5-4.
78 Senate Report No. 106-121, p. 13 (quoting testimony of Jeffrey Pash, executive vice president of the
National Football League).
79 NGISC Final Report, p. 5-4.
80 American Psychiatric Association, APA Advisory on Internet Gambling (16 January 2001).
81 Senate Report No. 106-121, p. 14.
82 Ibid. (quoting testimony of Bill Saum, Director of Agent and Gambling Activities for the National
Collegiate Athletic Association).
83 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).

is inherently more difficult to control. 84 While many Americans participate in various limited forms
of legalized gambling, it remains true nonetheless that restrictions on remote supply of gambling
services in the United States reflect legislators' and citizens' concerns about their inability to control
an activity as to which many individuals and groups harbour serious ethical and religious
reservations.85
3.19 Finally, the supply of gambling into privat e homes, workplaces, and other environments
creates additional health risks. The Council on Com pulsive Gambling reports that five per cent of all
persons who engage in gambling become addicted to it. Dr. Howard J. Schaffer of the Harvard
Medical School's Division on Addictive Studies comp ares Internet gambling to "new delivery forms
for addictive narcotics,"86 and a US Senate committee has concluded that "Internet gambling threatens
to expand the number of addicted gamblers."87
3.20 The United States further argues that Antigua's statement of facts contains misleading
statements, inaccuracies, and irrelevant material. Many of the disputable facts appear to have little
bearing on the substance of this proceeding. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the United States
focuses on the most broadly misleading elements of An tigua's statement. Contrary to what is asserted
by Antigua, the United States activel y enforces its laws against domestic illegal gambling. In fact,
illegal gambling activity is in no way sanctioned by the United States, and arrest figures for illegal
gambling remain impressive. Additionally, Antigua's data do not appear to include the many cases in
which gambling was one of several charges, but not the main charge. For example, many cases
against organized crime figures include gambling charges. Gambling in the United States is permitted
only within particular locations and facilities de signated by law, and only in forms that the
United States believes can be effectively regulat ed. Where it exists, it operates under the most
rigorous regulatory constraints. As the NGISC ob served, "nowhere is gambling regarded as merely
another business, free to offer its wares to the public."
88 Instead, gambling "is the target of special
scrutiny by governments in every jurisdiction where it exists." 89 The purpose of that regulatory
scrutiny is to protect the public, not to protect domestic industry. Indeed, if its purpose were
protectionist, it would have failed miserably, sin ce numerous foreign suppliers of gambling services
are already present in the US mark et. Regardless of foreign or domestic origin, all providers of
gambling services in the United States operate under severe restrictions. And when it comes to
remote supply of gambling, those restrictions are particularly stringent.
3.21 The United States submits that it is puzzled by the breadth of Antigua's description of the
gambling market in the United States. Antigua st ates that it licenses only two types of cross-border

84 Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act and the Internet Gambling Licensing and
Regulation Commission Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the Committee on the Judiciary, 108
th Cong., p. 7 (2003) (statement of the Honorable James A. Leach,
Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa) ("Casino gambling as it has been sanctioned in all Western
democracies has only been allowed to exist with comprehensive regulation. Internet gambling lacks such
safeguards. It is a danger to the family and society at la rge. It should be ended. From a family perspective, the
home may be considered a castle; but it should never be a casino.").
85 By way of illustration, an unsuccessful 1999 propo sal for additional federal legislation restricting
Internet gambling enjoyed support from, among others, the African Methodist Episcopal Church; the American
Muslim Council; the Christian Coalition; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latte r Day Saints; the Family Research
Council; Focus on the Family; Friends United Meeting; the National Coalition Against Gambling Expansion;
the National Council of Churches; the Presbyterian Chur ch; Rev. Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office of
the United Church of Christ, Office of Church in Society; the United Methodist Church, General Board of
Church and Society; the Southern Baptist Convention, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission; and the
Traditional Values Coalition. Senate Report No. 106-121, p. 9 (1999).
86 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, Senate Report No. 106-121, (1999), p. 15.
87 NGISC Final Report, p. 4-1.
88 NGISC Final Report, p. 3-1.
89 Ibid.

gambling and betting – "virtual casinos" and sports betting ("sports book") operators, with the former
supplied by Internet and the latter by Internet and telephone. These would therefore appear to be the
only Antiguan services and service suppliers at issue in this dispute. Concerning casino gambling,
Antigua highlights two locations where regulated casi no gambling is available – Nevada and Atlantic
City – but fails to acknowledge the extreme string ency with which officials in these and other US
locations exercise regulatory control over gambling. Antigua also fails to cite any example of a
"virtual casino" operating legally anywhere in the United States.
3.22 Antigua's description of lotteries in the United States is misleading. There is no nationwide
lottery industry; rather, there are 39 state-operate d and -controlled lotteries, each of which offers
services solely within the borders of the state that authorized it. All are controlled by stringent
legislation, rules and procedures. While there ar e some lottery games that are offered by lottery
authorities of more than one state, they are not offered by remote supply. Similarly, Antigua's
description of pari-mutuel wagering mistakenly st ates that the Interstate Horseracing Act permits
betting on horse races over the Internet. The In terstate Horseracing Act does not provide legal
authority for any form of Internet gambling. As clarified in the Presidential Statement on Signing
accompanying the bill enacting the December 2000 amen dments to the IHA, nothing in the IHA (a
civil statute) overrides the previously enacted crim inal laws applicable to Internet gambling.
Specifically, then-President Clinton stated that:
"The Department of Justice, however, do es not view this provision as codifying the
legality of common pool wagering and inters tate account wagering even where such
wagering is legal in the various States involved for horseracing, nor does the
Department view the provision as repealing or amending existing criminal statutes
that may be applicable to such activity, in particular, sections 1084, 1952, and 1955
of Title 18, United States Code."
90
3.23 The Department of Justice has repeatedly affirm ed the view that the Interstate Horseracing
Act does not override pre-existing criminal laws app licable to Internet gambling and other forms of
remote gambling. Indeed, Antigua's own evidence confirms this.91
3.24 Finally, with respect to sport wagering, Antigua identifies no examples of the legal offering of
sports book services outside Nevada. Nevada regulators have imposed stringent precautions to ensure
that sports book services offered by computer a nd telephone in southern Nevada are provided only
within the immediate vicinity, and not through Internet gateways accessible to the general public.
3.25 The United States submits that Antigua's attempts to regulate gambling and money laundering
cannot address basic concerns relating to remote supply of gambling. Antigua states that it introduced
"industry-directed" regulation of gambling as early as 1997, and that it maintains financial sector
regulations that meet or exceed international st andards. The United States wishes to comment on
these statements briefly even though it notes that Antigua fails to link these assertions to its
substantive arguments. Antigua asserts that Anti guan operators "undertake some form of identity
verification" of persons who register to use Anti guan gambling services. Antigua further states that
children do not register to play on Antiguan gamb ling sites because children lack access to payment
instruments, or because their parents can stop them. In fact, such regulation is infeasible. Children
have ready access to payment instruments, and no technology has yet been developed to enable

90 Statement on Signing the Departments of Commer ce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act, 2001 , 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 31 53, 3155-3156 (Decem ber 21, 2000),
Exhibit U.S.-17.
91 See M. Shannon Bishop, And They're Off: The Legality of Interstate Pari-Mutuel Wagering and its
Impact on the Thoroughbred Horse Industry, 89 Kentucky Law Journal 711, 713 (2001) ("[T]he Department of
Justice has recently taken the position that interstate pari-mutuel wagering violates the Interstate Wire Act,
indicating that the horseracing industry proceeds in its business at its own ri sk."), submitted by Antigua to the
Panel as Exhibit-39.

constraints on Internet gambling even approaching those that are possible in other settings where
gambling can be confined and access to it strictly controlled.92
3.26 Antigua rejects the US argument that Antigua's arguments contain inaccuracies and
misstatements. For instance, Antigua did not mi srepresent the law enforcement efforts of the
United States when it comes to controlling its no n-sanctioned gambling activity. The statistics
themselves – from about 123,000 arrests in 1960 down to around 15,000 arrests in 1995 – remain
unchallenged and impressive. The United States also fails to describe, much less to establish, how
Antigua's description of the lottery industry in the United States is misleading. There are other
examples, in each case unfounded and unproven. For instance, the United States submits that the
Las Vegas Internet sports betting service referred to by Antigua does not operate on the Internet but
on a "local 'Private Network". In reality, the adve rtisement refers to a so-called "Virtual Private
Network". This is a security technology used over the Internet, not a separate local network.
3.27 Antigua submits that the United States has in la rge part chosen to ignore the points made and
evidence offered by Antigua and Ba rbuda as if they were not made and not offered – with the result
being that many of Antigua's arguments have not b een rebutted or even addressed. For example, the
United States assumes that Antigua is an unregul ated jurisdiction. This is not the case and the
United States adduced no evidence contradicting Anti gua's evidence regarding regulation. As a result
the extensive discussion by the United States rega rding the ills of unregulated gambling becomes
irrelevant. Another striking feature of the US submission is its reliance on completely
unsubstantiated, conclusory statements that it descr ibes as "fact." On the few occasions an attempt is
made at substantiation, most references are to self-serving statements of American politicians and
government officials. In the rare instances where the United States does cite independent sources, the
sources prove to be either taken out of context (such as the quote in paragraph 3.19 attributed to
Dr. Howard Shaffer who was in fact referring to a ll forms of electronic gambling and betting), or of
dubious value.
B. L
EGAL ARGUMENTS
1. Applicability of the GATS
3.28 Antigua submits that, in Canada – Autos, the Appellate Body found that a threshold question
for the application of the GATS is whether the m easure at issue is a measure "affecting trade in
services."93 In this dispute it is clear that this is the ca se. First, there can be no real dispute that the
offerings of the gaming industry of Antigua to consumers in the United States and elsewhere
constitute "services". Second, it has been firmly established in WTO law that what constitutes
"measures (…) affecting trade in services" is to be ve ry broadly construed. As stated by the Appellate
Body in EC – Bananas III:
"In our view, the use of the term 'affecting' re flects the intent of the drafters to give a
broad reach to the GATS. The ordinary meaning of the word 'affecting' implies a
measure that has 'an effect on', which indi cates a broad scope of application. This
interpretation is further reinforced by the c onclusions of previous panels that the term
'affecting' in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider in scope than such terms

92 For example, in 2002, the Fede ral Trade Commission conducted an informal survey in which found
that minors could easily access gambling websites. Th e survey also found that there was no effective
mechanism to block minors from entering. Federal Trade Commission, Press release: FTC Warns Consumers
about Online Gambling and Children (26 June 2002). See also NGISC Final Report, p. 5-4. ("In most instances,
a would-be gambler merely has to fill out a registration form in order to play. Most sites rely on the registrant to
disclose his or her correct age and make little or no attemp t to verify the accuracy of the information. Under age
gamblers can use their parents' credit cards or even their own credit and debit cards to register and set up
accounts for use at Internet gambling sites.).
93 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Autos, para. 152. See also Article I:1 of the GATS.

as 'regulating' or 'governing'. (…) We al so note that Article I:3(b) of the GATS
provides that 'services' includes any service in any sector except services supplied in
the exercise of governmental authority' (e mphasis added), and that Article XXVIII(b)
of the GATS provides that the "'supply of a service' includes the production,
distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service". There is nothing at all in
these provisions to suggest a limited scope of application for the GATS."
94
3.29 The services at issue are supplied from Antigua by means of distant communication (in
particular through Internet connection, telecommuni cations or postal or delivery services) into the
territory of the United States. Antigua submits that this constitutes "mode 1" or "cross-border" supply
of services, as defined in Article I:2(a) of the GATS. This view is supported by paragraph 19 the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines which gives examples for the four modes of supply; this same paragraph
has been confirmed, unchanged, in para graph 28 of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines 95. Antigua
further notes that a "Progress Report" adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 19 July 1999
concerning the "Work Programme on Electronic Comme rce" mentions that "there was particular
difficulty" in making a distinction between suppl y under modes 1 and 2 ("cross-border supply" and
"consumption abroad," respectively).
96 While that may be the case in certain circumstances Antigua
believes that this is not the case here. 97 In any event whether the gambling and betting services at
issue in this proceeding are supplied in mode 1 or mode 2 does not have a material impact on this
dispute because the United States has made the same commitments for both modes of supply.
2. As to whether the United States has undertaken a specific commitment on gambling and
betting services98
3.30 Antigua argues that the GATS itself is a relatively brief document. The full nature and extent
of each Member's obligations under the GATS can only be determined by reference to their respective
"schedules of specific commitments" that are manda ted by GATS Article XX:1. Once developed, the
schedules of specific commitments of the Members "s hall be annexed to [the GATS] and shall form
an integral part thereof."99 Antigua submits that, in its Schedule of commitments under the GATS 100,
the United States has made a full commitment for th e cross-border supply of services classified under
sub-sector 10.D "Other recreational services (except sporting)." 101 In drafting its Schedule, the
United States made use of the Services Sectoral Cl assification List prepared by the GATT Secretariat
during the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations. 102 Sub-sector 10.D of W/120 is headed

94 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 220.
95 Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitm ents Under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) , adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, S/L/92, 28 March 2001
(hereinafter the "2001 Scheduling Guidelines").
96 S/L/74, para. 5
97 Antigua notes that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines provide the following explanation about
"consumption abroad": "This mode of supply is often referred to as 'movement of the consumer'. The essential
feature of this mode is that the service is delivered ou tside the territory of the Member making the commitment.
Often the actual movement of the consumer is necessary as in tourism services. However, activities such as ship
repair abroad, where only the property of the consumer 'moves,' or is situ ated abroad, are also covered." See
Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services – Explanatory Note , MTN.GNS/W/164,
3 September 1993, para. 19 (hereinafter the "1993 Scheduling Guidelines"). This definition is taken over
without change in para. 29 of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines.
98 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' replies to Panel question Nos. 1-8 and
30-31 in Annex C of this Report.
99 GATS, Article XX:3.
100 The United States of America – Schedule of Specific Commitments , GATS/SC/90, 15 April 1994
(hereinafter the "US Schedule").
101 Antigua notes that, with regard to that sector, the United States has also made a full commitment for
"consumption abroad."
102 Services Sectoral Classification List, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991
(hereinafter the "W/120").

"Sporting and other recreational services" and lists "964" as the corresponding CPC number. 103 Its
heading 964 "Sporting and other recreational services" is broken down as follows:
 "964 Sporting and other recreational services
 9641 Sporting services
 96411 Sports event promotion services
 96412 Sports event organization services
 96413 Sports facility operation services
 96419 Other sporting services

 9649 Other recreational services
 96491 Recreation park and beach services
 96492 Gambling and betting services
 96499 Other recreational services n.e.c."

3.31 Sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule is headed "Other recreational services (except sporting)".
Thus the United States has clearly excluded CPC category "9641 Sporting services" from the
commitments it has made in sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule. By the same token sub-sector 10.D of
the US Schedule clearly includes CPC category "9649 Other recreational services" which
encompasses CPC category "96492 Gambling and betti ng services". During consultations with the
United States, Antigua fully disclosed its interpretation of the US Schedule and the legal basis for that
interpretation to the United States, both orally and in writing. In reply the United States simply
denied that it has made commitments for gambling a nd betting services. Despite being asked to do so
by Antigua the United States has not explained: (i) why Antigua's interpretation of the Schedule is
legally incorrect; (ii) what alternative approaches s hould be followed to interpret the US Schedule; or
(iii) what type of activities are, in the view of the United States, covered by sub-sector 10.D "Other
recreational services (except sporting)" in its Schedule.
3.32 Antigua submits that, because the US Schedule is made an integral part of the GATS by
Article XX:3 of the GATS, it must be interpreted on the basis of the general rules of interpretation
provided for in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention .
104 Antigua's interpretation of the US Schedule
follows from: (i) the ordinary meaning of the words "Other recreational services" (Article 31:1 of the
Vienna Convention); (ii) agreements and instrume nts connected to the conc lusion of the GATS that
are part of its context (Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention); and (iii) practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the par ties regarding its interpretation (Article 31:3 of
the Vienna Convention). None of the interpre tation methods permitted by the Vienna Convention
contradicts Antigua's interpretation of the US Schedule.
3.33 Antigua argues that even an interpretation excl usively based on the ordinary meaning of the
words "other recreational services" in the US Schedule leads to the plausible conclusion that gambling
and betting services fall within this broadly worded cat egory. It could perhap s be argued that, if only
taking into account the "ordinary meaning" of the words, gambling and betting services might be
classified under "Entertainment services" (sub-sector 10.A of the US Schedule). However, that would
not change the conclusion because the United Stat es also made a full commitment for cross-border
supply of services under that category.105

103 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.289 and 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 16.
104 See, by analogy, Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment , para. 84 (concerning the
interpretation of a GATT 1994 Schedule).
105 Antigua notes that the United States also has a full commitment for "consumption abroad" for
sub-sector 10.A "Entertainment services".

3.34 Antigua argues that the two most important docum ents that are part of the context of the
GATS for the interpretation of any GATS sche dule are the W/120 list and the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines. Paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines provides that:
"[T]he legal nature of a schedule as well as the need to evaluate commitments, require
the greatest possible degree of clarity in the description of each sector or
sub-sector scheduled. In general the classification of sectors and sub-sectors should
be based on [W/120]. Each sector contained in [W/120] is identified by the
corresponding Central Product Classification (CPC) number. Where it is necessary to
refine further a sectoral classification, this should be done on the basis of the CPC or
other internationally recognized classification (e.g. Financial Services Annex)."
3.35 This paragraph was carried over in the 2001 Sc heduling Guidelines without change. The US
Schedule clearly follows the structure of W/ 120, with the exception of insurance services
(sub-sector 7.A) in relation to which the Sche dule explicitly states (no doubt pursuant to the
Scheduling Guidelines) that "[C]ommitments in this sub-sector are undertaken pursuant to the
alternative approach to scheduling commitments set forth in the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services."
3.36 Antigua states that, during c onsultations, the United States submitted that W/120 is not a
legally binding document. It also stated that the 1993 Scheduling Guide lines provide only general
guidance and that the document itself provides in pa ragraph 1 that it "should not be considered as an
authoritative legal interpretation of the GATS." Th e latter phrase, however, only confirms what is
obvious in the light of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement which reserves the right to make such
interpretations to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. Furthermore this phrase does
not relate to a provision such as paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines which provides no
interpretation at all (unlike, for instance, para graph 7 which interprets the national treatment
principle). Paragraph 16 (and various others) merely explain how WTO Members should schedule
items and how, in the interest of clarity, they s hould provide concordance with the CPC (or additional
definitions) should they wish to use their own cl assifications or definitions. In doing so, these
paragraphs simply set a standard for clear and unambiguous communication in a legal context
requiring "the greatest possible degree of clarity."
106 In the absence of such standards for
communication, GATS schedules could have varied wildly in the drafting and WTO Members might
not have been able to understand each other's sch edules. In that light, documents such as the
Scheduling Guidelines and W/120 obviously form a ve ry important part of the context of the US
Schedule.
3.37 Antigua submits that W/120's status as an "agreem ent" or "instrument" that is part of the
context of the GATS (and the WTO Agreement in gene ral) is further confirmed by Article 22 of the
DSU concerning the suspension of concessions in relation to non-compliance with rulings and
recommendations of the DSB. Paragraph (3)(f)(ii) of Article 22 provides that "for purposes of this
paragraph, 'sector' means: [...] (ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the
current 'Services Sectoral Classification List' which identifies such sectors". 107 Given the clear
importance and acceptance of W/120 in construing Member's commitments under the GATS, the
United States had the ability unambiguously to exclude gambling and betting services from its
commitments under its Schedule. Indeed, numer ous WTO Members that made commitments for

106 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 16.
107 The original footnote provides "[T]he list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors."

sub-sector 10.D have totally or partially excl uded gambling and betting services from the scope of
their commitment in that sector.108 The United States has not done so.
3.38 Antigua observes that, since the entry into force of the GATS, WTO Members have
consistently referred to W/120 (and its cross-refere nces to the CPC) as th e classification used for
GATS purposes and as the main point of reference fo r any discussion on the classification of services.
The Appellate Body has used the CP C as an interpretative tool even when the issue at stake was the
scope of the GATS in general rather than the interpretation of a Member's schedule. In EC –
Bananas III, for instance, the Appellate Body refers to the CPC when it draws the conclusion that
banana traders of United States origin are service s uppliers and that their activities come within the
scope of the GATS. 109 This qualification allowed the a pplication of Article II of the GATS
(application of which is not linked to Member 's schedules) to the situation at issue in EC –
Bananas III (US) . In Canada – Autos , several WTO Members and the Panel itself referred to the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines and its addendum 110 when discussing the interpretation of GATS
schedules and the GATS itself. 111 None of the parties in that dispute (nor the Panel) submitted that it
would be inappropriate to make use of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines for the interpretation of GATS
schedules. Finally, even the United States Inte rnational Trade Commission (hereinafter "USITC")
uses W/120 and its cross-references to CPC as a tool to interpret the US Schedule. In 1997, the
USITC published a document explaining the US Schedule. 112 On page viii of that document, it is
stated that "[T]he US Schedule makes no explic it references to CPC numbers, but it corresponds
closely with the GATT Secretariat's list." The USITC Document also contains a "Concordance of
Industry Classifications" which is described as follows:
"The concordance developed by the USITC clarifies how the services sectors
referenced in the GATT Secretariat's list, the CPC System, and the US Schedule
correspond. The first column of the concor dance identifies the service sectors listed
by the GATT Secretariat. The second column identifies the CPC classifications that
correspond to the GATT Secretariat's list. The third column identifies the sectors
addressed in the US Schedule, and the fourth column provides more detailed
information regarding the structure and coverage of the US Schedule."
113
3.39 According to the actual concordance table in cluded in the USITC Document, sub-sector 10.D
of the US Schedule corresponds to sub-sector 10.D of W/120 and CPC code 964. The fourth column
(in which more information is provided on the stru cture and coverage of th e US Schedule) provides
that sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule excludes "sporting." It does not, however, state that
gambling and betting services, which are covered by CPC code 964, are excluded from the US
Schedule.

108 Antigua notes that, for instance, Austria, Bulg aria, the European Communities, Finland, Slovenia
and Sweden excluded gambling from the scope of their respective commitments under sub-sector 10.D by
specifically using the words "other than gambling" or similar words.
109 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, paras. 225-227. See also the Appellate Body Report on
Canada –Autos, para. 157, where the Appellate Body draws the co nclusion that there is "trade in services" in
that case, inter alia, on the basis of a reference to the CPC.
110 Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note – Addendum ,
MTN.GNS/W/164/Add.1, dated 30 November 1993.
111 Panel Report on Canada – Autos: for Canada, see para. 10.241; for Japan, see para. 6.1002; for both
complaining parties (i.e. Japan and the EU), see para. 10.295; for the Panel itself, see para. 10.243.
112 United States International Trade Commission, US Schedule of Commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services – With explanatory materials prepared by the U.S. International Trade
Commission (hereinafter "USITC Document"), dated May 1997. As is stated on page vii of the USITC
Document, the USITC has "assumed responsibility for maintaining and updating, as necessary, the United
States' Schedule of Commitments (…)."
113 Ibid., page viii.

3.40 The United States replies that Antigua has failed to explain why any particular US gambling
measure(s) that might be relevant in this disput e apply to services or service suppliers operating in a
specific services sector inscribed in the US Schedul e to the GATS. Instead, Antigua simply asserts
that all gambling falls within "other recreati onal services," or possibly within "entertainment
services," and that the United States has made commi tments in its schedule under "other recreational
services" and "entertainment services." The comm itments that a Member schedules for specific
sectors under Part III of the GATS apply to the Memb er's measures affecting the supply of services in
those sectors. Article XVI:2 thus refers to certain "measures which a Member shall not maintain or
adopt," and Article XVII:1 refers to national treatment "in respect of all measures affecting the supply
of services." Article XVIII refers to "commitmen ts with respect to measures." Articles XIX:1 and
XX:2 also refer to "measures." In order to est ablish the relevance of any commitment that the
United States may have made, Antigua must therefore make a prima facie case: (i) that the
United States has adopted or maintained some specifi c measure(s); (ii) that the scope and meaning of
the specific measure(s) adopted or maintained is such that they affect the cross-border supply of
gambling services; (iii) that the United States has insc ribed a commitment in the relevant sector of its
schedule to the GATS for measures affecting those ser vices; and (iv) that the commitment prohibits
the maintenance or adoption of such measure(s). In this case, Antigua has refused to make a case as
to steps (i) or (ii). This in turn makes it impossi ble to carry out steps (iii) and (iv). Had Antigua
argued the existence and meaning of particular measu res, the United States would have been prepared
to examine under step (iii) whether the measures af fect services subject to one or more US sectoral
commitments. By refusing to offer argumenta tion as to specific measures, however, Antigua has
denied the Panel any means to examine whether the United States has made any relevant sectoral
commitments under the GATS.
3.41 The United States argues that, even assuming arguendo the possible relevance of sector 10,
Antigua's claims to find there a US commitment for cross-border supply of gambling services rely on
the W/120 and its references to the CPC. These arguments improperly treat W/120 as an agreement
or instrument made in connection with the c onclusion of the GATS under the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law refl ected in Article 31(2)(a) or 31(2)(b) of the Vienna
Convention. In fact, W/120 is part of the negot iating history of the GATS, which is at best a
supplementary means of interpretation pursuant to the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law reflected in Ar ticle 32 of the Vienna Convention.
114 The context for the US
Schedule includes other Members' schedules. 115 Accordingly, the proper context for the US Schedule
includes the fact that some Members based their sche dules, or parts of them, on the CPC, while others
did not. There are a multitude of references to the CPC in some of the Members' schedules, while the
US Schedule clearly does not reference or rely on the CPC. This context confirms that Members were
free not to use CPC definitions – simply by not referring to them. 116 In fact, many Members'
schedules refer to the CPC for some commitments but not all, while others deviate from the W/120
correspondence table comparing W/120 to the CPC by identifying W/120 entries with CPC numbers
that represent only a subset of the three-digit CP C numbers listed in W/120. The negotiating history
of the GATS confirms that, while Members were en couraged to follow the broad structure of W/120,

114 The United States notes that, while not saying so explicitly, the EC – Bananas III (US) panel
appears to have regarded W/120 as part of the negotiating history of the GATS. See Panel Report on EC –
Bananas III (US), para. 7.289 (discussing W/120 in the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations). Moreover,
W/120 was drawn up by the Secretariat for use for us e in negotiations; as such it does not constitute an
"agreement relating to the treaty which was made by all th e parties" or an "instrumen t ... accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty." See Panel Report on US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act , para.
6.45. This is confirmed by the fact that some parties referred to it in their schedules and others did not.
115 According to the United States, the other schedules are "annexes" within the meaning of Vienna
Convention Article 31(2). Article XX:3 of the GATS confirms this by providing that "[s]chedules of specific
commitments shall be annexed to this agreement and shall form an integral part thereof."
116 The United States adds that some schedules include interpretive notes in which certain Members
agreed that their schedules would have the meaning attributed to them by the CPC, while other schedules
include different interpretive notes, or none at all.

it was never meant to bind Members to the CP C definitions, nor to any other "specific
nomenclature."117 Because the United States did not bind itself to, or reference or rely on, the CPC in
the text of its schedule, the CPC definitions cannot control the interpretation of the US Schedule.
3.42 The United States submits that the question of whether to tie commitments of the United
States or any other Member to CPC definitions w as a matter for negotiations, the answer to which
should not be imposed post hoc through dispute settlement. To do so would contradict the principles
relied upon by the Appellate Body in EC – Computer Equipment, where the Appellate Body found,
with respect to a GATT schedule, that:
"Tariff negotiations are a process of reci procal demands and concessions, of "give
and take". It is only normal that importi ng Members define their offers (and their
ensuing obligations) in terms which suit their needs. On the other hand, exporting
Members have to ensure that their co rresponding rights are described in such a
manner in the Schedules of importing Members that their export interests, as agreed
in the negotiations, are guaranteed. ... We cons ider that any clarification of the scope
of tariff concessions that may be required during the negotiations is a task for all
interested parties."
118
3.43 The reasoning in EC – Computer Equipment is equally applicable to negotiations over
services schedules. The terms of the US offer, and of certain other Members' offers, were defined
without reference to the CPC. All Members agreed to those schedules, and did so with full awareness
that some parties had explicitly chosen to bind themselves to the CPC and others had not. 119 T h e
significance of the presence or absence of explicit CPC references in a commitment was confirmed by
the panel in EC – Bananas III (US). The panel observed that "in scheduling commitments on
'wholesale trade services', the EC inscribed the CPC item number (622) in its services schedule." 120 It
was on the basis of this text that the panel reas oned that: "[T]herefore, any breakdown of the sector
should be based on the CPC. Consequently, any lega l definition of the scope of the EC's commitment
in wholesale services should be based on the CPC description of the sector and the activities it
covers."121
3.44 The United States further submits that a proper interpretation of the US Schedule, without
recourse to the CPC, would show that the United States made no commitment for measures affecting
gambling services. In order to give effect to th e terms of the wide variety of GATS schedules, the
Panel must distinguish between "CPC commitments," which include textual re ferences to numerical
CPC codes, and "non-CPC commitments," the text of which make no reference to the CPC. The EC –
Bananas III (US) panel addressed interpretation of CPC commitments 122, but no panel has yet
addressed the interpretation of non-CPC commitments. Because of the absence of a textual basis for

117 See Note on the Meeting of 27 May to 6 June 1991, MTN.GNS/42, paras.18-19 (24 June 1991)
("The representatives of the United States, Poland, Malays ia and Austria said that th e [sectoral classification]
list should be illustrative or indicative and not bind parties to any specific nomenclature.").
118 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, paras. 109-110.
119 Ibid. ("while each Schedule represents the tariff commitments made by one Member, they represent
a common agreement among all Members."). The United States submits that Antigua's CPC argument also
improperly relies on a document by the USITC, which it refers to under the heading of "practice in the
application of the treaty." This document does not constitu te practice by parties to a treaty for purposes of the
customary rule of interpretation reflected in Ar ticle 31:2(b) of the Vienna Convention. See Appellate Body
Report on Chile – Price Band System , paras. 213-214. Moreover, the document in question has no legal
significance. The explicit purpose of the concordance in the document is only to "facilitate comparison of the
US Schedule with foreign schedules."
120 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.289.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.

referring to the CPC, the legal definition of the scope of a non-CPC commitment must be deduced
through application of customary rules of treaty interpretation.
3.45 The United States notes that Antigua's allegati ons regarding a possible US commitment for
gambling services rely on sectors 10.A and 10.D of the US Schedule to the GATS. However, the
relevant text makes no explicit reference to gambling services. The ordinary meaning of
"recreational" is "[o]f or pertaining to recreation; us ed for or as a form of recreation; concerned with
recreation."
123 Recreation is "[a]n activity or pastime pursued, esp. habitually, for the pleasure or
interest it gives."124 Recreation is also defined as "refreshme nt of strength and spirits after work" or
"a means of refreshment or diversion." 125 The ordinary meaning of "entertainment" is "[t]he action of
occupying a person's attention agreeably; amusement" or "[a] thing which entertains or amuses
someone."126 It is also defined as "the act of entert aining" or "something diverting or engaging." 127
With regard to the "except sporting" notation in sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule, the ordinary
meaning of "sporting" according to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is "[t]he action of
sport," as well as "participation in sport; amusement; recreation;" and "[i]nterested in or concerned in
sport; ... a person interested in sport from purely me rcenary motives . . . [n]ow esp[ecially] pertaining
to or interested in betting or gambling". 128 "Sporting" is defined in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary as "of, relating to, used, or suitable for sport" or "of or relating to dissipation and
esp[ecially] gambling".129 The ordinary meaning of "sporting" in "except sporting" thus encompasses
gambling. Based on the ordinary meaning of the words "recreational," "entertainment," and
"sporting," it is impossible to conclude that gambli ng and betting services must be considered to fall
within sub-sector 10.A "entertainment" or sub-sector 10.D "recreational" services in the US Schedule.
Moreover, Antigua has not explained why it thinks gambling services should fall within the "ordinary
meaning" of those terms.
3.46 The United States submits that an examination of the US Schedule's context – in particular,
other Members' schedules – also fails to dem onstrate that the United States undertook a commitment
with regard to gambling services. Some Memb ers inscribed gambling-related limitations and
restrictions under sub-sector 10.D "recreational services."
130 However, notwithstanding references to
the CPC, others included gambling restrictions under sub-sector 10.A "entertainment services," 131
others inscribed them under tourism services 132, and at least one Member scheduled such restrictions
under sub-sector 10.E "other." 133 Significantly, other Members' schedules confirm the existence of a
residual "other" category that is within sector 10, but not captured by the text of its other
subcategories (sub-sector 10.E). Two Members made commitments in sub-sector 10.E;
134 the United
States did not. The fact that Members were free to schedule this residual category provides further
support that Antigua's claims are in error. Sc heduling of the 10.E residual category would have
provided a default location in the US Schedule for services that could not be classified elsewhere in
sector 10. As shown above, gambling is one such service. Without textual evidence placing

123 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2508 (1993).
124 Ibid.
125 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 975 (10th ed. 2001).
126 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 829 (1993).
127 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 386 (10th ed. 2001).
128 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 3000 (1993).
129 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1134 (10th ed. 2001).
130 The United States notes that, for example, eight European Members specifically excluded gambling
from 10.D. They are Austria, Croatia, the EC, Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Sweden. A few other
Members, such as Australia and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, limited
their commitments to CPC headings unrelated to gambling.
131 The United States notes that Bulgaria excludes ga mbling from sector 10.A entertainment services.
Lithuania, in addition to excluding gambling from 10.D, also scheduled a restriction on gambling under 10.A.
132 Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Peru exclude or restrict gambling activities under the tourism sector.
133 Senegal.
134 Iceland and Senegal.

gambling services elsewhere in sector 10 (and still assuming arguendo that such services belong
somewhere in that sector), the United States could only have a commitment for gambling services if it
had scheduled the 10.E residual category. By not doing so, the United States made no commitment
for gambling services. Thus, in the event that th e Panel addresses the issue of whether the United
States has recorded a commitment for cross-border gambling services in its GATS schedule, the Panel
should find that Antigua has failed to prove that gambling services are covered under 10.D, 10.A, or
any other commitment inscribed in the US Schedule . This finding would be consistent with the
finding by the Appellate Body in EC – Computer Equipment that the burden of clarifying a schedule
does not lie on the importing Member; rather "cla rification ... that may be required during the
negotiations is a task for all interested parties."
135
3.47 The United States also points out that the US Schedule of Specific Commitments does not
apply to measures of Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands challenged by Antigua. The
United States is defined in the text of the US Schedule as "encompassing the 50 states of the United
States, plus the District of Columbia."
136 Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands are not part of
the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As a result, commitments in the US Schedule do not apply
to measures of Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
3.48 Antigua replies that the arguments and evidence it previously put forward, as well as the third
party submissions of the European Communities, Canada and Japan make it very clear that the United
States has, in sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule – interpreted with the assistance of the W/120 – made
full mode 1 and mode 2 market access and national treatment commitments with respect to gambling
and betting services. It is absurd for the United St ates to suggest that WTO Members abandon W/120
as well as the CPC in favour of dictionary refe rences when interpreting the schedules of fellow
Members. Antigua wishes to reiterate that both W/1 20 and the CPC form a part of the context of the
GATS, and it is natural that Members would turn to them for assistance in r eading schedules. Noting
the US argument that, during trade negotiations, it is incumbent upon exporting countries to seek
clarification of the scope of the commitments o ffered by other WTO Members, Antigua argues that
the United States' communication of 7 December 1993, circulated during the Uruguay Round to
Members of the Group of the Negotiations on Se rvices comprises the United States' draft final
schedule concerning initial commitments under GATS. Paragraph 5 of the introduction to this
document states that "[e]xcept where specifically not ed, the scope of the sectoral commitments of the
United States corresponds to the sectoral coverage in the Secretariat's Services Sectoral Classification
list (MTN/GNS/W/120, dated 10 July 1991)." Thus the United States' negotiating partners had no
reason to doubt that the W/120 document provides the basis for the interpretation of sub-sector 10.D
of the US Schedule. And, of course, fellow Members were not referred to the Merriam-Webster
Collegiate or any other dictionary.
3.49 On the issue of the "ordinary meaning of the words," Antigua does not wish to revisit the
United States argument on the dictionary definition of "sporting," which was adequately dealt with by
the European Communities in its third party submissi on. With regard to the ordinary meaning of
"recreational" and "entertainment", the United States stated that "Antigua has not explained why it
thinks gambling services should fall within the "ordin ary meaning" of those terms." However, as
pointed out by the European Comm unities, even the dictionary definitions the United States itself
quotes for these words would cover gambling and betti ng services. In this context, Antigua also
refers to the NGISC Final Report, the first sentence of which states that "[T]oday the vast majority of
Americans (…) gamble recreationally and experience no measurable side effects related to their
gambling (…)".
137 To the same effect, the first sentence of the study on pathological gambling by the
United States National Research Council states that "[G]ambling in America has deep cultural roots

135 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 110 (original emphasis).
136 GATS/SC/90, p. 1.
137 NGISC Final Report (18 June 1999), p. 1-1.

and exists today as a widely available a nd socially accepted recreational activity."
138 Further, on page
2 of this same study, it is stated that "[P]athological gambling differs from the recreational or social
gambling of most adults, who view it as a form of entertainment and wager only small amounts."
139
Throughout these two reports gambling is consistently referred to as "recreation" or "entertainment."
Finally, Antigua would also like to point out th at although the United States tries to claim that
gambling and betting services are covered by sub-sector 10.E of US Schedule – in which it has made
no commitments – the United States fails to note th at the concordance table produced by the USITC
includes, immediately following the heading "E. Other" a parenthetical containing the words "No
corresponding CPC." And, of course, gambling and betting services clearly have their own CPC –
preventing sub-sector 10.E from being the location of the United States' putative lack of commitments
in the gambling and betting sector.
3.50 The United States notes that Uruguay Round negotiators made the GATS very broad; almost
all services are within its scope. At the same time, the GATS negotiators explicitly preserved the
right of Members to regulate services, subject to their specific commitments and obligations.
Antigua's substantive challenge in this case is to prove that the United States has made a commitment
that includes gambling. But beyond that, Antigua must then grapple with the fact that even assuming
the existence of a commitment, Members remain fr ee to regulate services, even to the extent of
declaring particular activities to be illegal, so long as they do so in a manner consistent with their
GATS commitments and obligations.
3.51 The United States notes that all parties to this dispute agree that the GATS schedules are an
integral part of the treaty; they must be interpre ted according to the customary international rules of
treaty interpretation as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Starting with the
ordinary meaning of the terms, the terms of the US Schedule indisputably say nothing about gambling
as such – neither the word "gambling" nor any synonym for that word appears anywhere in the text of
the US Schedule. This means that Antigua bears the heavy burden of proving that the United States,
without explicitly saying so, undertook an implic it commitment covering its longstanding and deeply
rooted system of regulations on gambling. If the United States and its Uruguay Round negotiating
partners had intended such a commitment on the part of the United States, es pecially on this very
sensitive issue, the US Schedule would have said so explicitly. Needless to say, it does not. Antigua
nonetheless proposes that gambling is implicit in the or dinary meaning of "other recreational services
(except sporting)," or perhaps within "entertainment services." However, the United States has shown
that Antigua has failed to prove that the ordi nary meanings of the words "recreational" or
"entertainment" encompasses gambling. In fact, di ctionary definitions point to a very different
conclusion. Of the three key terms at issue here, "recreational," "entertainment," and "sporting," the
only one that dictionaries associate with gambling is "sporting." And the US Schedule explicitly
excludes sporting.
3.52 Customary rules of treaty interpretation further in struct the interpreter to look at the ordinary
meaning of words "in context." The context for th e US Schedule includes other Members' schedules.
Accordingly, the proper context for the US Schedul e includes the fact that some Members inscribed
references to the CPC in their schedules, while th e United States and other Members did not. This
makes clear that not all parties intended that their schedules refer to the CPC – and for good reason.
The CPC was designed as a statistical device. It was not purpose-built to serve as a nomenclature for
binding services commitments. It is hardly surprisi ng then that some Members, including the United
States, preferred not to inscribe references to it. This is not to say that the non-CPC Members have
undertaken no commitments, nor is the United States suggesting that its obligations are defined by its
own subjective expectations. To the contrary, no n-CPC commitments are interpreted in exactly the

138 See Commission on the Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, Committee on Law
and Justice, Commission on Behavioural and Social Scie nces and Education, Natio nal Research Council,
Pathological Gambling: A Critical Review, (1999), p. 1.
139 Ibid., p. 2.

same way as any normal term of a treaty is interprete d: they are to be given their ordinary meaning,
in context, and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. The United States notes that it has been
suggested that the Panel should have recourse to th e CPC in this dispute because the Appellate Body
in the EC – Computer Equipment dispute found that panels in goods disputes should have recourse to
the Harmonized System. This argument ignores the fact that Harmonized System numbers were an
explicit and integral part of the schedule at issue in EC – Computer Equipment 140, while it is
undisputed that the US Schedule makes no reference to the CPC.
3.53 The United States is of the view that context reveals another significant fact for the
interpretation of the US Schedule. The Unite d States has shown that even among Members who
generally referred to the CPC, restrictions on gamb ling were thought to belong in sectors other than
"entertainment services" and "other recreational services." A number of assertions have been made in
an attempt to distinguish particular schedules of other Members. The important point is that the other
schedules previously cited by the United States rev eal that Members had difficulty with this issue
even in the presence of CPC references. In their absence, Antigua has even less basis to assert that the
United States undertook an implicit commitment for gamb ling. Antigua must be held to its burden of
proving where gambling does fall in the US Schedule. Customary rules of treaty interpretation further
instruct the interpreter to look at the ordinary m eaning of words in light of the treaty's object and
purpose. Two considerations about the object and purpose of the GATS are especially relevant here.
First, the GATS recognizes "the right of members to regulate ... the supply of services within their
territories in order to meet national policy obj ectives." Second, it provides a framework for
"progressively higher levels of liberalization, " exemplified by the adoption of a "positive list"
approach to scheduling. That approach provided that Members' obligations would depend to a large
extent upon the making of "specific" commitmen ts. These objects and purposes of the GATS tend to
confirm that Panels should respect a Member's d ecision to exclude CPC references from its "positive
list" commitments.
3.54 The United States further notes that it has been suggested that the United States either failed
to clarify its "other recreational services (except sporting)" commitment during negotiations, or that it
fails to prove the scope of that commitment in this dispute. On the first issue, the Appellate Body has
already made it clear that the importing party does not bear the burden of clarifying its commitments.
On the contrary, in the EC – Computer Equipment case, the Appellate Body found that the job of
clarifying a Member's schedule is a task for all interested parties to achieve through negotiations.
This Panel need only point out to Antigua that, consistent with EC – Computer Equipment, no panel
may impose such a clarification on the parties post hoc through dispute settlement rather than through
negotiations. On the second issue, Antigua is th e party asserting the existence of a US commitment
for gambling services, and it alone bears the burden of proving the scope of any commitment that it
alleges to be relevant. This is particularly true in this case, where the text reflects a conscious choice
by the United States not to adopt CPC references. To throw the burden onto the United States to
prove the negative would be nothing more than an unjustifiable attempt to reverse the burden of proof.
Antigua bears the burden of proof and has not sust ained its burden. Ultimately, the only piece of
evidence that it has to support its arguments is th e CPC. The United States has explained that the
CPC is negotiating history, not context. And in the view of other negotiating history recording the
intent of the parties not to be bound by the CPC, or any other extra-agreement nomenclature, it is
clear that the CPC was not intended to control the interpretation of a Member's commitments in the
absence of an explicit reference to the CPC in a Memb er's schedule. Without an explicit reference to
the CPC in the US Schedule, Antigua has no viable argument for a US commitment. The most it can
do is urge that, based on plain meaning, gambling somehow relates to recreation; that it somehow
relates to entertainment; and that the Panel should th erefore look for a way to fit it into the US sector
10 commitments, notwithstanding the "sporting" excep tion. As the United States already pointed out,
at best that argument would lead to the conclusi on that gambling services fall in a sub-sector 10.E
"other" category, which the United States chose not to inscribe in its schedule. At the end of the day,

140 Panel Report on EC – Computer Equipment, paras. 2.10 and 2.15.

what Antigua really wants is for this Panel to validate Antigua's subjective position that the US
Schedule should be read as if it referred to th e CPC, even though it clearly does not. The Panel
should decline this invitation, particularly in a c ontext where the text of the US Schedule provides no
evidence of a specific intention of the parties to incorporate a commitment in the sensitive area of
cross-border gambling services.
3.55 According to the United States, Antigua and the third parties are expending a great deal of
rhetorical energy in an effort to seek to modi fy the text of the US Schedule through dispute
settlement. They would like very much through this process to write in references to the CPC where
none currently exist in the US Schedule. There is more than a little irony to this, because some of
those same parties are right now asking us to do exac tly the same thing in negotiations. That, in fact,
is the proper forum for that effort, and it is the only proper forum. The dispute settlement system is
specifically proscribed from adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of Members. On this
point, the Appellate Body in EC–Computer Equipment has already given us an unambiguous answer.
The task of clarifying commitments in a GATS schedule, like the tariff schedule in EC–Computer
Equipment, is one for all interested parties to achie ve through negotiations. The US Schedule –
without CPC references – is an integral part of the Agreement as accepted by all WTO Members.
That Schedule, and not the schedule others would have liked, sets forth US commitments. And that
schedule, like other WTO provisions, must be inte rpreted based on its ordinary meaning, in its
context, and in light of the Agreement's object and purpose.
3.56 The United States further argues that Antigua's reliance on the CPC Prov. as the basis for a
US commitment is misplaced. Members have une quivocally acknowledged the fact that the CPC
does not define commitments made in a schedule that does not refer to the CPC. For example, this
was repeatedly confirmed during a 1998 discussi on in the Committee on Specific Commitments.
141
The Secretariat's Note recording that discussion recounts th e following statement by the United
States:
"Time and resources should not be spent in exhaustive study of the CPC, which was
inadequate not only for financial services and telecoms but more generally. That
explained why some countries had chosen not to use the CPC as the basis for
scheduling and why scheduling in some sectors had been done on a sui generis basis.
... Attention should focus on the improvement of W/120. Delegations should indicate
which sectors seem to them poorly defined in W/120 or elsewhere and the Committee
should work on an understanding to improve these definitions."
142
3.57 No Member expressed disagreement with the US premise that "some countries had chosen
not to use the CPC." In fact, the European Comm unities agreed that "[d]issatisfaction with [CPC]
descriptions was certainly one of the reasons why certain Members had chosen not to use the CPC as
the basis for their schedules."143 In the same discussion, Hong Kong confirmed that "[t]he provisional
CPC was merely an individual option for members." 144 In sharp contrast to its position as a third
party in the present dispute, the European Comm unities did not then assert that non-CPC schedules
should be read according to the CPC (and thus in de fiance of the intent of the parties). On the
contrary, the European Communities stated that "[ w]hen a schedule made no reference to the CPC,
the interpretation of the extent of commitments was difficult. 145 In making this suggestion, the
European Communities was acknowledging what the Un ited States has argued from the outset of this

141 Committee on Specific Commitments, Report of the Meeting Held on 2 April 1998 , Note by the
Secretariat, S/CSC/M/5 (6 May 1998).
142 Ibid., para. 4.
143 Ibid., para. 6.
144 Ibid., para. 10.
145 Ibid. The United States notes that there was no mandatory requirement to take any such steps
during or after the Uruguay Round negotiations.

dispute – that the CPC does not control the interpre tation of the schedule of a Member that chose not
to refer to it.
3.58 These statements all confirm the basic premises of the US position on this issue – i.e ., that a
Member scheduling GATS commitments during the Uruguay Round was free to choose or not to
choose to inscribe references to th e CPC descriptions; that the result of not choosing to inscribe such
references is that the CPC does not control the inte rpretation of that Member's commitment; and that
any elaboration that may be desired by another Me mber must be achieved through negotiations, not
through dispute settlement. In light of these cons iderations, to now read the US Schedule according
to the CPC would only improperly "add to or dimi nish the ... obligations provided in the covered
agreements," in direct contravention of Article 3 of the DSU . It should come as no surprise that the
United States did not schedule commitments for gambling services, given the overriding policy
concerns surrounding those services, which are refl ected in the extremely strict limitations and
regulation of these services. The United States wi ll further discuss those policy concerns in its
arguments on GATS Article XIV (see below, section III. B.8). In fact, in view of those concerns, and
the numerous bans or restrictions and strict contro ls on gambling, it would be surprising to find that
the United States did schedule such a commitment.
3.59 Antigua submits that what the United States appear s to have fallen back to are three, non-
technical issues. First, the United States would like the Panel to read the general GATS scheduling
methodology essentially in reverse – that is, unless a service sub-sector is expressly mentioned in a
schedule, then it is ipso facto excluded. But that is not the case. The schedules of the Members are all
organized around the concept of services sectors, with the understanding that once a particular service
sector is listed in a schedule, then all its sub-sectors are also covered unless the Member clearly limits
its commitment in relation to one or more of these sub-sectors. If a Member wanted to exclude an
entire sector, it could either expressly say so or simply leave that sector off its schedule. However, the
schedules of the Members may differ in one way or another, all schedules are consistent with this
approach. Therefore, either gambling and betting services are expressly (or at least clearly) excluded
by the United States in its schedule or they are commi tted to. Together with the third parties, Antigua
has made a compelling case for the inclusion of gambling and betting services in sub-sector 10.D of
the US Schedule. Secondly, contrary to the assertion made by the United States, Antigua is not trying
to "force" the CPC on the United States and its GATS schedule. But Antigua considers it is
appropriate that the W/l20 document and the CPC be used in the interpretation of the US Schedule
under concepts of international law – and not the least because the USITC has expressly instructed us
to do so in a public document.
3.60 For Antigua, the third defence of the United Stat es seems to be the concept that, regardless of
what its Schedule might say (or might be interprete d to say) the United States simply would not have
made a commitment in the field of gambling servic es. At the outset, Antigua agrees with the United
States when it said to the panel in Mexico – Telecommunications (emphasis added):
146
"To begin, the United States considers that whether or not Mexico was 'freezing' the
level of market access prevailing at the tim e of the negotiations is irrelevant; the
ordinary meaning of Mexico's Schedule speaks for itself and should control. The
extent of a Member's commitments cannot depend upon what it alleges to have
intended at the time of the negotiations. The ordinary meaning of Mexico's Schedule
instead dictates its commitments."
3.61 In Antigua's view, WTO jurisprudence is in ag reement with the United States' position in the
Telmex dispute. The fact that the United States made its commitment "unintentionally" is not relevant
for the interpretation of its Schedule. As the Appellate Body pointed out in EC – Computer

146 Second written submission of the Unites States of America, Mexico – Measures Affecting

Equipment, in relation to a GATT schedule, schedules are an integral part of WTO law and need to be
interpreted on the basis of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention – the purpose of which is to ascertain
the common intentions of the parties. Accord ing to the Appellate Body "[t]hese common intentions
cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjec tive and unilaterally determined 'expectations' of one
of the parties to a treaty."
147 Antigua also cannot believe that the United States in particular would
have made any commitment "unintentionally" and that, dur ing the negotiations on its Schedule, the
United States did not realize that the only proper in terpretation of the scope of its sub-sector 10.D is
that it covers gambling and betting services. As both Antigua and the EC pointed out, quite a few
countries, including many with considerably fewe r available resources than the United States, were
able to recognize where gambling and betting commitm ents might be made and to expressly exclude
these services from their schedules. Antigua may speculate about why the United States may have
made full commitments in this area, although the reas on, if any, is legally irrelevant. But the most
plausible reason is that the United States, as the main advocate of the GATS and in an attempt to
convince developing countries to open their services markets, made commitments in all sectors where
it did not perceive an immediate competitive threat.
3.62 Finally, Antigua rejects the United St ates' dictionary-based arguments. The New Shorter
Oxford Dictionary provides differences for the use of "sporting" as a verbal noun and "sporting" as an
adjective. As a verbal noun it means "the action of sport" and "participatio n in sport; amusement,
recreation." According to the dictionary it is used in combinations with other words in the sense of
"concerned with." This is of course precisely the ty pe of usage one can expect in a classification such
as W/120 or the US Schedule referring to "sporting ser vices." Indeed, this is how the word "sporting"
is used in the United States' own NAICS. As an adjective it means "sportive; playful," "engaged in
sport or play," "interested in or concerned in sport" or, in more colloquial and ironic language
"designating an inferior sportsman or a person in terested in sport from purely mercenary motives.
Now esp. pertaining to be interested in betting or gambling. Chiefly in sporting man." It is clear on
the face of these definitions that "sporting" is not no rmally used as an adjective in relation to a word
such as "services." The Panel should also note that according to the United States, the term "sporting"
does not only refer to gambling but, as stated in it s response to the Panel's question 8, the term
"sporting" also covers "other (non-gambling) forms of sporting." Thus, rather than arguing that
"sporting" should be given its ordinary meaning, th e United States submits that "sporting" should be
given all the meanings that can be found in a dictionary. In this case this would include: (i) services
concerned with sport; (ii) prostitution; (iii) ser vices related to the spontaneous producing by a plant
of an abnormal form or variety; (iv) services related to gambling; and (v) services relating to the
taking of risks. Even if it is true that dicti onaries mention all these divergent meanings, the term
"sporting" cannot simultaneously have all of these diffe rent meanings in a document if it is used just
once.
3.63 The United States notes that both parties disagree as to whether the United States has made a
commitment, but appear to agree that the US commitm ents are part of the text of the GATS, and thus
the issue is one of treaty interpretation. As a ma tter of ordinary meaning, Antigua has argued that
gambling services are both "other recreational services" and "entertainment services." The United
States has already discussed the ordinary meaning of these terms, and Antigua's arguments to date
only confirm the US view that gambling services do not fit properly within the plain meaning of either
category. Some sources may refer to gambling casually as "entertainment" or "recreation," yet
gambling services also involve considerations of fina ncial gain and other considerations not typically
associated with recreational or entertainment servi ces. Indeed, the Solicitor General of Antigua has
himself described remote gambling servi ce suppliers as "financial institutions."
148 All of this taken
together indicates that this sui generis service at most belongs in the residual "E. Other" sub-sector,
where the United States made no commitment.

147 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84 (original emphasis).
148 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "The Big Gamble," broadcast on The Fifth Estate,
31 October 2001.

3.64 Additionally, focusing on "other recreational ser vices," the ordinary meaning of the "except
sporting" notation in the US Schedule confirms that the United States has made no commitment for
gambling under 10.D "other recreational services (except sporting)." In response to the US point that
the ordinary meaning of "sporting" includes gambling, Antigua has referred solely to the arguments of
a third party to this dispute, the European Co mmunities. The United States would like to note,
however that, first, the EC states that "sporting" is not "commonly used" to refer to gambling. But it
provides no evidence to support that assertion; i ndeed, a stack of dictionaries would seem to
contradict it. Second, the EC states that the u se of "sporting" in the sense of gambling refers to
persons rather than services. If "sporting" means gambling when used to describe the consumer or
supplier, it could hardly be said to lose that meani ng entirely in reference to the service they consume
or supply. Other dictionary definitions provided by the United States imply no such limitation. Third,
the EC states that the use of "sporting" in referenc e to gambling is referred to in one dictionary as an
"Americanism," and therefore not within the "ordinary meaning" of a term used in the US Schedule of
specific commitments. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which is usually scrupulous in
such matters, places no such qualification on the use of sporting to refer to gambling. And, all
linguistic prejudices aside, no rule of treaty interpre tation provides that the "ordinary meaning" of a
word in the English language cannot originate in th e United States. Indeed, the fact that the schedule
at issue is that of the United States makes it all the more absurd to exclude any meaning a priori on
the basis that one dictionary calls it an "Americanism." The United States therefore submits once
again that the ordinary meaning of the term "sporting" includes gambling services.
3.65 The United States notes that, against the US argum ents based on ordinary meaning, Antigua
offers an interpretation based on the CPC. In this regard, the United States submits that the text of the
US Schedule, viewed in context, shows an affirma tive choice on the part of the United States not to
refer to the CPC. The negotiating history confirms that parties following W/120 did not intend to be
bound by the CPC or any other nomenclature ab sent explicit references to such nomenclature.
149 The
EC itself has subsequently confirmed that "[d]issatisfaction with [CPC] descriptions was certainly one
of the reasons why certain Members had chosen not to use the CPC as the basis for their
schedules."150 This statement by the EC undermines the credibility of assertions in the present dispute
that Members are somehow bound by the CPC notwithstanding having chosen not to use it. Seeking
another way to make the CPC binding on the United States, Antigua has seized on the USITC
Document. Should this document state – contrary to the fact – that "the United States has no GATS
commitment for gambling services", it would have no interpretive value in a WTO dispute settlement
proceeding. A Member may not unilaterally adop t a multilaterally binding interpretation of any
provision of a WTO agreement, and such statem ents by themselves do not constitute subsequent
practice under the customary international rules of treaty interpretation as embodied in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention. In any event, the USITC Document makes it clear that the Document is not
purporting to interpret the US Schedule. The docum ent itself confirms that the USITC has only been
delegated the responsibility to undertake ministerial duties – to "maintain" and "compile" the US
Schedule, not to interpret the US Schedule on behalf of the US Government. Indeed, given that a
Member may not unilaterally adopt a multilaterally binding interpretation of any provision of a WTO
agreement, a delegation of unila teral interpretive authority woul d make no sense with respect to
provisions of the WTO agreements.
3.66 The United States notes that a third party has asserted that the USITC Document may have
probative value for the "purpose of throwing light on a disputed question of fact."
151 This statement
might be correct if the issue under discussion were factua l in nature. It is not. The issue here is the
legal interpretation of an annex to the GATS pursuant to the customary rules of treaty interpretation of
international law – an area in which the USITC's unilateral document carries no weight in this dispute.
Moreover, given that this is an issue of treaty interpretation, Antigua's arguments comparing the

149 See above para. 3.41, footnote 115.
150 See above para. 3.57.
151 Canada's reply to Panel question No. 2.

USITC Document to the US Statement of Administ rative Action (hereinafter "SAA") are off point.
The SAA has been referenced in WTO dispute settle ment to help interpret US domestic law, not
WTO agreements. Antigua's various arguments for giving independent force to the USITC Document
are untenable, but also unpersuasive for the simple reason that obligations in a GATS schedule must
be based on the schedule itself, not on some extrinsic, unilateral document.
3.67 With respect to Antigua's assertions regarding the cover note to draft versions of the US
Schedule, the United States disagrees with Antigua's statement that the cover note was not included in
the final US schedule annexed to the GATS "simply b ecause such a cover note is not formally part of
a GATS schedule as it is attached to the GATS by Article XX:3."
152 Several Members included such
notes in their schedules. For example, Australia's schedule begins with a note stating that "[t]he
classification of sectors is based on the 1991 provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) of the
United Nations Statistical Office, while the ordering reflects the Services Sectoral Classification List
(MTN.GNS/W/120 of 10 July 1991)". Needless to say, the final US Schedule includes no such
statement. The United States has already confirme d in this proceeding that it used W/120 for the
ordering of the US schedule. That is consiste nt with the note accompanying drafts of the US
Schedule. However, unlike Australia and a num ber of other Members, the United States never
adopted the CPC nomenclature. The cover note to draft US Schedules does not indicate otherwise
and, as Australia's note further confirms, these were understood to be distinct issues.
3.68 Concerning the 1993 and 2001 Scheduling Guidelin es, the United States argues that Antigua
lacks any basis for its assertion that "the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines comprise a subsequent
agreement between the parties (as per Article 31( 3) of the Vienna Convention) regarding the
interpretation of existing schedules in the light of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines."
153 The 2001
document, like its 1993 predecessor, explicitly stat es that it "should not be considered as a legal
interpretation of the GATS." Indeed, both documents were adopted by the Council for Trade in
Services, not the General Council or the Ministerial Conference, which have the "exclusive authority"
to adopt legal interpretations of the WT O agreements under Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization . Moreover, Antigua's assertion that the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines and W/120 are context within the meani ng of Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention
fails for the simple reason that neither document was "made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other pa rties as an instrument related to the treaty," as
required under that Article. The United States and Antigua seem to agree that these documents were
not made by any party, and insofar as they refer to the CPC, the schedules to the GATS demonstrate
that numerous parties accepted them only partially, or not at all, for that purpose.
3.69 The United States considers that Antigua's argu ments on the issue of non-existence of a US
commitment represent a series of attempts to turn the rules of treaty interpretation on their head by
using preparatory work and other extrinsic sources, which could never be more than secondary means
of interpretation, to override text of the Agreement. Antigua even goes so far as to assert that the text
of a GATS commitment cannot diminish the interpretive value of preparatory work
154 – a statement
that is inconsistent with the fundamental principl es of treaty interpretation. Certainly the CPC was
discussed in the preparatory work for the GATS. Some Members decided to use it always. Some
decided to use it when it suited them. Some decided not to use it at all. The texts of the schedules
reflect those choices, and show the United States to be in the third category. Mere preparatory work
cannot override the text in this case. But the prep aratory work can and does confirm the US reading
of the text in regard to the CPC. Specifica lly, it shows that the United States and other Members
spoke explicitly of their desire that Members not be bound by any particular nomenclature. Finally,
the United States reiterates that if some Members would prefer that all schedules be read according to

152 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 3.
153 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 1.
154 Ibid.

the CPC, that is a matter for negotiations rather than dispute settlement. The Appellate Body report in
EC – Computer Equipment confirms that principle.
3.70 The United States further notes that An tigua quoted the US argument in Mexico – Telecom
that "the ordinary meaning of Mexico's Schedule sp eaks of itself and should control." That statement
applies equally to the US Schedule – its ordinary meaning speaks for itself and should control. That
ordinary meaning does not include gambling services, and does not include references to the CPC.
The same text-based approach applies equally to sect ors that were not inscribed in the US Schedule,
such as 10.E "Other." Notwithstanding Antigua's ar guments to the contrary, the United States cannot
be found to have made a commitment in sub-sect or 10.E when it has declined to inscribe that
sub-sector while simultaneously inscribing other sub-sectors under sector 10. Moreover, in
paragraph 3.62, Antigua appears to concede that th e definition of "sporting" includes gambling. It
argues, however, that this meaning is somehow not correct, apparently because Antigua intuits,
without any basis, that "sporting" in the US Schedu le is a gerund (or "verbal noun") rather than an
adjective. Moreover, according to Antigua, a word used only once in a document can only have one
meaning, and in this case that meaning cannot encomp ass gambling. In the view of the United States,
these unfounded assumptions represent nothing more than an attempt to artificially limit the ordinary
meaning of "sporting."
3. The measure(s) at issue155
3.71 Antigua argues that, in its request for the establishment of a panel submitted to the WTO on
13 June 2003, the government of Antigua attached an Annex in which it listed a large number of US
federal and state statutes that adversely affect th e ability of Antiguan service suppliers to provide
cross-border gambling and betting services to consum ers in the United States. The Annex also
included references to a number of illustrative acti ons by US federal and state authorities that also
constitute measures that inhibit the provision of cross-border gambling and betting services into the
United States. During the consultations as well as in meetings of the DSB, the United States
expressed itself confused by the nature, extent a nd impact of the measures cited in the Annex.
Antigua believes these expressions of confusion to be merely a "red herring" – not only is the United
States better positioned than Antigua to coherently construe its own laws, but crucially the United
States has unambiguously stated in the context of th is dispute that the provision by Antiguan service
suppliers of cross-border gambling and betting ser vices into the United States is illegal under United
States law. Under such circumstances, the Unite d States should not be allowed to in essence "hide
behind" the complexity and opacity of its own legal structure to deflect attention from the
fundamental simplicity of this complaint.
3.72 The rules applying to the cross-border suppl y of gambling and betting services in the United
States are complex and comprise a mixture of state and federal law the precise meaning of which is
often unclear. The debate on the interpretation of these rules has often been conducted in terms of the
legality of "Internet gambling" (because the Internet has become one of the main tools to supply
gambling and betting services on a cross-border basis). A recent report by the United States General
Accounting Office (hereinafter, "GAO") describes th e legal framework for Internet gambling in the
United States as "complex".
156 The GAO further summarises the legal framework in the United States
as follows:
"Both federal and state laws apply to Inte rnet gambling in the United States. In
general, gambling is a matter of state la w, with each state determining whether
individuals can gamble within its borders and whether gaming businesses can legally
operate there. Since Internet gambling typically occurs through interstate or

155 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' replies to Panel question Nos. 9-14 and
32-36 in Annex C of this Report.
156 GAO Report, p. 3.

international means, with a Web site located in one state or country and the gambler
in another, federal law is used to protect the states from having their laws
circumvented. To date, the Wire Act
157 is the federal statute that has been used to
prosecute federal Internet gambling cases, although courts sometimes disagree on the
applicability of certain provisions of the statute. In addition, the Travel Act158 and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act 159 have been used to pro secute gambling entities that
take interstate or internat ional bets over the telephone a nd would likely be applicable
to Internet gambling activity. Some states have taken specific legislative actions to
address Internet gambling, in some cases criminalizing it and in others relying on
existing gambling laws to bring actions ag ainst entities engaging in or facilitating
Internet gambling."
160
3.73 The GAO Report directly addressed some of the ambiguities in US law on this issue.161 Some
of these ambiguities are discussed more extensively in a report prepared by Mr. Jeffrey R. Rodefer
from the Department of Justice of the State of Nevada. 162 This complexity and ambiguity as well as
the overlap between federal law and the laws of th e more than 50 states and territories makes it very
difficult to identify with complete precision all laws and regulations of the United States that could be
applied in the prohibition of the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.
3.74 Antigua submits that the existence of a complete prohibition is not in dispute. In the context
of this dispute, the United States government has stated that the provision of cross-border gambling
and betting services (into the United States from abroad ) is always unlawful in the entire territory of
the United States and under whatever form. 163 Antigua accepts this prem ise for the purpose of this
dispute settlement procedure. Consequently there is no need to conduct a debate on the precise scope
of specific United States laws and regulations. The s ubject of this dispute is the total prohibition on
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services – and the parties are in agreement as to the
existence of that total prohibition. The precise way in which this import ban is cons tructed under
United States law should not affect the outcome of this proceeding.
3.75 Antigua submits that, to facilitate the legal di scussion, it has made a distinction between two
broad types of measures: (i) those which act to pr ohibit the offering of gambling and betting services
per se and (ii) those restricting international money transfers and payments relating to gambling and
betting services. While the former include statutes criminalising the provision of the services (such as
those used by the United States in 2000 to prosecu te and imprison a licensed Antiguan operator), the
latter category comprises enforcement measures, such as the actions by the Attorney General of New
York against Paypal, Inc., a company that provides Internet payment services.
164 The two categories

157 Transmission of Wagering Information, 18 U.S.C. §1084, (hereinafter, "Wire Act").
158 Interstate or Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises, 18 U.S.C. §1952,
(hereinafter "Travel Act").
159 Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Business, 18 U.S.C. §1955, (hereinafter, "Illegal Gambling
Business Act").
160 GAO Report, p. 11.
161 Ibid., pp. 12-17.
162 Jeffrey R. Rodefer, "Internet Gambling in Nevada. Overview of Federal Law Affecting Assembly
Bill 466" published on 18 March 20 03 on the website of the Department of Justice of Nevada
(www.ag.state.nv.us).
163 See, e.g., the statement of the United States' re presentative at the DSB meeting of 24 June 2003:
"[…] the United States had made it clear that cross-bo rder gambling and betting services were prohibited under
US law." (WT/DSB/M/151, p. 11).
164 Press Release by the New York Attorney Genera l, dated 21 August 2002 and the "Assurance of
Discontinuance" signed between the New York Attorney General and Paypal, Inc. dated 16 August 2002. The
New York Attorney General started an inquiry against Paypal because it provided payment services to
companies that supply gambling and betting services to persons resident in New York without being expressly
authorized to do so under New York law. Because, in the opinion of the Attorney General, this supply of

of measures identified by Antigua are not two rigidly distinct categories. In fact, the measures in the
second category of payment-related measures are actions by law enforcement authorities based on the
legislative measures in the first category (and are th erefore a practical manifestation of the measures
in that first category). The only reason why the dis tinction is made is to facilitate the discussion on
the application of specific provisions of the GATS to the facts of this dispute.
3.76 Antigua argues that Article 6.2 of the DSU provi des that a request for the establishment of a
panel shall "identify the specific measures at issue." The Appellate Body has repeatedly stated that
there are two reasons why a Panel request must be pr ecise. First, it forms the basis for the terms of
reference which define the scope of the dispute. Second, it serves the due process objective of
notifying the defendant and the third parties of the complainant's case.
165 The complexity of the
United States' legislation has made it relativel y difficult for Antigua to "identify the specific
measures" (despite the obvious simplicity of the ef fect of the United States total prohibition). To
avoid misunderstanding and procedural difficulties Antigua adopted the following approach in its
Panel request: Section I and Section II of the A nnex attached to the Panel request list specific
references to United States laws (at both the federa l and the state level) that Antigua believed could
reasonably be construed as adversely impacting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services; and Section III of the Annex provides examples of non-legislative measures, such as court
decisions, criminal prosecutions or statements and actions by state Attorneys General, that apply some
of these laws to the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. This approach was clearly
explained in the Panel request and, for the avoi dance of doubt, it was added that "[T]he measures
listed in the Annex only come within the scope of this dispute to the extent that these measures
prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua and Barbuda from lawfully offering gambling and
betting services in the United States under conditions of competition compatible with the United
States' obligations."
166 Further Antigua explicitly stated in the Panel request that: "[a]lthough this is
not always clear on the face of the text of these laws , relevant United States authorities take the view
that these laws (separately or in combination) ha ve the effect of prohibiting all supply of gambling
and betting services from outside the United States to consumers in the United States." In the
circumstances Antigua has used its best endeavours to "identify the specific measures at issue" and
submits that it has done more than could reasonabl y be required from a complainant by conducting a
detailed investigation of an arcan e area of law of the United States (and by attempting to provide
examples of legislation and other measures that adversely impact on Antiguan service suppliers).
Clearly, given that United States itself has stated that the offering of gambling and betting services
into the United States from Antigua is unlawful in every instance, the United States has been given
fair notice of Antigua's claim.
3.77 Antigua notes that at the DSB meeting of 24 June 2003, the United States representative
mentioned three procedural concerns with the Pane l request of Antigua: (i) the Annex to Antigua's
Panel request contained items that "did not constitute 'measures' that could properly be included
within the scope of a Panel request"; (ii) the Anne x to the Panel request "included several measures
which appeared not to have been included in the 1 April 2003 consu ltation request"; and (iii) "not all
of the measures cited in the Annex were related to cross-border gambling and betting." The United
States' first apparent concern that some of the US measures listed in the Annex to the Panel request
are not "measures" presumably relates to the matters listed in Section III of the Annex (which lists

gaming services is illegal under New York and United States federal law it would therefore also be illegal for
Paypal to provide Internet payment services to businesses offering these unauthorized gaming services. The
matter was settled when Paypal agreed to cease proce ssing payments for such gaming companies and pay the
sum of US $200,000. Other examples of such measures are provided by the New York Attorney General's press
releases of 14 June 2002 and 11 February 2003 announcing similar settlements with 11 banks that provide credit
card services.
165 For instance, Appellate Body Reports on EC – Bananas III , para. 142, and US – Carbon Steel ,
para. 126.
166 WT/DS285/2, 2nd paragraph, last sentence.

court decisions and statements of law enforcement and administrative agencies either taking or
explaining actions against cross-border gaming services). However, the measures listed in Section III
of the Annex to the Panel request clearly are "m easures" within the meaning of the GATS. The
United States entities that have taken these measures include the United States Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court of the State of Ne w York, the Gaming Control Board of Michigan and
the Attorneys General of the States of Florida, Minnesota and New York. The measures listed in
Section III of the Annex to the Panel request come within the meaning of "measure" specified in
Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS as either "procedure, decision, administrative action or any other
form" taken by "central, regional or local governments and authorities."
167 Further, the measures
described in Section III of the Annex are based upon or arise out of a number of the statutory
provisions listed in Sections I and II of the Annex and are therefore in any event caught by the GATS
in that capacity.
3.78 Antigua notes that the United States' second stat ed concern relates to measures that "appeared
not to have been included" in the consultation requ est of Antigua. There are a number of differences
between the list of measures annexed to the consu ltation request and the list of measures annexed to
the Panel request. The main difference between th e two is that the Annex to the Panel request
contains considerably fewer measures than the Anne x to the consultation request. The United States
suggests, however, that certain measures were adde d in the Annex to the Panel request that do not
appear in the consultation request. Presumably the United States' concern is related to three
references that contained typographical errors in the Annex to the consulta tion request, which were
corrected in the Annex to the Panel request. These are the following (with the differences underlined):
 Incorrect reference in consultation
request
Correct reference in Panel request
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-10-101 to 18-10-08 (1999) §§ 18-10-101 to 18-10-108 (1999)
New York
Constitution
art. II, § 9 art. I, § 9
Rhode Island
Constitution
art. I, § 22 art. VI, § 22

3.79 The request for consultations (and the addendum thereto) submitted by Antigua made it clear
that the subject matter of this dispute is the United States' prohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services as it results from the application of a great number of separate laws. In
this respect it should have been clear to the United States that the se typographical errors are indeed
nothing but typographical errors. The reference to the Colorado statutes contained in the consultation
request simply makes no sense and it is clear on the face of this reference that it contains an error.
Article II, § 9 of the New York Constitution concerns suffrage and Article I, § 22 of the Rhode Island
Constitution concerns the right to bear arms. Each of the constitutional articles as corrected in the
Annex to the Panel request concern gambling. Here too, it should have been clear to the United States
that these were mere typographical errors. In each case, it is difficult to believe that the United States
could have been prejudiced by the corrections. Furthermore, in Brazil – Aircraft the Appellate Body
stated that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU do not require "(…) a precise and exact identity between the
specific measures that were the subject of consu ltations and the specific measures identified in the
request for the establishment of a panel."
168 If "precise and exact identity" were to be a requirement it
would never be possible for a complainant to obta in a more precise understanding of the other WTO

167 Article I:3(a) of the GATS. See also the Appellate Body Reports on US – Gasoline, p. 28 and US –
Shrimp, para. 173, where it is stated that a Member bears responsibility for acts of all its departments of
government, including legislative, executive and judiciary. This concept is also clear in Article I:3(a) of the
GATS which provides that "each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to
ensure [observance of the Member's obligations and commitments] by regional and local governments and
authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory."
168 Appellate Body Report on Brazil – Aircraft, para. 132.

Member's measures during consultations – and that would undermine the effectiveness of the dispute
settlement process.
169 Finally, the objectives underlying Articles 6.2 and 4.4 of the DSU 170 are the
need to define the scope of the dispute and th e due process objective of notifying the defendant and
the third parties of the complainan t's case. Correcting three rather obvious typing errors has certainly
not harmed these objectives.
3.80 The United States' third procedural concern that not all the measures cited in the Annex are
related to cross-border gambling and betting, is answ ered in the Panel request itself which explicitly
states that the listed measures only come within the sc ope of this dispute to the extent that they do
relate to cross-border gambling and betting. If ther e are measures in the Annex that do not relate to
cross-border gambling and betting in the way described in the Panel request, they are not within the
scope of this dispute. Further, Antigua believes that the key issue regarding the measures in this
proceeding is whether or not there are measures that impede the ability of Antigua to offer cross-
border gambling and betting services into the United States. Logically then, if simply one of the
measures listed in the Annex to the Panel request has this effect then this matter has been established,
even if (quod non) the remaining scores of listed measures are irrelevant.
171
3.81 The United States argues that rather than providing an analysis of specific US laws as they
relate to gambling, Antigua is asking this Panel to accept a mere assertion as to the effect of such laws
– that they represent a "total prohibition" on cross-border gambling – as proof that the United States is
in violation of its WTO obligations. The United St ates recalls the Appellate Body's observation that
"...we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any syst em of judicial settlement could work if it
incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof." 172 Ignoring
this finding, Antigua has refused to provide the Panel with the text of actual laws or regulations, and
the reasons for why it views such laws and regulations to be inconsistent with the GATS. Simply put,
Antigua has not provided evidence and argumentati on regarding specific measures at issue. This
approach cannot form the basis for a prima facie case in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. A
party cannot advance a prima facie case without linking its evidence and argumentation to some
specific measure(s), and a mere assertion is not itself a measure.
3.82 The United States submits that, as the complainant, Antigua bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case demonstrating that the United States h as adopted specific measure(s) and that the
measure(s) are inconsistent with obligations that the United States has assumed as a Member of the
WTO. As the Appellate Body has consistently fo und, the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings generally rests on the complainant, which must make out a prima facie case by
presenting sufficient evidence and argumentation to create a presumption in support of its claim. 173 If
the complainant succeeds in establishing such a presumption, the respondent may rebut this
presumption.174 Thus, a respondent's measures – such as the gambling-related measures of the United
States at issue in this proceeding – must be treated as WTO-consiste nt until proven otherwise. 175 If

169 According to the Appellate Body "the claims that are made and the facts that are established during
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings." ( India – Patents
(US), para. 94). See also the Panel Report on Brazil – Aircraft, para. 7.9.
170 In the Preliminary Rulings in Canada – Measures relating to exports of wheat and treatment of
imported grain, WT/DS276/12, para. 15, the Panel stated that: "( …) Article 4.4 omits the term 'specific' in
referring to the 'measures at issue'. We believe this di fference in language is not inadvertent and must be given
meaning. Indeed, in our view, this difference in language supports the view that requests for consultations need
not be as specific and as detailed as requests for establishment of a panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU."
171 Antigua notes that this point is particularly sa lient given the agreement of the parties on the legal
position of the United States government regarding the legality of these services. See para. 3.74 above.
172 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
173 For instance, Appellate Body Report on Canada –Dairy II, para. 66, and Appellate Body Report on
EC–Hormones, para. 98.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, para. 157.

the balance of evidence is inconclusi ve with respect to a particular claim, Antigua must be found to
have failed to establish that claim.
176
3.83 The United States notes that Antigua claims that one or more US measure(s) are inconsistent
with WTO treaty obligations; Antigua therefor e bears the burden of providing evidence and
argumentation in support of this claim. In US – Carbon Steel , the Appellate Body found that a party
making such a claim regarding another party's municipal law "bears the burden of introducing
evidence as to the scope and meaning of su ch law to substantiate that assertion." 177 The Appellate
Body went on to describe the type of evidence as to the scope and meaning of municipal law that can
be introduced by the complaining party challenging the law of a WTO Member, stating that "[s]uch
evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or legal
instruments," and "may be supported, as appropriate, by evidence of the consistent application of such
laws, the pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal
experts and the writings of recognized scholars."
178
3.84 The United States points out that, ignoring the most basic burden of proof requirements,
Antigua goes so far as to insist that it is under no obligation to adduce evidence as to specific US laws
or regulations. Antigua is mistaken. As the Appellate Body found in India - Patents (US), where the
measure alleged to be in breach took the form of domestic legislation, an examination of relevant
provisions of such a law is essential to determ ining whether a Member has complied with its
obligations.179 Conducting such an examination necessarily means that a panel or the Appellate Body
"must look at the specific provisions" of domestic law. 180 Antigua appears to agree that the "total
prohibition" it identifies as the measu re at issue in this dispute must be actually comprised of one or
more US laws or regula tions. Consistent with India – Patents (US) and US – Carbon Steel, Antigua
must provide the laws or regulations that it vi ews as relevant, as well as evidence and argumentation
as to their scope and meaning. Antigua, however, has flatly refused to say exactly which provisions it
views as relevant. Indeed, it has neither provided the text of, nor offered evidence or argumentation
as to the meaning of, a single word of any US law or regulation restricting gambling. 181 This
represents a total failure of proof.
3.85 According to the United States, Antigua mis understands the US position on this failure of
proof, calling it an "argument that the Panel cannot i nvestigate in the aggregate the impact of a series
of individual laws." 182 In fact, panels have often examined claims based on the combined effect of
two or more measures, but have correctly approach ed such claims by first examining each specific

176 For instance, Appellate Body Report on EC – Hormones, para. 109.
177 Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, WT/DS213/AB/R para. 157.
178 Ibid.
179 Appellate Body Report on India – Patents (US) , para. 66: "It is clear th at an examination of the
relevant aspects of Indian municipal law and, in par ticular, the relevant provisions of the Patents Act ... is
essential to determining whether India has complied with its obligations under Article 70.8(a). There was
simply no way for the Panel to make this determination without engaging in an examination of Indian law." The
Panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.18, applied the same principle, stating that "[w]e are ... called upon
to establish the meaning of Sections 301-310 as factual elements and to check whet her these factual elements
constitute conduct by the US contrary to its WTO ob ligations. The rules on burden of proof for the
establishment of facts ... also apply in this respect."
180 Appellate Body Report on India – Patents (US), paras. 68-69 (emphasis added).
181 The United States notes that Antigua provides a singl e discrete example in su pport of its claim that
certain law enforcement actions applying US legislative measures are inconsistent with WTO obligations. That
example – the Assurance of Discontin uance between the New York Attorney General and PayPal, Inc. – is
among the measures in section III of the Annex to the Panel request that the Panel has declined to examine as
"separate, autonomous measures." In any event, the Un ited States notes that the example contains a specific
restriction on a single company, the scope of which explicitly depends on the scope of underlying laws
authorizing or restricting particular gambling transactions.
182 Comments On The United States' Request For Preliminary Rulings By Antigua And Barbuda,
submitted to the Panel on 22 October 2003, para 17.

measure that allegedly contributes to a combined effect. 183 Indeed, it would be impossible to know
what the combined effect of various measures is as a matter of municipal law without first examining
how each measure works, and then analyzing how these measures interact. The panel in US – Export
Restraints confronted a similar claim regarding the combined effect of several US measures. In that
dispute, the panel quoted the following argument by the United States:
"It is not clear why, under the reasoning of either Canada or the United States –
Section 301 Trade Act panel report, the documents in th is dispute 'must' be analyzed
together. Canada contends th at one or more of the documents in question, alone or
together, somehow require the DOC to treat export restraints as subsidies. However,
the proper analysis of such a claim canno t be undertaken based upon abstract notions
of whether documents cited by a complaini ng party 'must be analyzed together', but
on the status of the cited documents, and how they relate to each other, under the
responding Member's domestic law."184
3.86 The Panel subsequently adopted this approach. Noting that Canada's argument related to
measures "taken together," the panel concluded that it would "first analyse them separately, both in
respect of the status and the effect of each under US domestic law, and in respect of whatever each
says concerning export restraints."185
3.87 Similarly, in order to examine the validity of Antigua's claim in this dispute, the Panel must
first analyze each measure individually. Antigua thus bears the burden of detailing precisely how
each individual measure at issue operates under US municipal law. Antigua then bears the further
burden of detailing how, under US municipal law, th ese individual measures operate together to give
rise to the cumulative effect that Antigua is alleging inconsistent with the GATS. The Japan – Film
panel described this further burden. It found that:
"[T]o the extent that the United States claims that various "measures" in the areas of
distribution, promotion and large stores set in motion policies which are said to have
a complementary and cumulative effect on impor ted film and paper, we consider that
it is for the United States to provide this Panel with a detailed showing of how these
alleged 'measures' interact with one anot her in their implementation so as to cause
effects different from, and additional to, t hose effects which are alleged to be caused
by each 'measure' acting individually."
186
3.88 Therefore, Antigua's staunch refusal in this dispute to provide evidence and argumentation
relating to each relevant individual measure, as well as to the interaction between the measures under
municipal law that supposedly results in Antigua's claimed collective effect, makes it impossible for
Antigua to credibly assert that it has sustained its burden of proof in this dispute.

183 For instance, in US – FSC, the panel examined the effect of a series of tax exemptions "taken
together," but did so only after first examining each individual exemption under municipal law. See Panel
Report on US – FSC, paras. 7.94-7.97. The Appellate Body went on to rely on the panel's examination of
individual measures for purposes of its own review, thus confirming the systemic importance of a full
examination by panels of individual measures. See Appellate Body Report on US – FSC, footnote 23 and paras.
16-18. Similarly, in Argentina – Hides and Leather, a panel concluded that two tax resolutions "taken together"
gave rise to an inconsistency with Article III:2 of the GATT, but not without first making an individualized
evaluation of each resolution. See Panel Report on Argentina –Hides and Leather, footnote 319 (stating that
measures "taken together" gave rise to inconsistencies) and paras. 1.108-11.115 (evaluating each measure
individually).
184 Panel Report on US – Export Restraints, para. 8.83, quoting an argument made by the United States.
185 Ibid., para. 8.84.
186 Panel Report on Japan – Film, para. 10.353.

3.89 The United States stresses that it is Antigua's burden to provide argumentation explaining
what aspect of specific US measure (s) in Antigua's view renders th e measure(s) inconsistent with
specific US obligations or commitments under the GA TS. Since Antigua has failed in all respects to
sustain that burden, the United States cannot delve into any specific measure in detail. In the view of
the United States, Antigua explicitly seeks to sh ift its burden of proof onto the United States.
187 It
offers no basis for doing so except the complexity of US law – an excuse that the Appellate Body has
already rejected as a ground for allocating the burden of proof: "There is nothing in the WTO dispute
settlement system to support the notion that the allocation of the burden of proof should be decided on
the basis of a comparison between the respective di fficulties that may possibly be encountered by the
complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a case."
188 Antigua admonished
the Panel that the United States "should not be allowe d to in essence 'hide behind' the complexity and
opacity of its own legal structure." To the cont rary, the United States submits that the burden has
always been on Antigua to come out of hiding and say what specific measures it does or does not seek
to challenge, and then to provide evidence and ar gumentation as to each measure. Antigua has not
only failed to do so, it has repeatedly refused to do so.
3.90 Antigua submits that the biggest point of contentio n in respect of the measures is whether
Antigua and Barbuda has submitted su fficient proof that the United St ates maintains "measures" that
result in a complete prohibition – or a "total ban" – on the provision of gambling and betting services
from Antigua and Barbuda into the United States. However, rather than ask ing the United States to
assume any burden of proof, Antigua's very basic poi nt is that the United States has conceded this
point of US law. Given the clear and unambiguous concession of the United States on the complete
prohibition – the total ban – Antigua and Barbuda believes that there is simply no sense in proving an
already conceded point. In fact, under the laws of vi rtually every jurisdiction that Antigua is aware of
(including the United States), a concession, such as th at made in this case by the United States, would
result in a stipulation of the conceded fact or i ssue – precluding further discussion on the topic. The
same concept holds true in the WTO. As noted by the European Communities 189, previous panels
accepted similar such concessions as being accurate. Moreover, the United States has conceded this
point to Antigua in consultations meeting on this matter, as well as in open session before the dispute
settlement body in the context of this dispute on two occasions. Despite its insistence that Antigua
should prove the point, the United States refers to its prohibition. In multiple public statements and
position papers, the United States Department of Ju stice has unambiguously made this concession.
And the United States clearly acts as if there is a prohibition – hence some of the actions taken by the
United States and referenced in Section III of the A nnex to Antigua's request for consultations in this
proceeding. Indeed, Antigua invites the United Stat es to deny that concession before the Panel.
Given the concession by the United States, Antigua and Barbuda strongly believes that a detailed
discussion of all measures on a state and federal le vel is unnecessary and would prove difficult and,
more importantly, wasteful. Further, consultations between parties are intended not only to resolve
disputes, but also to frame and refine the issues.
3.91 Antigua notes that the United States apparen tly takes the position that a "measure" for
purposes of WTO dispute resolution must consist of a discrete "law on the books" and that "measures"
can only be a number of such discrete laws. This is a clear misinterpretation of a well-settled area of
WTO jurisprudence which has established that many things – government policies, procedures and
actions included – may constitute "measures." Indeed, the GATS itself defines "measures"
expansively in Article XXVIII(a). Of course, if a measure were required to be a specific, discrete
statute or regulation, Members could easily evade the reach of the dispute settlement machinery of the
WTO through the use of informal policies and unwritten practices without any legislation or formal
rulemaking at all. The point of the United States in this regard seems to be that the admitted "total

187 See above, para. 3.71, where Antigua states that the United States is "better positioned than Antigua
to coherently construe its own laws".
188 Appellate Body Report on EC – Sardines, para. 281.
189 See below para. 4.15.

ban" cannot itself constitute a "measure" because it is not one discrete law. And so, the United States
would submit, Antigua must lead this Panel through a muddle of discrete United States laws and piece
together the puzzle of measures that then add up to th e sum of the total ban. Antigua disagrees. First,
WTO law must not be forced to be interpreted in the light of formal characteristics of the laws of an
individual Member. Whether a "measure" that is challenged under the DSU is under domestic law,
considered to be comprised of one or more laws, rules or actions cannot therefore be definitive in
determining whether the sum of the laws constitute a "measure" under the DSU. Second, while the
United States points to a number of panel reports and Appellate Body decisions in which the measure-
by-measure "puzzle" was required to be assembled, it fails to note that in each of those proceedings
there was genuine disagreement as to the collective im pact of the various pieces of legislation. That,
of course, is manifestly not the case in this proceeding where Antigua and Barbuda and the United
States both agree upon the existence of the complete prohibition. Third, the United States tries to
create the impression that the cumulative effect of the complete prohibition created by the mass of
specific US laws flows from a complex interaction betw een these specific laws. In reality, this is not
the case. Most of the measures cited in the Panel request are prohibition measures that could arguably
be applied independently of each other against An tiguan gaming operators. There are differences,
however, in the territorial scope of the laws, as stat e laws typically only appl y or have reach within
the territory of the state at issue. Furthermore th ere appear to exist small differences in substantive
scope of some of the laws. The overall result, however, is that all cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services from outside the United States is always caught by one (and normally several) of
the United States' prohibition laws.
3.92 Antigua argues that although the number of prohibi tion laws differs from state to state, the
state prohibition laws all broadly follow the same pattern – all gambling is prohibited unless a specific
exemption has been granted. But while many dom estic operators have, in one way or another,
obtained an exemption and are therefore allowed to operate lawfully, such exemptions are not
available to foreign operators who want to supply gambling and betting services on a cross-border
basis. Hence, state laws prohibit all cross-border supply of so-called "unauthorized" gambling, via the
Internet or otherwise. The report prepared by the GAO provides a more detailed explanation of how
the laws of five states prohibit so-called "unauthorized" Internet gambling.
3.93 Overlaying the network of state laws are United States federal laws. The letter dated
11 June 2003, sent by the United States Department of Justice to the National Association of
Broadcasters provides a good example of how the Un ited States itself holds the opinion that several
federal prohibition laws might apply to the same conduc t. The letter refers to three federal statutes
when explaining the illegality of cross-border, "rem ote access" gambling: (i) the Wire Act, which
prohibits gambling businesses from knowingly recei ving or sending certain types of bets or
information that assist in placing bets over interstate and international wires; (ii) the Travel Act
which imposes criminal penalties for those who utilize interstate or foreign commerce with the intent
to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activit y, including gambling considered unlawful in the
United States; (iii) the Illegal Gambling Business Act which makes it a federal crime to operate a
gambling business that violates the law of the stat e where the gambling takes place (provided certain
other criteria are fulfilled such as the involvement of at least five people and an operation during more
than 30 days). Each of these three laws separatel y prohibits the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services from Antigua. However, there is so me uncertainty about the exact scope of these
laws. For instance, there is debate as to whether or not the Wire Act would also apply to the relatively
recent wireless Internet technology or indeed whether it applies to casino-type gambling or only to
sports betting. In order to avoid these types of loopholes, United States authorities prosecute on the
basis of a combination of these laws.
3.94
Antigua submits that it is for the similar reas on of trying to avoid loopholes that it has not
challenged the Wire Act alone, although the Wire Act undoubtedly seems to be the most significant
law in the United States' prohibition arsenal. Antigua and Barbuda needs to ensure that, at the stage
when the United States needs to implement any recommendations and rulings resulting from this

proceeding, the United States cannot take the position that it needs to amend only the Wire Act and
can continue to apply its other prohibition laws. This is particularly important because given the huge
amount of American legislation on gambling and betting, it cannot be excluded that Antigua and
Barbuda has been unable to identify all domestic laws that could possibly be applied against the cross-
border supply of gambling services. In this context Antigua and Barbuda submits that it is not only
legally possible but also logical for it to challenge the United States' total prohibition on the cross-
border supply of gambling. Under domestic United States law this to tal prohibition is composed of
many different prohibition laws which all have a si milar effect but which may have a different or
slightly different territorial or substantive scope . Taken together, however, they cover the entire
United States and all possible supply variants of cross-border gambling services, whether wire-based,
wireless or otherwise. It is important to note that, under the federal scheme of the United States and
given the international, cross-border nature of th e services that Antigua provides, the United States
federal government possesses the power to legislate exclusively in a manner that would both be
binding on its states and completely resolve this di spute. Accordingly, given that the United States
federal government possesses the power under its Constitu tion to fashion a remedy at the federal level
without requiring state-by-state corrective acti on, the exhausting exercise of plodding through
hundreds of state and federal statutes becomes even more obviously wasteful and absurd.
3.95 Antigua reiterates that contrary to the Unite d States' assertions, Antigua and Barbuda has
never "refused" to cite or provide evidence of United States laws that together create the total ban. In
fact, Antigua's effort at identifying in its panel and consultations requests a huge number of American
laws is evidence of its good faith in this endeavou r. Despite this, even though it is wasteful and
unnecessary in the view of Antigua to do so, Antigua has submitted to the Panel on 8 December 2003
the texts of all the relevant laws listed in its Pa nel request, together with brief summaries of these
laws. Antigua also submitted the texts of all the items listed in Section III of the Annex to its Panel
request that had not been submitted previously. Finally, Antigua believes that not much remains to be
said about the typographical errors that were discussed at paragraphs 3.78 and 3.80 above; the text of
these laws were submitted to the Panel which can verify them.
3.96 The United States replies that Antigua has chosen to de fine the scope of measures at issue in
this dispute in exceedingly broad terms, and to ignor e the text and meaning of actual US laws. It has
rejected the US suggestion that it relate its claims to particular measures – even to the point of
accusing the United States of engaging in "litigation tactics." And Antigua alone decided to withhold
until more than two months after the date of its firs t submission the text of the very measures at issue
in this dispute. While the United States has some concerns about Antigua's strategy in this dispute, it
is not its role to second-guess them. The United St ates can only point out that Antigua has thus far
not provided sufficient evidence and argumentation to establish its prima facie case. The United
States reiterates that Antigua is apparently still asser ting a proposition about the collective effect of
US domestic laws relating to the remote supply of gambling, without regard to individual measures
and how they work. Antigua, without any basis, labels this effect a "total prohibition on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services." It asserts that, whatev er the effect of the
measures at issue individually, in concert they necessarily give rise to an inconsistency with the
GATS. While Antigua claims the United States has no t conceded any ground in this dispute, Antigua
rests its case in large part on a supposed US "concession." No such concession was in fact ever made.
3.97 With respect to its burden of proof, Antigua has previously taken the position that it only
needs to assert the alleged overall effect of US dom estic law, and that the particular causes of this
alleged overall effect – the measures that supposedly r esult in this effect – are irrelevant. In essence,
Antigua wants the Panel to assume the overall effect of US domestic law without first determining
how the measures at issue operate and interact, and whether such interaction would in fact comprise
the overall effect alleged by Antigua. Antigua's asserti on that a mere allegation is all it needs to meet
its burden of proof is wrong. The Appellate Body has stated in its Carbon Steel report that the burden
of providing evidence and argumentation begins with providing the text of the measures at issue, and
is then followed by the presentation of authorities an d arguments as to the meaning of these measures.

The Appellate Body has also explained in India - Patents (US) that an examination of the meaning of
relevant provisions of domestic legislation is not ju st helpful, it is essential to determining whether a
Member has complied with its obligations. To bor row the Appellate Body's own phrase, a panel or
the Appellate Body "must look at the specific provisions " of domestic law. The same is true in this
dispute. As the United States has repeatedly em phasized, Antigua's notion of a total prohibition has
no legal status under US law. Antigua's mere asserti on that this is the effect of US law, without a
demonstration of the alleged causes, cannot underpin a panel finding that this is in fact the effect.
Assumptions and assertions are not sufficient. In order for the Panel to be able to discharge its duty to
make an objective assessment of the collective effect of domestic law with all its significant nuances,
Antigua must first provide sufficient evidence and argumentation to support its view of precisely how
each individual measure at issue operates under US domestic law. As already noted by the United
States, such an approach is consiste nt with that taken by the panel in US – Export Restraints and by
other panels. After assessing how each individual me asure operates under US law, Antigua must then
– given its claim of a collective effect – bear the fu rther burden of proving this collective effect. In
Japan – Film, the panel found that, in order to establish a claim of collective effect, the United States
was required to "provide this Pa nel with a detailed showing of how these alleged 'measures' interact
with one another in their implementation so as to cause effects different from, and additional to, those
effects which are alleged to be caused by each 'mea sure' acting individually." The same standard
applies here. Assuming that Antigua proves the me aning of individual measures, it must show their
collective effect through evidence and argumentati on regarding how these alleged measures interact
with one another in their implementation under US domestic law. To borrow a phrase used by
Antigua, Antigua must piece together the "puzzle" of its prima facie case.
3.98 The United States submits that, on 8 December 2003, Antigua finally gave the Panel the text
of the laws that it alleges may or may not comprise the US regulatory structure for remote supply of
gambling services. Along with the text of these laws, Antigua provided incomplete, and in some
cases misleading, thumbnail sketches of what some of the laws supposedly contain. There are also
texts of non-measures and other documentation that the United States was not expecting in what
essentially amounts to an additional submission by Antigua. Nonetheless, a cursory analysis of
Antigua's documentation (which is all the United Stat es was able to do so far given the timing of the
submission) only further reinforces the US view that Antigua has yet to provide sufficient evidence
and argumentation to support its view of the meani ng of each measure at issue, how each measure is
relevant to remote supply of gambling services, a nd finally how each measure interacts with other
measures so as to establish Antigua's prima facie case in this dispute. Indeed, the sheer volume of
Antigua's 8 December submission only further highli ghts the vastness of Antigua's unmet burden.
Antigua has explicitly sought to shift its burden of proof onto the United States by claiming that the
United States is in the best position to meet this burden and that the US legal system is complex.
However, not only is Antigua's position contrary to the well-established view of burden of proof in
WTO dispute settlement, it is also well-established in the WTO that complexity is not a viable excuse
for re-allocating the burden of proof. The presump tion remains that the laws of the United States are
consistent with the GATS unless and until Antigua as the complainant proves otherwise.
3.99 Antigua replies that the United States has relie d heavily throughout this proceeding on its
assertion that Antigua has not met its burden of proo f to establish the existence of any United States
measures that are contrary to commitments of the United States under the GATS. Despite its
unambiguous position that "cross-border gambling and betting services are prohibited under US
law,"190 the United States has insisted that Antigua bears the "burden of proof" of otherwise
establishing in some form this "total prohibition" and that Antigua has not done so. Antigua, on the
other hand, has consistently taken the position th at not only should the express agreement of the
United States as to the existence of the total pr ohibition obviate the need for the provision of any
additional "proof" that the United States indeed totally prohibits the provision of cross-border
gambling and betting services from Antigua, but that th e conceded total prohibition in and of itself

constitutes a "measure" within the meaning of the GATS. Antigua has never taken the position that
the "burden of proof" to establish the existence of actionable measures should be "shifted" to the
United States. Rather, Antigua believes that there is , in essence, no burden to be shifted – the parties
are in agreement on the scope and extent of the to tal prohibition, and this agreement has definitive
consequences in this proceeding under WTO jurisprudence.
191
3.100 Antigua submits that the United States' argument that its total prohibition is not a measure
that can be challenged in WTO dispute settlement because it is not "something that has a 'functional
life of its own' under municipal law"
192 is apparently based on the panel report in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review . However, the Appellate Body has recently reversed the aspect of this
panel report on which the United States relies, and found that a measure can be challenged even if it is
not mandatory under municipal law:
"As long as a Member respects the principles set forth in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the
DSU, namely to exercise their 'judgement as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful' and to engage in disput e settlement in good faith, then that Member
is entitled to request a panel to examine measures that the Member considers nullify
or impair its benefits. We do not think that panels are obliged, as a preliminary
jurisdictional matter, to examine whether th e challenged measure is mandatory. This
issue is relevant, if at all, only as part of the panel's assessment of whether the
measure is, as such, inconsistent with particular obligations."
193
3.101 The Appellate Body further stated that the re ference to a Member's "laws, regulations and
administrative procedures" in Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement "must be determined for
purposes of WTO law and not simply by reference to the label given to various instruments under
domestic law of each WTO Member. This determination must be ba sed on the content and substance
of the instrument, and not merely on its form or nomenclature." 194 A similar interpretation should,
a fortiori, apply to the definition of measures in Articl e XXVIII(a) of the GATS which is formulated
more broadly than the phrase used in Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that was at issue in
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review. Antigua already argued this precise point.195
3.102 Antigua submits that, in view of the decision of the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review , it is possible to challenge a tota l prohibition that is comprised of
numerous (i) "specific legislative and regulatory provis ions;" (ii) "application[s] of such provisions;"
and (iii) "practice[s]."196 While the Panel needs to establish that this ban exists, it is not necessary for
the Panel or Antigua to establish the definitive list of (and analyzed) every law, regulation, application
and practice that is part of the total prohibition. The purpose of dispute settlement is to stop the
impairment of benefits accruing under the covered agreements. In the context of this proceeding, this
means obtaining access for Antigua's gambling and betting services to the US market. For the
impairment of Antigua's GATS benefits, it does not matter how many laws make that market access
impossible and how exactly they do it. What matters is that this market access is impossible, whilst it
should be possible. In performing its analysis, a pa nel must verify whether benefits are impaired and
must have sufficient information about the me asures concerned to properly apply the specific
provisions of the GATS.

191 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 9.
192 Request For Preliminary Rulings By The United States Of America, submitted to the Panel on
17 October 2003.
193 Appellate Body Report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 89.
194 Ibid., footnote 87.
195 See above para. 3.91.
196 See Panel question No. 10.

3.103 Antigua points out that it is noteworthy that the United States itself stated that putting together
all the pieces of the United States legislative puzzle in this area is "an impossible task." That is
certainly the case if the standard of evidence concerning municipal law is the one set out in the United
States' request for preliminary rulings. In this re quest, the United States explained that, in its view,
even the United States v. Cohen decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit197 is of limited value because it is the opinion of a court inferior to the United States Supreme
Court. Consequently, according to the United States, under US law the Cohen decision only has value
as precedent with respect to the same court and lowe r federal courts of the Second Circuit. Thus,
under this reasoning, Antigua could only challenge be fore the Panel those individual federal and state
laws which the United States Supreme Court has unambiguously confirmed prohibit the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services from Antigua. In this respect the Panel should note that the
United States Supreme Court declined to review the conviction of Mr. Cohen. In effect, the approach
of the United States would mean that WTO dispute resolution would only be possible in relation to a
"measure" whose meaning had been definitively ascertained by the court of final instance of the
relevant jurisdiction. This interpretation ca nnot be correct under WTO law because the formal
characteristics of any domestic legal system could make WTO dispute resolution impossible, even in
a situation where the meaning in practice of the me asure was absolutely clear. Even more directly,
the United States continuing insistence that "[ a]ssuming that Antigua proves the meaning of
individual measures, it must show their collec tive effect through evidence and argumentation
regarding how these alleged measures interact with one another in their implementation under US
domestic law" is simply incorrect, both under th e definition of measure under the GATS as well as
under WTO jurisprudence.
3.104 Despite Antigua's firm belief that this dispute is best and most efficiently resolved on the
basis of the unequivocal agreement between Antigua and the United States on the "total prohibition"
constituting a measure of itself, contrary to what the United States has rep eatedly asserted, Antigua
has provided considerable evidence of and discussi on about the construction of the total prohibition
under United States law. These efforts have included, among other things: (i) numerous references to
and discussions of the principal federal statutes used by the United States to support its total
prohibition; (ii) provision to the Panel of the actual text of the principal state and federal laws that
underlie the total prohibition; (iii) discussions regarding the basic scheme of state and federal
interaction in the area of gambling and betting and ho w the state and federal laws act to further the
total prohibition.
3.105 Antigua submits that, under the complicated and extensive body of law framed by the US
federal Constitution, federal legislation and rulemaking, as well as interpretive (and precedent-setting)
court decisions, the federal government of the United States has left certain powers exclusively to the
various states, while other powers are either solely in the hands of the federal government or, in many
cases, shared on various bases between the states a nd the federal government. One of the primary
sources of the power of the federal government to legi slate in a manner binding on all of the states is
what is known as the "commerce clau se" to the United States Constitution.
198 This allows the United
States federal government to legislate, exclusively in most cases, in areas of commerce that cross state
and international boundaries. This clause has been used historically by the federal government to
legislate on a vast number of topics that in many cases only have remote connections with interstate or
international commerce.199

197 260 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S.Ct. 2587 (2002).
198 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which provides in its pertinent part that "[T]he Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations , and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
199 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power , 73 Va. L.Rev. 1387 (1987); Grant
S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Appl ying First Principles to Uphold
Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1999).

3.106 According to Antigua, the United States' total prohibition comprises both state and federal
laws, which, broadly speaking, fulfil two different ro les: (i) state law generally prohibits all gambling
within the territory of a state that has not been specifically authorized by that state; and (ii) federal
law prohibits the use of cross-border means to avoi d circumvention of the territory-based prohibitions
of the individual states.
200 In general, gambling is a matter of state law in the United States. Each
state can determine for itself whether individuals can gamble within its borders and which gaming
businesses can legally operate there. 201 All states have adopted the same basic legal approach to
gambling: it is illegal to offer gambling services in the state unless otherwise expressly authorized by
statute. In general, gambling is prohibited by one or more constitutional or statutory provisions, while
other constitutional or statutory provisions then "add back" the specific circumstances under which
gambling can be offered in the state. 202 Thus, even in Nevada "unauthorized" gambling is
synonymous with "illegal gambling". Currently, 48 states and the District of Colombia have given
authorizations to offer gambling and betting services w ithin their territory to operators established on
their territory.
3.107 Antiguan operators cannot, however, obtain an authorization to supply gambling services
from Antigua to any state or territory of the Un ited States. This is often related to specific
authorization criteria in legislation but may also be a matter of practice. Antigua has not been able to
investigate all the criteria that all states apply to authorize a domestic operator to offer gambling and
betting services. In fact, it seems that in many cases states do not use predetermined, objective
criteria when granting such an authorization. Th e Final Report of the United States National Gaming
Impact Study Commission
203 states the following about gambling regulation in the states:
"Governments determine which kinds of ga mbling will be permitted and which will
not; the number, location, and size of est ablishments allowed; the conditions under
which they operate; who may utilize them and under what conditions; who may work
for them; even who may own them. And, because governments determine the level
and type of competition to be permitted ─ they also are a key determinant of the
various industries' potential profits and losses.
204
[…] rivalry and competition for investme nt and revenues have been far more
common factors in government decision-making regarding gambling than have any
impulses toward joint planning.
205
Those decisions generally have been reactiv e, driven more by pressures of the day
than by an abstract debate about the public welfare. One of the most powerful
motivations has been the pursuit of revenues."206
3.108 Furthermore under the laws or the practice of every state that provides for state-sanctioned
gambling in one form or another, the conditions a ttached to obtaining the right to supply gambling

200 Antigua notes that, in some instances, federal laws act exclusively in pursuit of a federal interest that
preempts state law. See , e.g., Interstate Horseracing Act; 28 U.S.C. §§3701-3704 (the "Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act").
201 GAO Report, p. 11.
202 Antonia Z. Cowan, " The Global Gaming Village: Interstate and Transnational Gambling ," 7
Gambling Law Review 251, pp. 255-257. See also "Gambling Law in Five States and Their Effect on Internet
Gambling", Enclosure 1 to the Interim Report of the United States General Accounting Office on Internet
Gambling (23 September 2002), in which the United States General Accounting Office "discusses the details of
the gambling laws in the five states – Massachusetts , Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Utah – that we
judgmentally selected to reflect the wide variations in state gambling laws." Ibid. at p. 18.
203 National Gaming Impact Study Commission – Final Report, 18 June 1999.
204 Ibid., pp. 1-4
205 Ibid., pp. 1-5.
206 Ibid.

services in the state by definition preclude An tiguan operators from qualifying on a cross-border
basis. In combination with the general prohibitions in each state, these exclusionary "authorization"
state laws prohibit all cross-border supply of so -called "unauthorized" gambling from suppliers in
Antigua, via the Internet or otherwise. Some stat es limit all forms of sanctioned gambling to specific
locations within the state. For example: (i) in Colorado, casino gambling may only be conducted in
three historic mining towns; 207 (ii) in Connecticut, slot machines and electronic gaming devices
("EGDs") can only operate from the state's Native American casinos208 and bingo may only be offered
at a location which can be physically inspected by state gaming officials; 209 (iii) in Indiana, casino
gambling may only be conducted on ri verboats on Indiana waterways. 210 This requirement is
consistent with the legislative intent of the Indi ana gaming statute "to benefit the people of Indiana by
promoting tourism and assis ting economic development"; 211 (iv) in South Dakota, casino gambling
(blackjack, poker, slot machines) is permitted only in the city of Deadwood and nine Indian casinos
located in the state; 212 (v) Mississippi will only license casino gambling on boats or in other limited
defined areas within the state.213
3.109 Antigua further submits that some states limit the number of gambling licenses available to
service providers. For example: (i) Illinois limits the number of gaming licenses to ten for the entire
state;214 (ii) Louisiana limits the number of riverboat casino licenses to fifteen, with no more than six
per designated waterway; 215 (iii) in Iowa, the state has set a maximum number of pari-mutuel
operators and casino operators. 216 Antigua notes that some states require the providers of betting and
gambling services to be physically present within th e state as they provide their services. For
example: (i) in Iowa, in order to offer gambling services such as blackjack, craps, roulette, poker, slot
machines and video poker, the services must be offered on the licensed facility's grounds; 217
(ii) Nevada will not license any gambling provider w hose premises are "difficult to police" or where
the conduct of gaming would be inconsiste nt with the public policy of the state. 218 Moreover, some
states require gamblers to be physically present when they are engaged in gambling activities. For

207 Colorado Division of Gaming, Colorado Gaming Questions and Answers
(www.gaming.state.co.us/dogfaq.htm) (visited 22 December 2003).
208 Connecticut Division of Special Revenue, Frequently Asked Questions: Agency
(www.dosr.state.ct.us/FAQagency.htm), question no. 4 (visited 22 December 2003).
209 Connecticut Division of Special Revenue, Administrative Regulations: Operation of Bingo Games,
Rule, 7-169-8a (www.dosr.state.ct.us/PDFFolder/OPERATION%20BINGO%20GAMES.pdf).
210 Indiana Code 4-33-9-1 (stating that gambling can be conducted by licensed providers on riverboats)
(www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title4/ar33/ch9.html); 68 Indiana Administrative Code 2-1-4(c)(1) (requiring
applications for riverboat gambling licenses to state which dock the riverboat will be docked)
(www.in.gov/legislative/iac/T00680/A00020.PDF).
211 Indiana Code, 4-33-1-2 (www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title4/ar33/ch1.html).
212 South Dakota Commission on Gambling, Frequently Asked Questions
(www.state.sd.us/drr2/reg/gaming/frequent.htm).
213 Mississippi Gaming Commission Regulations, Section II(B)(2) (www.mgc.state.ms.us/).
214 Illinois Riverboat Gaming Act, 230 Illinois Compiled Statutes 10/7(e) (stating that the state gaming
board may issue up to 10 licenses authorizing riverboat gambling) (www.igb.state.il.us/act/section7.html).
215 Louisiana Gaming Control Law, RS 27:65
(www.legis.state.la.us/tsrs/tsrs.asp?lawbody=RS&title=27&section=65).
216 This limitation reads as follows: Limitation on location and number of racetracks and excursion
gambling boats. 1.6(1) The number of licenses to conduct horse racing sha ll be one for a racetrack located in
Polk County. The number of licenses to conduct dog racing shall be two, one for a racetrack located in Dubuque
County and one for a racetrack located in Pottawattamie County. The total number of licenses issued to conduct
gambling games on excursion boats shall not exceed ten and shall be restricted to the counties where such boats
were operating (or licensed to operate in the future) as of May 1, 1998. Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission,
Administrative Rules, 491--1.6(99D,99F) (www3.state.ia.us/irgc/CH1.pdf).
217 Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, Administrative Rules, 491--11.5(4)(a)(4)
(www3.state.ia.us/irgc/CH11.pdf).
218 Regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board, Regulation
3.010(5) and (7) (http://gaming.state.nv.us/stats_regs/reg3.doc).

example: (i) in Connecticut, in order to gamble at bingo a player must be physically present on the
premises where the game is offered;
219 (ii) in Indiana, to gamble on a riverboat casino a gambler must
be physically present on the riverboat;220 (iii) in Iowa, a racetrack can only make payment on winning
pari-mutuel tickets upon presentation and surrender by the bettor where the wager was made.221
3.110 Historically the main objective of federal law concerning gambling was to protect the
territorial integrity of states' gambling legislation by prohibiting the use of interstate or international
facilities (such as post and "wire communications") or interstate or international commerce to offer
gambling services. 222 While some state laws might purport to extend beyond their borders, the
questionable ability to acquire jurisdiction over persons in other states and countries as well as the
inability to apply state laws in the generally federa l area of interstate and international commerce in
virtually every instance limits the effectiveness of state legislation to activities actually occurring and
persons actually present within the territory of the state. The existence of federal legislation facilitates
the prosecution of suppliers of "unauthorized" gambling to, for instance, New York from another state
or another country because the supply of this "u nauthorized" gambling then also becomes a federal
crime and many of the jurisdictional difficulties of a state prosecution are no longer applicable. Thus
the United States federal laws that prohibit interstate and cross-border 223 supply (i.e. the ban on the
use of interstate or international commerce or communication facilities) are a critical component of
and add to the total prohibition that is in fact al ready established (albeit difficult to enforce) by the
state laws alone. In this respect the Panel should also note that, contrary to what the United States
suggests, the laws comprising the federal ban on in terstate and cross-borde r supply of gambling and
betting services were not put in place because interstate and cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services was considered a greater health risk than the local supply of gambling services. The
federal ban on interstate and cro ss-border supply is merely intended to safeguard the states' ability to
regulate gambling as they see fit within their borders.
3.111 Antigua states that it is particularly important to realize what United States federal law does
not do. For example: (i) federal law does not require states to regulate gambling within their borders;
(ii) federal law does not require states to prohibit gambling within their borders;
224 (iii) federal law
does not prohibit telephonic, electronic, Internet or any other forms of remote gambling from
occurring within the borders of any state . Thus, ironically (and somewhat difficult to reconcile with
the position of the United States that cross-border supply of gambling and betting services poses
significant health, law enforcement and other soci al issues that justify the United States total
prohibition), under current federal law every state in the United States, if it so chose, could offer

219 Connecticut Division of Special Revenue, Administrative Regulations: Operation of Bingo Games,
Sec. 7-169-13a (www.dosr.state.ct.us/PDFFolder/OPERATION%20BINGO%20GAMES.pdf).
220 Indiana Code, 4-33-9-10 (www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title4/ar33/ch9.html).
221 Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, Administrative Rules, 491-8.2(4)(g)
(www3.state.ia.us/irgc/CH8.pdf).
222 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, Senate Report No. 106-121, footnotes 46 and 47.
223 Antigua is of the view that, throughout this proceeding there has been some uncertainty about, and
mixed use of, the proper nomenclature for the gambling and betting services offered by Antigua. While the
United States would generally like to call the Antiguan serv ices "remote," Antigua believes that there are many
state-sanctioned gambling services provided domestically in the United States that ar e also "remote" even if
originating domestically and even if not involving some type of electronic transmission or communication (such
as scratch card gambling offered by lotteries in the United States). Given the language of the GATS ("cross-
border supply"), Antigua believes cros s-border supply to be the more accurate term for the services being
offered by Antigua and prohibited by the United States. See also Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 20. As
explained in Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 20, An tigua uses the term "cross-border" as defined by the
GATS, i.e. in relation to trade in services crossing borders of WTO Members. The tr ade in services between
states of the United States is described as "interstate."
224 Antigua notes that there are limited exceptions where the United States has legislated under the
power of the "commerce clause" that impact the ability of st ates to legislate or regulate in certain respects. See
footnote 200 above.

completely unregulated Internet gambling to every pe rson located within the borders of the state. Yet
Antigua would still be unable to provide any gambli ng and betting services – regulated or not – into
the United States on a cross-border basis.
3.112 The United States reiterates that a complaining part y must demonstrate, through evidence
and argumentation, the existence and meaning of the measure(s) purportedly at issue. 225 Antigua is
the party making claims about US domestic law, and it therefore "bears the burden of introducing
evidence as to the scope and meaning of su ch law to substantiate that assertion." 226 An examination
of relevant "specific provisions" of domestic law is essential to the assessment of such a claim 227, and
Antigua has not provided the evidence and argumen tation necessary in order for the Panel to make
such an assessment. Antigua has given the Panel a "data dump" of nearly all the measures cited in its
Panel request, along with cursory descriptions of those laws. These descriptions are patently
insufficient as argumentation. Most obviously, they fail to tell the Panel or the United States precisely
which measures Antigua regards as relevant – a fail ure that Antigua continues to dismiss with the
baseless excuse that it is sufficient me rely to cite a "range" of measures. 228 Antigua's thumbnail
descriptions also fail to allege the impact of each specific provision on remote supply of gambling.
Finally – and most fundamentally – Antigua fails to explain how each specific measure relates to its
argumentation regarding alleged violations of the GATS.
3.113 The United States maintains that, to the extent that Antigua means to assert a "collective
effect" claim, it is well-established that the pa rty asserting such a claim must provide evidence and
argumentation to enable the Panel to first examine the independent meaning of each specific measure
that allegedly contributes to a combined effect. Then that party bears the further burden of detailing
how, under domestic law, the individual measures operate together to give rise to the cumulative
effect that is alleged to be inconsistent with WTO obligations. Antigua has not done such an analysis,
and has instead explicitly denied any obligation on it s part to piece together the "puzzle" of its own
claim. Antigua's claim is indeed a puzzle. It is neither the responsibility of the Panel nor that of the
United States to guess which measures are relevant and which are not, nor to assemble Antigua's
claim of collective effect. 229 As the complainant, Antigua itself formulated its broad claims, thus it
alone must undertake the "exhausting exercise of plodding through hundreds of state and federal
statutes" to make its prima facie case, and the Panel cannot disregar d Antigua's failure or explicit
refusal to do so. 230 Based on Antigua's inactions, the Panel can only conclude that it is unable to
proceed with an examination of any "measure" becau se Antigua has neglected to articulate its claims
with sufficient precision.
3.114 Antigua maintains that the most efficient way for th e Panel to approach this dispute is on the
basis of the unambiguous agreement of the partie s that the cross-border provision of gambling and
betting services from Antigua to consumers in the Un ited States is always illegal under United States
law. Antigua has demonstrated the wide scope of what constitutes a "measure" under the GATS and
other WTO agreements, and that WTO jurisprudence supports this approach. Yet, the United States
essentially submits that the Panel can only assess Antigua 's claim if Antigua first provides a "precise

225 The United States indicates it has already pointed out that Antigua's mere assertion as to the
collective effect of US gambling laws – that they repr esent a "total prohibition" on cross-border gambling –
cannot amount to proof of a violatio n of WTO obligations. The notion of a total prohibition is not itself a
measure, nor is it a notion with any legal status as su ch under US law. Antigua misstates the US position as
saying that only statutes can be challenged in WTO dispute settlement. This is obviously not the US position.
226 Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, para. 157.
227 Appellate Body Report on India – Patents (US), paras. 66-69.
228 For instance, Antigua's 19 December 2003 letter to the Panel.
229 Appellate Body Report on Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 125-131 (finding that a Panel
cannot rule in favour of a complaining party which has not established a prima facie case of inconsistency based
on specific legal claims asserted by it).
230 See above para. 3.94.

statutory analysis"
231 of all federal and state laws and regula tions applying to the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services from Antigua, and also , apparently, of all the laws and regulations
authorising and regulating legal gambling in the Unit ed States. The United States also believes that it
is incumbent upon the Panel to "examine the inde pendent meaning of each specific measure (…)." 232
This concerns thousands of pages of legislative and regulatory provisions and (as the United States
itself has noted) would make this case simply im possible. No matter how confidently the United
States may so assert, there is no support for this kind of formalistic approach, either in the GATS, any
of the other WTO Agreements or under WTO jurisprude nce. Such an approach would also make the
resolution of many other trade disputes impossibl e, in particular claims brought by developing
country Members against Members that maintain very complex domestic legislation with regard to a
specific subject matter. Because of scarce resour ces, developing countries find it difficult to bring
dispute settlement cases to the WTO even when the domestic legislation of the defendant is simple.
An approach such as that insist ed upon by the United States would serve only to deter developing
Members from using the dispute settlement syst em, effectively limiting access to WTO dispute
machinery to the richest Members. Furthermore there will likely be cases where the thousands of
pages of domestic legislation are not available in E nglish, French or Spanish. In such a situation a
stringent requirement of "precise statutory analysis " of all these provisions would entail, to say the
least, an insurmountable translation task. Finally, it would be totally impossible for panels to respect
the nine months timeframe laid down in Article 20 of the DSU.
3.115 Antigua acknowledges that there may be circum stances in which a panel nevertheless has to
undertake such a "precise statutory analysis," na mely in situations where there is a genuine
disagreement and a genuine lack of clarity about the e ffect of a Member's domestic law. But that is
patently not the case here. The United States, referring to the Appellate Body Report in US – Carbon
Steel, argued that Antigua had to submit evidence as to the scope and meaning of United States law.
According to that Appellate Body report:
"Such evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant
legislation or legal instruments, which ma y be supported, as appropriate, by evidence
of the consistent application of such laws , the pronouncements of domestic courts on
the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts and the writings of recognized
scholars."
This is precisely what Antigua has done.

3.116 Contrary to what the United States continues to maintain, Antigua has not "failed or refused"
to submit evidence of the United States measures. In fact, the evidence submitted by Antigua on this
point is more than sufficient to satisfy Antigua's bur den of proof and to establish the existence of one
or more United States measures – particularly because the United States has either expressly agreed or
at least not sought to deny that: (i) all cross-border supply of services from Antigua to the United
States that involves placing a bet or wager is prohibited; (ii) it is impossible to obtain an authorization
to supply gambling and betting services on a cross-borde r basis to the United Stat es; (iii) its states
maintain physical presence requirements; (iv) its states maintain numerical limits on the number of
service suppliers; (v) its states have establishe d monopolies and given exclusive rights to certain
domestic operators. The purpose of WTO dispute se ttlement is to stop the impairment of treaty
benefits. It is not to undertake academic analyzed s of Member's domestic laws. It is also not to
identify and remove specific "measures" of the defendant. If that were the case a defendant who loses
a case could replace its "measures" with new and different "measures" that have the same effect. As
already demonstrated by Antigua, under US law, the federal government possesses the exclusive
power to legislate in the area of international commerce. If the United States is concerned about how
it might comply with an adverse ruling by the DSB against it in this proceeding, it need only look as

231 See below para. 3.139.
232 See above para. 3.87.

far as what its Congress has done in countless other situations – impose one federal law governing the
relationship between the United States and Antigua that is binding upon all of the states, automatically
rendering all contrary state legislation moot.
3.117 The United States maintains its views regarding the legal requirements for a prima facie
case. Moreover, the United States notes that, in suppor t of the view that it may challenge the alleged
US "total prohibition", Antigua cites the Appellate Body's report in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review for the propositions that it is "legally possibl e to challenge such a total ban" and that a
panel "is not obliged ... to examine all domestic laws, regulations, applications and practices that may
contribute" to the alleged total prohibition. 233 Antigua's discussion of US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review misreads that report. That report was addressing the question of whether an actual
document issued by the US Department of Commer ce could be considered a "measure". Here,
however, Antigua is seeking to challenge its own creation – its alleged "total prohibition". This
alleged "total prohibition" is not a document issu ed by the US Government and it embodies no act or
omission of the United States Government – it is nothi ng more than verbiage that Antigua attaches
without basis to a large group of "specific legi slative and regulatory provisions" of the United
States.234
3.118 On this point, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review affirmatively contradicts
Antigua's assertion that this Panel need not examin e all the relevant specific provisions that make up
the alleged "total prohibition." Indeed, the Appellate Body faulte d the panel in that dispute because it
"had not conducted any in-depth consideration of the impugned provisions of the" US Department of
Commerce document at issue. 235 Moreover, the Appellate Body referred at paragraph 168 to its
statement in its recent report on US – Carbon Steel that a party asserting that another party's
municipal law is inconsistent with a WTO obliga tion must introduce evidence as to the scope and
meaning of that municipal law. Thus, US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review if anything
confirms the US view that the assessment of clai ms regarding domestic law requires an examination
of relevant "specific provisions" of domestic law. 236 Consistent with this principle, Antigua has the
burden of providing evidence and argumentation suffici ent to enable the Panel to examine all of the
"specific provisions" relevant to Antigua's claims in dividually and in terms of their interaction under
domestic law. To the extent that Antigua fails to say precisely what provisions are or are not relevant,
or offer argumentation on specific provisions, it does not even meet the most basic elements of a
prima facie case. The United States further submits that Antigua still has not sustained its burden of
proof regarding the existence and meaning of any state law individually, much less all of them
collectively. Antigua asserts that "[S]tate law generally prohibits all gambling within the territory of a
state that has not been specifically authorized by that state," yet the language of the statutes provided
by Antigua varies widely, as do their meaning, operati on, application and interpretation. And, as the
United States has previously observed, many seem pa tently irrelevant. It is Antigua's burden to
confront those issues – something it again still has not done.
3.119 The United States notes that, in its second submission, Antigua for the first time cited specific
state measures that allegedly "prohibit all cross-border supply."
237 In particular, Antigua cites alleged
restrictions on the physical location of gambling in Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Mississippi, and
South Dakota; alleged limits on the number of licenses for riverboat casinos in Illinois and Louisiana,
alleged limits on the number of pari-mutuel operato rs and casino operators in Iowa; alleged physical
presence requirements for gambling service providers in Iowa and Nevada; and alleged physical
presence requirements for bettors in Connecticut, Indi ana, and Iowa. The United States has examined

233 See Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10, See also above para. 3.102.
234 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
235 Appellate Body Report on US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 95.
236 See above paras. 3.112; 3.84 (citing the Appellate Body Report on India – Patent US, paras. 66-69).
237 See above paras. 3.108 and 3.109.

the sources identified by Antigua fo r each of those alleged restrictions
238 and is not able to locate any
of the cited sources among the items listed in the Annex to Antigua's Panel request. It therefore
appears that these alleged restrictions are outside th is Panel's terms of reference. In any event,
Antigua does not explain how these alleged restrictions affect, much less "prohibit," cross-border
supply. Based on Antigua's descriptions, all of th em appear to relate exclusively to supply of
gambling services by physical presence within a state.
3.120 The United States notes that Antigua also argu es that the United States has somehow made a
"concession" in this dispute regarding the existence of a "total prohibition" on cross-border supply of
gambling services, and that this somehow relieves Antigua of its fundamental responsibility to make a
prima facie case regarding specific provisions of US law. The United States very forthrightly told
both the DSB and this Panel that it does not permit cer tain services, such as Internet betting, either
domestically or on a cross-border basis. The Unit ed States has also clarified that it does permit
certain other gambling services on a cross-border basis. And it has stated that there is no overarching
measure apart from US laws themselves that embodies these restrictions. The "total prohibition" is
simply a baseless label created by Antigua. It does not embody, or even accurately describe, the
actual provisions of US law, and it is nothing mo re than another attempt by Antigua to avoid its
burden of establishing its prima facie case regarding the actual text and meaning of US law.
3.121 The United States submits that nothing that it h as said to the DSB or in the course of this
dispute relieves Antigua of its burden to show exactly what measures it is challenging, and how those
measures, individually or in combination, violate the GATS. The United States neither concedes nor
agrees with any of Antigua's propositions about the a lleged "total prohibition". Antigua asserts that
the US – Section 301 Trade Act panel report somehow suggests that it need not examine the US laws
and regulations at issue in this dispute, but the Section 301 Trade Act panel could not be clearer in
opposing this position. In fact, the Section 301 Trade Act panel that it is an indispensable first step in
any dispute to determine the meaning of the domestic laws at issue in order to then analyze whether
those laws breach the Member's obligations.
239 In this dispute, Antigua acknowledges that its alleged
total prohibition is "composed of specifi c legislative and regulatory provisions." 240 Yet Antigua
refuses to examine those "specific" instruments, as called for in Section 301 Trade Act and numerous
other Panel and Appellate Body reports. Finally, Antigua's lengthy assertions about US law
governing stipulations, estoppel, and the like are all i rrelevant, and need not be addressed at length.
Antigua has acknowledged that US law does not govern such issues in this forum 241, and the United
States agrees on that point, but disagrees with Antigua's hypothesis about how a US court would deal
with these issues given the particular facts of this dispute.
3.122 The United States further notes that it is Antigua itself – not the United States – that
established through its own Panel request the terms of reference in this dispute, and thus the extent of
its own burden of proof. If Antigua now finds it impossible to sustain this burden, it only has itself –
not the United States – to blame. On a related not e, Antigua appears to assert that its status as a
developing country should exempt it from having to make a prima facie case. The United States has
high regard and great sympathy for the concerns of developing countries, and welcomes their use of
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO. However, it questions whether Antigua's developing
country status has been responsible for its decision not to offer a prima facie case. Antigua has
obtained the assistance in this dispute of a team of US and European counsel who are experts on US
and WTO law, as well as a team of US and European academic advisers. Moreover, since Antigua is
an English-speaking country, the United States fails to see the relevance of Antigua's concerns about
language barriers for developing countries. And finally, and most fundamentally, the United States

238 See above footnotes 207 to 221.
239 Panel Report on US – Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.17-7.18.
240 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
241 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 9.

questions whether basic notions of due process w ould ever permit a downward or upward adjustment
in the burden of proof based on a Member's level of development.
3.123 The United States submits that Antigua has not met the standard for a prima facie case
articulated in Carbon Steel by merely providing the text of domestic laws – to the tune of a thousand
pages or more – and short summaries of some of those laws. The standard as articulated in Carbon
Steel calls for information that is necessary to engage in an analysis of the meaning, application,
interpretation, and interaction of specific provisi ons of domestic law. The Appellate Body has
repeatedly confirmed – for example in India – Patents (US) and US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review – that this means an analysis of "sp ecific provisions" of US law – not merely
provisions and short summaries of the laws. The United States argues that a case built on
generalizations about US law does not meet th e burden of proof because the purpose of dispute
settlement is not to analyze domestic law or "remove specific 'measures' of the defendant." The DSU
clearly states in Article 3.7 that, in the absence of a mutually agreed solution, "the first objective of
the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements." This just
further confirms that Antigua's burden relates to sp ecific measures of U.S. law, not generalizations
about US law.
4. GATS Article XVI242
3.124 Antigua argues that, in its Schedule, the United States has made a full commitment to the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. Simultaneously, the United States totally
impedes cross-border market access by prohibiting all cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services. This constitutes a manifest violation of Article XVI:1 of the GATS.
3.125 Antigua further argues that the United States main tains an array of measures that constitute a
total prohibition of the supply of gambling and betting services unless this has been authorized
(generically or individually) by authorities of the United States (via legislation, regulation or
individual licences). Thousands of service suppliers of United States origin have been given an
authorization to supply gambling and betting services (often creating monopolies or exclusive service
suppliers). It is impossible, however, for service s uppliers from Antigua to obta in an authorization to
supply services on a cross-border basis. This comple te ban on cross-border supply maintained by the
United States qualifies as a "limitation on the number of service suppliers" prohibited by
Article XVI:2(a) of the GATS. The United States measures violate Article XVI:2(a) not only as
establishing a numerical quota (of zero)
243 but also as measures creating monopolies or exclusive
service suppliers. The complete ban on cross-border s upply also qualifies as a "limitation on the total
number of service operations" prohibited by Article XVI:2(c) of the GATS.
3.126 The United States replies that Antigua fails to prove th e inconsistency of any US measure(s)
with Article XVI of the GATS. Article XVI prohi bits Members that have inscribed commitments
from maintaining or adopting six types of measures re ferred to in its paragra ph 2, sub-paragraphs (a)
to (f). Antigua asserts that the United States h as made a full commitment applicable to gambling
services, and that the United States "totally impedes cross border market access" and therefore
violates Article XVI:1 of the GATS. This argument appears to rest on the mistaken assumption that
the existence of a commitment in the market ac cess column of a Member's schedule implies a
generalized commitment not to impede "market acc ess." In fact, Article XVI does not enshrine a
general rule prohibiting measures that impede "market access" in whole or part. Instead, it prohibits

242 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' replies to Panel questions Nos. 15 and
37-39 in Annex C of this Report.
243 Antigua suggests to compare, with regard to Article XI:1 of GATT 1994, the Panel Report on
Canada – Periodicals, para. 5.5.

only those measures falling within the sp ecific categories listed in Article XVI:2.
244 While
Article XVI:1 makes clear that the Article a ddresses market access, it is the closed list in
Article XVI:2 that defines the substance of the ob ligation that Article XVI imposes. Therefore, the
Panel should restrict its Article XVI inquiry in this dispute to an examination of whether Antigua has
proven that any specific US measures fall within the particular types of measures listed in
Article XVI:2.
3.127 The United States further submits that Antigua re fers to an "array of measures that constitute
a total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gamb ling services. Once again, Antigua's failure to
cite specific measures makes it impossible for the Pane l to examine exactly what types of activity are
or are not restricted under US law. Without some evidence – aside from the mere assertion of a "total
prohibition" – as to the scope and meaning of US la w, Antigua's argument fails. Antigua specifically
argues that the alleged "complete ban" violates Artic le XVI:2(a), which prohibits the maintenance or
adoption of "limitations on the number of service su ppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the require ments of an economic needs test," as well as the
prohibition in Article XVI:2(c) on "limitations on the total number of service operations ... expressed
in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirements of an economic needs
test." The United States submits that these provisions require a panel to examine the "form" of the US
measure(s) at issue and the way in which su ch measures are "expressed" – something it cannot do
without evidence from Antigua as to the specific measures alleged to be inconsistent with
Article XVI:2.
3.128 According to the United States, even if Antigua had attempted to make a prima facie case as
to how any US measure is inconsistent with Article XVI, which it has not, it could not have done so.
The United States can find no US measure listed in Antigua's Panel request that takes the form of
"numerical quotas" or is expressed as "designated nu merical units in the form of quotas." Nor is the
United States aware of any measure within the scope Antigua's Panel request the form or manner of
expression of which matches any of the other form s identified in Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c).
Indeed, Antigua has pointed to no such measures . As far as the United States is aware, the
gambling-related US measures listed in the Pane l request are framed entirely in terms of non-
numerical criteria that restrict certain forms of activity, rather than numbers of providers, operations,
or output. Thus, no relevant US measures would a ppear to fall within the ambit of Article XVI:2.
245
Antigua's assertion that Antiguan suppliers cannot ob tain authorization from regulators in the United
States to supply gambling services on a cross-border basis has no relevance by itself, unless Antigua
can point to some measure listed in its Panel re quest that contains some quantitative limitation
specified in Article XVI:2, which it has not done.246
3.129 Antigua further argues that Article XVI:1 of the GATS clearly provides that each Member
shall accord services and service suppliers of any ot her Member treatment no less favourable that that
provided for under the terms, limita tions and conditions agreed and sp ecified in its Schedule. This
language is completely straightforward. The Un ited States has made a full commitment to market
access for gambling and betting services from other WTO Members supplied on a cross-border basis
while simultaneously it completely prohibits all cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.
This constitutes an obvious violation of Article XVI:1.

244 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 8 ("A Member grants full market access in a given sector and
mode of supply when it does not maintain in that sector and mode any of the types of measures listed in
Article XVI.").
245 The United States notes in particular that qualitative tests are beyond the scope of Article XVI. The
Scheduling Guidelines make explicit what is already clear from the text of the Article: The criteria in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of Article XVI "do not relate to the quality of the service supplied." Ibid.
246 Ibid., para. 10 (stating that "approval procedures or licensing and qualification requirements" need
not be scheduled under Article XVI "as long as they do not contain any of the limitations specified in
Article XVI").

3.130 According to Antigua, the United States appears to argue that Article XVI:1 does not have a
legal significance separate from Article XVI:2. Antigua is of the view that the text of Article XVI:1 is
clear, and unambiguously imposes a legal obligation on the United States. If the United States were
to be correct that the first paragraph of Article XVI is merely an introductory clause to the second
paragraph, by implication the wording of the firs t paragraph must somehow assist in or otherwise
frame the interpretation of the second paragraph. Othe rwise, Article XVI:1 would be pointless. Thus
Article XVI:2 should be interpreted in a way that ensures that services and service suppliers of the
exporting Member are given the treatment by the importing country described in Article XVI:1, which
is market access "no less favourable than that provi ded for (...) in its Schedule." The United States,
however, does precisely the opposite and suggests a very restrictive interpretation of the
subparagraphs of Article XVI:2. In particular, the United States submits that limitations on the
number of service suppliers and limitations on th e number of service operations are only caught by
Article XVI if they are expressed in the form of sp ecific numerical restrictions. However, as Antigua
and the European Communities have pointed out, a total prohibition is a numerical restriction – of
zero. As explained by the European Communities, if this were not the case it would be easy for
Members to escape the prohibitions of subparagraphs (a) and (c) by refusing to specify an actual
number and just simply prohibit any number – exactly what the United States is attempting to do here.
Such a restrictive interpretation would also conflict with the objective of Article XVI as defined in its
first paragraph.
3.131 As to the United States' argument that qualitativ e tests are beyond the scope of Article XVI,
Antigua submits that it is precisely the point that it is seeking to make. The reason why it is
impossible for Antiguan operators to obtain an au thorization to supply ga mbling and betting services
into the United States, while so many domestic operators do have such an authorization, is not that the
Antiguan operators fail to meet a qualitative test th at United States operators do meet. The United
States' prohibition applies irrespective of the qualit y or specific characteristics of the service or the
service supplier. Thus, the United States prohibition is a quantitative restriction and not a qualitative
restriction. Antigua also points out that Article XVI does not have any "likeness" requirement as that
found in Article XVII. Thus under Article XVI, the na ture and extent of the domestic industry is in
fact irrelevant in assessing a Member's obligations in a sector in which commitments have been made.
3.132 The United States replies that Antigua treats Article XVI as if it enshrines a general rule
barring measures that impede "market access" in whole or in part. That is simply the wrong
interpretation. A market access commitment in a pa rticular sector does not imply that Members lose
all rights to restrict particular types of activity in that sector. For exampl e, a commitment for cross-
border supply of medical services does not imply that Members must then permit doctors to diagnose
patients over the telephone or over the Internet. The only question under Article XVI is whether the
measure is in fact one of those listed in Article XVI :2. The list includes, in relevant part, measures
identified by their particular "form" – such as "in the form of numerical quotas." The United States
points out again that its restrictions on certain remote supply gambling activities are expressed as
limitations on the character of the activity supplied, not as quantitative limits or other restrictions
within the ambit of Article XVI:2.
3.133 It has been suggested that an across-the-boa rd prohibition on cross-border services could
amount to the same thing as a zero quantitative restriction, because under such a prohibition no
foreign supplier can provide gambling services from out side the territory of the United States. The
legal premises for this argument are obscure; the te xt of Article XVI:2, quite clearly refers to the
numerical expression of such limitations. Moreover, the basic factual premise for this argument is
completely absent. There is no across-the-board prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
services in US law. US law certainly restricts th e remote supply of gambling, but these restrictions
are not so broad that they prohibit all cross-borde r supply of gambling services. An examination of
specific provisions of US law, had Antigua undertaken one, would have borne this out.

3.134 Antigua reiterates that, by maintaining a total prohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services the United States completely denies market access and violates its
obligations under Article XVI of th e GATS. This total prohibition violates Article XVI:1 and XVI:2,
regardless of whether the provisions are construed separ ately or jointly – that is even if Article XVI:1
cannot be applied independently of Article XVI:2, it must at the very least govern the interpretation of
Article XVI:2. Stated differently, the sum of the rules in the subparagraphs of Article XVI:2 cannot
be less than what is set out in Article XVI:1. Th e United States' total prohibition, as such, is caught
by Article XVI:2(a) because it is the equivalent of a zero quota. The ability to apply Article XVI:2(a)
to such a non-numerical zero quota is mandated by th e principle of effective treaty interpretation and
confirmed by the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.
3.135 In Antigua's view, the individual legislative and regulatory provisions, applications thereof
and related practices that make up the United St ates' total prohibition are also caught by both
Article XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c) as separate measures: (i) federal laws specifically prohibiting "cross-
border" supply function, like an es tablishment requirement, and are ther efore the equivalent of a zero
quota for cross-border supply; (ii) state laws that prohibit all gambling, in combination with other
state laws that exempt specifically authorized gambling without providing a possibility for Antiguan
operators to obtain an authorization to supply gambling services on a cross-border basis
247, are the
equivalent of a zero quota for cross-border supply; (iii) several state laws or regulations explicitly
establish numerical quotas; 248 (iv) several laws or regulations expressly grant exclusive or special
rights to operators of domestic origin; 249 (v) several state laws require the physical presence of the
operator within the territory of the state 250 and, in doing so, constitute a zero quota for cross-border
supply.
3.136 During the first substantive meeting of the par ties with the Panel the United States explained
that it does not prohibit the cross-border supply of all "gambling and betting services" because it
allows cross-border supply of services such as "odds-making" or broadcasting of horse races.
Although Antigua does not understand what point the United States seeks to make when qualifying its
prohibition in such a way, this may constitute an e ffort to save its total ban from being found to be the
equivalent of a zero quota prohibited by Article XVI. Such an argument would be wrong. If a
Member makes a market access commitment in a sect or or sub-sector, that commitment covers all
services that come with in that sector or sub-sector . A Member cannot discharge its treaty obligations
by allowing market access only for a fraction of the services covered by a sector or sub-sector while
prohibiting all others. This would make market access commitments under GATS largely
meaningless. More to the point, if a Member desire s to restrict market access with respect to certain
services within a sector or sub-sector, it should, as many Members (including the United States)
indeed have done, set out the restrictions or limitations on access in the appropriate place on the
Member's schedule of commitments under the GATS.
3.137 The United States maintains that Antigua fails to prove the inconsistency of any US
measure(s) with GATS Article XVI. As the Unite d States has previously explained, Article XVI
prohibits Members that have inscribed commitme nts from maintaining or adopting six types of
measures referred to in its paragra ph 2, sub-paragraphs (a) to (f).
251 A close comparison between
Article XVI:2 of the GATS and its goods counterpa rt, Article XI of GATT 1994, demonstrates that

247 See above paras. 3.106-3.108.
248 See above para. 3.109.
249 Antigua notes that, for example, each of the 40 states that authorize a lottery allows only one
operator, which then is permitted to operate a multitude of gambling games. Authorizations for horse race
betting are only given to "associations that control pari -mutuel wagering services on horseracing in the United
States" which the United States describes as a "special type of supplier" (see below para. 3.154).
250 See above para. 3.109.
251 The United States reiterates that, to the extent th at Antigua's claims rest on Article XVI:1, Antigua
misconstrues that provision as a general rule requiring market access. Article XVI prohibits only the specific
types of limitations on establishment listed in Article XVI:2.

Antigua's claim that its alleged "total prohibition" is ipso facto impermissible under Article XVI is
incorrect. While Article XI of GATT 1994 stat es a general rule banni ng any import or export
"prohibition or restriction" except for a duty, tax, or charge, Article XVI:2 of the GATS establishes no
such general rule. Instead, it defines, and caref ully describes, precise types of limitations that
Members shall not maintain or adopt in committed sectors. To prove its case as an initial matter,
Antigua has the sole burden of proving that the United States maintains one of the precise types of
limitations in Article XVI:2(a) to (f).
3.138 The United States submits that Antigua's claims appear to rely on sub-paragraph (a), which
bars the maintenance or adoption of "limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the
form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic
needs test," and on sub-paragraph (c), which ba rs "limitations on the total number of service
operations ... expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the
requirements of an economic needs test." These provisions may be summarized as follows:

Subject matter of limitation

Prohibited form/manner of expression

number of service suppliers (sub-paragraph (a))

"in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies,
exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of
an economic needs test" (emphasis added)

total number of service operations or total
quantity of service output (sub-paragraph (c))

"expressed in terms of designated numerical units
in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test" (emphasis added)

3.139 As the table above clarifies, paragraphs (a) and (c) each involve two explicit criteria. First,
the subject matter of the limitation must match the s ubject matter specified in the column on the left.
Second, the "form"
252 of the limitation or the manner in which it is "expressed" 253 must correspond to
the detailed specifications reproduced in the column on the right. (Also, with respect to sub-
paragraph (c), the numerical units in question must be "designated."254) Antigua has completely failed
to offer the Panel the kind of precise statutory an alysis necessary to apply these requirements to US
law.
3.140 In fact, the subject matter of the US restri ctions on gambling mentioned by Antigua is the
character of the activity involved, without regard to the "number of service suppliers" or the "total
number of service operations of total quantity of service output." For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1084
applies to persons providing gambling services as a business. 255 It says that such persons may not use
certain facilities for certain types of transmissions. 256 It does not purport to restrict the number of

252 The United States notes that the ordinary meaning of "form" in this context clearly refers to the
particular way in which the limitation is manife sted, rather than its alleged effect. See The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, p. 1006 (defining "form" inter alia as "shape, arrangement of parts," or "[t]he particular
mode in which a thing exists or manifests itself," or, in linguistics, "the external characteristics of a word or
other unit as distinct from its meaning.").
253 The ordinary meaning of the verb "express" in this context is "[r]epresent in language; put into
words" or "manifest by external signs." See ibid., p. 890.
254 The ordinary meaning of the verb "designate" in this context is "[p]oint out, indicate, specify." See
ibid., p. 645.
255 I.e., persons "engaged in the business of betting or wagering." See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
256 The United States notes specifically, that th ey may not "knowingly use[] a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign comme rce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers." 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).

providers, operations, or quantity of output of services, much less do so in a form or manner of
expression, or with a numerical designation, of the kind indicated in Article XVI:2 (a) or (c).
Significantly, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 does not prevent pe rsons engaged in gambling businesses from using
wire communications facilities for other purposes.
257 This confirms that the US legislators drafting
this provision accepted that a number of gambling service providers would continue to exist and
operate without quantitative restraints. 258 Congress only wished to require such providers to observe
restrictions on the character of their activities i nvolving wire communications facilities. The two
other statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 1955, also restrict the characteristics of gambling services
without purporting to restrict the number of provi ders, operations, or quantit y of output of gambling
services. Both statutes make it a crime at the federal level for gambling service providers or other
persons to engage in activities that viol ate certain state and/or federal laws. 259 In each case the
restrictions take the form of, and are expressed as, limitations on the characteristics of an activity;
they do not mention, much less impose, a "numer ical quota," a "designated numerical unit," or any
other prohibited form or manner of expression mentioned in Article XVI:2(a) and (c).
3.141 The United States reiterates that Antigua's de facto "zero quota" claim lacks both a legal and a
factual basis. Legally, this claim incorrectly assu mes that Antigua's alleged "total prohibition" is
automatically inconsistent with Article XVI:2. As discussed above, while such an assertion might be
tenable under GATT Art. XI, there is no automatic "prohibition on prohibitions" under the GATS.
Moreover, Antigua's argument is untenable unde r the actual language of Article XVI:2, which
requires that determinations as to the existence of a GATS-inconsistent quantitative restriction be
based on the form, manner of expression, and designation of numerical quotas. Factually, Antigua's
"zero quota" claim relies entirely on its incorrect assertion of a "total prohibition" on cross-border
supply of gambling services. In reality, US restric tions do not preclude cross-border supply of all
gambling services, and thus are not a "total prohibition." For example: (i) persons not involved in the
business of gambling may transmit casual or social bets by any means, provided that the transmission
is permissible under state law; (ii) pari-mutuel betting services may exchange the accounting data and
pictures necessary to permit a racetrack outside the United States to offer pari-mutuel betting on US
races (and vice-versa), provided that such gambling is legal in both the sending and the receiving
jurisdictions; (iii) suppliers of odds making and handicapping services (e.g ., handicappers of horse
races) as well as other gambling informational servi ces may supply such services, provided that the
form of gambling that they facilitate is legal in both the sending and the receiving jurisdictions;
(iv) gambling websites may (and many do) provide so-called "free play" games in which no real
money is wagered; and (v) any other gambling servi ce that does not consist of actual transmission of
a bet or wager is legal to the extent stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b), provided that it also does not violate

257 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) ("Nothing in this section sh all be construed to prevent the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the
transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State
or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in
which such betting is legal.").
258 The United States argues that Antigua incorrectly asserts that "the United States' prohibition applies
irrespective of the quality or specific characteristics of the service or the service supplier" and concludes on that
basis that "the United States prohibition is a quantitative restriction and not a qualitative restriction." In fact, the
application of US restrictions clearly depends on non-qua ntitative characteristics of the service and/or supplier
(e.g., whether the services are supplied by wire communications facilities, whether they comply with sub-federal
laws, etc.).
259 18 U.S.C. § 1952 essentially makes it a crime at the federal level of government for violators of
certain state or federal laws (including, but not limited to, laws pertaining to business enterprises involving
gambling, untaxed liquor, narcotics, or prostitution) to extend their activities into interstate or foreign
commerce. Section 1952 thus restricts the character of legally authorized ga mbling services to the same extent
as the underlying laws that it enforces. It does not, however, limit the number of providers, number of
operations, or quantity of output of such services. Si milarly, 18 U.S.C. §1955 makes it a crime at the federal
level of government to conduct a gambling business that meets specified size, duration and/or revenue
requirements and is in violation of the law of the US state or other political subdivision in which it is conducted.

state law in the US consumer's jurisdiction. As these examples demonstrate, the United States does
not "prohibit" cross-border supply of gambling services.
3.142 Antigua submits that the late effort of the United States to avoid the scope of Article XVI by
stating that it indeed allowed certain cross-borde r "gambling and betting" services is baseless. The
latest US arguments on the interpretation of Article XVI:2 are disingenuous on two accounts. First,
the United States interprets Article XVI:2 in a litera l, exclusively text-based way. However, it does
not do the same with Article XVI:1. The text of the latter unambiguously imposes a legal obligation
on a Member to accord services of other Members trea tment no less favourable that that provided for
in its Schedule. The United States previously argued that the Panel should set aside this clear text on
the basis of a phrase from the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines.260 In Antigua's view, if Article XVI:2 is to
be interpreted in a purely text-based way, that shoul d also be the case for the Article XVI:1. Second,
the United States' textual analysis of Article XVI :2(a) is disingenuous because it is not based on the
actual text of Article XVI but on a table summarizing the text. The actual text of Article XVI:2(a)
mentions "limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas,
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requ irements of an economic needs test" (emphasis
added). The United States has removed the word "whether" and reads Article XVI:2 as if its says
"limitations on the number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies,
exclusive service suppliers (...)". However, the fact that the actual text contains the word "whether"
indicates that the enumeration following it is not meant to limit the application of Article XVI:2(a) but
rather to make it clear that the four forms of limitations on the number of service suppliers explicitly
mentioned are in any event caught by Article XVI:2(a).
3.143 As discussed in its response to question 9 from the Panel, Antigua's interpretation is
confirmed by the 1993 and the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines which state unequivocally that a
nationality requirement for service suppliers woul d be caught by Article XVI:2(a) as equivalent to a
zero quota despite the fact that it does not have the form of a numerical quota. In fact, the United
States' interpretation would for example allow a law that explicitly provides that "all foreign services
are prohibited" to escape the application of Article XVI, because it is not expressed in numerical
terms. This clearly cannot be the case.
3.144 The United States recalls that it would under no circ umstances concede the existence of a
commitment. Although the United States has rai sed Antigua's failure to provide evidence and
argumentation as a threshold matter in this dispute, and also raises it in relation to each of Antigua's
substantive claims. To the extent that Antigua ma kes claims of violation based on its alleged "total
prohibition" and fails to relate those to particular US laws and regulations, it also fails to meet its
burden for those claims. US previous arguments on these issues and the alleged effect of US
statements apply equally to the complaining party's burden under Article XVI and the other
substantive provisions at issue. The main issue under Article XVI appears to be the question of
Antigua's "zero quota" argument. The United States has explained that such an argument cannot be
reconciled with the text of Article XVI, which clearly refers to limitations in the "form" of quotas, and
so on. A comparison between Article XVI of the GATS and Article XI of the GATT shows that the
GATT provision contains a "prohibition on prohibitions," and the GATS provision does not.
Antigua's arguments are therefore inconsistent with the text of Article XVI.
3.145 The United States argues that Antigua also has its facts wrong. In its answer to one of the
Panel's questions, Antigua states that "during the fi nal Panel meeting of the session the United States
once more made clear its position that the cross- border provision of gambling and betting services
from Antigua to the United States was illegal under Un ited States law." In fact, the United States
stated at that time, and mainta ins, that it in fact permits some cross-border supply of gambling
services from Antigua. This is what the United St ates meant when saying that proving a "total
prohibition" is an impossible task. Previously, An tigua appeared to argue, based on its "zero quota"

theory, that it would take an across-the-board prohibition of all cross-border gambling services to
violate Article XVI – hence its misguided effort to try to show a "total" US prohibition on cross-
border gambling services. Since the United States in fact permits some cross-border gambling
services, and since Antigua disregards the actual cont ent of US law, Antigua lacks a factual basis for
arguing a "blanket" prohibition.
3.146 The United States notes that Antigua now asserts that a prohibition on any fraction of the
services covered by a sector or sub-sector would amount to a "zero quota" and would therefore be
inconsistent with Article XVI:2(a) under Antigua's "zero quota" theory.
261 In other words, Antigua's
view is that a full market access commitment mean s that nothing whatsoever subject to that
commitment may be prohibited. This is a signifi cant step beyond the "blanket" prohibition theory
previously discussed by Antigua and certain third parties. 262 Antigua's new argument regarding
fractional prohibitions fails on the same textual gr ounds as its blanket prohibition argument, that is,
Article XVI only addresses limitations that take cer tain carefully-specified forms. Moreover,
Antigua's fractional prohibition argument does not withstand scrutiny in light of the objects and
purposes of the GATS. Members cannot effectively ex ercise the "right to regulate" services that are
the subject of a commitment if they lack an y power to prohibit services within a sector or
sub-sector that do not conform to the Member's regulation. The right to regulate recognized in the
GATS implies the power to set limitations on the scope of permissible activity, as the United States
has done with gambling services.
3.147 Antigua rejects the US argument that a Member that makes a market access commitment
with regard to a certain sector, escapes the app lication of Article XVI if it does not maintain
Article XVI limitations with regard to some of the services within that sector. Antigua believes this is
legally wrong: the Article XVI obligation obviously applies to all services within that sector.
5. GATS Article XVII
263
(a) "Likeness" of services and service suppliers
3.148 Antigua argues that services and service suppliers of Antigua are "like" those of the United
States. The types of games offered from Antigua are the same as those offered in the United States
and all involve the winning or losing of money. Th e only differences are the origin of the services
and the suppliers and the mode of supply (cross- border as opposed to comme rcial presence). These
differences, however, are not relevant in the cont ext of a commitment to national treatment of cross-
border supply under the GATS.
3.149 To date, panels and the Appellate Body have addressed the issue of "likeness" in the GATS in
only two disputes (EC – Bananas III (US) and Canada – Autos). In both disputes the panels accepted
that the services and the service suppliers were "lik e" without the extensive discussion that has taken
place in the "likeness" debate in the context of the GATT. 264 In the view of Antigua, this is not a
coincidence because the concept of likeness will often be less important in disputes concerning trade
in services than in disputes on trade in goods. 265 In the case of trade in goods the characteristics of a

261 See above para. 3.136.
262 See below para. 4.35.
263 In addition the arguments presented here, see also parties' responses to Panel questions Nos. 16-26
and 40-43 in Annex C of this Report.
264 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US) , para. 7.322, and Panel Report on Canada – Autos ,
paras. 10.247-10.248.
265 Antigua submits that the view that the likeness debate may be of lesser importance in services
context than in goods context is also supported by the Appellate Body's statement in Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages, according to which the "likeness" concept is a fl exible one that may have different meanings in
different WTO Agreements and in different circumstances: 'the concept of 'likeness' is a relative one that evokes
the image of an accordion. The accor dion of 'likeness' stretches and squeezes in different places as different

specific product are often inherently "locked in" to the good (for instance in a specific type of cement
as in EC – Asbestos). In the case of trade in services, how ever, the characteristics of the "product" –
the service – are intangible and often easily adaptable. 266 Thus, even if services and service suppliers
are "unlike" it will often be relatively simple to ad apt the foreign service and service supplier in order
to make these "like" their domestic counterparts. Of course, the regulatory system of the importing
WTO Member must offer the foreign services and supp liers an opportunity to be or become "like."
For example, a WTO Member cannot set up a regulatory system that is only open to domestic services
and suppliers and then argue that all foreign ser vices and suppliers are "unlike" because they are
unregulated. Such an approach would sanctify a re gulatory regime that is inherently discriminatory
and cannot therefore be compliant with Article XVII of the GATS. In this respect, Antigua invites the
Panel to exercise judicial economy in deciding whether an investigation of specific characteristics of
various gaming services is necessary to dispose of this dispute. Antigua strongly believes this not to
be the case because access to the US market for gambling and betting services is not determined by
the application of objective criteria to the servi ces and the service suppliers. Even an Antiguan
service that is identical to a service of US origin (which many – perhaps all – are) would have no
access to the United States market simply because it is provided from a foreign location. This factor,
however, can play no role in the determination of "likeness" in Article XVII because it is the specific
purpose of Article XVII to remove different treatment solely on the basis of origin.267
3.150 The fact that services of Antiguan gaming opera tors are supplied via a different "mode of
supply" than services of suppliers of United States origin (cross-border as opposed to commercial
presence) does not make these "unlike." 268 If the use of a different "mode of supply" were sufficient
for a WTO Member to escape the obligations of nati onal treatment on the basis of "unlikeness," this
would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the GATS. In particular, a commitment to national
treatment for cross-border supply would be meaningl ess because the simple fact that a service is
supplied cross-border would make that service and its supplier "unlike" their domestic counterparts
and remove the national treatment obligation. Such an interpretation is contrary to the principle of

provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any of those places must be
determined by the particular provision in which the term 'like' is encountered as well as by the context and the
circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply." (Appellate Body Report on
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 21).
266 William J. Davey and Joost Pauwelyn, "MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in
View of its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of 'Like Product'"
in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination
in World Trade Law (The University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 13-50, at footnote 14: "It would seem to be
difficult to transpose this approach to the GATS. Sin ce most, if not all, features of services and service
suppliers are intangible, none of them can really be said to be objectively linked to the service or service
supplier itself."
267 See, by analogy on Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 the Panel Report on US – FSC (Article 21.5 –
EC) "[W]e view the principal purpose of the 'like product' inquiry under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 as
ascertaining whether any formal differentiation in treatment between an imported and a domestic product could
be based upon the fact that the products are different – i.e. not like – rather than on the origin of the products
involved" (para. 8.132) and "[W]e do not believe that the mere fact that a good has US origin renders it 'unlike'
an imported good" (para. 8.133). See also (again with regard to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994), the Panel
Report on India – Autos, para. 7.173-7.176. With regard to Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, see the Panel Report
on Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.113: " ... an origin-based distinction in respect of internal taxes suffices in itself
to violate Article III:2, without the need to demonstrate the existence of actually trad e like products" and, also
with regard to Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, the Panel Report on Argentina – Hides and Leather ,
paras. 11.168-11.169. With regard to the possibility to make use of hypothetical examples in the "likeness"
analysis (in the context of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994), see Appellate Body Report on Canada –
Periodicals, pp. 20-21.
268 Note by the WTO Secretariat entitled The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (S/C/W/68)
which, in para. 33 (concerning Article XVII of the GATS) states that: "[A]s discussed in the context of Article II
on MFN, likeness in the national treatment context also depends in principle on attributes of the product or
supplier per se rather than on the means by which the product is delivered."

effective treaty interpretation because it renders re dundant an important part of the GATS, i.e. all
schedules with national treatment commitments for cross-border supply.
269
3.151 In the context of trade in goods the Appellate Body referred to four categories of
characteristics that have been used to assess "lik eness" in the context of the GATT: (i) physical
properties; (ii) capability of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) consumer perception; and
(iv) international tariff classification. 270 To the extent that a compar able analysis of characteristics
would need to be made in the GATS context, An tigua submits that the gambling and betting services
offered from Antigua and those offered in the Unite d States are virtually the same. The types of
games are the same and all involve the placing of wagers and the winning or losing sums of money.
Consumers perceive Antiguan and US gambling services as interchangeable. 271 Both Antiguan and
US origin gambling and betting services are offere d to the public via communication technology
including telephone and electronic communication. Finally, the international classification of services
used in the WTO context, the CPC Prov., provides only one category for gambling and betting
services. The more recent versions of the CPC classification, CPC 1.0 and CPC 1.1 also provide for
just one category for gambling and betting services.
272 To the extent that suppliers from Antigua and
suppliers from the United States provide like services, they are also like service suppliers.273
3.152 The United States recalls that the panel in EC–Bananas III (US) stated that "[i]n order to
establish a breach of the national treatment obligati on of Article XVII, three elements need to be
demonstrated: (i) the (Member) has undertaken a commitment in a relevant sector and mode of
supply; (ii) the (Member) has adopted or applied a measure affecting the supply of services in that
sector and/or mode of supply; and (iii) the measure accords to service suppliers of any other Member
treatment less favourable than that it ac cords to (its) own like service suppliers.
274 The United States
has already demonstrated Antigua 's failure to prove the first element – existence of a specific
commitment in a relevant sector. Furthermore, Antigua has ignored the second element – adoption or
application of a measure affecting the supply of services in the relevant sector and/or mode – by
failing to argue the scope or meaning of specifi c measures. Even if these elements had been
established, however, Antigua has also failed on the third element by proving neither how its services
and service suppliers are "like" US services and service suppliers nor how specific US measures
accord Antiguan services and service suppliers less favourable treatment.
3.153 The United States submits that the burden rests on Antigua to provide evidence demonstrating
that Antiguan services and service suppliers are " like" particular US services and suppliers for
purposes of GATS Article XVII.
275 Antigua states that it licenses only two types of gambling services

269 See also, with regard to the principle of effective treaty interpretation, the Appellate Body Report on
US – Gasoline, p. 23 and Appellate Body Report on Korea – Dairy, para. 81.
270 Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para. 101.
271 Antigua notes that various gambling operators of United States origin state that the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services is hurting their sales. See the statement by Mr. Steve Woodall, Fiscal
Officer in Idaho (reported in The Spokesman Review (2 February 2001); the statement by Mr. Dennis Kennedy,
Executive Director of the Ohio Lottery, reported in David Bennett, "Lottery's pot for schools ends up short",
Crain's Cleveland Business (23 July 2001). See also the arguments put forward by the horse race betting
industry in Florida (reported in Jim Saunders, "Video-gambling debate spins in soft economy", The Florida
Times-Union (28 December 2002); and the stat ement of Mr. Joe Lupo, manager of a bookmaker in Las Vegas,
reported in Michael Kaplan, "Gambli ng in America: A Special Report", Cigar Aficionado (September/October
2002), p. 66.
272 Both CPC 1.0 (1998) and 1.1 (2002) classify "gambling and betting services" as a class (9692) and
subclass (96920) under "Section 9 – Community, social and personal services"; "Division 96 – Recreational,
cultural and sporting services"; and "Group 969 – Other amusement and recreational services". The different
versions of the CPC can be consulted electronically on http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regct.asp?Lg=1.
273 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.322; Panel Report on Canada – Autos, para. 10.248.
274 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.314.
275 Panel Report on Canada – Autos, para. 10.289.

– "virtual casino" services and sports book services, with the former supplied by Internet and the latter
by Internet and telephone.276 Antigua approaches its burden by first dismissing the likeness inquiry as
hardly important in the context of services. Anti gua essentially urges the Panel to find that in the
context of Article XVII it is sufficient to merely assume likeness. Contrary to Antigua's assertions,
nothing about the "intangible" nature of services re nders likeness a given, or an analysis of likeness
unnecessary; services can be like or unlike one another (for example, in their manner of performance),
and so can suppliers. Had the Uruguay Round negotia tors not believed this, they would not have
made likeness of services and suppliers an elemen t of the Article XVII inquiry. According to the
United States, Antigua itself identified, in its statem ent of facts, several different forms of gambling
services with different characteristics. 277 Yet Antigua goes on to assert for purposes of Article XVII
that gambling services offered from Antigua are "virtually the same" as those offered in the United
States, because "the types of games are the same and all involve the placing of wagers and the
winning or losing [of] sums of money" and because "consumers perceive Antiguan and United States
gambling services as interchangeable." These cursor y and baseless assertions ignore the important
distinctions between different gambling and betting services. For example, as a general matter, the
National Research Council has found that "[t]he characteristics of game technologies, such as the
number of gambles offered per time period, the phy sical and informational environment of games,
game rules, speed of play, probabilistic structure, cost per play, and jackpot size, appear to affect
gambling preferences and habits." 278 Antigua has not addressed any of these factors. Nor has it
addressed distinctions that may be relevant in d ecisions regarding how to regulate various types of
gambling services.
3.154 According to the United States, Antigua also ignores potentially relevant differences in
service suppliers. For example, Antigua states that US state lotteries are supplied exclusively through
state monopolies, but nowhere does it attempt to say wh at, if anything, makes its (presumably private,
non-state) service suppliers "like" state lottery m onopolies in any sense. Nor does it try to explain
how its suppliers are "like" the associations that control pari-mutuel wagering services on horseracing
in the United States, or any other special type of su pplier in the US market. Antigua further fails to
address differences in the object of the bet or wager that distinguish different gambling services. For
example, the distinctions between selecting random numbers, picking winners in a race or sport,
playing a table game with gambling paraphernalia , and other forms of gambling shape consumer
perceptions and influence the odds of winning, which determine the profitability of different forms of
gambling. Antigua fails to take account of such distinctions between, e.g., its sports book services
and gambling services provided in the United States. Indeed, Antigua actually provides evidence that
sports betting is unlike pari-mutuel betting by ob serving that "[w]hen betting with a bookmaker a
gambler bets against the bookmaker as opposed to betting against the other gamblers, as is the case
with pari-mutuel betting."279
3.155 Antigua's own evidence also demonstrates that Internet virtual casinos are unlike real casinos
in that the true object of the bet or wager in a virtual casino is the generation by a software algorithm
of some random number. 280 This result is often presented thro ugh a visual and audio simulation of
gambling paraphernalia such as cards, dice, wheels, gaming boards, etc., that one would find in a
casino. In contrast to a real casino, however, th e online casino is an illusion – a "virtual reality"
environment in which outcomes are controlled by a com puter rather than by the laws of the physical
world. The odds in virtual gambling are thus set by manipulation of the software simulation, and bear
no necessary relationship to the outcomes that would occur in a casino with the use of physical

276 See above para. 3.2.
277 See above para. 3.1.
278 National Research Council, Pathological Gambling: A Critical Review, pp. 7-5 to 7-7 (1999).
279 Ibid., see above para. 3.12.
280 United Kingdom Department for Culture, Media & Sport, The Future Regulation of Remote
Gambling: A DCMS Position Paper, April 2003, paras. 90, 93.

gambling paraphernalia.
281 Antigua also concedes major di fferences in consumer perceptions
between real and virtual casino services. For example, Antigua admits that the "noise and visual
effects of the casino floor . . . heightens the thrill and pleasant tension" that consumers perceive in a
real casino.
282 Its own evidence indicates that consumer perceptions are influenced by the physical
surroundings, layout, amenities, and real-world stimuli of a real casino. 283 Moreover, Antigua
concedes that US consumers who go to real casinos are "brought in" by "shows by major stars,
Broadway-style musicals, revue spectaculars, and a variety of lounge acts" as well as meals and other
amenities. None of this exists in the virtual casino, in which a lone player sits in front of a terminal in
a home, school, office, etc. Thus, far from proving that Internet virtual casinos are like real casinos,
Antigua has actually shown the opposite to be true – in terms of consumer perceptions, a virtual
casino is nothing like a real casino.
3.156 The United States submits that Antigua further disregards significant differences in scope of
availability of different services, particularly availab ility to minors. To the extent that they can be
legally offered, gambling services in the United Stat es operate under intense regulatory controls that
constrain the scope of their availability, often to a particular facility. Moreover, there is no means to
prevent minors from gaining access to remotely su pply gambling services comparable to the means
available in connection with supply of gambling services in the United States. Likewise, Antigua fails
to address the law enforcement, addiction, and other risks associated with remote supply of gambling.
These risks make Internet and other remotely supp lied gambling services quite "unlike" other forms
of gambling. The Appellate Body has stated in the goods context that "[w]e are very much of the
view that evidence relating to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an
examination of 'likeness' under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994."
284 Similarly, in the context of
Antigua's claims of likeness under GATS Article XVII, the significant differential risks and concerns
associated with gambling by remote supply, as comp ared to other gambling services, are pertinent.
The burden rests on Antigua to show that its remotely supplied gambling services are "like" services
in the United States in spite of such obvious differe nces, including, for instance, those relating to law
enforcement and consumer protection, protection of youth, and health. Antigua has failed to meet this
burden.
3.157 Antigua notes that third major prong of the United States' defence agai nst the claims of
Antigua and Barbuda is its attempt to categor ise the gambling and betting services offered by
Antiguan providers as not "like" the gambling a nd betting services provided by United States
domestic suppliers. The US argument is constructe d of three contentions. First, the United States
attempts to differentiate between various kinds of gambling games and activities. Second, the United
States contends that the ownership or structure of particular service suppliers renders them "unlike."
Third, the United States attempts to saddle cross- border gambling with regu latory, health and law
enforcement concerns that it apparently presumes are not applicable to gambling and betting services
provided by domestic suppliers.
3.158 Before getting into detail on the US claims , Antigua wishes to point out some of the
misstatements and errors contained in the United Stat es' discussion on this topic. First, Antigua does
not license "only two types of gambling services (…). " In fact, Antigua provides for two types of
gambling licenses, and a significant number of games and gambling opportunities are then furnished
under the scope of those two kinds of licenses. Antigua notes that the United States labels as "cursory
and baseless" Antigua and Barbuda's statements that gambling services offered from Antigua are

281 The United States submits that this situation is thus distinguishable from the situation in which
electronic supply of a service merely represents another means of supplying the same underlying content or
service.
282 See above para. 3.9.
283 Bill Friedman, Designing Casinos to Dominate the Competition: The Friedman International
Standards of Casino Design, University of Nevada (2000).
284 Appellate Body Report on EC - Asbestos, para. 113.

"virtually the same" as those offered by United States service providers and that "consumers perceive
Antiguan and United States gambling services as inte rchangeable." Far from being "cursory and
baseless," Antigua's statements are supported by a number of independent sources that were cited in
footnote 271 above. Further, the United States asserts that Antigua "disregard[ed] significant
differences" and "fail[ed] to address the law enforcem ent, addiction, and other risks associated with
remote supply of gambling (…)." The reality is th at Antigua has neither disregarded differences nor
failed to address social issues – the United States h as simply refused to give Antigua's extensive
discussions on the gaming industry and problems associ ated with gambling any credence, or in fact
any reference, whatsoever. More disingenuously , the United States assumes as a fact something
which Antigua strongly disputes – that there are any different or more extreme "law enforcement and
consumer protection, protection of youth and health" risks associated with cross-border (or what the
United States prefers to call "remote" or "rem ote access") gambling and betting than with domestic
gambling and betting in the United States. As w ill be discussed in detail further on, Antigua's
fundamental position is that no meaningful basis ex ists for distinguishing the services provided by
Antiguan operators from those provided by United States operators for the purposes of the GATS.
3.159 Antigua argues that the most serious defect in the United States' discussion on the concept of
"likeness" in Article XVII of the GATS is perhaps its complete lack of context. Indeed, other than a
reference to the Appellate Body Report in EC – Asbestos in an (overstated) effort to establish that
health risks can be a factor in determining "lik eness," the United States provides no framework for its
discussion at all. Perhaps that failure is because in the two reported instances in which "likeness"
appeared to have been remotely at issue, the panels have simply concluded without elaboration that
the services were "like." The paucity of discu ssion on the "likeness" issue in these cases lends
credence to the point already made by Antigua that, in the services context, "likeness" is much less of
an issue given the ease at which services may be made "like."
3.160 According to Antigua, the failure of the United St ates to provide the Panel with a context for
its discussion on "likeness" may be due to the fact that the US claim will not stand up in the face of a
complete analysis of "likeness" on the basis of the seminal Appellate Body Report in EC – Asbestos.
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body reviewed a panel determ ination that two types of fibre and two
types of cement incorporating two types of fibre were "like" for purposes of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994. In its report, the Appellate Body, having first thoroughly discussed some of the inherent
difficulties in determining "likeness" and surveying the considerable body of GATT 1994
jurisprudence on the subject, proceeded to analyzed the issue under four criteria: (i) the physical
properties of the products; (ii) the extent to wh ich the products are capable of serving the same or
similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which cons umers perceive and treat the products as alternative
means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the
international classification of the products for tari ff purposes. Before applying these criteria to the
facts in this proceeding, it is important to note va rious other helpful points that may be gleaned from
the Appellate Body Report in EC – Asbestos. First, in paragraph 92 of its report, the Appellate Body
recognized that "like" products may have different characteristics or qualities, and that important
aspects of a "likeness" analysis include: (i) determining what characteristics or qualities are important
in assessing "likeness," (ii) determining to what degree or extent the products must share qualities or
characteristics to be considered "like" and (iii) deciding from whose perspective "likeness" should be
considered. Second, analyzing GATT 1994 language substantively similar to Article XVII:1 of the
GATS, the Appellate Body concluded in paragra ph 99 of its report that the determination of
"likeness" was "fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive
relationship between and among products."
3.161
 Returning to the four criteria applied in EC – Asbestos , Antigua and Barbuda submits that a
"physical properties" comparison is inherently mo re problematic when dealing with a service than
with a discrete product, particularly given the vari ous methods by which a service can be supplied.
While the United States has not presented its "likeness" discussion in the context of EC – Asbestos ,
two of the United States' themes might be applicable to these criteria: (i) the ostensible differences

between Antiguan gambling and betting services and tho se of United States domestic providers that
arise primarily because the Antiguan services are "remote" or furnished on a cross-border basis; and
(ii) the ostensible differences between Antiguan gambling and betting services and those of United
States domestic providers that arise because the outcome of certain games offered by Antiguan
operators is determined by comput er equipment and not "by the laws of the physical world". Framed
mostly through discussion of the superficial differences between "bricks and mortar" gaming and
"remote" gaming, the United States' first and most elaborate argument is that cross-border supply via
remote communication, in and of itself, makes An tiguan services (and its service suppliers) "unlike"
those of domestic providers. As explained above, this simply cannot normally be the case in a context
where a Member has made a commitment to "nationa l treatment" of cross-border supply of services.
By definition, cross-border supply requires the use of remote communication – thus if the different
mode of supply ipso facto results in a conclusion that services are "unlike" it would render Members'
commitments in respect of cross border supply under the GATS meaningless. Indeed, the
United States has itself stated in a submission to the WTO on electronic commerce that "there should
be no question that where market access and nationa l treatment commitments exist, they encompass
the delivery of the service through electronic means, in keeping with the principle of technological
neutrality."
285
3.162 Antigua and Barbuda submits therefore that, in the context of a commitment by a Member to
national treatment of cross-border supply, there must at least be a presumption that the fact that the
services are provided by cross-border supply cannot, standing alone, make a service "unlike" a
domestically provided service. Antigua agrees that in certain specific circumstances a service could
be considered "unlike" only because it is supplied on a cross-border basis. However, in line with
Antigua's reasoning above, and the position expressed by Japan in its third party submission, Antigua
and Barbuda believes that it is for the United St ates to rebut what should be an assumption of prima
facie "likeness" of services supplied on a cross-borde r basis. Antigua does, however, disagree with
Japan when it submits that cross-border supply can be considered "unlike" domestic supply simply
because the regulatory circumstances are different. As the European Comm unities observes, this
would make commitments on cross-border supply meaningless because regulatory circumstances will
almost always be different for cross-border supply. Or, as in Antigua's case, a Member could simply
refuse to accept another Member's regulatory schem e or refuse to allow the other Member's service
suppliers to qualify under its own regulatory scheme. Furthermore, this approach would conflict with
the approach adopted by the Appellate Body in cases such as US – Gasoline. In a further attempt to
brand the Antiguan gambling and betting services as "unlike" those of United States providers, the
United States cites certain law enforcement and hea lth concerns to assert that cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services via remote communication is sufficiently "unlike" United States
domestic gambling and betting to re quire radically different treatment under the GATS. As the
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos considered "health ri sks" associated with a product as part of its
"physical properties," Antigua will do so in this dispute as well.
3.163 Antigua notes that the primary "concerns" of th e United States in this respect appear to be
(i) the risk of under age gambling; (ii) the risk of increased pathological gambling; (iii) the risk of
abuse of non-domestic service providers for money la undering purposes; and (iv) the heightened risk
of crime, fraud and related consumer protection i ssues. Antigua notes initially that the United States
fails to substantiate its statements about the "differences" in the natu re of these risks in the context of
"remote" gaming as opposed to domestic gaming. The scant traces of "evidence" submitted by the
United States on this point should never be enough to justify a distin ction between services for the
purposes of Article XVII of the GATS. In paragraph 114 of its report in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate
Body noted that it was particularly important for panels to focus on physical properties of products
that are likely to influence the competitive relations hip between products in the marketplace. In that
case, the Appellate Body determined that the very real health risks inherent in the physical properties

285 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce , Submission by the United States, WT/GC/16
(12 February 1999).

of asbestos fibres would clearly affect the competitive position of the product in the marketplace, as,
given a choice between two otherwise similar pr oducts, it was logical to conclude that most
consumers would prefer a non-carcinogenic product over a competing product that is a proven
carcinogen. Under this analysis, Antigua and Ba rbuda believes that the supposed regulatory and
health risks referred to by the United States in this proceeding have a materially different impact in
this case than did the health risks at issue in EC – Asbestos . In particular, the factors raised by the
United States cannot in any material respect influen ce the decision of a consum er to use the services
of a licensed and regulated Antiguan provider ov er those of a licensed and regulated domestic
United States provider – and indeed, the fact th at so many United States consumers do use the
services of Antiguan gaming companies confirms that these concerns are not relevant from the
perspective of the consumer. The possible law en forcement and health concerns raised by the
United States are the concerns of the authorities, not of the individual gambler, and consequently
cannot influence the consumer's decision. If these law enforcement or regulatory concerns were to
have a place in this case, it would be in the context of Article XIV of the GATS. Indeed, in its report
in EC – Asbestos the Appellate Body explicitly made this point when it stated in paragraph 115 that
(original emphasis):
"Under Article III:4, evidence relating to health risks may be relevant in assessing the
competitive relationship in the marketplace between allegedly "like" products. The
same, or similar, evidence serves a di fferent purpose under Article XX(b), namely
that of assessing whether a Member has a sufficient basis for 'adopting or enforcing'
a WTO-inconsistent measure on the grounds of human health."
3.164 Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, of course, is fundamentally the same as Article XIV of the
GATS. The United States, however, has not raised an Article XIV defence in this proceeding.
3.165 Antigua notes that the United States' second argument concerning physical properties seems
to be that, in the random selection games offere d by Antiguan operators, the random selection is
performed by software and not by the laws of the physical world. This distinction only relates to
random selection games and not to sports betting or card games, which presumably the United States
is not attempting to distinguish on this basis. In its discussion, the United States fails to mention that
in the case of almost all random selection games offe red in the United States, the random selection is
performed by a machine – not exactly the "laws of the physical world." This includes lotteries,
gambling machines and table games such as roulette . Some gambling machines legally available in
the United States are mechanical (for instance traditional slot machines, although an increasingly
large number of "traditional" slot machines are in fact computers with a mechanical façade over
them), others are electronic (for instance video lotte ry terminals and video poker and other card game
terminals). In fact, gamblers in the United St ates will often not know whether the machine that
performs the random selection is electronic or mechani cal. Clearly, it is not possible to differentiate
in any material, meaningful way between US and Antiguan gambling on this basis. More
importantly, Antigua's evidence, and the popularity of remote gambling in the United States
demonstrates that this alleged "physical differe nce" in the operation of the various games has no
impact on consumer preferences and no impact on the competitive position of cross-border gambling
service providers vis-à-vis domestic service pr oviders, nor has the United States submitted any
evidence to indicate that consumers care one bit wh ether a machine delivers its result electronically or
mechanically. Thus Antigua concludes that the United States has not submitted arguments or
evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that United States and Antiguan gambling and betting
services are "unlike" due to differences in "physical properties."
3.166 Turning to the second and third criterion elaborated in EC – Asbestos, what the Appellate
Body summarised in paragraph 117 of its report as "end-uses" and "consumers' tastes and habits,"
Antigua considers the two criteria toge ther, which the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos considered
particularly important because they "involve certa in of the key elements relating to the competitive
relationship between products (…)." Evidence from independent sources already submitted by

Antigua (see footnote 271) shows that consumer s in the United States do switch between gambling
and betting services offered domestically and gamb ling and betting services offered on a cross-border
basis via remote communication. This evidence clearly indicates that the two methods of service
delivery do in fact compete with each other. The United States' admission that there is "explosive
growth" and a "dramatic increase"
286 in such gambling further confirms this. Antigua and Barbuda
believes that no one would dispute that: (i) the se lling of music over the Internet competes with the
selling of music in "brick and mortar" stores; (ii) the delivery of specialized news services over the
Internet competes with paper based delivery of such services; and (iii) the selling of books, wine, cars
or other products via the Internet or mail-orde r catalogues competes with the selling of these products
in "brick and mortar" establishments. In all these ca ses it is clear that the "brick and mortar" and the
Internet based business model compete because they are capable of "serving the same or similar end-
uses" and are perceived as interchangeable by c onsumers. There is no reason why this would be
different for gambling services and suppliers of su ch services, nor has the United States offered any
evidence of any such difference.
3.167 Antigua notes that the United States alleges th at the two methods of delivering the gambling
and betting services at issue here should be viewed differently than the examples just cited because
"brick and mortar" casinos use marketing techniques such as shows by popular stars, free meals and
audiovisual effects to attract customers which cross- border suppliers can not offer. This is irrelevant
because it concerns marketing techniques and not the service or the service supplier. What is
important here is, as the Appellate Body recalls in EC – Asbestos
287, that some characteristics may be
meaningful and others not when determining whether things are "like." For instance, while there may
be a number of superficial distinctions between th e way a slot machine might look in a casino versus
how a computer generated slot machine looks at a computer terminal, both involve an individual,
frequently sitting alone, engaging in unsupervised gambling activity. The mere assertion by the
United States that the Antiguan games and services are "different" from those of domestic providers is
simply no evidence. Further, the United States offers no evidence that the supposed "differences"
have any impact on the "end-use" of the services or "consumer tastes and habits." Antigua, on the
other hand, has shown that the offerings do compete with each other for consumer attention.
3.168 Antigua notes that the United States cites various "differences" but then fails to indicate that
the putative difference has any probative effect what soever. For example, the United States says (see
above paragraph 3.154) "[I]ndeed , Antigua actually provides evidence that sports betting is unlike
pari-mutuel betting by observing that '[w]hen betti ng with a bookmaker a gambler bets against the
bookmaker as opposed to betting against the other gamble rs, as is the case with pari-mutuel betting.'"
But after making this point, the United States fails to demonstrate or even allege that a gambler cares
whether he or she is betting against a bookmaker or other gamblers. In light of the foregoing
discussion, Antigua and Barbuda submits that on the basis of their capability of serving the same or
similar end-uses and on the basis of consumer pe rception Antiguan and United States gambling and
betting services must be considered "like" for purposes of GATS Article XVII.
3.169 The fourth and final criterion for "likeness" considered by the Appellate Body in EC –
Asbestos is the tariff classification of the product. In the context of this dispute, this would equate to
the classification of the offered services under W/120 and the CPC. As Antigua has already
established, W/120 and the CPC both provide for just one category applicable to gambling and betting
services. This is particularly important given the comprehensiveness of the CPC and the huge number
of categories delineated under it. Having reviewed, at quite some length, the applicability of the EC –
Asbestos methodology on "likeness" to the facts in this dispute with the United States, Antigua is
brought to the inevitable conclusion that the An tiguan gambling and betting services are "like" those
offered by United States suppliers for purposes of the GATS.

286 See above para. 3.15.
287 Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para. 92.

3.170 Concerning the issue of "like service supplie rs", Antigua notes the US argument that
Antiguan service suppliers are not "like" certain service suppliers of United States origin, namely
state-owned lotteries, "associations controlling pari -mutuel wagering services" or "any other special
type of supplier in the US market." With regard to this issue Antigua and Barbuda agrees with the
European Communities that the ownership of a servi ce supplier can play no role in determining the
"likeness" of service suppliers. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the principle of effective
treaty interpretation, as it would make it very easy for WTO Members to circumvent Article XVII of
the GATS by only giving authorizations to so-calle d "special" domestic operators such as state owned
companies. This would largely nullify the effect of the GATS in sectors such as telecommunications
and postal services, where Members often maintain state monopolies. If such was the case, even
Members with full commitments on market access and national treatment could simply and
effectively prevent all forms of competition from ot her Members. In addition, Antigua cannot see
how the United States can argue that it does not violate Article XVI and, in the context of
Article XVII, justify its refusal to give Antiguan op erators an authorization on the basis that it only
gives authorizations to "special" operators of domestic origin. Surely a Member cannot
simultaneously argue that, on the one hand, it does not maintain monopolies and exclusive rights and
therefore does not violate Article XVI, and that, on the other hand, foreign operators cannot be given
a licence because they are unlike th e "special" operators of domestic origin that have been given a
licence. On a more basic level, there is simply no thing in evidence to indicat e that consumers care at
all about the legal structure or identity of the pr oviders of "like" gambling services, and it is quite
possible that the "likeness" of service providers has little functional relevance in this case. In similar
circumstances, the Appellate Body, in paragraph 7.322 of its report in EC – Bananas III simply
concluded that "to the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service providers."
3.171 While Antigua and Barbuda firmly believes th at the issue of "likeness" is properly and
conclusively resolved in its favour, it also thinks that the United States has raised some tangential
issues that should be addressed. In particular the United States refers to differences in game
characteristics such as the rules of the game. Howe ver, the United States makes no attempt to explain
how, on that basis, it could po ssibly make a distinction between gambling services of Antiguan and
United States origin. Not all differences – to the extent that they actually are differences – can justify
different treatment under an international trade treaty (let alone radically different treatment). A red
car is undoubtedly "unlike" a blue car in one respect, namely its colour. This does not allow however,
different treatment under WTO law. Given the need for "remote" gambling and betting service
providers to compete effectively against domestic operators, in most cases significant effort is made to
create game play and "feel" as similar to domestic offerings as possible. In this respect, Antigua and
Barbuda submits that it is unaware of any pr oduct offering by its ga mbling and betting service
suppliers that has no clear counterpart in the games offered by domestic suppliers in the United States.
3.172 In this context it is also important for the Pane l to keep in mind that the debate on likeness in
this case does not take place in a context of an au thorization system in the United States based on
objective, qualitative criteria – a context one woul d perhaps normally expect in an Article XVII
debate. Antiguan gambling services are not prohibited in the United States because of specific game
rules or other specific characteristi cs, and they cannot become legal by adapting game characteristics
to objective, qualitative criteria. They are pr ohibited because they are supplied from abroad.
Consequently, specific game characteristics are irrelevant to this dispute because whatever they are, or
could become, under the United States legal schem e cross-border Antiguan gambling services of any
kind – even if completely identical in every wa y to United States domestic services – would still be
prohibited.
3.173 Turning to law enforcement and health concerns , Antigua submits that, as is true with the
"differences" in the various games or services provided by Antiguan gami ng operators over those
provided by United States operators , Antigua and Barbuda believes that its earlier discussion in the
context of EC – Asbestos fully addresses the relevant impact of law enforcement and health concerns
in making a "likeness" determination. However, the numerous unfounded a llegations of the United

States with respect to law enforcement and health issues should be addressed specifically in more
detail. As noted earlier, the United States' concerns seem to be in four distinct areas: (i) under age
gambling; (ii) pathological gambling; (iii) mone y laundering; and (iv) organized and other crime,
fraud and consumer protec tion concerns. From the outset, Antigua observes that the United States
does not provide any evidence in its first submission that any of these concerns are particularly
associated with the cross-border provision of gambling and betting services from Antigua and
Barbuda. Nor does the United States counter the su bstantial evidence submitted by Antigua that is
expressly to the contrary. Antigua will show not on ly that there is no evidence of any pathologies or
other problems associated with cross-border gamb ling services different than those historically
associated with gambling in general, but also th at there is no evidence that cross-border gambling
results in higher levels of pathologies or greater law enforcement risks than domestic gambling.
3.174 Antigua submits that, in analysing youth gamblin g issues, it is important to note that both
Antigua and Barbuda and the United States set mi nimum legal ages for gambling. Unlike Antigua
and Barbuda however, which strictly prohibits gambling by those younger than 18 years of age, the
United States permits youths under the age of 18 to gamble on charitable games such as bingo or pull
tabs in approximately 19 states, either alone or in the presence of their parents.
288 The United States
avers in paragraph 3.18 that "remote" access gami ng poses an unacceptable and unmanageable risk of
under age gambling, but not surprisingly it provides no evidence to support this statement. The only
material concerning under age gambling it does refer to, does not relate to remote access gaming. In
fact, numerous investigations have shown the exis tence of under age gambling in the United States
but these all concern conventional gambling opportun ities offered by operators inside the United
States. The NGISC reports:
"Although illegal in every state, the sale of lottery tickets to minors nevertheless
occurs with a disturbing frequency. For example, one survey in Minnesota of 15-to
18-year-olds found that 27 per cent had purchased lottery tickets. Even higher levels
of 32 per cent, 34 per cent, and 35 per cen t were recorded in Louisiana, Texas, and
Connecticut, respectively. In Massachuse tts, Connecticut, and other states, lottery
tickets are available to the general public though self-service vending machines, often
with no supervision regarding who purchases th em. Thus, it is not surprising that a
survey conducted by the M assachusetts Attorney General's office found that minors
as young as 9 years old were able to purch ase lottery tickets on 80 per cent of their
attempts, and that 66 per cent of minors were able to place bets on keno games.
Seventy-five per cent of Massachusetts hi gh school seniors report having played the
lottery."
289
3.175 Antigua and Barbuda is not aware of any inves tigation that has found under age participation
in remote access gambling to be a significant probl em. The obvious reason for this is that remote
access gambling requires the use of financial instruments such as credit cards which are not generally
available to minors. Because of this significant prac tical hurdle, the legally sanctioned, cash intensive
forms of gambling available in the United States ar e a much more attractive option for the under age
gambler. The United States further argues that preventing under age use of remote access gambling is
not feasible, and asserts, in paragraph 3.25, th at "[C]hildren have ready access to payment
instruments, and no technology has yet been devel oped to enable constraints on Internet gambling
even approaching those that are possible in othe r settings where gambling can be confined and access
to it strictly controlled." It is difficult to see, how ever, how any age restriction system could be less
effective than the situation descr ibed in the paragraph from the NG ISC on under age lottery playing.
Particularly troublesome to Antigua and Barbuda in the face of the United States' allegations in
respect of minors' access to payment instruments and lack of control technology is the fact that the

288 Table 1 from I. Nelson Rose, "The United States: Minimum Legal Age to Place a Bet," Futures at
Stake: Youth, Gambling and Society, Howard J. Shaffer, ed., University of Nevada Press (2003).
289 NGISC Final Report, 18 June 1999, pp. 3-4.

United States has recently adopted legislation that aims to protect minors from harmful content on the
Internet by expressly providing that on-line merchants can be protected against claims of violations of
the legislation by using credit cards as an exclus ive means of payment in order to prevent access by
minors to harmful content such as pornography. 290 The United Kingdom also makes use of the fact
that payment systems such as credit cards are not available to minors to prevent under age use of
remote access gambling facilities.291
3.176 Regarding pathological gambling, Antigua notes that, in 2001, a group of seven eminent
experts in the psychology of gambling, including Dr. Howard Shaffer of Harvard University (who is
quoted by the United States) published a seminal editorial in the Journal of Gambling Studies . The
editorial was an appeal to the scientific community researching gambling behaviour to adopt a more
serious and "scientific" approach when making stat ements about the impact of gambling. In the
Article they stated that "[I]mmature fields lik e gambling studies also prov ide the opportunities for
quasi-scientists and even charlatans to influence the public, policy makers and perhaps themselves to
thinking that their "evidence" supports a particul ar treatment, causal relationship or public policy." 292
In this respect Antigua notes that the United States submits, in paragraph 3.18, that gambling websites
have been designed to resemble video games and ther efore are especially attractive to children. This
conclusion is based on a statement of the executive vice president of the National Football League
who, presumably, is a football expert, not a ps ychologist who studies gambling behaviour. In any
event none of the games offered from Antigua and Ba rbuda are designed to resemble video games in
order to attract children.
3.177 Antigua and Barbuda has extensively surveyed literature associated with problem gambling,
and has been unable to find any discernable body of scientific evidence to support the assertion of the
United States that remote access gambling is any more problematic than other forms of gambling
when it comes to compulsive, problem or other form s of pathological gambling. However, to better
substantiate its findings, Antigua and Barbuda engaged the services of internationally recognized
experts in the field of pathological gambling to advi se with respect to evidence of particular problems
associated with remote (and in particular, Internet ) gambling. These experts confirmed the results of
Antigua's own research, and in fact each has pointed out some areas in which Internet gambling may
present fewer risks associated with problem gambling than "brick and mortar" gambling.
293
3.178 Antigua submits that, concerning money la undering, the United States makes, in
paragraph 3.16, the unsubstantiated statement th at "[r]emote supply gambling businesses provide
criminals with an easy vehicle for money laundering (…)." It further submits that "[t]he industry is
far more cash-intensive than conventional forms of telephone or Internet commerce, yet it lies outside
the special regulatory and monitoring structures deve loped for financial services." And it concludes,
in paragraph 3.25, that "Antigua's attempts to regulate gambling and money laundering cannot address
basic concerns relating to remote supply of gamb ling." The alleged insufficiency of Antigua and
Barbuda's anti-money laundering measures is not explained further. The United States simply states it
to be so, and in so doing ignores the fact that in ternational bodies such as the Financial Action Task
Force (or "FATF") and the Caribbean Financial Acti on Task Force have recognized the effectiveness
of Antigua's anti-money laundering legislation. The United States even ignores the fact that it has
itself lifted a so-called "Financial Advisory" in relation to money launderi ng that it had imposed on

290 "The Child Online Protection Act", 47 United States Code Ann. §231.
291 United Kingdom Department for Culture, Media & Sport, The Future Regulation of Remote
Gambling: A DCMS Position Paper (April 2003), para. 43.
292 Howard J. Shaffer, Mark Dickerson; Jeffrey Derevensky, Kenneth Winters, Elizabeth George,
Marvin Karlins, Walter Bethune (eds.), Considering the Ethics of Public Claims: An Appeal for Scientific
Maturity, Journal of Gambling Studies, Vol. 17. No. 1 (2001), p. 1.
293 Prof. Mark Griffiths & Dr. Richard Wood, Is Internet Gambling More Addictive and/or Problematic
Than Other Forms of Gambling? , The International Gaming Research United, Division of Psychology,
Nottingham (UK), October 2003 (document submitted by Antigua to the Panel).

Antigua and Barbuda in 1999. This Financial A dvisory advised financial institutions to give
"enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions routed into or out of Antigua and Barbuda."
294 I n
2001, the United States considered this no longer necessary due to regulatory changes in Antigua and
Barbuda and lifted the Financial Advisory. In doing so, it made no exemption for gambling and
betting transactions. Furthermore, the United Stat es' explanation as to why remote supply gambling
businesses provide criminal enterprises with an easy vehicle for money laundering lacks credibility.
The United States seems to argue that money can be laundered by placing it in a gambling account,
losing a small amount of it and requesting repaym ent of the balance (which would apparently
somehow make the original source untraceable). Not only do Antigua's Gaming Regulations require
that winnings be paid back to the same bank acc ount or credit card from which the stake was paid,
they also prohibit funding accounts with cash. Furt her, the use of credit cards and other financial
instruments leaves a large and traceable electronic footprint.
3.179 Antigua notes that, in footnote 72, the United States also refers to money laundering methods
allegedly described in a report from the FATF. However, the examples in that FATF report do not
describe how Internet gambling can be used as a money laundering vehicle. The FATF report
submitted as evidence by the US does mention however , that "cash remains the major if not primary
form in which illegal funds are generated." 295 Furthermore, that report states that "traditional casino
gambling has been confirmed as being a well us ed channel for money laundering in some FATF
jurisdictions"296 and it mentions specific methods used in casinos in the United States involving safe
deposit boxes. Should there remain any furthe r doubt about the money laundering opportunities
presented by the cash-heavy United States gambli ng business versus the non-cash gambling industry
in Antigua and Barbuda, Antigua submits a copy of a recent press Article describing how a major Las
Vegas casino that has a representative in Tokyo ha d been facilitating the money laundering efforts of
a member of a Japanese organized crime syndicate. 297 The presence of cash transactions in a
gambling operation is key to its attractiveness fo r money laundering. And because remote access
gambling in Antigua makes no use of cash at all, it is simply not attractive for money laundering.
This is confirmed by the GAO which reported the following findings from its investigation on Internet
gambling:
"Banking and gaming regulatory officials did not view Internet gambling as being
particularly susceptible to money launde ring, especially when credit cards, which
create a transaction record and are subject to relatively low transaction limits, were
used for payment. Likewise, credit card and gaming industry officials did not believe
Internet gambling posed any particular risks in terms of money laundering. (…) In
general, gaming industry officials did not believe that Internet gambling was any
more or less susceptible to money laundering than other electronic commerce
businesses and noted that the financial i ndustry – which is responsible for the
payments system – is better suited to monito ring for related suspicious activity in the
area than the gaming industry itself."
298
3.180 Antigua notes that the United Kingdom, which has spent considerable time and effort
studying the feasibility of Internet gambling, also tak es the view that "there appears to be a paucity of
proof" that money laundering through Internet gambling sites is "a significant problem" and that "[i]t

294 United States Department of the Treasury – Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN
Advisory, Issue 11 (April 1999).
295 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering Typologies,
2000-2001 (1 February 2001), para. 39.
296 Ibid., para. 37.
297 "Las Vegas Casinos Named in Arrest – Money Laundering Involving Japan Loan Shark Alleged", in
reviewjournal.com (14 November 2003), at http://www.revie wjournal.com/lvrj_home/2003/Nov-14-Fri-
2003/news/22583394.html.
298 United States General Accounting Office, GAO Report, p. 37.

is safe to say that gambling transactions complete d online can be more secure than cash business
conducted in traditional gambling outlets."299
3.181 Concerning crime, fraud and consumer prot ection concerns, Antigua notes that, in
paragraph 3.15, the United States levels the allega tion that "[l]aw enforcement authorities in North
America have seen evidence that or ganized crime plays a growing part in remote supply of gambling,
including Internet gambling." In the same paragr aph, the United States quotes a government official
as saying that "[w]e have now seen evidence that orga nized crime is moving into Internet gambling."
However, in neither case does the United States bother to share any of this "evidence" with the Panel,
and characteristically its claims about organized crime involvement in Internet gambling are
completely unsubstantiated. The United States continues, in paragraph 3.17, to make unsubstantiated,
largely irrelevant statements about possible fraud ri sks that may be associated with the provision of
cross border gambling services. However, Antigua and Barbuda fails to see the relevance of
fraudulent lotteries in the context of this disput e, nor does it see any support for the United States'
claims that the "potential for fraud is heighten ed when gambling opportunities are supplied from
remote locations." Antigua notes in particular that, in the "Top 10 Consumer Fraud Complaints"
submitted as evidence by the United States (which is not specific to electronic commerce), the
category "Prizes, Sweepstakes & Lotteries" ranks seventh with four per cent of all complaints. This is
behind: Internet auctions at 13 per cent; Internet services and computer complaints at six per cent;
advance-fee loans and credit protection at five pe r cent; and shop-at-home and catalogue sales at four
per cent. Although Antigua questions the releva nce to this dispute of "prizes, sweepstakes and
lotteries," in the "Top 10 List" such activities are ranked just before: business opportunity and work-
at-home plans at three per cent; and telephone servi ces and health care at two per cent each. While
Antigua and Barbuda does not take law enforcement and health related issues lightly, the fact of the
matter is that these concerns are applicable to ga mbling and betting in genera l and indeed to a large
number of other economic activities, not simply to cross-border or "remote access" gambling and
betting. And, just as the United States has chosen to do, Antigua and Barbuda has determined that
these risks and concerns, to the extent present at all, can be acceptably minimised through effective
regulation.
3.182 The United States reiterates that Antigua has failed to prove the fundamental premises that
its services and service suppliers are "like" US services and service suppliers, and it has not shown
how specific US measures accord Antiguan services a nd service suppliers less favourable treatment.
The differences between the views of Antigua and the United States flow from a fundamental
difference in their respective understandings of the principle of national treatment. Antigua appears to
claim that a cross-border commitment for gambling services would mean that allowing any domestic
gambling opens the door to all forms of cross-borde r gambling, regardless of likeness of services or
service suppliers. If one applied this novel view of national treatment to the medical services example
above, it would mean that so long as certain domestic doctors are allowed to diagnose certain patients
under limited circumstances within a Member's territo ry, all cross-border doctors must be allowed to
diagnose all patients by telephone or Internet throug hout that Member's territory. The United States
takes a very different view. A cross-border commitment for national treatment entitles the provider of
another Member to offer services only to the extent that like domestic suppliers can offer the like
services. That simply means that where domestic doctors cannot diagnose patients over the telephone
or by other means of remote supply, neither can foreign doctors.
3.183 The United States submits that, after a cursory treatment of the issue of likeness of services
and service suppliers in its first submission, Antigua has more recently adopted the strategy of trying
to reverse its burden of proof by asserting that "t he United States has not submitted arguments or
evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the United States and Antiguan gambling and betting

299 United Kingdom Department for Culture, Media & Sport, The Future Regulation of Remote
Gambling: A DCMS Position Paper, April 2003, paras. 69-70.

services are 'unlike.'"
300 Antigua is again trying to ignore the complaining party's burden of proof in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Antigua is the party asserting a violation of Article XVII,
therefore Antigua alone bears the burden of provi ding evidence and argumentation proving likeness.
Past panel and Appellate Body reports provide little detailed discussion of the legal issues
surrounding likeness of services and suppliers, but the b asic framework for such an analysis is clear.
A panel assessing likeness must make a case- and fact-s pecific analysis of the particular services and
suppliers at issue. In doing so, the panel must examine the characteristics of the allegedly like
services and suppliers. These characteristics are not defined in the text of the GATS, and vary on a
case-by-case basis. To engage in this analysis, this Panel must first identify the services and suppliers
it is comparing. Antigua has described the typ es of services and suppliers it licenses as Internet
"virtual casinos" and Internet and telephone sports betting ("sports book") operators. 301 The Panel's
task therefore appears to be to determine whether Antigua has in the first instance established that its
Internet "virtual casino" services and suppliers are "like" US non-remote gambling services and
suppliers, and whether Antigua's Internet and tele phone sports book services and suppliers are "like"
sports book services and suppliers in the State of Nevada (the only part of the United States where
such services are allowed).
3.184 The United States disagrees with Antigua's suggestions that the Panel must examine
characteristics that relate to the "end use" of a servi ce or "consumer tastes a nd preferences" regarding
that service, including consumer preferences and th e "physical" characteristics of the service.
Contrary to Antigua's argument, these are by no means the only factors to consider in a GATS
likeness analysis. As discussed belo w, likeness in the context of this particular dispute depends more
heavily on the regulatory characteristics of services and suppliers. Assuming arguendo that consumer
perceptions nonetheless play a role in a GATS likeness analysis, a full analysis of the characteristics
relevant in shaping consumer perceptions wei ghs strongly against a finding of likeness between
virtual and real gambling.
3.185 The United States submits that remote gambli ng has different consumers. Antigua's own
evidence shows that Internet gambling services have different customer bases than other gambling
services, as reflected by Bear Stearns' conclusion that "Internet gamers are generally not the same
customer as land-based gamers."
302 Indeed, Internet gambling site s tend to attract gamblers who do
not consume other forms of gambling, partly by virtue of the ability to indulge in gambling in
seclusion without the stigma or effort requi red to go to a public gambling facility. 303 Most telling of
all is the fact that Antigua's ow n consultants unequivocally state that Internet gamblers are different
from other gamblers in terms of "financial stabili ty, motivation, physiological effects, need for
acknowledgement, and social facilitation." 304 Besides, Antigua itself concedes that a virtual casino is

300 See above para. 3.165. Antigua's comments on the issue of likeness consisted of an attack on what it
described as "claims" by the United States regarding the absence of likeness. See above paras. 3.158 and 3.160.
Needless to say, the only "claims" at issue regarding likeness in this dispute are the unsubstantiated claims made
by Antigua.
301 The United States notes that Antigua seems to take issue with this characterization, but has offered
no alternative description of its services and suppliers fo r purposes of a "likeness" analysis. Antigua clearly
stated that it offers an interactive gaming license, which is "for casino-type, random selection and card games" –
also described by Antigua as "virtual casinos" – supplied by Internet; and an interactive wagering license, which
is "for sports betting" supplied by Internet or telephone. See above para. 3.2. These services and their operators
are the relevant Antiguan services and suppliers for purposes of a likeness analysis.
302 Bear Stearns, E-Gaming: A Giant Beyond Our Borders , p. 55 (September 2002). This assessment
plainly contradicts the four anecdotal statements relied on by Antigua (see above footnote 271 and para. 3.166)
for the proposition that its services are "virtually the same" as services offered in the United States.
303 American Psychiatric Association, APA Advisory on Internet Gambling (16 January 2001), p. 1
(discussing solitary nature of Internet gambling).
304 Prof. Mark Griffiths & Dr. Richard Wood, Is Internet Gambling More Addictive and/or Problematic
Than Other Forms of Gambling? , The International Gaming Research United, Division of Psychology,
Nottingham (UK), October 2003 (document submitted by Antigua to the Panel), pp. 5-6.

a mere imitation of a real casino. 305 The games operate differently; while designed to resemble real
casino games, virtual games actually consis t of betting on software algorithms. 306 Antigua's own
evidence shows that the environments virtual casi no services operate are completely different from
those of real casinos. 307 As to other forms of remotely supplied gambling, Antigua still has not
attempted to offer specific proof of likeness. The United States reiterates that particular forms of
gambling have operational and supplier characteristics that sharply distinguish them from other forms
of gambling. The two most clear-cut examples ar e lotteries and pari-mutuel wagering, which differ
from other forms of gambling both in terms of their operation (for example, by a common pool in the
case of pari-mutuel betting) and their suppliers.
3.186 The United States argues that in assessing "end use" or "consumer tastes and preferences," as
Antigua urges, the Panel should begin from the premise repeatedly asserted by Antigua – that
gambling is a recreational service. Assuming that to be the case for purposes of argument
308, the "end
use" of a gambling service would be to provide recreation. The characteristics shaping consumer
perceptions of gambling services would therefore be primarily those characteristics that influence the
recreational value of gambling activity. Antigua's "end-use" and "consumer perception" arguments
thus require the Panel to determine whether the r ecreational experience provided by a virtual casino is
similar enough to that of a real casino to make them "like services." The United States submits that it
is not. No one would dispute that, in terms of the consumer's experience, services providing graphical
"virtual reality" simulations that mimic such r ecreational activities as horseback riding, participation
in sports, etc., are unlike actual participation in those activities. In the context of recreational services,
where the consumer's purpose is to purchase the recreational experience itself, the qualitative
difference between the consumer's experience in a real setting as compared to a virtual setting
assumes vastly greater importance than such a distinction might have in the context of other services.
3.187 The United States has already shown that real casinos offer a vastly different consumer
experience than virtual casinos, and that the virtual games do not involve the use of traditional gaming
paraphernalia.
309 This evidence demonstrates that the sensations and environmental attributes likely
to shape consumer perceptions of recreational value of an Internet virtual casino are no more "like"
those of a real casino than the attributes of partic ipation in a football video game are like those of
participation in a real football game. And the fact ors that shape the recreational value of a virtual
casino are worlds apart from the characteristics of a real casino. Antigua's own consultants,
Prof. Griffiths and Dr. Wood, appear to agree. Th ey cite a litany of differences that distinguish the

305 Antigua states that a virtual casino "is designed to mimic land-based casino settings" and provides
"virtual imitations of video poker terminals, slot machines and other gambling machines."
306 Given the differences between goods and services, it may be more accurate to refer not only to
"physical" characteristics, but also to "operational" or "functional" aspects of the service. Antigua dismisses the
these issues as "superficial." Such characteristics can not be dismissed as irrelevant, especially not in the
gambling context, where they determine c onsumer's chances of win or loss (i.e. , the "price" of the gambling
service).
307 The United States notes that Antigua attempts to respond to this point by simply claiming that a
person sitting at a real slot machine is having the sa me experience as a person playing a virtual slot machine
from a home, school, etc. As discussed below, Antigua's own evidence confirms that the consumer perception
of the virtual setting differs greatly from the real setting.
308 The United States reiterates that it is only assuming arguendo the existence of a commitment for
such services for purposes of explaining the failure of Antigua's argument. As discussed above, gambling
services are not "other recreationa l services (except sporting)" within the meaning of the US specific
commitments.
309 See above para. 3.155. Antigua tries to dismiss some of these differences as mere "marketing
techniques" that have no impact on consumer perceptio ns, but overlooks the fact that the entire point of a
"marketing technique" is to influence consumer perceptions. Moreover, Antigua's assertion is further
contradicted by its submission of a report stating that consumers in the U.S. perceive gambling as a diversion
rather than a daily activity. See Bear Stearns, E-Gaming: A Giant Beyond Our Borders , (September 2002),
p. 45. If true, that would suggest that the qualitative difference in consumer experience between virtual and real
casinos is especially pertinent to US consumers.

allegedly recreational experience of Internet ga mbling from that of traditional gambling. For
example, they observe that: (i) "the 'physical' transaction of collecting winnings ... can be highly
rewarding" – and lack of this sensation creates a "barrier" between traditional gamblers and gambling
on the Internet;
310 (ii) "Internet and traditional gamblers appeared to be different in terms of
motivation to gamble. Traditional gamblers gambled for more expressive and affective reasons than
Internet gamblers. Traditional gamblers enjoyed gambling as a means of escape. The 'real' gambling
environment was more conducive to satisfying th ese needs than Internet gambling in the home"; 311
"[T]raditional gamblers reported gr eater physiological effects (e.g. , increased heart rate) when
gambling compared to Internet gamblers. For instan ce, traditional gamblers reported more feelings of
nausea, dizziness and stomach contractions after experiencing a sizeable loss"; 312 "Internet gambling
sites may not satisfy a deeper psychological need – the need for self-esteem. Typically, gambling
establishments have always operated in a social environment. An important aspect of such an
environment has been the level of social reinforcem ent that exists. ... At first sight, it would appear
that social reinforcement is unavailable in Internet gambling, i.e. , if you win on an Internet gambling
site, who is there to witness it?" 313 All of these observations go directly to the issue of consumer
perception. They confirm that consumer per ceptions of Internet gambling are nothing like
perceptions of real gambling. Antigua's comparis on between Internet gambling and Internet sale of
music, or sale of goods (books, wine, etc.) reinforces the foregoing point. In Antigua's examples, the
consumer's end objective in using a particular service is to transact for the attainment of something –
be it a song, a bottle of wine, etc. – that is identical or nearly identical to the product or service one
could get by going to a physical facility. In such a case, whether the shopping is done in a real or a
virtual environment may be immaterial to the liken ess of the service supplied. In a case where the
consumer is buying the experience of engaging in recreation, however, one must recognize that
consumers will inevitably perceive the simulation of a recreational activity in a virtual environment as
vastly different from actually experiencing such activity in the real world.
3.188 The United States disagrees with Antigua's asser tion that the regulatory and law enforcement
risks inherent in a service are relevant to "liken ess" only insofar as they shape consumer perceptions
and competitive relationships in the marketplace for services.
314 The United States also disagrees with
Antigua's denial that virtual casinos or other form s of gambling by remote supply involve different
regulatory and law enforcement risks than real casinos . Regulatory distinctions are directly relevant
under GATS Article XVII, and should be considered in their own right – not solely through the lens
of consumer perceptions. The GATS explicitly reco gnizes in its preamble the "right of Members to
regulate" services. The "like services and supplie rs" language of Article XVII must therefore be
interpreted in light of that object and purpose of the GATS. Thus one must consider not only the
different competitive characteristics of a service or supplier as such, but also the existence of
regulatory distinctions between services in in terpreting and applying the likeness analysis under
Article XVII. Such issues have sometimes been addressed in the goods context under the rubric of
consumer perceptions and their im pact on competitive relationships
315, but they merit independent
consideration in the context of the GATS. They assu me particular importance in this dispute because
gambling is so heavily regulated. As previously discussed, the United States maintains and applies a

310 Prof. Mark Griffiths & Dr. Richard Wood, Is Internet Gambling More Addictive and/or Problematic
Than Other Forms of Gambling? , The International Gaming Research United, Division of Psychology,
Nottingham (UK), October 2003 (document submitted by Antigua to the Panel), p. 5.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
314 See above para. 3.163, where Antigua also quotes the Appellate Body's statement in EC–Asbestos
that "[U]nder Article III:4, evidence relating to health risks may be relevant in assessing the competitive
relationship in the marketplace between allegedly 'like' products." In the servic es context, regulatory
distinctions between services and suppliers have a significant impact on the "competitive relationship in the
marketplace" between those services and suppliers, and could therefore be considered under that analysis.
315 For example, the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos considered health dang ers in the context of
consumer perceptions. See Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para. 113.

regulatory distinction between remotely supplied gambling services and other gambling services, with
the former subject to even tighter restrictions than the latter. This distinction arises from the
numerous distinguishing law enforcement, consumer protection, and health concerns associated with
the remote supply of gambling.
3.189 The United States has provided evidence showi ng that US law enforcement authorities have
seen organized crime playing a growing role in Internet gambling. 316 Antigua claims that any such
concerns are indistinguishable from existing concer ns about organized crim e involvement in other
forms of gambling. The comments of a Canadian law enforcement official show why Antigua is
incorrect, and confirm the views of US law enforcem ent. According to a Detective Inspector of the
Ontario Illegal Gaming Enforcement Unit:
"Internet Gambling provides organized criminals with everything they could ever
want from a criminal enterprise: anonymity, large amounts of cash, the ability to
control the odds, very little chance of ge tting caught, and power. Criminals gravitate
towards money and the more fast-moving the money is, the more appealing it is."
317
3.190 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FB I") Racketeering Records and Analysis Unit
provided the following assessment to Congress in 1999:
"Organized crime ['OC'] groups are heavily involved in offshore gambling. OC
involvement is in four different areas. (1) Using offshore sports books as layoff
sources for US based bookmaking operati ons, (2) Extending credit to finance
offshore gambling operations, (3) Se tting up offshore gambling operations
temporarily for the purpose of ripping off customers, (4) Setting up offshore
gambling operations as a permanent means of income for the organization."
318
3.191 Looking ahead, the FBI stated that "[O]ffshore gambling will become increasingly popular as
it is legalized and accepted in more nations thr oughout the world. Despite it's appearance of
legitimacy, organized crime has already infiltrated the industry". 319 As the foregoing comments
suggest, while the tentacles of organized crime clearly reach many forms of gambling, remotely
supplied gambling, and Internet gambling in part icular, raises uniquely grave concerns. These
include, inter alia, the enticing new opportunities for organized crime presented by the amount of
money and manipulability inherent in Internet gamb ling; the opportunity to use gambling by remote
means of supply as a clearinghouse through which or ganized crime bookmakers in the United States

316 The United States notes that by asserting that US claims about th e involvement of organized crime
in Internet gambling are "unsubstantiated," Antigua is apparently choosing simply to disbelieve the official
statements of US and Canadian authorities on this issue cited in para. 3.15 above. Nonetheless, these statements
are clear. Moreover, at a Congressional hearing on 3 October 2001, Dennis M. Lormel, who was then chief of
the Financial Crimes Section at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had the following discussion with a US
legislator:
Rep. Oxley: I won't ask you to discuss specifics, but is the Bureau pursuing any cases that involve a
linkage between Internet gambling and money laundering?
Mr. Lormel: Yes, sir. There are a minimum of two pending investigations, as we speak, that I'm aware
of. It's more in keeping with our organized-crime site [s ic] of the house, which is not my area of expertise. But
I am -- from my prior assignment in Pittsburgh, I'm aware of a case that we actually worked in our shop out
there.
Rep. Oxley: And are you pursuing any cases linking organized crime to Internet gambling?
Mr. Lormel: I believe so, sir, yes.
Dismantling the Financial Infrastructure of Glob al Terrorism: Hearing Before House Committee on
Financial Services, 107th Cong., p. 42 (2001).
317 L.D. Moodie, Detective Inspector, Ontario Illegal Gaming Enforcement Unit, Gambling Law
Enforcement Systems Issues Conference (8 March 2002), p.18.
318 Federal Bureau of Investigation, RRAU Analysis of Offshore Gambling (1999), p. 1.
319 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

can "lay off" their bets;
320 and the opportunity for organized criminals to more easily hide their
involvement in gambling and evade law enforcemen t by operating beyond the intense scrutiny of
regulators and law enforcement officials in the gambler's jurisdiction.321
3.192 The United States argues that Antigua asserts that it has enacted laws to deal with money
laundering, but whatever the impact of Antigua's legislation, it is not relevant to the issue of the
concerns regarding the susceptibility of remote supply of gambling to money laundering in the United
States. Moreover, a September 2003 report by the US Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
disagrees with Antigua's assertions. The DEA report concludes that "Internet gambling in Antigua
and Barbuda is sometimes used for money laundering."
322 It also states that Internet gambling in three
other Caribbean countries raises money laundering concerns. 323 Similarly, a US State Department
report, while praising changes in Antigua's statut es, nonetheless concluded that Antigua "remains
susceptible to money laundering because of its loosel y regulated offshore financial sectors and its
Internet gaming industry."324 Antigua denies that the potential for fraud is heightened when gambling
is supplied from remote locations, and again asserts that there are no special concerns regarding
fraudulent Internet gambling. It is true that many forms of gambling involve a high potential
vulnerability to fraud and other crimes; that is a major reason why gambling services require the
utmost regulatory scrutiny. But here again Antigua disregards the even greater threat when fraudulent
gambling services operate far away from their victim s, through anonymous media, and in some cases
subject to at best uncertain law enforcement scrutiny. It also disregards the inherent manipulability of
Internet gambling. The NGISC found that "the global dispersion of Internet gambling operations
makes the vigilant regulation of the algorith ms of Internet games nearly impossible." 325 Antigua goes
to great lengths to try to show that Internet ga mbling is no more addictive than other forms of
gambling. Yet ultimately it only proves the obvious proposition that the precise mechanics of
gambling addiction is a novel issue on which not al l authorities agree. The United States has already
demonstrated that the respected American Psychiatric Association views Internet gambling as posing
a special health threat, and other evidence corroborates that threat.
326 Whether the health threat comes

320 See, e.g. , Press Release, dated 4 June 2002, 17 Members and Associates of the Gambino Crime
Family Indicted for Corruption on the New York Waterf ront, United States Attorney 's Office for the Eastern
District of New York ("The defenda nts allegedly used off-shore wire-r ooms in Costa Rica to place tens of
thousands of dollars in sports bets per week for approximately 30 bettors.").
321 The United States notes that the latter concern was a major factor in the adoption of restrictions on
the remote supply of gambling in the early 1960s. At the time, long before the Internet exacerbated the
problem, US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy alre ady testified that "our information reveals numerous
instances where the prime mover in a gambling or other illegal enterprise operates by remote control from the
safety of another State – sometimes half a continent aw ay." Testimony of Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime
and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., (1961), p. 4.
322 Drug Enforcement Administration, The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment ,
(September 2003), DEA-03014, p. 3. See also See Bear Stearns, E-Gaming: A Giant Beyond Our Borders ,
(September 2002), p. 40, (discussing Antigua and five other jurisdictions, and concluding that "although these
major markets provide for some of the most lucrative and popular gaming sites on the Internet, they also provide
for the least amount of public informati on. . . . In our view, this lack of access to information increases the risk
profile of the region tremendously.").
323 Ibid., pp. 12, 19, and 31.
324 US State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes (March 2003), p. XII-87, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18171.pdf.
325 NGISC Final Report, pp. 5-6. Putting the point more bluntly, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary stated that the Committee agreed with one of the NGISC commissioners, who stated that "anyone who
gambles over the Internet is making a sucker bet" Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act and the
Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Commission Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, 108 th Congress 10 (2003) (statement of
John G. Malcom) , p. 6.
326 For example, the American Psyc hiatric Association states that "Internet gambling, unlike many
other types of gambling activity, is a solitary activity, which makes it even more dangerous: people can gamble

from the nature of Internet play itself or simply from the added population of potential victims –
including youth – reached by a medium as pervasiv e as the Internet is an interesting question for
scientific debate, but it is not releva nt to this dispute. Even if ( quod non) Internet gambling is only
equally addictive, or only half as addictive, ope ning the floodgates to legalized remote supply of
gambling services into homes, schools, offices, etc., w ould clearly involve an enormous growth in the
opportunity for gambling and, consequently, for gambling addiction.
327
3.193 According to the United States, Antigua admits that the United States imposes age restrictions
on non-remote gambling, but argues that Internet gambling poses no greater risk of child and youth
gambling. Antigua specifically denies that any of the remotely supplied gambling games offered from
Antigua are designed to resemble video games or be attractive to children. The United States attached
to its second submission images of a few of the numerous child-oriented games offered on gambling
websites licensed by the Antiguan government. The video game presentation, cartoon-like design,
and childish iconography of such games such as "Hau nted House," "Rock'n Roller," "Dinosaur Slots,"
"Alien Alert," "Goblins Cave," and "Ocean Princess" speak for themselves.
328 Antigua also argues
that minors lack access to credit cards and other payment instruments. The testimony of a senior
executive of Visa (which describes itself as the world's largest consumer payment system) 329 before
the US Commission on Online Protection refutes Antigua's assertion in the clearest possible terms.
After observing that the Child Online Protection Ac t "basically assumes that only adults have access
to a credit card or a debit card," the Visa executive testified:
"To the contrary, it is important for the Commission to understand that this
assumption simply is not correct. Access to a credit card or a debit card is not a good
proxy for age. The mere fact that a person uses a credit card or a debit card in
connection with a transaction does not mean that this person is an adult.
Many individuals under the age of 17 have legitimate access to, and regular use of,
credit cards and debit cards. For example, parents may designate their child as an
'authorized user' of the parent's credit car d or debit card. This actually is quite
common, particularly for credit cards. Wh enever this occurs, the child will have
access to the parent's credit card number or debit card number and can use that card
number to access materials deemed 'harmful to minors' on the Internet.
In addition, many children under the ag e of 17 have their own deposit accounts and
may have access to a debit card that accesses such account. [...]

uninterrupted and undetected for unlimited periods of time." American Psychiatric Association, APA Advisory
on Internet Gambling (16 January 2001), p.1.
327 The United States notes that one of Antigua's own consultants has stated that "[r]esearch has
consistently shown a positive relationship between the av ailability of gambling and both regular and problem
gambling." See Mark Griffiths and Paul Delfabbro, The Biopsychosocial Approach to Gambling: Contextual
Factors in Research and Clinical Interventions, eGamb ling: The Electronic Journal of Gambling Issues, issue 5
(2001), available at http://www.camh.net/egambling/archive/pdf/EJGI-issue5/EJGI-issue5-complete.pdf. See
also NGISC Final Report, pp. 4-19 (stating that "[a]s the opportunities for gambling become more
commonplace, it appears likely that th e number of people who will deve lop gambling problems also will
increase.").
328 In addition, the American Psychiatric Association st ates that "[o]ne significant hazard is that many
online games sites – which target children and teens – have direct links to gambling sites. Many of these sites
offer "freebies" and other supposed discounts to get young people started." American Psychiatric Association,
APA Advisory on Internet Gambling (16 January 2001), p. 2.
329 Visa describes itself as "the world's leading payment brand and largest consumer payment system,"
with more than 396 million cards issued through U.S. financial institutions. See
http://usa.visa.com/personal/newsroom/?it=ss_/index.html.

Thus, although the [Child Online Protectio n] Act assumes that only adults have
access to a credit card or a debit card, it is important for the Commission to
understand that this assumption is simply not true. As a result, the Commission may
want to focus its attention on more suitable methods of verifying age."
330
3.194 The same Visa executive also noted the dange r of unauthorized use of credit cards by
minors.331 In addition, a 1999 survey conducted in the United States found that 28 per cent of
respondents between the ages of 16 and 22 had at least one major credit card, including seven per cent
of the younger high school students (age 16 to 18). 332 Since 1999, efforts to market credit cards to
Americans under the age of 18 have only expanded. 333 Thus Antigua's assertion that "payment
systems such as credit cards are not available to minors" is wrong; minors do have ever-increasing
access to such instruments, therefore the anonym ity of Internet gambling does in fact create a
significant opportunity for under age gambling as compared to other forms of gambling that can be
controlled through in-person supervision.
3.195 Whether the foregoing law enforcement, health, and consumer protection concerns are viewed
separately or together, it is clear that significantly different regulatory issues arise in connection with
the remote supply of gambling by virtue of the fact that it is supplied remotely. The United States
does not assert that such concerns would always est ablish a regulatory distin ction between remotely
supplied services and non-remote services. Likeness is a case-by-case analysis. Gambling is a special
case because it is a service that is "the target of special scrutiny by governments in every jurisdiction
where it exists."
334 Remote supply of gambling poses a far greater danger of eluding that scrutiny,
causing the various problems described above and therefore requiring a regulatory distinction between
remote supply and other forms of supply.
3.196 The United States submits that to the extent that international classifications bear on the issue
of likeness, the explanatory notes to recent servi ces classifications support the finding of a "likeness"
distinction between remote supply of gambling and ot her forms of gambling. For example, the most
recent version of the CPC, version 1.1, identifies four distinct components of CPC subclass 96920,
"Gambling and betting services." They are (1) "organisation and selling services of lotteries, lottos,
off track betting," (2) "casino and gambling hou se services," (3) "gambling slot-machine services,"
and (4) "on-line gambling" (emphasis added). 335 Antigua asserts that W/120 and the CPC both
provide a single category for gambling services. Of course, this is incorrect with respect to the W/120
categories, which do not mention gambling services. With respect to the CPC, it is hardly surprising
the provisional document referenced in the GA TS negotiating history, unlike its more recent
successor, did not address the new phenomenon of on-line gambling. These sources should not play a
significant role in any likeness analysis that the Panel might undertake in this particular dispute.
3.197 Antigua submits that the United States uses much of its Article XVII discussion not only to
develop its "remote" gambling theory but also to lay out its claims concerning "law enforcement and

330 Testimony of Mark MacCarthy, Senior Vice Presid ent for Public Policy, Visa U.S.A., Before the
Commission on Online Protection (9 June 2000), pp. 3-4.
331 Ibid., p.3.
332 American Savings Education Council, 1999 Youth and Money Survey, available at
http://www.asec.org/youthsurvey.pdf, pp. 4, 11.
333 Amit Asaravala, Why Onlin e Age Checks Don't Work, Wired News (10 October 2002). ("Since
[1999], credit card companies have been making it even easier for minors to get cards in their names.").
334 NGISC Final Report, p. 3-1.
335 Central Product Classification Version 1.1, ST/E SA/STAT/SER.M/77/Ver.1.1, E.03.XVII.3, code
96920. See also International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities,
ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/4/Rev.3.1, E.03.XVII.4, code 9249, (with explanatory note breaking down "gambling
and betting activities" into five distinct categories, cons isting of (1) "sale of lottery tickets," (2) "operation
(exploitation) of coin operated gambling machines," (3) "operation (exploitation) of coin operated games," (4)
"operation of gambling cruises," and (5) "operation of virtual gambling websites" (emphasis added)).

health considerations." The United States uses both of these concepts to allege that Antiguan
gambling and betting services and service suppliers are not "like" gambling and betting services and
service suppliers domiciled in the United States. Antigua stresses it does not believe there is any
meaningful category of "remote" gambling for the purposes of this dispute. Antiguan services are
necessarily "remote" because they are furnished cros s-border, but this does not change their character
as fundamentally gambling and betting services. The United States complaint that Antigua wishes to
reverse the "burden of proof" on the issue of likeness is another misstatement. Antigua has
demonstrated with considerable evidence and le gal discussion that its gambling and betting services
are "like" those in the United States for purposes of Article XVII – and that the United States has
failed utterly to establish the contrary.
3.198 According to Antigua, the US argument that Antiguan so-called "remote" gambling services
do not compete with the gambling services offered domestically by United States operators because
"remote gambling has different consumers" is based on a statement in the Bear Stearns' report that
"Internet gamers are generally not the same customer as land-based gamers."
336 But this obviously
does not mean that "Internet based" and "land-b ased" gambling and betting services do not compete.
It simply means that, in Bear Stearn's view, gamblers choose their preferred distribution channel. For
example, most consumers who buy music over the Inte rnet will normally reduce or stop their visits to
"brick and mortar" music shops. But, of course, there is competition between the two distribution
channels because consumers switch from one to the other – just like a gambler can switch from one
land based casino to another. The United States also refers to the statements in the expert report of
Professor Griffiths and Dr. Wood that Internet gambling could involve a smaller risk of excessive
gambling or "gambling addiction" than the more tr aditional forms of gambling available in the United
States.337 To the extent that regulatory concerns can pl ay a role in the context of Article XVII at all
(which Antigua and the EC both discount), Antigua re peats that not every difference in public interest
concerns raised by domestic and foreign services is capable of justifying radically different treatment.
Certainly the prohibition of a less harmful foreign service cannot be justified by the argument that it is
not "like" a more harmful domestic service that is allowed.
3.199 With regard to the claim that cross-border gambling offers a "mere imitation" of a casino,
Antigua submits, first, that casino "imitations" form only part of the Antiguan product offerings.
Second, and more importantly, Antigua strongly di sagree that various product offerings can be
meaningfully distinguished on what are really s uperficial comparisons between how they look, how
they sound or whether their components clink abou t mechanically or connect electronically. The
mistake the United States makes in trying to compare cross-border gambling and domestic gambling
with physical activities such as "virtual reality" horse riding and actual horse riding is this – it is the
recreational activity of gambling – the experience of winning or losing – that is fundamentally being
engaged in, not the flipping of cards or the watc hing of a screen. The flipping of cards and the
watching of a screen are merely the methods thro ugh which the same recreational experience is
delivered. This is precisely why the United States ' prohibition focuses on the wagering of money. A
US exhibit to the Panel provides examples of statut ory provisions articulating state gambling policies.
The statute cited for Louisiana says "[G]ambling h as long been recognized as a crime in the state of
Louisiana and despite the enactment of many legalized gaming activities remains a crime. Gambling
which occurs via the Internet embodies the very activit y that the legislature seeks to prevent". In this
connection, it is important to keep in mind that, as Dr. Howard J. Shaffer of Harvard University has
stated in his expert's report that Antigua has submitted to the Panel, in essence, all gambling is
experienced "locally" by the individual gambler himself
338, irrespective of whether the source of the
gambling is a slot machine in a casino, a scratch ticket that the gambler scratches at home or an
Antiguan operator who communicates via the Internet.

336 See above para. 3.185.
337 See above paras. 3.185 and 3.187.
338 Howard J. Shaffer, Internet Gambling & Addiction , Harvard Medical School, Division on
Addictions (16 January 2004), p. 8.

3.200 Antigua notes it is possible to engage in the dubious activity of comparing gambling
offerings. For instance, Antigua provided the Pa nel with examples of scratch cards with a casino
theme marketed by United States lotteries. These are also "mere imitations" of a casino and cannot be
distinguished on that basis from Antiguan services. Casino games and their "imitators" all operate on
the basis of the same simple premise – random selecti on. The fact that random selection is performed
by a software algorithm does not make a random se lection game "unlike" a random selection game
using another selection method. Furthermore random selection by software algorithms is used on a
grand scale in state-sanctioned gambling in the United States and consequently cannot be the basis of
a distinction between random selection games of Antiguan and United States origin.
339 Alleged
"operating differences" are in any event irrelevant for the betting on sports and other future events and
for card games where players play against each other via Internet connections rather than whilst all
sitting together in the same room (both major components of the Antiguan gambling industry).
Further, these alleged differences cannot distinguish Antiguan cross-border gambling services from
non-casino gambling that is legally and prolifically o ffered in the United States such as lotteries, the
electronic gambling devices (or "EGDs") that are available in thousands of American pubs, bars, truck
stops and convenience stores, or the "remote acce ss" gambling that is offered by United States
operators.
3.201 Antigua maintains that the regulatory issues ar e not relevant for the assessment of likeness
under Article XVII. Further, the United States is bei ng disingenuous when it claims to "regulate" so-
called "remote" gambling differently than "other gambling services." What the United States in fact
does is prohibit cross-border gambling from other WTO Members, tolerate extensive domestic inter-
state gambling and regulate at state level the rest of the massive domestic gambling market (whether
"remote" or "non-remote"). The United States also continues to make its vague and unsubstantiated
allegations that "remote gambling" poses a greater organized crime threat. The United States says in
its second submission that "Antigua is apparently choosing simply to disbelieve the official statements
of U.S. and Canadian authorities on this issue (...)." That is absolutely correct, at least in so far as
such statements are intended to apply to the cross- border gambling industry in Antigua. Further, the
United States does not explain exactly what constitutes "organized crime" but in most of the materials
submitted by the United States, the crime at issue ap pears to be the gambling itself – and, of course,
this makes the United States' argument circular: the gambling is organized crime because the United
States declares it illegal.
3.202 Antigua agrees with the United States that it is more difficult to police an activity that is
partially taking place abroad. Howeve r, this applies to all cross-border economic activity and trade.
Furthermore organized crime syndicates can and do abu se many areas of international trade to further
their criminal objectives.
340 The answer to this threat is not a blanket prohibition of international trade
but international cooperation. Despite the cynical statement that "Internet gambling in Antigua and
Barbuda is sometimes used for money laundering,"341 the United States does not cite even one specific

339 See articles describing the use of computerized dr awings and games by United States lotteries in
"the Minnesota Lottery's New Digital Draw Show Debut," www.telecomgamefactory.com, (5 March 2003),
"The Lottery Draw," Public Gaming International, (March 2003), and Patricia McQueen, "Lottery, Department
of Revenue - Summary. See also Matt Connor, "Game Trends", International Gaming & Wagering Business
(January 2004), p. 28: "With a majority of the slots currently in use in U.S. casinos being the video variety
(…)".
340 The report referred to by the United States in above footnote 324. The report describes how
"international trade", as such, is abused fo r criminal purposes (U .S. State Department, International Narcotics
control Strategy Report: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes (March 2003) p. XII-27). See also United
States Drug Enforcement Agen cy, Department of Justice, Drug Intelligence Brief: Money Laundering in
Canada (August 2003), p. 6 (www.usdoj.gov/deal/pubs/intel/03034/03034.pdf) (concluding that as of
August 2003 organized crime syndicates in the United States and Canada uses Canadian jewelry stores, travel
agencies, video rental stores, courie r services, land-based casinos and international computer networks to
launder illicitly obtained proceeds).
341 See above para. 3.192.

example of money laundering via Antiguan gambling opera tors. Further, as of this day, the Antiguan
authorities have received no communication whatsoever from the United States – much less any
requests for judicial cooperation – concerning mone y laundering via Antigua' s gambling industry.
Yet, Antigua has received numerous other requests or enquiries from the United States about other
instances of financial crime under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty which exists between Antigua
and the United States and which the United States acknowledges operates successfully. If the United
States has any information about infiltration of organized crime syndicates in the Antiguan gaming
industry or the use of our industry for money la undering purposes, the United States would have
communicated this information to Antigua to ensure appropriate action by both our authorities and
theirs. Antigua has since 1999 handled more than 30 formal requests for information from the United
States under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty yet not one of these requests involved criminal conduct
related to Antigua's gaming industry. Antigua is and has always been willin g to cooperate with the
United States to combat crime. For instance, the Office of National Drug and Money Laundering
Control Policy (the "ONDCP") routinely cooperates with the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration or ("DEA") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). In fact, DEA and FBI
agents often operate in unison with the ONDCP agents.
3.203 Antigua notes that the United States tries to s ubstantiate its allegation concerning organized
crime by referring to a statement from the investment bank Bear Stearns
342, which bases its view on
the fact that little public information is availabl e about Antiguan operators. However, if Antiguan
operators were able to operate lawf ully and if they were confident that the information would not be
used by the United States to prejudice their pos ition, more information would be made publicly
available to the Americans. It was not so long ago that the Directorate of Offshore Gaming would
routinely contact the United States government for background informati on on American citizens
applying for gaming licenses in Antigua. Also, in 1997 the then-director of Offshore Gaming
travelled to the United States expressly to meet with United States officials to discuss the Antiguan
gambling and betting industry and any concerns that the United States might have with respect to the
industry. A copy of her report to the Prime Mini ster on these meetings is submitted to the Panel as
exhibits. On the topic of consumer fraud, the United States has not provided even one example
involving Antigua but only makes general statements about Internet gambling, irrespective of source.
The United States asserts the compelling need for regulation and appears to suggest that other
countries, and in particular countries such as Antigua , can never be capable of regulating a service as
well as a developed economy like the United States. Of course, it can never be sufficient for a WTO
Member to make such a general, unsubstantiated st atement – in its own terms a "mere assertion" – to
escape its obligations under the GATS. Any other po sition would turn the GATS into an agreement
that only works in one way: export from developed countries to developing countries.
3.204 Antigua considers that the real answer to an y actual concerns the United States may have
regarding the abuse of cross-border trade for m oney laundering, consumer deception, fraud or other
criminal activities is international cooperation. 343 The Panel should also note that there is clear
evidence of involvement of organized crime, m oney laundering and consumer fraud in the United
States' own gambling industry. 344 Yet the United States does not prohibit this domestic gambling.
Much effort has been expended by the United States to convince the Panel that cross-border gambling
and betting presents unique health risks to American citizens, although the United States appears to
come around to the point of view that "the precise mechanics of gambling addiction is a novel issue

342 See below para. 3.280.
343 A view shared by the United States' Federal Trade Commission, see "FTC Chairman Muris presents
the FTC's New Five-Point Plan for attacking cross-bo rder fraud and highlights links between competition and
consumer protection", Federal Trade Commission (31 October 2002).
344 See document entitled "Organized Crime in the United States Gambling Industry", Document
entitled "Money Laundering in the United States Gambli ng Industry", and document entitled "Fraud within the
United States Gambling Industry".

on which not all authorities agree."
345 Antigua responds that a "novel issue on which not all
authorities agree" per se is an insufficient basis on which to distinguish between services under the
GATS.
3.205 Antigua submits that on the substance of the Un ited States claim, the very short opinion from
the American Psychiatric Association 346 cited by the United States is based on studies prepared by
Professor Griffiths and Dr. Wood and by Dr. Shaffer – each of whom serves as an expert to Antigua
in this proceeding. The opinion in fact says very little about risks specifically related to Internet
gambling. First, it mentions that Internet gamb ling is often unregulated. Internet gambling in
Antigua is regulated. As stated many times previ ously, Antigua is prepared to amend its regulatory
scheme if the United States were to have any specifi c concerns or suggestions. Second, it mentions
that Internet gambling is a solitary activity but that is also the case for most gambling in the United
States. Third, it mentions that people who gamb le on the Internet can gamble uninterrupted and
undetected for unlimited periods of time. However, United States operators lawfully use numerous
techniques to ensure that gamblers do just that in order to maximize the gambler's losses (and the
operator's gains). 347 The remainder of the document from the American Psychiatric Association
simply discusses the risks of gambling in general.
3.206 In his Article prepared for this proceeding, Dr. Shaffer, Director of the Harvard Medical
School Division of Addictions and one of the leading e xperts in the field, concludes that to the extent
there is a demonstrable difference at all in the health risks associated with gambling, the primary
distinction is not between Internet gambling and ot her forms of gambling, but between "rapid-cycle"
games and other kinds of gambling that involve eith er more deliberation or participation by other
persons. A thorough reading of Dr. Shaffer's paper reveals that only sports gambling and multi-player
table games appear to clearly evade the "rapid-cycle " effect or the single player environment that may
exacerbate health concerns. But it is clear from Dr. Shaffer that, as acknowledged by the United
States in the quote above, this is not a field in wh ich there is any scientific certainty. The United
States pleads that allowing the u se of the Internet or the telephone to offer gambling and betting
services from Antigua would "open the floodgates" and would add to the "population of potential
victims." This smacks of the unscientific hysteria that Dr. Shaffer and his colleagues warned against
in their joint editorial in the Journal of Gambling Studies and that he references in his paper submitted
to you today.
348 Such bare hyperbole simply cannot form a basis for distinguishing between services
for purposes of the GATS.
3.207 According to Antigua, the reality is that num erous legal gambling opportunities are available
in the United States to people who want to gamble, w ith or without Internet gambling. Certainly the
expansion of gambling opportunities has not been a c oncern to the United States in the past. In 1999
the NGISC called for a pause in the expansion of gambling opportunities. Since then, however,
gambling opportunities have expanded considerably in the United States 349 and total gross gaming
revenue increased almost 25 per cent from already very high levels. 350 Furthermore lotteries
promoted by American authorities themselves, and not by private companies, use aggressive and
sophisticated marketing techniques to sell as many lottery products as possible. One of their most
widespread selling techniques is to market scratch cards as impulse purchase products on the counters
of thousands of shops throughout the country.
351 In this respect it is wo rth referring back to the quote

345 See above para. 3.192.
346 American Psychiatric Association, APA Advisory on Internet Gambling (16 January 2001).
347 See above para. 3.9.
348 See above para. 3.176.
349 Document entitled "Examples of recent expansion of gambling opportunities in the United States".
350 1998 figures compared to 2002 figures.
351 The Report concerning the Wisconsin Lottery "97-2 Wisconsin Lottery, Department of Revenue –
Summary, and the stat ement of the Ohio lottery reported in Public Gaming International (September 2002), p.
20 ("The Ever-Advancing ITVM," public Gam,ing International, (September 2002)).

from the Champion v. Ames decision of the United States Supreme Court in the United States first
submission referring to the "widespread pestilence of lotteries" which "infests the whole community;
it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class." Furthermore the Panel should note that the United
States federal government has even subsidised Native American tribes to develop gambling
enterprises.352 Against this background the United States cannot credibly contend that it seeks to limit
gambling opportunities. What they describe as the "population of potential victims" already
comprises the entire United States population. Allowing cross-border gambling simply provides
another gambling option to choose from.
3.208 Antigua wish to draw the Panel's attention to the 1999 decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the Greater New Orleans case.
353 The Supreme Court found that federal rules that prohibited
the broadcasting of advertisements for private casinos whilst allowing it for Native American casinos
was unconstitutional. In that case the United Stat es argued that the prohibition was necessary to
protect the American public from gambling opportunities. However, the Supreme Court found that,
whatever the character of the broadcasting ban was in 1934 when it was adopted, "the federal policy
of discouraging gambling in genera l, and casino gambling in particular, is now decidedly equivocal."
The Supreme Court also rejected the federal gove rnment's argument that Native American casinos
were a lesser threat because they operated in isolated locations and found that: "[I]f distance were
determinative, Las Vegas might have remained a relatively small community or simply disappeared
like a desert mirage."
354 This is an authoritative statement that is highly relevant for the current
dispute. As a result of the Greater New Orleans ruling, United States gambling operators can now
advertise in all states.
3.209 In Antigua's view, the United States has also made nothing but "mere assertions" regarding
the supposed increased risk to childre n posed by Internet gambling. Antigua has shown not only that
its regulatory scheme and the nature of the busin ess in general works against the participation of
children in cross-border gambling, but that there are other ways to avoid child gambling as well.
While the United States quotes a credit card official to the effect that credit cards are available to
children
355, this does not change the fact that the Unite d States Congress has seen fit to legislate the
use of credit cards as an effective way to k eep children from engaging in potentially harmful
behaviours on the Internet. Antigua has presen ted additional factual evidence regarding child
gambling in the United States. 356 This material also shows that United States government-run
lotteries actively target the youth market, and even the under age market. 357 Suffice it to say that
American children have many opportunities to ga mble (for instance on scratch cards with "cartoon-
like design and childish iconography" 358) and Antigua believes that Internet gambling is among the
very least accessible ways for them to do so. The United States has presented no evidence to the
contrary. The last "likeness" point raised by th e United States is international classification in the
most recent version of the CPC 359. But the most recent version of the CPC does not provide a
different subclass for Internet gambling. Rather it explicitly includes "on-lin e gambling" in the same
category as other "gambling and betting services" – thus supporting Antigua's position.
3.210 Recalling that it does not concede the th reshold issue of a commitment, the United States
notes that Antigua argues for a likeness analysis clos ely following the goods model, while at the same

352 The US Supreme Court's Decision in Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083.
353 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
354 527 U.S. 173, 119 S.Ct. 1923, at p. 10.
355 See above para. 3.193.
356 Document entitled "Youth Gambling", p. 4.
357 Document entitled "Youth Gambling", p. 2 (with regard to the under age market, note the statement
from the Washington D.C. Lottery concerning "Generation X, Generation Y and Generation Z." See also Iowa
Lottery Winner Claim Form, a "Winner claim form" of the Iowa lottery that allows minors to claim their
winnings by post.
358 See above para. 3.193.
359 See above para. 3.196.

time arguing that likeness is not important. The United States maintains that likeness is a crucial
component of the Article XVII inquiry, and supports an analysis in this case that looks at regulatory
concerns, such as those identified by the United Stat es, which have a significant impact on likeness in
the particular context of gambling services. A nu mber of third parties also appear to support
examination of regulatory concerns on a case-by-case basis. The United States disagrees with
Antigua's disjunctive reading of "services and service suppliers." If the text were intended to mean
that likeness could be proven with respect to one or the other, but not both, it would have said services
"or" service suppliers. Instead, the drafters chose th e word "and," reflecting an intent to require that
likeness of both the services and their suppliers be shown. The parties to the GATS negotiations did
not intend that likeness with respect to suppliers only, or with respect to services only, without regard
to one another, would be sufficient – the two are intertwined. A contrary reading would lead to
absurd results – such as finding likeness of suppliers even though they supply different services.
3.211 The United States maintains its arguments rega rding the particular regulatory concerns
surrounding remote supply of gambling services, and wishes to emphasize and elaborate on a few key
points. Remote supply of gambling services presents additional regulatory risks that do not exist, or
are not present to the same degree, in non-remote settings, such as casinos. In a casino, the gambler
must be physically present. Therefore, he or she can be identified with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Casinos are thus able to restrict a ccess to minors, known criminals, persons who are known
to be financially insolvent, and so on. However, due in large measure to the virtual anonymity of
remote media such as the Internet, remote supply gambling operations cannot reliably identify their
customers. The evidence on age verification submit ted by the United States to this Panel illustrates
this fact. Similarly, disreputable suppliers can exploit the anonymity of remote media in ways not
possible with non-remote supply of gambling services. Remote gambling also presents special health
and youth protection risks in part because it is ava ilable to anyone, anywhere – including compulsive
gamblers and children – who can gamble 24 hours a da y with a mere "click of the mouse." Isolation
and anonymity compound the danger. In the words of a gambling addict interviewed on the videotape
provided by the United States, "nobody has to see you do it" and "nobody has to know."
360
3.212 With respect to Antigua's continuous argumen t that the United States has not shown the link
between Internet gambling and various forms of crim e, the United States has al ready established that
remote supply of gambling is particularly susceptible to organized crime, money laundering, and other
forms of crime, and also raised law enforcement concerns when discussing Article XIV. The United
States remains unable to discuss pending law enforcement matters out of concern for compromising
criminal investigations, but has located publicly av ailable evidence of one case study that illustrates
the link between criminal activity and Internet ga mbling. Mr. William Scott describes himself as one
of the persons responsible for bringi ng gambling to the island of Antigua. 361 Antigua licensed Mr.
Scott to operate an Internet gambling site in spite of the fact that records av ailable publicly show that
Mr. Scott had been convicted of racketeering in the United States. In an October 2001 Canadian
television broadcast, Mr. Scott admitted that he was a felon and had spent three years in prison. 362 In
an interview with the same Canadian program, th e Solicitor General of Antigua, Mr. Lebrecht Hesse,
stated that the Government of Antigua was not aware that this individual was a felon and that it had
no indication of such during the "due diligence" pr ocess that led to the granting of a license to operate
a gambling web site to a convicted felon. The se gment of the broadcast transcribed below follows a
long discussion of Mr. Scott's background and a Canadian company with which he did business. It
picks up with Mr. Scott's release from prison and his decision to relocate his operations.

360 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "The Big Gamble", broadcast on The Fifth Estate
(31 October 2001).
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.

Reporter: Antigua has a law that you can't – a licensee can't – have a criminal record.
You were sentenced to eight years for illegal bookmaking and extortion.
Mr. Scott: Illegal bookmaking and extortion, that's correct. [...]
Reporter: So how did, how did you get around the rule in Antigua?
Mr. Scott : Uh, I think it was grandfathered in. I mean, I just put down, and they
licensed me. [...]
Reporter: So how did Bill Scott slip through the cracks?
Solicitor General Hesse: How did he ... I don't know what you mean by that. He has
a criminal record? [...]
Reporter: I spoke to him yesterday and he admits it.
Solicitor General Hesse : A due diligence was conducted on him and this did not
come out.
Reporter: Not a very good due diligence. It is not difficult to find out. Forgive me
sir.
Solicitor General Hesse: No. We have people who conduct it. We don't do this due
diligence ourselves.
Reporter: So what do you do now?
Solicitor General Hesse: You have raised a very important issue and I have to mount
an investigation into it.
363 [...]
3.213 The United States submits that the report on this videotape states that convicted felon William
Scott transferred his license to a relative. Notwith standing that transfer, the tape showed him to be
actively involved in the supply of gambling servi ces. Mr. Scott still owned an Internet gambling
concern based in Antigua as recently as last year 364, and to the best of US knowledge, he continues to
provide gambling services by remote supply from Anti gua. Mr. Scott does in fact have a lengthy
criminal history in the United Stat es. Most notably, he received three concurrent eight year sentences
entered in 1984 after his guilty plea to three counts of a six-count criminal indictment. The
indictment included one count of violating the R acketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
based upon multiple predicate acts of bribery of police officials, the act of conducting an illegal
bookmaking business, and multiple acts of extortion for the payment of gambling debts through the
use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to a person. The indictment also contained five
counts of extortion for the payment of gambling debts through threats of the use of violence or other
criminal means to cause harm to a person. In 1 998, the United States issued an arrest warrant for
Mr. Scott based on a criminal complaint for federal gambling violations. Mr. Scott is a fugitive from
that complaint. The United States argues that William Scott is by no means the only supplier of
remote gambling services. There are many others operating from Antigua and other locations. The
United States has already discussed its views on or ganized crime involvement in remote supply of
gambling, and provided the views of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the view of the
United States, Mr. Scott is the tip of the iceberg.
3.214 On the related issue of money laundering, the United States disagrees with Antigua's
statement that there is essentially no difference in the relative threat between remote and land-based
casino gambling. Unlike casino gambling in which the gambler is physically present, Internet
gambling allows for virtually anonymous and instan taneous communications that are difficult to trace
to a particular individual or account. While it is true that casino gambling can be used, among other
things, to launder the cash proceeds of crime duri ng the placement stage of money laundering, remote
supply of gambling is a convenient vehicle for money launderers to conceal the ownership and nature
of the proceeds through layering and integration, the second and third stages of money laundering.
Due in part to the virtual anonymity availabl e to Internet gamblers, remote supply gambling
operations are not susceptible to effective an ti-money laundering and "know your customer"
requirements. The volume and speed of remote tran sactions, combined with the virtual anonymity of

363 Ibid.
364 Prospectus – Consolidated Gaming Corporation Limited, (31 January 2003), p. 33.

such transactions, makes remote supply of gambli ng a prime mechanism for the money launderer to
conceal and disguise the proceeds of illicit activity by creating a deceptive "paper trail" that makes the
money appear to be legitimate. In the layering stage, money launderers conceal transactions by
burying them in huge volumes of transactions daily and by creating records and "audit trails" that
conceal and disguise the true nature, source and owne rship of the ill-gotten gains of crime. Remote
supply of gambling is especially well-suited to facilitate money laundering in the layering stage.
3.215 The United States further submits that Antigua is unable to persuasively rebut its own
evidence on the differences in customers and custom er experiences that distinguish remote and non-
remote gambling. Bear Stearns has observed that Internet and land-based customers were not the
same, to which Antigua replies, implausibly and withou t any basis, that this really means that the two
services are competing for the same customers. Mo reover, Antigua's argument that gambling is only
about the "experience of winning or losing" without regard to the recreational impact of remote or
non-remote settings contradicts the statements of its own consultants. The United States further notes
that Antigua implies that the United States some how endorses statements by Antigua's consultants
that the Internet poses a lesser health risk than other forms of gambling. That is incorrect. In line
with the views of the respected American Psychiatric Association, the United States continues to view
Internet gambling as posing a greater health risk. And a reasonable observer could hardly deny that
the Internet and other remote media propagate this risk to large new populations of potential victims.
3.216 The United States argues that Antigua makes asser tions about lotteries and other distinct US
gambling services without having proven likeness be tween these particular services and suppliers and
any Antiguan services and suppliers. For example, Antigua asserts that lotteries target under age
players, citing the example of an Iowa lottery form. In fact, the Iowa lottery, like other US lotteries, is
age-restricted (in Iowa players must be 21). Had Antigua examined Iowa law, it would have found
that Iowa regulations require a seven-day suspension of the license of any retailer that sells a ticket to
an under age player, followed by 30 days for the second offence within one year, followed by one
year for the third offence within one year.
365 US state lotteries enforce age restrictions, and in many
cases offer special programs to curb under age gambling. 366 Moreover, members of the National
Association of State and Provincial Lotteries subscrib e to advertising restrictions designed to ensure
that lottery advertising does not appeal to persons under the legal purchase age 367, all of which is far
more than Antigua could possibly do to limit under ag e Internet gambling, given the lack of effective
age verification technologies. Finally, the United St ates rejects Antigua's assertions that despite clear
evidence of money laundering, organized criminal ac tivity and fraud involved in domestic gambling,
the United States does not prosecute domestic illegal gamblers. The United States describes below in
paragraph 3.235 the hundreds of prosecutions involving illegal gambling. However, only a handful of
illegal gamblers based outside the United States ha ve been prosecuted, such as Jay Cohen who is
currently in prison.
3.217 Referring to the television documentary 368 submitted by the United States, Antigua submits
that this video is offensive and totally irrelevant to the legal questions that arise in this proceeding:
the fact that the United States seeks to adduce it as ev idence at all, let alone at this late stage, makes
the ruse all the more obvious. This programme portrays Antigua as a backwater, the Antiguan
Solicitor General, who is African and whose mother tongue is not English, finds himself depicted as
incompetent. The approach adopted by the produ cers of this documentary is precisely what one
would expect from sensational commercial televisi on seeking to maximise its viewing figures and
advertising revenues. If the United States is struggling so much in this case that it needs to resort to a

365 Iowa Admin. Code Sec. 531–12.12(4), at http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Rules/Current/iac/
531/53112/53112.pdf.
366 See http://www.naspl.org/support.html; http://www.naspl.org/programs.html.
367 See http://www.naspl.org/nasplad.html.
368 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "The Big Gamble", broadcast on The Fifth Estate
(31 October 2001).

media hatchet-job of a small developing country that does not have the clout to get a retraction, then
the United States is really clutching at straws. The most offensive fact of all, however, is that by
submitting this video as evidence, the United States explicitly adopts the views expressed in it as its
own formal view vis-à-vis Antigua. If put in the context of the rest of the US argument, the
United States is essentially saying that Antigua is a backwater, irredeemably incapable of organising a
respectable gaming, or any other industry. This is an astonishing statement, which sends a message to
all developing countries that they can be condemn ed with the weakest reputational attacks. The
United States does not have to assess the regulatory efforts of Antigua and consequent behaviour of
its operators – it can simply refuse market access to all Antiguan companies on the basis of outright
prejudice.
3.218 Antigua notes, however, that this position is in stark contrast with the latest Strategy Report of
the United States State Department concerning mone y laundering and financia l crimes, published in
March 2003, which describes at some length the respons ible steps taken by Antigua to regulate its
financial services and gaming industries,
369 based on the United States own analysis by its competent
agencies and not by a producer or a television station. It is also in contrast to a letter sent to the
Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda a few week s ago by the US Secretary of State, Mr Collin
Powell, thanking him for Antigua's cooperation in the fight against money laundering and drug
trafficking. No regulatory system is foolproof. Th at is the case for gaming regulation in Antigua, but
also for gaming regulation in the United States. A number of exhibits submitted by Antigua in this
dispute make that abundantly clear. As to Mr. Scott, on whose example the United States seeks
predominantly to rely, the facts do not in any even t demonstrate that the Antiguan regulatory system
is fatally flawed. The gambling related offences in relation to which Mr. Sc ott pleaded guilty took
place 20 years before the documentary was made. When Mr. Scott first came to Antigua there was no
gambling regulation in force but since its introduction he has to the best of our knowledge been
scrupulously compliant in relation to every aspect. Two years ago Mr. Scott's company was sold to a
publicly held Australian company and he retired from the business: the United States' statement that
he "continues to provide gambling services by remote supply from Antigua" is therefore wholly false.
The United States said he was the tip of the iceberg: given the falsity of their remarks about him, that
iceberg has melted in the stark sunlight of truth. Overall, therefore, it is not clear why anything in this
television programme makes a case against Mr. Sco tt which Antigua should have pursued, let alone a
case against the Antiguan gaming industry as a whole. In any event, Antigua and the United States
have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty under wh ich the United States has made numerous requests
and inquiries of Antigua, and received swift respon ses. If the United States has any concerns about
any operator in the gaming industry in Antigua, why have they not brought this to the attention of our
authorities so that appropriate action could be taken?
3.219 The United States replies that Antigua protests too mu ch with regard to the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation program that the Unite d States provided on video tape. Antigua has
submitted dozens of journalistic reports as evidence, and this one submitted by the United States is no
different; it is entitled to the same evidentiary we ight. If anything, it has greater probative value
because in the video the actors sp eak for themselves. Moreover, th e lack of due diligence displayed
before granting William Scott a license indicates that Antigua does not screen persons before granting
them a licence to operate an Internet gambling s ite. While the due diligence requirement may be the
law in theory, Antigua's practice has sometimes diverg ed from this theory. This is a similar type of
problem that was observed in the 1990s, when some of Antigua's offshore banks were found to be
engaged in money laundering and pe rsons of questionable character – some of whom were later
convicted of fraud and money laundering in US c ourts – had been granted licenses to operate
Antiguan banks. There is a similar concern re garding Antigua's money laundering laws, which
appears to have resulted in no convictions since they were enacted and the advi sory issued by the US
Treasury was withdrawn.

369 US State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes (March 2003), p. XII-87 to XII-89.

3.220 Concerning the reference made by Antigua to the report issued by the US Department of State
in March 2003 as evidence that the US government has no concerns with Antigua, the United States
wishes to quote from the first sentence of that report on page 209 under the heading of Antigua and
Barbuda: "Antigua and Barbuda has comprehensiv e legislation in place to regulate its financial
sector, but it remains susceptible to money laund ering because of its loosely regulated offshore
financial sectors and its Internet gaming industry."
370 As reflected in the State Department report, the
issue is not whether Antigua has laws on the books, the question is whether those laws are adequately
enforced. The United States is also encouraged by the statement of the delegate of Antigua that
Mr. Scott may no longer be operating an Internet gambling site in Antigua; 371 this understanding that
he operated the business as late as 2003 was based upon a document submitted by the United States to
the Panel.372 The United States would be interested in Antigua's views on how he got licensed in the
first place, and continues to be concerned about the operation of gambling businesses through third
parties, as cases have been prosecuted in the Un ited States where a person who cannot be licensed
continues to run a gambling operation through third parties.
(b) Treatment no less favourable
3.221 Antigua argues that the US Schedule provides no limitations on national treatment for the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. The fact that the United States' measures at
issue in this case disfavour services and service suppliers of other WTO Members compared to
services and service suppliers of United States origin needs no further explanation.
3.222 The United States submits that on the "less favourable treatment" prong of Article XVII,
Antigua again offers no argumentation at all; it me rely asserts that this issue "needs no further
explanation." The United States has pointed out from the earliest stages of consultations that its
restrictions applicable to Internet gambling (and other forms of gambling services that Antiguan firms
seek to supply on a cross-border basis) apply equa lly within the United States. Antigua fails to
provide evidence or argumentation pointing to any US law or regulation restricting supply of services
or service suppliers from outside the United States that is not accompanied by an equal or greater
restriction on services originating inside the United St ates. Its claim therefore must fail. Underlying
this failure of proof is a failure on the part of Antigua to address the fact that relevant restrictions on
remote supply of gambling under US law, whether by Internet or other means, are based on objective
criteria that apply regardless of the national origin of the service or service supplier. As the Chairman
of the Group of Negotiations on Services observed with respect to Article XVII during the final stages
of the Uruguay Round negotiations , "distinctions without a link to national origin and based on
objective criteria would not normally violate the national treatment provisions."
373 Stripped down to
its essence, Antigua's Article XVII claim is plainl y unsustainable. If accepted, Antigua's argument
would let Antiguan companies offer gambling on a scal e and in a manner that would be illegal for US
suppliers. Such an outcome would afford Antiguan companies treatment vastly more favourable than
domestic suppliers – something that Article XVII clearly does not require.
3.223 Antigua replies that literally thousands of gamb ling and betting services are offered in the
United States by state-sanctioned providers. Antig ua has shown the existence and extent of these
operations. On the other hand, it is not possible fo r Antiguan suppliers to obtain an authorization to
supply gambling services on a cross-border basis. The United States nevertheless submits that there is
no violation of Article XVII of the GATS because the laws that prevent Antiguan service suppliers
from supplying gambling services by "remote" means also prevent United States domestic service
suppliers from doing the same. Antigua disagrees. Article XVII:3 explicitly provides that formally

370 Ibid., p. 209.
371 Ibid., para. 5.
372 Prospectus – Consolidated Gaming Corporation Limited, (31 January 2003).
373 See Informal GNS Meeting – 10 December 1993, Chairman's Statement, MTN.GNS/49, circulated
11 December 1993, section 1.

identical treatment can be less favourable if it modifies conditions of competition. Prohibiting foreign
cross-border service suppliers from using means of remote communication makes it impossible for
them to supply their services. The impact of that prohibition on domestic operators is clearly much
less far reaching, as they can still supply services via other means even if not considered "remote."
Thus, the "formally identical treatment" advanced by the United States modifies conditions of
competition very considerably. In fact, it makes competition from Antigua and Barbuda impossible.
3.224 In Antigua's view, "remote access" gambling is rampant across the United States in a variety
of different forms, from the off-track betting ser vices and the Internet-based betting to the most
obvious form of "remote" gambling – the lotteries – which market their products in almost 180,000
stores, petrol stations, pharmacies, news stands, bars and restaurants (not to mention stand-alone self-
service lottery vending machines) that have nothing bu t at best an electronic connection to the source
of the lottery. The federal laws that prohibit the use of remote communication to offer gambling
services do not apply to these opera tions, either because the remote communication does not cross a
state or international border (which is the case for the lotteries) or because the operations have
obtained an exemption (which is the case for the horse race betting industry). The United States
argues that lotteries "are not offered by remote supply."
 374 In fact, virtually all lottery games in the
United States are offered by remote supply. Star ting in the early 1980s, providers of United States
lotteries invested heavily in electronic communications networks linking their central computers with
thousands of purpose-built computer terminals set up in the approximately 180,000 retail points
mentioned above for the specific purpose of making lottery gambling as accessible as possible. These
communication networks have also allowed the lotteries to compete with casino-style gaming by
offering more and more frequent games. Long before the arrival of the Internet, the lotteries referred
to these games as "on-line" games.
375 In essence, Antiguan suppliers of "on-line" gambling games do
the same as the lotteries. But rather than us ing the very expensive purpose-built communication
networks that the US lotteries use, Antiguan operators use the generic technology of the Internet.
3.225 Antigua does not agree with the US arguments that the amendment of the Interstate Horse
Racing Act allowing betting by the Internet has no legal effect under United States law. 376 Antigua
cannot see how a law adopted by the United States Congress can have no legal effect, particularly
given that operators in the United States are offering betting services via the Internet. Most
importantly, however, the United States undertakes no law enforcement actions against these large
scale Internet betting operations. If the United Stat es continues to argue that these operations are
unlawful under United States law, Antigua and Barbuda will have to withdraw its suggestion to the
Panel not to examine the actions listed in Secti on III of the Annex to its Panel request as separate
measures. In a situation of selective enforcemen t of the law against foreign suppliers only, law
enforcement measures obviously "do something" that is relevant for the purposes of WTO law – they
result in less favourable treatment. Antigua submits th at the United States' inference that it is in the
process of investigating these operations lacks credibility. The United States has undertaken
considerable law enforcement efforts against Antiguan operators. Yet, no enforcement action
whatsoever has been taken against its domestic operators, who must present a much easier law
enforcement target, given their presence within the territory. The Panel should further note that one
of these Internet betting businesses, Capital OTB, is a public corporation owned by the State of New
York. In addition, the United States' position on this issue is linked to its attempt to characterise
gambling opportunities in the United States as "confined to particular locations." As demonstrated in
the map showing the locations of casinos in the United States
377, the "particular locations" (which on
the map do not include the thousands upon thousands of lottery sales outlets mentioned above) do not
appear very limited or "confined."

374 See above para. 3.22.
375 NGISC Final Report, p. 2-1.
376 See above para. 3.22.
377 "Casinos in the United States", Bear Stearns 2002-2003 North American Gaming Almanac.

3.226 The United States reiterates that the burden also r ests on Antigua to provide evidence and
argumentation showing that its services and suppliers receive "less favourable treatment." The United
States again points out that US restrictions applicable to Internet gambling and other forms of
gambling services that Antiguan firms seek to supply on a cross-border basis apply equally to those
remote supply activities within the United States. In this regard the United States would like to
correct the misstatement by Antigua that Antiguan gambling services "are prohibited because they are
supplied from abroad." This is incorrect. The laws governing remote supply of gambling apply
equally within the United States.
3.227 Antigua emphasises that to the extent that Article XVII of the GATS can play a role in this
dispute
378, Antigua believes that the United States' total prohibition and the legisl ative and regulatory
provisions, applications thereof and related pract ices that make up the total prohibition violate
Article XVII in a number of ways. 379 First, the United States' tota l prohibition, as such, violates the
United States' commitment to national treatment of cross-border supply. Domestically supplied
gambling and betting services are permitted whilst cross-border supply of foreign services is
completely prohibited. Second, the federal laws and other legislative and regulatory provisions,
applications thereof and related practices specifi cally prohibiting or preventing cross-border supply
from Antigua whilst allowing domestic supply, whet her remote or in person, within states by
authorized domestic suppliers, result in less favour able treatment of Antiguan services and service
suppliers. Third, the United States' authorities a llow in a number of instances, whether because it is
lawful or as a matter of selective enforcement of state and federal laws, the "remote" supply of
gambling and betting services between states in the United States. The United States' authorities do
not, however, allow cross-border supply of gambling and betting services from Antigua. Fourth, even
if it were to be correct that all "remote" s upply of gambling and betting services was effectively
prohibited in the United States, quod non, the United States would still be in violation of Article XVII
of the GATS because such formally identical treatment of Antiguan and United States origin services
results in less favourable conditions of compe tition for Antiguan services and service suppliers:
domestic operators can still supply their services "in person" (i.e . non-remote). For service suppliers
in Antigua, however, it is obviously impossible to supply services in person. This violates
Article XVII in the context of a full national treatment commitment to cross-border supply. Fifth, the
state laws that prohibit all gambling, while exem pting gambling specifically authorized but without
providing a possibility for Antiguan operators to obtai n an authorization to supply the same services
on a cross-border basis 380, result in less favourable treatment of Antiguan services and service
suppliers. Sixth, the state laws or regulations that grant exclusive or special rights to operators of
domestic origin381 result in more favourable treatment of those domestic operators and their services
compared to Antiguan services and service suppliers. And, seventh, the state laws that require the
physical presence of the operator within the territory of the state 382 result in less favourable treatment
of Antiguan service suppliers that seek to supply their services on a cross-border basis.
3.228 The United States submits that it is important to recall that even within a group of like
services or like suppliers, nothing in the GATS pr events the maintenance of nationality-neutral
regulatory distinctions. 383 Thus, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Antigua could

378 See Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 16.
379 Antigua notes that some of these violations comprise de jure less favourable treatment whilst others
comprise de facto less favourable treatment. Yet other violations are difficult to qualify as de jure or de facto
less favourable treatment. The application of Article XV II, however, does not requ ire the qualification of a
particular instance of less favourable treatment as de jure or de facto. It only requires the establishment of less
favourable treatment of like services.
380 See above paras. 3.106 and 3.107.
381 See above footnote 249.
382 See above para. 3.109.
383 Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Treatment: Requiem for an "Aim and Effect"
Test, 32 International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), at: http ://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecrequiem.pdf,

show likeness between some remotely supplied gambling service and supplier and a non-remote
gambling service and supplier (which it cannot), the United States may nonetheless maintain a
regulatory distinction between remote and non-remote supply of gambling services. 384 The GATS
only requires that such distinctions, whether de jure or de facto, must afford no "less favourable
treatment" to foreign suppliers on the basis of nati onal origin (Article XVII:1 and XVII:2). It also
provides that treatment that "modifies the conditions of competition" in favour of domestic like
services or suppliers "shall be considered to be less favourable" (Article XVII:3). US restrictions on
remote supply of gambling services comply with these requirements. One pair of commentators has
observed that "a foreign crook who is subject to a nation's criminal laws is still receiving 'national
treatment.'"385 That observation applies equally in this di spute. As the United States has repeatedly
pointed out, US restrictions on remote supply of gambling apply regardless of national origin.
Nonetheless, Antigua appears to make a claim of de jure discrimination based on its assertion that US
law authorizes two domestic gambling services – pari -mutuel betting on horseracing and state lottery
services – to operate by remote supply. 386 Once again, Antigua's assertions are factually incorrect.
The United States has addressed the issue of remote supply of pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing in
its responses to the Panel's questions. 387 To briefly summarize, Antigua claims that US federal law in
the form of the Interstate Horseracing Act creates an "exemption" that permits remote supply of pari-
mutuel wagering on horseracing by domestic suppliers. This is incorrect. US federal criminal statutes
continue to prohibit the transmission of bets or wa gers on horse races to the same extent that they
prohibit other forms of remote supply of gambling services. The 2000 amendment to the Interstate
Horseracing Act did not alter pr e-existing federal criminal law.
388 In fact, contrary to Antigua's
claims, the Interstate Horseracing Act actually provides more favourable treatment to foreign
suppliers of gambling services. As noted in the US response to the Panel's question 22, US laws do
not prohibit remote supply of information assisting in the placing of pari-mutuel wagers on
horseracing (or any other form of gambling) as long as the information is being transmitted from a
place where that betting is legal to a place where that betting is legal. In the pari-mutuel horseracing
context, the Interstate Horseracing Act imposes sp ecial requirements on the supply of such gambling
services domestically (e.g., requiring certain writte n consent agreements), but does not impose any

p. 30-31 ("[A] government is permitted to distinguish between otherwise "like" service providers by imposing
regulatory distinctions based on some other characteristic of the service provider or service transaction.").
384 The United States considers that this distinction is not, contrary to Antigua's assertion, an intermodal
distinction between cross-border supply and supply by local presence. A US domestic remote supplier is no less
subject to US restrictions on remote supply of gambling than a remote supplier operating on a cross-border
basis.
385 Don Wallace, Jr. and David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Exceptions, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 615, 627 (1998).
386 The United States recalls that, as noted above, Antigua still has not shown, and cannot show, that it
offers "like services" through "like suppliers" with respect to either of these services.
387 See the United States' replies to Panel question Nos. 21-22.
388 In above para. 3.225, Antigua suggested in connec tion with this issue that it might "withdraw its
suggestion to the Panel not to examine the actions listed in Section III of the Annex to its Panel request as
separate measures," apparently for th e purpose of asserting a new claim of de facto less favourable treatment.
Antigua cannot "withdraw" its clarification regarding the measures at issue here. The Panel's terms of reference
are what they are; they are estab lished by the complaining Member's Panel request, not by how a responding
party defends itself. Antigua has already clarified, in the Panel's words, that "it does not intend to treat the items
listed in Section III as distinct and autonomous 'measur es' but, essentially, will seek to rely upon them as
evidence to illustrate the existence of a general prohib ition against cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services in the United States." See Communication from the Panel, 29 October 2003, para. 31, in Annex B of
this Report. The Panel has therefor e already determined that it "will not consider and examine [the items in
Section III of the Panel request] as separate, autonomous measures." Ibid. Any attempt by Antigua to retract its
clarification of its Panel request would amount to an improper attempt to expand the Panel's terms of reference.

requirements on cross-border supply of the same services.
389 Foreign services and suppliers thus get a
better deal under the Interstate Horseracing Act than their domestic counterparts.
3.229 According to the United States, Antigua asserts that lottery games are offered by remote
supply in the United States, apparently because, unsurprisingly, state lotteries use computers and other
electronic devices to communicate with their various offices and distributors. Each of the distribution
mechanisms that Antigua identifies (stores, gas stations, pharmacies, newsstands, bars and restaurants,
and vending machines) requires the service consumer to present himself or herself in person at an
authorized lottery distribution location. Thus th e supply of the service by these means is non-remote.
In other words, Antigua simply confuses the fact that lotteries often have many retail points of
presence with the entirely different concept of remote supply.
3.230 The United States argues that overshadowing Antigua's de jure national treatment claims
regarding lotteries and pari-mutuel betting on hor seracing is a much more ambitious claim about de
facto national treatment. Antigua argues that although US law provides "formally identical" treatment
to foreign and domestic services and suppliers, the fact that it restricts remote supply of gambling
more severely than non-remote supply alters th e "conditions of competition" in the market for
gambling services in a way that disfavours Antiguan suppliers. The basis for Antigua's argument is
difficult to discern. As a factual matter, one can only assume that the abolition of US restrictions on
the remote supply of gambling would pose an enor mous new competitive threat to Antiguan services
and suppliers, as major US-based gambling service pr oviders would begin offering their services in
competition with those of Antiguan websites. Nonetheless, Antigua complains that it is
disadvantaged because US domestic suppliers can still supply their services by means that are not
remote. This argument fails because Antigua has no t offered evidence of any restriction that would
stop its suppliers from supplying their services by the same non-remote means available to domestic
suppliers. Hence there is no national treatment viola tion. If what Antigua really means to argue is
that it is inherently harder for foreign suppliers to supply non-remote services in the United States,
then its argument is precluded by Article XVII, footnote 10, which states that:
"Specific commitments assumed under this Ar ticle shall not be c onstrued to require
any Member to compensate for any inhere nt competitive disadvantages which result
from the foreign character of the relevant services or service suppliers."
3.231 Consistent with footnote 10, even if one assumes, contrary to fact, that the United States made
a national treatment commitment for gambling services, the United States would be under no
obligation to make up for the fact that Antiguan services and their suppliers are from somewhere other
than Nevada, New Jersey, etc., and by reason of that fact may find it inherently more difficult to offer
non-remote gambling services in the United States than would be the case for some domestic
suppliers. Through footnote 10, the negotiators of the GATS anticipated and rejected precisely this
kind of argument.
3.232 Antigua submits that the United States clearly has and enforces laws that specifically outlaw
gambling services that cross international borders. This is de jure discrimination in the context of a
national treatment commitment for cross-border supply, irrespective of whether these laws also
prohibit inter-state gambling. To the extent th at these laws would indeed prohibit inter-state
gambling, Antigua has shown that they are not enforced against domestic operators which also
constitutes a discrimination. The US argument on less favourable treatment is entirely based on the
notion of "remote supply," an unspecified distribut ion method which is allegedly not used by United
States gambling operators. The United States argu es, for instance, that lottery gambling is not
"remote" because lotteries use computers and ve nding machines that are placed in the 180,000

389 15 U.S.C. § 3002(3) (defining an "interstate off-track wager" to include only domestic wagers
between US states); § 3004(a) (requiring a consent ag reement as a condition precedent to acceptance of an
interstate off-track wager).

"authorized lottery distribution locations" in th e United States. But this obviously is "remote"
gambling because the gambler does not need to physica lly go to the lottery to play. Rather, he can
play in the local grocer, pharmacy, petrol station or other location where he must go to buy other
products in any event. Furthermore lotteries do allow players to play at home. United States lotteries
allow players to purchase tickets to participate in numerous drawings spread out over several months
or even a year.
390 Players can verify winning numbers on the television or the Internet. Many United
States lotteries allow players to purchase lottery ticke ts by post, pay by cheque or even credit card,
and then claim any winnings by post – all without ever leaving the home. 391 Several United States
lotteries also have games that allow players to pa rticipate from home in a televised lottery game. 392
Some United States lotteries can even be played from home by minors under the age of 18, as
illustrated by the form used by the Iowa lottery which allows unde r age gamblers to claim their
winnings by post.393 Sports betting operators in Las Vegas also allow punters to place bets on events
occurring in the near- or the far-distant future, retu rn to their homes and claim their winnings by post
days, weeks or months later.394
3.233 Antigua submits that, given the absence of a clear definition of the term "remote" 395, a
discussion concentrating on whether or not something is "remote" is unlikely to be fruitful. Rather the
discussion should be conducted on the basis of the terms of Article XVII which requires "conditions
of competition" that are "not less favourable" fo r "like services." In paragraph 3.230, the United
States stated that Antigua "has not offered evidence of any restriction that would stop its suppliers
from supplying their services by the same non-remote means available to domestic suppliers." This
begs the question whether it would be legal for An tiguan operators to place computers in bars, shops
or other outlets through which cons umers could then gamble with An tiguan operators (similar to, for
instance, the New York state lottery).
396 Such an operation would violate state law because it is not
specifically authorized and it would of course also violate the Wire Act and the other federal anti-
gambling laws because the gambling service crosses an international border.
3.234 In Antigua's view, this gives rise to two further issues in the debate about the application of
Article XVII to the inability of Antiguan services su ppliers to use specific distribution methods. The
first issue is "less favourable treatment within sp ecific distribution methods." The United States
allows its gambling operators to use distribution met hods (whether intra-state or inter-state) that could
be used by Antiguan operators to supply gambli ng and betting services on a cross-border basis: the
Internet, telephone, post, television, vending machines, electronic links with computers and the like.
The United States prohibits, however, the use of these distribution methods for Antiguan services.
This inevitably results in a finding of "less favourable treatment." The second issue is "less
favourable treatment across specific distribution methods." In Antigua's view, the United States also
violates Article XVII by allowing domestic suppliers to use distribution methods that require physical

390 Information on how to play New York's Mega Millions lottery game, found at www.nylottery.org.
391 See, for instance, the Virginia Lottery (which offe rs "subscriptions for season tickets" that can be
ordered from home by regular post [www.valottery.com/m egamillions/subscription.asp] and allows winnings to
be collected by sending a signed lottery ticket, regular post, with a return address on it
www.valottery.com/faq/kb_detail.asp?id=7]). The Illinois lottery's Internet web site offers players a
downloadable form to purchase up to a year's worth of lottery tickets by mail, with payment to be made by
credit card. (www.illinoislottery.com/subsections/Subscrip.htm). See also www.nylottery.org regarding "Lotto
from Home" in New York.
392 For instance, the material on the Ohio lottery's "The Cash Explosion – Play-At-Home Bonus Box".
393 Iowa Lottery Winner Claim Form (the claim fo rm specifies how minors under the age of 18 can
claim their winnings [www.ialottery.com/LegalRequirements/claimform.pdf]).
394 Extract from the 2002 NAICS Definition, Exhib it AB-208 [sic]. The Panel notes that, when
commenting on the draft descriptive part, Antigua indica ted that the correct reference was to Exhibit AB-198,
containing material from the "Venetian" casino in Las Vegas.
395 In its reply to Panel question No. 20, Antigua has explained how it intended to use the term "remote
gambling." The United States obviously uses this term in a different way.
396 Information on how to play Quick Draw, found at www.nylottery.org.

commercial presence (such as brick and mortar casi nos) whilst prohibiting the use of a distribution
method that can be used for cross-border supply (suc h as the Internet). Because of its commitment to
national treatment of cross-border supply, the United States must allow Antiguan operators to
compete with United States' brick and mortar casi nos under equal conditions of competition. This
does not mean that they should receive formally iden tical treatment (which is indeed unlikely in view
of the different distribution method). It does, how ever, mean that the Unite d States must allow fair
competition.
3.235 The United States notes that Antigua has asserted a lack of prosecution of violators of US
laws restricting remote supply of gambling, and horseracing in particular.
397 The United States has
already provided the Panel with statistics and indivi dual cases attesting to the robust enforcement of
such laws. To add to that information, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Department of Justice has compiled statistics c oncerning the number of racketeering prosecutions
approved by the RICO Review Unit from 1992 to 20 02 alleging predicate violations of federal
gambling statutes 18 U.S.C. § 1084, 18 U.S.C. § 1 955, or both. In other words, these are federal
racketeering cases that were premised on two federal gambling laws. Over that period, the
Department of Justice approved 90 of those cases.398 The United States does not keep statistics on the
number of cases in which the fact pattern alleged involved international as opposed to purely domestic
gambling activity. However, the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, has
confirmed based on his many years of personal experience that the vast majority of these 90 cases
involved purely domestic betting activity, not cross-border gambling. In fact, that is only a fraction of
all the gambling cases pursued by the federal governme nt. In all, US statistics show 125 cases filed
under Section 1084 and 951 cases filed under Sec tion 1955 between 1992 a nd September 2003.
Many of those cases involve multiple defendants, so the number of individuals involved would be
substantially higher. The majority of these cases involve the activities of organized crime syndicates.
In addition there were cases filed under Section 19 52 involving illegal gambling, but those statistics
would include other kinds of cases as well, since S ection 1952 is not limited to gambling. As these
numbers reflect, illegal gambling continues to be a primary enforcement program in the 24 Organized
Crime Strike Force Units in U.S. Attorneys' offices around the United States. All but a very few of
these cases involve purely domestic illegal gambling activity. There have only been a handful of
cases (some of them with multiple defendants) th at involved supply of gambling from outside the
United States.
3.236 The United States notes that, regarding horseracing in particular, Antigua asserts in its
response to the Panel's question 19 that the United States fails to prosecute providers of remote
gambling on horseracing. In fact there have been many reported court cases (representing just a small
fraction of all prosecutions) in which the Department of Justice used federal gambling laws
challenged by Antigua to prosecu te illegal wagering on horseracing.
399 Regarding the activities of
entities such as Youbet.com, this i ssue came to prominen ce well after 1998, when the United States
took action against Mr. Jay Cohen, Mr. Scott, and other Antigua-based remote suppliers. It was not
until December 2000 that amendments to the Intersta te Horseracing Act created what some now cite,
incorrectly, as the statutory basis for Internet ga mbling on horseracing. The United States is aware of
these activities and US law enforcement officials do not agree with assertions made by the service
providers who rely on this alleged justification. While the United States is not at liberty to discuss
pending investigations or prosecutions, it can point to the fact that Youbet.com itself disclosed in its

397 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 19.
398 Department of Justice document – Criminal Caseload Statistics, 18 U.S.C. 1955.
399 Erlenbaugh v. United States , 409 U.S. 239 (1972); United States v. Southard , 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1987); United States v. Denton, 556 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
892 (1977); United States v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1974; United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Swank , 441 F.2d 264 (9 th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bergland , 318 F.2d 159 (7 th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 (1963); United States v. Athanas , 362 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mo. 1973); United
States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.W.Va. 1962).

2002 annual report that "the United States Justice Department is in the process of taking action against
selected companies that it deems to be operating without proper licensing and regulatory approval." 400
The company added that, while it "believes that its activities conform" to applicable laws, "this
conclusion is not free from doubt." 401 The annual report went on to acknowledge that Youbet.com
"faces the risk" of criminal proceedings and penalties brought by the government, and the
United States agrees with that risk assessment. 402 Finally, Antigua has raised the issue of restrictions
on advertising for gambling services. Antigua, however, has again fa iled to identify what laws or
regulations on this subject, if any, within the scope of the Panel's terms of reference allegedly embody
this restriction. The same is true of Antigua's new assertions about the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
("IGRA"). The IGRA is outside the Panel's terms of reference.
3.237 Antigua rejects the US statement with regard to the activities of entities such as Youbet.com
that "this issue came to promin ence well after 1998." Page 5-4 of the NGISC Final Report discusses
the activities of Youbet.com and footnote 14 mentions that the website was visited on 17 March 1999.
The activities of TVG are discussed at page 2-13 of the same report.
3.238 The United States notes that Antigua insists that it does not ask that its services and suppliers
be treated more favourably than US services and supp liers. Yet at the same time, Antigua asks that
the United States allow remote services and suppliers to operate cross-border from Antigua when they
are not allowed to do so domestically. It also asks that the United States engage in the development
of international standards to permit remote supply 403 when no such standard permits such activity
domestically. In short, these requests by Antigua make clear that it is in fact asking that its services
and suppliers be allowed to do things that domestic services and suppliers cannot do.
6. GATS Article VI404
3.239 Antigua argues that the United States maintains numerous laws and regulations prohibiting
the supply of gambling and betting services unless a sp ecific authorization has been granted. These
are "measures of general application affecting trade in services" caught by Article VI:1 of the GATS.
Many service suppliers of United States origin have been given an authorization to supply gambling
and betting services. It is impossible, however, for foreign service suppliers to obtain an authorization
to supply services on a cross-border basis or to even apply for such an authorization. Antigua submits
that this constitutes a violation of Article VI:1 of the GATS.
3.240 Antigua further argues that Article VI:3 of th e GATS implies that a WTO Member is obliged
to make authorization procedures that are open to domestic service suppliers available to suppliers
from other WTO Members that want to supply ser vices on which a commitment has been made. By
prohibiting all cross-border supply of gambling a nd betting services, the United States obviously does
not fulfil that obligation with respect to those services.
3.241 The United States argues that Antigua's claim fails both because of Antigua's failure to prove
the existence of relevant US commitments and becau se Antigua fails to meet its burden of proof, with
respect to any particular measure(s), that such measure(s) are not "administered in a reasonable,
objective, and impartial manner." Antigua has provided no evidence at all about the administration of
any of the measures identified in its Panel request. In fact, such measures apply equally to all services

400 Youbet.com, Inc., U.S. Securities and Exchan ge Commission Form 10-K Annual Report under
Section 13 or 15(d) of th e Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for th e fiscal Year Ended 31 December 2001,
Commission File Number: 33-13789LA (15 April 2002), available at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814055/000102140802005310/0001021408-02-005310.txt.
401 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
403 See below Antigua's arguments regarding GATS Article XIV.
404 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' replies to Panel question No. 27 in
Annex C of this Report.

and service providers, regardless of origin, and ar e routinely applied against domestic as well as
foreign lawbreakers.
405
3.242 The United States further submits that Article VI:3 contains certain transparency requirements
relating to the processing of applications to supply a service in a committed sector. Antigua has not
shown that the United States has undertaken any commitments regarding gambling services in general
or cross-border gambling services in particular. Thus, Antigua cannot demonstrate that Article VI:3 is
relevant in this dispute. Moreover, Antigua has pointed to no occasions on which US authorities have
failed to inform Antiguan suppliers regarding decisions on their applications. Indeed, Antigua has not
demonstrated that its gambling service suppliers have ever filed any relevant applications. Rather,
Antigua asserts that Article VI:3 "implies" something that it does not say – that "a WTO Member is
obliged to make authorization procedures that are open to domestic suppliers available to suppliers
from WTO Members that want to supply services on which a commitment has been made." In fact,
what Antigua is seeking is something that Artic le VI:3 on its face does not provide – namely, a
requirement that the United States give foreign supp liers the right to provide services that even its
domestic suppliers do not have a right to provide.
3.243 Antigua replies that given what has been demonstrated above, it is clear that the
United States' conduct also violates Article VI:1 and Article VI:3 of the GATS. The United States has
made a full commitment to the cross-border suppl y of gambling and betting services, yet while it
prohibits all cross-border supply of these servic es from Antigua, numerous operators of domestic
origin are allowed to supply gambling and betting se rvices in the United States. This constitutes an
obvious violation of Article VI:1. The United States submits that there is no such violation because
the laws that are used against Antiguan service supp liers "are routinely applied against domestic as
well as foreign lawbreakers." However, the numer ous exemptions from these laws that have been
granted to gambling operators of United States origin are not equally available for domestic as well as
foreign operators.
3.244 Antigua reiterates that Article VI:3 provision implies that all authorization procedures that are
open to domestic service suppliers should be equally open to suppliers from other WTO Members that
wish to supply services for which a commitment h as been made. United States domestic service
providers can and do qualify for authorization to offer gambling and betting services. Yet Antiguan
service providers cannot. The United States asserts that "Antigua has not demonstrated that its
gambling service suppliers have ever filed any releva nt applications," yet, on the other hand, it has
made it very clear that all cross-border supply of gambling and betting services is prohibited. Given
this, Antigua fail to see why Antiguan operators woul d have filed any applications for authorization,
much less under what authority such a filing could have been made.
3.245 The United States submits that Antigua's claim does not co rrespond to the text of Article VI.
Antigua cites portions of this provi sion relating to the administration of US measures, but it identifies
no flaws in the administration of US gambling laws. Instead, its arguments seek to convert Article VI
into an implicit obligation of better-than-nationa l-treatment. Under Antigua's view, Article VI
effectively means that Members must let cross- border suppliers supply services that are beyond the
scope of activities permissible for suppliers with a local presence. The text of Article VI simply does
not bear that interpretation. Antigua appears to be lieve, mistakenly, that by alleging an inconsistency
with Article XVI or XVII, it has automatically proven, without evidence or argumentation, an
inconsistency with Article VI. Antigua h as failed to offer anything approaching a prima facie case of
violation of Article VI.

405 The United States notes that, since Antigua does no t even purport to challenge specific US state or
local laws authorizing (as opposed to restricting) various forms of gambling, any assertions relating to measures
affirmatively authorizing gambling are beyond the scope of this dispute.

3.246 Furthermore, Antigua appears to be unable to cite any instance in which "authorization to
supply" a gambling service in the United States was refused. 406 Moreover, Antigua states that it "has
not been able to investigate all the criteria that all states apply to authorize a domestic operator to
offer gambling and betting services," making it di fficult for the United States to understand how
Antigua can credibly assert that such procedures "by their very terms exclude Antiguan suppliers." In
any event, an examination of such procedures would seem to lie outside the Panel's terms of
reference, since they were not identified in Antigua's Panel request.
7. GATS Article XI407
3.247 Antigua argues that the United States also maintain s measures that restrict international
money transfers and payments relating to the cro ss-border supply of gambling and betting services.
United States authorities particularly seek to restrict payments and transfers relating to "unauthorized"
gambling and betting services with businesses that "usu ally operate offshore in foreign locations". 408
"Legally authorized gaming transactions" are exempt from these measures. 409 The purpose of these
measures is to prevent foreign suppliers of ga mbling and betting services from offering their services
on a cross-border basis. To the extent that these measures reinforce the prohibition measures
discussed in paragraph 3.75 above, they violate Ar ticles XVI:1, XVII and VI:1 of the GATS. These
measures also violate Article XI:1 of the GATS.
3.248 The United States submits that Antigua asserts, again without any argument, that US
measures to prohibit money transfers relating to ga mbling violate Article XI:1 of GATS. Antigua's
claim fails first of all because of Antigua's failure to prove the existence of a relevant specific
commitment. Moreover, even if such a commitme nt had been proven, Antigua has made no attempt
to explain how or why any specific measure violates Article XI:1, and thus fails to make a prima facie
case. In asserting its claim, Antigua refers to "measures discussed in paragraph [3.75]". This
paragraph makes reference to an agreement between the New York Attorney General and PayPal, Inc,
which is found among the items in section III of the Annex to Antigua's Panel request. First of all, the
United States notes the Panel's preliminary ruling that it will not consider and examine these items as
"separate, autonomous measures." 410 In any event, the text of th e PayPal agreement provides that
PayPal agrees to "cease processing any payments for online gambling merchants" involving New
York members of PayPal and gaming not expressly authorized under US law. 411 It further provides
that PayPal agrees to "block automatically (...) any credit card or debit card funded payments by
PayPal's New York members" that should bear certain coding indicating an Internet gambling
transaction.412 Antigua has provided no evidence that th ese provisions represent the application of
restrictions on movements of funds across borders. On the contrary, by their own terms they apply

406 Antigua reply to Panel question No. 11.
407 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' replies to Panel question No. 29 in
Annex C of this Report.
408 "Financial giant joins fight against online gamb ling," Press Release from the Office of the New
York State Attorney General (14 June 2002).
409 "Agreement reached with Paypal to bar New Yorkers from online gambling," Press Release from
the Office of the New York State Atto rney General (21 August 2002). On 10 June 2003, the United States
House of Representatives adopted legislation known as H.R.2143, the "Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act". This is designed to unambiguously prohibit banks and other financial service providers from
engaging in financial transactions involving gambli ng and betting services from non-United States based
gambling operators (Section 4(2)(E)(ix) excludes "any lawful transaction with a business licensed or authorized
by a State" thus exempting United States gambling operators from the prohibition to facilitate payment of
Internet gambling services). The second component of the United States Congress, the Senate, has yet to adopt
this legislation.
410 See Communication from the Panel, 29 October 2003, para. 31, in Annex B of this Report.
411 "Assurance of Discontinuance" signed between the New York Attorney General and Paypal Inc.
(16 August 2002), para. 20.
412 Ibid., para. 21.

without regard to whether the payments in question are destined for further transfer to a domestic or
international destination.
3.249 Antigua replies that the United States attempts to deflect the issue of a violation of
Article XI:1 by making use of its procedural tac tics aimed at excluding the non-legislative items from
the scope of this dispute. The United States stated above that actions by Attorneys General (and the
actions of the New York Attorney General in the context of PayPal, Inc. are particularly relevant here)
do not constitute measures under the GATS because they are not binding; they are merely applications
of United States domestic law. In the interest of procedural efficiency, Antigua suggested that the
Panel not address the issue because it does not rea lly matter for the adjudication of this dispute
whether these actions constitute separate measure s or whether they are examples clarifying the
meaning of the law.
3.250 Antigua submits that in the case of the PayPal matter, paragraphs 14 through 16 of the
agreement referenced in its Panel request identify the legal provisions that form the basis of the
Attorney General's action in the case.
413 The action by the New York Attorney General against
PayPal confirms that these legal provisions can be used to stop money transfers to Antiguan gaming
operators. If the United States would somehow dis pute that this action by the New York Attorney
General is correctly based on United States law, this would be another reason for Antigua and
Barbuda to withdraw its suggestion to the Panel not to examine the measures listed in Section III of
the Annex to its Panel request as separate measures. If, contrary to what the United States argued in
its request for preliminary rulings, such an action is not based on legislation it becomes a separate
"measure" in its own right, even within the restri ctive interpretation of this term advanced by the
United States. With regard to the substance of th is matter, the United States argues that the Attorney
General's action applies to any Internet gambling transaction and is not specifically aimed at the
cross-border supply of such services. Not only is that irrelevant, but it is also inaccurate.
Paragraph 20 of the PayPal agreement provides th at PayPal shall cease processing payments "other
than gaming transactions that are expressly author ized under New York law." Furthermore, the
New York Attorney General has openly stated that the real objective of his actions against financial
intermediaries is to stop gambling businesses that "usually operate offshore in foreign locations,
beyond the enforcement power of local authorities."
414 Indeed, there are no measures in New York or
elsewhere in the United States that seek to stop fina ncial transfers in relation to gambling transactions
that are considered lawful in the United States.
3.251 The United States reiterates that Antigua's assertion that some US measure or measures
violates Article XI, which deals with "restrictions on international transfers and payments," is
completely unsubstantiated. Anti gua offered no theory as to how or why a particular measure might
violate Article XI, and it has conceded that the onl y example it cited in this regard – an agreement
between the New York Attorney General and Pay Pal, Inc. – is not being challenged as such. This
empty assertion is emblematic of Antigua's complete failure to offer evidence and argumentation in
support of its substantive claims. To the extent th at Antigua means to rely on items cited in the
PayPal agreement, it bears the burden of providi ng evidence and argumentation concerning such
items.
3.252 Moreover, insofar as Antigua is citing this agre ement as evidence of the application of other
measures, its arguments are misplaced.415 The Paypal agreement discusses New York gambling laws,
but it does not say that such laws bar international payments and transfers for gambling services. The

413 "Assurance of Discontinuance" signed between the New York Attorney General and Paypal Inc.
(16 August 2002).
414 "Ten Banks End Online Gambling with Credit Cards", Press Release from the New York Attorney
General (11 February 2003), p. 2; see also "Financial Giant Joins Fight Against Online Gambling", Press
Release from the New York Attorney General (14 June 2002), p. 1.
415 Antigua's response to Panel's question 29.

agreement itself is not an application of those laws as such; rather, it is a mutual settlement of a
disputed matter entered into in the exercise of the settlement authority po ssessed by both parties. 416
Such settlements reflect only the parties' anticipa tion that one or more criminal penalties might be
applied, and the crafting of an alternative solution agreed to by them – a solution that often does not
resemble the actual application of the criminal pena lties. The United States therefore submits that the
voluntary remedies settled upon in the Paypal agre ement are not probative of the meaning or
application of the laws that gave rise to that di spute. Moreover, both the Paypal agreement and the
underlying laws are neutral regarding the destination of payments. The fact that Paypal is permitted
under the agreement to make transfers for forms of gambling that are lawful in New York does not
indicate otherwise. Such transfers can be to domestic or international destinations, as can transfers for
unlawful gambling.
8. GATS Article XIV417
3.253 Antigua observes that it is possible that the United States may try to invoke one or more of
the general exceptions of Article XIV of the GATS. It would of course be inconsistent for the
United States to seek to do so given its principa l position during consultations that it has made no
commitment in relation to gambling and betting servi ces. At the DSB meeting of 24 June 2003 the
United States nevertheless stated that cross- border gambling and betting services are prohibited
because of "the social, psychological dangers an d law enforcement problems that they created,
particularly with respect to Internet gambling and betting." 418 The United States also expressed
"grave concerns over the financial and social risks po sed by such activities to its citizens, particularly
but not exclusively children." 419 Antigua also points out that in a Note, the WTO Secretariat states,
with regard to the protection of public morals a nd the maintenance of public order under Article XIV,
that "[M]easures to curb obscenity or to prohibit Internet gambling might well be justified on these
grounds."420 Article XIV of the GATS is an "affirmative defence" and, if the United States were to
invoke it, the burden of proof would be on the United States. 421 Therefore, it is for the United States
to make its case under Article XIV and for Antigua to respond. In the interest of procedural
efficiency, Antigua nevertheless submits a number of general considerations on the interpretation of
Article XIV of the GATS. Of course, Antigua will only be able to respond in full to a possible
Article XIV defence when (and if) the United States presents one.
3.254 Antigua notes that Article XIV of the GATS has not yet been interpreted by panels or the
Appellate Body. However, the interpretation and ap plication of Article XX of the GATT 1994 (the
corresponding GATT provision) by the Appellate Body, WTO panels and GATT panels provides
useful and relevant guidance, particularly so because the text of Article XIV of the GATS and
Article XX of the GATT 1994 is largely identical. Th e "chapeau" of both provisions is identical but
for the reference to "trade in services" in Article XIV of the GATS (as opposed to the reference to
"international trade" in Article XX of the GATT 1994). The subparagraphs of Article XIV of the
GATS that the United States may tr y to invoke in this case use the pivotal term "necessary" to
establish a connection between the s ubparagraph and the chapeau. The term "necessary" is used in a
similar way in some of the subpara graphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994. In view of the similarity
between Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT 1994, Antigua submits that, just like
Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article XIV of th e GATS requires a two-tiered analysis: first,

416 "Assurance of Discontinuance" signed between the New York Attorney General and Paypal Inc.
dated 16 August 2002., para. 10.
417 In addition to the arguments presented here, see also parties' responses to panel's questions 44 and
45 in Annex C of this Report.
418 WT/DSB/M/151, para. 47.
419 Ibid.
420 The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce , Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/68
(16 November 1998), para. 26.
421 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 16 (with regard to GATT Article XX).

provisional justification of a measure as "necessar y" under one of the subpa ragraphs and, second,
further assessment of the measure under the "chapeau."
422
3.255 In Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the Appellate Body confirmed the "necessary" test
adopted by the Panel in US – Section 337 423, i.e. that a measure is not "necessary" when "a WTO-
consistent alternative measure which the Member concerned could 'reasonably be expected to employ'
is available, or whether a less WTO-inc onsistent measure is 'reasonably available'." 424 I n Korea –
Various Measures on Beef , the Appellate Body has also "outlin ed" a weighing and balancing process
that is comprehended in the "reasonable alternative" test of the GATT Panel report US – Section 337:
"It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary to
secure compliance of a WTO-consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases,
take into account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the
law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or important
those common interests or values are, the ea sier it would be to accept as 'necessary' a
measure designed as an enforcement instrument.
There are other aspects of the enforcement measure to be considered in evaluating
that measure as 'necessary'. One is the exte nt to which the measure contributes to the
realization of the end pursued, the securing of compliance with the law or regulation
at issue. The greater the contribution, the more easily a measure might be considered
to be 'necessary'. Another aspect is th e extent to which the compliance measure
produces restrictive effects on international commerce
425, that is, in respect of a
measure inconsistent with Article III:4, restrictive effects on imported goods . A
measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be
considered as 'necessary' than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects.
In sum, determination of whether a meas ure, which is not 'indispensable', may
nevertheless be 'necessary' within the c ontemplation of Article XX(d), involves in
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently
include the contribution made by the complia nce measure to the enforcement of the
law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected
by that law or regulation, and the accompan ying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports."
426
3.256 Antigua notes that the dispute on Korea – Various Measures on Beef concerned the
application of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Wh en the Appellate Body interpreted Article XX(b)
in EC – Asbestos , it referred back to its analysis of "necessary" in Korea – Various Measures on
Beef.427 This shows that the Appellate Body's analysis in Korea – Various Measures on Beef does not
exclusively apply to Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 but is likely to apply by analogy to all similar
necessity tests, including those of Article XIV of the GATS.
3.257 In its report on US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body described Article XX of the GATT 1994 as
requiring the following:

422 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline , p. 22; Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp ,
paras. 119-121.
423 GATT Panel Report on US – Section 337, BISD 36S/345.
424 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 166.
425 (original footnote) We recall that the last paragraph of the Preamble of the GATT of 1994 reads as
follows: 'Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.'" (emphasis added)
426 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 162-164.
427 Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, paras. 171-172.

"[A] balance must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception
under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the
other Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an
exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty ri ghts of other Members. If the abuse or
misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty
obligation to a merely facultative one and di ssolves its juridical character, and, in so
doing, negates altogether the treaty right s of other Members. The chapeau was
installed at the head of the list of "Gener al Exceptions" in Article XX to prevent such
far-reaching consequences."
428
3.258 In US – Shrimp , the Appellate Body found that the United States regulation at issue did not
meet the chapeau's test because: (i) it imposed a "r igid and unbending" standard that left no scope for
taking into account other specific policies and measures that an exporting country may have adopted
to protect the general interest objective at issue;
429 (ii) it imposed a "rigid and unbending" standard on
other countries that did not take into account the conditions prevailing in the 'exporting countries; 430
and (iii) it had made no effort to pursue internati onal cooperation with releva nt countries in order to
deal with the policy concerns at issue before imposing an import ban.431
3.259 In US – Gasoline , the Appellate Body found that the words "discrimination between
countries," in the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 covers discrimination between the
exporting and importing country (national treatme nt) as well as discrimination between exporting
countries (most favoured nation treatment).432
3.260 The United States argues that Antigua has failed to make out its case. Indeed, it is unable to
make out a case for the simple reason that there is no breach of any US GATS obligation. It is
therefore unnecessary for the Panel to examine Antigua 's claims in light of Article XIV of GATS.
Nonetheless, the United States believes that, in orde r to develop the fullest possible appreciation of
the scope and gravity of the issues at stake in this dispute, it is important to understand the vital policy
objectives served by US measures restricting gambling. In so doing, these US measures would easily
meet the requirements of Article XIV. The fact that these measures so clearly fall within Article XIV
also serves to confirm that it would have been inco mprehensible for the Unite d States to make them
the subject of a specific commitment.
3.261 The United States notes that Antigua mentioned three statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1084, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952; and 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Since the "total prohibition" asserted by Antigua is not a notion
capable of any independent existence under US law, an examination of Article XIV can only take
place in the context of these specific measures. The United States therefore addresses the following
discussion to the origins, operation, and purpose of the three statutes that Antigua has deigned to
mention in the course of its arguments.
3.262 Following the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, the US Department of Justice
launched an all-out assault on organized crime in the Un ited States. As part of that effort, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy proposed the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering. Sections 1084 and 19 52 of Title Eighteen, United States Code, formed part of that
program. Congress enacted them in 1961. Explaining the overall effect of his program, including the
portions that would become §§ 1084 and 1952, Atto rney General Kennedy observed that organized

428 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 156.
429 Ibid., para. 163.
430 Ibid., para. 177.
431 Ibid., para. 171.
432 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, pp. 23–24.

crime posed an "acute" danger to the United Stat es, and that "the need for action is clear."
433 The
question, in his words, was "what can be done e ffectively to curtail these hoodlums and racketeers
who have become so rich and so powerful." His answer:
"These people use interstate commerce and interstate communications with impunity
in the conduct of their unlawful activities. If we could curtail their use of interstate
communications and facilities, we could inflic t a telling blow to their operations. We
could cut them down to size.
Mr. Chairman, our legislation is mainly concerned with effectively curtailing
gambling operations. And we do this, Mr. Chairman, because profits from illegal
gambling are huge and they are the primary source of the funds which finance
organized crime, all throughout the country."
434
3.263 The United States argues that Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that the goal of his
package would not be to displace state laws restri cting gambling, but to aid in their enforcement. 435
Noting that federal law enforcement work in other areas had been "effective" and "helpful to local law
enforcement," he urged that similar enforcemen t cooperation between federal and state authorities
was "essential in getting action against organized cr ime, which is so well organized and so well
entrenched on a multistate basis that local law enforcement often is vi rtually powerless to act without
aid and assistance of the federal government."436
3.264 The United States reiterates that Section 1084 pr ohibits a person in the business of betting or
wagering from knowingly using a wire communication f acility to transmit in interstate or foreign
commerce bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers. As previously
noted, this statute does not prevent the cross-border supply of gambling information so long as the
information assisting in the placing of certain types of bets or wagers is being transmitted from a state
or foreign country where such wagering is legal to a state or foreign country where wagering on the
same event is legal, or if the informa tion is being transmitted for news reporting.
437 T h e m a i n
purposes of § 1084, as articulated at the time of its consideration by Congress, are to aid in the
enforcement of state and local laws and, in so doi ng, to suppress organized gambling. The legislative
history describes them in the following terms:
"The purpose of the bill is to assist the various States and the District of Columbia in
the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offences
and to aid in the suppression of organized gambling by prohibiting the use of wire
communication facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of bets or
wagers and gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce."438

433 Kennedy testimony, p. 11.
434 Ibid., p. 2 ("Organized crime is nourished by a number of activities, but the primary source of its
growth is illicit gambling. From huge gambling profits flow the funds to bankroll the other illegal activities I
have mentioned including the bribery of local officials.").
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid.
437 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
438 House of Representatives Report No. 87-967, pp. 1-2 (1961). See also Kennedy testimony, p. 6 ("It
cannot be overemphasized that this bill is designed, first to assist the States and te rritories in enforcement of
their laws pertaining to gambling and like offenses. Second, the bill would in that regard help suppress
organized gambling ....") (original emphasis omitted). Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that the
legislation was not aimed at "a social wager between friends." Ibid., US court decisions have confirmed these
purposes. For example, a 1983 decision of a federal appellate court found that § 1084 was enacted to assist the
states in enforcing their own laws against gambling. See United States v. Southard , 700 F.2d 1 (1
st Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).

According to Attorney General Kennedy, the restri ctions on remote supply of gambling reflected in
§ 1084 were needed as an additional enforcemen t tool because the use of wire communications
technologies for the dissemination of gambling in formation frustrated local law-enforcement
efforts.439

3.265 The United States reiterates that Section 1952 of Title 18, United States Code, prohibits
travelling in interstate or foreign commerce, or usi ng the mails or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, with intent to, inter alia, "distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity" or "otherwise
promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafte r perform[] or attempting to perform" such act.
The term "unlawful activity" is defined to include "any business enterprise in volving gambling ... in
violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States." The primary
purpose of § 1952, as articulated by Attorney Genera l Kennedy, is to enable the Federal Government
to "take effective action against the racketeer w ho conducts an unlawful business but lives far from
the scene in comfort and safety."
440 In his words, "[t]he target clearly is organized crime." 441
Government investigations made it clear that "onl y the Federal Government can shut off the funds
which permit the top men of organized crime to live far from the scene and, therefore, remain immune
from the local officials."442
3.266 Section 1955 of Title 18, United States Code, was enacted by Congress as part of Title VIII of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In the Statement of Findings prefatory to that Act,
Congress described the threat posed by organized crime in grave terms:
"(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy
by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of for ce, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized
crime derives a major portion of its powe r through money obtained from such illegal
endeavours as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property,
the importation and distribution of narco tics and other dangerous drugs, and other
forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labour unions and to subvert and corrupt
our democratic processes; (4) organized cr ime activities in the United States weaken
the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens."
443
3.267 The United States notes that Section 1955 pr ohibits conducting, financing, managing,
supervising, directing, or owning all or part of an illegal gambli ng business. Section 1955(b) defines
the term "illegal gambling business" as "a gambling bus iness which – (i) is a violation of the law of a
State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct,
finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in
substantially continuous operati on for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2000 in any single day." Congress articulated three broad reasons for including § 1955 in the
Organized Crime Control Act. First, the Congress and the President viewed gambling income as the
"lifeline of organized crime" and the means by which it financed other activities.
444 Second, Congress

439 Kennedy testimony, p. 5.
440 Kennedy testimony, p. 15.
441 Ibid., p. 16.
442 Ibid.
443 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note.
444 116 Congressional Record H9711 (daily ed. 7 October 1970) (Statement by Rep. Poff).

and the President expressed concern that gambling "preys upon society," especially the poor.
445
Third, from a law enforcement standpoint, "gambling is more susceptible than most organized crime
activities to detection and prosecution."446 Commenting on the law enforcement purpose in particular,
a legislator observed that:
"[T]itle VIII's expansion of the Federal jurisdiction over large scale gambling cases
will improve local efforts [to enforce antiga mbling laws], not merely by providing an
impetus for effective and honest local law en forcement, but also by making available
to assist local efforts the expertise, man power, and resources of the Federal agencies
which under existing Federal antigambling st atutes have developed high levels of
special competence for dealing with gambling and corruption cases."447
Several US courts have confirme d and elaborated on these purposes. 448 For example, the courts have
confirmed that § 1955 is a measure against organized crime 449, and that it provi des an enforcement
tool in cases where local officials fail to prosecute illegal gambling.450

3.268 Because all of the foregoing measures operate in part as measures to enforce state restrictions
on gambling, it may be useful for the United States to elaborate on the policy concerns that underlie
state-level restrictions. Generally speaking, stat e laws prohibiting or restricting various forms of
gambling rest on state policies relating to public health, safety, welfare, and the preservation of good
order. The examples of state gambling policies submitted by the United States provide further
elaboration on these state policies.
3.269 The United States submits that Article XIV of the GATS is clear that "nothing" in the GATS
"shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures" falling
within the terms of that article. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the United States may
maintain sections 1084, 1052, and 1955 since they meet the requirements of Article XIV, over and
above the fact that they are also consistent with the remainder of the GATS. In order to meet the
requirements of Article XIV, a measure must fall within the scope of para graphs (a) to (e) of
Article XIV, and it must meet the requirement s of the introductory provisions in the chapeau of

445 Ibid. See also House of Representatives Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 53 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4029, ("The provisions of this title [referring to 18 U.S.C.§ 1955] do not apply to gambling
that is sporadic or of insignificant monetary proportions. It is intended to reach only those persons who prey
systematically upon our citi zens and whose syndicated operations are so continuous and so substantial as to be
of national concern, and those corrupt State and local officials who make it possible for them to function.").
446 116 Congressional Record H9711 (Statement by Rep. Poff).
447 Ibid., at H9712.
448 See, e.g. , United States v. Scavo , 593 F.2d 837, 841 (8 th Cir. 1979) (In enacting § 1955, Congress
did not intend to make all gambling businesses subject to federal prosecution; rather the statute was "intended to
reach only those persons who prey sy stematically upon our citizens and wh ose syndicated operations are so
continuous and so substantial as to be of national con cern.." (quoting House of Representatives Rep. No. 1549,
91st Cong. 2d. Sess. (1970)); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478 (5 th Cir. 1976) (It is not the purpose of
§ 1955 to prohibit gambling, but only to prohibit "illegal" gambling of such a size as would affect interstate
commerce. Organizers of illegal gamb ling activities are among the organized criminal elements targeted by
Congress.).
449 United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (5 th Cir. 1976) (Clearly, the dominant concern
motivating Congress to enact § 1955 was that large-scale gambling operations in this country have been closely
intertwined with large-scale organized crime, and indeed may have provided the bulk of the capital needed to
finance the operations of organized crime. The target of the statute was la rge-scale gambling operations – local
"mom and pop" bookmaking operations were to be left to state law.).
450 United States v. Nugent , 389 F. Supp. 817, 819 (W.D. La. 1975) (The legislative history of
18 U.S.C. § 1955 indicates Congress' intention to place in the hands of the prosecutor a weapon with which to
attack the corruption of local law en forcement personnel and public officials by persons involved in illegal
gambling operations.).

Article XIV.451 Article XIV has not been interpreted through dispute settlement. Some of its
provisions are similar to provisions of Article XX of the GATT, while others differ in certain respects.
3.270 The operative language in the opening phrases of Article XIV(c) of the GATS is virtually
identical to Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Article XIV(c) protects measures that are "necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which ar e not inconsistent with the provisions of [the
GATS]." The text states that these measures include, inter alia, laws or regulations relating to "the
prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices" 452 and laws or regulations relating to "safety." 453
The text indicates that this GATS provision appli es to laws that are (i) designed to "secure
compliance" with laws or regulations not themselve s inconsistent with some provision of the GATS,
and (ii) "necessary" to that end.454
3.271 The United States argues that, first, a panel mu st determine whether the measure in question
is designed to ensure compliance wi th other WTO-consistent measures. 455 Article XIV(c)(i)-(iii)
provides examples of these types of measures – exam ples that are intended to be illustrative rather
than exhaustive, as indicated by the use of the word "including." Second, a panel must examine
whether a measure is "necessary." 456 In doing so it should apply the ordinary meaning of the term,
which has been described in the following manner by the Appellate Body:
"The word 'necessary' normally denotes something 'that cannot be dispensed with or
done without, requisite, essential, needful'. We note, however, that a standard law
dictionary cautions that:
[t]his word must be considered in the connection in which it is used,
as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may import
absolute physical necessity or in evitability, or it may import that
which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or
conducive to the end sought. It is an adjective expressing degrees,
and may express mere convenience or that which is indispensable or
an absolute physical necessity."
457
3.272 The United States notes that this ordinary meani ng indicates that "the word 'necessary' is not
limited to that which is 'indispensable' or 'of absolute necess ity' or 'inevitable.'" 458 Moreover, the
concept of necessity is a continuum that may extend, depending on the nature of the interest served,
all the way to measures that "make a contribution" to compliance. 459 In the services context, a panel
should also bear in mind the particular objects and purposes of the GATS, including recognition of the

451 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline (interpreting Article XX of the GATT).
452 GATS Article XIV(c)(i).
453 GATS Article XIV(c)(iii).
454 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 157 ("For a measure, otherwise
inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragra ph (d) of Article XX, two elements
must be shown. First, the measure must be one designed to 'secure compliance' with laws or regulations that are
not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be "necessary"
to secure such compliance.")
455 Panel Report on Canada–Periodicals, para. 5.9 (interpreting Article XX of the GATT).
456 The United States notes that the views expres sed here regarding the term "necessary" under
Article XIV of the GATS are restricted to that context, and do not necessar ily apply to the same term in other
provisions of the GATS, or in other WTO agreements.
457 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 160 (interpreting Article XX of
the GATT).
458 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161 (interpreting Article XX of
the GATT).
459 Ibid. (interpreting Article XX of the GATT).

"right of Members to regulate." This includes the ri ght of a Member to heavily restrict a highly risky
service (in this case, gambling by remote supply) while allowing the use of a less risky service.
460
3.273 The United States argues that Congress designed §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 in large part to
serve as law enforcement tools to secure compliance with other WTO-consistent US laws. Most
obviously, these statutes "secure compliance" with state laws restricting gambling and other like
offences by enhancing the enforcement of such me asures. Sections 1084, 1952, and 1955 make an
essential contribution to the enforcement of state law. Before these federal laws existed, violators of
state gambling laws often avoided prosecution by supplying their services remotely, from locations
out of reach of state and local law enforcement authorities. Sections 1084 and 1952 address that
problem by enabling federal law enforcement aut horities to pursue remote suppliers of illegal
gambling who violate state law, even if those vi olators are beyond the reach of state or local
authorities. Section 1955 similarly furthers enforc ement of state laws by enabling federal authorities
to pursue large gambling businesses that violate stat e law, especially in cases where state authorities
are unable or unwilling to address the problem. The design of §§ 1952 and 1955 confirms their role
as enforcement measures, inasmuch as a violation of state law is an express element of the offence
described in each of those statutes. In the case of § 1084, the same characteristic is reflected in the
fact that the statute includes an exception in § 10 84(b) the scope of which depends on the extent to
which gambling activity is lawful under state law. Moreover, as described above, the legislative
history of these measures is painstakingly explicit in recording the fact that they were designed in
large part as measures to aid in the enforcement of state restrictions on gambling in situations where
such compliance was doubtful.
3.274 The United States argues that as to the substance and WTO-consistency of the state laws with
which these measures are designed to secure complian ce, it suffices to note that most of them are
among the many measures included in the CD-ROM containing copies of State and Territorial
Legislation that Antigua provided to the Panel;
461 yet Antigua has failed to make out a prima facie
case with respect to any of these measures. Ther efore their WTO consistency can be presumed.
Section 1952 also secures compliance with other state laws not challenged by Antigua, including laws
relating to liquor, narc otics, and prostitution. 462 The state gambling laws, which §§ 1084, 1952, and
1955 help to enforce, protect fundamentally importa nt state policies relating to public health, safety,
welfare, and the preservation of good order. Promin ent among these is society's interest in remaining
free from crime, and organized crime in particular. More generally, these policies protect the public
from the law enforcement, consumer protection, h ealth, and other concerns associated with gambling
and more fully described elsewhere by the United States.
463
3.275 As measures against organized crime, §§ 10 84, 1952, and 1955 are necessary to secure
compliance with all the various WTO-consistent US criminal laws violated by organized crime
activities. As discussed above, §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 are clearly measures against organized
crime, and legislative history and subsequent interp retations confirm that purpose. Inherent in the
concept of "organized crime" are certain types of criminal activity in which organized crime groups
typically engage. 464 The specific crimes most closely associ ated with organized crime include, in

460 Appellate Body Report on EC–Asbestos, para. 168 (interpreting Article XX of the GATT)
("Accordingly, it seems to us perfectly legitimate for a Member to seek to halt the spread of a highly risky
product while allowing the use of a less risky product in its place.")
461 One relevant group of statutes not included in that selection is are the statutory age limits on
participation in gambling activities established by every US state. Antigua has acknowledged the existence of
these restrictions. As with other state-level restrictions, §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 are necessa ry to secure
compliance with these laws.
462 8 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (defining "unlawful activity" for purposes of § 1952).
463 See above paras. 3.189-3.195.
464 The United States notes that, in the words of one commentator, every organized crime activity is
made up of "more specific crimes, which constitu te what we know as organized crime." See Jay S. Albanese,

addition to gambling offences, such crimes as loan sharking (i.e., illegal lending), prostitution, the sale
and distribution of drugs and/or pornography, the fencing (i.e. , illegal purchase) and distribution of
stolen property, money laundering, and labour racketeering (i.e. , the use of force or threats to obtain
money for ensuring jobs or labour peace). 465 In addition, the pursuit of these organized crime
activities often entails acts or thr eats of murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, bribery, and extortion,
not to mention lesser crimes such as assault, fraud, and larceny. 466 The Panel will not be surprised to
learn that all of the foregoing offences are crimes under the federal and/or state laws of the United
States. The WTO consistency of these US crimin al laws is not in question, nor could Antigua
seriously dispute the importance of the interests th at they serve. Nor can it seriously question the
importance of combating organized crime.
3.276 The United States notes that to effectively en force these underlying criminal laws against
organized criminals, law enforcement authorities require special statutory tools that are adapted to the
challenges posed by sophisticated, well-financed criminal groups. Sections 1084, 1952, and 1955 are
three such tools. 467 As with terrorist groups and other criminal groups, one essential enforcement
strategy for pursuing organized crime is to pl ace restrictions on its major sources of funds. 468
Gambling has long been recognized as a major sour ce of funds for organized crime, and clearly a
major purpose behind the enactment of §§ 1084, 1952, a nd 1955 was to restrict that source of funds
and ensure that it would not escape the scrutiny of law enforcement officials. 469 Congress further
confirmed the association between these specific me asures and enforcement in the field of organized
crime when it enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Ac t of 1970, known as the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statut e, or, more commonly the "RICO" statute. 470 In the
RICO statute, Congress defined "racketeering activity" as including, inter alia, acts indictable under
§§ 1084, 1952, and 1955.471
3.277 In addition, §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 were all enacted out of the firmest possible conviction
that they were indispensable to defeating organized crime. 472 The Senate Report for the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 thus stressed that:
"What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals,
but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a
serious threat to the economic well-being of th e Nation. In short, an attack must be

The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime: A Risk Assessment Instrument for Targeting Law Enforcement
Efforts, p. 19, at http://www.ojp.gov/nij/international/programs/ukr_pred_paper.pdf (2002).
465 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
466 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (defin ing "racketeering activity" in part to include "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dea ling in obscene matter, or
dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical .. wh ich is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.").
467 See above paras. 3.261-3.267.
468 United States Attorney' Bulletin, June 1999, p. 27, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usab4703.pdf ("Most crimes have some type of financial gain as the primary motive.
Curtailing or eliminating the proceeds of criminal ac tivity can have a substantial impact on reducing crime
overall. ... Taking the profit out of crime is also an important step in eliminating the operating capital needed to
fund ongoing criminal activity.").
469 See above paras. 3.262-3.267.
470 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
471 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).
472 For example, Attorney General Kennedy testified before the U. Senate th at there was an "acute
need" for §§ 1084 and 1952. Kennedy testimony, p. 17. See also ibid., p. 5 (§ 1952: "[T]his bill is vital. We
need it. Local law enforcement officials need it. The country needs it.").

made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all
available fronts."
473
As this quotation suggests, a major goal of US law enforcement efforts against organized crime is to
attack its sources of money and power.

3.278 The United States notes that Article XIV(a) provides a general exception for measures that
are "necessary to protect public morals or to mainta in public order." The text does not elaborate on
these provisions except to note, with respect to public order, that "[t]he public order exception may be
invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental
interests of society."
474 Article XIV(a) provides an excepti on for measures "necessary to protect
public morals or to maintain public order." The te rm "public order" refers to the familiar civil-law
concept denoted in French by the expression "ordre public" and its functional counterpart in common-
law systems, the concept of "public policy" (although the latter term is also used in other contexts
with a broader meaning). In the words of Judge Laut erpacht, the concept of "public order" refers to
the "fundamental national conceptions of law, decency and morality." 475 "Public morals" in turn
refers to standards of right and wrong that can be described as "belonging to, affecting, or concerning
the community or nation." 476 The concepts of public order and public morals are closely associated
with restrictions on gambling. For example, th e original use of "public morals" in the GATT
followed prior multilateral trade negotiations in wh ich it was well-understood that restrictions on the
importation of lottery tickets – the forerunner of modern restri ctions on cross-border gambling –
would fall within the public morals exception. 477 Indeed, Members continue to maintain similar
restrictions for similar reasons. 478 As to Internet gambling in particular, Antigua has correctly noted

473 Senate Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong.,1st Sess., p. 79 (1969). President Nixon similarly noted in his
Message on Organized Crime that organized crime's "economic base is principally derived from its virtual
monopoly of illegal gambling, the numbers racket, ... the importation of narcotics," and certain other crimes.
Ibid., p. 35. The Senate Report also incorporated th e American Bar Association' s conclusion that "[t]he
magnitude of the [organized crime] problem makes it clear that all legitimate methods of combating organized
crime must be utilized." Ibid., p. 76.
474 Article XIV, footnote 5.
475 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants
(Netherlands v. Sweden), 1958 I.C.J. 55, 90 (Judgment of 28 November) (sep. op. of J. Lauterpacht).
476 "Public" means "of or pertaining to the people as a whole; belonging to, affecting, or concerning the
community or nation," and "moral" means "Of or pertaining to human character or behavior considered as good
or bad; of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong....". See New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, pp. 1827, 2204.
477 The United States notes that the Economic Committ ee of the League of Nations put forward a draft
convention that included an exception for "[p]rohibitions or restrictions imposed for moral or humanitarian
reasons or for the suppression of improper traffic, prov ided that the manufacture of and trade in the goods to
which the prohibitions relate are also prohibited or restricted in the interior of the country." See Abolition of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restriction, Comme ntary and Preliminary Draf t International Agreement
drawn up by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations to serve as a Basis for an International
Diplomatic Conference, League of Nations Doc. C.E.1.22. 1927 II.13. pp. 10, 15 (1927). Commenting on this
draft, the US State Department observed that the moral exception was "necessary" because of "American
prohibitions or restrictions imposed for moral or humanitarian reasons or to suppress improper traffic relate inter
alia to intoxicating liquors, smoking opium and narcotic drugs, lottery tickets, obscene and immoral articles, ...
[etc.]." Department of State, The S ecretary of State to the Minister in Sw itzerland (Wilson), in Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, p. 257 (1942) (emphasis added). In the debate over the
proposed exception, the representative of Egypt asked whether a prohibition on the importation of foreign
lottery tickets would be covered by the moral exception. The president of the c onference stated that such
prohibitions would be covered by the exception for measures adopted for "moral or humanitarian reasons."
International Conference for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, Proceedings of
the Conference, p. 110, League of Nations Doc. C.21.M.12. 1928 II.7, p. 110 (1928).
478 The United States argues that, for example, the 1 999 Trade Policy Review of Israel observed that
Israel maintained an import prohibition on "[t]ickets or publicity items for lottery or gambling" and identified
the reason for this prohibition as "[p]ublic morals." Trade Policy Review - Israel - Report by the Secretariat ,

that the WTO Secretariat in 1998 observed, with re gard to the protection of public morals and the
maintenance of public order under Article XIV, that "[m]easures to curb obscenity or to prohibit
Internet gambling might well be justified on these grounds." 479 In the GATS, invocation of the
"public order" portion of this exception is limite d to measures necessary to respond to "genuine and
sufficiently serious" threats to a fundamental interest of society.
3.279 Remote supply of gambling raises significant c oncerns relating to the maintenance of public
order and the protection of public morals. The Un ited States has shown that gambling by remote
supply is particularly vulnerable to various forms of criminal activity, especially organized crime. 480
Maintaining a society in which persons and their pr operty exist free of the destructive influence of
organized crime is both a matter of "public mora ls" and one of "public order." As Congress found
when it enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, the specific threats posed by organized crime
include, among others, social exploitation; corrupt ion and subversion of the democratic processes;
economic losses and instability; and diminution of the domestic security and general welfare of the
United States and its people.
481 These grave concerns meet the high standard for "genuine and
sufficiently serious" threats to a fundamental intere st of society, as required in the case of "public
order" by footnote 5 of the GATS.
3.280 According to the United States, Antigua's own evidence dispels any possible doubt about the
gravity of such concerns in the specific context of remote supply of gambling. The first paragraph of
the Bear Stearns report submitted by Antigua states that:
"Many offshore jurisdictions, particularly those in the Caribbean, exert little or no
regulatory control over gambling site operator s, who are for the most part unknown.
More importantly, they are beyond the contro l of the US Justice Department. Still,
these sites generate up to 60% of their revenues from the vast American market.
They are a direct pipeline of dollars out of the US into virtually unknown hands. In
addition, such sites fall under loose offshore reporting requirements, so it is unclear
how these funds are spent. In our view, this uncertainty could pose a risk to national
security from terror and/or criminal organizations."
482

WT/TPR/S/58, table III.8 (1999). Similarly, the 1999 trade policy review of the Philippines listed limitations on
foreign ownership of gambling operations (e.g. , racetracks) under a h eading that referred, inter alia, to
limitations "for reasons of ... risk to health and morals." Trade Policy Review - The Philippines - Report by the
Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/59, table III.11 (1999) (The document does not specify precisely which reason is
associated with the gambling ownership restriction, but from the context of the document it is reasonable to
infer that restriction is based on "morals" or "health and morals."). Numerous countries prohibit imports of
gambling paraphernalia on GATT Article XX grounds, although it is not always possible to discern whether
these restrictions are attributed to public morals or to some other Article XX exception. To cite just one
example, El Salvador "operates import prohibitions on a limited number of products, generally on grounds of
health, security, morality or environmental protection," and includes gambling paraphernalia on the list of such
products. See Trade Policy Review - El Salvado r - Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/111, para. 50 and
table III.5 (2003).
479 The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce , Note by the Secretaria t, 16 November 1998,
S/C/W/68, para. 26. While not legally binding, this observation by the Secretariat further confirms the
association between restrictions on gambling and the pr otection of public morals and maintenance of public
order.
480 See above paras. 3.189-3.192.
481 See above para. 3.266 (quoting Statement of Findings accompanying the Or ganized Crime Control
Act of 1970).
482 See Bear Stearns, E-Gaming: A Giant Beyond Our Borders , (September 2002), p. 1 (emphasis
added). See also ibid., p. 40, (discussing Antigua and five other jurisdictions, and concluding that "although
these major markets provide for some of the most lucrative and popular gaming sites on the Internet, they also
provide for the least amount of public in formation. In our view, this lack of access to information increases the
risk profile of the region tremendously. As we stated earlier in this report, we believe that the Caribbean

3.281 The United States argues that Antigua's own evid ence thus confirms that the United States is
not alone in viewing remote supply of gambling as a potential vehicle for organized crime and other
forms of lawlessness that threaten public order and public morals. In addition, the United States has
shown that remote supply greatly expands gambli ng opportunities into settings – such as homes and
schools – where it has not traditionally been present and is not subject to the controls present in other
settings.
483 By thus expanding gambling from controlled settings into uncontrolled settings, remote
supply expands the audience of potential gamblers – most notably by making it easy for children to
gamble. While adults can be expected to exerci se their own moral judgment, society recognizes that
children have a less well-develope d sense of right and wrong. Thus the availability of gambling in
uncontrolled settings naturally provok es concerns about public morals that are present to a far lesser
degree when gambling is conducted away from hom es and schools and subject to verifiable age
controls.484
3.282 The United States has already shown that §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 are indispensable tools in
the fight against organized crime and other forms of criminality. 485 At the same time, these statutes
serve to suppress betting by remote supply, and are in that respect necessary to prevent the intrusion
of gambling into uncontrolled settings. Taken together, these public order and public morals concerns
should lead a panel to conclude that remote supply of gambling poses a grave threat to the
maintenance of public order and the protection of public morals in the United States – certainly
enough so to justify the maintenance and enforcement of origin-neutral restrictions on gambling such
as those found in §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955.
3.283 The United States submits that the chapeau of Article XIV imposes an additional requirement
that any measure provisionally justifiable under (a) through (e) not be "applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary and unjustif iable discrimination between countries where like
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services." The purpose of the chapeau of
Article XIV is to avoid abuse or misuse of the pa rticular exceptions set forth in Article XIV(a)
through (e). 486 The restrictions in §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955 meet the requirements of the chapeau.
None of these measures introduces any discrimination on the basis of nationality. On the contrary, as
the United States has repeatedly observed, they appl y equally regardless of national origin. Therefore
the only question with respect to th e chapeau is whether these laws c onstitute "a disguised restriction
on trade in services." Antigua has asserted that th e real purpose of US restrictions on remote supply
of gambling is protectionism. As the foregoing discussion of the legislative history of §§ 1084, 1952,
and 1955 amply illustrates, Antigua is mistaken. These measures were enacted long before Internet
gambling was even thought possible, and for reasons having nothing to do with protection of domestic
industry. There is simply no basis on which to assert that they constitute "a disguised restriction on
trade in services." On the contrary, their applica tion is a legitimate and non-discriminatory response
to the continuing threats posed by remote supply of gambling – including those newer threats posed
by Internet gambling.
3.284 Antigua's comments suggest a belief on its part that the United States should be required to
address its concerns about remote supply of ga mbling by negotiating international regulatory
standards.
487 This suggestion suffers from at least two basic flaws. First, as a legal matter, nothing in
the text of the GATS requires such action. S econd, as a factual matter, the absence of any US

market, in which we believe a large number of operator s are domiciled, could present a threat to national
security given the lack of available information.")
483 NGISC Final Report, pp. 5-1 ("[O]n-line wagering promises to revolutionize the way Americans
gamble because it opens up the possibility of immedi ate, individual, 24-hour access to the full range of
gambling in every home."). See also US arguments above, para. 3.18 (discussing classification of gambling as
vice activity and concerns about its spread into homes, schools, etc.).
484 See above paras. 3.193 and 3.18.
485 See above paras. 3.261-3.267.
486 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, pp. 22 and 25.

domestic regulatory regime that permits the remote supply of gambling services makes it
unreasonable for Antigua to expect the United States to seek negotiations to permit such a regime for
its cross-border suppliers. The United States recogni zes that certain other countries – including, most
obviously, Antigua itself – have determined that they can regulate the remote supply of gambling
services in a manner that those countries consider to be sufficient. Indeed, each Member has the right
to determine for itself the level of law enforc ement to provide through its domestic laws and
regulations.
488
3.285 The United States reiterates that the Panel has before it extensive evidence of the study and
debate that has taken place in the United Stat es concerning the possible regulation of remotely
supplied gambling services. In spite of all of this study and debate, the United States has not found it
possible to develop regulations for the remote s upply of gambling on a domestic basis that would
provide sufficient levels of law enforcement to satisfy the priorities of US regulators. 489 Given this
context, it is unreasonable to expect the United States to negotiate an "agreed regulatory context" for
cross-border supply of such services. In closing, th e United States wishes to reiterate that there is no
need for the panel to reach Article XIV issues in orde r to resolve this dispute. While the maintenance
and enforcement of US restrictions on gambling cl early serves the interests identified by the GATS
negotiators in Article XIV as being of overridi ng importance, it does so in a non-discriminatory
manner that is in all respects fully consistent with the GATS.
3.286 Antigua notes that, after having never mentioned Article XIV of the GATS, the United States
for the first time raised this provision on 9 January 2003. Even so, it is not entirely clear that the
United States is actually asserting Article XIV as a defence. The United States says it is "unnecessary
for the Panel to examine Antigua' s claims in the light of Article XIV" but that its measures "would
easily meet the requirements of Article XIV." Article XIV provides an affirmative defence and if the
United States does not invoke it, then the Panel should not address it. Antigua does certainly not
request the Panel to apply Article XIV and refers to the language already quoted and contained in
paragraph 3.285 above "the United States wishes simply to reiterate that there is no need for the panel
to reach Article XIV issues in order to resolve this dispute." To the extent that the United States seeks
to somehow raise an "informal" Article XIV type de fence, it does so only with regard to three federal
statutes and not with regard to other federal or state statutes. The three federal statutes at issue are the
Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act. With rega rd to these three federal
statutes the United States essentially raises three Article XIV type defences.
3.287 Antigua states that, first, the United States submits that the three statutes are "necessary" "for
the enforcement of state laws on gambling" and are therefore covered by Article XIV(c).
Article XIV(c) exempts measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreem ent." The United States says that its state laws are
consistent with the GATS and that therefore the federal laws enhancing those laws are exempted
under Article XIV(c). This reasoning is obviously ci rcular and merits only a brief response. An
Article XIV issue can only arise when a WTO Me mber violates its GATS obligations. Antigua

488 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 176 ("It is not open to doubt
that Members of the WTO have the right to determine for themselves the level of enforcement of their WTO
consistent laws and regulations.").
489 As the United States has pointed out, among the issues that have prevented the US regulators from
authorizing remote supply of gambling are the significantly greater regulatory concerns associated with remote
supply of gambling, See above paras. 3.189-3.195, including the law enforcement and other concerns described
above that led to the enactment of, and require the enforcement of, §§ 1084, 1952, and 1955. Internet gambling
poses such severe regulatory difficulties that the US National Association of A ttorneys General ("NAAG"),
representing state law enforcement officials, has taken the unusual step of asking the federal government to
enact new legislation to make US restrictions on Internet gambling more explicit. See NGISC Final Report,
pp. 5-9. As the NGISC observed, "NAAG's position on In ternet gambling is a rare stance by the association in
support of increased federal law enforcement and re gulation and is a clear indication of the regulatory
difficulties posed by Internet gambling." Ibid.

challenges the lack of market acc ess and the absence of equal cond itions of competition. To the
extent that United States laws contribute to this vi olation they cannot be invoked as a justification for
this infringement under Article XIV(c).
3.288 The second Article XIV type defence seems to be that these statutes are "necessary" for the
enforcement of the criminal laws violated by organized crime and are therefore covered by
Article XIV(c). The crimes mentioned by the Un ited States include loan sharking, prostitution, sale
and distribution of drugs, distribution of stolen property, murder, kidnapping, arson and robbery.
Apparently the United States believes that the pr ohibition of all cross-border gambling and betting
services from Antigua is "necessary" to enable the United States to combat organized crime and
prevent the commission of these crimes – a baffling proposition which lacks all credibility. In any
event, in evaluating the United States' claim, the Panel must take into account, on the one hand, the
extent to which the prohibition contributes to that end and, on the other, the extent to which the
prohibition produces restrictive effects on international commerce.
490 In Antigua's view, this
evaluation is very simple: (i) the United States has submitted no evidence of organized crime
involvement in Antigua's gambling industry nor has it submitted any evidence that Antigua would not
cooperate with criminal investigations and prosecuti ons by the United States; (ii) the effect of the
United States' measures is the most restrictive possible: total prohibition. Consequently, this aspect of
the defense fails. Antigua points out a 1989 decision of the United States Supreme Court
491, where
the Supreme Court had to balance the desire of th e State of California to prohibit certain forms of
gambling on Native American reservations against the Native American and federal interest of
promoting tribal economic development. As th e United States does here, in that case California
submitted that its gambling restrictions were necess ary to prevent the infiltration of Native American
tribes by organized crime. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the fears expressed by
California were, as is true here, but a vague allegation.
3.289 Antigua notes that the United States' third Ar ticle XIV defence is that the three federal
statutes are "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order" as provided in
Article XIV(a). The footnote to Article XIV(a) cl arifies that this exception needs to be interpreted
narrowly: "[T]he public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society. In Korea – Various Measures on
Beef the Appellate body also found that when evaluating whether a measure is "necessary":
"[A] treaty interpreter (...) may (...) take into account the relative importance of the
common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to
protect. The more vital those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to
accept as 'necessary' a measure designed as an enforcement instrument."
492
3.290 Antigua notes that the United States wisely does not argue that gambling and betting is, as
such, contrary to public morals and public order. In view of the wide availability of gambling in the
United States and the active involvement in the promotion of gambling of both the state and the
federal governments, such a claim would have no cr edibility at all. The United States does, however,
argue that public order and public morals are e ndangered because of the alleged organized crime
threat (which Antigua has already dealt with) and because "[..] remote supply greatly expands
gambling opportunities into settings – such as homes and schools – where it has not traditionally been
present and is not subject to the controls present in other settings." Howeve r, this would only be
problematic for children because the United States con cedes that "adults can be expected to exercise
their own moral judgment." Antigua has already explained to the Panel that age verification and other
technologies exist (and many are being used) to reduce the chances of minors gambling on the

490 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 162-164.
491 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
492 Appellate Body on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162.

Internet with Antiguan operators. While the United States has made plenty of "mere assertions," it
has not provided any evidence to the contrary with respect to Antigua's industry.
3.291 Antigua submits that, even if the United States could establish that current age verification
systems are not effective, other methods of preventing under age gambling are conceivable that would
be less restrictive on international trade than a tota l prohibition. For instance, the United States could
cooperate with Antiguan operators in verification of social security numbers or other government
means of identification. Or, gambling and betti ng accounts with Antiguan ope rators could be opened
in person at news agents or other specifically designated shops. In such circumstances the age
verification system would be exactly the same as that used by lotteries in the United States.
Consequently, the United States' total ban on cr oss-border supply from Antigua cannot possibly be
said to be "necessary" because its "remote" character would not allow age verification. Antigua
recalls it has shown that the United States tolera tes a substantial amount of under age gambling and
that state lotteries aggressively target the youth market. One must therefore conclude that youth
gambling and the strict enforcement of its laws on under age gambling is of only limited importance
to the United States.
3.292 Antigua submits that, even were the United States to make out a provisional defence under
Article XIV, it is required to demonstrate that the three federal statutes in question meet the additional
requirements of the "chapeau" of Article XIV. This is clearly not the case. First, the United States
discriminates against Antiguan services because they cannot be supplied through distribution methods
that are available for the distribution of domestic services. This is an obvious "unjustifiable
discrimination". Second, even when comparing th e treatment of purely Internet and telephone based
Antiguan services with that of services that the Un ited States describes as "non-remote," the United
States' total prohibition does not meet the requireme nts of the chapeau. As effected by the three
federal statutes explored by the United States, the total prohibition is a "rigid and unbending"
493
measure. While the United States refuses to consid er cooperation with Antigua regarding its alleged
objectives of age verification and fighting organized crime, such internati onal cooperation would not
only be a less "rigid and unbending" and trade restrictive policy, but it would also be a much more
effective tool for the United States to achieve its stated objectives. The United States dismisses, out
of hand, the suggestion of cooperation with Antigua, despite the fact that it follows from the Appellate
Body report in US – Shrimp that under the chapeau, a total prohibition cannot be justified by a
Member that refuses to pursue international cooperation. In this context, the Panel should refer to an
interview494, where the president of the International A ssociation of Gaming Attorneys explains how
the expansion of United States gaming companies into the United Kingdom benefits from cooperation
between the regulators of the two countries. Thus, international regulatory cooperation in the gaming
sector is possible and is already taking place – albeit to the exclusive advantage of companies from
the United States.
3.293 As a final point on the chapeau, Antigua refers th e Panel to two letters of the president of an
association of the state lotteries in the United St ates (the "NASPL"), one of which specifically
concerns this dispute.
495 In both letters it is repeated verbatim that the NASPL "does not take a
position on Internet gambling, per se" but that it is the position of the NASPL "that each individual
state should be permitted to legislate and regulate the forms of gaming conducted within its borders,
as well as the methods by which gaming is offered to the citizens of the state." This means in practice
that state governments determine "the various industries' potential profits and losses" and in that
process "rivalry and competition for investme nt and revenues" is the main motivation. 496 The two
letters from the NASPL clearly indicate what the states' real concern is with Internet gambling – not

493 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 177.
494 "Talking Points: Legal Eagle", International Gaming & Wagering Business (January 2004), p. 10.
495 "Aubin, Lemons and Musgrave: Running Racinos and Raking in Revenue", Public Gaming
International, (May 2003).
496 See above para. 3.107.

that it is inherently more dangerous than other forms of gambling but simply that it will undermine the
states' ability to determine the conditions of co mpetition in the gambling sector in view of the
economic benefits accruing to the state and its local operators. Thus, this is further evidence that the
United States' total ban on Internet gambling services from Antigua is "a disguised restriction on trade
in services."
3.294 The United States maintains its view that the Panel need not reach the issue.
497 The United
States would also like to invite the Panel to reflect on the Article XIV implications of some of its
earlier discussion – including the discussion of Mr. Scott, money laundering and other dangers, and
the statistics on federal prosecuti ons in gambling cases. These obser vations further support the law
enforcement arguments and the public order and pu blic morals arguments discussed above by the
United States. Moreover, the Canadian television program 498 provided on videotape to the Panel also
includes, among other things, an on-camera intervie w with a Canadian police official commenting –
before September 11, 2001 – on the concern that money from Internet gambling could flow to
"organized terrorist groups." He calls it a "very real scenario that could be occurring now and that
could certainly develop in the future." Clearly these are matters to be taken seriously.
3.295 In response to Antigua's statements about in ternational cooperation, the United States would
welcome Antigua's continued assistance in the inv estigation and prosecution of money launderers and
others who violate US law. In particular, th e United States would note the assistance provided by
Antiguan law enforcement in turning over reco rds of EuroFed Bank, which Pavel Ivanovich
Lazarenko and others used to launder funds. While it is not true that the United States has "refused"
to pursue international requests for assistance as suggested by Antigua, there is a basis for a reluctance
to do so if the case involves Internet gamblers. For example, Antigua publicly took a position
contrary to the United States in the prosecution of Jay Cohen by filing an amicus brief in support of
Mr. Cohen in the US Supreme Court. In addition, in its licensing of William Scott, a convicted felon,
the fact that procedures apparently were not fo llowed is troubling. These matters suggest that
requests for assistance would not be fruitful if the inv estigation involves or is related to an Internet
gambler. Finally, the Cabazon case cited by Antigua affords no support for Antigua's attempts to
downplay the threat of organized crime. That case rests on the principle that "Indian tribes retain
attributes of sovereignty over both their members a nd their territory and that tribal authority is
dependent on, and subordinate to only the Federal G overnment, not the States." It was in that narrow
context of limited state power that the Court held th at the State of California's interest in keeping
charitable bingo games from being infiltrated by or ganized crime was not sufficient to override the
Federal and tribal interests in promoting self-suffici ency by the tribe. The court did not in any way
conclude that organized crime is not a serious probl em in relation to gambling – and certainly not in
relation to forms of gambling more serious than ch aritable bingo. On the contrary, the United States
already cited Supreme Court precedent confirming the dangers of organized crime in relation to
gambling.
IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES499
A. CANADA
4.1 Canada submits its views on the interpretation of a Member's Schedule under the GATS – in
this case the United States – but does not reach any conclusions on whether or not the United States is
in breach of one of its obligations under the GA TS. Canada submits that the W/120 Classification
List and the corresponding CPC numbers are, pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention, relevant sources for the purpose of interpreting the specific commitments in the US

497 See the United States' reply to Panel question No. 44.
498 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "The Big Gamble", broadcast on The Fifth Estate
(31 October 2001).
499 See also the replies of the third parties to questions from the Panel in Annex C of this Report.

Schedule. When the specific commitments of the Un ited States at issue in this case are interpreted in
the light of the W/120 Classification List and the CPC numbers referred to in it, the only reasonable
conclusion is that the United States has taken "f ull" modes 1 and 2 market access and national
treatment commitments with respect to gambling and betting services.
4.2 Pursuant to Article XX:3 of the GATS, the Sche dule of a Member forms an integral part of
the GATS. The rules of interpretation that apply with respect to a GATS Schedule thus are the same
as those applicable with respect to the rest of th e Agreement. This means that the Schedule of a
Member, and the specific commitments contained th erein, must be interpreted in accordance with
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Alth ough this position has not been specifically stated
in the context of the GATS, it is supported by find ings of the Appellate Body in the context of the
GATT 1994. In EC – Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body stated that:
"A Schedule is […] an integral part of the GATT 1994 […]. Therefore, the concessions
provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which
may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty
interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention."500

4.3 This position was later affirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry, Canada – Dairy and
Korea – Various Measures on Beef .501 While there are differences between tariffs and specific
commitments, the Appellate Body's reasoning is equa lly applicable with respect to the interpretation
of a GATS Schedule. This also accords with Ar ticle 3:2 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's view
that "the rules of treaty interpretation in Artic les 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention apply to any
treaty, in any field of public international law." 502 The specific commitments of a Member – in this
case the United States – must therefore be interpre ted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the Schedule in their context and in the light of the object and
purpose of the GATS (and the WTO Agreement more generally). 503 To the extent appropriate,
recourse may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation.504
4.4 The United States clearly used and followed the structure of the W/120 Classification List to
schedule its specific commitments. However, its Sc hedule does not include explicit references to the
CPC numbers that, in the W/120 Classification List, are associated with a particular services sector or
sub-sector. This does not mean, as the United States s uggests, that the CPC numbers associated with a
particular services sector or sub-sector in the W/120 Classification List are irrelevant, inapplicable or
to be ignored when interpreting the United States' specific commitments. Rather, they form part of
the context that, pursuant to Article 31 of the Vie nna Convention, must be taken into account by the
interpreter of these specific commitments.
4.5 In US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act , the following remarks were made concerning the
requirements for an "agreement" or "instrument" to exist within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the
Vienna Convention:
"The International Law Commission explains in its commentary on the final set of
draft articles on the law of treaties that this provision is based on the principle that a
unilateral document cannot be regarded as fo rming part of the context unless not only
was it made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, but its relation to the

500 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
501 Appellate Body Report on EC – Poultry, para. 82; Appellate Body Report on Canada – Dairy ,
paras. 131-133; Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 96-97.
502 Appellate Body Report on US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 60. With respect to Article 3:2 of the DSU,
see Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 17.
503 Vienna Convention, Article 31.
504 Ibid., Article 32.

treaty was accepted by the other parties. 'On the other hand, the fact that these two
classes of documents are recognized in para graph 2 as forming part of the 'context'
does not mean that they are necessarily to be considered as an integral part of the
treaty. Whether they are an actual part of the treaty depends on the intention of the
parties in each case.' It is essential that the agreement or instrument should be
related to the treaty. It must be concerned with the substance of the treaty and clarify
certain concepts in the treaty or limit its field of application. It must equally be
drawn up on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty. Any agreement or
instrument fulfilling these criteria will form part of the "context" of the treaty and will
thus not be treated as part of the prepar atory works but rather as an element in the
general rule of interpretation."
505
4.6 The W/120 Classification List (and by implication the CPC numbers referred to in it) meets
these criteria and at least qualifies as an "instrumen t" within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the
Vienna Convention. The W/120 Classification List was prepared by the then GATT Secretariat at the
request of Uruguay Round participants. In particul ar, the Montreal Ministerial Declaration called for
the preparation of such a list by the Secretariat.
506 The revised version of the W/120 Classification
List, dated 10 July 1991, which is the version that was (and still is) used by Members, was based on
comments from Uruguay Round participants. 507 The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, also prepared by
the then GATT Secretariat at the request of Urugua y Round participants, called for the general use of
the W/120 Classification List in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of clarity in the
description of each sector or sub-sector scheduled.508
4.7 While there is no question that the 1993 Sche duling Guidelines are not an authoritative legal
interpretation of the GATS – they specifically state that they are not – there is also no question that, in

505 Panel Report on US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act , para. 6.45 (quotation marks in text; emphasis
added; notes omitted).
506 MTN.TCN/7 (MIN), 9 December 1988, Part II, para. 10. See also Note by the Secretariat,
Reference List of Sectors , MTN.GNS/W/50, 13 April 1989. According to Canada, the fact that the Uruguay
Round participants acted through the GATT Secretariat for the preparation of the W/120 Classification List –
this was arguably the practical and effective way to wo rk in a concerted manner on such a matter – obviously
does not mean that the W/120 Classification List should not be considered to have been "made by the parties"
within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention.
507 See cover-note by the Secretariat on the W/120 Classification List.
The legal nature of a schedule as well as the ne ed to evaluate commitmen ts, require the greatest
possible degree of clarity in the description of each sector or sub-sector scheduled. In general the classification
of sectors and sub-sectors should be based on the Secret ariat's revised Services Sect oral Classification List.
Each sector contained in the Secretariat list is identified by the corresponding Central Product
Classification (CPC) number. Where it is necessary to refi ne further a sectoral classification, this should be
done on the basis of the CPC or other internationally recognised classification (e.g. Financial Services Annex).
The most recent breakdown of the CPC, including explanatory notes for each sub-sector, is contained in the UN
Provisional Central Product Classification.

Example: A Member wishes to indicate an o ffer or commitment in the sub-sector of
map-making services. In the Secretaria t list, this service would fall under the general heading "Other Business
Services" under "Related scientific and technical consu lting services" (see item l.F.m). By consulting the CPC,
map-making can be found under the corresponding CPC classification number 86754. In its offer/schedule, the
Member would then enter the sub-sector under the "Other Business Services" section of its schedule as follows:

 Map-making services (86754)

If a Member wishes to use its own sub-sectoral classification or definitions it should provide
concordance with the CPC in the manner indicated in the above example. If this is not possible, it should give a
sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity as to the scope of the commitment.

accordance with their stated purpose, they assisted all Members in the preparation of their Schedules
and the listing of their specific commitments. 509 For instance, the GATS did not prescribe any
particular format for the Schedules of Members, apart from what is specified in Article XX. The 1993
Scheduling Guidelines provided a standard format for the Schedules of Members, which was used and
followed by Members in implementing their Article XX obligations. Following numerous
consultations, a revised version of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines was adopted by the Council for
Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, for the purpose of the current round of negotiations. The
revised 2001 Scheduling Guidelines have retained, unchanged, the statement quoted above contained
in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines 510. The foregoing suggests that there is agreement among
Members that, in general, the classification of sect ors and sub-sectors in a Schedule should be based
on the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC numbers referred to in it. A Member
can, of course, depart from the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC numbers. In
such a case, however, it should provide concordance w ith the CPC or, if this is not possible, it should
give a sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity as to the scope of a specific
commitment. According to Canada, the DSU
511 offers further eviden ce of the acceptance by
Members of the W/120 Classification List (and by implication the CPC numbers referred to in it) for
the purpose of scheduling their specific commitments. In elaborating upon how Members may
suspend concessions with respect to services sectors, Article 22 relies on the W/120 Classification
List to define these sectors.
512
4.8 Canada does not challenge the fact that a Memb er may, in certain cases, have departed from
the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC numbers associated with it. This possibility
is specifically provided for in the 1993 Sche duling Guidelines (and the revised 2001 Scheduling
Guidelines). No Member was forced or obliged to schedule specific commitments in accordance with
the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC numbers. As previously emphasized,
however, a Member that intended to depart from the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding
CPC numbers was asked to provide concordance with the CPC or, in cases where this was not
considered possible, to give a sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity as to the scope of
a specific commitment. In a number of inst ances, the United States did depart from the
W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CP C numbers in a clear and unambiguous manner,
that is, in the manner suggested in the 1993 Sc heduling Guidelines. In two cases where the
United States did not wish to include certain elements otherwise covered by the
W/120 Classification List and, by implication, the corresponding CPC numbers, it specifically said
so.
513 Similarly, in scheduling its specific commitments on environmental services, the United States,
while using the W/120 Classification List, expressly defined the activities covered by its specific
commitments.514 In scheduling specific commitments on hos pital and other health care facilities, the

509 Ibid., para. 1. See also Panel Report on EC – Banana III (US) , para. 7.289, where it is stated that
"[i]n the Uruguay Round negotiations participants agreed to follow a set of guidelines for the scheduling of
specific commitments under the GATS."
510 See above footnote 508.
511 The DSU is one of the Multilateral Trade Agr eements binding on all Members: WTO Agreement,
Article II:2.
512 DSU, Article 22:3(f)(ii). This invalidates the Un ited States' assertion that the W/120 Classification
List is only part of the negotiating history of the GA TS and therefore cannot constitute anything more than a
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. It supports the argument that
the W/120 Classification List qualifies as an "agreemen t" within the meaning of Article 31:2(a) of the
Vienna Convention.
513 With respect to Computer and Related Services, th e following entry is made in the US Schedule:
"(MTN.GNS/W/120 a) – e), except air line computer reservation systems)." With respect to Publishing, the
following entry is made: "(Only part of MTN.GNS/W/12 0 category: 'r) Printing, Publishing'." GATS/SC/90,
pp. 61 and 73.
514 See US Schedule, p. 87. The entry "Environmental Services" is followed by note 19, which
provides that "[i]n each of the follo wing sub-sectors, United States' commi tments are limited to the following
activities: […]"

United States expressly defined the scope of that sub-sector in its Schedule.
515 A contrario, where the
United States has simply followed the W/120 Classi fication List, without any clear and explicit
departure from it and the corresponding CPC numbers, it should be inferred that the specific
commitments at issue are to be interpreted in th e light of the W/120 Classification List and the CPC
numbers associated with it.
4.9 The specific commitments provided for in a Member's GATS Schedule are reciprocal and
result from a mutually-advantageous negotiati on between importing and exporting Members.
516 I n
EC – Computer Equipment , the Appellate Body stated, in the context of Schedules of tariff
concessions under the GATT, that tariff negotiati ons are a process of reciprocal demands and
concessions and that, while each Schedule represents the tariff commitments made by one Member,
they represent a common agreement among all Members.517 Thus, the meaning of a tariff concession
must be determined based on the common intention of the Members. 518 By analogy, when
interpreting a specific commitment under the GATS, one must ascertain the common intention of the
Members. The common intention of the Members in regard to the Schedule of the United States is
that where it simply follows the W/120 Classificati on List, without clearly and explicitly departing
from it and the corresponding CPC numbers, it must be inferred that the United States' specific
commitments are to be interpreted in the light of the W/120 Classification List and the CPC numbers
associated with it. The alternative would be that where the United States failed to include in its
Schedule an explicit reference to the CPC number for a services sector or sub-sector listed in
accordance with the W/120 Classification List, then the CPC number should be ignored for the
purpose of interpreting the corresponding commitment. The effect of this would be to make those
specific commitments largely dependant on the s ubjective and unilateral interpretation of the
United States. This cannot be the common intention of the Members.
4.10 Canada submits that in EC – Computer Equipment the Panel, when interpreting the European
Communities' Schedule under the GATT, did not consider the Harmonized System and its
Explanatory Notes. The Appellate Body reacted as follows:
"We are puzzled by the fact that the Panel, in its effort to interpret the terms of
Schedule LXXX, did not consider the Harmonized System and its Explanatory Notes.
We note that during the Uruguay Round negotiations, both the European
Communities and the United States were parties to the Harmonized System .
Furthermore, it appears to be undisputed that the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations
were held on the basis of the Harmonized System's nomenclature and that requests
for, and offers of, concessi ons were normally made in terms of this nomenclature.
[…] We believe, however, that a proper interpretation of Schedule LXXX should
have included an examination of the Harmonized System and its Explanatory
Notes."
519
4.11 By analogy, one would be puzzled if, as suggested by the United States recourse were not had
to the W/120 Classification List and the correspondi ng CPC numbers intrinsically linked with it
where the Schedule of a Member follows the W/120 Cl assification List. This would be all the more
surprising considering that the USITC has itsel f recognized the close correspondence between the
United States' specific commitments, the W/120 Classification List and the CPC numbers referred to

515 US Schedule, p. 117. The entry "Hospital and Other Health Care Facilities" is followed by the
following definition: "Direct ownership and management and operation by contract of such facilities on a 'for
fee' basis"
516 See Preamble of the GATS, third paragraph. See also GATS Article XIX:1.
517 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109.
518 Ibid., paras. 84 and 109.
519Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 89.

in it, stating that while "[t]he US Schedule ma kes no explicit references to CPC numbers, […] it
corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list [the W/120 Classification List]."520
4.12 Canada is therefore of the view that the W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC
numbers qualify as "context" for the purpose of in terpreting the specific commitments in the US
Schedule. Accordingly, in the present case, Canada agrees with Antigua and Barbuda that the United
States has taken "full" modes 1 and 2 market access and national treatment commitments with respect
to gambling and betting services. This is based on the United States' modes 1 and 2 commitments for
"Other Recreational Services (except sporting)," which, according to the W/120 Classification List,
refer to CPC number 964.
521 CPC number 964 includes CPC number 96492 – gambling and betting
services.
4.13 Canada argues, alternatively, that in the event that the W/120 Classification List and the
corresponding CPC numbers do not qualify as "context " within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the
Vienna Convention, the W/120 Classification Li st and the corresponding CPC numbers can be
referred to as supplementary means of interpreta tion of the US Schedule under Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention. The W/120 Classification List and the corresponding CPC numbers referred to
in it are part of the historical background agains t which the GATS and the Schedules were negotiated.
Recourse to them may thus be had in appropriate cases, that is, in tho se instances where the US
Schedule simply follows the W/120 Classification List , without clearly and explicitly departing from
it and the corresponding CPC numbers. Without such recourse to the W/120 Classification List and

520 See USITC Document, p. viii. Canada notes the US argument that this document has no legal
significance since the explicit purpose of the concordance in the document is only to "facilitate comparison of
the US Schedule with foreign schedules". In Canada's vi ew, this statement is factually incomplete and legally
incorrect. The relevant part of the document reads, at p. viii:

To facilitate comparison of the US Schedule w ith foreign schedules, the USITC has developed a
concordance that demonstrates the relationships between sectors found in the US Schedule, sectors identified in
the GATT Secretariat's Services Sectoral Classification List, and sectors defined and numbered in the United
Nations' Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC ) System. In preparing national schedules, countries
were requested to identify and define sectors and sub-sectors in accordance with the GATT Secretariat's list [the
W/120 Classification List], which lists sectors and their respective CPC numbers. Accordingly, foreign
schedules frequently make explicit references to th e CPC numbers. The US Schedule makes no explicit
references to CPC numbers, but it corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list.

The concordance developed by the USITC clarifies how the service sectors referenced in the GATT
Secretariat's list, the CPC system, and the US Schedule correspond. […]

Canada submits that such a statement by the organization (a federal agency) that, "[a]t the request of
the Office of the United States Trade Representative [… ] assumed responsibility for maintaining and updating,
as necessary, the [US Schedule]" has probative value and is a factor conf irming other evidence that there is a
close correspondence between the United States' specifi c commitments, the W/120 Classification List and the
CPC numbers referred to in it (Ibid, p. vii). In Chile – Alcoholic Beverages , para. 7.119, the Panel noted that
statements by a government against WTO interests are most probative.
521 See US Schedule, p. 123. According to Canada , it is clear that in th e case of this specific
commitment the United States was follo wing the classification of the W/12 0 Classification List. Sub-sector
10.D in the W/120 Classification List is entitled "Sportin g and other recreational services." The United States'
entry for sub-sector 10.D re ads "Other Recreational Services (except spor ting)." The logical conclusion is that
recreational services, except sporting, within the meaning of sub-sector 10.D of the W/120 Classification List
has been included in the US Schedule. The United States' almost exclusive reliance on definitions of
dictionaries to interpret this specific commitment, in pa rticular the terms "except sporting", is in effect an
attempt to have the Panel read the specific commitment out of its context, contrary to what is mandated by
Article 3:2 of the DSU and the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention. In this regard, it is worth
recalling the Appellate Body's observation that dictionaries are not dispositive statements of definitions of words
appearing in agreements and legal documents. Appellate Body Report on United States – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), para. 248.

the corresponding CPC numbers, the meaning of th e United States' specif ic commitments would
remain ambiguous and obscure. This is demonstrated by the inability of the United States to clearly
identify, absent recourse to the W/120 Classificati on List, where in its Schedule gambling and betting
services have been included or excluded.
4.14 Canada asks the Panel to find that the W/120 Classification List, including the CPC numbers
referred therein, is a relevant source for the purpos e of interpreting the specific commitments in the
US Schedule. This conclusion is legally justified under Article 31 or , alternatively, Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention. It is also supported by the findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Computer
Equipment.
B. E
UROPEAN COMMUNITIES
4.15 The European Communities notes that a stat ement such as the one made by a US
representative and reported in the minutes of the Dispute Settlement Body in connection with this
dispute522, while not relieving Antigua and Barbuda of its burden of proof, is pertinent to this
question. Statements of Members' representatives interpreting their own domestic law have been
accepted as having probative value in previous panel proceedings. 523 However, the European
Communities indicates that its comments are based on the assumption arguendo that a prohibition on
the "supply of gambling and betting services from outside the United States to consumers in the
United States"
524 exists in the US legal system.
4.16 The European Communities argues that such a prohibition is within the scope of GATS.
Article I:1 of the GATS defines the scope of the agreement as covering "measures by Members
affecting trade in services". A prohibition of cross-border supply of gambling and betting services
contained in legislative or administrative measu res is no doubt a "measure by a Member" because it
results from an action of public authorities of a Member.
525 The term "affecting" is not defined in the
GATS. Previous reports have made clear that the term "affecting", in its ordinary meaning, context
and in the light of the object and purpose of the GATS, suggests a broad meaning, notably of "having
an effect on".
526 A prohibition of cross-border supply of gambling and betting services affects trade in
services under Article I:1, the GATS because it impa cts on the conditions of competition between the
suppliers established in the Member maintaining it and those providing such services cross-border.
All other conditions being equal, such prohibition provides an incentive to consumers to turn to
service suppliers within the US territory over lik e services supplied from the territory of other
Members, thereby modifying the conditions of comp etition. The incentive is obviously a particularly
powerful one, since consumers who continue to ga mble through websites operated e.g. from Antigua
and Barbuda are doing so in breach of the law. The services at issue – namely gambling and betting
services – are not excluded from the GATS by Article I: 1 (or I:3) and their trade is thus covered by
the Agreement. Similarly, the term "supply of a service" has also broad coverage. According to
GATS Article XXVIII(b) it includes "the production, di stribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a
service."527

522 See WT/DSB/M/151, page 11.
523 Panel Report on US – Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.115, 7.121 and 7.125.
524 WT/DS285/2, para. 2.
525 Pursuant to Article I:3(a) of the GATS, "in fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the
Agreement, each Member shall take su ch reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their
observance by regional and local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory".
526 Appellate Body Report on EC – Banana III, para. 220.
527 See also Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.281, where the Panel recognized that the
"the drafters consciously adopted the terms 'affecting' and 'supply of a service' to ensure that the disciplines of
the GATS would cover any measure bearing upon conditions of competition in supply of a service, regardless of
whether the measure directly governs or indirectly affects the supply of the service."

4.17 In the view of the European Communities, the US Schedule, interpreted in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public intern ational law codified in the Vienna Convention,
includes commitments on gambling and betting services. Although GATS Schedules of specific
commitments have been reviewed in previous reports
528, panels and the Appella te Body have not as
yet specifically addressed the criteria for their in terpretation. Nonetheless, the interpretation of
Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 a nd the GPA by the Appellate Body 529 and WTO panels 530
undoubtedly provides relevant guidance, particularly so because the text of Article II:7 of the GATT
1994 and Article XX:3 of the GATS set out the le gal status of Members' Schedules of tariff
concessions/ specific commitments in largely identical terms. The EC – Computer Equipment
Appellate Body report provides the general st andard for interpretation of WTO Schedules. 531 In that
report the Appellate Body examined the legal nature of a Member's tariff Schedule in order to address
the question as to whether and how the general rul es of treaty interpretation as set out Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention are applicable in the interpretation of the former. In that respect it held:
"A Schedule is made an integral part of the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT
1994. Therefore, the concessions provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms
of the treaty. As such, the only rules wh ich may be applied in interpreting the
meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the
Vienna Convention."532
4.18 Like Article II:7 of the GATT 1994, which refe rs to the Schedules of concessions as an
"integral part of the Agreement", Article XX:3 of the GATS provides that "Schedules of specific
commitments shall be annexed to this Agreement a nd shall form an integral part thereof". This
confirms that GATS Schedules must also be treate d as treaty language and acco rdingly be interpreted
pursuant to the customary rules of treaty interpretati on. This applies to all commitments contained in
all Members' Schedules, and the distinction dr awn by the United States, i.e. between "CPC
commitments," which include textual referenc es to numerical CPC codes, and "non-CPC
commitments," the text of which make no refere nce to the CPC, is uns upported inasmuch as it
suggests different interpretative approaches for co mmitments which are all integral part of an
international agreement.
4.19 The European Communities argu es that in the Uruguay Round negotiations, participants
agreed on the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines for the scheduling of specific commitments under the
GATS533 according to which the classification of se ctors should be based on the W/120, also
developed during the Uruguay Round. In turn, each sector listed in the 1991 Sectoral classification is
identified by the corresponding CPC number. According to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines,
Members should schedule their commitments on the basis of the CPC or otherwise in such a way as to
ensure precision and clarity.534
4.20 In its GATS Schedule, the United States has clo sely followed the structure of the W/120. It
has in particular made a commitment for th e cross-border supply of services classified under
sub-sector 10.D "Other recreational services (except s porting)." Sub-sector 10.D of the 1991 Sectoral
classification is headed "Sporting and other recreational services" and it is identified therein by the
corresponding CPC "964" code. The CPC 964 category, equally headed "Sporting and other

528 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), paras. 7.287 ff.
529Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment ; AB Report, Canada – Dairy ; Appellate
Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef.
530 Panel Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef; Panel Report on Korea – Procurement.
531 The European Communities notes that this report has been cited and the findings stated therein in
relation to schedules' interpretation have been reaffirmed in all subsequent reports dealing with the issue.
532 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
533 MTN.GNS/W/164 and Add.1; Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), WT/DS27/R, para. 7.289.
534 MTN.GNS/W/164, paras. 1 and 16.

recreational services", is further broken down into two sub-sectors, namely 9641: "Sporting services"
and 9649: "Other recreational services". Finally , the latter encompasses CPC category 96492:
"Gambling and betting services". The United States has also followed the structure of W/120 in
drafting its commitments under sector 10 of its Sche dule, including sub-sector 10.D. It has only
modified the title of sub-sector 10.D, which reads "Other recreational services (excluding sporting)"
instead of "Sporting and other recreational services" (and has made a commitment for the cross-border
supply of services falling within such sub-sector). Admittedly, the United States has not inscribed in
connection with sub-sector 10.D the equivalent CPC num ber. However, had it wanted to depart from
the CPC classification, it should have done so exp licitly. Therefore, by excluding "sporting" under
sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule, the United States has only excluded services comprised in CPC
category 9641, that is sporting services. To the contrary, by not listing any limitations on cross-border
supply of services with respect to "other recreationa l services", the United Stat es has included in its
commitment the entire CPC cate gory 9649, which further encompasses CPC category 96492:
"Gambling and betting services". In the view of th e European Communities, interpretation of a treaty
provision under the rules codified in the Vienna Convention starts by examining the ordinary meaning
of a treaty provision, in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.
535
4.21 The European Communities argues that the ordinary meaning of the US specific
commitments relating to Sector 10 ("Recreational, cultural and sporting services") does not warrant
the conclusion that gambling and betting services are excluded from such commitments. The US
interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the defin itions for sub-sectors 10.D and 10.A is contradicted
by the very dictionary definitions of some key te rms employed in Sector 10 of its schedule quoted by
the United States. First, the United States makes much of a reference to gambling and betting in
connection with the term "sporting" in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary . The European
Communities notes that the one quoted by the United States is certainly not a commonly used
meaning of the term. What is more, under the very definition in the New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary on which the United States relies, only when it is referred to a person is the term
"sporting" taken to refer, inter alia, to gambling. The full quote from the New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary is as follows:
Sporting, adj.
 1 a Sportive; playful. rare.
 b Engaged in sport or play.
 c Of a plant etc.: tending to produce abnormal varieties or sports
 2 a Interested in or concerned in sport
b Designating an inferior sportsman or a person interested in sport from purely
mercenary motives. Now esp. pertaining to or interested in betting or
gambling. Chiefly in sporting man.
 c sporting girl, woman, a prostitute, a promiscuous woman.
536

Thus, under the definition that the United States quotes, a sporting man may be a person interested in
betting or gambling (he can also be merely interested in sport, under definition 2.a). This, however,
does not prove that sporting services pertain to or include gambling. Likewise, a sporting woman
may be a prostitute, but this presumably does not m ean that sporting services pertain to or include
prostitution. An adjective, such as "sporting" qualifies another term (typically a noun) and its
meaning in a given case depends on the term it is meant to qualify.

4.22 The European Communities further submits that the United States also refers to another
dictionary definition under which the adjective "s porting" is somehow related to gambling. The

535 Vienna Convention, Article 31:1.
536 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (emphasis added), New York, Oxford University Press,
1993.

European Communities is not in a position to verify the source quoted by the United States. 537 I t
notes nonetheless that another US dictionary, the Webster's New World Dictionary of American
English, reads:
Sporting, adj.
 1 of, having to do with, or for sports, or athletic games, etc.
 2 interested in or taking part in sports, or athletic games, etc.
 3 sportsmanlike; fair
 ☼4 interested in or having to do with games, races, etc. characterized by gambling or
betting
 5 Biol. inclined to mutate –
☼ Americanism 538

4.23 The meaning relating to gambling, besides defi nitely not being a common one, is qualified by
the dictionary itself as an "Americanism". Th e European Communities therefore doubts that the
meaning to which the United States points can be rea lly considered the "ordinary meaning" within the
meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .539 Also, if applied to services, the above
definition would mean "having to do with games, ra ces, etc. characterized by gambling or betting".
This does not entail that "sporting services" include gambling and betting services. Accordingly, the
ordinary meaning of the heading for sub-sector 10.D – "Other recreational services (except sporting)"
in the US Schedule does not exclude that gambling and betting services fall under that sub-sector.
4.24 The European Communities notes that the Unite d States further refers to dictionary
definitions of the terms "entertainment" and "rec reational" and, after allegedly establishing the
ordinary meaning of the term "sporting", the Unite d States hastens to infer that "[b]ased on the
ordinary meaning of the words "recreational", "e ntertainment" and "sporting" it is impossible to
conclude that gambling and betting service must be considered to fall within sub-sector 10.A."
540
4.25 The European Communities submits that, ev en taking the definition of the term
"entertainment" provided by the United States, it is hard to deny that gambling and betting is e.g. "[a]
thing which entertains or amuses someone." Likewi se, taking the definition of the term "recreational"
referred to by the United States, it is hard to deny that gambling and betting is "used for or as a form
of recreation". The United States, has certainly no t demonstrated the contrary by merely quoting
these definitions and making the conclusory assertion th at a different interpretation is "impossible".
Furthermore, sub-sector 10.A in the US Schedule clearly designs a rather broad category - the
reference to theatre, live bands and circus services is merely illustrative of what is encompassed by
the term "entertainment services". Accordingly, th e term "entertainment", used to define sub-sector
10.A of the US schedule, may well also cover gambling and betting services, just as the term
"recreational", used to define sub-sect or 10.D, may also cover such services.
541 This further confirms
that, based on the ordinary meaning of the definitions used in sector 10, gambling and betting services
are not excluded from the US schedule.

537 That is, the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., 2001.
538 Webster's New World Dictionary of American English , V. Neufeldt and D. B. Guralnik eds., New
York, Simon & Schuster, 1993, 3rd college ed., p. 1297.
539 The European Communities notes that, to the extent that the meaning referred to by the United
States could be considered as a "sp ecial meaning", then, pursuant to Article 31:4 of the Vienna Convention, it
shall be given to the term "sporting" only "if it is established that the parties so intended" (the burden of proof
being on the party asserting that special meaning).
540 See above para. 3.45.
541 According to the European Communities, one reason why sub-sector 10.D is the proper
classification for gambling and betting is that the United States itself has indicated that it considers CPC code
964 to fall under sub-sector 10.D instead (see USCIT document).

4.26 The European Communities further argues that each of the specific commitments of a
Member must be placed in its own - different - contex t, which is first of all the Schedule to which it
belongs. For the purposes of interpretation of th e US specific commitments, the US Schedule and its
structure, not the commitments taken by other Me mbers, are the most relevant context. The
United States tries to support its conclusion that it has taken no commitments for gambling and
betting services by referring to Schedules of other Me mbers as "context". It is somehow surprising
that the United States, having tried to distance itsel f from the classification and scheduling approach
of most other Members, particularly of those which expressly followed the CPC classification, is
placing so much emphasis on this different scheduling practice. In any event, the references to other
Members' Schedules, while not supporting the US position, often prove the contrary.
4.27 Having argued, on the basis of its own reading of the ordinary meaning, that it has excluded
gambling and betting services by the way it has wr itten the heading of its sub-sector 10.D, the
United States seems to further argue that in fact, s ub-sector 10.D is not really the appropriate heading
for those services – witness the fact that other Me mbers have referred to them under sub-sectors 10.A
or 10.E of their respective Schedules. One common feature of the schedules of other WTO Members
referred to by the United States in connection with this point is that, unlike the US one, all expressly
refer to gambling and betting services (and, for th ose schedules referring to the CPC codes, any
departure from such codes appears to be expressly pr ovided for). This in turn means that one cannot,
in the absence of such express refe rences in the US Schedule, automatically infer that gambling and
betting services also do not fall under sub-sector 10. D of such Schedule. Moreover, each of the
commitments in other Members' Schedules has to be placed in its own – different – immediate
context, which is the Schedule to which each belongs.
4.28 Thus, it is true, for example, that one WT O Member, Senegal, has inscribed gambling
services under a residual sub-sector 10.E headed "other ", instead of 10.D, and this notwithstanding a
reference to CPC in that Schedule. However, looki ng at Senegal's Schedule, it is clear that Senegal
has used sub-sector 10.D not to cover the entire CPC category 964 (which also encompasses gambling
and betting). To the contrary, Senegal only classified under 10.D a very limited selection of CPC 964,
that is "Recreational fishing". By contrast, a similar clear limitation of the scope of sub-sector 10.D is
lacking in the US Schedule. Having limited sub- sector 10.D to a very specific part of CPC 964,
Senegal logically had to classify gambling services elsewhere in its Schedule - which it did in
sub-sector 10.E. It is to be noted that in Senega l's Schedule there is no reference to any CPC code in
connection with sub-sector 10.E. This brings to what appears to be the second contextual argument of
the United States, which is based on the fact that two WTO Members included in their Schedules an
additional residual category 10.E. The United States points out that, unlike those two Schedules, its
own does not include such a residual category. It is not clear to the European Communities how this
confirms that the claim of Antigua and Barbuda is unfounded. If the United States means to say that,
in order to include gambling and betting services, it would have needed this extra category in its
Schedule, this is wrong for a number of reasons. First, the United States is in numerous company,
given that only two Members have added a residual sub-sector 10.E in their schedule. Nonetheless,
other WTO Members arguably do not contest to have undertaken commitments in relation to
gambling and betting services even without such residual sub-sector. As for Iceland, it is true that a
sub-sector 10.E has been added to a schedule that otherwise corresponds in full to the CPC. However,
this is done in accordance with the 1991 Sectoral classification (W/120), which relates CPC 964 code
(also encompassing gambling and betting) to sub-sector 10.D. Furthermore, this does not mean that
gambling and betting services fall under sub-sector 10.E in Iceland's Schedule. Quite to the contrary,
having equated sub-sector 10.D to CPC 964, Icel and correctly included gambling under that
sub-sector in its Schedule. Therefore, Iceland's Schedule does not prove that an extra sub-sector is
needed in order to have commitments on gambling and betting services. The very fact that only two
other Members needed an extra category (10.E), and only one of them to classify gambling, does not
take away that many other Members did not need it and yet committed or limited their commitments
on gambling. Thus, the presence of a category 10.E is not indispensable to take full or limited
commitments on gambling and betting, contrary to what the US seem to suggest. In addition, the US

schedule already contains a residual category for "other recreational services" – 10.D precisely. There
is therefore no need for another "Other" category in that Schedule.
4.29 It is also curious that the United States, having asserted that a limitation on gambling and
betting have been inscribed in its Schedule by writing a limitation on sporting services in sub-sector
10.D, at the same time maintains that commitmen ts for the same service category should have been
written under a different (and residual) sub-sector of Sector 10 (that is under sub-sector 10.E:
"Other"). Furthermore, the US Schedule already includes a residual sub-sector – 10.D precisely. It is
thus not clear why an additional residual category wo uld be needed. Also, the fact that another WTO
Member – Lithuania – mentions gambling and betting services under both sub-sector 10.A and 10.D
does not mean that such services are irrelevant under (or excluded from) the latter. In addition, if it
were necessary to also inscribe limitations under 10.A, the United States should have done it too, but
it did not do so. Furthermore, the fact that some WTO Members – Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Peru
– have mentioned gambling under the "Tourism" Sect or of their Schedules also does not prove that
the United States has no commitments for gambling a nd betting under Sector 10.D. Those mentions
do not concern gambling and betting services per se, but only specific instances of provision of such
services which are directly connected with tourism se rvices. To the extent that commitments in the
"Tourism" Sector also cover certain gambling and betting services, the United States should have also
inscribed limitations for those services in Sector 9 of its Schedule, but it did not.
4.30 The European Communities fu rther argues that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and the
W/120 are also pertinent to the interpretation of the WTO Schedules of specific commitments in
accordance with customary rules. Th is also applies to the US Sche dules. Those two documents have
been developed and used as reference during th e Uruguay Round negotiations , and thus constitute
preparatory works and circumstances of the conclusion of the GATS and the WTO Agreement, within
the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
542 These documents confirm that the US
Schedule does not depart from the CPC system definition as regards sub-sector 10.D ("Other
Recreational Services"). Accordingly, by excluding sporting services from its sub-sector 10.D, the
United States has excluded what is considered to be sporting services under the CPC system, but not
also gambling and betting services.
4.31 The W/120, irrespective of whether it is a legally bi nding instrument of its own, is part of the
preparatory works of the GATS and the WTO. Th e fact that the United States, which closely
followed its structure, was not bound either by it or by the CPC system, does not mean that such
Member did not follow the CPC system, directly or through the W/120, in a particular case. As for
the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, irrespective of the legal status, their overall objective must have been
shared by the negotiators. 543 The guidelines were circulated by the GATT Secretariat in response to
requests by participants544, who agreed on them. Moreover, thei r objective was to "achieve precision
and clarity", and to this effect Members not following the CPC classification should have provided
unambiguous commitments otherwise. Clarity of commitments in turn gua rantees the security and
predictability of "the reciprocal and mutually adva ntageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade" [which] is an object and purpose of the WTO
Agreement, generally, as well as of the GATT 1994.
545 Thus, security and predictability, besides
being an objective of the WTO Agreement generally, has been specifically recognized to be relevant
in connection with GATT tariffs schedules. But it is at least as important for the scheduling of
commitments on services.546 It is therefore not pure coincidence that the US Schedule follows closely

542 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 86.
543 Panel Report on EC – Bananas III (US), para. 7.289.
544 MTN.GNS/W/164, p. 1, footnote 1.
545 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 82.
546 The European Communities notes that, similarly to the GATT 1994, the GATS is also aimed at
"promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis" and at "progressive liberalization"
(Preamble, paras. 2 and 3).

the 1991 Sectoral classification, mirroring what vi rtually all other WTO Members have done. The
references to the CPC codes in the 1993 Schedu ling Guidelines are aimed at providing such
predictability because the CPC offers a relatively sophisticated tool for defining the sectors/ sub-
sectors for which Members undertake commitments. This is made clear in paragraph 16 of the
Scheduling Guidelines.
4.32 Referring to CPC codes was not the only possible way contemplated by the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines to achieve clarity. However, where Members intended not to follow the CPC system, they
were requested by the Scheduling Guidelines to provi de such predictability otherwise – that is by
clarifying and defining otherwise the content of thei r commitments: "If a Member wishes to use its
own sub-sectoral classification or definitions it s hould provide concordance with the CPC in the
manner indicated in the above example. If this is not possible, it should give a sufficiently detailed
definition to avoid any ambiguity as to the scope of the commitment."
547 In other words, while use of
the CPC definitions was not mandatory, departure from those definitions was not free and
unconditional. Rather, departure was to be done so as to ensu re predictability through some
alternative means. Departure from the CPC system was not meant to allow convenient ambiguity in a
Member's Schedule. If the United States did not pr ovide concordance at the time it put forward its
Schedule, or other sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity, it means that it did not
intend to depart from the CPC.
4.33 Moreover, the United States itself recognized, in th e last draft Schedule it tabled at the end of
the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993, that the scope of its sectoral commitments
corresponds to the 1991 Sectoral classification.
548 Paragraph 5 of the introductory language to the US
Draft Final Schedule mentions, in pertinent part, that "[E]xcept where specifically noted, the scope of
the sectoral commitments of the United States corresponds to the sectoral coverage in the Secretariat's
Services Sectoral Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/ 120, dated 10 July 1991)." The US Draft Final
Schedule includes, inter alia, sector 10, which is defined in identical terms to the sector 10 appearing
today in document GATS/SC/90. So is in par ticular sub-sector 10.D, equally labelled "OTHER
RECREATIONAL SERVICES (except sporting)". Thus , paragraph 5 of the in troductory language to
the US final offer contains an express admission that the US Draft Final Schedule was in principle
based on the 1991 Sectoral classification – and theref ore also on the CPC, to which the latter makes
reference. The same paragraph also states that only when expressly mentioned does the US Draft
Final Schedule depart from the 1991 Sectoral cla ssification. Clearly, however, sub-sector 10.D does
not contain any such express mention. It is also wo rth mentioning that identical language to that of
paragraph 5 just quoted also appears in the in troduction to the second Revised Conditional Offer
tabled by the United States earlier during the Uruguay Round.
549 To the best of the knowledge of the
European Communities, the US second Revised Cond itional Offer is also the one where a specific
commitment on "Other recreational services" first appears, and again, it is defined in terms of
"OTHER RECREATIONAL SERVICES (except sporti ng)". This means that the US specific
commitment on "other recreational services" was al ways accompanied by an indication that it was
based on the 1991 Sectoral classification. It also means that sub-sector 10.D was drafted on the basis
of the 1991 Sectoral classification – whether or not it was so because the United States was bound to
it. And, as noted by Canada
550, there are only two instances wher e the United States made explicit
exceptions to the 1991 Sectoral classification. Th e United States seems to argue that other WTO
Members should have sought clarification from the Unite d States of the scope of its commitments. In
fact, the language quoted from the US Draft Fi nal Schedule and second Revised Conditional Offer
shows that it was the United States itself that provided such clarification, including in the last offer it

547 MTN.GNS/W/164, page 7, para. 16, in fine.
548 Communication from the Un ited States of America, Draft Final Schedule of the United States of
America concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.3, 7 December 1993.
549 Communication from the United States of America, Revised Conditional Offer of the United States
of America concerning initial commitments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.2, 1 October 1993, p. 1.
550 See above para. 4.8.

tabled at the end of the negotiations in December 1993. It also shows that there is no attempt to
impose a link with the CPC definitions ex post facto, contrary to the US contention.
4.34 The European Communities further argues th at the need for clear and predictable
commitments also underlies the explanatory document of the US Schedule prepared by the USITC at
the request of the USTR. For sub-sector 10 .D, that document expressly recognizes the
correspondence between the US Schedule, the 1991 Sectoral classification and the relevant CPC
codes, which include gambling and betting. Havi ng expressly recognized in that document what can
already be inferred from its own Schedule and from paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
(that is, that the US Schedule does not depart from the CPC description for sub-sector 10.D), the
United States cannot in good faith attempt to unilate rally restrict the scope of its commitments in
dispute settlement. The "security a nd predictability" of "the recipr ocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade" pursued by the
WTO Agreement would otherwise be compromised.
4.35 As for GATS Article XVI, the European Communities argues that two elements must be
reviewed under Article XVI:1, i.e. whether the US Schedule of specific commitments includes market
access commitments on gambling and betting services and whether maintaining such a measure
amounts to less favourable treatment than committed. Moreover, under Article XVI:2, the measure in
question must not be of any of the six types of prohibited measures listed therein. Concerning the first
point, the European Communities submits that th e US specific commitments, specifically in
sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule, correctly in terpreted, also cover gambling services. Second,
given that the United States has inscribed no limita tion in its Schedule of specific commitments for
gambling and betting services provided under mode 1, a prohibition on the "supply of gambling and
betting services from outside the United States to consumers in the United States", which is a
complete limitation on provision under that mode, would clearly entail less favourable treatment than
provided in such Schedule. Thirdly, a "blanket" prohibition of cross-border gambling services means
that no foreign gambling service can enter ("access ") the US gambling market under the so-called
"mode 1" of service provision and that no foreign supplier can operate from outside the US territory
on the US market. This is tantamount to saying th at there is a quantitative restriction ("numerical
quota") within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) of the GATS, which quota equals zero. The
United States, while contesting that the measures referred to by Antigua and Barbuda in its request for
panel establishment contain numerical quotas, does not appear to contest Antigua and Barbuda's
statement that a complete ban would constitute a nu merical quota. On the other hand, the fact that
Article XVI:2(a) refers to "limitations on the numbe r of service suppliers … in the form of numerical
quotas" does not in itself indicate that a particular number or ceiling of providers operations or output
must be expressly indicated in a measure in order fo r it to be caught by such provision. Otherwise, it
would indeed not be difficult for Members to fash ion their measures in such a way as to escape the
prohibition in Article XVI:2(a).
4.36 As to GATS Article XVII, the European Commun ities argues that, to establish a violation of
this provision, one must assess: (i) whether the US schedule of specific commitments includes market
access commitments on gambling and betting services; (ii) whether there are like services/suppliers;
and (iii) whether maintaining such measure amount s to less favourable treat ment than granted to
domestic services and suppliers, that is (a) wh ether the measure modifies the conditions of
competition and (b) this is in favour of domestic services and suppliers.
4.37 As regards the identification of like domestic service or suppliers, the European Communities
shares the Appellate Body's view on the need for a case-by-case approach to the issue of "likeness" in
WTO provisions. Furthermore, some special cauti on needs to be exercised to avoid mechanical
transposition to services of criteria developed in connection with trade in goods. Services are,
generally, a different "case". In the two cases in wh ich the term as it appears in the GATS has been
interpreted so far, the services and suppliers at is sue were found to be "like" by focusing on the

similarity of the activity performed and of the r esult of such activity (that is the service itself).
551 The
intangibility of services may make certain other si milarities extremely subjective and too uncertain
properly to appreciate. It is thus important to focus on the characteristics of the services at issue
themselves and other objective elements. The classification of services in Members' Schedules will
also be a useful indicator because classification generally reflects a certain level of differentiation
between the various activities listed. Indeed, it is most likely that services will not be "like" one
another if classified in different parts of a Schedule.
4.38 Activities which are essentially the same (e.g. the provision of wholesale trade services) will
most likely lead to a finding of "likeness". On the other hand, focusing on the service activity per se
also allows to make distinctions, where appropriate . Thus, for example, in the case of "specialized
medical services" covered by the CPC number 93122, one will need to further distinguish between
different kinds of specialization. A cardiologi st's activity will be distinguishable from an
ophthalmologist's – and the differe nce in activity will also tell something about whether these two
specialized services can compete. Or, to take one example from environmental services, "nature and
landscape protection services" covered by CPC number 9406 include service activities as diverse as
ecosystem protection services, disaster assessment a nd abatement services, climate change studies.
The capability of serving the same or partially common end uses will normally also confirm the
similarities or differences of two services resulting from an analysis of the "attributes" or "features" of
a service per se . Thus, to return to the example of specialized medical services, a service by a
cardiologist will also serve a different purpose th an a service by an ophthalmologist. Reliance on
more subjective elements – such as consumer perception – may greatly reduce predictability of GATS
commitments and obligations, contrary to the objec tives of the WTO Agreement. This is especially
so when consumer perception may have been aff ected by past or current regulatory or other
restrictions.
4.39 Differences in elements extrinsic to the services themselves – such as in terms of law
enforcement and consumer protec tion, protection of youth – are not as such relevant to decide
whether two services are "like" (eve n if they may respond to differen ces in the characteristics of two
services). Otherwise, given that services provided cross-border are often regulated differently from
services provided domestically, there could hardly ever be likeness between the former and the latter.
Thus, for example, US international telecomm unication service providers would not be like the
domestic Mexican provider because the Mexican regulator cannot impose fine on them. Likewise, the
nature or identity of the shareholders of two service suppliers may not as such make services "unlike".
4.40 The European Communities further submits that paragraph 3 of Article XVII expressly refers
to a modification of the conditions of competition (t o the detriment of foreign services and suppliers)
as an indication of "less favourable treatment". Th is provision suggests that the purpose of the GATS
national treatment obligation is to protect the e xpectations of equal competitive conditions between
foreign and domestic services and suppliers.
552 A notion of "likeness" that were so narrow such that it
would not be permissible to take account of the competitive relationship between foreign and
domestic services would not seem to be in line with the full text and objective of Article XVII.
4.41 For the European Communities, the fact that a prohibition on the "supply of gambling and
betting services from outside the United States to consumers in the United States" would violate
GATS provisions does not rule out that the violations may be justified under GATS Article XIV
thereof. In view of the close correspondence in wording and function between Article XIV of the
GATS, and Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Eu ropean Communities concurs with Antigua and
Barbuda that the former provision is an affirmativ e defence. As such, it would be up to the United

551 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III , para. 227; Panel Report on Canada – Autos,
paras. 10.248, 10.285 and 10.289.
552 Similarly to Article III of GATT 1994 (see Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, paras. 98-99,
referring to the Appellate Body Report on Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, paras. 109-110).

States to show that a prohibition on cross-border s upply of services is justified on grounds foreseen in
Article XIV (which it has not done in its first wr itten submission). For the same reasons of close
similarity to Article XX of the GATT 1994 both in drafting and in function, Article XIV should be
interpreted in the light of the pertinent GATT acquis.
C. JAPAN
4.42 On the issue of whether the United Stat es undertook commitments on gambling and betting
services (CPC 96492), Japan submits that the relations between the headings in the US Schedule and
CPC classification is not clear, as there is no explicit reference to CPC number in the US Schedule.
This is an issue of vital importance for the lega l stability of the commitments undertaken by Members
during the Uruguay Round and the continuing services negotiations. The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
state in paragraph 15 that "the legal nature of a schedule as well as the need to evaluate commitments,
require the greatest possible degree of clar ity in the description of each sector and
sub-sector scheduled", and make reference to the W/120 and CPC numbers. It might be argued that
the same paragraph states that only "(i)n general," "the classification of sectors and sub-sectors should
be based on the Secretariat's revised Services Sect oral Classification List." Moreover it might be
argued that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines is not a legally binding document. However, given the
practice of Members to frequently refer to this document, to W/120 and the CPC in the course of
negotiations and after, it could at least be said that there existed an implicit confidence among
Members that each would respect those documents and classification. The question seems to be
whether offers are sufficiently de fined when not referencing or relying on the CPC, without any
positive indication of the items which are included. Should this be the case, then Members would be
forced, in the context of current servi ces negotiations, to bring with them the Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary on every bilateral exchange with the Unite d States. Or they would be forced to
request the United States to provide a set of US de finitions for the respective sectors and sub-sectors
where commitments are proposed in the US initia l offer (TN/S/O/USA), possibly together with
corresponding US domestic industrial classification.
4.43 In this dispute, if the United States is to refuse to accept that it has undertaken commitment on
gambling and betting services (CPC 96492), it is not su fficient to merely prove that the said services
are not included in sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule. The United States should also elaborate on what
specific service sub-sectors are actually included under the same heading. The United States also fails
to prove that it made it sufficiently clear at th e time of Uruguay Round negotiations on which specific
sub-sectors that it intended to undertake co mmitments under the heading "10.D. OTHER
RECREATIONAL SERVICES (except sporting)." Had there not been, at the time of the
negotiations, an explicit and comprehensive statem ent by the United States regarding the specific
content of that heading in its Schedule, the gene ral expectation that the United States respected the
structure of W/120 and the CPC needs and deserves a full protection; when specific commitments are
undertaken on a CPC four digit-number service ite m, it indicates that those specific commitments
cover all CPC five digit-number service items. Ja pan notes that its arguments above are without
prejudice to a possibility that some sub-classificati on of a service sector specifically committed under
a heading in the sector/sub-sector column of a Me mber's schedule or some measures thereupon could
be affected by some provisions of the GATS and its Annexes, such as Article I:3(b).
4.44 Concerning the issue of interpretation of "like services" as provided in Article XVII of the
GATS, Japan notes Antigua's arguments that the issue of "likeness" plays a less significant role in the
context of trade in services than in the context of trade in goods, and that the characteristics of a
specific service or service supplier are often not in herently "locked in" to the product and are often
easily adaptable. This issue of "likeness", however, requires a cautious consideration of all conditions
surrounding services, including appropriate policy cons iderations. Moreover, in Japan's view, it
should be confirmed that identification of "likeness" of trade in services should be made, as that of
trade in goods, on a case-by-case basis, on certain criteria and without over-simplification or
excessive generalization of the characteristics of servi ces or service suppliers; mere similarity in the

appearance of types of games or in the essential nature or functions of winning and losing money
should not suffice to identify the "likeness" of ser vices. Japan could support the US argument that
"likeness" of services should be identified, as appr opriate, taking into account such elements as
consumer perception, scope of availability, law en forcement environment and possible risk involved
in some particular services. In fact, such scope for argument is, Japan believes, a necessary
component of the very structure of the GATS. It could be argued that the US restrictions on Internet
gambling which are equally applicable within the United States might have some implication on the
US consistency with Article XVI of the GATS.
4.45 In some service sectors, it could be argued, in identifying "likeness", differences in regulatory
circumstances need to be, as appropriate, taken acco unt of. When services are supplied cross-border,
regulatory circumstances are completely different from those supplied through commercial presence;
service suppliers are outside the country and ther efore are not administratively and judicially
accountable to the government or to the consumer s in the same manner as domestic suppliers. In
gambling and betting services, for example, in which policy considerations such as prevention of
international organized crimes are particularly essentia l, such a difference in regulatory circumstances
might justify, to a certain extent, different regulator y framework to be applied to different modes. In
other words, certain services, when supplied cro ss-border, are recognized to be under less sound
regulatory circumstances than when supplied dom estically; it therefore could be argued from the
viewpoint of the consuming Member, these two cases are not like services to be accorded the same
treatment. Under a full national treatment commitme nt in cross-border mode, it is considered that
there is still room, at least in some services, for treating as not like services, cross-border services and
commercial-presence services of similar appearance and functions, if the necessity of differentiated
treatment in light of high regulatory requirement an d difference in regulatory circumstances, etc. is
sufficiently proven by the consuming Member.
4.46 Without prejudice to the arguments above, and ta king carefully into account the reference to
the same question in the Panel Report on Canada – Autos
553, Japan also would like to invite attention
of the Panel to the issue of a possible functio n of modes of supplying services in identifying
"likeness" of services. When this issue was take n up by the Council for Trade in Services in its
Regular Session meeting on 19 March 2002 under an age nda item of "proposal for a technical review
of GATS provisions", the views of Members were not uniform. 554 In these discussions, Members'
attention was drawn to the commonality of the u sage of "like services and service suppliers" in GATS
Articles II:1 and XVII:1-3. In the absence in Article II of the phrase "in the sectors inscribed in its
Schedule", the obligation apparently covers all services sectors and sub-sectors whether commitments
are undertaken or not. This, if "likeness" of services is to be established across modes, in turn could
effectively expand the obligation of a Member beyond what it has inscribed in its Schedule. When
Member A, for example, has inscribed "None" in the mode 3 national treatment column in a particular
service sector, Member A is obliged through Article XVII of the GATS to extend to like services and
service suppliers of Member B treatment ("treatment b") in the same mode no less favourable than
that it accords to its own service and service supplie rs. Then, through Article II of the GATS, in turn,
Member A is obliged to extend treatment no less fa vourable than "treatment b", to like services and
service suppliers of Member C, for example, in cross-border mode of supplying services, whatever
inscription Member A has made in the mode 1 nati onal treatment column in the same particular
service sector. Therefore, there was a suggestion that modes of supplying services might have a
certain function in identifying "likeness" of services. This consideration is not explicit in the Panel
Report on Canada – Autos . Japan, therefore, considers that a possible function of the mode of
supplying services, together with the findings of the Canada – Autos Panel Report needs to be
considered, if at all the Panel needs to make findings upon the issue of "likeness" of services.

553 Panel Report on Canada – Autos, para. 10.307.
554 S/C/M/59, paras. 20-39

D. MEXICO
4.47 Mexico submits that its government has decided to participate as a third party in this dispute
because of its systemic interest in the proper in terpretation and application of the GATS disciplines
and of the specific commitments of WTO Members on national treatment and market access. Of
particular interest to Mexico is the relationship between the specific commitments of WTO Members,
the W/120, and the CPC. Mexico disagrees with th e US contention that the CPC numeric codes are
not relevant in interpreting the United States' sp ecific commitments under the GATS. In Mexico's
view, the CPC is a means of interpreting and giving meaning to the United States' specific
commitments.
4.48 Firstly, Mexico shares the view expressed by Canada that "[t]he common intention of
Members in regard to the Schedule of the United States is that where it simply follows the W/120
Classification List, without clearly and explic itly departing from it and the corresponding CPC
numbers, it must be inferred that the United States' specific commitments are to be interpreted in the
light of the W/120 Classification List and the CPC numbers associated with it".
555 Secondly, Mexico
considers that the W/120 and the corresponding CPC numeric codes unquestionably qualify as
"supplementary means of interpretation" under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. As such, they
can always be used to confirm the meaning of the United States' specific commitments resulting from
the application of the general rule of interpretati on in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation acco rding to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure. Consequently, it is wrong to re fer, as the United States has done, to "non-CPC
commitments". Under Article 32, the CPC numeric codes and definitions can be relevant in
interpreting the Schedule of Specific Commitments of all WTO Members.
E. CHINESE TAIPEI
4.49 Chinese Taipei did not submit its views to the Panel.556
V. INTERIM SECTION
5.1 On 7 April 2004, pursuant to Article 15.2 of the DSU, Article 16 of the Panel's Working
Procedures and the revised Timetable for Panel Pr oceedings, the parties provided their comments on
the Interim Report. None of the parties requested a further meeting to review part(s) of the Panel's
Report. On 16 April 2004, pursuant to the revised Timetable for Panel Proceedings, the parties
submitted further written comments on the comments th at had already been provided on the Panel's
Interim Report on 7 April 2004.
5.2 Pursuant to Article 15.3 of the DSU, this sec tion of the Panel Report contains the Panel's
response to the main comments made by the parties in relation to the Interim Report and forms part of
the Findings of the Panel's Report.
A. P
UBLIC RELEASE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INTERIM REPORT
5.3 When, on 24 March 2004, the Panel transmitted its Interim Report to the parties, we clearly
indicated that such Interim Report was strictly conf idential. Indeed, pursuant to the DSU, all panel
proceedings remain confidential until the Panel Repor t is circulated to the WTO Members. We had
also explicitly emphasized at all our meetings with the parties that the Panel's proceedings were
confidential. This was accepted by the parties and reflected in the Panel's Working Procedures and in
all our relevant correspondence with the parties.

555 See above para. 4.9.
556 Chinese Taipei replied, however, to various questions from the Panel (see Annex C).

5.4 Therefore, we note with concern that the conf identiality of the Panel proceedings has been
breached on various occasions.
5.5 For instance, it has come to our attention that the representative of Antigua and Barbuda has
been quoted in press releases as commenting on c onfidential aspects of the Panel proceedings.
557
Within hours of its transmission to the parties, th e Interim Report was referred to in the press and
commented upon by both parties to the dispute. 558 On 26 March 2004, an international law firm
published a commentary on the Interim Report, from wh ich it appears that the authors, not being a
representative of either of the parties in this case, had access to the text of the Interim Report.559
5.6 In its comments to the Panel, dated 16 April 2004, Antigua stated that its delegation:
"... was contacted by a member of the international press corps who was already
aware of both the release and the ultimate conclusions of the Interim Report. The
press representative in question informed the delegation that information on the
contents of the report was provided to him by sources independent of the parties."560
5.7 In a letter to the Panel dated 27 April 2004, the United States requested that the Panel:
"... investigate whether 'sources indepe ndent of the parties' breached the
confidentiality of the interim report, and that it inform the parties of the results of this
investigation and any actions taken in response."
5.8 The Panel notes first that the statement made by Antigua and referred to in paragraph 5.6 is
very serious in that it may imply that a member of the Panel or the WTO Secretariat breached the
confidentiality requirement of the DSU. The Panel wi shes to assert forcefully that neither the Panel
nor the Secretariat has done so. Third parties cannot be blamed since they do not receive a copy of
the Interim Report.
5.9 On 28 April 2004, the Panel asked Antigua to clarify this statement and, in particular, the
assertion that information was provided by a source independent of the parties.
5.10 By letter dated 29 April 2004, Antigua stated as follows:

557 See, for instance, Antigua and U.S. Disagree on Dispute Panel, Online Casino News – August 2003,
at http://www.casinomeister.com/news/sept2003.html ("When this route was foiled by an inability to agree on
the composition of the panel, Antigua lead negotiato r Sir Ronald Sanders accused the Americans for being
responsible for the lack of progress, saying 'We were prov ided with two lists of people by the WTO secretariat,
most of whom were rejected by the U.S. on the basis that they didn't like what someone said about them or
wrote about them or whatever'."); U.S. Loses Preliminary Ruling in Review By WTO Internet Gambling
Restrictions, WTO Reporter, 12 November 2003 ("Antigua's ambassador in London Sir Ronald Sanders, who
represents the country at the WTO, welcomed the prelim inary decision Nov. 10 as a 'positive development' and
said the panel was already moving ahead with its work."); WTO Panel Concludes First Hearing of Antigua-
United States Dispute, found on the website of the Government of Antigua and Barbuda, at http://www.antigua-
barbuda.com/busnss_politics/body_wto_firsthearing.html ("The Caribbean state's Chief Foreign Affairs
Representative, Sir Ronald Sanders, said Friday 'This has been a long up hill battle but we have overcome every
obstacle so far. These included the US attempt to stop th e establishment of the Panel, then its failure to agree
with us on the composition of the Panel, and finally its filing of a 'no-case' submission which was overturned by
the Panel.").
558 See, for instance, Antigua Claims Victory Over US in Gaming Dispute, by R. Waddington, Reuters,
24 March 2004, found at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4594859/; WTO Ruling Said To Open U.S. To Internet
Gaming, by Scott Miller from the Wall Street Journal, published by Dow Jones Newswires on 24 March 2004.
559 See WTO Panel Rules Against United States in Internet Gambling: What Does it Mean ? By Kay
Georgi and Philippe Vlaemminck, Coudert Brothers.
560 Comments by Antigua and Barbuda on the Request by the United States for Review of Precise
Aspects of the Interim Report, 16 April 2004.

"On 24 March 2004 the Antiguan delegation w as approached by a member of the
international press corps who was clearly aware of both the release of the Interim
Report and its overall conclusion. The journalist did not disclose the source of the
information to the Antiguan delegation, nor does the delegation have any idea to date
what the source was.
Please note that Antigua did not make any allegation with respect to the source of the
information; rather in the Comments Antigua simply reported what was told to the
Antiguan delegation by the journalist. Antigua offers its apologies for any
misunderstanding."
5.11 Assuming that Antigua's assertions are true, in the Panel's view, even if the journalist had
claimed to have received information about th e Interim Report from a source independent of the
parties, it was inappropriate, in light of the conf identiality requirement contained in the DSU, for
Antigua, as a party, to have commented to the journalist on the contents of the Report.
5.12 In light of the circumstances, the United States felt obliged to comment on the Interim Report,
and, thereby, also violated its obligation to ensure confidentiality of the Interim Report.
5.13 To conclude, the Panel wishes to emphasize that disregard for the confidentiality requirement
contained in the DSU affects the credibility and in tegrity of the WTO dispute settlement process, of
the WTO and of WTO Members and is, therefore, unacceptable.
B. E
DITORIAL/TYPOGRAPHICAL CHANGES
5.14 The parties have suggested a number of editori al changes to the Panel's Interim Report and
corrections of typographical errors. The Panel has largely accepted these suggestions. As requested
by the United States, the Panel has clarified and/ or elaborated upon certain factual descriptions
contained in the Interim Report, including those re lating to the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, statistics on US enforcement and the websites of TVG, Capital OTB and
Xpressbet.com. The United States has also asked the Panel to reconsider the use of certain terms such
as "expectations", "errors", "late submissions" and mo re or less "trade restrictive" and the Panel has
done so.
5.15 Antigua requested the Panel to add references to support a conclusion that Antigua has made
a prima facie demonstration that the federal measu res at issue prohibit the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. The Panel believes that Antigua is not entitled at this late stage of the
proceedings to attempt to make or add to its demonstration of its claims that the GATS has been
violated.
C. M
EMBERS' RIGHT TO REGULATE AND TO PROHIBIT GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES
5.16 The United States has suggested that the appro ach taken by the Panel in the Interim Report
may be read as "supporting the criticisms levelle d by numerous groups against the GATS as being
overreaching and an unjustified intrusion into the so vereign ability of Members to regulate in the area
of services".
5.17 In our view, it is clear that WTO Members do have the right to regulate and to prohibit
gambling and betting services, if they so wish. In the present case, we reached the conclusion that the
United States had undertaken a specific commitment for cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services. In this context, the Panel would like to reiterate here its Concluding Remarks contained in
paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4 of the Interim Panel Report:

"The Panel wishes to note that it is well aware of the sensitivities associated with the
subject-matter of this dispute, namely gambling and betting services. Our
conclusions are directly linked to the partic ular circumstances of this dispute. We
note in this regard that the United Stat es may well have inadvertently undertaken
specific commitments on gambling and betting services. However, it is not for the
Panel to second-guess the intentions of the United States at the time the commitment
was scheduled. Rather, our role is to in terpret and apply the GATS in light of the
facts and evidence before us.
We also wish to emphasize what we have not decided in this case. We have not
decided that WTO Members do not have a right to regulate, including a right to
prohibit, gambling and betting activities. In this case, we came to the conclusion that
the US measures at issue prohibit the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services in the United States in a manner inconsistent with the GATS. We so
decided, not because the GATS denies Member s such a right but, rather, because we
found, inter alia , that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the measures at
issue were inconsistent with the United States' scheduled commitments and the
relevant provisions of the GATS."
D. T
HE US SCHEDULE
5.18 The United States has suggested that the Panel, in its interpretation of the US Schedule, had
set aside the ordinary meaning of "sporting", wh ich it had excluded from its specific commitment
under sub-sector 10.D ("Other recreational services (e xcept sporting)"). The United States has also
argued that the Panel has accorded undue importa nce to the context (i.e. the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines and W/120) and, by so doing, it has i gnored the difference between Members' schedules
that include explicit references to the CPC and those that do not.
5.19 Although the terms "gambling and betting services" do not appear in its Schedule, the United
States has undertaken specific commitments under sub-sector 10.D, entitled "Other recreational
services (except sporting)". The Schedule does not provide a definition of those terms and during the
Panel proceedings, the United States did not provide any definitional framework of its schedule in
general and this entry in particular, even in response to a specific question by the Panel on the issue.561
The Panel was, thus, obliged to interpret the US specific commitments under sub-sector 10.D in order
to give meaning to the terms contained therein. Th e Panel did so by examining, first, the ordinary
meaning of such terms. Since the dictionary de finitions of the term "Other recreational services
(except sporting)" did not allow a definitive conclusi on to be reached, the Panel continued its analysis
to consider the context of that term, in accord ance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
5.20 When the Panel made reference to the 1993 Sc heduling Guidelines and to W/120 as "context"
of the GATS, it did not suggest that such "context" was part of the GATS. The relevant "context"
was never considered with a view to identifying an y obligations that could have been imposed on the
United States. Rather, when interpreting the sp ecific commitment undertaken by the United States,
the Panel read the US Schedule in light of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120. The Panel,
therefore, did not reach the conclusion that sch edules that contain references to the CPC are
necessarily like schedules that do not contain such re ferences. The Panel reached the conclusion that
the effective interpretation of the terms "Other recreational services (except sporting)" in the
circumstances of this case included gambling and betting services.

561 Panel question No 5.

E. MEASURES AFFECTING THE CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF TRADE IN SERVICES
5.21 The United States has argued that the Interim Report does not address the issue of the legal
consequences flowing from the fact that, under US law, state laws cannot be and are not used to
prosecute conduct by an actor located wholly outs ide the state and having no presence there. The
United States has also submitted that it is not awar e of any argumentation by Antigua on this issue
that would allow the Panel to resolve the issue of applicability of these state laws to the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services.
5.22 In our view, the state laws at issue are w ithin the scope of the GATS since these measures
"affect trade in services" within the meaning of Article I:1 of the GATS. The Panel has found that the
measures at issue entail prohibitions on the supply of gambling and betting services. In our view,
prohibitions on certain types of activities necessarily affect trade in services with respect to that
activity. We agree with the Appellate Body's statement in EC – Bananas III that "the scope of the
GATS encompasses any measure of a Member to the extent it affects the supply of a service
regardless of whether such measure directly gove rns the supply of a service or whether it regulates
other matters but nevertheless affects trade in services". There is no reason why measures adopted by
regional and local governments and authorities cannot a priori "affect the supply of a service" within
the meaning of Article I:1 of the GATS, even if such measures cannot be enforced extraterritorially.
5.23 This being said, we would like to emphasize that whether a measure "affecting trade in
services" within the scope of the GATS in accordance with Article I:1 is inconsistent with one or
more provisions of the GATS is a distinct matter which calls for a separate determination under the
relevant GATS provisions.
5.24 We have revised the section of the Interim Re port entitled "Measures at issue" so as to more
clearly reflect our understanding of the meaning of Ar ticle I:1 of the GATS and its application in this
case.
F. ARTICLE XIV
5.25 The United States objected to the interpretation and application of Article XIV of the GATS
made by the Panel. In particular, the United Stat es objected to the Panel's conclusion that it had a
"burden" to prove that it could not guard against those risks specific to remote gambling by means
having a less restrictive trade impact than a prohi bition on the remote supply of gambling and betting
services. According to the United States, there is no such "burden" under Article XIV. The United
States also opposed the Panel's conclusion that , in the context of the necessity test under
Articles XIV(a) and (c), the United States was ob liged to consider invitations by Antigua and
cooperation with other Members to address concerns expressed by the United States to justify its
prohibition on gambling and betting services by remo te means and to explore whether there were
WTO-consistent alternatives.
5.26 It is well established under WTO law that it is for the Member invoking the application of a
justification provision (such as Article XIV of the GATS) to demonstrate that it has complied with the
requirements of such a provision. It was, theref ore, for the United States to demonstrate that the
measures at issue were "necessary" to "protect public morals" or to "maintain public order". The
Panel reached the conclusion that the measures at i ssue were indeed designed so as to protect public
morals or to maintain public order; but the Unite d States had failed to demonstrate that they were
"necessary" since it had not shown that there was no WTO-consistent alternative measure reasonably
available that would provide the United States with the same level of protection against the risks it
had identified. It was in this context that we c onsidered it relevant that the United States had not
accepted Antigua's invitation to discuss and consider WTO-consistent alternatives that might or could
address the United States' concerns.

5.27 Even if the United States had considered that no such alternative currently exists, it could not
properly have prejudged the situation that may arise in the future. It is because the United States had
made a specific market access commitment with resp ect to cross-border trade of gambling and betting
services that it was obliged to consider WTO-consis tent alternatives, including those that may be
suggested by Antigua and other Members before a nd while maintaining its prohibition on the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services.
5.28 Finally, we would like to reiterate that in concluding that the United States had not fulfilled
the conditions in order to benefit from the protection of Article XIV of GATS in the circumstances of
the present case, we have neither found nor mainta in that WTO Members, including the United
States, have forfeited their sovereign right and ab ility to regulate the cross-border supply of services,
consistently with the GATS, particularly for the prot ection of public morals or for the maintenance of
public order.
VI. FINDINGS
A. I
NTRODUCTION
1. Terms of reference of this Panel
6.1 The terms of reference of this Panel are determ ined by the Request for the Establishment of a
Panel circulated by Antigua and Barbuda to the DSB on 13 June 2003. 562 The Panel request refers to
the specific GATS provisions that, according to Antigua , have been violated by the United States as
well as the US measures that Antigua wishes to challenge.
6.2 Antigua has claimed that the GATS Schedul e of the United States includes specific
commitments on gambling and betting services. Antigua has further claimed violations of, and has
developed argumentation in its s ubmissions with respect to, Articles VI:1, VI:3, XVI:1, XVI:2,
XVII:1, XVII:2, XVII:3 and XI:1 of the GATS.563
6.3 The United States denies these claims. It argues that its Schedule makes no such commitment
on gambling and betting services and that, in any case, th e measures at issue are not inconsistent with
its GATS obligations. It also invokes Article XIV(a) and Article XIV(c) of the GATS in its defence.
2. Structure of this Panel Report
6.4 Since all the provisions in respect of which Antigua has developed violation claims are
applicable only in sectors and sub-sectors in which specific commitments exist, the Panel will need to
examine whether the United States has undertaken a specific commitment with respect to gambling
and betting services. The Panel will examine this issue first because the absence of any relevant
commitment by the United States would suffice to dismiss this case.
6.5 Secondly, the Panel will address the issue of, and the difficulties associated with, the
identification, interpretation and effect of the measure(s) being challenged by Antigua. The Panel will
have to determine whether Antigua has identifie d with sufficient clarity the measures it seeks to
challenge. In particular, the Panel will have to determine, inter alia, whether, under the GATS and
the DSU, Antigua can challenge in dispute settlement proceedings what Antigua refers to as a "total
prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, as a measure in and of itself.

562 WT/DS285/2, 13 June 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Panel request"). See the Request for
Preliminary Rulings in Annex B.
563 The Panel notes that, in the Panel request, Antigua claimed violation of Article VIII of the GATS,
paras. 1 and 5. However, Antigua did not pursue this claim during the Panel proceedings.

6.6 Thirdly, the Panel will examine whether Antigua has demonstrated that the measures at issue
violate the relevant GATS provisions identified in the Panel request. The Panel will proceed in the
following order: Article XVI, paragraphs 1 and 2; Article XVII, paragraphs 1 to 3; Article VI,
paragraphs 1 and 3; and Article XI, paragraph 1.
6.7 If necessary, that is, if a violation of any of the GATS provisions invoked by Antigua is
established, the Panel will examine whether the Un ited States has demonstrated that the challenged
measures are justified under Article XIV (a) and/or (c) of the GATS.
3. Interpretation of WTO provisions
6.8 The Panel recalls Article 3.2 of the DSU which states that:
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral tradin g system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provi sions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements."
6.9 It is now established
564 that the "customary rules of interpretation of public international law"
include at least Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vie nna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter
referred to as the "Vienna Convention"). Accordingl y, in this dispute, we will make reference to
Articles 31, 32 and 33, which are cited below.
6.10 Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention read as follows:
"Article 31
(General rule of interpretation)
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in goo d faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the trea ty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the inte rpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

564 See for instance Appellate Body Reports on US – Gasoline, p. 17; EC – Hormones, para. 181; India

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a te rm if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Article 32
(Supplementary means of interpretation)
Recourse may be had to supplementary me ans of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the applica tion of Article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
Article 33
(Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages)
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree
that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text
was authenticated shall be considered an au thentic text only if the treaty so provides
or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each
authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text preva ils in accordance with paragraph 1, when
a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the
application of Articles 31 and 32 does not re move, the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted."
4. Burden of proof
6.11 The Panel recalls the rules on burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, which,
in essence, require that a party asserting an allegation must prove it.
6.12 In US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , the Appellate Body made the following statement on the
issue of burden of proof:
"[W]e find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could
work if it incorporated the proposition th at the mere assertion of a claim might
amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surpri sing that various international tribunals,
including the International Court of Justi ce, have generally and consistently accepted

and applied the rule that the party who asser ts a fact, whether the claimant or the
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted
canon of evidence in civil law, common law a nd, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the
burden of proof rests upon the party, whethe r complaining or defending, who asserts
the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence
sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to
the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption.
In the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, precisely how much and
precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will
necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to
case."565
6.13 The Panel in Turkey – Textiles, in a finding not addressed by the Appellate Body, summed up
the rules on burden of proof under WTO jurisprudence as follows:
"(a) it is for the complaining party to establish the violation it alleges;
(b) it is for the party invoking an excepti on or an affirmative defence to prove
that the conditions contained therein are met; and
(c) it is for the party asserting a fact to prove it." 566
6.14 Therefore, in the present dispute, it is for An tigua to establish that the measures at issue
violate Articles XVI, XVII, VI and XI of the GATS, while it is for the United States to establish, if
need be, that the challenged measures benefit from th e justification provisions of Article XIV of the
GATS.
5. Judicial economy
6.15 In deciding whether to exercise judicial economy over any of Antigua's claims, the Panel
recalls that the principle of judicial economy is recognized in WTO law. In US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses, the Appellate Body made clear that panels ar e not required to address all the claims made by
a complaining party. The Appellate Body relied on the explicit aim of the dispute settlement
mechanism, which is to secure a positive solution to a dispute (Article 3.7) or a satisfactory settlement of
the matter (Article 3.4). Thus, the basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes and
not to develop jurisprudence. The Appellate Body stated:
"[G]iven the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not
consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the
Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO
Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only
address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue
in the dispute.
567"568
6.16 In its supporting reasoning, the Appellate Body also explored Article 11 of the DSU, the
provision setting out the mandate of panels, and found nothing in this provision that would require

565 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
566 Panel Report on Turkey – Textiles , para. 9.57. See also Panel Report on Argentina – Textiles and
Apparel, paras. 6.34-6.40.
567 (original footnote) The "matter in issue" is the "matter referred to the DSB" pursuant to Article 7 of
the DSU.
568 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 19.

panels to examine all legal claims made by a complaining party. The Appellate Body relied on
previous dispute settlement practice, inter alia, under the GATT 1947. Specifically, it stated: "if a
panel found that a measure was inconsistent w ith a particular provision of the GATT 1947, it
generally did not go on to examine whether the measure was also inconsistent with other
GATT
provisions that a complaining party may have argued were violated."569
6.17 Yet, the Panel is aware of the limits to its discretionary right to exercise judicial economy. As
the Appellate Body stated in Australia – Salmon , the right to exercise judicial economy cannot be
exercised where only a partial resolution of a dispute will result:
"The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping in mind the aim of the
dispute settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and 'to secure a
positive solution to a dispute'. To provide only a partial resolution of the matter at
issue would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address those claims on which
a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise
recommendations and rulings so as to a llow for prompt compliance by a Member
with those recommendations and rulings 'in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members.'"
570
6.18 In the present dispute, the Panel will need to address the issue of judicial economy and it will
do so according to these guiding principles.
6. Definitional issues
6.19 A number of definitional issues have arisen in this dispute that need clarification before the
Panel can proceed further with its examination of Antigua's claims.
(a) Definition of "gambling and betting services"
6.20 This dispute is about "gambling and betting services". The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary defines "to gamble" as:
"[P]lay games of chance for (a lot of) money; indulge in betting, esp. habitually; risk
money, fortune, success, etc., on the outcome of an event [...]."571
6.21 Pursuant to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, "to bet" is defined as:
"[S]take (an amount of money, etc.) against another's in support of an affirmation or
on the outcome of a doubtful event; risk an amount of money etc. against (a person)
by agreeing to forfeit it if the truth or outcome is not as specified. [...]"
572
6.22 The Panel also notes that, according to the Internet Gambling Report:
"Gambling involves any activity in which a person places a bet or wager. Generally,
a bet or wager occurs when a person risks something of value on the outcome of an
uncertain event: (1) in which the bettor does not exercise any control; or (2) which is
determined predominantly by chance."573

569 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 18 (footnote omitted).
570 Appellate Body Report on Australia – Salmon, para. 223.
571 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002.
572 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002.
573 A . C a b o t & L . V . C s o k a , What is Gambling? , in Internet Gambling Report, 6 th edition, ed. by
M. Balestra, River City Group, United States, 2003, p. 14.

6.23 The Internet Gambling Report distinguishes three broad categories of gambling and betting:
(i) casino-type games, including games such as roul ette, blackjack, slot-machines, poker, craps, and
baccarat; (ii) lotteries, including games such as lotto, keno, bingo, video lottery terminals (VLTs) and
scratch cards; and (iii) sports betting, including be tting on the outcome of different sporting events
(soccer, American football, cricket, etc.). This last category would also include betting on horseracing
and greyhound racing.574
6.24 During these proceedings, the parties gave in dications as to what activities should be
considered as "gambling and betting" services for the purposes of this dispute. Antigua indicated that:
"[A] vast array of gambling and betting games and services are offered on a
commercial basis in the United States and elsewhere. These games can typically be
categorized into one of the following three broad categories: (i) betting on the
outcome of events in which the gamblers do not participate, such as sports contests
(for example, horse races, soccer, American football, basketball, and cricket); (ii)
card games involving monetary stakes (such as poker, black jack and baccarat);
575 and
(iii) random selection games which are games of chance based on the random
selection of numbers or other signs and wh ere the random selection is performed by a
machine or the casting of dice. This type of gambling takes various forms, including
lotto, keno and bingo; instant lotteries or 'scratch card games'; gambling machines;
and 'table games' such as roulette or 'cra ps'. Antigua notes that 'gambling', 'gaming',
'wagering' and 'betting' are different terms for the same basic activity. [...]
Antiguan regulation provides for two ki nds of gambling and betting licences –
interactive gaming and interactive wagering. The gaming licence is for casino-type,
random selection and card games and the wa gering licence is for sports betting.
Some operators possess both licences and players can access either type of service
from one internet site
576, while other operators offer only one service.577 Casino game
operators create "virtual casinos" on thei r web sites with detailed graphics and
enhancements designed to mimic land-based casino settings. These sites offer a
variety of card and dice games such as poker, black jack, craps and keno, as well as
arcade-type games that provide virtual im itations of video poker terminals, slot
machines and other gambling machines. B ecause of the highly visual aspect of the
casino-type games, these services are operated exclusively through internet
connection. The sports betting operators o ffer the chance to wager on the outcome of
sporting contests in a number of different ways, such as straight wagers on match
results, transacting in futures markets in player performances, team performances and
outcomes of political campaigns and other uncer tain future events, and other forms of
traditional as well as inventive methods of wagering. All Antiguan sports book
operators maintain an internet web site on which players may place wagers, but many
operators also make extensive use of telephone betting, as betting on contests or
performances to occur in the future does not need to be visual and the events are
independent of the operator's web site.
 "578
6.25 In response to a question posed by the Panel, Antigua further indicated that:

574A. Cabot, Traditional Versus Internet Gambling , in Internet Gambling Report, 6 th edition, ed. by
M. Balestra, River City Group, United States, 2003, p. 39.
575 Antigua notes that, in the context of a casino, card games will often be referred to as part of a wider
group of "table games" including random selection games such as roulette or craps.
576 (original footnote) See, e.g., www.intertops.com; www.wsex.com.
577 (original footnote) See, e.g., www.gamebookers.com; www.bingomania.net.
578 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 25, 39-40.

"Antigua seeks to supply all types of services that involve the making of a bet or
wager to consumers in the United States, subject to services that are prohibited by
Antiguan law, such as those involving the use of pornographic, indecent or offensive
material. It is difficult to cover every possible permutation in a list, but the product
offerings encompassed by the gambling a nd betting services that Antigua seeks to
offer include: (i) Random selection games (in whatever form and including games
that are traditionally described as 'lotteries ' or 'casino-type games' in their probably
endless permutations). (ii) Event-based ga mbling. (iii) Card games and other games
of skill involving monetary stakes. (iv) Pe rson-to-person gambling (so-called 'betting
exchanges')."
579
6.26 The United States indicated that it allows the cross-border supply of certain gambling
services, such as:
"[...] (i) persons not involved in the business of gambling may transmit casual or
social bets by any means, provided that the transmission is permissible under state
law; (ii) pari-mutuel betting services may exchange the accounting data and pictures
necessary to permit a racetrack outside the United States to offer pari-mutuel betting
on U.S. races (and vice-versa), provided th at such gambling is legal in both the
sending and the receiving jurisdictions ; (iii) suppliers of odds making and
handicapping services (e.g ., handicappers of horse races) as well as other gambling
informational services may supply such services, provided that the form of gambling
that they facilitate is legal in both the sending and the receiving jurisdictions; (iv)
gambling websites may (and many do) provide so-called 'free play' games in which
no real money is wagered."
580
6.27 Moreover, when asked the supply of which services is prohibited both domestically and on a
cross-border basis, the United States stated that the prohibition concerned:
"[T]he transmission of a bet or wager by a wire communication facility across state or
U.S. borders, such as Internet and telephone betting. Other gambling services that are
similarly restricted both domestically and cross-border include the mailing of lottery
tickets between states, the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, and
wagering on sporting events."
581
6.28 The Panel does not believe that it is necessary in the circumstances of this case to define
exhaustively the service activities falling under "gambling and betting services", as these are not
treaty terms in this dispute. Therefore, the Panel does not need to "interpret" these terms as such. In
light of the ordinary meaning of the words, the submissions of the parties and the specialized literature
to which we have made reference, the Panel cons iders that "gambling and betting services" include
any activity involving the placing of a bet or wager, that is, instances where a person risks something
of value (generally money) on the outcome of an un certain event. A bet or a wager can be made with
respect to casino-type games, lotteries and s porting events, irrespective of how these services are
supplied. The Panel notes that the definition of "gambling and betting services" for the purposes of
this dispute includes, at a minimum, the services that Antigua seeks to supply cross-border to the
United States as well as the other services the suppl y of which the United States allows cross-
border.
582

579 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 33.
580 United States' second written submission, paras. 26-27.
581 United States' reply to Panel question No. 35.
582 For instance the United States refers to "Persons not involved in the business of gambling may
transmit casual or social bets by any means, provided that the transmission is permissible under state law;

(b) "Cross-border" and "remote" supply
6.29 This dispute concerns one of the four modes of supply under the GATS, that is, the so-called
"cross-border supply" of gambling and betting services (hereinafter also referred to as supply by
"mode 1"), which is defined in Article I:2 (a) of the GATS as follows:
"For the purpose of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a
service:
(a) from the territory of one Memb er into the territory of any
other Member;
[...]"
6.30 The Explanatory Note on Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services 583
(hereafter called "The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines" ) further explains that cross-border supply
concerns a service "delivered within the territo ry of the Member, from the territory of another
Member". The Guidelines also provide the following example of cross-border supply:
"International transport, the supply of a service through telecommunications or mail,
and services embodied in exported goods (e.g. a computer diskette, or drawings) are
all examples of cross-border supply, since the services supplier is not present within
the territory of the Member where the service is delivered."584
6.31 In this dispute, the Panel will use the term "c ross-border supply" exclusively in the sense of
Article I:2(a) of the GATS.
6.32 "Cross-border" must be distinguished from "rem ote" supply, which is a term that has been
used by the parties in this dispute. The Panel will use the latter term to refer to "any situation where
the supplier, whether domestic or foreign , and the consumer of gambling and betting services are not
physically together". In other words, in situati ons of remote supply, the consumer of a service does
not have to go to any type of outlet where the s upply is supervised, be it a retail facility, a casino, a
vending machine, etc. Instead, the remote supplier offers the service directly to the consumer through
some means of distance communication. 585 Hence, cross-border supply is necessarily remote, but
remote supply amounts to "cross-border" supply only when the service supplier and the consumer are
located in territories of different Members. Th e Panel understands "non-remo te" supply to refer to
situations where the consumer presents himself or herself at a supplier's point of presence.
6.33 The expression "means of delivery" will be used in this Report to refer to the various
technological means (mail, telephone, Internet, etc. ) by which a service can be supplied cross-border

Parimutuel betting services may exch ange the accounting data and pictures necessary to permit a racetrack
outside the United States to offer parimutuel betting on U.S. races (and vice-versa), provided that such gambling
is legal in both the sending and the receiving jurisdictions; Suppliers of odds making and handicapping services
(e.g., handicappers of horse races) as well as other gambli ng informational services may supply such services,
provided that the form of gambli ng that they facilitate is legal in both the sending and the receiving
jurisdictions; Gambling websites may (and many do) provide so-called 'free play' games in which no real money
is wagered; any other gambling service that does not cons ist of actual transmission of a bet or wager is legal to
the extent stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b), provided that it also does not violate state law in the U.S. consumer's
jurisdiction." United States' second written submission, paras. 26-27.
583 The Panel discusses in section VI.B of this Panel Report the legal value of the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines in interpreting the GATS.
584 Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164,
3 September 1993, paras. 18-19.
585 See United States' first written submission, para. 7 and United States' reply to Panel question No. 42.

or remotely. Unless otherwise indicated, "cross-bor der" and "remote" supply cover all the various
technological means of supplying services.
B. H
AS THE UNITED STATES UNDERTAKEN SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON GAMBLING AND
BETTING SERVICES?
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.34 Antigua claims that by virtue of entry 10.D in its GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments586
under subheading "Other Recreational Services (excep t sporting)", the United States has made a full
market access and a full national treatment comm itment for the cross-border supply (mode 1) of
"gambling and betting" services.587
6.35 The United States denies this claim altogether , contending that its Schedule makes no such
commitment.588
6.36 In support of its claim, Antigua argues that the US Schedule is based on the Services Sectoral
Classification List589 and that sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule includes CPC category "9649 Other
recreational services" which encompasses CPC category "96492 Gambling and betting services".590
6.37 Antigua points out that, since under Article XX: 3 of the GATS, Members' schedules are an
integral part of the GATS, they must be interpre ted on the basis of the Vienna Convention's rules of
interpretation. On that basis, Antigua argues that an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of
the words "Other recreational services" in the US Schedule leads to the conclusion that gambling and
betting services fall within this broadly worded cat egory. Alternatively, they could fall under
sub-sector 10.A, "Entertainment services". With re spect to the context of the US Schedule, the two
most important agreements and instruments connected to the conclusion of the GATS that are relevant
for the interpretation of GATS Schedule are W/120 a nd the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines. As to the
practice in the application of the GATS, Antigua submits that WTO Members have consistently
referred to W/120 (and its cross-references to the CPC) as the classification used for GATS purposes
and as the main point of reference for any discussion on such a classification. Even the United States
International Trade Commission uses W/120 and its cro ss-references to CPC as a tool to interpret the
US Schedule. Moreover, the US Draft Final Schedule
591 during the Uruguay Round confirmed that
the United States had scheduled specific commitmen ts according to the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
and W/120.592
6.38 The United States replies that Antigua has inco rrectly interpreted the US Schedule to the
GATS. Even assuming arguendo the possible relevance of sector 10, Antigua's claims to find there a
US commitment for cross-border supply of gambling services rely on W/120 and its references to the
CPC Prov. Document W/120 is part of the negotiating history of the GATS, which is at best a
supplementary means of interpretation. The United States argues that the context for the US Schedule

586 The United States of America – Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/ SC/90, 15 April 1994
(hereinafter the "US Schedule").
587 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 160-162.
588 United States' first written submission, paras. 59-62.
589 Services Sectoral Classificati on List, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991
(hereinafter the "W/120").
590 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 160-162.
591 Communication from the United Stat es of America, Draft Final Schedule of the United States of
America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.3, 7 December 1993.
592 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 164-178; Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 27-32.

includes other Members' schedules. Accordingly, the proper context for the US Schedule includes the
fact that some Members based their schedules, or parts of them, on the CPC, while others did not.593
6.39 The United States submits that a proper interpretation of the US Schedule, without recourse to
the CPC, would show that the United States made no commitment for measures affecting gambling
services. Because of the absence of a textual basis fo r referring to the CPC, the legal definition of the
scope of a non-CPC commitment must be deduced th rough application of customary rules of treaty
interpretation. Antigua's allegations regarding a possible US commitment for gambling services rely
on sub-sectors 10.A and 10.D of the US Schedule to the GATS, which do not contain an explicit
reference to gambling services. The ordinary meani ng of "sporting" in sub-sect or 10.D confirms that
the United States has made no commitments for gambling and betting under that sub-sector.
Gambling is a sui generis activity that, if it belongs anywhere in sector 10, it can only be in sub-sector
10.E, where the United States made no commitment.594
6.40 The United States further submits that the USITC Document 595 is merely an "explanatory"
text prepared by an independent agency and does not purport to interpret the US Schedule. 596 Finally,
the cover-note to the US Draft Final Schedule only confirms that the United States followed the
structure of W/120, without adopting the CPC nomenclature. 597 The United States concludes that it
should come as no surprise that it did not schedul e commitments for gambli ng and betting services,
given the overriding policy concerns surrounding those services, which are reflected in the extremely
strict limitations and regulations of these services in the United States.598
2. Assessment by the Panel
(a) Method of interpretation to be adopted by the Panel
6.41 As a preliminary issue in this dispute, the Pa nel will have to decide whether the US Schedule
includes specific commitments on gambling and betting services notwithstanding the fact that the
words "gambling and betting services" do not appear in the US Schedule.
6.42 Article XX of the GATS provides, in paragra ph 1, that each Member "shall set out in a
schedule the specific commitments it undertakes under Part III of this Agreement." Paragraph 3 of
Article XX stipulates that "[s]chedules of specific commitments shall be annexed to this Agreement
and shall form an integral part thereof." In this dispute, there is no controversy about the application
of Article XX as such, but rather over the inte rpretation of a Member's schedule of specific
commitments which, pursuant to Article XX, is an integral part of the GATS.
6.43 The section of the US Schedule in respect of wh ich the parties have diverging views reads as
follows:
599

593 United States' first written submission, paras. 63-67.
594 United States' first written submission, paras. 68-76; first oral statement, paras. 23-41.
595 United States International Trade Commission, US Schedule of Commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services – With explanatory materials prepared by the U.S. International Trade
Commission (hereinafter "USITC Document"), dated May 1997.
596 United States' first written submission, para. 66 and footnote 90; United States' reply to Panel
question No. 2; United States' second oral statement, paras. 7-9.
597 United States' second oral statement, paras. 10-11.
598 United States' second written submission, para. 15.
599 US Schedule, pp. 71-72 (extract).

Sector or sub-sector Limita tions on market access Limitations on national treatment

10. RECREATIONAL,
CULTURAL, & SPORTING
SERVICES

A. ENTERTAINMENT
SERVICES (INCLUDING
THEATRE, LIVE BANDS AND
CIRCUS SERVICES)
 1) None
 2) None
 3) None
 4) Unbound, except as
indicated in the horizontal section

 1) None
 2) None
 3) None
 4) None
B. NEWS AGENCY SERVICES

C LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES,
MUSEUMS AND OTHER
CULTURAL SERVICES

D. OTHER RECREATIONAL
SERVICES (except sporting)
 1) None
 2) None
 3) The number of
concessions available for
commercial operations in federal,
state and local facilities is limited
 4) Unbound, except as
indicated in the horizontal section

 1) None
 2) None
 3) None

 4) None

6.44 Considering that, pursuant to Article XX:3 of the GATS, schedules of specific commitments
form an integral part of the GATS, the rules of interpretation that apply with respect to GATS
schedules are the same as those applicable to the GA TS itself. In this dispute, all parties and third
parties agree that customary rules of treaty interpreta tion are applicable to the interpretation of the US
Schedule. Moreover, in EC – Computer Equipment , the Appellate Body set out the interpretative
rules regarding tariff concessions under the GATT 1994:
"Tariff concessions provided for in a Member's Schedule – the interpretation of which
is at issue here – are reciprocal and result from a mutually-advantageous negotiation
between importing and exporting Members. A Schedule is made an integral part of
the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the concessions
provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only
rules which may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a concession are the
general rules of treaty interpreta tion set out in the Vienna Convention. " (emphasis
added)
600
6.45 This jurisprudence is relevant, mutatis mutandis , in respect of the GATS Schedules. 601
Therefore, the content of the US Schedule should be considered as treaty language and, pursuant to

600 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84. The Appellate Body confirmed this
finding in EC – Poultry, para. 81 and Canada – Dairy, para. 131. The Panel notes that the Vienna Convention
was also used to interpret government procurement schedules. In Korea – Procurement (para. 7.9), the panel,
noting relevant Appellate Body juri sprudence and the fact that, accordi ng to Article XXIV:12 of the GPA,
"Notes, Appendices and Annexes to [the GPA] form an in tegral part thereof" referred to "customary rules of
interpretation of public international law as summarized in the Vienna Convention in order to interpret" the
GPA schedules of the party complained against.
601 In this respect, we recall that in its Report on EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body stated that, in
agricultural schedules, a Member "may yield rights and gr ant benefits, but it cannot diminish obligations", thus
confirming the findings contained in the Panel Report on US – Sugar Waiver with respect to GATT tariff

Article 3.2 of the DSU, should be interpreted in light of the general rules of treaty interpretation set
out in the Vienna Convention, in particular Articles 31, 32 and 33.602
6.46 Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Conventio n, the US Schedule must be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Schedule when
read in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the GATS and the WTO Agreement. 603
Of particular relevance in the present dispute is the principle of "effective treaty interpretation" 604,
which derives from the requirement that treaties be interpreted in good faith, and whereby all terms of
a treaty (including in the present dispute the term s of the US Schedule) should be given a meaning
(see paragraph 6.49 below).
6.47 The Panel will thus start by examining the ordina ry meaning of various key terms used in the
US Schedule. However, dictionary definitions are generally not conclusive and the Panel will have to
examine the context of the US Schedule. In th is regard, the Panel will examine whether document
W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines: (i) are part of the context within the meaning of
Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention, and, as such , should be used to assess the legal context within
which the ordinary meaning of the terms of the US Schedule must be determined; or (ii) whether,
rather, they are part of the preparatory work of the GATS or the circumstances of its conclusion, in
which case they can only be used as supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention. The Panel will address the releva nce of other Members' practice with regard to
their GATS schedules, in the interpretation of the US Schedule. For the same purpose, it will also
examine the practice of the United States as reflected in its Schedule. Finally, the Panel will consider
the object and purpose of the GATS.
6.48 In the second instance, pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the Panel will resort
to supplementary means of interpretation, incl uding the history of negotiations, to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of Article 31. Under Article 32, the Panel will look at various
instruments comprising the preparatory work of the GATS and the US Schedule.
(b) Application of the general rules of treaty interpretation to this case
(i) Effective interpretation
6.49 The requirement that a treaty be interprete d in "good faith" can be correlated with the
principle of "effective treaty interpretation", accordin g to which all terms of a treaty must be given a

schedules. We see no reason why this principle should not apply to GATS schedules as well. We believe,
therefore, that, although se rvices schedules are considered as treat y provisions for the purpose of their
interpretation, they should comply with the main provisions of the GATS.
602 The text of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention is reproduced in para. 6.10 of this Report.
603 The Panel notes that the Appellate Body has established a sequence concerning the consideration of
elements contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body stated: "[a] treaty interpreter
must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words
constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty
must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where
confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text it self is desired, light from the object and purpose of
the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought". See Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 114. See also
Panel Reports on US – Section 301 Trade Act , para. 7.22; India – Patents (US) , para. 7.18; US – Underwear,
604 See Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 23. See also the Appellate Body Reports on Japan
– Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 12, US – Underwear, p. 16, Argentina – Footwear (EC), paras. 81 and 95, Korea –
Dairy, para. 81, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para. 338 and US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) ,
para. 271.

meaning. We also note that "the principle of good faith in the process of in terpretation underlies the
concept that interpretation should not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable".
605
6.50 Good faith is a core principle of interpretation of the WTO Agreement. On several occasions,
the Appellate Body has emphasized the importance of the principle of effectiveness whereby "an
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that woul d result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of
the treaty to redundancy or inutility". 606 The Appellate Body has also stressed the importance of this
principle in the interpretation of agriculture schedules.607
6.51 Since, as indicated above, the United Stat es undertook a full commitment with respect to
market access and national treatment under sub-sector 10.D, the terms Other Recreational Services
(except sporting ), and the commitment thereof, must have a meaning. We need, therefore, to
determine the meaning of these terms and, thereby, the scope of the US commitments in question.
6.52 In EC – Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body stated that:
"The fact that Member's Schedules are an integral part of the GATT 1994 indicates
that, while each Schedule represents the tariff commitments made by one Member,
they represent a common agreement among all Members."608
6.53 The Panel is of the view that this finding is equally relevant for GATS schedules. The
primary purpose of treaty interpretation is to identify the common intention of the parties. The Vienna
Convention rules have been developed to help in assessing in objective terms what was or what could
have been the common intention of the parties to a treaty. The Panel will thus proceed to determine
the common intention of the parties concerning the US Sc hedule, and, more particularly, with respect
to sector 10 (Recreational, Cultural & Sporting Services) of that Schedule.
(ii) Ordinary meaning of the term
6.54 According to the United States, the ordinary me aning of "sporting" includes "gambling" and,
thus, confirms that the United States has made no commitments for gambling and betting services in
sub-sector 10.D. 609 Antigua, Canada and the European Communities disagree with this
interpretation.610
6.55 The full definition of "sporting" (adj.) contained in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
(1993 edition), reads as follows:

605 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , Manchester University Press, 2 nd edition,
1984, p. 120. Under Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention, the Panel could also examine whether "any other
relevant rules of international law" could be applicab le in the interpretation of the terms used in the US
Schedule. This could, for instance, lead the panel to examine the US Schedule in light of the effective treaty
interpretation principle. The Panel will, however, refer to the effective treaty interpretation principle pursuant to
the first sentence of Article 31. The Panel will also examine other principles of interpretation, as supplementary
means of interpretation, pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
606 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 23. See also the Appellate Body Reports on Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 12, US – Underwear , p. 16, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , paras. 81 and 95, Korea –
Dairy, para. 81, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para. 338 and US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) ,
para. 271.
607 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Dairy, para. 135.
608 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109.
609 United States' first written submission, para. 71.
610 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 30; Canada's written submission, para. 23 and footnote 30;
European Communities' written submission, paras. 26-33.

"1a Sportive; playful. rare. b Engaged in sport or play. c Of a plant etc.: tending to
produce abnormal varieties or sports. 2a Interested in or concerned in sport.
b Designating an inferior sportsman or a person interested in sport from purely
mercenary motives. Now esp. pertaining to or interested in betting or gambling.
Chiefly in sporting man. c sporting girl, woman, a prostitute, a promiscuous woman
N. Amer. 3 Orig., providing good sport or entert ainment. Later, characterized by
sportsmanlike conduct; fair-minded, generous."611
6.56 Other dictionary definitions of "sporting" read:
"1 a : of, relating to, used, or suitable for sport b: marked by or calling for
sportsmanship c: involving such risk as sports contender may expect to take or
encounter (a sporting chance) 2: of or relating to dissipation and especially
gambling" 3: tending to mutate freely."612
"1 Engaged in sport of play. b Sportive; playful. c Of plants, etc. 2. a Interested in,
accustomed to take part in, field sports or similar amusements. b. Esp. sporting man:
now used to denote a sportsman of an inferior type or one who is interested in sport
for purely mercenary motives."613
"1. of, relating to, suitable for, in, or engaged in sports: a sporting event, sporting
goods, sporting dogs. 2 characteristics of a sportsman; fair or obliging: That was
very sporting of him. 3. of or relating to gambling, esp. on sports."614
"sporting adj 1 belonging, referring or relating to sport • Gun dogs are classed as
sporting dogs. 2 said of someone, their behaviour, attitude, nature, etc: characterized
by fairness, generosity, etc • It was sporting of him to lend me the car . 3 keen or
willing to gamble or take a risk • I'm not a sporting man, but I like a bet on the Grand
National. sportingly adverb."615
"1. Used in or appropriate for sports: sporting goods. 2. Characterized by
sportsmanship. 3. Of or associated with gambling."616
6.57 The Penguin Pocket English Dictionary (1988) and the New Oxford Thesaurus of English do
not refer to "gambling" as a possible meaning of "sporting". Similarly, the New Roget's Thesaurus
(1978) does not refer to gambling/wagering as possible synonyms for "sporting" (and vice-versa).
6.58 The Panel notes that the United States quoted the following definitions:617
1 b : suitable for or characteristic of a sportsman: marked by or calling for
sportsmanship (a ~ solution of the problem) c: involving such risk as a sports
contender may reasonably take or expect to encounter (a ~ chance of success) 2 a: of,

611 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993 (original emphasis).
612 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online , found at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary, vistied on
11 November 2003.
613 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. X, (1938). The Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary,
Vol. IV (1986) states, with respect to sporting man: "[A]lso used in other collocations referring to low gaming
and betting."
614 Collier's Dictionary, 1977.
615 Chambers Online Reference , at http://.chambersharrap.co.uk/cham bers/chref/chref.py/main, visited
on 14 November 2003.
616 The American Heritage Dictionary , Online edition, at http://www.bartleby.com, visited on
14 November 2003.
617 United States' reply to Panel question No. 8.

relating to, or preoccupied with dissipation and esp. gambling; often; FAST
FLASHY(~ gents and their ladies) b: engaged or used in prostitution 3: lending to
produce sports usu, with exceptional frequency (a ~ strain of evening primrose).
618
1. engaging in, disposed to, or interested in open-air or athletic sports; a rugged,
sporting man. 2. concerned with or suitable for such sports; sporting equipment. 3.
sportsmanlike. 4. interested in or connected with sports or pursuits involving betting
or gambling the sporting life of Las Vegas . 5. involving or inducing the taking of
risk, as in a sport (1580-1600); SPORT + -ING').619
1. Appropriate for or used in sports. 2. Marked by sportsmanship. 3. Of or having to
do with gambling.620
1. used in sports : relating to or used in sports activities • sporting dogs 2. fair: in
keeping with the principles of fair comp etition, respect for other competitors, and
personal integrity 3. GAMBLING of gambling: relating to gambling, or taking an
interest in gambling 4. risking: willing to take a risk.621
6.59 The word "sporting" encompasse s various definitions, relati ng to different activities or
characteristics (sports, gambling, prostitution, plan t biology). Some dictionary definitions of
"sporting", when referring to gambling and bett ing activities, appear to convey a pejorative
connotation ("of or relating to di ssipation and especially gambling" 622). Moreover, the word
"sporting", when defined to encompass gambling, is used mainly to qualify a person ("Chiefly in
sporting man", see above Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ) interested in betting, and thus, may not
be the most appropriate word for describing services activities. Antigua and the European
Communities note that, considering that the same dictionary defines a "sporting woman" as a
prostitute, this raises the question of whether the word "sporting", under the approach suggested by
the United States, would also encompass prostitution. 623 Several dictionary definitions quoted above
suggest that gambling activities encompassed unde r "sporting" are essentially those relating to
sporting events; hence, it remains unclear whethe r, by excluding "sporting", the United States
excluded all activities involving the placing of be ts and wagers like, among other things, casino-
related activities and lotteries.
6.60 Moreover, the words "sportifs" 624 and "deportivos" 625 respectively French and Spanish
translations of "sporting", do not cover gambling-related activities.
6.61 On the basis of the various dictionary defi nitions quoted above, including in French and
Spanish, we find that the ordinary meaning of "sporting" does not include gambling.

618 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1986.
619 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., 1987.
620 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, 1988.
621 Encarta World English Dictionary , available at http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/sporting.html,
2004.
622 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, op. cit., footnote 612.
623 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 27; European Communities' written submission, para. 30.
624 "Sportif" is defined as follows: "adj. [...] 1. Pr opre ou relatif au sport, aux différents sports. [...]
Qui a un caractère de sport, de compétition (et non de simple exercice). [...] Mouvementé, tumultueux. [...] 2.
625 "Deportivo" is defined as follows: "adj. Perteneciente o relativo al deporte. 2. Que sirve o se
deporte. 4. Dicho de la ropa y de la forma de vestir: Cómoda e informal. [...] 5. m. automóvil deportivo.
[...]". Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, 22nd ed, 2001.

6.62 The Panel turns now to Antigua's argument that the ordinary meaning of the words "other
recreational services" (sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule) or "entertainment services" (sub-sector
10.A of the US Schedule) encompass "gambling and betting services". According to the United
States, the ordinary meaning of these words does not encompass gambling activities. The Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary defines "entertainment" and "recreational", respectively, as:
"The action of occupying a person's attention agreeably; amusement. b A thing
which entertains or amuses someone, esp. a public performance or exhibition
designated to entertain people."
626
"Of or pertaining to recreation; used for or as a form of recreation; concerned with
recreation". The word "recreation" is defined as: "[T]he action of recreating (oneself
or another), or fact of being recreated, by some pleasant occupation, pastime or
amusement".627
6.63 The Panel considers that an interpretation of th e US Schedule relying mainly on the ordinary
meaning of the words as defined in dictionaries does not provide sufficient clarity as to the scope of
the sector/sub-sector concerned and leaves many in terpretive questions open. This problem is
particularly acute in respect of sector 10, where words such as "recreational" and "entertainment"
could cover virtually the same types of services acti vities. In other words, the ordinary meaning of
"entertainment" and "recreational" does not ensure the mutual exclusiveness 628 of the sub-sectoral
headings, which is a prerequisite for a classification system.629
6.64 This latter problem is exemplified by the res ponse given by the United States to a question
posed by the Panel.630 The United States indicated, with respect to the scope of its commitment under
sub-sector 10.D, that an interpreter could find , consistently with customary rules of treaty
interpretation, that:
"'Other recreational services (except sporting)' (10.D) includes services that fall
squarely within the plain meaning of 'recr eation' and are distinguishable from either
'sporting' or 'entertainment.' Such activities could include, inter alia, the operation of
such recreational facilities as marinas, beaches, and parks, as well as the organization
and/or facilitation of non-sporting recreational activities."
'Entertainment services' (10.A) includes ser vices that fall squarely within the plain
meaning of 'entertainment' and are distinguishable from either 'sporting' or
'recreation'. Such activities could include, inter alia, services consisting of the
operation of entertainment facilities, such as theaters, dance halls, music halls, and

626 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002 (5th ed.).
627 Ibid.
628 The Panel notes that the introduction to the CPC Prov., for instance, states that "[T]he CPC is a
system of categories covering both goods and services that is both exhaustive and mutually exclusive." See
Provisional Central Product Classification, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77, United Nations (1991), p. 7
(emphasis added).
629 An interpretation based mainly on the ordinary meaning, without recourse to the CPC or any sui
generis definition, would raise various questions, such as: what would be covered by "entertainment services"
(10.A), in addition to theatre, live bands and circuses? Wh at would be precisely the "o ther cultural services" in
10.C? How and where to draw the "border" between 10.A and 10.C? What is the difference between
"entertainment" (10.A) and "recreational" (10.D) as these words are largely synonymous? For instance, where
would discotheques, amusement parks, services provided by composers and sculptors, zoos be categorised under
the five items of sector 10? How would a clear separation be ensured between sector 10 and other sectors/sub-
sectors of W/120, such as audiovisual services?
630 Panel question No. 7.

other performing arts venues; and the or ganization and/or facilitation of such
entertainment activities."
631
6.65 In view of the ordinary meaning of the words "recreational", "entertainment" and "sporting",
the Panel fails to understand the United States' clai m that the operation of facilities such as marinas,
beaches and parks "fall squarely within the plain me aning" of "recreation" and are "distinguishable"
from "entertainment". Similarly, it is not clear why theatres, dance halls, music halls, etc. "fall
squarely within the plain meaning of 'entertainme nt'" and are "distinguishable" from "recreation". In
fact, it seems that the words "entertainment" and "recreation" are largely synonymous and could be
used interchangeably.
6.66 Moreover, in the Panel's vi ew, gambling and betting have, a priori , the characteristics of
being entertaining or amusing, or of being used as a form of recreation. The National Gambling
Impact Study Commission (NGISC) states that "[t]oday the vast majority of Americans [...] gamble
recreationally";
632 the US National Research Council states that "[p]athological gambling differs from
the recreational or social gambling of most adults, who view it as a form of entertainment and wager
only small amounts".
633 Therefore, the Panel finds it difficult to assert, as the United States does, that
"[T]o the extent that other services fall within sector 10 but do not fall within sub-sector 10.A to 10.D,
those services reside by default in sector 10.E, 'other'."634
6.67 On the basis of these considerations, the Panel concludes that the ordinary meaning of the
words "Other recreational services (except sporting)" and "entertainment services" leaves a number of
questions open and does not allow it to reach a definitive conclusion on whether or not the US
Schedule includes specific commitments on "gambling and betting services" in sector 10
(Recreational, cultural and sporting services). The Pa nel also notes the Appellate Body's view that
dictionary definitions do not necessarily provide a final answer and "leave many interpretive
questions open".
635 In another dispute, the Appellate Body recalled that "dictionaries are important
guides to, not dispositive statements of, definitions of words appearing in agreements and legal
documents".636
6.68 The Panel needs, therefore, to continue its analysis pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention which stipulates, inter alia, that the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty must be
examined in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.
(iii) ... ordinary meaning ... in light of the context ...
6.69 According to Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention, the "context" comprises:
"[I]n addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

631 United States' reply to Panel question No. 7.
632 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report (hereinafter "NGISC Final Report"),
18 June 1999, p. 1-1.
633 Commission on the Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, Committee on Law and
Justice, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council,
Pathological Gambling: a Critical Review, (1999), p. 1.
634 United States' reply to Panel question No. 7.
635 Appellate Body Reports on Canada – Aircraft, para. 153 and in EC – Asbestos, para. 92.
636 Appellate Body Report on US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 248.

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty."
6.70 Furthermore, Article 31:3 stipulates that "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the
context [...] any subsequent agreemen t between the parties [...] or [..] any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty [...]".
6.71 Parties and third parties refer to W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as being relevant
for the interpretation of the US Schedule. However, they disagree as to whether these two documents:
(i) belong to the "context", within the meaning of Article 31:2(a) of the Vienna Convention; (ii) are to
be examined as a subsequent agreement or are ev idence of the subsequent practice of Members,
pursuant to Article 31:3(a) or (b); or (iii) are "supplementary means of interpretation" within the
meaning of Article 32. The United States also argu es that the proper context for interpreting the US
Schedule includes schedules of other Members. Fina lly, the context for the interpretation of US
specific commitments includes the US Schedule and its structure. The Pa nel will examine these
various elements in turn.
1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120 as part of the context
6.72 The Panel will start by examining whether W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines belong
to the context of the US Schedule within the meaning of Article 31:2(a) of the Vienna Convention.
6.73 The Appellate Body found that, when interpreting GATT tariff schedules, the Harmonized
System ("HS") and its Explanatory Notes should be taken into account:
"[W]e are puzzled by the fact that the Panel, in its effort to interpret the terms of
Schedule LXXX, did not consider the Harmonized System and its Explanatory Notes.
We note that during the Uruguay Round negotiations, both the European
Communities and the United States were parties to the Harmonized System .
Furthermore, it appears undisputed that the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations were
held on the basis of the Harmonized System's nomenclature and that requests for, and
offers of, concessions were normally made in terms of this nomenclature."
637
6.74 The Panel also notes the US argument that "Harmonized System numbers were an explicit
and integral part of the schedule at issue in EC – Computer Equipment, while it is undisputed that the
US Schedule makes no reference to the CPC". 638 In EC – Computer Equipment both the European
Communities and the United States were parties to the HS, i.e. there was no controversy as to the
relevance of the HS, whereas, in this dispute, ther e is some controversy as to the relevance – or at
least part of it – of W/120, in particular with respect to CPC references.
6.75 So, while there are undoubtedly differences betw een tariffs and services schedules, it is our
view that the Appellate Body's reasoning can be transposed in the context of GATS Schedules.
Beyond the particular circumstances of the EC – Computer Equipment dispute, there is a more general
principle which we can discern in the Appellate Bo dy's findings which is that documents used as a
"basis" for conducting requests – offers during a mark et access negotiations – should be taken into
account for interpreting schedules. This is the case of both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines.
6.76 In EC – Computer Equipment , the Appellate Body did not indicate whether the HS and its
Explanatory Notes belonged to the "context", within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna

637 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 89.
638 United States' first oral statement, para. 31.

Convention, or were, rather, supplementary means of interpretation according to Article 32. In US –
Section 110(5) Copyright Act
639, the panel made the following statements concerning the requirements
for an instrument to be part of the "context" within the meaning of Article 31:2 of the Vienna
Convention:
"The International Law Commission explains in its commentary on the final set of
draft Articles on the law of treaties that this provision is based on the principle that a
unilateral document cannot be regarded as fo rming part of the context unless not only
was it made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, but its relation to the
treaty was accepted by the other parties.
640 [...] It is essential that the agreement or
instrument should be related to the treaty. It must be concerned with the substance of
the treaty and clarify certain concepts in the treaty or limit its field of application. 641
It must equally be drawn up on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty. 642 Any
agreement or instrument fulfilling these criteria will form part of the 'context' of the
treaty and will thus not be treated as part of the preparatory works but rather as an
element in the general rule of interpretation."
643
6.77 For W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines to be part of the context within the meaning
of Article 31:2(a), three conditions s hould be fulfilled. They must: (i) "relate" to the treaty, i.e. the
GATS; (ii) constitute an agreement made between all the parties or an instruments made between
some parties and accepted by the others as such; a nd (iii) be "in connexion" with the conclusion of
the GATS.
6.78 With respect to the first condition, the stated objective of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines is
to "explain ... how commitments should be set out in schedules in order to achieve precision and
clarity. ... a common format for schedules as well as standardization of the terms used in schedules
are necessary to ensure comparable and unambiguous commitments." 644 Members felt the need to
complement the GATS (Article XX) to ensure that GATS schedules would "speak" a common
language. Clearly, GATS schedules cannot be unders tood without reference to the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines. For instance, basic terms such as "None", Unbound", and "Unbound*", which are used in
all schedules, do not appear in the GATS itself; thus, they make sense only with reference to the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines. Also, the very form at of GATS schedules was established in the
Guidelines.645 Both the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/ 120 are "concerned with the substance of
the treaty and clarify certain concepts in the treaty or limit its field of application."

639 Panel Report on US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, para. 6.45.
640 (original footnote) Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , Manchester University
Press, 2nd edition, 1984, p. 129.
des Traités, op.cit., p. 37; cited by Sinclair, op.cit., p.129.
642 ( original footnote ) "Il y a ici une certaine notion de contemporanéité, l'un ou l'autre peut être
643 (original footnote) Sinclair, op. cit. 129. Sinclair mentions the example of the Council of Europe,
where governmental experts charged with the task of negotiating and formulating an international convention of
a particular topic, draw up, in parallel with the text of the convention, an explanatory report which sets out the
framework within which and the background against which the convention has been drawn up, and which then
goes on to furnish an Article by Article commentary on the text. The explanatory report is agreed upon
unanimously by the governmental experts responsible for drawing up the text of the convention and it is adopted
simultaneously with the text of the convention.
644 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, para. 1.
645 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, p. 12.

6.79 All this suggests that, although they are not an authoritative interpretation of the GATS 646, the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines are, nevertheless, inextr icably linked to the GATS itself. As suggested
by the European Communities, it is indubitable that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120
assisted Members in the preparation of their schedules. The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines provide
indications as to how Members collectively unders tand their GATS obligations in relation to their
specific commitments. In that sense, we agree that their overall objective must have been shared by
negotiators.
647
6.80 Although both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Gu idelines were "technically" drafted by the
Secretariat – this was arguably the most practical a nd efficient way to work on such a matter – they
can be considered "agreement[s] ... made between all [Members]" or an "instrument[s] ... made by one
or more [Members]" but accepted by all of them as su ch within the meaning of Article 31:2(a) and (b)
of the Vienna Convention. In this regard, it may be recalled that the two documents were prepared by
the – then – GATT Secretariat, at the behest of th e Uruguay Round participants. The participants can
thus be considered to be the "intellectual" authors of the documents.648 Besides, both documents were
the object of a series of formal and informal cons ultations during which Members had the opportunity
to amend them and to include changes. Both were circulated as formal "green band" documents with
the agreement of the participants.649
6.81 Finally, both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are "in connexion" with the GATS.
Both documents were drafted in pa rallel with the GATS itself, with the stated purpose of being used
as "guides" for scheduling sp ecific commitments under the GA TS and for the subsequent
interpretation of Members' schedules. In that sense, they can be considered to have been "drawn up
on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty". 650 As to W/120, it was used by most WTO Members
during the Uruguay Round to establish their schedules of specific commitments. 651 As indicated by
Antigua and Canada, W/120 is referred to in Article 22.3(f) of the DSU 652 for the purpose of defining

646 Paragraph 1 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines states that "the answers [to questions that might
occur to persons responsible for scheduling commitments] should not be considered as an authoritative legal
interpretation of the GATS".
648 At the 1988 Montreal Ministerial Conference, Mini sters agreed that future work in the services
negotiations should provide for the "compilation by the s ecretariat of a reference list of sectors by February
1989. This process could be assisted by submissions by participants" (MTN.TNC/7(MIN), Part II). The 1993
Scheduling Guidelines have been prepared by the Secretariat "in response to requests by participants"
(MTN.GNS/W/164, footnote 1).
649 In various instances, the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are referred to as the "agreed" Guidelines.
See, for instance, informal Paper for the Group of Negotiations on Services, Verification of Schedules of
Commitments and MFN Exemptions – Opening Statement, 10 February 1994, para. 2 (emphasis added) and EC
– Banana III, para. 7.289. By contrast, the Explanatory Note on Listing of MFN Exemptions, which was drafted
and discussed at the same time, has remained an in formal document because Members' agreement on it has
never been secured (see Listing of Article II Exemptions – Explanatory Note by the Secretariat , Job No. 2061,
15 September 1993).
650 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , Manchester University Press, 2 nd edition,
1984, p. 129.
651 The Panel notes that the huge majority of GATS schedules are based on W/120, although they do
not explicitly state so: they follow its structure, headings and codes, with only minor derogations for a few of
them. Only three schedules do not follow the general structure of W/120; however, even in these cases, one can
identify some "traces" of W/120, for in stance at sub-sectoral level. Only six schedules contain an explicit
reference to W/120. The Panel also notes that most Members chose to refer to CPC numbers to define the scope
of their commitments: (i) only 17 schedules adopted a non-CPC approach; (ii) a few schedules have a "mixed"
approach, i.e. they includ e CPC numbers for some sectors only. The systematic use of W/120 and CPC
references is even more striking with the 20 Members that have acceded since the end of the Uruguay Round. A
survey of these schedules shows that they are all based on W/120 and all but one used CPC references.
652 The relevant provision reads: "for the purpose of this paragraph [i.e. paragraph 3, referring to the
suspension of concessions], "sector" mean s: [...] (ii) with respect to servi ces, a principal sector as identified in

what a services "sector" is in case of suspension of concessions. At the time of the conclusion of the
WTO Agreement, Members made reference to W/120 in connexion with the DSU; this lends support
to the view that W/120 can be considered as be longing to the context within the meaning of
Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention.
6.82 On this basis, both W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines were agreed upon by
Members with a view to using such documents, not only in the negotiation of their specific
commitments, but as interpretative tools in the inte rpretation and application of Members' scheduled
commitments. As such, these documents comprise the "context" of GATS Schedules, within the
meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and the Panel will use them for the purpose of
interpreting the GATS, GATS schedules and thus the US Schedule. In so doing, the Panel is aware
that: (i) the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines do not repr esent an authoritative interpretation of the GATS;
and (ii) there was no obligation imposed on WTO Memb ers to use the W/120 and its references to the
CPC. Yet, these instruments must be examined, as co ntext, to determine the ordinary meaning of the
terms used in a Member's GATS Schedule and these te rms must have a meaning. The Panel will now
proceed to interpret the US Schedule, in particul ar sector 10, in the context of document W/120 and
the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.
Interpreting the US Schedule in the context of document W/120 and the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines
6.83 The US Schedule does not contain any explicit refe rence to the CPC. We recall also that the
United States has included under sector 10 a sub-sector, namely, sub-sector 10.D, entitled Other
Recreational Services (except sporting) . In light of the public international law principle of effective
interpretation, such terms in the US Schedule must be given a meaning. The Panel needs, thus, to
proceed to interpret the US Schedule, in particular sub-sector 10.D, in light of the ordinary meaning of
the terms used in the context of document W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines.
6.84 Paragraph 15 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines states that:
"[S]chedules record, for each sector, the le gally enforceable commitments of each
Member. It is therefore vital that schedules be clear, precise and based on a common
format and terminology."653
6.85 Paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines states:
"[T]he legal nature of a schedule as well as the need to evaluate commitments, require
the greatest possible degree of clarity in the description of each sector and
sub-sector scheduled. In general the classification of sectors and sub-sectors should
be based on the Secretariat's revised Services Sectoral Classification List
[MTN.GNS/W/120]. Each sector contained in the Secretariat list is identified by the
corresponding Central Product Classification (CPC) number. Where it is necessary to
refine further a sectoral classification, this should be done on the basis of the CPC or
other internationally recognised classifica tion (e.g. Financial Services Annex). The
most recent breakdown of the CPC, includi ng explanatory notes for each sub-sector,
is contained in the UN Provisional Central Product Classification. […] If a Member

the current "Services Sectoral Cl assification List" which identifies such sectors". A footnote to
subparagraph (ii) indicates that "[T]he list in docume nt MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors" and lists
them.
653 Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, MTN.GNS/W/164 (3
September 1993) (hereinafter the "1993 Scheduling Guide lines"), para. 15. The same requirement appears in
the Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, S/L/92 (28 March 2001) (hereinafter
the "2001 Scheduling Guidelines"), para. 22.

wishes to use its own sub-sectoral classification or definitions it should provide
concordance with the CPC in the manner indi cated in the above example. If this is
not possible, it should give a sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambiguity as
to the scope of the commitment."
654
6.86 The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines are not an author itative legal interpretation of the GATS for
various reasons. First, they explicitly state as much.655 Second, according to Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, the Ministerial Conference and the Gene ral Council have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of WTO agreements. However, as part of the context for the interpretation of the US
Schedule, the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines explain the in tention of Members with regard to the nature
and scope of the Members' GATS scheduled comm itments and how Members should and can read
each other's Schedules.
6.87 Paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guide lines suggests that there was an understanding
among Members that, in order to secure clarity a nd predictability, the classification of sectors and
sub-sectors should be based on W/120 and the co rresponding CPC numbers. The Panel agrees with
the United States that no Member was forced or obliged to schedule specific commitments in
accordance with W/120 and the CPC numbers and that the CPC was not binding on Members.
However, as argued by the European Communities, "departure from W/120 and CPC definitions was
not free and unconditional and was not meant to allow convenient ambiguity in Members'
schedules".656 Pursuant to paragraph 16 of the 1993 Sc heduling Guidelines, a Member intending not
to use W/120 and/or the corresponding CPC numbers ha d two options: (i) to use its own sub-sectoral
classification or definition and give concordance with the CPC; or (ii) if this was not possible, to give
a "sufficiently detailed definition to avoid any ambigui ty as to the scope of the commitment". In fact,
paragraph 16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines is nothing other than the expression of a general
requirement of transparency to ensure clarity and predictability of the specific commitments,
expressed in the GATS preamble.
6.88 The relevant section of W/120 is as follows:
"SECTORS AND SUB-SECTORS C ORRESPONDING CPC

10.
RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES
 (other than audiovisual services)

A. Entertainment services (including theatre, 9619
 live bands and circus services)

B. News agency services 962

C. Libraries, archives, museums and other
 cultural services 963

D. Sporting and other recreational services 964

E. Other
[...]"

654 Para. 16 of W/164.
655 Para. 1 of W/164.
656 See para. 4.32 above.

6.89 CPC number 964, corresponding to sub-sector 10.D ( Sporting and other recreational
services), is broken down as follows:
"964 Sporting and other recreational services

 9641 Sporting services
 96411 Sports event promotion services
 96412 Sports event organization services
 96413 Sports facility operation services
 96419 Other sporting services

 9649 Other recreational services
 96491 Recreation park and beach services
 96492 Gambling and betting services
 96499 Other recreational services n.e.c."
6.90 The United States argues that "because [the United States] did not bind itself to, or reference
or rely on, the CPC in the text of its Schedule, th e CPC definitions cannot control the interpretation of
the US Schedule. The question whether to tie commitments of the United States or any other Member
to CPC definitions was a matter for negotiations, th e answer to which should not be imposed post hoc
through dispute settlement [...]."
657 The Panel would like to make tw o remarks with respect to this
statement. First, the fact that the United States di d not bind itself to the CPC does not mean that the
CPC is not relevant for the purpose of determining the ordinary meaning of the US Schedule, in its
context, and in light of the object and purpose of the GATS. The Panel is of the view that, even if it is
not binding, the CPC, through the context of W/120 and the Scheduling Guidelines, remains relevant
for the interpretation of the US Schedule.
6.91 Secondly, in this dispute, there is no question of seeking to "impose" the CPC on the United
States, but simply to give a meaning to a US co mmitment according to the customary rules of treaty
interpretation. If the United States had made clear re ferences to the CPC, the interpretation of the US
Schedule would be controlled by the CPC definitions that would compose the ordinary meaning of the
terms of the treaty. This is not the case here. Th e United States had the possibility to provide its own
definitions for sub-sector 10.D. It did not. In the absence of any clear terms or any other clear
indication of the meaning and scope of the US entr ies in sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule, the Vienna
Convention points to a series of instruments that should be used to assist in the interpretation of the
US Schedule. Such instruments include W/120, which refers to CPC definitions, and the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines which explains the relations hip between Members' schedules, W/120 and the
CPC. In these findings, we do not mean to suggest that "CPC schedules" are like "non-CPC
schedules". Clearly, where "non-CPC" schedules prov ide a sufficiently detailed definition, the scope
of the commitment should not be ambiguous, as in the present case. The Panel is obliged to give
meaning to a specific entry in the US Schedule, in li ght of the particular circumstances of this case.
Moreover, the US documents that the Panel will examine pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention (see below) tend to confirm – rather than contradict – this approach.
6.92 In its decision in EC – Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body stated that:
"[w]hile each Schedule represents the tariff commitments made by one Member, they
represent a common agreement among all Members."
658

657 United States' first written submission, paras. 64-65.
658 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 109. See also the similar reasoning of
the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy , para. 139 when dealing with the unilateral commitments made by
Canada in its Agriculture Schedules.

6.93 The Panel is of the view that W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines assist in establishing
the common agreement among WTO Members with resp ect to the content of the US Schedule.
Where the US Schedule follows W/120 without any cl ear departure and in the absence of any specific
definition, the United States has created an expectat ion that its commitments must be interpreted in
the light of W/120 and the corresponding CPC numbers. Sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule is
entitled Other Recreational Services (except sporting ); we understand that this
sub-sector corresponds to CPC 964 ( Sporting and other recreational services ). By explicitly
excluding Sporting services, the United States has excluded the category of services corresponding to
CPC 9641 (Sporting services). Hence, what remains under sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule is the
CPC category 9649 ( Other recreational services ), which includes, inter alia , gambling and betting
services (CPC 96492). Therefore, the US Schedule, r ead in the light of paragraph 16 of the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines, is to be understood to in clude a specific commitment on gambling and betting
services under sub-sector 10.D (Recreational services (except sporting)).
6.94 The Panel wishes to underline th at there is no suggestion that the "context" (i.e. the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines and W/120) is a part of the text of the GATS and would, therefore, "bind"
Members. Thus, while the 1993 Scheduling Guid elines and W/120 do not impose any "obligations"
on Members, nevertheless, an interpreter trying to interpret and appreciate relevant GATS obligations
must read them, where appropriate, in light of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120. This is the
reason why these two documents are relevant when trying to give meaning to the terms used in the US
Schedule. In this dispute, an interpretation based mainly – if not exclusively – on the ordinary
meaning of the words does not ensure the clarity a nd predictability of the US specific commitments at
stake.659
6.95 Finally, even if the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines and W/120 were "only" preparatory work, the
Panel's conclusions would be the sa me: Article 32 of the Vienna Conve ntion allows a Panel to resort
to preparatory work as supplementary means of in terpretation when the interpretation according to
Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure".
6.96 The Panel will further discuss below other elements of evidence confirming that the United
States led other Members to believe in good faith that, unless otherwise provided for, the ordinary
meaning of the terms of the US Schedule should be read in light of W/120, including the CPC
references.
Other Members' GATS Schedules as part of the context for the interpretation of the
US Schedule
6.97 The United States refers to other Members' schedules as being part of the context in which the
US Schedule must be interpreted. The Panel c oncurs with the United States that other Members'
schedules comprise the "context" with in the meaning of Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention. All
Members' schedules are annexed to the GATS and, ac cording to Article XX:3, are "an integral part
thereof".
6.98 The United States does not need to invoke the f act that other Members did not use the CPC to
justify its own choice not to refer to the CPC beca use it was entitled to do so anyway. In that sense,
the practice of other Members is relevant only to confirm that, as stipulated in the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines, Members were free to use or not to use the CPC. If the United States wanted to rely on
the other Members' schedules, as evidence of a "prac tice of Members" relevant in the interpretation of
its own Schedules, it should have demonstrated th at such Members' practice was coherent and
consistent. We believe that th e few examples pointed to by the United States do not evidence any
such practice by Members. The Panel agrees with the European Communities that each of the
commitments in other Members' schedules has to be placed in its own – different – immediate

659 See above at para. 6.87.

context, which is the schedule to which it belongs.
660 Each schedule has its own intrinsic logic, which
is different from the US Schedule. Moreover, no Member could invoke the fact that other "non-CPC"
Members did not provide "sufficiently detailed definitions" to justify ambiguities in its own schedule.
6.99 Moreover, the Panel fails to see the direct rele vance of other Members' schedules to support
the US argument that the United States has not undertaken specific commitments on gambling and
betting services.
6.100 In particular, the Panel does not accept the US argument that "the United States could only
have a commitment for gambling services if it had scheduled the 10.E residual category". The mere
fact that two Members scheduled gambling and be tting services under 10.E is not sufficient to allow
the United States to argue that, should it have undertaken specific commitments, it would have done
so under 10.E as well. More than two Members seem ed to be of the view that gambling and betting
services belong to sub-sector 10.D, and made commitmen ts, or introduced limitations with respect to
those services. Moreover, the reason why two Members scheduled gambling under sub-sector 10.E
can be determined only on the basis of an examinati on of the Schedules concerned; this is outside the
terms of reference of this Panel.
6.101 The United States further argues that should it have undertaken a commitment on gambling
and betting, it would have done so under 10.E ("Other"). This appears to be at odds with the other US
argument that the exclusion of "sporting" under sub-sector 10.D had the consequence of excluding
gambling and betting services.
661 The Panel takes note of the US response to a question posed by the
Panel,662 but is nevertheless of the view that the two US arguments contradict the principle that entries
in a classification system – and in a Schedule – s hould be mutually exclusive. Further, these
arguments are in contradiction with the USITC Document, which indicates that sub-sector 10.D
corresponds to CPC 964 (which includes gambling) and that there is "no corresponding CPC" for
sub-sector 10.E (see below paragraphs 6.122 et seq .). Moreover, this argument is also difficult to
reconcile with the cover-notes to the US dr aft Schedules during the Uruguay Round (see below
paragraphs 6.115 et seq.).
6.102 On the basis of these considerations, the Panel is of the view that an examination of the
schedules of other Members does not allow it to conclude that, should the United States have
undertaken specific commitments on gambling and betting services, it would have done so under
sub-sector 10.E. The US Schedule, interpreted in the context of the schedules of other Members, does
not contradict our previous conclusion that th e US Schedule, includes a specific commitment on
gambling and betting services under sub-sector 10.D (Recreational services (except sporting)).
The US Schedule as context for the interpretation of sub-sector 10.D
6.103 The Panel agrees with the United States th at, under the GATS, Members can "define their
offers (and their ensuing obligations ) in terms which suits their needs" 663 (the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines do not say otherwise). The Panel notes th at the US Schedule follows closely the structure
of W/120, in particular as far as sector 10 is concerned. The numbering used by the United States in
its Schedule for all sectors and sub-sectors corresponds to that of W/120. But for a few minor drafting
changes (omission of the word "services", for inst ance), the sectoral and sub-sectoral headings are
similar to those contained in W/120. The section on Recreational Services in the US Schedule is
placed under number 10, as in W/120. The first three sub-sectors (A to C) on which the United States
has undertaken commitments have the same denomi nations as in W/120 and are placed in the same

660 European Communities' written submission, paras. 44-60.
661 United States' first written submission, paras. 75 and 71.
662 In particular, the United States' reply to Panel question No. 8.
663 United States' first written submission, para. 65, referring to Appellate Body Report on EC –
Computer Equipment, paras. 109-110.

order. The United States entitled sub-sector 10.D Other recreational services (except sporting) , as
compared to Sporting and other recreational services in W/120. Finally, the Panel also notes that the
USITC itself states that "[t]he U.S. Schedule makes no explicit references to CPC numbers, but it
corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list".
664
6.104 In a number of instances, the United States departed from W/120 and, as recommended in the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines, clearly indicated that it was doing so. For instance, in two cases, the
United States did not wish to include certain elemen ts otherwise covered by W/120 and it specifically
said so.665 Similarly, in scheduling its specific commitments on environmental services, the United
States, while using W/120, expressly defined th e activities covered by its specific commitments. 666
With respect to "Financial Services - Insurance", the US Schedule indicates, as stipulated in paragraph
16 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelin es, that "commitments in this sub-sector are undertaken pursuant
to the alternative approach to scheduling co mmitments set forth in the Understanding on
Commitments on Financial Services". 667 In scheduling specific commitm ents on hospital and other
health care facilities, the United States expressly defined the scope of that sub-sector in its
Schedule.
668
6.105 When asked by the Panel which classification sy stem, if any, the United States had followed
in establishing its Schedule, the United States replie d that "subject to some changes (e.g. "except
sporting"), the United States generally followed the W/120 structure", adding that its Schedule should
be interpreted according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.669 The United States did not
indicate a relevant US industry classifica tion system for interpreting its Schedule. 670 In its Schedule,
the United States has not provided any kind of defi nition for the sub-sectors listed under sector 10,
contrary to what is recommended in the 1993 Sche duling Guidelines. Finally, we recall that
dictionary definitions leave a number of questions open.
(iv) ... ordinary meaning in light of the object and purpose of the treaty
6.106 The object and purpose of the GATS lends support to the conclusion that the ordinary
meaning of the terms used in the US Schedule, when read in their context, is that the United States has
undertaken specific commitments on gambling and betting services in sub-sector 10.D of its Schedule.
Our conclusion derives from the need to provide clarity and precision in respect of the US entry under
sub-sector 10.D ( Other recreational service s, except sporting ) and the fact that, unless otherwise
indicated in the schedule, Members were assume d to have relied on W/120 and the corresponding
CPC references.
6.107 The need for clarity and precision in Members' schedules referred to in the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines is consistent with the pr eamble to the GATS which stipulates, inter alia , that, in
establishing the GATS, Members sought the expansion of trade in services "under conditions of
transparency". This requirement of transparency is undoubtedly an object and purpose of the GATS –
and the WTO in general – and applies equally to GATS schedules of specific commitments. Indeed,
schedules of specific commitments determine, inter alia , the scope of market access and national

664 See the section below dealing with US practice – USITC Document, and in particular para. 6.132.
665 With respect to "Computer and Related Services", the US Schedule contains the following entry:
"(MTN.GNS/W/120 a) – e), except airlin e computer reservation systems)." With respect to "Publishing", the
following entry is made: "(Only part of MTN.GNS/W/120 category: 'r) Printing, Publishing'."
666 The entry "Environmental Services" is followed by note 19, which provides that "[i]n each of the
following sub-sectors, United States' commitments are limited to the following activities: […]".
667 US Schedule, p. 54.
668 US Schedule, p. 117. The entry "Hospital and Other Health Care Facilities" is followed by the
following definition: "Direct ownership and management and operation by contract of such facilities on a 'for
fee' basis".
669 United States' reply to Panel question No. 5 (emphasis in the original).
670 United States' reply to Panel question No. 6.

treatment obligations that Members undertake under the GATS. It is, therefore, important that
schedules be readily understandable by all other WTO Members, as well as by services suppliers and
consumers.
6.108 The Appellate Body found that "the security and predictability of 'the reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade' is
an object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of GATT 1994."
671 T h i s
confirms the importance of the security and predicta bility of Members' specific commitments, which
is equally an object and purpose of the GATS.
6.109 Finally, our conclusion is compatible with the principle of progressive liberalization as
embodied in Article XIX of the GATS and the preamble of the GATS.
(v) Conclusions under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
6.110 In its interpretation of the US Schedule in light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the
Panel noted that dictionary defin itions of key terms in that Schedule ("entertainment", "recreational",
and "sporting") do not exclude that gambling and betting services could be covered under sub-sector
10.D of the US Schedule. We also found that thes e definitions are less than conclusive. The Panel
then examined the terms of the US Schedule in the context of W/120 and the 1993 Scheduling
Guidelines and found that, where the US Schedule follows W/120 without any clear departure and in
the absence of any specific definition, there would be reason enough for Members to believe that the
scope of sub-sector 10.D in the US Schedule corresponds to that of W/120 and the corresponding
CPC numbers. Thus, the Panel believes that the US Schedule, read in the light of paragraph 16 of the
Scheduling Guidelines, can be understood to in clude a specific commitment on gambling and betting
services under sub-sector 10.D (Recreational services (except sporting)).
6.111 CPC 96492 does not offer an explanatory note for "gambling and betting services". However,
for the purpose of this dispute, the Panel will pro ceed on the basis of the parameters proposed in the
Introduction to the Report (see above Section VI.A.6).
6.112 The Panel will now resort to Article 32 of th e Vienna Convention (supplementary means of
interpretation), to confirm the meaning imparted to sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule on the basis
of its examination under Article 31.
(vi) Supplementary means of interpretation
6.113 In EC – Computer Equipment , the Appellate Body found it appropriate to resort to
"supplementary means of interpretation", pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention:
"The application of [the] rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually
allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term [footnote omitted].
However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or
obscure, or leads to a result which is mani festly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32
allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to: '... supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion'. With regard to 'the circum stances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this
permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against
which the treaty was negotiated."
672

671 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 82.
672 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 86. See also Appellate Body Report on
Canada – Dairy, paras. 138-139.

6.114 Under Article 32, the Panel will take into account preparatory work. However, Article 32 is
not limited to preparatory work, but allows a treat y interpreter to take in to consideration other
supplementary means of interpretation.673 The Panel will thus consider other relevant material.
Preparatory work
Cover-notes to US draft Schedules during the Uruguay Round
6.115 Antigua and the European Communities referred to US Draft Final Schedules towards the end
of the Uruguay Round. The relevant paragraph of the cover-note to the US Draft Final Schedule,
dated 7 December 1993, reads as follows:
"[E]xcept where specifically noted, the sc ope of the sectoral commitments of the
United States corresponds to the sectoral c overage in the Secr etariat's Services
Sectoral Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/120, dated 10 July 1991)".674
6.116 This text also appeared in the Revised Cond itional Offer tabled by the United States on
1 October 1993.675 The European Communities indicated that the same paragraph was included in the
cover-note of the Schedule of the United States, tabled on 15 December 1993. 676 The entire cover-
note was deleted from the US Schedule that was circulated on 15 April 1994 as GATS/SC/90.677
6.117 This cover-note qualifies as preparatory work, as well as circumstances of the conclusion of
the treaty, and is undoubtedly relevant as a supplem entary means of interpretation within the meaning
of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
6.118 In the Panel's view, the fact that this refere nce to W/120 was made at a crucial stage during
the services market access negotiations and was contained in three successive drafts cannot be ignored
as it would have led participants to believe in good faith that the "scope" of the US commitments
"corresponded" to the "sectoral coverage" of W/120. The date of 15 December 1993 marked the end
of the Uruguay Round negotiations, including the ser vices negotiations. The only activity in the area
of services thereafter, during the early months of 1994, was a process of verification of schedules

673 "Article 32 gives only examples of the principal supplementary means of interpretation. [...] There
are several other means of interpretation, though it is not always easy to distinguish them from familiar legal
techniques, often based on commonsense or grammatical rules." Aust A., Modern Treaty Law and Practice ,
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 200. See also Elias T. O., The Modern Law of Treaties , Sÿthoff
Publishers, Leiden, 1974, p. 80 and Sir R. Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law ,
Longman Publishers, Harbour, 9th ed., 1996, pp. 1275-1282.
674 Communication from the United States of America – Draft Final Schedule of the United States of
America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.3, 7 December 1993.
675 Communication from the United States of America – Revised Conditional Offer of the United States
of America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/ W/112/Rev.2, 1 October 1993. The cover-note does
not appear in the first and second draft schedules circ ulated by the United States. See Communication from the
United States of America, Conditional Offer of the Un ited States of America Concerning Initial Commitments,
MTN.GNS/W/112, 13 November 1990. Communication from the United States of America, Revised
Conditional Offer of the United States of America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev.1,
21 January 1992.
676 Communication from the United States – Schedule of the United States Concerning Initial
Commitments on Trade in Services , MTN.GNS/W/112/Rev. 4, 15 December 1993. This document was
circulated in paper copy only.
677 The Panel notes that a number of draft final schedules presented betw een October and December
1993 started with a cover-note where Members were giving some indications on the content of their schedule
and/or the conditions attached to its circulation. The decision to suppress these cover-notes seems to have been
taken during the process of verification of schedules, which took place between Janu ary and March 1994, but,
since this process was largely informal, it has not been possible to identify a written source confirming this
point.

which was not meant to modify the substantive results of the negotiations.
678 Thus, contrary to what
is suggested by the United States 679, the scope of the results of the negotiations could not be altered
unilaterally after 15 December 1993.680
6.119 The scope of the "sectoral coverage" in W/120 , referred to in the c over-notes, can only be
determined when reading W/120 in its entirety, i.e. by reading the left-hand column ( Sectors and Sub-
sectors) jointly with the right-hand column ( Corresponding CPC ). Indeed, the left-hand column,
which enumerates the sectoral and sub-sectoral headings , is not sufficiently informative by itself. In
many, if not most cases, the ordinary meaning alone of the eleven sectors and some 160 sub-sectors
listed in that column cannot determine with su fficient clarity the scope of the sector or
sub-sector concerned. Also, the ordinary meaning is not sufficient to ensure the mutual exclusiveness
of the headings, which is a prerequisite for any cl assification system. In W/120, the sectoral and sub-
sectoral headings must be read in conjunction with the CPC references indicated in the right-hand
column; these CPC references ensure that the headings are mutually exclusive.
681
6.120 The cover-notes indicate that the United Stat es used W/120 not only for the "ordering" 682 of
its Schedule or for establishing its "str ucture", but also to determine the scope of its commitments,
except where specifically noted otherwise, even though it chose not to refer to the CPC, as it was
indeed entitled to do under the 1993 Scheduling Guid elines. Nevertheless, it is clear that, as the
negotiations progressed and were finalized, the understanding of Uruguay Ro und participants with
respect to the commitments offered by the Unite d States was that the United States had followed
W/120. Document W/120 in its entirety was the benchmark instrument that Uruguay Round
participants could rely on in good faith to assess the content of the US offer until the very end of the
negotiations. In EC – Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body noted, in particular that:
"[I]t appears to be undisputed that the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations were held
on the basis of the Harmonized System's no menclature and that requests for, and
offers of, concessions were normally made in terms of this nomenclature. [...] We
believe [...] that a proper interpretation of [the] Schedule [...] should have included an
examination of the Harmonized System and its Explanatory Notes."683
6.121 In this dispute, the cover-notes indisputably testify that services market access negotiations
were held on the basis of W/120 and contribut e to determining the common intention of the
participants to the Uruguay Round negotiations with re gard to the content of the US Schedule, and,
thus, the obligations that the United States was willing to undertake. It can, therefore, be concluded

678 This process was announced in the Airgram GATT/AIR/3544, dated 14 January 1994, (Uruguay
Round: Group of Negotiations on Services – General Agreement on Trade in Services: Verification of
Schedules of Commitments and MFN Exemptions): "[a] s announced by the Chairm an of the GNS in the
Group's meeting of 11 December 1993, and as agreed by the Group, a process of verification of schedules of
commitments in services and of lists of MFN exemptions will be established as set out below. It is emphasised
that, negotiations on services having been concluded, the purpose of this process is to confirm the technical
accuracy of schedules and exemption lists and not to am end their substantive conten t." Moreover, during an
informal meeting on 11 December 19 93, the Chairman of the GNS had stat ed that after 15 December 1993, the
"schedules and MFN lists cannot be modified or with drawn in any way that would alter the results of the
negotiations. Only additional commitments could be incorporated or MFN exemptions withdrawn". See
Processing and Verification of Final Schedules and Exemption Lists, Statement by the Chair of the GNS on 11
December 1993, informal document dated 12 December 1993. There is no record of this meeting.
679 United States' reply to Panel question No. 30.
680 This opinion appears to be shared by the European Communities in its reply to Panel question No. 3.
681 The Panel notes that the introduction to the CPC Prov., for instance, states that "[t]he CPC is a
system of categories covering both goods and services that is both exhaustive and mutually exclusive." See
Provisional Central Product Classification, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77, United Nations (1991), p. 7
(emphasis added).
682 United States' second oral statement, para. 11 and reply to Panel question No. 3.
683 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 89.

that the common intention of the Members, at the time the US specific commitments were negotiated,
was that where the US Schedule visibly followed W/ 120 without any clear and explicit departure, the
specific commitments at i ssue were to be interpreted in the light of W/120 and the CPC numbers
associated with it. The fact that the cover-note does not explicitly refer to the CPC does not change
our conclusion. In fact, the indication, containe d in three successive US draft schedules, that the
"scope of the sectoral commitments of the Unite d States corresponds to the sectoral coverage" in
W/120 was sufficiently clear in itself.
Other supplementary means of interpretation
US practice – USITC Document
6.122 As indicated in paragraph 6.114, the Panel is of the view that Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention is not necessarily limited to preparatory ma terial, but may allow treaty interpreters to take
into consideration other relevant material. A commentator indicates that the principle of acquiescence
is one of these possible aids to interpretation: "[i]f a party has made plain its understanding of the
meaning of a provision, and it later applies it in that sense without objection, other parties may not be
able to insist on a different interpretation. Article 31:3(b) might also apply".
684
6.123 Antigua argues that the United States Intern ational Trade Commission ("USITC") itself
indicates that sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule corresponds to sub-sector 10.D of W/120 and CPC
code 964.
685 In their responses to the Panel, Antigua , Canada, the European Communities and, to
some extent, Mexico, argue, in essence, that the US ITC Document can be used as an interpretative
aid, which has probative value and confirms othe r evidence (such as the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
or the cover-note to the US Draft Final Schedule) concerning the interpretation of the US Schedule.
These Members also argue that the acts of the US ITC can be attributed to, and bind, the US
government (in particular given the fact that th e USITC was formally mandated by the USTR to
maintain the US Schedule).686
6.124 In its reply to a question posed by the Pa nel, the United States argues that the USITC
Document is "merely an 'explanatory' text" by an "independent agency" which is meant to facilitate
comparison with other documents. Contrary to the Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"), the
USITC Document does not provide authoritative interp retative guidance of US law. According to the
United States, the USITC Document does not bind th e United States with respect to the US Schedule
because the United States, like all Members, ca nnot unilaterally adopt multilaterally binding
interpretations of a term of the GATS.687
6.125 As a starting point, the Panel agrees with the Un ited States that the USITC Document is not a
binding interpretation of the US Schedule b ecause no Member can unilaterally adopt binding
interpretations of any WTO agreement, nor of any in ternational treaty. However, this does not mean
that the USITC Document must be disregarded altogether. While the USITC Document cannot, on its
own, determine the scope of the US Schedule, it is undoubtedly one element in the body of evidence
that the Panel can and must consider when assessi ng the common intentions of the Members for the
purpose of interpreting the scope and the meaning of the US Schedule. Therefore, the Panel must
determine the interpretative value of the USITC Document with respect to the US Schedule.

684 Aust A., Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 200.
685 US Schedule of Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services , United States
International Trade Commission, May 1997 (hereinafter "the USITC document").
686 Replies to Panel question No. 2 by Antigua, Canada, the European Communities and Mexico.
687 United States' reply to Panel question No. 2.

6.126 The USITC is an agency of the US fede ral government, created by an Act of Congress.
688 It
was given a number of powers and responsibilities under a number of federal statutes 689, including the
power to make rules and regulations. 690 The USITC Document consists of "explanatory materials"
produced by the USITC in connection with the US Sche dule. As to the role of the USITC in relation
to the US Schedule, the Panel notes that "[a]t th e request of the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) assumed responsibility
for maintaining and updating, as necessary, the Unite d States' Schedule of Commitments [...] and List
of MFN Exemptions".691 The USTR is also an agency of the US federal government, created by Act
of Congress. 692 It is given a variety of powers a nd responsibilities under a number of federal
statutes693, including the power to make rules and regulations 694, the power and responsibility for the
conduct of all international trade negotiations, incl uding "any matter considered under the auspices of
the World Trade Organization" 695 and, in particular, to "develop (and coordinate the implementation
of) United States policies concerning trade in services."696
6.127 We believe that, as an agency of the United States government with specific responsibilities
and powers, actions taken by the USITC pursuant to those responsibilities and powers are attributable
to the United States.
6.128 This conclusion is supported by the International Law Commission ("ILC") Articles on the
Responsibility for States of Internationally Wrongful Acts. 697 Article 4, which is based on the
principle of the unity of the State, defines gene rally the circumstances in which certain conduct is
attributable to a State. 698 This provision is not binding as such, but does reflect customary principles
of international law concerning a ttribution. As the International Law Commission points out in its
commentary on the Articles on State Responsibility, the rule that "the State is responsible for the
conduct of its own organs, acting in that capacity, h as long been recognised in international judicial
decisions."699 As explained by the ILC, the term "state or gan" is to be understood in the most general

688 19 U.S.C. §1330.
689 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§1331-1339; 19 U.S.C. §2151.
690 19 U.S.C. §1335.
691 USITC Document, p. vii.
692 19 U.S.C. §2171(a).
693 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2171(c)-(f).
694 19 U.S.C. §2171(e)(3).
695 19 U.S.C. §2171(c)(1)(C).
696 19 U.S.C. §2114c(1)(A).
697 On 12 November 2001 the Resolution on the Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts was adopted by the general Assembly of the United Nations. The third paragraph of this resolution stats
that the General Assembly "takes note of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts, presented by the International Law Commission, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, and
commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or
other appropriate action."
698 Article 4 states that: "The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 'State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislativ e, executive, judicial or an y other functions, whatever
position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
government or of a territorial unit of the State.' An organ includes any person or entity which has the status in
accordance with the internal law of the State." Articles on the Responsibility for States of Internationally
Wrongful Acts, as annexed to the UN General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 2001, A/RES/56/83.
699 Commentaries to the draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts ,
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty- third session (2001), Official Records of the General
Assembly, fifty-sixth session, Supplement No . 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.2; J. Crawford, The International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility- Introduction, Text and Commentaries , Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2002, commentary to Article 4 at p. 94, para. 3 and footnote 108.

sense.700 It extends to organs from any branch of the State, exercising legislative, executive, judicial
or any other functions.
6.129 The fact that certain institutions performing public functions and exercising public powers are
regarded in internal law as autonomous and inde pendent of the executive government does not affect
their qualification as a state organ. 701 Thus, the fact that the USITC is qualified as an "independent
agency" does not affect the attributability of its actio ns to the United States, because what matters is
the activity at issue in a particular case, not the formal qualification of the body concerned.
6.130 Consequently, official pronouncements by the USITC in an area wher e it has delegated
powers are to be attributed to the United States. In this dispute, the USITC Document can
legitimately be considered to be probative of the United States' interpretation of its own GATS
Schedule. The Panel will now turn to the content of the USITC Document.
6.131 The relevant section of the USITC Document reads as follows (bold added):702
GATT Secretariat's
Services Sectoral
Classification List
United Nations'
Provisional Central
Product Classification
System
U.S. Schedule of Services
Commitments
Notes
Sectors and Sub-sectors Sections, Divisions,
Groups, Classes
Sector-Specific
Commitments

10.RECREATIONAL,
CULTURAL AND
SPORTING SERVICES
 10.RECREATIONAL,
CULTURAL AND
SPORTING SERVICES
GATT and U.S.
section 10
excludes
audiovisual
services
A. Entertainment services Class 9619: Other
entertainment services
A. Entertainment services GATT and U.S.
sector "10.A:
Entertainment
services" includes
theatre, live bands
and circus
services.
B. News agency services Group 962: News agency
services
B. News agency services
C. Libraries, archives,
museums and other
cultural services
Group 963: Library,
archive, museum and other
cultural services
C. Libraries, archives,
museums and other cultural
services

D. Sporting and other
recreational services

Group 964: Sporting and
other recreational services

D. Other recreational
services
U.S. sector "10.D:
Other recreational
services" excludes
sporting

E. Other (No
corresponding CPC)
 E. No U.S. commitment

6.132 According to the USITC, the purpose of the document is:

700 The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, p. 95, para. 6.
701 The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, p. 92, para. 6 and p. 98,
para. 11.
702 USITC Document, p. 25.

"[T]o facilitate comparison of the U.S. Schedule with foreign schedules, the USITC
has developed a concordance that demons trates the relationships between sectors
found in the U.S. Schedule, sectors identified in the GATT Secretariat's Services
Sectoral Classification List, and sectors defined and numbered in the United Nations'
Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) System. In preparing national
schedules, countries were requested to iden tify and define sectors and sub-sectors in
accordance with the GATT Secretariat's list, which lists sectors and their respective
CPC numbers. Accordingly, foreign schedules frequently make explicit references to
the CPC numbers. The U.S. Schedule mak es no explicit references to CPC numbers,
but it corresponds closely with the GATT Secretariat's list. The concordance
developed by the USITC clarifies how the service sectors referenced in the GATT
Secretariat's list, the CPC System, and the U.S. Schedule correspond ."
703 (emphasis
added)
6.133 The content of the USITC Document is not a binding interpretation on the United States.
However, it has probative value as to how the US government views the structure and the scope of the
US Schedule, and, hence, its GATS obligations. This document confirms other evidence already
discussed by the Panel regarding the scope of the United States' specific commitments: W/120, the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines and the cover-notes to the US Uruguay Round Draft Schedules. The
USITC Document clearly states that sub-sector 10.D of the US Schedule "corresponds" to CPC 964.
Under this sub-sector, the United States' Schedule explicitly excluded "sporting services" (CPC 9641),
but not "gambling and betting services" (CPC 96492). This confirms the Panel's conclusion following
its analysis pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, that the US Schedule includes specific
commitments on gambling and betting services.
(c) Conclusion
6.134 Therefore, the Panel finds that the US Sc hedule includes, under sub-sector 10.D, entitled
"Other recreational services (except sporting)", specific commitments on gambling and betting
services.
(d) Final comments
6.135 Lastly, and before the Panel takes leave of this issue, it would like to note the United States'
position that it did not and indeed could not have scheduled a commitment for gambling and betting
services given the long legislative hi story of tight regula tion of these services. As stated by the
United States:
"The fact that these measures so clearly fall within Article XIV also serves to confirm
that it would have been incomprehensible for the United States to make them subject
of a specific commitment."
704
Again:
"[I]t should come as no surprise that the United States did not schedule commitments
for gambling services, given the overriding policy concerns surrounding those
services, which are reflected in the extremel y strict limitations and regulations of
these services. [...] In fact, in view of those concerns, and the numerous bans or

703 USITC document, p. viii.
704 United States' second written submission, para. 73.

restrictions and strict controls on gambling, it would be surprising to find that the
United States did schedule such a commitment."
705
6.136 The United States has repeated several times in these proceedings that it did not intend to
schedule a commitment for gambling and betting services. 706 This may well be true, given that the
legislation at issue in this dispute predates by decades, not only the GATS itself, but even the notion
of "trade in services" as embodied therein. We have, therefore, some sympathy with the United
States' point in this regard. However, the scope of a specific commitment cannot depend upon what a
Member intended or did not intend to do at the time of the negotiations. In this context, the Panel
recalls that:
"[T]he purpose of treaty interpretation unde r Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is
to ascertain the common intention of the parties. These common intentions cannot be
ascertained on the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined 'expectation' of
one of the parties to a treaty. Tariff concessions provided for in a Member's Schedule
– the interpretation of which is at issue he re – are reciprocal and result from mutually
advantageous negotiations between importing and exporting Members."707
6.137 While Members are expected to negotiate, apply and interpret their treaty obligations in good
faith, there are no provisions in the WTO Agreement that would allow a Member's intentions to be
probed and determined, except as reflected in the treaty language.
6.138 Pursuant to Article XVI:4 of the WTO Ag reement, "Each Member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administra tive procedures with its obligations as provided in
the annexed Agreements". Thus, independent of any expectation or any unintentional mistake, the
United States' obligations pursuant to Article XVI:4 are to ensure that its relevant laws are in
conformity with its WTO obligations, including any commitments undertaken in its GATS Schedule.
C. THE MEASURE(S) AT ISSUE
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.139 Antigua's request for the establishment of this Panel lists as the challenged "measures" federal
and state laws as well as court decisions, stat e Attorneys' General statements, websites and
agreements between US enforcement agencies and credit card companies. 708 In its submissions,
Antigua argues that all of these "measures" constitu te a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services that is inconsiste nt with the United States' obligations under the
GATS.709 In support of its claims that the GATS has been violated, Antigua relies upon what Antigua
refers to as an "admission" by the United States before the DSB and before the Panel in these
proceedings that the United States maintains a prohibition on the cross-border supply of some
gambling and betting services.710

705 United States' second written submission, para. 15
706 See also first oral statement, para. 26 ("The Unite d States submits that if the United States and its
Uruguay Round negotiating partners had intended such a commitment [on gambling and betting services] on the
part of the United States, especially on this very sensitive issue, the US Schedule would have said so explicitly.
Needless to say, it does not.")
707 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84.
708 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/2.
709 Antigua's first written submission, para. 1; Antigua's first oral statement, para. 23; Antigua's second
written submission, paras. 5, 13, 19 and 21; Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 32.
710 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 1, 133 an d 136; Antigua's first oral statement, para. 13;
Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 9; Antigua's second written submission, paras. 8 and 136.

6.140 The United States claims that Antigua's identification of challenged measures is not consistent
with the DSU and the GATS. Accord ing to the United States, a "total prohibition" is not a "measure"
within the meaning of the DSU and the GATS.
711 Moreover, Antigua's argumentation on the
instruments that are said to result in this "total prohibition" is insufficient to satisfy Antigua's burden
to provide a prima facie demonstration that th ese instruments affect the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services in a manner inconsiste nt with the United States' obligations under the
GATS.712 The United States also submits that nothing that United States has said to the DSB or to
the Panel in the course of these proceedings reli eves Antigua of its burden to say exactly what
measures it is challenging and how it alleges that t hose measures, individually or in combination,
violate the GATS.713
2. Relevant WTO provisions
6.141 Article I:3 of the GATS reads as follows:
"'[M]easures by Members' means measures taken by:
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated
by central, regional or local governments or authorities.
In fulfilling its obligations and commit ments under the Agreement, each Member
shall take such reasonable measures as ma y be available to it to ensure their
observance by regional and local governme nts and authorities and non-governmental
bodies within its territory."
6.142 Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS provides that "measure" means:
"[A]ny measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule,
procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form."
6.143 In addition, Article XXVIII(c) provides that "measures by Members affecting trade in
services" include measures in respect of:
"(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service;
(ii) the access to and use of, in connec tion with the supply of a service, services
which are required by those Members to be offered to the public generally;
(iii) the presence, including commercial pre sence, of persons of a Member for the
supply of a service in the territory of another Member."
6.144 Article XXIII of the GATS provides that:
"If any Member should consider that any other Member fails to carry out its
obligations or specific commitments under th is Agreement, it may with a view to
reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter have recourse to the DSU."

711 United States first written submissi on, para. 2; United States' first oral statement, para. 17; United
States' reply to Panel question No. 9; United States' second oral statement, paras. 10-11.
712 United States' first written submission, paras. 3 and 44; United States' second written submission,
713 United States' second oral statement, para. 19.

6.145 Article 3.3 of the DSU provides that:
"The prompt settlement of situations in wh ich a Member considers that any benefits
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired
by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the
WTO and the maintenance of a proper balan ce between the rights and obligations of
Members."
6.146 Article 6.2 of the DSU provides that the request for the establishment of a panel:
"[S]hall … identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly."
6.147 It is also important to bear in mind that the measures(s) that have been challenged in a panel
request may, at the end of the dispute settlement process, be the subject of DSB recommendations
under Article 19.1 of the DSU, which provides that:
"Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned
714 bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the
panel and the Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations."
3. Assessment by the Panel
(a) "Measures" being challenged
(i) Legal standard relating to the identification of the measures being challenged
6.148 The Panel commences by noting that the purpose of the exercise that we will undertake in this
section of our Report is to identify the measures that the Panel will consider in determining whether
the specific provisions of the GATS that Antigua h as invoked have been violated. Under WTO law,
the measures that a panel is obliged to consider ar e those contained in the relevant panel request.
However, for reasons that are explained in greater detail below, the issue of which measures we are
obliged to consider in this case is not a straightfo rward one. We set out below the framework within
which we will determine which meas ures should be considered by us in assessing Antigua's claims of
violation of the GATS.
6.149 First, we note that the provisions of the GATS and the DSU that have been referred to above
clearly require that a Member must specifically id entify the "measures" that are the basis for a claim
that another Member has failed to fulfil its oblig ations or specific commitments under the GATS. In
particular, Article XXIII of the GATS effectively provides that Members may have recourse to the
DSU in cases where one Member considers that anot her Member has not abided by its obligations
and/or specific commitments under the GATS. In turn , Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that "specific
measures" be identified in a panel request.
6.150 In our response to the US request for preliminary rulings 715, we concluded that, since
Article 6.2 of the DSU is a general provision governi ng the content of panel requests, it must be read
together with relevant provisions cont ained in the concerned WTO agreements. 716 In this case, the

714 ( original footnote ) The "Member concerned" is the party to the dispute to which the panel or
Appellate Body recommendations are directed.
715 Annex B of the Panel Report contains our response to the US request for preliminary rulings.
716 The Panel's response to the US request for preliminary rulings, para. 34.

relevant provisions are contained in the GATS. Articles I:3 and XXVIII(a) and (c) of the GATS
together broadly define the "measures" to which the provisions of the GATS apply. To the extent that
the definition of a "measure" in Articles I:3 and XXVIII(a) and (c) of the GATS is broader than the
meaning attributed to that term under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the definition contained in the former
supplements the meaning of "measures" under the latter.
717
6.151 Amongst other things, the identification of the measures challenged in a dispute is important
to determine the terms of referenc e of a panel and to ensure that the defending party is well informed
about the basis of the complaint against that party. In EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body made
clear that:
"It is important that a Panel request be sufficiently precise for two reasons: first, it
often forms the basis for the terms of refere nce of the Panel pursuant to Article 7 of
the DSU; and, second, it informs the defending party and the third parties of the legal
basis of the complaint."718
(ii) Identification of "measures" by Antigua in this dispute
6.152 The identification and definition of what "measure s" are being challenged by Antigua in this
dispute have been difficult issues with which the Pa nel has had to grapple since the very inception of
these Panel proceedings. The Panel sets out below in some detail the evolution of the way in which
Antigua has argued its case to illuminate these issu es and to provide some context for the Panel's
determination as to which measures it should consider in determining whether the specific provisions
of the GATS that Antigua has invoked have been violated by the United States.
6.153 In its Panel request, Antigua states in relevant part that:
"The Government of Antigua and Barbuda c onsiders that certain measures of central,
regional or local governments and authoriti es of the United States are inconsistent
with the United States' commitments and obligations under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) with respect to the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services.
The rules applying to the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services in the
United States are complex and comprise a mixture of state and federal law. The
relevant laws are listed in Sections I and II of the Annex attached to this request.
Although this is not always clear on the face of the text of these laws, relevant United
States authorities take the view that these laws (separately or in combination) have
the effect of prohibiting all supply of gambling and betting services from outside the
United States to consumers in the United St ates. Section III of the Annex lists
examples of measures by non-legislative authorities of the United States applying
these laws to the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. The measures
listed in the annex only come within the scope of this dispute to the extent that these
measures prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua and Barbuda from lawfully
offering gambling and betting services in the United States under conditions of
competition compatible with the United States' obligations.
The total prohibition of gambling and betting services offered from outside the
United States appears to conflict with th e United States' obligations under GATS and

717 The Appellate Body has already so determined in Guatemala – Cement I : Appellate Body Report,
para.75. See also the Appellate Body Report on US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 62.
718 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 142.

its Schedule of Specific Commitments annexed to the GATS (and in particular Sector
10.D thereof) for the following reasons:
(a) The central, regional or local authorities of the United States
allow numerous operators of United States origin to offer all types of
gambling and betting services in the United States (sometimes via
exclusive rights or monopolistic structures). There appears to be no
possibility for foreign operators, however, to obtain an authorization
to supply gambling and betting services from outside the United
States. This appears to conflict with the United States' commitments
and obligations under GATS, including Articles VI:1, VI:3, VIII:1,
VIII:5, XVI:1, XVI:2, XVII:1, XVII:2 and XVII:3 and its Schedule
of Specific Commitments.
(b) The United States authorities also restrict international
transfers and payments relating to gambling and betting services
offered from outside the United States. Some of the non-legislative
measures listed in Section III of the Annex are examples thereof: the
measures described in the documents released by the Florida
Attorney General and the New York Attorney General. These
restrictions appear to violate Articles VI:1, XI:1, XVI:1, XVII:1,
XVII:2 and XVII:3 of GATS and th e United States' Schedule of
Specific Commitments."
719
6.154 In its first written submission, Antigua framed its argumentation on the basis of what it
considered to be an admission by the United States that there is a "total prohibition" on the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services in the United States. On the basis of this admission, in
its first written submission, Antigua did not discuss in any detail the specific provisions of US laws in
support of its allegation that the United States main tains measures inconsistent with its obligations
under Articles XVI, XVII, VI and XI of the GATS.720
6.155 Following Antigua's first written submission, the United States made a request for
preliminary rulings. 721 In its request for preliminary ruli ngs, the United States asked the Panel to
declare that Antigua's challenge of a network of federal and state laws, which, according to Antigua,
together constitute a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, is
not compatible with the GATS, the DSU and the WTO Agreement.722
6.156 In its response to the United States' request for preliminary rulings, the Panel noted that, in its
Panel request, in its first written submission, and in its comments on the US request for preliminary
rulings, Antigua had indicated that it is effectively challenging the overall and cumulative effect of
various federal and state laws which, together with various polic y statements and other governmental
actions, constitute a total prohibition on the cr oss-border supply of gambling and betting services
which is, in Antigua's view, inconsistent with the US GATS obligations.723 Indeed, at that stage of the
proceedings, we considered that this was the basis upon which Antigua was framing its challenge.

719 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/2.
720 See, for example, Antigua's first written submission, paras. 133 and 136.
721 The United States made a request for preliminary rulings on 17 October 2003, details of which are
set out in Annex B.
722 United States' request for preliminary rulings, paras. 16-21.
723 See para. 17 of the Panel's response to the US Request for preliminary rulings. The Panel's
characterisation of Antigua's challenge was based, inter alia on paras. 13-17 of Antigua's comments on the
United States' request for preliminary rulings and paras. 140-143 of Antigua's first written submission.

6.157 However, in its second written submission, Antigua stated that it is challenging a "total
prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambli ng and betting services. According to Antigua, this
total prohibition "in and of itself constitutes a measure within the meaning of the GATS".
724 When we
asked Antigua whether it was challenging specific legislative and regulatory provisions, the specific
application of those provisions, and/or US practices vis-à-vis (foreign) cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services, Antigua confirmed that it was challenging all three aspects with the
objective of bringing the "total prohibition itself before the Panel". 725 Antigua submitted at that stage
of the Panel proceedings that it considered it "logical and efficient to challenge the United States' total
prohibition as a measure in and of itself composed of specific legislative and regulatory provisions,
applications and practices that separately and jointly impair Antigua's GATS benefits".
726
6.158 The United States argues that the concept of a "total prohibition" is devoid of any legal
meaning or consequences under either US law or th e GATS. In fact, throughout these proceedings,
the United States has maintained the position that An tigua cannot challenge a "total prohibition" on
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services as a single measure. 727 The United States
considers that the only claims within the scope of Antigua's Panel request and, therefore, within the
Panel's terms of reference, are "as such" claims in respect of specific legislative provisions and/or the
collective effect of two or more such provisions. 728 According to the United States, Antigua is
essentially making assertions about the collective effect of US domestic laws relating to the remote
supply of gambling and betting services, without rega rd to individual measures and how they work.
The United States submits that panels have often ex amined claims based on the combined effect of
two or more measures but have correctly approach ed such claims by first examining each specific
measure that allegedly contributes to a combined effect. 729 According to the United States, it is not
possible to know what the combined effect of vari ous measures is as a matter of municipal law,
without first examining how each measure works a nd then analysing how these measures interact. 730
The United States adds that the Appellate Body in its recent report on US – Carbon Steel made clear
that a party asserting that another party's municipa l law is inconsistent with a WTO obligation must
introduce evidence as to the scope a nd meaning of that municipal law. 731 In the United States' view,
in order to succeed with its claims, Antigua must identify which specific provisions of the US laws are
inconsistent with which specific provisions of the GATS, and it must demonstrate prima facie how
and why such inconsistencies arise.732
6.159 Antigua has consistently stated that it is wasteful and unnecessary to identify the various
domestic legislative provisions that will need to be brought into conformity with the GATS. 733 I t
argues that there is no need to conduct a debate on the precise scope of specific US laws because the
United States has admitted a total prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services under US law. 734 It further argues that the fact that a "measure" that is challenged in the

724 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10; Antigua's second written submission, para. 8; Antigua's
second oral statement, para. 12.
725 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
726 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
727 United States first written submissi on, para. 2; United States' first oral statement, para. 17; United
States' reply to Panel question No. 9; United States' second oral statement, paras. 10-11.
728 United States' reply to Panel question No. 10.
729 United States' first written submission, para. 50; United States' second written submission, para. 7.
730 United States' first written submission, para. 74; Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 17-18.
731 United States' first oral statement, para. 16; United States' second oral statement, paras. 10-11.
732 United States' first written submission, para. 50; United States' first oral statement, para. 16; United
States' second oral statement, paras. 10-11.
733 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 25; Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10. See also para. 23
of Antigua's second written submission where it states that it has "not been able to investigate" all the criteria
that all states apply to authorize a domestic operator to offer gambling and betting services.
734 Antigua's first written submission, para. 136; Antigua's first oral statement, para. 13; Antigua's reply
to Panel question No. 9; Antigua's second written submission, paras. 8 and 136. Antigua further argues that

WTO may comprise one or more laws, rules or ac tions under domestic law cannot be definitive in
determining whether the sum of the laws constitutes a "measure" within the meaning of the DSU.735
6.160 The United States does not appear to admit the ex istence of a "total prohibition" on the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services a lthough it does admit a prohibition on the remote
supply of most gambling and betting services.
6.161 During two successive DSB meetings, the Unite d States stated that a prohibition on the
"cross-border supply of gambling and betting service s under US laws" exists in the United States. 736
The panel's decision in US – Section 301 Trade Act appears to support the view that the United States
should be bound by these statements. 737 The statements were made by representatives of the United
States to express their understanding of US law. Th ey were made in the context of a formal WTO
meeting for the record. The United States has not argued that the representatives were acting outside
the authority bestowed upon them in making these statements.
6.162 Further, in response to a question posed by the Panel as to which gambling and betting
services are prohibited in the United States, the United States responded:
"The United States is referring principally to services involving the transmission of a
bet or wager by a wire communication facility across state or U.S. borders, such as
Internet and telephone betting. Other gambling services that are similarly restricted
both domestically and cross-border include the mailing of lottery tickets between
states, the interstate transportation of wagering parapherna lia, and wagering on
sporting events."
738
6.163 The United States separately identified aspects of the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services that it says are not prohibited in the United States:
"US restrictions do not preclude cross-border supply of all gambling services, and
thus are not a 'total prohibition'. For example:
 Persons not involved in the business of gambling may transmit casual or
social bets by any means, provided that the transmission is permissible
under state law.
 Parimutuel betting services may exchange the accounting data and
pictures necessary to permit a racetrack outside the United States to offer
parimutuel betting on U.S. races (and vice-versa), provided that such
gambling is legal in both the sending and the receiving jurisdictions.
 Suppliers of oddsmaking and handicapping services ( e.g., handicappers
of horse races) as well as other gambling informational services may
supply such services, provided that the form of gambling that they
facilitate is legal in both the sending and the receiving jurisdictions.

there may be circumstances in which a panel has to underta ke a precise statutory analysis, namely, in situations
where there is a genuine disagreement and a genuine lack of clarity about the effect of a Member's domestic
law. Antigua submits that this is patently not the case in this dispute: Antigua's first oral statement, para. 18;
Antigua's second oral statement, para. 15.
735 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 17.
737 Panel Report on US – Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.118–7.125.
738 United States' reply to Panel question No. 35.

 Gambling websites may (and many do) provide so-called "free play"
games in which no real money is wagered.
 Any other gambling service that does not consist of actual transmission
of a bet or wager is legal to the extent stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b),
provided that it also does not violate state law in the U.S. consumer's
jurisdiction."
739
6.164 On the basis of the foregoing, we understand th at the United States admits that federal and
state laws are applied and enforced so as to proh ibit what it describes as the "remote supply" of most
gambling and betting services.740 The United States defines "remote supply" as:
"[S]ituations in which the gambling servi ce supplier (whether foreign or domestic)
and the service consumer are not physically together. In other words, the consumer
of a remotely supplied service does not have to go to any type of outlet, be it a retail
facility, a casino, a vending machine, etc. Instead, the remote supplier has no point of
presence but offers the service directly to the consumer through some means of
distance communication. Non-remote supply means that the consumer presents
himself or herself at a supplier's point of presence, thus facilitating identification of
the individual, age verification, etc."
741
6.165 Despite the fact that the United States has admitte d that federal and state laws are applied and
enforced so as to prohibit what it describes as the "remote supply" of most gambling and betting
services, what remains unclear is: what are the spec ific provisions of those laws that prohibit the
remote supply of gambling and betting services in the United States and with which specific
provisions and why are they inconsistent with the GATS?
6.166 As is evident from the foregoing, the Panel h as encountered significant difficulty in pin-
pointing the specific measures at issue in this disput e. Given that Antigua appears to have argued in
its most recent submissions that it seeks to bring th e "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services before the Panel, we cons ider that there are two critical issues that we
need to decide before we can proceed to examine and assess Antigua's claims of violation with the
GATS. First, can Antigua challenge a "total pr ohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services under US law as a measure in and of itself in the context of this dispute? Secondly, if
Antigua is not entitled to challenge such a "total prohibition" as a measure in this dispute, which
measures must the Panel consider in determining whether Antigua has demonstrated its claims that
the GATS has been violated? We consider these issues in turn below.
(b) Can Antigua challenge a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services under US law as a measure in and of itself in the present dispute?
6.167 Pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU and the Appellate Body's findings in EC – Bananas III
742,
the Panel must refer to Antigua's Panel request in determining whether or not Antigua can challenge a
"total prohibition" as a measure in this dispute given that it is the Panel request that defines our terms
of reference.

739 United States' second written submission, paras. 26-27.
740 We note that in its reply to Panel question No. 35, the United States submitted that the transmission
of a bet or wager by a wire communication facility across st ate or U.S. borders, such as Internet and telephone
betting, the mailing of lottery tickets between states, the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, and
wagering on sporting events are restricted both domestically and cross-border. We understand from this
statement that federal and state laws prohibit the remote supply of gambling and betting services.
741 United States' reply to Panel question No. 42.
742 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 142.

6.168 We recall that, in its Panel request 743, Antigua argues that "certain measures of central,
regional or local governments and authorities of the United States" are inconsistent with the United
States' commitments and obligations under the GA TS with respect to the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. The Panel request goes on to state that "the relevant laws are listed in
Sections I and II of the Annex attached to this request" and that "Section III of the Annex lists
examples of measures by non-legislative authoriti es of the United States applying these laws to the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services". Also of relevance is the fact that the Panel
request states that "the measures listed in the Annex only come within the scope of this dispute to the
extent that these measures prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua and Barbuda from lawfully
offering gambling and betting services in the United States under conditions of competition
compatible with the United States' obligations."744
6.169 Nowhere in its Panel request does Antigua list a "total prohibition" as a measure that is sought
to be challenged. Rather, in its Panel request, Anti gua describes the effect of the laws referred to in
Sections I and II of the Annex as "prohibiting all supply of gambling and betting services from
outside the United States to consumers in the United States". The Panel request then goes on to state
that this effect, which is subsequently labelled in the Panel request as "the total prohibition" of the
supply of gambling and betting services offered from outside the United States, conflicts with the
United States' obligations under the GATS.
6.170 It is apparent to us from the Panel request th at Antigua identified the measures contained in
its Annex as those that were the subject of its challenge under the GATS. It is also apparent to us that
Antigua refers to the "total prohibition" in its Pa nel request to describe the alleged effect of the
measures listed in Sections I and II of the request.
6.171 We consider that Antigua is bound to rely upon the measures identified in its Panel request.
Since it did not identify the "total prohibition" as a measure in and of itself, it is not entitled to rely
upon it as a "measure" in this dispute. Moreover, we consider that, in the present dispute, even if the
"total prohibition" were to have been identified as a "measure" in its Panel request, Antigua is not
entitled to rely upon the "total prohibition" as such for the reasons set out below.
6.172 Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS provides that a "measure" under the GATS is "any measure
by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regul ation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative
action, or any other form " (emphasis added). The reference to "any other form" in this definition
indicates a broad interpretation of the term "measures" in the context of the GATS.
6.173 In US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body, in discussing the
meaning of the term "measure" under WTO law, made reference to Article 3.3 of the DSU. In
particular, it stated that:
"Article 3.3 of the DSU refers to 'situa tions in which a Member considers that any
benefits accruing to it direc tly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being
impaired by measures taken by another Member '. (emphasis added) This phrase
identifies the relevant nexus, for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings, between
the 'measure' and a 'Member'. In principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO
Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement
proceedings. The acts or omissions that are so attributable are, in the usual case, the
acts or omissions of the organs of the state, including those of the executive branch.
In addition, in GATT and WTO dispute settle ment practice, panels have frequently
examined measures consisting not only of particular acts applied only to a specific

743 The relevant aspects of Antigua's Panel request are set out in para. 6.153 above.
744 Antigua's reiterates this in para. 141 of its first written submission.

situation, but also of acts setting forth rules or norms that are intended to have general
and prospective application. In other words, instruments of a Member containing
rules or norms could constitute a 'measure' , irrespective of how or whether those
rules or norms are applied in a particular instance.

This analysis leads us to conclude that there is no basis, either in the practice of the
GATT and the WTO generally or in the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
for finding that only certain types of measure can, as such, be challenged in dispute
settlement proceedings under the Anti-Dumping Agreement."
745 (emphasis added)
6.174 In summary, the definition of "measures" unde r the GATS as well as jurisprudence regarding
the interpretation of this term in the context of the DSU indicates a broad reading of the term under
the GATS. It includes any "act or omission attri butable to a WTO Member" and "instruments of a
Member containing rules or norms ... irrespective of how or whether those rules or norms are applied
in a particular manner".
6.175 Notwithstanding the broad concept of "measur es" under the GATS and the DSU, the Panel
believes that, in the circumstances of this case, the alleged "total prohib ition" on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services describes the a lleged effect of an imprecisely defined list of
legislative provisions and other instruments and cannot constitute a single and autonomous "measure"
that can be challenged in and of itself, even if it is claimed that, together, these legislative provisions
and other instruments result in a total prohibition. Our reasons for forming this conclusion are as
follows.
6.176 First, as we understand it, Antigua's use of the term "total prohibition" in this case is by way
of description of an alleged effect to which it takes objecti on, namely the fact that Antigua's suppliers
are prohibited from providing gambling and betting services in the United States on a cross-border
basis. As noted above, the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review made it
clear that "instruments of a Member containi ng rules or norms could constitute a 'measure'" that may
be the subject of challenge under the DSU. We do not consider that a "total prohibition" as explained
by Antigua can be construed, in this dispute, as an "instrument" within the meaning ascribed to that
term by the Appellate Body because it is a descrip tion of an effect rather than an instrument
containing rules or norms.
6.177 Secondly, Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that measures be "specifically" identified in a panel
request. In our view, the "total prohibition" has not been "specifically" identified. In particular, the
details of how it is constituted are far from clear. We recall in this regard that Antigua has listed 93
laws in its Panel request. However, during the co urse of these proceedings, Antigua itself raised the
question as to which of these laws and which provisions of these laws, if any, should be examined as
part of the alleged "total prohibition". In partic ular, in response to a question posed by the Panel
requesting clarification as to what Antigua is specif ically challenging, Antigua referred to the laws in
its Panel request and replied as follows:
"It is important to note ... that Antigua has cited all these laws in its Panel request in
order to be as comprehensive as possible, not because it believes that each law is an
essential part of a "puzzle" without which there would be no total prohibition. ... most
of the laws cited in the Panel request a re prohibition laws that could be applied

745 Appellate Body Report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 81-82 and 88.

independently of each other to prohibit cross-border supply from Antigua ."746
(emphasis added)
6.178 The Panel attempted on several other occasions to seek clarification from Antigua as to what
exactly it is challenging. When asked by the Pa nel which specific provisions of which specific
legislative measures it is actually challenging, Antigua replied:
"Antigua is in essence challenging every legislative provision that could be construed
to form a piece of the United States' total prohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. The statutory provisions that the United States
appears to rely on most heavily in its law enforcement actions, or are most likely to
form part of the total ban, were listed in th e Annex to Antigua's Panel request and
also have been submitted to the Panel, together with summaries."
747 (emphasis added)
6.179 In its first oral statement, Antigua underlined "[its] effort at identifying, in [its] Panel and
consultations requests, a huge number of American laws", which, in its view, demonstrates "good
faith". However, at the same time, it states that the complexity and ambiguity as well as the overlap
between federal and state laws made it "very difficult to identify with complete precision all laws and
regulations of the United States that could be app lied in the prohibition of the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services." 748 Antigua also states that it fi nds it "wasteful and unnecessary" to
engage in such an identification exercise.749
6.180 In our view, in the light of the relevant prov isions of the DSU, in particular Article 7
concerning the "terms of reference" and the prima facie requirements of Antigua's burden of proof, we
believe that it is crucial, and not "wasteful a nd unnecessary", to be precise and consistent in the
identification of the measures at issue.
6.181 Thirdly, the Panel recalls that the identificati on of the challenged measures is critical not only
in terms of defining the Panel's terms of reference and informing the defending party of the legal basis
of the complaint so that it can defend itself but also because the challenged measure, if found to be in
violation of a WTO agreement, must be brought in to conformity with that agreement pursuant to
Article 19.1 of the DSU. In our view, the ability of an instrument to be brought into conformity with
a WTO Agreement is an important consideration in determining whether or not a measure has been
sufficiently identified for the purposes of the DSU and the GATS.
6.182 The Panel fails to see how the United States could be requested to implement a DSB
recommendation to bring a "prohibition" into comp liance with the GATS pursuant to Article 19.1 of
the DSU when an imprecisely defined "puzzle" of la ws forms the basis of the "total prohibition" that
has been identified by Antigua as the challenged measure. 750 The Panel also fails to see how the DSB
could monitor the implementation process pursuan t to Article 21.6 of the DSU and how an
implementation panel established under Article 21.5 of the DSU could assess the WTO compatibility
of any implementing measure, if there is no certain ty as to which laws should ultimately be changed

746 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 32.
747 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
748 Antigua's first written submission, para. 135.
749 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 25.
750 Indeed, it could be said that Antigua itself has acknowledged this. Antigua submits that "Antigua
and Barbuda needs to ensure that, at the stage when the United States needs to implement any recommendations
and rulings resulting from this proceeding, the United States cannot take the position that it needs to amend only
the Wire Act and can continue to apply its other prohibitio n laws. This is particularly important because, given
the huge amount of American legi slation on gambling and betting, it can not be excluded that Antigua and
Barbuda has been unable to identify all domestic laws that could possibly be applied against the cross-border
supply of gambling services." : Antigua's first oral statement, para. 22.

to address a "total prohibition" in the event that such a prohibition were to be found to be in violation
of the GATS.
6.183 Antigua has argued that the fact that the "total prohibition" is comprised of a large number of
different statutory provisions does not mean that th e United States would have to abolish or amend all
the individual legislative provisions to bring it in to conformity with the GATS since the US federal
government possesses power to legislate in the area of international commerce in a manner that would
"pre-empt" all contradictory state laws and regulations.
751 With respect to this argument, we note that
our role here is to identify which measures are inc onsistent with the GATS. Under Article 19.1 of the
DSU, if we conclude that a measure is inconsistent with the GATS in this dispute, we can only make a
recommendation to the DSB that the United States "b ring [its] measure into conformity with [the
GATS]". It is clear from the terms of Article 19.1 that our role does not extend to dictating how the
United States should implement such a recommendation. At best, pursuant to the second sentence of
Article 19.1, we could make suggestions as to how the United States could implement our
recommendation once adopted by the DSB. However, these suggestions would not be binding on the
United States. Accordingly, we consider that th e fact that the United States may possess a power to
legislate to override contradictory states laws and regulations with respect to the supply of gambling
and betting services is not a matter for our considera tion in these proceedings but may be of relevance
in the context of the assessment, if any, of the implementation of our recommendations under
Article 21.5 of the DSU.
6.184 Finally, Members' national laws are always presumed to be compatible with the WTO
Agreement.
752 Antigua, as the complaining party in this dispute, bears the burden of properly
identifying measures with some detail and explanation so as to allow the United States to defend itself
adequately. The fact that the United States has ad mitted a total or partial prohibition on the remote
supply of certain gambling and betting services unde r US law does not relieve Antigua of its
obligation to specifically identify and demonstrat e WTO inconsistencies that result from such a
prohibition. Moreover, the fact that a prohib ition on the remote supply of gambling and betting
services may exist under US law does not, in our view , necessarily mean that such laws are contrary
to the GATS or to the WTO Agreement. Antigua must still prove that the US prohibition constitutes a
WTO-inconsistent restriction in respect of which the United States may also be able to invoke general
or specific exceptions to justify such a prohibitio n. Accordingly, we fail to see how a simple
allegation of a total prohibition can enable Antigua to meet its burden of proof.
6.185 On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that Antigua is not entitled to rely upon a "total
prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services as a "measure" in and of
itself in this dispute.
(c) Measures that the Panel should consider in determining whether the GATS has been violated
6.186 The question remains as to which measures the Pa nel should consider in determining whether
or not the United States has violated its obligations under the GATS Agreement.
6.187 As we stated above, we consider that we ar e bound to examine the measures that Antigua has
identified in its Panel request. The Panel request re fers to measures listed in Sections I and II of the
Annex to Antigua's Panel request, which, according to the request, are laws applying to the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services in the Un ited States. The Panel request also refers to
measures listed in Section III of the Annex, which, in Antigua's words are "examples of measures by
non-legislative authorities of the United States applying [the laws contained in Sections I and II] to

751 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 24; Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10; Antigua's second
oral statement, para. 18.
752 Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, para. 115

the extent that these measures prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua and Barbuda from
lawfully offering gambling and betting services."
6.188 The total number of measures contained in Secti ons I, II and III of the Annex to Antigua's
Panel request is 105. The measures listed in the Pa nel request are a mix of federal and state laws,
court decisions, state Attorneys' General stat ements, websites and agreements between US
enforcement agencies and credit card companies.
6.189 We asked Antigua to clarify whether the Panel was expected to consider all of the items listed
in the Panel request in our determination of wh ether or not the United States has violated the
GATS.753 Antigua responded:
"Antigua is challenging all three aspects which are intrinsically linked and are all
elements of the total ban that Anti gua seeks to challenge in this case. Legislative and
regulatory provisions are given a practical effect by their application to specific
cases. If, for example, the United States maintained its prohibition but did not
enforce it, then the impairment of Antigua 's GATS benefits would be much less
substantial and Antigua would probably not ha ve started this proceeding. The United
States practice vis-à-vis the foreign cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services is also based on or at least purported to be based on legislative and regulatory
provisions.
754 In Antigua's view it would not be logical or effective to challenge
some of these elements and not others."755
6.190 Antigua stated very clearly in the above respon se that it is challenging laws, applications and
practices relating to the legality of the United St ates' prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
and betting services. We refer below to Antigua's s ubmissions and evidence, which, in our view, are
relevant in deciding which laws, applications a nd practice the Panel may consider in determining
whether the United States has viol ated the Articles of the GATS that Antigua has invoked. We first
examine "specific applications", followed by "practi ce" and, finally, we will consider the "laws" at
issue.
(i) Specific applications
6.191 With respect to the specific a pplications Antigua seeks to cha llenge, when questioned by the
Panel for further information as to when and how efforts by Antigua's operators to provide cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services had been the object of refusal by the US enforcement
authorities, Antigua stated that it was not able to point to any specific rejection of its request for a
licence to provide cross-border supply of gambli ng and betting services, despite having effectively

753 Panel question No. 10 reads as follows: "Is Antigua and Barbuda challenging: (i) specific
legislative and regulatory provisions that are claimed to amount to a proh ibition on the cross- border supply of
gambling and betting services as such; and/or (ii) the specific application of such provisions; and/or (iii) the US
practice vis-a-vis the foreign cross-border supply of gambling and betting services?"
754 ( original footnote ) See, e.g., the "Assurance of Discontinuance" entered into in August 2002
between the Attorney General of the State of New York and Paypal, Inc. (a copy of which is found at Exhibit
AB 56) and the discussion of that document in Antigua's response to Question 29. See also Exhibits AB 73, 92,
94, 96 and 98.
755 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10. In addition, Antigua submits that it is possible to
challenge in dispute settlement proceedings a total prohibition that is comprised of numerous specific legislative
and regulatory provisions, application[s] of such prov isions and practices: Antigua's second written submission,
para. 13.

asserted as much in its first written submission and first oral statement.
756 For the purposes of
clarifying its allegations, in response to a question posed by the Panel, Antigua submitted:
"What was meant here was not that An tiguan operators had applied to supply
gambling and betting services into the United States and were refused—the point was
that under United States law, it is impossible for Antiguan suppliers to meet any
authorization criteria. There are two reasons for this. First is the obvious, that the
United States government considers the provision of cross-border gambling and
betting services illegal, and thus it would be illegal under United States law as it
currently exists for Antiguan suppliers to gain authorization. At the first Panel
meeting Antigua asked the United States to explain how Antiguan service providers
could lawfully provide gambling and betti ng services into the United States. In
response, the United States confirmed that this was not possible.
Second, under the laws or practice of every state that provides for state-sanctioned
gambling in one form or another, the cond itions attached to obtaining the right to
supply gambling services in the state by de finition preclude Antiguan operators from
qualifying on a cross-border basis. Thus, ev en if the United States did not maintain
its total prohibition, Antiguan operators c ould still not lawfully offer their services
under the authorization schemes of the various states."
757 (emphasis added)
6.192 This response appears to us to indicate that An tigua is challenging laws together with related
practices rather than specific applications of the relevant laws. However, also in response to a
question posed by the Panel soliciting support for an a llegation made by Antigua that it is illegal for
Antigua and Barbuda operators to provide gambling and betting services in the United States, Antigua
referred to three court cases in which the relevant provisions of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act were applied. 758 It also referred to examples of law enforcement
action against financial intermediaries. 759 Finally, it referred to various statements by government
officials advising national advertisers not to a llow advertising for off-shore Internet gambling
services.760 Although not all of these items would necessarily be "applications" within the meaning of
WTO jurisprudence, they could, nevertheless, be used as evidence of how the challenged measures
are effectively interpreted and applied by the United States that is, evidence of the United States'
practice.
6.193 Some of these items are referred to in Secti on III of the Annex to Antigua's Panel request. 761
Section III lists documents that are categorized by Antigua in the request as "Other United States and
State actions or measures". We note that in our r esponse to the United States' request for preliminary
rulings, we concluded that:

756 See, for example, Antigua's first written submissi on, paras. 183 and 197 and Antigua's first oral
statement, para. 88.
757 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 11.
758 In its reply to Panel question No. 12, Antigua refers to the following court cases: United States v Jay
Cohen (Exhibit AB-83), Vacco ex rel. People v World Interactive Gaming Corp (Exhibit AB-97) and United
States v Truesdale (Exhibit AB-115).
759 In its reply to Panel question No. 12, Antigua also refers to Exhibits AB-56, 57, 58, 73, 92 and 98,
which it says contain examples of law enforcement action against financial intermediaries and media companies
carrying advertising for foreign gambling and betting services.
760 In its reply to Panel question No. 12, Antigua refers to Exhibits AB-73, 86, 92 and 116 as examples
of state action taken regarding the advertisement of offshore Internet gambling and betting services.
761 In particular, Section III of the Annex to Antigua's Panel request lists two of the court cases referred
to by Antigua, namely, United States v Jay Cohen (Exhibit AB-83) and Vacco ex rel. People v World Interactive
Gaming Corp (Exhibit AB-97). Section III also lists four of the examples of law enforcement action against
financial intermediaries and media companies referred to by Antigua, namely those contained in Exhibits AB-
56, 57, 58 and 98.

"Given that Antigua & Barbuda has indicated that it does not intend to treat the items
listed in Section III as distinct and aut onomous 'measures' but, essentially, will seek
to rely upon them as evidence to illustra te the existence of a general prohibition
against cross-border supply of gambling and betting services in the United States, we
decline to rule out the relevance of such items. However, as suggested by Antigua &
Barbuda, during our substanti ve consideration of this dispute, we will not consider
and examine them as separate, autonomous measures." (emphasis added)762
6.194 In other words, in accordance with what had been suggested by Antigua, we decided during
preliminary ruling proceedings in this case that we would not consider and examine the items
contained in Section III of the Annex to Antigua 's Panel request as separate, autonomous measures
but that they could be relevant in Antigua's demonstration that the le gislative measures referred to in
Sections I and II of the Annex to its Panel request result in a total prohibition on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services.
6.195 Therefore, we conclude that Antigua is not challenging specific "applications" in the present
dispute as separate, autonomous measures. We w ill, nonetheless, make reference if and where
necessary to the court cases in which the relevant provi sions of the Wire Act, Travel Act and Illegal
Gambling Business Act were applied, the law enforc ement actions against financial intermediaries
and media companies and the statements by governme nt officials advising national advertisers not to
allow advertising for off-shore Internet gambling services as illustrative of the "practice" of US
authorities regarding their interpretation and applic ation of the relevant laws, which we discuss in
greater detail below.
(ii) Practice
6.196 The panel in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review stated that "practice" under WTO
law is "a repeated pattern of similar responses to a set of circumstances". 763 The Appellate Body in
the same case indicated that "practice" in the form, for example, of a policy bulletin, may be
challenged "as such". 764 I n US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products , the Appellate
Body issued a recommendation that the US bring its "practice" into conformity with the SCM
Agreement. The Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel indicated that "practice" may also be used to
provide evidence of how laws are being interpreted and applied.765
6.197 On the basis of the foregoing, we consider that "practice" can be considered as an autonomous
measure that can be challenged in and of itself or it can be used to support an interpretation of a
specific law that is challenged "as such".
6.198 We consider that the three court cases in whic h the relevant provisions of the Wire Act,
Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act were applied, the examples of law enforcement action
against financial intermediaries and media compan ies and the various statements by government
officials advising national advertisers not to allow advertising for off-shore Internet gambling services
could be considered to be "practices". However, Antigua is not challenging these practices "as such".
Rather, in accordance with our reply to the United States' request for preliminary rulings 766, the Panel
considers that Antigua is entitled to and has referred to these practices in its submissions to support its
allegations and argumentation that cer tain laws are inconsistent with the United States' obligations
under the GATS.

762 See the Response of the Panel to the US request for preliminary ruling contained in Annex B of this
Panel report.
763 Panel Report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 7.31.
764 Appellate Body Report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 97.
765 Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, para. 157.
766 See para. 6.193 above.

(iii) Laws
6.199 Turning finally to the laws which Antigua claims result in a "total prohibition" that is contrary
to the GATS, Antigua has listed 93 laws in its Panel request. At the Panel's first substantive meeting
with the parties, Antigua submitted the texts of these laws together with general summaries of most of
the measures cited in its Panel request.
767
6.200 However, during the course of these proceedings, Antigua cast doubt on the extent to which
the Panel should consider each of these laws in its determination of whether or not the United States is
in violation of the GATS. Indeed, Antigua stated:
"The measures listed in the Annex only co me within the scope of this dispute to the
extent that these measures prevent or can prevent operators from Antigua and
Barbuda from lawfully offering gambling and betting services in the United States
under conditions of competition compatible with the United States' obligations." 768
(emphasis added)
6.201 In addition, as we noted above, Antigua stated that " Most of the measures cited in the Panel
request are prohibition measures that could arguably be applied independently of each other against
Antiguan gaming operators." (emphasis added) 769
6.202 We recall again that when asked by the Pane l which specific provisions of which specific
legislative measures it is actually challenging, Antigua replied:
"Antigua is in essence challenging every legislative provision that could be construed
to form a piece of the United States' to tal prohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. The statutory provisions that the United States
appears to rely on most heavily in its law enforcement actions, or are most likely to
form part of the total ban, were listed in the Annex to Antigua's Panel request and
also have been submitted to the Panel, together with summaries."770 (emphasis added)
6.203 The United States submits that, to the extent that Antigua fails to say precisely what
provisions are or are not relevant, or to offer argumentation on specific provisions, it does not meet
the basic elements of a prima facie case. 771 According to the United States, Antigua cannot sustain its
burden by merely identifying laws that "could be cons trued" as relevant, or are "most likely" relevant.
In order for the Panel to consider whether hundred s of US laws interact together so as to be
inconsistent with the GATS and for the United Stat es to defend its laws, it is both reasonable and
necessary for Antigua to be very precise about th e specific US measures it is challenging and their
relevance, meaning, interaction, and interpretation under US domestic law. The United States submits
that Antigua has not done any of this.772
6.204 It is evident from the foregoing that Antigua is effectively asking the Panel to identify for
itself which of the listed measures and which provisions of those measures could be construed as
imposing a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. Even among the
measures that could be described as imposing such a prohibition, Antigua states that most of them
could arguably be applied independently to impose a pr ohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. However, the Panel is left to determine for itself which measures

767 Exhibits AB-82, 89, 90, 91 and 99.
768 Antigua's first written submission, para. 141.
769 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 19.
770 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 10.
771 United States' second oral statement, para. 12.
772 United States' second oral statement, para. 2.

could be applied independently to impose such a prohibition. Antigua further indicates that the
measures listed in the Annex only come within the scope of this dispute "to the extent that these
measures prevent or can prevent operators fro m Antigua and Barbuda from lawfully offering
gambling and betting services in the United States." He re again, the Panel is required to determine
which measures actually prevent or can, in theory, prevent Antigua's operators from lawfully offering
gambling and betting services in the United States.
6.205 Confronted with this ambiguity, we must decide which of the 93 laws listed in Sections I and
II of the Annex to its Panel request we should consider . By way of context for this determination, we
recall the following statement of the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos where, after reversing the
panel, it wrote:
"We are mindful of the importance of the GATS as a new multilateral trade
agreement covered by the WTO Agreement. This appeal is only the second case in
which we have been asked to review a pane l's findings on provisions of the GATS.
Given the complexity of the subject-matter of trade in services, as well as the
newness of the obligations under the GATS, we believe that claims made under the
GATS deserve close attention and serious analysis."
773
6.206 This dispute is the fourth WTO case where the GATS has been at issue. In line with the
above comments of the Appellate Body, we have d one our utmost to examine the claims made by
Antigua under the GATS despite the practical difficulties we encountered.
6.207 Antigua stated that it had "provided considerab le evidence of ... the construction of the total
prohibition [including] numerous references to and discussions of the principal federal statutes used
by the United States to support its total prohibition; provision to the Panel of the actual text of the
principal state and federal laws that underlie th e total prohibition; discussions regarding the basic
scheme of state and federal interaction in the area of gambling and betting and how the state and
federal laws act to further the total prohibition."
774 However, in our view, Antigua has effectively left
the Panel to search through the material that An tigua has submitted to identify which among the 93
measures identified in Antigua's Panel request result in violations of the GATS. We do not consider
that it is permissible for us to search through th e items listed in Antigua's Panel request for the
purpose of identifying the laws upon which Antigua mi ght have relied in order to support a case that
Antigua has itself not articulated precisely.
6.208 Indeed, we note that there are limits to our ab ility to rely for our findings on the results of our
own investigation and we are we ll aware of those limitations. 775 In Japan – Agricultural Products,
the Appellate Body reversed the panel for effectiv ely having made the complainant's case for it and
stated that:
"Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement suggest that panels
have a significant investigative authority. However, this authority cannot be used by
a panel to rule in favour of a complain ing party which has not established a prima
facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims asserted by it. A panel [is
not entitled] to make the case for a complaining party."776

773 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Autos, para. 184.
774 Antigua's second written submission, para. 19.
775 In Thailand – H-Beams, in response to an argument by Thailand that the panel had improperly made
Poland's case for it, the Appellate Body stated that the panel had itself showed a clear appreciation of the
limitations of its authority as well as its understanding of the role of Poland as the complaining party in this
dispute. The Appellate Body concluded that the panel had not erred to the extent that it had asked questions of
the parties that it deemed necessary "in order to clarify and distil the legal arguments": para. 136.
776 Appellate Body Report on Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 129.

6.209 Nevertheless, in light of the encour agement by the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos to pay
close attention to and to undertake a serious analysis of Antigua's claims, we perused all of Antigua's
submissions, including footnotes to those submissions and exhibits submitted by Antigua, with a view
to identifying which of the 93 laws listed in its Panel request we should c onsider in determining
whether or not the United States is in violation of its obligations under the GATS. We note that
Annex E of this Panel Report contains a summary of what we found. In particular, the table lists the
laws that Antigua apparently relies upon in clai ming that the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services is prohibited and contrary to the United States' obligations under the GATS. The
table indicates whether or not those laws are containe d in Antigua's Panel request and where, if at all,
in Antigua's submissions and exhib its Antigua refers to and/or discusses these laws. Set out below is
a summary of the conclusions that we drew on the basis of our examination of Antigua's submissions.
6.210 As a starting point, we note that the factual pr emise for Antigua's claims of violation of
Articles XVI, XVII and VI is the existence of a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services.
777 In particular, Antigua argues that federal and state laws prohibit or prevent the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services by Antigua in violation of Articles XVI, XVII
and VI of the GATS. We recall that the United St ates has admitted the existence of a prohibition of
the remote supply of certain gambling and betting services. However, the United States has not
indicated pursuant to which laws and according to which provisions of those laws the prohibition is
imposed.
6.211 Antigua's discussion of the various laws upon wh ich it seeks to rely in this dispute may be
grouped into three categories that are set out below:
(a) Laws that are referred to and/or discussed in Antigua's submissions but which are not
contained in Antigua's Panel request;
(b) Laws that are contained in the Panel request but which are not discussed to an extent
that could enable the Panel to identify acco rding to which particular provisions and
how the laws result in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services which would be inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
the GATS; and
(c) Laws that are contained in the Panel re quest, which are discussed in Antigua's
submissions and which indicate according to which particular provisions and how the
laws result in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services.
6.212 We deal with each of these three categories in turn.

777 With respect to its Article XVI claim, Antigua relies upon the existence of a "total prohibition" on
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services in its first written submission, paras. 183–184 and in
its second written submission, paras. 35–36. In relation to its Article XVII claim, Antigua also relies upon the
existence of a "total prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services in para. 39 of its
second written submission. With respect to its Article VI claim, Antigua also relies upon the existence of "laws
and regulations prohibiting the supply of gambling an d betting services" in its first written submission,
paras. 197 and 199 and in its first oral statement, para. 104.

Laws referred to and/or discussed in Antigua's submissions but not contained in
Antigua's Panel request
6.213 Below is a list of laws and regulations that were discussed in Antigua's submissions in the
context of its allegation that federal and state la ws prohibit or prevent the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services but which are not contained in Antigua's Panel request:778
(a) California: Cal. Penal Code §§ 187-189, 240-241 and 518-527;
(b) Connecticut: Connecticut Division of Speci al Revenue, Administrative Regulations:
Operation of Bingo Games, Rules 7-169-8a and 7-169-13a;
(c) Illinois: Illinois Riverboat Gaming Act § 230; Illinois Compiled Statutes § 10/7 (e);
(d) Indiana: Indiana Code §§ 4-33-1-2, 4-33-9-1, 4-33-9-10; Indiana Administrative
Code § 2 1-4 (c) (1);
(e) Iowa: Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission Administrative Rules, Rules 491 – 1,
491 – 8.2 (4) (g) and 491 – 11.5 (4) (a) (4);
(f) Kansas: Kansas Consumer Protection Act; Kansas Crim. Code Ann. § 21-4302(e);
(g) Louisiana: Louisiana Gaming Control Law RS § 27 : 65;
(h) Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6, § 48; ch. 10, §§ 22-58;
(i) Mississippi: Mississippi Gaming Commission Regulations, Section II (B) (2);
(j) Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.0129, 463.750, 465.091- 465.094; Regulations of the
Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board, Regulations 3.010 (5)
and (7);
(k) New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 5:5-159, 5:8-1 - 8–118, 5:9–1 et seq;
(l) New York: NY Penal Code §§ 120.00-.15 and 155.05 (2) (e); Gen. Mun. Law § 185
et seq; Rac., Pari-Mut Wag. & Breed Law §§ 101 and 1012;
(m) Oregon: Oregon Administrative Rules, Rules 462-220-0060;
(n) Utah: Ut. Const. Art. VI § 27.
6.214 The Panel request defines our terms of referenc e. Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to
examine any laws or regulations that were discussed by Antigua in support of its allegation that US
law prohibits the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services but which are not contained in
Antigua's Panel request. Consequently, we will not consider any of the laws listed in paragraph 6.213
above in examining Antigua's claims.

778 We note that Antigua referred to other federal and state laws that are also not contained in Antigua's
Panel request but which are not listed here because they were not referred to by Antigua in the context of its
allegation that US law prohibits the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services and/or because they
have not yet been enacted.

Laws contained in the Panel request but not discu ssed to an extent that could enable Antigua
to provide a prima facie demonstration
6.215 Below is a list of laws and regulations that we re not discussed by Antigua to an extent that
would enable the Panel to identify according to whic h particular provisions and how the laws result in
a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services:
(a) Federal laws:
(i) The Federal Aiding and Abetting Statute (18 USC § 2);
(ii) Interstate Horseracing Act (15 USC §§ 3001 – 3007);
(iii) Federal Lottery Statute (18 USC §§ 1301 – 1307);
(iv) Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia (18 USC § 1953);
(v) The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (28 USC §§ 3701 –
3704);
(vi) Postal Law Regarding Mailing Gamb ling Related Materials (39 USC
§ 3005).
(b) State laws:
(i) All laws listed in the Panel request for the states of Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississi ppi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhod e Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, Guam, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands;
(ii) Colorado: Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 2; Col. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-10-101 - 18-10-
102 and 18-10-104 - 18-10-108; Col. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-47.1-101 - 12-47.1-
106;
14:90.4;
(iv) Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 271, §§ 1-50 except § 17A;
(v) Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.76 - 609.754; 609.756 - 609.763;
(vi) New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:40-2 - 2A:40-9, 2C:37-1 - 2C:37-9, 5:5-
63, 5:12-1 - 5:12-210;
(vii) New York: N.Y. Executive Law §§ 430 - 439a; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 225.00-
225.40; N.Y. General Obligation Law §§ 5-402 - 5-423;
(viii) South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-25-1 - 22-25-15; and
(ix) Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1101, 76-10-1103 - 76-10-1109.

6.216 In its examination of Antigua's submissions, th e Panel found that, in the context of a very
general discussion regarding the existence of an alleged prohibition on the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services 779, Antigua included a footnote reference to exhibits containing what it
itself described as a "huge number of American laws". 780 The exhibits cited in the footnote contain
the texts781 and very brief summaries of the laws that are referred to in paragraph 6.215 above.782
6.217 The summaries contained in these exhibits do not enable us to identify according to which
particular provisions and how the laws result in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services that would be inconsistent wi th the United States' obligations under the GATS.
Accordingly, we will not consider any of the above laws in examining Antigua's claims under
Articles XVI, XVII and VI, which are premised upon the existence of a prohibition on the cross-
border supply of gambling and be tting services, because Antigua c ould not and did not make any
prima facie demonstration that they are inconsistent with the GATS.
6.218 Additionally, in the case of one of the laws lis ted above, namely, the Interstate Horseracing
Act ("IHA") 783, it is listed in Antigua's Panel request and is, thereby, identified as resulting in a
prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling a nd betting services. However, when referring to
the IHA in its submissions, Antigua submits very clearly that the IHA allows gambling by the
Internet.784 Indeed, Antigua refers to the IHA to sh ow that the United States does not prohibit the
remote supply of gambling and betting services in the United States as it has suggested. Therefore, in
relation to the IHA, we are still unclear as to how th is Act results in a prohibition on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services. Since Antigua's claims are premised upon the existence of a
prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling a nd betting services, we will not consider the IHA
insofar as Antigua seeks to rely upon it as resulting in such a prohibition because Antigua could not
and did not make any prima facie demonstration that it is inconsistent with the GATS.
Laws contained in the Panel request and discussed in Antigua's submissions
6.219 Below, we point to US laws contained in An tigua's panel request and for which Antigua has
been able to identify one or several provisions a nd offer some discussion as to whether and how such
provisions could be inconsistent with the GATS. We recall that we are not at this early stage
assessing the legal validity of Antigua's arguments but we are only trying to identify which provisions
of which US laws can be considered to have been sufficiently identified so as to warrant a substantive
examination by the Panel.
Federal laws
6.220 In its first oral statement, Antigua refers to three US federal laws , which it says indicate that
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting servi ces is prohibited in the United States. More
particularly, Antigua refers to:
(a) the Wire Act (18 USC § 1084);
(b) the Travel Act (18 USC § 1952); and
(c) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 USC § 1955).
6.221 Antigua provides the following discussion of each of these Acts:

779 See Antigua's first oral statement, para. 25.
780 Exhibits AB-81, 82, 88 and 89.
781 Exhibits AB-82 and 99.
782 Exhibits AB-81 and 88.
783 Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 USC §§ 3001 – 3007.
784 See, for example, Antigua's first written submission, para. 116.

"The 'Wire Act' (18 U.S.C § 1084), wh ich prohibits gambling businesses from
knowingly receiving or sending certain types of bets or information that assist in
placing bets over interstate and international wires;
The 'Travel Act' (18 U.S.C. § 1952), which imposes criminal penalties for those who
utilize interstate or foreign commerce with th e intent to distribute the proceeds of any
unlawful activity, including gambling considered unlawful in the United States;
The 'Illegal Gambling Business Act' (18 U.S.C. § 1955), which makes it a federal
crime to operate a gambling business that violates the law of the state where the
gambling takes place (provided certain other criteria are fulfilled such as the
involvement of at least five people and an operation during more than 30 days).
Each of these three laws separately prohi bits the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services from Antigua."
 785
6.222 The three federal Acts referred to above are listed in Antigua's Panel request. Antigua
provided the full texts of the three Acts to the Pane l in Exhibit AB-82. In the context of a broader
discussion about the impact of US laws on the cr oss-border supply of gambling and betting services,
Antigua refers to Exhibit AB-81, which contains, inter alia, an explanation of how these laws prohibit
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.
6.223 With respect to Antigua's discussion of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, we consider that they have been di scussed in Antigua's submissions, oral statements
and replies to Panel questions and those discussions indicate according to which particular provisions
and how the laws allegedly result in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services.
State laws
Colorado
6.224 In its discussion of the legal position regardi ng the supply of gambling and betting services in
the state of Colorado, Antigua states that "casino ga mbling may only be conducted in historic mining
towns".786 In a footnote to that statement, Antigua points to an excerpt from a website contained in
Exhibit AB-131 entitled "Colorado Gaming Questions a nd Answers". At page 5 of that excerpt, the
website states that:
"There is no Colorado state law which expressly addresses Internet gambling. The
violation under Colorado law is simply the crime of 'gambling', no different than any
unlawful form of gambling in Colorado, prohibited by 18-10-103, Colorado Revised
Statutes. A few states other than Colora do have recently passed specific state laws
expressly prohibiting Internet gambling."
6.225 Section 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes is referred to in the Panel request and the
text of that section is contained in Exhibit AB-99. The text of § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes can be found in Annex F.
6.226 We consider that § 18-10-103 of the Colo rado Revised Statutes has been discussed in
Antigua's submissions and those submissions indi cate according to which particular provision and
how the law of Colorado allegedly results in a pr ohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services.

785 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 21.
786 Antigua's second written submission, para. 26.

Louisiana
6.227 In its discussion of the federal and state laws applying to the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services 787, Antigua refers through a footnote to Exhibit AB-119. 788 Exhibit AB-119
contains an article which discusses, inter alia , "The Intersection of States' Rights and Federal
Interest". In the context of that discussion, re ference is made to US laws concerning Internet
gambling. In particular, the article states:
"In Louisiana, gambling by computer is illegal for operators, designers, and producers
of related computer services unless the wagering takes place on the premises of a
licensed river-boat, state lottery outlet or pari-mutuel facility. Therefore, the same
Louisiana provision that generally prohibits Internet gambling does allow a very
limited use of computer networks for ga mbling restricted to the premises of
designated wagering facilities."
789
6.228 A footnote to the excerpted paragraph refers to § 14:90.3 of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section
14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. is referred to in the Panel request 790 and the text of that section is
contained in Exhibit AB-99. The text of § 14:90.3 of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. can be found in Annex F.
6.229 We consider that § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. has been discussed in Antigua's
submissions and those submissions indicate accordi ng to which particular provision and how the law
of Louisiana allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services.
Massachusetts
6.230 Antigua states in its submissions that the laws of five states prohibit "unauthorized"
gambling.791 In making this statement, Antigua points to Exhibit AB-84, which contains summaries
of five state laws, including those of Massachusetts. In that Exhibit, as concerns Massachusetts, the
only statement made that could be construed as rele vant to Antigua's allega tion that the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services is prohibite d in Massachusetts is: "Massachusetts law makes
it illegal to transmit any bet or wager over the telephone." 792 In making this statement, Antigua
includes a footnote reference to Mass. Ann. Laws: chapter 271 § 17A.793
6.231 Section 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws is referred to in the Panel request and the text
of that section is contained in Exhibit AB-99. Th e text of § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws
can be found in Annex F.
6.232 We consider that § 17A of ch apter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws has been discussed in Antigua's
submissions and those discussions indicate accordi ng to which particular provision and how the law
of Massachusetts allegedly results in a prohibiti on on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services.
Minnesota
6.233 Antigua notes in its submissions that it incl uded in its Panel request a "huge number of
American laws" that together "create the total ban" of the cross-border supply of gambling and betting

787 See Antigua's second oral statement paras. 11–18.
788 Footnote 4 of Antigua's second oral statement.
789 Exhibit AB-119, p. 4.
790 We note that the Panel request refers to "La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:90.-4". We understand this
reference to include §§ 14:90.0-14:90.4 and, therefore, encompasses § 14:90.3.
791 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 20.
792 Exhibit AB-84, p. 18.
793 Exhibit AB-84, footnote 15.

services.
794 In making this submission, Antigua refers through a footnote to a number of exhibits,
which it says contain "the text of all relevant laws listed in our Panel request, together with brief
summaries of these laws." Antigua refers, inter alia , to Exhibit AB-88, which contains Antigua's
summary of the state laws listed in its Panel request including those pertaining to Minnesota. Antigua
also refers to Exhibit AB-99, which contains the text of those laws. These exhibits do not, in our
view, indicate according to which particular provi sion and how the law of Minnesota results in a
prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling a nd betting services. However, in its reply to a
question posed by the Panel, Antigua refers to le gislative provisions, their application and relevant
practice that Antigua submits are "all elements of the total ban". 795 In making this statement, Antigua
includes a footnote reference to Exhibit AB-96. Exhibit AB-96 contains a statement by the Minnesota
Attorney General on Internet jurisdiction, which states in relevant part that:
"Minnesota residents should be aware that it is unlawful to make a bet through
Internet gambling organizations. Minnesota law makes it a misdemeanour to place a
bet unless done pursuant to an exempted, state-regulated activity, such as licensed
charitable gambling or the state lottery. Minnesota Statute Sections 609.75,
Subdivisions 2 – 3; 609.755(1) (1994). The Internet gambling organizations are not
exempted. Therefore, any person in Minn esota who places a bet through one of these
organizations is committing a crime."
6.234 Sections 609.75, Subdivisions 2- 3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. are referred to in the
Panel request and the text of those sections is cont ained in Exhibit AB-99. The text of §§ 609.75,
Subdivisions 2-3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. can be found in Annex F.
6.235 We consider that §§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2-3 a nd 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. have been
discussed in Antigua's submissions and those discussions indicate according to which particular
provisions and how the law of Minnesota allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services.
New Jersey
6.236 Antigua states in its submissions that the laws of five states prohibit "unauthorized"
gambling.796 In making this statement, Antigua points to Exhibit AB-84, which contains summaries of
five state laws, including those of New Jersey. In that Exhibit, as concerns New Jersey, the only
statements that can be construed as relevant to Antigua's allegation that the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services is prohibited are as follows:
"In New Jersey, only gambling that has b een authorized by public referendum is
legal, and Internet gambling has not been authorized by public referendum. The New
Jersey constitution prohibits the legislat ure from authorizing gambling unless the
specific type of gambling, any restrictions on it, and control of it have been approved
by public referendum. In addition, New Jers ey's ... civil code bans any form of
unauthorized gambling as well. As an unauthorized form of gambling, Internet
gambling is prohibited under New Jersey law."
797
6.237 In making these statements, Antigua includes a footnote reference to N.J. Const. Art. 4,
Sec. VII, paragraph 2798 and to N.J. Code § 2A:40-1.799

794 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 25.
795 Panel question No. 10.
796 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 20.
797 Exhibit AB-84, pp. 19-20.
798 Exhibit AB-84, Footnote 37.
799 Exhibit AB-84, Footnote 39.

6.238 Paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code800 are referred to in
the Panel request and the text of those sections is contained in Exhibit AB-99. The text of paragraph
2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code can be found in Annex F.
6.239 We consider that paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Ar t. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code
have been discussed in Antigua's submissions a nd those discussions indicate according to which
particular provisions and how the law of New Jersey allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services.
New York
6.240 Antigua states in its submissions that the laws of five states prohibit "unauthorized"
gambling.801 In making this statement, Antigua points to Exhibit AB-84, which contains summaries
of five state laws, including those of New York. In that Exhibit, as concerns New York, the only
statements that can be construed as relevant to Antigua's allegation that the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services is prohibited are as follows:
"Unauthorized betting and gambling are illegal in New York. With certain
exceptions, New York has expressly prohibite d betting in both its constitution and its
General Obligations Law."802
6.241 In making these statements, Antigua includes a f ootnote reference to N.Y. Const. Art. I § 9
and N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. § 5-401. Both of these secti ons are listed in the Panel request and the text of
both sections is contained in Exhibit AB-99.803 The text of § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of
the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. can be found in Annex F.
6.242 We consider that § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Cons t. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. have
been discussed in Antigua's submissions and those discussions indicate according to which particular
provisions and how the law of New York allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services.

800 We understand that the N.J. Code is equivalent to "N.J. Stat. Ann.", which is the way in which the
Code is referred to by Antigua in its Panel request.
801 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 20.
802 Exhibit AB-84, p. 21.
803 We note that N.Y. Const. Art. I § 9 is listed in Antigua's Panel request but the revised request for
consultations refers to N.Y. Const. Art. II § 9. We st ated in our response to the US request for preliminary
rulings that we would definitively determine whether or not the difference between the reference in the Panel
request and the revised request for consultations is due to a typographical error after Antigua had completed
making its prima facie case. Antigua has only provided us with the text of Art. I § 9 of N.Y. Const. and not Art.
II § 9. On the basis of the text that is available to us, it appears that Antigua intended to refer to N.Y. Const.
Art. I § 9 rather than Art. II § 9 in its revised reques t for consultations since the former clearly relates to
gambling. We understand from Antigua that the latter concerns suffrage (see Antigua's first written submission,
para. 150). The United States has not disputed this. Accordingly, we conclude that the discrepancy between the
references in the Panel request and the revised request for consultations to the N.Y. Const. is merely
typographical in nature. There are also differences between the references in the Panel request and the revised
request for consultations in respect of the laws for Colo rado and Rhode Island. However, the differences apply
to provisions of the laws of these st ates that are not being considered fu rther by the Panel because, as we
concluded in paragraph 6.215(b) above, Antigua could not and did not make any prima facie demonstration that
they are inconsistent with the GATS. Therefore, we do not need to decide whether or not the discrepancies
between the references in the Panel request and the revised request for consultations to provisions of the laws of
these states are merely typographical in nature. In any case, it is the Panel request and not the request for
consultations that determines our jurisdiction.

South Dakota
6.243 In its discussion of the federal and state laws applying to the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services 804, Antigua refers through a footnote to Exhibit AB-119. 805 Exhibit AB-119
contains an article which discusses, inter alia , "The Intersection of States' Rights and Federal
Interest". In the context of that discussion, re ference is made to US laws concerning Internet
gambling. In particular, the article states:
"Laws concerning Internet gambling are as varied as the diverse gaming schemes in
each state jurisdiction, and even states that prohibit Internet gambling may provide
for exceptions for Internet gambling c onducted by a state regulated and licensed
gaming operators. In Nevada, Illinois 806 and South Dakota, it may be fairly stated
that these states have enacted provisions that criminalize unregulated Internet
gambling but leave a door open for regulated Internet gambling conducted by a
gaming operator licensed by the respective state."807
6.244 A footnote to the excerpted paragraph refers to S.D. Codified Laws, §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-
15. Sections 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws are referred to in the Panel request and
the text of these sections is contained in Exhibit AB-99. The text of §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the
S.D. Codified Laws can be found in Annex F.
6.245 We consider that §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws have been discussed in
Antigua's submissions and those submissions indi cate according to which particular provisions and
how the law of South Dakota allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling
and betting services.
Utah
6.246 Antigua states in its submissions that the laws of five states prohibit "unauthorized"
gambling.808 In making this statement, Antigua points to Exhibit AB-84, which contains summaries
of five state laws, including those of Utah. In th at Exhibit, as concerns Utah, the only statement that
can be construed as relevant to Antigua's allega tion that the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services is prohibited is: "Internet gambling is prohibited in Utah, along with all other forms of
gambling".809 In making this statement, Antigua includes a footnote reference to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1102.
6.247 Section 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann. is refe rred to in the Panel request and the text of
that section is contained in Exhibit AB-99. The te xt of § 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann. can be
found in Annex F.
6.248 We consider that § 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann. has been discussed in Antigua's
submissions and those discussions indicate accordi ng to which particular provision and how the law
of Utah allegedly results in a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.
(iv) Summary
6.249 After making our utmost efforts to accord Antigua's claims "close attention and serious
analysis", in light of our discussion above, we have concluded that, among the laws listed in Antigua's

804 See Antigua's second oral statement, paras. 11–18.
805 Footnote 4 of Antigua's second oral statement.
806 The laws cited in the Article for Nevada and Illinois are not contained in Antigua's Panel request.
807 Exhibit AB-119, p. 4.
808 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 20.
809 Exhibit AB-84, p. 22.

Panel request, the following have been discussed in Antigua's submissions and those discussions
indicate according to which particular provisions and how the laws result in a prohibition on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services:
(a) Federal laws:
(i) Wire Act (18 USC § 1084);
(ii) Travel Act (18 USC § 1952); and
(iii) Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 USC § 1955).
(b) State laws:
(i) Colorado: § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
(ii) Louisiana: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.;
(iii) Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws;
(iv) Minnesota: §§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2 – 3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann;
(v) New Jersey: paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of
N.J. Code;
(vi) New York: § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L.;
(vii) South Dakota: §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and
(viii) Utah: § 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann.
(d) "Measures ... affecting trade in services"
6.250 The threshold question that must be addressed in determining whether or not the GATS is
applicable to the measures identified above in paragraph 6.249 is whether those measures "affect trade
in services" within the meaning of Article I:1 of the GATS. This threshold question must be
addressed regardless of the specific Article of the GA TS that is being invoked in support of a claim
that the GATS has been violated.
6.251 The Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III indicated that the expression "measures ...affecting
trade in services" in Article I:1 is to be interpreted broadly.810 Further, the Appellate Body in that case
upheld the Panel's interpretation of that expression as meaning:
"... no measures are excluded a priori from the scope of the GATS as defined by its
provisions. The scope of the GATS encompasses any measure of a Member to the
extent it affects the supply of a service re gardless of whether such measure directly
governs the supply of a service or whether it regulates other matters but nevertheless
affects trade in services."
811

810 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 220.
811 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 220 citing the Panel Report on EC – Bananas III,
para. 7.285.

6.252 There is no reason why measures adopted by regional and local governments and authorities
cannot a priori "affect the supply of a service" within the m eaning of Article I:1 of the GATS, even if
such measures cannot be enforced extraterritorially.
6.253 This being said, whether a measure "affecting trade in services" within the scope of the GATS
in accordance with Article I:1 is inconsistent with one or more provisions of the GATS is a distinct
matter which calls for a separate determination under the relevant GATS provisions.
6.254 In our view, the measures identified above in paragraph 6.249 necessarily affect trade in
services within the meaning of Article I:1 of the GATS because, as we find below in paragraphs 6.360
- 6.418, they entail prohibitions on the supply of gambling and betting services.
6.255 We will consider in the following sections of our Report whether Antigua has met its prima
facie burden in proving that each of the measures id entified above in paragraph 6.249 are inconsistent
with the various Articles of the GATS that Antigua has invoked. Where relevant and necessary, we
will also make reference to the court cases in which the relevant provisions of the Wire Act, Travel
Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act were applied, the law enforcement actions against financial
intermediaries and media companies and the stat ements by government officials advising national
advertisers not to allow advertising for off-shor e Internet gambling services as illustrative of the
"practice" of US authorities regarding their interpretation and application of the above laws.
D. C
LAIMS OF VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES ' MARKET ACCESS CO MMITMENT UNDER
ARTICLE XVI OF THE GATS
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.256 Antigua argues that since the United States ha s scheduled a full market access commitment
for the cross-border supply of gambling and bettin g services but maintains and enforces measures
prohibiting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, and that those measure(s) are
inconsistent with Article XVI:1 of the GATS. 812 Antigua submits that the United States' "total
prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services also violates
Article XVI:2(a) and 2(c) 813 because the "total prohibition" amounts to a zero quota. Antigua adds
finally that the application of Article XVI:2(a) and (c) to a non-numerical quota, such as the alleged
"total prohibition", is mandated by the principle of effective treaty interpretation and by the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines.814
6.257 According to the United States, contrary to th e situation under Article XI of the GATT 1994,
under the GATS, a "prohibition" is not ipso facto inconsistent with Article XVI.815 The United States
submits that the substance of Article XVI is contai ned in Article XVI:2, which deals with the subject-
matter of restrictions and their precise form and/or manner of expression, and that it is a closed list. 816
The United States argues that the restrictions it ma intains on the remote supply of some gambling and
betting services are not restrictions of the type covered by Article XVI:2 of the GATS because the
subject-matter of the US restrictions refers to th e character of the activity involved rather than the
"number of service suppliers" or the "total number of service operations or total quantity of service
output", being the criteria listed under subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 respectively.
817

812 Antigua's first written submission, para. 181.
813 Antigua's first written submission, para. 184.
814 See Antigua's second written submission, paras. 36-38 and Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 15.
815 United States' reply to Panel question No. 15.
816 United States first written submission, para. 81.
817 United States' second written submission, paras. 21-25.

Finally, the United States submits that, in the United States, there is no "total prohibition" or any "zero
quota" since the cross-border supply of some gambling and betting services is permitted.818
2. Relevant GATS provisions
6.258 Article XVI of the GATS provides as follows:
"1. With respect to mark et access through the modes of supply identified in
Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms,
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.819
2. In sectors where market-access comm itments are undertaken, the measures
which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional
subdivision or on the basis of its entire te rritory, unless otherwise specified in its
Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the
form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or
the requirements of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets
in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic
needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on
the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated
numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test;
820
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be
employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may
employ and who are necessary for, an d directly related to, the supply
of a specific service in the fo rm of numerical quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal
entity or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a
service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of
maximum percentage limit on forei gn shareholding or the total value
of individual or aggregate foreign investment."

818 United States' second written submission, para. 26.
819 (original footnote) If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of
a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I and if the cross-border
movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is ther eby committed to allow such
movement of capital. If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service
through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I, it is thereby committed to allow related
transfers of capital into its territory.
820 (original footnote) Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member which limit inputs for
the supply of services.

3. Assessment by the Panel
(a) Introduction
6.259 In light of the claims and arguments of the par ties, it is necessary to determine the nature and
scope of the obligations contained in Article XVI of the GATS. In order to do so, the Panel will need
to examine whether Article XVI:1 contains obliga tions that are different from those contained in
Article XVI:2 and whether Article XVI:2 exhaustivel y defines the types of restrictions that are
prohibited by Article XVI. In the specific circum stances of the present dispute, the Panel will also
need to ascertain the legal impli cations of the inscription by a Me mber of the word "None" in the
market access column of its schedule for mode 1 for a specific sector or sub-sector.
6.260 In particular, the Panel will need to determin e whether such a Member is entitled to maintain
a measure which prohibits one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1; whether such a
measure is inconsistent with the first and the second paragraphs of Article XVI of the GATS; and
whether a restriction on some services covered in a scheduled sector or sub-sector amounts to a
violation of Article XVI.
6.261 In this dispute, Antigua claims that its ma rket access rights under Ar ticle XVI for gambling
and betting services in the United States are impaired by the US measures at issue. We examine the
United States' obligations under Article XVI hereafte r. To do so, the Panel will, in the light of
Article 3.2 of the DSU and the Vienna Convention, interpret the text of Article XVI of the GATS in
good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of this provision when
read in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the GATS and those of the WTO
Agreement.
(b) Interpretation and scope of Article XVI
(i) The first paragraph of Article XVI
6.262 In the present dispute, Antigua claims that a blanket prohibition on the remote supply of
gambling and betting services is contrary to the US Schedule, which contains the inscription "None"
in the market access column for mode 1 in respect of the specific sub-sector 10.D. Therefore,
according to Antigua, the measures at issue provide less favourable treatment than that provided for in
the US Schedule in a manner inconsistent with the first paragraph of Article XVI. The United States
responds that the second paragraph of Article XVI e xhaustively defines the types of restrictions that
are prohibited by Article XVI. We understand the United States' argument to imply that when a
Member has inscribed the word "None " in its market access column for mode 1, it signifies that the
Member has specified in its schedule none of the limitations or measures listed in subparagraphs (a) to
(f) of Article XVI:2 and is, accordingly, prohibited from adopting or maintaining any such limitations
or measures.
6.263 In the Panel's view, the ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the first paragraph of
Article XVI imposes an obligation on Members to provide, with respect to market access, no less
favourable treatment than that provided for in the Members' respective schedules. The standard of
"no less favourable" treatment in Article XVI is est ablished by reference to the specific commitments
inscribed in the market ac cess column of a Member's schedule. In particular, the first paragraph of
Article XVI makes clear that Members are bound by the "terms, limitations and conditions" contained
in the market access column of th eir respective schedules. A Member must abide by the "terms,
conditions and limitations" containe d in its schedule and cannot provide, in respect of services and
services suppliers of other Member s, treatment less favourable th an the minimum treatment it is
committed to in its schedule for market access.

6.264 The ordinary meaning of the terms used in the first paragraph of Article XVI also indicates
that nothing would prevent a Member from providing to services and service suppliers of all Members
treatment more favourable than that provided for in its schedule or that it provides to its own services
and service suppliers.
6.265 The first paragraph of Article XVI also extends to Members the obligation to provide no less
favourable treatment than that provided for in their respective schedules, to any other Members, i.e. to
all WTO Members. In other words, the commitments undertaken pursuant to Article XVI are to be
applied on a non-discriminatory basis. Therefore, the first paragraph of Article XVI contains a
specific expression of the MFN principle of Article II of the GATS.
821
6.266 When faced with an allegation of violation of Article XVI, a panel must first examine the
schedule of the challenged Member. There are thr ee possible inscriptions that can be made in the
market access column of a Member's schedule: "Unbound" 822, "None" or limitations may be
inscribed.
6.267 In the present dispute, the United States inscrib ed "None" in the market access column of its
Schedule for mode 1 in respect of gambling and betti ng services. Since the first step in an analysis
under the first paragraph of Article XVI is to have regard to the challenged Member's schedule, we
believe that, with respect to the US Schedule, we must determine the legal significance under
Article XVI of the inscription of the word "None" in the market access column for "mode 1".
"None" inscribed under "Market Access Limitations"
6.268 The terms of a schedule are to be interpreted as treaty terms. 823 All Members' schedules
include three columns in their respective schedul es: one entitled "sector or sub-sector", another
"Limitations on market access" and the third "Limitations on national treatment".824
Sector or sub-sector Limita tions on market access Limitations on national treatment

D. OTHER RECREATIONAL
SERVICES (except sporting)
 1) None
 2) None
 3) The number of concessions
available for commercial operations in
federal, state and local facilities is
limited
 4) Unbound, except as indicated
in the horizontal section
 1) None
 2) None
 3) None

 4) None

821 We note in passing that paragraph 5 of the "Listing of Article II exemptions – Explanatory Note by
the Secretariat" (the so-called Scheduling Guidelines on MFN Exemptions) states that: "Therefore if a Member
takes an MFN exemption in a sector where specific commitments are undertaken, the exemption would allow
that Member to deviate from its obligations under paragraph 1 of Article II but not from its commitments under
Articles XVI or XVII. Accordingly, a Member undertaking a market access or a national treatment commitment
in a sector must accord th e stated minimum standard of treatment specified in its schedule to all other
Members.": Job No. 2061 dated 15 September 1993.
822 S/L/92, para. 47, states that: "In some situations, a particular mode of supply may not be technically
feasible. An example might be the cross-border supply of hair-dressing services. In these cases the term
UNBOUND* should be used. The asterisk should refer to a footnote which states 'Unbound due to lack of
technical feasibility'. The term may not be used as an entry in the national treatment column for modes 1 and 2
when, for the same service, there is a market access co mmitment. Where the mode of supply thought to be
inapplicable is in fact applicable, or becomes so in the future, the entry means 'unbound'."
823 Appellate Body Report on EC – Computer Equipment, para 84.
824 The fourth column (Additional commitments) has not been reproduced here.

Source: The United States of America, Schedule of Sp ecific Commitments, GATS/SC/90, 15 April 1994, p. 72
(extract).

6.269 As is evident from the above excerpt of the US Schedule, the word "None" is a treaty term
since it is in its Schedule. Further, "None" is inscribed under "Limitations on market access".
However, "None" is not defined in the GATS nor in any Members' schedules.
6.270 In the absence of any treaty definition of th e word "None" when inscribed in a Member's
schedule under "Limitations on market access", and pur suant to Articles 31.1 and 31.2 of the Vienna
Convention, the Panel will, as a starting point, resort, to the dictionary definitions of these terms. In
so doing, the Panel is well aware of the limitations of dictionary definitions to identify the ordinary
meaning of the terms of a treaty.825
6.271 The term "none" is defined in the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary as "no one not any one of a
number of persons or things". 826 The Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary defines it as "not any
such thing or person". 827 T h e New Little Oxford Dictionary defines it as "not any of...".828 T h e s e
definitions indicate that the Panel has to identif y what an inscription of the word "None" in a
Member's schedule relates or refers to.
6.272 In the context of the present dispute, the inscrip tion of the word "None" refers to "Limitations
on market access". Therefore, the inscription of th e word "None" in the mark et access column of the
US Schedule would appear to mean "none of the limitations on market access".
6.273 The ordinary meaning of "limitations", as defined in the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, is "a
point or a respect, in which a thing, an d especially a person's ability, is limited". 829 The Webster New
Encyclopedic Dictionary defines it as "something that limits" 830 and the New Little Oxford Dictionary
as "limiting or being limited; lack of ability ...".831
6.274 The concept of "market access" was fundamental to GATT law and practice; it is still so
under the WTO Agreement. 832 In the Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, "market access" is defined
as:
"[O]ne of the most basic concepts in intern ational trade. It describes the extent to
which a good or a service can compete with locally-made products in another market.
In the WTO framework it as [sic] a le galistic terms outlining the government-
imposed conditions under which a product may enter a country under non-
discrimination conditions".
833
6.275 On the basis of the above dictionary definitions, "Limitations on market access" would appear
to include provisions or conditions limiting the ability of services and service suppliers to gain access
to the market of that Member. However, in light of the specific and specialized context where these

825 Appellate Body Reports on EC – Asbestos, para. 92; and Canada – Aircraft, para. 153.
826 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1993, p. 1936.
827 Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1993, p. 681.
828 New Little Oxford Dictionary, 1989, p. 364.
829 New Shorter Oxford Dictionary,1993, p. 1592.
830 Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1993, p. 580.
831 New Little Oxford Dictionary, 1989, p. 313.
832 Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement provides th at: "Except as otherwise provided under this
Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and
customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in
the framework of GATT 1947."
833 Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms (2nd ed.), Walter Goode, 1998, p. 176.

terms are used, the Panel believes that the dictionary definitions are not particularly enlightening or
informative.834
6.276 Pursuant to Articles 31.1 and 31.2 of the Vi enna Convention, we turn to the legal context of
Article XVI in our effort to interpret the first para graph of Article XVI and relevant inscriptions in a
Member's schedule.
6.277 The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, which are part of the context for the GATS Agreement 835,
are also part of the context of Article XVI and sh ed light on the meaning of "None". Paragraphs 23
and 24 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines cont ain the following pertinent comments on the
inscription of the term "None" in the market access column of a Member's schedule:
"23. Since the terms used in a Memb er's schedule create legally binding
commitments, it is important that those expressing presence or absence of limitations
to market access and national treatment be uniform and precise. Depending on the
extent to which a Member has limited market access and national treatment, for each
commitment with respect to each mode of supply, four cases can be foreseen:
(a) Full commitment
24. In this case the Member does not seek in any way to limit market access or
national treatment in a given sector and mode of supply through measures
inconsistent with Articles XVI and XVII. The Member in this situation should mark
in the appropriate column: NONE. However, any relevant limitations listed in the
horizontal section of the schedule will still apply."
6.278 According to paragraph 24 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, by inscription of the word
"None" in the market access column of a Member's schedule, a Member cannot adopt or maintain any
measure inconsistent with Article XVI. The word "None" in the market access column means that the
Member has undertaken a full market access commitment . "Full market access" is defined in
paragraph 4 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as follows:
"A Member grants full mark et access in a given sector and mode of supply when it
does not maintain in that sector and mode any of the types of measures listed in
Article XVI. The measures listed comprise four types of quantitative restrictions
(subparagraphs a-d), as well as limitations on forms of legal entity (subparagraph e)
and on foreign equity participation (subpa ragraph f). The list is exhaustive and
includes measures which may also be di scriminatory according to the national
treatment standard (Article XVII). The quantitative restrictions can be expressed
numerically, or through the criteria specifi ed in subparagraphs (a) to (d); these
criteria do not relate to the quality of the service supplied, or to the ability of the
supplier to supply the service (i.e. technical standards or qualification of the
supplier)."
6.279 Thus, when a Member has the inscription "None" in the market access column of its schedule,
it must maintain "full market access" within the meaning of the GATS, i.e. it must not maintain any of
the six limitations and measures listed in the second paragraph of Article XVI.

834 Appellate Body Reports on EC – Asbestos, para. 92; and Canada – Aircraft, para. 153.
835 We recall our conclusion in para. 6.82 above.

"Mode 1" and its inherent "means of delivery"
6.280 In the present dispute, the Panel has to interp ret the meaning of the word "None" when it has
been inscribed under "Limitations on market access" for mode 1 . The Panel is of the view that it
must, therefore, consider the nature of a market access commitment for mode 1, since Antigua claims
that the challenged US measures are contrary to the US market access commitment for mode 1 in
respect of sub-sector 10.D.
6.281 Article I:2(a) of the GATS defines "mode 1", otherwise referred to as "cross-border", as the
supply of a service "from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member". The
definition does not contain any indication as to the means that can be used to supply services cross-
border. This indicates, in our view, that the GATS does not limit the various technologically possible
means of delivery under mode 1.
6.282 As for relevant context for identifying the m eans of delivery included under Article I:2(a),
paragraph 18 of the Scheduling Guidelines states that:
"The four modes of supply listed in the schedules correspond to the scope of the
GATS as set out in Article I:2. The modes are essentially defined on the basis of the
origin of the service supplier and consumer , and the degree and type of territorial
presence which they have at the moment the service is delivered."
6.283 In respect of supply by mode 1, or "cross-border" supply, the chart entitled "Modes of
Supply" contained in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines states:
"Service supplier not present within the territory of the Member
Service delivered within the territory of the Member, from the territory of another
Member"
6.284 Paragraph 19 of the Scheduling Guidelines defines "cross-border supply" as:
"International transport, the supply of a service through telecommunications or mail,
and services embodied in exported goods (e.g. a computer diskette, or drawings) are
all examples of cross-border supply, since the service supplier is not present within
the territory of the Member where the service is delivered."
6.285 The Panel concludes that mode 1 under th e GATS encompasses all possible means of
supplying services from the territory of one WTO Member into the territory of another WTO
Member. Therefore, a market access commitment for mode 1 implies the right for other Members'
suppliers to supply a service through all means of de livery, whether by mail, telephone, Internet etc.,
unless otherwise specified in a Member's Schedule. We note that this is in li ne with the principle of
"technological neutrality", which seems to be largely shared among WTO Members.
836 Accordingly,
where a full market access commitment has been made for mode 1, a prohibition on one, several or all
means of delivery included in this mode 1 would be a limitation on market access for the mode.

836 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce – Progress Report to the General Council , adopted by
the Council for Trade in Services on 19 July 1999, S/L/74, 27 July 1999. para. 4: "It was also the general view
that the GATS is technologically neutral in the sense that it does not contain any provisions that distinguish
between the different technological means through which a services may be supplied." The United States seems
to agree as is evident from the following comments made by it in a submission contained in WT/GC/16, p. 3:
"there should be no question that where market access and national treatment commitments exist, they
encompass the delivery of th e service through electronic means, in keeping with th e principle of technological
neutrality."

6.286 In our view, if one, several or all means of delivery cross-border are prohibited, the
opportunities for foreign suppliers using those mean s of delivery to supply services cross-border to
gain access to foreign markets are clearly reduced, if not nullified. If a Member desires to exclude
market access with respect to the supply of a servi ce through one, several or all means of delivery
included in mode 1, it should do so explicitly in its schedule. The Panel considers that any other
interpretation would result in the nullification of be nefits of a commitment made for mode 1, as
Members could, through regulations, impose restricti ons or prohibitions essentially on one, several or
all means of delivery.
6.287 To sum up, we conclude that mode 1 includes all means of delivery. We are of the view that
when a Member inscribes the word "None" in the market access column of its schedule for mode 1, it
commits itself not to maintain measures which prohibit the use of one, several or all means of delivery
under mode 1 in a committed sector or sub-sector. This is especially so in sectors and sub-sectors
where cross-border supply is effected essentially if not exclusively through the Internet.
Restrictions with respect to certain services covered in a sector or sub-sector
6.288 In this dispute, the United States argues that it does not prohibit the cross-border supply of all
"gambling and betting services" because it allows th e cross-border supply of services such as "odds-
making" or broadcasting of horse races. Antigua is of the view that a commitment in a given sector or
sub-sector covers all services that come within that sector or sub-sector.
6.289 Article XXVIII(e) of the GATS defines "sector" to mean:
"(i) with reference to a specific commitment, one or more, or all, subsectors of
that service, as specified in a Member's Schedule,
(ii) otherwise, the whole of that service sector, including all of its subsectors."
6.290 In our view, if a Member makes a market access commitment in a sector or sub-sector, that
commitment covers all services that fall within the scope of that sector or sub-sector. A Member does
not fulfil its GATS obligations if it allows market access for only some of the services covered by a
committed sector or sub-sector while prohibiting all others. If a Member wishes to restrict market
access with respect to certain services falling within the scope of a sector or sub-sector, it should set
out the restrictions or limitations on access in the appropriate place in the Member's schedule. Indeed,
a specific commitment in a given sector or sub-sector is a guarantee that the whole of that sector, i.e.
all services included in that sector or sub-sector are covered by the commitment. Any other
interpretation would make market access commitments under the GATS largely meaningless.
6.291 The context of the first paragraph of Article XVI includes the second paragraph of
Article XVI. We proceed, therefore, to examine the second paragraph of Article XVI.
(ii) The second paragraph of Article XVI
6.292 Article XVI:2 provides in relevant part that:
"In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a
Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on
the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined
as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers ....
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions ...

(c) limitations on the total num ber of service operations ...
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons ...
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal
entity ...; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital ..."
6.293 On the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms contained in Article XVI:2, the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article XVI is to define the types of limitations and measures which shall not
be maintained or adopted in scheduled sectors or sub-sectors, unless otherwise indicated in the
relevant Member's schedule. Paragraph 2 also in forms Members of the manner in which they should
schedule such limitations and measures.
6.294 We now turn to the context for the interpretation of Article XVI:2 . First, confirmation of our
interpretation is to be found in Article XX:1 of the GATS, which requires Members to set out in their
schedules "terms, limitations and conditions on market access". This language, particularly the use of
the word "limitations", denotes the limitations identif ied in Article XVI:2(a),(b),(c),(d) and (f). The
words "terms" and "conditions" refer to the "measu res" contemplated by Article XVI:2(e) and the
chapeau of Article XVI:2 (i.e. the possibility to make a commitment on the basis of a regional
subdivision of the territory).
6.295 Secondly, footnote 2 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines states that:
"The term 'limitations' will be used throug hout this Note to refer to the 'terms',
'conditions', 'limitations' and 'qualificati ons' used in Article XVI and XVII of the
GATS."
6.296 Therefore, the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines would seem to indicate that no difference exists
between the "terms, conditions and limitations " contained in a Member's schedule and the
"limitations" and "measures" that it is entitled to maintain if scheduled, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article XVI.
837
6.297 Thirdly, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines provides in relevant part that:
"A Member grants full mark et access in a given sector and mode of supply when it
does not maintain in that sector and mode any of the types of measures listed in
Article XVI. The measures listed comprise four types of quantitative restrictions
(subparagraphs a-d), as well as limitations on forms of legal entity (subparagraph e)
and on foreign equity particip ation (subparagraph f). The list is exhaustive and
includes measures which may also be di scriminatory according to the national
treatment standard (Article XVII)." (emphasis added)
6.298 It seems clear from the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines that the list of limitations in paragraph 2
of Article XVI is an exhaustive list. Thus, th e types of measures listed in the second paragraph
exhaust the types of market access restrictions prohi bited by Article XVI, in particular by the first
paragraph of Article XVI. Paragr aph 4 of the 1993 Scheduling Guid elines therefore confirms that
paragraph 2 of Article XVI exhaustively defines th e limitations and measures that are prohibited by

837 The footnote suggests that this understanding is a reading convention for the purpose of the
Scheduling Guidelines. However, since the 1993 Schedu ling Guidelines are context for the GATS, we believe
that this understanding informs the interpretation of the term "limitation" in the GATS itself. In this regard, we
note that this understanding also applies to GATS schedules which follow the format established in the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines and which refers to "limitations on market access".

Article XVI, unless scheduled. In that sense, paragraph 2 of Article XVI complements the first
paragraph of that Article.
(iii) The scope of the first and second paragraphs of Article XVI
Ordinary meaning
6.299 As discussed previously, the ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the first and second
paragraphs of Article XVI means that the only lim itations and measures falling within the scope of
Article XVI are those listed in the second paragraph of Article XVI.
6.300 We must, as required by Articles 31.1 and 31. 2 of the Vienna Convention, continue our
investigation for the interpretation of Article XVI by looking at the context of the first and second
paragraphs of Article XVI, namely other provisions of the GATS. In particular, we will look at the
relationship between Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII and paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI of the GATS, as
this may assist the Panel in determining the nature and the scope of the obligations contained in
Article XVI. We believe that these other provisions ma y give us indications as to the outer limits of
Article XVI.
The context: the relationship between Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, VI:4 and 5
6.301 Articles VI:4 and VI:5 provide that:
"4. With a view to ensuring that measur es relating to qualification requirements
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, th e Council for Trade in Services shall,
through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such
disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia:
 (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as
competence and the ability to supply the service;
 (b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of
the service;
 (c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a
restriction on the supply of the service.
5. (a) In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments,
pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant to
paragraph 4, the Member shall not ap ply licensing and qualification requirements
and technical standards that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a manner
which:
(i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in
subparagraphs 4(a), (b) or (c); and
(ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at
the time the specific commitments in those sectors were made.

 (b) In determining whether a Member is in conformity with the
obligation under paragraph 5(a), account shall be taken of international standards of
relevant international organizations
838 applied by that Member."
6.302 The object of Article VI is to provide disci plines on domestic regulations or measures that
regulate qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements
while the object of Article XVI is to prohibit mark et access limitations, as defined in Article XVI:2,
unless scheduled.
6.303 Measures that constitute market access limitations within the meaning of Article XVI and
which, unless scheduled must be eliminated , are to be distinguished from measures that impose
qualification requirements and procedures, techni cal standards and licensing requirements, which can
be maintained so long as they do not constitute "unnecessary barriers to trade in services", pursuant to
the criteria contained in Article VI:5 or pursuant to the criteria to be developed by the Council for
Trade in Services pursuant to Article VI:4.
6.304 Domestic regulations falling within the scope of Articles VI:4 or VI:5 of the GATS are,
nonetheless, likely to have an effect on market access to the extent th at services and service suppliers
from other WTO Members which do not, or cannot, comply with such regulations will not have
access to the relevant Member's market. Yet, non- discriminatory measures relating to, for instance,
the quality of the service supplied or the ability of the supplier to supply the service (i.e. technical
standards or qualification of the supplier) can be main tained provided that they conform to criteria to
be developed by the Council for Trade in Services pu rsuant to Article VI:4 and, in the meantime, to
the criteria contained in Article VI:5.
6.305 Under Article VI and Article XVI, measures are e ither of the type covered by the disciplines
of Article XVI or are domestic regulations rela ting to qualification requirements and procedures,
technical standards and licensing requirements subject to the specific provisions of Article VI. Thus,
Articles VI:4 and VI:5 on the one hand and XVI on the other hand are mutually exclusive.
6.306 Therefore, qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements covered by the disciplines of Article VI:4 and VI:5 could not be evidence that a Member
is providing less favourable treatment than that provi ded in its schedule contrary to Article XVI, even
when "None" has been inscribed in the market access column of a Member's schedule.
6.307 While the GATS does not explicitly address the re lationship between Article XVI and VI, the
1993 Scheduling Guidelines, as part of the cont ext for interpreting the GATS, contain some
discussion on this issue:
"4. [...] The quantitative restrictions ca n be expressed numerically, or through the
criteria specified in subparagraphs (a) to (d); these criteria do not relate to the
quality of the service supplied, or to the ability of the supplier to supply the service
(i.e. technical standards or qualification of the supplier).
5. It should be noted that the quantitative restrictions specified in subparagraphs (a)
to (d) refer to maximum limitations. Minimum requirements such as those common
to licensing criteria (e.g. minimum capital requirements for the establishment of a
corporate entity) do not fall within the scope of Article XVI. If such a measure is
discriminatory within the meaning of Article XVII and, if it cannot be justified as an
exception, it should be scheduled as a limitation on national treatment. If such a
measure is non-discriminatory, it is subject to the disciplines of Article VI:5. Where

838 ( original footnote ) The term "relevant international organizations" refers to international bodies
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the WTO.

such a measure does not conform to these disciplines, and if it cannot be justified as
an exception, it must be brought into conf ormity with Article VI:5 and cannot be
scheduled."
839
6.308 The Revised Scheduling Guidelines of 2001 840 contain an Annex (4) entitled "Discussion of
Matters Relating to Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS in Connection with the Disciplines on
Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector – In formal Note by the Chairman". Paragraphs 2
and 3 of this Annex shed light on the relations hip between Articles XVI and VI of the GATS and
seem to confirm our interpretation that, based on th e ordinary meaning of their respective terms,
Articles VI and XVI are mutually exclusive.
"In the course of work to develop multila teral disciplines on domestic regulation in
the accountancy sector, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VI of the GATS, the
WPPS addressed a wide range of regulatory measures which have an impact on trade
in accountancy services. In discussing the structure and content of the new
disciplines, it became clear that some of these measures were subject to other legal
provisions in the GATS, most notably Articles XVI and XVII. It was observed that
the new disciplines developed under Article VI:4 must not overlap with other
provisions already existing in the GATS, including Articles XVI and XVII, as this
would create legal uncertainty. For this reason, a number of the suggestions for
disciplines were excluded from the text. [emphasis added]
(...) A Member scheduling commitments under Articles XVI and XVII has the right
to maintain limitations on market access a nd national treatment and inscribe them in
its schedule. On the other hand, the disciplines to be developed under Article VI:4
cover domestic regulatory measures which are not regarded as market access
limitations as such, and which do not in principle discriminate against foreign
suppliers. They are therefore not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII."
(emphasis added)
6.309 The organization of the GATS and, in particular , the disciplines provided for in Part III of the
GATS entitled "Specific commitments" cast light on the inter-relationship between Articles XVI,
XVII and XVIII, the last of which can include me asures falling within the scope of Articles VI:4
and VI:5.
6.310 In pursuing the progressive liberalization of trade in services, the GATS defines measures that
constitute restrictions on such trade. In designing the structure of the GATS, it appears that the
drafters aimed at liberalizing such restrictions th rough the provisions of Part III of the Agreement,
which is comprised of Article XVI ("Market Access"), Article XVII ("National Treatment") and
Article XVIII ("Additional Commitments"). In our view, these provisions aim at establishing legal
obligations in relation to the use of (or rather the need to refrain from using) trade-restrictive
measures.
6.311 In drafting Part III of the GATS, the aim seems to have been to capture all types of trade
restrictions and to establish a mechanism for schedu ling specific commitments in relation to them. In
Articles XVI and XVII, specific commitments are defi ned in a way that allows the identification of
trade restrictions (in other words, limitations). Therefore, if a Member undertakes a full market
access or a full national treatment commitment, it must not apply any measure that would be
inconsistent with the provisions of those articles. N onetheless, the drafters seem to have realized that
there may be other types of restrictions that would not be covered by the disciplines of Articles XVI
and XVII. In other words, there could be restricti ons that would not be discriminatory and, therefore,

839 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, paras. 4-5.
840 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, S/L/92.

would escape the provisions of Article XVII; nor would they be one of the six types of measures
referred to in subparagraphs 2(a) to (f) of Article XVI. Apparen tly, it was considered that such
measures would mainly, but not exclusively, relate to qualifications, standard s and licensing matters.
At the same time, it appears that it may not have b een possible to arrive at a clear definition of the
restrictive nature of such measures so that discip lines similar to those of Articles XVI and XVII could
be established. It seems, therefore, that it was c onsidered best to simply provide a legal framework
for Members to negotiate and schedule specific commitments that they would define, on a case-by-
case basis, in relation to any measures that do not fa ll within the scope of Article XVI or XVII. That
framework appears to have been provided in Article XVIII.
841
6.312 It also appears that the conception of Article XVIII was linked to that of paragraph 4 of
Article VI which establishes a work programme for the development of disciplines to ensure that
measures relating to qualification requirements an d procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements and procedures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.842
6.313 Apparently, these provisions are at the heart of the notion of progressive liberalization, which
finds expression in the preamble of the GATS and in Article XIX, paragraphs 1 and 3. Progressive
liberalization entails including more sectors in Members' schedules and reduction or elimination of
limitations, terms, conditions and qualifications on market access and national treatment through
successive rounds of negotiations.
Object and purpose of the GATS
6.314 Our interpretation of the scope of the first a nd second paragraphs of Article XVI based on the
ordinary meaning of the words and the context of Article XVI is confirmed by the object and purpose
of the GATS. The second, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble to the GATS state that:
"Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in
services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency
and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic growth of
all trading partners and the development of developing countries;
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of
trade in services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at
promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at
securing an overall balance of rights and oblig ations, while giving due respect to
national policy objectives;
Recognizing the right of Members to regulate , and to introduce new regulations, on
the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy
objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development
of services regulations in different countri es, the particular need of developing
countries to exercise this right ..." (emphasis added)
6.315 These paragraphs confirm that Members intended to liberalize trade in services progressively.
This implies that a progressive elimination of various restrictions would occur, including those
restrictions covered by Article XVI:2. However, in the meantime, if they have made a market access

841 Article XVIII reads: " Members may negotiate co mmitments with respect to measures affecting
trade in services not subject to scheduling under Article s XVI or XVII, including those regarding qualifications,
standards or licensing matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a Member's Schedule."
842 It should be noted, however, that the scope of Article XVIII goes beyond that of Article VI:4. The
former provides the possibility for negotiating commitments on matters other than qualifications, standards or
licensing.

commitment in a particular sector or sub-sector, Me mbers are entitled to maintain such restrictions,
provided that they have been explicitly and transparently scheduled.
6.316 Articles XVI and XVII are obligations that appl y only to scheduled sectors. Hence, Members
can, but are not obliged to, undertake market acce ss and/or national treatment commitments. In
scheduled sectors, Members have the freedom to maintain limitations, terms, conditions and
qualifications to these specific commitments. More over, Members maintain the sovereign right to
regulate within the parameters of Article VI of the GATS. Members' regulatory sovereignty is an
essential pillar of the progressive liberalization of trade in services, but this sovereignty ends
whenever rights of other Members under the GATS are impaired.
6.317 The preamble of the GATS, which sets out its object and purpose, confirms that the purpose
of Article XVI is not to abolish all measures, whet her numerical or non-numerical, that are liable to
restrict freedom to provide services, but to ta ke an early and significant step towards the progressive
liberalisation of trade in services, acknowledging that this is to be achieved through successive rounds
of negotiations designed to secure an overall balance of rights and obligations.
(iv) Conclusion
6.318 The ordinary meaning of the words, the context of Article XVI, as well as the object and
purpose of the GATS confirm that the restrictions on market access that are covered by Article XVI
are only those listed in paragraph 2 of this Article. We proceed now to consider the interpretation of
the particular subparagraphs of Article XVI: 2 that have been invoked by Antigua, namely
Articles XVI:2(a) and XVI:2(c).
(c) Interpretation of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c)
(i) Article XVI:2, subparagraph (a)
6.319 Sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVI:2 provides that:
"[L]imitations on the number of service supp liers whether in the form of numerical
quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic
needs test"
6.320 There are four elements of Article XVI:2(a) th at must be interpreted in order for us to
determine whether the challenged measures violate Article XVI. First, the Panel must determine
whether the challenged measures contain limitations on "service suppliers"; secondly, whether the list
of limitations in Article XVI:2(a) is an illustrativ e or an exhaustive list; thirdly, whether a measure
which prohibits one, several or all means of supply is to be considered as a limitation "in the form of
[a] numerical quota"; and finally, in this case, we must also determine whether a limitation on some
of the services covered by a committed sector or sub-sector, is to be considered as a limitation "in the
form of [a] numerical quota".
Service suppliers
6.321 The term "service suppliers" is defined in Article XXVIII:(g) to mean "any person that
supplies a service". 843 On the basis of Article XXVIII:(g), we consider that subparagraph (a) of

843 The footnote to Article XXVIII:(g) states that: "Where the service is not supplied directly by a
juridical person but through other forms of commercial pr esence such as a branch or a representative office, the
service supplier (i.e. the juridical pers on) shall, nonetheless, through such presence be accorded the treatment
provided for service suppliers under th e Agreement. Such treatment shall be extended to the presence through
which the service is supplied and need not be extended to any other parts of the supplier located outside the
territory where the service is supplied."

Article XVI:2 covers measures that are addressed to and drafted so as to impose limitations on "any
person that supplies a service".
Illustrative or exhaustive list of limitations?
6.322 Antigua argues that the word "whether" in Article XVI:2(a) indicates that the list that follows
is illustrative rather than exhaustive. More particularly, in Antigua's view, the enumeration in Article
XVI:2(a) of four forms of limitation 844 is not meant to limit the application of Article XVI:2(a) to
those four identified forms. Rather, in Antigua's view, the word "whether" makes it clear that the four
forms of limitations explicitly mentioned are clear ly caught by Article XVI:2(a). According to
Antigua, in addition, there may be other forms of limitation that are also caught by Article XVI:2(a)
but which are not explicitly listed.845 We disagree.
6.323 Rather, we share the view expressed by the Un ited States that the word "whether" does not
automatically imply an illustrative list. Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS states that "'measure' means
any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision,
administrative action, or any other form " (emphasis added). It is those three final words rather than
the use of the word "whether" that establish the illustrative character of the list of instruments and
actions in Article XXVIII(a) of the GATS.
6.324 Article XI of the GATT 1994 describes an illustrativ e list of "prohibitions or restriction ...
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures " (emphasis
added). It is not the word "whether" that qualifies Article XI as an illustrative list. Rather, the words
"other measures" at the conclusion of the excerpted te xt have this effect. Had "other measures" been
omitted from this text, the list of prohibitions and rest rictions covered by Artic le XI would have been
confined to the types of prohibitions and restri ctions listed in the Article following the word
"whether".
6.325 With respect to Article XVI:2(a), we note that there is no word or term at the conclusion of
that subparagraph that could be c onstrued as creating an illustrative list, such as "any other form" or
"any other measure". In these circumstances, we consider that the word "whether" identifies an
exhaustive list of limitations that are covered by Artic le XVI:2(a), namely, "limitations in the form of
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service supp liers or requirements of an economic needs
test".
"Limitations on the number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas"
6.326 We note that Article XVI:2(a) applies, inter alia , to "limitations on the number of service
suppliers in the form of numerical quotas". The pa rties disagree as to whether this language captures
any measure not explicitly framed in quantitative or numerical terms.
6.327 The issue is not whether qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) restrictions should be caught
under Article XVI; the parties agree that they should not and this is confirmed by the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines.846 The issue is, rather, whether a measure prohibiting the supply of a service
by remote means is caught by Article XVI:2(a).

844 Article XVI:2(a) refers to: limitations on the numb er of service suppliers "w hether" (a) in the form
of numerical quotas; (b) monopolies; (c) exclusive service suppliers; or (d) the requirements of an economic
needs test.
845 See Antigua's second oral statement, para. 31.
846 "... these criteria [specified in subparagraphs (a) to (d)] do not relate to th e quality of the service
supplied, or to the ability of the supplier to supply the service (i.e. technical standard or qualification of the

6.328 The United States submits that in maintaining and enforcing laws that prohibit the supply by
remote means of the service of receiving bets and wa gers, it does not contravene Article XVI:2 of the
GATS since those laws prescribe a prohibition on the character of certain services and not on the
number of service suppliers or the number of service operations. This submission cannot be accepted.
6.329 On the premise that the United States wished to maintain and enforce those laws, the proper
course for it was to make an entry in its schedul e of commitments against sub-sector 10.D, "Other
Recreational Services (except sporting)" expressing a limitation on market access in respect of the
supply by remote means of the service of gambling and betting services. Such an entry would have
limited to zero the number of service suppliers and service operations in the sector to which the
relevant market access commitment was made.
6.330 Having made no such entry, the United States, ne vertheless, maintains and enforces laws that
prohibit the supply by remote means of gambling and betting services.
847 By so doing, it limits to
zero the number of service suppliers in the sector to which the relevant market access commitment
had been made. In the words of Article XVI:2(a) of the GATS, it imposes a "limitation on the
number of service suppliers in the form of [a ] numerical quota". Any other reading of that
subparagraph would be inc onsistent with the commitment made by the United States when inscribing
the word "None" in the market access column of its schedule of commitments for sub-sector 10.D.
6.331 It is true that the wording of Article XVI:2(a) covers numerical quotas other than zero. That
is because the subparagraph is designed, in part, to indicate the limitations, short of total prohibition,
that Members may specify in their schedules, on th e number of service suppliers. The fact that the
terminology embraces lesser limitations, in the fo rm of quotas greater than zero, cannot warrant the
conclusion that it does not embrace a greater limitation amounting to zero. Paragraph (a) does not
foresee a "zero quota" because paragraph (a) was not drafted to cover situations where a Member
wants to maintain full limitations. If a Member want s to maintain a full prohibition, it is assumed that
such a Member would not have scheduled such a sec tor or sub-sector and, therefore, would not need
to schedule any limitation or measures pursuant to Article XVI:2.
6.332 Moreover, the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines provide the following example of a limitation
under subparagraph (a): "nationalit y requirements for suppliers of services (equivalent to zero
quota)".
848 This suggests that a measure that is not expressed in the form of a numerical quota or
economic needs test may still fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a). To hold that only restrictions
explicitly couched in numerical terms fall within Ar ticle XVI:2(a) would produce absurd results. It
would, for example, allow a law that explicitly prov ides that "all foreign services are prohibited" to
escape the application of Article XVI, because it is not expressed in numerical terms.
Limitation on all or part of a scheduled commitment
6.333 The United States argues that since it does not maintain a prohibition on the cross-border
supply of all gambling and betting services, it does not mainta in a zero quota and, therefore, does not
contravene Article XVI:2(a).
6.334 We consider that, for the purposes of this dispute, we need to determine whether a prohibition
on the supply of a number of services that fall within the scope of the US commitment on gambling
and betting services can constitute a "limitation in th e form of numerical quotas" within the meaning
of Article XVI:2(a).

847 See paras. 6.161 - 6.164 above.
848 See 1993 Scheduling Guidelines , para. 6. The same example is contained in the 2001 Scheduling
Guidelines, para. 12.

6.335 We recall that if a Member makes a market access commitment in a sector or sub-sector, that
commitment covers all services that come within that sector or sub-sector. Therefore, we are of the
view that a Member does not respect its GATS market access obligations under Article XVI:2(a) if it
does not allow market access to the whole or part of a scheduled sector or sub-sector.
Limitation on one, several or all means of delivery under mode 1
6.336 Antigua argues that limitations on one or more means of delivery under mode 1 with respect
to a committed sector fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a). The United States argues that
restrictions relating to the means of supply are c oncerned with the character of the activity involved
and, therefore, fall outside the scope of Article XVI:2(a).
6.337 The Panel needs, therefore, to determine whether a prohibition on one, several or all means of
delivery included in mode 1 that effectively limits the means of delivery that service suppliers can use
in supplying a service is a limitation in the fo rm of numerical quotas within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a).
6.338 We recall that the effect of a scheduled commit ment for mode 1 is to allow services suppliers
in other WTO Members for a committed sector to supply services cross-border via any means of
delivery. As we stated above, if one, several or all means of delivery cross-border are prohibited, the
opportunities for foreign suppliers using those mean s of delivery to supply services cross-border to
gain access to foreign markets are clear ly reduced. The Panel is of the view that such a prohibition is
a "limitation on the number of service suppliers in th e form of numerical quotas" within the meaning
of Article XVI:2(a) because it totally prevents the use by service suppliers of one, several or all means
of delivery that are included in mode 1.
(ii) Article XVI:2, subparagraph (c)
6.339 Subparagraph (c) of Article XVI:2 provides that:
"[L]imitations on the total number of serv ice operations or on the total quantity of
service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas
or the requirement of an economic needs test"
849
Limitations "expressed ... in the form of a quota"
6.340 Subparagraph (c) differs in its wording from subparagraph (a) in several respects.
6.341 Firstly, in subparagraph (a), the word "whe ther" precedes the expression "in the form of
quotas". In subparagraph (c) that word is omitted . We do not consider this to be of present
significance. For the reasons referred to above in paragraphs 6.322-6.325, we consider that the
presence of the word "whether" in subparagraph (a) does not imply an illustrative list. Therefore, its
omission from subparagraph (c) is without present significance.
6.342 Secondly, in subparagraph (c), as indeed in su bparagraph (d), the word "number" is qualified
by the adjective "total". This may be explained by the fact that subparagraph (c) relates to limitations
on the aggregate of the service operations or output whereas subparagraph (a) contemplates that limits
may be imposed on the number of suppliers by refe rence to a criterion other than the national or
regional aggregate. However, when a Member's la ws prohibit the supply of a certain service by a
certain mode, the word "total" is without significance, since the number will always be zero.

849 (original footnote) Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member which limit inputs for
the supply of services.

6.343 Thirdly, subparagraph (c), in its English vers ion, speaks of "limitations ... in terms of
designated numerical units in the form of quotas". This might perhaps be taken to imply that any
quota has to be expressed in terms of designated nu merical units. The element of ambiguity on this
point is resolved by comparison of the English ve rsion with the French and the Spanish ones, which
are equally authentic. These read as follows:
"c) limitations concernant le nombre to tal d'opérations de services ou la quantité
totale de services produits, exprimées en un ités numériques déterminées, sous forme
de contingents ou de l'exigence d'un examen des besoins économiques850;"
"c) limitaciones al número total de operaciones de servicios o a la cuantía total de
la producción de servicios, expresadas en unidades numéricas designadas, en forma
de contingentes o mediante la exigencia de una prueba de necesidades
económicas851;"
As can be seen, in these versions, a comma appears af ter the equivalent in the English version of the
words designated "numerical units". According to the French versions, there are three possible types
of limitations that fall within the scope of subpa ragraph (c), namely: (i) limitations exprimées en
unités numériques déterminées; (ii) limitations ex primées sous forme de contingents; and (iii)
limitations exprimées sous forme de l'exigence d'un examen des besoins économiques. These three
possibilities also exist under the Spanish version.

6.344 The comparison of these equally authentic texts thus discloses a difference of meaning.
According to Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty interpreter must attempt to remove such
differences through the application of Articles 31 a nd 32 thereof. In this regard, a reference to
progressive liberalization as an object and purpose of the GATS appears to be useful. Interpreting
Article XVI:2(c) premised on numerical expression of restrictions alone would open the possibility
for Members to avoid their obligations and thereby deny and diminish the rights of other Members in
cases where a sector or sub-sector has been committ ed, particularly in cases of a full market access
commitment, as in this case. This would def eat the object and purpose of the GATS. Thus, the
correct reading of Article XVI:2(c) is that the lim itation may be either in the form of designated
numerical units, in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test.
6.345 Unlike subparagraph (a), subparagr aph (c) of Article XVI:2 contains a reference to "total"
number of service operations and "total" quantity of service output. The 1993 Scheduling Guidelines
state that: "It should be noted that the quantitative r estrictions specified in subparagraphs (a) to (d)
refer to maximum limitations." This suggests that the word "total" in Article XVI:2(c) serves the
purpose of indicating that limitations covered by Article XVI:2(c) must impose maximum limits on
services operation and/or service output.
6.346 Accordingly, such differences as there are betw een the wording of subparagraphs (a) and (c)
of Article XVI:2 do not warrant a different conclusi on as to the impact of the two subparagraphs in
the present case.
6.347 The maintenance and enforcement of laws that prohibit the supply by remote means of a
committed sector or sub-sector limits to zero the number of service operations in the sector or
sub-sector for which the Member has made a commitment. It imposes a "limitation on the total
number of service operations ... expressed ... in the form of quotas" contrary to Article XVI:2(c) of the
GATS.

servant à la fourniture de services.
insumos destinados al suministro de servicios.

Service operations or service output
6.348 Subparagraph (c) of Article XVI:2 concerns limitations on service operations or service
output. As for how "service operations" and "service out put" should be interpreted, we note that the
GATS does not contain definitions of these terms.
6.349 However, relevant context for their meaning can be found in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines,
which provide the following example of a limitati on on "service operations or quantity of service
output" under Article XVI:2(c), namely restrictions on broadcasting time available for foreign films.
On the basis of this example, we understand "servi ce operations" to mean activities comprised in the
production of a service. We understand "service output" to mean the result of the production of the
service.
Limitation on all or part of a scheduled commitment
6.350 The United States argues that since it does not maintain a prohibition on the cross-border
supply of all gambling and betting services, it does not mainta in a zero quota and, therefore, does not
contravene Article XVI:2(c).
6.351 Therefore, we need to determine whether a prohibition on the supply of a number of services
that fall within the scope of the US commitm ent on gambling and betting services can constitute a
"limitation expressed in the form of a quota" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.352 We recall that if a Member makes a market access commitment in a sector or sub-sector, that
commitment covers all services that come within that sector or sub-sector. Therefore, we are of the
view that a Member does not respect its GATS market access obligations under Article XVI:2(c) if it
does not allow market access to the whole or part of a scheduled sector or sub-sector.
Limitation on one, several or all means of delivery under mode 1
6.353 Antigua argues that limitations on one, several or all means of delivery under mode 1 with
respect to a committed sector fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(c). The United States argues that
restrictions relating to the means of supply are c oncerned with the character of the activity involved
and, therefore, fall outside the scope of Article XVI:2(c).
6.354 Thus, the Panel needs to determine whether a prohibition on one, several or all means of
delivery included in mode 1 that effectively limits these means of delivery for service operations or
service output is a limitation in the form of a quota within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.355 We examined above in the context of Article XVI:2(a), the means of delivery that are
included in mode 1. We recall our conclusion in that context, which is equally applicable here, that
the effect of a scheduled commitment for mode 1 is to allow service suppliers in other WTO Members
for the relevant sector to supply services cross-border via any means of delivery. In our view, if one
or several mean(s) of delivery cross-border are pr ohibited, services operated through one or more of
these means of delivery or services that are outputte d using one or more of these means of delivery
will be limited. We consider that a prohibition on one, several or all of the means of delivery included
in mode 1 constitutes a limitation on mode 1. The Pa nel is of the view that such a limitation is a
limitation "on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output ... in the
form of quotas" within the meaning of Article XV I:2(c) because it totally prevents the services
operations and/or service output through one or more or all means of delivery that are included in
mode 1. In other words, such a ban results in a "zero quota" on one or more or all means of delivery
include in mode 1.

(d) Application of the legal standard to the facts of this case
(i) US commitment on market access
6.356 The Panel recalls its finding above that the United States has made a specific commitment
with respect to gambling and betting services in sub- sector 10.D of the US Schedule. In relation to
sub-sector 10.D, the United States has inscribed th e word "None" for mode 1 in the column entitled
"Limitations on market access ".
(ii) Measures at issue
6.357 We refer to our conclusions in paragraph 6.249, where we decided that we would confine our
consideration of violation of the GATS to three US federal laws (namely the Wire Act, the Travel Act
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act) and to the laws of eight US states (namely, Colorado: § 18-
10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes; Louisian a: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.;
Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws; Minnesota: §§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2 – 3
and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann; New Jersey: paragr aph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and §
2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code; New York: § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L.; South Dakota: §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and Utah: § 76-10-
1102 of the Utah Code Ann.)
6.358 Our task in examining these laws is to determin e whether, in light of the fact that the United
States has inscribed "None" in its market access column for mode 1 for gambling and betting services,
these laws impose "limitations on the number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas"
within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) and/or "lim itations on the total number of service operations
or on the total quantity of service output ... in the form of quotas" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.359 By way of context for this examination, we re call that the United States admits that federal
and state laws are applied so as to prohibit what it describes as the "remote supply" of most gambling
and betting services
852 and, as further discussed below, there is relevant evidence confirming the US
practice in this regard.
Federal laws
The Wire Act
6.360 The Wire Act provides in relevant part that:
"Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a
wire communication facility for the transmis sion in interstate or foreign commerce of
bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or cred it as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
6.361 The opening text of the Wire Act refers to "whoever being engaged in the business of ...".
This language makes it clear to us that the Wire Act concerns suppliers of "betting and wagering"
services. Therefore, we consider that this Act c oncerns "service suppliers" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a). The Wire Act can also be read to concern the treatment of services operations or
service output since the Act effectively prohibits the supply of betting or wagering services through

852 See paras. 6.161-6.164.

the use of a wire communication facility. Therefore, we consider that this Act concerns "service
operations" and "service output" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.362 As is evident from the excerpted text of the Wi re Act, the Act prohibits the use of a wire
communication facility for, inter alia, the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or
wagers. Therefore, in our view, the Wire Act prohibits the use of te lephone given the explicit
reference to wire communication. In addition, so me US courts have interpreted the Wire Act to
include communication by the Internet.
853 Further, the United States has acknowledged that the Wire
Act covers the remote transmission in intersta te or foreign commerce of bets or wagers. 854 Therefore,
we consider that the Wire Act prohibits the use of at least one or potentially several means of delivery
included in mode 1.
6.363 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. Under the
Wire Act, service suppliers seeking to supply gambling and be tting services through the telephone,
Internet and other means of delivery using wire communication are prohibited from doing so.
Further, services operations and service output through the telephone, Internet and other means of
delivery using wire communication are prohibited under the Wire Act. Accordingly, the Panel
considers that the Wire Act contains a limitati on "in the form of numerical quotas" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(a) a nd a limitation "in the form of a quota" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.364 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. The Wire Act c oncerns "betting or wagering", which is part of the services covered
by the US commitment under sub-sector 10.D. Theref ore, through the Wire Act, the United States
restricts market access to part of a scheduled sector, namely, " betting or wagering".
6.365 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Article XVI:2. As the Wire Act contains limitations
that fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the United States is according less
favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to Article XVI:1 and
Article XVI:2. Therefore, we conclude that the Wire Act is inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and
Article XVI:2.
The Travel Act
6.366 The Travel Act provides in relevant part that:
"(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to –
 (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
 (2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
 (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity,

853 See United States v Jay Cohen (Exhibit AB-83) and Vacco ex rel. People v World Interactive
Gaming Corp. (Exhibit AB-97). Exhibits AB-56, AB-73 and AB -98 also contain evidence indicating that the
Wire Act covers communication by the Internet.
854 United States' second written submission, paras. 22 and 78.

and thereafter performs or attempts to perform --
 (A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or
 (B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death
results shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) As used in this section (i) "unl awful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling ... in violation of the laws of the State in which they
are committed or of the United States."
6.367 The text of the Travel Act makes it clear that it prohibits travel in interstate or foreign
commerce or the use of mail or any facility in inte rstate or foreign commerce, with the intent to:
distribute the proceeds of any " unlawful activity"; commit any crim e of violence to further any
"unlawful activity"; or otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of an y "unlawful activity". "Unlawful activity" is
defined, inter alia, as any business enterprise involving gambling in violation of the laws of the state
in which they are committed or of the United States. It may be the case that some state laws prohibit
a "business enterprise involving gambling". In such cases, a "business enterprise involving gambling"
in contravention of the relevant state laws would al so be contrary to the Travel Act if such a business
enterprise entails the supply of gambling and betting services by "mail or any facility" provided that
the other requirements in subparagraph (a) of the Travel Act have been met.
6.368 The Travel Act refers to service suppliers , in particular, those who travel in interstate or
foreign commerce or those who use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce with
intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful ac tivity, commit any crime of violence to further any
unlawful activity or otherwise promote, manage, es tablish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any un lawful activity. The interpretation that the Act
is targeted at suppliers is confirmed by the fact th at "unlawful activity" is defined by reference to
activities engaged in by a "business enterprise". Th erefore, we consider that this Act concerns
"service suppliers" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a).
6.369 The Travel Act can also be read to concern the treatment of services operations or service
output because it effectively prohibits the supply of gambling services through mail or "any facility".
Facility may be interpreted to in clude the telephone and Internet.
855 Therefore, we consider that the
Travel Act also concerns "service operations" or "service output" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.370 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. As we
stated above in paragraph 6.367, the Travel Act pr ohibits gambling activity that entails the supply of
gambling and betting services by "mail or any facility" to the extent that such supply is undertaken by
a "business enterprise involving gambling" that is prohibited under state law and provided that the
other requirements in subparagraph (a) of the Travel Act have been met.

855 There is evidence to indicate that the Travel Ac t covers supply of gambling services through the
telephone and the Internet. See Vacco ex rel. People v World Interactive Gaming Corp (Exhibit AB-97). See
also Exhibit AB-73.

6.371 Therefore, under the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)
856, service
suppliers seeking to supply gambling and betting ser vices through the mail and potentially all other
means of delivery included in mode 1 are prohibited from doing so. Further, services operations and
service output through the mail and perhaps all other means of delivery included in mode 1 are also
prohibited under the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws). Accordingly, the
Panel considers that the Travel Act contains a lim itation "in the form of numerical quotas" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(a) a nd a limitation "in the form of a quota" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.372 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. The Travel Act concerns, inter alia , "gambling", which is part of the services
covered by the US commitment under sub-sector 10.D. Therefore, through the Travel Act, the United
States restricts market access to part of a scheduled sector, namely, "gambling".
6.373 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Ar ticle XVI:2. As the Travel Act contains
limitations that fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the United States is
according less favourable treatment than that provide d for in its Schedule contrary to Article XVI:1
and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we conclude that th e Travel Act is inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and
Article XVI:2.
The Illegal Gambling Business Act
6.374 The Illegal Gambling Business Act provides in relevant part that:
"(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or owns all or part
of an illegal gambling business shall be fine d under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section –
(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which –
 (i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision
in which it is conducted;
 (ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance,
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business;
and
 (iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day.
(2) 'gambling' includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries,
policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

856 That is, state laws that prohibit a "business ente rprise involving gambling". Such state laws would
include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts
Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code, which we
find below in paragraphs 6.381-6.418 together prohibit the supply of gambling and betting services by all means
included in mode 1.

(3) 'State' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States."
6.375 In our view, the text of the Illegal Gambling Business Act makes it clear that the Act prohibits
the conduct of businesses that fall within the definition of an "illegal gambling business". A gambling
business is defined as "illegal" under the Act if it violates the law of a state (or political subdivision)
of the United States. It may be the case that so me state laws prohibit gambling businesses. In such
cases, a "gambling business" that violates state law and that entails the conduct, finance, management,
supervision, direction or ownershi p of all or part of such a business would also be contrary to the
Illegal Gambling Business Act provided that the ot her requirements in subparagraph (b)(1) of the
Illegal Gambling Business Act have been met. We consider that because the Illegal Gambling
Business Act prohibits the conduct, finance, manageme nt, supervision, directio n or ownership of all
or part of a "gambling business" that violates state law, it effectively prohibits the supply of gambling
and betting services through at least one and potentia lly all means of delivery included in mode 1 by
such businesses.
6.376 The Illegal Gambling Business Act refers to service suppliers , in particular, those who
conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of an illegal gambling business.
Therefore, we consider that this Act concer ns "service suppliers" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a). The Illegal Gambling Business Act can also be read to concern the treatment of
services operations or service output because it effectively prohibits businesses that fall within the
definition of an "illegal gambling business". Ther efore, we consider that the Illegal Gambling
Business Act also concerns "service operations" or "service output" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.377 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. As we
stated above in paragraph 6.375, the Illegal Ga mbling Business Act prohibits gambling activity that
entails the conduct, finance, management, supervision, direction or ownership of all or part of such a
business to the extent that such supply is undertaken by a "gambling business" that is prohibited under
state law and provided that the other requirements in sub-paragraph (b)(1) of the Illegal Gambling
Business Act have been met.
6.378 Therefore, under the Illegal Gambling Business Ac t (when read together with the relevant
state laws)
857, service suppliers seeking to supply gambling and betting services through at least one
and potentially all means of delivery included in mode 1 are prohibited from doing so. Further,
services operations and service output through all means of delivery included in mode 1 are also
prohibited under the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws).
Accordingly, the Panel considers that the Illegal Gambling Business Act contains a limitation "in the
form of numerical quotas" within the meaning of Ar ticle XVI:2(a) and a limitation "in the form of a
quota" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.379 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. The Illegal Gambling Business Ac t concerns, "gambling", which is part of the
services covered by the US commitment under sub- sector 10.D. Therefore, through the Illegal
Gambling Business Act, the United States restricts market access to part of a scheduled sector,
namely, "gambling".

857 That is, state laws that prohibit a "gambling busin ess". Such state laws would include but are not
limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-
25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code, which we find below in
paragraphs 6.381-6.418 together prohibit the supply of gambling and betting services by all means included in
mode 1.

6.380 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Ar ticle XVI:2. As the Illegal Gambling Business
Act contains limitations that fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the
United States is according less favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to
Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we c onclude that the Illegal Gambling Business Act is
inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
State laws
Colorado
6.381 The text of § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides as follows:
"(1) A person who engages in gambling commits a class 1 petty offense.
(2) A person who engages in professional gambling commits a class 1 misdemeanor.
If he is a repeating gambling offender, it is a class 5 felony."
6.382 In our view, the text of § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes indicates that is not
directed at "service suppliers" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(a) nor to "service operations" and
"service output" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(c). Rather, we consider that § 18-10-103 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes is directed at persons wh o engage in gambling, that is, those who actually
gamble. This appears to be confirmed by eviden ce before us regarding the interpretation of § 18-10-
103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which indicates that § 18-10-103 is inte rpreted and applied to
prohibit gambling by the Internet.
858 Antigua has not adduced any evidence to indicate that the supply
of gambling services by the Internet or by any other means included in mode 1 is prohibited.
6.383 Therefore, we conclude that Antigua has not provided a prima facie demonstration that § 18-
10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes contains a limitation that falls within the scope of
Article XVI:2(a) and/or Article XVI:2(c). In par ticular, we are not convinced that that section is
directed at "service suppliers" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(a) and/or to "service operations" and
"service output" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(c). Accordingly, we find that Antigua has not
provided a prima facie demonstration that § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes is
inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
Louisiana
6.384 Section 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. provides in relevant part that:
"E. Whoever designs, develops, manages, supervises, maintains, provides, or
produces any computer services, computer system, computer network, computer
software, or any server providing a Home Page, Web Site, or any other product
accessing the Internet, World Wide Web,
859 or any part thereof offering to any client
for the primary purpose of the conducting as a business of any game, contest, lottery,
or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize
a profit shall be fined not more than twen ty thousand dollars, or imprisoned with or
without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.

858 Exhibit AB-131, p. 5.
859 The terms "client", "computer", "computer network", "computer services", "computer software",
"computer system", "Home Page", "Internet", "Server" and "World Wide Web" are defined in § 14:90.3.C of the
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. These definitions are set out in Annex F.

I. ... The provisions of this Subsection shall not exempt from criminal prosecution any
telephone company, Internet Service Provider, software developer, licensor, or other
such party if its primary purpose in providing such service is to conduct gambling as
a business."
6.385 Section 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. concerns service suppliers, in particular, those who
design, develop, manage, supervise, maintain, pr ovide, or produce any computer services, computer
system, computer network, computer software, or any server providing a Home Page, Web Site, or
any other product accessing the Internet or World Wide Web. Subparagraph I of § 14:90.3 of the La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. makes it clear that § 14:90.3 of the La . Rev. Stat. Ann. is directed at service suppliers,
including telephone companies, Internet Service Pr oviders, software develope rs, licensors and other
parties whose primary purpose is to conduct a ga mbling business. Therefore, we consider that
§ 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. concerns "service suppliers" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a).
6.386 Section 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. can also be read to concern the treatment of
services operations or service output because it effectively prohibits the conducting as a business of
any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order
to realize a profit. Therefore, we consider that § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. also concerns
"service operations" or "service output" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.387 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, sever al or all of those means of delivery. Under §
14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann., service suppliers seeking to conduct a business of any game,
contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize
a profit through the Internet are prohibited from doing so. Further, services operations and service
output involving a business of any game, contest, lottery , or contrivance whereby a person risks the
loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit through the Internet are also prohibited under §
14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Accordingly, the Panel considers that § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. contains a limitation "in the form of numerical quotas" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a) and a limitation "in the form of a quota" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.388 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. Section 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. concerns the conduct "as a business of
any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order
to realize a profit", which is part of the services covered by the US commitment under sub-sector
10.D. Therefore, through § 14.90.3 of the La. Re v. Stat. Ann., the United States restricts market
access to part of a scheduled sector, namely, the "business of any game, contest, lottery, or
contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit".
6.389 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations re ferred to in Article XVI:2. As § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. contains limitations that fall within the sc ope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the
United States is according less favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to
Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we concl ude that § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. is
inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
Massachusetts
6.390
 Section 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws provides that:
"Whoever uses a telephone or, being the occ upant in control of premises where a
telephone is located or a subscriber for a telephone, knowingly permits another to use

a telephone so located or for which he subscribes, as the case may be, for the purpose
of accepting wagers or bets, or buying or selling of pools, or for placing all or any
portion of a wager with another, upon the resu lt of a trial or contest of skill, speed, or
endurance of man, beast, bird, or machine, or upon the result of an athletic game or
contest, or upon the lottery called the numbe rs game, or for the purpose of reporting
the same to a headquarters or booking office, or who under a name other than his own
or otherwise falsely or fictitiously proc ures telephone service for himself or another
for such purposes, shall be punished by a fi ne of not more than two thousand dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than one year; provided, however, that this section
shall not apply to use of telephones or other devices or means to place wagers
authorized pursuant to the provisions of section 5C of chapter 128A."
6.391 Section 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws concerns service suppliers , in particular,
those who use a telephone or, being the occupant in control of premises where a telephone is located
or a subscriber for a telephone, knowingly perm it another to use a telephone for the purpose of,
inter alia, accepting wagers or bets. Therefore, we cons ider that § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann.
Laws concerns "service suppliers" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a).
6.392 Section 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws can also be read to concern the treatment of
services operations or service output because it effectively prohibits the supply of services including
the acceptance of wagers or bets through use of the telephone. Therefore, we consider that § 17A of
chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws also concerns "service operations" or "service output" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.393 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, sever al or all of those means of delivery. Under §
17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws, service suppliers seeking to conduct a business involving,
inter alia, the acceptance of wagers or bets using the telephone are prohibited from doing so. Further,
services operations and service output involving, inter alia, the acceptance of wagers or bets using the
telephone are also prohibited under § 17A of chapte r 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws. Accordingly, the
Panel considers that § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws contains a limitation "in the form of
numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article XV I:2(a) and a limitation "in the form of a quota"
within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.394 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. Section 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws concerns, inter alia , the
acceptance of wagers or bets which are part of the services covered by the US commitment under
sub-sector 10.D. Therefore, thro ugh § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws, the United States
restricts market access to part of a scheduled sector, namely, the acceptance of wagers or bets.
6.395 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Ar ticle XVI:2. As § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass.
Ann. Laws contains limitations that fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the
United States is according less favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to
Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we c onclude that § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann.
Laws is inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
Minnesota
6.396 Section 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. provides that:
"Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:

(1) makes a bet;
(2) sells or transfers a chance to participate in a lottery;
(3) disseminates information about a lo ttery, except a lottery conducted by an
adjoining state, with intent to encourage participation therein;
(4) permits a structure or location owned or occupied by the actor or under the actor's
control to be used as a gambling place; or
(5) except where authorized by statute, possesses a gambling device.
Clause (5) does not prohibit possession of a gambling device in a person's dwelling
for amusement purposes in a manner that does not afford players an opportunity to
obtain anything of value."
Section 609.75, Subdivisions 2 – 3 of Minn. Stat. Ann., contains definitions of what are and what are
not "bets" for the purposes of § 609.755(1) of Mi nn. Stat. Ann. The text of section 609.755(1),
Subdivisions 2 – 3 of Minn. Stat. Ann. is contained in Annex F.
6.397 In our view, the text of the subparagraph of § 6 09.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. that is relevant
for this dispute, namely subparagraph (a), indicates that it is not directed at "service suppliers" for the
purposes of Article XVI:2(a) nor to "service ope rations" and "service output" for the purposes of
Article XVI:2(c). Rather, we consider that § 609.755 (1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. is directed at persons
who make a bet. This appears to be confirmed by evidence before us regarding the interpretation of
§§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2 – 3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann, which indicates that, under these
sections, a "person in Minnesota who places a bet th rough [an Internet gambling organization] is
committing a crime".
860 Antigua has not adduced any evidence to indicate that the supply of betting
services by the Internet or by any other means in cluded in mode 1 is proh ibited under §§ 609.75,
Subdivisions 2 – 3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann.
6.398 Therefore, we conclude that Antigua has not provided a prima facie demonstration that
§ 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. contains a limita tion that falls within the scope of Article XVI:2(a)
and/or Article XVI:2(c). In particular, we are not convinced that that section is directed at "service
suppliers" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(a) or to "service operations" and "service output" for the
purposes of Article XVI:2(c). Accordingly, we find that Antigua has not provided a prima facie
demonstration that § 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann. is inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and
Article XVI:2.
New Jersey
6.399 Paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII provides in relevant part that:
"No gambling of any kind shall be authorized by the Legislature unless the specific
kind, restrictions and control thereof have been heretofore submitted to, and
authorized by a majority of the votes cast by, the people at a special election or shall
hereafter be submitted to, and authorized by a majority of the votes cast thereon by,
the legally qualified voters of the State voting at a general election, except that,
without any such submission or authorization: [a list of lawful activities when
authorized is provided]."
861

860 See a statement by the Minnesota Attorney General contained in Exhibit AB-96.
861 For the full text see Annex F of our Report.

6.400 Section 2A:40-1 of N.J. Code further provides that:
"All wagers, bets or stakes made to de pend upon any race or game, or upon any
gaming by lot or chance, or upon any lot, chance, casualty or unknown or contingent
event, shall be unlawful."
6.401 In our view, the text of paragraph 2 of N.J. Cons t. Art. 4, Sec. VII and the text of § 2A:40-1
of N.J. Code, which appears to be the implementati on of the relevant paragraph of the N.J. Const.,
indicate that these provisions are not directed at "service suppliers" for the purposes of
Article XVI:2(a) nor to "service operations" and "service output" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(c).
Rather, we consider that paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of N.J. Code are
directed at persons who engage in gambling. An tigua has not adduced any evidence to indicate that
the supply of wagering and betting services by the Internet or by any other means included in mode 1
is prohibited under paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of N.J. Code.
862
6.402 Therefore, we conclude that Antigua has not provided a prima facie demonstration that
paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of N.J. Code cont ain limitations that fall
within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and/or Article XVI :2(c). In particular, we are not convinced that
those sections are directed at "service suppliers" fo r the purposes of Article XVI:2(a) or to "service
operations" and "service output" for the purposes of Ar ticle XVI:2(c). Accordingly, we find that
Antigua has not provided a prima facie demonstration th at paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII
and § 2A:40-1 of N.J. Code are inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
New York
6.403 The text of § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. provides as follows:
"1. No law shall be passed abridging the rights of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition the government, or any depart ment thereof; nor shall any divorce be
granted otherwise than by due judicial proceedings; except as hereinafter provided,
no lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool -selling, bookmaking, or any other kind of
gambling, except lotteries operated by the state and the sale of lottery tickets in
connection therewith as may be authorized a nd prescribed by the legislature, the net
proceeds of which shall be applied exclusively to or in aid or support of education in
this state as the legislature may prescribe, and except pari-mutuel betting on horse
races as may be prescribed by the legislatur e and from which the state shall derive a
reasonable revenue for the support of govern ment, shall hereafter be authorized or
allowed within this state; and the legisl ature shall pass appropriate laws to prevent
offenses against any of the provisions of this section. [.... a list of lawful activities
when authorized is listed]."
863
6.404 The text of § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. provides as follows:
"All wagers, bets or stakes, made to depend upon any race, or upon any gaming by lot
or chance, or upon any lot, chance, casu alty, or unknown or contingent event
whatever, shall be unlawful."
6.405 In our view, the text of § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and the text of § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L., which appears to be the implementation of the relevant paragraph of the N.Y. Const.,
suggest that at least the latter provision is not directed at "service suppliers" for the purposes of

862 We have seen the discussion of paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII in Exhibit AB-119 but
we note that, in its submissions, Antigua did not refer to or elaborate on that discussion.
863 For the full text see Annex F of our Report .

Article XVI:2(a) nor to "service operations" and "service output" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(c).
Rather, we consider that § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. when read together with § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L. is directed at persons who engage in gambling. Antigua has not adduced any evidence to
indicate that the supply of wagering and betting services by th e Internet or by any other means
included in mode 1 is prohibited under § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L.864
6.406 Therefore, we conclude that Antigua has not pr ovided a prima facie demonstration that § 9 of
Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. contain limitations that fall within the
scope of Article XVI:2(a) and/or Article XVI:2(c). In particular, we are not convinced that those
sections are directed at "service suppliers" for the purposes of Article XVI:2(a) or to "service
operations" and "service output" for the purposes of Ar ticle XVI:2(c). Accordingly, we find that
Antigua has not provided a prima facie demonstration that § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of
the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. are inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
South Dakota
6.407 The aspects of §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws that we consider to be
relevant to Antigua's claim of violation under Article XVI are set out below:
"22-25A-8 Establishment of internet gambling business prohibited.
Except as provided in § 22-25A-15, no person ma y establish a location or site in this
state from which to conduct a gambling business on or over the internet or an
interactive computer service.
22-25A-9 Violation if gambling originates or terminates in state -- Each bet a
separate violation.
A violation of § 22-25A-7 or § 22-25A-8 occurs if the violation originates or
terminates, or both, in this state. Each i ndividual bet or wager offered in violation of
§ 22-25A-7 or from a location or site that violates § 22-25A-8 constitutes a separate
violation."
6.408 Section 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws concerns service suppliers, in particular, those
who establish a location or site in the state of South Dakota from which to conduct a gambling
business on or over the Internet or an interactive computer service, including suppliers whose services
terminate in the state of South Dakota as provided fo r in § 22-25A-9. Therefore, we consider that §
22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws concerns "service suppliers" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a).
6.409 Section 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws can also be read to concern the treatment of
services operations or service output because it effectively prohibits the supply of gambling services
through the use, inter alia , of the Internet. Therefore, we consider that § 22-25A-8 of the S.D.
Codified Laws also concerns "service operati ons" or "service output" within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(c).
6.410 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. Under § 22-
25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws, service suppliers seeking to conduct a gambling business through

864 We have seen the discussion of § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L.
in Exhibits AB-56, AB-57, AB-58, AB-83, AB-97 and AB-98 but we note that, in its submissions, Antigua did
not refer to or elaborate on that discussion.

the Internet are prohibited from doing so. Further, services operations and service output involving a
gambling business that uses the Inte rnet are also prohibited under § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified
Laws. Accordingly, the Panel considers that § 22 -25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws contains a
limitation "in the form of numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) and a limitation
"in the form of a quota" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.411 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. Section 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codi fied Laws concerns "gambling", which is part of
the services covered by the US commitment under sub- sector 10.D. Therefore, through § 22-25A-8
of the S.D. Codified Laws, the United States restri cts market access to part of a scheduled sector,
namely, "gambling".
6.412 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Artic le XVI:2. As § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified
Laws contains limitations that fall within the sc ope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the
United States is according less favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to
Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we conc lude that § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws
is inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
Utah
6.413 Section 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann. provides as follows:
"(1) A person is guilty of gambling if he:
(a) participates in gambling;
(b) knowingly permits any gambling to be played, conducted, or dealt upon or in any
real or personal property owned, rented, or under the control of the actor, whether in
whole or in part; or
(c) knowingly allows the use of any video gaming device that is:
(i) in any business establishment or public place; and
(ii) accessible for use by any person within the establishment or public place.
(2) Gambling is a class B misdemeanor, provi ded, however, that any person who is
twice convicted under this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor."
6.414 Section 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code Ann. concerns service suppliers, in particular, those
who knowingly permit any gambling to be played, conduc ted, or dealt upon or in any real or personal
property owned, rented, or under the control of that person, whether in whole or in part. Therefore,
we consider that § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code Ann. concerns "service suppliers" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(a).
6.415 Section 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code Ann. can also be read to concern the treatment of
services operations or service output because it effectively prohibits the supply of gambling services.
Therefore, we consider that §76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code Ann. also concerns "service operations"
or "service output" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.416 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. Under § 76-

10-1102(b) of the Utah Code, service suppliers seeking to conduct a gambling business through all
means included in mode 1 are prohibited from doing so. Further, services operations and service
output involving a gambling business that uses any of the means included in mode 1 are also
prohibited under § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code. Accordingly, the Panel considers that § 76-10-
1102(b) of the Utah Code contains a limitation "in the form of numerical quotas" within the meaning
of Article XVI:2(a) and a limitation "in the form of a quota" within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.417 We also recall that a Member does not resp ect its GATS market access obligations under
Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) if it does not allow market access to the whole or part of a
scheduled sector. Section § 76-10-1102(b) of the Ut ah Code concerns "gambling", which is part of
the services covered by the US commitment under sub-sector 10.D. Therefore, through
§ 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code, the United States restricts market access to part of a scheduled
sector, namely, "gambling".
6.418 Since the United States has inscribed "None" in the market access column under sub-sector
10.D, it cannot maintain limitations referred to in Article XVI:2. As § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah
Code contains limitations that fall within the sc ope of Article XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c), the
United States is according less favourable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule contrary to
Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2. Therefore, we c onclude that § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code is
inconsistent with Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2.
Cumulative Effect of the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with relevant state
laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the state laws of
Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah)
6.419 As noted above, the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws), the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read t ogether with the relevant state laws), § 14:90.3
of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chap ter 271 of Massachusetts A nn. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of
the South Dakota Codified Laws, and 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code concern "service suppliers"
within the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) and "ser vices operations" and "service output" within the
meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
6.420 We recall that a ban on the use of one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1
constitutes a "zero quota" for, respectively, one, several or all of those means of delivery. The Panel
is of the view that § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Re v. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts
Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code
together prohibit the supply of gambling and bettin g services by all means of delivery included in
mode 1. Moreover, the cumulative effect of the Wi re Act, the Travel Act (when read together with
the relevant state laws), the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws), is to prohibit all means of delivery included in mode 1 for all gambling and betting services that
are sought to be supplied by Antigua.
(iii) Conclusion
6.421 In the Panel's view, the following laws are in violation of Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2,
subparagraphs (a) and (c) of the GATS:
(a) Federal laws
(i) the Wire Act;
(ii) the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws); and

(iii) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws).
(b) State laws:
(i) Louisiana: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.;
(ii) Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws;
(iii) South Dakota: § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and
(iv) Utah: § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
E. CLAIMS OF VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES ' NATIONAL TREATMENT COMMITMENT UNDER
ARTICLE XVII OF THE GATS
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.422 Antigua submits that federal and state laws, applications thereof and related practices
specifically prohibit or prevent the cross-border s upply of gambling and betting services by Antigua
to the United States whereas the domestic supply of such services, whether by remote means or
otherwise, within US states by authorized domestic suppliers is permitted. An tigua submits that this
results in less favourable treatment of Antiguan gambling and betting services and suppliers of such
services in the United States in violation of Article XVII of the GATS.865
6.423 The United States argues that Antigua has faile d to demonstrate that any US measure is
inconsistent with Article XVII of the GATS. Acco rding to the United States, Antigua has failed to
prove that remote gambling and betting services are "like" non-remote gambling services and
suppliers.
866 The United States further argues that Antigua has failed to demonstrate that its services
and service suppliers receive less favourable treatment. According to the United States, even if it
were to be assumed that likeness could be estab lished between some remotely supplied gambling and
betting services and service suppliers and non-re mote gambling and betting service and service
suppliers, the United States may, nonetheless, mainta in a regulatory distinction between remote and
non-remote supply of such services given that such a distinction does not afford less favourable
treatment to foreign suppliers on the basis of national origin.867
2. Assessment by the Panel
6.424 As a preliminary matter, the Panel is of the view that it needs to address the question of
whether it should consider Antigua's Article XVII clai m. This issue has arisen because, in its Panel
request, Antigua claimed a violation, inter alia, of Article XVII of the GATS, noting that "the central,
regional or local authorities of the United States allo w numerous operators of United States origin to
offer all types of gambling and betting services in the United States. ... There appears to be no
possibility for foreign operators, however, to obtai n an authorization to supply gambling and betting
services from outside the United States." 868 In its submissions, however, Antigua has since
questioned the need for the Panel to consider its Article XVII claim. Antigua submits that the
relationship between Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS is one of "practical hierarchy" in which
Article XVI concerns regulation that affects market access whereas Article XVII concerns regulation
that distorts competition in favour of domestic suppliers in cases where market access has been

865 Antigua's first written submission, para. 3; Antigua's second written submission, para. 39.
866 United States' second written submission, paras. 28 et seq.
867 United States' second written submission, paras. 59 et seq.
868 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, WT7DS285/2, p. 1.

granted. Antigua submits that, in this case, a finding by the Panel of violation of Article XVI obviates
the need to assess whether Article XVII has also been violated.869
6.425 In deciding whether to exercise judicial economy over Antigua's Article XVII claim, the
Panel recalls that the principle of judicial economy is recognized in WTO law.870
6.426 The Panel recalls that it has found that a nu mber of the challenged US measures are in
violation of Article XVI. We are of the view th at the Panel does not need to examine whether the
challenged measures are also inconsistent with th e United States' national treatment obligations under
Article XVII of the GATS in order to assist the parti es in resolving the dispute at issue. We believe
that the essence of Antigua's claims will be addressed by a finding on Article XVI alone. Therefore,
the Panel exercises judicial economy with regard to Antigua's claim under Article XVII.
F. C
LAIMS OF VIOLATION UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE GATS
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.427 Antigua argues that the United States has violat ed Article VI:1 of the GATS by failing to
ensure that "all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a
reasonable, objective and impartial manner." The United States maintains numerous laws and
regulations prohibiting the supply of gambling a nd betting services unless specific authorization has
been granted. Antigua submits that it is im possible for foreign service suppliers to obtain
authorization to supply services on a cross-border basis or even to a pply for such an authorization.
However, exemptions from these laws have been gr anted to gambling operators of US origin, but not
to foreign operators. Antigua argues that this cons titutes a violation of Article VI:1 of the GATS.
Antigua further argues that Article VI:3 implies that a WTO Member is obliged to make authorization
procedures that are open to domestic service supplie rs also available to suppliers from other WTO
Members that may want to supply services for whic h a commitment has been made. US domestic
service providers can and do qualify for authorizat ion to offer gambling and betting services, but
Antiguan providers cannot. Antigua submits that gi ven that the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services is prohibited, Antigua fails to see why Antiguan operators would have filed any
applications for authorization, much less under what authority such a filing could have been made.871
6.428 The United States replies that Antigua's claim under Article VI of the GATS does not
correspond to the text of this provision. In partic ular, Antigua has failed to meet its burden of proof
under Article VI:1 to show that particular measure s are not "administered in a reasonable, objective,
and impartial manner". According to the United States, Antigua has provided no evidence about the
alleged flaws in the administration of any of the meas ures identified in its Panel request. In fact, such
measures apply equally to all services and service pr oviders, regardless of origin, and are routinely
applied against domestic as well as foreign law-breakers. The United States further argues that, as
Antigua did not show that the United States has undertaken any commitments in gambling services in
general and cross-border gambling services in pa rticular, Antigua cannot demonstrate that
Article VI:3 is relevant in this dispute. More over, Antigua has pointed to no occasions on which US
authorities have failed to inform Antiguan suppliers regarding decisions on their applications for
authorization. Indeed, Antigua has not demonstrat ed that its gambling and betting service suppliers
have ever filed any relevant applications. Acco rding to the United States, Antigua appears to be
seeking something that Article VI:3 on its face do es not provide – namely, a requirement that the

869 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 6.
870 See paras. 6.15 - 6.18 above.
871 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 196-199; Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 104-106.

United States give foreign suppliers the right to pr ovide services that even its domestic suppliers do
not have a right to provide.
872
2. Relevant GATS provisions
6.429 Article VI (Domestic Regulation) provides in relevant part as follows:
"1. In sectors where specific commitme nts are undertaken, each Member shall
ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are
administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.

3. Where authorization is required for the supply of a service on which a
specific commitment has been made, the co mpetent authorities of a Member shall,
within a reasonable period of time after th e submission of an application considered
complete under domestic laws and regulations, inform the applicant of the decision
concerning the application. At the request of the applicant, the competent authorities
of the Member shall provide, without undue delay, information concerning the status
of the application.
[...]"
3. Assessment by the Panel
6.430 For the reasons mentioned in Section VI.C above of our Report, we will confine our
consideration of Antigua's claims under Article VI to three US federal laws (namely the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act) and to the laws of eight US states (namely,
Colorado: § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes; Louisiana: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat.
Ann.; Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of M ass. Ann. Laws; Minnesota: §§ 609.75, Subdivisions
2–3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann; New Jersey: pa ragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and
§ 2A:40-1 of the N.J. Code; New York: § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L.; South Dakota: §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and Utah: § 76-10-
1102 of the Utah Code Ann.)
6.431 We will now turn to whether Antigua has me t its prima facie burden that these laws are
inconsistent with Article VI, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the GATS.
6.432 The Panel is of the view that Article VI:1 do es not apply to measures of general application
themselves but, rather, to the administration of these measures. Article VI:3 imposes transparency
and due process obligations with respect to the pro cessing of applications for authorization to supply
in a sector where specific commitments have been undertaken. Therefore, Articles VI:1 and VI:3
contain disciplines of a procedural nature.
6.433 The Panel also notes the very vague and general nature of the arguments advanced by Antigua
in regard to the alleged violation under Article VI. For instance, Antigua refers to the "numerous laws
and regulations" maintained by the United States. 873 Antigua also asserts that the "United States
domestic service providers can and do qualify for authorization to offer gambling and betting services.

872 United States' first submission, paras. 104-107. See also United States' first oral statement, para. 53
and United States' second written submission, para. 70.
873 Antigua's first written submission, para. 197.

Yet, Antiguan service providers cannot." 874 The Panel also notes that Antigua did not refer to any
violation of Article VI in its second written submission, nor in its second oral statement.
6.434 In relation to its claim under Article VI:1, the Panel asked Antigua to specify "what 'measures
of general application' are not begin 'administered in a reasonabl e, objective and impartial manner'
and why". Antigua responded
"The general approach to gambling law in the United States is that all gambling and
betting is prohibited unless a specific authorization has been given. Thus, the United
States first maintains its "measures of gene ral application"—the state and federal
measures that act to prohibit the provision of gambling and betting services in the
United States. Overlaying the general prohi bitions are the state and federal measures
that authorize certain persons to provide certain gambling and betting services under
a wide and disparate variety of situatio ns. [footnote omitted] By not providing a
method by which Antiguan suppliers can obtain authorization to offer their services
into the United States, the United States is in violation of Article VI:1."
875
6.435 When asked by the Panel to identify and provide details of instances when "authorization to
supply" in the United States was refused, Antigua replied that:
"[...] What was meant here was not that Antiguan operators had applied to supply
gambling and betting services into the United States and were refused — the point
was that under United States law, it is impossible for Antiguan suppliers to meet any
authorization criteria. [...]"
876
6.436 The Panel also asked Antigua to specify what "authorization procedures" it was referring to in
support of its claim of violation of Articles VI:1 and VI:3, Antigua replied:
"The answer to this question is the same as [in paragraph 6.435 above]. It is not
possible for Antiguan service suppliers to obtain authorization to provide gambling
and betting services into the United States. This violates Article VI:1 of the GATS
because the 'authorization procedures' by their very terms exclude Antiguan suppliers
and thus cannot be considered 'administere d in a reasonable, obj ective and impartial
manner'. This violates Article VI:3 becau se the inability to apply for authorization
makes it impossible for the United States to comply with the requirements of
Article VI:3."
877
6.437 Antigua's claims under Article VI:1 and under Article VI:3 are based on the premise that
suppliers wishing to supply gambling and betting services in the United States require authorization to
supply and that Antiguan suppliers are unable to obtain such authorization. The Panel notes,
however, that Antigua has not specifically identifi ed which "state and fede ral measures" and which
provisions of those measures impose such authoriza tion requirements. Nor has it demonstrated that
its gambling and betting service suppliers have ever filed any applications to obtain such
authorization. In fact, paragraph 6.435 indicat es that Antiguan suppliers have never made such
applications. Therefore, the Panel is of the view that Antigua has not made a prima facie
demonstration that the measures at issue are inconsistent with Articles VI:1 and VI:3.

874 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 106.
875 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 28.
876 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 11.
877 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 27.

G. C
LAIM UNDER ARTICLE XI OF THE GATS
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.438 Antigua submits that the United States maintain s measures that restrict international money
transfers and payments relating to the cro ss-border supply of gambling and betting services. 878 I n
particular, Antigua points to the laws of the state of New York that render contracts that are based on
wagers or bets void 879 as well as an example of an "enforce ment measure" taken by the New York
Attorney General against a financial intermed iary that provides Internet payment services. 880 I n
Antigua's view, the purpose of these measures is to prevent foreign suppliers of gambling and betting
services from offering their services on a cross-border basis. 881 Antigua argues that, therefore, these
measures violate Article XI:1 of the GATS.
6.439 The United States submits that both the laws and the enforcement measure in the form of an
agreement between a state Attorney General and a financial intermediary upon which Antigua relies
are neutral regarding the destination of payments. 882 With respect to Antigua's reliance upon an
agreement between a state Attorney General and a fi nancial intermediary, this "measure" is contained
in Section III of Antigua's Panel request and, th erefore, following the Panel's preliminary ruling,
cannot be examined as a separate, autonomous measure. 883 Further, according to the United States,
Antigua has provided no evidence that the provis ions of the agreement in question result in
restrictions on the movements of funds across bor ders. The United States submits that, on the
contrary, by the terms of the agreement, it applies without regard to whether the payments in question
are destined for further transfer to a domestic or international destination.884 The United States further
submits that, insofar as Antigua relies upon the agr eement in question as evidence of the application
of the laws of the state of New York, the agreement is not an application of those laws. Rather, it is a
mutual settlement between the relevant contracting parties.885
2. Relevant GATS provisions
6.440 Article XI of the GATS (Payments and Transfers) provides that:
"1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII [Restrictions to
Safeguard the Balance of Payments], a Member shall not apply restrictions on
international transfers and payments for cu rrent transactions relating to its specific
commitments.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall a ffect the rights and obligations of the
members of the International Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the
Fund, including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the
Articles of Agreement, provided that a Member shall not impose restrictions on any
capital transactions inconsistently with its specific commitments regarding such
transactions, except under Article XII or at the request of the Fund."

878 Antigua's first written submission, para. 200.
879 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 29.
880 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 108; Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 29.
881 Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 107–110.
882 United States' second oral statement, para. 71.
883 United States' second oral statement, para. 70.
884 United States' first written submission, para. 110.
885 United States' second oral statement, para. 71.

3. Assessment by the Panel
6.441 Article XI has not, as yet, been the subject of in terpretation or application by either panels or
the Appellate Body. In light of this and taking into account the limited facts and arguments submitted
by the parties with respect to Antigua's claim under Article XI, we believe that there is not sufficient
material on record to enable us to undertake a meaningful analysis of this provision and its specific
application to the facts of this case. Moreover, in our view, the findings of violation under
Article XVI in Section VI.D above of our Report should allow the parties to settle this dispute, even
in the absence of a ruling on Antigua's Article XI cl aim. We will, therefore, exercise judicial
economy and not rule on Antigua's claim under Article XI.886
6.442 However, the Panel wants to emphasize that Ar ticle XI plays a crucial role in securing the
value of specific commitments undertaken by Me mbers under the GATS. Indeed, the value of
specific commitments on market access and national treatment would be seriously impaired if
Members could restrict international transfers a nd payment for service transactions in scheduled
sectors. In ensuring, inter alia , that services suppliers can receive payments due under services
contracts covered by a Member's specific commitment, Article XI is an indispensable complement to
GATS disciplines on market access and national treatment. At the same time, the Panel is of the view
that Article XI does not deprive Members from regula ting the use of financial instruments, such as
credit cards, provided that these regulations are cons istent with other rele vant GATS provisions, in
particular Article VI.
H. D
EFENCE UNDER ARTICLE XIV OF THE GATS
1. Claims and main arguments of the parties
6.443 The United States submits that, because the measures that have been challenged by Antigua in
this dispute serve important policy objectives that fall within Article XIV of the GATS, they benefit
from the exceptions of Article XIV(a) and Article XI V(c). Moreover, they are applied in a way that
complies with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS.
887
6.444 In relation to its defence under Article XIV(a), the United States argues that the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Ac t are necessary to protect "public morals" and
"public order" within the meaning of Article XIV(a) because, inter alia , remote gambling is
particularly vulnerable to use by minors who ar e prohibited from gambling or can be used for
laundering the proceeds of organized crime.888 Antigua questions the United States' argument that the
US measures prohibiting the remote supply of ga mbling and betting services are necessary to protect
public morals and public order on the basis, inter alia, that the United States is a significant consumer
of gambling and betting services and that state-sanctioned gambling opportunities are available in
48 states.889
6.445 With respect to its defence under Article XIV(c) , the United States argues that the Wire Act,
the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act serve as law enforcement tools to secure
compliance with other WTO-consistent US laws, in particular, state gambling laws and criminal laws
relating to organized crime. 890 Antigua argues that the United States' defence under Article XIV(c)
should fail because it has not submitted sufficient info rmation on the laws upon which it seeks to rely
for its defence under Article XIV(c). Antigua submits that the burden on a defending party to identify

886 Concerning the lack of sufficient facts for carrying out a legal anal ysis, see, for instance, Appellate
Body Report on EC – Asbestos, paras. 78-83. Concerning judicial economy, see our remarks in section 5 of the
Introduction to this Report.
887 United States' reply to Panel question No. 44.
888 United States' second written submission, paras. 111-116.
889 See Antigua's first written submission, paras. 80 and 108.
890 United States' second written submission, paras. 95-106.

such laws is, at the least, similar to that of a complaining party who seeks to challenge a measure in
dispute settlement proceedings; both must establish th at "measures" with the alleged effect exist.
891
The United States responds that Members' legislation is presumed to be WTO-consistent, including all
legislation invoked by the United States in support of its Article XIV defence.892
2. Relevant GATS provisions
6.446 Article XIV of the GATS provides in relevant part that:
"Subject to the requirement that such me asures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services,
nothing in this Agreement shall be constr ued to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public
order;5
(footnote original) 5 The public order exception may be invoked only
where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society.

(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement
including those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to
deal with the effects of a default on services contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the
processing and dissemination of person al data and the protection of
confidentiality of individual records and accounts;
(iii) safety;
[...]"
3. Assessment by the Panel
(a) Introduction
6.447 Since this is the first occasion on which Ar ticle XIV of the GATS has been invoked by a
Member in a WTO dispute, the Panel is unable to avail itself of prior jurisprudence under the GATS
for possible guidance.
6.448 However, in EC – Bananas III , the Appellate Body confirmed that jurisprudence under the
GATT 1994 could be relevant for the interpretation of analogous provisions contained in the
GATS.
893 Given the textual similarity between Artic le XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the
GATS, and the similar purposes that both Articles are designed to serve, we consider that

891 Antigua's comments on the United States' reply to Panel question No. 45.
892 United States' reply to Panel question No. 44.
893 Appellate Body Report on EC – Bananas III, para. 231.

GATT/WTO jurisprudence in relation to the former may be relevant and useful in the interpretation of
the latter.
6.449 In accordance with the Appellate Body's guidance in US – Gasoline 894, US - Shrimp 895 and
Korea – Various Measures on Beef 896 in respect of Article XX of the GATT 1994, we believe that a
measure found to be inconsistent with one or several of the substantive obligations of the GATS must
be subjected to a two-tiered analysis in order for it to be justified under Article XIV. Specifically, that
a measure must:
(a) fall within the scope of one of the recognized exceptions set out in paragraphs (a) to
(e) of Article XIV in order to enjoy provisional justification; and
(b) meet the requirements of the introductory provisions of Article XIV, the so-called
"chapeau".
6.450 In US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , the Appellate Body stated that the burden of proof rests
upon the party, whether complaining or defending, w ho asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence.897 Accordingly, a party seeking to invoke Article XIV of the GATS bears the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the various elements comprising a defence under this Article have been
fulfilled.
6.451 We also note that the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones stated that:
"It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of
effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule
in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case."898
We consider that this statement is equally applicable in respect of a defence invoked by a Member
under Article XIV of the GATS. More particularly, th e Panel is of the view that, if a defending party
in a case has made a prima facie demonstration that a measure fulfils the requirements of Article XIV,
in the absence of "effective refutation" by the compla ining party, a panel must rule in favour of the
defending party.

6.452 Finally, we recall that the Appellate Body has indicated that, when applying Article XX of the
GATT 1994 in a given case, a balance needs to be struck between the ma rket access right of a
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX a nd the duty of that same Member to respect the
treaty rights of other Members.
899 In our view, this statement is eq ually applicable to the application
of Article XIV of the GATS.
(b) Measures at issue
6.453 The United States seeks to defend, under Artic le XIV of the GATS, three of the federal
statutes that have been challenged by Antigua in th is dispute, namely, the Wire Act, the Travel Act
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act. The United States has not sought to defend the state laws
challenged by Antigua independently of the Illegal Gambling Business Act. However, throughout the
present proceedings the United States has argued that the prohibition in the United States against the
remote supply of gambling and betting services, rega rdless of whether enforced through state or
federal laws, is based on the same policy concerns discu ssed hereafter. We recall that, in this dispute,

894 See Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 22.
895 See Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, paras. 115–119.
896 See Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 156.
897 Appellate Body Report on US – Wool Shirts and Blouse, pp. 15-16.
898 Appellate Body Report on EC – Hormones, para. 104.
899 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 156.

we are examining the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)
 and the Illegal
Business Gambling Act (when read together with the relevant state laws).
6.454 We have found above that the Wire Act, the Trav el Act (when read together with the relevant
state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)
are inconsistent with US obligations under Ar ticle XVI of the GATS by virtue of specific
commitments the United States has undertaken in its GATS Schedule. Accordingly, we will now
examine whether these laws can be justified under Artic le XIV. More specifically, we will examine
first whether these laws can be provisionally jus tified under Article XIV(a) and Article XIV(c), the
two provisions specifically invoked by the United States. If provisionally justified, we will then
consider whether the United States has successf ully met the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XIV with respect to these measures. In our view, if we find the Travel Act and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act are justified under Article XIV, the relevant state laws that are otherwise
inconsistent with US obligations under Article XVI shall also be deemed to be justified under
Article XIV, to the extent that they are enforced by and through th e Travel Act and/or the Illegal
Gambling Business Act and for, inter alia the same policy concerns.
(c) Provisional justification under Article XIV(a)
(i) The legal standard under Article XIV(a)
6.455 Pursuant to the text of Article XIV(a), in determining whether a challenged measure is
provisionally justified under that Article, the Memb er invoking that provision must demonstrate two
elements, namely:
(a) the measure must be one designed to "prot ect public morals" or to "maintain public
order"; and
(b) the measure for which justification is claimed must be "necessary" to protect public
morals or to maintain public order.
6.456 The Panel will now proceed to examine these two elements in turn.
Measures ... to "protect public morals" or to "maintain public order"
6.457 The United States argues that the challenged measu res are necessary to protect public morals
and to maintain public order under Article XIV(a). 900 The United States submits that the remote
supply of gambling and betting services raises signifi cant concerns relating to the maintenance of
public order and the protection of public morals. According to the United States, remote supply of
gambling and betting services is, generally speaking, particularly vulnerable to various forms of
criminal activity, especially organized crime. Maintaining a society in which persons and their
property exist free of the destructive influence of or ganized crime is both a matter of "public morals"
and one of "public order". 901 Protecting children from uncontrolle d gambling settings is certainly a
matter of "public morals".902
6.458 The United States argues that the term "public or der" refers to the familiar civil law concept
denoted in French by the expression "ordre public " and its functional counterpart in common law
systems, the concept of "public policy". The Unite d States further submits that the term "public

900 United States' second written submission, paras. 111 et seq.
901 United States' second written submission, paras. 108-110.
902 United States' second written submission, para. 114.

morals" refers to standards of right and wrong that can be descri bed as "belonging to, affecting, or
concerning the community or nation."903
6.459 The Panel will first examine the meaning of the terms "protect public morals" and "maintain
public order" in an effort to understand their scope . The Panel will interpret Article XIV(a) of the
GATS in accordance with the ordinary meaning of th e words when read in their context and in light
of the object and purpose of the GATS and the WTO Agreement
6.460 The term "public morals" is used in Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 but not defined and it
has not been interpreted by any panel or the Appella te Body. The term "public order" is likewise not
specifically defined in the GATS, although the footnote to Article XIV(a) indicates that the "public
order" exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one
of the fundamental interests of society.
6.461 We are well aware that there may be sensitiviti es associated with the interpretation of the
terms "public morals" and "public order" in the co ntext of Article XIV. In the Panel's view, the
content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors,
including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and re ligious values. Further, the Appellate Body has
stated on several occasions that Members, in applying similar societal concepts, have the right to
determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate. 904 Although these Appellate Body
statements were made in the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994, it is our view that such
statements are also valid with respect to the protection of publ ic morals and public order under
Article XVI of the GATS. More particularly, Me mbers should be given some scope to define and
apply for themselves the concepts of "public morals" and "public order" in their respective territories,
according to their own systems and scales of values.
6.462 This being said, the Panel considers that, d espite the inherent difficulties and sensitivities
associated with interpretation of the terms "public morals" and "public order" in the context of
Article XIV(a), we must nonetheless give meaning to these terms in order to apply them to the facts of
in this case.
905 Indeed, the principle of effective treaty interpretation requires us to do so .
6.463 In determining the ordinary meaning of the term s "public morals" and "public order", we turn
to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. "Public" is defined therein as:
"Of or pertaining to the people as a whole; belonging to, affecting, or concerning the
community or nation."906
The Panel believes that a measure that is sought to be justified under Article XIV(a) must be aimed at
protecting the interests of the people within a comm unity or a nation as a whole. This is the case
whether the measure is asserted to be necessary to "protect public morals" or to "maintain public
order" since both terms contain the word "public".

6.464 The word "morals" (noun, pl.) is defined therein as:
"[...] habits of life with regard to right and wrong conduct."
907

903 United States' second written submission, para. 108.
904 See Appellate Body Reports on Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 176 and EC – Asbestos,
para. 168.
905 We recall the Appellate Body's instructions in the context of the interpretation of Article XX of the
906 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002.
907 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002.

6.465 The Panel considers the term "public morals " denotes standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.
6.466 The dictionary definition of the word "order" th at appears to be relevant in the context of
Article XIV(a) reads as follows:
"A condition in which the laws regula ting the public conduct of members of a
community are maintained and observed; th e rule of law or constituted authority;
absence of violence or violent crimes."
908
6.467 We recall that drafters of the GATS clarified in footnote 5 that "[t]he public order exception
may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficien tly serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society". Hence, in our vi ew, the dictionary definition of the word "order",
read together with footnote 5, suggests that " public order" refers to the preservation of the
fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and la w. These fundamental interests
can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and morality.
6.468 Based on the dictionary definitions referred to above and taking into account the clarification
added by the drafters of the GATS in footnote 5, we believe that "public mo rals" and "public order"
are two distinct concepts under Article XIV(a) of the GATS. Nevertheless, to the extent that both
concepts seek to protect largely similar values, some overlap may exist.
6.469 For example, in this case, it could be argued that the prevention of underage gambling and the
protection of pathological gamblers relates to public morals, while the fight against organized crime is
rather a matter of public order. The preven tion of money laundering and of fraud schemes could
arguably relate to both public morals and public order. However, we are of the view that, in this
dispute, it is not necessary to qualify various polic y considerations relied upon by the United States as
relating either to "public morals" or to "public order".
6.470 The following supplementary means of interpre tation may also be instructive. Judge
Lauterpacht, the elder, referred to "public order" as the "fundamental national conceptions of law,
decency and morality." He further stated that "the protection of the interest of minors ... falls
naturally within the notion of ordre public."909
6.471 Examples of WTO Members that have relied on "public moral" grounds to justify certain
restrictions include Israel and the Philippines. In this regard, the 1999 Trade Policy Review of Israel
observed that Israel maintained an import prohibitio n on "[t]ickets or publicity items for lottery or
gambling" and identified the reason for this prohibition as "[p]ublic morals." 910 Similarly, the 1999
Trade Policy Review of the Philippines listed limitations on foreign ownership of gambling operations
(e.g., racetracks) under a heading that referred, inter alia, to limitations "for reasons of ... risk to
health and morals."911
6.472 A historic example of the use of "moral" grounds to restrict certain activities was raised in the
context of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, where a draft convention had been put
forward that included an exception for "[p]rohib itions or restrictions imposed for moral or
humanitarian reasons or for the suppression of imprope r traffic, provided that the manufacture of and

908 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002.
909 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants
(Netherlands v. Sweden), 1958 I.C.J. 55, 90 (Judgment of 28 November) (sep. op. of J. Lauterpacht).
910 Trade Policy Review - Israel - Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/58, table III.8 (1999).
911 Trade Policy Review - The Philippine s - Report by the Secretariat , WT/TPR/S/59, table III.11
(1999). The document does not specify precisely which reason is associated w ith the gambling ownership
restriction, but from the context of the document it is reasonable to infer that the restriction is based on "morals"
or "health and morals."

trade in the goods to which the prohibitions relate are also prohibited or restricted in the interior of the
country."912 It is reported that in the debate over th e proposed exception, the representative of Egypt
asked whether a prohibition on the importation of fo reign lottery tickets would be covered by the
moral exception. The president of the conference stated that such prohibitions would be covered by
the exception for measures adopted for "moral or humanitarian reasons."
913
6.473 Other jurisdictions have accepted that gambli ng activities could be limited or prohibited for
public policy considerations, in derogation of general treaty or legislative rules.914
6.474 In light of the above, the Panel concludes that measures prohibiting gambling and betting
services, including the supply of those services by the Internet, could fall within the scope of
Article XIV(a) if they are enforced in pursuance of policies, the object and purpose of which is to
"protect public morals" or "to maintain public order".
Measures "necessary" to protect public morals or to maintain public order
6.475 With respect to the requirement, under Article XIV(a) of the GATS, that a measure be
"necessary", the Panel notes that the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef
established various parameters within which a dete rmination of whether a measure is "necessary"

912 See Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restriction, Commentary and Preliminary
Draft International Agreement drawn up by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations to serve as a
Basis for an International Diplomatic Conference, League of Nations Doc. C.E.1.22. 1927 II.13. pp. 10, 15
(1927).
913 International Conference for the Abolition of Im port and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions,
Proceedings of the Conference, p. 110, League of Nations Doc. C.21.M.12. 1928 II.7, p. 110 (1928).
914 For instance, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determined that national legislation which
prohibits, subject to specified exceptions, the holding of lotteries in a Member State and which, thus, wholly
precludes lottery operators from other Member States from promoting their lotteries and selling their tickets,
whether directly or through independent agents, in the Member State which enacted that legislation, restricts the
freedom to provide services, even though it is applicable without distinction. However, the court considered
that the particular features of lotte ries justify national authorities having a sufficient degree of latitude to
determine what is required to protect the players and, more generally, in the light of the specific social and
cultural features of each Member State, to maintain order in society as re gards the manner in which lotteries are
operated, the size of the stakes, and the allocation of prof its they yield and to decide whether to restrict or
prohibit them: Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler , (24
March 1994). Further, in a more r ecent decision, the ECJ held that nati onal legislation which authorized the
operation and playing of games of chance or gambling solely in casinos, in permanent or temporary gaming
areas created by decree-law and which wa s applicable without distinction to its own nationals and nationals of
other Member States constituted a barrier to the freedom to provide services. However, the ECJ found that this
legislation was compatible with the EC Treaty in view of the concerns of social policy and the prevention of
fraud which justified it. The court noted, inter alia, that the considerations unde rlying the legislation at issue
concerned "the protection of consumers, who are recipients of the services and the maintenance of order in
society": Case C-6/01 – Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others
(11 September 2003). We also note that the The River City Group reported that in virtually all parts of the
world, gambling activities, when not prohibited entirely, have traditionally been subject to strict regulation,
involving civil and criminal laws. In view of technological developments, a number of countries have
developed – or are in the process of developing – special legal framework for Internet gambling for instance,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finla nd, Iceland, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, United
Kingdom. Other countries currently apply to Internet gambling the laws and regulations developed for
traditional gambling [for instance, Canada, France. The regulations targeting Internet gambling appear to us to
be as stringent, if not more, that regulations applying to traditional forms of gambling. Some countries seem to
restrict drastically or even prohibit entirely Internet gambling for instance, Esto nia, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Norway, Uruguay: See Internet Gambling Report – Sixth Edition , Mark Balestra (Ed.), The River City Group,
United States, 2003.

within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994
915 must be made. Specifically, the Appellate
Body noted that:
"[T]he reach of the word 'necessary' is not limited to that which is 'indispensable' or
'of absolute necessity' or 'inevitable'. Measures which are indispensable or of
absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil the requirements
of Article XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this
exception. As used in Article XX(d), the term 'necessary' refers, in our view, to a
range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies 'necessary'
understood as 'indispensable'; at the other end, is 'necessary' taken to mean as
'making a contribution to'. We consider that a 'necessary' measure is, in this
continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of 'indispensable' than to the
opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution to'." [original footnote omitted]
916
The Panel is of the view that these statements are e qually applicable in the context of Article XIV of
the GATS, including Article XIV(a).

6.476 The Appellate Body in the same case articulat ed a "weighing and balancing" test as the basis
for making a determination as to whether a me asure is "necessary" within the meaning of
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. In particular, the Appellate Body stated that a determination of
whether a measure is necessary within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994:
"[I]nvolves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors
which prominently include the contributi on made by the compliance measure to the
enforcement of the law or regulation at i ssue, the importance of the common interests
or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law
or regulation on imports or exports."
917
6.477 On the basis of the articulation of the guiding principles for the "weighing and balancing" test
by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and, subsequently, in EC – Asbestos918,
we believe that, in the context of Article XIV(a), we must assess the following in determining whether
a measure is "necessary" to protect public morals or to maintain public order:
(a) the importance of interests or values that the challenged measure is intended to
protect. (With respect to this requirement, the Appellate Body has suggested that, if
the value or interest pursued is considered important, it is more likely that the
measure is "necessary".)
919
(b) the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the realization of the end
pursued by that measure. (In relation to this requirement, the Appellate Body has
suggested that the greater the extent to which the measure contributes to the end
pursued, the more likely that the measure is "necessary".)
920
(c) the trade impact of the challenged measure. (With regard to this requirement, the
Appellate Body has said that, if the measure has a relatively slight trade impact, the
more likely that the measure is "necessary" . The Appellate Body has also indicated

915 Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 is textually anal ogous to Article XIV(c) of the GATS, which we
consider below.
916 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161.
917 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 164-166.
918 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 178; Appellate Body Report on
EC – Asbestos, para. 172.
919 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162.
920 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163.

that whether a reasonably available WTO-cons istent alternative measure exists must
be taken into consideration in applying this requirement.)921
(ii) Applying the legal standard under Article XIV(a) to the facts of this case
6.478 The Panel will consider in this section whet her the prohibition of the remote supply of
gambling and betting services imposed by the three relevant US federal laws – namely, the Wire Act,
the Travel Act (when read together with the rele vant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) – are "necessary" to "protect public morals"
and/or to "maintain public order."
Are the challenged measures so as to "protect public morals" or to "maintain public order"
within the meaning of Article XIV(a)?
6.479 The United States argues that the remote supply of gambling and betting services raises
significant concerns relating to the maintenance of public order and the protection of public morals. 922
According to the United States, the remote suppl y of gambling poses threats related to organized
crime, money laundering, fraud and other criminal act ivities; risks to children given the availability of
remotely supplied gambling and betting services to child ren; and particular health risks. The United
States submits that it is for these reasons that it places stringent restrictions on the ability of any
operator to offer gambling and betting services by re mote supply, regardless of whether such services
are supplied from the territory of another Member or from within the territory of the United States.923
6.480 Antigua points to a 2001 report prepared by the United States Department of Defense
evaluating the social impact of readily availa ble gambling machines, which concluded that the
presence of military casinos did not have a negative e ffect on the morale or fi nancial stability of the
United States forces, their family members and ot her persons – including foreign nationals – who
gambled at the government-owned facilities. 924 Antigua also submits that countries such as the
United Kingdom have seen no insupe rable public interest issues fl owing from the move towards the
online supply of gambling and betting services but, rather, have embraced it in a regulated context.925
6.481 In the Panel's view, the eviden ce adduced establishes that the Wi re Act, the Travel Act (when
read together with the relevant state laws) and th e Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together
with the relevant state laws) are measures to protect "public morals or public order", for the following
reasons.
6.482 A 1961 report by the House of Representative on th e Wire Act issued shortly before its entry
into force states that:
"The purpose of the bill is to assist the various States and the District of Columbia in
the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses
and to aid in the suppression of organized gambling by prohibiting the use of wire
communication facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of bets or
wagers and gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce."
926

6.483 With respect to the Travel Act, during heari ngs before the Judiciary Committee regarding the
Attorney General's Programme to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, the then Attorney

921 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 163 and 166.
922 United States' second written submission, para. 111.
923 United States' first oral statement, para. 10.
924 Antigua's first written submission, para. 86.
925 Antigua's first written submission, para. 19.
926 House of Representatives Report No. 87-967, pp. 1-2 (1961) contained in Exhibit US-30.

General, Robert F. Kennedy, stated that his prog ram, which included the Travel Act as well as the
Wire Act, enabled the federal government to "take effective action against the racketeer who conducts
an unlawful business but lives far from the scene in comfort and safety."
927
6.484 We also note that during 2003 hearings befo re the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security regarding the yet to be enact ed Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition
Act, which , if passed, will prohibit Internet gambling in a similar way to the Wire Act and the Travel
Act, reference was made to the threat of mone y laundering, organized crime, fraud and risks to
children (i.e underage gambling) a nd health (i.e. pathological gambling) that are associated with
Internet gambling.928
6.485 With respect to the Illegal Gambling Business Ac t, in the statement of findings made in
advance of enactment of that Act, Congress articulated a number of reasons justifying its enactment.
In particular, reference was made to the fact that gambling income is the "lifeline of organized crime"
and the means by which other illegal activities are fi nanced. Further, Congress stated that gambling
"preys upon society", especially the poor. Fina lly, Congress stated that, from a law enforcement
standpoint, "gambling is more susceptible than most organized crime activities to detection and
prosecution."929 The United States has also indicated that US courts have confirmed that the Illegal
Gambling Business Act is a measure against organized crime.930
6.486 In our view, these Congressional statements re garding the respective purposes underlying the
Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act indicate that various arms of the
government of the United States consider these Acts were adopted to address concerns such as those
pertaining to money laundering, organized crim e, fraud, underage gambling and pathological
gambling. We consider that, insofar as the stat e gambling laws are enforced through the Illegal
Gambling Business Act, those state laws ma y be considered to be enforced for, inter alia, the same
purpose as the Illegal Gambling Business Act.
6.487 In light of the above, we conclude that the c oncerns which the Wire Act, the Travel Act and
the Illegal Gambling Business Act seek to address fa ll within the scope of "public morals" and/or
"public order" under Article XIV(a). In other words, we find that the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when
read together with the relevant state laws) and th e Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together
with the relevant state laws) are measures that ar e designed to "protect public morals" and/or "to
maintain public order" in the United States within the meaning of Article XIV(a).
Are the challenged measures "necessary" to protect public morals or to maintain public order?
6.488 We now consider whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Business Act (when
read together with the relevant states laws) are "necessary" to protect public morals and/or to maintain
public order. In this regard, we recall that we must assess taking into account the relevant
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body referred to in paragraph 6.477 above:
(a) the importance of the interests or values that these Acts are intended to protect;
(b) the extent to which these Acts contribute to the realization of the ends respectively
pursued by these Acts; and
(c) the respective trade impact of these Acts.

927 Testimony of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4
(1961) p. 15, Exhibit US-24.
928 Exhibit US-5. See, for example, pp. 1, 6, 10-11, 13.
929 Congressional Record H9711contained in Exhibit US-32.
930 See United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1976) contained in Exhibit US-31.

Importance of interests or values protected
6.489 The Congressional statements identified above in paragraphs 6.482-6.485 indicate that these
Acts are intended to protect society against the th reat of money laundering, organized crime, fraud
and risks to children (i.e underage gambling) and to health (i.e. pathological gambling).
6.490 We again note comments made in 1961 by the then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to
describe the overall intended effect of the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering, of which the Wire Act and the Travel Act were part:
"These [hoodlums and racketeers who have b ecome so rich and so powerful] use
interstate commerce and interstate communi cations with impunity in the conduct of
their unlawful activities. If we could curt ail their use of interstate communications
and facilities, we could inflict a telling blow to their operations. We could cut them
down to size.
Mr. Chairman, our legislation is mainly concerned with effectively curtailing
gambling operations. And we do this, Mr. Chairman, because profits from illegal
gambling are huge and they are the primary source of the funds which finance
organized crime, all throughout the country.
931
6.491 In the Congressional statement of findings prefatory to the Illegal Gambling Business Act,
Congress described the threat posed by organized crime which was the impetus for the enactment of
that Act, in the following terms:
"(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy
by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of for ce, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized
crime derives a major portion of its powe r through money obtained from such illegal
endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property,
the importation and distribution of narco tics and other dangerous drugs, and other
forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business a nd labor unions and to subvert and corrupt
our democratic processes; (4) organized cr ime activities in the United States weaken
the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens."
932
6.492 On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear to us that the interests and values protected by the
Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) serve very important societal interests
that can be characterized as "vital and important in the highest degree" in a similar way to the
characterization of the protection of human life and h ealth against a life-threatening health risk by the
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos.933

931 Testimony of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4
(1961), p. 11 contained in Exhibit US-24.
932 Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Note on 18 USC § 1961, p. 812 contained in
Exhibit US-35.
933 Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para. 172.

6.493 We accept that a Member may judge that stri ct controls may be needed to protect the
above-mentioned societal interests. However, in the process of "weighing and balancing" this factor
against the others to which we must have regard, we consider that it is important to bear in mind that
these interests – to protect society against the threat of money launde ring, organized crime, fraud and
risks to children (i.e underage gambling) and health (i.e. pathological gambling) – also exist in the
context of the non-remote supply of gambling and be tting services. Neither party has disputed this.
934
Yet, in contrast to its treatment of the remote supply of gambling and betting services, the United
States does not prohibit outright the non-remote supply of gambling and betting services. We
acknowledge that there may be particular aspects associated with remote supply of gambling and
betting services that may justify a difference in tr eatment as compared to the non-remote supply of
such services. However, reference must be ma de to the evidence at hand to determine whether
particular aspects associated with the remote supply of gambling and betting services will justify a
prohibition, particularly in light of the tolerant a ttitude displayed in some parts of the United States to
the non-remote supply of such services. We cons ider this issue in further detail below in our
discussion of whether or not a WTO-consistent a lternative is reasonably available to the United
States.
935
Contribution to ends pursued
6.494 As for the extent to which the Wire Act, the Tr avel Act (when read together with the relevant
state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)
contribute to the realization of the ends pursued by those laws, we recall our finding above that these
laws seek to address concerns pertaining to mone y laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage
gambling and pathological gambling.
936 Given that the Wire Act and the Travel Act prohibit the
remote supply of gambling and betting services, wh ich has been associated with each of these
concerns937, these Acts must contribute, at least to some extent, to addressing these concerns. Further,
the Illegal Gambling Business Act prohibits conducting, financing, mana ging, supervising, directing
or owning all or part of an "illegal gambling bus iness" which is defined as a gambling business which
violates the law of a state (or political subdivision) of the United States. We consider that the Illegal
Gambling Business Act must contribute, at least to some extent, to addressing these concerns.
Trade impact
6.495 With respect to the trade impact of the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act (when read together with the
relevant state laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws), Antigua argues that the effect of these laws is total prohibition, which is the most trade-
restrictive approach possible.938 We have no doubt that these Acts have a significant restrictive trade
impact. Indeed, the United States has admitted as much when arguing that a Member has "the right to

934 The United States submits that it "maintains and applies a regulatory distinction between remotely
supplied gambling services and other gambling services, with the former subject to even tighter restrictions than
the latter. This distinction arises from numerous distinguishing law enforcement, consumer protection, and
health concerns associated with the remote supply of gambling": United States' second written submission,
para. 45. The United States implicitly acknowledges in this statement that la w enforcement, consumer
protection, and health concerns also exist in the context of the non-remote s upply of gambling and betting
services. Antigua also submits that underage gambling, pathological gambling, money laundering, crime, fraud
and consumer protection concerns exist in the cont ext of the non-remote supply of gambling and betting
services: Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 70–87.
935 See paras. 6.499-6.521 below.
936 See para. 6.486 above.
937 See paras. 6.499-6.521 below.
938 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 71.

heavily restrict a highly risky service (in this case, gambling by remote supply) while allowing the use
of a less risky service [in this case, gambling by non-remote means]".939
6.496 In the assessment of the trade im pact, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on
Beef referred to the GATT panel on US – Section 337 where the panel made clear that a Member must
first explore and exhaust all GATT/WTO compa tible alternatives before resorting to WTO-
inconsistent alternatives.
940 In examining whether a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative
measure existed, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures Affecting Beef examined the
means that had been used by Kor ea to address the prevention of fra udulent conduct in relation to the
sale of other food products.
6.497 Recalling the Appellate Body's reasoning in Korea – Various Measures Affecting Beef, we
need to consider whether the United States has, in other contexts, used measures other than a
prohibition to address similar concerns to those that ar e alleged to be the basis for its justification in
this case of the prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services. The only other
relevant context to which reference has been ma de in this dispute is gambling and betting services
supplied by non-remote means.
6.498 In this dispute, and for the reasons discussed he reafter, the Panel considers that some of the
concerns the United States has identified are speci fic only to the remote supply of gambling and
betting services. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to attempt to compare that treatment of these
specific concerns with the treatment of whatever concerns the United States has with the non-remote
supply of these services. We examine below each concern invoked by the United States.
6.499 With respect to money laundering , the United States argues that the volume, speed and
international reach of remote gambling transactions combined with the offshore locations of most
remote suppliers and the virtual anonymity of such transactions mean that the "layering and
integration" stages of money laundering are effec tively facilitated. More particularly, the United
States submits that the remote supply of gambling a nd betting services is particularly well-suited to
concealing and disguising the true nature, source and ownership of the ill-gotten gains of crime.941
6.500 The United States General Accounting Offi ce Report to Congressional Requestors entitled
"Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues" refers to these concerns.942
6.501 In addition, we have before us a 2001 Repor t on Money Laundering Typologies prepared by
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. That report tends to confirm the existence of
the concerns identified by the United States in th e context of the remote supply of gambling and
betting services that relate to the audit trail of remote transactions. In particular, the report states:
"Despite attempts to deal with the poten tial problems of Internet gambling by
regulating it, requiring licences in order to operate, or banning such services outright,
a number of concerns remain in addition to the inability to track ... Internet links ...

939 United States' second written submission, para. 93.
940 The Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef at para. 165 referred to the GATT panel
US – Section 337 which stated: "It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure
inconsistent with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure
which it could reasonably be expected to employ and whic h is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to us e, among the measures reasonably available to it, that
which entails the least degree of inconsistenc y with other GATT provision": Panel Report on US – Section 337,
para. 5.26.
941 United States' first written submission, paras. 12 et seq ; United States' second oral statement,
paras. 59-60.
942 Exhibit AB-17, p. 35.

For example, transactions are primarily performed through credit cards, and the
offshore placement of many Internet ga mbling sites makes locating and prosecuting
the relevant parties more difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, gambling
transactions, the records of which might be needed as evidence, are conducted at the
gambling site and are software-based; this may add to the difficulty of collecting and
presenting such evidence."
943
6.502 Along similar lines, in 2002, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General made the following
statement in a special briefing on "Money Laundering and Payment Systems in Online Gambling":
"The anonymous nature of the Internet and the use of encryption makes it difficult to
trace the transactions. The gambling business may also not maintain the transaction
records, in which case tracing may be impossible. While regulators in the United
States can visit physical casinos, observe their operations, and examine their books
and records to ensure compliance with regulations, this is far more difficult, if not
impossible, with virtual casinos."
944
6.503 Similar statements have been made during a 2003 Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Funding Prohibition Act and the Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Commission
Act.945 The concern expressed by the United States regarding the anonymity of transactions is also
reflected in several of the recommendations made in the 2001 Report on Money Laundering
Typologies that are aimed at addressing the speci fic difficulties associated with remote gambling
transactions. In particular, the report recommends that Internet Service Providers be required to
maintain reliable subscriber registers with appropriate identification information.
946
6.504 The concern expressed by the United States rega rding the international reach of remote
supply gambling and betting transactions appears to be confirmed in an example referred to in the
2001 Report on Money Laundering Typologies where mone y flows were detected in many parts of
the world.947
6.505 Antigua has not pointed to any evidence that calls into question the specific concerns referred
to above. Rather, Antigua points to evidence indicati ng that money laundering is at least as grave a
concern in relation to the supply of non-remote gambling and betting services as in the case of the
remote supply of such services.
948 The United States does not dispute that casino gambling can be
used, among other things, to launder the cash proceeds of crime during the placement stage of money
laundering.
949 In any event, it is our view that, the fact that money laundering may exist in the context
of the non-remote supply of gambling and betting services does not mean that the United States is not
entitled to address differently the aspects of this c oncern that are specific to the remote supply of
gambling and betting services, namely, the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling
transactions combined with the offshore locations of most remote suppliers and the virtual anonymity
of such transactions.

943 Exhibit US-7, p. 6.
944 Exhibit AB-86, p. 4. A similar statement was made by the same Deputy Assistant Attorney General
before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security: Exhibit AB-85, p. 3.
945 See Exhibit US-5.
946 Exhibit US-7, p. 8.
947 Exhibit US-7, Example 1, pp. 6-7.
948 See, for example, Exhibit AB-79; Exhibit AB-147; Exhibit AB-149; Exhibit AB-150;
Exhibit AB-154.
949 United States' first written submission, paras. 12 et seq ; United States' second oral statement,
paras. 59-60.

6.506 With respect to fraud, the United States submits that the risk of fraud is heightened in the case
of the remote supply as compared to the non-remo te supply of gambling and betting services because
the barriers to establishing an online gambling opera tion are low so that unscrupulous operators can
appear and disappear within minutes.950
6.507 We have seen evidence that tends to support th e United States' concern that low barriers to
entry in the context of the remote supply of gambling and betting services heightens the risk of fraud.
Indeed, in 2002, the Deputy Assistant Attorney Ge neral made the following statement in a special
briefing on "Money Laundering and Payment Systems in Online Gambling":
"Although there are certainly legitimate companies who are either operating or who
want to operate on-line casinos in an honest manner, the potential for fraud connected
with casinos and bookmaking operations in the virtual world is far greater than in the
physical realm. Start-up costs are relatively low and cheap servers and
unsophisticated software are readily-ava ilable. On-line casinos and bookmaking
establishments operate in many countr ies where effective regulation and law
enforcement is minimal or non-existent. Like scam telemarketing operations, on-line
gambling establishments appear and disappear with regularity, collecting from losers
and not paying winners, and with little fear of being apprehended and prosecuted."
951
6.508 Similar statements are contained in the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final
Report.952
6.509 Antigua has pointed to evidence indicating that the non-remote supply of gambling and
betting services may be as susceptible to fraud as is the remote supply of these services. 953 However,
we do not consider that this evidence refutes the existence of the specific fraud concerns that the
United States maintains exist in the context of the remote supply of gamb ling and betting services,
namely that because the barriers to establishing an online gambling operation are low, unscrupulous
operators can appear and disappear within minutes.
6.510 The essence of the United States' health concerns in relation to the remote supply of gambling
and betting services relate to the isolated environm ent in which gamblers may operate, which protects
them from social stigma and enables them to ga mble without interruption for extended periods of
time. 954
6.511 The evidence tends to support the existence of the United States' concerns regarding the
isolated environment of consumers of remotely su pplied gambling and betting services. In particular,
in 2003, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General stat ed before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security that:
"Unlike on-site gambling, on-line gambling is readily available to anyone with an
Internet connection at all hours of the day or night. This present a particular danger
for compulsive gamblers. As was recently pointed out by the American Psychiatric
Society: "Internet gambling, unlike many other forms of gambling activity, is a
solitary activity, which makes it even more dangerous; people can gamble
uninterrupted and undetected for unlimited periods of time." Indeed, the problems
associated with pathological and problem gamblers, a frighteningly-large percentage

950 United States' second written submission, para. 51.
951 Exhibit AB-86, p. 2.
952 Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-11. See also Exhibit AB-159, p. 2.
953 See Exhibit AB-156, which is a document prepared by Antigua entitled "Fraud within the United
States gambling industry".
954 United States' second oral statement, para. 30.

of which are young people, are well-establishe d and can be measured in the ruined
lives of both the gamblers themselves and their families."
955
6.512 Similar statements are contained in the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final
Report.956
6.513 The concern regarding the relative anonymity associated with remote gambling, which
protects consumers from social stigma, is acknowle dged in a statement made by two professors from
the International Gaming Research Unit, Division of Psychology, in Nottingham Trent University,
United Kingdom entitled "Is Internet gambling more a ddictive and/or problematic than other forms of
gambling?", which is relied upon by Antigua. In pa rticular, it states that "Another concern that has
been noted concerns the relative anonymity of Inte rnet gambling, which may lead to disinhibition and
increased levels of gambling."957 The authors of the statement conclude, inter alia, that:
"There are a number of factors that ma ke online activities lik e Internet gambling
potentially seductive and/or addictive. Su ch factors include anonymity, convenience,
escape, dissociation/immersion, accessib ility, event frequency, interactivity,
disinhibition, simulation, and asociability."958
6.514 Antigua has argued that there is no evidence that cross-border gambling results in higher
levels of pathologies than non-remote gambling. 959 However, in our view, the United States is not
submitting that remote gambling may result in a higher incidence of pathological gambling. Rather,
the United States argues that remote ga mbling presents "special health risks" 960 associated with the
isolated and anonymous environment in which such gambling takes place. We do not consider that
Antigua's evidence disproves the existence of this specific concern.
6.515 With respect to underage gambling, the United States argues that there is no means to prevent
minors from gaining access to remotely supplied gambling and betting services comparable to the
means available in connection with the non-re mote supply of gambling services in the United
States.961
6.516 The evidence tends to support the United States ' assertion that age verification is a specific
concern with respect to the remote supply of gambling and betting services. In particular, in 2003, the

955 Exhibit AB-85, p. 2.
956 Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-5. See also Exhibit AB-159, p. 2.
957 Exhibit AB-80, p. 8. The statement refers to a 2003 paper written by one of the co-authors of the
statement that suggests that remote gamblers are, perhaps, not as anonym ous as they would think because of,
inter alia, the existence of the ability of Internet gambling operators to collect data about gamblers. However,
nowhere does the statement point to ev idence to suggest that gamblers are aware that their anonymity is being
compromised by this facility.
958 Exhibit AB-80, p. 12.
959 In this regard, Antigua refers to a statement prepared by two of its consultants for this dispute,
namely Professor Mark Griffiths and Dr Richard Wood , entitled "Is Internet gambling more addictive and/or
problematic than other forms of gambling?" contained in Exhibit AB-80. The statement concludes that "there is
no greater risk of a pathological response as a result of exposure to Internet-based gambling opportunities, than
as a result of exposure to other forms of gambling opportunity": Exhibit AB-80, p. 2. Antigua also relies upon a
statement by another of its consultants in this dispute, namely, Dr Howard Shaffer, who concludes that "health
risks associated with Internet base d gambling are not meaningfully different from other electronic gambling":
Exhibit AB-185, p. 8.
960 In para. 30 of its first oral statement, the United States submits that: "Remote gambling also presents
special health and youth protection risks in part because it is available to anyone, anywhere – including
compulsive gamblers and children – who can gamble 24 hours a day with a mere 'click of the mouse'. Isolation
and anonymity compound the danger. In the words of a gambling addict interviewed on the videotape we have
provided, 'nobody has to see you do it' and 'nobody has to know.'"
961 United States' first written submission, para. 99.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General stated befo re the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security that:
"On-line gambling also makes it far more difficult to prevent minors from gambling.
Unlike traditional physical casinos and Off-T rack-Betting parlors, the operators of
gambling websites cannot look at their cu stomers to assess their age and request
photo identification. Currently, Internet gambling businesses have no reliable way of
confirming that gamblers on their website are not minors who have gained access to a
credit card. Although some companies are developing software to try to detect
whether a player is old enough to gamble or whether that player is from a legal
jurisdiction, such software has not been perfected and would, of course, be subject to
the same types of flaws and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers."
962
6.517 Similar statements were made during a 2003 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Judici ary Committee on the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Funding Prohibition Act and the Internet Ga mbling Licensing and Regulation Commission Act 963 and
are contained in the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report.964
6.518 The evidence indicates that credit card gatewa ys are the primary means of verifying age
online.965 However, despite suggestions to the contrary by Antigua 966, the evidence suggests that
credit cards have proved to be an inadequate means to restrict children's access to Internet gambling
and betting web sites. In particular, in his test imony before the Commission on Online Protection in
2000, the Senior Vice President for Public Policy of Visa USA stated:
"The Child Online Protection Act ... is desi gned to prevent a person who is a minor
from accessing materials that are 'harmful to minors' over the Internet. Under the
Act, a defendant can assert an affirmat ive defense to prosecution under the Act by
showing that the defendant has made a good fa ith effort to restrict access by persons
under the age of 17 to obscene materials on the defendant's Internet site. One way for
the defendant to assert this affirmative defen se is to show that the defendant required
use of a credit card or a debit card to access the Internet site. In providing so, the Act
basically assumes that only adults have access to a credit card or debit card.
To the contrary, it is important for the Commission to understand that this assumption
simply is not correct. Access to a credit card or a debit card is not a good proxy for

962 Exhibit AB-85, p. 2. See also Exhibit AB-17, pp. 17 et seq, Exhibit AB-164 and Exhibit US-18.
963 See Exhibit US-5, p. 1.
964 Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-4.
965 See, for example, the Article entitled "Why Online Age Checks Don't Work" contained in Exhibit
US-28. The Article states that "The credit card gateway as age verification standard has been in place ever since
the late 1990's." Antigua submits as much when it states that the US Congress has legislated to provide that the
use of credit cards is an effective way to keep children from engaging in potentially harmful behaviour on the
Internet: Antigua's second oral statement, para. 59.
966 See Exhibit AB-158, which is a document prepared by Antigua entitled "Youth Gambling". This
document states, inter alia, that "United States legislation recognizes that the use of credit cards is an effective
means to prevent underage access". We also note that Antigua has submitted evidence in Exhibits AB-163,
AB-165 and AB-166 to suggest that underage gambling and betting occurs when the relevant services are
supplied through non-remote means in the United States. However, in our view, this does not indicate that the
United States' concerns with respect to the remote supply of gambling and betting services do not exist. Antigua
has also submitted evidence in Exhibits AB-167, AB-168, AB-169, AB-170 and AB-171 that "younger people"
are the target of marketing strategies of non-remote su ppliers of gambling and betting services. However, there
is no indication that the reference to "younger people" in the exhibited documents means "minors" or "underage
gamblers". Therefore, we will disregard this evidence.

age. The mere fact that a person uses a credit card or a debit card in connection with a
transaction does not mean that this person is an adult.
Many individuals under the age of 17 have legitimate access to, and regular use of,
credit cards and debit cards. For example, parents may designate their child as an
'authorized user' of the parent's credit car d or debit card. This actually is quite
common, particularly for credit cards. Wh enever this occurs, the child will have
access to the parent's credit card number or debit card number and can use that card
number to access materials deemed "harmful to minors" on the Internet.
In addition, many children under the ag e of 17 have their own deposit accounts and
may have access to a debit card that accesses such account.

Thus, although the [Child Online Protectio n] Act assumes that only adults have
access to a credit card or a debit card, it is important for the Commission to
understand that this assumption is simply not true. As a result, the Commission may
want to focus its attention on more suitable methods of verifying age."
967
6.519 In relation to organized crime, in essence, the United States argues that the remote supply of
gambling and betting services is cause for graver co ncern than is the case for the non-remote supply
of such services because of the amount of money and manipulability inherent in Internet gambling;
the opportunity to use gambling by remote m eans of supply as a clearinghouse through which
organized crime bookmakers in the United States can "lay off" their bets; and the opportunity for
organized criminals to more easily hide their invo lvement in gambling and evade law enforcement by
operating beyond the intense scrutiny of regulators a nd law enforcement officials in the gambler's
jurisdiction.
968
6.520 The evidence we would have expected to see in proving the existence of the particular
organized crime concerns referred to by the Unite d States would have been evidence demonstrating,
inter alia, that the "inherent manipulability" of the Internet makes it more attractive to participants in
organized crime and that organized criminals find it easier to hide their bets, thereby evading the
scrutiny of law-enforcement officers. We have not seen any concrete evidence of this nature. Rather,
the United States has pointed us to instances of organized crime involvement and prosecution in
connection with the remote supply of gambling and betting services.
969 The non-remote supply of
gambling and betting services is permitted in much of the United States, although it also gives rise to
concerns in respect of organized crime.
970 In the absence of evidence demonstrating the nature and
extent of the risks of organized crime presented by remote gambling and betting, we are not fully
satisfied that the United States has demonstrated th at it could not guard against those risks through
means that are WTO-consistent.
6.521 To sum up, the United States has certain concer ns with respect to money laundering, fraud,
health and underage gambling that, in our view, are specific to the remote supply of gambling and
betting services. Therefore, the measures used by the United States to address its concerns with

967 Exhibit US-27, pp. 2-4. In addition, the Un ited States General Accounting Office Report to
Congressional Requestors entitled " Internet Gambling: An Overview of the Issues" indicates that efforts aimed
at restricting the use of credit cards fo r Internet gambling have been hampered, inter alia, by Internet gambling
sites that attempt to disguise their transactions to avoid them being blocked by banks: Exhibit AB-17, p. 4. See
also Exhibit AB-159, p. 2.
968 United States' second written submission, paras. 46 et seq.
969 See, for example, Exhibit US-3; Exhibit US-4; Exhibit US-5; Exhibit US-6; Exhibit US-14;
Exhibit US-22; Exhibit US-23.
970 See, for example, Exhibit AB-145.

respect to money laundering, fraud, health and unde rage gambling in the context of the non-remote
supply of gambling and betting services cannot be compared and examined as WTO-consistent
alternatives that the United States could have used to address the specific concerns it has with regard
to the remote supply of gambling and betting services.
6.522 In our consideration of whether the United States has explored and exhausted reasonably
available WTO-consistent alternatives, we note, importantly, that Antigua has asserted that it has in
place a regulatory regime that is sufficient to address the specific concern s identified by the United
States with respect to the remote supply of gambling and betting services. These include measures
aimed at countering money laundering that meet international standards 971, requirements for identity
verification, fraud prevention and gambling addiction 972, and that under-age gambling is expressly
prohibited by Antiguan law973.
6.523 Antigua further submits that it has offered to c onsult with the United States with a view to
meeting any specific concerns that may remain , notwithstanding the Antiguan regulatory regime .
Antigua claims that the United States has refused to engage in such consultations. Antigua also points
to lack of collaboration and consultation effo rts by the United States through a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty that exists between the two countri es to address concerns of the type raised by the
United States. Antigua submits that during consultati ons with the United States in the context of this
dispute, Antigua again expressed its willingness to cooperate with the United States to find a mutually
agreeable regulatory scheme. However, according to Antigua, the United States has on all occasions
refused to engage in consultation or cooperation. Antigua claims that the United States' refusal to
engage in consultations with Antigua is contrary to Article XIV of the GATS.974

971 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 34, 35, 43 and 45 et seq. See also Exhibit AB-5.
972 Antigua's first written submission, para. 43. In particular Antigua refers to a CFATF Report
(contained in Exhibit AB-8) which states that "the government of Antigua and Barbuda has shown a clear
commitment to a regulatory anti-money laundering regime that meets international standards" and that "Antigua
and Barbuda's new institutional anti money laundering fram ework is adequate and compliant with international
standards and is being enforced." Antigua adds that in practice as well as by requirement of Antiguan law,
winnings and the balance of deposits are transmitted b ack to the account from which the initial deposit came or,
if the deposit was by credit card, someti mes by credit back to the same cred it card. In some cases, amounts are
paid to players by cheque. In addition to satisfying Antig ua's regulatory requirements for identity verification,
anti-fraud prevention motivates operat ors to ensure identification, a number of operators use commercially
available databases where large amounts of information on persons can be found, including dates of birth and
employment, criminal record s, credit history and residential addresse s. Antigua submits that each Antiguan
operator maintains an "anti-fraud" department with the objective of preventing abuses of the gaming systems,
collusion among players, financial fraud and credit card abuse, under-age playing and other occurrences which
can result in financial losses to the operator. See also Exhibit AB-6.
973 Antigua's first written submission, paras. 45 et seq. In particular Antigua submits that under-age
gambling is expressly prohibited by Antiguan law. According to Antigua, experience has shown that under-age
gambling with Antiguan operators is relatively rare for several reasons. The first obstacle to gambling and
betting by minors is the age verification that forms a part of the identification process. A second material
obstacle is the need to f und an account before any wagering can co mmence, which requires access to financial
instruments such as cheques and a funded bank account, the ability to send funds by wire transfer from a funded
bank account or access to a valid credit card. Also, in practice, many Antiguan oper ators provide direct links
from their web sites to parental control providers such as "Cybersitter". Antigua submits that it is a requirement
of Antiguan law that operators display on their sites a warning of the addiction possibilities of gambling and
information to assist compulsive gamblers . Moreover, most operators appear to be able to detect patterns of
problem gamblers either at the sign-up stage (where the operators refuse to authorize funding of or playing on
an account) or later on during the cour se of the relationship with the player, in which event the person's account
will often be closed and the balance returned to the player. See also Exhibit AB-6.
974 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 4; Antigua 's second oral statemen t, para. 81; Antigua's
comments on the United States' reply to Panel question No. 43.

6.524 The United States submits that it has had significant interactions with Antigua on law
enforcement issues. The United States also subm its that it has made clear that it would welcome
Antigua's continued assistance in the investigati on and prosecution of mone y launderers and others
who violate US law. The United States asserts that it was not aware of any effort by the government
of Antigua to pursue such cooperation but, in any ev ent, Antigua's position in this dispute has made it
clear that Antigua is unwilling to recognize the existence of specific US regulatory concerns
surrounding remote supply of gambling.
975 The United States adds that, while it is not true that the
United States has "refused" to pursue international requests for assistance as suggested by Antigua,
there is a basis for its reluctance to do so since th is case involves Internet gamblers. For example, the
United States points to the fact that Antigua publicly took a position contrary to the United States in
the prosecution of an Antigua-based remote supplie r of gambling and betting services, Jay Cohen, by
filing an amicus brief in support of Mr. Cohen in the US Supreme Court. In addition, the United
States is troubled by the fact that a convicted felon, William Scott, was licensed as an Internet supplier
of gambling and betting services in Antigua. Acco rding to the United States, these matters suggest
that requests for assistance would not be fruitful.976
6.525 Antigua also claims that the United States' failure to respond to Antigua's invitation to
engage in international cooperation as to how to deal with the specific concerns the United States has
with the remote supply of gambling and betting servi ces is inconsistent with the United States' WTO
obligations.977 Antigua submits that international regula tory cooperation in the gambling sector is
possible and is already taking place. 978 The United States responds that, as a legal matter, nothing in
the text of the GATS requires such action. Furt her, as a factual matter, the absence of any US
domestic regulatory regime that permits the remote supply of gambling services makes it
unreasonable for Antigua to expect the United States to seek negotiations to permit such a regime for
its cross-border suppliers.979
6.526 We recall that Members are obliged to consider all reasonably available WTO-consistent
alternatives before imposing a WTO-inconsistent me asure (which may be justified by the relevant
WTO exceptions provisions). In this regard, the Panel notes the following statements made by the
panel in US – Tuna (Mexico) in its un-adopted report: "The United States had not demonstrated to the
Panel – as required of the party invoking an Articl e XX exception – that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin pr otection objectives through measures consistent with
the General Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements,
which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and
the high seas."980 We understand that the Appellate Body has recognized that there may be situations
where unilateral measures are justified under Article XX of the GATT.981 On the other hand, we note
that the Appellate Body has also insisted that "'as far as possible', a multilateral approach is strongly
"preferred".982

975 United States' reply to Panel question No. 43.
976 United States' reply to Panel question No. 43; United States' closing statement at the Panel's second
substantive meeting with the parties, para. 9.
977 Antigua's second oral statement, paras. 81-82.
978 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 82.
979 United States' second written submission, para. 120.
980 Panel Report on US – Tuna (Mexico) , para. 5.28. With regard to the legal value of an unadopted
GATT panel report, we recall that the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages stated at
page 15: "[W]e agree that a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted
panel report that it considered to be relevant".
981 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 124.
982 The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), at para. 124 of its Report added that:
"[I]t is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in th e application of a measure that is provisionally justified
under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GA TT 1994; it is another to require the conclusion of a

6.527 During the course of these Panel proceedings, we have concluded that the United States has
made a full market access commitment in its Schedule for gambling and betting services for
mode 1.983 The principle of effective treaty interpretation requires that meaning and effect be given to
this commitment, regardless of the motivation behind that commitment (even if the commitment may
have been undertaken inadvertently). In our view , a full commitment in respect of market access in a
Member's schedule for a particular mode of supply creates legitimate trade expectations and, thus,
obligations with respect to the committed sector.
6.528 Article XIV allows Members to derogate fro m their obligations under GATS (including any
specific commitments they may have undertaken) subject to the conditions stipulated in that Article.
Under Article XIV(a), the challenged measures must be "necessary" to protect public morals and/or
public order. Based on Appellate B ody decisions, we believe that a key element of the application of
the "necessity" test of Article XIV in this disput e is whether the United States has explored and
exhausted reasonably available WT O-consistent alternatives to the US prohibition on the remote
supply of gambling and betting services that would ensure the same level of protection.
6.529 In our view, it is in the context of assessing whether or not reasonably available WTO-
consistent alternatives exist and ha ve been explored by the United States that Antigua's invitation to
the United States to engage in cons ultations and/or negotiations on the particular concerns associated
with the remote supply of gambling and betting servi ces identified by the United States is relevant.
Through bilateral and multilateral consultations and negotiations, Memb ers may be able to determine
whether their concerns can be adequate ly addressed in a WTO-consistent manner. 984 In this case, we
note that a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty exists between Antigua and the United States, that could
be the framework within which such consultations could take place.
6.530 We do not overlook the possibility that, given the circumstances surrounding this case, the
United States may have been convinced that its sp ecific concerns could not have been adequately
addressed through such consultations and/or negotiations. Indeed, with respect to the possibility of
participating in international cons ultations and negotiations in this case, the United States suggested
that consultations would not have been "fruitful".985
6.531 Even if the United States is of the view that no such alternative curre ntly exists, the United
States cannot prejudge that the situatio n will remain unchanged in the future. 986 The United States'
obligation to consult with Anti gua before and while imposing its prohibition on the cross-border

multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding 'arbitrar y or unjustifiable discrimination' under the chapeau of
Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement."
983 We recall that Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreemen t provides that "Each Me mber shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreement."
984 The Panel recalls in this regard that Article 4.2 of the DSU states that: "Each Member undertakes to
accord sympathetic consider ation to and afford adeq uate opportunity for consultation regarding any
representation made by any Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement
taken within the territory of the former."
985 In particular, the United States submitted that: "While it is not true that the United States has
'refused' to pursue international requests for assistance as suggested ... there is a basis for a reluctance to do so if
the case involves Internet gamblers. For example, Antigua publically took a position contrary to the United
States in the prosecution of Jay Cohen by filing an amicus brief in support of Mr. Cohen in the US Supreme
Court. In addition, its licensing of William Scott, a convicted felon, is troubling. These matters suggest that
requests for assistance would not be fruitful if the investigation involves or is related to an Internet gambler" :
United States' closing remarks for the second oral statement, para. 9.
986 In this regard, we note that a number of jurisdictions in the world have legalized Internet gambling.
See, for example, Exhibit AB-2, p. 3; Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-10; Exhibit AB-17, p. 3 and 18 et seq, Exhibit AB-36,
pp. 13 et seq and 42 et seq . We also note that suggestions have been made in US literature as to how the
concerns that have been raised in the United States regarding the remote supply of gambling and betting services
may be addressed: Exhibit AB-159, pp. 6–7 and Exhibit AB-160, p. 9.

supply of gambling and betting services derives from the fact that it has undertaken a specific market
access commitment for mode 1. More specifically, it is because of the existence of this specific
market access commitment with respect to cross-border trade of gambling and betting services that
the United States remains obliged to consider WTO-consistent altern atives, including those that may
be suggested by Antigua and other Members, befo re and while maintaining its prohibition on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services. In rejecting Antigua's invitation to engage in
bilateral or multilateral consultati ons and/or negotiations, the Unite d States failed to pursue in good
faith a course of action that could have been used by it to explore the possibility of finding a
reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative.
987
"Weighing and Balancing"
6.532 Having identified and evaluated each of the el ements that we must assess in determining
whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read toge ther with the relevant state laws) and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) are "necessary" to protect
public morals and/or to maintain public order, we must now "weigh and balance" those elements.
6.533 As stated above, we conclude that the interests protected by the Wire Act, the Travel Act
(when read together with the relevant state laws ) and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read
together with the relevant state laws) protect very important societal interests in the United States.
We also conclude that the Wire Act, the Travel Ac t (when read together with the relevant state laws)
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read toge ther with the relevant state laws) contribute to
the realization of the ends pursued by those laws in the United States. On the other hand, as stated
above in paragraph 6.495, we also find that the measures in question have a significant impact on
trade. In this regard, we find that, while the Un ited States has legitimate specific concerns with
respect to money laundering, fraud, health and unde rage gambling that are specific to the remote
supply of gambling and betting services, which suggests that the measures in question are "necessary"
within the meaning of Article XIV(a), the United Stat es has declined Antigua's invitation to engage in
bilateral and/or multilateral consulta tions and/or negotiations to dete rmine whether there is a way of
addressing its concerns in a WTO-consistent manner.
6.534 We consider that, given the circumstance of th is case and for the reasons explained above in
paragraphs 6.526-6.530, the United States, before imposing a WTO inconsistent measure, was obliged
to explore these options in a good faith manner with a view to exhausting WTO-consistent
alternatives, even if it considered that the measures in question were "indispensable".
Overall conclusion on whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act are provisionally justified under Article XIV(a)
6.535 In sum, we conclude that, for the reasons explained above, the United States has not been able
to provisionally justify, under Article XIV(a) of the GATS, that the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when
read together with the relevant state laws) 988 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read

987 We note that the United States has submitted that "the absence of any US domestic regulatory
regime that permits the remote supply of gambling services makes it unreasonable for Antigua to expect the
United States to engage in international negotiations toward the establishment of such a regime for its cross-
border suppliers": United States' reply to Panel question No. 43. Further as noted above in paragraph 6.524, the
United States submitted that "while it is not true that the United States has 'refused' to pursue international
requests for assistance [in the investigation and prosecution of money launderers and others who violate US
law] ... there is a basis for a reluctance to do so if the cas e involves Internet gamblers. ... These matters suggest
that requests for assistance would not be fruitful if the investigation involves or is related to an Internet
gambler": United States' closing statement at the Panel's second substantive meeting with the parties, para. 9.
988 We recall that the "relevant state laws" for the purposes of the Travel Act are state laws that prohibit
a "business enterprise involving gambling". Such state laws would include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of

together with the relevant state laws) 989 are necessary to protect public morals and/or public order
within the meaning of Article XIV(a). We, noneth eless, acknowledge that such laws are designed so
as to protect public morals or maintain public order.
(d) Provisional justification under Article XIV(c)
(i) The legal standard under Article XIV(c)
6.536 Pursuant to the text of Article XIV(c), in determining whether a challenged measure is
provisionally justified under that Article, three elem ents must be demonstrated by the Member who
invokes Article XIV(c), namely:
(a) the measure for which justification is claimed must "secure compliance" with other
laws or regulations;
(b) those other "laws or regulations" must not be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement;
and
(c) the measure for which justification is claimed must be "necessary" to secure
compliance with those other laws or regulations. 990
6.537 We note that, textually, Article XIV(c) is very similar to Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.
Accordingly, on the basis of the comments made by the Appellate Body to which we have referred
above regarding the applicability of ju risprudence under the GATT 1994 to the GATS 991, we will
refer to and rely upon such jurisprudence to the exte nt to which it is applicable and relevant in our
interpretation of Article XIV(c).
Measures to "secure compliance" with laws or regulations
6.538 With respect to the first element, the Pane l notes that, in determining whether a measure
"secures compliance" with laws and regulations, the GATT panel in EEC – Parts and Components
found that such phrase in Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 is meant "to enforce obligations under
laws and regulations" rather than "to ensure th e attainment of the objectives of the laws and
regulations".992 We consider such a finding useful in th e context of Article XIV(c) of the GATS in
two respects. First, it indicates that the referenc e to "secure compliance" in Article XIV means that
the measures for which justification is sought must "enforce" the relevant laws and regulations.
Second, it indicates that the measures for which jus tification is sought must enforce "obligations"

the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South
Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
989 We recall that the "relevant state laws" for the purposes of the Illegal Gambling Business Act are
state laws that prohibit a "gambling business ". Such state laws would include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of
the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South
Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
990 We recall that the Appellate Body in Korea –Various Measures on Beef framed the analysis under
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 in terms of two require ments. Specifically, the Appellate Body stated that:
"For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragraph (d) of
Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the m easure must be one designed to 'secure compliance' with
laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the
measure must be 'necessary' to secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) as a justification
has the burden of demonstrating that these two re quirements are met." Appellate Body Report on Korea –
Various Measures on Beef , para. 157. We believe that our findings hereafter, which follow a three stage
analysis, are compatible with the Appellate Body's guidance in Korea –Various Measures on Beef.
991 See para. 6.448 above.
992 Panel Report on EEC – Parts and Components, paras. 5.14-5.18.

contained in the laws and regulations rather than merely ensure attainment of the objectives of those
laws and regulations.
6.539 As for the degree to which a measure must " secure compliance" with obligations under other
laws and regulations, we note that the panel in Korea – Various Measures on Beef recognized that a
measure need not be designed exclusively to "secure compliance" with th e justifying law. Rather, the
panel in that case accepted that it was sufficient if a measure was put in place, at least in part, in order
to secure compliance with the justifying legislation.
993
"Laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement"
6.540 As for the second element, we note that Article XIV(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of laws
or regulations "which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement". The list refers to
laws and regulations for the prevention of deceptiv e and fraudulent practices or to deal with the
effects of a default on services contracts; the protecti on of the privacy of individuals in relation to the
processing and dissemination of personal data; and the protection of confidentiality of individual
records and accounts; and safety. Accordingly, laws and regulations other than those that fall within
the list may be relied upon in justifying a GATS-in consistent measure under Article XIV(c) provided
that those other laws and regulations are WTO-consistent.
Measure "necessary" to secure compliance with laws or regulations
6.541 With respect to the third element, the Pane l recalls the "weighing and balancing" test
articulated by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef as the basis for making a
determination as to whether a measure is "necessar y" within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994.
6.542 On the basis of the articulation of the "weighing and balancing" test by the Appellate Body in
Korea – Various Measures on Beef and, subsequently, in EC – Asbestos 994, we believe that, in the
context of Article XIV(c), we must assess:
(a) the importance of interests or values that th e laws or regulations to be enforced are
intended to protect.
(b) the extent to which the enforcement measure contributes to the realization of the end
pursued, that is, to the securing of compliance with the laws or regulations to be
enforced.
(c) the trade impact of the enforcement measure.
(ii) Applying the legal standard under Article XIV(c) to the facts of this case
What are the "laws and regulations" relied upon by the United States?
6.543 As noted above, the measure for which justifi cation is claimed must secure compliance with
"other laws or regulations". The United States su bmits that the US Congress designed the Wire Act,
the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act in large part to serve as law enforcement tools
to secure compliance with other WTO-consistent US laws, namely, state gambling laws and criminal
laws related to organized crime.995

993 Panel Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 658.
994 Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 178; Appellate Body Report on
EC – Asbestos, para. 172.
995 United States' second written submission, paras. 95-106.

6.544 With respect to the state gambling laws , the United States argues that the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act secu re compliance with state laws that prohibit or
restrict gambling.996 The United States notes that the substan ce of most of the relevant state laws are
included in one of Antigua's exhibits.997
6.545 The United States argues that a Member's laws a nd regulations are presume d to be consistent
with WTO rules unless proven to be otherwise. According to the United States, although Antigua
challenges some of the state laws upon which the United States seeks to rely in its defence under
Article XIV(c), Antigua has not shown th at any are inconsistent with the GATS. 998 Antigua submits
that, to the extent that US state gambling laws are inconsistent with the GATS, they cannot be
invoked as the basis for a defence under Article XIV(c).999
6.546 The Panel recalls that the United States must de monstrate that the Wire Act, the Travel Act
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are necessar y to secure compliance with the state gambling
laws.1000
6.547 The United States has noted that most of the state gambling laws upon which it relies in
justifying the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act under Article XIV(c)
are those challenged by the Antigua in its Panel re quest. However, the United States has provided us
with no specific discussion of why and how the various state laws are WTO-consistent other than to
say that Antigua has failed to make out a prima facie case with respect to those laws and that,
therefore, their WTO-consistency can be presumed. 1001 In the Panel's view, this assertion is not
enough to discharge the United States' obligation to demonstrate that it complied with the
requirements of Article XIV(c) . 1002 This failure is particularly significant in light of the fact that we
have concluded above that, of the state laws upon which the United States seeks to rely, the state laws
of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah are inconsistent with US commitments in its
Schedule under Article XVI of the GATS. Accordi ngly, we conclude that the United States is not
entitled to rely upon state gambling laws in its defence under Article XIV(c).
6.548 In relation to the criminal laws related to organized crime , the United States submits that the
Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are measures "against organized
crime". The United States argues that, as measures ag ainst organized crime, the Wire Act, the Travel
Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act secure co mpliance with US laws and regulations that
define and/or prohibit organized crime, as well as laws and regulations that prohibit the criminal
activity that, when committed in certain ways, constitu tes organized crime. In this regard, the United
States specifically refers to the Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations statute ("RICO

996 United States' reply to Panel question No. 45.
997 Namely, in Exhibit AB-99.
998 United States' reply to Panel question No. 45.
999 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 70.
1000 See our discussion in paras. 6.448-6.451 above.
1001 United States' second written submission, para. 98.
1002 Despite a question from the Panel requesting the United States to "clearly and specifically identify
the provisions of laws and regulations with which it says the challenged measures secure compliance under
Article XIV(c)", the United States merely referred in a f ootnote to the provisions of two state laws by way of
example. The footnote did not contain the text of those provisions: United States' reply to Panel question
No. 45. Specifically, the United States referred to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1102; Hawaii Rev. Statutes
§§ 712-1221 through 712-1223. The te xt that accompanied this footnote was: "State laws restricting gambling
include the laws by which a number of states prohibit some or all gambling." We note that, when discussing the
relevant state gambling in its second written submission, the United States did refer the Panel through a footnote
to Exhibit US-34. However, that Exhibit does not specifically identify obligations in the relevant state laws.
Rather, it merely contains examples of state gambling policies for six US states.

statute"), the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 findings that contain a definition of "organized
crime", and Attorney General Order 1386-89, which also contains a definition of organized crime.
1003
6.549 With respect to the criminal laws relating to organized crime upon which the United States
also seeks to rely in making its defence under Ar ticle XIV(c), Antigua has not questioned their WTO-
consistency. Therefore, since Members' laws are presumed to be WTO-consistent 1004, the Panel
considers that we are entitled to assume that these laws are WTO-consistent.
6.550 Antigua has argued with respect to these laws, however, that the United States has not
submitted sufficient information on them and that it merely cites a number of specific laws by way of
example but does not try to give a comprehensive overview of the main state and federal laws at
issue.1005 We note that the United States has made sp ecific reference to the RICO statute, the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 "findings", and Attorney General Order 1386-89 in arguing that
criminal laws relating to organized crime justif y the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act. We consider that the Unit ed States has submitted sufficient information in
relation to the RICO statute. In particular, it has named it, explained it and provided the text
containing the relevant provisions.1006 Accordingly, we will confine our attention to the RICO statute
in considering the United States' defence under Ar ticle XIV(c) but will make reference to the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 "findings " and Attorney General Order 1386-89 for the
definition of organized crime to the extent that such reference is necessary.
6.551 In summary, the Panel finds that the United States may not rely upon state gambling laws in
making its defence under Article XIV(c) because th e laws of four US states upon which the United
States seeks to rely have been found to be inconsis tent with US obligations under the GATS in these
proceedings. With respect to the other state laws , the Panel finds that the United States has not
discharged its obligation to specifically identify th e state gambling laws upon which it seeks to rely
and the obligations contained therein. In relation to criminal laws relating to organized crime, we find
that the United States may rely upon the RICO statute in asserting a defence under Article XIV(c).
Do the challenged measures secure compliance with the RICO statute?
Existence of a measure that "secures compliance" with the RICO statute
6.552 According to the United States, the Wire Act aids in the enforcement of the RICO statute.
The Wire Act is part of an essential enforcement strategy insofar as it places restrictions on major
sources of funds for organized crime.1007 The United States submits that local law officials seeking to
enforce such laws are often powerless to act without the aid and assistance of the federal
government.1008 The United States submits that the Travel Ac t, similarly, aids in the enforcement of
the RICO statute. The United States argues more par ticularly that the Travel Act enables the federal
government to "take effective action against th e racketeer who conducts an unlawful business but
lives far from the scene in comfort and safety."1009 The United States also submits that US courts have
confirmed that the Illegal Gambling Business Act provides an enforcement tool in cases where local
officials fail to prosecute illegal gambling.1010

1003 United States' reply to Panel question No. 45.
1004 Appellate Body Report on US – Carbon Steel, para. 115
1005 Antigua's comments on the United States' reply to Panel question No. 45.
1006 See the United States' reply to Panel question No. 45, Exhibit US-35 and Exhibit US-42.
1007 United States' second written submission, para. 103.
1008 United States' second written submission, paras. 74 et seq.
1009 United States' second written submission, para. 80.
1010 United States' second written submission, para. 85.

6.553 The Panel notes that the United States has provi ded it with the text of the RICO statute 1011,
which defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act or threat involving ... gambling ... which is
chargeable under State law". The statute further provides in relevant part that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person who has re ceived any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal ... to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce ..."
6.554 Given that the Wire Act prohibits suppliers of betting and wagering services from using a
wire communication facility for, inter alia, the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers, we consider that it assists in enforcing, at least in part, the RICO statute. In particular, it
helps to curb organized crime operations that might rely upon the use of wire communication
technologies for the supply of gambling and betting services across state and international borders.
Therefore, we find that the Wire Act "secures compliance" with the RICO statute.
6.555 The Travel Act prohibits the supply of gambling services through mail or "any facility" in
interstate or foreign commerce. We consider that th is Act assists in enforcing, at least in part, the
RICO statute. In particular, it helps to curb orga nized crime operations that might rely upon the use
of mail or other "facilities" for gambling across state a nd international borders. Thus, we find that the
Travel Act "secures compliance" with the RICO statute.
6.556 Finally, we find that the Illegal Gambling Business Act assists in enforcing the RICO statute
because it prohibits conducting, financ ing, managing, supervising, dir ecting or owning all or part of
an "illegal gambling business", which may have links to organized crime.
"Necessity" of the measure taken to secure compliance
6.557 Having found that the Wire Act, the Travel Ac t and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are all
used to secure compliance with the RICO statut e, we now turn to whether these measures are
"necessary" to secure compliance with the RICO statute. In this regard, based on Appellate Body
decisions, we must assess:
(a) the importance of the interests or values that the RICO statute is intended to protect;
(b) the extent to which the Wire Act, the Tr avel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act contribute to the realization of the end pursued, that is, to secure compliance with
the RICO statute; and
(c) the trade impact of the Wire Act, the Tr avel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act.
6.558 With respect to the importance of the interests or valu es protected by the RICO statute , the
United States argues that organized crime poses an "acute" danger to the United States and that the
RICO statute seeks to address that danger. 1012 The Panel notes that the Congressional Statement of
Findings and Purpose for the RICO statute refers to organized crime as a significant drain on the US
economy, a source of interference with free comp etition and a threat to democratic processes,
domestic security and the general welfare of the na tion. The Congressional Statement also refers to
links between organized crime and the illegal use of force, fraud, corruption and syndicated

1011 Exhibit US-35.
1012 United States' second written submission, paras. 74 et seq.

gambling.
1013 It is clear to us from this statement that the interests protected by the RICO statute are
very important societal interests that can be characterized as "vital and important in the highest
degree" in a similar way to the characterization of the protection of human life and health against a
life-threatening health risk by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos.
1014
6.559 As for the extent to which the Wire Act, the Travel Act and th e Illegal Gambling Business Act
contribute to the realization of the end pursued , namely to secure of compliance with the RICO
statute, the United States argues that these Acts ma ke an essential contribution to the enforcement of
this law. The United States submits that the Wire Act aids in suppressing organized gambling in
pursuance of the organized crime laws because, in its absence, the use of wire communications
technologies for the dissemination of gambling inform ation frustrate local law-enforcement efforts
aimed at combating organized crime.
1015 The United States submits that, similarly, the Travel Act
aids in suppressing organized gambling in pursuance of the organized crime laws because, in its
absence, local law-enforcement efforts aimed at combating organized crime are frustrated. 1016 With
respect to the Illegal Gambling Business Act, the Unite d States refers to a statement by one legislator
who observed that the Illegal Gambling Business Ac t provides "an impetus for effective and honest
local law enforcement, but also by making availabl e to assist local effort s the expertise, manpower,
and resources of the Federal agencies which un der existing Federal antigambling statutes have
developed high levels of special competence for dealing with gambling and corruption cases."1017
6.560 The Panel does not consider that the issue of the possible of involvement of Antigua's
gambling industry in organized crime is relevant in deciding whether or not the Wire Act, the Travel
Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act contri bute to securing compliance with criminal laws
dealing with organized crime, such as the RICO stat ute. Rather, it is our view that our examination
should entail an objective assessment of whether and, if so, the extent to which, these Acts play a role
in enforcing the laws and regulations in question. We find that, in fact, the Wire Act does make a
significant contribution to ensuring that local law enfo rcement efforts to enforce criminal laws against
organized crime, including the RICO statute, are not undermined, given that the Act applies to the
supply of betting and wagering services by wire co mmunication across intersta te and international
borders. The Panel also finds that the Travel Ac t makes a significant contribution to ensuring that
local law enforcement efforts to enforce criminal laws against organized crime, including the RICO
statute, are not undermined, given that it appli es to the supply of betting and wagering services by
mail and other "facilities" across interstate and intern ational borders. Finally, the Panel finds that the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act make a significant contribution in ensuring that
local law enforcement efforts to enforce criminal laws against organized crime, including the RICO
statute, are not undermined. In making certa in gambling activity illegal under federal law by
reference to what is illegal under state law, they allow federal resources to be used to combat
organized crime.
6.561 With respect to the trade impact of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, Antigua argues that the effect of, inter alia, the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act is total prohibition, which is the most trade-restrictive approach possible. 1018
Indeed, the United States has admitted as much when arguing that a Member has "the right to heavily
restrict a highly risky service (in this case, gambling by remote supply) while allowing the use of a
less risky service [in this case, gambling by non-remote means]".
1019

1013 Exhibit US-35, pp. 812-813.
1014 Appellate Body Report on EC – Asbestos, para. 172.
1015 United States' second written submission, paras. 78 et seq.
1016 United States' second written submission, paras. 78 et seq.
1017 Congressional Record H9712 contained in Exhibit US-32.
1018 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 71.
1019 United States' second written submission, para. 93.

6.562 As to whether there are any WTO-consistent alternatives to the prohibition imposed by the
Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act that are reasonably available to the
United States, we note the submission by the United St ates that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act are "indispensable" to defeating organized crime.
1020 However, it
cannot be enough that the United States believes and maintains that a measure is "indispensable". The
onus lies on the United States to show that it has explor ed WTO-consistent alternatives. As we stated
above in paragraphs 6.522-6.531, we believe that the United States should have engaged in good faith
bilateral or multilateral consultations and/or negotiations with Antigua when invited to do so, with a
view to exploring whether there were any ways of meeting its concerns with regard to organized
crime in a WTO-consistent manner.
6.563 Having identified and evaluated each of the el ements that we must assess in determining
whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act are "necessary" to secure
compliance with the RICO statute, we will now "weigh and balance" our assessment of those
elements.
6.564 In the Panel's view, the interests protected by the RICO statute are important. Further, in our
view, the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act make a significant
contribution to ensuring that local law enforcemen t efforts to enforce criminal laws relating to
organized crime, including the RICO statute are not undermined. On the other hand, the measures in
question have a significant impact on trade and the United States has not explored and exhausted
WTO-consistent alternatives in the form of consu ltations and/or negotiations to determine whether
there is a way of ensuring that its organized crim e concerns can be addressed in a WTO-consistent
manner. In our view, the United States is required to do so in order to demonstrate that the challenged
measures are "necessary" within the meaning Article XIV(c).
Overall conclusion on whether the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act are provisionally justified under Article XIV(c)
6.565 In sum, we conclude that, for the reasons explained above, the United States has not been able
to provisionally justify that the Wire Act, the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state
laws)1021 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when r ead together with the relevant state laws) 1022
are necessary within the meaning of Article XIV( c) of GATS to secure compliance with the RICO
statute, but which we, nonetheless, acknowledge are important to enforce US criminal laws relating to
organized crime.
(e) The chapeau of Article XIV
6.566 Given that the Panel has reached the conclusion that the United States has not been able to
provisionally justify the Wire Act, the Travel Act (w hen read together with the relevant state laws)
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the relevant state laws) under
Article XIV(a) nor under Article XIV(c) of the GATS, logically, it is not necessary for us to proceed
to consider whether the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV have been met. However, since
important arguments have been made by the parti es on key issues discussed below, we have decided
to address them so as to assist the parties in resolving the underlying dispute in this case.

1020 United States' second written submission, para. 105.
1021 We recall that the "relevant state laws" for the purposes of the Travel Act are state laws that
prohibit a "business enterprise involving gambling". Such state laws would include but are not limited to §
14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the
South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
1022 We recall that the "relevant st ate laws" for the purposes of the Illegal Gambling Business Act are
state laws that prohibit a "gambling business ". Such state laws would include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of
the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South
Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.

6.567 The United States claims that the Wire Act, th e Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act meet the requirements of the chapeau of Ar ticle XIV, as none of these measures discriminate on
the basis of nationality. The United States submit s that these measures reflect authentic societal
concerns and were enacted long be fore the existence of the Internet and before the GATS came into
force. The United States further submits that this is evidence that protectionist motivations are
absent.
1023
6.568 Antigua argues that the manner in which th e US measures are applied constitutes both
"arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" and a "d isguised restriction on trade in services" within
the meaning of the chapeau of Article XIV.1024
(i) The legal standard under the chapeau of Article XIV
6.569 The chapeau of Article XIV reads as follows:
"Subject to the requirement that such me asures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services,
nothing in this Agreement shall be constr ued to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures ..."
6.570 The chapeau requires that the measures in question are not applied in a manner that would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services.
6.571 The Panel notes that the chapeau of Article XI V is textually similar to the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994. On the basis of the comments made by the Appellate Body referred to
above regarding the applicability of jurisprudence under the GATT 1994 to the GATS 1025, we will
refer to such jurisprudence to the extent to which it is applicable and relevant in interpreting and
applying the chapeau to Article XIV in this case.
6.572 We begin by recalling several principles relevant to the interpretation and application of the
chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS on the basis of jurisprudence in respect of Article XX of the
GATT 1994.
6.573 First, we recall jurisprudence in which the A ppellate Body identified some broad parameters
within which exceptions under the GATT 1994 may be relied upon. In the specific context of
Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline stated that:
"The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within
one of the exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in
its application, constitute abuse of su ch exception under the chapeau, rests on the
party invoking the exception. That is, of necessity, a heavier task than that involved
in showing that an exception, such as Ar ticle XX(g), encompasses the measure at
issue."1026
6.574 The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline also stated that the chapeau to Article XX of the GATT
1994 has been worded to prevent the abuse of exceptions under that Article:

1023 United States second written submission, para. 119.
1024 Antigua's second oral statement, paras. 80-83.
1025 See para. 6.448 above.
1026 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 22.

"The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or
its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is
applied.
1027 It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose and object of
the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of 'abuse of the
exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX].' 1028 This insight drawn from
the drafting history of Article XX is a valu able one. The chapeau is animated by the
principle that while the exceptions of Artic le XX may be invoked as a matter of legal
right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the
holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement . If those
exceptions are not to be abused or misu sed, in other words, the measures falling
within the particular exceptions must be a pplied reasonably, with due regard both to
the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other
parties concerned."
1029
6.575 The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp elaborated on the notion of preventing abuse or misuse
of the exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 19 94. The Appellate Body found that "a balance
must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty
of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members". 1030 The Appellate Body then
linked the balance of rights and obligations under the chapeau of Article XX to the general principle
of good faith:
"The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good
faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of
international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this
general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit ,
prohibits the abusive exercise of a state' s rights and enjoins that whenever the
assertion of a right 'impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonabl y'. An abusive exercise by a Member of
its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members
and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting. Having said
this, our task here is to interpret th e language of the chapeau, seeking additional
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international
law."
1031
6.576 It is on the basis of this obligation of good faith and because it had negotiated with some
Members but not with others, that the Appellate Bo dy concluded that the United States was acting
inconsistently with the chapeau of XX of the GATT in that dispute.1032

1027 ( original footnote ) This was noted in the Panel Report on United States – Imports of Certain
Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD 30S/107, para. 56; adopted on 26 May 1983.
1028 ( original footnote ) EPCT/C.11/50, p. 7; quoted in Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and
Practice, Volume I, p. 564 (1995).
1029 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 22.
1030 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 156.
1031 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 158. In the following paragraph 159, the Appellate
Body added: "The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of
locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between th e right of a Member to invoke an exception under
Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the
GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or
impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as
the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ."
1032 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 119-123.

6.577 The Appellate Body has also provided certain guidance on the meaning of the terms "arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail" and "disguised
restriction", which are used in the chapeau to both Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of
the GATS.
6.578 With respect to the meaning of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where like conditions prevail", the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp stated that:
"In order for a measure to be applied in a manner which would constitute "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countri es where the same conditions prevail",
three elements must exist. First, the application of the measure must result in
discrimination. As we stated in United States – Gasoline , the nature and quality of
this discrimination is different from the di scrimination in the treatment of products
which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of
the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, III or XI.
1033 Second, the discrimination must be
arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. We will examine this element of arbitrariness
or unjustifiability in detail below. Third, this discrimination must occur between
countries where the same conditions prevail . In United States – Gasoline , we
accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal that such discrimination
could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between
exporting Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the standards
embodied in the language of the chapeau ar e not only different from the requirements
of Article XX(g); they are also different from the standard used in determining that
Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994."
1034
6.579 The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline provided certain guidance on the term "disguised
restriction" on international trade:
"'Arbitrary discrimination', 'unjustifiable discr imination' and 'disguised restriction' on
international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to
one another. It is clear to us that 'disguised restriction' includes disguised
discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or
unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the
meaning of 'disguised restriction'. We cons ider that 'disguised restriction', whatever
else it covers, may properly be read as embr acing restrictions amounting to arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination in interna tional trade taken under the guise of a
measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a
somewhat different manner, the kinds of c onsiderations pertinent in deciding whether
the application of a particular measure amounts to 'arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination', may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a
'disguised restriction' on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in
the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to
substantive rules available in Article XX."
1035
6.580 We understand from the Appellate Body's comments in US – Gasoline that there is a certain
degree of overlap between, on the one hand, what may be considered as "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" in the context of the chapeau a nd, on the other, what may be considered as a

1033 ( original footnote ) In US – Gasoline , adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 23, we stated:
"The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a
substantive rule has been determined to have occurred."
1034 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, para. 150.
1035 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, p. 25.

"disguised restriction on trade". This is so because a "disguised restriction" includes disguised
discrimination in international trade and a "disguised restriction" may be read as embracing
restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable di scrimination in international trade. Accordingly,
we consider that the manner in which a measure is applied may simultaneously lead to the conclusion
that such an application constitutes arbitrary or unj ustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction
on trade within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XIV.
6.581 To sum up these interpretive principles, th e chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
addresses not so much a challenged measure or its specific content, but rather the manner in which
that measure is applied, with a view to ensuring th at the exceptions of Article XX are not abused. In
order to do so, the chapeau of Article XX identifies three standards which may be invoked in relation
to the same facts: arbitrary discrimination, unjus tifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on
trade. In our view, these principles would also be applicable in relation to Article XIV of the GATS.
6.582 With these general interpretative principles in mind, the Panel now proceeds to consider the
parties' arguments as to whether the US measures in question are consistent with the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XIV. More particularly, in light of Antigua's challenge, we will consider
whether there is evidence that the manner in which the United States applies the Wire Act, the Travel
(when read together with the relevant state la ws) Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when
read together with the relevant state laws) c onstitutes "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on trade".
(ii) Application of the legal standard under the chapeau of Article XIV to the facts of this case
6.583 The Panel notes that the United States did not argue and develop its defence under
Article XIV until it made its second written submissi on. It only affirmatively invoked Article XIV
during the Panel's second substantive meeting with th e parties in response to a question posed by the
Panel.
6.584 Antigua did not advance much argumentation in response to the submissions made and
evidence adduced by the United States in support of its defence under Article XIV. However, we
consider that a number of the factual arguments ma de by Antigua in the context of Article XVII are
relevant in deciding whether or not the measures in question are applied in a manner that constitutes
"arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail" and/or a
"disguised restriction on trade". More particularly, we consider that they are relevant in determining
whether or not the United States is consistent in prohibiting the remote supply of gambling and
betting services. In our view, the absence of consiste ncy in this regard may lead to a conclusion that
the measures in question are applied in a manne r that constitutes "arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on
trade". Below, we evaluate all the evidence presen ted to the Panel that we consider relevant in
determining whether the United States has been ap plying and enforcing domestically its prohibition
on the remote supply of gambling and betting services in a consistent manner.
Enforcement against local suppliers
6.585 Antigua submits that, although large-scale Intern et operators in the United States are offering
betting services via the Internet, the United States does not take enforcement action against them. 1036
Antigua submits that several US-based compani es, namely, Youbet.com, TVG, Capital OTB and
Xpressbet.com, have been providing telephone or online gambling and betting services for some
time.1037 Antigua argues that, in contrast, in the case of United States v. Jay Cohen, an operator of an
Internet sportsbook service based in Antigua was prosecuted and ultimately convicted under the Wire

1036 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 94.
1037 Antigua's first written submission, para. 118; Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 19.

Act even though that operator had modelled his business on that of Capital OTB, a US company that
has been offering interstate betting by telephone for more than 20 years as well as more recently by
the Internet without prosecution under the Wire Act.
1038
6.586 The United States submits that it applies its pr ohibition on the remote supply of gambling and
betting services equally as regards domestic companies and those supplying such services from
abroad.1039 In support, the United States refers to statistics from the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice that show that it approved 90 racketeering
prosecutions from 1992 to 2002 allegi ng violations of the Wire Act, the Illegal Gambling Business
Act or both. The United States submits that th e vast majority of these 90 cases involved purely
domestic betting activity, not cross-border gambling. The United States also refers to statistics from
the Department of Justice that show that 125 cases were filed under the Wire Act and 951 cases were
filed under the Illegal Gambling Business Act be tween 1992 and September 2003. The Department
of Justice confirmed that only a handful of th ese cases involved supply of gambling from outside the
United States.
1040
6.587 According to the United States, while Youbet.co m states on its website that it is in "full
compliance with all applicable state and federal law" 1041, Youbet.com disclosed in its 2002 annual
report that "the United States Justice Department is in the process of taking action against selected
companies that it deems to be operating without pr oper licensing and regulatory approval" and that
Youbet.com "faces the risk" of criminal proceedings and penalties brought by the government, and the
United States agrees with that risk assessment.
1042 The United States further submits that there have
been many reported court cases representing just a small fraction of all prosecutions in which the
Department of Justice used the federal gambling la ws that are challenged by Antigua to prosecute
illegal wagering on horseracing. 1043 The United States points to arrest figures for illegal gambling in
support of its argument that the Department of Justice considers illegal gambling a serious crime
meriting active investigation and prosecution.1044
6.588 In relation to the enforcement of the US prohi bition on the remote supply of gambling and
betting services against domestic suppliers of such services, the Panel notes indications by the United
States that prosecution proceedings against Youbet.com1045 are currently pending and, more generally,

1038 Antigua's reply to Panel question No. 12. In addition, we note that, while Antigua has submitted
evidence in Exhibits AB-163, AB-165 and AB-166 to suggest that underage gambling and betting occurs when
the relevant services are supplied through non-remote means in the United States, Antigua has not suggested
that the United States does not enforce its laws to pr ohibit such underage gambling and betting in the United
States. Therefore, we do not deal with this argument here.
1039 United States' first written submission, para. 101.
1040 United States' second oral statement, paras. 62–66.
1041 United States' reply to Panel question No. 21.
1042 United States' second oral statement, paras. 66–67 . The United States refers to Youbet.com, Inc.,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10 K An nual Report under Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 fo r the fiscal Year Ended December 31 , 2001, Commission File Number: 33
13789LA (April 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814055/000102140802005310/
0001021408 02 005310.txt.
1043 United States' second oral statement, para. 65. The United refers in particular to Erlenbaugh v.
United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972);United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1987); United States v. Denton, 556 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); United States v.
O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020 (6th Ci r. 1974; United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Swank, 441 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bergland, 318 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 861 (1963);United States v. Athanas, 362 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F.
Supp. 276 (N.D.W.Va. 1962).
1044 United States' first written submission, paras. 23 et seq; United States' closing remarks, second oral
statement, para. 9.
1045 Exhibit AB-42 indicates that Youbet.com supplies services by remote means relating to wagering
on horse racing only.

that it applies and vigorously enforces its proh ibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and
betting services against domestic and foreign suppliers alike. 1046 We have no evidence as to the
enforcement action, if any, that the United States is taking against other remote suppliers of gambling
and betting services, including TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com. 1047 With respect to
enforcement of the US prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services against
suppliers of such services from other Members, we have evidence of the prosecution of one Antiguan
operator for having failed to abide by the prohib ition against the remote supply of gambling and
betting services under the Wire Act.1048
6.589 In our view, the foregoing evidence is inconclusive. We, therefore, find that the United States
has failed to demonstrate that the manner in which it enforced its prohibition on the remote supply of
gambling and betting services against TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com is consistent with the
requirements of the chapeau.
Video lottery terminals
6.590 Antigua refers to a number of US states where video lottery terminals are legal 1049 and notes
that state lotteries market and sell their products through computers and electronic connections to the
source of the lotteries. 1050 Antigua submits these operations involve "remote" gambling because the
gambler does not need to physically go to the lottery to play. 1051 The United States argues that, with
respect to the video lottery terminals, the service consumer must present himself or herself in person
at an authorized lottery distribution location. Thus, the supply of the service by these means is non-
remote.
1052
6.591 The Panel recalls that the United States has defined the "remote" supply of gambling and
betting services as follows:
"By remote supply, the United States means situations in which the gambling service
supplier (whether foreign or domestic) and the service consumer are not physically
together. In other words, the consumer of a remotely supplied service does not have
to go to any type of outlet, be it a reta il facility, a casino, a vending machine, etc.
Instead, the remote supplier has no point of presence but offers the service directly to
the consumer through some means of dist ance communication. Non-remote supply
means that the consumer presents himself or herself at a supplier's point of presence,
thus facilitating identification of the individual, age verification, etc."
1053
6.592 According to this definition, the United St ates defines non-remote supply as instances where
the consumer presents himself or herself at a supp lier's point of presence to facilitate, amongst other
things, identification of the individual and age verification.

1046 In addition to the evidence pointed to by the United States in paragraph 6.586 above, we note that
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report states that "The federal government has been
active in the area of Internet gambling. Thus far, DOJ has investigated and brought charges of violating the
Wire Communications Act. All the defendants operated their businesses offshore and maintained that they were
licensed by foreign governments": Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-9.
1047 The Panel has evidence that indicates that at l east TVG and Capital OTB are supplying services by
remote means relating to wagering on horse racing only: Exhibits AB-43, AB-44 and AB-123. We note that
Exhibit AB-44 indicates that Capital OTB supplies services relating to lotteries as well as wagering on horse
racing but there is no suggestion in the evidence that these services are supplied remotely.
1048 Exhibit AB-83.
1049 Antigua's first written submission, para. 123.
1050 Antigua's first oral statement, paras. 92-93.
1051 Antigua's second oral statement, paras. 62-63.
1052 United States' second written submission, para. 65.
1053 United States' reply to Panel question No. 42.

6.593 In our view, Antigua has not effectively refuted the United States' submission that
identification and age verification do not occur when lottery tickets are purchased through video
lottery terminals. We note that the evidence suggest s that the video lottery terminals are located on
shop counters, suggesting that they are, in fact, manned.
1054 Consequently, the Panel is not convinced
that the sale of lottery tickets through video lottery terminals can be categorized as "remote" supply.
6.594 Therefore, the Panel concludes that, based on the evidence presented to the Panel regarding
video lottery terminals, the United States has demons trated that the manner in which it applies the US
federal prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services domestically is not
inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of GATS as regards video lottery
terminals.
Interstate Horseracing Act
6.595 Antigua submits that the Interstate Horseraci ng Act ("IHA") permits the remote supply of
gambling and betting services for horse races. 1055 Antigua argues that the federal laws that prohibit
the use of remote communication to supply gamb ling and betting services do not apply to horse race
betting because the IHA effectively "exempts" such betting from the application of the relevant
federal laws. 1056 According to the United States, the IHA does not provide legal authority for any
form of Internet gambling. 1057 The United States submits that the IHA did not repeal the pre-existing
federal laws making such activity illegal.1058
6.596 The Panel recalls that the United States must su bmit evidence sufficient to substantiate its
assertion that the provisions of the IHA do not au thorize interstate pari -mutuel wagering over the
telephone or other modes of electronic communication, including the Internet.
6.597 The United States has submitted that the IHA is a civil statute for which the federal
government has no enforcement role. The United Stat es also submits that, in December 2000, when
the definition of the term "interstate off-track wage r" in the IHA was amended, Congress, did not also
amend pre-existing criminal statutes, which prohibit cross border gambling. 1059 Further, the United
States refers us to a statement made by the then President William J. Clinton after the bill containing
the amendment to the IHA was passed by Congress, which suggests that the amendment to the IHA
was not intended to legalize common pool and inters tate wagering, including "via telephone or other
electronic media".1060 The statement indicates that the IHA wa s not intended to repeal the Wire Act,
the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Ac t, which are specifically referred to in the
statement.
6.598 In its submissions, Antigua refers us to the defi nition of "interstate off-track wager" in the
IHA, which was amended in December 2000 to provide as follows:
"[T]he term ... 'interstate off-track wager' means a legal wager placed or accepted in
one State with respect to the outcome of a horserace taking place in another State and

1054 See Exhibits AB-190 and AB-191. We note that Antigua has also made reference in its reply to
Panel question No. 19 to interstate lottery games for which lottery tickets are purchased through retail terminals.
However, in our view, in its reply, Antigua does not demonstrate that the terminals in question are not manned
so as to facilitate identification and age verification.
1055 Antigua's first written submission, para. 116.
1056 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 92.
1057 United States' first written submission, paras. 33-35; United States' second written submission,
para. 63.
1058 United States' reply to Panel question No. 21.
1059 United States' reply to Panel question No. 21.
1060 Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act (21 December 2000) contained in Exhibit US-17, pp. 3155-3156.

includes pari-mutuel wagers, where lawful in each State involved, placed or
transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media and
accepted by an off-track betting system in the same or another State, as well as the
combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools."
6.599 We agree with Antigua that the text of the re vised statute does appear, on its face, to permit
interstate pari-mutuel wagering over the telephone or other modes of electronic communication,
which presumably would include the Internet, as long as such wagering is legal in both states.
Antigua also refers us to a statement made by a Member of the US Congress during the parliamentary
debates regarding the amendment, which suggests th at the amendment to the IHA has the effect of
legalizing interstate horse race gambling over the Internet.
1061 In our view, even if the IHA did not
repeal the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Ille gal Gambling Business Act as has been submitted by
the United States, there is ambiguity as to the re lationship between, on the one hand, the amendment
to the IHA and, on the other, the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act.
We consider this relationship to be critical in dete rmining whether, in fact, the amendment to the IHA
permits wagering on horse racing by means of electronic communication.
6.600 Given the conflicting interpretations put forwar d by Antigua and the United States regarding
the interpretation of the IHA and since it is for th e United States to demonstrate that it has complied
with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV, we find that the evidence presented to the Panel
is inconclusive and that the United States has not demonstrated that the IHA, as amended, does not
permit interstate pari-mutuel wa gering for horse racing over the tele phone or using other modes of
electronic communication, including the Internet.1062
Nevada
6.601 Antigua argues that Nevada bookmakers offer th eir services to home-users via the Internet
and the telephone. 1063 The United States submits that the services provided by Nevada bookmakers
that are referred to by Antigua are not offered on the publicly accessible Internet, but on a local
private network.
1064 In response, Antigua submits that the so-called private network is a security
technology used over the internet, not a separate local network. 1065 Further, in response to a question
posed by the Panel relating to a reference in th e Bear Stearns Report to proposals for Internet
gambling in the state of Nevada, the United States s ubmits that Nevada's plans for Internet gambling
are on hold and that Nevada has been informed by th e Department of Justice that US federal law does
not permit Internet transmission of a bet or wager. According to the United States, Nevada officials
have assured federal officials that no operation licensed in Nevada has been approved or authorized to
use any wagering system that operates over the Internet.1066
6.602 The only evidence that we have before us with regard to Antigua's allegation that Nevada
bookmakers currently offer their services to home-u sers via the Internet and the telephone is an
advertisement for the supply of services by a Nevada bookmaker. 1067 On the basis of this evidence,

1061 Congressional Record H11230-03 contained in Exhibit AB-124, p. 5.
1062 In forming this conclusion, we have also had regard to Exhibit AB-17, Appendix II, Exhibit AB-39,
p. 5, Exhibit AB-54, pp. 7 and 29, Exhibit AB-70, p. 7, Exhibit AB-124 and Exhibit AB-125, page 3.
1063 Antigua's first written submission, para. 122.
1064 United States' first written submission, paras. 36-37.
1065 Antigua's first oral statement, para. 7.
1066 United States' reply to Panel question No. 23.
1067 Exhibit AB-47. We note that we have also had regard to evidence that suggests that Internet
gambling is currently legal or may be legalized in Nevada in the future: See, for example, Exhibit AB-10, p. 5-7,
Exhibit AB-36, pp. 34-35, Exhibit AB-73 and Exhibit AB-199, p. 4. However, as noted previously, in response
to question No. 23 posed by the panel, the United States indicated that Nevada's plans for Internet gambling are
on hold and that Nevada officials have assured federal o fficials that no operation licensed in Nevada has been
approved or authorized to use any wagering system that operates over the Internet.

the Panel is not convinced that Nevada bookmakers supply services to home-users via the Internet and
the telephone.
6.603 Therefore, the Panel believes that, based on th e evidence presented to the Panel regarding the
situation in Nevada, the United States has demons trated that the manner in which it applies the
prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services as regards Nevada is not
inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of GATS.
Letters from the President of the North Amer ican Association of State and Provincial
Lotteries
6.604 Antigua refers to two letters of the president of an association of state lotteries in the United
States (the "NASPL"), noting that both letters state that the NASPL "does not take a position on
Internet gambling, per se" but that it is the position of the NASPL "that each individual state should
be permitted to legislate and regulate the forms of gaming conducted within its borders, as well as the
methods by which gaming is offered to the citizens of the state." Antigua submits that these letters
clearly indicate that US states fear that Internet gambling will undermine their ability to determine the
conditions of competition in the gambling sector in view of the economic benefits accruing to the
state and its local operators. Antigua submits that this demonstrates that the United States' "total ban"
on the remote supply of gambling and betting servi ces from Antigua is "a disguised restriction on
trade in services."
1068
6.605 The Panel has reviewed the letters in question. 1069 We note that both letters explicitly state
that the NASPL "does not take a position on Internet gambling per se". Both letters go on to state that
each individual US state should be permitted to le gislate and regulate the forms of gaming conducted
within its borders, as well as the methods by which ga ming is offered to citizens of the state. We
consider that these letters pertain primarily to the states' concerns regarding their ability to
autonomously regulate Internet gambling within thei r borders and do not demonstrate the existence of
an intent to restrict the remote supply of gambling and betting services from abroad.
6.606 Therefore, the Panel believes that the eviden ce adduced from these letters from the President
of the North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries does not indicate that the manner
in which the United States applies its prohibitio n on the remote supply of gambling and betting
services is inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of GATS.
Conclusion
6.607 In summary, on the basis of evidence provi ded to the Panel relating to the domestic
enforcement of the US prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse racing against
TVG, Capital OTB and Xpressbet.com and in light of the ambiguity relating to the Interstate
Horseracing Act, which pertains to wagering services for horse racing, we believe that the United
States has not demonstrated that it applies its prohibition on the remote supply of these services in a
consistent manner as between tho se supplied domestically and those that are supplied from other
Members. Accordingly, we believe that the Unite d States has not demonstrated that it does not apply
its prohibition on the remote s upply of wagering services for horse racing in a manner that does not
constitute "arbitrary and unjustifiable discriminati on between countries where like conditions prevail"
and/or a "disguised restriction on trade" in acco rdance with the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XIV.

1068 Antigua's second oral statement, para. 83
1069 The letters are contained in Exhibit AB-207.

(f) Overall conclusion on Article XIV
6.608 In sum, in light of the particular circumst ances of this case and for the reasons explained
above, we find that the United States has not been able to provisionally justify the Wire Act, the
Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws)1070 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act
(when read together with the relevant state laws) 1071 under the provisions of Article XIV(a) and
Article XIV(c) of the GATS. While this conclusi on did not require us to proceed further to an
examination of the consistency of these measur es with the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XIV, we nonetheless did so to assist the parties in resolving the underlying dispute in this case.
We conclude that the United States has not demons trated that it does not apply its prohibition on the
remote supply of wagering services for horse racing in a manner that does not constitute "arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail" and/or a "disguised
restriction on trade" in accordance with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.
VII. CONCLUSIONS, CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 The Panel recalls that the following US laws were determined to be the measures at issue in
this dispute:
(a) Federal laws:
(i) the Wire Act (18 USC § 1084);
(ii) the Travel Act (18 USC § 1952); and
(ii) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 USC § 1955).
(b) State laws:
(i) Colorado: § 18-10-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
(ii) Louisiana: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.;
(iii) Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws;
(iv) Minnesota: §§ 609.75, Subdivisions 2 – 3 and 609.755(1) of Minn. Stat. Ann;
(v) New Jersey: paragraph 2 of N.J. Const. Art. 4, Sec. VII and § 2A:40-1 of the
N.J. Code;
(vi) New York: § 9 of Art. I of N.Y. Const. and § 5-401 of the N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L.;
(vii) South Dakota: §§ 22-25A-1 - 22-25A-15 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and
(viii) Utah: § 76-10-1102 of the Utah Code Ann.

1070 That is, state laws that prohibit a "business enterprise involving gambling". Such state laws would
include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts
Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
1071 That is, state laws that prohibit a "gambling busi ness ". Such state laws would include but are not
limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-
25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.

7.2 For the reasons set out in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:
(a) the United States' Schedule under the GA TS includes specific commitments on
gambling and betting services under sub-sector 10.D;
(b) by maintaining the following measures, whic h, on their face, prohibit one, several or
all means of delivery included in mode 1, contrary to its specific market access
commitments for gambling and betting services for mode 1, the United States fails to
accord services and service suppliers of Antigua treatment no less favourable than
that provided for under the terms, limitati ons and conditions agreed and specified in
its Schedule, contrary to Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2 of the GATS:
(i) Federal laws
(1) the Wire Act;
(2) the Travel Act (when read together with the relevant state laws);
 1072
and
(3) the Illegal Gambling Business Act (when read together with the
relevant state laws).1073
(ii) State laws:
(1) Louisiana: § 14:90.3 of the La. Rev. Stat. Ann.;
(2) Massachusetts: § 17A of chapter 271 of Mass. Ann. Laws;
(3) South Dakota: § 22-25A-8 of the S.D. Codified Laws; and
(4) Utah: § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
(c) Antigua has failed to demonstrate that the measures at issue are inconsistent with
Articles VI:1 and VI:3 of the GATS;
(d) The United States has not been able to demons trate that the Wire Act, the Travel Act
(when read together with the relevant st ate laws) and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act (when read together with the relevant state laws):
(i) are provisionally justified under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the GATS;
and
(ii) are consistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of the
GATS;
(e) The Panel decided to exercise judicial ec onomy with respect to Antigua's claims
under Articles XI and XVII of the GATS.

1072 That is, state laws that prohibit a "business enterprise involving gambling". Such state laws would
include but are not limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts
Ann. Laws, § 22-25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.
1073 That is, state laws that prohibit a "gambling busi ness ". Such state laws would include but are not
limited to § 14:90.3 of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. Ann., § 17A of chapter 271 of Massachusetts Ann. Laws, § 22-
25A-8 of the South Dakota Codified Laws, and § 76-10-1102(b) of the Utah Code.

B. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE PANEL
7.3 The Panel wishes to note that it is well aware of the sensitivities associat ed with the subject-
matter of this dispute, namely gambling and betting services. Our conclusions are directly linked to
the particular circumstances of this dispute. We no te in this regard that the United States may well
have inadvertently undertaken specific commitments on gambling and betting services. However, it is
not for the Panel to second-guess the intentions of the United States at the time the commitment was
scheduled. Rather, our role is to interpret and apply the GATS in light of the facts and evidence
before us.
7.4 We also wish to emphasize what we have not decided in this case. We have not decided that
WTO Members do not have a right to regulate, including a right to prohibit, gambling and betting
activities. In this case, we came to the conclusi on that the US measures at issue prohibit the cross-
border supply of gambling and betting services in th e United States in a manner inconsistent with the
GATS. We so decided, not because the GATS deni es Members such a right but, rather, because we
found, inter alia , that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the measures at issue were
inconsistent with the United States' scheduled commitments and the relevant provisions of the GATS.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
7.5 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body requests the United States to bring
the measures identified in paragraph 7.2(b) above into conformity with its obligations under the
GATS.