RUSSIA - ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON LIGHT COMMERCIAL VEHICLES FROM GERMANY AND ITALY REPORT OF THE PANEL
Document: REPORT OF THE PANEL
Date: 27 January 2017
Document codes: WT/DS479/R
Complainant: EU
Respondent: Russia
Third parties: China, India, Japan, South Korea, U.S., Brazil, Turkey, Ukraine
Dispute stage: Appellate Body
Agreements cited: Art. 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 6.5.1, 6.9, 12.2, 12.2.2, 1, 18.4  Anti-dumpingArt. VI  GATT 1994

RUSSIA - ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON LIGHT COMMERCIAL VEHICLES
FROM GERMANY AND ITALY
REPORT OF THE PANEL
BCI deleted, as indicated [***]

LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
Contents Page
Annex A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel A-2
Annex A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel concerning business confidential
information
A-7
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex B-1 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-2
Annex B-2 First integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation B-11
Annex B-3 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union B-21
Annex B-4 Second integrated executive summary of the arguments of the
Russian Federation
B-31
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
Contents Page
Annex C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil C-2
Annex C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan C-6
Annex C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Turkey C-11
Annex C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine C-13
Annex C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States C-15
ANNEX D
PRELIMINARY RULING
Contents Page
Annex D-1 Preliminary ruling on the panel's jurisdiction under Article 6.2 of the DSU dated

D-2

CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
Short title Full case title and citation
Argentina – Poultry
Anti-Dumping Duties
Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from
Brazil, , adopted 19 May 2003, DSR 2003:V, p. 1727
China – Autos (US) Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Automobiles from the United States, and Add.1, adopted
18 June 2014, DSR 2014:VII, p. 2655
China – Broiler Products Panel Report, China  Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on
Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/R and Add.1, adopted
25 September 2013, DSR 2013:IV, p. 1041
China – GOES Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,
WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6251
China – GOES Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WT/DS414/R
and Add.1, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS414/AB/R, DSR 2012:XII, p. 6369
China – GOES (Article 21.5 –
US)
Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS414/RW and Add.1,
adopted 31 August 2015
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on
High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/AB/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted
28 October 2015
China – HP-SSST (Japan) /
China – HP-SSST (EU)
Panel Reports, China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-
Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan /
China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from the European Union,
WT/DS454/R and Add.1 / WT/DS460/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted
28 October 2015, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS454/AB/R /

China – X-Ray Equipment Panel Report, China – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security
Inspection Equipment from the European Union, WT/DS425/R and Add.1,
adopted 24 April 2013, DSR 2013:III, p. 659
EC – Bed Linen Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, p. 2077
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
India, WT/DS141/RW, adopted 24 April 2003, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS141/AB/RW, DSR 2003:IV, p. 1269
EC – Fasteners (China) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R,
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
EC – Fasteners (China) Panel Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1,
adopted 28 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289
EC – Fasteners (China)
(Article 21.5 – China)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, WT/DS397/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted
12 February 2016
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, p. 135

Short title Full case title and citation
EC – Salmon (Norway) Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed
Salmon from Norway, WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008, and Corr.1,
DSR 2008:I, p. 3
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R,
adopted 18 August 2003, DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable
Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R, adopted
18 August 2003, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS219/AB/R,
DSR 2003:VII, p. 2701
Egypt – Steel Rebar Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from
Turkey, WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, DSR 2002:VII, p. 2667
EU – Footwear (China) Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear
from China, WT/DS405/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:IX, p. 4585
Guatemala – Cement II Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000,
DSR 2000:XI, p. 5295
Korea – Certain Paper Panel Report, Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from
Indonesia, WT/DS312/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XXII,
p. 10637
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted
20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice
Panel Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice,
Complaint with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/R, adopted 20 December 2005,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS295/AB/R, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11007
Mexico – Corn Syrup Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R, adopted
24 February 2000, and Corr.1, DSR 2000:III, p. 1345
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from
Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207
Thailand – H-Beams Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
Thailand – H-Beams Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/R,
adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, p. 2741
Ukraine – Passenger Cars Panel Report, Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger
Cars, WT/DS468/R and Add.1, adopted 20 July 2015
US – Countervailing Duty
Investigation on DRAMS
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea,
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,
p. 3
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted
23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 August 2001 modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR 2001:X, p. 4769

Short title Full case title and citation
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX,
p. 4051
US – Softwood Lumber V Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS264/AB/R, DSR 2004:V, p. 1937
US – Softwood Lumber VI
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006,
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4865
US – Steel Safeguards Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R,
WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R,
WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R, adopted 10 December 2003,
DSR 2003:VII, p. 3117
US – Tyres (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China,
WT/DS399/AB/R, adopted 5 October 2011, DSR 2011:IX, p. 4811
US – Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R,
adopted 19 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, p. 717
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997,
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation Description
Application Sollers-Elabuga LLC , "Application for application of anti -dumping me asures
regarding import of light commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy,
Poland, and Turkey", Letter No. 117, 30 September 2011
BCI Business Confidential Information
DIMD Department for Internal Market Defence of the Eurasian Economic Commission
Draft Report Eurasian Economic Commission, Results of the anti -dumping investigation with
regard to light commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland, and
Turkey imported into the common customs area of the Customs Union (Moscow,
28 March 2013)
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
EAEU or CU Eurasian Economic Union or Customs Union between Republic of Belarus,
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation
EEC Eurasian Economic Commission
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
GAZ Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod
Investigation Report Eurasian Economic Commission, Findings from the anti -dumping investigation
relating to light commercial vehicles origi nating in Germany, Italy, Poland and
Turkey and imported into the common customs territory of the Customs Union
of the Domestic Market Protection Department of the Eurasian Economic
Commission (Moscow 2013) (Public and BCI versions)
LCVs Light commercial vehicles
PCA Peugeot Citroen Automobiles
POI Period of investigation
RUB Russian roubles
Sollers Sollers-Elabuga LLC
USD United States dollars
VEB Vnesheconombank

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Complaint by the European Union
1.1. On 21 May 2014 , the European Union requested consultations with the Russian Federation
pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994 ), and Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) with
respect to the measures and claims set out below.1
1.2. Consultations were held on 18 June 2014. The consultations failed to resolve the dispute.
1.2 Panel establishment and composition
1.3. On 15 September 2014, the European Union requested the establishment of a panel pursuant
to Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference. 2 At its meeting on 20 October 2014, the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of the European Union
in document WT/DS479/2, pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU.3
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisi ons of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by the European Union in
document WT/DS479/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.4
1.5. On 8 December 2014, the European Union requested the Director -General to de termine the
composition of the P anel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU . On 18 December 2014 , the
Director-General composed the Panel as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Simon Farbenbloom

Members: Mr Matthew Kronby
 Mr Luis Catibayan

1.6. Following the resignation on 1 December 2015 of the Chairperson and a member of the
Panel, the Director-General on 11 December 2015 appointed a new Chairperson and a new
member of the Panel. Accordingly, the composition of the Panel is as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Faizullah Khilji

Members: Mr Thinus Jacobsz
Mr Luis Catibayan

1.7. Brazil, China, India, Japan, Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States notified their
interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.3 Panel proceedings
1.3.1 General
1.8. After consulting the parties, the Panel:

1 European Union's request for consultations, WT/DS479/1, 21 May 2014.
2 Request for the establishment of a Panel by the European Union, WT/DS479/2 (European Union's
panel request).
3 See WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of meeting held on 20 October 2014, WT/DSB/M/351,
11 December 2014.
4 Russia – Anti-Dumping Duties on Light Commercial Vehicles, Constitution of the Panel established at
the request of the European Union, WT/DS479/3, 19 December 2014.

a. adopted its Working Procedures5 and timetable on 1 December 2015;
b. revised the timetable on 15 January 2016, and again on 1 April 2016; and
c. adopted, on 14 January 2016, additional procedures for the protection of Business
Confidential Information (BCI).6
1.9. The Panel held its first substantive meeting with the parties on 9 and 10 of March 2016 . A
session with the third parties took place on 10 March 2016. The Panel held its second substantive
meeting with the parties on 7 June 2016. On 22 July 2016, the Panel issued the descriptive part of
its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 26 August 2016. The
Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 30 September 2016.
1.3.2 Preliminary ruling
1.10. In its first written submission dated 22 January 2016, the Russian Federation requested a
preliminary ruling that certain claims addressed by the European Union in its firs t written
submission are not within the scope of the request for the establishment of a panel in this dispute
and are therefore not within the jurisdiction of this Panel. 7 The European Union responded to the
Russian Federation's request in its response to a question posed by the Panel during the Panel's
first substantive meeting with the parties8 and in its second written submission.9
1.11. By communication dated 20 April 2016, the Panel did not grant the Russian Federation's
request. The Panel's preliminary ruling is set out in Annex D-1.
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 The measures at issue
2.1. This dispute concerns the levying of anti-dumping duties on certain light commercial vehicles
(LCVs) from Germany and Italy by the Russian Federation pursuant to Decision No. 113 of
14 May 2013 of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission (E EC), as set forth therein,
including any and all annexes, notices and reports of the Department for Internal Market Defence
of the EEC (DIMD), and any amendments thereof.
3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1. The European Union requests that the Panel find that the measures at issue are inconsistent
with the following provisions10:
a. Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because, by excluding GAZ 11 from
the definition of "domesti c industry", the DIMD acted in a biased manner, potentially
leading to a risk of materially distorting the injury analysis, contrary to the obligations
under Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement. As a consequence of such a
wrongly-defined dom estic industry, the DIMD's injury determination was based on an
incorrect data set, in violation of Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
b. Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 , and 3.5 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because, by selecting
non-consecutive periods of n on-equal duration for the examination of the trends for the
whole domestic industry, the DIMD's injury determination was not based on an objective
examination of positive evidence, thereby contrary to Article 3.1 of the A nti-Dumping
Agreement. Since the DIMD relied on such an examination for the purpose of gauging
the effects of the dumped imports on the domestic industry and assessing whether the

5 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.
6 See Additional Working Procedures on BCI, Annex A-2.
7 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 668. See also second written submission,
paras. 306-309.
8 European Union's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 2.
9 European Union's second written submission, paras. 7-14.
10 European Union's first written submission, para. 453.
11 Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod.

injury found to exist is caused by the dumped imports, the DIMD's injury determination
was further inconsistent with Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
c. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD failed to make
an objective analysis based on positive evidence when considering whether the effects of
the dumped imports was to prevent domestic price increases, which otherwise would
have occurred, to a significant degree (i.e. price suppression);
d. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD failed to make a
proper evaluation of all injury factors i n context and thus failed to reach a reasoned and
adequate conclusion with respect to the impact of dumped imports on the domestic
industry. As a result, the DIMD failed to make a determination of injury on the basis of
an "objective examination" of the disclosed factual basis;
e. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD failed to conduct
an objective examination, based on positive evidence, of the causal relationship between
the imports under investigation and the alleged injury to the domestic industry. The
DIMD also failed to conduct an objective examination, based on positive evidence, of
factors other than the imports under investigation that have been injuring the domestic
industry, and therefore improperly attributed the injur ies caused by these other factors
to the imports under investigation;
f. Article 6.5 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD accorded confidential
treatment to information that is not confidential by nature, and because the DIMD did
not require inter ested parties to show good cause for the confidential treatment of
information, nor did it properly assess whether such good cause was shown;
g. Article 6.5.1 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD failed to require
interested parties to furnish non -confidential summaries of the confidential information
provided, and also failed to require them to explain why it was not possible to provide
such summaries, and in any event those non -confidential summaries, when submitted,
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance
of the information submitted in confidence, including indexes that show meaningful
trends;
h. Article 6.9 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement, because the DIMD failed to inform the
interested parties of t he essential facts under consideration which form the basis of the
decision to impose anti -dumping measures, including failing to inform Volkswagen AG
and Daimler AG of the essential facts underlying the calculation of the normal value and
the export price and failing to inform the interested parties of the essential facts
underlying the determination of injury and a causal link between dumping and injury;
and
i. Articles 1 and 18.4 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994,
also as a consequence of the breaches of the Anti-Dumping Agreement described above.
3.2. The Russian Federation requests that the Panel reject the European Union 's claims in this
dispute in their entirety.12
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their integrated executive summaries, provided
to the Panel in accordance with paragraph 19 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see
Annexes B-1 to B-4).
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES
5.1. The arguments of Brazil, Japan, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States are reflected in their
executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working Procedures

12 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 1055.

adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C -1 to C-5). China and Korea participated in the third-party
session; China, India and Korea did not make formal submissions to the Panel.
6 INTERIM REVIEW
6.1 Introduction
6.1. On 26 August 2016, the Panel submitted its Interim Report to the parties. On
12 September 2016, the European Union and the Russian Federation each submitted written
requests for the rev iew of precise aspects of the Interim Report. On 16 September 2016, both
parties submitted comments on each other's requests for review. Neither party requested an
interim review meeting.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Pane l Report sets out the
Panel's response to the parties' requests made at the interim review stage. The Panel modified
aspects of its Report in the light of the parties' comments where it considered it appropriate, as
explained below. Due to changes as a result of our review, the numbering of the paragraphs and
footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the Interim Report. The text below refers to the
numbers in the Interim Report, with the numbers in the Final Report in parentheses for ease of
reference.
6.3. In addition to the modifications specified below, the Panel also corrected a number of
typographical and other non -substantive errors throughout the Report, including those identified
by the parties.
6.2 European Union's requests for changes to the Interim Report
6.2.1 Paragraph 1.6
6.4. The European Union requested modifications to paragraph 1.6. The Russian Federation
objected to this request. We do not consider it appropriate to make any changes to this paragraph.
6.2.2 Paragraph 7.4, subparagraphs (ii) and (iii)
6.5. The European Union requested that:
a. The words "and was gaining market share" be added to subparagraph (iii).
b. Subparagraph (ii) be modified to state that "GAZ also produced petrol-engine LCVs …".
6.6. We have made these modifications.13
6.2.3 Footnote 45 to paragraph 7.8
6.7. The E uropean Union requested the addition of a paragraph more fully setting out its
arguments in respect of the obligation in Article 4.1. We have modified this footnote in response to
this request.
6.2.4 Footnote 63 to paragraph 7.12
6.8. The European Union requested a r eference in this footnote to its submissions; we have
provided the reference and made a small typographical modification.
6.2.5 Paragraph 7.14, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c)
6.9. The European Union requested the addition of certain references in these subparagraphs to
its oral statement at the second substantive meeting of the Panel. As these subparagraphs are the
Panel's observations, we do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes.

13 Except as indicated, the Russian Federation did not object to European Union requests.

6.2.6 Footnote 72 to paragraph 7.14
6.10. The European Union requested the additio n of a sentence to this footnote to reflect its own
arguments. As this footnote reflects the Panel 's observations, we do not consider it necessary to
make the proposed changes.
6.2.7 Paragraphs 7.16 and 7.18
6.11. The European Union disagreed with our statement that the European Union "agrees" with
the Russian Federation regarding the sequence of events set out in this paragraph . It argued that
that "it did not agree with Russia's assertions as to how or when the DIMD defined domestic
industry in this case; rather, the European Union responded to the arguments raised by Russia to
make its case and showed that, even following Russia's recounting of the facts, the domestic
industry definition was inconsistent with Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement. "14 We have
some difficulty with this position.
6.12. To begin with, as the complainant, the European Union has the burden of establishing its
case – in this specific instance by identifying exactly what was WTO -inconsistent with the way the
DIMD defined the domestic industry. Accordingly, the initial exposition of the European Union's
position could not have been a response to the Russian Federation's arguments.
6.13. Turning to that initial position as set out in the first submissions, we observe that i t is not a
model of clarity. The European Union repeatedly asserted that the DIMD had "excluded" GAZ from
the scope of the definition of domestic industry. 15 It also argued , however, that the DIMD had
violated Articles 3.1 and 4.1 in this definition. 16 Thus, from its first written submissi on, it was not
clear to us whether the European Union considered the DIMD to have acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 4.1 by defining the domestic industry and then excluding GAZ, or by not including
GAZ in the definition in the first instance. For this reason, the Panel put a specific question to both
parties as to whether, in their view, there was a difference between "excluding" a producer from
the definition of domestic industry or "not including " that producer in that definition from the
outset. In paragraphs 33-35 of its response to our question number 9, the European Union stated:
[T]here is indeed a difference between the failure to include additional producers of
the like product in the domestic industry and excluding a domestic producer of the like
product from the industry definition.
… Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides only two situations in which an
investigating authority is permitted to exclude domestic producers of the like product
from the scope of the definition of the domestic industry. …
However, a failure to include additional producers of the like product in the domestic
industry may lead to a violation of both Articles 4.1 and 3.1.17
6.14. The response of the European Union demonstrates that it understood "excluding" to mean
defining the domestic industry and removing producers from that definition afterwards, and
"failure to include" to mean not including a producer in the definition in the first place. In its first
written submission, the European Union repeatedly referred to th e "exclusion" of GAZ. We
concluded, on this basis, that while not expressly stated, the understanding of the sequence relied
upon by the European Union in its first written submission (definition -exclusion) was consistent
with the sequence put forward by t he Russian Federation in its later submissions , which was
different from that in its first submission . Nothing in the European Union 's later submissions
indicated a shift in its own position because of the apparent change in the position of the
Russian Federation. Accordingly, we see no reason to change our understanding of an apparent
agreement between the parties in this regard . Nevertheless, we have made a minor modification
to reflect the lack of clarity in these arguments. We underline that our finding s do not rest on the
agreement or lack thereof of the European Union with the Russian Federation on this point.

14 European Union's comments on the Interim Report, para. 13.
15 See for example European Union's first written submission, paras. 18, 33, 44, 46, and 60.
16 European Union's first written submission, para. 46.
17 European Union's response to Panel question 9. (fn omitted, emphasis added)

Indeed, the absence of evidence on the record to support the sequence of events we understand
the parties to have agreed upon is why we made our principal findings on the basis of the Russian
Federation's first description of the sequence, which is supported by evidence on the record.
6.15. For these reasons, we see no need to make the changes suggested by the European Union.
We have made minor modifica tions and added additional references to the European Union 's
submission in this respect.
6.2.8 Paragraph 7.26 (as well as the text in paragraphs 7.14 and 7.20, and footnote 79)
6.16. The European Union requested that the Panel make certain modifications in this parag raph.
The Russian Federation objected to the requested modifications and disagreed with the
European Union's interpretation of the relevant panel and Appellate Body reports. We recall that
the Interim Review stage is not an opportunity for parties to rearg ue the case. We note however
that the European Union is not challenging the findings of the Panel and that the requested
modification does, indeed, fall within the meaning of a "precise aspect[]" as set out in Article 15 .2
of the DSU. In our view, an injur y determination made on the basis of an incorrect definition of
domestic industry is necessarily not consistent with a Member 's obligation under Article 3.1. For
this reason, we have made certain modifications to paragraphs 7.15 and 7.26.
6.2.9 Footnote 105 to paragraph 7.31(d)
6.17. The European Union requested the Panel to provide specific references in this footnote as to
where in the Investigation Report the DIMD made comparisons between the situation in 2011 and
the situation in 2008 or 2009, and both 2008 and 2009. We have provided these references.
6.2.10 Footnote 157 to paragraph 7.63
6.18. The European Union requested that the Panel make what it describes as clarifications in
respect of the European Union's change of position on the question of benchmarks in the course of
these proceedings. The Russian Federation objected to this request. We note that the proposed
language is in substantial part a restatement of the European Union's position after the first
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties , which has alrea dy been reflected in
paragraphs 7.53 and 7.59 of our findings. We see no reason to make the requested modifications.
6.2.11 Last sentence of paragraph 7.81
6.19. The European Union requested that a graph containing BCI be adjusted or explained to be
accessible in the n on-confidential version of these findings. We have made the necessary
adjustments for this and all other graphs containing BCI.
6.2.12 Footnote 225 to paragraph 7.116
6.20. The European Union requested that the Panel more fully reflect the European Union's
arguments in respect of the systemic implications of relying on confidential investigation reports in
dispute settlement proceedings . The Russian Federation did not object to the European Union
request, but suggested a modification indicating that the European Union' s concern was of a
general nature. We have included the European Union's suggested text in the footnote; we do not
think it is necessary to incorporate the Russian Federation 's proposed modification , as we
understand the European Union's suggested text to be general in nature . We note that these are
not the findings of the Panel. More important, in our view the concern raised by the
European Union in turn risks undermining the presumption of good faith that is at the heart of
both Members' observance and im plementation of their obligations under the WTO Agreement, as
well as their participation in these proceedings.
6.2.13 Paragraph 7.164
6.21. The European Union requested that the Panel more fully reflect the European Union's
arguments in respect of the systemic implications of relying on confidential investigation reports in
dispute settlement proceedings . As this matter has already been dealt with at paragraph 6.20

above concerning footnote 225, we do not see the need to make additional mo difications in this
paragraph.
6.2.14 Paragraph 7.139
6.22. The European Union requested the Panel to add a reference to its written submission. We
inserted a footnote to the first sentence of paragraph 7.139 to accommodate the European Union's
request.
6.2.15 Paragraph 7.207
6.23. The European Union requested the Panel to correct a factual inaccuracy with regard to the
production of like product by GAZ pri or to its p roduction of the Gazelle diesel -engine LCV in the
middle of 2010 . The Russian Federation did not object to the Europ ean Union request for the
factual correction and proposed a more accurate reference. We have made the requested
modifications.
6.3 Russian Federation's requests for changes to the Interim Report
6.3.1 Paragraph 7.5
6.24. The Russian Federation requested certain modifications to ensure that this paragraph better
reflects its arguments.18 We have made the necessary adjustments.
6.3.2 Footnote 73
6.25. The Russian Federation requested an addition to ensure that this paragraph better reflects
its arguments. We have made the necessary adjustments.
6.3.3 Paragraph 7.19 and Footnote 78
6.26. The Russian Federation requested that this paragraph be modified to better reflect its
arguments. Specifically, it argued that " the Russian Federation has not argued that Article 3.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement pr ovides 'another exception to the domestic industry definition set
out in Article 4. 1'".19 The Russian Federation also requested that the reference in the footnote to
its second written submission be deleted. The European Union objected to this requested
modification on the basis that: (a) this paragraph reflects the understanding of the Panel; and
(b) the Russian Federation had not provided a "valid reference" in support of its request.
6.27. We recall that in paragraph 7.19, we observe that the Russian Federatio n "appears" to
make the argument in question. We arrived at this understanding because of the specific wording
of the Russian Federation's arguments in its second written submission. In paragraph 52,
referenced in footnote 78, the Russian Federation argues20:
If the European Union considers that the "unbiased" and "objective" approach could
include GAZ into the domestic industry for the purposes of injury analysis, we believe
that the factual circumstances of the case objectively prevented to include the dat a
pertaining to GAZ into the injury analysis.

18 In its comments on the Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, the European Union
states:
Absent specific reaction or comment from the European Union does not mean that the European
Union agrees with Russia's requests. To the extent that Russia requests clarification of its
arguments in the parts of the report where the Panel summarises Russia 's argument, the
European Union agrees with Russia's suggestions provided that Russia makes adequate
references to its submissions.
European Union's comments on the Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 2
In this light, unless there are specific comments by the European Union, we do not reflect agreement or
objection in respect of Russian Federation requests.
19 Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 12. (emphasis original)
20 Emphasis added.

6.28. The gist of this argument, as we understand it, is that to conduct an objective and unbiased
examination of the matter in accordance with Article 3.1 , the DIMD was required to not include
GAZ in the definition of the domestic industry under Article 4.1 , on the basis of the alleged
deficiency of its data. To us, although not expressly stated, this argument appears to set the
requirements of Article 3.1 as a possible exception to Article 4.1. Accordingly, we see n o need to
make the requested modifications.
6.3.4 Paragraphs 7.19 and 7.66, and section 7.4.2.2
6.29. The Russian Federation requested significant modifications to provide a fuller summary of its
arguments. The European Union requested that the Panel reject the propos ed modifications. We
recall that the executive summaries of the arguments of the parties are set out in Annexes B1 -B4.
These executive summaries were prepared by the parties themselves, and reflect, or should reflect,
the judgement of each party as to its main arguments and how they should be summarised in the
Report. The brief references to the arguments of the parties in our report are not meant to and do
not duplicate those executive summaries . Rather, they highlight the principal points of the
arguments of the parties that we considered key and addressed in our findings. For this reason, we
see no need to make the requested modifications.
6.3.5 Paragraph 7.119
6.30. The Russian Federation requested the addition of the bracketed phrase in order that this
paragraph re ad: " the DIMD provided an evaluation of inventory data [of the producer ] in its
Investigation Report, and thus complied with this aspect of Article 3.4 ."21 We do not consider the
proposed addition appropriate, given that Article 3.4 is concerned with the evaluation of
information concerning the "domestic industry" and not "the producer ". M oreover, in this case,
there were at least two domestic producers of the like product. In this light, we have inserted a
reference to the inventory data [of Sollers] in this sentence, to clearly reflect the facts as argued.
6.3.6 Paragraph 7.160
6.31. The Russian Federation requested certain modifications to ensure that this paragraph better
reflects its arguments. We have made the necessary adjustments.
6.3.7 Paragraph 7.163
6.32. The Russian Federation requested certain modifications to this paragraph, arguing:
The Russian Federation did not assert that the DIMD met the requirements of
Article 3.4 by requesting and receiving the financial accounts of Sollers in confidential
form, as it is stated at paragraph 7.163 of the Interim Report.22
6.33. We recall the Russian Federation's arguments in its first written submission. In
paragraph 280, the Russian Federation asserted23:
Therefore, the EU's statement that "[t]here is nothing in the Report or on th e record
showing that the DIMD evaluated <these factors> " is wrong. Evidence on the record
apparently shows that the DIMD required positive evidence that it needed to consider.
Nothing on the record shows that the Russian Federation actually evaluated the infor mation it
gathered. And this is why we put a specific question to the parties on this point. The Russian
Federation replied as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the fact that data was requested and received from the
domestic industry can be indicative t hat the relevant information has been evaluated,
although the results of such evaluation were not set forth in the published document.
… the fact that the requested data was submitted in confidential form gives an

21 Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 21.
22 Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 23.
23 Emphasis added.

indication that the injury factor must hav e been evaluated but the results of such
evaluation were not set forth in the non -confidential version of the report for
confidentiality reasons.24
6.34. In the light of this statement, we see no reason to make the requested modifications.
6.3.8 Paragraph 7.237
6.35. The Russian Federation requested certain modifications to ensure that this paragraph better
reflects its arguments concerning the GAZ Questionnaire response. We have made the necessary
adjustments, including a consequential adjustment to paragraph 7.244.
6.3.9 Paragraphs 7.244 and 7.245
6.36. The Russian Federation requested certain modifications to ensure that this paragraph fully
reflects its arguments concerning Sollers ' letter of 25 December 2012 and the letter of the
"Association of Russian Automakers" of 11 February 2013. The European Union objected to this
request, noting that it "never agreed" that these letters were available as part of the
non-confidential file. We have made the necessary adjustments to p aragraphs 7.237, 7.244 ,
and 7.245.
6.37. The Russian Federation further requested certain modifications in respect of information
treated as confidential where, in its view, such treatment constituted a "technical error"
(Sollers' Application, sections 9.4 and 9.5). Our findings in paragraph 7.244(b) address this issue.
6.3.10 Paragraph 7.267
6.38. The Russian Federation requested that the Panel give specific reasons as to why the DIMD's
treatment of information originating from electronic databases of national customs authorities of
the Customs Union between Republic of Belarus, R epublic of Kazakhstan , and the Russian
Federation (CU) as confidential did not meet the requirements of Article 6.5. We have added a
paragraph explaining our views in that respect.
6.3.11 Paragraph 7.268
6.39. The Russian Federation argued that " we have not argued that the DIMD has limited
disclosure obligations in respect of Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG, which were conside red as
non-cooperating parties." 25 The European Union disagr eed. Our summary of the
Russian Federation's arguments accurately captures the essence o f the Russian Federation's
arguments. We recall that the executive summaries of the arguments of the parties are set out in
Annexes B1-B4. These executive summaries were prepared by the parties themselves, and reflect,
or should reflect, the judgement of eac h party as to its main arguments and how they should be
summarised in the Report. The brief references to the arguments of the parties in our report are
not meant to and do not duplicate those executive summaries. Rather, they highlight the principal
points of the arguments of the parties that we considered key and addressed in our findings. For
this reason, we see no need to make the requested modifications.
6.3.12 Paragraphs 7.249 and 7.269-7.271
6.40. The Russian Federation argues that "taking into account correct a rguments of the
Russian Federation, as explained in the previous paragraph, the Panel's discussion of the rights of
interested parties should be associated with the scope of disclosure for particular interested
parties."26 We note that this argument somewha t undercuts the Russian Federation's argument ,
set out in the previous paragraph , that it did not argue that it had limited disclosure obligations in
respect of non -cooperating parties. Be that as it may, the Russian Federation appears to be
rearguing its case at this stage of the proceedings. We note that this is not an appropriate use of
the Interim Review stage. We see no reason to make the requested modifications.

24 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 16, para. 86. (emphasis added)
25 Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 41.
26 Russian Federation's comments on the Interim Report, para. 42.

6.3.13 Paragraph 7.272
6.41. The Russian Federation considers that this paragraph does not reflect its arguments
concerning the disclosure of essential facts to the two non -cooperating German exporting
producers. We have modified this paragraph to address these concerns.
6.3.14 Paragraph 248 and Table 12
6.42. The Russian Federation requested a factual correction in re spect of the essential facts at
issue. Specifically, it considered that a specific fact had not been at issue. The European Union
requested that the Panel reject the requested correction, on the basis that it had claimed that the
failure to disclose the "s ource" of that information was inconsistent with Article 6.9. We do not
consider that failing to disclose the source of information is the same thing as failing to disclose
the information itself. In this light we have made the requested modifications in p aragraph 248
and Table 12, and their corresponding footnotes.
7 FINDINGS
7.1 General principles regarding treaty interpretation, standard of review, and burden
of proof
7.1.1 Treaty interpretation
7.1. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to clarify the
existing provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law". Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement similarly
requires panels to interpret that Agreement's p rovisions in accordance with the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.27 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties codify in part these customary rules.28
7.1.2 Standard of review
7.2. Article 11 of the DSU provides that:
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements.
In addition, Article 17.6 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement sets out the special standard of review
applicable to disputes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether
the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and wh ether their evaluation of
those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper
and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have
reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel
finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permis sible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
Thus, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement together establish the
standard of review that a panel is required to apply with respect to both the factual and the legal
aspects of the present dispute. This means that in reviewing the investigating authority's
determination in this dispute, we must:

27 Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also provides that if a panel finds that a provision of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, it shall uphold a measure
that rests upon one of those interpretations.
28 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17.

a. examine whether the authority has provided a reasoned29 and adequate30 explanation as
to:
i. how the evidence on the record supported its factual findings31, and
ii. how those factual findings support the overall determination32;
b. not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
investigating authority;
c. limit our examination to the evidence that was before the investigating authority during
the course of the investigation33;
d. take into account all such evidence submitted by the parties to the dispute34; and
e. not simply defer to the conclusions of the investigating authority : our examination of
those conclusions must be "in-depth" and "critical and searching".35
7.1.3 Burden of proof
7.3. In WTO dispute settlement , "the burden of proof rests upon the party, whe ther complaining
or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence ".36 Where a party
"adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then
shifts to the other party, who will fail unless i t adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption".37 A complaining party establishes a prima facie case where, in the absence of
effective refutation by the defending party, a panel is required as a matter of law to rule in favour
of the complaining party.38
7.2 The definition of domestic industry
7.2.1 Introduction
7.4. The European Union claims that the DIMD's definition of the "domestic industry" is
inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement . It argues that that t he
DIMD did not conduct an objective examination based on positive evidence because it:
a. defined the domestic industry as consisting of one producer, Sollers, which accounted for
87.8%39 of total domestic production of the like product during the POI; and

29 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93: "[t]he panel's
scrutiny should test whether the reasoning of the authority is coherent and internally consistent."
30 Ibid.: "[w]hat is 'adequate' will inevitably depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the
particular claims made, but several general lines of inquiry are likely to be relevant."
31 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93: "[t]he panel
must undertake an in-depth examination of whether the explanations given disclose how the investigating
authority treated the facts and evidence in the record and whether there was positive evidence before it to
support the inferences made and conclusions reached by it."
32 Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 186; and US –
Lamb, para. 103. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93:
"[t]he panel must examine whether the explanations provided demonstrate that the investigating authority
took proper account of the complexities of the data before it, and that it explained why it rejected or
discounted alternative explanations and interpretations of the record evidence."
33 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 17.5(ii); and Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty
Investigation on DRAMS, para. 187.
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 187.
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 93.
36 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
37 Ibid.
38 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 98 and 104.
39 Sollers accounted for 87.9% of the total domestic production of the like product over the period of
trend analysis (2008-2011), and 87.8% of total domestic production during the POI (2nd half of 2010 and 1st
half of 2011). (Eurasian Economic Commission, Findings from the anti-dumping investigation relating to light
commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey and imported into the common customs

b. excluded GAZ from the definition of the domestic industry.40
7.5. Excluding GAZ from the domestic industry led to a risk of materially distorting the injury
analysis and resulted in the violation of Articles 3.141 and 4.1.42 This is because:
a. Sollers-Elabuga LLC (Sollers) was an "assembler " and not a "producer" of the domestic
like product, diesel-engine LCVs43;
b. GAZ also produced petrol -engine LCVs that were in competition with the im ported
diesel-engine LCVs subject to the investigation and the domestic like product44; and
c. GAZ accounted fo r nearly 15% of production of the domestic like product, diesel LCVs ,
and was gaining market share.45
As well, such exclusion is not permitted by Article 4.1 because it does not fall within the specific
exceptions set out in that Article.

7.6. The arguments of the Russian Federation evolved over the course of the dispute. In the first
instance, the Russian Federation argued that:
a. the DIMD did not intentionally exclude GAZ from the outset. GAZ did not actively
participate in the investigation due to its deficie nt Questionnaire response. The DIMD
decided to conduct the injury analysis with respect to Sollers only, which represented
87.9% of the total production of the CU46;
b. the European Union used data that included products – petrol-engine LCVs – outside the
scope of the like product in order to show alleged undisputed leadership of GAZ in the
overall LCV market 47;
c. the European Union did not demonstrate how the injury analysis would have changed if
the DIMD had included GAZ in the definition of the domestic industry48;
d. once the domestic industry as defined satisfies the "major proportion" requirement, no
further explanation or justification is necessary for conducting the injury analysis in
respect of the domestic producer that accounts for a high and substantial share of total
domestic production 49; and

territory of the Customs Union of the Domestic Market Protection Department of the Eurasian Economic
Commission (Moscow 2013) (Public version of the Investigation Report), (Exhibits RUS-12 and EU-21)
(exhibited twice), Eurasian Economic Commission, Findings from the anti-dumping investigation relating to
light commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey and imported into the common
customs territory of the Customs Union of the Domestic Market Protection Department of the Eurasian
Economic Commission (Moscow 2013) (Confidential version of the Investigation Report), (Exhibit RUS-14)
(BCI), section 1.6; and Sollers, "Application for application of anti-dumping measures regarding import of light
commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey", Letter No. 117, 30 September 2011
(Application), (Exhibits EU-1 and RUS-1) (exhibited twice), p. 7).
40 European Union's first written submission, para. 44.
41 Article 3 is entitled "Determination of Injury". 3.1 provides that:
A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1 994 shall be based on positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports
and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like product, and (b)
the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
42 European Union's first written submission, para. 63.
43 European Union's first written submission, para. 50.
44 European Union's first written submission, para. 49.
45 European Union's first written submission, paras. 47-49.
46 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 38 and 41-43.
47 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 52.
48 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 54.
49 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 60.

e. Sollers' share of total domestic production averaged 87.9% for the period of trend
analysis (2008-2011)50; given this very high proportion, the DIMD's determination does
not give rise to a risk of material distortion.51
In response to questions from the Panel as to the timing of the definition of the domestic industry,
the Russian Federation confirmed that:

a. "[t]he final decision not to include GAZ into the injury analysis is a part of the final
Report and the Decision of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission"52; and
b. "[t]he explanation of impossibility to include GAZ into the definition of the domestic
industry, for the purposes of injury analysis, was the absence of correct and verifiable
data".53
7.7. In its second written submission the Russian Federation provided additional clarity:
The investigating authority expressed its willingness to include GAZ into the domestic
industry for the purposes of the injury analysis (sent a questionnaire for the producer
of the l ike product in the CU, sought clarifications regarding the Questionnaire
Reply).54
…
At the outset, the domestic industry was defined as all known domestic producers of
the like product. The scope of the domestic industry was defined following the
definition of the like product. This is an important step because the domestic industry
is limited to only those domestic producers that produce a like product.55
…
Hence, the domestic industry, from the outset, included both known domestic
producers of the like product, namely Sollers and GAZ.56
7.8. In the course of the second substantive meeting of the Pane l with the parties, the
Russian Federation further clarified that although the domestic industry had included both known
domestic producers at the outset, in the co urse of the invest igation the DIMD redefined the
domestic industry to include only Sollers.57
7.2.2 A Member's obligation under Article 4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
7.9. Article 4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement is entitled "Definition of Domestic Industry".
Article 4.1 provides that:
For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall be interpreted
as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of

50 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 60.
51 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 64-74.
52 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13(b), paras. 42 and 43. (emphasis added)
53 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13(c), para. 44 (emphasis added). In response
to Panel question No. 9 (paras. 29 and 30), the Russian Federation argues:
In our view, there is an important difference between the "exclusion" of the producer from the
definition of the domes tic industry and inability to include the data on certain producers into the
injury analysis.
"Exclusion" of the producer from the domestic industry may occur only in two cases, which are specified
in Article 4.1 (i) and (ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
54 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 24. (fns omitted)
55 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 46. (emphasis original)
56 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 47. (emphasis added)
57 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 64, paras. 20-22.

them whose collective output of the products constitutes a majo r proportion of the
total domestic production of those products, except that:
(i) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term
"domestic industry" may be interpreted as refer ring to the rest of the
producers;
(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the
production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets
and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate
industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of
their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the
demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by
producers of the product in question located elsewh ere in the territory. In
such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major
portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a
concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and
provided further that t he dumped imports are causing injury to the
producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.58
Thus, "domestic industry" may be interpreted as either the domestic producers as a whole of the
like products or domestic producers whose coll ective output constitutes a major proportion of the
total domestic production of those products. On its face, Article 4.1 does not establish a hierarchy
between the two different ways of defining the domestic industry. 59 There are two express
exceptions to the chapeau rule set out in Articles 4.1(i) and 4.1(ii). Article 4.1 does not provide for
other exceptions.

7.10. The use of the passive voice ("shall be interpreted") in the chapeau may give rise to some
ambiguity as to who bears the obligation to interpret "d omestic industry". The context of that
provision strongly suggests that Article 4.1 imposes an obligation on the investigating authority of
a Member as it defines the domestic industry in the context of an investigation. In this respect, we
make the following two observations about the context of the chapeau:
a. Article 4.1(ii) is an exception to the chapeau. It is also drafted in the passive voice. 60 It
nevertheless is unambiguous: it specifies what an investigating authority can do
differently under that exce ption in respect of the obligation set out in the chapeau.
Because the exception and the obligation must necessarily apply to the same entity, it is
clearly the investigating authority that must bear the obligation in the chapeau of
Article 4.1.
b. Article 4.2 is also written in the passive voice, and describes consequences if the
exception in Article 4.1(ii) is applied. 61 This obligation ("anti -dumping duties shall be

58 Fn omitted.
59 Panels and the Appellate Body have not made specific findings in this respect. In EC – Fasteners
(China), the Appellate Body observed that "Article 4.1 thus juxtaposes two methods for defining the term
'domestic industry'", but did not elaborate further. (Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 411).
In our view, the use of the word "or" indicates the lack of a hierarchy between the two options. The disputing
parties appear to accept the view that there is no hierarchy between the two methods. (European Union's first
written submission, para. 35; and Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 67). However, the
European Union argues that there could be a "practical" preference by investigating authorities to define
domestic industry on the basis of total domestic production, precisely to avoid any risks of violating Articles 4.1
and 3.1. (European Union's response to Panel question No. 11, paras. 40-43).
60 Article 4.1(ii) provides in part:
[I]n exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be
divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be
regarded as a separate industry … In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist … .
We note that the exception set out in Article 4(i) is also in the passive voice.
61 Article 4.2 provides:
When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain area,
i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 1(ii), anti -dumping duties shall be levied only on the
products in question consigned for final consumption to that area. (fn omitted)

levied" in a more limited fashion) is imposed on the Member whose investigating
authority conducted the investigation and defined the domestic industry.
Accordingly, where a Member's definition of "domestic industry" does not meet the requirements
of Article 4.1, that Member acts inconsistently with its obligations under that provision.62

7.11. Article 4.1 imposes a substantive obligation on a Member to "define" the "domestic
industry" subject to the injury analysis under Article 3 as either "the domestic producers as a
whole of the like products" or "those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production of those products". "A major proportion" is one
that is "important, serious or significant" 63, but that may be less than 50% of the total domestic
production.64 Finally, producers of domestic l ike products may not be left out of the definition of
domestic industry on the basis of considerations or selection methods that, by their nature, are
likely to distort the subsequent injury determination . For example, it is clear that an investigating
authority may not leave out an entire group of domestic producer of the like product, as happened
in EC – Salmon (Norway) 65 or limit the domestic industry to only those producers willing to
participate in the investigation by providing data for a sample, as ha ppened in EC – Fasteners
(China).66

62 Indeed, we note that in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties the panel arrived at the same
conclusion:
Article 4.1 provides that the term "domestic industry" "shall" be interpreted in a specific manner.
In our view, this imposes an express obligation on Members to interpret the term "domestic
industry" in that specified manner. Thus, if a Member were to interpret the term differently in the
context of an anti -dumping investigation, that Member would violate the obligation set forth in
Article 4.1.
See Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.338.
63 Panel Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 7.226.
64 The use of the indefinite rather than the definite article modifying "major" suggests that the drafters
did not intend that the term "major proportion" in Article 4.1 mean "more than 50%". See Panel Reports,
Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.341; and EC – Fasteners (China), para 7.226.
65 The European Communities had defined the product under consideration as "farmed (other than wild)
salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen". (Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.108). It
then did not include in the domestic industry:
[C]ertain categories of enterprises in the domestic industry based on the nature of their specific
activities (filleting -only undertakings, organic producers, and producers of "cer tain kinds" of
salmon).
Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.107. (fn omitted)
The panel concluded that it saw:
[N]o basis in the text of Article 4.1 which would allow for the exclusion from the domestic
industry, as a category or group, of producer s of any form of the like product – in this case,
producers of any of the "presentations" identified by the EC as the like product – "farmed (other
than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen".
Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.112.
66 As the Appellate Body found:
It is not disputed, however, that the Commission limited the definition of the domestic industry
to those producers who "fully cooperated in the investigation". …
In our view, by defining the domestic industry on the basis of willingness to be included in the
sample, the Commission's approach imposed a self -selection process among the domestic
producers that introduced a material risk of distortion. First, we fail to see the reason why a
producer's willingness to be included in the sample should affect its eligibility to be included in
the domestic industry, which is a universe of producers that is by definition wider than the
sample.
…

[B]y limiting the domestic industry definition to those producers willing to be part of the sample,
the Commission excluded producers that provided relevant information. In so doing, the
Commission reduced the data coverage that could have served as a basis for its injury analysis
and introduced a material risk of distorting the injury determination.

Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), paras. 426, 427, and 430.

7.2.3 Evaluation by the Panel
7.12. The Russian Federation's initial argument in respect of the definition of domestic industry
indicated that the domestic industry was defined as Sollers after both Sollers and GAZ had
submitted their data. According to the Russian Federation, the DIMD was unable to include the
deficient data of GAZ in its analysis and for this reason GAZ was not included in the definition of
domestic industry. As the Russian Federation observed 67 , the Investigation R eport proceeds
chronologically, from the Application to the conclusion of the investigation by the DIMD. We recall
the facts as set out in the Investigation Report and explained in the Russian Federation's early
submissions:
a. Sollers filed the Application on 3 October 201168;
b. the DIMD initiated the investigation on 16 November 201169;
c. the DIMD identified the domestic like product in the notice of initiation70;
d. the DIMD identified the universe of domestic producers of the like product as comprising
Sollers and GAZ71;
e. the DIMD then sent "domestic producer" questionnaires to both Sollers and GAZ, and
received responses from both72;
f. the DIMD reviewed the responses received and determined that the data from GAZ were
"deficient"73;
g. the DIMD defined the "domestic industry" as comprising Sollers74; and
h. the DIMD conducted its injury determination solely on the basis of data regarding
Sollers.75

67 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 40:
Thus, the domestic industry, as defined for the purpose of the injury analysis, was defined i n
Section 4.2 of the Report.
Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13(a), para. 41:

GAZ is not part of the domestic industry, as defined for the purposes of the injury analysis and
explained in Section 4.2 of the Report.
Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13(b), para. 43:
The final decision not to include GAZ into the injury analysis is a part of the final Report and the
Decision of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission.

68 European Union's first written submission, para. 10. The Russian Federation does not disagree.
69 Investigation Report, Section 1.1; and Order of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the
Russian Federation No. 1587, Notice of Initiation (15 November 2011), (Exhibit RUS-2), p. 1.
70 Order of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation No. 1587, Notice of Initiation
(15 November 2011), (Exhibit RUS-2), p. 1.
71 Investigation Report, section 1.1; Russian Federation's response to Question 1 posed by the
European Union, paras. 1 and 2; Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 45.
72 Investigation Report, section 1.2.
73 Investigation Report, sections 4.2 and 5.3.2; Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 42
(referring to JSC "Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod" GAZ Questionnaire response, Letter No. 15/OD/3/2012,
16 March 2012, (Exhibit RUS-15) (BCI); Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13, paras. 42
and 44; Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 45; Russian Federation's response to
Question 1 posed by the European Union, para. 1.
74 Investigation Report, section 4.2; Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 13, paras. 40,
41 and 43;Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 45. Russian Federation's response to
Question 1 posed by the European Union, para. 1.
75 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 43; and Investigation Report, section 4;
Russian Federation's response to European Union's question No. 3, para. 6.

According to this version of events 76 , the investigation proceeded on the basis of an initial
identification of domestic producers of the like product, a review of data provided by those
producers and the definition by the DIMD of the "domestic industry" as comprising Sollers on the
basis of its 87.9% share of total domestic production of the like product.

7.13. If the definition of domesti c industry as "a major proportion" of the domestic producers of
the like product rested solely on quantitative considerations, in our view the DIMD's definition of
the domestic industry as comprising only Sollers would be unexceptionable. It is not necessa ry for
us to determine precisely what percentage constitutes "a major proportion"; indeed, this is a
matter that must be determined based on the facts of each case. In the facts of this case, we find
that an 87 .9% share of total domestic production falls w ell within the quantitative bounds of the
term "a major proportion". 77 As well, we note that there is no hierarchy between the two possible
ways of defining "domestic industry". Accordingly, where an investigating authority properly
defines the domestic ind ustry on the basis of "a major proportion", it is no more required to
explain or justify78 either its choice of how it defined domestic industry, or its definition, than if it
had defined the domestic industry on the basis of "domestic producers as a whole."
7.14. It is useful, in this context, to address the first and second b ases on which the
European Union challenges the domestic industry definition: that Sollers was merely an
"assembler" of the like product, and that GAZ was also a producer of petrol -engine LCVs. Neither
consideration is relevant to the definition of domestic industry in this case. First, Article 4.1 does
not make a distinction between "assemblers" and "producers" (in the sense these terms are used
by the European Union) . There may well be a ca se where the actual activity of an " assembler"
might justify the conclusion that that particular assembler is not , in fact, a "producer" of the like
product. There is no evidence before us that that was the case here 79; indeed, the European Union
does not a rgue that Sollers is not a "domestic producer", only that GAZ is a more integrated
producer and therefore should also have been included in the definition of domestic industry.
Second, the domestic like product was defined as certain diesel -engine LCVs 80 ; n othing in
Article 4.1 requires the inclusion in the "domestic industry" of a producer of a potentially
competitive product that is not the like product. 81 Neither singly nor cumulatively do these
arguments vitiate the findings of the DIMD under Article 4.1.
7.15. Meeting the quantitative threshold of Article 4.1 is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
of fulfilling its requirements as a whole. As indeed the parties to this dispute agree, the definition
of domestic industry under Article 4.1 has both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect.82 They also
agree that at a minimum, a qualitative assessment of "a major proportion" definition of domestic
industry implies ensuring that the approach of the investigating authority to the definition of or its
methodology for selecting the domestic industry does not create a risk of material distortion. 83
Viewed in this light, the approach of the DIMD to the domestic industry definition in this case gives

76 We underline that this chronology is based on the text of the Investigation Report and the first written
submission of the Russian Federation. It was not further argued by the Russian Federation.
77 We do not consider persuasive the fourth basis of the European Union for its challenge of the
domestic industry definition by the DIMD. (See European Union's first written submission, para. 58). In
quantitative terms, an average of 87.9% of total domestic production of the like product over the period
considered constitutes "a major proportion" of that production.
78 European Union's first written submission, paras. 35-43; second written submission, paras. 26-34;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 19-22; and response to Panel question No. 1,
paras. 1-4.
79 We have not been made aware of any evidence to this effect before the investigating authority.
80 FEACN CU Code 8704 21 310 0, Motor vehicles for the transport of products, other, with internal
combustion piston engine with compression ignition (diesel or semi), with a gross vehicle weight not exceeding
5 tons, other, with an engine cylinder capacity exceeding 2500 cc., new; FEACN CU Code 8704 21 910 0, Motor
vehicles for the transport of products, other, with internal combustion piston engine with compression ignition
(diesel or semi), with a gross vehicle weight not exceeding 5 t., other, with an engine cylinder capacity not
exceeding 2500 cc., new.
81 Indeed, to do so would likely be inconsistent with that provision.
82 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), paras. 5.298-5.303.
83 The European Union, in its statement at the second substantive meeting with the Panel, suggested
that there may be instances where a qualitative assessment of the producers themselves might be required
before "a major proportion" is defined. (European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, paras. 11-15; closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 8). For the reasons set out in
this part of the analysis, we are sceptical about the appropriateness of a qualitative assessment of the
producers before the domestic industry is defined.

rise to three concerns that, considered together, lead us to find erro r in its definition of domestic
industry:
a. The investigating authority decided to not include in its definition a known producer of
the like product that had provided data and sought to cooperate in the investigation
after having reviewed that producer's da ta. This sequence of events gives rise to an
appearance of selecting among domestic producers based on their data to ensure a
particular outcome, resulting in an obvious risk of material distortion in the subsequent
injury analysis.
b. The reasons given by th e Russian Federation for the DIMD's decision to not include GAZ
in the definition of domestic industry were not set out in the Investigation Report and
thus constitute impermissible post hoc rationalization.
c. Even if the reasons given were actually those of the DIMD (albeit unexpressed), they are
not such reasons as a reasonable and unbiased investigating authority could have relied
upon to not include GAZ in the definition of domestic industry . Specifically, the
Russian Federation argues that "it was imposs ible to distinguish confidential and
non-confidential data" in GAZ's Questionnaire response.84 Nothing in Article 4.1 provides
for defining the domestic industry on the basis of the alleged failure of a producer in
separating out confidential and non -confidential data; the only required quality for
domestic industry is to be a producer of the like product. The Russian Federation further
argues that data from GAZ suffered from gaps and inaccuracies. Nothing in Article 4.1
suggests that a Member may ignore a domestic producer for the purposes of defining the
domestic industry on the basis of alleged "gaps" in the information the producer has
provided to the investigating authority. Data problems can always arise in the course of
an investigation, but the issue here is the definition of the domestic industry and not the
quality of the data that might be provided by the producers included in the domestic
industry.85
7.16. As a matter of fact, based on the events set out in the Investigation Report , we conclude
that the D IMD defined the domestic industry as Sollers only after it received Questionnaire
responses from both Sollers and GAZ. 86 As a matter of law, w e find that , for the reasons set out
above, the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 in its definition of "domestic industry". Where
an investigating authority makes injury and causation determination on the basis of information
related to an improperly defined domestic industry, it acts inconsistently with various provisions of
Article 3.87 In the light of the cl aims of the European Union in this case, based on our findings
above in respect of Article 4.1, we find that the DIMD consequently acted inconsistently with
Article 3.1.
7.17. Having found inconsistency on the basis of the evidence on the record, we ordinarily w ould
end our examination of the claim regarding domestic industry here and proceed to the other

84 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 47.
85 We appreciate the challenges faced by an investigating authority in terms of data collection. In
particular, we are deeply sensitive to the expressed desire of the Russian Federation to ensure that the findings
of the DIMD are based on positive evidence in accordance with Article 3.1. We reiterate, however, that the
definition of domestic industry and the collection and use of data from that domestic industry are separate
issues. Where producers included in the domestic industry fail to cooperate with the investigation, the
investigating authority faces obvious challenges. It may be forced to repeatedly seek additional information,
and may face difficulties in verifying information received. It may ultimately have to proceed on the basis of
less than complete information regarding the domestic industry, or facts available from secondary sources.
However, the possibility of such consequent difficulties cannot affect the legal obligations of the investigating
authority under Article 4.1. Where – as in this case – an investigating authority is choosing among domestic
producers for purposes of defining the domestic industry, data collection concerns cannot be a consideration
for determining which specific producers are included in the domestic industry and which are not. This is
especially the case where, as in this instance, the investigating authority has already reviewed producer data.
Without impugning the integrity of the DIMD, the risk of result-driven choices and a distorted determination is
simply too great for such a procedure to be acceptable.
86 The notice of initiation described the domestic industry as Sollers only. The Russian Federation
explained, however, that the notice of initiation did not in fact reflect the definition of the domestic industry,
but the standing of Sollers. (Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 14(a), para. 46).
87 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.124.

claims in this dispute. Three considerations persuade us to address the full range of arguments
presented by the Russian Federation:
a. the Russian Federation's la ter assertions in respect of the timing of its definition of
domestic industry appear to be consistent with the sequence of events presented by the
European Union in its submissions88;
b. aside from the apparently chronological order of events set out in the I nvestigation
Report, there is no direct evidence of what happened from the time of the Application up
to the Draft Report in respect of the definition of the domestic industry, and the Russian
Federation is quite emphatic, in its later representations, tha t the correct sequence of
events is set out in these later representations; and
c. a more comprehensive set of findings may facilitate implementation in the event our
findings are adopted by the DSB.
7.18. In this light, we address, in the alternative 89 the arguments of the Russian Federation that
the DIMD:
a. initially defined the domestic industry as comprising both Sollers and GAZ, and
determined to consider only data from Sollers because of deficiencies in GAZ's data; and
b. redefined the domestic industry as comprising only Sollers after an initial definition
comprising both.
7.19. In respect of what we consider to be the first alternative argument, in its second written
submission, the Russian Federation sets out the following chronology90:
a. the DIMD initially defined the "domestic industry" as including both GAZ and Sollers;
b. having received and reviewed GAZ's data, the DIMD did not find the data to be usable;
and

88 European Union's first written submission, paras. 23-33; second written submission, para 22.
89 We stress that the Russian Federation does not make these arguments in the alternative. Rather, the
various arguments may be seen as evolutions of the initial argument over the course of the proceedings.
90 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 24:
The investigating authority expressed its willingness to include GAZ into the do mestic industry
for the purposes of the injury analysis (sent a questionnaire for the producer of the like product
in the CU, sought clarifications regarding the Questionnaire Reply). (fns omitted)
Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 46:
At the outset, the domestic industry was defined as all known domestic producers of the like
product. The scope of the domestic industry was defined following the definition of the like
product. This is an important step because the domestic industry is li mited to only those
domestic producers that produce a like product. (emphasis original)
Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 47:
Hence, the domestic industry, from the outset, included both known domestic producers of the
like product, namely Sollers and GAZ.
Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 48:
After the initiation of the investigation the investigating authority sent questionnaires to both
known domestic producers. Both of them replied to the questionnaires.
Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 52:
[A]s the data of GAZ could not be included into the injury analysis, GAZ could not be considered
as part of the domestic industry for the purposes of injury determination. This statement,
however, is withou t prejudice to a priori definition of the domestic industry that included both
known domestic producers, namely GAZ and Sollers.

c. in the light of the data deficiency, the DIMD ultimately defined the domestic industry to
include only Sollers.
We note that this sequence of events, though unsupported by evidence 91, is not disputed by the
European Union.92

7.20. In this regard, the Russian Federation appears to argue that the "positive evidence"
requirement of Article 3.1 constitutes another exception to the domestic industry definition set out
in Article 4.1.93
7.21. We do not find this line of argument persuasive, for four reasons:
a. Article 4.1 expressly provides for only two exceptions from an already -defined domestic
industry, and data deficiency is not one of these.
b. Nothing in either Article 4.1 or Article 3.1 suggests that the "positive evidence"
requirement of Article 3.1 creates an additional exception to Article 4.1.94 Indeed, the
definition of domestic industry necessarily precedes the examination and c onsideration
of the data collected from domestic producers, including the quality of the data, in the
context of making a determination of material injury to the domestic industry as defined.
c. Nothing in Article 4.1 conditions the definition of the domesti c industry on an a priori
assessment of the quality of the data provided by individual producers in the domestic
industry as defined. In this regard, we recall that Sollers itself was required to provide
additional supplemental data. If the Russian Federat ion's position were correct, the
DIMD could not have "defined" the domestic industry as comprising Sollers until
Sollers' data had been submitted and found not to be deficient. Nothing on the record
suggests that that was the case.
d. As explained above, ass essing the data collected from domestic producers before
defining the domestic industry in itself gives rise to a risk of material distortion in the
ensuing injury analysis.
7.22. We emphasize that the arguments of the Russian Federation in this respect are not
supported by the chronology of events set out in the Investigation Report itself. Nevertheless,
even if we were to accept as a matter of fact the Russian Federation's contention that the DIMD
made an "a priori definition of the domestic industry that included both known domestic producers,
namely GAZ and Sollers", we would consider that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 by
excluding GAZ from a previously defined industry on a basis other than one of those permitted by
the exceptions in Article 4.1. Where an investigating authority makes injury and causation
determination on the basis of information related to an improperly defined domestic industry, it
acts inconsistently with various provisions of Article 3 . 95 In the ligh t of the claims of the
European Union in this case, based on our findings above in respect of Article 4.1, we find that the
DIMD consequently acted inconsistently with Article 3.1.

91 Neither the Russian Federation nor the European Union directs us to any evidence on the record to
support this particular chronology or the conclusion that GAZ was excluded from the definition of domestic
industry because of deficiency in the data it submitted.
92 In its second written submission, the European Union asserts that the domestic industry was
originally defined as including both GAZ and Sollers, and GAZ was subsequently excluded from further
consideration.
93 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 52; first written submission, paras. 41-43;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7-11; and response to Panel question No. 7,
para. 27.
94 This is separate from the question of whether Articles 3.1 and 4.1 should be "read together" such that
the definition of "domestic industry" under Article 4.1 is subject to the "objective assessment" and "positive
evidence" requirements of Article 3.1, a question that we need not resolve in this case. (European Union's first
written submission, paras. 18, 40-43, and 66; Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 8-19; Japan's third-party
submission, paras. 11-17; Turkey's third-party submission, paras. 5-16; and United States' third-party
submission, paras. 5-12).
95 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.124.

7.23. In respect of what we consider the second alternative argument (or an ancillary to the first
alternative argument), the Russian Federation argues that the DIMD initially defined the domestic
industry as comprising both Sollers and GAZ, but that in the course of the investigation and in the
light of data problems, it redefined the domestic industry to comprise only Sollers. That is, the
Russian Federation asserts that, first, as a matter of law, an investigating authority has the right
to redefine the domestic industry where the evidence requires it to do so; and second, this is what
happened in this case: there was an initial definition of the domestic industry as comprising both
Sollers and GAZ, with a subsequent redefinition leaving GAZ out.
7.24. In support of its legal position, the Russian Federation makes the following arguments:
a. "neither the Anti -Dumping Agreement, nor the WTO jurisprudence specifies the precise
moment at which the domestic industry shall be defined and the circumstances when the
domestic industry may be redefined"96;
b. "at the outset [of an anti -dumping investigation] all known domestic pr oducers of the
like product constitute the domestic industry"97; and
c. "[t]he final definition of the domestic industry is linked to the scope of information on
domestic producers that is available at the time when the final determination is made. …
the dome stic industry at the final stage may be different from the domestic industry
defined at the outset of the investigation."98
The Russian Federation then sets out the circumstances in which the definition of domestic
industry may evolve over the course of the investigation. These are: evidence of the existence of
domestic producers not known to the investigating authority, failure of a domestic producer to
respond to the questionnaire or provide a complete response, or redefinition of the like product.

7.25. The European Union does not disagree that under Article 4.1 an investigating authority may
"redefine" the domestic industry. It argues that:
[I]t could happen that a so -considered "known domestic producer" in reality does not
make the product concerned, or that it is related to an exporting producer. In those
cases, the investigating authority can adjust its definition of "domestic industry" within
the parameters of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.99
It disagrees, however, that an investigating authority may adju st the definition of the domestic
industry on the basis of deficiency of questionnaire responses or "any other reason not foreseen in
Article 4.1".100

7.26. We do not consider it appropriate – or necessary – to make a definitive finding in respect of
the possibility or modalities of "redefinition" of domestic industry under Article 4.1 on the basis of
these arguments. Nor are we convinced that the scenarios set out by either the European Union or
the Russian Federation are helpful in defining the scope of a right to redefine domestic industry for
the purposes of this case. We make the following observations:
a. Nothing in Article 4.1 justifies the use of data problems of the kind identified by the
Russian Federation as a basis for redefinition. The disputing parties h ave identified
instances where the definition of domestic industry may be adjusted to take account of
new or changed facts relevant to the specific parameters of Article 4.1. However, this
does not mean that a redefinition that has the potential of materia lly distorting an injury
analysis would be consistent with Article 4.1.
b. On the facts of this case, neither the asserted initial definition nor the alleged
redefinition finds support in the record. The first mention of the definition of "domestic
industry" is found in section 4.2 of the Investigation Report, and it refers only to Sollers.

96 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 62, para. 1.
97 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 62, para. 2.
98 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 62, para. 3.
99 European Union's response to Panel question No. 62, para. 3.
100 European Union's response to Panel question No. 62, paras. 3 and 4.

There is no evidence of a "redefinition" of the domestic industry in the Investigation
Report, or any other document in the record brought to our attention by the parties.
7.27. We underline that the arguments of the Russian Federation in this respect are not supported
by the chronology of relevant actions and events set out in the Investigation Report itself and thus
in our view constitute attempts at post hoc rationalization. Nevertheless, even if we were to accept
as a matter of fact the Russian Federation's argument that the DIMD made an " a priori definition
of the domestic industry that included both known domestic producers, namely GAZ and Sollers ",
we would consider that th e DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 by including GAZ in the
initial definition of the domestic industry and then purporting to redefine the domestic industry to
not include GAZ on the basis of considerations not consistent with the parameters of A rticle 4.1.
Where an investigating authority makes injury and causation determination on the basis of
information related to an improperly defined domestic industry, it acts inconsistently with various
provisions of Article 3.101 In the light of the claims o f the European Union in this case, based on
our findings above in respect of Article 4.1, we find that the DIMD consequently acted
inconsistently with Article 3.1.
7.3 Selection of "non-consecutive periods of non -equal duration " for the injury and
causation analyses
7.3.1 Introduction
7.28. The European Union claims that by selecting "non-consecutive periods of non -equal
duration" for the examination of the tr ends for the domestic industry, the DIMD's injury
determination was not based on an objective examination of positive evidence, c ontrary to
Article 3.1 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement. In the light of the alleged breach of Article 3.1, the
European Union also makes consequential claims under Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 .102 Specifically,
the European Union argues that:
a. the DIMD examined the data on a non-equal basis because it considered data relating to
the two half-year periods of the period of investigation (POI, i.e. the 2nd half of 2010 and
the 1st half of 2011)103, whereas for the rest of the period of trend analysis it e xamined
full year data (i.e. 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011). The comparison of half-year data with
data examined on an annual basis cannot lead t o any meaningful conclusions on the
trends in the development of an industry and, therefore, does not constitute an objective
examination of the data104;
b. the DIMD examined the data on a non-consecutive basis by comparing the two half-year
periods of the POI (i.e. the 2nd half of 2010 and the 1st half of 2011) with the
corresponding periods of the respective previous years (i.e. it compared the 2 nd half
of 2010 with the 2 nd half of 2009, and the 1 st half of 2011 with the 1 st half of 2010).105
The DIMD's use of non-consecutive periods makes it impossible to follo w the temporal
development of the state of the domestic industry and "to obtain an accurat e and
representative picture of the state of the industry"106;
c. the DIMD failed to provide an explanation as to why the use of "non-consecutive periods
of non-equal duration" was necessary in this case107; and

101 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.124.
102 European Union's first written submission, para. 70.
103 The DIMD split the POI into two periods (2nd half of 2010 and 1st half of 2011) and compared data for
each of these periods with data for the corresponding period of the preceding year (i.e. it compared the 2nd half
of 2010 with the 2nd half of 2009, and the 1st half of 2011 with the 1st half of 2010). (See European Union's first
written submission, para. 89).
104 European Union's first written submission, para. 93.
105 European Union's first written submission, paras. 99 and 100.
106 European Union's first written submission, para. 101.
107 European Union's first written submission, para. 68.

d. the DIMD failed to systematically compare data for the entire period on an end-point to
end-point basis (i.e. 2008 compared to 2011) for all factors it examined, and selectively
sought to depict the most negative picture of developments in the domestic industry.108
7.29. The Russian Federation argues that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that the
DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the A nti-Dumping Agreement.109
Specifically, the Russian Federation argues that:
a. the DIMD analysed the data pertaining to the state of the domestic industry for each of
the calendar years 2008, 2009, 2010 , and 2011 , including the changes on a
year-on-year basis. The evaluation of the trends for the two half-year periods of the POI
compared to the corresponding periods o f the respective previous year s was
supplementary to the trend analysis conducted on a year-on-year basis110;
b. the European Union did not demonstrate or even mention how the selection of the
periods could, in itself, lead to a result that would be more favour able to any interested
party or group of interested parties or how, in this case, the DIMD favoured the interests
of any interested party, or group of interested parties.111 The European Union is factually
incorrect in asserting that the DIMD followed an app roach suggested by Sollers in the
Application112;
c. the half -year periods compared by the DIMD can be considered comparable by
definition, as they correspond to the same intervals in the respecti ve previous years.
Moreover, these periods are in consecutive calendar years, and thus may be considered
consecutive113;
d. the DIMD's methodology of comparing the two half -year periods of the POI with
corresponding periods of the previous years is reasonable and appropriate, and does not
require any additional explanation.114 Nevertheless, the DIMD provided an explanation
concerning its consideration of half-year periods of the POI in its Investigation Report115;
and
e. an end-point to end -point comparison of data for 2008 and 2011 116 is not separately
reflected in the tables in th e Investigation Report, but can be understood by taking the
data in the tables and making a simpl e mathematical comparison.117 Further, in the
narrative section of the Investigation Report, the DIMD did compare the data on certain
economic indicators for 2011 with that for 2008 (and/or in some cases 2009, in light of
the influence of the economic recovery).118
7.3.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.3.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.30. The periods of investigation119 and data collection established by an investigating authority
determine the scope of its data collection and the time periods for its dumping and injury analysis

108 European Union's second written submission, paras. 72 and 78.
109 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 80.
110 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 121-123; second written submission,
paras. 56-58.
111 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 133; second written submission, paras. 78-82.
112 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 136.
113 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 142.
114 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 142.
115 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 143 (referring to Public version of the
Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-12), part 6).
116 By the term end-point to end-point comparison, we refer to the comparison of data for the first and
last years of the period of consideration. In the present case, this term refers to a comparison of data on injury
factors for 2008 and 2011.
117 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 70.
118 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 71.
119 The term of period of investigation is used in the Anti-Dumping Agreement only with respect to the
investigation and determination of dumping. However, the term is generally used by investigating authorities

and determinations. The A nti-Dumping Agreement does not establish any specific period of
investigation or period of data collection in an anti-dumping investigation, or any guidance for the
selection of such periods.120 However, the selection of a period of investigation and period of data
collection for the purposes of the dumping and injury investigations must be one that enables the
investigating authority to make an injury determination based on an objective examination of
positive evidence, as required by Article 3.1.121 Article 3.1 provides:
A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on
positive evidence and involve an objective examina tion of both (a) the volume of the
dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic
market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic
producers of such products.
7.31. In an injury investigation, the evidence relevant to the examination of the volume of
dumped imports, their effect on prices of like products and their consequent impact on the
domestic industry will be collected for the periods established by the investigating authority, which
must then make its determination of injury consistently with Article 3.1.
7.3.2.2 The periods of investigation and data collection of the DIMD's injury and
causation analyses
7.32. As we understand it, the relevant and undisputed facts are as follows. The DIMD defined the
POI (and data collection) for the dumping investigation as the 12-month period comprising the
second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011 . The DIMD defined the period of data collection for
the injury analysis as the calendar years from 1 January 2008 to 3 1 December 2011 . In the
Investigation Report, the DIMD employed the following approach in evaluating the evidence with
respect to injury and causation:
a. The injury and causation sections of the Investigation Report contain tables reporting
data, narrative evaluations of that data and conclusions.
b. The tables report the data for each of the economic indicators for each calendar year for
the period 2008 -2011, and for the two half -year periods comprising the POI. They also
report the changes in the data for eac h period as compared with the corresponding
previous calendar year or half -year period of the previous year. The table below
illustrates the format of the tables:
Table 1: format of the tables in the Investigation Report
Injury
factor 2008 2009 2010
POI
1st half (2nd
half of 2010)
POI 2nd half
(1st half of
2011)
2011
 Data Data Data Data Data Data

Change
compared
with 2008
Change
compared
with 2009
Change
compared with
2nd half of 2009
Change
compared with
1st half of 2010
Change
compared
with 2010

c. In its injury analysis the DIMD evaluated the data on the economic indicators by
comparing data for one period with the data for the previous year or the corresponding
half-year period of the previous year.

to refer to the period for which data is collected and analysed with respect to either the dumping or injury
determinations, or both.
120 See Panel Report, Egypt – Steel Rebar, paras. 7.130 and 7.131.
121 The parties do not disagree that the choice and duration of the POI and the period of data collection
is subject to the legal requirement of Article 3.1. (See European Union's second written submission, para. 66;
and Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 72-76).

d. In addition, the DIMD also described, in the narrative portions of the investigation report,
comparisons between the situation in 2011 and the situation in 2008 122, or 2009 123 or
both 2008 and 2009.124
7.3.2.3 The use of allegedly "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods
7.33. The European Union presents three main arguments to challenge the DIMD's selection of
the periods. We examine each in turn.
7.3.2.3.1 Inappropriate comparison
7.34. The European Union argue s that the DIMD compared half-year data with full calendar year
data.125 The European Union does not, however, identify any instance in which the DIMD made
such a comparison. The European Union also asserts that the data for the POI was contrasted with
the data for the previous calendar years. 126 The record does not support this characterization of
the DIMD's analysis. For each of the economic indicators, the DIMD analysed changes from 2008
to 2011 on a year-on-year basis: from 2008 to 2009, from 2009 to 2010 , and from 2010 to 2011.
In addition, it analysed the change between the second half of 2010 ( i.e. the first half of the POI)
and the second half of the previous year, 2009, and the change between the first half of 2011 (i.e.
the second half of the POI) and the first half of the previous year, 2010. Therefore, the DIMD
compared half-year data only with other half-year data, and compared full calendar year data only
with other full calendar year data; in each instance, the DIMD compared the data with the data for
the corresponding period of the previous year. Nowhere in the Investigation Report can we find an
indication that the DIMD compared or contrasted half-year data with full calendar year data.
7.35. Accordingly, the European Union's argument is not supported by the record as a matter of
fact.
7.3.2.3.2 Splitting the period of investigation
7.36. The European Union argues that the POI was split into tw o half -year periods in order to
"artificially show negative trends ".127 We understand that the European Union does not argue that
splitting the POI into two half -year periods for comparison with the corresponding periods of the
respective previous year s is in itself inconsistent with Article 3.1.128 Rather, it argues that in this
case, the DIMD split the POI into two half-year periods in order to artificially show negative trends
and in having done so, it failed to objectively examine the evidence and acted inc onsistently with
Article 3.1.
7.37. In support of its position, the European Union relies on the panel reports in Mexico –
Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice and Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes . 129 The

122 The DIMD compared the situation in 2011 with the situation in 2008 concerning consumption volume
and labour productivity. (See Investigation Report, sections 4.2.6 and 4.3).
123 The DIMD compared the situation in 2011 with the situation in 2009 concerning domestic industry's
market share, profitability, capacity utilisation, prices, and cost of production. (See Investigation Report,
section 4.3).
124 The DIMD compared the situation in 2011 with the situation in both 2009 and 2008 concerning
volume of production and sale. (See Investigation Report, section 4.3).
125 European Union's first written submission, para. 93.
126 European Union's response to the Panel question No. 26, para. 87.
127 European Union's second written submission, para. 70.
128 European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 84; second written submission, para. 69.
We note that nothing in Article 3.1, Article 3 as a whole, or indeed the Anti -Dumping Agreement as a whole,
sets out any rules or guidance for the selection of periods of investigation or data collection. In the absence of
such rules, whether the selection of a particular period results in an analysis and determination inconsistent
with Article 3.1 can only be determined on a case -by-case basis. Where the POI is a 12 -month period spread
across two calendar years, as in the present case, splitting the POI into two half -year periods may allow the
investigating authority to make a closer and mo re accurate evaluation of developments in the data relating to
the injury factors during the POI.
129 European Union's first written submission, paras. 85-88; second written submission, para. 64.

European Union also identifies three instances in which , by splitting the POI, the DIMD allegedly
"artificially" revealed negative trends130:
a. in the second half of the POI, when t he cost of production dropped by 0.4%, suggesting
that Sollers was capable of cutting costs during the POI. However, the trend from 2008
to 2011 shows a continuous upward movement in production costs;
b. in the first half of the POI, when the domestic prices decreased by 1% , suggesting that
Sollers was required to reduce prices in 2010. However, domestic prices increased from
2008 to 2011 on a year-on-year basis; and
c. in the second half of the POI, when Sollers incurred losses. However, if the profits of the
first half of the POI and the loss of the second half of the POI are combine d, Sollers
would still have made profits over the POI as a whole.131
7.38. We recall that in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice , the period of
investigation covered March to August 1999 for the purposes of the dumping determination, and
March to August of 1997, 1998, and 1999 for purposes of the injury analysi s. The panel in that
case noted that the Mexican investigating authority had limited its injury analysis to only six
months (March to August ) of each of the years 1997, 1998, and 1999, and entirely disregarded
data from the period September to February of each of these years. The panel found that an
examination on the basis of an incomplete set of data, characterized by the selective use of data
for limited periods of successive years for the injury analysis, could not be "objective" within the
meaning of Article 3.1, unless a proper justification were provided.132 The panel also noted that the
domestic producers had themselves, in their petition, suggested that the six -month period of
March to August should be used because it reflected the period of highest i mport penetration.133
The panel's finding was upheld by the Appellate Body on appeal. 134 The facts were similar in
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes: as proposed by the petitioner, the Mexican investigating authority
relied principally upon data from three six-month periods (July-December 1998, 1999, 2000) in its
injury analysis. The panel concluded that such a truncated temporal approach, considering only
certain data for the injury analysis, did not constitute a proper establishment of the facts on which
to base the determination.135
7.39. These cases are clearly distinguishable on the facts from the dispute before us. Unlike in
those two cases, in the underlying investigation at issue here, the DIMD:
a. did not make an injury determination by looking only at half-year snapshots of data; and
b. did not conduct the injury analysis on the basis of an incomplete set of data.
Therefore, while the findings in the two cases relied upon by the European Union clarify the scope
and relevance of Article 3.1 insofar as the selection of periods for data collection and analysis is
concerned, the facts are so different that it is not a given that the outcome of our examination
must be the same.

7.40. We now turn to the allegation that the DIMD split the POI into two half -year periods to
"artificially show negative trends". We make the following observations:
a. The date of initiation of the investigation was 16 November 2011. 136 At the time the
investigation was initiated – the point at which the POI was established – a complete set
of data was not available for the second half of 2011. The DIMD could therefore not have
intentionally selected the POI to "artificially show negative trends".

130 European Union's response to the Panel question No. 26, paras. 88-91. See also second written
submission, paras. 70 and 82-83.
131 European Union's response to the Panel question No. 26, paras. 88-91. See also second written
submission, paras. 70 and 82-83.
132 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.81.
133 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 7.83.
134 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, para. 188.
135 Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, paras. 7.252 and 7.261.
136 Investigation Report, p. 4.

b. The narrative portion of the Investigation Report discussing costs and prices sets out the
data without drawing, or suggesting, any conclusions, contrary to the European Union's
allegations.
c. The tables on which the narratives are based set out data, in the form of indexes, for all
of 2011.
We do not read these tables and narratives to suggest anything other than wh at they actually say.
We find nothing in the record that supports the proposition that either the POI or the period of
data collection was selected to artificially generate a finding of injury. We find nothing in the
record that supports the proposition that the selection did, in fact, lead to such an artificial result.

7.41. Finally, nothing in Article 3.1 prohibits an investigating authority from focussing on a part of
the period of investigation for a more detailed analysis of developments during that part o f the
period of investigation . In this instance, for each of the indicators analysed in the Investigation
Report, the DIMD analysed a complete set of data for the period from 2008 to 2011 on an annual
basis137, and the data for the POI as compared with the corresponding periods of the respective
previous years. The DIMD did not focus its analysis on the POI only, or on any part of the POI only.
Furthermore, in focussing on the intervening trends over the POI, the DIMD applied the same
approach consistently to each of the economic indicators it examined. The DIMD's more detailed
analysis of the intervening trends during the POI revealed for some indicators , such as profits,
negative trends either in the first half or the second half of the POI. However, that al one cannot
lead to the conclusion that the DIMD did not conduct an objective examination . We further recall
that an investigating authority is not precluded from considering the intervening trends during the
period of consideration; in fact, it is generally necessary that it do so.138
7.42. Accordingly, the European Union has not established that the DIMD's approach had the
intent or the effect of "artificially creating" negative trends.
7.3.2.3.3 Accepting a data collection period proposed by the Applicant
7.43. The European Union argues that the fact that the DIMD accepted the period s proposed in
the Application contributed to the lack of objectivity in the present case.
7.44. We note that, in the Application, Sollers did not propose the POI actually determined by the
DIMD, i.e. the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011. Nor did it suggest comparing data for
those two half-year periods with data for the corresponding periods of the respective previous
years. The following table illustrates the approach used in the Application139:
Table 2: format of the tables used in the Application
Injury factor 2008 2009 2010 1st half 2010 1st half 2011
 Data Data Data Data Data
Source: Application, (Exhibits EU-1 and RUS-1) (exhibited twice).

7.45. We note that the data in the Application were c ollected on an annual basis for three years
(2008 to 2010) and the first half of 2011. For the f irst half of 2011, the Application compared data
with the data for the previous corresponding half year period, i.e. the first half of 2010.
Accordingly, the third argument of the European Union is once again not supported by the record.

137 Except the cost of production, for which the DIMD analysed data from 2008 to the end of the POI.
138 In this regard, the Appellate Body in US – Steel Safeguards warned against the risk of a simple
end-point to end-point comparison because "a simple end-point-to-end-point analysis could easily be
manipulated to lead to different results, depending on the choice of end points". (See Appellate Body Report,
US – Steel Safeguards, paras. 354 and 355). The Appellate Body has also stated that "more recent data is
likely to provide better indications about current injury". (See Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping
Measures on Rice, para. 166). The Panel in Ukraine – Passenger Cars stated that "without any analysis of the
intervening trends … it is not clear whether the position of the domestic industry was improving or
deteriorating towards the end of the period of investigation." (See Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars,
para. 7.269).
139 Application, (Exhibits EU-1 and RUS-1) (exhibited twice).

7.46. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the European Union has failed to establish
that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 by the alleged use of "non -equal and
non-consecutive" period in its injury and causation analyses.
7.3.2.4 Explanation for the selection of the period of data collection
7.47. The European Union also argues that the DIMD failed to provide an explanation as to why
the use of the "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods was necessary. The European Union relies
on the Recommendation concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti -Dumping Investigations
(hereinafter "the Recommendation") adopted by the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices on
5 May 2000 to support its argument that the DIMD should have explained its selection of the POI
and period of data collection in this case.140
7.48. In its submissions, the European Union does not address the legal status of the
Recommendation or its relevance for purposes of cl arifying and interpreting the obligations of the
Members in accordance with Article 3.2 of the DSU. While previous panels and the Appellate Body
have had occasion to consider the Recommendation, they have generally refrained from
definitively ruling on its status and, indeed, from relying on it for interpretive purposes.141
7.49. Three considerations militate heavily against giving undue prominence to the
Recommendation in our consideration of the European Union's claim regarding the alleged need to
explain the use of "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods:
a. The text of the Recommendation does not evince any intention on the part of Members
that it should be treated as anything other than a " useful guide to the common
understanding of Members" . 142 On its face , the Re commendation is a non -binding
document that sets out a common understanding of WTO Members , not of their legal
obligations, but of best practices under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
b. Nothing in the Recommendation suggests that it was meant to guide or influen ce the
interpretation, by panels or the Appellate Body, of the legal obligations of Members
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
c. Members should feel confident that not every document produced by a WTO body will be
interpreted as having legislative content or will have legal consequences for dispute
settlement purposes. Giving undue weight to recommendations and exhortations by, or
exchanges of ideas in, WTO bodies risks inhibiting the work of the political and policy
organs of the WTO.

140 European Union's first written submission, para. 93; second written submission, para. 65.
141 The panel in US – Hot-Rolled Steel stated that "the recommendation is a non-binding guide to the
common understanding of Members on appropriate implementation of the AD Agreement. It does not, however,
add new obligations, nor does it detract from the existing obligations of Members under the Agreement. See
G/ADP/M/7 at para. 40, G/ADP/AHG/R/7 at para. 2. Thus, any obligations as to the length of the period of
investigation must, if they exist, be found in the Agreement itself." (Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
fn 152). The Panel in Guatemala – Cement II, stated that "this recommendation is a relevant, but non-binding,
indication of the understanding of Members as to appropriate implementation practice regarding the period of
data collection for an anti-dumping investigation." (Panel Report, Guatemala – Cement II, para. 8.266 and
fn 868). In Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, Mexico contested upon appeal the Panel's reference to
the Recommendation. The Appellate Body noted that the Panel's reference to the Recommendation was made
"not as a legal basis for its findings, but simply to show that the Recommendation's content was not
inconsistent with its own reasoning". Furthermore, the Appellate Body said the Recommendation was not a
"decisive factor" in the Panel's decision. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice,
para. 169).
142 WTO, Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Minutes of the Meeting held on 29 April 1996,
G/ADP/M/7 (2 October 1996), para. 40. The Recommendation states explicitly that "[t]he Committee also
recognizes, however, that such guidelines do not preclude investigating authorities from taking account of the
particular circumstances of a given investigation in setting the periods of data collection for both dumping and
injury, to ensure that they are appropriate in each case." (WTO, Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
Recommendation concerning the periods of data collection for Anti-Dumping investigations, G/ADP/6 (adopted
5 May, circulated 16 May 2000), (Exhibit EU-24)).

7.50. Given our understanding of the Recommendation, we see no basis for the view put forward
by the European Union, that the DIMD was required to explain its selection of the POI or the period
of data collection.143
7.51. In any event, as a matter of fact the European Union's assertion that the DIMD failed to
provide an explanation as to its selection of "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods is incorrect.
Even assuming arguendo it was required to provide such a justification, the DIMD did so in this
instance in the Investigation Report. Specifically, the DIMD explained that its approach:
(a) enabled a more detailed assessment of the trends in the injury data over the POI ; and
(b) helped establish the time lag between dumped imports and the injury suffered by the domestic
industry. This is clearly reflected in the Investigation Report:
[W]e believe that the division of the period of investigation into equal parts (6 months
long) helps to carry out an objective analysis of the condition of the domestic industry
of the CU, thanks to a more det ailed assessment of the changes of economic
indicators pertaining to the domestic industry of the CU during the period of
investigation, both in relation to the same period last year, and also for the
assessment of overall trends on the CU market , and it also helps to establish the time
lag of the injury suffered by the domestic industry of the CU as a result of dumped
imports of the product and to possible elimination of such an economic factor in the
case such injury is detected.144
Thus, as a matter of fac t the DIMD provided in its Investigation Report an explanation for its
selection of the periods of investigation and data collection that in our view is relevant, specific,
and adequate.

7.52. For the above reasons, the European Union has not established that the DIMD failed to
explain its selection of the periods.
7.3.3 Conclusion
7.53. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the European Union has failed to establish
that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 by purportedly using "non-equal and
non-consecutive" periods in the examination of developments in injury indicators for the domestic
industry. Having reached this conclusion, we also reject the European Union's consequential claims
of inconsistency under Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5.

143 Moreover, for the sake of completeness, we note that the Recommendation does not even stand for
the proposition asserted by the European Union, that if the data is not collected on an annual basis, the
investigating authority has to explain the reasons for its methodology. Paragraph 3 of the Recommendation
states in relevant part that:
In order to increase transparency of proceedings, investigating authorities shoul d include in
public notices or in the separate reports provided pursuant to Article 12.2 of the Agreement, an
explanation of the reason for the selection of a particular period for data collection if it differs
from that provided for in: paragraph 1 of thi s recommendation, national legislation, regulation,
or established national guidelines. (emphasis added)
Paragraph 1 of the Recommendation contains only one rule concerning the period of data collection for the
examination of injury:
As a general rule: … (c) the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should be
at least three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser
period, and should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the d umping
investigation.
There is no rule in the Recommendation that would require an investigating authority to collect the data on an
annual basis. In any event, as the period examined by the DIMD was at least three years, and there is no
allegation that the period differed from that provided for in national legislation, regulation or established
national guidelines, nothing in the Recommendation itself would have suggested that any explanation should
have been provided.
144 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 54.

7.4 Price suppression
7.4.1 Introduction
7.54. The European Union claims that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to make an objective examination of the price suppressive
effect of dumped imports based on positive evidence . The European Union challenges four aspects
of the DIMD's findings145:
a. The DIMD constructed146 the estimated prices that would otherwise have occurred in the
absence of dumping using an abnormally high profit rate reported for 2009 as the
benchmark without further adjustments.147
b. The DIMD failed to properly consider the trends of import and domestic prices in an
objective manner by mixing up data expressed in Russian roubles (RUB) and US dollars
(USD) in different sections of the Investigation Report.148
c. The DIMD did not conduct its analysis on the basis of positive evidence because the
DIMD did not examine:
i. import and domestic price trends that were moving in "contrary directions", and how
consistently higher import prices could explain the price suppression;
ii. the reasons for Sollers' cost increases, and consequently, whether the market would
have accepted additional price increases by the domestic industry after increases of
over 30% between 2008 and 2011149; and
iii. the impact of competition from the other domestic producer, GAZ.150
d. The DIMD did not explain or demonstrate why the alleged price suppression was "to a
significant degree". In particular, t he DIMD did not compare the constructed target
domestic prices and the actual prices of the domestic like product, nor did it consider the
gap between those prices. There would not be significant price suppression if domestic
prices remained consistently below the import prices, as they had during 2008 -2011,
because Sollers could still increase the domestic prices to at least the level of import
prices.151
7.55. The Russian Federation argues that:
a. The DIMD constructed the estimated prices that would have been reached in the absence
of dumped imports on the basis of cost of producti on plus a rate of return . The DIMD
selected the domestic industry's 2009 rate of return as the benchmark because in 2009
dumped imports had their lowest market share and had minimal impact on domestic
prices.152 This rate of return was verified by internal analysis, on the basis of publicly
available information, and on the basis of high inflation and refinancing rates and the
average rates of return of the Sollers Group and GAZ.153

145 European Union's first written submission, para. 136.
146 European Union's first written submission, para. 140; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 40-42.
147 European Union's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 113.
148 European Union's first written submission, para. 143.
149 European Union's first written submission, paras. 153 and 154; opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, paras. 43 and 44.
150 European Union's first written submission, para. 155.
151 European Union's first written submission, para. 158; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 45-47.
152 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 161 and 166; second written submission,
para. 101.
153 Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 102 and 103. The Russian Federation
provided the following consolidated table regarding these rates:

b. Data concerning the evolution of domestic costs of production and prices were presented
in domestic currency (RUB) in table 4.2.5 of the Investigation Report concerning the
state of the domestic industry . For purposes of the price effects analysis , the DIMD
converted domestic prices from RUB into USD to compare with the prices of the dumped
imports, which were reported in USD in table 5.2 of the Investigation Report. 154 The
DIMD assessed the price trend s objectively, and took into account currency fluctuations
in its Investigation Report.155
c. The DIMD conducted its price suppression analysis in line with the views of the Appellate
Body in China – GOES by comparing actual prices and estimated prices that would have
occurred in the absence of dumped imports:156
i. the fact that there was no undercutting or price depression cannot preclude a
determination of the existence of price suppression. 157 There was a margin for
increase of domestic prices, given that the import prices were higher than domestic
prices158;
ii. the DIMD considered the competition from GAZ as part of its non -attribution
analysis159; and
iii. because the DIMD constructed target domestic prices that would have been achieved
in the absence of dumped imports, it was not required to analyse whether the
market would absorb price increases.160 The investigating authority is only obliged to
examine this issue if it is faced with evidence that calls into question the
"explanatory force " of the subject imports for significant price suppression. There
was no such evidence on the record.161
d. Article 3.2 does not require a comparison between the estimated prices that would exist
for the domestic like product in the absence of dumped imports and the prices that
actually occurred or the gap between these prices. The DIMD compared the weighted
average prices of the dumped imports and of the domestic like product, and compared
the profitability and prices that actual ly occurred with the situation which would have
occurred in the absence of dumped imports.162
7.4.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.4.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.56. Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is set out in paragraph 7.30 above. Article 3.2
provides:

Table 3: Inflation rates of the Russian Federation and the rate of return of Sollers Group
 2008-2011,
average
2010 2011 2010-2011,
average
Inflation rate,% 9.2 8.8 6.1 7.4
Refinancing
rate,%
10.0 8.25 (on
average)
8.0 (on
average)
8.1
Rate of return,
Sollers Group,%

154 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 168.
155 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 169 and 170; second written submission,
para. 93.
156 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 178.
157 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 185 (citing Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper,
para. 7.243).
158 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 189.
159 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 190.
160 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 125.
161 Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 120 and 121.
162 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 195 and 196 (referring erroneously to Exhibit
RUS-37, table 5.2.2; it is Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI)).

With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by
the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing
Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a
significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to
a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive
guidance.
7.57. Article 3.2 thus requires an investigating authority to consider, inter alia, whether the effect
of the dumped imports is to "prevent domestic price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree". Article 3.2 does not require an investigating authority to make a
definitive determination on whether the effect of dumped imports is significant price
suppression. 163 Article 3.2 provides no methodological guidance as to how an investigating
authority is to "conside r" whether there has been significant price suppression. However, an
investigating authority's consideration of price effects under Article 3.2 is subject to the principles
of Article 3.1 regarding an objective examination of positive evidence in the deter mination of
injury.164
7.4.2.2 The use of 2009 rate of return as a benchmark
7.58. Before examining the European Union 's claim, we briefly describe the DIMD's price
suppression analysis, as set out in section 5.2 of the Investigation Report. The DIMD constructed
estimated domestic prices that would have occurred in the absence of dumped imports on the
basis of the actual costs of production and a reasonable rate of return. As to what constitutes a
"reasonable rate of return", the DIMD used the actual rate of return of Sol lers for 2009. The
Investigation Report shows that the DIMD chose the 2009 rate of return as the benchmark
because that was the year in which the market share of dumped imports was the lowest and, for
that reason, the year in which the impact of the dumped imports was minimal. The DIMD
compared the data pertaining to a number of economic indicators (e.g. domestic industry's prices
and profits) during the period of consideration with the data pertaining to the constructed
counterfactual, and concluded that dumped imports significantly supressed domestic prices.165
7.59. The European Union argues that the DIMD's price suppression analysis was not objective
because the high rate of return reported by the domestic industry for 2009 ([***]) that the DIMD
used as the benc hmark for constructing domestic prices that would have been realized in the
absence of dumped imports was not an appropriate benchmark .166 The European Union asserts
that in 2009 the domestic industry was not healthy , as evidenced by certain negative injury
indicators in that year.167 The European Union contends that 2009 was marked by temporary shifts
in consumer preferences due to the financial crisis.168 According to the European Union, the rate of
return for 2009 was "abnormally high" relative to both 2008 and 2010.169
7.60. The Russian Federation makes three arguments in support of the DIMD's choice of 2009 as
the benchmark year and [***] as the benchmark rate of return:
a. the DIMD used the 2009 rate of return because that was the year when the dumped
imports' market share was the lowest;
b. the 2008 rate of return could not have been used because it was the start -up year for
the domestic industry170; and

163 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 130.
164 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 130.
165 Investigation Report, section 5.2.
166 European Union's first written submission, paras. 138-142; second written submission, para. 95.
167 European Union's second written submission, para. 96.
168 European Union's response to Panel question Nos. 29, para. 98, and 35, paras. 113 and 116;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 41.
169 European Union's first written submission, paras. 139, 140, 208, and 281; opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, para. 41. See also second written submission, para. 95, where the European Union
consider the 2009 rate of return to be "extremely high" compared with those in 2008 and 2010.
170 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 165.

c. the 2009 rate of return was considered reasonable in the light of an internal analysis of
the publicly available high inflation and refinancing rates in the Russian Federation and
high profit levels achieved by the Sollers Group during the period considered.171
7.61. The reference price for assessing price suppression under Article 3.2 is the domestic price
"which otherwise would have occurred". Accordingly, the consideration of price suppression is
counterfactual in nature. 172 This means that in considering whether prices have been suppressed
to a significant degree, an investigating authority must consider hypothetical domestic pr ices that
would have occurred if dumped imports had not taken place. Article 3.2 does not provide any
guidance on how such a counterfactual consideration should be conducted. Accordingly, an
investigating authority has a degree of discretion in this regard . That discretion is guided, in turn ,
by the principle set out in Article 3.1 that the determination of injury, including the consideration
of price effects, must be based on an objective examination of positive evidence. Where, as in th is
case, the investigating authority constructs a hypothetical domestic price that would have occurred
in the absence of dumped imports (target domestic price) on the basis of a rate of return and the
actual costs of production, an investigating authority must use a rate of return that is objective
and that is based on positive evidence. Such a rate of return would take into account the particular
circumstances of the industry and market at issue in the investigation. Given the nature of the
required counterfactual, a rate of return that may reasonably be used as a benchmark for the
calculation of a target domestic price that would have been realized in the absence of dumped
imports would be one that the domestic industry could have expected to achieve under normal
conditions of competition in the absence of dumped imports. 173 That is to say, an objective rate of
return based on positive evidence for the purposes of considering price suppression under
Article 3.2 is not a rate of return that the domestic industry might wish to achieve, but one that it
might actually be able to achieve.
7.62. The DIMD chose the 2009 rate of return as the benchmark because, the Russian Federation
asserts, 2009 was the year in which the market share of dumped import was the lowest. 174 The
Investigation Report states:
When considering a reasonable rate of return, the Department chose the rate of
return earned by the domestic industry of the CU when selling like Product on the
territory of the Customs Union in 2009. The aforementioned period was chosen to
determine reasonable rate of return due to the fact that the year 2009 saw the lowest
share of dumped imports of Product subject to the investigation in consumption on the
territory of the Customs Union and, therefore, the impact of the dumped imports on
the domestic industry of the CU during the aforementioned period was minimal.175
7.63. In the light of the counterfactual nature of the consideration of price suppression, we do not
find it unreasonable for the DIMD to have used the 2009 rate of return as a starting po int for its
construction of the target domestic price . It was the rate of return actually achieved by the
domestic industry during a period in which the subject imports had a low market share and did not
have any major negative effects on the domestic indu stry. We note that the European Union does
not argue that the DIMD should have used the rate of return for 2008 or 2010.176 Indeed, use of
the rates of return for either of those years would have given rise to particular problems, because:

171 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 102. The inflation rate in the Russian
Federation from 2008 to 2011 was around 9.2% on average. The refinancing rate in the Russian Federation
from 2008 to 2011 was 10% on average. The rate of return of the Sollers Group from 2008 to 2011 was
16.3% on average.
172 We note that the Appellate Body stated in China – GOES, that price suppression "cannot be properly
examined without a consideration of whether, in the absence of subject imports, prices 'otherwise would have'
increased". (See Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 141).
173 We note that this is the shared view of the parties. (See European Union's response to Panel
question No. 29, para. 97; and Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 111).
174 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 101.
175 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 47.
176 See European Union's second written submission, para. 97. We note that the European Union initially
argued that the DIMD should have used the 2008 rate of return as a benchmark for its price suppression
analysis. (See European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 39 and 40).

a. 2008 was a start -up year for Sollers' production of the like product 177, and as a general
matter, industry performance in a start -up period is likely to be out -of-line with normal
operations178; and
b. 2010 saw a sharp increase in dumped imports , and the beginning of the injury i dentified
by the DIMD, as indicated by factors regarding the state of the domestic industry.
Accordingly, neither would necessarily have been a more appropriate benchmark than the rate of
return for 2009. Finally, w e do not see the fact that the 2009 rate of return was the highest
reported during the period considered as a problem in itself. In the absence of dumped imports, or
if the level of dumped imports had remained low, the profitability of the domestic industry might
have remained at that level, or been even higher during the remainder of the period considered.

7.64. If the rate of return used in constructing a counterfactual target domestic price is not one
that the domestic industry could reasonably have expected to achieve in the subsequent years in
normal conditions and in the absence of dumped imports, then using that rate of return would
result in a consideration of the price suppressive effect of dumped imports inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2. For this reason, a reasonable and objective investigating authority may need
to go beyond identifying the rate of return achieved in a given year if it undertakes such an
analysis. If there is evidence before the investigating authority of market conditions during the
selected year that bring into quest ion whether that rate of return could be achieved in subsequent
years under normal conditions of competiti on and in the absence of dumped imports , an
investigating authority may not ignore such evidence.
7.65. In the present case, the rate of return of the domes tic industry increased significantly
from 2008 to 2009, and returned to a lower level in 2010 overall. In the first half of 2011, the
domestic industry began to suffer losses, showing a negative rate of return.
Table 4: Rates of return of the domestic industry
Year 2008 2009 2010 2nd half
2010
1st half
2011
2011
Rate of
Return

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), table 5.2.2.
7.66. As the DIMD acknowledged in the Investigation Repo rt, Sollers' performance in 2009 was
positively affected by the financial crisis, during which "consumers preferred the cheaper light
commercial vehicles, manufactured on the territory of the Customs Union ".179 In our view, t he
financial crisis was an extraordinary event affecting the domestic industry's operations in 2009. We
do not consider it reasonable for an investigating authority to base its analysis on facts relating to
a period in which extraordinary conditions prevailed without, at a minimum, explai ning why the
extraordinary conditions are not relevant to its counterfactual analysis . In our view , an
investigating authority may take such extraordinary conditions into account in its consideration of
price effects in different ways. However, it may not ignore the possibility that such conditions will
not continue, and should account for that fact in its analysis, including in the construction of a
target domestic price . This could involve making an adjustment to the chosen rate of return , or
otherwise taking extraordinary circumstances into account in considering the "explanatory force"180
of dumped imports for price suppression. We do not mean to suggest that an investigating
authority may not rely on a benchmark rate of return in constructing a target dom estic price that
is less than ideal, so long as it recognizes and takes into account relevant factors in its
consideration. An objective and unbiased investigating authority in the underlying investigation
would, in our view, have questioned whether the effects of the financial crisis , including the

177 See Soller's Updated Questionnaire response, 31 January 2013, (Exhibits RUS-3 and EU-4)
(exhibited twice), para. 2.5. See also Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 106.
178 This is recognized in Article 2.2.1.1 and footnote 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which recognize
that costs of production are likely to be affected during start-up operations and provide for adjustments for
such effects.
179 Investigation Report, section 4.3.
180 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 151. According to the Appellate Body, Article 3.2
requires an investigating authority to consider the relationship between subject imports and domestic prices,
so as to understand whether the former may have "explanatory force" for the occurrence of significant
depression or suppression of the latter.

preference for the domestic product , would continue and thus whether the high rate of return
reported in 2009 could reasonably be expected in the subsequent years in the absence of dump ed
imports. Nothing in the DIMD's Investigation Report suggests that it undertook such an
assessment in its consideration of price suppression.181
7.67. For the reasons above , we conclude that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1
and 3.2 by failing to take into account the impac t of the financial crisis in determining the
appropriate rate of return in its consideration of price suppression.
7.4.2.3 The alleged mixing of currencies
7.68. The European Union argues that:
a. the DIMD mixed data expressed in USD and RUB without any explanation in its price
suppression analysis182; and
b. because of exchange rate fluctuations, the trend of domestic prices expressed in RUB is
different from the trend expressed in USD.
7.69. The parties agree that an objective comparison of the domestic prices and subject import
prices requires that the prices be expressed in the same currency. 183 The Investigation Report
shows that in discussing the state of the domestic industry, the DIMD analysed the evolution of
domestic prices in RUB , the currency in which those prices were rep orted.184 In considering the
effect of dumped imports on the prices of the domestic like product , the DIMD converted the
domestic prices from RUB into USD , and compared these with the subject import prices , which
were reported in USD.185 Given that the domesti c and subject import prices were not reported in
the same currency, in order to be able to make an objective consideration of price suppression ,
the DIMD was obliged to either convert domestic prices from RUB to USD or convert subject
import prices from USD to RUB. The European Union has not pointed to any convincing reason why
converting import prices from USD into RUB was required or more appropriate for the
consideration of the effect of the subject imports on domestic prices in this case , as opposed to
converting domestic prices from RUB into USD. 186 It is clear to us that either conversion would
have reflected the effects of exchange rate fluctuations, and in particular the RUB devaluation in
2009. Accordingly, we do not consider that, in the present case , the DIMD was obliged to convert
the import prices from USD into RUB in considering price suppression.

181 In response to questions from the Panel and in its second written submission, the Russian Federation
argued that the 2009 rate of return ([***]) was not abnormally high when compared with the average rate of
return achieved by the Sollers Group from 2008 to 2011, and the prevailing inflation and refinancing rates in
the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation argues that some of these figures were "public" and that
others were part of its "internal analysis". There is no evidence in the Investigation Report of any such
"internal analysis" related to inflation figures and rates of return for Sollers and/or GAZ. In the absence of
evidence on the record, we consider the Russian Federation's assertion regarding this "internal analysis" as a
post hoc rationalization, and the tables it submitted in this regard (see fn 153) as evidence not on the record of
the investigation and therefore not to be considered.
182 In response to the Russian Federation's question No. 5, the European Union argues that in
comparing the domestic prices and the import prices, the DIMD should have taken into account the impact of
the exchange rate fluctuation and the change of customs duties.
183 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 168; and European Union's response to the
Russian Federation's question No. 6, para. 12.
184 Investigation Report, section 4.2.5. See Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 69,
para. 44.
185 Investigation Report, section 5.2. See Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 69,
para. 43. According to the Russian Federation, the statistical value of imported goods in the customs
declaration must be indicated in USD in accordance with paragraph 44 of Article 15 of the Instruction on the
procedure for filling in the goods declaration adopted by the Decision of the Board of EEC No. 39 on
26 April 2012.
186 The European Union argues that the DIMD should have converted the import prices into RUB to
compare with domestic prices in RUB because it is the local currency. (See the European Union's response to
the Russian Federation's question No. 6, para. 12). However, the European Union has not demonstrated that
consideration of prices in the local currency is more appropriate, much less required, in considering price
suppression.

7.70. As well, given the volatility of the RUB in this time -frame187 and, in particular, the RUB
devaluation in 2009, whichever way the conversion was done, th e price trends observed in one
currency are not likely to match the trends observed when prices are converted to another
currency. In this regard, we note that in the Investigation Report the DIMD addressed the
European Union's concern that the trend in domestic prices expressed in RUB differed from the
trend when prices were converted to USD. In section 4.2.5 of the Investigation Report, the DIMD
observed an upward trend in the evolution of domestic prices in RUB from 2008 to 2011. 2009 was
singled out as the year in which the main increase in domestic prices was observed:
As the table [4.2.5] shows, the period from 2008 to 2010 saw an increase in the
weighted average price of the Product produced by the domestic industry of the CU
and sold in the CT CU. In general, during the period from 2008 to 2010 the price of
Product increased by 25.8% ( [***]). The main increase in the price of the Product
was observed in 2009 in relation to 2008 when the increase amounted to 25.5%
([***]). In 2010, as compared to 2009, there was a slight increase in price of 0.2%
([***]). During the period of investigation, in the 2nd half of 2010, the weighted
average price of the Product dropped by 1% ( [***]) whereas in the 1st half of 2011
the price rose by 10.4% ( [***]). In 2011, th e increase in the price of the Product
was 6.2% ([***]).188
The DIMD accounted for the difference in the trends expressed in RUB and USD by factoring in the
exchange rate fluctuation s in its consideration of price suppression in section 5.2 . of its
Investigation Report:

Between 2008 and 2010, the weighted average price of the Product produced by the
domestic industry of the CU grew by 2.8% ([***]). In 2009, as a result of the 27.7%
increase in the exchange rate of the USD versus RUB, the price fell by 1.7% ([***])
whereas in 2010 the price rose by 4.6% versus 2009 ( [***]). During the period of
investigation, in the 2nd half of 2010, the price of the Product produced by the
domestic industry of the CU decreased by 1.9% ( [***]). Whereas in the 1st half
of 2011 the price increased by 15.9% ( [***]). In 2011, the weighted average price
of the Product produced by the domestic industry of the CU increased by 9.8%
([***]) versus 2010.189
7.71. As the passage above shows, in its price suppression analysis, the DIMD highlight ed the
underlying reason for the decrease in domestic prices in USD in 2009 , attributing it to "the 27.7%
increase in the exchange rate of the USD versus RUB" . Sections 4.2.5 and 5.2 of the Investigation
Report, when read together, do not give rise to any c onfusion or distortion about the overall
upward trend of domestic prices expressed in RUB.
7.72. The European Union does not point to any evidence suggesting that the DIMD relied on the
1.7% decrease of domestic prices in USD in 2009 to support any incorrect co nclusions concerning
price effects . The DIMD 's conclusion that there was neither price undercutting nor price
depression190 is supported by the trends of prices expressed both in RUB and in USD. Indeed,
the 2009 decrease in domestic prices due to exchange rate fluctuations (i.e. lower domestic prices
in USD terms) made a finding of any price undercutting more unlikely. In its consideration of price
suppression, the DIMD focused on a counterfactual analysis rather than the prices and trends set
out in table 5.2. The DIMD's ultimate conclusions on price suppression are therefore based on the
consideration of the actual situation (in terms of prices and the profit/losses) compared with the
situation which would have occurred in the absence of dumped imports , rather than on whether
the domestic prices increased (in RUB) or decreased (in USD) in 2009.

187 There was a 27.7% increase in the exchange rate of USD to RUB in 2009. (See section 5.2. of the
Investigation Report). The parties do not disagree that the exchange rates fluctuation was volatile during this
period.
188 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 40. (emphasis added)
189 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.2. (emphasis
added)
190 The DIMD concluded that "based on the information received by the Department in the course of the
investigation and analysed above, the prices of Product affected by dumped imports were not lower than the
prices of like Product sold in the market of the Customs Union. Furthermore, the dumped imports did not lead
to significant depression of the prices of like Product sold on the market of the Customs Union." (See
Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 47).

7.73. For the reasons above, we find that the European Union has not established that the DIMD
acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because the DIMD "mixed up" data expressed in USD
and RUB without any explanation in its consideration of price suppression.
7.4.2.4 Whether price suppression is the effect of dumped imports
7.74. The European Union claims that the DIMD did not properly consider evidence relevant to the
question whether the subject imports have "explanatory force"191 for the occurrence of significant
suppression of domestic prices in four aspects.
7.4.2.4.1 The trends in dumped import prices and domestic prices
7.75. The European Union presents three arguments in support of its co ntention that the DIMD
failed to properly consider the trends in dumped import prices and domestic prices:
a. the fact that dumped import prices were higher than domestic prices may suggest that
other factors unrelated to the dumped imports were responsible for the alleged price
suppression192;
b. the long term price trends of dumped imports and the domestic like product do not
support the conclusion of price suppression193; and
c. there was no price suppression during the POI.194
7.76. We begin with the European Union's argument that higher import prices may suggest that
other factors unrelated to dumped imports were responsible for the alleged price suppression. As
we understand it, the E uropean Union does not argue that the fact that the import prices were
higher than domes tic prices is in itself evidence that dumped imports did not have the effect of
significant price suppression of domestic prices. Rather, as we understand the European Union, as
long as the import price is higher than the domestic price, there is room for increase in the
domestic prices, unless the market would not allow for such an increase. The European Union
argues that this price gap calls into question the "explanatory force" of the dumped imports for the
alleged price suppression. The European Union argues that the DIMD should have explained why
the dumped imports have "explanatory force" for the alleged price suppression in the presence of
such a price gap.195
7.77. As the European Union acknowledges, the fact that dumped import prices were higher than
domestic prices is not in itself evidence that dumped imports do not have "explanatory force" for
the effect of significant suppression of domestic prices. In certain situations, higher dumped import
prices can have a su ppressing effect on domestic prices . This is most commonly observed in
situations where imports command a price premium over the domestically produced product. In
these situations, when dumped import prices decline, prices for the domestic product may well
follow suit, or increase at a slower pac e, or to a lesser extent, to maintain the price differential
necessary for the domestic industry to make sales. 196 Accordingly, the absence of price
undercutting, or the presence of a "price gap" in the European Union's term, does not necessarily
preclude or call into question the "explanatory force" of the dumped imports for the alleged price
suppression.

191 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 151. According to the Appellate Body, Article 3.2
requires an investigating authority to consider the relationship between subject imports and domestic prices,
so as to understand whether the former may have "explanatory force" for the occurrence of significant
depression or suppression of the latter.
192 European Union's first written submission, paras. 150 and 151; second written submission, para. 110;
and response to Panel question No. 67, paras. 17-20.
193 European Union's second written submission, para. 112.
194 European Union's response to Panel question No. 67, para. 20; and Detailed undercutting and injury
calculations, (Exhibit EU-32) (BCI).
195 European Union's response to Panel question No. 67, paras. 17-20.
196 Indeed, the record shows that the present case may well have been such a situation. During the
investigation, the exporting producers such as Mercedes consistently argued that their LCVs were of much
higher quality. Furthermore, as discussed below in paragraph 7.81, the trends in domestic and dumped import
prices show that, since 2009, the dumped import prices decreased and remained at a lower level, thereby
creating downward pressure on domestic prices.

7.78. In addition, where an investigating authority constructs a target domestic price that
otherwise would have occurred in the absence of the dumped imports , the methodology itself
ensures that the failure of actual domestic prices to rise to the level of the target domestic price is
an effect of the dumped imports.197 Thus, in the present case, the DIMD's use of that methodology
itself explained the effect of th e dumped imports to suppress domestic prices in the absence of
price undercutting and despite the price gap. In the Investigation Report, the DIMD noted first that
there was no price undercutting. The DIMD then identified a benchmark rate of return in the year
with the lowest dumped import penetration. On the basis of the rate of return in that year, it
constructed the target domestic prices that would otherwise have occurred in the absence of the
dumped imports, and compared these with the actual price situation during the period considered.
Because the actual prices were lower than the target domestic prices (which factored out the effect
of dumped imports), the DIMD ultimately concluded that the effect of the dumped imports was to
suppress domestic prices significantly. 198 We underline that the target domestic price is the
benchmark against which the existence and extent of "price suppression" is considered; this target
domestic price is calculated independently of the dumped import price. Where the gap between the
actual domestic price and the target domestic price is considered, an investigating authority is not
required to further explain any gap between actual domestic and dumped import prices. Given that
the DIMD's methodology explained that the effect of the dumped imports was to suppress
domestic prices, the DIMD is not required to explain separately why, despite being higher priced,
the effect of dumped imports was to prevent domestic price increases.
7.79. We turn to the second argument of the European Union, that the long term price trends of
dumped imports and the domestic like product do not support a conclusion of price suppression.
The European Union notes that from 2008 to 2011 , domestic prices in RUB increased by [***]
while import prices increased b y only [***]. The European Union contends that in a price
suppression situation, the domestic prices should fail to increase or increase less than would
otherwise be the case, while import prices decrease.199
7.80. We observe first that the European Union's argument is premised on a simple end -point to
end-point (2008 to 2011) comparison of domestic and import prices. Such a simple comparison
cannot in our view be determinative of the question whether the effect of the dumped imports was
to suppress domestic price s to a significant degree, as it ignores intervening developments over
the period considered . Looking at the trends in the dumped import prices during the period of
consideration, as shown in the tables below , we see that d umped import prices increased
from 2008 to 2009 but then decreased in 2010, and eventually converged with steadily increasing
domestic prices in 2011. 200 Significantly, after 2009, dumped impor t prices continued on a deep
downward trend, despite an additional 15% customs duty201 imposed after 2009. This downward
trend in dumped import prices is seen throughout the entire period of investigation.

197 To give an example, the domestic price would have been higher (constructed target domestic
price A) in the absence of dumped imports; it increased only to a lower level (actual domestic price B) during
the period when dumping occurred; it follows that the inability of domestic prices to increase from B to A was
the effect of dumped imports.
198 Investigation Report, section 5.2.
199 European Union's second written submission, para. 112.
200 Dumped import prices in USD increased by 9.3% from 2008 to 2009 but decreased in 2010 by
17.6% compared with 2009, rebounding slightly in 2011 by 0.4% compared with 2010, and eventually
converged with the steadily increasing domestic prices in 2011.
201 The customs tariff for the product concerned increased from 10% to 25% as of 1 January 2009 for
reasons unrelated to the investigation at issue here.

Figure 1: Trends of domestic prices and dumped import prices (in USD and RUB)

Source: European Union's second written submission (BCI).

7.81. In its Investigation Report, the DIMD relied on the downward pressure of dumped imports
on prices in considering price suppression. The DIMD focused on the POI and 2011:
During the period of investigation, the domestic industry of the CU incurred losses as
a result of downward pressure on prices which [***]. The situation deteriorated
significantly in 2011.202
We consider that in the light of the downward pressure exercised by dumped imports on prices at
least since 2009, the long term price trends do not, as th e European Union argues, call into
question the "explanatory force" of dumped imports for price suppression . To the contrary, the
long term price trends corroborate the DIMD's counterfactual analysis, as the following graph
shows.

202 Emphasis added.

Figure 2: Price effects of the dumped imports

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.2.

7.82. We now turn to the European Union's argument that there actually was no price suppression
during the POI. In support of this argument, the European Union relies on a calculation it made on
the basis of data it first obtained during the present proceedings. 203 According to the
European Union, this calculation shows that, using the same rate of return of [***] that the DIMD
relied upon to construct a target domestic price in RUB and comparing that price with the import
prices converted to RUB, there was no price suppression during the POI.204 The Russian Federation
argues, inter alia, that the European Union's argument is flawed because its calculation is based on
an incorrect conversion of the import prices from USD to RUB. 205 According to the
Russian Federation, when converting import prices expressed in USD to RUB, the European Union
divided import prices expressed in USD by the exchange rate of USD to RUB (e.g. 1 USD equals
29.366 RUB for 2011) instead of multiplying by that exchange rate . The Russian Federation
submits its own calculation that shows that there was price suppression based on the same data
but making the proper conversion , con trary to the European Union 's argument. 206 Having
examined the calculations in the parties' exhibits EU -32 and RUS-31, we conclude, as the Russian
Federation asserted, that the European Union's calculation was based on an incorrect conversion of
import prices from USD to RUB, which materially affected the result. Accordingly, we find that the
European Union has not established that there was no price suppression during the POI.207

203 See European Union's response to Panel question No. 67, para. 20; and Detailed undercutting and
injury calculations, (Exhibit EU-32) (BCI).
204 We note that we have doubts about the European Union's argument in this regard. The
European Union has not explained why its calculation methodology is preferable to that relied upon by the
DIMD, much less demonstrated that it is required. However, as we find that the European Union's argument is
based on an erroneous calculation, we find it unnecessary to consider this point further.
205 The Russian Federation also argues that the European Union used incorrect data in Exhibit RUS-30,
and the European Union relied on the margin of price underselling while ignoring the difference between actual
and estimated domestic prices. (See Russian Federation's comments on the response of the European Union to
the Panel question No. 67, paras. 19-22). We rejected the European Union's argument because it is premised
on an incorrect calculation which affected the result. Therefore, we do not need to address these arguments.
206 See Russia's comments on the response of the European Union to the Panel question No. 67,
para. 23; and Calculations with respect to price suppression, (Exhibit RUS-31) (BCI).
207 In the light of this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to consider the other arguments of the
Russian Federation in paragraphs 19-22 of its comments on the European Union's response to Panel question
No. 67.

7.4.2.4.2 Whether the market would accept additional domestic price increases
7.83. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to examine the reasons for the increase in
the domestic industry's costs 208 and the likelihood that the market would accept additional
domestic price increases.209 The European Union argues that the DIMD should have considered this
issue for three reasons:
a. domestic prices increased between 2008 and 2009 and again between 2010 and 2011;
b. there were "quality issues" with Sollers' LCVs that would have limited any price increases;
and
c. there was a significant increase in the domestic industry's cost of production due to the
increasing cost of raw materials.210
7.84. The Russian Federation argues that there was a margin for domestic price increases given
that the dumped import prices were higher than domestic prices. 211 The Russian Federation also
argues that because the DIMD construct ed a target domestic price in the absence of dumped
imports, it d id not have an additional obligation to analyse whether the market would or c ould
absorb price increases. 212 According to the Russian Federation , an investigating authority is only
required to examine this issue if it is presented with evidence that calls into question the
"explanatory force " of the subject imports for the significant price suppression. The
Russian Federation asserts that this was not the case here.213
7.85. We recall that the DIMD's price suppression analysis was based on the counterfactual that
the domestic industry would achieve and maintain a certain level of prices and consequently rate
of return under normal market conditions in the absenc e of dumped imports. The Investigation
Report does not contain any indication that the DIMD considered whether the market would accept
additional price increases by the domestic industry . The notion that there was a margin for
domestic prices to increase is not a part of the analysis set out by the DIMD in the Investigation
Report. For this reason, we view the Russian Federation's argument that there was a margin for
domestic price increases as post hoc rationalization and do not rely on this assertion.
7.86. Turning to the question of whether the DIMD was obliged to examine whether the market
would have accepted additional price increases in the present case, we note that the parties do not
disagree that where there is evidence before the investigating authority that calls into question the
ability of the market to absorb price increases , the investigating authority should consider this
question.214 Article 3.2 does not explicitly require an investigating authority to address whether the
market will continue to acc ept additional price increases as part of its consideration of price
suppression. Nevertheless, the term "which otherwise would have occurred" in Article 3.2 suggests
that an investigating authority should at least consider whether the market would accept price
increases in the absence of dumped imports , when faced with relevant evidence suggesting it
would not. If the market would not accept price increases in the absence of dumped imports , it
seems unlikely that price increases "otherwise would have occurred". It follows in that situation

208 The European Union argues that "[w]hilst the [DIMD] did not explain why Sollers' costs increased,
evidence on the record shows that the Fiat Ducato presented several problems and several deficient parts had
to be replaced". (European Union's first written submission, para. 154). The European Union also argues that
the significant rise in the cost of production was "due to the raising costs of raw materials [sic]".
(European Union's second written submission, para. 113). To the extent that the European Union argues that
the rise in domestic costs of production was due to the alleged "quality problems", we refer to our analysis in
paragraph 7.89 below, where we conclude that the evidence before the DIMD did not demonstrate the
existence of "quality problems" that would affect the cost of production or the willingness of the market to
accept further price increases.
209 European Union's first written submission, paras. 153 and 154; response to Panel question No. 30,
para. 99.
210 European Union's first written submission, paras. 153 and 154; second written submission,
paras. 113-116.
211 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 189.
212 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 125.
213 Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 120 and 121.
214 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 65; and European Union's response to
Panel question No. 30, paras. 101 and 102.

that the dumped imports could not be found to have the effect of suppressing prices – that is,
preventing price increases "which otherwise would have occurred" – as such price increases would
not have occurred regardless of the effect of dumped imports.
7.87. As a preliminary matter, we observe that the record does not indicate that interested parties
questioned the ability of the market to absorb additional price increases , made arguments, or
presented evidence in this regard, before the DIMD. The European Union's argument is based on
the fact that prices had already increased in the domestic market, and refers to aspects of the
record evidence it categorizes in the present proceedings as evidence calling into question the
ability of the market to absorb additional price increases. For example, Daimler and Peugeot
Citroen Automobiles (PCA) relied on alleged quality problems in support of their argument that the
injury to the domestic industry was self -inflicted.215 Interested parties, including Sollers, PCA, and
Association of Turkis h Exporters from the Automotive Industry referred to trends in the cost of
production in their submissions, but did not make any argument concerning the ability of the
market to absorb further price inc reases.216 Against this background, we will consider whether, in
the absence of any clearly raised argument s concerning the ability of the market to accept
additional price increase, the evidence before the DIMD was such that an objective and unbiased
investigating authority should nonetheless have considered this issue.
7.88. Concerning the first basis of the European Union's argument , we consider that the fact that
domestic prices increased during the period of consideration cannot in itself call into question t he
market's ability to absorb additional price increases in the future. There must be evidence that the
price increases have resulted in prices having reached a level where the market will not accept any
further increases. In the present case, there is no such evidence on the record. Indeed, the
European Union does not even argue that the market would not accept price increases beyond the
level they were at during the period considered.
7.89. Concerning the alleged quality problems, the European Union refers to Daimler's allegation
during the investigation that there had been quality problems with Sollers' Fiat Ducato. According
to the European Union, this "raised doubts that consumers would be willing to continue paying
ever higher prices for Sollers' LCVs".217 However, the only evidence of the alleged quality problems
on the record is a single article from Auto Review Magazine reporting on the testing of one Fiat
Ducato LCV on a cobblestone road. 218 Given the limited sample in Auto Review's testing of
Sollers' LCVs, we consider that this magazine article cannot suffice to demonstrate the existence of
quality problems with Sollers' product of a degree that would support the conclusion DIMD acted
unreasonably in failing to consider whether such problems affected the li kelihood that the market
would accept further price increases.
7.90. Concerning the increasing costs of production, we note that producers will normally seek to
pass increased costs of production on to consumers in order to maintain their profit margins. There
is no evidence and no arguments on the record to indicate that the rising cost of production could
not have been passed on, in the form of increased prices, to consumers in the absence of dumped
imports. Accordingly, we consider that the increasing costs of production cannot call into question
the market's ability to accept additional price increases.
7.91. For the above reasons, we conclude that the evidence on the record of the present case was
not sufficient to require an objective and unbiased investigating a uthority to consider whether the
market would absorb price increases beyond those that actually took place in the context of its
consideration of price suppression.

215 Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit EU-19),
p. 6 and Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8 and
attachment 7: Auto Review Magazine testing of Fiat Ducato and Gazelle; Minutes of the Public Hearing of
22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-9), p. 28; and PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing
of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-13), p. 15.
216 PCA's Submission of 11 April 2013, (Exhibit EU-20), p. 4, point 1.3(e).
217 European Union's second written submission, para. 116.
218 Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit EU-19),
p. 6; Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8 and
attachment 7: Auto Review Magazine testing of Fiat Ducato and Gazelle; and Minutes of the Public Hearing of
22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-9), p. 28.

7.4.2.4.3 Domestic competition
7.92. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to examine whether any price suppression
was the effect of competitive pressure exerted by the other domestic producer, GAZ. 219 The
Russian Federation argues that the DIMD considered competitive pressure from GAZ as part of its
non-attribution analysis in the context of Article 3.5.220 There are two issues before us:
a. whether the Russian Federation was required to consider any alleged competitive
pressures exerted by GAZ in the context of its consideration of price suppression; and if
so,
b. whether the DIMD's discussion of competition from GAZ in its non-attribution analysis is
sufficient to fulfil that obligation.
7.93. Article 3.2 requires that an investigating authority consider whether any price suppression
was the effect of dumped imports. This analysis does not duplicate the causation analysis required
by Article 3.5, which has a broader scope221 leading to a specific determination. 222 At the same
time, where there is evidence that any observed price suppression is the effect of factors other
than dumped imports, an investigating authority is required to consider that evidence.223
7.94. In our view, given its broader scope, it seems reasonable that the Article 3.5 causation
analysis may, in the circumstances of a particular case, encompass elements that are relevant to
the consideration called fo r under Article 3.2 of whether the effect of the dumped imports is to
prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred . If an investigating authority
considers such elements in its causation analysis, it seems to us an unnecessary formality to
require that this consideration be duplicated in a separate consideration of the price suppressive
effect of dumped imports under Article 3.2. We recall in this regard that no determination is
required under Article 3.2.224
7.95. In the present case, the DIMD cons idered competition from GAZ as an "other factor"
causing injury. The Investigation Report states that:
Based on the information obtained by the Department in the course of the
investigation, the share of light commercial vehicles manufactured by OOO
"Avtozavod "GAZ" on the CU market in the period between 2008 and 2010 was
[***]. In 2011, the increase in share of this producer 's Product up [***] was
observed.
However, this indicator is significantly less than the share of the dumped imports on
the CU market. Besides, as mentioned in the Report, the deterioration of the financial
state of the domestic industry of the CU caused by price suppression was observed
starting from 2010, when the share of OOO "Avtozavod "GAZ" was insignificant.
Therefore, OOO "Avtozavod "GAZ", starting from 2011, competed with the domestic

219 European Union's first written submission, para. 155.
220 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 190.
221 In China – GOES the Appellate Body observed that:
Interpreting [Article 3.2] as requiri ng a consideration of the explanatory force of subject imports
for significant depression and suppression of domestic prices does not result in duplicating the
causation analysis under [Article 3.5]. Rather, the analysis under Article 3.5 concerns the caus al
relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry , and covers a broader
scope of elements than those relevant to an analysis under [Article 3.2].
Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 161 (emphasis original)
222 Under Article 3.2, an investigating authority is required to consider the explanatory force of dumped
imports on price suppression; under Article 3.5 the investigating authority is required to demonstrate that the
dumped imports cause material injury through, inter alia, price effects. Having done so, Article 3.5 further
requires the investigating authority to ensure that the injuries caused by other factors are not attributed to the
dumped imports.
223 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 152.
224 See Panel Report, Korea – Certain Paper, para. 7.253. See also Appellate Body Report, China – GOES,
para. 151.

industry of the CU; however, this factor was not determining in causing the material
injury to the domestic industry of the CU.225
7.96. In the context of its causation/non -attribution analysis, the DIMD co nsidered the
relationship between price suppression, that is, the failure of prices to increase as would have
been expected in the absence of dumped imports, and competition from GAZ. In particular, the
DIMD observed that there was no temporal correlation between injury resulting from price
suppression and the competition from GAZ. The DIMD stated in this regard that "the deterioration
of the financial state of the domestic industry of the CU caused by price suppression was observed
starting from 2010, when the share of OOO 'Avtozavod 'GAZ' was insignificant". 226 Given that
Article 3.2 only requires the investigating authority to consider the effect of the dumped imports
on domestic prices and significant price suppression, we conclude that, to the extent consideration
of whether competition from GAZ had "explanatory force" for price suppression was necessary for
the consideration of price suppression under Article 3.2, the DIMD undertook the necessary
consideration in the context of its causation/non-attribution analysis.
7.97. For this reason, we find that the European Union has not demonstrated that the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Article 3.2 by failing to consider the effect on prices of competitive pressure
from domestic producer GAZ.
7.4.2.4.4 The change in the level of the applicable customs tariff
7.98. The European Union argues that in assessing the development of import prices, the DIMD
failed to examine the relevance of the 2009 increase in customs duties on imported LCVs from
10% to 25%. 227 According to the European Unio n, the DIMD identified a "sudden drop" in import
prices between 2009 and 2010; this drop was entirely due to the incre ase in customs duties
in 2009. The European Union asserts that the failure of the DIMD to give due account to the
impact of the customs du ty increase on import prices vitiated the objectivity of the price
suppression analysis.228 The Russian Federation argues that the DIMD provided, in table 3.4 of the
Investigation Report, information on import prices both including and excluding customs duti es,
and that this shows that import prices dropped in 2010 irrespective of whether customs duties
were included in those prices or not.229
7.99. In table 5.2.2 of the Investigation Report, the DIMD set out data on dumped import prices
inclusive of customs duties, and compared it with the actual domestic prices ( on an ex works
basis230) and the target domestic prices. This section does not contain any discussion on the
impact of the 2009 increase in the customs duty rate on dumped import prices. However, t he
DIMD noted in section 3.1 of the Investigation Report, that:
Import duties under FEACN codes of Russia, applied to deliveries of light commercial
vehicles for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2008, amounted to 10%
of the customs value. As regards supp lies of light commercial vehicles to the territory
of the Russian Federation during the period fro m 1 January 2009 to
31 December 2009 under codes 8704 21 310 0 and 8704 21 910 0 FEACN CU, an
import duty of 25% of the customs value was ap plied. During the period from
1 January 2010 to 22 August 2012 the rate of import duty on light commercial
vehicles imported into the Customs Union under the aforementioned codes FEACN CU
codes amounted to 25% of the customs value.231
Moreover, in section 3.4 of the Investiga tion Report, the DIMD did set out the prices of the
dumped import both inclusive and exclusive of customs duties.

225 Investigation Report, section 5.3.2. (emphasis added)
226 Emphasis added.
227 European Union's response to Panel question No. 28, para. 95.
228 European Union's response to Panel question No. 28, para. 95.
229 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 87.
230 An ex works price is one where the seller makes goods available to the buyer at the seller's factory,
and the buyer is responsible for paying for them to be transported to where they are needed. (See
International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms® 2010 English Edition, ICC Product No. 715E (Paris: ICC
Publications, 2010)).
231 Investigation Report, section 3.1.

7.100. The increase in the customs duty took effect on 1 January 2009. We note that the customs
duty rate remained at the increased level (25%) throughout the remainder of the period of
consideration and the POI – that is, f rom 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. Because the
dumped import prices in 2009 and 2010 both included the same 25% rate of customs duties, the
sudden drop in dumped import price s from 2009 to 2010 could not have been, as the
European Union asserts, due to the increase in the customs duty. To the contrary, as the graph
below shows, the level of customs duty played no role in this sudden drop. We therefore conclude
that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that the increase in customs duties on imported
LCVs had any effect on the comparability of prices or the consideration of the explanatory effect of
dumped imports for price suppression.
Figure 3: trends of the prices of dumped imports

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 3.4.

Accordingly, we find that the European Union's argument is incorrect as a matter of fact.

7.4.2.5 "To a significant degree"
7.101. The European Union argues that the DIMD did not demonstrate that the alleged price
suppression was "to a significant degree", because it failed to compare the target domestic prices
and the actual prices of the domestic like product, and did not consider the gap between those
prices.
7.102. Article 3.2 requires the investigating authority to consider "whether the effect of the
dumped imports is to prevent price increases , which otherwise would have occurred, to a
significant degree". A straightforward comparison of the constructed target domestic price that
would have been achieved in the absence of dumped imports with the actual domestic prices
would provide a basis for an investigating authority to consider whether the difference between
those prices suggested that there was significant price suppression . We recall, however, that
Article 3.2 requires consideration of whether the effect of dumped imports is significant price
suppression, but no conclusion to that effect is necessary for the analysis of whether dumped
imports cau se material injury to proceed. Moreover, Article 3.2 does not set out any
methodological guidance on how to consider price suppression, much less on how to consider
whether any pric e suppression was significant. In this light, there is no basis for us to conclude
that Article 3.2 requires a comparison between target domestic prices in the absence of dumped
imports and the actual prices of the domestic like product in a market including dumped imports.
Rather, we will review what DIMD actually did and said with respect to the significance of price
suppression in the Investigation Report , and evaluate whether its consideration was that of a
reasonable and unbiased investigating authority, on the basis of the facts and arguments that
were before the DIMD.
7.103. The DIMD set out the following information in table 5.2.2 for each year of the period
considered, and for the two half-year periods comprising the POI:

a. Weighted average domestic costs of production.
b. Actual weighted average domestic prices.
c. Actual rate of return of the domestic industry.
d. Actual profit/loss of the domestic industry.
e. Benchmark rate of return (2009 rate of return).
f. Target domestic prices.
g. Target profit/loss of the domestic industry.
h. Difference between target profit/loss and actual profit/loss (g-d).
i. Dumped import prices.
j. Difference between actual domestic prices and dumped import prices (b-i).
k. Difference between target domestic prices and dumped import prices (f-i).
l. Difference between target domestic prices and dumped import prices as a percentage of
target domestic price ([f-i]/f).
The DIMD stated:

The results of calculations presented above show that the dumped imports
significantly prevented the growth of prices for the like Product produced by the
domestic industry in the CU. The enterprise of the domesti c industry of the CU was
forced to keep prices down regardless of the increase in the production cost of like
Product. Starting from the 1st half of 2011, the actual import prices were lower than
the prices of like Product produced by enterprise belonging to the domestic industry of
the CU, which may have occurred in the absence of dumped imports. During the
period of investigation, the domestic industry of the CU incurred losses as a result of
downward pressure on prices which [***]. The situation deterio rated significantly
in 2011.
Therefore, the prices of the dumped imports had a significant adverse effect on the
prices and profits at the sales of like Product on the territory of the Customs Union,
thus significantly suppressing the prices.232
7.104. The DIMD did not explicitly compare the actual domestic prices and the constructed target
domestic prices. However, table 5.2.2 of the Investigation Report sets out both the actual and
target domestic prices . The difference between these prices is evident on the face of the table .
Starting from the second half of the POI and in 2011 , the difference was larger than at any
previous point:
Table 5: Actual and target domestic prices
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 POI 1st
half
POI 2nd half 2011
Actual domestic
prices
USD [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Target
domestic prices
USD [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), table 5.2.2.

232 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.2.

Nothing in Article 3.2 requires an investigating authority specifically to compare actual and target
domestic prices in considering whether the effect of dumped imports was price suppression to a
significant degree . It is for the European Union, as the complaining party in this dispute , to
demonstrate that the DIMD did not consider evidence that was self-evidently before it, or that its
consideration of that evidence was biased or otherwise lacked objectivity. The European Union has
not done so in this case; it merely contends that a comparison of actual and target domestic prices
was necessary. There is no basis for us to draw the conclusion that, having set out the relevant
data in the Investigation Report, the DIMD did not in fact consider it, including the self-evident fact
that the actual domestic prices were cons istently below the tar get domestic prices, apart
from 2009, the benchmark year.

7.105. Moreover, the DIMD did compare the actual domestic prices and dumped import prices,
and the target domestic prices and the dumped import prices . The DIMD also considered the
difference between the total profit/loss actually reported by the domestic industry, and that which
would have occurred in the absence of dumped imports during the POI. The DIMD then concluded
that "dumped imports significantly prevented the growth of price s". In our view, it is beyond
question that the DIMD did, in fact, consider whether the effect of dumped imports is significant
price suppression, and in fact ultimately concluded that this was the case, taking account of the
effect of the dumped imports o n the prices of the domestic like product and the profits of the
domestic industry.
7.106. Finally we note that the European Union also argues that, because dumped import prices
were consistently above the actual domestic prices, any price suppression cannot be significant.233
As discussed above in paragraph 7.77, the absence of price undercutting does not necessarily
preclude a finding of price suppression. For the same reason, we consider that the absence of price
undercutting does not demonstrate that price suppression is not "to a significant degree".
7.107. For the reasons above, we conclude that the European Union has failed to establish that
the DIMD did not demonstrate that the alleged price suppression was "to a signif icant degree "
because it did not compare the target domestic prices and the actual prices for the domestic like
product.
7.4.3 Conclusion
7.108. For all the reasons set out above, we conclude that:
a. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 by failing to t ake into account
the impact of the financial crisis in determining the appropriate rate of return in its
consideration of price suppression;
b. the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because the DIM D "mixed up " data expressed in USD and RUB
without any explanation in its consideration of price suppression;
c. the European Union has not established that the DIMD's consideration of whether the
subject imports have "explanatory force " for the occurrence o f price suppression of
domestic prices was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2; and
d. the European Union has not established that the DIMD did not demonstrate that the
alleged price suppression was "to a significant degree " because the DIMD did not
compare the estimated prices and the actual prices for the domestic like product.
7.5 State of the domestic industry
7.5.1 Introduction
7.109. The European Union claims that the DIMD's examination of the impact of the dumped
imports on the state of the domestic industry does not constitute an objective examination based
on positive evidence. Specifically, the European Union alleges that the DIMD failed to:

233 European Union's first written submission, para. 158.

a. base its evaluation of the injury factors on positive evidence , as evidenced by certain
discrepancies between data in the In vestigation Report and in the Application and/or
Questionnaire response of Sollers;
b. make a proper evaluation of the injury factors in context;
c. consider certain facts and arguments on the record; and
d. examine all relevant factors, including those explicitly listed in Article 3.4.
7.110. The Russian Federation argues that, in respect of certain of its claims, the European Union
fails to make a prima facie case. The Russian Federation further argues that the DIMD's
examination of the state of the domestic industry was internally consistent and properly took into
account all facts and arguments on the record relating to the state of the domestic industr y, and
thus constituted an objective examination of positive evidence.
7.5.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.5.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.111. Article 3.1 is set out in paragraph 7.30 above. Article 3.4 provides:
The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry
concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic f actors and indices
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization
of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnit ude of the margin of
dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor
can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
Article 3.4 requires that the injury examination shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic
factors, including each of the fifteen listed in that provision.234 An "evaluation" of each of the
factors in Article 3.4 requires a process of analysis and assessment of the role, relevance and
relative weight of each factor in the particular investigation. Where an investigating authority
concludes that a particular factor listed in Article 3.4 is not relevant, this conclusion must be
explained.235

7.5.2.2 Data discrepancies
7.112. The European Union identifies the following discrepancies in data that was before the
DIMD:
a. data in the Investigation Report concerning profit/profitability do not match those in
Sollers' Questionnaire response; and
b. data in the Inves tigation Report concerning inventories do not match those in the
Application.236
The European Union further argues that the Russian Federation's explanations in the present
proceedings are not sufficient to clarify the discrepancies.237

7.113. The Russian Federation does not dispute the existence of the data discrepancies identified
by the European Union. The Russian Federation argues that:

234 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 125.
235 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 –India), para. 6.162.
236 European Union's first written submission, para. 192.
237 European Union's second written submission, para. 127; opening statement at the first meeting of
the Panel, para. 50.

a. discrepancies in data do not, on their own, establish a prima facie case of violation of
Articles 3.1 and 3.4238; and
b. the observed discrepancies can be explained in the light of the sources of the data in
question.239
7.5.2.2.1 Profit/profitability
7.114. The European Union argues that:
a. data in the Investigation Report concerning profit/profitability do not match those in the
Questionnaire response240; and
b. developments based on the data in the Investigation Report and Sollers' Questionnaire
response show notable unexplained differences.241
7.115. In our view, as a general matter, discrepancies between two sets of data do not in
themselves bring into question t he quality of the data or demonstrate the relevance of the
existence of the discrepancy to the determinations that follow; mere discrepancy does not mean
that the data sets are not "positive evidence" 242 or that an evaluation based on such data is not
objective. In the same vein, discrepancies in data sets on the record or different trends observed
in the different data sets on the record do not, in themselves, bring into question the
reasonableness or the objectivity of the evaluation conducted by an investi gating authority under
Article 3.4. Indeed, such discrepancies often arise in anti -dumping investigations. This is because
during an anti -dumping investigation, d ata are submitted with the initial application, and further
data are collected from questionnaire responses and other sources. Data may be verified, revised,
corrected or supplemented before being considered in the decision-making process and relied upon
in the final determination. Where data in questionnaire responses are verified and corrected before
being evaluated in the final determination, the investigating authority is certainly entitled to rely
on the verified data in its evaluation . To demonstrate that a discrepancy in data vitiates the
cogency of the evidence or the objectivity of the anal ysis, a complainant must demonstrate more
than the mere existence of a discrepancy. It must demonstrate that the discrepancy had
consequences in terms of the analysis and conclusions: for example, that different data from that
considered and relied upon wa s not only better, but that the discrepancy was so meaningful as to
bring into question the reasonableness or objectivity of the evaluation required under Article 3.4.
7.116. On the facts of this case, the European Union has identified discrepancies between the
data supplied by Sollers in its Questionnaire response, and the data relied on by the DIMD in its
Investigation Report. However, the European Union has not demonstrated in what way any
identified discrepancy brings into question the probative value of the evidence actually relied upon
by the DIMD, or the reasonableness and objectivity of the determination based on that evidence.
We note that the Questionnaire response of Sollers was submitted to the DIMD on 30 March 2012,
and was updated and corrected on at least two occasions during the investigation, upon request
from the DIMD. 243 Therefore, discrepancies between the data in these documents and that in the

238 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 204; see also, paras. 206, 213, and 214.
239 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 206, 207, 211, and 212; second written
submission, paras. 137-140.
240 European Union's first written submission, paras. 193-204.
241 European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 44.
242 We recall that "positive evidence" is:
[E]vidence that is relevant and pertinent with respect to the issue to be decided, and that has
the characteristics of being inherently reliable and creditworthy. Under the positive evidence
criterion of Article 3.1, the questi on whether the information at issue constitutes "positive
evidence" – i.e., is relevant, pertinent, reliable, and creditworthy – is assessed with respect to
the particular issue at stake and the particular circumstances of a given case.
Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, para. 7.213 (citing Appellate Body Report, Mexico –
Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, paras. 164 and 165)
243 The Questionnaire response was submitted by Sollers on 3 March 2012 and subsequently updated on
31 January of 2013 and on 13 February of 2013. (See Russian Federation's second written submission, fn 221).
See also Sollers' Questionnaire response, 3 March 2012, (Exhibit EU -3); and Soller's Updated Questionnaire
response, 31 January 2013, (Exhibits RUS-3 and EU-4) (exhibited twice).

Investigation Report are not surprising and are not in themselves sufficient to prove that the DIMD
failed to base its evaluation of profit/profitability on positive evidence. We stress that, other th an
referring to the discrepancies, the European Union does not even attempt to call into question the
relevance, pertinence or quality of the aggregated profit/profitability data that the DIMD actually
relied upon or the reasonableness and objectivity of the evaluation of that data.244
7.117. Accordingly, we find that the European Union has failed to demonstrate that the DIMD's
evaluation of profit/profitability was not based on an objective examination of positive evidence
before it and thus has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4
in this regard.
7.5.2.2.2 Inventories
7.118. The European Union argues that:
a. data in the Investigation Report concerning inventories do not match those in the
Application245; and
b. by not taking into account the inventories of Turin Auto, an LCV dealer related to Sollers,
the DIMD relied on a partial picture of the domestic industry's inventories.246
7.119. The Russian Federation c onfirmed that the inventory data in the Investigation Report
pertained to Sollers only.247 However, the Russian Federation argues, the European Union fail ed to
establish a prima facie case by merely pointing out the discrepancies. 248 The Russian Federation
further argues that Article 3.4 requires an investigating authority to evaluate inventories, but does
not provide any guidance on how this is to be done. The Russian Federation contends that the
DIMD provided an evaluation of inventory data of Sollers in its Investigation Report, and thus
complied with this aspect of Article 3.4.249
7.120. In our view, with regard to the discrepancies between the data in the Application and the
Investigation Report, as discussed above, the mere existence of discrepancies between the da ta in
the Application and that ultimately relied upon by the investigating authority in its determination
does not, without more, establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4. We
note in particular that the purpose of an application is to provide evidence to allow an investigating
authority to decide whether initiation of an investigation is warranted. It is generally understood
that the evidentiary standard for initiation is lower than for a final determination .250 After the
initiation, an investigating authority is required to investigate and gather evidence relevant to all
aspects of the analysis and determinations to be made, and then to consider, examine, and
evaluate that entire body of evidence in the light of the arguments mad e by interested parties in
making its determination of injury . Discrepancies between the evidence in an application, or in
questionnaire responses, and the evidence on which a determination of injury is based are to be
expected, and cannot, standing alone, call into question the determination of injury of an
investigating authority.

244 While it may be true that there was little that the European Union could do to advance its claim in
this case other than pointing to the discrepancies before receipt of the Russian Federation's first written
submission and accompanying exhibits, given it did not have access to the confidential data and analysis in the
Investigation Report, that does not relieve it of its burden of proof, particularly once it did have relevant
information available to it. The European Union nevertheless raises the concern that production of the
confidential version of the Report and the subsequent acceptance by a panel in a WTO dispute, risks opening
the door for WTO Members to be able to adjust the confidential version of the Investigation Report in light of
the arguments made by the complaining party in the dispute. (European Union's second written submission,
para. 4).
245 European Union's first written submission, paras. 200-204.
246 European Union's second written submission, para. 130; response to Panel question No. 45,
para. 141.
247 Russian Federation's response to the European Union's question No. 7, para. 12; and Investigation
Report, fn 6 (indicating that the source for information on the changes in stocks was "questionnaire data from
ООО Sollers-Elabuga"). See also Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 211.
248 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 213.
249 Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 139-142.
250 See, for example, Panel Reports, US – Softwood Lumber V, para. 7.54; and Mexico – Steel Pipes and
Tubes, para. 7.22.

7.121. In this case, the European Union has identified discrepancies between the data in the
Application and the Investigation Report . It has not , however, demonstrated how these
discrepancies bring into question the data actually relied upon by the DIMD in its evaluation of the
state of the domestic industry, or the objectivity and reasonableness of its evaluation of that data .
Accordingly, the European Union has not demonstrated that the DIMD's evaluation of inventories
was not based on an objective examination of positive evidence.
7.122. We turn next to the European Union's argument that, by not considering the inventories of
Sollers' related dealer Turin Auto 251 , the DIMD relied on a partia l picture of inventories, and
consequently, that it failed to objectively examine positive evidence of the domestic industry's
inventories. We recall that Article 3.4 requires the evaluation of "all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry". One factor that is specifically set out in
Article 3.4, and therefore must be evaluated, is "inventories" . We further recall that Article 3 is
concerned with the determination of injury; that is, "material injury to a domestic industry".252 As
a rule, the evidence to be considered and evaluated for this purpose must be evidence pertaining
to the domestic industry as defined in the investigation. We find nothing in Article 3.4 that
suggests to us that an investigating authority is generally required to consider the inventories of a
dealer related to a domestic producer, but not itself a producer of the like product and therefore by
definition not part of the domestic industry. We do not exclude the possibility that in certain
circumstances, evidence pertaining to such a related trader may constitute evidence pertaining to
"a relevant economic factor []" having a bearing on the state of the industry such that an
investigating authority is required to evaluate it. However, the relevance of such evidence would
have to be demonstrated to the investigating authority, on the basis of the facts of the particular
investigation, in order that the investigating authority can be satisfied that it relates to the
domestic industry and is therefore to be considered.
7.123. In the present case, the DIMD defined the domestic industry as Sollers. The evaluation of
the state of the domestic industry required by Article 3.4 therefore required the DIMD to consider
the state of Sollers, including its inventories .253 The European Union has not pointed to any
evidence before the DIMD that would support the conclusion that Turin Auto's inventories were a
relevant economic factor having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry producing LCVs.254
For this reason, we conclude that the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in not considering the inventories data of Sollers' related
trader in the Investigation Report.
7.5.2.3 Failure to properly examine all relevant injury factors in a proper context
7.124. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to examine all injury factors in a proper
context in four respects. We examine each of these arguments in turn.

251 There is no dispute that Turin Auto is a trading house related to Sollers. (See Russian Federation's
response to the European Union's question No. 5, para. 10).
252 Article 3, fn 9 to the title. (emphasis added)
253 The panel in Egypt – Steel Rebar took a similar approach regarding profits. That panel concluded that
an investigating authority is not required to examine "all factors affecting profits," taking the view that the
text of Article 3.4 only requires an examination of the domestic industry's profits:
[T]he text [of Article 3.4] … lists a variety of such factors and indices that are presumptively
relevant to the investigation and must be examined, one of which is "profits". The text does not
say … "all fac tors affecting profits". To us, this text means that in its evaluation of the state of
the industry, an investigating authority must include an analysis of the domestic industry's
profits.

Panel Report, Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.60
254 We further note that, in the present proceedings, the European Union has not presented any
evidence or argument in support of its proposition that the inventories of Turin Auto should have been taken
into account by the DIMD in its evaluation of the state of the domestic industry.

7.5.2.3.1 "End-point to end-point" comparison
7.125. The European Union argues 255 that the DIMD did not systematically undertake an
"end-point to end -point"256 analysis of the data. For this reason, the DIMD did not conduct an
objective evaluation of the evidence before it. The European Union contends that the DIMD had to
assess the trends b y making both an end -point to end -point compa rison (i.e. comparing 2011
with 2008) and a year-on-year comparison (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011) in order to make
an objective evaluation based on positive evidence. 257 The Russian Federation asserts that the
DIMD did in fact conduct an end-point to end -point comparison in the narrative discussion in the
Investigation Report. The Russian Federation contends that the DIMD's injury analysis should be
viewed as a whole to include the tables, the narratives, and the conclusions.258
7.126. We recall that an investigating authority is required, pursuant to Article 3.1, to base its
determination of injury on positive evidence and an objective examination of, inter alia, the impact
of dumped imports on the domestic industry, and that Article 3.4 sets out factors to be considered
in this regard. However, neither provision sets out requirements as to how an investigating
authority is to conduct its examination or make its determination. One common method of analysis
is to examine trends in the data concerning the Article 3.4 factors over time, in order to evaluate
changes in the state of the domestic industry. In general , when examining trends in the data
pertaining to the Article 3.4 factors over the period being considered, there are various options. An
investigating authority may examine trends by comparing the data from the beginning of the
period considered and the end of that period ( end-point to end -point comparison), or by
comparing data for specified intervals (for instance , on an annual, semi -annual, monthly, or other
basis), or some combination of approaches. Which approach an investigating authority may choose
in a particular case will depend on the nature of the particular industry it is examining and the
information before it.
7.127. If an investigating authority only compares data from the last year of the period of
consideration to data for the first year, without also examining changes, or trends, over the
intervening period, concerns may arise about the adequacy, and ultimately, the objectivity, of the
examination. This is because an end-point to end-point comparison is open to manipulation by
selecting different end points. The outcome of such a comparison, in terms of the direction of any
changes, will depend on the choice of the two end points.259 An end-point to end-point comparison
could also mask intervening trends and thus the developments in the data for the injury factors
during the period considered. If there are such changes, these may well be relevant to
consideration of both the state of the industry at the end of the period, as well as during the

255 The European Union makes arguments concerning the DIMD's failure to make end-point to end point
comparisons in two separate sections of its submissions. We consider it appropriate to analyse the
European Union's arguments in the context of its claims concerning the state of the domestic industry.
In its first written submission, the European Union had addressed this argument in the section
concerning the state of the domestic industry (section 5.4.3.3.1). In its second written submission, the
European Union argued, in the section concerning the selection of time periods (section 3.2.2.3), that the
DIMD failed to systematically make an end-point to end-point comparison of data for all of the economic
indicators. (See European Union's second written submission, paras. 72-78). In response to our question, the
European Union clarified that its end-point to end-point argument is made in the context of its claims under
Articles 3.1 and 3.4. The European Union explained that it had also referred to this argument in the context of
its claims concerning the selection of the time-periods to illustrate the significant contrast between the DIMD's
use of the alleged "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods, and the objective picture that would follow from
consideration of consecutive time periods of equal duration in the context of a longer-term comparison of data
from 2008 to 2011. (See the European Union's response to Panel question No. 65, paras. 12 and 13). The
Russian Federation argues that the European Union's end-point to end-point argument does not in any way
touch upon the issue of selection of periods at the initial stage of the process of injury analysis, and is thus
irrelevant to the European Union's claim concerning the selection of time-periods. (See Russian Federation's
response to Panel question No. 65, para. 23). In the light of the parties' submissions, and the fact that we
have rejected above the European Union's claims concerning the selection of the time-periods, we do not find it
necessary to address the European Union's end-point to end-point argument in the context of its claims
concerning the selection of the time-periods.
256 In the present case, the European Union uses this term to refer to a comparison of data for injury
factors in 2008 and 2011.
257 European Union's second written submission, paras. 72-78.
258 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 61.
259 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 354. The Appellate Body's statement in that
case was made in reference to the increase of imports. However, the same would apply by analogy in relation
to the data for economic indicators in the context of the injury analysis.

period, and the impact of the dumped imports on the state of the industry over the period
considered. Such concerns do not arise if the investigating authority undertakes only a
year-on-year comparison of data, because in such a case, the end-point to end-point comparison
is not masked, but is readily apparent in the data describing the year -on-year changes. Indeed, in
the present proceeding the European Union presented its own end-point to end-point comparison
based on the data in the public version of the Investigation Report.260 It might be preferable for an
investigating authority undertaking a year-on-year analysis of data also to explicitly set out the
end-point to end-point changes observed, but this is not required.
7.128. We note that, in respect of some of the data it exa mined, the DIMD did set out an
end-point to end-point comparison. In the narrative sections of the Investigation Report, the DIMD
set out the data showing changes from 2008 to 2011 for labour activity, domestic production by
volume and domestic sales by volume 261, and from 2009 to 2011 for domestic market share,
capacity utilisation, production costs , and domestic prices.262 For certain economic indicators such
as consumption, domestic production by volume and domestic sales by volume, the DIMD made
end-point to end-point comparisons between 2011 and both 2008 and 2009.
7.129. In this respect, where an investigating authority compares data for different factors on an
end-point to end -point basis, but uses different starting points within the period of consideration
without justification or explanation263, concerns may arise about the sufficiency and objectivity of
the examination.264 It leaves open the possibility that the selection of the starting points may have
been result-driven.265 Nevertheless, in the absence of a specific requirement in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, we do not consider that lack of consistency in the selection of beginning or ending
points in an end-point to end -point comparison in itself gives rise to an inconsistency with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4. Such an inconsistency must be demonstrated by reference to the examination
under Article 3.4 as a whole. Thus, the question before us is whether, on the facts of this case, the
European Union has demonstrated that the fact that the DIMD used different starting points for
the end-point to end -point comparison s it made in the course of its analysis resulted in a
determination that a reasonable and objective investigating authority could not have made.
7.130. In support of its claim, t he European Union refers to two instances in which the DIMD
allegedly used different starting points "to depict the most negative picture of the developments in
the domestic industry"266:
a. The DIMD found that the domestic industry's market share decreased by 20.1% between
2009 and 2011. However, if 2008 had been used as the starting point, the domestic
industry's market share would have shown an increase of [***]%.
b. The DIMD found that the domestic industry's cost of production increased by 42.7%
whereas domestic prices increased by only 6.4% between 2009 and 2011. However, if

260 European Union's first written submission, fn 91; see also second written submission, para. 78. The
European Union stated that "the European Union reconstructed based on the public version of the Final Report
the 2008-2011 trends".
261 Investigation Report, section 4.2.6; Russian Federation's answers to the European Union question
262 Investigation Report, section 4.3; European Union's second written submission, para. 75; and
Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 71.
263 The Russian Federation argues that the DIMD compared the situation in 2011 with 2008 or 2009, in
light of the impact of the financial crisis. (See Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 71; and
response to Panel question No. 65, paras. 33-36.). However, there is no indication in the Investigation Report
that the choice of the beginning and ending points for comparison was linked to the impact of the financial
crisis. Therefore, we consider the Russian Federation's arguments in this regard to be post hoc rationalization.
264 We recall that the panel in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties considered that "there is a prima
facie case that an investigating authority fails to conduct an 'objective' examination if it examines different
injury factors using different periods. Such a prima facie case may be rebutted if the investigating authority
demonstrates that the use of different periods is justifiable on the basis of objective grounds (because, for
example, data for more recent periods was not available for certain injury factors)." (Panel Report, Argentina –
265 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 354. The Appellate Body stated that "a simple
end-point-to-end-point analysis could easily be manipulated to lead to different results, depending on the
choice of end points. A comparison could support either a finding of an increase or a decrease in import
volumes simply by choosing different starting and ending points".
266 European Union's second written submission, paras. 76-78.

2008 had been used as the starting point, the cost of production would have increased
by [***]% while domestic prices increased by [***]%.
7.131. In addressing these arguments, we recall the nature of the concern we have identified with
end-point to end-point comparisons: where an investigating authority compares data from the last
year of a period to data for the first year without a lso examining intervening trends, the concern is
that the analysis could be manipulated to provide different, possibly desired, results. We recall that
in the present case, the DIMD examined the data from multiple perspectives, rather than relying
exclusively on an end -point to end -point comparison . Indeed, the DIMD primarily relied on a
year-on-year comparison in considering the data. Moreover, the DIMD's determination of material
injury during the POI is primarily based on development s in the latter years of the period
considered, in the light of the impact of the financial crisis (that is, post-2009).
7.132. With respect to the domestic industry's market share, it is true that , had the DIMD
used 2008 as a starting point, the domestic industry's market share would have shown an increase
rather than a decrease. However, the 2008-2011 comparison is only one of the different possible
ways to look at the same data and does not undermine the conclusion that the domestic industry's
market share decreased from 2009 to 2011 on a year-on-year basis.
7.133. With respect to the cost of production, using 2008 as the starting point of comparison
results in a numerically different comparison between the increase in costs and the increase in
prices from beginning to end of the period, but does not change the nature or direction of the
comparison. What the European Union has presented is simply an alternative way of looking at the
data. However, it has failed to demonstrate that this alternative was the only, or the necessary,
way of looking at this data objectively in this case. Nor has the European Union demonstrated how
failing to use 2008 as the starting point undermined the DIMD's conclusion on the basis of the data
it considered, that the increase in domestic prices did not keep up with the rising cost of
production. Accordingly, in the present case, based on the facts before us, we consider that the
failure of the DIMD to compare the data for 2011 with 2008 in these two contexts did not
undermine its evaluation of these economic in dicators. We therefore find that the European Union
has failed to demonstrate that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to
systematically compare data for 2011 with data for 2008 for all economic indicators in the present
case.
7.5.2.3.2 Profit/profitability for the first half of 2011 and the full year 2011
7.134. The European Union argues that in table 4.2.5 of the Investigation Report the DIMD only
indicated that there were "losses" in the first half of 2011 and the full year 2011, without gi ving
actual figures for the losses. The European Union argues that this approach "breaks" the
presentation of a trend in the evolution of the profit/loss. 267 The European Union contends that the
mere suggestion that some undisclosed amount of "losses" would have happened during a small
part of the POI is not sufficient to support a conclusion of material injury. 268 The European Union
also argues that evidence in the record contradicts the DIMD's suggestion of a negative trend in
the domestic industry's profits during the POI.
7.135. We note that the European Union 's argument is made under the heading "failure to
properly examine all injury factors in a proper context" . However, the European Union in fact
asserts that the DIMD failed to provide the actual figures for the losses it referred to. It is true that
table 4.2.5 of the non-confidential version of the Investigation Report only indicates "losses" or
"negative value" for the 1 st half of 2011 and the full year 2011, without setting out the relevant
figures. Indeed, this table does not set out any of the actual figures for profit or loss for any
period, reporting only percentage changes and the challenged references to "losses".

267 European Union's first written submission, paras. 218-220.
268 European Union's second written submission, para. 135.

Table 6: profit/loss of the domestic industry (non-confidential version)
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010
POI
2011 H2 of
2010
H1 of
2011
Profit/loss of enterprises of the
domestic industry in the CU from the
sale of Products in the CT CU (in
relation to the same period in the
preceding year, percentage)

% - +233.8 -17.1 +26.1 losses losses
Change in the profitability of sales of
Products in the CT CU (in relation to
the same period in the preceding
year, in percentage points)

pp - +9.4 -9.0 -6.1 negative
value
negative
value
Source: Public version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibits RUS-12 and EU-21) (exhibited twice).

However, the confidential version of table 4.2.5 does set out the actual figures for profit and loss,
and profitability, which were treated as confidential:

Table 7: profit/loss of the domestic industry (confidential version)
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010
POI
2011 H2 of
2010
H1 of
2011
Profit/loss of enterprise of
the domestic industry of
the CU from the sales of
Product in the CT CU (in
relation to the same period
in the preceding year,
percentage)

RUB
million [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Return on sales of Product
in the CT CU (in relation to
the same period in the
preceding year, in
percentage points)

% [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI).

To the extent that the European Union challenges the failure to set out in the public decision the
figures for the actual profits/losses, this is not an issue under Article 3.4. It is quite clear to us that
an investigating authority may examine confidential information in its evaluation of the Article 3.4
factors and indices. While there may be an issue in such a case as to whether the information in
question was properly treated as confidential pursuant to Article 6.5, that issue is in no way
determinative of, or even relevant to, whether the investigating authority properly examined the
factors and indices at issue. In any event, the European Union has made no claim under Article 6.5
in respect of this issue in this dispute. 269 The European Union makes no other arguments as to
alleged error in the DIMD's evaluation of the profit/profitability trends in its Investigation Report.

7.136. We now turn to the last argument of the European Union in this context , that evidence on
the record contradicts the DIMD's finding of a negative trend in the domestic industry's profits
during the POI, which we recall comprised the 2 nd half of 2010 and the 1 st half of 2011. The
European Union argues that the fact that " profits decreased significantly in the first half of 2010,
i.e. before the investigated period … contradicts the DIMD's suggestion of a negative trend in the
domestic industry's profits during the investigated p eriod". 270 The European Union does not,
however, explain how the fact of a decrease in profits in the 1 st half of 2010, before the POI,
contradicts the finding of negative profit performance during the POI. In its second written
submission, the European Union argues that [***], i.e. after the end of the POI, and that if the
POI is considere d on a 12-month basis (by combining the profits/losses of the two half -year

269 The European Union did make a claim under Article 6.9 concerning the DIMD's use of the terms
"losses" and "negative value" in its final disclosure, which is addressed later in this Report.
270 European Union's first written submission, para. 220.

periods), Sollers made profits. The European Union argues that this shows that by 2011, the
domestic industry was still doing very well.271
7.137. The European Union re-organizes and recasts the data in making this argument. However,
merely showing that a different way of looking at the data could support a different conclusion is
not enough to demonstrate error in the investigating authority's evaluation, unless there is some
reason to conclude that the proposed different approach was necessary, either as a matter of law,
or because the evidence could not be objectively examined otherwise. The European Union has
demonstrated neither of these. None of its arguments contradicts or otherwise c alls into question
the objectivity of the findings of the DIMD concerning profit/profitability, which are set out in its
Investigation Report:
2010 saw the reduction of profit by 17% ([***]) in comparison with 2009. During the
period of investigation – in the 2nd half of 2010 profit increased by 26.1% ([***]), in
the 1st half of 2011 the domestic industry of the CU suffered losses which amounted
to [***].The overall losses in 2011 amounted to [***].272
7.138. Accordingly, we conclude that the European Union has not established that the DIMD failed
to base its evaluation on an objective examination of the evidence concerning the domestic
industry's profit/profitability during the POI, that is, the 2nd half of 2010 and the 1st half of 2011.
7.5.2.3.3 Comparison between the period 2008-2009 and the period 2010-2011
7.139. The European Union argues that the DIMD split the analysis into two periods , and then
compared the "abnormal" period 2008-2009, which was affected by the start -up of the domestic
industry and the financial crisis, with the period 2010-2011.273 The European Union asserts that
the DIMD assumed that the exceptional positive developments in the domestic industry
during 2009 c ould continue during 2010 -2011 without more explanation, and "base[d] its
conclusions on a comparison between these two time periods".274
7.140. The European Union does not identify where in the Investigation Report the DIMD
compared the period 2008-2009 with the period 2010-2011. Nor does the European Union provide
any argument as to how this alleged approach und ermined the DIMD's injury analysis. As
discussed earlier, the DIMD compared the data and looked at trends principally on a year -on-year
basis. In addition, the DIMD also compared the data for 2011 with the data for 2008 or 2009, or
both. Nothing in the Inv estigation Report suggests that DIM D relied on a comparison of the
period 2008-2009 with the period 2010-2011.
7.141. Accordingly, we conclude that the European Union has not established as a matter of fact
that the DIMD assumed that the exceptional positive developments in the domestic industry
during 2009 c ould continue during 2010 -2011 without more explanation, and "base[d] its
conclusions on a comparison between these two time periods".
7.5.2.3.4 Failure to consider whether the market will accept further price increases
7.142. The European Union argues that the DIMD relied on an assumption that the market would
have accepted a continuous increase in price in line with rising costs.275
7.143. The European Union's argument is identical to the one it makes in its price suppression
analysis claims, which we address ed above in paragraph 7.91. Our finding there applies mutadis
muntandis to the European Union's argument in this context.
7.5.2.3.5 Failure to consider certain facts and arguments on the record
7.144. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to consider the following sets of facts and
arguments relevant to the state of the domestic industry that were before it:

271 European Union's second written submission, para. 136.
272 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 41.
273 European Union's second written submission, para. 115.
274 European Union's first written submission, para. 221.
275 European Union's first written submission, para. 223.

a. the DIMD did not address interested parties' arguments that, despite a slight decrease in
the domestic industry's market share during the POI, that market share remained at a
very high level during the period 2010 and 2011, when compared to 2008276;
b. the DIMD ignored information on the record concerning independent dealers' inventories
when evaluating the evolution of the inventories277; and
c. the DIMD failed to consider Volkswagen's argument that the increase in the domestic
industry's inventories was due to the termination of the licence agreement between
Sollers and Fiat.278
7.5.2.3.5.1 Domestic industry's market share
7.145. The European Union notes that the domestic industry's market share in 2011 was above its
level in 2008. The European Union argues that this is very hard to reconcile with the DIMD's
conclusion that the domestic industry was suffering material i njury during the POI. 279 The
European Union contends that interested parties, including PCA, raised the increased market share
in 2010 relative to 2008 during the course of the investigatio n, arguing that this increase
contradicts the DIMD's finding of negat ive trends.280 The European Union contends that the DIMD
failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation addressing this evidence and argument in
reaching its conclusions. 281 The Russian Federation does not comment on the relevance of the
domestic indust ry's market share in 2011 as compared with that of 2008 to the DIMD's
determination. The Russian Federation asserts that no interested party presented positive
evidence that would put in question the credibility and the affirmative, objective and verifiabl e
character of the information in questionnaires and import statistics used for the calculation of
market shares.
7.146. Section 4.2 of the Investigation Report sets out the following data on the market share of
the domestic industry (Sollers):
Table 8: Domestic industry's market share
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010
POI
2011 H2 of
2010
H1 of
2011
Share of consumption
accounted for by Product
manufactured by the
domestic industry of the CU
and sold in the CT CU
% [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI).

With regard to market share, the DIMD stated that:

Between 2008 and 2010, the share of Product produced by the domestic industry in
consumption within the CT CU increased by 37.9 percentage points ([***]) whereas
in the period of investigation, the 2nd half of 2010 saw a decline in the share of
consumption in the CT CU accounted for Product produced by the domestic industry of
the CU by 8.9 percentage points ( [***]), and by 11.5 p ercentage points in the 1st
half of 2011 ( [***]). In 2011, the share of consumption in the CT CU accounted for
Product produced by the domestic industry in the CU was 18.1 percentage po ints
lower than the 2010 figure.

276 European Union's first written submission, paras. 226-230.
277 European Union's first written submission, paras. 232 and 233.
278 European Union's first written submission, para. 233 (referring to Volkswagen's submission of
6 April 2012 regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-11), p. 13).
279 See European Union's first written submission, paras. 228 and 229. We note that, in making this
argument, the European Union relies on the market share of the domestic producers (Sollers and GAZ), rather
than the market share of the domestic industry as determined by the DIMD. Therefore, the European Union's
argument does not demonstrate anything about the determination actually made by DIMD.
280 European Union's first written submission, paras. 226 and 227.
281 European Union's first written submission, para. 234.

In its conclusions, the DIMD stated that:

[I]n the context of the financial and economic crisis, consumers preferred the cheaper
light commercial vehicles, manufactured on the territory of the Customs Union, and,
as a result, the volumes of production of like Product by the domestic industry of the
CU shrank by 37.7% in 2009 compared with 2008 whereas the sales volume in the
same period decreased by 8.6%. The share of like Product produced by the domestic
industry of the CU in the volume of consumption in the CT CU also increased
significantly: by 39.9 percentage points.
The share of like Product produced by the domestic industry of the CU in the
consumption volume in the CT CU decreased by 20.1 percentage points between 2009
and 2011 …
Thus, despite the recovery of production and volumes of sales of like product by the
domestic industry of the CU in the CT CU following the f inancial and economic crisis
of 2009, the domestic industry of the CU failed to maintain its position in the CT CU.
Starting form [sic] 2010, the domestic industry of the CU underwent a decline in
profits and profitability of sales, a shrinking share of like product on the CU market
and an increase in stocks. In 2011, the aforementioned negative trends intensified
significantly in the context of growing dumped imports, and, as a result, the business
of the domestic industry of the CU involving the production and sale of Product
became unprofitable.282
7.147. The Investigation Report shows that the DIMD's analysis of the domestic industry's market
share was principally based on an examination of the trends on a year -on-year basis and for the
period of investigation. In its ultimate conclusion regarding material injury caused by dumped
imports, the DIMD attributed the increase in domestic industry market share from 2008 to 2009 to
the impact of the financial crisis on consumer's preferences for lower priced domestic LCVs. The
DIMD found that from 2009 to 2011, the domestic industry's market share decreased by 20.1%.
The DIMD focused primarily on the continued decline in domestic industry market share in 2010
and 2011 in its finding.
7.148. The issue before us is whether the DIMD provided a reasoned and adequate explanation
for the conclusions it reached in the light of the alternative explanations argued by at least one
interested party.283
7.149. During the investigation, PCA made the following statement concerning the domestic
industry's market share:
Sollers market share increased by almost 35 percentage points from 2008 to 2010 ,
but there was a relative drop in the market share of Sollers, as its pro duction did not
keep up with the important increase in consumption. …
… (domestic) market share increased significantly overall.284
7.150. The graph below shows the domestic industry's actual market share (the blue line), the
comparison relied on by the DIMD (the red arrow) on the one hand and the comparison referred to
by PCA (the green arrow) on the other hand.

282 Emphasis added.
283 See, for example, Appellate Body Reports, US – Tyres (China), para. 280; and US – Softwood
284 PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit
EU-13), p. 10.

Figure 4: Domestic industry's market share

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.1.

7.151. We consider that PCA merely identified an alternative way of interpreting the data that was
before the DIMD. PCA did not explain, however, why the DIMD should have relied on this 2008
to 2010 end-point to end -point comparison rather than the year -on-year changes it identified, as
well as the 2009 to 2011 comparison it made. Nor has the European Union demonstrated in this
proceeding why PCA's interpretation of the data was necessary, either as a matter of law or
because the evidence could not be objectively examined o therwise. The mere existence of this
alternative interpretation of the data does not automatically render the DIMD's explanation
"implausible". However, we will go on to consider, in the light of this alternative interpretation,
whether the DIMD's explanat ion for its conclusion based on its approach to the data is adequate
and reasoned.
7.152. The DIMD explained in the Investigation Report that the significant increase in the
domestic industry's market share from 2008 to 2009 was due to the impact of the financial crisis
on consumer preferences for lower priced domestic LCVs . The DIMD contrasted this earlier
increase with the more recent downward trend from 2009 to 2011, and particularly the shrinking
market share starting from 2010 through the POI and 2011 as a wh ole.285 In our view, m ore
recent data during the period of consideration is likely to be particularly relevant to the
determination of material injury during the POI , which in this c ase included the second half
of 2010 and the first half of 2011.286 PCA's alternative interpretation is based on a 2008-2010 end-
point to end -point comparison without reference to the intervening trends ; it does not
demonstrate that the DIMD's explanation was not reasoned and adequate. And, as we note above,
the European Union has not made additional arguments that would support the conclusion that
PCA's interpretation of the data was necessary. Thus, it is clear that the DIMD rejected PCA's
interpretation of the data in favour of its own interpretation, which we find to be reasonabl e and
adequately explained.
7.153. Accordingly, we conclude that the European Union has failed to establish that the DIMD
acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to specifically address the interested
parties' argument on the comparison of the domestic industry's market share in 2010 and 2008.

285 Investigation Report, section 4.3.
286 The DIMD stated in its Investigation Report that it established the existence of material injury during
the POI. (Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), p. 53: "according to the
requirements of Article 13(3) of the Agreement the investigating authority established the existence of injury
to the domestic industry of the CU during the period of investigation (the 2nd half of 2010 to the 1st half
of 2011)").

7.5.2.3.5.2 Inventories of independent dealers
7.154. The European Union argues that the DIMD ignored information on the record concerning
independent dealers' inventories when evaluating the evolution of the domestic industr y's
inventories.287 The Russian Federation argues that the DIMD is not required, for the purpose of an
objective examination of inventories, to assess the inventories of downstream independent dealers ,
which are not part of the domestic industry.288
7.155. As discussed above, insofar as inventories are concerned, an investigating authority must
evaluate the data concerning the inventories of the domestic industry at issue in the investigation,
and not the inventories of entities that do not form part of that domestic industry. For this reason,
we conclude that there is no basis for finding that DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1
or 3.4 by failing to evaluate the inventories of independent dealers in its consideration.
7.5.2.3.5.3 The reason for the increase in domestic industry's inventories
7.156. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to consider Volkswagen's argument that
the increase in the domestic industry's inventories was due to the termination of the licence
agreement between Sollers and Fiat.289
7.157. We note that the European Union's argument pertains to the issue of causation, rather
than the DIMD's evaluation of inventories in the context of its examination of the state of the
domestic industry. We refer to section 7.6.2.4.1 of our Report concerning causation and
non-attribution.
7.5.2.4 Failure to examine all factors
7.158. The European Union argues that in arriving at its determination, the DIMD failed to
examine the following required factors:
a. magnitude of the margin of dumping;
b. return on investments;
c. actual and potential effects on cash flow; and
d. the ability to raise capital or investments.290
7.5.2.4.1 The magnitude of the margin of dumping
7.159. The magnitude of the margin of dumping is one of the fifteen injury factors expressly listed
in Article 3.4, evaluation of which is required in every case.291 Accordingly, the DIMD was under an
obligation to examine this factor. Article 3.4 does not require that the magnitude of the margin of
dumping be evaluated in any particular way or be given any particular weight.292 Nor is there any
guidance in Article 3.4 or, indeed, elsewhere in the Anti -Dumping Agreement, as to how the
investigating authority's evaluation should be set out in its determination.
7.160. The DIMD set out its examination of the Article 3.4 factors relating to the state of the
domestic industry in section 4.2 of the Investigation Report. This section does not mention or
discuss the magnitude of the margin of dumping. Nor is there any explicit discussion of the
magnitude of the margin of dumping, in r elation to the state of the domestic industry, elsewhere

287 European Union's first written submission, paras. 232 and 233.
288 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 257-261.
289 European Union's first written submission, para. 233 (referring to Volkswagen's submission of
6 April 2012 regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-11), p. 13).
290 European Union's first written submission, para. 236.
291 See e.g. Panel Reports, Egypt – Steel Rebar, para. 7.36; EC – Bed Linen, para. 6.159; Mexico – Corn
Syrup, para. 7.128; and China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 7.159; and Appellate Body
292 Except to the extent that Article 3.4 makes clear that no one or several of the factors listed can
necessarily give decisive guidance.

in the Investigation Report. The Russian Federation concedes that this factor was "not explicitly
explained" in the Investigation Report .293 The Russian Federation argues, however, that it suffices
for compliance with Article 3.4 that the margin of dumping was discussed in section 4.1 of the
Investigation Report, where the DIMD analysed whether the margin of dumping for each country
investigated was more than 2%, in the context of determining whether on e of the conditions for a
cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports under Article 3.3 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement was met.294
7.161. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 do not require that an investigating authority set out its assessment of
injury factors in any particular section of its report. At issue here, however, is not the placement of
the evaluation, but whether it was done at all. Under Article 3.4, the issue is the impact of dumped
imports on the domestic industry; thus, it requires an evaluation of the magnitude of the margin of
dumping in that context. In the present case, in section 4.1 of the Investigation Report, the DIMD
was addressing the issue whether the margin of dumping for each of the countries potentially
subject to a cumulative assessment wa s greater than de minimis (2%). There is no discussion of
the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry , or the magnitude of the margin of
dumping in that context . There is no ba sis for us to conclude that the analysis in section 4.1 for
the purpos es of Article 3.3 was relevant to, or considered in, the context of the Article 3.4
examination.295 Section 4.1 of the Investigation Report does not, therefore, contain an evaluation
of the magnitude of the margin of dumping for purposes of Article 3.4.
7.162. For this reason, we conclude that the DIMD failed to evaluate the magnitude of the margin
of dumping, and thus acted inconsistently with Article 3.4.
7.5.2.4.2 Return on investments, actual and potential effects on cash flow, and the
ability to raise capital or investments
7.163. The European Union argues that the non -confidential version of the Investigation Report
shows that the DIMD failed to examine the domestic industry's return on investments, actual and
potential effects on cash flow, and the ability to raise capital o r investments . The
Russian Federation argues that the DIMD evaluated these factors in the confidential version of the
Investigation Report. The Russian Federation also contends that the European Union is incorrect to
state that there is nothing in the Inve stigation Report or the record which shows that the DIMD
evaluated these factors. The Russian Federation asserts that the DIMD met the requirements of
Article 3.4 by requesting and receiving the financial accounts of Sollers in confidential form. 296
According to the Russian Federation, the fact that data were requested and received from the
domestic industry indicates that the relevant information has been evaluated, although the results
of the evaluation of such data were not set forth in the published document.297
7.164. The European Union argues that the Panel should not base its assessment under
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 on the confidential version of the Investigation Report that was submitted by
the Russian Federation as Exhibit RUS -14 in these proceedings, to the ext ent that the same
information was not apparent from the non -confidential version of the Investigation Report on
which the European Union based its claims. 298 The European Union also argues that the obligation
to examine these factors under Article 3.4 cannot be fulfilled by simply requesting or even
obtaining information concerning a given factor. Rather, this information must be analysed and
interpreted by the investigating authority.299

293 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 273.
294 The Russian Federation also argues that the DIMD implicitly evaluated the magnitude of the margin
of dumping in the context of the analysis of the effect of the prices of dumped imports on the domestic prices.
(Russian Federation's second written submission, paras. 180–203). We find no support for this argument in the
record.
295 We recall in this regard the conclusion of the panel in China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SSST
(EU) that "MOFCOM's simple assertion that the margins of dumping are more than de minimis provides no
basis on which we can conclude that MOFCOM actually evaluated the magnitude of those margins in the
context of its Article 3.4 analysis." (See Panel Reports, China – HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU),
paras. 7.159-7.161).
296 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 280.
297 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 34, para. 86.
298 European Union's second written submission, para. 144.
299 European Union's second written submission, para. 145.

7.165. We address first the issue whether we may base our assessment of the Eur opean Union's
claim on the confidential version of the Investigation Report. The evaluation of the Article 3.4
factors at issue is absent, in its entirety, from the non -confidential version of the Investigative
Report; the DIMD did not even indicate that c onfidential information had been redacted from the
non-confidential version in this context. This fact may give rise to concerns, particularly with
respect to whether the published report of the investigation is consistent with the requirements of
Article 12 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. 300 We recall that the Article 3.1 requirement that an
injury determination be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of the
required elements of the volume, price effects, and impact of the dumped im ports, does not imply
that the determination must be based only on reasoning or facts that were disclosed to, or
discernible by, the parties to an anti -dumping investigation.301 Therefore, there is no basis for the
proposition that we may not base our assessment of the European Union's claim on th e
confidential version of the Investigation Report.
7.166. We proceed on the basis of all the evidence on the record, including that found in the
confidential version of the Investigation R eport and in the underlying record as appropriate, and
the arguments presented, to examine the European Union's assertion that the factors at issue
were not examined by the DIMD as required under Article 3.4. Section 4.2.7 of the confidential
version of the Investigation Report states, concerning the factors at issue:

[***] [sic].302
7.167. Concerning return on investments, the DIMD explicitly stated that [***].303 We consider
that this passage suffices to demonstrate that the DIMD evaluated the return on investments of
the domestic industry.
7.168. Concerning cash flow, the DIMD stated that the [***]. 304 Article 3.4 requires the
evaluation of "actual and potential negative effects on cash flow ", and not merely the cash flow of
the domestic industry itself . Logically, the [***] during the pe riod of consideration at least
potentially affect cash flow negatively. Th e passage above suffices to demonstrate that the DIMD
evaluated the actual and potential negative effects on cash flow of the domestic industry.
7.169. Concerning the ability to raise capi tal or investments , the DIMD noted that [***]. The
DIMD also noted that the financial accounts of Sollers confirmed that [***].305 We consider that
information is relevant to, and this discussion suffices to demonstrate that DIMD did evaluate, the
industry's ability to raise capital or investments.
7.170. The European Union asserts that, even if we were to rely on the confidential version of the
Investigation Report in considering this aspect of its arguments , the analysis in the confidential
version of the Investi gation Report would still be inconsistent with Articles 3.4 and 3.1. 306
However, the European Union did not substantiate this assertion with argument or evidence. Thus,
we have no basis on which to further consider our view of the adequacy of the DIMD's evaluation
of these factors. Accordingly, we conclude that the European Union has not established that the
DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 by failing to evaluate the domestic industry's return on

300 The European Union argues that total silence on a factor may call into question whether the DIMD
actually examined it. (See European Union's second written submission, para. 146; and response to Panel
question No. 50, para. 156). However, the European Union has not presented any evidence suggesting that the
confidential version of the Investigation Report is not genuine. Moreover, although the European Union stated a
claim under Article 12 in its request for establishment (para. 9), it did not pursue that claim in this proceeding,
making no arguments and presenting no evidence in that regard.
301 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 111.
302 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.7, p. 42.
303 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.7, p. 42.
304 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.7, p. 42.
305 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.7, p. 42.
306 European Union's second written submission, para. 144.

investments, actual and potential effects on cash flo w and the ability to raise capital or
investments.
7.171. In the light of the above, on the basis of t he confidential version of the Investigation
Report, we conclude that the DIMD evaluated the factors in question. For this reason, we are of
the view that there is no need for us also to consider the parties' arguments concerning whether
the fact that data was requested and received from the domestic industry can indicate that the
relevant information has been evaluated where the results of such evaluation were no t set forth in
the published document.
7.172. Accordingly, we conclude that the European Union failed to establish that the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to examine the domestic industry's return on
investments, actual and potent ial effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital or
investments.
7.5.3 Conclusion
7.173. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the European Union has not established
that:
a. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in its evaluation of
profit/profitability data in the Investigation Report;
b. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in its evaluation of inventory
data in the Investigation Report;
c. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to systematical ly
compare data for 2011 with data for 2008 for all economic indicators in the present case ;
d. the DIMD failed to objectively examine the domestic industry's prof it/profitability during
the POI;
e. the DIMD assumed that the exceptional positive developments in the domestic industry
during 2009 could continue during 2010 -2011 without more explanation, and "base[d]
its conclusions on a comparison between these two time periods";
f. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to consider whether the
market will accept further price increases;
g. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to specifically address
the interested parties' argument on the comparison of the domestic industry' s market
share in 2010 and 2008;
h. the DI MD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in failing to evaluate the
inventories of independent dealers and the reason for the increase in inventories; and
i. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article s 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to evaluate the
domestic industry's return on investments, actual and potential effects on cash flow and
the ability to raise capital or investments.
7.174. We further conclude that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 by failing to
evaluate the magnitude of the margin of dumping.
7.6 Causation
7.6.1 Introduction
7.175. The European Union claims that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by
failing to properly establish a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury, and
by failing to conduct a proper non-attribution analysis of factors other than the dumped imports

that were known to the DIMD and that were injuring th e domestic industry at the same time as
dumped imports.307 The European Union further argues that, insofar as the DIMD relied on its price
suppression analysis in determining causation, that inadequate analysis also undermined the
causation analysis.308
7.176. The Russian Federation argues that , in its causation analysis, the DIMD provided a
coherent and consistent explanation for its conclusion that dumped im ports captured a share of
the growing market which they otherwise would not have done in the absence of dumping and
thereby caused injury. 309 With regard to the DIMD's non -attribution analysis, the
Russian Federation argues that the DIMD analysed the comment s of the interested parties and
provided explanation s with respect to the alleged impact of the two " other factors " that were
clearly raised before it.310
7.6.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.6.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.177. Article 3.1 is set out in paragraph 7.30 above. Article 3.5 provides that:
It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports
and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known
factors other than the dumped imports wh ich at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect
include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not so ld at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers,
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the
domestic industry.
7.178. Together, these provisions require that an investigating authority demonstrate, on the
basis of an objective examination of positive evidence, that:
a. dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry; and
b. injury caused by other known factors is not attributed to the dumped imports.311
In making such a determination, the investigating authority must demonstrate a relationship of
cause and effect, such that dumped imports are shown to have contributed to the injury to the
domestic industry. Dumped imports need not be "the" cause of the injury suffered by the domestic
industry, provided they are "a" cause of such injury 312; that other factors may also have caused
injury to the domestic industry is no bar to establishing this causal relationship.

7.179. With respect to non -attribution, Article 3.5 requires an investigating authority to examine
other known factors that are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped
imports, and sets out an illustrative list of such factors.313 It further requires that the investigating
authority not attribute to dumped imports injuries caused by such other factors. The investigating
authority must undertake an assessment that enables it to "separat[e] and distinguish[] the

307 European Union's first written submission, para. 239.
308 European Union's first written submission, para. 275 (referring to Panel Reports, China – GOES
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 7.124; China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.239; China – Autos (US), paras. 7.327
and 7.328; and China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 7.191).
309 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 296.
310 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 315-318.
311 Panel Reports, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, para. 7.352; and Thailand – H-Beams, para. 7.262.
312 Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 67.
313 Panel Report, Thailand – H-Beams, para. 7.275.

injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports". 314 For this
assessment to be required, however, Article 3.5 requires that the "other factor" at issue be:
a. "known" to the investigating authority;
b. a factor "other than dumped imports"; and
c. injuring the domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports.315
7.180. Article 3.5 contains no guidance on how an investigating authority is to analyse either the
causation of injury by dumped imports, or non-attribution.316
7.6.2.2 The DIMD's consideration of the price effects of the dumped imports in the
context of its causation analysis
7.181. The DIMD's finding of a causal link between material injury to the domestic industry and
the dumped imports was based on both the increased volume317 and the price suppressive318
effects of the dumped imports. The European Union makes arguments concerning both aspects of
the DIMD's causation determination in support of its claim . We will first address the DIMD's
causation determination with respect to the price suppressive effects of the dumped imports.
7.182. We have found above that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 by
failing to taken into account the impact of the financial crisis in its consideration of price
suppression. The error we have found in the DIMD's co nsideration of price suppression under
Article 3.2 undermines the DIMD's determination of a causal link between the dumped imports and
the injury suffered by the domestic industry. 319 Consequently, we find that the DIMD acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 insofar as it relied on price suppression in its causation
determination.
7.6.2.3 The DIMD's consideration of the volume of the dumped imports in the context of
its causation analysis
7.183. We now turn to the DIMD's consideration of the volume of the dumped im ports in the
context of its causation analysis, after which we turn to the DIMD's non-attribution analysis.

314 Appellate Body Reports, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 223; China – GOES, para. 151; and China –
HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 5.283.
315 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 175.
316 Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 224.
317 Regarding the volume of the dumped imports, the DIMD concluded that the dumped imports
displaced the domestic like product in the market based on the fact that after declining from 2008 to 2009, the
volume of dumped imports increased steadily throughout the rest of the period of consideration (2009-2011)
both in absolute terms and relative to domestic consumption, domestic production and total imports. The DIMD
also relied on the fact that the market share of the dumped imports increased rapidly from 2009 through the
end of the POI (an increase of 13 percentage points) at the same time as there was a proportionate decrease
in the market share of the domestic industry (a decrease of 12.3 percentage points). (See Investigation Report,
section 5.1).
318 Regarding price effects, the DIMD concluded that there was no price undercutting or price depression
during the period of consideration. However, the DIMD concluded that there was significant price suppression
on the basis of a comparison of the actual domestic prices observed and the target domestic prices which it
calculated would have occurred in the absence of dumped imports. The DIMD constructed the target domestic
prices on the basis of what it found to be a reasonable rate of return and the actual costs of production of the
domestic industry. The DIMD used the rate of return achieved by the domestic industry in 2009 as the
benchmark because 2009 saw the lowest share of dumped imports. The DIMD also considered whether the
injury was caused by other known factors including the termination of a licence agreement between Sollers and
Fiat and domestic competition, and concluded that the termination of the licence agreement was not a factor
causing injury to the domestic industry, and that the injury caused by the domestic competition was not
determinative in the material injury suffered by the domestic industry. (See Investigation Report, sections 5.2
and 5.3).
319 European Union's first written submission, para. 275 (referring to Panel Reports, China – GOES
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 7.124; China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.239; China – Autos (US), paras. 7.327
and 7.328; and China – HP-SSST (Japan)/China – HP-SSST (EU), para. 7.191).

7.6.2.3.1 Trends in dumped imports' market share
7.184. The European Union argues that the increased market share of the dumped imports was
not injurious, because dumped imports simply recovered from the effects of the financial crisis and
merely reached their pre -crisis level in 2011. The European Union contends that the DIMD could
not assume that the exceptional situation existing during the financial crisis would p ersist
indefinitely, and that the domestic industry would retain the market share it had gained in that
situation.320 The Russia n Federation argues that dumped imports did not only reach pre -crisis
level, but were substantially higher than that level at the end of the period considered. The
Russian Federation asserts that the volume of dumped imports in 2011 was at least 1. 2 times
larger than in 2008.321
7.185. In section 5.1 of the Investigation Report, the DIMD examined the volume of dumped
imports in absolute terms, relative to total imports, relative to domestic production and relative to
total domestic consumption. During the investigation, interested parties had argued that in 2010
and 2011 dumped imports recovered from the financial crisis and merely reached the ir pre-crisis
level in 2011, comparing the end points of the period of consideration, as shown by the red arrow
in the graph below .322 The DIMD found that from 2008 to 2009, during the financial crisis, the
dumped imports' volume and market share decreased b ecause of the impact of the financial crisis
on consumers' preferences for lower priced domestic LCVs. However, in the post -financial crisis
period, 2010 and 2011 (including the POI), the dumped imports' market share increased steadily,
displacing the dome stic like product in the market, as shown by the green arrows in the graph
below.323 The DIMD thus concluded that the dumped imports displaced domestic like product
in 2010 and 2011, including during the POI, thereby causing injury to the domestic industry.
Figure 5: Dumped imports' market share

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.1.

320 European Union's first written submission, para. 273.
321 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 297.
322 European Union's first written submission, para. 269.
323 The DIMD stated in its Investigation Report that:
Starting from 2009, the share of like Product manufactured by the domestic industry of the CU in
consumption decreased in parallel with an increase in the share of dumped imports. In the period
from 2009 to the 1st half of 2011, the share of dumped imports in total consumption rose by
13 percentage points whereas the share of like product s produced by the domestic industry of
the CU dropped by 12.3 percentage points. The trend persisted in 2011.
Section 5.1 of the Public version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-12), and Confidential version of the
Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI).

7.186. The European Union does not dispute the underlying facts and evidence relied upon by the
DIMD in reaching its conclus ion of domestic sales displacement. 324 Rather, it considers that the
fact that dumped imports' market share returned to the 2008 level in 2011 undermines the DIMD's
causation analysis.
7.187. As a general matter, the fact that the dumped import market share was not higher in 2011
than in 2008 does not necessarily preclude or undermine a finding of causation. While "significant
increases in imports have to be 'consider[ed]' by investigating authorities under Article 3.2 … the
text does not indicate that in the absence of such a significant increase, these imports could not be
found to be causing injury" within the meaning of Article 3.5. 325 As well, a reasonable and
unbiased investigating authority may well take the view that consideration of the intervening
trends of the dumped imports market share, rather than merely making an end -point to end-point
comparison of the situation in 2008 and 2011, provides a better understanding of the trends in
dumped imports' volume and their possible contribution to injury. In the present case, the DIMD
noted that the dumped import volume and market share decreased during the financial crisis, but
increased thereafter, thereby displacing domestic sales after the fin ancial crisis, i.e. in 2010
and 2011, the period including the POI. This displacement largely corresponded to the increase of
dumped imports' market share, as shown on the graph below.
Figure 6: Trends of market shares of the domestic industry, dumped imports and third
country imports

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 5.1.

7.188. The DIMD also addressed the interested parties' argument that the dumped import market
share was "stable" in 2011 when compared with 2008, while the domestic market share in creased
in 2011 when compared with 2008. The DIMD found that the domestic industry market share
during the period of consideration increased mainly at the expense of non -dumped imports from
third countries, which declined to a negligible level of 1% of mar ket share. The DIMD also
observed that displacement of the domestic like product by the dumped imports continued
throughout 2011. The DIMD thus rejected the interested parties' argument and found that the
domestic like product was displaced in the market b y the dumpe d imports during the POI and
in 2011 as a whole . The DIMD did not explicitly discuss the assertion that the dumped
imports' market share was "stable" in 2011 as compared with 2008. However, the DIMD's analysis
relied on the intervening changes i n market share . Neither the interested parties during the
investigation, nor the European Union in this proceeding, has explained why the comparison relied

324 European Union's first written submission, paras. 263-266.
325 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, fn 114.

on by the interested parties was necessary or undermined the cogency of the DIMD's analysis. For
these reasons, we consider that the DIMD did not have to respond further to this argument.
7.6.2.3.2 The market share of all domestic producers in 2011
7.189. The European Union notes that the combined market share of the two domestic producers
of LCVs, Sollers and GAZ, was approximately 57% in 2011. The European Union argues that "it
seems unlikely that dumped imports replaced the domestic sales if the domestic market share
remained at the high level of 57%" .326 The Russian Federation argues that a 57% market share
does not ma ke it less plausible that the decrease in domestic producers' market share in 2011
(from 2009 and 2010 levels by 8% and 6% respectively) was caused by the effects of dumping.327
7.190. The European Union's argument is based on the 2011 market share of the two domestic
producers (Sollers and GAZ ) combined. However, the market share of the domestic industry
(Sollers), upon which the DIMD relied in its analysis , was lower ( [***]).328 In our view , the
market share of domestic producers (Sollers and GAZ) in 2011 does not e xplain anything about
developments in the market share of the domestic industry , which is the proper focus for an
investigating authority. More to the point, t he fact that the market share of the two domestic
producers (Sollers and GAZ) in 2011 was "high" does not, in itself, preclude a finding of causation
of injury to the domestic industry . Nor would the fact that the market share of the domestic
industry was "high" preclude a finding of causation. A domestic industry with a high market share
may still be found to have suffered material injury caused by dumped imports , particularly in a
situation where it is losing market share to those imports.
7.6.2.3.3 Dumped imports displaced third country imports rather than the domestic like
product
7.191. The European Union notes t hat the market share of the dumped imports increased by
18 percentage points from 2009 to 2011, while the domestic m arket share decreased by only
8 percentage points during the same period. 329 The European Union argues that, rather than
displacing domestic sales, the dumped imports "largely" displaced imports from third countries.330
7.192. The fact that dumped imports displaced third country import s does not, on its own,
preclude or undermine a finding that dumped imports also displaced the domestic like product. The
European Union's own wording, that dumped imports "largely" displaced third country imports,
acknowledges that the dumped imports displaced the domestic like product in the market , at least
to some extent . Indeed , the European Union does not argue that t he dumped imports did not
displace the domestic like product at all. Nor has the European Union demonstrated that the DIMD
acted unreasonably in considering the displacement of the domestic like product by the dumped
imports on the market relevant and significant in the causation determination.

326 European Union's first written submission, paras. 272 and 273. We note that, in making this
argument, the European Union calculated the market share of domestic producers (Sollers and GAZ combined)
rather than the market share of the domestic industry as defined by the DIMD (Sollers). The domestic
industry's market share in 2011 was [***], rather than 57%. The Russian Federation does not dispute these
figures.
327 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 298.
328 The European Union does not explain how the domestic producers' market share in 2011 is relevant
to the determination actually made by the DIMD, concerning the causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry (Sollers).
329 The European Union calculates the market share on the basis of data in the record as follows:
Table 9: Trends of market share as calculated by the European Union
 2008 2009 2010 2011
Domestic market share (Sollers + GAZ) 24 65 63 57
Dumped imports market share 42 24 37 42
Source: European Union's first written submission, para. 271.

The Russian Federation does not dispute the correctness of this market share information.
330 European Union's first written submission, para. 272.

7.6.2.3.4 Conclusion
7.193. For the reasons above, we find that the European Union has failed to establish that the
causation determination of the DIMD was one that a reasonable and objective investigating
authority could not have reached on the basis of the evidence and arguments before it.
7.6.2.4 Non-attribution
7.194. The European Union identifies five "factors other than the dumped imports which at the
same time are injuring the domestic industry " that it alleges were known to the DIMD but w hich it
did not examine properly, or failed to examine at all, in its non-attribution analysis:
a. the termination of the licensing agreement between Fiat and Sollers331;
b. competition by GAZ during the POI332;
c. self-inflicted injury333;
d. the financing difficulties334; and
e. the discontinuance of government support programmes.335
7.195. The Russian Federation argues that, for a factor to be "known" to the investigating
authority, it must be clearly raised before the investigating authority 336 and be supported and
justified by eviden ce.337 Only those factors that were found by the investigating authority to be
substantiated needed to be taken into account in the non -attribution analysis . 338 The
Russian Federation contends that the DIMD analysed the interested parties' comments and
explained in the Investigation Report its conclusions regarding the alleged impact of two factors
that were clearly raised before it: the termination of the license agreement and the competition
from other domestic producers. 339 The Russian Federation contends that the other three factors
identified by the European Union were not substantiated before the DIMD, and therefore were not
"known" to it and did not require further consideration.340
7.196. We turn first to the DIMD's assessment of the two factors that it concluded w ere clearly
raised before it, before turning to its treatment of the other three factors identified by the
European Union.
7.6.2.4.1 The termination of the licence agreement
7.197. During the investigation, several interested parties argued that the announcement in
early 2011 that the licence agreement between Fiat and Sollers would be terminated as of
31 December 2011 became a disruptive factor for Sollers' business. 341 In examining this
argument, the DIMD found that the domestic industry was entitled to produce the like pr oduct
throughout the period of investigation, which ended on 30 June 2011, and beyond

331 European Union's first written submission, para. 293; second written submission. paras. 160-164.
332 European Union's first written submission, paras. 294 and 298-304; second written submission,
para. 165; and opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 72 and 73.
333 European Union's first written submission, para. 305; second written submission, paras. 166-168.
334 European Union's first written submission, para. 306; second written submission, para. 169.
335 European Union's first written submission, para. 307; second written submission, para. 170.
336 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 322 (citing Panel Reports, EC – Tube or Pipe
337 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 323 (citing Panel Report, EU – Footwear (China),
para. 7.484).
338 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 324 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Steel
Safeguards, para. 491).
339 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 315-318.
340 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 342.
341 PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit
EU-13), p. 14; Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit
EU-19), p. 6; and Volkswagen's submission of 6 April 2012 regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012,
(Exhibit EU-11), section IV.1.c.

through 2012.342 The DIMD also noted that production decreased by only 7% in 2011, despite the
serious deterioration of the state of the domestic industry. The DIMD conclud ed that the
announced termination of the licence agreement was not a factor causing injury to the domestic
industry at the same time as dumped imports.343
7.198. The European Union argues that the DIMD's analysis of the effects of the termination of
the licence ag reement between Fiat and Sollers was contradicted by evidence. 344 The
European Union contends that the fact that Sollers was entitled to produce the like product
throughout 2011 and 2012 is not sufficient to conclude that the dwindling cooperation with Fiat did
not cause difficulties to Sollers' activities, requiring it to sell its LCV models at lower prices than
would otherwise have been the case. 345 The European Union argues that the Russian Federation
itself considers that the announcement of the termination was "'likely to exert a significant impact
on changing of market share, price and net profit margin ' of Sollers"346, and refers to section 2.3
of Exhibit RUS -5 to this effect. The Russian Federation argues that there was no evidence in the
record which woul d have allowed the DIMD to conclude that the termination of the license
agreement itself could be considered as a known factor other than the dumped imports which at
the same time was injuring the domestic industry.347
7.199. The parties do not dispute the fact tha t the termination of the cooperation agreement did
not happen during the period of consideration or the fact that the domestic industry was entitled to
produce the like product throughout the period of consideration. The European Union argues that
the DIMD's explanation for its conclusion that the termination did not cause injury at the same
time as the dumped imports is not sufficient, because in its view the fact that production continued
does not lead to the conclusion that injury was not caused by the t ermination of the licence
agreement.
7.200. The European Union's argument that the DIMD acknowledged that the announcement of
the termination was likely to have exerted a significant impact on the domestic industry is not
supported by the record. Exhibit RUS-5 contains the written arguments and evidence submitted by
two interested parties at the public hearings in the underlying investigation . The section of this
submission referred to by the European Union does not contain any acknowledgement by the
DIMD or the Russian Federation of the impact of the announcement of the termination.348
7.201. We agree with the European Union to the extent that, in principle, the fact that Sollers was
entitled to produce Fiat Ducato LCVs both during and after the period of consideration d oes not
necessarily preclude that the forthcoming termination of the underlying licence agreement might
have disruptive effects on the domestic industry during the period of consideration. In some
situations, the announcement of a strategic business decisi on may , in itself, affect market
behaviour. However, there is no indication that there was any evidence before the DIMD during
the investigation to suggest that this was the case here. No interested party submitted any

342 The DIMD stated in section 5.3.3 of the Investigation Report that:
The term of the license agreement f or the production of Fiat -brand light commercial vehicles
expired on 31 December 2011. In line with the arrangements with Fiat Group Automobiles
S.p.A., the applicant was entitled in 2012 to conduct the assembly of previously supplied
automobile components and sell the manufactured light commercial vehicles via a network of
authorized dealers.
343 Section 5.3.3 of the Investigation Report.
344 European Union's second written submission, paras. 160-164; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 71..
345 European Union's first written submission, para. 293.
346 European Union's second written submission, para. 161 (referring to Daimler's and
Mercedes' comments regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, Letter No. 21-1204/EAPP, 5 April 2012,
(Exhibit RUS-5), section 2.3); response to Panel question No. 51, para. 163.
347 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 333-335.
348 Section 2.3 of Exhibit RUS-5 contains, in relevant part, the following statement by Daimler AG and
Mercedes-Benz RUS CJSC:
We would like to direct attention of the Ministry to other factors which appear reasonably likely to
exert a significant impact on changing of market share, price and net profit margin of the
Applicant.
Daimler's and Mercedes' comments regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, Letter
No. 21-1204/EAPP, 5 April 2012, (Exhibit RUS-5), p. 56

evidence to substantiate the allegati on that the termination of the licence agreement, which
happened after the period of consideration, caused injury to the domestic industry at the same
time as the dumped imports. 349 To the contrary, the record shows conflicting views expressed by
interested parties as to the impact of the announced termination of the licence agreement on
Sollers' performance.350
7.202. The interested parties furnished no evidence to support the allegation that the termination
of the licence agreement or its announcement caused injury to the domestic industry. Accordingly,
we find that the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted unreasonably in
concluding that the termination of the license agreement was not a known factor other than the
dumped imports which at the same time was injuring the domestic industry.
7.6.2.4.2 Competition from GAZ
7.203. In relation to the allegation that competition from GAZ caused injury to the domestic
industry, the DIMD found that the market share of GAZ was negligible from 2008 to 2010, then
increased in 2011, but only to a level much lower than that of the dumped imports. The DIMD also
found that the deterioration of the state of the domestic industry started from 2010, when the
market share of GAZ was still insignificant. The DIMD concluded that the impac t of competition
from GAZ was not determinative in causing material injury to the domestic industry.351
7.204. The European Union argues that the DIMD's analysis suffered from several shortcomings:
a. the DIMD did not analyse whether the imminent entry of GAZ on the diesel-engine LCV
market was likely to have exerted considerable competi tive pressure on Sollers
during 2010, which may have had an impact on prices352;
b. the DIMD did not consider the effect of the competition between diesel- and
petrol-engine LCVs that exi sted before GAZ started production of its Gazelle
diesel-engine LCV in the middle of 2010. In support of this argument, the European
Union refers to a marketing report in which the author discussed the LCV market
structure in the Russian Federation during the year 2010 without differentiating between
diesel- and petrol-engine LCVs353; and
c. the injury suffered by Sollers in 201 0 and 2011 must have been caused by competition
from GAZ, due to the fact that the domestic producers' (i.e. Sollers and GAZ) market
share remained at a significantly high level (57%) in 2011.354
7.205. The Russian Federation argues that the DIMD's analysis of the allegedly injurious effects of
competition from GAZ was adequate. The DIMD examined the nature and extent of injury caused
by competition from GAZ and determined that such injury was not decisive, as opposed to the

349 PCA referred to one newspaper article entitled "Sollers and Fiat did not go far", published by the
Kommersant on 21 February 2011. (See appendix 10 to Annexes to PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012,
(Exhibit EU-14), p. 42). However, this article does not contain any evidence supporting the allegation that the
termination caused injury to Sollers.
350 For instance, Daimler argued that the termination of the licence agreement was "disruptive and not
conducive to supporting the Applicant's core business". (Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the
Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8; and Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of
28 March 2013, (Exhibit EU-19), p. 6). PCA acknowledged that the termination of the licence agreement and
the consequent switch of business partners did not have any major impact on the performance of Sollers
during the period of consideration, stating that:
The Sollers Group switched business partner (Fiat to Ford) in the middle of investigation period,
although the situation was not so critical in terms of their commercial performance during that
period.
PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-13),
p. 14 (emphasis added)
351 Investigation Report, section 5.3.2.
352 European Union's first written submission, para. 297.
353 European Union's first written submission, para. 298 (referring to Autostat, Marketing Report LCV
Market in Russia: Results, Trends, and Perspectives (April 2011), (Exhibit EU-15), p. 10).
354 European Union's first written submission, para. 303.

effects of the dumped imports. 355 The Russia n Federation argues that the effect of competition
from GAZ was separated and distinguished from the effect of the dumped imports, as required by
Article 3.5.356
7.206. We address in turn each of the European Union's three arguments concerning the DIMD's
analysis.
7.6.2.4.2.1 The impact of imminent market entry of Gazelle diesel -engine LCVs on the
domestic industry's prices
7.207. The European Union challenges the DIMD's conclusion that injury to the domestic industry
was found during a period when GAZ's market share for the like product was still negligible. The
European Union argues that the imminent entry of GAZ on the diesel-engine LCV market was likely
to have exerted considerable competitive pressure on Sollers during 2010 and may have had an
impact on prices. 357 The Russian Federation maintains that the DIMD made conclusions on the
basis of evidence before it concerning the nature and extent of injury caused by competition from
GAZ, and asserts that the DIMD was right to look at the timing of the injury caused by GAZ,
because the other known factor must be causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time
as the dumped imports.358
7.208. The parties do not disput e that GAZ started production of the Gazelle and Sobel
diesel-engine LCVs in the middle of 2010. 359 In principle, the imminent entry of a new competitor
may exert competitive pressure on existing players in the domestic market for the like product,
with negative effects for the domestic industry. However, in the present case the European Union
has pointed to no evidence on the record that shows that interested parties argued, or presented
evidence, during the investigation to the effect that the imminent entr y of Gazelle diesel -engine
LCVs had a negative impact on the domestic industry, including its prices, in 2010, when the DIMD
found that injury caused by dumped imports was already occurring. There is no express
requirement in Article 3.5 that investigating authorities seek out and examine in each case on their
own initiative the effects of all possible factors other than dumped imports that may be causing
injury to the domestic industry under investigation . Accordingly, we conclude that the DIMD did
not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by not analysing the imminent entry of GAZ on the
diesel-engine LCV market during 2010.
7.6.2.4.2.2 Competition between diesel- and petrol-engine LCVs
7.209. The European Union argues that the DIMD failed to consider the impact of th e competition
between diesel - and petrol-engine LCVs that allegedly existed before GAZ launched its Gazelle
diesel-engine LCVs in the middle of 2010. In support of this arg ument, the European Union refers
to submissions of the interested parties who argued that petrol-engine LCVs should be included in
the scope of the like product.360
7.210. The European Union's argument rests on the premise that:
a. there was a competitive relationship between diesel - and petrol -engine LCVs, in
particular GAZ's petrol-engine LCVs361; and

355 European Union's first written submission, para. 296; and Russian Federation's first written
submission, para. 338 (quoting Public version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-12), section 5.3.2).
356 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 339.
357 European Union's first written submission, para. 297.
358 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 340.
359 Before that, GAZ only produced a very small quantity of diesel-engine LCVs. (See JSC "Gorkovsky
Avtomobilny Zavod" Reply on Volumes of Production, Letter No. 18/ОД/2/2013, 21 February 2013, (Exhibit
RUS-16 (BCI)). See also Minutes of the Public Hearings (exhibit EU-9), p. 12.
360 European Union's first written submission, para. 299 (referring to Comments by Daimler of
16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), attachment 7: Auto Review Magazine testing of
Fiat Ducato and Gazelle; and Minutes of the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-9), p. 12); and
Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), attachment 8.
361 European Union's first written submission, paras. 298-300.

b. the LCVs of GAZ and Sollers are not within the same price segments as imported
LCVs.362
7.211. These allegations were investigated and rejected by the DIMD during the investigation. 363
Because the DIMD had already considered and rejected the interested parties' f actual premise in
the context of the definition of the like product, we do not consider that the DIMD was required to
repeat that analysis in the context of its determination of causation. 364 Accordingly, we conclude
that the DIMD did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to consider the impact
of competition between diesel- and petrol-engine LCVs.
7.6.2.4.2.3 Domestic producers' market share in 2011
7.212. The European Union asserts that the injury suffered by Sollers in 2010 and 2011 must
have been caused by competition from GAZ , due to the fact that the domestic producers' (Sollers
and GAZ) market share remained at a significantly high level , 57%, in 2011. 365 This argument
overlaps to a great extent with the European Union's argument concerning the DIMD's
demonstration of a causal link on the basis of the volume effects of the dumped imports. We refer
to our discussion of the similar argument of the European Union in section 7.6.2.3.2 above. The
same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the European Union's argument concerning the
DIMD's non-attribution analysis of the competition from GAZ in 2011.
7.213. Furthermore, the European Union argues that the market share lost by Sollers was actually
taken by GAZ, rather than the dumped imports. 366 However, the European Union has not shown
that this argument was clearly raised by the interested parties before the DIMD during the
investigation.
7.214. For the reasons above, we conclude that the European Union has not established th at the
DIMD's non -attribution analysis of competition from GAZ was inc onsistent with Articles 3.1
and 3.5.
7.6.2.4.3 Other factors
7.215. The European Union argues that in its non -attribution analysis, the DIMD did not consider
at all certain "other known factors", referring specifically in this regard to:
a. self-inflicted injury367;
b. the difficulties encountered by Sollers in obtaining financing for its joint venture with
Fiat368; and
c. the discontinuation of government support programmes by the end of 2010.369

362 European Union's first written submission, para. 301.
363 The DIMD addressed the alleged competitive relationship between diesel- and petrol-engine LCVs in
section 2.1 of the Investigation Report in the context of its conclusions regarding the scope of the subject
imports and the domestic like product. The DIMD found that the technical parameters of diesel engines
(torque, fuel efficiency, the degree of compression, the method of mixture ignition, durability) are significantly
different from those of a petrol engine. The DIMD also found that diesel engines are preferable in terms of
operation of LCVs. The DIMD concluded that the technical characteristics of diesel engines can affect buyers'
preference when choosing between petrol and diesel versions of a LCV. (See Public version of the Investigation
Report, (Exhibit EU-21), p. 18).
Concerning the allegedly different price segments, the DIMD found that interested parties did not
present sufficient evidence to substantiate their claims. The DIMD also found that the evidence before it did not
confirm the existence of the allegedly different price segments. The DIMD concluded that the price of the
domestic like product was in the same range as the export price of the allegedly dumped imports. (See Public
version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit EU-21), p. 17).
364 See by analogy, Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 178.
365 European Union's first written submission, para. 303.
366 European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, figure 6.
367 European Union's first written submission, para. 305.
368 European Union's first written submission, para. 306.
369 European Union's first written submission, para. 307.

7.216. The Investigation Report does not contain any reference to the se three allegedly known
other factors causing injury at the same time as dumped imports . The Russian Federation argues
that interested parties did not present evidence to substantiate their claims that these "ot her
factors" were injuring the domestic industry as the same time as the dumped imports.
Consequently, the Russian Federation argues, these factors were not clearly raised before the
DIMD and were therefore not "known" to the DIMD. 370 The Russian Federation contends that an
investigating authority is only required to undertake a non -attribution analysis with respect to
factors other than the dumped imports which are known to the investigating authority and which
are injuring the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports.
7.217. We recall that the obligation under Article 3.5 to conduct a non -attribution analysis only
arises where the alleged "other factor" is:
a. "known" to the investigating authority;
b. a factor "other than dumped imports"; and
c. injuring the domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports.371
7.218. An investigating authority is not required to address every argument and element of
evidence raised by interested parties – indeed, such a requirement would make the investigating
authority's task largely impossible. In the circumstances of this case, where there is nothing on the
face of the Investigation Report concerning these alleged other factors, we will examine the record
of the investigation to determine whether there was evidence before the DIMD based on which it
should have addressed whether the alleged "other factors" referred to by the European Union were
injuring the domestic industry as the same time as the dumped imports . If we conclude that there
was indeed no such evidence before the DIMD with respect to any of these factors, we may
conclude that there was no inconsistency with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in not addressing that alleged
other factor at all.372 If we find there was evidence suggesting that one or more of these "other
factors" was injuring the domestic industry a t the same time as the dumped imports, we may
conclude that the DIMD erred in not making findings with respect to such factor(s).373
7.6.2.4.3.1 Self-inflicted injury
7.219. The European Union argues that the DIMD did not examine the interested
parties' arguments that the injury suffered by Sollers was largely self -inflicted as an "other factor"
causing injury:
a. PCA argued before the DIMD that Sollers' business plan for its joint -venture with Fiat
was "very ambitious", with a plan to launch nine new models at once 374 and a target to
sell 75,000 Fiat Ducato vans per year375;
b. both PCA and Daimler argued before the DIMD that there were quality problems with
Sollers' Fiat Ducato. 376 According to the European Union, the ambitious business plan
and the qualit y problems explained why Sollers was making less profit than expected
and could not raise prices; and

370 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, paras. 91-103.
371 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 175.
372 We note that this was also the approach taken by the panel in China – X-Ray Equipment. (See Panel
Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.267).
373 We note in this regard that it might have been preferable for the DIMD to, at a minimum, explain
that while interested parties asserted certain other factors were causing injury, they failed to submit evidence
suggesting that these factors were causing injury, rather than to remain silent.
374 Annexes to PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012, (Exhibit EU-14), p. 39.
375 PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit
EU-13), p. 14.
376 PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit
EU-13), p. 14; Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit
EU-19), p. 6; Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8 and
attachment 7: Auto Review Magazine testing of Fiat Ducato and Gazelle; and Minutes of the Public Hearing of
22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-9), p. 28.

c. Daimler pointed out that Sollers reduced the number of Fiat Ducato models produced in
the second half of 2010.377
7.220. The Russian Federation argues that the int erested parties simply did not provide any
evidence concerning the allegedly ambitious business plan beyond certain press articles stating the
view that the business model of Fiat/Sollers cooperation was not viable .378 The Russian Federation
argues that the interested parties similarly provided no supporting evidence that Sollers had
overall quality problems. The Russian Federation contends that interested parties failed to show
how such factors explained the decrease in Sollers' profits and its ability to raise prices.379
7.221. Turning first to the alleged quality issues, we note that the only evidence of any quality
problems on the record was an article from Auto Review Magazine on the testing of one Fiat
Ducato LCV on a cobblestone road. 380 As discussed above in paragraph 7.89, given the narrow
sample of Auto Review's testing of Sollers ' LCVs, we consider that this magazine article cannot
suffice to demonstrate the existence of quality problems with Sollers' products to the degree that
would suggest that DIMD acted unreasonably in failing to consider whether the alleged quality
problems affected Sollers profits and ability to raise prices and thereby caused injury . Accordingly,
we find that the DIMD did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by not conducting a non-
attribution analysis of the alleged quality issues.
7.222. Concerning the alleged reduction in the number of Fiat Ducato models produced in the
second half of 2010 , we note that Daimler, the interested party mak ing this argument, did not
explain how th is fact, if substantiated, could have caused or contributed to injury suffered by
Sollers. We do not consider that a reduction in the number of models produced would necessarily
cause injury to the domestic industry in the circumstance of this case at all. Indeed, in certain
situations, a reduction in the number of models produced could contribute to improving the
performance of a domestic industry. In other situations, such a reduction could ind icate the
existence of injury. In the absence of any explanation, it is difficult to understand the view that
such a reduction is itself a cause of injury. Accordingly, we find that the DIMD did not act
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by not conducting a non -attribution analysis of the
reduction of the number of Fiat Ducato models produced.
7.223. Concerning the allegedly ambitious business plan, the record shows that PCA relied upon
several newspaper articles in arguing that the allegedly ambitious business plan of Sollers c aused
self-inflicted injury. However, these articles do not support PCA's argument. First, these
articles concerned the Sollers Group's planned joint venture with Fiat for passenger cars and
off-road vehicles, rather than the licensing agreement pertaining to production of the like
product.381 Second, one of the newspaper articles comments on Sollers' business model as being
"well established and scalable", a statement which would seem positive rather than negative,
assuming it referred to the business model for production of the like product.382 We find nothing in
these articles to suggest that DIMD acted unreasonably in failing to consider whether
Sollers' business plan for the like product was so ambitious as to be unlikely to succeed, and thus
a cause of self-inflicted injury.

377 Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit EU-19),
p. 6; and Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 9.
378 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 92.
379 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 94; opening statement at the second
380 Comments by Daimler and Mercedes-Benz RUS on the Report of 28 March 2013, (Exhibit EU-19),
p. 6; Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8 and
attachment 7: Auto Review Magazine testing of Fiat Ducato and Gazelle; and Minutes of the Public Hearing of
22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-9), p. 28.
381 Annexes to PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012, (Exhibit EU-14), appendix 7, p. 36, appendix 8,
p. 37, and appendix 9, p. 39.
382 Annexes to PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012, (Exhibit EU-14), appendix 9, p. 39. It was
stated that "Sollers doesn't have that massive fictitious force, as the AutoVA vehicles do, it is like a stone on
your ankles, – commented Boris Rohin, the head of the Automobile Society Ward Howell. – The company
possesses a well-established and scalable business model, while the AutoVAZ is not even on the 'basic
correctness'".

7.224. The confidential data on capacity and capacity utilization on the record does lend some
support to PCA's argument that Sollers' plan to launch nine new models at once and a target to
sell 75,000 Fiat Ducato vans per year was overly ambitious. PCA argued that:
Following the Licensing agreement between the Complainant and Fiat to produce Fiat
Ducato in the Russian Federation, the production started late in 2008 on the eve of
the economic crisis. The announced capacity dedicated to Ducato m odel was 75,000
vehicles per year - which appeared overly ambitious . In fact, the realization of such
production capacity of Ducato in historical, current and near future market conditions,
would mean that Sollers would replace all imports, but also a major part of its main
local competitor's (GAZ Gazelle) market share.383
PCA's argument relates to the impact of a high level of installed capacity on the state of the
domestic industry, in particular with respect to capacity utilisation. PCA argued essentially t hat
Sollers installed too much capacity from the beginning of its production of the like product and that
production at or near full capacity would be difficult to realize under normal market conditions. The
confidential data concerning the domestic indust ry in section 4.2.3 of the Investigation Report,
[***], lends support to this argument:

Table 10: Capacity and capacity utilisation of the domestic industry
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 POI 2011 H2 of 2010 H1 of 2011
Capacity of the
domestic industry
of the CU
units [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Volume of
production of the
domestic industry
of the CU
units [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]
Capacity utilization % [***] [***] [***] [***] [***] [***]

Source: Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), table 4.2.3.

7.225. We recognize that, in some situations, the installation or existence of a large amount of
production capacity could by itself result in low capacity utilisation, and cause injury to the
domestic industry. It is not necessarily unreasonable for a start -up operation to install capacity
sufficient to, if the enterprise is successful, serve its domestic market . However, we would have
expected a reasonable and objective investigating authority to have considered, in the light of the
facts and arguments in this case, whether the level of installed capacity in the domestic industry
was an "other factor" causing injury and addressed it in its non -attribution analysis. There is
nothing in the Investigation Report to suggest that the DIMD considered the possible cause of low
capacity utilisation, an allegedly overly ambitious business plan and excessive capacity , in its
assessment of non -attribution. To the contrary, despite the evidence of an overly ambitious
capacity installation at the outset of Sollers ' operations, the DIMD relied on low capacity utilisation
in its finding of material injury.384
7.226. For the reasons above , we find that by failing to address PCA's argument regarding the
possible cause of Sollers' l ow capacity utilisation during the period of consideration in its
non-attribution analysis, the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5.
7.6.2.4.3.2 Financing difficulties
7.227. The European Union argues that interested parties pointed out during the investigat ion
that the Russian Federation's public bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) backed out of its plan to
extend a line of credit, at subsidised rates of interest, meant to cover the vast majority of the

383 PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit
EU-13), p. 14. (emphasis added)
384 We note that the DIMD found that "the production capacity of the domestic industry of the CU during
the analysed period remained unchanged", and that "[n]otwithstanding the increase of the capacity utilization
during the analysed period this indicator remained at a low level". (See Confidential version of the
Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.3 (emphasis added)).

costs of a planned Fiat -Sollers joint venture project concerning the assembly of passenger cars
and off-road vehicles, and asserts that the DIMD failed to consider this as an "other factor" causing
injury.385 The European Union contends that facts on the record suggest that VEB pulled out of the
project before the joint venture with Fiat was ended, and that one of the reasons for its decision to
do so was the absence of a credible business plan. The European Union refers to two documents in
the record:
a. Letter of Volkswagen dated 15 October 2013, (Exhibit EU-44), section 4; and
b. PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 following the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012 ,
(Exhibit EU-13), p. 14, and Annexes 1 and 8 to PCA's Injury Submission of 6 April 2012 ,
(Exhibit EU-14) (newspaper articles relating to financing of the planned F iat-Sollers joint
venture).
7.228. The Russian Federation argues that the letter of Volkswagen dated 15 October 2013
(Exhibit EU-44) was not on the investigation record because it post-dated the entry into effect of
the measure. Nor did the European Union provide this letter during the present proceedings .386
The Russian Federation contends that the newspaper articles referred to by PCA did not indicate to
the DIMD that the injury caused to the domestic industry was due to this allegedly financing
difficulty.387
7.229. The question for us is whether there was evidence on the record that would have led a
reasonable and objective investigating authority to know that the financing difficulties were an
"other factor" possibly causing injury to the domestic industry at the same t ime as dumped
imports. PCA relied upon the following documents in its arguments to the DIMD in this regard:
a. Annex 1 to PCA's injury submission is an article dated 18 February 2011 from the
Russian newspaper Vedomosti stating that the Fiat -Sollers joint -venture project could
not be structured based on the business plan presented by the two companies. It also
mentioned that Sollers had failed to provide the necessary documents by
December 2010. Sollers General Director Vadim Shevtsov said that the joint ventu re
could get a loan from commercial banks.
b. Annex 8 to PCA's injury submission is an article dated 6 December 2010 from the
Russian newspaper RIA N ovosti stating that Sollers had not presented all necessary
documents for VEB to consider the financing the joint project between Sollers and Fiat.
These articles do not address any matters having to do with the Fiat -Sollers licensing agreement
underlying the production of Fiat Ducato LCVs, the like product, and thus do not appear to relate
to the domestic industr y at issue in the underlying investigation. The articles suggest that VEB
decided not to finance the planned Fiat-Sollers joint venture project for the assembly of passenger
cars and off-road vehicles388 because Sollers had not presented all necessary documents.

7.230. The European Union argues that VEB "most likely" had access to information relating to
Sollers' capacity and production of LCVs. The European Union contends that " the doubts that
banks had with regard to Sollers' business plans for the elaborated jo int venture with Fiat
(producing other cars) were affected by the general doubts that banks had with regard to the state
of Sollers. This in turn affected Sollers' positi on further."389 In our view the possibility that VEB's
decision was affected by information concerning the existing Sollers-Fiat project or the state of the
domestic industry does not support the conclusion that VEB's decision not to go forward with
financing plans for the planned joint venture project injured the domestic industry. Moreover,
nothing in the newspaper articles themselves, or in PCA's submissions, explains how VEB's

385 European Union's first written submission, para. 306; second written submission, para. 169.
386 In response to our question at the second meeting of the Panel, the European Union clarified that
this was an incorrect reference. The European Union did not submit this letter to the Panel.
387 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, paras. 95-98.
388 It is not entirely clear from these articles whether the planned Fiat-Sollers joint venture project
concerned Sollers-Elabuga LLC (i.e. the domestic industry) or Sollers JSC. However, taking into account the
arguments concerning Sollers planned joint venture with Fiat discussed at paragraph 7.223 above, it seems
most likely to us to be the latter.
389 European Union's response to Panel question No. 72, paras. 28-30.

decision not to finance the planned joint venture affected the state of the domestic industry
producing diesel-engine LCVs. We find therefore that the European Union has not established that
the alleged financing difficulties of the planned Fiat-Sollers joint-venture project for the assembly
of passenger cars and off -road vehicles was a "known factor" causing injury to the domestic
industry producing diesel-engine LCVs.
7.6.2.4.3.3 Discontinuation of government support programmes
7.231. The European Union argues that the DIMD did not examine the discontinuation of certain
Russian government programmes supporting local car manufacture rs at the end of 2010 as an
"other factor" causing inj ury to the domestic industry . The European Union refers to Daimler's
comments that:
Important governmental support programs were discontinued at the end of 2010.
Prior to this time the Applicant used the opportunities of the local support provided by
the Russian Government to increase sales and gain SoM (e.g. subsidizing of credits for
the customers on the local market, subsidizing of a number of lease companies, state
credits, massive public procurements of the vehicles, etc. (cf. Attachment 6).
The governmental "Sole Supplier" decree supporting local producers was also stopped
at the end of 2010. In accordance with this governmental resolution there was a list of
producers whose products could be purchased by state bodies through the placement
of the order with a single supplier. Moreover, there was an increase in the amount of
state advancing by 50% when concluding a state contract for the purchase of vehicles
through the placement of the order with a single supplier.390
The European Union contends that the discontinuation of this programme meant that an important
incentive for consumers to purchase local cars was removed, affecting Sollers.391

7.232. The Russian Federation contends that the alleged discontinuation of the support
programmes was not only unsubstantia ted but also factually incorrect. The Russian Federation
argues that Daimler provided evidence of only one support programme, concerning the sales of
vehicles at a discount in return for recycled vehicles under the Order of the Ministry of Industry
and Trade dated 14 January 2010 . The Russian Federation asserts that this programme was not
discontinued by the end of 2010, but remained in force throughout the period of consideration .392
Moreover, the Russian Federation argues that, contrary to the European Unio n's allegation, only
the dealers, and not domestic car producers, could claim the discounts under this programme. 393
In any event, the alleged discontinuation of this support programme was not a "known other
factor" within the meaning of Article 3.5 because it could not have caused injury to the domestic
industry at the same time as the dumped imports.394
7.233. Daimler advanced two arguments before the DIMD , one concerning the "subsidized
discounts" programme and the other the "Sole Supplier" programme. Daimler asser ted that
Sollers' diesel-engine LCVs benefited from the "subsidized discounts" programme. Daimler does
not, however, appear to have provided any evidence that the support programme was
discontinued or that Sollers' LCVs no longer benefited from it after th e end of 2010. Absent
evidence to suggest that a benefit to Sollers' LCVs was no longer available after 2010, there is no
basis for the argument that the termination of the programme, if true, caused injury to the

390 Comments by Daimler of 16 March 2012 regarding the Public Hearing, (Exhibit EU-8), p. 8 and
attachment 6: List of models and producers of new vehicles, produced in Russia, eligible to be sold at
discounted prices as part of a test to stimulate the acquisition of new vehicles in return for used and to be
recycled vehicles.
391 European Union's first written submission, para. 307; second written submission, para. 170.
392 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 102 (referring to the Order of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 31 December 2009, No. 1194, as revised by the Order of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 28 December 2010 No. 1171); opening statement at the second
meeting of the Panel, paras. 62 and 63.
393 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 102 (referring to the Order of the
Government of the Russian Federation dated 31 December 2009, No. 1194, Rules of provision of subsidies
from the Federal budget for recovering revenue losses of trading companies from selling new vehicles,
produced in the Russian Federation, with discounts).
394 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 103.

domestic industry. Accordingly, we find th at the European Union has not demonstrated that the
discontinuation of the "subsidized discounts" programme was a "known factor" causing injury to
the domestic industry.
7.234. Second, the record contains no indication that Daimler submitted any evidence to supp ort
its allegations that : (a) there was a "Sole Supplier" programme; ( b) Sollers benefited from this
programme; and (c) the programme was discontinued or Sollers no longer benefited from it after
the end of 2010. In fact, the record shows that Daimler did not even allege that Sollers was a
beneficiary of the "Sole Supplier" programme with respect to its diesel -engine LCVs, but merely
mentioned that the programme supported "local producers" without further explanation. In the
absence of any evidence to sugge st that Sollers ever benefitted from this programme, there is
again no basis for the argument that the termination of the programme, if true, caused injury to
the domestic industry. Accordingly, we find that the European Union has not established that the
discontinuation of the "Sole Supplier" programme was a "known factor " causing injury to the
domestic industry.
7.235. For the reasons above, we find that the DIMD did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1
and 3.5 by failing to undertake a no n-attribution anal ysis with respect to the alleged
discontinuation of government support programmes.
7.6.3 Conclusion
7.236. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5, insofar as it relied on its price suppression analysis in its causation
determination.
7.237. We also conclude that the European Union failed to establish that:
a. the DIMD's determination that the increased volume and market share of dumped
imports caused material injury to the domestic industry was inconsistent with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5;
b. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to conduct a proper
non-attribution analysis of the termination of the Fiat licence agreement;
c. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in its non -attribution analysis of
competition from GAZ;
d. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to consider the alleged
financing difficulties as an "other factor" causing injury; and
e. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to consider the alleged
discontinuation of the government support programmes as an "other factor" causing
injury.
We further conclude that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failin g to (a)
examine whether the alleged overly am bitious business plan of Sollers, in particular the level of
capacity, was causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped imports, and if
so, (b) separate and distinguish the injurious effects of that factor from the injurious effects o f the
dumped imports.

7.7 Confidential Treatment
7.7.1 Introduction
7.238. The European Union argues that confidential treatment by the DIMD of certain information
submitted by interested parties was inconsistent with Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 because, with respect
to each item of information in question, one or more of the following occurred:
a. the DIMD failed to require a showing of good cause for confidential treatment;

b. the DIMD did not assess whether the cause shown was sufficient to warrant the
confidential treatment;
c. there was no "meaningful" summary of the confidential information submitted; or
d. no explanation of why a summary was not possible was provided.395
7.239. The Russian Federation rejects these arguments. In general terms, the Russian Federation
contends that:
a. with respect to requiring that good cause be shown, the CU law contains an
unconditional requirement that an interested party submitting information show good
cause for confidential treatment and provide a non -confidential summary of such
confidential information. 396 Such a legal requirement, along with "recommendations"
issued by the investigating authority, meets the requirements of Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1397;
b. the Anti -Dumping Agreement does not provide for specific sanctions to penalize
interested parties if they fai l to provide a sufficient non -confidential summary or a
statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible and the Anti -Dumping
Agreement does not require an investigating authority to reject confidential information
submitted in the absence of good cause shown398;
c. with respect to whether good cause was actually shown, "in some instances the nature
of information itself may show justification, this applies mainly to the information which
is by nature confidential. With respect to such information, the basis for providing
confidential treatment is self-evident"399; and
d. with respect to the requirement to assess good cause shown, "the Anti -Dumping
Agreement could not be understood as to require an investigating authority to explain
why it accepted whatever the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for … Rather it required
to explain the reasons why an investigating authority did not"400, and so "the fact that
confidential treatment is granted signifies that an investigating authority is satisfied with
the good cause shown and finds that a request for confidentiality is warranted" 401; "the
DIMD assessed the reasons for withholding the information from the public file and was
satisfied with the 'good cause' shown."402
In respect of specific information, the Russian Federation further argues that:

e. import/export statistics could be treated as confidential, where for example there is "risk
of potential disclosure of the details on the individual transactions, including the terms of
transactions and personal information of th e entities, exists"403, and "[t]he provisions of
the Protocol on the Status of the Customs Statistic Centre of the CU clearly define the
absence of the Centre 's competence to provide the statistics on foreign trade of the CU
to anyone except the government bodies of the CU Member States"404;
f. material redacted as confidential in the "textual part of particular sections of the
Application" could be found in the accompanying tables either in whole or in summarised

395 European Union's second written submission, para. 174.
396 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 349.
398 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 449.
399 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 255.
400 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 260. (emphasis original)
401 Ibid. para. 264.
402 Ibid. para. 266.
403 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 359.
404 Ibid. para. 369. (fn omitted)

format405 , and this was sufficient to permit intere sted parties to have a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence406; and
g. the GAZ Questionnaire response was not included in either the confidential or the
non-confidential record of the investigation, because:
i. GAZ had not made a distinction between confidential and non -confidential
information407, and
ii. the information supplied by GAZ was deficient.408
h. Sollers' letter of 25 December 2012 and the letter of the "Association of Russian
Automakers" of 11 February 2013 were referenced in the non-confidential version of the
investigation report and were not treated as confidential by the DIMD.
7.7.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.7.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.240. Article 6.5 provides:
Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because i ts disclosure
would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its
disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the
information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or
which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon
good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not
be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it.
Article 6.5.1 provides:

The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to
furnish non -confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient
detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information
submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that
such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a
statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided.
Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 thus strike a balance between confidentiality and due process,

[B]y protecting information where good cause has been shown for confidential
treatment, while providing an alternative method for its communication so as to
satisfy the right of o ther parties to the investigation to obtain a reasonable
understanding of the substance of the confidential information.409
7.7.2.2 Article 6.5
7.241. "Confidential information" is defined in Article 6.5 as information that is : (a) b y nature
confidential; or (b) provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation . Under
Article 6.5, "upon good cause shown" an investigating authority must:
a. treat such information as confidential; and
b. not disclose such information without the permission of the submitter.

405 Ibid. para. 374.
406 Ibid. para. 377.
407 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 677 and 678; second written submission,
para. 272.
408 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 678.
409 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.36.

Showing go od cause is thus a "condition precedent for according confidential treatment to
information submitted to an authority". 410 The condition applies to all information to be treated as
confidential, whether it is by nature confidential or submitted on a confiden tial basis . 411 An
interested party fulfils this requirement where it demonstrates " the risk of a potential
consequence, the avoidance of which is important enough to warrant the non -disclosure of the
information".412 Article 6.5 does not require a showing of g ood cause in respect of each item of
such information. Rather, depending on the information and the documents in question, good
cause may be shown in respect of general categories of information. Where an investigating
authority treats as confidential info rmation in respect of which no good cause has been shown,
that investigating authority acts inconsistently with its obligation under Article 6.5.

7.242. In this case, the Russian Federation does not identify any instance of an actual showing of
good cause by th e submitter of information in respect of documents containing information to
which the DIMD extended confidential treatment . Indeed, the Russian Federation agrees that
many of these documents do not contain an express showing of good cause. 413 The
Russian Federation raises three general arguments in defence of its position that in spite of the
absence of an express showing of good cause, the DIMD met the requirements of Article 6.5 in
treating the information as confidential.
7.243. First, the Russian Federation ar gues that it is acting consistently with Article 6.5 because
CU law 414 and certain "recommendations" issued by the investigating authority 415 "require" that
interested parties show good cause. We recall the specific words of Article 6.5: "upon good cause
shown". By its express terms, Article 6.5 envisages more than a formal requirement in a Member's
anti-dumping law or regulations; it sets out an obligation of results: it is not enough for a Member
merely to "require" the showing of "good cause" in its legal re gime; under Article 6.5, authorities
that conduct an anti -dumping investigation may extend confidential treatment to information only
where good cause is, in fact, shown. The Russian Federation's position is not consistent with the
words of the Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. As well, were it to prevail, the
interpretation proposed by the Russian Federation would permit Members to be in apparent
compliance with Article 6.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement while at the same time providing no
basis on which to ensure that , in substance, the requirements of Article 6.5 are met by the
interested parties to an investigation and the investigating authority . The facts of this case are
instructive. We note the Russian Federation's claim that the interested p arties were "required" to
show good cause . But the interested parties did not , in fact, do so in respect of any of the
information at issue. 416 Having received information that, inconsistently with the alleged
requirement417 under CU law418, did not contain or w as not accompanied by a showing of good
cause, the DIMD nevertheless extended confidential treatment to such information.
7.244. Second, the Russian Federation argues that the Anti -Dumping Agreement does not require
an investigating authority to reject confidential information submitted without good cause . This

410 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.38.
411 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537; and EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5
– China), para. 5.37: "Article 6.5 applies to both information that is confidential by nature, and information
that has been submitted to authorities on a confidential basis. … the requirement to show 'good cause' applies
to both categories of information." (fn omitted)
412 Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 537.
413 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 344, 347, and 349-354; second written
submission, paras. 261-267.
414 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 349.
416 The Russian Federation argues that in some instances an express showing of good cause was not
necessary because the confidential nature of the information was "self-evident". We address this argument
below in paragraph 7.245.
417 We observe that, according to the Russian Federation, this "requirement" was set out in CU law and
"recommendations" or "Guidelines" in the various documents sent out by the DIMD. There is therefore some
question as to whether on its own terms, the DIMD "required" that good cause be shown. Indeed, the failure to
observe this requirement by the submitters of information seems to have been without any consequence for
either the submitter or the information submitted.
418 We note that the European Union alleges that regardless of the Russian Federation's municipal legal
requirements, on the facts and on the record of this case good cause was not shown for confidential treatment
of items of information. Even if relevant in law, the arguments of the Russian Federation merely demonstrates
that its anti-dumping regime is not as such inconsistent with Article 6.5; they do not respond to whether in this
case and in respect of the documents and information in question the Russian Federation acted consistently
with its obligations under Article 6.5.

argument does not address the requirements of Article 6.5. An investigating authority may not
extend confidential treatment to information in respect of which the submitter of the information
has not shown good cause for confidential treatment. Accordingly, where a submitter fails to show
good cause to maintain the confidentiality of the information it submits, it has three choices . It
may: seek to show good cause, thereby fulfilling the condition precedent for confidential treatment
by the investigating authority; withdraw the request for confidential treatment; or withdraw the
information.
7.245. Third, the Russian Federation argues that w ith respect to information that is by nature
confidential, "the basis for providing confidential treatment is self -evident". This argument again
does not address the requirements of Article 6.5. We recall the specific words of Article 6.5: "upon
good cause shown". These words imply the performance of an act – the showing of good cause –
above and beyond the submission of information that is self -evidently confidential. The arguments
of the Russian Federation would reduce the "upon good cause shown" condition to inutility by
merging the requirement into the other parts of Article 6.5: the task of a panel would be to review
not whether good cause was shown, but whether the information was of such nature as to contain
within itself the required showing of good cause. As well, we recall that the obligation to show
good cause applies e qually to information that is by nature confidential and to information that is
provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation . The Russian Federation further
argues that "the fact that confidential treatment is granted signifies that an i nvestigating authority
is satisfied with the good cause shown and finds that a request for confidentiality is warranted" .419
That may well be – if good cause were , in fact, shown. For much of the information at issue the
Russian Federation admits that no sho wing of good cause was made 420, and for the rest of the
information at issue, nothing in the record indicates that a showing of good cause was made. We
find it difficult to see how an investigating authority could be "satisfied" with a condition precedent
that by its own admission has not been met.
7.246. In respect of specific information, the Russian Federation raises the following additional
arguments:
a. The Russian Federation argues that "[t]he provisions of the Protocol on the Status of the
Customs Statistic Cent re of the CU clearly define the absence of the Centre 's
competence to provide the statistics on foreign trade of the CU to anyone except the
government bodies of the CU Member States ".421 We consider that this does not detract
from the obligation of the DIMD , under Article 6.5, not to extend confidential treatment
to information unless good cause has been shown to justify such treatment.
b. In respect of certain material redacted as confidential in the "textual part of particular
sections of the Application" (sections 9.4 and 9.5 of Sollers' Application) , the Russian
Federation argues that the information could be found in the accompanying tables either
in whole or in summarised format . 422 However, in our view , to the extent that
information that is set out in one part of a document is treated as confidential in another
part of the document, this aggravates rather than responds to concerns about
compliance with Article 6.5: not only is there no good cause shown, it is difficult to see
how good cause could be shown in respect of such information.
c. With respect to the GAZ Questionnaire response, the Russian Federation argues that the
information at issue was not in either the confidential or non -confidential versions of the
record. We find the Russian Federation 's argument difficult to reconcile with the
Investigation Report. We note in particular that data set out in the Investigation Report
up to section 4.2 includes data related to GAZ as one of two domestic producers of the
like product. We recall in particular our findings in paragraph 7.14. Specifically, we found
that:

419 Russian Federation's second written submission para. 264. (emphasis added)
420 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 344, 347, and 349-354; second written
submission, paras. 261-267.
421 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 369. (fn omitted)
422 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 374 and 394-396; response to Panel question
Nos. 79 and 80, paras. 45-48.

i. The investigating authority decided to not include in its definition a known producer
of the like product that had provided data and sought to cooperate in the
investigation after having reviewed that producer's data. This sequence of events
gives rise to an appearance of selecting among domestic producers based on their
data to ensure a particular outcome, resulting in an obvious risk of material
distortion in the subsequent injury analysis.
ii. The reasons given by the Russian Federation for the DIMD's decision to not include
GAZ in the definition of domestic industry were not set out in the Investigation
Report and thus constitute impermissible post hoc rationalization.
That is, we have already found tha t information submitted by GAZ in the form of a
questionnaire response was on the record. 423 Aggregate data in part informed by this
information was treated as confidential. According to the Russian Federation itself, GAZ
did not distinguish between confiden tial and non-confidential information: by definition, it
could not have shown "good cause." In this light, the DIMD's treatment as confidential of
the information in the Questionnaire response was in contravention of Article 6.5.
d. Concerning the Sollers le tter of 25 December 2012 and the letter of the Association of
Russian Automakers of 11 February 2013, there was some disagreement between the
parties as to whether these two letters were treated by the DIMD as confidential . The
European Union argues that t hese letters were not placed in the non-confidential file.
The Russian Federation asserts that the documents were not given confidential
treatment in the first place and w ere made available to interested parties in the
non-confidential file. The Russian Federation contends that the non -confidential version
of the Investigation Report also contained a reference to these letters. In the
circumstances, we find that the European Union has not established that the DIMD
treated these two letters as confidential.
7.247. In respect of the items of information treated as confidential by the DIMD at issue in this
dispute, t he European Union has demonstrated that the submitters of that information did not
show good cause for confidential treatment. On that basis, in respect of all the information at
issue, treated as confidential by the DIMD, the DIMD did not act consistently with Article 6.5. The
specific items of information to which this conclusion applies are set out in Table 11.
Table 11: Information treated as confidential in respect of which no good cause was
shown
Information Description
Sollers' Application, section 3 Information on the production of LCVs by GAZ
Sollers' Application, section 7 Information on major consumers of Sollers' goods
Sollers' Application, table 8.1.1 Information on export volumes
Sollers' Application, sections 9.1 and 9.2; fn 8 and
annex 3; tables 9.1.1 and 9.1.3
Information on the volume of imports to Kazakhstan and
Belarus
Sollers' Application, section 9.4 Information on aggregated import volumes
Sollers' Application, section 9.5 Information on the volumes of dumped imports
Sollers' Application, section 10.2 Information on export price data
Sollers' Application, table 11.2.1 Information on Sollers' sales prices on the domestic market
Sollers' Application, section 11.4 Information on changes in stocks
Sollers' Application, sections 11.5 and 11.6 Information on the drop in the profit and profit margin
Sollers' Application, section 11.7 Information on the supposed effect of the alleged ly dumped

423 We note in particular the following assertion by the Russian Federation:
Specifically, the information pertaining to GAZ, which was used in the final determinat ion, was
requested additionally. The investigation record demonstrates that this information was received
in a Letter No. 18/ОД/2/2013 dated 21 February 2013 that contains only GAZ’s data on volume
of production. Importantly, this information differed from the information contained in the
deficient Questionnaire response.
Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 679 (footnote omitted). We do not understand the
Russian Federation to be suggesting that the DIMD compared the new information received from GAZ to
information that was not on the record to determine whether and how much they differed from one another.
For this reason, we understood from this paragraph that deficient or not, the GAZ Questionnaire response was
indeed part of the record.

Information Description
imports on Sollers' obligations
Sollers' Application, section 11.9 Information on the supposed effect of the allegedly dumped
imports on the diesel engine production project
Sollers' Application, section 12.2 Information on the market shares of imported and domestic
products
Sollers' Application, annexes listed in the Annex List The annexes to Sollers' Application
Sollers' Questionnaire response424, section 1.3 Information on the legal organizational form of Sollers
Sollers' Questionnaire response, sections 2.5 and 2.6 Information on catalogues, brochures and Application areas
Sollers' Questionnaire response, section 2.7 Information on quality complaints
Sollers' Questionnaire response, section 2.8 Information on the major consumers of LCVs
Sollers' Questionnaire response, sections 3.2 and 4.2 Information on production capacity
Sollers' Questionnaire response, section 7.1 Information on accounting system and principles
Sollers' Questionnaire response, section 8.2 Information on prices
Sollers' Questionnaire response, section 8.3 Information on terms of sale
Sollers' Questionnaire response, tables in sections 3-7 Information on production volume and capacities, sales
volume, profit/loss, employment, salary, investments,
purchase of the pr oducts from other sources, volume of
inventories, sales of the products, average weighted prices
for the sales, and production cost structure
Turin-Auto's Questionnaire response425, section 1.3 Information on Turin-Auto's Articles of Association
Turin-Auto's Questionnaire response, tables in
sections 3-6
Information on volume of product purchases, stock level
volume, staff number, salaries, investments, volume of
product sales, weighted prices, profit/losses, profitability, and
costs structure
Sollers' comments after the hearing426, p. 1,
subheading 1
Information on stakeholders and their commercial interests
Sollers' comments after the hearing, pp. 2 and 3 Information on the goods subject to the investigation
Sollers' comments after the hearing, pp. 7 and 8 Information on the production of the goods by Sollers
Sollers' comments after the hearing, p. 10 Information on capacity utilisation
Sollers' comments after the hearing, p. 10 Information on the sales of goods in the domestic market to
independent buyers
Sollers' comments after the hearing, p. 12 Information on the financial and economic results from the
sales of goods in the domestic market
Sollers' comments after the hearing, pp. 13 and 14 Information on the dynamics of investments, staff headcount
and salaries
Sollers' comments after the hearing, p. 16 Information on price suppression
Sollers' comments after the hearing, tables 4-7, 11-15,
and 17-20
Information on production, capacity utilisation, sales of
products, financial and economic results from sales,
investments, staff, salaries, consumption, and vo lume of
sales
Sollers' comments after the hearing, annexes numbered
1 and 2
Annexes to Sollers' comments after the hearing
Public version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibits
RUS-12 and EU-21) (exhibited twice), section 1.2
confirms receipt of GAZ's Questionnaire response
GAZ's Questionnaire response

424 Sollers' Questionnaire response, 3 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-3).
425 Turin Auto's Questionnaire response, 3 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-5).
426 Sollers' Comments of 6 April 2012 regarding the Public Hearing of 22 March 2012, (Exhibit EU-10).

7.7.2.3 Article 6.5.1
7.248. Under Article 6.5.1 an investigating authority must require an interested party submitting
information that satisfies the requirements of Article 6.5 for confidential treatment to:
a. furnish a non -confidential summary of the information that is in sufficient detail to
permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in
confidence; and
b. in exceptional circumstances, where the submitter indicates that confidential information
is not susceptible of summary, provide a statement of the reasons why summarization is
not possible.427
7.249. Article 6.5.1 applies in respect of information properly treated as confidential u nder
Article 6.5. Because we find that the DIMD has not acted consistently with Article 6.5 in extending
confidential treatment to the items of information at issue, we do not need to address the claims
of the European Union under Article 6.5.1 to resolve this dispute. Nonetheless, in the light of the
parties' extensive arguments and integrated approach to their arguments concerning Articles 6.5
and 6.5.1, we make the following observations:
a. The obligations of these provisions apply in respect of all infor mation submitted by all
interested parties that falls under Article 6.5, whether or not the information is otherwise
complete or used by the investigating authority. This is because the obligation applies to
the interested party submitting information at t he time it submits the information in
question. The interested party has no way of knowing ex ante whether an investigating
authority will ultimately consider the information "complete" or use it.
b. Where non -confidential summaries are provided, they must be in "sufficient detail to
permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in
confidence". A "summary" is not a facsimile. In providing a summary, an interested
party is not required to ensure a full understanding of the conf idential information, but
rather a reasonable understanding of the substance of that information. The
Anti-Dumping Agreement does not provide any guidance on how summaries may be
prepared. Accordingly, whether a summary meets the requirements of Article 6.5.1 must
be determined on a case -by-case basis. We note that much of the confidential
information provided to the DIMD consists of figures set out in tables. Such information
may be summarised in a number of ways. A "range o f figures" may, as the
European Union suggests, be one way of summarising such information. So are indexes,
and the European Union does not argue that the fact of being summarised in the form of
indexes (rather than, for example, ranges) would in itself constitute a violation of
Article 6.5.1.
c. Article 6.5.1 is not complied with where a Member seeks to demonstrate that a summary
of confidential information was provided, or provides a statement of reasons why
confidential in formation could not be summarized, in the course of WTO dispute
settlement. In this case, many of the explanations linking confidential information to
alleged "summaries" in the Investigation Report were set out in the Russian Federation's
submissions to the Panel, rather than having been in the submitted documents or fo und
elsewhere in the record of the investigation; all statements of reasons explaining the
absence of a non -confidential summary were l ikewise provided by the
Russian Federation in the course of this dispute settlement proceeding.
d. In accepting summaries of information to be treated confidentially, an investigating
authority might find it useful to consider its own disclosure obligations under Article 6.9.
In respect of information properly treated as confidential, " the investigating authority
could meet its obligations under Article 6.9 through the use of non -confidential
summaries of the ' essential' but confidential facts ." 428 At a minimum, non -confidential

427 Emphasis added.

summaries provided by a submitter of information to be treated as confidential could
serve as a starting point for the required disclosure of essential facts under Article 6.9.429
7.8 Essential Facts
7.8.1 Introduction
7.250. The European Union alleges violations of Article 6.9 in respect of the alleged failure to
inform interested parties of essential facts under considerat ion concerning all aspects of the
decision to impose the definitive measure: the existence of dumping and the determination of
material injury caused by dumped imports. 430 The interested parties in question, to whom the
required disclosure was not made, are the exporters of the subject LCVs, Daimler AG and
Volkswagen AG.431 The European Union alleges that the following essential facts were not disclosed
to these interested parties, either in full or in the form of "meaningful" summaries:
a. the actual volumes of i mports of subject products to the CU effected by Daimler AG and
Volkswagen AG that were used for the purpose of calculation of the normal value and of
the export price432;
b. the weighted average export prices of LCVs produced by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG
respectively433;
c. the weighted average export price for subject products exported by each of the
abovementioned companies into the CU434;
d. the source of the information concerning import volumes and values used by the
DIMD435;
e. the actual figures that show "the consumption volumes of LCVs in the Customs Union" ,
"the production and sales volume of LCVs in the Customs Union" , "the evolution of the
profits and profitability of the domestic industry in 2011"436;
f. the profit/loss of Sollers from the sale of LCVs in the CT CU in 2011437;
g. "dynamics of profitability of sales of Goods in the CT CU (versus the respective period of
the preceding year, in percentage points)"438;
h. the source of the data used to compile tables 4.1.1.3 (import volume and volume of
dumped imports)439;
i. return on investments, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow and ability to
raise capital or investments for Sollers440;

429 For reasons that are set out below, we do not make any findings in respect of non-confidential
summaries under Article 6.9 in this dispute.
430 European Union's first written submission, para. 416; second written submission, para. 278. See also
the Panel's preliminary ruling in respect of the scope of this claim.
431 Investigation Report, section 1.2.
432 European Union's first written submission, paras. 428, 431, and 432; second written submission,
para. 278.
433 European Union's second written submission, para. 278.
434 European Union's first written submission, paras. 428 and 429; second written submission,
para. 278.
435 European Union's first written submission, paras. 430-433; second written submission, para. 278.
436 European Union's first written submission, paras. 436-438; second written submission, para. 278.
437 European Union's first written submission, paras. 219, 437, and 438; second written submission,
para. 278.
438 European Union's first written submission, paras. 437 and 438; second written submission,
para. 278.
439 European Union's first written submission, paras. 448-450; second written submission, para. 278.
440 Table contained in section 4.2.7 of the Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit
RUS-14) (BCI); European Union's second written submission, para. 301.

j. the market share held by GAZ in 2011441;
k. information on the relation of the volume of export to the total volume of production442;
l. the figures for the production capacity of the domestic industry443;
m. the figures for the structure of the costs of production of the domestic industry444;
n. the production volumes, consumption volumes and sales volumes in aggregate form445;
o. return on investment s, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow and ability to
raise capital or investments446; and
p. the figures for the numbers and salaries of staff.447
7.251. In general terms, the Russian Federation argues that:
a. the European Union did not demonstrate that " the DIMD had an opportunity to disclose "
the information at issue because the information was confidential448;
b. "where facts available are by nature confidential, or are submitted to the investigating
authority on a confidential basis, are also part of the 'essential facts under consideration'
the investigating authority has to meet dual obligations"449;
c. the two interested parties were non -cooperating and a Member has limited disclosure
obligations in respect of such interested parties450;
d. "in cases where the rel evant essential facts are already in the possession of the
respondents, a narrative description of the data used cannot ipso facto be considered
insufficient disclosure"451; and
e. to establish a violation of Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement , a complai ning
party must demonstrate that the omitted facts affected the interested parties ' right of
defence. Thus, an incomplete disclosure document will satisfy the requirements of

441 European Union's first written submission, para. 443; second written submission, para. 278.
442 Investigation Report, section 4.1.2; Eurasian Economic Commission, Results of the anti-dumping
investigation with regard to light commercial vehicles originating in Germany, Italy, Poland, and Turkey
imported into the common customs area of the Customs Union (Moscow, 28 March 2013) (Draft Report),
(Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), section 4.1.2; and European Union's second written
submission, para. 302.
443 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), table in section 4.2.3; Draft
Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), table in section 4.2.3; and European Union's second
written submission, para. 302.
444 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.4 and
table 4.2.4.2; Draft Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), section 4.2.4 and table 4.2.4.2
(not complete); and European Union's second written submission, para. 302.
445 European Union's first written submission, paras. 210, 355, and 356; second written submission,
para. 296.
446 European Union's first written submission, para. 236; second written submission, para. 301.
447 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.6 and
table 4.2.6; Draft Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), section 4.2.6; and European Union's
second written submission, para. 302.
448 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 343, 344, 359-363, 371, 976, and 990; second
written submission, paras. 243, 244, 269, 274, 313, 382, 419, 453, 489, 500, 503, 512, 514, 524-537,
and 610; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 78; and response to Panel question No. 44,
para. 161.
449 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 722.
450 Russian Federation's first written submission, paras. 696, 760, 827, and 877, and fn 325; second
written submission, paras. 347-358; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 79; and
response to Panel question No. 44, paras. 145-161.
451 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 719.

Article 6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement if this incompleteness does not affect
interested parties' right of defence.452
The Russian Federation also raises specific arguments in respect of certain essential facts; these
we discuss below.

7.8.2 Evaluation by the Panel
7.8.2.1 Relevant provisions
7.252. Article 6.9 provides:
The authorities shall, before a f inal determination is made, inform all interested
parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision
whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient
time for the parties to defend their interests.
7.253. The first sentence is the operative part of Article 6.9. Broken down to its constituent parts,
it has the following required elements:
a. shall inform
b. all interested parties
c. before a final determination is made
d. of the essential facts
i. under consideration
ii. which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures.
Thus, a complaining party demonstrates that an investigating authority has acted inconsistently
with Article 6.9 where it establishes that any one of these required ele ments has not been
satisfied.

7.254. The second sentence of Article 6.9 is, on its face, a temporal exhortation. As context for
the central obligation in Article 6.9453, it gives an indication both of why disclosure is to be made454
and when it must be made. Nothin g in the second sentence suggests that it is an element
noncompliance with which must be independently demonstrated by the complaining party to
establish inconsistency with Article 6.9. For this reason, to establish inconsistency with Article 6.9,
a complaining party is not required to demonstrate that a failure to disclose essential facts did
"affect interested parties' right of defence".455
7.255. In view of the questions at issue in this dispute and the required elements of Article 6.9,
our analysis will proceed in three steps:
a. What are the "essential facts" at issue? In particular, how is the obligation in Article 6.9
to be met in respect of confidential information?
b. Are there any limits on who is entitled to receive disclosure?

452 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 89, para. 65.
453 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
454 The panel in EC – Salmon (Norway) at para. 7.805:
We consider that the purpose of disclosure under Article 6.9 is to provide the interested parties
with the necessary information to enable them to c omment on the completeness and correctness
of the facts being considered by the investigating authority, provide additional information or
correct perceived errors, and comment on or make arguments as to the proper interpretation of
those facts.
455 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 89, para. 65.

c. How are interested parties to be "informed"?
7.8.2.2 "Essential facts"
7.256. Article 6.9 requires the disclosure of " the essential facts under consideration which form
the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures". 456 There are three cumulative
elements as to the kinds of information an investigating authority is required to disclose:
a. Article 6.9 requires the disclosure of facts: the information underlying a decision rather
the reasoning, calculation or methodology that led to a determination.457
b. A fact is essential where it is "extremely important and necessary"458, "indispensable"459
or "significant, important or salient" 460 in the process of reaching a decision as to
whether or not to apply definitive measures.
c. Not every "essential fact" is required to be disclosed. Article 6.9 requires the disclosure
of "essential facts under consideration": the "facts on the record that may be taken into
account by an authority in reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive
anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties."461
7.8.2.2.1 The facts at issue
7.257. The European Union has not demonstrated that three of the alleged "essential facts" meet
these requirements:
a. The source of the data used to compile tables 4.1.1.3 (import volume and volume of
dumped imports ). In itself, the source of data is not an essentia l fact under
consideration. Knowledge of the sources of data might be useful to establish the
credibility of information used by investigating authorities, but the sources of data are
not themselves essential facts under consideration.
b. The source of the information concerning import volumes and values used by the DIMD,
for the same reasons as above.
c. The market share held by GAZ. This information does not appear to have been under
consideration in the investigation.
Accordingly, we make no findings in respect of these alleged essential facts.

7.258. In respect of disclosure of facts related to investments, the return on investments, the
actual and potentia l negative effects on cash flow, the ability to raise capital or investments,
relation of the volume of export to the total volume of production, production capacity, structure of
production costs and numbers and salaries of staff the Russian Federation argues that these are
"new claims" that the European Union raises for the first time in its second written submi ssion.462
The European Union points out that its claim in this dispute is that the DIMD failed to disclose
essential facts related to the determination of dumping and injury, including causation. Additional
instances of allegedly undisclosed essential facts became known only after the Russian Federation

456 Emphasis added.
457 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.90.
458 Merriam-Webster dictionary online, definition of "essential", available at:
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/essential.
459 Oxford English dictionary online, definition of "essential", available at:
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/64503?redirectedFrom=essential#eid
460 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240:
Moreover, we note that Articles 6.9 and 12.8 do not require the disclosure of all the facts that
are before an authority but, instead, those that are "essential" ; a word that carries a connotation
of significant, important, or salient.
461 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
462 Russian Federation's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 77 and 78;
response to Panel question No. 88, para. 60.

submitted the confidential version of the Investigation Report.463 The European Union notes further
that "Russia does not appear to have actually made any legal objection to their raising, and has
been able to fully engage with them on the merits in these proceedings."464
7.259. We recall the structure of a claim under Article 6.9: a complaining party alleges that an
investigating authority has acted inconsistently with its obligations by not disclosing essential facts
under consideration. The European Union's claim follows this structure – in its request for
establishment of a panel, the European Union claimed that the Russian Federation failed to inform
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration , referring specifically to the essential
facts underlying the determinations of the existence of dumping and the calculation of the margins
of dumping and the determination of injury.465 It is in the nature of a claim under Article 6.9 that a
complaining party may not know everything that the investigating authority did not disclose.
Indeed, in certain instances a complaining party may only become aware of non -disclosure of
certain essential facts in the course of WTO dispute settlement, when it has access to a les s-
redacted published report. For this reason, a panel should exercise caution in unduly narrowing the
scope of a claim under Article 6.9 on the basis that specific facts known to the investigating
authority but not to the complaining party were not identif ied as undisclosed essential facts by the
complaining party early in the dispute. This does not mean that a complaining party may expand
the scope of its Article 6.9 claims as the case develops or is excused from providing the
evidentiary basis for establishing its case, only that if a claim regarding non -disclosure of essential
facts is properly before it, a panel should not ex ante exclude certain evidence and argument from
consideration.
7.260. In this case, the European Union's claim in respect of Article 6.9 is properly before us.466
The parties agree that the European Union did not mention certain allegedly undisclosed essential
facts in its earlier submissions. At issue is the legal relevance of this omission for the
European Union's claim under Article 6.9. We have compared the Draft Report, which constitutes
the Russian Federation's disclosure under Article 6.9, with the confidential version of the
Investigation Report. As a matter of fact, we find that:
a. tables containing figures in section s 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 of the confidential version of the
Investigation Report are missing in their entirety, and in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.3 in part,
from the Draft Report; and
b. in the Draft Report, there is no indication that there were tables containing figures in
sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. However, the Draft Report does contain tables showing that
figures were redacted as indicated by the use of the term "CONFIDENTIAL".
That is, in respect of the "essential facts" at issue, entire pieces of information are missing from
the Draft Report; nothing in the Draft Report suggest ed the existence of confidential information
that had been redacted; the contrast with other instances where confidential information was
redacted from the Draft Report suggested the exact opposite.

7.261. We further note that:
a. the Russian Federation has been aware of the full scope of the European Union's claims
under Article 6.9 since 15 September 2014 and at the latest 20 April 2016;
b. the European Union raised these matters at the earliest opportunity after the Russian
Federation submitted a less-redacted version of the Investigation Report as an exhibit in
this dispute;
c. the Russian Federation has been in full possession of all the evidence at issue since the
beginning of the case; and
d. the Russian Federation has ha d ample opportunity to respond to the arguments of the
European Union, and has done so in considerable detail.

463 European Union's response to Panel question No. 88, paras. 70 and 71.
464 European Union's comments on Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 88, para. 43.
465 European Union's panel request, para. 8.
466 Russia – Commercial Vehicles, preliminary ruling of the panel, para. 4.1. (Annex D-1)

Accordingly, we do not consider these additional allegations of undisclosed essential facts to
constitute "new claims", and will address them in our findings.

7.262. The Russian Federation further argues that [***] "were not central to the conclusion of
injury and did not weigh significantly "467 and therefore did not constitute essential facts. T he
Russian Federation argues that [***] does not constitute an essential fact because, in part, "the
named factors do not constitute relevant factors listed in Article 3.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement".468 As to whether the facts at issue constituted "essential facts", the European Union
argues that:
The body of essential facts to be disclosed under Article 6.9 concerns the facts "under
consideration" by the investigating authority in determining whether (or not) to apply
measures, including those that are "salient for a decision to apply definitive measures,
as well as those that are salient for a contrary outcome". This surely covers the facts
underlying the assessment of mandatory injury factors which an investigating
authority is required to undertake under Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement.469
The European Union furt her argues that in addition to the mandatory injury factors, Article 3.4
requires analysis of "relevant economic factor having a bearing on the state of the industry".
Accordingly, information related to non-listed factors such as [***] is nevertheless "salient for the
DIMD's decision to apply definitive measures " and thus an essential fact subject to the disclosure
requirements of Article 6.9.470

7.263. A fact is essential if it is "significant, important or salient" or "indispensable" in the process
of reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive measures . That "process" has three
principal constituent elements: dumping, material injury and causation. Each of these constituent
elements has, in turn, specific analytical and evidentiary requirements. A fact is essential where it
is "significant, important or salient" in respect of a requirement under any of the three elements.
Accordingly, even if we were to agree with the Russian Federation that the facts at issue were not
"central to the conclusion of injury", that does not end the analysis as to whether they are
"essential facts" within the meaning of Article 6.9. In this instance, the Russian Federation does
not dispute that [***] are required elements in evaluating the injury factors under Article 3.4.471
Facts that are "significant, important or salient" in conducting required analyses are "essential
facts" whether or not they are "central" to the final injury determination. For this reason, we find
that the facts at issue, that is, the figures rela ted to investments, the return on investments, the
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital or investments are
essential facts subject to the disclosure requirements of Article 6.9.
7.264. Finally, w e agree with the Russ ian Federation that some of the [***] does not relate
directly to the specific factors listed in Article 3.4. However, we recall that Article 3.4 requires an
analysis of "all relevant economic factors and indices " including the listed fifteen specific fact ors.
The information at issue is in our view salient to the analysis of relevant economic factors and
therefore constitutes essential facts subject to the disclosure requirement of Article 6.9.
7.265. The parties do not disagree as to whether the other facts at issue are "essential facts
under consideration" within the meaning of Article 6.9. As well, the parties do not disagree that
the essential facts in question were not disclosed in their entirety to the two interested parties
named. Rather, the Russian Feder ation considers that the information allegedly not disclosed was

467 Russian Federation's response to Panel question No. 89, para. 61.
468 Russian Federation's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 79.
469 European Union's response to Panel question No. 89, para. 72. (fn omitted, emphasis added)
470 European Union's second written submission, paras. 303 and 304.
471 Article 3.4 provides that:
The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall
include an evaluation o f all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state
of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments , or utilization of capacity; factors affecting do mestic prices;
the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow ,
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments . This list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance. (emphasis
added)

subject to confidentiality requirements. The European Union initially argued that the failure to
disclose certain actual figures (whether or not confidential) amounted to acting inconsistentl y with
Article 6.9.472 In later submissions, the European Union appears to argue that to the extent that
information was confidential, it was not properly disclosed. 473 We now turn to the question of
disclosure under Article 6.9 of information properly treated as confidential under Article 6.5.
7.8.2.2.2 Confidential information
7.266. The Russian Federation argues that:
a. in respect of information treated as confidential 474 , the European Union did not
"demonstrate that the DIMD had an opportunity to disclose the actual figures …"475; and
b. certain "essential facts" in this case constituted information subject to the confidentiality
requirements of Article 6.5.476
7.267. The European Union considers that:
[T]he central objective of Article 6.9 is to enable interested parties to defend their
interests. With respect to confidential information, whether they are summarized in a
meaningful way will similarly often depend on whether the summary allows interested
parties to defend their interests.477
In this instance, then, " what is at issue is the omi ssion of essential facts, without providing a
meaningful non-confidential summary".478

7.268. Nothing in Article 6.9 requires a complaining party to demonstrate that an investigating
authority had "an opportunity" to make the required disclosure. Under Article 6.9, a complaining
party presents a prima facie case where it demonstrates that essential facts have not been
disclosed to the interested parties as required. Article 6.9 does not require the disclosure of
essential facts that benefit from confidential treat ment under A rticle 6.5. Indeed, the
Russian Federation also argues that a Member is under "dual obligations" 479 in respect of essential
facts that are treated as confidential by an investigating authority. But Article 6.5 is not a
carve-out to Article 6.9; confidentiality of information is neither an absolute bar to disclosure nor a
defence to the failure to disclose as required under Article 6.9. Rather, a harmonious interpretation
of the "dual obligation" is that where essential facts are properly treated a s confidential, " the
investigating authority could meet its obligations under Article 6.9 through the use of
non-confidential summaries of the 'essential' but confidential facts".480
7.269. We have found above that none of the information set out in Table 11 that was treated as
confidential by the DIMD met the requirements of Article 6.5 for such treatment. This includes the
essential facts contained in that information. We stress that this finding does not mean that the
information at issue was not confidential , or could not have been properly treated as confidential .
Rather, we found that the condition precedent for treatment as confidential of such information by

472 European Union's first written submission, para. 438. Both the actual figures that show the domestic
consumption, production and sales volumes, and the evolution of the profits and profitability of the domestic
industry in 2011, are essential facts that form the basis of the injury analysis.
473 European Union's response to Panel question No. 71, para. 26.
474 Specifically, the actual volumes of imports of subject products to the CU effected by Daimler AG and
Volkswagen AG that were used for the purpose of calculation of the normal value and of the export price; the
actual value of imports of subject products to the CU effected by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG that were
used for the purpose of calculation of the export price; the actual figures that show the domestic consumption,
production and sales volumes, and the evolution of the profits and profitability rate of Sollers in 2011; the
profit/loss of Sollers from the sale of LCVs in the CT CU in 2011; the profitability rate of Sollers from the sale of
LCVs in the CT CU; and the production volumes, consumption volumes and sales volumes in aggregate form.
475 Russian Federation's second written submission, para. 313. (emphasis added)
476 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 722.
477 European Union's response to Panel question No. 82, para. 55.
478 European Union's response to Russian Federation question No. 5, para. 12.
479 The obligation to disclose under Article 6.9 and the obligation to protect confidential information
under Article 6.5. Both provisions apply in respect of confidential information.

the investigating authority, a showing of good cause, was not met and therefore that information,
including the essential facts at issue, was not properly treated as confidential in the investigation.
Because confidential treatment of the essential facts in question by the DIMD was not consistent
with the Russian Federation's obligations under Article 6.5, it was not properly treated as
confidential; to the extent that the DIMD failed to disclose information that was not properly
treated as confidential constitutes, it acted inconsistently with Article 6.9.
7.270. In respect of information originating from electro nic customs database of national customs
authorities of the CU, the Russian Federation argues that this information was submitted on a
confidential basis to the DIMD and, accordingly, was treated as confidential by the DIMD. We note
that there is no showing of good cause on the record in respect of such information. T his does not
mean that the information at issue was not confidential , or could not have been properly treated
as confidential. Rather, the condition precedent for treatment as confidential of s uch information
by the investigating authority, a showing of good cause, is nowhere on the record. For this reason,
consistent with our finding in paragraph 7.269, this information, including the essential facts at
issue, was not properly treated as confidential in the investigation. To the extent that the DIMD
failed to disclose information that was not properly treated as confidential, it acted inconsistently
with Article 6.9.
7.8.2.3 "All" interested parties
7.271. The Rus sian Federation argues that the two interested parties at issue were
non-cooperating and that a Member has limited disclosure obligations in respect of such interested
parties.
7.272. Article 6.9 requires the authorities to "inform all interested parties of the essential facts".
The European Union and the Russian Federation do not disagree that the two interested parties in
question are, in fact, "interested parties" within the meaning of Article 6.9. The question at issue is
whether "all interested parties" in Article 6.9 includes non-cooperating interested parties.
7.273. Unless otherwise defined or indicated, "all" means everyone. Nothing in Article 6.9
provides a different definition of "all" or otherwise suggests that "all" should be interpreted as
anything other than all. It is true that Article 6.9 does not set out the precise manner in which an
investigating authority must disclose the essential facts.481 The disclosure, in whatever "manner" it
is undertaken, must be made to all interested parties:
a. before a final determination is made;
b. with a view to enabling interested parties to defend their interests; and
c. "in a coherent way, so as to permit an interested party to understand the basis for the
decision whether or not to apply definitive measures."482
7.274. The broader context supports the view that "all" means all. Where the drafters intended to
make a distinction between various interested parties in a disclosure context, they did so
expressly, as in Article 6.7. Furthermore, Article 6.9 follows Article 6.8, which refers to
"non-cooperating" parties: it would therefore have been easy, had it been the intent of the
drafters, to exclude such parties from the scope of disclosure in Article 6.9, which is not the case.
And nothing in the object and purpose of Article 6.9 detracts from the textual understanding that
"all" means all. Article 6.9 is not about disclosure in the abstract or transparency for its own sake.
The second sentence of Article 6.9 provides: "[s]uch disclosure should take place in sufficient time
for the part ies to defend their interests ."483 This sentence, combined with the opening sub -clause

481 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.95:
Article 6.9 does not prescribe a particular format for the disclosure of the essential facts under
consideration. The standard by which to assess whether a disclosure satisfies the requirements of
Article 6.9 is not whether it was provided in the respondent's preferred format, but whether it
provided sufficient di sclosure of the essential facts such that the respondent could defend its
interests.
482 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
483 Emphasis added.

of Article 6.9 ("before a final determination is made"), makes clear the purpose of disclosure under
Article 6.9:
[To] provide the interested parties with the necessary i nformation to enable them to
comment on the completeness and correctness of the facts being considered by the
investigating authority, provide additional information or correct perceived errors, and
comment on or make arguments as to the proper interpretation of those facts.484
This purpose will not be served by reading "all" as not meaning all. An interested party's failure to
fully cooperate in the investigation does not necessarily lessen the interest or concerns of that
interested party with the conduct a nd outcome of an investigation; the purpose of Article 6.9 will
not be served by not including non -cooperating interested parties in its scope. Indeed, in this
instance, we note that the two "non -cooperating" interested parties in question were involved in
the investigation from the beginning and made numerous representations to the DIMD.485

7.275. In respect of its obligations under Article 6.9, an investigati ng authority may not make a
distinction between cooperating and non-cooperating interested parties. All interested parties have
the right to be informed of the essential facts under consideration.
7.8.2.4 "Inform"
7.276. The Russian Federation argues that "in cases where the relevant essential facts are already
in the possession of the respondents, a narrative description o f the data used cannot ipso facto be
considered insufficient disclosure". In respect of certain specific essential facts 486 the Russian
Federation argues that it has met its obligation to "inform" interested parties because:
[T]he Draft Report allows any int erested parties to determine the weighted average
price for LCVs produced by German exporting producers on EXW basis and the
weighted average price for LCVs produced by German exporting producers on CIF
basis … .487
7.277. Article 6.9 requires an investigating auth ority to disclose the essential facts "in a coherent
way, so as to permit an interested party to understand the basis for the decision whether or not to
apply definitive measures".488 What other information is in the possession of the interested parties
does not determine the obligation of an investigating authority to "inform" the interested parties of
the essential facts. As well, the requirement to "inform" interested parties of essential facts "in a
coherent way" is not met where interested parties are ex pected to deduce the essential facts
themselves from information they have otherwise received.
7.8.2.5 Conclusion
7.278. In the light of the above, in respect of the "essential facts" at issue we make the following
specific findings:

484 Panel Report, EC – Salmon (Norway), para. 7.805.
485 Both Volkswagen AG and Daimler AG were registered as investigation participants. They both
participated in investigation meetings, held on 28 February 2012 and 17 May 2012 with each respectively.
Volkswagen AG presented non-confidential materials on 17 and 27 March 2012, and both companies
participated in the public hearing of 22 March 2012, presenting information in writing. (Investigation Report,
section 1.2).
486 Specifically, "[e]xport volumes and weighted average export prices of LCVs produced by Daimler AG
and Volkswagen AG respectively."
487 Russian Federation's first written submission, para. 813. (fn omitted)
488 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.

Table 12: Findings concerning the disclosure of essential facts
"Essential fact" at issue Finding
a. the source of the information concerning import volumes and
values used by the DIMD489
b. the source of the data used to compile tables 4.1.1.3 (import
volume and volume of dumped imports)490
c. market share held by GAZ in 2011491
Not an essential fact under consideration.
Accordingly, the European Union has not
established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Article 6.9 by failing to inform all interested parties
of these items of information.
d. the ac tual volumes of imports of subject products to the CU
effected by Daimler AG and Volkswagen AG that were used for the
purpose of calculation of the normal value and of the export
price492
e. the weighted average export prices of LCVs produced by Daimler
AG and Volkswagen AG respectively 493
f. the actual figures that show the domestic consumption,
production and sales volumes, and the evolution of the profits and
profitability rate of Sollers in 2011494
g. the profit/loss of Sollers from the sale of LCVs in the CT CU in
2011495
h. the profitability rate of Sollers from the sale of LCVs in the CT
CU496
i. the production volumes, consumption volumes and sales volumes
in aggregate form497
j. the weighted average export price for subject products exported
by each of the abovementioned companies into the CU498
k. return on investments, actual and potential negative effects on
cash flow and ability to raise capital or investments499
l. information on the relation of the volume of export to the total
volume of production500
m. the figures for the production capacity of the domestic industry501
n. the figures for the structure of the costs of production of the
domestic industry502
o. the figures for the numbers and salaries of staff503
Not properly treated as confidential.504
Accordingly, the DIMD's failure to inform all
interested parties of these items of information was
not consistent with Article 6.9.

489 European Union's first written submission, paras. 430-433; second written submission, para. 278.
490 European Union's first written submission, paras. 448-450; second written submission, para. 278.
491 European Union's first written submission, para. 443; second written submission, para. 278.
492 European Union's first written submission, paras. 426 and 429; second written submission,
para. 278.
493 European Union's second written submission, para. 278.
494 European Union's first written submission, paras. 436-438; second written submission, para. 278.
495 European Union's first written submission, paras. 219, 437, and 438; second written submission,
para. 278.
496 European Union's first written submission, paras. 437 and 438; second written submission,
para. 278.
497 European Union's first written submission, paras. 210, 355, and 356; second written submission,
para. 296.
498 European Union's first written submission, paras. 428 and 429; second written submission,
para. 278.
499 European Union's first written submission, para. 236; second written submission, para. 301.
500 Investigation Report, section 4.1.2; Draft Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice),
section 4.1.2; and European Union's second written submission, para. 302.
501 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), table in section 4.2.3; Draft
Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), table in section 4.2.3; and European Union's second
written submission, para. 302.
502 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.4 and
table 4.2.4.2; Draft Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), section 4.2.4 (table 4.2.4.2 was
not included); and European Union's second written submission, para. 302.
503 Confidential version of the Investigation Report, (Exhibit RUS-14) (BCI), section 4.2.6 and
table 4.2.6; Draft Report, (Exhibits EU-16 and RUS-10) (exhibited twice), section 4.2.6 (table 4.2.6 was not
included); and European Union's second written submission, para. 302.
504 See paragraph 7.247 for our findings concerning the European Union's claims under Article 6.5.

7.9 Consequential claims
7.279. The European Union claims that the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 1 and 18.4 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 199 4, as a consequence of the alleged
breaches of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
7.280. We note that the European Union's claims under Article 1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement
and Article VI of the GATT 1994 are purely consequential, in the sense that they depend on the
outcome of other claims brought by the European Union under other provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. As a consequence of the inconsistencies we have found to exist with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, we find that the Russian Federation acted inconsistently with Article 1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994.
7.281. With respect to the European Union's claim under Article 18.4 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement, we note that the European Union has not brought any claims concerning the
conformity of any laws, regulations or administrative procedures with the provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement as they may apply to the Russian Federation. Accordingly, we find that
the European Union has not established its consequential claim under Articl e 18.4 of the Anti -
Dumping Agreement.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, we conclude as follows:
a. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 in its definition of "domestic industry";
b. the DIMD acted inconsistently wi th Article 3.1 because it undertook its injury and
causation analyses on the basis of information related to an impro perly defined domestic
industry;
c. the European Union has failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Article 3.1 by purportedly using "non-equal and non-consecutive" periods in the
examination of developments in injury indicators for the domestic industry . Having
reached this conclusion , we also reject the European Union 's consequential claims of
inconsistency under Articles 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5;
d. With respect to claims related to price suppression;
i. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 by failing to taken into
account the impact of the financial crisis in its price suppression analysis;
ii. the European Union has no t established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because the DIMD "mixed up" data expressed in USD and RUB
without any explanation in its price suppression analysis;
iii. the European Union has not established that the DIMD's consideration of whether the
subject imports have "explanatory force " for the occurrence of significant
suppression of domestic prices was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2;
iv. the European Union has not established that the DIMD did not demonstrate that the
alleged price suppression was "to a significant degree " because the DIMD did not
compare the estimated prices and the actual prices for the domestic like product.
e. With respect to claims related to the state of the domestic industry,
i. the European Union has no t established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in its consideration of profit/profitability data in the Investigation
Report;

ii. the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in its consideration of inventories d ata in the Investigation
Report;
iii. the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to systematically compare data for 2011 with data for
2008 for all economic indicators in the present case;
iv. the European Union has not established that the DIMD failed to objectively examine
the domestic industry's profit/profitability during the POI, the 1st half of 2011 and the
full year of 2011;
v. the European Union has not established that the DIMD assumed that the exceptional
positive developments in the domestic industry during 2009 could continue during
2010-2011 without more explanation, and "base[d] its conclusions on a comparison
between these two time periods";
vi. the Europea n Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to consider whether the market w ould accept further
price increases;
vii. the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to specifically address the interested parties' argument
on the comparison of the domestic industry's market share in 2010 and 2008;
viii. the European Union has not established that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 in failing to evaluate the inventories of independent dealers and
the reason for the increase in inventories;
ix. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 by failing to evaluate the magnitude of
the margin of dumping;
x. the European Union has not establis hed that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.4 by failing to evaluate the domestic industry's return on
investments, actual and potential effects on cash flow and the ability to raise capital
or investments.
f. With respect to claims related to causation and non-attribution,
i. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article s 3.1 and 3.5, insofar as it relied on its
price suppression analysis in its causation determination;
ii. the European Union failed to establish t hat the DIMD's determination that the
increased volume of dumped imports caused material injury to the domestic industry
was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5;
iii. the European Union failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to conduct a prop er non -attribution analysis of the
termination of the Fiat licence agreement;
iv. the European Union failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5 in its non-attribution analysis of the competition from GAZ;
v. the European Unio n failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to consider the alleged financing difficulties as an
"other factor" causing injury;
vi. the European Union failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to consider the alleged discontinuation of the
government support programmes as an "other factor" causing injury;

vii. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 by failing to (a) examine,
whether the alleged overly ambitious business plan of Sollers, in particular the level
of capacity, was causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time as dumped
imports, and if so, (b) separate and distinguish the injurious effects of that factor
from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.
g. With respect to claims concerning confidential treatment,
i. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 by treating all information as set out in
table 11 as confidential in the absence of any showing of good cause;
ii. the European Union failed to establish that the DIMD treated the Sollers letter of 25
December 2012 and the letter of the Association of Russian Automakers of 11
February 2013 as confidential.
h. With respect to claims concerning the disclosure of essential facts,
i. the Eur opean Union failed to establish that the DIMD acted inconsistently with
Article 6.9 by not informing all interested parties of the information listed in items (a)
to (c) of table 12;
ii. the DIMD acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 by failing to inform all i nterested
parties of the information listed in items (d) to (o) of table 12.
8.2. We do not consider it necessary to address the European Union's claims under Article 6.5.1.
8.3. With respect to the European Union's consequential claims, we find that
a. the Russian F ederation acted inconsistently with Article 1 of the Anti -Dumping
Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994;
b. the European Union has not established its consequential claim under Article 18.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
8.4. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in c ases where there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue have been
found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, they have nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to the European Union under these agreements.
8.5. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, we recommend that the Russian Federation bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti -Dumping Agreement and the
GATT 1994.