SL EN Uradni list Evropske unije C 318/1

Poročilo o dejavnostih nadzornega odbora urada OLAF

februar 2013 – januar 2014

(2014/C 318/01)

Člani nadzornega odbora urada OLAF Johan DENOLF (predsednik) Glavni komisar, direktor direktorata belgijske zvezne policije za gospodarski in finančni kriminal ter član finančne obveščevalne enote (FIU), Belgija Herbert BÖSCH Nekdanji poslanec Evropskega parlamenta Nekdanji predsednik Odbora za proračunski nadzor Evropskega parlamenta, Avstrija Catherine PIGNON Glavna javna tožilka na prizivnem sodišču v Angersu, Francija Jens MADSEN Državni tožilec za hujše oblike gospodarskega in mednarodnega kriminala, Danska Tuomas PÖYSTI Glavni državni revizor, predsednik državnega revizijskega urada, Finska

VSEBINA

NALOGE URADA 3

PREDGOVOR PREDSEDNIKA 4

PREGLED 5

1. SPREMLJANJE PREISKAV URADA OLAF 5

Navodila urada o preiskovalnih postopkih 6

Prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike 6

Izbor primerov v uradu OLAF 7

Trajanje preiskav 7

Primeri, posredovani nacionalnim sodnim organom 8

Odločitve o odložitvi posredovanja informacij instituciji, organu, uradu ali agenciji 9

Priporočila generalnega direktorja urada OLAF 9

Postopki urada OLAF za obravnavo pritožb 10

Pritožbe in zahteve, naslovljene na nadzorni odbor 10

2. SPREMLJANJE UPRAVLJANJA PREISKOVALNE FUNKCIJE URADA OLAF 11

Predhodni predlog proračuna za leto 2014 11

Reorganizacija urada OLAF in ankete o zadovoljstvu zaposlenih 12

3. SODELOVANJE Z URADOM OLAF 12

Nadaljnji ukrepi urada OLAF v zvezi s priporočili nadzornega odbora 12

Delovne ureditve z uradom OLAF 12

4. SODELOVANJE Z ZAINTERESIRANIMI STRANMI 13

Sestanki z institucijami EU 13

Izmenjava mnenj z institucijami EU 13

Javna razprava Evropskega parlamenta o procesnih jamstvih 13

Civilna družba 13

5. VODENJE NADZORNEGA ODBORA 14

Vloga nadzornega odbora v skladu z Uredbo št. 883/2013 14

Prednostne naloge in cilji 14

Kodeks ravnanja 14

Delovne metode 14

6. SEKRETARIAT NADZORNEGA ODBORA 15

PRILOGE 16

NALOGE URADA

Člen 15(1) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Nadzorni odbor redno spremlja Urad pri uresničevanju njegove preiskovalne funkcije, da bi okrepil neodvisnost Urada pri ustreznem izvajanju pooblastil, ki so mu dodeljena s to uredbo. Nadzorni odbor spremlja zlasti napredek v zvezi z uporabo procesnih jamstev in trajanjem preiskav glede na informacije, ki mu jih sporoči generalni direktor v skladu s členom 7(8).

Kakor je navedeno v Uredbi (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 (1) je naloga nadzornega odbora urada Olaf okrepiti neodvisnost Urada pri ustreznem izvajanju pooblastil, ki so mu dodeljena (2). Za uresničitev te naloge je zakonodajalec EU nadzornemu odboru dodelil trojno vlogo:

— Nadzorni odbor je nadzorni organ urada OLAF in varuh njegove neodvisnosti; redno spremlja izvajanje njegove preiskovalne funkcije ter zlasti napredek v zvezi z uporabo procesnih jamstev in trajanjem preiskav.

— Nadzorni odbor svetuje generalnemu direktorju urada OLAF in mu pomaga pri opravljanju njegovih nalog, tako da mu: — sporoča rezultate spremljanja izvajanja preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF, uporabe procesnih jamstev in trajanja preiskav ter po potrebi daje ustrezna priporočila, — pošilja mnenja in, če je to ustrezno, priporočila, med drugim glede virov, ki jih urad potrebuje za uresničevanje svoje preiskovalne funkcije, prednostnih preiskovalnih nalog in trajanja preiskav, — mu predloži svoje pripombe (in po potrebi priporočila) v zvezi s smernicami za preiskovalne postopke (in njihovimi morebitnimi spremembami), ki jih sprejme generalni direktor v skladu s členom 17(8) Uredbe.

— Nadzorni odbor je partner v dialogu z institucijami EU, ki jim poroča o svojih dejavnostih ter jim na njihovo zahtevo izda mnenja in z njimi izmenjuje stališča na politični ravni, s čimer institucijam EU zagotavlja edinstveno strokovno znanje, ki temelji na njegovih izkušnjah s spremljanjem.

PREDGOVOR PREDSEDNIKA

V zadovoljstvo mi je, da lahko kot predsednik nadzornega odbora Evropskega urada za boj proti goljufijam predložim letno poročilo o dejavnostih odbora v skladu s členom 15(9) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013.

To je drugo poročilo o dejavnostih v mandatu sedanjega nadzornega odbora, ki vsebuje pregled glavnih dejavnosti, opravljenih v obdobju poročanja od 1. februarja 2013 do 31. januarja 2014.

Prvo in drugo poglavje vsebujeta celovito poročilo o dejavnostih spremljanja nadzornega odbora. Osredotočena sta na spremljanje izvajanja preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF in na upravljanje njegove preiskovalne funkcije. Tretje in četrto poglavje obravnavata odnose nadzornega odbora z uradom OLAF ter z institucijami EU in drugimi zainteresiranimi stranmi. Peto in šesto poglavje vsebujeta pregled delovnih metod nadzornega odbora, strateških dokumentov, ki jih je odbor sprejel, in premisleke v zvezi z njegovim sekretariatom.

Ob koncu obdobja poročanja je član nadzornega odbora Jens Madsen zapustil odbor, da bi prevzel novo in zahtevno funkcijo v nacionalni upravi. Ob tej priložnosti bi se mu rad zahvalil za dragocen prispevek k delu odbora, hkrati pa bi pozdravil novega člana Dimitriosa Zimianitisa, ki je v odboru od 1. februarja 2014.

Na koncu bi se želel še posebej zahvaliti osebju našega sekretariata za njihovo neprecenljivo pomoč in kakovostno delo, ki je pomembno prispevalo k učinkovitosti spremljanja preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF.

Bruselj, 12. marca 2014 Johan DENOLF

PREGLED

Dejavnosti spremljanja

Analiza in ocena:

— 56 primerov, ki zahtevajo, da se podatki posredujejo nacionalnim sodnim organom;

— 186 devetmesečnih poročil;

— 293 mnenj o izboru primerov;

— 14 pritožb in zahtev posameznikov;

— 1 pritožba institucije EU;

— 2 zahtevi za javni dostop do dokumentov nadzornega odbora;

— 1 zahteva za sodelovanje nacionalnega sodnega organa.

Mnenja in poročila

— 4 mnenja v zvezi z izvajanjem in upravljanjem preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF: — Mnenje št. 1/2013: Predhodni predlog proračuna urada OLAF za leto 2014; — Mnenje št. 2/2013: Vzpostavitev notranjega pritožbenega postopka urada OLAF; — Mnenje št. 1/2014: Prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike urada OLAF; — Mnenje št. 2/2014: Izbor primerov v uradu OLAF.

— Letno poročilo o dejavnostih za leto 2012.

Dokumenti o stališču in strateški dokumenti

— Dokument o stališču „Okrepitev procesnih jamstev v uradu OLAF“;

— Ugotovitve o preiskovalnih postopkih v uradu OLAF;

— Dokument o nalogah in pristojnostih nadzornega odbora v skladu z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 in srednjeročno strategijo;

— Smernice za spremljanje (v teku);

— Sprememba poslovnika (v teku).

Sodelovanje

— Nove delovne ureditve z uradom OLAF.

1. SPREMLJANJE PREISKAV URADA OLAF

1. Nadzorni odbor urada OLAF spremlja različne vidike preiskovalnih dejavnosti urada na podlagi informacij, ki jih je dolžan zagotavljati generalni direktor urada OLAF, in informacij, za katere zaprosi nadzorni odbor na lastno pobudo.

Tretji odstavek člena 15(1) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Nadzorni odbor generalnemu direktorju pošilja mnenja in, če je to ustrezno, priporočila, med drugim glede virov, ki jih Urad potrebuje za uresničevanje svoje preiskovalne funkcije, prednostnih preiskovalnih nalog Urada in trajanja preiskav. Ta mnenja lahko pripravlja na lastno pobudo, na zahtevo generalnega direktorja ali na zahtevo institucije, organa, urada ali agencije, pri čemer pa ne posega v izvajanje potekajočih preiskav.

Navodila urada o preiskovalnih postopkih

2. Generalni direktor urada OLAF je 7. februarja 2013 nadzornemu odboru predložil kopijo spremenjene različice Navodil urada o preiskovalnih postopkih. Nadzornemu odboru je 5. julija 2013 predložil drugo spremenjeno različico Navodil urada o preiskovalnih postopkih, katere namen je bil uskladiti preiskovalne postopke urada OLAF z novimi določbami, predvidenimi v Uredbi (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 (osnutek). Generalni direktor urada OLAF je obvestil nadzorni odbor, da namerava spremenjena Navodila urada o preiskovalnih postopkih sprejeti 31. julija 2013.

3. Čeprav je nadzorni odbor poudaril, da v tako kratkem času ne more opraviti poglobljene analize spremenjenih Navodil urada o preiskovalnih postopkih, je 30. julija 2013 predložil vrsto pripomb in vprašanj v zvezi s spremenjenimi Navodili urada o preiskovalnih postopkih (3). Zlasti je preučil določbe v zvezi s postopkom izbora ter izvajanjem preiskav in primerov usklajevanja.

4. Nadzorni odbor je menil, da bi morala spremenjena Navodila urada o preiskovalnih postopkih med drugim: — izrecno navajati pojem „utemeljen sum“, kakor je opredeljen v Uredbi, kot osnovni pogoj za začetek preiskave; — jasno razmejiti osebe, ki izvajajo izbor, in pregledovalce v preiskovalni enoti za izbor in pregledovanje; — še naprej jasno razlikovati med notranjimi in zunanjimi preiskavami, ker se preiskovalna pooblastila urada OLAF razlikujejo; — vključevati določbe za uvedbo širšega notranjega nadzora nad pregledom zakonitosti, ne le preiskovalnih dejavnosti, navedenih v Navodilih urada o preiskovalnih postopkih, temveč tudi tistih, ki niso posebej predvidene v Navodilih urada o preiskovalnih postopkih, vendar bi lahko morebiti ovirale temeljne pravice oseb, ki so predmet preiskav.

5. Generalni direktor urada OLAF je 5. septembra 2013 nadzornemu odboru na njegovo zahtevo predložil odgovore in dodatne informacije glede pripomb nadzornega odbora. Poleg tega je nadzorni odbor obvestil, da so spremembe Navodil urada o preiskovalnih postopkih dokončno oblikovane ob upoštevanju nekaterih pripomb nadzornega odbora, in mu predložil končni osnutek novih Smernic za preiskovalne postopke za osebje urada OLAF, ki nadomeščajo Navodila urada o preiskovalnih postopkih.

Prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike

6. V Mnenju št. 1/2014 so ocenjene prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike urada OLAF, ki jih vsako leto določi generalni direktor urada OLAF in so objavljene v letnem načrtu upravljanja (4).

7. Nadzorni odbor je primerjal prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike za leti 2012 in 2013 z osnutkom prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike za leto 2014 in pozdravil izboljšano opredelitev teh nalog, kar je rezultat pripomb, ki jih je izrazil na tehničnih sestankih z generalnim direktorjem urada OLAF, in sicer, da prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike ne bi smele vsebovati splošnih načel (ki bi jih bilo treba vedno upoštevati pri odločanju o začetku preiskave), temveč le posebna področja ali vrste goljufij, ki bi jih urad OLAF moral prednostno obravnavati.

8. Nadzorni odbor je ugotovil, da so bili finančni kazalniki, ki so bili v preteklih letih previsoko ocenjeni, popolnoma izključeni iz osnutka prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike za leto 2014. Poudaril je, da bi morali biti taki kazalniki pomembni za oceno resnosti tveganja goljufije in bi lahko bili koristni za namene sklicevanja in kot notranje smernice za uporabo načela sorazmernosti. Opozoril je tudi na potrebo po ponovni preučitvi politike subsidiarnosti/dodatne vrednosti, ki jo je treba previdno uporabljati, in po rednem ocenjevanju prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike.

9. Nadzorni odbor je izpostavil potrebo po jasni opredelitvi prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike in priporočil, naj generalni direktor urada OLAF izda smernice za uporabo načel izbora, določenih v Uredbi (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013, ter vzpostavi konstruktiven dialog z zainteresiranimi stranmi o določitvi in izvajanju prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike, zlasti kar zadeva finančne kazalnike in morebitno nadaljnje spremljanje zavrženih primerov, kadar se na podlagi njihove ocene ugotovi, da obstaja utemeljen sum goljufije. V tej fazi nadzorni odbor še vedno ne more oceniti uspešnosti urada OLAF na področjih prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike, ker urad OLAF ni opravil nobene ocene učinkov prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike. Nadzorni odbor je zato zaprosil generalnega direktorja urada OLAF, naj zagotovi oceno rezultatov izvajanja prednostnih nalog preiskovalne politike za leti 2012 in 2013 za vsako od prednostnih področij skupaj s povzetkom povratnih informacij, pridobljenih od zainteresiranih strani.

Izbor primerov v uradu OLAF

10. V Mnenju št. 2/2014 z naslovom Izbor primerov v uradu OLAF (5) so ocenjene učinkovitost, kakovost in preglednost postopka izbora v uradu OLAF. Nadzorni odbor je oceno izvedel med drugim na podlagi analize vzorca 293 mnenj preiskovalne enote za izbor in pregledovanje urada OLAF, ki je priporočila bodisi zavrnitev primerov bodisi začetek preiskav/primerov usklajevanja.

11. Nadzorni odbor je najprej ocenil učinkovitost izborne funkcije, tako da je preučil vire, ki so bili na voljo preiskovalni enoti za izbor in pregledovanje za izvajanje njenih nalog, ter konkretne rezultate, dosežene v letih 2012 in 2013. Ugotovil je, da je včasih manjkalo tehnično, preiskovalno ali jezikovno strokovno znanje oziroma je bilo to nezadostno, da je bila nezadostno predstavljena pravna analiza, da čas, dodeljen za izbore (obvezno dvomesečno obdobje), v nekaterih primerih očitno ni bil zadosten in da je bil potreben tudi jasen postopek za obravnavo internih prijaviteljev.

12. Nadzorni odbor je nato ocenil kakovost mnenj glede na njihovo skladnost z izbornimi merili, ki jih je določil generalni direktor urada OLAF. Ugotovil je, da niso bila strogo spoštovana navodila za uporabo izbornih meril, saj se pri ocenjevanju pristojnosti urada OLAF za ukrepanje niso dovolj upoštevali ustrezni pravni instrumenti; osebe, ki izvajajo izbor, niso imele natančnih kazalnikov za ocenjevanje ustreznosti informacij, če pa so bili taki kazalniki na voljo, jih niso vedno in dosledno uporabljale; pogosto so se uporabljale neutemeljene izjave.

13. Na koncu je nadzorni odbor pregledal še preglednost izbornega postopka, tako da je preučil pretok informacij v celotnem postopku izbora, zlasti v smislu sodelovanja med preiskovalno enoto za izbor in pregledovanje ter preiskovalnimi enotami.

14. Nadzorni odbor je dal generalnemu direktorju urada OLAF več priporočil za izboljšanje izborne funkcije preiskovalne enote za izbor in pregledovanje. Nadzorni odbor je kot splošni sklep ocenjevanja izdal končno priporočilo, naj urad OLAF izvede notranjo oceno dejavnosti preiskovalne enote za izbor in pregledovanje, da bi med drugim ugotovil obseg potrebnih virov, prednosti in pomanjkljivosti enote ter „stopnjo napake“ v ocenjenih primerih. Poleg tega je zaprosil generalnega direktorja, naj ga obvesti o nadaljnjem spremljanju priporočil iz mnenja v enem letu po njegovem sprejetju.

Trajanje preiskav

Člen 11(7) Uredbe (ES) št. 1073/1999: Če preiskava traja več kakor devet mesecev, direktor obvesti nadzorni odbor o razlogih, zaradi katerih še ni bilo mogoče končati preiskave, in o pričakovanem roku njenega zaključka. Člen 7(8) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Če preiskave ni mogoče zaključiti v 12 mesecih od njenega pričetka, generalni direktor po poteku teh 12 mesecev ter potem vsakih šest mesecev poroča nadzornemu odboru, pri čemer navede ustrezne razloge in predvidene ukrepe za pospešitev preiskave.

15. Nadzorni odbor je spremljal trajanje preiskav urada OLAF, pri čemer je kot vir informacij uporabil devetmesečna poročila (6) in poročila, sestavljena v primerih, ki jih je urad OLAF posredoval nacionalnim sodnim organom v skladu s prejšnjo Uredbo (ES) št. 1073/1999, ter druge dokumente v zvezi s primeri, ko je bil dovoljen dostop do sistema vodenja zadev (Case Management System – CMS) urada OLAF.

16. Nadzorni odbor je najprej analiziral razloge, ki jih je urad OLAF navedel kot obrazložitev v primerih, ki so trajali več kot devet mesecev: zapletenost zadeve v preiskavi, pomanjkanje virov, nizka prednostna razvrstitev primera, nezadostno sodelovanje. Ugotovil je odstopanje med preiskovalnimi direktorati in njihovimi enotami glede točnosti navedenih obrazložitev. V zvezi s tem še vedno izvaja analizo.

17. Z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 sta bili uvedeni dve pomembni spremembi, ki naj bi nadzornemu odboru omogočili boljše spremljanje trajanja preiskav: devetmesečna poročila se nadomestijo z dvanajstmesečnimi poročili (ki bolj ustrezajo stvarnemu stanju, saj večina preiskav urada OLAF traja več kot 12 mesecev), urad OLAF pa ima novo obveznost rednega poročanja vsakih šest mesecev, kar nadzornemu odboru omogoča spremljanje celotnega življenjskega cikla preiskave.

18. Nadzorni odbor je 31. januarja 2014 prvič prejel 83 dvanajstmesečnih poročil izmed 243 primerov, ki so takrat trajali več kot 12 mesecev. Nadzorni odbor je z zaskrbljenostjo ugotovil, da je urad OLAF sicer v skladu z zahtevami Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 pregledal delovni obrazec, ki se je uporabil za ta poročila, vendar so nova poročila, poslana nadzornemu odboru, vsebovala nezadostne informacije, zlasti v zvezi z elementi, ki bi mu omogočili, da preveri morebitne neupravičene zamude v preiskavah. Na primer v 33 od 83 poročil o primerih, ki so trajali več kot 12 mesecev, so navedeni razlogi in predvideni popravni ukrepi za pospešitev preiskave, vendar pa niso navedene nobene dejanske informacije (tj. opis dejstev, preiskovalni ukrepi urada OLAF in njihov kronološki pregled, morebitna obdobja neaktivnosti, vrsta goljufije, finančni učinek, premisleki v zvezi z zastaranjem itd.), brez katerih nadzorni odbor ne more v celoti oceniti trajanja preiskave. Čeprav je Uredba (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 okrepila vlogo nadzornega odbora pri nadzorovanju trajanja preiskav, urad OLAF na lastno pobudo ne zagotavlja dovolj informacij za izvajanje te vloge. Nadzorni odbor je to vprašanje postavil na sestanku z generalnim direktorjem urada OLAF in pričakuje, da bodo prihodnja poročila vsebovala več informacij.

19. Urad OLAF je na tehničnem sestanku nadzorni odbor seznanil z orodji, ki jih uporablja za spremljanje trajanja primerov in ki temeljijo predvsem na sistemu opozorilnih kazalnikov v sistemu CMS, ki opozarjajo na iztek roka za dvanajstmesečna ali šestmesečna poročila. Urad OLAF je vzpostavil tudi novo nižjevodstveno strukturo v preiskovalnih enotah, ki je med drugim pristojna za spremljanje trajanja preiskav. Nadzorni odbor pozdravlja prizadevanja urada OLAF in njegovo pripravljenost, da poveča ozaveščenost preiskovalcev o časovnih omejitvah, ter hkrati poudarja, da so lahko dvanajstmesečna in šestmesečna poročila, ki se mu posredujejo, koristno upravljavsko orodje pri spremljanju trajanja preiskav tudi za urad OLAF, vendar pomanjkanje bistvene vsebine v večini teh poročil ovira tako uporabo. To je zlasti pomembno v primerih, pri katerih lahko podaljšano trajanje negativno vpliva na ugled in poklicno življenje oseb, ki so predmet preiskav, ali povzroči zastaranje nadaljnjih nacionalnih pravnih postopkov.

Primeri, posredovani nacionalnim sodnim organom

Člen 11(7) Uredbe (ES) št. 1073/1999: Direktor obvesti odbor o primerih, ki zahtevajo, da se podatki pošljejo sodnim organom države članice. Tretji odstavek člena 17(5) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Generalni direktor redno obvešča nadzorni odbor o: […] (b) primerih, ko so bile informacije posredovane sodnim organom držav članic; […].

20. Z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 je bila uvedena pomembna sprememba glede primerov, ki jih urad OLAF namerava posredovati nacionalnim sodnim organom: uradu OLAF ni treba obvestiti nadzornega odbora o teh primerih pred posredovanjem (kot je to veljalo v skladu s prejšnjo Uredbo (ES) št. 1073/1999), temveč v rednih časovnih presledkih po posredovanju.

21. Med 1. februarjem 2013 in 30. septembrom 2013 (do začetka veljavnosti Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013), je nadzorni odbor prejel 56 primerov (7), ki zahtevajo, da se podatki posredujejo nacionalnim sodnim organom. V 18 primerih je bil na zahtevo nadzornega odbora odobren poln dostop do dokumentov o primerih v sistemu CMS.

22. Vendar nadzorni odbor ni mogel temeljito preučiti teh primerov, preden so bili posredovani nacionalnim sodnim organom, ker bi dobil dostop do spisov primerov šele po izteku petdnevnega roka, določenega v prejšnjih sporazumih z uradom OLAF. Ocena uporabe procesnih jamstev v uradu OLAF, ki jo opravi nadzorni odbor, temelji predvsem na informacijah, vsebovanih v mnenjih o končnih ali vmesnih poročilih in priporočilih, ki jih izda preiskovalna enota za izbor in pregledovanje (8), ter, v primeru dostopa do primerov, o dokumentih o primerih, registriranih v sistemu CMS. Nadzorni odbor je ugotovil, da je v vseh mnenjih preiskovalne enote za izbor in pregledovanje navedeno, da so bile preiskovalne dejavnosti opravljene v skladu z veljavnimi pravnimi predpisi. Nadzorni odbor je na podlagi teh mnenj in drugih pregledanih dokumentov ugotovil le posamične težave v zvezi s spoštovanjem procesnih jamstev v uradu OLAF (npr. v enem primeru oseba, ki je predmet preiskave, ni bila obveščena o zaključku preiskave, v drugem primeru pa ni bilo pisnega pooblastila za zaslišanje osebe, ki je predmet preiskave (9)).

23. V enem primeru je oseba, ki je predmet preiskave, nadzornemu odboru prijavila domnevno resno kršitev zahteve po zaupnosti s strani urada OLAF. Vendar je lahko nadzorni odbor, ki nima ustreznih orodij za preiskavo (incident ni bil omenjen v spisu primera urada OLAF), pritožbo le posredoval generalnemu direktorju urada OLAF, ki je zanikal obstoj take kršitve.

24. Nadzorni odbor je bil 31. januarja 2014 obveščen o dodatnih 17 primerih, v katerih so bile informacije posredovane sodnim organom držav članic od 1. oktobra 2013 (začetka veljavnosti Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013). Glede na to, da je bilo to obvestilo prejeto zadnji dan obdobja, zajetega v tem poročilu o dejavnostih, bo nadzorni odbor zahteval dodatne informacije in te primere preučil kasneje v letu 2014.

Odločitve o odložitvi posredovanja informacij instituciji, organu, uradu ali agenciji

Člen 4(6) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Če se ob notranjih preiskavah izkaže, da bi preiskovanec lahko bil uradnik, drugi uslužbenec, član institucije ali organa, vodja urada ali agencije ali član osebja, je o tem obveščena institucija, organ, urad ali agencija, ki ji navedena oseba pripada. […] Izjemoma se posredovanje takšnih informacij lahko tudi odloži, in sicer na podlagi utemeljene odločitve generalnega direktorja, ki se po zaključku preiskave posreduje nadzornemu odboru.

25. Z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 je bila prvič uvedena obveznost generalnega direktorja urada OLAF, da po zaključku preiskave nadzornemu odboru posreduje svojo utemeljeno odločitev o odložitvi posredovanja informacij instituciji, organu, uradu ali agenciji, ki ji pripada oseba, ki je predmet notranje preiskave. Nadzorni odbor je 31. januarja 2014 prejel obvestilo od urada OLAF, da od začetka veljavnosti Uredbe ni bilo nobene take odložitve.

Priporočila generalnega direktorja urada OLAF

Člen 11(7) Uredbe (ES) št. 1073/1999: Direktor obvesti odbor o primerih, ko zadevna institucija, organ, agencija ali urad ne upošteva priporočil urada. Tretji odstavek člena 17(5) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Generalni direktor redno obvešča nadzorni odbor o: (a) primerih, ko niso bila upoštevana njegova priporočila; […].

26. Nadzorni odbor je v obdobju poročanja in dejansko od začetka svojega mandata prejel zelo omejene informacije o primerih, ko niso bila upoštevana priporočila generalnega direktorja. Na podlagi lastne preiskave je ugotovil, da tako kot v prejšnjih letih znatno število takih priporočil ni bilo upoštevano. Nadzorni odbor je v prejšnjih poročilih o dejavnostih poudaril, da se zdi, da urad OLAF v preteklosti ni imel ustreznih orodij za spremljanje, da bi lahko pravilno spremljal, kako nacionalni organi in organi EU izvajajo njegova priporočila.

27. Po reorganizaciji urada OLAF v letu 2012 je bilo spremljanje izvajanja njegovih priporočil decentralizirano na raven preiskovalnih enot. Urad OLAF si trenutno prizadeva razviti in izvajati nova orodja za spremljanje, ki bi omogočila boljše nadaljnje spremljanje rezultatov in učinkov njegovih priporočil. Nadzorni odbor je ugotovil, da je urad OLAF vložil že veliko truda v merjenje izvajanja njegovih priporočil, zlasti sodnih in finančnih. Pregleduje na primer več kot 600 primerov, ki so zaključeni s sodnimi priporočili. Nadzorni odbor se je z zanimanjem seznanil z lestvico za ocenjevanje, ki se uporablja za ta pregled in v skladu s katero se spremljanje priporočil v nacionalnih sodnih organih preveri glede na ključne faze v nacionalnih sodnih postopkih (uvedba kazenske preiskave, obtožnica ali odločba o zavrnitvi zadeve, oprostilna ali obsodilna sodba itd.). Kar zadeva nadaljnje spremljanje na finančnem področju, si urad OLAF prizadeva izboljšati svoje postopke, da bi lahko določil zneske, ki so dejansko izterjani za proračun EU.

28. Nadzorni odbor priznava zahtevnost teh prizadevanj, ki še vedno potekajo, in pozdravlja pripravljenost urada OLAF za izboljšanje svojih orodij za spremljanje. Vendar je v tej fazi zaradi pomanjkanja ustreznih informacij prezgodaj, da bi nadzorni odbor ocenil vpliv sprememb, ki so posledica reorganizacije, na učinkovitost in uspešnost dejavnosti urada OLAF na področju spremljanja. Nadzorni odbor od urada OLAF pričakuje, da bo zagotavljal boljše informacije, ko bodo uvedena ustrezna orodja za spremljanje.

Postopki urada OLAF za obravnavo pritožb

29. Nadzorni odbor je v Mnenju št. 2/2013 (Vzpostavitev notranjega pritožbenega postopka urada OLAF), ki ga je sprejel decembra 2013 (10), preučil možnosti za pravna sredstva, ki so na voljo osebam, ki so predmet preiskav urada OLAF, v zvezi z morebitnimi kršitvami njihovih pravic in procesnih jamstev. Ugotovil je, da take osebe niso imele zadostnih in takojšnjih pravnih sredstev za odpravo kršitev prek zunanjega (sodišča EU ali nacionalnega sodišča, Evropskega varuha človekovih pravic ali Evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov) ali notranjega mehanizma (urada OLAF).

30. Nadzorni odbor je poudaril, da nova Uredba (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 v zvezi s preiskavami, ki jih izvaja urad OLAF, ne rešuje te težave, ker ne uvaja mehanizma za obravnavo posameznih pritožb. Izrazil je mnenje, da bi se lahko sedanja zakonodajna vrzel zapolnila s formaliziranim pritožbenim postopkom v okviru urada OLAF, zlasti v zvezi z domnevnimi kršitvami temeljnih pravic in procesnih jamstev med preiskavami, ki jih izvaja urad OLAF.

31. Zato je priporočil, naj generalni direktor urada OLAF po posvetovanju z nadzornim odborom o podrobnostih določi in objavi tak notranji postopek. Nadzorni odbor je izrazil željo, da mu generalni direktor urada OLAF redno poroča o pritožbah, ki jih prejme urad OLAF, in nadaljnjih ukrepih v zvezi z njimi.

32. Urad OLAF je januarja 2014 na svojem spletišču objavil opis korakov, ki se morajo izvesti v okviru urada pri obravnavi pritožb. Po tem, ko je nadzorni odbor zahteval pisni sklep o uvedbi ustreznega postopka, je generalni direktor urada OLAF v svojem pismu z dne 17. februarja 2014 potrdil, da po njegovem mnenju spletna objava pomeni formalno ureditev obstoječega postopka, zato ni potreben uraden pisni sklep z njegove strani.

33. Na podlagi tega nadzorni odbor ugotavlja, da njegovo priporočilo ni bilo izvedeno. Nadzorni odbor je zaskrbljen zaradi nevarnosti zavajanja državljanov, ki bi želeli vložiti pritožbo pri uradu OLAF, saj lahko mislijo, da lahko besedilo, objavljeno na spletišču urada OLAF, uporabijo kot pravni okvir za pritožbo, dejansko pa zadevni postopek (za pritožbe v zvezi s procesnimi jamstvi) formalno ne obstaja, ker ni pravnega akta, ki bi bil zakonska podlaga za tak postopek.

Pritožbe in zahteve, naslovljene na nadzorni odbor

34. V obdobju poročanja je nadzorni odbor od posameznikov prejel 14 pritožb in zahtev, kar je 100 % več kot v prejšnjem letu. Pritožbe zadevajo med drugim domnevno nespoštovanje temeljnih pravic in procesnih jamstev, kršitve v zvezi z zaupnostjo preiskav, predolgo trajanje preiskav in domnevno nezakonito zaključevanje primerov brez priporočil. Pritožbe so vložile predvsem osebe, ki so predmet preiskav urada OLAF, pa tudi interni prijavitelji, ki so nezadovoljni z odločitvijo urada OLAF po njihovi prijavi domnevne goljufije.

35. Nadzorni odbor je v odgovoru pritožnikom poudaril, da v okviru sedanje uredbe ni imenovan kot pritožbeni organ. Kljub temu je te pritožbe upošteval pri svojem sistemskem spremljanju preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF in od urada OLAF zahteval, kadar se mu je to zdelo primerno, dodatne informacije in pojasnila in/ali poln dostop do spisov primerov v sistemu CMS.

36. Nadzorni odbor je januarja 2014 prejel uradno obvestilo od institucije EU, ki je izrazila zaskrbljenost zaradi domnevnega neutemeljenega vmešavanja urada OLAF v pravico do varstva osebnih podatkov uradnikov te institucije. Nadzorni odbor je v odgovoru poudaril, da je ta pritožba zadevala preiskavo, ki je v teku in v katero se nadzorni odbor ne sme vmešavati. Navedel je tudi, da je pristojni organ za obravnavo take pritožbe Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov in da bi moral nadzorni odbor počakati na njegovo odločitev.

37. Nadzorni odbor je prejel dve zahtevi za dostop do njegovega Mnenja št. 2/2012. Menil je, da zadevni dokument spada v izjeme iz člena 4 Uredbe (ES) št. 1049/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (11), zlasti drugo in tretjo alinejo člena 4(2) ter člen 4(1)(b)), zato se zaenkrat ne more razkriti. Vendar je izrazil pripravljenost, da dokument na zahtevo predloži v okviru sodnih postopkov, ki so v teku.

38. Poleg tega je nacionalni sodni organ zahteval odpravo nedotakljivosti arhiva nadzornega odbora v zvezi z mnenjem št. 2/2012 in dolžne molčečnosti njegovih članov v okviru nacionalnega postopka. Nadzorni odbor je tej zahtevi ugodil.

39. Kadrovski predpisi za uradnike EU in pogoji za zaposlitev drugih uslužbencev EU določajo, da uradnik ali drug uslužbenec, ki izve za dejstva, na podlagi katerih je mogoča domneva o obstoju možne nezakonite dejavnosti, ali o ravnanju v zvezi z opravljanjem poklicnih nalog, ki lahko pomeni hudo kršenje obveznosti uradnikov Unije, o tem nemudoma obvesti svojega neposredno nadrejenega ali svoj Generalni direktorat ali, če se mu zdi to koristno, generalnega sekretarja ali Evropski urad za boj proti prevaram (OLAF) (12). Ta pravila veljajo tudi v uradu OLAF, kar pomeni, da je osebje urada obvezano sporočiti enemu od svojih nadrejenih v uradu ali, če menijo, da je to ustrezno, neposredno generalnemu sekretarju Komisije vse dejanske informacije in dokaze v zvezi z domnevnimi nezakonitimi dejanji ali resnimi zadevami v zvezi z izpolnjevanjem službenih obveznosti v uradu OLAF, s katerimi so se seznanili. Ob upoštevanju posebnega položaja osebja v uradu OLAF, ki želi prijaviti morebitne kršitve v uradu OLAF, je bilo z nadzornim odborom dogovorjeno (13), da se lahko take informacije sporočijo predsedniku nadzornega odbora.

40. Nadzorni odbor še ni prejel nobene take prijave. Mogoče je, da osebje urada OLAF ni bilo dovolj seznanjeno s postopkom, še pomembneje pa je, da nadzorni odbor ni dobil nobenih orodij za spremljanje morebitnih pritožb ter za zagotovitev učinkovite preiskave in odprave nepravilnosti.

2. SPREMLJANJE UPRAVLJANJA PREISKOVALNE FUNKCIJE URADA OLAF

Člen 6(2) sklepa Komisije o ustanovitvi urada OLAF, kakor je spremenjen s Sklepom Komisije 2013/478/EU (14) : Po posvetovanju z nadzornim odborom generalni direktor pošlje generalnemu direktorju za proračun predlog proračuna, ki ga je treba vključiti v prilogo, ki se nanaša na urad, k splošnemu proračunu Evropske unije – oddelek Komisija. Tretji odstavek člena 15(1) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013: Nadzorni odbor generalnemu direktorju pošilja mnenja in, če je to ustrezno, priporočila, med drugim glede virov, ki jih Urad potrebuje za uresničevanje svoje preiskovalne funkcije […].

Predhodni predlog proračuna za leto 2014

41. Da bi nadzorni odbor zagotovil, da se v proračunu urada OLAF ustrezno upošteva neodvisnost preiskovalne funkcije urada in da ima ta na voljo zadostne vire za učinkovito in uspešno delovanje kot medinstitucionalna služba pri okrepitvi boja proti goljufijam, je sprejel Mnenje št. 1/2013 o predhodnem predlogu proračuna urada OLAF za leto 2014 (15).

42. Preučil je dodelitev virov za prednostne dejavnosti in strategijo o človeških virih. Njegova priporočila so bila osredotočena na nadaljnje spremljanje preiskav in na razvoj kazalnikov učinkovitosti in kakovosti preiskovalne funkcije na podlagi politike EU in strategije Komisije za boj proti goljufijam. Priporočil je tudi, naj urad OLAF nameni pozornost usposabljanju, poklicnemu razvoju, načrtovanju nasledstva ter primernemu ravnovesju med uslužbenci, ki opravljajo podporne storitve, in uslužbenci, ki opravljajo preiskave.

43. Nadzorni odbor je poudaril pomen posvetovanja prek dejanske in obsežne izmenjave mnenj med generalnim direktorjem urada OLAF in nadzornim odborom, preden se predhodni predlog proračuna v kakršni koli obliki pošlje generalnemu direktorju za proračun.

44. Na koncu je priporočil še uvedbo ločene proračunske postavke v proračunu urada OLAF za nadzorni odbor in njegov sekretariat, da bi se jasno opredelili stroški funkcije nadzornega odbora in na pregleden način poudarila medinstitucionalna narava nadzornega odbora in njegovega sekretariata. Poudaril je tudi, da je pomembno, da generalni direktor sekretariatu nadzornega odbora dodeli zadostne vire in da se zagotovi njegovo neodvisno delovanje.

45. Nadzorni odbor je podprl predhodni predlog proračuna za leto 2014, če se upoštevajo priporočila iz njegovega mnenja.

Reorganizacija urada OLAF in ankete o zadovoljstvu zaposlenih

46. Anketa, opravljena v Komisiji leta 2013, ki ji je sledila notranja anketa v uradu OLAF, je pokazala nizko raven zadovoljstva zaposlenih v zvezi s poklicnim okoljem. Nadzorni odbor je zaskrbljen predvsem glede treh elementov zaradi njihovega morebitnega vpliva na učinkovitost preiskovalne funkcije urada OLAF: — osebje urada OLAF je navedlo, da obsežna reorganizacija urada ni zmanjšala upravne obremenitve preiskovalcev ali izboljšala preglednosti notranjih postopkov, — menilo je, da višje vodstvo urada OLAF z njimi ne komunicira učinkovito oziroma ni ustrezno pozorno na njihove povratne informacije, — po reorganizaciji urada OLAF leta 2012 je bilo vse višje vodstvo in več kot 75 % srednjega vodstva na novo imenovano v svoje sedanje enote/direktorate, medtem ko je veliko osebja odšlo, za več kot eno četrtino preostalega osebja pa se šteje, da je v odhodu, kar vse vzbuja resno zaskrbljenost glede kontinuitete strokovnega znanja in izkušenj v uradu.

47. Nadzorni odbor je zato zaprosil generalnega direktorja urada OLAF, naj ga redno obvešča o načrtovanih ali izvedenih ukrepih v zvezi s temi vprašanji.

3. SODELOVANJE Z URADOM OLAF

Nadaljnji ukrepi urada OLAF v zvezi s priporočili nadzornega odbora

48. Nadzorni odbor je leta 2012 uradu OLAF izdal več priporočil, zlasti glede varstva temeljnih pravic in procesnih jamstev (16). Začetna analiza nadzornega odbora je pokazala, da izvajanje večine njegovih priporočil iz leta 2012 ni bilo zadovoljivo. Generalni direktor urada OLAF v svojih odgovorih bodisi ni dovolj utemeljil neizvajanja, bodisi ni navedel vsebinskih informacij, kako naj bi bila priporočila izvedena. Nadzorni odbor bo zato to vprašanje analiziral v ločenem mnenju, ki ga bo izdal leta 2014.

Delovne ureditve z uradom OLAF

49. V obdobju poročanja je nadzorni odbor opravil obširne in dolge razgovore z generalnim direktorjem urada OLAF o dostopu nadzornega odbora do informacij v zvezi s primeri. Rezultat teh razgovorov je predstavljen v Delovnih ureditvah (17), ki sta jih 14. januarja 2014 podpisala generalni direktor urada OLAF in predsednik nadzornega odbora. Ureditve določajo (i) obseg informacij o preiskovalnih dejavnostih urada OLAF, ki se morajo posredovati nadzornemu odboru, (ii) metodologijo posredovanja informacij in (iii) časovni okvir. Njihov namen je vzpostaviti pravično ravnovesje med dolžnostjo urada OLAF, da varuje zaupnost informacij v zvezi s svojimi preiskavami, in potrebami nadzornega odbora v zvezi s spremljanjem.

50. Nadzorni odbor je v zvezi s primeri, posredovanimi nacionalnim sodnim organom, izrazil željo, da se mu posreduje kopija mnenj o končnem poročilu in priporočilih, ki jih generalnemu direktorju urada OLAF izda preiskovalna enota za izbor in pregledovanje, da bi lahko spremljal napredek v zvezi z uporabo procesnih jamstev. Ker lahko navedeni dokument vsebuje osebne podatke, se je nadzorni odbor strinjal z uradom OLAF, da za mnenje v zvezi s tem najprej zaprosi Evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov. Pridobivanje mnenja je še v teku.

51. V skladu z Delovnimi ureditvami je bilo prvo posredovanje informacij, ki jih mora generalni direktor urada OLAF redno pošiljati nadzornemu odboru, opravljeno 31. januarja 2014, tj. na zadnji dan obdobja poročanja za to poročilo. Zato bo podrobnejša ocena izvajanja ureditev predstavljena v naslednjem poročilu.

52. Čeprav nadzorni odbor priznava, da Delovne ureditve predstavljajo pomemben dosežek, še vedno meni, da je treba izboljšati njihovo izvajanje, zlasti v zvezi z vsebino informacij, ki jih urad OLAF posreduje nadzornemu odboru, saj v nasprotnem ne bo mogel učinkovito izvajati svoje funkcije spremljanja.

4. SODELOVANJE Z ZAINTERESIRANIMI STRANMI

Sestanki z institucijami EU

53. Nadzorni odbor je bil med majem in julijem 2013 povabljen, naj predstavi sklepe iz svojega poročila o dejavnostih za leto 2012 Parlamentu (Odboru za nadzor proračuna), Svetu (Delovni skupini za boj proti goljufijam) in Evropskemu računskemu sodišču.

54. Na več drugih sestankih z Odborom za nadzor proračuna in komisarjem Šemeto, je poročal o rezultatih preiskav urada OLAF in spoštovanju temeljnih pravic. Predstavil je tudi svoje ugotovitve o učinkovitosti nadzora nad uradom OLAF, reformi uredbe o uradu OLAF in novi nadzorni strukturi urada OLAF, kot je predlagana v sporočilu Komisije z naslovom Izboljšanje upravljanja urada OLAF in krepitev procesnih jamstev v preiskavah (18).

55. Nadzorni odbor je novembra 2013 organiziral neformalno izmenjavo mnenj o izzivih urada OLAF in njegovega nadzornega odbora po uveljavitvi Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013.

Izmenjava mnenj z institucijami EU

56. Nadzorni odbor je avgusta 2013 začel priprave na formalno izmenjavo mnenj s Komisijo, Parlamentom, Svetom in Računskim sodiščem o politiki v zvezi z dejavnostmi urada OLAF, kakor je določeno v členu 16 Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013. Nadzorni odbor je predlagal, naj se pozornost najprej posveti ureditvi nadzora za reformirani urad OLAF. Na žalost je uprava Komisije organizirala pripravljalne sestanke, v katere so bili vključeni vsi drugi udeleženci razen nadzornega odbora. Čas bo torej pokazal, ali bo prva izmenjava mnenj zadovoljila cilje, zastavljene v navedeni uredbi.

Javna razprava Evropskega parlamenta o procesnih jamstvih

57. Nadzorni odbor je oktobra 2013 na podlagi svojih izkušenj s spremljanjem sprejel dokument o stališču z naslovom Okrepitev procesnih jamstev v uradu OLAF (19). Nadzorni odbor je na javni razpravi, ki jo je organiziral Parlament (20), predstavil svoje stališče o možnih novih zakonodajnih spremembah Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013, kakor jih je v svojem sporočilu predlagala Komisija.

58. Nadzorni odbor je pozdravil predlog Komisije, vendar je poudaril, da je treba ponovno preučiti nekatere strukturne rešitve s posebnim poudarkom na neodvisnosti urada OLAF in nadzornega odbora. Zlasti se je treba izogniti vsem možnim navzkrižjem pristojnosti in podvajanju dela med sedanjimi in predvidenimi nadzornimi strukturami. Nadzorni odbor je predlagal alternativne rešitve, ki bi ohranile koristne instrumente, ki jih predlaga Komisija, in jih obenem vključile v celovit mehanizem nadzora.

Civilna družba

59. Evropski urad Transparency International (TI-EU) je sklenil izvesti oceno sistema integritete EU (21). Predsednik nadzornega odbora in člani sekretariata nadzornega odbora so se januarja 2014 sestali s predstavniki urada TI-EU in razpravljali o vprašanjih, kot so odnosi med uradom OLAF in nadzornim odborom, odgovornost in neodvisnost urada OLAF ter pravila integritete, ki veljajo za nadzorni odbor.

5. VODENJE NADZORNEGA ODBORA

Vloga nadzornega odbora v skladu z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013

60. Z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 je bilo uvedenih več sprememb glede vloge nadzornega odbora in njegovih orodij za spremljanje. Velik del sestankov nadzornega odbora je bil zato namenjen razpravam o njihovem vplivu na dejavnosti nadzornega odbora.

61. Nadzorni odbor je opravil temeljito analizo sprememb v zvezi s svojim poslanstvom in vlogo, temeljnimi nalogami ter orodji za spremljanje in poročanje. V dokumentu nadzornega odbora z naslovom Naloge, pristojnosti in cilji nadzornega odbora (22)v povezavi z novo uredbo o uradu OLAF so pojasnjene te spremembe, metodologija spremljanja za nadzorni odbor in vloga njegovega sekretariata, katerega neodvisno delovanje zagotavlja tudi neodvisnost nadzornega odbora.

Prednostne naloge in cilji

62. Nadzorni odbor je opredelil svoje strateške cilje in prednostne naloge za svoje naslednje mandatno obdobje z namenom povečati učinkovitost in vpliv svojih temeljnih dejavnosti ter tako zagotoviti močnejšo podporo preiskovalni funkciji urada OLAF in okrepiti njegovo neodvisnost. Nadzorni odbor je opredelil naslednje strateške cilje: (i) razviti učinkovita in pragmatična orodja za spremljanje; (ii) izboljšati sodelovanje z uradom OLAF in njegovim generalnim direktorjem; (iii) delovati kot zainteresirana stran pri izvajanju politike boja proti goljufijam; (iv) povečati prepoznavnost nadzornega odbora v institucijah EU in državah članicah; (v) razviti delovne metode nadzornega odbora; (vi) zagotavljati neodvisno delovanje nadzornega odbora in njegovega sekretariata; (vii) prispevati k zakonodajnemu predlogu za okrepitev nadzora nad uradom OLAF. Nadzorni odbor je za dosego teh ciljev opredelil več prednostnih nalog, ki so prav tako predstavljene v dokumentu Naloge, pristojnosti in cilji nadzornega odbora, ki je hkrati tudi njegova srednjeročna strategija.

Kodeks ravnanja

63. Nadzorni odbor je 9. oktobra 2013 sprejel Kodeks ravnanja skupaj z Obrazložitvenim memorandumom o zagotovilih nepristranskosti in tveganjih navzkrižja interesov pri izvajanju funkcij spremljanja (23). Nadzorni odbor je poudaril, da imajo njegovi člani ponavadi ključne funkcije v svojih nacionalnih sodnih sistemih ali upravah, kar jim omogoča, da delujejo kot sodelujoča stran/partner urada OLAF na nacionalni ravni v kateri koli fazi primera, ki ga urad obravnava. Hkrati redno spremljajo primere urada OLAF, zlasti tiste, ki zahtevajo, da se podatki posredujejo nacionalnim sodnim organom. Tako lahko pride do tega, da isti primer urada OLAF obravnavajo v okviru svojih nacionalnih dolžnosti in kot člani nadzornega odbora. Zato je nujno zagotoviti, da obravnavanje primerov v tej dvojni vlogi ne povzroča nobenih dejanskih ali morebitnih navzkrižij interesov, ki bi ogrozila zaupanje javnosti v nepristranskost in objektivnost njihovega dela. Nadzorni odbor je opravil pregled navedenih posebnih nalog svojih članov, ki bi lahko povzročile navzkrižje interesov, in na tej podlagi sestavil popis konkretnih situacij, v katerih lahko pride do navzkrižja interesov. Kodeks ravnanja določa jasen postopek obvladovanja primerov navzkrižja interesov.

64. Da bi bila ta politika in kodeks ravnanja jasna v pravnem smislu, je nadzorni odbor menil, da je primerno, da spremeni svoj poslovnik. To delo je v teku.

Delovne metode

65. Nadzorni odbor je marca 2013 pozdravil novega člana Tuomasa PÖYSTI-ja. Na sestanku oktobra 2013 je nadzorni odbor za še eno leto kot predsednika izvolil Johana DENOLF-a.

66. Nadzorni odbor se je med februarjem 2013 in januarjem 2014 sestal na 11 plenarnih sejah v Bruslju in Luxembourgu. Poleg tega so se predsednik, poročevalci in člani sekretariata redno sestajali, da bi obravnavali posamezna vprašanja ter pripravljali plenarne seje in nadaljnje ukrepe.

67. Nadzorni odbor je za vsako pomembno vprašanje, ki je bilo preučeno, imenoval poročevalca. To je storil zlasti v zvezi s proračunom urada OLAF, analizo postopkov urada OLAF za obravnavo pritožb, Navodili urada o preiskovalnih postopkih, prednostnimi nalogami preiskovalne politike urada OLAF in analizo postopka izbora v uradu OLAF. Poročevalci so ob sodelovanju s sekretariatom nadzornega odbora pripravili osnutek mnenj ali dokumente, ki so se obravnavali na plenarnih sejah.

68. Sekretariat nadzornega odbora je na plenarni seji februarja 2013 višjemu vodstvu urada OLAF predstavil delovne metode nadzornega odbora, zlasti v zvezi s primeri, ki jih mora urad OLAF posredovati nacionalnim sodnim organom. Razložil je tudi, katere informacije potrebuje nadzorni odbor za pravilno izvajanje svojih nalog. Na podlagi te predstavitve je nadzorni odbor pripravil sklop smernic za spremljanje. Nadzorni odbor po uveljavitvi Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 uvaja nove smernice za spremljanje.

6. SEKRETARIAT NADZORNEGA ODBORA

69. Sekretariat nadzornega odbora je sestavljen iz pravnikov, preiskovalcev in asistentov, ki zagotavljajo dnevno spremljanje preiskovalnih dejavnosti urada OLAF in pomagajo članom nadzornega odbora pri opravljanju njihovih nalog. Sekretariat prejme vse informacije, posredovane nadzornemu odboru, in opravi njihov prvi pregled. Sekretariat je odgovoren tudi za pripravo pravnih nasvetov za člane nadzornega odbora.

70. Nadzorni odbor želi poudariti, da mora biti sekretariat sposoben, da mu lojalno in učinkovito pomaga pri izvajanju nalog spremljanja, pri čemer ne sme biti izpostavljen tveganju morebitnih navzkrižij interesov, ker je kot osebje urada OLAF podrejen generalnemu direktorju urada. V zadnjih nekaj letih je nadzorni odbor dosledno poudarjal pomen svojega neodvisnega in učinkovitega delovanja, za kar pa potrebuje neodvisen sekretariat z ustreznim osebjem, ki kljub umeščenosti v organizacijsko strukturo urada OLAF deluje neodvisno in izključno po navodilih nadzornega odbora. Nadzorni odbor je zadovoljen, da je neodvisno delovanje sekretariata zdaj zagotovljeno z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 (24).

71. Nadzorni odbor je opredelil štiri osnovne pogoje, ki zagotavljajo neodvisno delovanje sekretariata: (i) zaposlovanje, ocenjevanje in napredovanje vodje sekretariata na podlagi sklepov nadzornega odbora; (ii) prerazvrstitev vodje sekretariata v višje vodstvo; (iii) zaposlovanje, ocenjevanje in napredovanje osebja sekretariata izvaja vodja sekretariata; (iv) pooblastitev vodje sekretariata za izvrševanje proračuna sekretariata. Nadzorni odbor je začel razgovore z generalnim direktorjem urada OLAF o izvajanju novega pravnega predpisa, ki so v teku.

72. Poleg tega je nadzorni odbor zadovoljen, da je generalni direktor urada OLAF ponovno vzpostavil enako število (osem) delovnih mest sekretariata, kot jih je bilo pred reorganizacijo urada OLAF leta 2012.

Kako se obrniti na nadzorni odbor

Prek sekretariata nadzornega odbora:

Po pošti: J30 13/62 – Rue Joseph II, 30 – B – 1049 Bruselj Po telefonu + 32 2 2984022 Po elektronski pošti OLAF-FMB-supervisory-committee@ec.europa.eu Po telefaksu: + 32 2 2959776 Spletna stran http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/supervisory-committee/index_en.htm

(1) Uredba (EU, Euratom) št. 883/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. septembra 2013 o preiskavah, ki jih izvaja Evropski urad za boj proti goljufijam (OLAF), ter razveljavitvi Uredbe (ES) št. 1073/1999 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta in Uredbe Sveta (Euratom) št. 1074/1999 (UL L 248, 18.9.2013, str. 1).

(2) Člen 15.

(3) Glej Prilogo 5.

(4) Glej Prilogo 3.

(5) Glej Prilogo 4. Čeprav je bilo to mnenje sprejeto marca 2014, ga je nadzorni odbor sklenil priložiti temu poročilu o dejavnostih, ker je bilo skoraj vse delo v zvezi z mnenjem opravljeno v obdobju poročanja.

(6) Leta 2013 je nadzorni odbor prejel 186 devetmesečnih poročil.

(7) V letnem poročilu o dejavnostih nadzornega odbora za leto 2012 je bilo prijavljeno, da je urad OLAF nadzornemu odboru januarja 2013 poslal 21 primerov, ki zahtevajo, da se podatki pošljejo nacionalnim sodnim organom države članice. V letu 2013 je bilo skupaj prejetih 77 primerov.

(8) Urad OLAF je nadzornemu odboru poslal mnenja o končnem/vmesnem poročilu in priporočilih v 72 od 77 primerov, ki so bila v letu 2013 poslana nacionalnim sodnim organom.

(9) V drugem primeru je bilo zaslišanje osebe, ki je predmet preiskave, opravljeno v skladu s pravili prejšnjega priročnika urada OLAF.

(10) Glej Prilogo 2.

(11) UL L 145, 31.5.2001, str. 43.

(12) Člen 22a Kadrovskih predpisov in člen 11 pogojev za zaposlitev drugih uslužbencev EU.

(13) Po posvetovanju s Pravno službo Komisije – glej obvestilo generalnega direktorja urada OLAF z dne 10. novembra 2008 za osebje urada OLAF.

(14) UL L 257, 28.9.2013, str. 19.

(15) Glej Prilogo 1.

(16) Glej povzetek v Prilogi 7.

(17) Glej Prilogo 10.

(18) COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013.

(19) Glej Prilogo 6.

(20) Javna razprava z dne 3. oktobra 2013 z naslovom „Urad OLAF in pravice oseb, ki so predmet preiskav“.

(21) Glej spletni naslov: http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/european-union-integrity-system-study/.

(22) Glej Prilogo 8.

(23) Glej Prilogo 9.

(24) Uvodna izjava 40.

PRILOGE 1. Mnenje št. 1/2013: Predhodni predlog proračuna urada OLAF za leto 2014 2. Mnenje št. 2/2013: Vzpostavitev notranjega pritožbenega postopka urada OLAF 3. Mnenje št. 1/2014: Prednostne naloge preiskovalne politike urada OLAF 4. Mnenje št. 2/2014: Izbor primerov v uradu OLAF 5. Ugotovitve nadzornega odbora o preiskovalnih postopkih v uradu OLAF 6. Dokument o stališču z naslovom Okrepitev procesnih jamstev v uradu OLAF 7. Priporočila nadzornega odbora za leto 2012 8. Naloge, pristojnosti in cilji nadzornega odbora: srednjeročna strategija 9. Kodeks ravnanja članov nadzornega odbora in Obrazložitveni memorandum o zagotovilih nepristranskosti in tveganjih navzkrižja interesov pri izvajanju funkcij spremljanja 10. Delovne ureditve z uradom OLAF

PRILOGA 1 OPINION No 1/2013 OLAF's preliminary draft budget for 2014 Brussels, 16 July 2013 INTRODUCTION At the meetings of 27 February and 16 July, 2013, OLAF's Supervisory Committee examined OLAF's preliminary budget for 2014 and adopted the following opinion. In accordance with the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1) and Article 3 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom (2), the European Anti-Fraud Office (hereinafter OLAF) shall have full independence to exercise its investigative function in all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by or on the basis of the Treaty on the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Euratom Treaty. To do this and to ensure that OLAF is able to function in an efficient and effective manner and contribute in the best possible way to the Union's objectives of the fight against fraud defined in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a specific budget line within the Commission budget (European Commission section of the general budget of the European Union) is created for OLAF. (3) In accordance with Article 11 of the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the mission of the OLAF Supervisory Committee (SC) is to reinforce the independence of OLAF in the exercise of OLAF's investigative function. In the reform of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2013, the role of the SC has been strengthened as guardian of the independence of OLAF in its investigative function and in the supervision of the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this context, and with a view to the powers conferred by the Commission on the SC (4), the SC has considered OLAF's preliminary draft budget (PDB) and the Commission draft budget for 2014 concerning OLAF and delivers the following Opinion. The objective of the procedure in which the SC adopts an Opinion on OLAF's preliminary draft budget and draft budget is to give assurance that the draft budget duly takes into account the independence of the investigative function of OLAF and that OLAF is resourced to function effectively and efficiently as an inter-institutional service in stepping up the fight against fraud as foreseen by the Union legislator in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. The SC Opinion on the preliminary draft budget also creates a documented forum of the SC advice to the Director-General of OLAF and to the Budgetary Authority of the Union and other Institutions of the Union on the prerequisites for efficient allocation and use of resources to and within OLAF. In this way the SC Opinion contributes to the attainment of value for money, legal certainty and efficient anti-fraud policy in the European Union. The Opinion of the SC is not therefore limited only to commenting on the budget line on the SC of the OLAF. I. RESOURCES In the draft budget presented by the Commission on 26 June 2013, the OLAF budget will be increased by approximately 1,5 % with a total expenditure of EUR 58 523 000. The increase comes principally from the transfer of an additional 6 posts from headquarters budget line ‘Expenditure related to officials and temporary staff working with the institution to OLAF’. If the impact of the EU enlargement to include Croatia is taken into account, the increase in the OLAF expenditure is 0,7 %. In the draft budget presented by the Commission the general increase in the Commission's administrative expenditure is 0,1 % and 0,8 % when taking into account the expenditure resulting from the enlargement to Croatia. The OLAF Budget has not been subject to the same strict savings measures as those within the Commission services in general. The SC notes this with satisfaction and considers that this line on resources provides the conditions necessary to continue the fight against fraud as one of the important priorities of the European Union. The budget line concerning buildings and IT has been kept on zero growth in accordance with the general orientation of the Commission. The SC observes that a well-organised and up-to-date ICT support and infrastructure are necessary conditions for a cost-effective fraud investigation function. The SC has no objection to the general orientation in the Commission draft budget but SC would stress the need to keep both OLAF's Case Management, ICT analytics and other information systems up to date in order to enable OLAF to function efficiently. Allocation of resources to priority activities The SC has regularly recommended to OLAF in its previous opinions on the budget to allocate more staff to OLAF's core business — investigations — by shifting them from the support units. In addition, the SC has proposed clarification of the distinction between investigative and operational activities of OLAF. The SC notes the reorganisation of OLAF put in place on 1 February 2012 in which resources at the organisational level were increasingly concentrated on investigations. As a result of this, in the OLAF Report of 2012, the distribution of staff in the units dealing with the fight against fraud, OLAF policy strategy and coordination and administrative support is reported separately. This goes in the direction of clarification of the distinction between investigative and other operational activities of OLAF in line with the SC's earlier recommendations. However, the SC considers that clarification between investigation and investigation support functions, anti-fraud policy functions and other operational activities of OLAF should go still further. Opening and follow up of the investigations The SC would mention that consistent application over the years of the investigative policy priorities in line with Union's anti-fraud policy and the Commission's anti-fraud strategy is a core issue in the resources management of OLAF and in the performance of its investigative function. The SC notes that in the OLAF Management Plan the alignment with the investigative policy priorities is defined as one of the performance indicators for OLAF. (5) The SC underlines the importance of transparent and reliable follow-up of the investigative policy priorities. The SC would refer to its earlier observations and statistics as presented by the European Court of Auditors in the Special Report No 2/2011 (6) on the low number of OLAF investigations leading to convictions by Member States judicial authorities. (7) The SC considers that the rate of OLAF reports leading to convictions is one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative function requiring close and open attention. The SC recognises that the reasons why OLAF reports do not lead to conviction may, in some instances lie outside OLAF's control, however, the impact of such external factors should be carefully analysed and transparently reported. The SC therefore encourages OLAF to continue to develop indicators and report on them in a transparent and reliable manner in order to show an example of value for money and to demonstrate the positive impact that contribution of additional resources to OLAF has in the fight against fraud in the European Union, appropriate follow-up thus ensuring that the ultimate results of investigations are achieved. Without this OLAF risks carrying out good, hard work which may ultimately not produce the required results. HR strategy The reorganisation of the Office resulted in significant shifts of staff and modifications in their job description or even a completely new allocation of tasks. In such circumstances the SC reiterates its earlier position that it is essential to have an appropriate human resources strategy built on the identified and real needs of the organisation and its priorities, with the aim of giving direction and maximising the use of existing resources. The SC draws particular attention to OLAF's ability to recruit and maintain high quality professionals in its investigative functions as a focal point of cost-effective anti-fraud service at the Union level. A crucial element of the human resources strategy should continue to be the continuous training related to internal mobility and overall restructuring. It should address the optimum balance between administrators and staff members with administrative professional background performing core investigative tasks and assistants providing support services. Recommendations: — Effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured and results of the investigations reported with timely and reliable indicators — OLAF shall continue to develop indicators describing the efficiency and quality of its investigative function and on the alignment with the anti-fraud policy of the European Union and anti-fraud strategy of the European Commission — A human resources strategy based on a needs assessment of OLAF's current activities should be developed and focus given to training, career development, succession planning and appropriate balance between assistants providing support services and administrators performing core investigative tasks. II. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE The Commission Decision establishing OLAF is clear that the SC must be consulted on the PDB of OLAF before it is sent to the Director-General for Budgets (8). Up to now the Director-General of OLAF has transmitted the PDB to the Committee after ‘technical’ meetings/arrangements with DG Budget. In 2013 the SC was presented with the preliminary draft budget in February and informed in June with regard to the Commission Decision on the draft budget for 2014. The SC believes that to provide an effective opinion on the PDB is one of its core tasks and would remind the Director-General of OLAF to undertake a substantive consultation with the SC prior to budget negotiations with DG Budget. Furthermore, the SC would encourage the Director-General to consult the SC on the OLAF Annual Management plan in order to have independent support and feed-back based on the follow-up of the investigative function by the SC. Conclusion: — The Director-General of OLAF shall ensure that the SC be effectively consulted regarding the next PDB by means of a real and substantive exchange of opinions between the Director-General and the Committee before the PDB is sent to the Director-General for Budget in any form. III. THE SC AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SC The SC expenditure The SC notes that the budget line of the expenditure related to the SC is not changed in 2014 draft budget. The SC draws attention to the fact that with the extended responsibilities attributed to the SC by the Union legislator, the performance of the duties of the SC requires the devotion of a considerable amount of time by its Members who, by definition, do so on a part time bases. The Resources of the Secretariat of the SC In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the SC has a crucial role to play in the monitoring of OLAF's investigative function. Moreover, the SC has a specific inter-institutional character. In the discharge of its duties assigned by the legislator, the SC is dependent on its Secretariat. The SC would like to point out that the role of the Secretariat is primarily not to assist in the organisation and documentation of the meeting of the SC. In practice, the SC Secretariat performs an overall, regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF. This results from the fact that it is the SC Secretariat which has access, in accordance with the established access arrangements, to the OLAF Case Management System. The data protection rules de facto require that access to case information by the SC is implemented via the SC secretariat. An adequately staffed Secretariat with high quality personnel is thus a vital condition for the SC in the discharge of its duties as stipulated by the legislator. The SC considers that the 2014 draft budget creates conditions for appropriate resourcing of the SC Secretariat. The SC would point out the general principle of sincere cooperation between Institutions and bodies of the European Union, which is a general principle of the Union law, specifically that Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 sets out further requirements on the sincere cooperation between the Director-General of OLAF and the SC. The Director-General of OLAF shall, in the spirit of sincere cooperation, consult the SC on all issues which relate to the staffing, promotion of personnel and resources of the SC Secretariat. To be fully informative and representative of the total cost of supervision, the budget entry for the SC should incorporate the total cost of operations stemming from the duties stipulated in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999, that is, all the SC Members' expenditure as well as that of its Secretariat which includes their salaries, training, travel etc. OLAF has the privilege of transferring its funds freely from one line item to another. By joining up the total cost of the SC's function in a separate budget entry it is ensured that funds targeted for use by the SC are actually used for the supervisory function. However, funds remaining unused could be redeployed to other headings within the OLAF budget. Such redeployment should only be possible with prior notification to the SC and its approval. The Head of the SC Secretariat should be sub-delegated as the authorising officer to manage the total fund allocation for the SC's operations under the control of the Committee. Having one budget line which incorporates all expenditure will facilitate the management and efficiencies of the supervisory framework whilst, at the same time, any unused funds are passed on to other OLAF budget lines by the Director-General upon the approval of the SC. A separate budget line has the benefit of transparency and reflects also the independence of the SC in line with the Regulation. At the same time, this separate budget line will inform the three institutions appointing the SC regarding the resources specifically allocated to the supervisory function. Secretariat Staff The SC maintains its position, as expressed in its previous opinions on the OLAF budget, on the minimum requirement of eight Secretariat staff, which is equivalent to the current needs of the SC. This represents about 2 % of OLAF staff (9) which the SC deems the minimum number required for it to carry out its monitoring function efficiently. (10) The SC would point out that the legal duties of the SC require a small, but high quality staff in Secretariat. The SC has noted with satisfaction the intention of the OLAF Director-General to allocate additional posts to the Secretariat. The SC expects a fluid and rapid implementation of the announced intention. Furthermore, the SC is of the opinion that, with regard to the appointment of the Head of the Secretariat and other staff for its Secretariat, including internal transfers, there should be close consultation with the Committee, as indicated in its Rules of Procedure (11) reflecting the principle of cooperation stipulated in the Regulation. The SC acknowledges that the Commission staff rules and the appraisal and promotion system do not currently permit the SC Members to evaluate the performance of the staff of the Secretariat directly. The SC also notes that nothing in the Commission staff rules and appraisal and promotion system excludes the consultation of the SC and that some Institutions have developed consultation systems for situations in which a member of staff is effectively working for another directorate or body than the one which is legally responsible for the appraisal and promotion. Therefore the SC considers that even though the appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion are ultimately decided by the Director-General of OLAF, he should make these decisions on the basis of the opinions of the Committee under whose direct authority the Secretariat works, as it is foreseen in the SC's Rules of Procedure (12). This will ensure the continuous independence of the Secretariat in their day to day functions. Recommendations: — Separate budget line for both the SC and Secretariat should be considered to clearly indicate the costs of the SC function and to highlight in a transparent manner the inter-institutional character of the SC and its Secretariat. — The Director-General of OLAF shall, in sincere and close cooperation with the SC, ensure that appropriate resources and staff members are allocated to the SC Secretariat in line with the intention expressed by the Director-General. — Regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF and SC access to information depend on a small but high quality Secretariat. The Secretariat should have eight members of staff. — Appointments, appraisal and promotion of the SC Secretariat staff should only be made following the approval of the SC, thus ensuring full independence of the SC Secretariat in the performance of its duties. — Appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion should be decided by the Director-General on the basis of the SC's opinion. IV. CONCLUSION The SC supports OLAF's draft budget for 2014 with the provision that the above recommendations be taken into consideration. In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999, the Opinion should be transmitted to the Budgetary Authority by OLAF. Furthermore, the SC invites the Director-General of OLAF to update the SC regularly on measures taken by OLAF towards implementation of the recommendations in this Opinion. Adopted in Brussels, on 16 July 2013 For the Supervisory Committee, Johan DENOLF Chairman (1) Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1). (2) Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20). (3) See Art. 13 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 (Art. 18 of the Regulation amended as of 1 October 2013). (4) Article 6 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom. (5) See OLAF Annual Activity Report 2012 final, Ares (2013) 509786 — 26.3.2013: chapter 1.3, Specific objectives for ‘fight against fraud’: investigative and coordination activities, p. 5. (6) Special Report No 2/2011, ‘Follow-up of Special Report No 1/2005 concerning the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office’. (7) See the SC Opinion 1/2012 of the 2013 OLAF draft budget, reproduced as Annex 2 of the SC Annual Report of 2012. (8) Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom cited above provides: ‘After consulting the Surveillance Committee, the Director shall send the Director-General for Budgets a preliminary draft budget to be entered in the special heading for the Office in the annual general budget’. (9) According to the OLAF report for 2011, there are 437 staff in the Office. (10) For the detailed analysis of the SC workload and consequently of the necessary SC Secretariat resources, see the note of the Head of the SC Secretariat of 21 March 2013. In view of the incoming amendments to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 entrusting additional tasks to the SC, the resources of the SC Secretariat may require reinforcement in the year 2014. (11) Article 11(3) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘In any case, the Head of the Secretariat shall inform the SC about the candidates for membership of the Secretariat. Once the applications are known, the Committee shall discuss in the plenary session whether they meet the Committee's working needs with a view to submitting a proposal for their appointment to OLAF's Director-General’ (OJ L 308, 24.11.2011, p. 114). (12) Article 11(5) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘The Supervisory Committee shall periodically evaluate the work of the Head of the Secretariat and of the Secretariat members’.

PRILOGA 2 OPINION No 2/2013 on establishing an internal OLAF procedure for complaints The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the options for redress open to persons involved in OLAF's investigations regarding potential violations of their rights and procedural guarantees. The Committee found that such persons do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations either through an external (an EU or national court, the European Ombudsman or the European Data Protection Supervisor) or internal mechanism (OLAF itself). The Committee believes that the new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF has not resolved the problem, since it does not introduce a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints. The Committee expressed the opinion that the current legislative gap could be closed by putting in place a transparent and efficient complaints procedure within OLAF, to deal with complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in the course of an OLAF investigation. The Committee therefore recommended that the Director-General of OLAF institute such an internal procedure and put forward concrete suggestions with regard to its implementation. INTRODUCTION 1. OLAF has been given far-reaching powers of investigation in order to efficiently carry out its mission to protect the financial interests of the EU. The exercise of these powers is very likely to touch upon the fundamental rights of persons concerned by investigations (1), and therefore their respect by OLAF is essential. It contributes — as the SC has already emphasised (2) — not only to ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF's investigative activities, but also to consolidating its reputation, credibility and ultimately its independence. 2. OLAF is obliged to ensure the protection of fundamental rights by safeguarding the procedural guarantees as listed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (3). In addition, the EU legislator decided to enhance OLAF's accountability for its investigative activities by reforming its legal framework (4) which resulted in the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (5) (hereinafter, the Regulation). 3. The SC welcomes the changes brought by the Regulation but would like, nevertheless, to point out that the mechanisms put in place to enforce the procedural guarantees need further improvement. The Regulation provides for a legality check (6) and a monitoring mechanism (7), but does not establish a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints which would be, in the SC's view, indispensable for ensuring effective protection of fundamental rights. 4. In the SC's opinion, persons involved in OLAF investigations do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations of their rights and the recent reform of the legal framework has not solved that problem. Therefore, the SC takes the view that the Director-General of OLAF ((hereinafter, the DG) should swiftly establish a transparent and stable internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. I. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EXISTING REDRESS MECHANISMS 5. Persons considering that, in the course of an investigation, OLAF breached their fundamental rights and wishing to complain, have at their disposal various means of judicial and non-judicial review which, however, may be insufficient, for the reasons stated below. 6. Firstly, they may seek the direct judicial review by an EU Court (action for annulment, action for damages and request for interim relief) or indirectjudicial review by EU and national courts (preliminary ruling procedure). (8) However, it should be noted that these actions are governed by rather strict rules on admissibility (9) and must fulfil a number of conditions to trigger a right to reparation (10). Even when an action is successful, ‘Judicial protection is obtained long after the contested investigative act and the act as such is not affected by the EU court's ruling; only compensation for the prejudice created by that act is obtained’ (11). 7. Secondly, persons wishing to complain may address themselves to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who is specifically entrusted (12) with the competence of hearing and investigating complaints lodged by persons whose personal data are processed by OLAF. However, the material scope of his review is limited to the protection of personal data and privacy. 8. Thirdly, the European Ombudsman (EO) is competent to investigate complaints regarding maladministration (13) against OLAF, namely failure to act in accordance with the law, to respect the principles of good administration, or breaches of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, it is the EO's view — which the SC fully shares — that an institution ‘in frequent contact with people who may have reason to complain should provide for a first line complaints mechanism allowing for their problems to be addressed and solved rapidly, before, in the event that resolution is not successful, having to turn to other redress mechanisms, such as Ombudsmen and courts’ (14). The SC considers that this statement also applies to OLAF. 9. Fourthly, the SC itself — as the OLAF's supervisory body — is quite often the addressee of individual complaints which it takes into consideration as a valuable source of information concerning OLAF's investigations and thus triggering the SC's monitoring activity. The SC's role, as emphasised by a ruling of the EU General Court (15) and confirmed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to monitor developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (16) which cannot be carried out without examination of individual cases. However, the SC was not established as a complaints body and its supervision takes place only ex post, since the SC cannot intervene in ongoing investigations. Furthermore, the SC regrets the lack of appropriate monitoring tools at its disposal and the absence of a specific reporting obligation for the DG to inform the SC of complaints addressed to him and, in particular, on the way they were dealt with. 10. In addition to the external mechanisms, the SC notes that an internal mechanism for dealing with individual complaints is not completely absent from the legal framework governing OLAF's investigations. Any official or other servant of the EU who is the subject of an internal investigation has the right to submit to the DG a complaint against an act adversely affecting him in connection with investigations by OLAF (17). However, according to the existing EU case-law, OLAF's investigative acts do not constitute acts adversely affecting the persons concerned within the meaning of Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and therefore are not challengeable acts (18). 11. Moreover, the SC would point out that OLAF staff who are aware of possible illegal activities or serious violations of professional duties that might trigger potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within an investigation have the additional possibility to report wrongdoing within OLAF to the President of the SC, on the basis of Article 22a of the Staff Regulations and of the agreement between the DG and the SC (19). II. LACK OF A COMPLAINT PROCEDURE IN REGULATION (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 12. The SC notes that the intention of the EU legislator was to strengthen the protection of procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations (a) by inserting in the Regulation detailed provisions concerning the procedural guarantees and (b) by enforcing them by means of an enhanced review. As a result, Article 9 of the Regulation contains now explicit procedural guarantees and thus defines and clarifies the contents of those foreseen in the Charter. On the other hand, although the EU institutions involved in the legislative process all agreed on the need for a review of potential violation of fundamental rights and put forward various proposals aimed at establishing both an ex ante legality check (relating, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation, during all stages of the investigation) and an ex post review procedure for handling individual complaints (20), it seems that no consensus was finally reached, since the Regulation does not explicitly put in place any such procedure. 13. The SC would point out that in the past, via its internal rules, OLAF put in place a review procedure open to all persons concerned in internal and external investigations in which procedural guarantees were allegedly not respected in a manner possibly having an impact on the conclusions of the investigation (21). This procedure evolved under the influence of interinstitutional discussions on reforming the OLAF legal framework. Since the Commission's proposal of 17 March 2011 contained provisions on a review procedure (22), the Instructions to Staff on Investigation Procedures (ISIP) (23) adopted by the OLAF DG as of 1 February 2012 anticipated the forthcoming legislative changes with the setting up of a procedure for dealing with complaints concerning an alleged failure to respect procedural guarantees (24). However, that Commission's proposal, which was subject to negotiations during the legislative process, was ultimately not maintained. Therefore, when the ISIP were replaced by the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures (GIP), which entered into force on the same day as the new OLAF Regulation (1 October 2013), this internal procedure disappeared. 14. As a result, neither the Regulation nor OLAF's internal rules foresee any formal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Therefore, the objective of improving the mechanisms for redressing potential breaches by OLAF of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation has not been achieved. The SC would point out that the recent Communication from the Commission on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations (25) supports the SC's view and its repeated recommendations (26) concerning the introduction of transparent and stable procedures for an internal legality check and for an independent review of complaints. This Communication also confirms the need for further improvements to the Regulation, by establishing of the office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguards’. 15. With its longstanding experience in monitoring OLAF's investigative function and thereby compliance by OLAF with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, the SC is therefore concerned by the lack of a transparent procedure for dealing with individual complaints and takes the view that, at least during the transitional period, until further amendments to the Regulation are adopted, the current gap should be closed by the DG re-establishing an internal procedure for complaint in OLAF. III. THE WAY FORWARD: AN INTERNAL PROCEDURE FOR COMPLAINTS 16. In OLAF's view, the notion of ‘complaints’ covers (i) complaints concerning procedural guarantees in the context of investigative actions, (ii) complaints against a reply by OLAF to a request for access to personal data and (iii) complaints from whistle-blowers (concerning either OLAF's obligation to inform them on the action taken following their fraud reporting or the protection of their identity) (27). According to information provided by OLAF, in the last three years there were 25 complaints concerning OLAF's investigation activity, of which 13 were addressed to the EO (28), 8 were addressed to the EDPS (29) and 4 were requests for review addressed to OLAF (30). OLAF is also aware of other complaints, addressed to other bodies (e.g. to the SC), but it does not have any systemic overview, register or statistics related to them. 17. Taking into account the number of cases opened by OLAF (718 in 2012 (31)) and the fact that complaints against OLAF are addressed, in particular, to the EDPS, the EO and the SC (32), the small number of complaints addressed to OLAF itself may lead to the conclusion that the absence of a transparent and independent procedure for handling complaints in OLAF effectively deters potential complainants from exercising their rights. 18. The SC notes, from its monitoring experience, that in the previous years the handling of complaints appeared to be carried out on a case-by-case basis rather than through a stable and consistent procedure. The SC shares the EO's view that a case-by-case approach is not ‘the best way to ensure the efficient and transparent handling of complaints’ (33) and that without a proper complaint procedure ‘compliance [with fundamental rights] cannot ultimately be effective’ (34). Such a procedure is a key element of OLAF's accountability and legitimacy, because protecting fundamental rights ‘is not only to the benefit of persons under investigation but also of OLAF, whose legitimacy can only increase when fundamental rights are (seen to be) effectively protected’ (35). 19. The SC considers that, from the OLAF perspective, a complaint procedure would help (i) the detection by OLAF of any breach of its own legal obligations, thus allowing for a prompt reaction, (ii) monitoring by OLAF of compliance with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees by its own staff, (iii) avoiding the risk of discriminatory treatment of persons concerned, (iv) settling possible disputes before they aggravate (36). 20. In the SC's opinion, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (37) (right to good administration) would offer a sufficient legal basis for establishing an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Complainants are entitled to expect from OLAF that their ‘affairs’ are ‘handled’ — according to the principles defined by the Charter. 21. The SC therefore believes that the DG should put in place a transparent and efficient internal procedure for dealing with all the types of complaints related to OLAF investigative activities, including not only complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights in the course of an OLAF investigation, but also those concerning duration of investigations, legality of OLAF's acts, breaches of confidentiality, refusals to provide information. The following practical recommendations are without prejudice to the forthcoming legislative proposals (38) or to the SC's position as expressed in its paper on Reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF — in view of the monitoring experience of the Supervisory Committee (39) — they should be regarded as transitional measures until the current legal framework is improved. 22. The SC would firstly point out that it is for the DG to establish and define the exact scope and content of rules on handling of complaints in OLAF. In so doing, the DG should take into consideration a number of requirements triggered by the right to good administration. Recommendations by the EO and the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour should be also taken into account. Without establishing an exhaustive list, the SC would point to the following requirements: — fairness and impartiality, including, inter alia, the requirement that a complaint should be treated by a person not related to the investigation or not in the direct line of hierarchy of the person(s) related to the investigation (40) and the necessity to set out a minimum level of guarantees ensuring the functional independence of the person handling a given complaint, — the requirement to state reasons for the decisions taken following a complaint (41); — a reasonable time-limit for handling a complaint (42), — the right of access to one's file (subject to limitations explicitly foreseen in the Charter (43), — the right to address OLAF in one of the EU official languages and to have an answer in the same language (44), — the requirement to inform the complainant of any possible alternative forms of redress (45). 23. Secondly, with regard to the person entrusted with the handling of complaints, he should have the appropriate competencies, qualifications and experience. Such person should have well defined tasks and benefit from access to appropriate resources. He should have access to all relevant case-related information and OLAF staff should fully cooperate with him. 24. Regarding particularly the requirement of independence, the SC would stress that any effective internal complaint procedure, which would necessarily imply the handling of a complaint by an OLAF (senior) official, requires that this person act, when carrying out his review duties, in full independence of the DG. This is a key element in ensuring external credibility and public trust. The SC acknowledges the difficulty of implementing such a requirement, since this person should report to the DG on his findings while the latter remains the appointing authority deciding on the career progress of all OLAF officials (46). 25. The SC would indicate three possible solutions to that problem. (i) Firstly, the SC Secretariat being the only part of OLAF with regulatory guarantees of independent functioning with regard to the DG (47), the most logical solution would be to place the (senior) official entrusted with handling complaints under the Head of the SC Secretariat, but without involving him in any regular work of the SC. (ii) Secondly, the official could be nominated as a ‘complaint’ advisor to the DG, but his functional independence should be safeguarded by the right to inform the SC whenever he considers that a measure taken by the Director-General puts his independence into question (48) and by the obligation to report on all his findings related to the complaints not only to the Director-General, but also to the SC (49). (iii) Thirdly, the task could be entrusted to the OLAF Legal Advice Unit, but then its Head should have equal safeguards as a ‘complaint advisor’ — in his capacity of the handler of complaints. 26. Finally, the SC considers that information on how to address complaints to OLAF, together with a description of the procedure for handling them, should be published on OLAF's website, for the sake of transparency and legal certainty. Moreover, the SC should be regularly informed of the complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled, this allowing it to properly perform its role of monitoring developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations. SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS In the light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee: (1) Recommends that the Director-General set up an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints concerning OLAF investigations; (2) Invites the Director-General to consult the details of the procedure with the SC, before its adoption; (3) Recommends that the Director-General publish the procedure on OLAF's website after its adoption; (4) Expects the Director-General to report regularly to the SC on complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled. Adopted in Brussels, December 2013 For the Supervisory Committee Johan DENOLF Chairman (1) Although little consideration was given to this aspect when OLAF was created, the few procedural guarantees defined in the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 were developed by the case-law of the EU General Court. (2) See the SC's Opinion No 5/2010 on Respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office, point 3. (3) See in particular Article 41 of the Charter. (4) One of the objectives of the reform was to reinforce the protection of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within OLAF's investigations. (5) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1). (6) The legality check relates, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of persons concerned (Article 17(7)). (7) Article 15(1). (8) For a thorough overview of the different kinds of judicial review of OLAF's investigative acts, see J.F.H. Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) — An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor's Office, Europa Law Publishing, 2011, p. 203. See also X. Groussot, Z. Popov, What's wrong with OLAF? Accountability, due process and criminal justice in European anti-fraud policy, Common Market Law Review 47, 2010, p. 605-643. (9) For example, the actions for annulment introduced against OLAF investigative acts have constantly been declared inadmissible on the grounds that none of such acts has to date been deemed to bring about a distinct change in the applicant's legal position. (10) In actions for damages, there are three conditions to be met in order to trigger a right to reparation: the infringement of a rule of law intended to confer rights on persons; a sufficiently serious breach of this rule; the existence of a direct causal link between the breach of the rule of law and the damage allegedly suffered by the complainant. (11) J.F.H. Inghelram, Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance, Common Market Law Review 49, 2012, p. 601-628. (12) Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1). (13) According to the definition given by the EO, ‘Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it’ (see the EO's Annual Report 1997, p. 23). (14) See the Special Report of the EO in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning FRONTEX, 12 November 2013, point 43. (15) Franchet and Byk v Commission (No 2),8 July 2008, Case T-48/05. (16) Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. (17) See Article 14 of the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. Its content has been included in Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and as a consequence has been deleted from Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. (18) See Commission v Antonello Violetti and Others and Nadine Schmit, 20 May 2010, Case T-261/09. (19) See the note of the Director-General to OLAF staff (I/011472 of 10 November 2008) and the note JUR(2008)45321 of 1 April 2008 of the Commission's Legal Service. (20) During the legislative process, the EU institutions put forward various proposals: an independent Review Adviser with the participation of the SC, a Review Panel consisting of senior officials of OLAF and of the Commission's Legal Service, two separate procedures (legality check by legal experts of OLAF and complaints to the Review Adviser via the SC), a review procedure to be set up by the DG within the Office. (21) See the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures, version July 2011, point 5.1.6. (22) Article 7b: this procedure aimed at dealing with requests from persons concerned by an investigation, to have an independent opinion regarding the respect of the procedural guarantees provided for in the Regulation. (23) Replacing the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures. (24) Article 23 of the ISIP — ‘23.1 Where a natural person concerned by an investigation has requested a review of the handling of his procedural guarantees, the Director-General appoints a member of OLAF staff not connected with the investigation, to conduct such a review. 23.2 The person entrusted with the review must act independently in his review of the complaint and report his findings to the Director-General. 23.3 The Director-General may take appropriate action in respect of any failure to respect procedural guarantees and will inform the complainant’. (25) COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013. (26) See the SC's Annual Activity Report 2012, specifically Section 2 of Annex III. (27) OLAF does not count as ‘complaint’ the applications for access to documents (including ‘confirmatory applications’), the requests for access to personal data, staff complaints (Art. 90 of Staff Regulations), motions to courts, complaints addressed to the Commission which do not concern directly OLAF, letters from informants/whistle-blowers unhappy with OLAF's decision to dismiss a case. (28) 7 complaints in 2013, 3 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011. (29) 5 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011. (30) 1 request in 2013, 2 requests in 2012 and 1 request in 2011. (31) See the OLAF 2012 Activity Report. (32) See the Annual Activity Reports of the EDPS and the EO. The SC itself received 7 complaints in 2012 and 14 complaints in 2013, concerning, inter alia, alleged failure to respect fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, breach of confidentiality of investigations, duration of investigations. (33) See the EO's Decision closing his inquiry into complaint 3072/2009/MHZ against the Commission, 5 April 2011, point 27. (34) See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), 9 April 2013, point 79. (35) J.F.H. Inghelram, Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance, quoted above, p. 627. (36) See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ quoted above, point 47. (37) Article 41(1) of the Charter: ‘Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union’. (38) See the Commission's proposal quoted above. (39) This paper was adopted at the SC's plenary meeting on 8 October 2013 and transmitted to the three appointing Institutions on 24 October 2013. (40) See the Decision of 26 June 2008 of the EO on complaint 1354/2007/VIK against the European Economic and Social Committee, point 2.3: ‘it is good administrative practice that complaints against a Community official should normally not be answered by this very same official, but by the superior of this official or by another appropriate official/body’. (41) See Article 18 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. See also the Draft recommendation of the EO in the inquiry into complaint 1183/2012/MMN against OLAF, 15 November 2013. (42) See Article 17(1) of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which elucidates the ‘reasonable time’ requirement of the Charter by establishing a two months period from the date of receipt of a request or complaint. Article 17(2) allows for an extension of this period if it is justified by the ‘complexity of the matters which it raises’. The SC notes with interest the EO's statement that extension of the time limit within which an EU institution may deal with a complaint can be justified by the complexity of the issues raised, but not by an alleged lack of sufficient human resources or internal obstacles within its own services, since ‘in accordance with the principles of good administration, the EU institutions have the duty to ensure that they provide their various services with sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks which have been entrusted to them’ and to ‘structure their various services in a such a way as not to hinder the performance of the institution's duties, including in particular, the need to treat complaints by citizens within a reasonable time’ (see EO's Decision closing his inquiry into complaint 2288/2011/MMN against the European Investment Bank, 25 September 2013, pt. 28, 30). (43) This right may be limited by the need to respect the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy. (44) See also Article 13 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. (45) See, in this respect, the Decision of the EO on complaint 1512/2007/JMA against the European Commission, 5 June 2008. Article 19 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour may also be relevant in this respect. (46) See the concerns expressed by civil society representatives with regard to the compatibility of the principle of independence with the fact that a person works in the interest of a specific entity (see the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ quoted above, point 78). (47) Recital 40 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. (48) As it was suggested by the Commission in its proposal of 17 March 2011, Article 7b.2. (49) Idem. See also Article 14 a) of the European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (COM(2006) 244 — C6-0228/2006 — 2006/0084(COD)) (OJ C 16E, 22.1.2010, p. 201).

PRILOGA 3 OPINION No 1/2014 OLAF Investigation Policy Priorities The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) established, on a yearly basis, by the Director-General of OLAF. The Committee compared the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 with the draft IPPs for 2014. The Committee welcomed the improved definition of the IPPs for 2014. The Committee considered however that the policy on financial indicators and the implementation of the proportionality principle needs further clarification. The Committee also drew attention to the need to reconsider the subsidiarity/added value policy and to