SL    SL  KOMISIJA EVROP SKIH SKUPNOSTI 
Bruselj, 7.1.2005 
KOM(2004) 861 kon čno 
. 
SPOROČILO KOMISIJE EVROPSKEMU PARLAMENTU IN SVETU 
Euratom - varnost in nadzor - dejavnosti v letu 2003  
. 
 
SL 2   SL 1. UVOD 
Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za at omsko energijo, ki je bila podpisana 
istočasno kot Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evr opske gospodarske skupnosti, dolo ča 
temeljno podlago v pravu Evropske unije za dejavnosti Komisije na podro čju jedrske 
in radiološke varnosti in nadzora. To sporo čilo opisuje dejavnosti, ki jih izvaja 
Generalni direktorat za energetiko in promet (DG TREN) Komisije v zvezi z 
naslovom dve, poglavjema 3 in 7 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo. Druge dejavnosti v okviru Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske 
skupnosti za atomsko energijo, npr. raziskave, v tem poro čilu niso zajete. 
2. NALOGE, PRAVNA PODLAGA IN OBSEG DELOVANJA VARNOSTI IN 
NADZORA EURATOMA 
2.1. Varovanje zdravja (naslov dve, poglavj e 3, Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evropske 
skupnosti za atomsko energijo) 
Na podlagi poglavja 3 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko 
energijo je glavna naloga Euratoma dolo čitev temeljnih standardov za varovanje 
zdravja delavcev in prebivalstva pred nevarnostmi, ki izvirajo iz ionizirajo čih sevanj. 
Poglavje 3 daje Komisiji tudi širš a pooblastila, da zagotovi pravilno uporabo 
temeljnih standardov za varovanje. 
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti
1 je izrecno priznalo pris tojnost Skupnosti za izdajanje 
predpisov na podro čju jedrske varnosti na podlagi poglavja 3 naslova dve Pogodbe o 
ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo. Sodiš če je predvsem odlo čilo, 
da ima Skupnost zakonodajno pristojnost, da za zaš čito zdravja vzpostavi odobritveni 
sistem, ki ga morajo države članice izvajati poleg temeljnih standardov. 
2.2. Nadzor (naslov dve, poglavje 7, Pogodba  o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za 
atomsko energijo) 
Naloga Komisije na podro čju jedrske varnosti je zagotovi ti, da se znotraj Evropske 
unije jedrski material uporablja le za pred videne namene in da se spoštujejo 
obveznosti glede nadzora, ki jih je S kupnost prevzela s sporazumom, sklenjenim s 
tretjo državo ali mednarodno organizacij o. Poglavje VII P ogodbe o ustanovitvi 
Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo in izvedbena Uredba (Euratom) št. 3227/76, kakor je bila spremenjena, tvorita pravno podlago nadzornih ukrepov Euratoma
2. 
3. REORGANIZACIJA 
16. februarja 2003 je bil Oddelek za varstvo pred sevanjem premeš čen iz 
Generalnega direktorata za oko lje v Generalni direktorat za energetiko in promet 
(DG TREN). Poleg tega sta se dve enoti Generalnega direktorat za energetiko in 
promet, ki sta se ukvarjali s pravnimi in tehni čnimi vprašanji ter mednarodnimi 
                                                 
1 Sodba v zadevi C-29/99 z dne 10. decembra 2002, Poro čila Sodiš ča evropskih Skupnosti 
[2002] I-11221. 
2 Za podrobnejše podatke glej poglavji 2 in 3 COM(2001) 436 kon č. 
 
SL 3   SL odnosi na jedrskem podro čju, preselili iz Bruslja v Luksemburg. Dva direktorata 
Generalnega direktorata za energetiko in pr omet, jedrska energija (H) in jedrski 
nadzorni ukrepi (I), sta zdaj  odgovorna za vse dejavnosti na podro čju varnosti in 
nadzora, ki jih izvaja Komi sija v okviru Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti 
za atomsko energijo, vklju čno s tistimi, ki jih je izvajal bivši Evropski urad za 
nadzorne ukrepe.  
4. VAROVANJE ZDRAVJA - JEDRSKA VARNOST 
4.1. Jedrski paket 
30. januarja 2003 je Komisija po posvetu s Skupino za člen 31 in Evropskim 
ekonomsko-socialnim odborom sprejela predlo ga za direktivi Sveta o jedrski varnosti 
in upravljanju z radioaktivnimi odpadki. 
Prvi predlog za direktivo, ki opredeljuje3 osnovne obveznosti in splošna na čela glede 
varnosti jedrskih objektov, je namenjen  zagotavljanju varovanja zdravja pred 
ionizirajo čim sevanjem v času življenjskega ciklus a jedrskega objekta - od 
načrtovanja do razgradnje. Z direktivo bi osnovne obveznosti in splošna na čela, 
zajeta v ustreznih mednarodnih konvencij ah, postala del zakonodaje Skupnosti. Za 
zagotavljanje verodostojnosti  sistema predlog predvide va sistem medsebojnega 
pregleda s strani pristojnih or ganov za varnost iz drugih držav članic. Poleg tega želi 
ta pobuda zagotoviti, da bodo na voljo zadostna finan čna sredstva za kritje stroškov 
razgradnje jedrskih objektov. 
Cilj drugega predloga za direktivo4 o upravljanju z izrablje nim jedrskim gorivom in 
radioaktivnimi odpadki je, da se države članice obveže, da sprejmejo nacionalne 
programe za upravljanje z radioaktivnimi odpadki, sprejmejo skupne skrajne roke za 
odlaganje radioaktivnih odpadkov in dajo prednost rešitvi gl obokega geološkega 
odlaganja. Ta predlog želi zagotoviti tudi sodelovanje med državami članicami na 
področju raziskav in tehnološkega razvoja, ki  se nanaša na ravnanje z izrabljenim 
gorivom in odlaganje radioaktivnih odpadkov. 
Predlagani direktivi sta bili 2. maja 2003 poslani Svetu, ki ju je v skladu s Pogodbo o 
ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo poslal v presojo Evropskemu parlamentu. Razprava v Svetu o predlogih, ki ju je podprl tudi Evropski parlament, je pripeljala do re vizije dokumentov. 
4.2. Regulativne delovne skupine 
Skupina CONCERT in Delovna skupina je drskih regulativnih organov (NRWG) 
povezujeta visoke predstavnike jedrskih  regulativnih organov iz Evropske unije, 
srednje in vzhodne Evrope ter nekdanje Sovjetske zveze. Leta 2003 so bili 
obravnavani in dokon čani številni dokumenti o pred časnem zaprtju jedrskih 
elektrarn, neporušitvenih pregledih jedrskih kompone nt ter vplivih ekonomskih 
predpisov na jedrsko industrijo. 
                                                
 
3 COM(2003) 32 kon č. 
4 COM(2003) 32 kon č. 
 
SL 4   SL 4.3. Radioaktivni odpadki in razgradnja 
Aprila 2003 je Komisija objavila Peto poro čilo o stanju na podro čju upravljanja z 
radioaktivnimi odpadki v Evropski uniji, ki kaže položaj v razširjeni EU. Poro čilo 
navaja, kot enega pomembnih dosežkov, da  se proizvodnja odpadkov še naprej 
zmanjšuje zaradi postopkov zmanjšev anja odpadkov v nizkoradioaktivnih 
kategorijah. 
Na podro čju razgradnje je Generalni direktorat za energetiko in promet okrepil svoje 
sodelovanje pri dejavnostih Mednarodni h skladov za razgradnjo (International 
Decommissioning Funds - IDF) še pred prenosom odgovornosti za upravljanje s 
skladi za Ignalino v Litvi in Bohunice na Slovaškem na Genera lni direktorat za 
energetiko in promet po širitvi maja 2004. 
Generalni direktorat za energetiko in prom et je še naprej sodeloval tudi pri delu 
številnih mednarodnih organizacij in nji hovih odborov (zlasti IAEA in OECD/NEA) 
na področju radioaktivnih odpadkov in razgradn je. Posebno pomembno je bilo delo 
na področju varnostnih zahtev glede geološ kega odlaganja radioaktivnih odpadkov. 
4.4. Prevoz radioaktivnih snovi in program SURE 
Glavna dejavnost v letu 2003 je bila priprava Petega poro čila o prevozu 
radioaktivnih snovi, ki ga je pripravila Stalna delovna skupina (SWG) in priprava 
sporočila Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu na osnovi tega poro čila. Namen 
navedenega poro čila je opisati položaj v zvezi s pr evozom radioaktivnih snovi v EU 
in ugotoviti posebne težave ter, če je to potrebno, predlaga ti ukrepe za izboljšanje 
delovanja tega sektorja in  zvišanje ravni varnosti. 
Poleg tega so bila pregledana tri kon čna poročila o statistiki prevozov jedrskih 
materialov, izboljšanju predpisov IAEA o prevozu površinsko kontaminiranih snovi 
in snovi z nizko specifi čno aktivnostjo in oceni var nostnih podatkov o jedrski 
kritičnosti ter omejitvah za prevoz aktinidov. Pregledani sta bili tudi dve vmesni 
poročili iz projektov SURE, ki sta osredoto čeni na metodologije za izdajanje potrdil 
držav članic in držav pristopnic ter izpuste  radioaktivnih snovi  v aerosolih kot 
posledice nesre č pri prevozu. 
5. VAROVANJE ZDRAVJA – VA RSTVO PRED SEVANJEM 
5.1. Splošni razvoj 
Pričakuje se, da se bodo zaradi sinergij, ki iz hajajo iz premestitve Enote za varstvo 
pred sevanjem iz Generalnega direktor ata za okolje v Genera lni direktorat za 
energetiko in promet, sprostila sredstva. Ker je bilo v letu 2003 izvedeno le eno 
preverjanje v skladu s členom 35, so bili izvedeni pripravljalni ukrepi, da bi 
omogočili obsežen program preverjanja v letu 2004. 
Čeprav je zakonodajni na črt utrpel nekaj zamude, je Komisiji do konca leta vseeno 
uspelo sprejeti dva pomem bna akta, in sicer priporo čilo Komisije, ki usklajuje 
 
SL 5   SL poročanje o izpustih iz jedrskih objektov5 in direktivo Sveta o nadzoru 
visokoaktivnih zaprtih virov6.  
5.2. Izvajanje zakonodaje 
Prenos v zakonodajo držav članic 
Pravilno in popolno izvajanje zakonodaje  Skupnosti je bilo zagotovljeno z 
instrumenti, ki jih dolo ča Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko 
energijo, in sicer s priporo čili, preverjanji, mnenji in postopki za ugotavljanje kršitev. 
Posebna prizadevanja so bili usmerjen a na izvajanje najnovejših direktiv o 
varnostnih standardih7 in izpostavljenosti sevanju v zdravstvu8, ki jih je bilo treba 
prenesti pred 13. majem 2000. 
Člen 33 Pogodbe zavezuje države članice, da Komisiji predložijo osnutke nacionalne 
zakonodaje. Sprejeti so bili štirje takšni os nutki, v dveh primerih je Komisija imela 
pripombe. Službe Komisije so pripravile 11 mnenj o na črtih za odlaganje 
radioaktivnih odpadkov, predloženih v okviru člena 37. V okviru člena 141 je bilo 
obravnavanih 26 postopkov za ugotavljanje kršitev. Komisija se je odlo čila, da bo 
dva primera v zvezi s členom 37 in direktivo o inform iranju javnosti predložila 
Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti. Skupaj je bilo zaklju čenih 10 primerov, dva od njih 
potem, ko je Sodiš če razglasilo, da država članica ni sporo čila prenosa ukrepov 
direktive o temeljnih varnostnih standardih in direktive o izpostavljenosti sevanju v 
zdravstvu. 31. decembra 2003 je bilo nerešenih še 16 primerov kršitev. 
5.3. Navodila za izvajanje 
Navodila za izvajanje, ki se nanašajo na  enotne temeljne varnostne standarde za 
varstvo zdravja delavcev in prebivalstva  pred nevarnostmi, ki izvirajo iz 
ionizirajo čega sevanja, pripravi Skupin a znanstvenih izvedencev iz člena 31 Pogodbe 
o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo. Leta 2003 je skupina sprejela 
osnutek dokumenta o doznih ogradah. Kon čno sprejetje se pri čakuje leta 2004. 
Strokovni seminar, ki ga je organizira la Komisija, je pripeljal do dogovora o 
prihodnjih ukrepih na podro čju poklicne prekomerne izpostavljenosti sevanju v 
zdravstvu in morebitnih dodatnih tvegan jih zaradi novih tehnologij v medicini. 
Dodatne pobude so se nanašale na izpostavl jenost letalskih posa dk sevanju (projekt 
EURADOS), na evropsko raziskavo o pok licni izpostavljenosti sevanju (ESOREX 
2000), na ocene „operativne iz vedbe direktive o delavcih na prostem“ in „uvajanja 
evropske platforme za izobraževanje in usposabljanje“. 
                                                 
5 UL L 2, 6.1.2004, str. 36. 
6 UL L 346, 31.12.2003, str. 57. 
7 Direktiva Sveta 96/29/ Euratom z dne 13. maja 1996 o dolo čitvi temeljnih varnostnih standardov za 
varstvo zdravja delavcev in prebivalstva pred nevarnostmi zaradi ionizirajo čega sevanja, 
UL L 159, 29.6.1996, str. 1. 
8 Direktiva Sveta 97/43/Euratom od 30. junija 1997 o varstvu zdravja posameznikov pred nevarnostjo 
ionizirajo čega sevanja zaradi izpostavljenosti sevanju v zdravstvu, UL L 180, 9.7.1997, str. 22. 
 
SL 6   SL 5.4. Pravni razvoj 
Direktiva Sveta o nadzoru visokoaktivnih zaprtih radioaktivnih virov in virov 
neznanega izvora (Direktiva HASS) je bila sprejeta decembra 20039. Direktiva 
navaja, da izdaja dovoljenja za kakršno koli dejavnost, ki vklju čuje visokoaktivni vir, 
zahteva predhodno preiskavo, da bi se prepri čali, da so bili izve deni vsi ukrepi, ne 
samo za varno uporabo vira, ampak tudi za pravilno upravljanje z njim po tem, ko ne bo več v uporabi. Direktiva vklju čuje tudi dolo čbe, ki se nanašajo na vodenje 
evidence, posedovanje in pr enos virov ter odgovornost za vire „neznanega izvora“. 
Kot smernice sta bili izdani dve priporo čili Komisije o radi oloških posledicah 
nesreče v Černobilu
10 in standardiziranih podatkih o radioaktivnih izpustih v okolje 
iz jedrskih reaktorjev in predelovalnih objektov11. 
Na osnovi razsodbe Sodiš ča Evropskih skupnosti z dne 10. decembra 2002 o 
pristojnostih Euratoma na podro čju varstva pred sevanjem, je Svet sprejel odlo čbo, ki 
spreminja besedilo izjave o pristojnos tih, ki jo je podal Euratom v skladu s členom 
30(4)(iii) Konvencije o jedrski varnosti12.  
5.5. Pripravljenost na izredne dogodke 
Enota za varstvo pred sevanjem je obdržal a svojo službo s 24-urno pripravljenostjo, 
imenovano ECURIE, z namenom, da bi la hko v primeru izrednega radiološkega 
dogodka sprožila izmenjavo informac ij. Opravljene so bile tehni čne izboljšave 
komunikacijskih sistemov ECURIE , organizirane pa so bile  tudi redne testne vaje. 
Z namenom, da bi v primeru izrednega dogodka sprožili takojšen odziv, vzdržuje 
sistem ECURIE tesne operativne povezave s Centrom za spremljanje in informiranje (Monitoring and Information Centre - MIC) , ki ga vodi Genera lni direktorat za 
okolje v okviru Mehanizma Skupnosti za krepitev sodelovanja na podro čju civilne 
zaščite.  
Maja je bil za države pristopnice in države kandidatke organiziran te čaj za 
usposabljanje ECURIE. Jeseni so se Bolgar ija, Madžarska in Litva uradno pridružile 
sistemu ECURIE. Druge države pristopnice in  države kandidatke so že udeležene v 
skupnosti ECURIE in se pripravljajo na članstvo, čeprav v nekaterih državah 
pristopnicah tehni čno izvajanje komunikacijskega sistema ECURIE ni tako teko če, 
kot je bilo predvideno. 
                                                
 
9 Direktiva Sveta 2003/122/Euratom, UL L 346, 31.12.2003, str. 57. 
10 Priporo čilo Komisije 2003/274/Euratom z dne 14. aprila o varstvu in informiranju javnosti glede 
izpostavljenosti, ki izhaja iz st alne kontaminacije neka terih prehrambenih izde lkov divjega videza z 
radioaktivnim cezijem kot posledice nesre če v jedrski elektrarni v Černobilu, 
UL L 99, 17.4.2003, str. 55. 
11 Priporo čilo Komisije 2004/2/Euratom z dne 18. decembra o standardiziranih informacijah glede 
radioaktivnih izpustov v zrak in odpadne vode iz normalno delujo čih jedrskih reaktorjev in 
predelovalnih objektov v okolje, UL L 2, 6.1.2004, str. 36. 
12 Sprejeta 15.12.2003. Glej tudi Odlo čbo Komisije 2004/491/Euratom z dne 29.4.2004, 
UL L 172, 6.5.2004, str. 7. 
 
SL 7   SL 6. VAROVANJE ZDRAVJA - ODGOVORNOST NA PODRO ČJU JEDRSKE 
VARNOSTI 
Pariška Konvencija z dne 29. juli ja 1960 o odgovornosti tretjim na podro čju jedrske 
energije dolo ča zahteve, ki zadevajo odgovornost nosil cev jedrske dejavnosti tretjim 
in pravila o odškodnini v primeru jedrske nesre če. Spreminjajo či protokol dolo ča več 
kot tridesetkratno povišanje vsote, ki jo mora pla čati nosilec jedrske dejavnosti, ki se 
tako pove ča na minimalno 700 milijonov EUR. Pr otokol razširja tudi geografski 
obseg uporabe Konvencije, da bi zagotovili  odškodnino žrtvam v državah, ki niso 
pogodbenice Konvencije, in širi materialni  obseg uporabe, da bi pokrili škodo za 
okolje ter stroške nadzorni h ukrepov. Ker spreminjajo či protokol vpliva na pravila 
Skupnosti o pristojnosti, je proces podpis ovanja in ratifika cije zahteval odlo čitve 
Sveta in posvetovanja Evropskega pa rlamenta, ki so potekala leta 2003. 
7. JEDRSKA VARNOST – NADZORNI UKREPI EURATOMA 
7.1. Splošni razvoj 
Leta 2002 je Komisija dolo čila novo poslanstvo za oddelke, ki vodijo njene nadzorne 
dejavnosti na podro čju nadzornih ukrepov („nadzor ni ukrepi Euratoma“) in od 
zadevnih direktoratov zahteva la, da ponovno opredelijo splošn e pristope spremljanja 
po tipih objektov in da v skladu s tem spre menijo postopke inšpekcijskih pregledov. 
Da bi v zvezi s tem zagotovila strokovno sv etovanje, je Komisija imenovala tudi 
Znanstveno skupino za svetovanje o nadzor nih ukrepih Euratoma (SAGES). Leta 
2003 so na skupnih sestankih SAGES in osebja  Komisije razpravljali o spremenjenih 
pristopih za številne tipe  objektov in o krovnem stra teškem dokumentu. Predlogi 
predstavljajo odmik od trad icionalnih nadzornih ukrepov. Pojmi, kot je pravo časnost, 
bodo manj pomembni kot v preteklosti. Ve čji poudarek bo na zagotavljanju, da bodo 
nosilci dejavnosti us trezno spremljali in nadzirali jedr ske snovi v svoji lasti. Vpeljane 
bodo tehnike, ki se uporabljajo izven podro čja nadzornih ukrepov, kot je preverjanje 
sistemov. Razsežnost in časovna razporeditev spremlja nja, ki ga bo opravljala 
Komisija, bosta za nosilce dejavnosti manj predvidljivi. Inšpek cijski pregledi bodo 
načrtovani ob upoštevanju medsebojnih odnosov med razli čnimi stopnjami jedrskega 
gorivnega cikla. 
Razprave o osnutku nove uredbe o nadzor nih ukrepih (COM(2002)99), ki se ukvarja 
s tehničnim razvojem nadzornih ukrepov in za gotavlja ustrezno pravno podlago za 
izvajanje dodatnih protokolov k sporazumom o ukrepih z IAEA, so se nadaljevale v 
Skupini za jedrska vprašanja Sveta ( AQG). Razprave so vodile do številnih 
obrazložitev, razumevanj in dogovorov me d Komisijo in delegacijami držav članic, 
ki so zbrani v dokumentu z naslovom „Smernice za uporabo COM(2002)99“, ki bo 
objavljen v obliki priporo čila Komisije in bo nosil ce dejavnosti oskrbel z 
neobvezujo čimi navodili. Pri čakuje se, da bo Svet uredbo potrdil v za četku leta 2004.  
Organizirana so bila dvostranska sre čanja z zadevnimi državami članicami, da bi 
razpravljali o vprašanjih , ki izhajajo iz dolo čb spremenjene uredbe o odpadkih in o 
podrobnostih izvajanja dodatnega protokola (AP). Vse države članice so bile 
povabljene na sre čanje v Luksemburgu decembra 2003, da bi razpravljale o 
izvedbenih vprašanjih, zlasti na podro čju skupnih dejavnosti Euratoma in IAEA v 
evropskih jedrskih objektih. Pozitiven odz iv po tem dogodku kaže, da bi bila taka 
 
SL 8   SL srečanja lahko koristna tudi v pr ihodnosti, zato naj bi od zdaj naprej organizirali eno 
ali dve sre čanji letno. 
Podrobni rezultati raziskave kakovosti nadzor nih ukrepov Euratoma so opisani v 
Prilogi 1. V splošnem so bili nosilci dejavnosti zadovoljni s podobo in uspešnostjo nadzornih ukrepov Euratoma v svojih objektih. 
Nadaljevalo se je delo v zv ezi z razvojem in izvajanj em novih tehnologij nadzornih 
ukrepov. Podrobnosti so nave dene v Prilogi 2. 
V luči prihodnje širitve EU je bila posebna  pozornost namenjena pripravljalnemu 
delu, da bi se omogo čil hiter za četek inšpekcijskega dela na podro čju nadzornih 
ukrepov v teh državah. Jedrska industrija v pristopnih državah je najpogosteje 
omejena na energijske reaktorje in skladiš ča. Za posamezne države so bile 
vzpostavljene misije, da bi vzpostavile stike na delovni ravni  in vpeljale okvir 
bodočega inšpekcijskega dela. Delovna s kupina za širitev se je novembra sre čala s 
predstavniki IAEA, da bi pripravila  prihodnje inšpekcijs ke dejavnosti. Dolo čen je bil 
program misije za ugotavljanje dejstev in tehni čne naloge, ki se bo izvedel v prvem 
četrtletju leta 2004. 
7.2. Dejavnosti nadzornih ukrepov preverjanja  
Nosilci dejavnosti v jedrskih objektih so Komisiji poro čali o svojih zalogah in 
pretoku jedrskega materiala. Med letom je prispelo ve č kot milijon vrstic 
knjigovodskih podatkov, v glavne m preko elektronskih sredst ev. Pri vseh podatkih se 
je preverjalo notranjo in zunanjo uskl ajenost (vmesno ujemanje) in skladnost z 
določbami sporazumov o sodelovanju s tretji mi državami. Vse ugotovljene tipkarske 
napake in neskladnosti so  bile popravljene po pos vetu z zadevnim nosilcem 
dejavnosti. Knjigovodski podatki so bili pos lani IAEA v skla du z izpolnjevanjem 
obveznosti EU glede njenih sporaz umov z IAEA o nadzornih ukrepih.  
V letu 2003 so inšpekcijske dejavnosti, ki so jih izvajali inšpektorji za nadzorne 
ukrepe Komisije, obsegale 6366 osebnih inšpek cijskih dni, skoraj 13 % manj kot leta 
2002. Ta padec je predvsem posledica nadaljnje racionalizacije in dolo čitve prednosti 
za inšpekcijske dejavnosti. Glavni pomisleki in/ali rezultati, dobljeni med izvajanjem inšpekcijskih dejavnosti za vse tipe objekt ov pod nadzorom so zbrani v Prilogi 3. 
Dejavnosti preverjanja, izvedene v skla du z nadzornimi ukrepi Euratoma v okviru 
poglavja 7 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske  skupnosti za atomsko energijo, so 
pokazale, da ni dokazov, ki bi kazali na t o, da se jedrske snovi ne uporabljajo za 
predvidene namene. Prav tako ni dokazov, ki bi kazali na neskladnost s posebnimi 
določbami o nadzornih ukrepih, ki jih je S kupnost sprejela s sporazumi, sklenjenimi 
z državami, ki niso članice EU. 
8. JEDRSKA VARNOST – SODELOVANJE Z IAEA 
Komisija sodeluje z Mednarodno agencijo  za atomsko energijo (IAEA), ki je 
odgovorna za svetovne nadzorne ukrepe v sk ladu s Pogodbo o neširjenju jedrskega 
orožja (NPT), ki jo spoštujejo vse države članice Evropske unije. Podrobnosti o tem 
sodelovanju so nave dene v Prilogi 4. 
 
SL 9   SL 9. JEDRSKA VARNOST – NEDOVOLJENA TRGOVINA  
Komisija je še naprej aktivno so delovala pri delu Mednarodne tehni čne delovne 
skupine za tihotapljenje jedrskih snovi (ITWG), ki deluje pod okriljem Strokovne 
skupine za neširjenje jedrskeg a orožja (NPEG) v okviru G8. V Evropski uniji so leta 
2003 zabeležili tri primere nedovoljene trgovine z jedrskimi snovmi, pri čemer je šlo 
za ščite iz osiromašenega urana in izdelke, ki so vsebovali torij. Poleg tega je bilo 
zabeleženih tudi deset primerov nedovoljene  trgovine z radioaktivnimi viri.  
10. JEDRSKA VARNOST – SODELOVANJ E Z DRUGIMI REGIONALNIMI 
ORGANIZACIJAMI 
Kot del „Dialoga o energiji“ med EU in Ru sijo je bilo na vrhu EU-Rusija novembra 
2003 v Rimu ob navzo čnosti g. Prodija in g. Putina predloženo Četrto poro čilo o 
napredku. Poro čilo je vklju čevalo izjavo, da nameravata EU in Rusija z namenom 
tesnejšega sodelovanja na podro čju jedrske varnosti izdela ti program sodelovanja pri 
knjigovodstvu in nadzoru jedrsk ih snovi. Izvedenci Komis ije za jedrske nadzorne 
ukrepe so že opravili predhodne pogovore z ruskimi sogovorniki, da bi pripravili 
skupen program sodelovanja. Za črtan je bil del ovni program, vklju čno z 
vzpostavitvijo inšpekcijskih postopkov za predelovalne in proizvodne objekte, 
skupnim razvojem ra čunalniških aplikacij, namenjenih sledenju zajemanja jedrskih 
snovi, ali drugih podobnih orodij za  upravljanje s podatki na podro čju nadzornih 
ukrepov, skupnim programom usposabljanja in z organizacijo konference v Rusiji na 
temo jedrske varnosti. 
11. JEDRSKA VARNOST – FIZI ČNO VAROVANJE 
Euratom je pogodbenica Konvenc ije iz leta 1979 o fizi čnem varovanju jedrskega 
materiala (CPPNM), ki v glavnem zadeva fizi čno varovanje jedrskih materialov med 
mednarodnim prevozom. Marca 2003 je  posebna delovna skupina dokon čala 
poročilo, ki je predlagalo spremembo za okrepitev dolo čb Konvencije. Predlagana 
sprememba bi okrepila ureditev fizi čnega varovanja s širitv ijo obsega pristojnosti 
Konvencije, ki bi pokrivala jedrski material med doma čo uporabo, skladiš čenjem in 
prevozom, kakor tudi zaš čito objektov pred sabotažo . Predlagana sprememba 
potrjuje, da primarno odgovornost za fizi čno varovanje nosijo posamezne države. 
Poleg tega je predlagana tudi uvedba pr avne obveznosti za uporabo temeljnih ciljev 
in načel fizičnega varovanja, kot je potrdil Sv et guvernerjev IAEA. Do konca leta 
2003 še ni bila sprejeta odlo čitev o amandmajski konferenci. 
12. MEDNARODNO SODELOVANJE 
Leta 2003 so se v zadovoljstvo vseh pogodbeni c uveljavili sporazumi o sodelovanju 
na jedrskem podro čju z Združenimi državami Amerike, Kanado in Avstralijo. 
Dvostranska posvetovanja med Komisijo in  Kanado, kakor tudi med Komisijo in 
ZDA, so potrdila, da so se med pogodbenicami razvili dobri odnosi. 
Nekaj napredka je bilo doseženega pri pogajanjih o sporazumih z Japonsko in 
Kitajsko. Čeprav sporazum z Japonsko ni bil sk lenjen zaradi težav med postopkom 
potrjevanja osnutka na Japonskem, obstaja  optimizem, da bi se v letu 2004 lahko 
 
SL 10   SL dogovorili o kompromisnem besedilu. Svet je  Komisijo pooblastil za pogajanja s 
Kitajsko glede sporazuma o jedrskem sodelovanju in pogajanja se bodo kmalu začela. 
13. SREDSTVA 
Člen 174 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske sk upnosti za atomsko energijo izrecno 
omenja nujnost vklju čevanja dodeljenih prora čunskih sredstev v prora čun Komisije 
za operativne izdatke v zvezi z dejavnostmi jedrskih nadzornih ukrepov. Leta 2003 
so posebna dodeljena operativna prora čunska sredstva v prora čunu EU za nadzorne 
ukrepe Euratoma dosegla 18,8 milijona EUR. Od tega zneska je bilo dejansko porabljenih 13 milijonov EUR (70 %). P odrobnosti so navedene v Prilogi 5. 
Ob koncu leta 2003 sta na podro čju jedrske varnosti in zaš čite delala 302 uradnika, 
od teh je bilo 182 jedrskih inšpektorje v. Podrobnosti o razpoložljivem osebju in 
njihovih dejavnostih so prav tako navedene v Prilogi 5. 
14. SKUPNI ZAKLJU ČKI 
Leto 2003 je bilo pomembno za prestrukturira nje dejavnosti Komisije na jedrskem 
področju, kar naj bi vodilo k pomembnim ope rativnim sinergijam, ki bodo Komisiji 
npr. omogo čile, da bo pove čala število preverjanj je drskih objektov države članice. 
Ko bo sprejet jedrski paket, najpomembne jša pravna pobuda le ta, bo to vodilo k 
enotni visoki ravni varnostnih standardov v jedrskih objektih po vsej razširjeni EU in 
bo obenem zagotavljalo, da bodo sprejete ustrezne dolo čbe za razgradnjo jedrskih 
objektov in za upravljanje z izrabljenim jedr skim gorivom in radioaktivnimi odpadki. 
Sprejem direktive o upravljanju z vis okoaktivnimi zaprtimi viri bo pomagal 
zagotoviti, da bodo potencialno škodljivi viri natan čno zabeleženi, upravljani in 
odstranjeni. Komisija je tudi dejavno zagotovila, da bodo države članice pravilno 
prenesle zakonodajo Skupnosti v svojo nacionalno zakonodajo. 
Komisija je dejavno sodelovala na mednarodnih forumih o jedrski varnosti, 
upravljanju z odpadki, nadzornih ukrepih, varstvu pred sevanjem in prevozih 
radioaktivnih snovi. Še naprej ostaja klju čni akter pri ukrepih Skupnosti za 
obvladovanje ve čjih radioloških nesre č. 
Kar zadeva nadzorne ukrepe Euratoma, je Ko misija naredila velik napredek v smeri 
praktičnega izvajanja novega pos lanstva za nadzorne ukrepe Euratoma. Korak naprej 
je bil dosežen v zvezi s spremembo ure dbe o nadzornih ukrep ih v razpravah s 
Svetom. Komisija je dosegla ve lik napredek tudi pri prakti čnih pripravah za izvajanje 
Dodatnega protokola. Raziskava o tem, kako nosilci dejavnosti sprejemajo nadzorne 
ukrepe Euratoma, je pokazala, da  so na splošno zadovoljni z na činom, kako Komisija 
izvaja nadzorne ukrepe. 
Na osnovi izvedenih inšpekcijskih pregledov in ocene knjigovodskih poro čil, ki so 
jih predložili imetniki jedrskih snovi, ni  dokazov, ki bi kazali na to, da se jedrske 
snovi ne uporabljajo za predvidene namene , ki so jih navedli uporabniki v Evropski 
uniji leta 2003. Prav tako ni dokazov, ki bi kazali na to, da se niso spoštovale dolo čbe 
mednarodnih sporazumov o nadzornih ukrepih. Statisti čna ocena knjigovodskih 
 
SL 11   SL poročil kaže, da knjigovodski sistemi za jedr ski material pri vseh velikih nosilcih 
dejavnosti dosegajo mednarodne standarde. 
Prizadevanja v letu 2003 t vorijo trdno osnovo, na kateri bo Generalni direktorat za 
energetiko in promet še naprej razv ijal svoje dejavnosti na jedrskem podro čju. 
Pomagala bodo obdržati jedrsko opcijo odprto , kar vodi k trajno stno uravnoteženi 
mešanici energetskih virov, manjši odvisnos ti od uvoza energije in varovanju okolja 
s splošnim zmanjševanjem emisij CO 2. 
 
SL 12   SL ANNEXES  
. 
 
SL 13   SL ANNEX 1  
Euratom Safeguards Performance – Detailed e valuation of the survey of operators 2002 
The survey contained 29 questions, divided in to five groups (general safeguards issues, 
transmission of data to Euratom Safeguards, quality of Euratom Safeguards’ information on 
inspections, evaluation of inspec tion issues, and wider issues). 
A total of 72 questionnaires were sent to all the major nuclear installations as well as to a 
representative sample of all the other nuclear installations in the European Union (EU). 84% 
of the questionnaires were returned and betw een 82% and 100% of the individual questions 
were answered. Thus, the size of the response  permits conclusions to  be drawn about the 
image and performance of the Euratom Safeguards authorities. Overall, operators noted their 
satisfaction concerning the image and the pe rformance of Euratom Safeguards in their 
installations. 
The costs to the operators of a safeguards in frastructure to meet Euratom requirements 
compared to the costs of meeting other statut ory obligations were fe lt to be not very high. 
Operators expressed reservations concerning remote transmission of  real-time accountancy 
data, surveillance images, and non-destructive assay results from their facilities to Euratom Safeguards headquarters in Luxembourg. 
With regard to the quality of information on insp ections, operators appear to be very satisfied 
with communication with Euratom Safeguard s inspectors during inspections, and most 
operators welcome the follow-up letters sent af ter inspections. Nonethel ess, the evaluation 
indicated that communication channels out side inspections need to be improved. 
Regarding the evaluation of inspection issues, the answers revealed that the majority of 
operators of power reactors, enri chment plants and reprocessing plants are not satisfied with 
coordination/cooperation between Euratom Safegua rds and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). This is an important finding which needs to be followed up. On the other 
hand, there is reasonably good continuity in th e approaches followed during two consecutive 
inspections conducted by Euratom Safeguards inspectors. The replies concerning the 
professional abilities of Eu ratom inspectors confirmed their knowledge and thorough 
understanding of their working environment. 
The balance between cost and effectiveness in the way in which inspections are organised and 
conducted is rated as medium. However, operato rs did not suggest meas ures to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of inspections, nor did they identify ways to improve the balance 
between cost and effectiveness. Most operators  were not very enthus iastic about providing 
more support to Euratom Safeguards in excha nge for a less intrusive inspector presence. 
As to the wider framework, operators were o pposed to the inclusion of safety, security, 
physical protection, and radiological protectio n in the tasks of the Euratom Safeguards 
inspectors. The views were somewhat divided on the question of whether or not the Euratom 
Safeguards system contributes to improving the quality of the nuclear accountancy system, 
the commercial relations/image, and the qu ality control system of the operators. The 
consensus view was that two to three years would be a suitable in terval between future quality 
surveys. 
 
SL 14   SL ANNEX 2  
Progress in Safeguards Technology 
In 2003, work continued on the development and implementation of new safeguards 
technologies including the new digital survei llance systems. These systems have motion 
detection and image data treatment applications already incorporated in the delivered systems. 
These advanced features provide valuable assi stance and they save time when viewing or 
reviewing images. The installation of one of th ese units at the Trillo nuclear power plant 
(Spain) was the first in the presence of the IA EA. This was an important step on the path to 
approval of the equipment fo r routine use by the IAEA. 
With regard to existing equipment, developmen t work has continued on the improvement of 
hand-held instruments and associated so ftware for measuring gamma radiation. 
A special instrument for the measurement of fresh, highly enriched fuel elements was 
developed in 2003 and installed at  the FRM2 reactor in Munich. 
In terms of new equipment, the Commission pa rticipated in a demonstration of a Digital 
Cerenkov Device for viewing irradiated nuclear fu el stored under water at the Ringhals power 
plant in Sweden. The device has the potential to view irradiated fuel with a cooling time in 
excess of 20 years or a low burn-up. 
The Commission has also been exploring the po ssibility of using Virtual Private Networks 
over the telephone network to provide a secu re means of data transmission. Following a 
workshop held in Luxembourg in March 2003 the requirements and boundary conditions were established for secure data transmi ssion from nuclear sites to Luxembourg. 
 
SL 15   SL ANNEX 3  
Euratom Safeguards: Detailed inspection findings 
In 2003 inspection activities conducted by Co mmission Safeguards inspectors amounted to 
6366 person-inspection days, down by almost 13 % in comparison with 2002. This fall mainly 
resulted from further streamlining and prioritisation of inspection activities. 
The main concerns and/or results achieved in the course of the inspection activities for each 
type of installations under c ontrol are summarised below. 
Reprocessing facilities13 
The nuclear fuel reprocessing installations at  THORP, Sellafield, UK,  and at UP2/UP3, La 
Hague, France are characterised by their high throughput14, automation, and limited access to 
the process areas. The current safeguards approach for these plants comprises high frequency inspections and automated unattended instrumentat ion to verify the nuclear material flow, a 
significant part of which is plutonium. Both sites have on-site laboratories, operated by 
analysts from DG JRC-ITU, in which ve rification measurements are performed. 
THORP was in normal production mode thr oughout 2003 with the exception of a planned 
shutdown during the months of October and November. Investigations continued on the 
apparent bias of the operator's input sample re sults from 2001 with particular emphasis on the 
calibration of the material used for verifica tion of input solutions . The annual Physical 
Inventory and the Material Balanc e presented by BNFL were accepted. 
Apart from a few short tec hnical shut-down periods, the Magnox reprocessing facilities  at 
Sellafield were in operation at a high throughput during the year. The first plutonium was 
introduced in the new Store 9 Extension in November 2002. Verification activities in these 
plants and in other Magnox rela ted facilities on the Sellafiel d site were satisfactorily 
concluded. Some reservations however, had to be made in respect of some old plutonium 
stores where access is restricted due to radiological conditions, as  well as in respect of some 
very old plants being decommissioned. 
The UP2/800 reprocessing plant was in operat ion during the whole of 2003. Efforts were 
made to optimise inspection activities. In pa rticular, a revised safeguards approach was 
successfully tested in the i rradiated fuel storage ponds; th is will halve the inspection 
manpower needed to safeguard these ponds. The annual physical inventor y verifications were 
successful in the plutonium stores. With re spect to the UP2/800 ch emical process, the 
verifications performed confirmed a probl em concerning high values of Material 
Unaccounted For (MUF) for uranium and uraniu m 235 which had already been detected in 
2002. The issue is still under investigation by COGEMA. The cumulative “Shipper-Receiver 
Difference” declarations for the unit for recycling of aged separated plutonium are higher than 
expected and might represent a new problem. This issue is also being examined by COGEMA. 
                                                
 
13 At reprocessing plants, irradi ated fuel assemblies received fr om power reactors are processed 
chemically to separate uranium and plutonium from the highly radioactive fission products. The separated nuclear materials can be re -introduced into the fuel cycle. 
14 The total annual throughput of these three facilities adds  up to over 3000 tonnes of fuel containing more 
than 20 tonnes of plutonium. 
 
SL 16   SL The UP3 reprocessing plant was in operation from January to December 2003. The annual 
physical inventory carried out in August 2003 wa s satisfactorily completed. The installed 
instrumentation to verify the plutonium produc t input and output was upgraded and updated 
satisfactorily. The operator announced the start of  reprocessing of research reactor fuel in 
2005; this will have an impact on the safeguards  strategy for the plant as it will involve 
handling highly enriched uranium. 
Enrichment facilities15 
At the three Urenco centrifuge enrichment plants  at Almelo (NL), Gronau (D) and 
Capenhurst (UK), sample taking for subsequent High Performance Trace Analysis (HPTA) is 
now routinely used to confirm that only low-en riched uranium is produced. The analysis of 
the samples started in 2003. 
Meetings were held between Urenco, the Member States involved, the IAEA and the 
European Commission to prepare for the implem entation of the Additional Protocol in the 
Urenco plants at Almelo, Gronau and Jülich (D). 
The diffusion enrichment plant,  Eurodif Production at Pierrelatte, France,  was subjected to 
weekly import and export verifications th roughout 2003. The operator cooperated with the 
Commission’s request concerning the presenta tion of product for ve rification and sealing 
before export from the European Union. 
The annual inventory verificatio n was carried out in the first week of February 2003. 
Additional verification ac tivities in two other installations  were required before the annual 
inventory verification could be successfully concluded. 
Constraints placed by France on th e inspectors due to the “ particular status ”16 of the 
installation remain in force, which cr eate unsatisfactory verification conditions. 
Within the limits set by these constraints, no evidence of diversion of  nuclear material under 
safeguards was found. 
Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX)17 
At the Belgonucléaire MOX fuel fabrication plant  at Dessel, Belgium, there is an apparent 
trend in the cumulative MUF. Although the individual MUF figure for the year 2003 was 
statistically acceptable, the quant ities of nuclear material esta blished during all recent annual 
physical inventory takings were systematical ly higher than the declared book figures. The 
operator is conducting a joint investigation with  DG TREN to identify the possible cause for 
this trend. 
                                                 
15 Modern Light Water Reactors need fuel with about 3 to 5 percent of the fissionable uranium isotope 
U235. As natural uranium contains only 0.7 percent of this nuclide, an enrichme nt process is needed to 
achieve the desired concentration. In the European Union, two companies offer this service for civil 
customers: URENCO and EURODIF. 
16 Due to the presence of material not under safe guards in the material balance area of EURODIF 
Production S.A. 
17 In MOX Fuel Fabrication Plans, the plutonium oxide produced in reprocessing installations is used in a 
mixture with uranium oxide to fabr icate MOX fuel elements for subseq uent use in nuclear power plants. 
 
SL 17   SL Active commissioning of the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) in the  UK continued. However, 
operational problems caused production delays th roughout the year. These problems were one 
of the causes of the higher th an expected MUF. The operator has started remedial work and 
has planned improvements of the concerned syst ems. Progress has been made in discussions 
with the operator and UK national authorities on data transfer to Luxembourg for evaluation. 
The decommissioning of the Siemens Mixed Oxide fuel fabrication plant  in Hanau, 
Germany is progressing well and is expected  to lead to a reduc tion of the inspection 
frequency there in 2004. 
The results of the annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at the  COGEMA MOX 
fabrication plant  at Cadarache in France were not en tirely satisfactory owing to the high 
values of MUF. There is, however, no evidence that safeguarded nuclear  material has been 
diverted from its intended use. The operato r has made a commitment to re-measure all 
materials identified as being a potential source of the discrepancies. 
LEU and HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion Facilities18 
At BNFL Springfields in the UK, a large natural and low-en riched uranium conversion and 
fuel fabrication plant, the annual Physical Inve ntory Verification revealed  shortcomings in the 
stocktaking arrangements for a limited area of  the plant. A task force was set up by the 
operator to improve the nucle ar material management. 
At Fabbricazione Nucleare LEU fabrication plant  in Bosco Marengo, Italy, the operator 
has finished the repackaging of the low enrich ed and natural uranium oxide which remained 
in the installation after fabri cation activities were stopped. Th e material was verified and 
sealed; it will be kept cont ained for a long period of time. 
At the FBFC LEU fabrication plant  Romans , France, a systematic error was discovered in 
the declared tare weights of uranium powders  shipped to FBFC in Dessel, Belgium. The 
accountancy declarations have si nce been corrected accordingly. 
Following evaluation, satisfactory explanations were also found for a series of positive MUF 
values at the FBFC LEU fabrication plant  at Dessel  in Belgium. 
Nuclear Power and Research Reactors19, other installations and facilities 
The formal status of Unit 1 of the Gundremmingen  power plant in Germany was changed 
from closed down to decommissioned as was the status of the Zwentendorf project  in 
Austria, which was abandoned before Austria be came an EU member. Both power plants are 
                                                 
18 At LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, fuel assemblies are produced from low en riched uranium (LEU) for 
subsequent use in nuclear power pl ants. In HEU Fuel Fabrication Plan ts, fuel elements for research 
reactors that use high-enriched uranium (HEU) are manufactured. 
19 Most of the nuclear power reactors operated in the European Union ar e of the Light Water Reactor type 
(LWR), i.e. the reactors are cooled  and moderated with normal water.  In addition, the UK operates 
MAGNOX and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) which are moderated with graphite and cooled 
with CO2 gas. The operation of LWRs using LEU is characterised by long periods (12-18 months) of 
continuous operation. These period s, when the in-core fuel is in accessible, are followed by outages 
typically lasting 2-4 weeks when about one third of the (used) core fuel is exchanged for fresh fuel from 
Fuel Fabrication Plants. LWRs are inspected during th is outage period when all the fuel is accessible for 
verification. 
 
SL 18   SL still being decommissioned but in spection visits confirmed that  massive reconstruction would 
be needed before the plants could be made usable. 
Initiatives are underway to remove the Dodewaard reactor in the Netherla nds from the list of 
safeguarded plants, the remain ing action being the final shut down of the facility and the 
subsequent shipments of the remaining nuc lear material, accompanied by the necessary 
inspections. 
During a check of the spent fuel pond at the Oskarshamn Power Plant in Sweden the 
operator found that a fuel rod appeared to be  missing from a storage cassette. The matter was 
treated seriously and it took concurrent inve stigations by the Commi ssion and the IAEA to 
clarify the situation which goes back to the time before  Sweden joined the EU. 
In Finland  the start of inspection work in two pow er plants was delayed because of plant 
security not accepting the inspector’s passport as  a valid document. In both cases, the matter 
could only be resolved by ne gotiation and through the interv ention of the Finnish State 
Authority (STUK). Inspectors also experienced di fficulties in gaining access to facilities in 
France where an operator’s health physics service refused to accept the inspector’s radiation 
protection passport, even though it was properly in order and up to date. 
Operators’ uncertainty with respect to the pr ogress/handling of verifi cation requests led to 
growing pressure for clarific ation. This was specifically felt in plants in Belgium: Doel, 
Tihange, and Belgonucléaire . 
At the BR2 reactor in Mol, Belgium, an Advanced Ther mal Power monitor was installed by 
the IAEA to verify the declaration of the operating history and guarantee the absence of 
undeclared production of plutonium. The BR2 reactor is the first research reactor in the EU to 
be equipped with such a monitor. The device is still being tested. 
Inspections to verify the transfer of spent fuel to  CASTOR casks  continued to be of 
particular concern. In view of the envisaged medium to long term  storage of these containers 
at reactor sites in Germany, Belgium and Spain , their contents were measured by DG TREN 
I before loading and subsequently brought under multiple containment and surveillance systems. Due to recurring technical problems dur ing the loading, drying  and closing of the 
CASTOR flasks, inspections prove d to be difficult to plan. As the above countries have to 
empty their reactor ponds for operational pur poses, these activities required more human 
resources than expected. 
A new store for spent fuel and plutoniu m (MAGENTA) is to be constructed at Cadarache  in 
France and is expected to be operational in 2009. The French authorities and the plants’ 
management presented the project to the Commissi on at an early stage in order to allow DG 
TREN’s requirements to be met. 
Anticipating the entry into force of the Additio nal Protocol, the IAEA insisted on visiting a 
large number of locations containing small quantities of nuclear material ( Locations Outside 
Facilities - LOF ). This caused a substantial additional inspection burden for DG TREN. 
However, on occasions these inspections led to unexpected findings, for example at the University of Vienna a small sample of hi ghly enriched uranium, which had not been 
recorded as such, was found. 
 
SL 19   SL Material Balance Evaluation of Bulk-Handling Facilities 
In bulk handling facilities (Conve rsion Plants, Enrichment Plan ts, Fuel Fabrication Plants, 
and, Reprocessing Plants) nuclear material is mostly processed in loose forms, such as 
powders or liquids. Measurement uncertainties and particularities of the process lead to 
differences between the book inventory and the physical r eality (known as Material 
Unaccounted For, MUF). The MUF is established at  the operator’s own annual physical 
inventory taking. It is verified  by the inspectors of DG TREN, who do their own verifications 
and measurements. 
In 2003, the Material Balance Evaluation focused on 
– the evaluation of differences between ope rators’ declarations and inspectors’ 
measurement results obtained by Destructive Analysis (DA), 
– evaluation of the MUF declared by the facility, 
– evaluation of the cumulative MUF, which is the algebraic sum of the MUF for 
a Material Balance Area (MBA) over time, and 
– Shipper-Receiver Differences (SRD)20. 
The entire evaluation of MUF, cumulative MU F and SRD was based on data collected from 
the Euratom Safeguards accountancy database wh ich means that the French bulk-handling 
MBAs for which no declarations exist were  excluded from the evaluation. Small bulk-
handling MBAs with a physical ending or a th roughput less than two si gnificant quantities21, 
as well as those plants decommissioned in  2003, were excluded from the evaluation. 
No evidence was found to suggest that, in th e bulk-handling facilitie s of the EU, source 
materials or special fissile mate rials were diverted from their intended uses as declared by the 
operators. It found that, without exception, operators’ measurement systems comply with the 
most recent international standa rds. Nevertheless, some problem s were revealed. At the large 
BNFL uranium conversion and fuel fabr ication plant at Sp ringfields in the  UK, the MUF 
cannot be explained by measurem ent uncertainties alone. In a ddition, there was still evidence 
of biases in the cumulative MUF for some bulk- handling facilities, which have to be further 
investigated to identify th e required corrective actions. 
                                                 
20 ‘Shipper-Receiver Difference’ means the difference be tween the quantity of nuclear material in a batch 
as stated by the shipping material  balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. 
21 Significant quantities are used in establishing the qu antity component of the safeguards inspection goal, 
e.g. 8 kg plutonium, 25 kg high enriched uranium and 75 kg low enriched uranium. 
 
SL 20   SL ANNEX 4  
CO-OPERATION WITH THE INTERNATI ONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 
The SIR 2002 concluded that there was no evid ence of diversion of nuclear material or 
misuse of equipment or facilities plac ed under safeguards in the European Union. 
The SIR 2002 acknowledged that collaboration  with Euratom and Member State support 
programmes made it possible to achieve significant advances  in safeguards technology and 
verification procedures. Trials we re carried out in various EU installations in the areas of 
surveillance systems, short notice random inspec tions, and remote monitoring, as were field 
tests on implementing the Additional Protocol (research centres in Finland and in the 
Netherlands). A workplan for Flowsheet Verifi cation (FSV) of neptunium was discussed and 
agreed with the ITU at Karlsruhe and the impl ementation of FSV measures is expected to 
begin shortly. 
In line with the New Partnership Approach arrang ements and in order to save resources, the 
IAEA and Euratom Safeguards continued to shar e the purchase, operational and maintenance 
costs of equipment installed in facilities under IAEA safeguards. 
A seminar on the New Partnership Approach, jointly developed by the Agency and Euratom, 
was held in Vienna. Many of the IAEA’s routin e training courses were attended by inspectors 
from DG TREN and conversely, IAEA inspector s attended courses gi ven by DG TREN, thus 
maintaining cooperation on training. 
In addition to its global conclusions, the SI R 2002 made recommendations for improvement 
in specific areas. These recommenda tions may be summarised as follows: 
• Problems occurred when nuclear material re mained in closed shipping containers at 
reactors over long periods. Th e practicalities of extending th e area under surveillance and 
of sealing the shipping cont ainers before their remova l are being investigated. 
• The issue of verifying that there has been no undeclared production of plutonium in the 
EU’s three large research reactors will be se ttled once power monitors are installed at the 
reactors concerned. Indeed, the first power  monitor was installed in 2003 at the BR2 
reactor in Belgium. 
• Corrective actions need to be taken as soon as possible after a Containment and 
Surveillance (C/S) failure is detected. The IAEA intends to install a newer generation of 
C/S equipment, improve equipment reliabi lity, and provide backup measures for C/S 
applied to reactor cores (particu larly during open core periods). 
Several meetings of Working Groups and the Li aison Committee took place to discuss these 
and other topics. Because the Euratom Safegua rds Office underwent extensive reorganisation, 
which will lead to changes in  the implementation of safeguards with the IAEA, the New 
Partnership Approach (NPA) arrangements need to  be reviewed to reflect these changes and 
to seek new efficiency and enhanced coope ration. The IAEA has called for a meeting to 
discuss forthcoming changes and their potential impact. 
 
SL 21   SL Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards 
The aim of the Additional Protocols is to increase the IAEA’s capabilities to detect 
undeclared nuclear materials and ac tivities in violation of the N on-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
In 2003, Euratom Safeguards continued to play a key role in preparing for the implementation of the Additional Protocol in the European  Union, on issues such as harmonising and 
standardising reporting under the Additional Protocol
22, arrangements for users with small 
quantities of nuclear material for non-fuel cycl e related activities and joint visits with the 
IAEA to confirm the status of decomm issioned facilities. Dedicated reporting software23, 
developed by the Commission, was supplied to all the Member Stat es for trials. The 
conceptual work on site defi nitions, developed jointly by DG TREN H and the EU Member 
States, is now reflected in the revised IAEA Gu idelines for reporting and can be considered as 
the international standard on site definition. 
By the end of 2003, all EU Member States ha d ratified the Additional Protocol and the 
majority had put the correspondi ng implementing arrangements in place. In line with Annex 
III of the EU-NNWS (non-nuclear  Weapons States) Additional Protocol, known as the “Side 
Letter”, the Commission the Commission agreed to  accept the transfer of certain activities 
which are the responsibility of the Member Stat es. Provision for the acceding Member States 
to become parties to the EU-NNWS Additional Protocol24 was made in close cooperation 
with the Commission’s Legal Service and the IAEA. 
                                                 
22 The implementation paper for the so-called Side Letter and non-Side Letter Member States has been 
merged as the differences turned out to be of only minor relevance. 
23 CAPE, Commission Additional Protocol Editor. 
24 The Additional Protocol does not provide fo r its own accession clause, but the Safeguards 
Agreement does. 
 
SL 22   SL ANNEX 5  
RESOURCES 
Budget Appropriations for Nuclear Safeguards Article 174 of the Euratom Treaty specifically mentions the necessity to include 
appropriations in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure related to nuclear 
safeguards activity. 
On this legal basis, safe guards activities are financed  from two types of budget 
appropriations: 
- A general “administrative” appropria tion involving the costs of Euratom 
Safeguards overheads such as general IT equipment, telecommunications, etc. (Part A of the Budget, chapters A- 70 and A-24), as well as a specific 
appropriation for the medical survey and the radiation protection of the 
inspectors (Part A of the Budget, line A-1420); 
- Specific “operational” appropriations allo cated for expenditure directly related 
to nuclear safeguards such as mission cost s, rental of offices  on site (including 
on site laboratories), purchase of tec hnical equipment and samples taking and 
analysis, contracts for services (i.e. ma intenance and repairs), transportation of 
equipment and samples, training, etc., necessary for Euratom Safeguards activities (Part B of the Budget, chapter B4-20). 
For 2003, specific operational appropriations in the EU budget for Euratom Safeguards came 
to €18.8 million. Of that amount, €13 million (70 %) was actually committed. The expenditure 
was broken down as follows: 
• Inspection mission costs (travel, daily allowances) €3.8m (29.2%) 
• Rental of offices for the inspectors on inspected sites 
(and related equipment costs) €0.5m (3.8%) 
• Purchase, installation, maintenance and repair of 
equipment on site, including IT, analysis of samples, 
and related costs such as transport, consumables, spare parts, etc. €2.0m (15.4%) 
• Investments made in la rge scale plutonium bulk 
handling plants and related maintenance, operation and logistics €6.0m  (46.2%) 
• Administrative and technical  assistance, training for 
inspectors, and other expe nses (including special 
insurance coverage) €0.7m (5.4%) 
 
SL 23   SL Staff Resources and Utilisation 
As of 31 December 2003, 95 officials were worki ng in Directorate H (Nuclear Safety and 
Security), and 189 officials in Directorate I (Nuc lear Inspection). In a ddition, the office of the 
deputy Director General, charged with the coordination of nuclear  matters, comprised 5 
persons. In addition, a total of 13 officials of Di rectorate A in Luxembourg were allocated to a 
number of administrative tasks related to both Directorates. 
Thus, an overall total of 302 offi cials were working in the field of nuclear safety and security, 
of which 182 were Nuclear Inspectors. 
In addition, the work of both Directorates wa s supported by a total of 19 external personnel. 
 
SL 24   SL ANNEX 6  
Table 1 - Quantities of nuclear ma terial under Euratom safeguards (t) 
 End 1990 End 1995 End 20011) End 20021) End 20031) 
Plutonium 203 406 548 569 590
Uranium 
Total HEU
2) 
LEU3) 
NU4) 
DU5)  
200 400 
13 
32 000 44 000 
124 400 269 100
11
46 70051 400
171 000314 610
10
57 00052 700
204 900 
318 710 
10 
58 500 47 700 
212 500 325 510
10
59 70042 600
223 200
Thorium 2 600 4 600 4 500 4 500 4 400
1) Quantities based on final reported data 
2) High enriched uranium 
3) Low enriched uranium 4) Natural uranium 5) Depleted uranium 
Table 2 - Inspection activities of Euratom Safeguards 
Person days of 
inspection in: 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States 2412 2113 2328 2348 1990 
France 3492 3426 2934 2539 2266 
UK 2871 2895 2399 2404 2110 
Total 8775 8434 7661 7291 6366 
 
SL 25   SL Table 3 – Euratom Safeguards budget 2003 
Expenditure committed for the specific appropriations 
Table 3A: Line B4-2000  
Safeguard inspections, training and retraining of inspectors 
Topics Expenditure (€ ’000) 
a) Studies, convocation of experts, publications 50 
b) Mission costs 3,744 
c) Transportation for staff and equipment 640 
d) Rental of offices and special services on sites 456 
e) Internships and training 30 
f) Special insurance 40 
TOTAL 4,960 (out of 5,700) 
Table 3B: Line B4-2020 
Sampling and analyses, equipment, specific wo rk, provision of services and transport 
Topics Expenditure 
(€ ’000) 
a) Administrative and t echnical assistance 135 
b) Purchase of surveillance equipment 463 
c) Purchase of measurement equipment 118 
d) Purchase of equipment for seals  
e) Purchase and maintenance of computing equipment directly linked to inspections 109 
f) Costs for destructive analysis  
g) Equipment spares, repairs, accessories and maintenance 282 
h) Consumable items, purchase of sources, transport of radioactive materials 47 
i) Monitoring (warning system based in Luxembourg) 52 
j) Software (accountancy program, management and firewall) 794 
TOTAL 2,000 (out of 5,500) 
 
SL 26   SL Table 3C: 
Line B4-2021: Specific safeguards for la rge-scale plutonium processing plants 
Topics Expenditure (€ ’000) 
a) Sellafield – BNFL (THORP, MOX) 294 
b) La Hague – COGEMA (UP3, UP2) 205 
c) Cadarache – COGEMA 10 
d) Marcoule – MELOX 30 
e) Dessel – BELGONUCLEAIRE 15 
f) On site laboratories (initial investments 
and operations) 3,563 
g) Software (on sites) 223 
h) Maintenance & repairs (equipment, 
hardware and software support) 1,129 
i) Software development (new applications, 
new equipment ) 531 
TOTAL 6,000 (out of 7,400) 
Table 3D: 
Line A0-1420: Health checks fo r staff exposed to radiation 
Topics Expenditure (€ ’000) 
a) Gamma spectrometry and toxicological 
analysis (non-standard) 5 
b) Measurement equipment (dosimeters) 29 
c) Maintenance and calibration 15 
d) Material, services and other 
contamination controls 46 
e) Mission costs (for body-counter) 35 
f) Other running expenses 20 
TOTAL 150 (out of 215) 
 
SL 27   SL Table 4 – DG TREN Safeguards budget 1991-2003 (€ million) 
Evolution of expenditure for the specific budget appropriations 
Budget Line 1991 1995 2003 
Safeguard inspections, 
training and retraining of inspectors 
(B4-2000) 2.5 4.2 5.7 
Sampling and analyses, 
equipment, specific work, provision of 
services and transport 
(B4-2020) 2.3 3.2 5.5 
Specific safeguards for 
large-scale plutonium 
processing plants 
(B4-2021) 2.6 10 7.4 
Health checks for staff 
exposed to radiation 
(A0-1420)  0.1 0.3 0.2 
TOTAL 7.5 17.7* 18.8 
*In addition, €1.8 million was spen t on cooperation with Russia.