SK Úradný vestník Európskej únie C 37/50

ŠTÁTNA POMOC – SPOJENÉ KRÁĽOVSTVO

Štátna pomoc SA.15373 (2013/C-18) (ex 2013/NN) – Monitorovanie existujúcej schémy pomoci „Enterprise Capital Funds“ (C17/2004)

Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 108 ods. 2 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie

(Text s významom pre EHP)

(2014/C 37/05)

Listom z 20. novembra 2013, ktorý je uvedený v autentickom jazyku za týmto zhrnutím, Komisia oznámila Spojenému kráľovstvu svoje rozhodnutie začať konanie stanovené v článku 108 ods. 2 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie, pokiaľ ide o uvedenú pomoc/uvedené opatrenie.

Zainteresované strany môžu predložiť svoje pripomienky k opatreniu, vo veci ktorého Komisia začína konanie, v lehote jedného mesiaca odo dňa uverejnenia tohto zhrnutia a nasledujúceho listu. Kontaktné údaje:

European Commission Directorate-General Competition State Aid Registry 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË Fax: +32 2 296 1242

Tieto pripomienky sa oznámia Spojenému kráľovstvu. Zainteresované strany môžu písomne s uvedením dôvodov požiadať o dôverné zaobchádzanie s údajmi o ich totožnosti.

ZHRNUTIE

1. POSTUP

Komisia schválila schému „Enterprise Capital Funds“ (podnikové kapitálové fondy, ďalej len „ECF“) (SA.15373) 3. mája 2005 článkom 87 ods. 3 písm. c) Zmluvy o ES [teraz článok 107 ods. 3 písm. c) ZFEÚ], a to najmä na základe usmernení o rizikovom kapitáli z roku 2001 (1) platnými v tom čase, po začatí konania vo veci formálneho zisťovania [C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)].

Listom z 18. októbra 2006 sa orgány Spojeného kráľovstva zaviazali prijať primerané opatrenia pre všetky existujúce schémy rizikového kapitálu.

V roku 2011 bola schéma ECF vybraná na monitorovanie štátnej pomoci [SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)]. Zistilo sa, že Spojené kráľovstvo neprijalo primerané opatrenia na zosúladenie schémy ECF v súlade s usmerneniami o rizikovom kapitáli z roku 2006. Orgány Spojeného kráľovstva predložili informácie o vykonávaní existujúcej schémy, ktorá bola aktualizovaná 12. júla 2013, e-mailom zo 16. júna 2013.

2. OPIS EXISTUJÚCEJ SCHÉMY ECF

Schéma ECF bola zameraná na zlepšenie prístupu ku kapitálu na rozširovanie pre MSP v celom Spojenom kráľovstve pomocou kombinovania verejných a súkromných investícií. Verejné investície boli obmedzené na dvojnásobok súkromného kapitálu získaného prostredníctvom fondu ECF. Rozdelenie ziskov a strát medzi verejných a súkromných investorov v ECF bolo založené na princípe, že v prípade negatívneho vývinu situácie sa mali straty rozdeliť rovnakým dielom so súkromnými investormi, a v prípade pozitívneho vývinu situácie sa mali zisky rozdeliť nerovnomerne (t. j. súkromní investori mali dostať väčšinu ziskov nad určitou mierou ziskovosti). Tento mechanizmus zabezpečil, že ECF boli komerčne orientované a zároveň zahŕňali štátnu pomoc.

ECF mali právo investovať do oprávnených MSP prostredníctvom nástrojov vlastného alebo kvázi vlastného kapitálu medzi 250 000 GBP (357 000 EUR) a 2 mil. GBP (2,9 mil. EUR). Čisté dlhové investície boli v rámci schémy vyslovene zakázané. Nadväzujúce investície boli povolené iba v prípade, ak celkové financovanie vlastného kapitálu, ktoré prijímajúci MSP dostal od ECF a od iných poskytovateľov vlastného kapitálu, nepresiahlo 2 mil. GBP (2,9 mil. EUR). Nadväzujúce investície presahujúce tento limit boli povolené, ak to bolo potrebné, len po uplynutí aspoň 6 mesiacov a v záujme zabrániť rozptýleniu boli podmienené hornou hranicou vo výške 10 % viazaného kapitálu príslušného ECF. V rámci schémy ECF bolo vytvorených 12 fondov, z ktorých sedem bolo vytvorených po 18. auguste 2007, t. j. po dátume, kedy mali orgány Spojeného kráľovstva prijať primerané opatrenia, a to najneskôr po tom, ako 18. augusta 2006 nadobudli účinnosť usmernenia o rizikovom kapitáli. Tieto fondy investovali do 94 spoločností.

Na základe dôkazov, ktoré predložili orgány Spojeného kráľovstva, sa Komisia domnieva, že tri ECF vykonali nadväzujúce investície do siedmich spoločností s cieľom zabrániť zníženiu hodnoty akcií. Komisia sa domnieva, že schéma umožnila fondom ECF využiť „predkupný mechanizmus“, v rámci ktorého mohli ECF využiť právo prvého odmietnutia s cieľom získať nové akcie vydané prijímateľom investície do portfólia ECF, aby sa zabránilo súkromným investorom investovať do takýchto podnikov, a tým znížiť akciový podiel ECF. Orgány Spojeného kráľovstva však uviedli, že takýto mechanizmus sa nikdy v praxi neuplatňoval a zaviazali sa, že sa nebude používať ani budúcnosti.

3. POSÚDENIE

Posúdenie vyvolalo pochybnosti Komisie, pokiaľ ide o súlad schémy ECF so súčasnými usmerneniami o rizikovom kapitáli, a to najmä v týchto oblastiach:

a) Oprávnenosť niektorých prijímateľov investície

Usmernenia o rizikovom kapitáli (bod 4.3.2) obmedzujú investície rizikového kapitálu na: 1. malé podniky až do fázy rozširovania, alebo 2. stredné podniky až do počiatočnej fázy bez ohľadu na sídlo prijímateľa investície (t. j. môže sa nachádzať sa v podporovaných alebo nepodporovaných oblastiach), alebo 3. stredné podniky až do fázy rozširovania v prípade, že sa nachádzajú v podporovaných oblastiach.

Komisia konštatuje, že šesť prijímateľov investície bolo vo fáze rozširovania, keďže v čase prvej investície ECF viac rokov vyvíjali obchodnú činnosť. Štyria zo šiestich uvedených prijímateľov investície boli v čase investície malé podniky; preto sa investície uskutočnili v súlade s obmedzeniami stanovenými v usmerneniach o rizikovom kapitáli. Dve spoločnosti – Reevoo a Interactive Investors – však boli v čase investície ECF strednými podnikmi (2), pretože počet ich zamestnancov prekračoval prahovú hodnotu (4). Okrem toho, vzhľadom na ich sídlo v Londýne, ktorý je nepodporovanou oblasťou, mohli dostať investíciu len do počiatočnej fázy.

V tomto štádiu skúmania vznikajú pochybnosti o súlade týchto dvoch investícií s usmerneniami o rizikovom kapitáli z roku 2006, keďže existujú iba obmedzené dôkazy zlyhania trhu. Tretie strany sa vyzývajú, aby predložili pripomienky k týmto oneskoreným investíciám a k existencii zlyhania trhu, ako to vyžadujú usmernenia o rizikovom kapitáli z roku 2006.

b) Využitie transakcií náhrady kapitálu

Na základe dôkazov poskytnutých orgánmi Spojeného kráľovstva sa Komisia domnieva, že fond […] (*) investoval do jedného kombinovaného manažérskeho odkupu (buy-in management buy-out – BIMBO). Cieľový podnik Andante Travels mal v čase investície 28 rokov predajnej činnosti. V čase investície zamestnávala spoločnosť […] (*) osôb a mala ročný obrat […] (*).

Usmernenia o rizikovom kapitáli zakazujú odkúpenia a transakcie náhrady kapitálu. Preto by sa mal rozsah, v akom mali tieto transakcie vplyv na hospodársku súťaž, odskúšať, a to tým, že sa tretím stranám umožní predložiť k tomu pripomienky.

Vzhľadom na uvedené skutočnosti zastáva Komisia predbežné stanovisko, že uvedené investície uskutočnené ECF poskytli niekoľkým prijímateľom investície hospodársku výhodu, pretože tieto subjekty prijali investíciu/pomoc, ktorá nebola v súlade s pravidlami stanovenými v usmerneniach o rizikovom kapitáli z roku 2006. V tomto štádiu má Komisia pochybnosti, či možno takúto pomoc považovať za zlučiteľnú s vnútorným trhom.

V súlade s článkom 14 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 659/1999 sa môže od príjemcu požadovať vrátenie každej neoprávnene poskytnutej pomoci.

ZNENIE LISTU

„The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter "TFEU"). 1. PROCEDURE (1) The Enterprise Capital Funds ("ECFs") scheme (SA.15373) was approved by the Commission on 3 May 2005 under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty (now Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) and in particular on the basis of the Risk Capital Guidelines of 2001 ("RCGs of 2001") (5), in force at the time, after opening a formal investigation procedure (C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)). (2) In September 2006, following a meeting with the UK authorities, the services of the Commission informed the UK authorities that the ECFs scheme was not in line with the Risk Capital Guidelines adopted in August 2006 (hereafter "RCGs of 2006") and invited them to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with them. (3) By letter of 18 October 2006, the UK authorities committed to take appropriate measures concerning all their existing risk capital schemes. (4) In 2011, the ECFs scheme was selected for the State aid monitoring exercise (SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)). It was found that the UK had failed to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with the RCGs of 2006. (5) A meeting took place on 21 May 2013 between the Commission services and the UK authorities where the former proposed that the monitoring case and several changes to the scheme, which were subsequently notified on 21 August 2013 (SA.36428) by the UK authorities, be treated separately in two cases but parallel in time. (6) By e-mail of 16 June 2013, the Commission services received information on the implementation of the existing scheme. The information was updated by e-mail of 12 July 2013. (7) Two teleconferences took place on 1 and 2 July 2013 to discuss several elements of the case, and a meeting took place on 6 August 2013 where the UK authorities clarified several aspects of the operations that took place under the existing scheme. 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ECFS SCHEME (DECISION OF 2005) (8) Combining public and private investment, the ECFs scheme aimed at improving access to expansion capital for SMEs throughout the UK. Public investment was limited to two times the private capital raised by the fund, i.e. minimum one third of an ECF fund was to be provided by private investors. (9) The distribution of the profits and losses between public and private investors in the ECFs was based on the logic that, on the downside, the losses were distributed on equal terms with the private investors being fully exposed, while on the upside the distribution of the profits was non pari passu, i.e. private investors received most of the profits notably above a certain profitability rate. (6) This mechanism ensured that ECFs were commercially oriented while entailing state aid. (10) According to the rules of the scheme (7), an ECF may invest expansion capital in any company: — that meets the EU definition of an SME; — where the purpose of the relevant investment, or the application of the proceeds of such investment by the relevant company or undertaking, is predominantly related to or for the benefit of the economy of the UK; — whose equity or other securities are not, at the time of investment, listed on a recognised stock exchange (such as the London Stock Exchange) or otherwise quoted on a non-recognised exchange, i.e. AIM, Ofex or any other market on which prices are quoted publicly; — where the trade of such company is a qualifying trade as defined in Paragraph 4, Schedule 28B of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, or where the company is undertaking research and development with a view to carrying on a qualifying trade (8). (11) ECF funds invested in eligible SMEs by means of equity and quasi-equity instruments between £250,000 (€357,000) and £2m (€2.9m). Pure debt investments were explicitly forbidden under the scheme (9). (12) Follow-on investments were permitted so long as the total equity funding raised by the SMEs from ECFs and other equity investors was no more than the £2m (€2.9m) limit. (13) Follow-on investments in excess of the above limit, i.e. £2m (€2.9m), were permitted, where necessary, only after a period of at least 6 months and to prevent dilution, subject to an upper limit of 10% of each ECF’s committed capital. (14) From the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that three ECFs, made follow-on anti-dilution investments in 7 companies. The Commission understands that the scheme allowed the ECFs to use a "pre-emption mechanism" whereby the ECFs could exercise a right of first refusal to acquire new shares issued by any investee in the ECF's portfolio, in order to prevent private investors from investing in such companies and thereby dilute the ECF's shareholding. However, the UK authorities have indicated that such a mechanism has never been applied in practice and that they committed not to make use of it in the future. (15) The ECFs scheme was initially approved for a period of 10 years, until 2 May 2015, and was intended to be self-financing over the medium term. For the first year of its operation, the UK allocated €65m to cover the cash-flow cost of the initial public participation. (16) 12 funds were created under the ECFs scheme, out of which 7 were created after 18 August 2007 that is, the date after which the scheme should have been aligned with the RGCs of 2006. The pre-2007 funds invested in 67 companies, while the post 2007 funds invested in 94 companies. Therefore, a total of 161 undertakings have benefited from the scheme. 3. OUTCOME OF THE MONITORING (17) The ECFs scheme was monitored by the Commission services in the light of (1) the Commission's decision of 2005 approving the measure and (2) the RCGs of 2006. (18) The assessment led to the conclusion that the scheme was not in line with the RCGs of 2006 as the UK authorities should have taken appropriate measures within 12 months from their entry into force, i.e. as from 18 August 2007, which they failed to do. The issue of appropriate measures arose with respect to ECFs that received public capital after 18 August 2007i.e. after the date by which the UK authorities should have adopted appropriate measures, at the latest, following the entry into force of the RCGs of 2006 on 18 August 2006. In practice, this meant that only the funds created after the end of the transitional period would need to comply with the RCGs of 2006, whilst the already existing risk capital funds could continue to operate under the rules established by the RSGs of 2001. (19) For the reasons explained in section 4 below, the Commission has doubts with respect to the compliance of the ECFs scheme's implementation with the RCGs of 2006, and particularly with respect to: a) Eligibility for investment of several investees; b) Use of capital replacement operations. 4. ASSESSMENT 4.1. Existence of State aid (20) In the decision of 2005 the Commission concluded that State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU is present at the level of the investors and at the level of the beneficiary SMEs. Therefore, through the implementation of the ECF scheme, the companies that are the object of the current monitoring case have received State aid in the sense of the above mentioned article. The UK authorities do not contest this conclusion. 4.2. Eligibility for investment of several investees (21) Since the creation of the scheme, the ECFs invested in 161 companies, of which 94 were investments made after 18 August 2007. Out of the 94 companies, 40 companies had not had sales at the time of the first investment. Of the remaining 54 companies, 6 appear to have been in their expansion stage since, at the moment of ECF's first investment, they had had commercial activities for a significant number of years. (22) The RCGs of 2006 (Point 4.3.2) limit the investment of risk capital to: (1) small enterprises up to the expansion stage and irrespective of their location, i.e. located in assisted or non-assisted areas (2) medium-size enterprises up to the start-up stage, irrespective of their location, and (3) medium-sized enterprises up to the expansion stage located in assisted areas. (23) The Commission notes that four out of the six above mentioned companies fulfil the definition of small enterprises at the moment of the investment. Therefore, although they seem to have been companies in their expansion stage, given their size, the investments were made in accordance with the limits set out in the RCGs of 2006. (24) The two other companies, Interactive Investors and Reevoo (10) exceeded, at the moment of the first investment, the threshold for a small enterprise (12). Therefore, at the moment of the investment, the two companies qualified as medium enterprises. Moreover, given their location in London, which is a non-assisted area, they could have received investment only up to the start-up phase (13). (25) Consequently, the Commission expresses doubts with respect to the compatibility of the aid for the investments into the two companies as they qualified as medium size enterprises, were in their expansion stage and were located in non-assisted areas. (26) The Commission may declare compatible measures providing finance for medium-sized enterprises in their expansion stage located in non-assisted areas, subject to a detailed assessment (balancing) of the individual case under Chapter 5 of the RCGs of 2006, including any evidence of market failure. At this stage of the investigation, the compatibility of the aid for these two investments with the RCGs of 2006 seems doubtful as there is limited evidence with respect to the market failure they faced. Third parties are invited to submit comments notably on the existence of a market failure with respect to such late-stage development companies as well as any other information relevant for making an in-depth assessment of the aid measure at issue under Section 5 of the RCG 2006. 4.3. Use of a capital replacement transaction (27) Based on the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that the fund […] invested in one buy-in management buy-out (14) (BIMBO). The target company, Andante Travels, had 28 years of commercial activities at the moment of the investment. At the moment of the investment, the company employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […]. (28) Under the RCGs of 2006 the venture capital and risk capital measures refer to new/fresh capital being provided to the investees. Since they have limited impact on the cash/balance sheet of an investee, capital replacement operations are not foreseen as compatible measures under the Guidelines. Hence, in its practice the Commission considers them as not covered by the Guidelines (15), irrespective of the location of the investee, i.e. assisted or not-assisted area. In order to further assess the conditions in which the operation took place and to test its impact on competition, the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure with respect to the above BIMBO operation and invites third parties to present comments on it. 5. CONCLUSION (29) Based on the foregoing analysis, the Commission considers that the ECFs may have granted aid outside of the scope of the approved scheme without prior notification. Therefore it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU in relation to funding decisions by the ECFs as to the following elements: a) Eligibility for investment into Reevoo and Interactive Investor; b) Use of one capital replacement transaction, namely the above BIMBO that benefited Andante Travels. (30) The Commission requires the United Kingdom and all interested parties, within one month from the receipt of this letter, to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessing the compatibility of the above-mentioned measures with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.. (31) The Commission wishes to remind the authorities of the United Kingdom that Article 108(3) TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw their attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. (32) The Commission informs the authorities of the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.“

(1) Ú. v. ES C 235, 21.8.2001, s. 3.

(2) V čase prvej investície ECF vyvíjala spoločnosť Reevoo obchodnú činnosť deväť rokov; zamestnávala […] () osôb a mala ročný obrat […] (*), zatiaľ čo spoločnosť Interactive Investors vyvíjala obchodnú činnosť 11 rokov; zamestnávala […] (*) osôb a mala ročný obrat […] (*).

(3) Tento údaj podlieha služobnému tajomstvu.

(4) 2003/361/ES – Ú. v. EÚ L 124, 20.5.2003, s. 36. Podľa článku 2 prílohy k odporúčaniu Komisie zo 6. mája 2003 o vymedzení mikropodnikov, malých a stredných podnikov je podnik definovaný ako stredný, ak zamestnáva od 50 do 250 osôb a ak má ročný obrat nepresahujúci 50 mil. EUR a/alebo ak celková ročná súvaha nepresahuje 43 mil. EUR. Podnik je definovaný ako malý, ak zamestnáva menej ako 50 osôb a jeho ročný obrat a/alebo celková ročná súvaha nepresahuje 10 mil. EUR.

(5) OJ C 235, 21.8.2001, p. 3.

(6) The government receives a prioritised return equivalent to the interest charged on the balance of outstanding loans to the fund (at the time 4.3%). Once the government has received its prioritised return, outstanding loans may then be repaid to the government and the private investors under the terms specified in the ECFs' partnership agreement. All further distributions to investors are to be divided between the government and all other private investors in a fixed profit-sharing ratio.

(7) Enterprise Capital Fund – Guidance for applicants http://www.capitalforenterprise.gov.uk/files/Guidance%20for%20Prospective%20ECF%20Managers%20-%20V2.pdf

(8) A trade will not qualify if one or more excluded activities together make up a 'substantial part' of that trade. The main excluded activities are: (1) dealing in land, financial instruments, or in goods other than in the course of an ordinary trade of retail or wholesale distribution; (2) financial activities, property development, or providing legal or accountancy services; (3) leasing (including letting assets on hire, except in the case of certain ship-chartering activities); (4) receiving royalties or licence fees, except where these arise from an intangible asset such as a patent or know-how, most or all of which has been created by the company (or one of its subsidiaries); (5) farming, market gardening, or forestry; (6) operating or managing hotels, guest houses, hostels, or nursing or residential care homes; and (7) providing services to another company in certain circumstances where the other company's trade consists to a substantial extent in excluded activities. Source: Enterprise Capital Funds – Guidance for applicants

(9) ECF's Partnership agreement, Point 3.6: "[ECF] may not acquire Investments in a Portfolio Company… (d) in loan finance or debt instruments with no associated equity securities."

(10) At the moment of the first investment Reevoo had 9 years of commercial activity; it employed […] () persons and had an annual turnover of […]. Interactive Investors had 11 years of commercial activity; it employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […];Source: UK authorities

(11) Covered by the obligation of professional secrecy;

(12) See Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124 of 20.5.2003, p. 36), Annex I, Article 2(2) (50 employees).

(13) The Commission also notes that Reevoo had been backed by well-known venture capital firms, i.e. […] and […] (Source: UK authorities) which puts in question whether the company faced any market failure.

(14) Management buy-out is a form of replacement capital through which one or more managers of a company take control of the company's capital by acquiring the majority of shares from the actual owner(s). When the buyer is an outsider of the company who will become manager once the operation is completed, the transaction is called management buy-in. A BIMBO occurs when existing management, along with outside managers, decide to buyout a company. Buy-in management buyout (BIMBO) is a form of a buyout that incorporates characteristics of both a management buy-out and a management buy-in.

(15) See, e.g., Case SA.36489 (2013/N), recital (41)