GĦAJNUNA MILL-ISTAT — IL-BELĠJU

Għajnuna mill-Istat SA.54915 (2019/N) — Mekkaniżmu ta’ remunerazzjoni tal-kapaċità

Stedina biex jintbagħtu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 108(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea

(Test b’rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2020/C 346/03)

Permezz tal-ittra bid-data tat-21/09/2020 riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, il-Kummissjoni avżat lill-Belġju bid-deċiżjoni tagħha li tagħti bidu għall-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 108(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea fir-rigward tal-miżura msemmija hawn fuq.

Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jibagħtu l-kummenti tagħhom, dwar il-miżura li dwarha il-Kummissjoni qed tiftaħ proċedura fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan is-sommarju u tal-ittra segwenti, lil:

European Commission, Directorate-General Competition State Aid Greffe 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel BELGIQUE/BELGIË Faks: + 32 22961242 stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

Dawn il-kummenti se jiġu kkomunikati lill-Belġju. Il-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti u/jew partijiet mill-kummenti sottomessi tista’ titlob bil-miktub biex l-identità tagħha tibqa’ kunfidenzjali, filwaqt li tagħti r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

1. Proċedura

Il-Belġju nnotifika l-miżura minn qabel fit-3 ta’ Lulju 2019. Ġew skambjati diversi kwestjonarji mal-awtoritajiet Belġjani u ġew organizzati laqgħat biex jiġi diskuss il-fajl ta’ qabel in-notifika. Il-Belġju nnotifika l-miżura fid-19 ta’ Diċembru 2019.

2. Deskrizzjoni tal-miżura li fir-rigward tagħha l-Kummissjoni qed tagħti bidu għall-proċedura

L-objettiv tal-mekkaniżmu propost ta’ remunerazzjoni tal-kapaċità (CRM) huwa li jiżgura s-sigurtà tal-provvista, kif definit minn standard ta’ affidabbiltà fl-Att dwar l-Elettriku tal-29 ta’ April 1999. Il-Belġju identifika riskju għas-sigurtà tal-provvista minħabba t-tneħħija gradwali tal-flotta nukleari tiegħu fl-2025.

Fil-mekkaniżmu ta’ kapaċità Belġjan, l-Operatur tas-Sistema ta’ Trażmissjoni (TSO) jixtri l-kapaċità mill-fornituri tal-kapaċità fil-forma ta’ għażliet ta’ affidabbiltà. Il-fornituri tal-kapaċità li jintgħażlu fl-irkant ibigħu l-għażliet ta’ affidabbiltà lit-TSO u jirċievu remunerazzjoni ta’ kapaċità fissa bi tpattija. Kull meta l-prezz ta’ referenza (jiġifieri l-prezz tal-elettriku ta’ ġurnata bil-quddiem) jaqbeż livell definit minn qabel, l-hekk imsejjaħ prezz tal-eżerċitar, il-fornitur tal-kapaċità jrid iħallas lura lit-TSO d-differenza bejn il-prezz ta’ referenza u l-prezz tal-eżerċitar.

It-TSO jorganizza rkant CRM skont il-livell ta’ riżorsi ta’ kapaċità li huma meħtieġa biex jiġi garantit livell adegwat ta’ adegwatezza tar-riżorsi biex jintlaħqu l-istandards ta’ affidabbiltà. L-irkant tal-kapaċità jsir kull sena għall-konsenja fi żmien erba’ snin f’“irkant Y-4”. Irkant ieħor ta’ sena bil-quddiem isir fis-sena immedjatament qabel is-sena ta’ konsenja tal-irkant prinċipali (“irkant Y-1”).

Il-kostijiet tas-CRM (jiġifieri dawk imġarrba biex jiffinanzjaw il-pagamenti tal-kapaċità lill-fornituri) se jiġu ffinanzjati abbażi ta’ “obbligu ta’ servizz pubbliku” permezz tat-tariffi tan-netwerk tat-TSO.

Il-bażi ġuridika tal-miżura hija l-Att dwar l-Elettriku tad-29 ta’ April 1999 dwar l-organizzazzjoni tas-suq tal-elettriku Belġjan immodifikat b’liġi ppubblikata fis-16 ta’ Mejju 2019 fil-Gazzetta Uffiċjali Belġjana (“Belgisch Staatsblad”/“Moniteur belge”). Leġiżlazzjoni sekondarja fil-forma ta’ Digrieti Rjali u Regoli tas-Suq se tiġi adottata u se telabora aktar il-modalitajiet tal-Mekkaniżmu ta’ Remunerazzjoni tal-Kapaċità (CRM). L-abbozzi ta’ dawn it-testi huma disponibbli fuq is-sit web tal-Ministeru tal-Enerġija (1).

3. Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

3.1. L-eżistenza ta’ għajnuna skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 107(1) TFUE

Il-Kummissjoni tqis li s-CRM hija ffinanzjata mir-riżorsi tal-Istat peress li hija ffinanzjata mir-rikavat ta’ imposta parafiskali imposta mill-Istat u li hija ġestita u mqassma skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-leġiżlazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni tinnota li, permezz tal-mekkaniżmu notifikat, l-offerenti rebbieħa jirċievu dħul li ma kinux jirċievu kieku komplew joperaw fis-suq tal-elettriku bil-kundizzjonijiet ekonomiċi normali u kieku kienu jbigħu l-elettriku u servizzi anċillari biss. Barra minn hekk, il-miżura tagħti vantaġġ lil ċerti impriżi biss, proprju lil dawk li jistgħu jikkontribwixxu għas-soluzzjoni tal-problema ta’ adegwatezza identifikata. Dawn jinsabu f’kompetizzjoni ma’ produtturi oħra tal-elettriku. Għaldaqstant, il-miżura notifikata se tagħti vantaġġ ekonomiku lil dawk l-impriżi li jinsabu f’sitwazzjoni fattwali u legali komparabbli ma’ dik ta’ produtturi oħra tal-elettriku. B’riżultat ta’ dan il-miżura hija selettiva. Il-ġenerazzjoni tal-elettriku kif ukoll il-bejgħ tal-elettriku bl-ingrossa u s-swieq tal-konsumaturi huma attivitajiet miftuħa għall-kompetizzjoni fl-UE sħiħa. Għaldaqstant, vantaġġ mir-riżorsi tal-Istat għal impriża f’dan is-settur għandu l-potenzjal li jaffettwa l-kummerċ intern tal-UE u joħloq distorsjoni fil-kompetizzjoni. Għalhekk, il-Kummissjoni tikkonkludi li l-miżura tikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 107(1) TFUE.

3.2. Legalità tal-għajnuna

Billi nnotifikaw l-iskema qabel l-implimentazzjoni tagħha, l-awtoritajiet Belġjani ssodisfaw l-obbligu tagħhom skont l-Artikolu 108(3) tat-TFUE.

3.3. Kompatibbiltà tal-miżura

Il-Kummissjoni vvalutat il-kompatibbiltà tal-miżura mas-suq intern abbażi tal-kundizzjonijiet stabbiliti fit-Taqsima 3.9 tal-Linji Gwida dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat għall-protezzjoni ambjentali u l-enerġija 2014-2020 (2) (EEAG), li jistabbilixxu kundizzjonijiet speċifiċi għall-għajnuna għall-adegwatezza tal-ġenerazzjoni u ilhom applikabbli mill-1 ta’ Lulju 2014. Fit-2 ta’ Lulju 2020, il-Kummissjoni adottat komunikazzjoni li testendi l-EEAG sal-31 ta’ Diċembru 2021 u li temendahom (3).

3.3.1. Objettiv ta’ interess komuni u ħtieġa tal-għajnuna

Il-Belġju identifika l-ħtieġa għas-CRM fi studju dwar l-Adegwatezza u l-Flessibilità ppubblikat fl-2019 mit-TSO Elia (4). L-istudju jidentifika riskji għall-adegwatezza tar-riżorsi Belġjani, b’referenza għall-istandard nazzjonali ta’ affidabbiltà deskritt speċjalment fix-xenarju EU-HiLo (Impatt Għoli – probabbiltà baxxa), li jassumi li diversi unitajiet nukleari mhumiex disponibbli fi Franza (minbarra n-nuqqas ta’ disponibbiltà “normali”). Il-Kummissjoni tqis li l-użu tax-xenarju EU-HiLo f’mekkaniżmu ta’ kapaċità fis-suq kollu ma jidhirx xieraq biex jiġi ddeterminat il-livell tal-problema tal-adegwatezza tar-riżorsi peress li jirriskja li jissopravaluta din il-problema u jfixkel is-suq tal-elettriku. Il-metodoloġija użata fl-istudju ta’ Elia ġiet ikkritikata mir-regolatur nazzjonali (CREG) (5).

Il-Kummissjoni għalhekk għandha dubji dwar jekk il-problema tal-adegwatezza tar-riżorsi ġietx identifikata b’mod preċiż biżżejjed u jekk ġietx analizzata u kkwantifikata kif xieraq mill-awtoritajiet Belġjani, b’mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-punti (221) u (222) tal-EEAG.

3.3.2. Adegwatezza tal-għajnuna

Il-Kummissjoni tiddubita li l-miżura hija xierqa, skont il-punt (226) tal-EEAG, fid-dawl tal-mod restrittiv tagħha ta’ kalkolu tal-limiti ta’ investiment li jwasslu għal kuntratti pluriennali (ta’ 3, 8 jew 15-il sena). Il-limiti jqisu l-kapaċità installata (jiġifieri l-kapaċità massima li l-unità hija mfassla li topera) minflok il-kapaċità deklassifikata (jiġifieri r-rata ta’ disponibbiltà predefinita tagħhom u l-kontribut tagħhom għall-objettiv tal-adegwatezza tar-riżorsi). Il-Kummissjoni hija tal-fehma li din il-karatteristika tista’ tipprevjeni l-kompetizzjoni ġusta bejn it-teknoloġiji li jikkontribwixxu b’mod ugwali għall-adegwatezza tar-riżorsi u b’mod partikolari tiskoraġġixxi teknoloġiji intermittenti b’fatturi ta’ klassifikazzjoni għolja milli jipparteċipaw kompletament (b’mod partikolari sorsi solari u eoliċi intermittenti).

3.3.3. Effett tal-inċentiv

L-objettiv tal-miżura huwa li tiġi żgurata s-sigurtà tal-provvista billi tinżamm disponibbli kapaċità suffiċjenti. Mingħajr mekkaniżmu ta’ kapaċità proporzjonat probabbilment ma jkunx hemm biżżejjed kapaċità biex tiġi żgurata s-sigurtà tal-provvista minħabba li porzjon sinifikanti tal-impjanti huwa previst li jagħmel dħul insuffiċjenti mis-suq tal-enerġija biss biex ikopri l-kostijiet tagħhom. Barra minn hekk, l-obbligu tal-ħlas lura joħloq inċentiv finanzjarju biex ikun disponibbli fi żminijiet ta’ skarsezza. Barra minn hekk, il-Belġju introduċa proċedura ta’ monitoraġġ għad-disponibbiltà qabel u matul il-perjodu tal-konsenja u ttestjar u penali xierqa biex tiġi żgurata l-konformità mal-obbligu tad-disponibbiltà. Il-Kummissjoni għalhekk waslet għall-konklużjoni preliminari li l-miżura għandha fil-prinċipju effett ta’ inċentiv.

3.3.4. Proporzjonalità

Il-Kummissjoni titlob kjarifiki dwar jekk il-miżura hijiex proporzjonata skont it-taqsima 3.9.5 tal-EEAG. Il-Kummissjoni għandha dubji dwar jekk: (i) il-proċess kompetittiv ta’ offerti huwa bbażat fuq kriterji mhux diskriminatorji minħabba l-limiti ta’ investiment imsemmija fit-taqsima 3.3.2 hawn fuq; (ii) il-metodoloġija li tiddefinixxi l-kurva tad-domanda użata għall-kalkolu tal-ammont ta’ kapaċità li għandha tiġi akkwistata f’kull irkant hija proporzjonata peress li tista’ tkun ibbażata fuq is-sensittività mhux realistika UE-HiLo jew sensittivitajiet oħra jekk wieħed jassumi nuqqas ta’ disponibbiltà addizzjonali tal-impjanti nukleari Franċiżi.

3.3.5. Prevenzjoni ta’ effetti negattivi fuq il-kompetizzjoni u l-kummerċ

Il-Belġju se japplika limitu tal-prezz intermedju għall-kapaċità fil-kategorija ta’ kuntratt ta’ sena, biex jevita profitti mhux mistennija. Konsegwentement, dawn il-kapaċitajiet la se jkunu permessi li jagħmlu offerta bi prezz ogħla minn dan il-limitu massimu, u lanqas li jirċievu prezz ta’ approvazzjoni ogħla minnu. Mhi prevista l-ebda valutazzjoni individwali tal-kapaċitajiet biex jingħataw deroga jekk jiffaċċjaw kostijiet ogħla.

Fis-CRM, il-kapaċità barranija indiretta se tkun soġġetta għal-limitu tal-prezz intermedju. Il-Kummissjoni hija tal-fehma preliminari li l-konnessjoni tan-nuqqas ta’ kuntratti pluriennali u l-applikazzjoni tal-prezz intermedju se jipprevjenu lil dawn il-kapaċitajiet milli jagħmlu offerti għall-kostijiet reali tagħhom fl-irkant f’każ li jkunu ogħla mil-limitu tal-prezz intermedju. Għalhekk, jistgħu jiġu skoraġġuti milli jipparteċipaw fis-CRM għal kollox. Il-Kummissjoni tqis li dan joħloq diskriminazzjoni kontra l-kapaċità barranija, bi ksur tal-punt (232) tal-EEAG.

Barra minn hekk, il-punt (233) (c) tal-EEAG jipprevedi li l-mekkaniżmi ta’ kapaċità ma għandhomx “jimminaw id-deċiżjonijiet ta’ investiment li jkunu ġew qabel il-miżura”. Madankollu, il-prezz intermedju jista’ jkollu l-effett li jipprevjeni l-kapaċità eżistenti milli tagħmel offerti għall-kostijiet reali tagħhom, filwaqt li ma jkunux jistgħu japplikaw għal kuntratti pluriennali, li jwassal għall-esklużjoni tagħhom mis-CRM u saħansitra l-ħruġ tagħhom mis-suq tal-elettriku. Il-Kummissjoni għalhekk tfittex aktar informazzjoni biex tivvaluta l-effett tal-limitu tal-prezz intermedju u l-kompatibbiltà tiegħu ma’ dan il-punt tal-EEAG.

Il-Belġju spjega li kien se jalloka d-dħul mill-konġestjoni li jirriżulta mill-allokazzjoni ta’ biljetti transkonfinali (jiġifieri d-drittijiet ta’ aċċess għall-fornituri ta’ kapaċità barranin biex jipparteċipaw fis-CRM) kif previst fl-Artikolu 19(2) tar-Regolament (UE) 2019/943 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (6). Il-Kummissjoni tqis li hija meħtieġa aktar informazzjoni biex tiġi vvalutata l-kompatibbiltà tas-CRM mal-punt (233) (a) tal-EEAG, jiġifieri tiżgura li d-dħul mill-konġestjoni jintuża sabiex is-CRM tipprovdi l-inċentiv it-tajjeb biex jiġi żgurat l-investiment fil-kapaċità tal-interkonnessjoni.

3.3.6. Konformità tal-miżura ta’ għajnuna ma’ dispożizzjonijiet intrinsikament marbuta mad-dritt tal-Unjoni

Jekk miżura ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat tinvolvi aspetti li huma marbuta b’mod indissolubbli mal-għan tal-għajnuna u li jiksru dispożizzjonijiet oħra tad-dritt tal-Unjoni, tali ksur jista’ jaffettwa l-valutazzjoni tal-kompatibbiltà ta’ dik l-għajnuna mill-Istat. F’dan ir-rigward, il-Kummissjoni tasal għall-konklużjoni preliminari li l-mekkaniżmu ta’ finanzjament tas-CRM ma jintroduċi l-ebda restrizzjoni li tikser l-Artikolu 30 jew l-Artikolu 110 TFUE peress li l-Belġju se jippermetti l-parteċipazzjoni ta’ kapaċitajiet barranin fis-CRM. Madankollu, il-Kummissjoni għandha dubji dwar jekk is-CRM hijiex konformi mal-Artikoli 22 (1) (c) u 24 (1) tar-Regolament (UE) 2019/943, peress li kemm l-istudju nazzjonali dwar l-Adegwatezza u l-Flessibbiltà kif ukoll ix-xenarju ta’ referenza użat biex jiġi ddeterminat il-volum tal-kapaċità li għandha tiġi rkantata huma bbażati fuq suppożizzjonijiet dwar il-provvista tal-elettriku barranija (nuqqas ta’ disponibbiltà addizzjonali ta’ impjanti nukleari Franċiżi).

F’konformità mal-Artikolu 16 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (UE) 2015/1589 (7), kull għajnuna illegali tista’ tkun soġġetta għal irkupru mill-benefiċjarju.

IT-TEST TAL-ITTRA

(1) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(2) ĠU C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1.

(3) Ara l-Komunikazzjoni C (2020) 4355 final (ĠU C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2).

(4) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(5) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(6) ĠU L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54.

(7) ĠU L 248, 24.9.2015, p 9.

(8) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385).

(9) Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 29 april 1999 betreffende de organisatie van de elektriciteitsmarkt, teneinde een capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme in te stellen” / “Loi modifiant la loi du 29 avril 1999 relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité portant la mise en place d'un mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(10) Projet d’arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Finaal voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de berekeningsmethode van het noodzakelijke capaciteitsvolume en de parameters die nodig zijn voor de organisatie van de veilingen in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(11) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit betreffende de criteria en nadere regels voor het in aanmerking komen voor de prekwalificatieprocedure voor wat betreft de regels inzake de minimumdrempel en de combinatie van steunmaatregelen

(12) Proposition d’arrêté royal fixant les seuils d’investissements et les critères d’éligibilité des coûts d’investissement en vue du classement des capacités dans les catégories de capacités — Voorstel van koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van de investeringsdrempels en de criteria voor het in aanmerking komen van investeringskosten met het oog op de klassering van capaciteiten in capaciteitscategorieën

(13) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité — Ontwerp van koninklijk besluit houdende vaststelling van de voorwaarden waaronder houders van rechtstreekse en onrechtstreekse buitenlandse capaciteit kunnen deelnemen aan de prekwalificatieprocedure in het kader van het capaciteitsvergoedingsmechanisme

(14) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(15) See: https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200828_public-consultation-crm-functioning-rules

(16) LOLE95 refers to a 95th percentile standard according to which during severe conditions with a chance of 5 % of occurring (i.e. a very cold winter that occurs once in 20 years), the LOLE must be inferior to the given standard, which is, in the case of Belgium, 20 hours.

(17) These values are to be considered as preliminary.

(18) https://www.plan.be/uploaded/documents/201709280927450.Addendum_CBA.pdf

(19) OJ C 121, 6.4.2018.

(20) https://www.elia.be/fr/actualites/communiques-de-presse/2019/06/20190628_press-release-adequacy-and-flexibility-study-for-belgium-2020-2030

(21) See State aid decision C(2018) 589 final, in case SA.48648 (2017/NN) — Belgium — Strategic Reserve.

(22) The ‘EU-BASE’ scenario takes into account the latest known policies of all modelled European countries (nuclear and coal trajectories, expected new built gas generation, demand-side response and storage developments, capacity mechanisms, flow based, rules of the Clean Energy package, expected grid development…).

(23) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/etude-f1957

(24) See State aid decision C(2016) 7086 final in case SA.39621 2015/C.

(25) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Mecanisme-remuneration-capacite-Note-E2-02-10-2019.pdf

(26) Albrecht, Johan, Hamels, S., & Thomas, L. (2017). Le trilemme énergétique: une exploration du paysage Belge de l’electricité en l'An 2030. Gent: Skribis., https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8560302; Study by Energyville: https://www.energyville.be/sites/energyville/files/downloads/2018/gp_bbl_iew_report_-_v2018_03_06_final.pdf

Study by the Federal Planning Bureau: https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201802260841090.OPREP201802.pdf

(27) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/MAF_2018_Methodology_and_Detailed_Results.pdf

(28) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%201%20-%20Detailed%20Results%2C%20Sensitivities%20and%20Input%20Data.pdf

(29) A ‘Coal Phase-out’ sensitivity is performed. In total, around 23,6 GW of generating capacity were removed from the 2025 Base-Case scenario, mainly through reductions in lignite and hard coal capacities.

(30) https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/clean-documents/sdc-documents/MAF/2019/MAF%202019%20Appendix%203%20-%20Country%20Comments.pdf

(31) https://www.benelux.int/files/4515/8998/1576/PENTAreport_FINAL.pdf

(32) Like for MAF 2019, ‘for 2025 a need of 2,5 GW new capacity is thus assumed in this study to be delivered under the CRM in 2025 in order to reach adequacy for Belgium.’

(33) ‘For the “Low Gas Sensitivity” in PLEF for Belgium, the assumed new capacity of 2,5 GW was removed from the PLEF “Base Case”’. ‘Belgian and French gas capacities are respectively 2,5 GW and 2,2 GW lower than in the base case. For Austria (1,2 GW less gas capacity), the Netherlands (1,6 GW less gas capacity) and Luxemburg (0,1 GW less gas capacity)’

(34) ‘For the Low Nuclear / CH NTC sensitivity, nuclear capacity is 1 700 MW lower in France and 1190 MW lower in Switzerland. For all other countries, the installed capacity is unchanged compared to the base case. Additionally, NTCs between Switzerland and the neighbouring zones are reduced in order take account increasing unscheduled flows through Switzerland due to the fact that Switzerland may not be included in the flow-based market coupling (FBMC) in 2025.’

(35) See also recital (38) below.

(36) SA.48648 Belgian Strategic Reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(37) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/consultations/consultation-belgiums-market-reform-plan_en

(38) Commission opinion C(2020) 2654 final: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/markets-and-consumers/capacity-mechanisms_en

(39) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/Belgian-electricity-market-Final-implementation-plan-CRM-22062020.pdf

(40) https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/grid-development/investment-plan/federal-development-plan-2020-2030.

(41) These percentages are based on the definitions used by the Interconnection Target Experts Group (ITEG), i.e. interconnection rate = Total import / Total generation capacity, with total import implying “maximum power flow that the cross-border asset can transmit in accordance with system security criteria.

(42) https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(43) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/avis-a2030

(44) ‘The use of a Hi-Lo scenario, in which extreme events are assumed to be the base case, can hardly be considered to be a “statistically normal year”. On the contrary, a Hi-Lo scenario implies, by definition, an exceptional situation. The CREG does not deny that extreme situations may actually occur, but these must be included with their probability in a probabilistic simulation. Instead, Elia’s security of supply analyses based on a Hi-Lo scenario involves a calculation of an average LoLE with a statistically anomalous base assumption (i.e. “low probability”).’

(45) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/note-z2024

(46) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(47) Expected Energy Not Served: forecast of annual demand that cannot be provided by resources available on the energy market, expressed in MWh

(48) https://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201403170843050.WP_1403.pdf

(49) https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Infrastructure_and_network%20development/Infrastructure/Documents/CEPA%20study%20on%20the%20Value%20of%20Lost%20Load%20in%20the%20electricity%20supply.pdf

(50) Other elements of the CREG’s proposal can be found here: https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-e2064

(51) https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/energie/securite-dapprovisionnement/mecanisme-de-remuneration-de

(52) See article 23 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(53) See article 24 of regulation (EU) 2019/943

(54) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/AR-methode-de-calcul-volume-de-capacite-parametres-encheres-mecanisme-de-remuneration-de-capacite-Annexe-1-Rapport-de-consultation.pdf; notably: ‘La DG Énergie constate que globalement, CBS soutient la méthode alternative telle que proposée par la DG Énergie. En particulier, CBS apprécie également que la possibilité soit prévue pour que des sensibilités HiLo puissent être prises en compte et que des volumes de balancing soient intégrés’, and ‘le paragraphe 4 de l’article 4 déroge des propositions précédentes d’Elia, en ce sens que la possibilité subsiste de tenir compte d’évènements HiLo, mais qu’il s’agit à présent d’une possibilité parmi d’autres. Elia peut se retrouver dans cette approche plus ouverte’. [‘DG Energy notes that, overall, CBS supports the alternative method proposed by DG Energy. In particular, CBS appreciates the possibility of taking into account HiLo sensitivities and that balancing volumes are integrated’, and ‘Article 4 (4) derogates from earlier proposals from Elia, in the sense that the possibility remains to take account of HiLo events, but is now one of several options. Elia supports this approach, which it find more open.’]

(55) Net-CONE represents the revenues that the best new entrant technology would need to earn in the capacity market to compensate for its ‘missing money’ in the energy market for 1 year. It is calculated by removing market revenues and ancillary service revenues from the Gross-CONE.

(56) The CREG launched a public consultation from 1 July 2020 to 13 July 2020 on a proposal of values of the CONE for a short-list of reference technologies, the WACC and the correction factor X (see recital (58)(b)).

(57) Considering CCGT, OCGT and Diesels in the short-list of reference technology and assuming average values for gross-CONE, energy market revenues and ancillary services revenues

(58) https://www.elia.be/en/public-consultation/20200505_public-consultation-on-the-scenarios-sensitivities-and-data-for-the-crm

(59)

‘2.2.1 French nuclear availability- The first sensitivity is in line with the 10-year Adequacy and Flexibility study 2020-30 (Elia, 2019) and is presented in § 2.6.8. It includes a nuclear availability reduced by 4 units in winter.’

(60) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c2105

(61) https://economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/Energy/avis-dg-energie-projet-proposition-2105-signed.pdf

(62) https://www.creg.be/fr/consultations-publiques/consultation-publique-relative-au-projet-de-proposition-2086-relative-au

(63) Elia launched a public consultation on the scenarios, sensitivities and data for the CRM parameter calculation for the Y-4 Auction for Delivery Period 2025-2026 (see recital (58)(a)).

(64) Derived from Figure 2-63, page 83 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 -2030. Note that for the OCGT technology, the values for units >25 are used, as there are OCGT units in the Belgian control zone that are older than 25 years.

(65) Derived from Section 4.4.5. Fixed costs under LTSA, page 36 of the Pöyry study in the context of CONE determination for the I-SEM

(66) Derived from data published on the Elia website regarding contracted volumes and prices for strategic reserves (https://www.elia.be/en/suppliers/supplier/energy-purchases/strategic-reserve-volume-and-prices), considering the average activation price for SDR winter period 2015-2016 for a 4h activation (hence corresponding to a 40 % derating), and assuming one availability test of 15 minutes per year, as follows:

(67) Considering the derating factor range for ‘large scale thermal’ varies between 85 and 95 %, as illustrated in Figure 4-5 of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030, a derating factor of 90 % is applied for the CCGT, OCGT and Turbojet technology. For the Market Response technology, a range is used from 30 % (2h availability; low) — 40 % (4h availability; mid) — 55 % (8h availability; high) to take into account the variety of possibilities included in the Market Response technology.

(68) Calculated as follows:

(69) Based on estimations done in the context of the Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020-2030. The revenue estimations considered in this calibration exercise are derived based on a reference scenario for 2025. Furthermore, it is considered that by means of intervention, missing money is covered such that the — in the study so-called ‘not-viable gap’ — is filled, meaning that sufficient capacity is assumed in the system in 2025 to meet the adequacy requirements. The yearly inframarginal rents from the electricity market (MID values) are derived as P50 revenues from a probabilistic simulation. For the LOW and HIGH values, for the sake of this indicative calibration a range of 20 % around the estimated revenues is considered.

(70) Derived from the data published on the Elia website regarding capacity auctions for the balancing services (https://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/balancing/capacity-auction-results), considering the overall average of average procurement prices for all auctions related to delivery periods from January 2017 until December 2019. Note that only mFRR reservation fees below 10EUR/MW/h are taken into account towards the overall average value, as prices above this cut-off point are considered to represent periods with adequacy issues and therefore not representative for this analysis. The LOW/MID/HIGH values are calculated as 60/75/90 % of the overall average value, to account for variable costs associated with the reservation of mFRR, such as for instance a cost for making a bid. The net revenues from the provision of frequency-related balancing services, in order to avoid double counting and consider only net revenues, have been considered to the following extent:

— FCR revenues are not considered, since Batteries are likely to become the dominant technology to provide FCR. The Batteries technology is not considered for the calibration of the intermediate price cap, as they are considered to derive a positive business case from the provision of FCR.

— aFRR revenues are not considered, as it is assumed that technologies who provide aFRR arbitrage between the provision of aFRR and selling energy. Therefore, aFRR reservation fees are assumed not to represent a net revenue on top of the inframarginal rents earned on the energy market.

— mFRR revenues are considered relevant for the Turbojet (assumed to provide mFRR standard product) and Market response (assumed to provide mFRR flex product) technologies, as they typically provide these services currently in the market. More specifically, revenues for Turbojet and Market response are determined by a percentage of the average mFRR reservation fee or the inframarginal rent from the energy market, according to whichever of both leads to the highest value.

(71) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des critères et modalités d'éligibilité à la procédure de préqualification en ce qui concerne les règles relatives au seuil minimal et au cumul des mesures d’aides

(72) The threshold for instance corresponds to the size of the larger existing units in the Belgian market and thereby such volume can be critical to create a competitive effect.

(73) Capacity providers are only eligible for capacity contracts up to their eligible volume, defined as their reference power (taking into account the opt-out volumes) multiplied by the derating factor.

(74) Arrêté royal fixant la méthode de calcul du volume de capacité nécessaire et des paramètres nécessaires pour l’organisation des enchères dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité.

(75) Based on Figure 4-5 of the latest Belgian Adequacy and Flexibility Study for Belgium 2020 — 2030 by Elia-https://www.elia.be/-/media/project/elia/elia-site/company/publication/studies-and-reports/studies/13082019adequacy-and-flexibility-study_en.pdf

(76) https://www.creg.be/fr/publications/proposition-c1907

(77) The volume that a CMU is obliged to make available during availability tests and availability monitoring.

(78) The CMU’s capacity that is actually available during the availability monitoring mechanism or the availability test.

(79) The maximum power (in MW) that the Delivery Point can inject into (or take off) the Elia grid for a certain quarter-hour, taking into account all technical, operational, meteorological or other restrictions known at the time of notification to Elia with the Daily Schedule, without taking into account any participation of the Delivery Point in the provision of balancing services.

(80) Projet d’arrêté royal relatif à l’établissement des conditions auxquelles les détenteurs de capacité étrangère directe et indirecte peuvent participer à la procédure de préqualification dans le cadre du mécanisme de rémunération de capacité (Draft royal decree on the establishment of the conditions under which holders of direct and indirect foreign capacity can participate in the prequalification procedure within the framework of the capacity remuneration mechanism).

(81) ‘Nominated electricity market operator (NEMO)’ means an entity designated by the competent authority to perform tasks related to single day-ahead or single intraday coupling — see article 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/943.

(82) https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&leftmenu=no&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm? lang=F&legislat=55&dossierID=1220

(83) https://www.creg.be/sites/default/files/assets/Publications/Decisions/Z1109-10FR.pdf

(84) Case 76/78 Steinike & Weinlig v Germany [1977] ECR 595, paragraph 21; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 58; Case C-706/17 Achema [2019] paragraph 47 and following.

(85) Case C-345/02, Pearle and Others [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:448.

(86) Case C-677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:348.

(87) Case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268 , paragraph 68.

(88) See case C- 405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:268, paragraphs 68 and 72; case C-706/17 Achema and Others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, paragraph 57 and case T-217/17 FVE Holýšov I and Others v Commission [2019] ECLI:EU:T:2019:633, paragraph 111.

(89) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 July 1996, SFEI and Others, C-39/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 1999, Spain v Commission, C-342/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

(90) See notably Regulation (EC) no714/2009, Directive 2009/72/EC, Regulation (EU) no2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944.

(91) OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1, as corrected by the corrigendum adopted by the Commission in OJ C 290, 10.8.2016, p. 11.

(92) See Communication C(2020) 4355 final — In particular, in point (16) of the EEAG, the following sentence has been added: ‘These Guidelines shall, however, apply to undertakings which were not in difficulty on 31 December 2019 but became undertakings in difficulty in the period from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021.’

(93) COM(2016) 752 final .https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mechanisms_final_report_en.pdf

(94) SA.4864 Belgian Strategic reserve (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018).

(95) SA.42011 Italian capacity mechanism (OJ C 158, 4.5.2018) (see recitals 79 and 80)

(96) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); SA.46100 Polish capacity mechanism (OJ C 462, 21.12.2018) (see recitals 46, 47, 48); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 70)

(97) SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism (OJ C 121, 6.4.2018) (see recital 50); see SA.35980 British capacity market (OJ L 70, 6.3.2020) (see recital 71)

(98) Available at https://www.elia.be/fr/users-group/implementation-crm

(99) See recital (25) of the Commission Decision in State aid SA.40029 (2014/N) ‘Reintroduction of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II — H1 2015’ (OJ C 136, 24.4.2015, p. 4). See recital (29) of Commission Decision in State aid SA.42215 (2015/N) ‘Prolongation of the Greek financial support measures (art. 2 law 3723/2008)’ (OJ C 277, 21.8.2015, p. 11).

(100) Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] I-1777, paragraph 30.