[pic] | KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ |

Brussel 29.5.2006

KUMM(2006) 248 finali

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI LILL-KUNSILL, LILL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW U LIL-KUMITAT EKONOMIKU U SOĊJALI EWROPEW

IR-RELAZZJONIJIET TA’ L-UE MAL-GŻEJJER TAL-PAĊIFIKU - STRATEĠIJA GĦAL PARTENARJAT IMSAĦĦAĦ {SEK(2006) 642}

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI LILL-KUNSILL, LILL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW U LIL-KUMITAT EKONOMIKU U SOĊJALI EWROPEW

IR-RELAZZJONIJIET TA’ L-UE MAL-GŻEJJER TAL-PAĊIFIKU - STRATEĠIJA GĦAL PARTENARJAT IMSAĦĦAĦ

1. INTRODUZZJONI

L-UE u l-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP[1] għandhom warajhom aktar minn 30 sena ta’ kooperazzjoni fil-kuntest tal-partenarjat bejn l-UE u r-reġjun tal-ACP. Dawn ir-relazzjonijiet sodi huma bbażati fuq wirt ta’ storja komuni, valuri komuni, kooperazzjoni ekonomika u kummerċjali. Illum, bl-iżviluppi li seħħew fuq iż-żewġ naħat, jeħtieġ li dan il-partenarjat jiġġedded u li titfassal strateġija komprensiva dwar il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP. Hemm raġunijiet sodi sabiex tiġi proposta din l-ewwel strateġija ta’ l-UE għall-Paċifiku.

Fuq in-naħa ta’ l-UE, il-Ftehim rivedut ta’ Cotonou u l-Kunsens Ewropew dwar l-Iżvilupp – stqarrija ta’ politika bejn tliet partijiet adottata b’mod konġunt mill-Parlament Ewropew, mill-Kunsill u mill-Kummissjoni – jipprovdu bażi u impetu ġodda għar-relazzjonijiet bejn l-UE u l-Paċifiku. Il-Ftehim ta’ Cotonou jsaħħaħ id-dimensjoni politika tal-kooperazzjoni bejn l-UE u l-ACP, billi jtejjeb id-djalogu politiku ma' l-imsieħba, fil-waqt li l-Kunsens Ewropew jidentifika l-eliminazzjoni tal-faqar fil-kuntest ta' l-iżvilupp sostenibbli bħala l-għan ċentrali u primarju, fil-waqt li jikkunsidra l-importanza li jkun hemm politika koerenti għall-iżvilupp u billi jiġġenera sinerġiji bejn elementi ta’ politika differenti, sew interni kif ukoll esterni, kif ukoll l-għanijiet ta’ l-azzjoni esterna ta' l-UE. Id-Dikjarazzjoni ta’ Pariġi dwar l-Effettività ta’ l-Għajnuna adottata f’Marzu 2005 tafferma mill-ġdid l-impenji biex il-politika dwar l-għajnuna tkun armonizzata u allineata u tistabbilixxi miri speċifiċi għall-2010.

Fuq in-naħa tal-Paċifiku, il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP illum għaddejjin minn għadd ta’ sfidi importanti f’dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-vulnerabbiltà, mal-faqar u tmexxija dgħajfa. Ta’ spiss jiġri li l-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta' l-ACP jintesew peress li l-popolazzjoni totali tagħhom hija anqas minn 10 miljuni, b’nofs dawn jgħixu fil-Papwa New Guinea. F’Diċembru 2005 Timor Leste rratifika l-Ftehim ta’ Cotonou u sar it-tieni l-akbar pajjiz tal-Paċifiku fl-ACP għal dik li hi popolazzjoni. Il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP, ħlief għal Tonga, huma pajjiżi demokratiċi. Għandhom diversità kulturali eċċezzjonali, li għandha titħares.

Fl-istess ħin ir-reġjun għandu riżorsi naturali sostanzjali (ħut, injam, prodotti agrikoli, żejt, gass, minerali). Għandu interess ewlieni fl-isforzi biex jittaffa t-tibdil tal-klima. Għandu biodiversità għanja ħafna (p.eż huwa stmat li Papwa New Guinea waħedha għandha ħames darbiet aktar speċi ta’ ħut mir-reġjun tal-Karibbew kollu kemm hu). Ħafna atturi internazzjonali qawwija, bħaċ-Ċina, il-Ġappun u l-Istati Uniti qed iżidu l-preżenza tagħhom fir-reġjun.

Barra minn dan, fl-2005 kien hemm imbuttatura ġdida lejn il-kooperazzjoni fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku, bl-adozzjoni tal-Pjan tal-Paċifiku mis-16-il pajjiż membru kollha tal-Forum tal-Gżejjer tal-Paċifiku, inklużi 14-il pajjiż ACP tal-Paċifiku[2], l-Awstralja u New Zealand. Dan huwa pass ’il quddiem importanti u ambizzjuż fil-kooperazzjoni fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku li jiffoka, b’mod partikolari, fuq it-tkabbir ekonomiku, l-iżvilupp sostenibbli, it-tmexxija tajba u s-sigurtà għall-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku permezz ta’ reġjonaliżmu u joffri opportunità biex ir-relazzjonijiet bejn l-UE u l-Paċifiku jissaħħew.

F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi dejjem jinbidlu hemm il-bżonn li l-istrateġija ta’ l-Ewropa għall-Paċifiku tittejjeb u tiġi rikalibrata. Qed issir għalhekk il-proposta biex tingħata attenzjoni partikolari fuq għadd limitat ta’ prijoritajiet speċifiċi, fejn il-Paċifiku għandu ħtiġijiet sinifikanti li fihom b’konfront l-Ewropa għandha bla dubju vantaġġi kbar.

Il-partenarjat imsaħħaħ għandu għalhekk jiffoka fuq it-tmexxija, ir-reġjonaliżmu u t-tmexxija sostenibbli tar-riżorsi naturali.

2. Ir-raġunijiet għal impenn ta’ l-UE fil-Paċifiku

2.1. Riżorsi naturali u sfidi ambjentali ta’ sinifikat globali

L-Oċean Paċifiku hu mifrux fuq terz ta’ wiċċ id-dinja li jfisser li l-iżviluppi ambjentali li jseħħu hemm ikollhom impatt sinifikanti fuq skala globali, bħal kif se jkun is-sajd dinji fil-futur, u t-tibdil fil-klima.

Hu fl-interess ta’ l-umanità li titħares il- biodiversità immensa fil-Paċifiku, li ħafna minnha għadha lanqas biss magħrufa. Jingħad li biss 20% tal-flora u tal-fawna fl-Oċean Paċifiku ġiet riċerkata kif xieraq. Dan ir-reġjun huwa l-uniku wieħed li fih ir-riżorsi tas-sajd għadhom ma humiex sfruttati żżejjed, u dan jinkludi l-akbar ammonti ta’ tonn fid-dinja.

Il-biodiversità unika tal-baħar f’dan ir-reġjun u l-istokkijiet tal-ħut l-aktar komuni (fosthom dawk migratorji) jiddependu fuq xulxin. L-Oċean Paċifiku għandu potenzjal immens għal saħħet il-bniedem f’dik li hi bioteknoloġija, bħal fil-każ tal-kura medika mibnija fuq elementi bioloġiċi u kura li tiġi żviluppata minn organiżmi ħajjin mill-Oċean Paċifiku. Għaldaqstant, l-Oċean Paċifiku, bħal żoni oħra ekoloġiċi ewlenin bħal ma hi l-Amażonja, jistgħu jitqiesu bħala ġid pubbliku globali.

Barra minn dan, meta l-komunitajiet jisfruttaw l-ekosistemi b'modi mhux sostenibbli, jista' jiġri li jkun hemm kollass ekoloġiku , li mbagħad dan jista’ jwassal għal aktar faqar, tensjonijiet u saħansitra ġlied.

Il-foresti tropikali tal-Papua New Guinea huma ta’ importanza globali għal dak li hi l-biodiversità u għal dak li hu tibdil fil-klima. Tqaċċit żejjed ta’ siġar hemmhekk, iżda wkoll f’Samoa, fil-Gżejjer Solomon, f’Timor Leste, f’Tonga u f’Vanuatu għalhekk huwa ta’ riskju sinifikanti għall-komunità globali. Flimkien ma’ prattiċi agrikoli mhux sostenibbli, dan iwassal f’ċerti każi għad-degradazzjoni ta’ l-art. Fl-aħħar mill-aħħar dan jeqred il-mezzi ta' l-għixien rurali u l-istil ta’ ħajja ta’ dawk li jgħixu fil-gżejjer Paċifiċi. Jekk ikompli għaddej it-tibdil fil-klima, ħafna ġżejjer f’pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP jgħibu għal kollox u r-reġjun ikollu jħabbat wiċċu ma’ refuġjati ambjentali. Barra minn dan, it-tniġġiż industrijali u l-immaniġġjar ħażin ta’ l-ambjent huma wkoll raġunijiet serji li jnisslu tħassib. L-ambjent għandu impatt dirett fuq is-setturi kollha ekonomiċi u soċjali, inkluż it-terroriżmu, is-sajd u s-saħħa.

Hekk kif ir-riżorsi naturali eżistenti f’naħat oħra tad-dinja qed jiġu kkunsmati, u hekk kif l-ekonomiji taċ-Ċina, ta’ l-Indja u tal-pajjiżi ta’ l-ASEAN qed ikomplu jikbru, se tkompli tiżdied it-talba għal riżorsi naturali u l-importanza tar-riżorsi sostanzjali tal-Paċifiku se tkompli tiżdied u l-kwistjoni ta' l-immaniġġjar sostenibbli tagħhom għalhekk jistħoqqilha attenzjoni bir-reqqa mill-UE.

2.2. L-isfida ta’ l-istabbiltà u s-sigurtà

Meta wieħed jikkunsidra li m’ilux wisq għadd ta' pajjiżi Paċifiċi ta’ l-ACP għaddew minn kunflitti , hu meħtieġ li l-komunità internazzjonali żżomm għajnejha miftuħa u li tagħti għajnuna mmirata lejn il-kawiżi li huma fl-għeruq ta’ dawn il-kunflitti. Il-konsegwenzi ta’ l-instabbiltà jistgħu jkunu drammatiċi f’dak li hu telf ta’ opportunitajiet ta’ żvilupp. Per eżempju, it-tensjonijiet fil-Gżejjer Solomon naqqsu l-PGD ras għal ras tal-pajjiż b’terz.

L-UE għandha interess li fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku jkun hemm l-istabbiltà u s-sigurtà. Il-ġrajjiet ta’ dan l-aħħar f’Timor Leste u fil-Gżejjer Solomon servew għal darb’oħra ta’ tifkira li dan ir-reġjun hu mhedded minn ġlied intern, mill-kriminalità u mill-instabbiltà politika. L-UE bagħtet missjoni ta’ osservaturi elettorali għall-elezzjonijiet ġenerali fil-Fiġi fl-2006 u l-Kummissjoni akkwistat xi esperjenza fl-appoġġ tagħha ta’ l-isforzi tar-reġjun stess lejn l-istabbilizzazzjoni bejn l-istati, bħal ma huma miżuri kumplimentari għall-Missjoni Reġjonali ta’ Assistenza li għaddejja fil-Gżejjer Solomon (RAMSI).

Stati fraġli fil-Paċifiku huma ta’ sfida kbira għall-komunità internazzjonali. Istituzzjonijiet dgħajfa u l-fallimenti tal-gvernijiet, flimkien ma’ tkabbir ekonomiku baxx, rata għolja ta’ qgħad u l-faqar kollha jwasslu biex l-istat ikun fraġli. Ir-reġjun se jkompli jħabbat wiċċu ma’ problemi agħar fil-futur. Bħala medja, l-ekonomiji tal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP bil-kemm qed jikbru fl-istess ħin li l-popolazzjoni qed tkompli tikber. Jekk din it-tendenza ma tiddawwarx din tista’ twassal għal sitwazzjoni soċjali u/jew politika, peress li l-faqar jikber. Hija ħasra wkoll li l-HIV-AIDS qegħda bil-mod il-mod tinfirex fil-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP bil-Papua New Guinea fil-qalba ta’ din il-kriżi.

2.3. Ir-relazzjonijiet ta’ l-UE ma’ pajjiżi terzi fir-reġjun

Il-15-il pajjiż Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP huma parti mir-reġjun usa’ Ażjatiku-Paċifiku, li l-importanza ġeo-politika tiegħu qed tikber. L-UE diġà għarfet l-importanza dejjem tikber tar-reġjun usa’ billi stabbiliet partenarjat ma’ l-Asja tax-Xlokk fl-2003.

L-Awstralja u New Zealand huma atturi ċentrali fil-Paċifiku. Ir-relazzjonijiet ta’ l-UE maż-żewġ pajjiżi huma soda u għandhom bażi mifruxa. Dawn jinkludu l-kooperazzjoni fuq kwistjonijiet ta’ politika barranija, il-kummerċ, is-sigurtà, l-ambjent u l-edukazzjoni. Barra minn dan, il-kooperazzjoni fl-iżvilupp qegħda ssir dejjem aktar element importanti fir-relazzjonijiet ma’ l-Awstralja u New Zealand u din għandha tittejjeb. L- Istati Uniti u l- Ġappun huma wkoll atturi importanti ħafna fil-Paċifiku. Għandhom kollha interessi politiċi, kummerċjali u ta’ sigurtà importanti fir-reġjun usa’ tal-Paċifiku, fil-waqt li r-rwol Ewropew naqas. Ir-relazzjonijiet bilaterali ta’ l-UE ma’ l-Istati Uniti, mal-Ġappun, ma’ l-Awstralja u ma’ New Zealand jistgħu jibbenefikaw ukoll minn rwol akbar Ewropew fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku.

L-impenn dejjem jikber taċ- Ċina huwa fattur ġdid li qed jinfluwenza l-iżviluppi tal-futur fil-Paċifiku, u li diġà qed iddaħħal dinamika ġdida fir-reġjun li qed ikollha effett fuq il-pożizzjoni politika ta' għadd ta' pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP.

Franza jibqagħlha rwol importanti permezz tat-tliet territorji mbiegħda u tal-preżenza militari li għandha. Ir- Renju Unit , li għandhu OCT (Pajjiżi u Territorji Mbegħda) fil-Paċifiku, dan l-aħħar naqqas il-preżenza diplomatika tiegħu fir-reġjun, fil-waqt li l- Portugall għandu rwol ċentrali fil-bini mill-ġdid ta’ Timor-Leste.

Erba’ OCTs (il-Kaledonja l-Ġdida, il-Polineżja Franċiża, Wallis u Futuna, Pitcairn) fil-Paċifiku huma assoċjati ma’ l-UE, u jirrappreżentaw preżenza Ewropea siewja u importanti fir-reġjun. Dawn jikkostitwixxu element b'saħħtu li għandu jittieħed f’kunsiderazzjoni sħiħa biex tiġi mħaffa l-integrazzjoni tagħhom fir-reġjun.

Partenarjat imsaħħaħ u djalogu politiku aħjar bejn il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u l-UE jista’ jkun ta’ appoġġ akbar għal azzjonijiet konġunti f’ fora multilaterali (13-il pajjiż tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP huma membri tan-NU u ħafna drabi jaġixxu flimkien bħala grupp), fejn iż-żewġ reġjuni spiss għandhom interessi komuni f’tmexxija dinjija aħjar, per eżempju fejn jidħol it-tibdil fil-klima.

3. Strateġija għal partenarjat imsaħħaħ

Il-Ftehim ta’ Cotonou hu msejjes fuq ħames pilastri, li kollha huma relevanti ħafna għall-koperazzjoni tal-lum il-ġurnata bejn il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u l-UE. (i) tisħiħ tad-dimensjoni politika; (ii) l-involviment tas-soċjetà ċivili, is-settur privat u atturi oħra mhux konnessi ma’ l-Istat; (iii) it-tnaqqis tal-faqar; (iv) qafas innovattiv ta’ kooperazzjoni ekonomika u kummerċjali; (v) razzjonalizzazzjoni ta’ strumenti finanzjarji u sistema ta’ programmazzjoni progressiva.

L-istrateġija li qed tkun proposta hi magħmula minn tliet elementi:

(1) relazzjonijiet aktar b'saħħithom bejn l-UE u l-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u r-reġjun biex ikun hemm djalogu politiku wiesa’ dwar affarijet ta’ interess komuni li jvarjaw minn kwistjonijiet politiċi u ta’ sigurtà għal dawk ekonomiċi, kummerċjali, soċjali, ambjentali u dwar tmexxija, biex b’hekk fiż-żewġ naħat jitjieb il-profil viżibbli u politiku tal-partenarjat bejn l-UE u l-Paċifiku.

(2) aktar azzjoni ta’ żvilupp iffokata, b’enfasi akbar fuq il-kooperazzjoni reġjonali biex tinbena massa kritika, titjieb it-tmexxija reġjonali u jitħaffef l-iskambju ta’ l-ideat. L-enfasi ewlenija se tkun biex jitlaqqgħu il-prijoritajiet ċentrali tar-reġjun, b’mod partikolari kif definiti fil-Pjan tal-Paċifiku[3];

(3) tqassim aktar effiċjenti ta' l-għajnuna , inkluż użu akbar ta’ appoġġ mill-baġit u koordinazzjoni eqreb ma’ sħab oħra, b’mod partikolari l-Awstralja u New Zealand.

3.1. Relazzjoni msaħħa

Il-proposta hija biex jitjieb id- djalogu politiku mal-Paċifiku billi jiżdied il-kuntatt l-aktar permezz ta’, u fi ħdan, il-Forum tal-Ġżejjer Paċifiċi li hija l-istituzzjoni reġjonali ewlenija għal kwistjonijiet politiċi li dalwaqt se tikseb status legali internazzjonali u li għandha mandat u elementi politiċi koerenti mfissra fil-Pjan tal-Paċifiku.

Id- Djalogu Post-Forum[4] , li hu l-konnessjoni ta’ bħalissa bejn iż-żewġ reġjuni, għandu għadd ta’ nuqqasijiet, bħal ma hi nuqqas ta’ viżibbiltà, interazzjoni u impatt u ftit ħin għat-tħejjjija u d-diskussjoni fi żmien meta l-aġenda EU-Paċifiku qed tikber.

Ta’ min iżid li ħafna mis-sieħba fir-reġjun, bħal ma hu l-Ġappun, diġà waqqfu sistemi apposta ta’ kuntatt mar-reġjun barra mill-parteċipazzjoni tagħhom fid-Djalogu Post-Forum.

Id-deċiżjoni ta’ Ottubru 2005 tal-mexxejja tal-Forum biex jaddottaw Ftehim ġdid li jistabbilixxi l-Forum tal-Ġżejjer tal-Paċifiku bħala organizzazzjoni intergovernattiva skond il-liġi internazzjonali toffri opportunità tajba biex jissaħħaħ id-djalogu bejn l-UE u r-reġjun tal-Paċifiku biex ikunu ndirizzati n-nuqqasijiet hawn imsemmija fid-Djalogu Post-Forum.

Għandu jintlaħaq qbil dwar il-metodoloġija għal djalogu mtejjeb bejn l-UE u l-Paċifiku bil-għan li d-djalogu jitmexxa bl-aktar mod effiċjenti u effettiv.

Barra mid-djalogu msaħħaħ fuq livell reġjonali kif propost hawnhekk, il-proposta hija biex isir djalogu fuq livell nazzjonali ma’ pajjiżi tal-Paċifku ta’ l-ACP li għandhom importanza ewlenija. Djalogu nazzjonali bħal dan għandu jseħħ skond il-Ftehim ta’ Cotonou, fil-waqt li jingħata għarfien lill-karatteristiċi speċifiċi tal-Paċifiku, izda fl-istess ħin għandu jsir użu sħiħ u sistematiku tal-potenzjal u tad-dispożizzjonijiet tiegħu.

3.2. Azzjoni ta’ żvilupp aktar iffokata

Huwa meħtieġ li jkun hemm iffokar biex ikun hemm l-aħjar impatt possibbli. Il-proposta hi biex il-konċentrazzjoni ssir fuq tliet prijoritajiet li jirriflettu modi kif jistgħu jintrabtu ħtiġijiet ewlenin tal-Paċifiku ma’ vantaġġi relattivi li għandha l-Ewropa: Tmexxija, reġjonaliżmu u immaniġġjar sostenibbli tar-riżorsi naturali.

3.2.1. Tmexxija

L-UE jista’ jkollha rwol kostruttiv fil-forma ta’ appoġġ sew fil-prevenzjoni kif ukoll fl-istabbilizzazzjoni f’sitwazzjonijiet ta’ wara l-kunflitti, billi tuża l-esperjenza ta’ l-UE f'sitwazzjonijiet simili f'naħat oħra tad-dinja. F’sitwazzjonijiet bħal dawn, l-assistenza Ewropea għandha tagħti appoġġ lil tranżizzjoni bla skossi lejn żvilupp għat-tul u jkollha perspettiva ċara ta’ tmexxija u ta’ tisħiħ nazzjonali.

L-UE se tkompli tfittex li tindirizza l-kawżi li qegħdin fl-għeruq tal-kunflitti , bħal ma huma l-faqar, id-degradazzjoni, l-esplojtazzjoni u t-tqassim u l-aċċess inġust għal riżorsi fuq l-art u riżorsi naturali, tmexxija dgħajfa, abbużi minn drittijiet tal-bniedem, inugwaljanza bejn is-sessi, u nuqqasijiet fid-demokrazija. Se tippromwovi d-djalogu, il-parteċipazzjoni u r-rikonċiljazzjoni.

It-tmexxija tajba hija pre-rekwiżit kruċjali għall-iżvilupp sostenibbli. It-tisħiħ ta' istituzzjonijiet kredibbli huwa ċentrali għal treġija tajba u effettiva - bħalma huma l-parlamenti, is-sistema tal-ġudikatura u s-sistemi ta' amministrazzjoni finanzjarja pubblika, inklużi s-servizzi statistiċi - kemm f'livell nazzjonali kif ukoll reġjonali. L-UE se tkompli toffri, f’kooperazzjoni ma’ donaturi oħra, appoġġ lill-pajjiżi demokratiċi fil-Paċifiku. Xi pajjiżi tal-Paċifku ta' l-ACP għandhom problemi ta’ tmexxija fis-setturi tas-sajd u dak tal-foresti, l-aktar minħabba telf ta’ dħul , per eżempju fil-forma ta’ eżenzjonijiet mit-taxxa li jwasslu għal dħul anqas għal gvernijiet milquta.

Barra minn dan, għal dik li hi tmexxija huwa essenzjali li titħajjar konformità akbar ma’ livelli internazzjonali fil-ġlieda kontra l-korruzzjoni, il-ħasil tal-flus u l-iffinanzjar tat-terroriżmu. Fil-passat il-kwistjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus kienet marbuta ħafna mar-reġjun. Għalkemm dan għadu riskju, il-problema tinsab taħt ħafna aktar kontroll. Madankollu, l-UE se tissokta tippromwovi t-trasparenza u l-iskambju effettiv ta’ informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet biex tiġġieled il-korruzzjoni kif ukoll il-prassi ħażina korporattiva u finanzjarja. L-UE sejra wkoll tappoġġja sforzi ewlenin li jsiru minn pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku biex dawn jimplimentaw dak li wegħdu lill-OECD f'dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ taxxi u biex jiġu eliminati prattiċi fiskali li jagħmlu l-ħsara. Huwa fl-interess komuni ta’ l-UE u tal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku li jaraw li dawn l-impenji jibqgħu jiġu implimentati b’mod effettiv.

3.2.2. Reġjonaliżmu

Il-kisba tal-massa kritika

Il-Pjan tal-Paċifiku huwa bbażat fuq il-kunċett tar- reġjonaliżmu. Kooperazzjoni reġjonali aktar b’saħħitha għandha ttejjeb il-ħila tar-reġjun biex ilaħħaq ma’ l-isfidi ta’ l-iżvilupp li għandu quddiemu. Strateġija effettiva ta’ appoġġ għall-iżvilupp għandha għalhekk tkun ibbażata l-aktar fuq għajnuna għal integrazzjoni reġjonali biex tinbena massa kritika, biex titjieb it-tmexxija reġjonali u biex jitħaffef l-iskambju ta’ l-ideat.

Jeżisti tħassib dwar l-effetti ta' żieda fil-globalizzazzjoni, u – b’estenzjoni – ta’ integrazzjoni reġjonali aktar profonda, sew fuq id- diversità bejn il-pajjiżi tal- Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u l-iżvilupp tagħhom soċjo-ekonomiku. L-esperjenza ta’ l-Ewropa ibbażata fuq simbjożi bejn il-kompetittività u l-koeżjoni soċjali turi li huwa possibbli u ta' ġid, anki għal pajjiżi żgħar, li jassoċjaw rwieħhom ma’ dinja li qed issir dejjem aktar globali fil-waqt li fl-istess ħin iħarsu l-identitajiet u l-kulturi nazzjonali tagħhom.

Formula għat-tul għal integrazzjoni effettiva u politikament stabbli fil-Paċifiku għadha qed tinbena. F’ċerti naħat il-kooperazzjoni reġjonali diġà qed tħalli riżultati tajba, bħal fil-każ ta’ l-Aġenzija tas-Sajd tal-Forum tal-Ġżejjer Paċifiċi (FFA) li tlaqqa’ flimkien 17-il gvern membru. Il-Pjan tal-Paċifiku, fil-waqt li hu pass importanti, għandu jiġi kkunsidrat bħala “dokument ħaj” u l-bidu ta’ proċess aktar milli bħala l-tmiem. Il-kooperazzjoni Paċifika reġjonali għandha tevolvi u l-politika ta' l-UE għar-reġjun se jkollha għalhekk biż-żmien tiġi adattata. Dan jista’ jsir l-aħjar bis-saħħa ta’ appoġġ sostnut lis-Segretarjat tal-Forum u aġenziji oħra rilevanti tal-CROP (Kunsill ta’ Organizzazzjonijiet Reġjonali fil-Paċifiku)[5], b’mod partikolari f’dak li hu mmaniġġjar tar-riżorsi naturali, il-vulnerabbiltà u t-tmexxija. B'hekk ir-reġjonaliżmu fil-Paċifiku jingħata spinta f’oqsma fejn dan ikun meħtieġ u fejn l-UE tkun tista’ tipproduċi valur miżjud konkret.

Ftehim ta' Partenarjat Ekonomiku (EPA)

Il-proċess ta' l-EPA qed ikollu effett katalitiku fil-kooperazzjoni ekonomika u l-integrazzjoni fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku peress li:

- tistimola lill-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP biex jinnegozjaw bħala grupp;

- tipprovdi inċentiv għal opportunitajiet fost il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifku ta' l-ACP infushom;

- jistimula u wieħed jittama li jistituzzjonalizza tmexxija reġjonali aktar b’saħħitha fil-forma ta’ evalwazzjonijiet inter pares.

Għaxar fil-mija ta’ l-esportazzjoni totali tal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP tmur lejn l-UE. Din hija ċifra konsiderevoli meta wieħed iqis id-daqs ta’ dawn il-pajjiżi u d-distanza fiżika bejn il-Paċifiku u l-Ewropa, iżda f’termini assoluti mhix kbira. Il- benefiċċji mill-kummerċ tal-prodotti jiġu l-aktar minn għadd ta’ prodotti speċifiċi li huma tipiċi ta’ għadd ta’ pajjiżi. Aktar benefiċċji għal kull pajjiż fir-reġjun jiġu minn integrazzjoni reġjonali mtejjba u minn tmexxija ekonomika, partikolarment jekk regoli li għandhom x’jaqsmu mal-kummerċ, is-servizzi u l-investiment kellhom ikunu parti mill-EPA.

Huwa biss grupp ta' pajjiżi akbar tal-Paċifiku li huwa nvolut f’kummerċ ta’ prodotti ma' l-UE. Il-prodotti l-aktar fis-suq huma l- ħut u l-prodotti tagħhom, u z-zokkor. Fiġi, bħala pajjiż tal-Protokoll taz-Zokkor, huwa eliġibbli biex jingħata assistenza għall-adozzjoni strateġika tiegħu wara r-riforma taz-zokkor. Ir-ristrutturar mistenni ta’ l-industrija taz-zokkor f’Fiġi, flimkien ma’ l-EPA għandu jtejjeb il-kompetittività. Barra minn dan, miżuri kumplimentari għal pajjiżi tal-Protokoll taz-Zokkor, li jibbenefikaw minn iffinanzjar speċifiku ta’ l-UE x’aktarx li jsaħħu l-azzjoni dwar l-iżvilupp sostenibbli ta’ riżorsi naturali, b’attenzjoni partikolari fuq il-produzzjoni ta’ l-enerġija mill-biomassa u r-ri-afforestazzjoni.

L-UE tibqa’ partner kummerċjali mbiegħed u relattivament żgħir għar-reġjun u l-impatt li jista’ jkun hemm tal-liberalizzazzjoni tal-kummerċ bl-EPA fuq il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP meħuda flimkien x’aktarx li jkun żgħir. Min-naħa l-oħra, il-ftehim propost dwar kummerċ ħieles reġjonali ma’ l-Awstralja u New Zealand (PACER) huwa ta’ livell għola u jista’ jikkaġuna spejjeż ta’ aġġustament sinifikanti għall-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta' l-ACP. Ikun għalhekk importanti li tingħata preferenza għal metodoloġija gradwali għal-liberalizzazzoni tal-kummerċ f’għaqda ma’ miżuri oħra, bħal ma huma l-ftuħ tas-swieq tal- partners żviluppati għal ħaddiema minn pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u ż-żieda fl-assistenza għall-għajnuna.

Biex l-effett mixtieq ta' l-EPA ikun kemm jista' jkun kbir, huwa kruċjali li n-negozjati u r-riżultati jkunu kkoordinati mill-qrib ma’ l-ipprogrammar u, biż-żmien, ma’ l-implimentazzjoni ta’ l-assistenza għall-iżvilupp, sew fuq livell reġjonali kif ukoll nazzjonali, biex jiġu sfruttati s-sinerġiji. Ta’ importanza partikolari huma l-assistenza marbuta mal-kummerċ u t-tiswir tal-ħiliet, it-tmexxija soċjo-ekonomika, finanzjarja u fiskali, kif ukoll miżuri ta' appoġġ b’għan speċifiku li jinkludu l-konformità ma’ livelli internazzjonali doganali u faċilitazzjoni għall-kummerċ fejn ikun rilevanti, iz-zokkor, is-settur privat jew l-iżvilupp tar-riżorsi umani u l-protezzjoni soċjali.

Permezz tal-flessibbiltà, ta’ l-ispirtu kostruttuiv u ta’ l-innovazzjoni, l-UE tista’ tistabbilixxi livelli ġodda li jgħinu lill-iżvilupp f’negozjati kummerċjali ma’ ekonomiji li qed jiżviluppaw fi ġżejjer żgħar, li jistgħu jittieħdu f’kunsiderazzjoni mill- partners l-oħrajn fir-reġjun li huma żviluppati meta jkunu qed (jerġgħu) jinnegozjaw il-ftehimiet kummerċjali tagħhom mal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP.

3.2.3. Immaniġġjar sostenibbli tar-riżorsi naturali

Meta wieħed iqis kemm hu importanti l-immaniġġjar tajjeb tar-riżorsi naturali, il-Kummissjoni qed tipproponi li waħda mit- temi ċentrali “blue-green” għal din il-kooperazzjoni msaħħa għandha tkun l-immanġġjar sostenibbli ta’ riżorsi naturali u biex jingħata appoġġ lil pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP hekk kif dawn jieħdu l-passi meħtieġa biex ilaħħqu mal-konsegwenzi ta’ tibdil fil-klima, livell tal-baħar dejjem tiela’, tnaqqis fl-istokkijiet tal-ħut, l-ibbliċjar tal-qroll, tqaċċit insostenibbli ta’ siġar, degradazzjoni ta’ l-art u żieda fit-tniġġiż u fl-iskart.

X’aktarx li dan hu qasam fejn il-valur miżjud ta’ l-UE huwa magħruf biċ-ċar u fejn l-Ewropa, barra l-assistenza finanzjarja tagħha, tista’ toffri l-esperjenza u l-kompetenza kollettiva tagħha dwar kif wieħed għandu jaffronta problemi ambjentali u ta’ immaniġġjar ta’ riżorsi. Bis-saħħa ta’ dan tkun tista’ ssir integrazzjoni ta’ dawn l-isforzi ta’ kooperazzjoni bejn l-UE u l-Paċifiku ma’ l-isforzi internazzjonali biex ikunu ffaċċjati l-isfidi ambjentali globali, fejn il-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP, New Zealand u l-UE għandhom għanijiet komuni, bħal ma huma dawk tal-Protokoll ta’ Kyoto. Huwa wkoll meħtieġ li jiġi stabbilit djalogu ma’ pajjiżi terzi oħra li huma attivament involuti fl-esplojtazzjoni ta’ riżorsi naturali fir-reġjun

Fuq il-bażi tal-prijoritajiet espressi mir-reġjun innifsu[6], l-Unjoni Ewropea tista’ tgħin lill-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP fl-immaniġġjar tar-riżorsi tal-baħar u kostali tagħhom b’mod sostenibbli permezz ta’ inizjattivi li jkunu jistgħu jgħaqqdu l-konservazzjoni tas-sajd u l-bio-diversità tal-baħar, fil-waqt li fl-istess ħin jippromwovu l-kooperazzjoni reġjonali u t-tisħiħ ta’ leħen l-Istati-Gżejjer Żgħar li qed jiżviluppaw, is-SIDS. Dawn l-inizjattivi jistgħu jipprovdu miżuri ta’ tiswir ta’ ħiliet biex jingħata appoġġ lill-implimentazzjoni ta’ ftehimiet ambjentali multi-laterali u elementi oħra meħtieġa ta’ politika marbuta ma’ l-immaniġġjar sostenibbli tar-riżorsi naturali u jistgħu ukoll iservu ta’ bażi biex jieħdu sehem Stati Membri ta’ l-UE li jkunu interessati. Il-Grupp ta’ Ħidma tas-Settur Marittimu, CROP, taħt il-Forum[7], ikun f’pożizzjoni tajba biex imexxi ’l quddiem din l-inizjattiva u jara li tkun imwettqa.

Is-sajd huwa settur li potenzjalment jista’ li jikkontribwixxi għall-iżvilupp ekonomiku u għall-integrazzjoni fl-ekonomija dinjija tal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP. L-użu sostenibbli tar-riżorsi tas-sajd u t-tmexxija tajba f'dan is-settur huma għaldaqstant 'il fuq fl-aġenda tar-reġjun. L-UE diġà akkwistat esperjenza konsiderevoli bil-kooperazzjoni reġjonali dwar is-sajd fil-Paċifiku, sew permezz tal-politika komuni tas-sajd tagħha, kif ukoll dik dwar l-iżvilupp, speċjalment fejn tidħol ir-riċerka u l-evalwazzjoni ta' l-istokks. L-UE u s-sħab tar-reġjun miġbura fl-Aġenzija tas-Sajd tal-Forum tal-Gżejjer tal-Paċifiku għandhom storja twila ta' kooperazzjoni b’suċċess f’organizzazzjonijiet reġjonali ta’ tmexxija, bħal ma hi l-Konvenzjoni dwar is-Sajd fil-Paċifiku tal-Punent u Ċentrali. L-UE tista’ tkabbar l-isforzi tagħha biex tippromwovi l-immaniġġjar sostenibbli tas-sajd billi tappoġġja s-sistema ta’ monitoraġġ, ta’ kontroll u ta’ sorveljanza (MCS) tar-reġjun u billi ssaħħaħ il-ħila tar-reġjun li jiġġieled is-sajd illegali, mhux rappurtat u mhux regolat (IUU), speċjalment minħabba t-telf fid-dħul li jkun hemm. Hemm potenzjal akbar għar-riċerka dwar is-sajd u l-affarijiet marittimi, li l-UE għandha l-intenzjoni li tappoġġja biex ikun hemm immaniġġjar sostenibbli tas-sajd dejjem aħjar fir-reġjun.

Il-ġenerazzjoni l-ġdida ta’ Ftehimiet ta’ Partenarjat tas-Sajd (FPAs), jikkostitwixxu metodoloġija ġdida peress li, barra li jipprovdu aċċess regolat għal opportunitajiet tas-sajd għal bastimenti Ewropej, jaħsbu wkoll għal kooperazzjoni mill-qrib biex jiġi promoss is-sajd responsabbli u biex jinġieb ‘il quddiem sajd b’responsabbiltà u jkunu żgurati l-konservazzjoni u użu sostenibbli tar-riżorsi tas-sajd tal-pajjiżi sħab konċernati. Din il-metodoloġija se tkun implimentata permezz ta’ djalogu ta’ politika u appoġġ finanzjarju għas-settur biex tingħata kontribuzzjoni ċentrali għad-definizzjoni u l-implimentazzjoni, mill-istati kostali, ta’ politika dwar l-iżvilupp sostenibbli ta’ attivitajiet tas-sajd fl-ibħra tagħhom. L-ewwel żewġ FPA’s ġew konklużi mal-pajjiżi sħab ta’ l-Oċean Paċifiku.

Għadd ta’ pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP u OCTs għandhom foresti tropikali u biodiversità relatata. Il-KE diġà għandha esperjenza sinifikanti ta' kooperazzjoni mal-Papwa New Gunea dwar it-tqaċċit ta’ siġar li jkun sostenibbli. Aktar ma jgħaddi ż-żmien, aktar qed jidher li l-verifika tal-legalità ta’ ħidmiet ta’ tqaċċit ta’ siġar u l-esportazzjoni ta’ l-injam hija strument ewlieni fil-programmi ta’ riforma tas-settur. Sistemi ta’ min joqghod fuqhom, li jistgħu jiddistingwu l-produzzjoni legali minn dik illegali se jkunu essenzjali biex is-suq ikun jista' jingħata garanzija li l-injam ikun ġej minn produzzjoni legali. F’konformità mal-Pjan ta’ Azzjoni dwar l-Infurzar, it-Tmexxija u l-Kummerċ tal-Liġi tal-Foresti (FLEGT) għall-pajjiżi ta’ l-ACP, il-Kummissjoni qed tipproponi li tappoġġja metodoloġija reġjonali fit-tiswir ta’ ħiliet nazzjonali u reġjonali biex jimmonitorjaw u jappoġġjaw ftehimiet ta‘ tisħib FLEGT.

Meta wieħed iqis il-vulnerabbiltà għad-diżastri naturali, il-Kummissjoni kienet ipproponiet lill-pajiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP fl-2005 biex iwaqqfu programm ta’ tħejjija għad-diżastri reġjonali. Din l-inizjattiva tista’ tiġi segwita u mwessgħa lejn il-qasam tat-tnaqqis tad-diżastri (tnaqqis tar-riskji, tnaqqis tal-perikli u vulnerabbiltà mnaqqsa, meħuda f’kunsiderazzjoni l-ħtieġa ta’ adattament għal tibdil fil-klima). Miżuri bħal dawn jikkumplimentaw l-azzjoni reġjonali eżistenti biex tonqos il-vulnerabbiltà.

Prezzijiet għolja taż-żejt, id-distanza kbira, u s-swieq żgħar kollha huma raġuniet biex il-gżejjer żgħar tal-Paċifiku jpoġġu l-enerġija rinnovabbli u l-effiċjenza enerġetika f'post għoli fuq l-aġenda tagħhom. L-inizjattivi tal-KE ta’ bħalissa f’dan is-settur jistgħu jiġu segwiti u mifruxa, speċjalment fil-qafas ta’ l-Inizjattiva ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea dwar l-Enerġija (EUEI) u tal-Faċilità dwar l-Enerġija EU-ACP, li hija marbuta magħha. Wieħed jista’ jikkunsidra wkoll li tingħata għajnuna mill-KE għall-kontroll tat-tniġġiż, l-ilma u l-iġjene.

L-azzjoni dwar l-immaniġġjar sostenibbli tar-riżorsi naturali tista’ tgħin biex jinħolqu l-kundizzjonijiet għal tkabbir ekonomiku li jwassal għall-ħolqien ta’ impjiegi produttivi u deċenti, ta’ koeżjoni soċjali u protezzjoni, kif ukoll tnaqqis fil-faqar, biex b’hekk dan kollu jgħin biex jinkisbu l-Għanijiet ta‘ Żvilupp tal-Millenju. Se tkompli tingħata attenzjoni għall-kwistjoni vitali ta’ l-iżvilupp tar-riżorsi umani. F’dan il-kuntest, atturi non-governattivi għandhom rwol importanti minħabba l-kontribuzzjoni kruċjali għal soċjetajiet miftuħa, speċjalment biex titjieb it-tmexxija, it-tiswir tan-nazzjonijiet u biex is-soċjetajiet jakkwistaw aktar awtonomija.

L-investiment fix-xjenza u t-teknoloġija fil-gżejjer tal-Paċifiku flimkien ma’ investiment fir-riżorsi umani u t-tiswir istituzzjonali se jsaħħu l-ħila f’firxa ta’ oqsma essenzjali għall-iżvilupp sostenibbli tagħhom, bħal fl-immaniġġjar tas-sajd, fil-bio-diversità u l-istat ta’ tħejjija għad-diżastri. Possibiltajiet għal kooperazzjoni fir-riċerka jistgħu jiġu segwiti taħt il-Programmi ta’ Qafas tar-Riċerka ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea.

Teknoloġiji ta’ l-informatika u tal-kommunikazzjoni moderni huma strumenti importanti, b’mod partikolari f’reġjun li fih distanzi kbar, u jistgħu ikunu sistematikament integrati fl-implimentazzjoni ta’ l-azzjoni li qed tkun proposta hawn fuq, per. eż. fil-forma ta’ sistemi ta’ sorveljanza u kontroll għas-sajd u għat-tqaċċit ta’ siġar u biex tkun iffaċilitata l-komunikazzjoni fis-settur ta’ l-edukazzjoni, kif ukoll biex il-medja titħalla tippreżenta u tħares id-diversità kulturali vasta tar-reġjun u jitwettaq il-potenzjal ekonomiku tiegħu. Għandu jiġi esplorat il-potenzjal biex jiddaħħal jew jissaħħaħ it-tagħlim mill-bogħod, b’mod speċjali t-tagħlim bil-kompjuter għal naħat rurali imbiegħda .

3.3. Twassil ta’ għajnuna aktar effiċjenti

Biex l-assitenza għall-iżvilupp ta’ l-UE ssir aktar effiċjenti u biex jonqsu l-ispejjeż konsiderevoli ta’ tranżazzjoni li kull naħa jkollha, il-Kummissjoni tipproponi li l-assistenza għandha tkun aktar ikkonċentrata, bħal kif ingħad hawn fuq, mixħuta lejn livell reġjonali, użu aktar effiċjenti ta‘ allokazzjonijiet għal pajjiżi żgħar u użu akbar ta’ appoġġ mill-baġit fejn ikun possibbli.

3.3.1. Koordinazzjoni bejn id-donaturi

Il-proposta li qed issir għal konċentrazzjoni ta’ l-istrateġija ta’ l-UE se tiffaċilita l-koordinazzjoni bejn id-donaturi sew fuq livell ta’ l-UE kif ukoll ma’ oħrajn, speċjalment l-Awstrajla u New Zealand, li l-Kummissjoni se tkompli tara li tikseb biex titnaqqas dejjem aktar il-pressjoni fuq il-ħiliet limitati ta’ l-amministrazzjonijiet nazzjonali konċernati. Il-ko-ordinazzjoni hija kritika biex ma jkunx hemm dupplikazzjoni jew inkonsistenzi bejn dawk li qed jippruvaw jilħqu għanijiet komuni. Il-koordinazzjoni bejn id-donaturi hija ta’ importanza partikolari fi stati fraġili. Il-Fond Globali għall-ġlieda kontra l-AIDS, it-Tuberkolożi u l-malarja għandu serje ta’ programmi fir-reġjun, u t-Trust Fund li hemm bħalissa u li għalih jikkontribwixxu ħafna donaturi dwar l-Influwenza tat-Tjur u l-Pandemija fost il-Bnedmin jista’ jservi ta’ eżempju għal koordinazzjoni internazzjonali bejn id-donaturi fis-settur tas-saħħa f’każ li tfaqqa’ l-marda fir-reġjun.

3.3.2. Kooperazzjoni aktar effettiva u effiċjenti ma’ l-iżgħar pajjiżi

Impenn sħiħ fil-partenarjat ta’ Cotonou jimplika djalogu politiku dejjem għaddej, immaniġġjar bi sħab tal-kooperazzjoni għall-iżvilupp u parteċipazzjoni sħiħa fil-proċess EPA. Għal numru ta’ pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku li huma l-iżgħar kooperazzjoni intensiva bħal din hija sfida serja għall-amministrazzjonijiet tagħhom, b’mod partikolari biex jimplimentaw programmi individwali speċifiċi għall-pajjiż. Biex tiżdied l-effiċjenza għall-għajnuna u biex jonqsu l-ispejjeż tat-tranżazzjonijiet, b’mod partikolari għall-iżgħar pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP, iridu jkunu kkunsidrati metodi ġodda – fil-waqt li jkun żgurat li l-pajjiżi konċernati jħossu li dak li qed isir għandhom sehem fih - u dan kollu bbażat fuq l-esperjenza li teżisti. Il-programm li għaddej bejn għadd ta’pajjiżi dwar enerġija rinnovabbli huwa mudell li wieħed jista’ jsegwi.

3.3.3. Appoġġ mill-baġit

L-UE għandha l-intenzjoni li tapplika b’mod aktar sistematiku l-istrumenti ta’ appoġġ fil-baġit fil-kooperazzjoni tagħha mal-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP.

Għal dan l-iskop, meta wieħed iqis l-involviment limitat ta’ istituzzjonijiet Bretton Woods fir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku, il-ħsieb hu li jinbeda djalogu b’mod partikolari ma’ l-IMF biex jiġu skambjati l-analiżi, l-esperjenza u l-istudji bil-ħsieb li tiġi żviluppata kooperazzjoni aktar qawwija fil-Paġifiku dwar l-appoġġ mill-baġit.

Barra minn dan, l-UE se tassisti b'mod proattiv lill-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP biex jilħqu l-kriterji ta’ l-eliġibbiltà qed teżamina jekk hemmx skop f’li testendi appoġġ bħal dan lejn pajjiżi oħra bħal ma huma Samoa u Fiġi u, possibbilment, lil oħrajn.

F’ livell reġjonali , il-KE qed tipprovdi fondi lill-Forum tal-Gżejjer għal għajnuna mill-baġit, jiġifieri:

- Paper dwar Strateġija għat-Tnaqqis tal-Faqar (PRSP) jew strateġija nazzjonali ta’ żvilupp li qed titħejja;

- qafas mikro-ekonomiku stabbli, li huwa jew sodisfaċenti jew qed jiġi rriformat;

- tmexxija trasparenti u soda tal-finanzi pubbliċi.

Bħalissa, f’Vanuatu, hemm programm wieħed ta’ appoġġ mil-baġit li jgawdi minn finanzjar tal-KE relattivament baxx Il-Kummissjoni tal-Paċifiku fil-forma ta’ ftehimiet ta’ kontribuzzjoni li jiżguraw grad għoli ta’ appartenenza. Fi żmien qasit se ssir evalwazzjoni istituzzjonali biex ikunu stabbiliti l-kundizzjonijiet għal kooperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib. Għall-quddiem għandha tingħata aktar kunsiderazzjoni biex jingħataw forom oħra ta’ iffinanzjar, bl-implikazzjoni ta’ kontribuzzjoni akbar mill-UE fid-definizzjoni u l-monitoraġġ ta’ programmi rilevanti.

4. Konklużjonijiet

Il-Paċifiku u l-UE għandhom storja twila ta’ sħubija mill-qrib, b’għeruq storiċi[8]. Fil-waqt li r-rabtiet iddgħajfu b'mod inevitabbli fit-tieni nofs tas-Seklu 20 wara d-dekolonizzazzjoni, minn dak iż-żmien lil hawn iż-żewġ reġjuni evolvew b’mod sostanzjali u qed jerġgħu jersqu lejn xulxin.

Din hija opportunità reali biex jissaħħaħ it-tisħib f’termini ta’ djalogu politiku wiesa’, kooperazzjoni kummerċjali u dwar l-iżvilupp. Fil-waqt li l-Paċifku u l-UE huma ġeografikament mbegħda, huma aktar importanti għal xulxin minn dak li wieħed issoltu jissopponu jew jifhem fl-Ewropa. Iż-żewġ reġjuni għandhom ħafna x’joffru lil xulxin, jikkumplimentaw lil xulxin b’mod konsiderevoli u għandhom valuri u interessi ewlenin komuni.

Peress li huma biss ftit l-Istati Membri, barra l-Kummissjoni innifisha, li għandhom rappreżentazzjonijiet fil-pajjiżi tal-Paċifiku ta’ l-ACP, ir-reġjun tal-Paċifiku jidher li hu f’pożizzjoni tajba għal preżenza konġunta, u għall-azzjoni, ta’ l-UE fil-qasam, per eżempju billi jiġi ssekondati uffiċjali mis-servizzi ta’ l-Istati Membri lid-Delegazzjonijiet reġjonali tal-Kummissjoni fil-Paċifiku, li jistgħu wkoll jipprovdu faċilitajiet fuq bażi ad hoc (“Europe House”)

Proċess gradwali, magħqud mal-flessibbiltà neċessarja, jista’ jagħti qafas għal rappreżentazzjoni esterna aħjar ta’ l-UE fil-Paċifiku, fil-forma ta' preżenza usa’, djalogu politiku aktar profond u profil ogħla għall-UE.

PAJJIŻI TA’ L-ACP – STATISTIĊI EWLENIN

Popolazzjoni | Erja (Km2) | HDI (UNDP 2003) | EEZ | PGD 'l ras (purchasing power standards $) Il-Bank Dinji 2004 |

2004 | (1,000 km2) |

Il-Gżira Cook | 20300 | 240 | 1830 | 4896** |

Fiġi | 848000 | 18272 | 0.752 | 1260 | 2690 |

Kiribati* | 98000 | 690 | 3600 | 970 |

Il-Gżejjer Marshall | 60000 | 170 | 2131 | 2370 |

Mikroneżja | 127000 | 700 | 2978 | 1990 |

Nauru | 10100 | 24 | 320 | 1917** |

Niue | 1800 | 259 | 390 | 2970** |

Palau | 20000 | 487 | 601 | 6870 |

Papwa New Guinea | 5700000 | 462840 | 0,523 | 3120 | 580 |

Samoa* | 179000 | 2857 | 0,776 | 120 | 1860 |

Il-Gżejjer Solomon* | 471000 | 28446 | 0,594 | 1630 | 550 |

Timor-Leste* | 925000 | 14874 | 0,513 | 322 | 550 |

Tonga | 102000 | 699 | 0,81 | 700 | 1830 |

Tuvalu* | 11190 | 26 | 757 | 989** |

Vanuatu* | 215000 | 12189 | 0,659 | 680 | 1340 |

Total | 8788390 | 542773 | 20439 |

* Pajjiżi l-anqas żviluppati** ċifri mill-2002, sors l-Università tal-Paċifiku ta' Isfel.

Sorsi: Nzaid: Rapport Annwali 2004-2005; Rapport ta’ l-Iżvilupp tal-Paċifiku (2002): Is-segretarjat tal-Komunità tal-Paċifiku; Rapport ta’ l-Iżvilupp Dinji 2006: UNDP: Rapport ta’ l-Iżvilupp Uman (2004):

STATISTIKA OCT TAL-PAċIFIKU

Pajjiż | Popolazzjoni (Lulju 2006, stima) | Żona (Km2) | EEZ (Km2) | PGN ‘l ras (ppp) (2003 est.) |

Kaledonja l-Ġdida | 219,246 | 19,060 | 1,347,964 | $15,000 |

Pitcairn | 45 | 47 | 837,221 | N/A |

Il-Polineżja Franċiża | 274,578 | 4,167 | 4,553,115 (it-tieni l-akbar fid-dinja) | $17,500 |

Wallis & Futura | 16,025 | 274 | 271,050 | $3,800 (2004, stima) |

ANNEX

1. The Pacific Region

1.1. Key characteristics

Oceania is an essentially maritime continent of about 30 million people with Australia at its centre of gravity. There are 15 countries in this region that have a special development, trade and political cooperation with the EU, governed by the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The total population of the 15 Pacific ACP countries is only about 9 million. Papua New Guinea (PNG) with its 5.7 million inhabitants is the biggest, while Niue with 1800 is the smallest. The Pacific ACP countries are inhabited by Pacific peoples (Melanesians, Micronesians and Polynesians). Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are all Melanesian countries. Timor-Leste and Fiji are predominantly Melanesian, while Fiji also has an important Indo-Fijian population. The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Nauru, Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands are all Micronesian countries. Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu are the Polynesian countries.

In addition, the Pacific region includes eight territories , of which four are European: New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna are French territories, while tiny Pitcairn is the last remaining UK territory in the Pacific. Of the remaining four territories three are with the United States (American Samoa, Guam and Northern Marianas); and one with New Zealand (Tokelau).

Apart from PNG, Solomon Islands and Fiji land resources are limited, but marine resources are very considerable. Twenty million sq km of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Pacific region belongs to the Pacific ACP countries[9]. The Pacific has the richest fishing grounds in the world and is one of the world’s centres of marine biological diversity , with up to 3,000 species found on a single coral reef. It has been estimated that PNG alone has five times more species of fish than the entire Caribbean region and twice as many as the Red Sea. Forests and their biodiversity are other important components of the Pacific islands natural capital, especially for poor rural communities in Melanesia. PNG hosts one of the world’s four remaining tracts of tropical rainforest and 7% of the world’s species of plant and terrestrial life forms, while Solomon Islands has the highest concentration of endemic birds on the planet. The region is rich in minerals – gold, copper, nickel – as well as oil and gas, and much of it is still unexplored.

Australia and New Zealand play a special role in the region. Each country has its own Pacific strategy, however, Australia and New Zealand have coordinated policies in some areas.

Australia, the region’s dominant economy and political actor, is geographically close to Melanesia. The region’s stability has always been an important issue for Australian foreign policy, while the Pacific is less important for Australia in commercial terms. Key concerns for Australia relate to transnational crime, and in recent years Australia has been pursuing a robust policy aimed to prevent the emergence of failed states in the region, including important initiatives to stabilise the Solomon Islands, to improve governance in PNG and to promote regional police cooperation. Its policy has been influenced by a number of terrorist attacks outside Australia, where Australian lives were lost. Australia has a delicate balancing act so as not to be seen as over-dominant. The country’s relations with its immediate neighbour, Papua New Guinea, have sometimes been strained, while its negotiations with Timor-Leste regarding a permanent maritime boundary, including access to natural resources, have, at times, been difficult. An important ongoing debate in the region concerns the interest of the Pacific ACP countries in gaining access for their citizens to the Australian labour market, in particular for unskilled labour. Australia is the most important donor in the region and has recently announced a very substantial increase of its ODA. Australia is about to launch its first White Paper on Development as well as an analytical report highlighting major challenges facing the Pacific to the year 2020. Australia is highly supportive of EU engagement with the region and keen to coordinate its development assistance with the EU.

New Zealand has close ties to the Pacific, and notably Polynesia, partly for historical reasons, partly because of its large Polynesian population. The Pacific is a primary area for New Zealand’s foreign policy. It played an important role in the peace process for Bougainville and it is the second biggest participant in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). New Zealand is committed to promoting Pacific regionalism. The Pacific is a medium-sized trading partner for New Zealand. It concentrates most of its relatively limited ODA to the region and is an important development partner for many Pacific ACP countries. Like Australia, New Zealand is also highly supportive of an active EU engagement with the region and keen to coordinate its development assistance with the EU.

1.2. Geo-political and geo-economic importance

The US, Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand are the key Pacific powers, and they all have important security, political and trade interests in the wider Pacific region, where the US has been the leading power since the end of World War II. Japan and Australia are close US allies, and have underpinned the position of the US in the wider Pacific for decades, while the European role has decreased with decolonisation. France, however, is significantly engaged through its territories and military presence. The growing engagement of China in the region is a new factor influencing future developments in the Pacific in the form of Chinese trade, investments, migration and aid coupled with an intensifying diplomacy. As the economies of China, India and ASEAN continue to grow rapidly, demand for the region’s natural resources is increasing.

1.3. Main development challenges

Of the 15 Pacific ACP countries no less than 11 have populations around or below 250.000[10]. It is difficult for such small nations to attain a critical mass for production and trade or indeed political influence, because of important dis-economies of scale. The concern is that for many small Pacific ACP countries globalisation may not mean interdependence, but increased dependency.

With the exception of Tonga, which is an almost absolute monarchy, all Pacific ACP countries are fully fledged democracies , but modern institutions have not yet taken root everywhere and do not easily combine with traditional power structures. In recent years political developments have proven that a number of Pacific countries are potentially unstable[11].

A number of Pacific countries, notably PNG and Solomon Islands, face important problems of governance and corruption . These are often linked to the issue of nation building in countries that are very heterogeneous, as identification with a clan or similar group may be stronger than with the State[12].

While the region, apart from Tonga, is not in general marred by grave human rights problems, there are serious issues related to gender . While the situation differs from country to country, violence against women and polygamy constitute important problems and women still have far to go in terms of empowerment[13].

Poverty and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain important challenges in a number of the countries. Poverty of opportunity is a particularly acute problem, with rural communities, where most Pacific islanders live, facing problems, such as poor access to basic social services, sustainable, efficient and affordable energy services and telecommunications, and with economic activities hampered by distance, insufficient and expensive transport services and limited access to capital.

Unsustainable management of natural resources is a serious issue facing several countries in the region. In particular, the rates at which forests are being depleted and biodiversity is being lost are so high that the countries concerned risk losing critical economic assets within a very short time span. Often a result of weak governance, this combines with serious leakages of financial resources away from Government. The result is that critical resources that should be invested in the development of these countries are diverted.

The Pacific ACP countries have relatively good food-security , although there is a problem of malnutrition in some places. However, while there is a tradition for safety nets and a culture of sharing, community support systems are now under strain in many places.

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The Pacific possesses an exceptional cultural diversity[14] , which is the basis for an extraordinary richness of cultural expression. This diversity, including the linguistic heritage, should be preserved[15]. Furthermore, this diversity also represents a non-negligible source of wealth in economic terms which the media through the use of ICTs can help realise.. The question of how best to achieve the desired and inevitable economic modernisation without jeopardising fundamental strengths of the traditional culture is crucial to the future of the region. When engaging in dialogue and development cooperation with the Pacific ACP countries this cultural dimension needs to be fully taken into account.

For potential investors Pacific culture imposes a number of important constraints. Traditional collective land ownership raises barriers to obtaining land for development and using land as collateral. The strong culture of sharing constitutes a disincentive to saving for investment.

Some of these factors may partly explain the weak economic growth experienced by most Pacific ACP countries, a concern not least in view of the growing population (around 3% a year) A study of economic data (available for 11 of the 15 Pacific ACP countries - excluding Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu) shows that in the period 2000-2004 average annual GDP growth was only 1.1%. However, some countries, notably Samoa, have recorded strong growth in the same period. Average inflation for the 11 countries stood at a modest 1.6% in 2004. There are considerable differences in GDP/capita requiring adapted policies and cooperation.

The Pacific is particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes, and generally with the poorest population segments being the most exposed. Since 1950 natural disasters have affected more than 3.8 million people in 14 Pacific ACP countries (Timor-Leste not included). In the 1990s alone natural disasters cost the region about USD 2.8 billion (in real 2004 value). From 1990 to 1999 the region had the world’s highest rates of disaster-related mortality, percentage of population affected, and damage cost per capita. While traditional coping mechanisms are strong, the number of reported disasters and the population affected per event have increased significantly, reflecting population growth, rapid urbanisation, growing environmental degradation in coastal areas, climate change and variability. With climate change and increasing sea levels many low-laying Pacific islands are at risk and the region may in future face a serious problem in terms of environmental refugees.

Last but not least, the geography of the Pacific is characterised by the enormous distances between and within most of its countries. The Cook Islands (population less than 25,000) stretch 1,400 km from North to South, and 1,000 km from East to West, while Kiribati (population 100,000) includes Christmas Island located 3,200 km from the country’s capital. In addition, it is the ACP region which is the furthest removed from the EU in geographical terms. This “tyranny of distance” is a serious constraint for development in the Pacific, because of serious diseconomies of distance resulting notably in low frequency and high-cost transport. However, electronic communication is becoming cheaper and more available.

1.4. Regional cooperation

The Pacific Islands Forum (the ‘Forum’) is the premier regional policy-making body of the self-governing states in the Pacific. Established in 1971, its membership includes 14 of the Pacific ACP countries together with Australia and New Zealand.[16] Forum Heads of State and Government meet annually, as do Forum Economics and Education Ministers. Similar meetings are planned for Forum Health Ministers. Ad hoc meetings of Transport and Fisheries Ministers are also held. The Chairmanship of the Forum rotates on an annual basis among the Member States. As regards security, the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 establishes a framework for Forum intra-state security cooperation, which calls for Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers to meet as part of an ad hoc crisis management mechanism for the region.

The Forum is served by its Secretary-General, whose work is supported by the Forum Secretariat . The Secretariat’s overall objective is to service the Member States and to promote Pacific regional cooperation, particularly on economic and trade matters. It also acts as the Forum’s administrative arm, implementing its decisions, including delivering development assistance to Member States. In the case of trade-related assistance, it can also act as implementing agency.

The Forum Secretary-General is also permanent Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) , which brings together the Forum Secretariat and nine other Pacific regional organisations (see annex A)[17].

At the October 2005 meeting of Forum Heads of State and Government two important decisions aiming at strengthening regional cooperation were taken. The Leaders approved an Agreement giving the Forum legal personality under international law. They also approved the Pacific Plan and a roadmap for its implementation. This decision represents the culmination of a process started in 2003 by initiative of the New Zealand Forum Chair aimed at strengthening Pacific regionalism. The Plan, covering the years 2005-2015, has been presented as a dynamic framework for strengthened regional cooperation and integration. It remains to be seen how far effective implementation can be achieved. Full implementation will depend on continued political commitment and mobilisation of the required financial resources.

Presently, regional cooperation in the Pacific is neither broad nor deep. Among the explanatory factors can be mentioned the geography of the region, the fact that many Pacific countries are still relatively young as independent states and therefore particularly sensitive about issues pertaining to sovereignty, and the asymmetry between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the Pacific ACP countries on the other[18].

In 2004 intra-regional trade between the Pacific ACP countries was as low as 3%[19], mainly due to transport costs and the limited size of their markets. These countries have concluded the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) , aiming to establish a FTA among its parties. The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) is a trade and economic cooperation agreement among all 16 Forum Member States. It sets out the basis for the future development of trade relations among these states[20].

The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is a sub-regional trading arrangement among PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, with New Caledonia as an observer. MSG aims at a FTA in 2008 and aspires to a Customs Union.

There is scope for increased cooperation and synergy between the Pacific ACP countries and the region’s OCTs in areas such as environment and vocational training.

1.5. Key partners of the Pacific beyond Europe, Australia and New Zealand: United States, Japan, China and Taiwan

The United States has important security interests in the Pacific, which it has dominated since its victory in World War II. US trade with the larger Asia-Pacific region has now overtaken its trade with the EU, so also for this reason the US has a strong interest in continued stability. The US National Security Strategy from March 2006 highlights the importance of in particular Japan, South Korea and Australia. In its Quadrennial Defense Review Report from February 2006 the US Department of Defense reports that of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States, adds that the pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk, and states: “U.S. policy remains focussed on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as a partner in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy.” The US has renewed economic and military agreements (Compacts of Free Association) with Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. The US also has territories in the Pacific, and Hawaii is a US state. Having curtailed its development cooperation with the region in the past the US has recently reengaged, notably with Vanuatu. The US has indicated its interest in seeing the EU pursue an active role in the region.

Japan has security, foreign affairs, trade and fishery interests in the region, and is traditionally an important donor, specialising mainly in infrastructure. As memories of World War II fade Japan’s cooperation with the Pacific ACP countries becomes easier.

China ’s role[21] in the Pacific region is growing in line with its increasing economic weight in the world. There is also migration from China to the Pacific ACP countries. China is competing with Taiwan for diplomatic relations with a number of the 13 Pacific ACP countries, which are members of the UN[22]. It already pursues defence cooperation with PNG, Fiji and Tonga. China has been a “Dialogue Partner” of the Forum since 1989 and has contributed generously to its activities. Since 1992 Taiwan has held its own separate post-Forum meeting with “friendly” Pacific Islands States. This competition between China and Taiwan, through investments and development cooperation, can be destabilising for the Pacific ACP countries concerned, as was seen in PNG in 1999, and most recently in Vanuatu, where it caused a political crisis in 2004.

2. EU AND THE PACIFIC

2.1. EU – Pacific relations so far

EU relations with the region are based on the colonial past , most recently with the UK, France and Portugal as the important players, and before that Germany and Spain. These EU Member States have all influenced the region in ways which are still perceptible today. The influence of British political institutions and tradition has been profound. Many Pacific ACP countries are members of the Commonwealth and most of these retain the Queen of England as Head of State[23].

France and UK have territories in the Pacific. The EU has an Association Agreement with four OCT in the region. The OCT are subject to a different preferential regime from the ACP countries. Under their statutes of autonomy, the French OCT are showing an increased interest in Pacific regional cooperation as they are enhancing contacts with their neighbours and their region.

France is a regional power with an important military presence and a series of diplomatic representations in the region, as well as a growing cooperation with Australia. France also engages in development cooperation with Pacific ACP countries, in particular with Vanuatu.

While the United Kingdom is presently phasing out its development cooperation with the Pacific ACP countries, it remains engaged through its diplomatic representations, its investments, volunteer programmes and its close relations with Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

Several EU Member States are strengthening official contacts with Pacific ACP countries. In addition, many Member States are engaged in other ways in the region, e.g. through scientific research or through a number of European NGOs , mainly environmental or faith-based, in particular from the UK, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands.

A number of EU Member States, in particular Portugal , have cooperation activities with Timor-Leste.

The EU’s relations with the Pacific ACP countries are structured, and have been so for decades, first on the basis of the Lome Conventions, and now by the Cotonou Agreement . In political terms an important objective for the EU has been to underpin a successful stabilisation following decolonisation while supporting economic and social progress. Considering the political volatility experienced in a number of Pacific ACP countries, this goal has not yet been convincingly attained. Research and evaluations indicate that the development assistance has had a positive impact in the region and that without it growth would have been lower and social indicators poorer. However, analyses indicate that in the last decade overall economic growth remained sluggish on average and insufficient to reduce poverty.

The EU has furthermore agreed Joint Political Declarations with Australia and New Zealand, and entered into a series of separate Agreements with these two countries, on the basis of which regular consultations are held.

The Pacific ACP countries and the EU share core values , such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, effective multilateralism and environmental protection. These countries are generally supportive of EU environmental positions. They also play a growing role in international institutions. Some of them, notably Fiji, contribute to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide[24].

The EU’s political dialogue with individual Pacific ACP Member States is limited. At the regional level, a broad political dialogue is pursued with the Forum, through the so-called Post-Forum Dialogue, which traditionally follows immediately after the Forum Leaders annual Summit[25]. Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement concerning essential elements was triggered in the case of the 2000 coup in Fiji. Cooperation was resumed in 2003.

Members of the European Parliament observed the 2001 parliamentary elections in Solomon Islands. A fully-fledged EU election observation mission took take place in Fiji in 2006.

EU-Pacific trade is relatively small and erratic. Unprocessed agricultural products, in particular palm oil and sugar dominate Pacific exports to the EC. Machinery, ships and boats are important items in the EC export structure. There has always been a trade surplus for the Pacific in its exchanges with the EC. Australia and New Zealand are major trading partners for the region particularly as regards Pacific ACP imports. The EC is a relatively small trading partner for the Pacific ACP absorbing around 10% of their exports and providing an estimated 5% of their imports. Based on 5-year averages PNG and Fiji together accounted for a full 90% of the Pacific ACP countries’ exports to the EU, while taking 41% of the total imports from the EU. In 2004 Pacific ACP goods exports to the EU amounted to € 588 million, while goods imports from the EU amounted to € 333 million[26]. Fiji currently exports half of its production (i.e. approximately 165,000 tonnes of a total production of 330,000 tonnes) to the EU under Sugar Protocol at guaranteed prices.

The EU has either signed or initialled fishery agreements with three Pacific ACP countries: Kiribati, Solomon Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. A small number of Spanish and French vessels are fishing with licenses under these agreements. In December 2004, the European Community acceded to the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPFC), which is responsible for overseeing the sustainable management and conservation of tuna in the Pacific. The EU also supports the scientific tuna stock work of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). The EC is also an active participant in the on-going inter-governmental consultations for the creation of a regional fisheries management organisation for non-tuna species in the Pacific.

EC development assistance to the region is substantial, and total aid granted under successive Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement exceeds € 1.8 billion.[27] Furthermore, Timor-Leste has received more than € 200 M under other instruments since 1999. In addition, the European Investment Bank and the Centre for Development of Enterprises are also active in the region. Together with ODA flows from the EU Member States, such as Portugal’s bilateral aid of more than € 300 M for Timor-Leste, the EU is one of the few major donors to the Pacific ACP countries, and this includes support financed by the EU’s budget, such as the Erasmus Mundus programme, food security and environment.

In September 2004 the EU and 14 Pacific ACP countries opened negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA )[28]. These aim at arriving at an ambitious and development-oriented arrangement, which should promote regional integration and economic development, policy reform, sustainable management of resources, such as fisheries, thereby also contributing to the reduction of poverty. The ACP side has indicated its interest in securing arrangements relating to services and tourism, fisheries and investment as well as goods. Their commitment to these negotiations was most recently confirmed by Pacific ACP Leaders in October 2005. However, given that negotiations need to be concluded before the end of 2007, there is a need for the ACP side to accelerate preparations and negotiations[29]. EPA will replace the preferential access scheme contained in Cotonou and which is currently covered by a WTO waiver, which expires in 2008.

2.2. Present challenges facing EU – Pacific relations

Presently, EU relations with the Pacific suffer from a lack of political profile and visibility on both sides, inadequate arrangements for regional interaction and reduced efficiency in development cooperation efforts due to a lack of focus and high transaction costs. Beyond the bilateral consultation mechanisms between the EU and Australia and New Zealand respectively, the only structured interaction between the EU and the Pacific region is provided by the so-called Post-Forum Dialogue.

Immediately following the Forum Summit, the Heads of State and Government interact with main Forum partners and donors through the Post-Forum Dialogue at ministerial level. On the Forum side this involves a panel consisting of three ministers and the Forum Secretary-General with a minister representing the Forum Chair as head of Delegation.

Presently, the EU takes part in this Dialogue with a delegation consisting only of the Commission. However, twice the EU Council Presidency has been associated to the Commission in this exercise. In parallel, France and the UK, the two EU Member States with remaining significant engagements in the Pacific region, hold separate Dialogue-meetings with the Forum panel.

Although positive exchanges have taken place over the years between the EU and the Pacific region through this arrangement, the Post-Forum Dialogue does not fully reflect the importance of EU-Pacific relations and is insufficient in terms of sustaining the bilateral relationship between the regions. Particular shortcomings are as follows:

1. Limited visibility for the EU in the Pacific. The arrangement does not reflect the fact that the EU is the second largest donor in the region. No joint communiqué is issued after the dialogue. The number of Dialogue partners has been increasing over the years.

2. Limited visibility for the Pacific in Europe due to lack of formal preparation in the EU institutions and the fact that the meetings always take place in the Pacific region.

3. Limited impact on both sides due to lack of formalisation.

4. As the Post-Forum Dialogue takes place the day after the Forum summit is concluded, there is insufficient time for the EU side to properly prepare its reactions to the summit outcome.

5. The time allotted to the EU dialogue is insufficient to deal with an increasingly comprehensive EU-Pacific agenda. The distribution of responsibilities between the two parties as regards the issues in the agenda is unsatisfactory.

Full engagement in the Cotonou partnership entails sustained political dialogue, co-management of development cooperation and full participation in the EPA process. For a number of the smallest Pacific ACP countries such intensive cooperation poses a serious challenge. The costs for these countries relating to their Cotonou obligations is substantial, the cooperation may therefore not reach critical mass for them, and may even outweigh the benefits. For countries with limited administrative capacity there is the added concern that the cooperation may crowd out other and perhaps more important activities.

The European OCT face specific challenges, such as economic, social and environmental vulnerability, as well as problems of scale and progressive erosion of their trade preferences with the EU. At the same time, the OCT have a number of strengths, such as advanced education, health and research facilities and relatively developed economies, which they bring to the growing ACP-OCT interaction in the region.

Annex A

CROP Agencies

The ten organisations are:

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS)

Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)

Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP)

Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC)

South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC)

South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)

South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO)

University of the South Pacific (USP)

South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment (SPBEA)

Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM)

The CROP membership varies significantly and is summarised in the table below.

Annex B

European Representations in Pacific ACP Countries |

Papua New Guinea | EC Delegation, UK High Commission, French Embassy |

Fiji | EC Regional Delegation, UK High Commission, French Embassy |

Timor Leste | EC Technical Office, Portuguese Embassy, UK Embassy, Irish Representative Office, French Co-operation Office |

Solomon Islands | EC Office, UK High Commission |

Vanuatu | EC Office, French Embassy |

Samoa | EC Technical Office, UK High Commission |

Kiribati | EC Technical Office |

[1] Il-Gżejjer Cook, il-Gżejjer Fiġi, Kiribati, il-Gżejjer Marshall, l-Istati Federati tal-Mikroneżja, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papwa New Guinea, Samoa, il-Gżejjer Solomon, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu u Vanatu.

[2] Timor Leste għandu stat ta’ osservatur.

[3] Ara l-anness għad-dettalji.

[4] Ara l-anness għad-dettalji.

[5] Id-disa' aġenziji CROP huma aġenziji tekniċi speċjalizzati li joperaw fuq il-bażi ta’ ftehimiet internazzjonali fil-livell reġjonali tal-Paċifiku.

[6] Il-Pjan tal-Paċifiku għandu bħala waħda mill-prijoritajiet ewlenin l-iffaċilitar ta’ iffinanzjar internazzjonali għal żvilupp sostenibbli, il-bio-diversità u l-ħarsien ambjentali u biex jiġu miġġielda l-effetti ta’ tibdil fil-klima fil-Paċifiku. Taħt din l-intestatura, il-Pjan tal-Paċifiku jirreferi wkoll għal agrikultura integrata u pjan għal forestrija. Il-Politika dwar l-Ibħra tal-Ġżejjer tal-Paċifiku adottata fl-2002 tipproponi li għandu jkun hemm immaniġġjar ta’ l-ibħra fl-interess tal-ġenerazzjonijiet tal-futur ta’ abitanti tal-gżejjer tal-Paċifiku u tipprovdi Qafas Integrat ta’ Azzjoni għal Inizjattivi dwar l-Ibħra.

[7] Il-Grupp jikkonsisti mis-Segretarjat tal-Komunità tal-Paċifiku (SPC), il-Kummissjoni tal-Paċifiku ta’ Isfel tal-Ġeo-xjenza Applikata (SOPAC), u l-Programm Ambjentali Reġjonali tal-Paċifiku (PREP).

[8] Ara l-Anness 1.

[9] Of the 15 Pacific ACP countries six (Cook Islands, FSM, Nauru, Niue, Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) have a total population of around or less than 250.000, but combined EEZs that exceed 8 million km2.

[10] All 15 Pacific ACP countries are SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and they participate actively in the UN-sponsored SIDS’ process, which most recently resulted in the Mauritius Declaration and Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS agreed in January 2005.

[11] Secessionist war on the island of Bougainville in PNG; tensions in Solomon Islands; repeated coups in Fiji; severe economic and financial crisis in Nauru; democratic deficit in Tonga.

[12] While PNG is ranked 130th in Transparency International’s corruption perception index, in some other Pacific countries corruption is a minor issue, such as in Kiribati, where theft is seen as dishonouring, and carries severe social sanctions.

[13] An extreme case is Solomon Islands, which as late as early 2006 did not have a single female member of parliament.

[14] It has been estimated that Papua New Guinea alone has more than 1000 cultural groups speaking some 800 different languages.

[15] The forthcoming UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions will offer a new international framework to promote international cooperation aimed at preserving cultural diversity, which may be important in this regard.

[16] Timor-Leste has observer status in the Forum and is not at present considering full membership.

[17] The core activities of these regional organisations are funded by contributions from Member governments, but they are governed by bodies that reflect their varying membership.

[18] Attempts at sectoral regional integration have had mixed results since the 1970s. PNG, by far the largest Pacific ACP country, established its own higher education system (UPNG, Unitech), while the rest of the region created the University of the South Pacific. Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu initially created Air Pacific but then quickly set up their own national airlines to promote tourist arrivals directly from major airports in Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii. The Pacific Forum (shipping) Line also proved unviable as a way of servicing the more peripheral states.

[19] Timor-Leste, which acceeded to the Cotonou Agreement in December 2005, is not included in this statistic.

[20] Timor-Leste is neither party to PICTA nor to PACER.

[21] In 2000 the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to establish of a Pacific Trade Office in Beijing and from 2000 to 2004 bilateral trade with China has doubled from USD 267 million to USD 530 million.

[22] Six Forum Member States currently recognise Taiwan: Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Palau and Nauru.

[23] Pacific culture has influenced major European artists, such as the painter Paul Gauguin and the author W. Somerset Maugham. The Pacific also provides a permanent source of inspiration for the European haute couture art and industry. English is an official language in all the present Pacific ACP countries, apart from Timor-Leste, which has Portuguese as an official language, while French is spoken in Vanuatu and in the French OCT. The fact that so many Pacific islanders speak European languages facilitates exchange and understanding between the two regions.

[24] Fiji’s role in international peacekeeping is quite remarkable. This small country has participated in virtually every UN peacekeeping mission - including in Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Lebanon – and also in Europe, where Fiji has contributed to the stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

[25] Cf section 3.1. below.

[26] As a result the EU was their second most important export market, after Australia and before Japan, while the EU was only 6th on the list of countries/regions the Pacific ACP countries source their imports from, behind Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, USA and Japan.

[27] Since independence Timor-Leste has benefited from substantial Community assistance under the ALA Regulation.

[28] Timor-Leste, which acceded to the Cotonou Agreeement in December 2005, does not at present participate in the EPA negotiations.

[29] The EU recognises that the Pacific ACP countries’ close links with Australia, New Zealand and the USA make these negotiations more complex. While trade flows between the Pacific ACP countries and the EU are limited, Australia and New Zealand are major trading partners and a FTA with them may imply major adjustment needs for the Pacific ACP countries. However, the opening of the formal negotiations on EPA, have not triggered demands by Australia and New Zealand to open discussions on parallel free trade negotiations as foreseen under Article 6 of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER).