[pic] | KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ |

Brussel 22.12.2005

KUMM(2005) 703 finali

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI

“Aktar gwida dwar il-pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni għall-perjodu kummerċjali mill-2008 sa l-2012 ta' l-Iskema ta' l-UE għall-Iskambju tal-Kwoti ta’ l-Emissjonijiet”

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI

“Aktar gwida dwar il-pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni għall-perjodu kummerċjali mill-2008 sa l-2012 ta' l-Iskema ta' l-UE għall-Iskambju tal-Kwoti ta’ l-Emissjonijiet” (Test b’ rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

1. INTRODUZZJONI

1. Din il-komunikazzjoni sservi ta’ gwida għall-Istati Membri sabiex jitfasslu l-pjanijiet ta’ l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali għat-tieni perjodu kummerċjali (mill-2008 sa l-2012). Din il-komunikazzjoni ma tiffurmax parti mill-analiżi li tinsab għaddejja bħalissa tad-Direttiva dwar l-Iskambju tal-Kwoti ta’ l-Emissjonijiet[1] (“id-Direttiva”), li skondha l-Kummissjoni se tressaq rapport lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill f’Ġunju 2006. Fit-tħejjija ta’ din l-analiżi, il-Kummissjoni tirrikonoxxi l-kontribut tal-partijiet interessati rigward firxa wiesgħa ta' kwistjonijiet dwar il-funzjonament u l-impatt ta' l-SKE ta’ l-UE ( EU ETS ).

2. Din il-gwida tissuplimenta l-gwida tal-Kummissjoni tas-7 ta' Jannar 2004[2] għall-implimentazzjoni tal-kriterji elenkati fl-Anness III għad-Direttiva. Id-dokument ta' gwida preċedenti b'mod partikolari fih analiżi teknika ta' l-interpretazzjoni u l-interazzjoni tal-kriterji differenti fl-Anness III u jispjega r-rwol tagħhom fl-evalwazzjoni tal-pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni min-naħa tal-Kummissjoni. Il-messaġġi ewlenin mill-ewwel dokument ta’ gwida jinsabu miġbura f’sommarju fl-Anness 3.

3. Il-Kummissjoni tqis bħala neċessarju li tiġi pprovduta gwida addizzjonali sabiex il-lezzjonijiet mitgħallma mill-ewwel fażi ta' allokazzjoni jiġu inkorporati konsistentement. Tinnota li n-natura ġenerali tal-kriterji elenkati fl-Aness III tad-Direttiva tippermetti li jkun hemm lok għall-implimentazzjoni tagħhom filwaqt li taqbel ma' l-Istati Membri u l-bosta partijiet interessati li tinħtieġ aktar gwida[3] sabiex jiġi żgurat li jkun hemm pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni aktar koerenti għat-tieni perjodu ta’ skambju tal-kwoti.

4. B’mod ġenerali, l-Istati Membri u l-partijiet interessati jenfasizzaw ukoll li jkun hemm preferenza għal aktar armonizzazzjoni tar-regoli ta’ l-allokazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni tqis li jinħtieġ ukoll li tinkiseb aktar koerenza fit-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti, sal-punt li jippermetti l-progress diverġenti mill-Istati Membri lejn il-miri ta' Kjoto individwali tagħhom. Ikun tajjeb li jkun hemm aktar armonizzazzjoni ’l hinn mill-2012. Il-Kummissjoni se tikkunsidra l-kwistjoni fil-kuntest ta' l-analiżi strateġika ta' l-Iskema ta' l-Iskambju tal-Kwoti ta' l-Emissjonijiet ta' l-UE ( EU ETS ).

5. Il-Kummissjoni tħeġġeġ lill-Istati Membri sabiex jaħdmu ħalli jkun hemm pjanijiet aktar sempliċi għat-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti. Pjanijiet ta’ allokazzjoni sempliċi jwasslu biex il-partijiet interessati jifhmu aħjar l-istrument filwaqt li jkabbru t-trasparenza u l-prevedibbiltà. L-Istati Membri għandhom jistinkaw ħalli jżommu l-pjanijiet għat-tieni allokazzjoni nazzjonali sempliċi kemm jista' jkun, b'mod partikolari f'dak li għandu x'jaqsam mal-metodi ta' l-allokazzjoni u r-regoli dwar dawk li jidħlu ġodda u l-egħluq ta’ l-impjanti. L-Istati Membri għandhom jevalwaw b’mod kritiku l-ħtieġa u l-effiċjenza tar-regoli li hemm fl-ewwel fażi tal-pjanijiet ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali u jżommu biss dawk li jqisu bħala assolutament essenzjali.

6. Sabiex tkompli ttejjeb it-trasparenza tal-pjanijiet, il-Kummissjoni żviluppat u annessat serje ta’ tabelli[4] li jiġbru f’sommarju b’mod standardizzat xi informazzjoni bażika li tinsab fi -pjan għall-allokazzjoni nazzjonali. Il-Kummissjoni tqis dawn it-tabelli bħala parti integrali tat-tieni fażi tal-pjanijiet għall-allokazzjoni nazzjoni u tistenna mill-Istati Membri li jużawhom. Barra minn hekk, tħeġġeġ lill-Istati Membri sabiex ikomplu jużaw il-Format Komuni[5] li kien ġie elaborat għall-ewwel pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni u, bħalma ġara fl-ewwel fażi, se tiżgura li jkun hemm evalwazzjoni kompletament konsistenti tal-pjanijiet kollha.

2. SOMMARJU TA’ L-ESPERJENZA MIKSUBA MILL-PJANIJIET TA’ ALLOKAZZJONI GħALL-EWWEL FAżI (2005-2007) U TAGħLIMIET ġENERALI GħAT-TIENI FAżI (2008-2012)

7. L-ewwel fażi tal-proċess ta’ allokazzjoni damet għaddejja għal madwar 15-il xahar, mill-iskadenza għan-notifika fil-31 ta' Marzu 2004 sa l-aħħar Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni fl-20 ta' Ġunju 2005. Din tawlet ferm aktar minn dak li kien previst fid-Direttiva. Il-proċess ta’ approvazzjoni daħal sew fl-ewwel perjodu ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti li beda fl-1 ta' Jannar 2005. In-notifika, l-approvazzjoni u l-finalizzazzjoni ttardjati fil-livell nazzjonali ta' xi wħud mill-pjanijiet taw lok għal inċertezzi mhux biss għall-kummerċ u għall-awtoritajiet nazzjonali rispettivi, iżda wkoll għall-esponenti fis-suq tal-kwoti madwar l-Ewropa kollha. Dan jenfasizza l-importanza li ssir notifika f’waqtha tal-pjanijiet kompleti għall-allokazzjoni nazzjonali fir-rigward tat-tieni fażi ta' allokazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni tqis li l-perjodu ta’ tliet xhur previst fl-Artikolu 9(3) jista' jibda jgħodd biss ladarba jiġi sottomess pjan ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali komplet. Għaldaqstant, tfakkar lill-Istati Membri fl-obbligi tagħhom rigward l-iskadenza tat-30 ta' Ġunju 2006 ħalli jippermettu l-kompletar tat-tieni proċess ta' allokazzjoni, inkluża d-deċiżjoni finali sussegwenti dwar l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali, ferm qabel il-bidu tat-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti fl-1 ta' Jannar 2008. Il-Kummissjoni mhix se taċċetta emendi għall-pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali li jiġu nnotifikati wara l-iskadenza tal-31 ta' Diċembru 2006 speċifikata fl-Artikolu 11(2) tad-Direttiva, għajr dawk rikjesti mid-deċiżjoni rispettiva tal-Kummissjoni dwar pjan ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali.

8. Filwaqt li tirrikonoxxi l-ewwel fażi bħala perjodu ta’ tagħlim, il-Kummissjoni evalwat il-pjanijiet ta' l-ewwel perjodu ta' allokazzjoni b'mod prammatiku. Mill-ewwel proċess ta' allokazzjoni ħarġu xi karatteristiċi notevoli, li jinsabu miġbura fil-qosor hawn taħt, li rriżultaw f'konverġenza ta' għażliet u strateġiji madwar l-Istati Membri kollha (għal aktar dettalji ara l-Anness 4:

- Jinħtieġ aktar użu ta’ l-iskambju tal-kwoti sabiex jintlaħqu l-miri ta' Kjoto b’mod li jkun finanzjarjament vijabbli.

- L-allokazzjonijiet ġeneralment kienu aktar restrinġenti għall-ġeneraturi ta' l-enerġija milli għal setturi oħra li jaqgħu taħt l-iskema.

- L-Istati Membri li jesperjenzaw eċċess konsiderevoli fl-emissjonijiet attwali fir-rigward tal-miri ta’ Kjoto rispettivi tagħhom beħsiebhom jixtru ammont sostanzjali ta' unitajiet ta' Kjoto.

- Għall-iżvilupp tas-suq tal-kwoti huwa essenzjali li ma jiġux aċċettati aġġustamenti ex-post .

- Xi pjanijiet ta’ allokazzjoni huma aktar kumplessi milli hemm bżonn u mhumiex trasparenti biżżejjed.

3. AKTAR GWIDA DWAR KWISTJONIJIET MAGħżULA RIGWARD IL-PJANIJIET TAT-TIENI PERJODU TA' ALLOKAZZJONIJIET NAZZJONALI

3.1. Il-progress lejn il-miri ta’ Kjoto

9. Fir-rapport dwar il-progress ta' l-2005[6], il-Kummissjoni evalwat il-progress ta' l-Istati Membri rigward il-miri ta' Kjoto. Fit-tqabbil ta’ l-emissjonijiet attwali ta’ l-2003 ma’ dawk permessi fil-perjodu mill-2008 sa l-2012, għadd konsiderevoli ta' Stati Membri għandhom xi lakuni, li xi wħud minnhom huma sinifikanti, u li jeħtiġilhom jikkompensaw għalihom. Bħalissa, jidher li l-Awstrija, il-Belġju, id-Danimarka, il-Finlandja, il-Ġermanja, l-Irlanda, l-Italja, il-Lussemburgu, l-Olanda, il-Portugall, is-Slovenja u Spanja mhumiex biżżejjed fi triqithom sabiex jissodisfaw il-miri ta' Kjoto tagħhom. F’dawn l-Istati Membri, jinħtieġ li jsir aktar fit-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti sabiex jiġu rrispettati l-miri ta' Kjoto, li ma jfissirx li mhumiex meħtieġa aktar miżuri f’xi Stati Membri oħra wkoll. Billi l-lakuni ma jistgħux jiġu kkompensati biss billi jiżdied il-piż fuq is-settur li ma jinvolvix l-iskambju tal-kwoti jew permezz ta' dipendenza fuq ix-xiri ta' l-unitajiet ta' Kjoto, l- EU ETS jeħtieġ li jintuża aktar sabiex iġib fis-seħħ b'mod aktar komplet il-potenzjal ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti ta' l-emissjonijiet bħala l-aktar strument vijabbli finanzjarjament.

3.2. L-iffissar tal-limiti nazzjonali

10. Skond il-kriterju 3 ta' l-Anness III (ara l-Anness 2 mehmuż ma' dan id-dokument għall-kriterji ta' l-Anness III għad-Direttiva), il-kwantità ta’ kwoti għandha tkun konsistenti mal-potenzjal, inkluż dak teknoloġiku, ta’ l-attivitajiet koperti mill-iskema sabiex jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet. Dan ifisser li l-kombinazzjoni tal-potenzjal ekonomiku u teknoloġiku rispettivi sabiex jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet tiffissa parametru massimu għal-limitu fil-livell nazzjonali.

11. Tnejn mill-aktar fatturi importanti li qed jinfluwenzaw ix-xejriet ta' l-emissjonijiet huma t-tkabbir ekonomiku (il-PGD) (b’aktar tkabbir iwassal għal aktar emissjonijiet) u l-intensità tal-karbonju (emissjonijiet għal kull unità tal-PGD, bl-emissjonijiet jonqsu hekk kif titnaqqas l-intensità tal-karbonju). Fil-prinċipju, aktar ma’ ekonomija tikber bil-ħeffa, it-teknoloġiji l-ġodda aktar jibdew jintużaw malajr u l-istokk kapitali jiġġedded aktar malajr, biex b'hekk jittejbu l-produttività u l-intensità tal-karbonju. Is-sehem li qed jikber tas-settur terzjarju u l-waqgħa fl-istess waqt tas-settur sekondarju li nħassu fl-ekonomiji Ewropej komplew jikkontribwixxu lejn dan l-effett. Barra minn hekk, l-introduzzjoni ta’ l- EU ETS u prezz tal-karbonju madwar l-UE kollha fis-settur ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti se jħeġġeġ aktar tnaqqisiet fl-intensità tal-karbonju.

12. Storikament (fil-perjodu mill-1990 sa l-2000) it-tnaqqisiet fl-intensità tal-karbonju għamlu tajjeb għat-tkabbir ekonomiku jew saħansitra għelbuh, li jfisser li l-emissjonijiet tal-gassijiet li jikkawżaw l-effett serra baqgħu kif kienu jew naqsu. It-tabella li ġejja tindika li din ix-xejra mistennija li tkompli matul id-deċennju li ninsabu fih (mill-2000 sa l-2010). Jeħtieġ li jiġi enfasizzat li l-istimi għall-perjodu mill-2000 sa l-2010 ma jorbtux ma’ l-inċentivi maħluqa fl-ewwel fażi ta’ l- EU ETS u, għaldaqstant, probabbli ħafna li jissottovalutaw it-tnaqqisiet attwali fl-intensità tal-karbonju matul dak il-perjodu.

Tabella A: Ix-xejriet fl-intensità tal-karbonju u r-rati tat-tkabbir tal-PGD storiċi u stmati[7]:

Bidla Annwali fil-PGD bħala % | Titjib fl-Intensità* tal-Karbonju Annwali bħala % | L-Effett Nett ikkombinat fuq ix-Xejra ta' l-Emissjonijiet Annwali bħala % |

Żvilupp attwali mill-1990 sa l-2000 |

UE25 | 2.0 | 2.3 | -0.3 |

UE15 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 0.1 |

Stati Membri Ġodda | 1.7 | 3.9 | -2.2 |

Żvilupp stmat mill-2000 sa l-2010 |

UE25 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 |

UE15 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 0.3 |

Stati Membri Ġodda | 3.8 | 3.6 | 0.2 |

Nota: * L-intensità tal-karbonju tesprimi r-relazzjoni bejn l-emissjonijiet tad-CO2 u l-PGD.

13. Fl-analiżi tal-potenzjal ekonomiku u teknoloġiku sabiex jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet, il-Kummissjoni tqis it-tkabbir fil-PGD u r-rati ta’ tnaqqis fl-intensità tal-karbonju annwali. L-effett ikkombinat ta’ dawn iż-żewġ fatturi jagħti r-rata għall-potenzjal annwali li jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet. Il-limitu indikattiv b'konsistenza mal-kriterju 3 fl-Anness III jista’ jiġi dderivat billi wieħed jibda mill-emissjonijiet attwali f’sena adatta (eż. l-2003), bil-preżunzjoni li s-settur ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti għandu sehem kostanti fl-emissjonijiet u potenzjal simili sabiex jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet bħall-ekonomija kollha kemm hi.

14. Il-limitu għall-ewwel fażi, għaldaqstant huwa punt tat-tluq fil-kalkolu u l-evalwazzjoni tal-kwantità totali għat-tieni fażi kemm fil-livell ta' l-UE kif ukoll fil-livell ta' l-Istati Membri. Minħabba l-kriterju 1, xi Stati Membri għandhom inaqqsu l-limiti ta' l-ewwel perjodu sabiex jirrispettaw il-mira ta' Kjoto. Xi Stati Membri oħra jeħtiġilhom iżommu l-limiti ta’ l-ewwel fażi sabiex il-pjan iġibuh konsistenti mal-potenzjal li jnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet (il-kriterju 3). B’mod simili, il-medja annwali tal-limitu ta’ l- ETS madwar l-UE kollha fit-tieni fażi għandha tkun anqas mil-limitu ta’ l-ewwel fażi.

15. Għadd ta’ Stati Membri għandhom distakk x’jikkumpensaw bejn l-emissjonijiet attwali tagħhom ta’ l-2003 u l-emissjonijiet permessi skond il-mira ta' Kjoto. Id-distakk totali għal dawn l-Istati Membri huwa ta’ 296.5 miljun tunnellata ta’ ekwivalenti ta’ CO2. Għaldaqstant, din il-figura tirrapreżenta l-emissjonijiet eċċessivi li dawn l-Istati Membri għad għandhom bżonn inaqqsu permezz ta' l-istrumenti għad-dispożizzjoni tagħhom sabiex jiżguraw li jkunu konformi mal-miri ta' Kjoto.

16. L-Istati Membri li għandhom distakk sabiex jissodisfaw il-mira ta’ Kjoto għandhom jimmiraw lejn taħlita bbilanċjata ta’ (i) tnaqqis ta’ l-allokazzjoni għat-tieni fażi u (ii) implimentazzjoni ta’ miżuri addizzjonali fis-settur li mhux involut fl-iskambju tal-kwoti, li potenzjalment jissupplimentawh bi (ii) xiri min-naħa tal-gvern ta' krediti ta' unitajiet ta' Kjoto. Taħlita bbilanċjata tagħmel it-tnaqqisiet aktar vijabbli mil-lat prattiku u aktar effiċjenti mil-lat ekonomiku.

17. It-tabella fl-Anness 1 telenka sehem is-settur ta’ l-iskambju ta’ l-emissjonijiet espress bħala allokazzjoni ta’ l-ewwel fażi mqabbel ma’ l-emissjonijiet attwali ta’ l-2003. Fil-livell ta’ l-UE, is-sehem jammonta għal xi 45%. Kieku s-settur ta' l-iskambju ta' l-emissjonijiet kellu jagħti l-kontribut xieraq tiegħu fl-irfiħ tal-piż għal dan it-tnaqqis ulterjuri fl-Istati Membri li għandhom distakk x'jikkumpensaw, l-allokazzjoni totali tat-tieni perjodu fl-UE-25 tkun ta’ madwar 6% anqas mill-allokazzjoni għall-ewwel perjodu, li jwassal għal allokazzjoni medja annwali ta' 2,063 biljun kwota. Sabiex jiġu ssodisfati l-miri ta’ Kjoto, tnaqqis ta’ anqas minn 6% ikun jimplika sforzi akbar min-naħa tas-settur li mhux involut fl-iskambju tal-kwoti.

3.3. Is-sostanzjament tax-xiri ta' unitajiet ta' Kjoto maħsub min-naħa tal-gvern

18. Fid-dawl ta’ l-istat ta’ l-iżvilupp tas-suq u r-restrizzjonijiet fil-provista ta' l-unitajiet ta' Kjoto, l-Istati Membri jiffaċċjaw sfida konsiderevoli sabiex jirrealizzaw il-volum tax-xirjiet maħsuba. Id-deċiżjoni min-naħa ta’ xi Stat Membru li jixtri l-unitajiet ta' Kjoto permezz ta’ fondi pubbliċi jiffaċilita (hekk kif jagħmel ukoll ix-xiri mill-kumpaniji skond it-termini tal- Linking Directive ) il-bżonn għat-tnaqqis fl-emissjonijiet domestiċi.

19. Għar-raġuni mogħtija hawn fuq, is-sostantazzjoni tal-ħsieb min-naħa ta' gvern li jixtri l-unitajiet ta' Kjoto hija kruċjali għall-konsistenza ta' pjan ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali mal-kriterju 1 fl-Anness III. Għalhekk, dan kien diġà element importanti fl-evalwazzjoni tal-pjanijiet ta' l-ewwel perjodu. Għadd ta’ Stati Membri ma ssostanzjawx b’mod komplet ix-xiri li kien beħsiebhom jagħmlu fil-pjanijiet ta' l-ewwel perjodu ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali u xi limiti tbaxxew skond dan. Għalhekk, kull Stat Membru li jiddependi fuq ix-xiri ta' l-unitajiet ta' Kjoto min-naħa tal-gvern, anke jekk diġà indika dan fil-pjan ta’ l-ewwel fażi ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali, jeħtieġ li jissostanzja b’mod aktar komplet l-intenzjonijiet tiegħu u juri l-progress fir-realizzazzjoni ta’ dan ix-xiri. Il-Kummissjoni se tibbaża l-evalwazzjoni tagħha fuq il-kriterji kumulattivi mfassla fl-Anness 5 u se tevalwa dawn l-aspetti b'mod strett. Meta xi Stat Membru jonqos milli jissodisfa b'mod sodisfaċenti s-serje kompleta ta' kriterji, il-Kummissjoni se tirrikjedi tnaqqis proporzjonali fil-limitu propost.

3.4. Is-sostanzjament ta’ politiki u miżuri oħra

20. Is-sostanzjament ta’ l-effetti ta’ politiki implimentati u addizzjonali u ta’ miżuri mill-Istati Membri hija kruċjali għall-konsistenza ta’ pjan ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali mal-kriterju 1 fl-Anness III għad-Direttiva. Fil-pjanijiet għall-ewwel perjodu ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali, l-Istati Membri elenkaw għadd ta’ politiki u miżuri eżistenti u addizzjonali. Kull Stat Membru li jiddipendi fuq politiki u miżuri implimentati u addizzjonali, anke jekk ikunu diġà indikati fil-pjan għall-ewwel fażi ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali, jeħtieġ li jissostanzja l-effetti u jagħti xhieda tal-progress fl-implimentazzjoni jew l-adozzjoni tagħhom[8]. Il-Kummissjoni se tibbaża l-evalwazzjoni tagħha fuq il-kriterji kumulattivi mfassla fl-Anness 6 u se tevalwa dawn l-aspetti b'mod strett. Meta xi Stat Membru jonqos milli jissodisfa b'mod sodisfaċenti s-serje kompleta ta' kriterji, il-Kummissjoni se tirrikjedi tnaqqis proporzjonali fil-limitu propost.

3.5. Gwida dwar il-kriterju 12 – il-limitu fuq ir-rikors għall-mekkaniżmi JI u CDM min-naħa ta' l-operaturi għal finijiet ta' konformità

21. Il-Kriterju 12 ta’ l-Anness III għad-Direttiva, kif emendat mil-Linking Directive, jistqarr[9]: “Il-pjan għandu jispeċifika l-ammont massimu ta' CERs u ERUs li jista' jintuża minn operaturi fl-iskema tal-Komunità bħala persentaġġ ta' l-allokazzjoni tal-kwoti għal kull stallazzjoni. Il-persentaġġ għandu jkun konsistenti ma' l-obbligi supplimentari ta' l-Istati Membri taħt il-Protokoll ta' Kjoto u d-deċiżjonijiet adottati skond il-UNFCCC jew il-Protokoll ta' Kjoto."

22. Il-Kriterju 12 huwa mandatorju fis-sens li l-pjan ta' allokazzjoni nazzjonali għandu jispeċifika l-ammont massimu ta' CERs u ERUs li jkunu jistgħu jintużaw għal finijiet ta’ konformità mill-operaturi fl-EU ETS .

23. Il-Kriterju 12 jiddikjara li l-persentaġġ stabbilit għandu jkun konsistenti ma' l-obbligi supplimentari ta' l-Istati Membri skond il-Protokoll ta' Kjoto u d-deċiżjonijiet adottati skond il- UNFCCC jew il-Protokoll ta' Kjoto. Il-Ftehimiet ta’ Marakexx jiddikjaraw li “ the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action” (“l-użu tal-mekkaniżmi għandu jkun supplimentali għall-azzjoni domestika”)[10] . M’hemm l-ebda definizzjoni kwantitattiva ta' x'inhuma l-obbligi ta' supplimentarjetà la fil-Protokoll ta' Kjoto, la fil- UNFCCC u lanqas fid-deċiżjonijiet li ġew adottati skond dawn[11]. Għandu jiġi nnotat ukoll li l-laqgħa tal-konferenzi tal-partijiet fi ħdan il-Protokoll ta’ Kjoto f’Montreal ħadet firxa ta' deċiżjonijiet importanti sabiex jitħeġġeġ l-użu tas- CDMs , li għalih jista' jikkontribwixxi l-iskambju tal-kwoti ta' l-emissjonijiet ta' l-UE.

24. Ir-rekwiżiti tas-supplimentarjetà huwa applikabbli għal emissjonijiet aggregati ta' xi Stat Membru ta’ gassijiet li jikkawżaw l-effett serra u mhux b'mod separat għal setturi individwali. Għaldaqstant, ix-xiri ta’ unitajiet ta' Kjoto maħsub min-naħa ta’ gvern jeħtieġlu wkoll li jitqies meta jiġi evalwat il-qadi ta’ dan ir-rekwiżit.

25. Il-Kummissjoni tqis li l-Istati Membri huma liberi li jagħżlu jekk japplikawx il-limiti individwalment fir-rigward ta’ kull stallazzjoni, jew kollettivament lill-istallazzjonijiet kollha. Biex ikun hemm flessibilità akbar, huwa rrikkmandat li l-Istati Membri japplikaw il-limitu għall-perjodu ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti kollu u b'mod kollettiv għall-istallazzjonijiet kollha.

3.6. Kwistjonijiet konnessi ma’ dawk li jidħlu ġodda u l-għeluq ta’ l-impjanti

26. Il-Kummissjoni tqis li għadu kmieni biex wieħed joħroġ b’konklużjonijiet u jidentifika l-aqwa prattika fir-rigward ta’ dawk li jidħlu ġodda u l-għeluq ta’ l-impjanti. Aktar dettalji huma speċifikati fl-Anness 7.

3.7. Aktar gwida dwar l-allokazzjoni fil-livell settorjali u ta’ stallazzjoni

27. Fl-iffissar ta' l-allokazzjonijiet fil-livell ta' stallazzjoni fit-tieni fażi, il-Kummissjoni tqis bħala neċessarju li l-Istati Membri ma jkunux jiddependu mill-emissjonijiet ta' l-ewwel fażi jew xi dejta oħra ta’ l-ewwel fażi. Inkella, l-istallazzjonijiet li attivament naqqsu l-emissjonijiet fl-ewwel perjodu ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti jkunu żvantaġġati bla ma jistħoqqilhom billi fit-tieni fażi jirċievu sehem iċken ta' kwoti minn stallazzjonijiet li ma jkunux naqqsu l-emissjonijiet matul l-ewwel perjodu.

28. Permezz ta’ nuqqas ta' dipendenza mill-emissjonijiet ta' l-ewwel fażi jew xi dejta oħra ta' l-ewwel fażi, tiġi rikonoxxuta azzjoni adegwata minn kmieni, li għalhekk tieħu post l-istabbiliment ta' riserva ta' azzjonijiet minn kmieni jew xi mezz ieħor li jakkomoda l-azzjonijiet minn kmieni.

29. Sabiex jitnaqqsu l-kumplessità u l-isforz amministrattiv, il-Kummissjoni tqis li ma jkunx xieraq li jinżammu id-dispożizzjonijiet speċjali fil-livell ta' l-istallazzjonijiet fuq l-emissjonijiet mill-proċessi.

30. Kif diġà ntqal aktar ’il fuq, wieħed ma jistax ma jenfasizzax l-importanza tal-ksib ta’ tfassil aktar sempliċi fir-rigward tal-pjanijiet għat-tieni fażi ta' l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali mqabbla ma’ l-ewwel fażi. Regoli ta’ allokazzjoni aktar sempliċi fil-livell settorjali u ta’ stallazzjoni jżidu t-trasparenza tal-proċess ta’ allokazzjoni u jraħħsu l-ispejjeż b'mod partikolari għall-intrapriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju li jkunu koperti mill-iskema.

3.8. Aktar gwida dwar aspetti oħra ta' l-allokazzjoni

31. Id-definizzjoni ta' normi ta' referenza ( benchmarking ) ma’ l-UE kollha mhux metodu ta’ allokazzjoni matur biżżejjed biex jintuża fit-tieni fażi. L-Istati Membri jistgħu, però, isibu użi xierqa għaliha fil-livell nazzjonali għal allokazzjoni fil-livell ta’ l-istallazzjonijiet f’ċerti setturi u għal dawk li jidħlu ġodda, eż. fis-settur ta' l-elettriku. L-esperjenzi minn użi ta’ dan it-tip se jiġu mixtarra mill-Kummissjoni fil-kuntest ta’ l-analiżi. Il-Kummissjoni hija interessata jekk ir-rekwiżiti tad-dejta addizzjonali għad-definizzjoni ta' normi ta' referenza jistgħux jiġu ssuperati u jekk l-Istati Membri jqisux vallapena l-isforz amministrattiv addizzjonali.

32. Il-Kummissjoni tinkoraġġixxi li l-Istati Membri, fit-tieni perjodu ta’ skambju tal-kwoti, jutilizzaw l-irkant fil-limitu ta’ 10% kif jippermetti l-Artikolu 10 tad-Direttiva, sabiex joħolqu kuntest ekwu ta' parteċipazzjoni fi ħdan l-UE, jakkwistaw aktar esperjenza fl-applikazzjoni ta' dan il-metodu ta' allokazzjoni u jarrikkixxu l-analiżi strateġika bl-esperjenza prattika. Tfakkar lill-Istati Membri li d-dħul mill-irkant jista’, fost affarijiet oħra, jintuża sabiex jifdi l-ispejjeż amministrattivi ta' l-iskema u x-xiri ta' unitajiet ta' Kjoto min-naħa tal-gvern. F’każijiet meta l-Istati Membri jagħżlu li jirkantaw il-kwoti, il-Kummissjoni tħeġġiġhom jispeċifikaw id-dettalji tal-proċess ta' l-irkant bil-quddiem mhux ħażin, preferibbilment fil-pjan għall-allokazzjoni nazzjonali, speċjalment rigward id-dati u l-kwantitajiet involuti.

33. Fir-rigward tal-konsultazzjoni pubblika prevista mill-Artikoli 9(1) u 11(2) u l-kriterju 9 ta' l-Anness III għad-Direttiva, il-Kummissjoni tistenna li l-Istati Membri jipprovdu skeda ta' żmien adatta sabiex jiżguraw li jkun hemm konsultazzjoni pubblika aktar effettiva f'dak li għandu x'jaqsam ma' l-istabbiliment tal-pjan għat-tieni fażi ta' l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali. L-Istati Membri għandhom jimmiraw sabiex jikkonkludu f’waqtha l-konsultazzjoni pubblika skond l-Artikolu 11(2) u l-kriterju 9 ta’ l-Anness III sabiex jirrispettaw l-iskadenza tal-31 ta’ Diċembru 2006. Billi għandu jkun hemm anqas pressjoni taż-żmien fit-tħejjija għat-tieni perjodu ta’ skambju tal-kwoti milli kien hemm fl-ewwel fażi, il-Kummissjoni tinsab kunfidenti li l-Istati Membri se jikkonformaw kif jixraq ma’ dan ir-rekwiżit taħt il-piż tar-responsabbiltà u d-diskrezzjoni tagħhom stess.

4. L-INTERPRETAZZJONI U L-KAMP TA’ APPLIKAZZJONI TA’ L-ANNESS I GħAD-DIRETTIVA

4.1. L-interpretazzjoni ta’ stallazzjoni tal-kombustjoni

34. Fir-rigward ta’ l-interpretazzjoni ta’ stallazzjoni tal-kombustjoni fl-Anness I għad-Direttiva, il-Kummissjoni tinnota li xi Stati Membri sejsu l-pjanijiet għall-ewwel fażi ta’ l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali fuq interpretazzjoni li kienet tinkludi l-proċessi tal-kombustjoni kollha li jissodisfaw il-kapaċità speċifikata, mingħajr kunsiderazzjoni jekk il-proċess ta’ kombustjoni jipproduċix l-enerġija indipendentement jew bħala parti integrata minn xi proċess ta’ produzzjoni ieħor. Xi Stati Membri oħra applikaw varjanti ta’ interpretazzjoni aktar dejqa, bl-esklużjoni tal-proċessi ta’ kombustjoni kollha li kienu parti integrata minn xi proċess ieħor ta' produzzjoni, jew ta’ xi wħud minnhom.

35. Il-Kummissjoni tqis din is-sitwazzjoni bħala waħda xejn sodisfaċenti. Mil-lenti tas-Suq Intern jeħtieġ li jkun evitat li l-istess tip ta' stallazzjoni tkun koperta f'xi Stati Membri iżda mhux f’oħrajn meta tkun qed tiġi applikata l-istess Direttiva. Huwa vitali li jkun hemm interpretazzjoni u kopertura konsistenti ta’ l-istallazzjonijiet tal-kombustjoni fl-Istati Membri kollha fil-perjodu ta' l-iskambju tal-kwoti sabiex jiġu evitati distorzjonijiet tal-kompetizzjoni sinifikanti madwar is-Suq Intern kollu.

36. Konsegwentement, il-Kummissjoni tqis bħala neċessarju li l-Istati Membri kollha japplikaw interpretazzjoni konsistenti li tkopri l-proċessi ta' kombustjoni kollha li jissodisfaw il-kapaċità speċifikata u għalhekk jinkludu fil-pjanijiet għat-tieni fażi ta' l-allokazzjoni nazzjonali tagħhom il-proċessi ta’ kombustjoni kollha ’l fuq mil-limitu ta' kapaċità rilevanti irrispettivament mis-settur, eż. crackers, carbon black, flaring [12], tnixxif, fuklara[13] u impjanti ta’ l-azzar integrati[14], ilkoll jikkawżaw emissjonijiet konsiderevoli. Fil-każ li xi Stat Membru ma jikkonformax ma’ dawn ir-rekwiżiti, il-Kummissjoni tirriserva d-dritt li tieħu l-miżuri kollha neċessarji kontra l-Istat Membru kkonċernat. Aktar dettalji dwar l-interpretazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni ta’ x’inhi stallazzjoni tal-kombustjoni jinsabu fl-Anness 8.

4.2. L-iċken stallazzjonijiet

37. Xi Stati Membri u partijiet interessati wrew ċertu tħassib fir-rigward tal-kopertura skond id-Direttiva ta' l-iċken stallazzjonijiet, billi, b'mod partikolari stqarrew li l-ispejjeż għall-parteċipazzjoni ta' l-iċken stallazzjonijiet jegħlbu l-benefiċċji li jkunu koperti mill-iskema. Il-Kummissjoni tirrikonoxxi li l-benefiċċji u l-ispejjeż tal-parteċipazzjoni ta’ ċerti stallazzjonijiet żgħar jistħoqilhom li jkomplu jiġu kkunsidrati fl-analiżi ta' l- EU ETS b'segwitu għall-Artikolu 30 tad-Direttiva.

38. Il-Kummissjoni tenfasizza li xi spejjeż ta’ parteċipazzjoni mġarrba mill-iċken stallazzjonijiet huma spejjeż “ta’ darba biss” fit-tnedija ta' l-ewwel perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti, u mhumiex se jerġgħu jitfaċċaw fil-futur. F’dawk li huma spejjeż rikorrenti, li fil-biċċa l-kbira tagħhom huma konnessi ma' l-ispejjeż annwali tal-monitoraġġ, ir-rappurtar u l-verifika ta' l-emissjonijiet, il-Kummissjoni tagħti attenzjoni partikolari għar-realizzazzjoni tal-potenzjali għall-iffrankar ta' l-ispejjeż għall-iċken stallazzjonijiet fl-analiżi li tinsab għaddejja tal-linjigwida dwar il-monitoraġġ u r-rappurtar. Il-Kummissjoni timmira li l-linjigwida riveduti jiddaħħlu fis-seħħ sa l-1 ta’ Jannar 2008, jiġifieri fl-istess waqt meta jibda t-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti.

39. Barra minn hekk, ittenni l-importanza li jintużaw regoli ta' allokazzjoni aktar sempliċi għat-tieni perjodu ta' skambju tal-kwoti li minnhom jibbenefikaw l-iċken stallazzjonijiet u li wieħed iħares ukoll lejn apsetti oħra, apparti l-monitoraġġ u l-allokazzjoni, sabiex jittaffew l-ispejjeż tal-parteċipazzjoni ta' dawn l-istallazzjonijiet. Il-Kummissjoni tinsab kunfidenti li dan se jkompli jtejjeb ir-relazzjoni bejn il-benefiċċji u l-ispejjeż tal-parteċipazzjoni tat-tali stallazzjonijiet fl- EU ETS .

40. Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-Istati Membri sabiex jiflu l-flessibiltajiet identifikati fl-Anness 9 fl-istabbiliment tal-pjanijiet għat-tieni fażi ta’ allokazzjoni nazzjonali tagħhom. Hi beħsiebha tikkunsidra f’aktar dettall il-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tad-Direttiva fir-rigward tal-kopertura ta’ l-iċken stallazzjonijiet, inkluża l-possibilità li tipproponi emenda għad-Direttiva sabiex tippermetti t-tneħħija ta’ xi stallazzjonijiet żgħar mill-EU ETS matul it-tieni perjodu ta’ skambju tal-kwoti. F’dak il-kuntest, il-Kummissjoni qed tikkunsidra l-possibbiltà li l-attivitajiet tal-kombustjoni taħt ċertu limitu ta' daqs, ngħidu aħna sa 3 MW, ma jkunux inklużi għall-finijiet ta' l-hekk imsejħa regola ta' l-aggregazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni qiegħda tixtarr ukoll il-possibbiltà li tneħħi l-parti tar-regola ta' l-aggregazzjoni li tipprevedi li jingħaddu flimkien il-kapaċitajiet ta' attivitajiet li jitħaddmu mill-istess operatur fl-istess sit.

ANNEX

Annex 1: Background data

Member State | 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions | Allowed emissions annual average 2008-12 under Kyoto Protocol | ETS share[15] | First phase cap annual average 2005-07 according to Commission decisions[16] |

Austria | 91.6 | 68.3 | 36.0% | 33.0 |

Belgium | 147.7 | 135.8 | 42.6% | 62.9 |

Cyprus | 9.2 | n.a. | 62.0% | 5.7 |

Czech Republic | 145.4 | 176.8 | 67.1% | 97.6 |

Denmark | 74.0 | 55.0 | 45.3% | 33.5 |

Estonia | 21.4 | 40.0 | 88.6% | 19.0 |

Finland | 85.5 | 70.4 | 53.2% | 45.5 |

France | 557.2 | 568.0 | 28.1% | 156.5 |

Germany | 1017.5 | 986.1 | 49.0% | 499.0 |

Greece | 137.6 | 139.6 | 54.1% | 74.4 |

Hungary | 83.2 | 114.3 | 37.6% | 31.3 |

Ireland | 67.6 | 61.0 | 33.0% | 22.3 |

Italy | 569.8 | 477.2 | 40.8% | 232.5 |

Latvia | 10.5 | 23.3 | 43.4% | 4.6 |

Lithuania | 17.2 | 46.9 | 71.2% | 12.3 |

Luxembourg | 11.3 | 9.2 | 29.8% | 3.4 |

Malta | 2.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.9 |

Netherlands | 214.8 | 200.3 | 44.4% | 95.3 |

Poland | 384.0 | 531.3 | 62.3% | 239.1 |

Portugal | 81.2 | 75.4 | 47.0% | 38.2 |

Slovakia | 51.7 | 66.0 | 59.0% | 30.5 |

Slovenia | 19.8 | 18.8 | 44.3% | 8.8 |

Spain | 402.3 | 329.0 | 43.4% | 174.4 |

Sweden | 70.6 | 75.2 | 32.5% | 22.9 |

UK | 651.1 | 657.4 | 37.7% | 245.3 |

Total | 2190.8 |

Note: All emission figures are in million tonnes CO2 equivalent.

Annex 2: Criteria for national allocation plans referred to in Articles 9, 22 and 30 of Annex III of the Directive

1. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated for the relevant period shall be consistent with the Member State's obligation to limit its emissions pursuant to Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account, on the one hand, the proportion of overall emissions that these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this Directive and, on the other hand, national energy policies, and should be consistent with the national climate change programme. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall not be more than is likely to be needed for the strict application of the criteria of this Annex. Prior to 2008, the quantity shall be consistent with a path towards achieving or over-achieving each Member State's target under Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol. |

2. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with assessments of actual and projected progress towards fulfilling the Member States' contributions to the Community's commitments made pursuant to Decision 93/389/EEC. |

3. Quantities of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with the potential, including the technological potential, of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions. Member States may base their distribution of allowances on average emissions of greenhouse gases by product in each activity and achievable progress in each activity. |

4. The plan shall be consistent with other Community legislative and policy instruments. Account should be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative requirements. |

5. The plan shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof. |

6. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the Community scheme in the Member State concerned. |

7. The plan may accommodate early action and shall contain information on the manner in which early action is taken into account. Benchmarks derived from reference documents concerning the best available technologies may be employed by Member States in developing their National Allocation Plans, and these benchmarks can incorporate an element of accommodating early action. |

8. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which clean technology, including energy efficient technologies, are taken into account. |

9. The plan shall include provisions for comments to be expressed by the public, and contain information on the arrangements by which due account will be taken of these comments before a decision on the allocation of allowances is taken. |

10. The plan shall contain a list of the installations covered by this Directive with the quantities of allowances intended to be allocated to each. |

11. The plan may contain information on the manner in which the existence of competition from countries or entities outside the Union will be taken into account. |

12. The plan shall specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators in the Community scheme as a percentage of the allocation of the allowances to each installation. The percentage shall be consistent with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. |

Annex 3: Key messages from the first allocation guidance document

In January 2004, the Commission provided guidance to assist Member States in the preparation of the national allocation plans[17]. The guidance contained in that document on the implementation of the then eleven[18] criteria in Annex III to the Directive remainsrelevant for the second trading period 2008-2012. The Commission therefore wishes to reiterate the main elements.

Criterion (1) – Kyoto commitments The Commission understands “likely to be needed” as forward-looking and linked to the projected emissions of covered installations as a whole, given that this criterion refers to the total quantity of allowances to be allocated. The Commission understands the reference to the “strict application of the criteria in this annex” to comprise the criteria with a mandatory character or containing mandatory elements - i.e. criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In order to satisfy this requirement and fulfil all mandatory criteria and elements, a Member State should not allocate more than is needed, or warranted, by the most constraining of these criteria. It follows that any application of the optional elements of Annex III may not lead to an increase in the total quantity of allowances. |

Criterion (2) – Assessments of emissions developments Pursuant to Decision 280/2004/EC concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol , the Commission undertakes an annual assessment of each Member State’s actual emissions and projected emissions for the period 2008-2012, in total and by sector and by gas. Criterion 2 requires the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to be consistent with these assessments. Consistency will be deemed as ensured, if the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to covered installations is not more than would be necessary taking into account actual emissions and projected emissions contained in those assessments. |

Criterion (3) – Potential to reduce emissions A Member State should determine the total quantity of allowances resulting from the application of criterion 3 by comparing the potential of activities covered by the scheme to reduce emissions with the potential of activities not covered. The criterion will be deemed as fulfilled if the allocation reflects the relative differences in the potential between the total covered and non-covered activities. |

Criterion (4) – Consistency with other legislation Criterion 4 concerns the relationship between allocations under Directive 2003/87/EC and other Community legislative and policy instruments. Consistency between allowance allocations and other legislation is introduced as a requirement in order to ensure that the allocation does not contravene the provisions of other legislation. In principle, no allowances should be allocated in cases where other legislation implies that covered emissions had or will have to be reduced even without the introduction of the emissions trading scheme. Similarly, consistency implies that if other legislation results in increased emissions or limits the scope for decreasing emissions covered by the Directive account should be taken of this increase. |

Criterion (6) – New entrants Under criterion 6, the national allocation plan should contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the emissions trading scheme in a Member State. The guidance proposes three ways in which new entrants can begin participating in the emissions trading scheme: by buying allowances in the market, by buying them in an auction, or by receiving them for free from a reserve set aside by the Member State. Having new entrants buy allowances in the market or in an auction is in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. |

Criterion (10) – List of installations This criterion will be deemed as fulfilled, if a Member State has respected its obligation to list all the installations covered by the Directive. A Member State has to indicate the total quantity of allowances intended to be allocated to each installation. |

Annex 4: Summary of experience gained from allocation plans for the first phase (2005-2007) and general lessons for the second phase (2008-2012)

1. More use of emissions trading is necessary to meet the Kyoto targets cost-effectively. Some Member States rely to a large degree on reductions in the non-trading sectors or on government purchase of Kyoto unit credits in the pursuit of their Kyoto targets. The intended government purchase of Kyoto units and the foreseen reduction efforts in the non-trading sectors have served in the first allocation phase as buffers resulting in moderate use of emission trading. In some Member States too much of the reduction effort may have been shifted to the non-trading sectors. Maintaining this imbalance would make Kyoto compliance more costly than necessary. Given that emissions trading is the most cost-effective instrument at hand, it should be used more in the second allocation round and beyond.

2. Allocations have in general been more restrictive for power generators than other sectors covered by the scheme. In most Member States, the allocation to the power generating sector, in relation to projected needs, has been more restrictive, i.e. more environmentally ambitious, than the allocations to the other sectors covered by the scheme.

3. Member States experiencing considerable excess in actual emissions with respect to their Kyoto targets intend to purchase a substantial amount of Kyoto units. Eight Member States announced in the first phase national allocation plans their intention to purchase with government funds in total some 500 to 600 million Kyoto units. Given the general outlook for Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the envisaged volume will be very challenging to realise. Furthermore, the Linking Directive will add private-sector demand to government demand for such credits. The Commission considers it as a matter of priority to improve the functioning of these mechanisms.

4. The non-acceptance of ex-post adjustments is essential for the allowance market development. The Commission did not approve the so-called ex-post adjustments envisaged by a number of Member States for the first trading period. This plays a vital role in the development of an efficient and liquid allowance market. The good functioning of the allowance market depends crucially on a stable and predictable allocation for the entire trading period in order to create stable incentives for installations to reduce emissions. For compliance purposes, companies can use the full flexibility of the scheme, be it via the allowance market or via company-internal transfers across borders.

5. Some allocation plans are more complex than necessary and not sufficiently transparent. In the first national allocation plans, some Member States created a complex set of special allocation rules: all Member States provided for a new entrants reserve and most also for some kind of administrative provision in the case of closure of an installation (i.e. no further allocation of allowances for the remainder of the ongoing trading period once an installation is closed). The design of new entrants and closure rules differs in detail. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in unnecessary distortions of competition. Member States should consider simplifying all rules which they have added themselves and which are not essential for the functioning of the scheme. Simpler rules will help make national allocations plans more transparent.

Annex 5: Information requested to assess substantiation of intended government purchase of Kyoto units

Member States must substantiate the intended government purchase of Kyoto units and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the amount of Kyoto units planned to be purchased for compliance with the Kyoto target and any changes in this amount compared to the first national allocation plan;

(2) indicate the type of Kyoto units planned to be purchased, along with their respective projected or contracted purchase price;

(3) demonstrate the existence of relevant national legislation and budget allocations;

(4) provide information on the progress to date in realising the planned purchases, in particular the quantity of Kyoto units for which emission reduction purchase contracts have been signed at the time of notification of the second national allocation plan;

(5) indicate the envisaged time schedule of still to be effected purchases;

(6) outline the administrative arrangements put in place for realising the planned purchases, such as national programmes or purchase tenders for purchasing Kyoto units;

(7) indicate details about the contributions of multilateral or private carbon purchase funds and the expected delivery of credits;

(8) demonstrate the existence of contingency measures applicable in the event that planned purchases and signed purchase agreements result in the delivery of a lower than expected amount of Kyoto units.

Annex 6: Information requested to assess substantiation of other policies and measures

Member States must substantiate the effects of implemented and additional policies and measures and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the implemented policies and measures it considers as significant in sectors not covered by the EU ETS. For sectoral framework policies implemented (e.g. rural development plan, waste management plan) the plan has to provide the individual measures included that are considered to lead to greenhouse gas emission reductions. For cross-sectoral policies and measures, the plan has to indicate in which way those measures affect emissions in the trading and non-trading sectors. The information provided has to include the year in which the implementation showed full effect;

(2) indicate additional policies and measures not yet implemented at the time of notification which the Member State considers as significant. The plan has to present information on the status of planning or adoption of relevant legislation, agreements, incentive programmes, etc. and has to address the period for which full additional reduction effects are expected;

(3) indicate the approximate level of current greenhouse gas emissions represented by the activity targeted by each policy or measure and include quantified annual emissions reductions for the period 2008 to 2012 for the policies and measures indicated under the two preceding bullets. If no quantitative estimation of effects is available, the plan should explain why this information could not be provided and should include additional information why the policy or measure is considered to provide significant emission reduction effects;

(4) provide assumptions and methodologies used for the quantification of the effects of indicated policies and measures and provide references to sources for this information;

(5) present quantitative indicators to demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy or measure under the first requirement;

(6) indicate how policies and measures presented under the first two requirements are reflected in the greenhouse gas emissions projections presented in the plan;

(7) indicate any developments and trends of the activities targeted by the policies and measures provided under the first two requirements that could potentially counteract the reduction effects, e.g. increased production capacities or growing trends in consumption patterns;

(8) indicate any overlapping effects among important measures (e.g. effects of cross-sectoral measures and sectoral measures on the same activity) and how such double-counting effects have been eliminated in the estimation of quantitative reduction effects.

Annex 7: Issues related to new entrants and closures

1. The Commission notes that in the first trading period all Member States have set aside allowances for new entrants in a reserve and most adopted some form of closure provisions. The Commission did not raise objections to these administrative provisions and rules to the extent that they were not tantamount to ex-post adjustments.

2. The Commission notes further a multitude of detailed provisions governing new entrants reserves and closures, including transfer rule arrangements, adopted by Member States in the first allocation phase. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in distortions of competition. At this stage, there is however insufficient practical experience with regard to the practical application of these rules.

3. For this reason, the Commission considers it premature to draw conclusions and identify best practice. In the case of new entrants’ reserves and closure and transfer provisions being maintained in the second trading period, the Commission recommends Member States ensure in particular that the new entrants reserve not be replenished upon exhaustion, that allowances not allocated to closed installations be cancelled or auctioned, and that there be no allocation at projected needs to new installations.

4. In the review report in June 2006[19], the Commission will consider alternative options (including the set-up of an EU-level new entrant reserve accompanied by EU-wide administrative rules on closure and cross-border transfer) to achieve further harmonisation with respect to new entrants and closure provisions.

Annex 8: Definition of combustion installation

1. The Commission considers the interpretation including all combustion processes, i.e oxidation of fuels, fulfilling the specified capacity to be the correct interpretation of Annex I of the Directive, for the following notable reasons:

2. Firstly, the term “combustion” is used in a wide range of Community legislation including not only the Emissions Trading Directive and the IPPC-Directive, but also the LCP-Directive[20] and the Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive[21]. The meaning of combustion in the context of the Emissions Trading Directive has to be interpreted within the framework of other Community legislation where definitions are included.

3. The Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive in its Article 2(5) and the LCP-Directive in its Article 2(7) define ‘combustion plant’ as “any technical apparatus in which fuels are oxidised in order to use the heat thus generated”. The LCP-Directive lists in the same Article a range of combustion plants which are specifically excluded from the scope of the LCP-Directive. The Emissions Trading Directive does not provide for such exclusion.[22]

4. Given that the Emissions Trading Directive makes no similar specific exclusions, the types of combustion installations excluded by Article 2(7) of the LCP-Directive are included within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive where the threshold is met or exceeded.

5. Further guidance in support of this conclusion comes from Annex I of the Emissions Trading Directive itself. Annex I specifically excludes municipal and hazardous waste incineration facilities from the scope of the scheme. The combustion of e.g. hazardous waste is clearly an integrated part of the normal process undertaken by hazardous waste incinerators. If, in the absence of this specific exclusion, the Directive were to be interpreted as not applying to such installations where combustion takes place as an integrated part of the installation’s processes, municipal and hazardous waste installations would not need to have been specifically excluded as they would in any case have fallen outside its scope. Their specific exclusion is further confirmation that it is the presence of a combustion process with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW that determines the Directive’s coverage of stationary combustion installations.

6. It is also commonly accepted that the term “combustion installation” for the purposes of the IPPC-Directive covers not just the power generation industry but also other industries where fuels are burned. Thus the heading “Energy industries” in the context of the IPPC Directive does not imply a narrow restriction of coverage of the term “combustion installations” to combustion processes that produce energy independently, but rather also includes combustion processes taking place as an integrated part of another production process. The heading “Energy activities” used in the Emissions Trading Directive, if anything, would be broader, so at least the same conclusion would apply. This therefore provides additional support for the argument that “combustion installations” in the Emissions Trading Directive not only covers combustion installations that are part of the energy industry, but also combustion installations in other industry sectors, including sectors that are not explicitly listed in its Annex I.

7. It is well-established that industries can fall under more than one activity category of the IPPC-Directive. Integrated steel works for example carry out several Annex I activities, and refineries include combustion installations of more than 50MW. Considering the similarities between the IPPC-Directive and the Emissions Trading Directive, there is no reason to take a different approach to the interpretation of the latter in this respect. In particular, a different approach cannot be justified by the separate listing of the steel and cement industries, given that both produce substantial CO2 emissions from (chemical) processes in addition to their emissions from combustion.

8. In the light of the above points, any installation, which includes one or more piece of stationary technical apparatus in which a combustion process takes place and that together on the same site and under the responsibility of the same operator has a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW, is therefore subject to the Emissions Trading Directive. This includes apparatus where the heat is used in another piece of apparatus, through a medium such as electricity or steam, and apparatus where the heat resulting from combustion is used directly within that apparatus, for example, for melting, drying, flares or units providing heat input to chemical reactors. The purpose to which the product of an activity is put should not be a determining characteristic as to whether or not an installation is subject to the Directive, as this would introduce subjectivity into its scope. Energy produced by combustion may be in the form of electricity, heat, hot water or steam, and the distance between the production of energy and its eventual use is not relevant for competent authorities to decide whether or not an installation is subject to the Emissions Trading Directive.

Annex 9: Interpretation issues related to the smallest installations

1. The Commission draws Member States’ attention to the fact that the so-called aggregation clause[23] contained in the second paragraph of Annex I of the Directive should be interpreted carefully so as to not cover certain small installations, without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In particular, the wording “under the same subheading” contained in this clause should be understood in the sense that a single activity falling simultaneously under several subheadings, e.g. both under “energy activities” and under a specific sectoral activity covered by Annex I of the Directive, such as “mineral industry”, is considered under the more specific sectoral subheading. Multiple activities of the same type should then be aggregated on the basis of that specific sectoral subheading, and not on the basis of all of the different possible activity descriptions that could apply. There is no basis for aggregating activities that fall under a different subheading, even though they may be part of the same installation.

2. Furthermore, flexibility at the discretion of Member States comes also from the wording “and/or” in the provision governing the manufacture of ceramic products in Annex I of the Directive. If Member States want to use this flexibility the Commission notes that this provision can be interpreted in a restrictive way so as to require the simultaneous presence of all mentioned sub-elements for the second trading period, again without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In this context, the Commission draws the attention of Member States to the Declaration of the Council and the Commission of 4 September 1996[24] supporting an interpretation of the same wording contained in Annex I of the IPPC-Directive, that it is up to Member States to decide as to whether one of the two criteria or both criteria need to be fulfilled at the same time.

Annex 10: Set of NAP common format summary tables

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Explanatory comments on NAP Common Format summary tables

Note: Grey fields are filled in automatically when using the Excel spreadsheets.

Table I: NAP summary table – target calculation

General description:

The purpose of this table is to provide an overview of key data relevant for NAP assessment. The gap (row C) between the Kyoto target (row A) and actual greenhouse gas emissions in 2003 (row B) is presented with necessary corresponding reduction measures (quantified in the fourth column of rows F-H, and totalled in row I). The gap is also expressed as the difference between the Kyoto target (row A) and the projected annual average total greenhouse gas emissions from 2008-2012 (row D). This figure is indicated in row E.

Specific remarks:

The second column makes a cross-reference to other data tables.

The fourth column refers to emissions or effects on emissions from measures recorded in the third column.

All rows with the exception of rows B and C contain annual averages relating to the second trading period 2008 to 2012.

Table IIa: NAP Summary table – Basic data

General description:

Table IIa gives an overview of historic and expected trends in various factors crucial to the calculation of a Member State’s potential to reduce emissions: namely, real GDP (row A), greenhouse gas emissions (row B) and carbon intensity (row C).

All three factors are expressed both in absolute numbers and in a trend index, with 2003 being the base year (2003=100).

Specific remarks:

In order to have a complete picture, the Commission invites Member States to provide annual data from 1990 to 2012. While re-stating some date in the public domain, Table IIa is of added value as an integral part of the NAP ensuring transparency and easy access to this information for stakeholders and other Member States.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used, separately per year where relevant.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of these figures over time. In case a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission would also accept the submission of only annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012, to be indicated in the respective column.

Table IIb: NAP Summary table – Basic data on electricity sector

General description:

Table IIb indicates the basic data for the electricity sector. The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive picture of total domestic electricity production (row A), imports (row B) and exports (row C), the electricity trade balance (row D, constituting the difference between rows B and C) as well as the shares of different fuels (gas, oil, coal, nuclear energy, and renewable energy) in total domestic electricity production (rows E-I).

Specific remarks:

Imports and exports (rows B and C) need to be disaggregated into the most important countries to/from which the export/import takes place, as well as a row with the remainder to other countries, and the total figure. These figures will allow the Commission to cross-check the plausibility of indications by individual Member States of their respective exports and imports, which would naturally need to be compatible with each other.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used (separately per year where relevant) and are encouraged to provide annual data also for the period 2008 to 2012.

If a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission requires explanation and at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012. Similarly, Member States should provide data on the fuel mix as accurately as possible.

Naturally, the future fuel mix will depend on estimates, amongst others, of the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Member States should introduce also the target pursuant to Directive 2001/77/EC in Table 2b for the year 2010.

Table III: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector (without taking into account additional policies and measures in Table VI)

General description:

Table III relates recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector, as further specified by the numbers for the respective sub-sectors in the second column. Where indicated, the emissions should be indicated for total greenhouse gases and CO2 in the EU ETS.

The Commission recognises the technical difficulty to complete this table but stresses the importance of bringing together the categories in the UNFCCC-based common reporting format with the categories under EU ETS reporting.

Specific remarks:

The second column indicates the sub-sectoral reference under the Common Reporting Format (CRF).

The Commission recognises that some Member States may not have all the data available to complete Table III. If a Member State can justify why such annual or sectoral data is not available, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

CO2 emissions in the ETS sector depend on estimates, amongst others, on the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Table IV: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected CO 2 emissions in sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

Table IV looks more specifically at the recent and projected CO2 emissions by installation or sector covered by the EU ETS, relating them to the activities mentioned in Annex I of the Directive. Certain activities have been aggregated where separate information is likely not to be available or necessary for the Commission’s assessment.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations also covered under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify the absence of such annual data for certain sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible. If a Member State can show this to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D). Where such data are not available on an annual basis, the Commission requires a justification and at least the submission of data for a recent year as well as annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

The amount entered in row J, column XI correlates to Table III, row O, last column. The amount entered in row K, column XI correlates to Table III, row N, last column.

Table V: NAP Summary table – Proposed allocation in relation to first period allocation (without additional policies and measures) in the sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

For installations or sectors covered by the EU ETS, Table V indicates 2003 and 2004 actual emissions (columns i and ii) as well as the proposed second period allocation in relation to first trading period allocation (columns iii and iv). Column v indicates the proposed second period allocation as a percentage of the first period allocation. The same sectoral specification is used as in Table IV.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations covered also under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify why such annual data is not available for all sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS). If a Member State can show it to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D).

Table VI: NAP Summary table – Reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU emissions trading scheme and which have not been taken into account for the "with measures" projection presented in Table III (Mt CO 2 eq)

General description:

Table VI gives account of greenhouse gas emissions reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU ETS, which have not been taken into account for the “with measures” projection presented in Table III.

It classifies such measures into three categories: “under implementation” (columns i-iii), “adopted” (columns iv-vi), and “planned” (columns vii-ix).

“Under implementation” means that the implementation is ongoing, and that the measure is not taken into account for the "with measures" projections presented in Table III.

“Adopted” means that the measure has been adopted by the final instance at the relevant local, regional or national level, but it is not yet implemented.

“Planned” means that the measure is at least mentioned in a formal government document, but not adopted.

Each of these three categories is again subdivided into three columns: the expected average annual reduction (2008-12), on the one hand, in ETS sectors (columns i, iv and vii), and, on the other hand, in non-ETS sectors (columns ii, v and viii). The third sub-column (iii, vi and ix, respectively) indicates the year, in which the full or a substantial part of the effects of the respective measure can be expected (not necessarily the first year of implementation).

The rows shall contain the measures to be specified in the second column.

Specific remarks:

The Commission recognises that for some measures the disaggregation of the expected reductions into those occurring outside and inside the ETS presents a technical difficulty. It is however an important element for the Commission’s assessment.

Table VII: NAP Summary table – Government’s planned use of Kyoto units (Mt CO 2 eq) and status of implementation

General description:

Table VII gives a detailed overview on the government’s planned use of Kyoto units and the status of their implementation.

It subdivides the Kyoto units into ERUs from JI projects, CERs from CDM projects, and AAUs and other units from international emissions trading. The last column indicates the total of the three types combined.

The status of implementation is presented in the rows, as follows.

Rows A and B indicate the sum across the various degrees of implementation, with row A giving the total amount in the period 2008 to 2012 and row B the annual average in that period per type of Kyoto unit and as a total. The total annual average across all three forms of Kyoto units is equal to row H of Table I.

Row C indicates the most advanced degree of implementation, i.e. the quantity of units already paid for.

Row D gives a lesser degree of implementation, which is the quantity of units contracted, but yet unpaid (delivery pending start of UN ITL). Units partially paid for should be proportionally distributed between rows C and D.

Row E relates to the quantity with the lowest degree of implementation, i.e. the units neither bought nor contracted by the date of notification (Row E = Row A – Row C – Row D).

Rows F and G give additional information on the full budget appropriated to the first commitment period (2008-12), both the one currently available for 2006 (row F) and the one committed up to 2012 (row G).

Row H indicates the implied future price of Kyoto units, which is the sum of rows F and G, divided by the total planned purchase in row A.

Specific remarks:

The Commission prefers Member States to specify the breakdown into ERUs, CERs, and AAUs and others. In case a Member State can justify why such a breakdown is not feasible, the Commission requires at least the submission of separate figures for ERUs and CERs on the one hand and AAUs and others on the other hand.

Table VIII: NAP Summary table – Details on new entrants, closures and auctioning

Table VIII contains various questions relating to important information on new entrants, auctioning and closures. The questions should be self-explanatory.

Table IX: NAP Summary table – Further details on new entrants

Table IX asks for further details on a selected new entrant, e.g. a power plant with a rated thermal input of 100 MW.

In one scenario (second column) the fuel used is coal, while in the other (third column) it is gas.

Member States are then requested to fill in row 4 (forecast number of operating hours/year in the period 2008 to 2012), where such a forecast is relevant for the allocation under the new entrants rule of the Member State, and row 5 (annual allowance allocation in 2008 to 2012).

This information will allow the Commission to better assess the standards used in the allocation to new entrants and at the same time provide for more transparency.

Table X: NAP Summary table – Important assumptions on annual averages

In Table X, Member States are requested to quantify for the years 2005-12 their key assumptions on annual average figures underlying the establishment of the NAP, in particular for:

- the EU allowance price (in Euro);

- the price for crude oil (Brent);

- the price for natural gas;

- the coal price; and

- the exchange rate (for those Member States outside the Euro-zone).

Member States should use and specify common market standards for fuel prices, including the currency used. They should indicate in detail sources of data and methodologies. This information is necessary in order to ensure comparability of data and transparency.

Member States are invited to indicate further assumptions considered important and useful for the Commission’s assessment.

[1] Id-Direttiva 2003/87/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Ottubru 2003 li tistabbilixxi skema li tippermetti l-iskambju tal-kwoti ta' l-emissjonijiet fir-rigward ta' gassijiet li jikkawżaw l-effett serra fi ħdan il-Komunità u li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/61/KE, il-ĠU L 275 tal-25.10.2003,p. 32–46, kif emendata mid-Direttiva 2004/101/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Ottubru 2004 li temenda d–Direttiva 2003/87/KE filwaqt li tistabbilixxi skema li tippermetti l-iskambju tal-kwoti ta’ l-emissjonijiet tal-gassijiet li jikkawżaw l-effett serra fi ħdan il-Komunità, fir-rigward tal-mekkaniżmu proġettwali tal-Protokoll ta’ Kjoto, il-ĠU L 338 tat-13.11.2004, p. 18.

[2] COM(2003) 830 finali

[3] Fl-1 ta’ Diċembru 2005, il-Kunsill stieden lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tagħmel ħilitha ħalli tipprovdi gwida kmieni biżżejjed għat-tħejjija għall-pjanijiet nazzjonali tat-tieni allokazzjoni.

[4] Ara l-Anness 10.

[5] COM(2003) 830 finali, p. 25-29.

[6] Ir-rapport mill-Kummissjoni dwar il-Progress lejn il-kisba tal-Mira Komunitarja ta' Kjototat-15.12.2005, COM(2005) 655.

[7] Sors: Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea, id-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Enerġija u t-Trasport, Xejriet Ewropej fl-Enerġija u t-Trasport sa l-2030, l-Appendiċi 2, Jannar 2003, ara l-websajt:http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/index_en.htm

[8] F’dan ir-rigward, il-Kummissjoni tenfasizza l-importanza li l-pjanijiet ta' allokazzjoni ikunu konsistenti b'mod sħiħ ma' l-obbligi ta' l-Istati Membri skond id-Direttiva 2001/77/KE għall-promozzjoni ta’l-elettriku prodott minn sorsi ta’ l-enerġija rinnovabbli fis-suq intern ta’ l-elettriku,ĠU L 283, tas-27.10.2001, p. 33.

[9] Id-Direttiva 2004/101/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Ottubru 2004 li temendad-Direttiva 2003/87/KE li tistabbilixxi skema għall-iskambju ta’ kwoti ta’ emissjonijiet ta’ gassijiet serra ġewwa l-Komunità, fir-rigward tal-mekkaniżmi proġettati tal-Protokoll ta’ Kjoto,ĠU L 338/18 tat-13.11.2004, p. 18.

[10] Id-Deċiżjoni 15/CP.7, Artikolu 1.

[11] Il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni għal- Linking Directive tipprevedi definizzjoni kwantitattiva ta' dan it-tip (COM(2003) 403).

[12] Inklużi dawk fuq il-baħar.

[13] Inkluż ir-rock wool.

[14] Inklużi mtieħen, re-heaters, fran tal-glazing, u proċessi tas-salmura.

[15] The ETS share is calculated as the first period cap divided by 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions.

[16] These figures do not account for changes to the number of installations subsequent to the respective Commission decision (e.g. opt-ins or opt-outs of installations).

[17] Commission Communication COM (2003) 830 final, 7.1.2004.

[18] Directive 2004/156/EC (“the Linking Directive”) added a criterion 12 to Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.

[19] As provided for by Article 30(2) of the Directive

[20] Directive 2001/80/EC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, OJ L 309, 27.11.2001, p. 1.

[21] Directive 1999/32/EC relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels, OJ L 121, 11.05.1999, p. 13.

[22] Certain activities that are specifically excluded by the LCP-Directive are also excluded from the Emissions Trading Directive, such as “(h) any technical apparatus used in the propulsion of a vehicle, ship or aircraft” because the Emissions Trading Directive only applies to stationary technical units (Article 3(e)). The Emissions Trading Directive therefore covers neither transportation in general nor greenhouse gas emissions arising from traffic on the site of an installation.

[23] “2. The threshold values given below generally refer to production capacities or outputs. Where one operator carries out several activities falling under the same subheading in the same installation or on the same site, the capacities of such activities are added together.”

[24] Council Declaration of 4 September 1996 on Directive 96/61/EC of the Council on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 9388/96, Interinstitutional dossier No. 00/0526 (SYN)