Opinjoni tal-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew dwar il-Proposta għal Direttiva tal-Kunsill (Euratom) li twaqqaf qafas Komunitarju dwar is-sikurezza nukleari

COM(2008) 790 finali – 2008/0231 (CNS)

2009/C 306/13

Nhar it-30 ta’ Jannar 2003, il-Kummissjoni Ewropea iddeċiediet, b’konformità mal-Artikolu 31 tat-Trattat Euratom, li jikkonsulta lill-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew, dwar

(COM(2003) 32 final – 2003/0021 (CNS) – 2003/0022 (CNS)).

Il-Kumitat ħareġ l-opinjoni tiegħu dwar dawn il-proposti fis-26 ta’ Marzu 2003.

Nhar l-4 ta’ Ġunju 2009, il-Kummissjoni Ewropea ddeċiediet li tikkonsulta lill-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew dwar il-verżjoni emendata ta’ waħda minn dawn id-direttivi:

biex tirċievi l-osservazzjonijiet tal-Kumitat fil-forma ta’ opinjoni komplimentari għal dik tas-26 ta’ Marzu 2003.

Is-Sezzjoni Speċjalizzata għat-Trasport, l-Enerġija, l-Infrastruttura u s-Soċjetà tal-Informazzjoni inkarigata sabiex tipprepara l-ħidma tal-Kumitat dwar is-suġġett, adottat l-Opinjoni tagħha nhar l-20 ta’ Mejju 2009. Ir-relatur kien is-Sur DANTIN.

Matul l-454 sessjoni plenarja tiegħu li nżammet fl-10 u l-11 ta’ Ġunju 2009 (seduta tal-10 ta’ Ġunju), il-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew adotta din l-opinjoni b’100 vot favur, l-ebda vot kontra u 3 astensjonijiet.

1. Konklużjonijiet u rakkomandazzjonijiet

2. Daħla

3. L-għan, l-approċċ u l-elementi ewlenin tal-proposta għal Direttiva ġdida

4. Kummenti ġenerali

5. Kummenti partikolari

5.1 Ambitu u kontenut tad-Direttiva

Il-KESE jaqbel mar-referenża għall-prinċipji fundamentali ta’ sikurezza (SF-1, 2006) tal-IAEA u għall-obbligi tal-Konvenzjoni dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari, iżda jixtieq li jiġi speċifikat liema partijiet minn dawn il-prinċipji fundamentali jaqblu bl-eżatt mal-għan ta’ din id-Direttiva. Din l-ispeċifikazzjoni għandha ssir f’forma ta’ anness għad-Direttiva kif imfisser f’punt 6 ta’ din l-opinjoni u mehmuż magħha. B’dan il-mod il-proposta għal Direttiva ssir aktar ċara u xi artikoli jkunu jistgħu jiġu simplifikati.

5.2 Artikolu 1

Il-KESE jissuġġerixxi li l-kliem jitpoġġa b’mod aktar espliċitu fl-Artikolu 1: “id-Direttiva għandha l-għan li twaqqaf qafas Ewropew għar-regolamentazzjoni tas-sikurezza nukleari, li jiddefinixxi l-prinċipji fundamentali li magħhom iridu jikkonformaw il-leġiżlazzjoni u r-regolamenti dwar is-sikurezza nukleari stabbiliti fil-livell nazzjonali, sabiex iżżomm u ssaħħaħ kontinwament is-sikurezza nukleari fil-Komunità u ttejjeb ir-rwol tal-korpi regolatorji”.

5.3 Artikolu 2

5.4 Artikolu 3

5.5 Artikolu 4 (1)

5.6 Artikolu 4 (3)

Il-KESE jipproponi li ż-żewġ paragrafi fil-proposta, il-paragrafi 3 u 4 tal-Artikolu 4, jingħaqdu kif ġej: Il-korp regolatorju jagħti l-liċenzji skont l-evidenza mogħtija mill-applikant li tipprova li l-lokazzjoni, id-disinn, il-kostruzzjoni, il-kummissjunar, it-tħaddim, it-tul ta’ żmien li jieħu t-tħaddim, il-kwalità u l-ammont ta’ persunal, sa meta jsir u inkluż iż-żarmar tal-installazzjonijiet nukleari jikkonformaw mar-rekwiżiti, il-kundizzjonijiet u r-regoli fis-seħħ. Il-korp regolatorju għandu jikkontrolla li jitħarsu kif xieraq l-impenni li jkun ħa l-pussessur tal-liċenzja lejn iż-żamma tas-sikurezza nukleari.

5.7 Artikolu 4, (4)

Imħassar u inkorporat fl-l-Artikolu 4 (3) il-ġdid.

5.8 Artikolu 4, (6)

Għandu jiżdied paragrafu ieħor biex tittejjeb il-kollaborazzjoni bejn il-korpi regolatorji fl-UE: Il-korpi regolatorji nazzjonali għandhom jaqsmu bejniethom l-aħjar prattiki ta’ regolamentazzjoni u jiżviluppaw fehma komuni tar-rekwiżiti internazzjonali adottati.

5.9 Artikolu 5

“Trasparenza”: il-KESE jisħaq dwar l-importanza ta’ dan l-artikolu biex tingħata tweġiba għall-kritika li spiss issir dwar is-segretezza tal-industrija nukleari u minħabba l-fatt li t-tagħrif dwar it-tħaddim tal-installazzjonijiet nukleari jolqot lill-Istati Membri kollha, jużawx enerġija nukleari fit-territorju tagħhom jew le, għaliex huma responsabbli mill-ħarsien taċ-ċittadini tagħhom meta titqies in-natura transkonfinali tar-riskju nukleari.

5.10 Artikolu 6, (1)

Il-KESE jissuġġerixxi li ssir referenza aktar speċifika għall-prinċipji fundamentali ta’ sikurezza tal-IAEA, billi jiġi inkluż l-anness li ssemma hawn fuq. Għalhekk, l-Artikolu 6 (1) jerġa’ jinkiteb kif ġej: Fejn jidħlu l-lokazzjoni, id-disinn, il-kostruzzjoni, l-użu u ż-żarmar ta’ installazzjonijiet nukleari, l-Istati Membri għandhom iħarsu l-prinċipji fundamentali tas-sikurezza tal-IAEA (Prinċipji Fundamentali tas-Sikurezza tal-IAEA: Prinċipji fundamentali tas-sikurezza, Standard tas-Sikurezza IAEA Nru SF–1 (2006), speċifikati fl-anness.

5.11 Artikolu 6, (2)

Dan l-artikolu, li mhuwiex preċiż biżżejjed fir-referenzi li jagħmel għall-Assoċjazzjoni tar-Regolaturi Nukleari tal-Ewropa tal-Punent (WENRA) u l-Grupp ta’ Livell Għoli, joħloq problema ta’ interpretazzjoni: kif jista’ Stat Membru jiġi obbligat li jqis riżultati futuri li mhumiex definiti la f’dak li huwa kontenut u lanqas żmien meta tiġi adottata d-Direttiva? Il-KESE jipproponi li dan il-paragrafu jitħassar, peress li l-ħarsien tal-prinċipji fundamentali tas-sikurezza u l-iżvilupp ta’ kultura ta’ sikurezza jiġu biż-żmien mal-progress xjentifiku u tekniku.

5.12 Artikolu 7

Dan l-artikolu huwa dwar ir-responsabbiltà tal-pussessuri tal-liċenzja iżda, peress li d-Direttiva hija maħsuba għall-Istati Membri, il-KESE jissuġġerixxi li l-aspetti li mhumiex marbuta direttament mar-rwol tal-Istati Membri jiċċaqilqu għall-anness. L-Artikolu 7 kieku mbagħad jgħid hekk:

Obbligi tal-pussessuri tal-liċenzja: L-Istati Membri għandhom jiżguraw li l-pussessuri tal-liċenzja jiddisinjaw, jibnu, jħaddmu u jżarmaw l-installazzjonijiet nukleari tagħhom f’konformità mad-dispożizzjonijiet stipulati fl-Artikolu 6.

5.13 Artikolu 8

L-Artikolu ġie integrat flArtikoli 3 u 4 u għalhekk tħassar.

5.14 Artikolu 10

It-titlu “Prijorità għas-sikurezza jista” joħloq konfużjoni peress li jagħti wieħed x’jifhem li l-Istati Membri li ma jieħdux miżuri aktar stretti minn dawk stabbilit fid-Direttiva mhux qed jagħtu prijorità lis-sikurezza, jew li hija d-Direttiva stess li ma tagħmilx dan. Il-KESE jipproponi li jinbidel bit-titlu “ It-tisħiħ tas-sikurezza ”.

5.15 Artikolu 11

L-artikolu 11 huwa dwar ir-rappurtar perjodiku, meħtieġ kif ukoll mixtieq, lill-Kummissjoni dwar l-impatt tad-Direttiva. Il-Konvenzjoni dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari diġà tistipula dispożizzjonijiet dwar ir-rappurtar bi frekwenza speċifika u l-KESE jidhirlu li għandu jkun hemm kalendarju komuni għar-rapporti kollha, sabiex jiġu ssimplifikati u kkordinati l-proċeduri.

Għalhekk l-artikolu għandu jgħid dan li ġej: L-Istati Membri għandhom jippreżentaw rapport lill-Kummissjoni dwar l-implimentazzjoni ta’ din id-Direttiva fl-istess żmien u bl-istess frekwenza tar-rapporti nazzjonali li jippreżentaw quddiem il-laqgħat ta’ reviżjoni li jsiru fl-ambitu tal-Konvenzjoni dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari. Abbażi ta’ dawn ir-rapporti, il-Kummissjoni tippreżenta rapport quddiem il-Kunsill dwar il-progress li jkun sar fl-implimentazzjoni tad-Direttiva, akkompanjat, fejn xieraq, minn proposti leġiżlattivi.

6. Proposta għal anness għad-Direttiva

(1) ĠU C 185 tal-14.8.1975, p. 1.

(2) ĠU C 172 tat-8.7.1992, p. 2.

(3) COM(2003) 32 finali u COM(2004) 526 finali (verżjoni modifikata).

(4) ĠU C 133 tas-6.6.2003, p. 70–74 (mhux disponibbli bil-Malti).

(5) Il-Ġermanja, il-Belġju, il-Bulgarija, Spanja, il-Finlandja, Franza, l-Ungerija, il-Litwanja, l-Olanda, ir-Repubblika Ċeka, ir-Rumanija, ir-Renju Unit, l-Isklovakkja, is-Slovenja u l-Iżvezja.

(6) ĠU C 110 tat-30.4.2004, p. 77-95(mhux disponibbli bil-Malti).

(7) Konvenzjoni internazzjonali negozjata fil-qafas tal-Kummissjoni Ekonomika għall-Ewropa tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti (UNECE) u firmata minn 40 mill-55 pajjiż tal-UNECE.

(8) ĠU C 175, 28.7.2009, p. 1–7.

(9) Ara d-dokument tas-Sottogrupp dwar l-Armonizzazzjoni tal-Forum Ewropew dwar l-Enerġija Nukleari dwar il-Proposta għal Direttiva Ewropea dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari.

ANNESS

għall-opinjoni TEN/377 tal-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew, dwar il-Proposta għal Direttiva tal-Kunsill (Euratom) li twaqqaf qafas Komunitarju dwar is-sikurezza nukleari

COM(2008) 790 finali – 2008/0231 (CNS)

ANNESS GĦAD-DIRETTIVA (1)

SAFETY OBJECTIVE

The fundamental safety objective is to protect the workers and the general public from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, which may be caused by the nuclear installations

To ensure the protection of the workers and the general public, the nuclear installations shall be operated so as to achieve the highest standards of safety that can reasonably be achieved taking into account economical and social factors.

Besides the protection of people laid down in the Euratom Basic Standards (Directive 96/29), measures shall be taken

— to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source and

— to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.

The fundamental safety objective shall be taken into account for all nuclear installations and for all stages over the lifetime of the nuclear installation.

SAFETY PRINCIPLES

1. Principle 1: Responsibility for safety

Each Member State shall ensure that the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.

Each Member State shall ensure that the licensee has implemented provisions for:

— Establishing and maintaining the necessary competences;

— Providing adequate training and information;

— Establishing procedures and arrangements to maintain safety under all conditions;

— Verifying appropriate design and the adequate quality of nuclear installations;

— Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive material that is used, produced or stored;

— Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive waste that is generated.

to fulfil the responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation.

These responsibilities shall be fulfilled in accordance with applicable safety objectives and requirements as established or approved by the regulator body, and their fulfilment shall be ensured through the implementation of a management system.

2. Principle 2: Leadership and management for safety

Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in all organizations concerned with nuclear safety.

2.1 Leadership in safety matters shall be demonstrated at the highest levels in an organization. An effective management system shall be implemented and maintained, which has to integrate all elements of management so that requirements for safety are established and applied coherently with other requirements, including those for human performance, quality and security, and so that safety is not compromised by other requirements or demands. The management system also shall ensure the promotion of a safety culture, the regular assessment of safety performance and the application of lessons learned from experience.

2.2 A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned shall be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes: — Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels; — Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety; — Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regard to safety.

2.3 The management system shall recognize the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organizations. To prevent safety significant human and organizational failures, human factors shall be taken into account and good performance and good practices shall be supported.

3. Principle 3: Assessment of Safety

Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments shall be carried out before the construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its lifetime. A graded approach shall be used taking in account the magnitude of the potential risks arising from the nuclear installation.

3.1 The regulatory body shall require an assessment on nuclear safety for all nuclear installations, consistent with a graded approach. This safety assessment shall involve the systematic analysis of normal operation and its effects, of the ways in which failures might occur and of the consequences of such failures. The safety assessments shall cover the safety measures necessary to control the hazard, and the design and engineered safety features shall be assessed to demonstrate that they fulfil the safety functions required of them. Where control measures or operator actions are called on to maintain safety, an initial safety assessment shall be carried out to demonstrate that the arrangements made are robust and that they can be relied on. An authorization for a nuclear installation shall only be granted by a member state once it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the safety measures proposed by the licensee are adequate.

3.2 The required safety assessment shall be repeated in whole or in part as necessary later in the conduct of operations in order to take into account changed circumstances (such as the application of new standards or scientific and technological developments), the feedback of operating experience, modifications and the effects of ageing. For operations that continue over long periods of time, assessments shall be reviewed and repeated as necessary. Continuation of such operations shall be subject to these reassessments demonstrating that the safety measures remain adequate.

3.3 Within the required safety assessment precursors to accidents (an initiating event that could lead to accident conditions) shall be identified and analysed, and measures shall be taken to prevent the occurrence of accidents.

3.4 To further enhance safety, processes shall be put in place for the feedback and analysis of operating experience in own and other facilities, including initiating events, accident precursors, near misses, accidents and unauthorized acts, so that lessons may be learned, shared and acted upon.

4. Principle 4: Optimization of safety

Member States shall ensure that nuclear installations are optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably practicable be achieved without unduly limiting their operation.

4.1 The optimization of safety shall require judgements to be made about the relative significance of various factors, including: — The likelihood of the occurrence of foreseeable events and the resulting consequences; — The magnitude and distribution of radiation doses received; — Economic, social and environmental factors arising from the radiation risks. — The optimization of safety also means using good practices and common sense as far as is practical in day to day activities.

5. Principle 5: Prevention and mitigation

Member States shall ensure that all practical efforts are made to prevent and mitigate nuclear incidents and accidents in its nuclear installations.

5.1 Each Member State shall ensure, that the licensees engages all practical efforts — to prevent the occurrence of abnormal conditions or incidents that could lead to a loss of control; — to prevent the escalation of any such abnormal conditions or incidents that do occur; and — to mitigate any harmful consequences of an accident, by implementing ‘defence in depth’.

5.2 The application of the defence in depth concept shall ensure that no single technical, human or organizational failure could lead to harmful effects, and that the combinations of failures that could give rise to significant harmful effects are of very low probability.

5.3 Defence in depth shall be implemented through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would all have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to workers or the general public. The levels of defence in depth shall include: (a) an adequate site selection (b) an adequate design of the nuclear installation, consisting of — High quality of design and construction — High reliability of components and equipment — Control, limiting and protection systems and surveillance features — appropriate combination of engineered safety features (c) an adequate organisation with — An effective management system with a strong management commitment to safety culture — Comprehensive operational procedures and practices — Comprehensive accident management procedures — Emergency preparedness arrangements

6 Principle 6: Emergency preparedness and response

Members States shall ensure that arrangements are made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear installations accidents according to Directive 96/29

(1) Dan it-test jinkorpora fih parti mid-dokument tas-Sottogrupp dwar l-Armonizzazzjoni tal-Forum Ewropew dwar l-Enerġija Nukleari dwar il-Proposta għal Direttiva Ewropea dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari.