MT EN Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea C 318/1

Rapport tal-Attivitajiet tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza tal-OLAF

Frar 2013 – Jannar 2014

(2014/C 318/01)

Membri tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza tal-OLAF Johan DENOLF (President) Kummissarju Ewlieni, Id-Direttur tad-Direttorat ECOFIN Kriminalità tal-Pulizija Federali u Membru tal-Unità ta' Intelliġenza Finanzjarja (FIU), il-Belġju Herbert BÖSCH Preċedentement Membru tal-Parlament Ewropew Preċedentement il-President tal-Kumitat għall-Kontroll tal-Baġit tal-Parlament Ewropew, l-Awstrija Catherine PIGNON Prosekutur Pubbliku Ewlieni fil-Qorti tal-Appell f'Angers, Franza Jens MADSEN Prosekutur tal-Istat għal Reati Ekonomiċi u Internazzjonali Serji, id-Danimarka Tuomas PÖYSTI Awditur Ġenerali tal-Finlandja, President tal-Uffiċċju Nazzjonali tal-Awditjar, il-Finlandja

WERREJ

STQARRIJA TAL-MISSJONI 3

KELMTEJN QABEL MILL-PRESIDENT 4

ĦARSA ĠENERALI 5

1. MONITORAĠĠ TAL-INVESTIGAZZJONIJIET TAL-OLAF 5

Struzzjonijiet lill-Persunal dwar Proċeduri Investigattivi 6

Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni 6

Selezzjoni tad-dossiers fl-OLAF 7

It-tul tal-investigazzjonijiet 7

Każi trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali 8

Deċiżjonijiet biex l-informazzjoni lill-istituzzjoni, il-korp, uffiċċju u aġenzija tiġi differita 9

Rakkomandazzjonijiet magħmula mid-Direttur Ġenerali tal-OLAF 9

Il-proċeduri tal-OLAF fit-trattament tal-ilmenti 10

Ilmenti u talbiet indirizzati lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza 10

2. MONITORAĠĠ TAL-ĠESTJONI TAL-FUNZJONI INVESTIGATTIVA TAL-OLAF 11

Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit għall-2014 11

Ir-riorganizzazzjoni tal-OLAF u Stħarriġ ta' Sodisfazzjoni tal-Persunal 12

3. KOOPERAZZJONI MAL-OLAF 12

Segwitu mill-OLAF tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet li għamel il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza 12

Arranġamenti ta' ħidma mal-OLAF 12

4. KOOPERAZZJONI MAL-PARTIJIET IKKONĊERNATI 13

Laqgħat mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE 13

Skambju ta' fehmiet mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE 13

Is-smigħ pubbliku tal-Parlament Ewropew rigward il-garanziji proċedurali 13

Is-soċjetà ċivili 13

5. IL-GOVERNANZA TAL-KUMITAT TA' SORVELVANZA 14

Ir-rwol tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza skont ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 14

Prijoritajiet u objettivi 14

Kodiċi ta' kondotta 14

Metodi ta' ħidma 14

6. IS-SEGRETARJAT TAL-KUMITAT TA' SORVELVANZA 15

ANNESSI 16

STQARRIJA TAL-MISSJONI

L-Artikolu 15(1) tar-Regolament(UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013: Il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza għandu jimmonitorja regolarment l-implimentazzjoni mill-Uffiċċju tal-funzjoni investigattiva tiegħu, sabiex tissaħħaħ l-indipendenza tal-Uffiċċju fit-twettiq tajjeb tal-kompetenzi mogħtija lilu permezz ta' dan ir-Regolament. Il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza għandu b'mod partikolari jimmonitorja l-iżviluppi dwar l-applikazzjoni ta' garanziji proċedurali u t-tul tal-investigazzjonijiet fid-dawl tal-informazzjoni pprovduta mid-Direttur Ġenerali f'konformità mal-Artikolu 7(8).

Il-missjoni tal-Kumitat ta' Sorvelvanza tal-OLAF, kif deskritt mir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 (1), hija li jsaħħaħ l-indipendenza tal-OLAF fit-twettiq tal-kompiti li ngħatawlu (2). Sabiex iwettaq din il-missjoni, il-leġiżlatur inkariga lill-KS bi rwol fi tliet aspetti:

— Il-KS huwa l-korp ta' sorveljanza tal-OLAF u l-kustodju tal-indipendenza tal-OLAF; huwa regolarment jimmonitorjakif l-OLAF jimplimenta l-funzjoni investigattiva tiegħu u, b'mod partikolari, l-iżviluppi rigward l-applikazzjoni tal-garanziji proċedurali u ż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet.

— Il-KS għandu rwol konsultattiv fi-konfront tad-Direttur Ġenerali tal-OLAF, li huwa jassisti fit-twettiq tar-responsabbiltajiet tiegħu: — billi jikkomunikalu r-riżultati tal-monitoraġġ li jagħmel il-KS fl-implimentazzjoni tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF, l-applikazzjoni tal-garanziji proċedurali u ż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet kif ukoll, fejn meħtieġ, jagħmel rakkomandazzjonijiet xierqa; — billi jindirizzalu l-opinjonijiet tiegħu, inkluż fejn xieraq, rakkomandazzjonijiet dwar, inter alia, ir-riżorsi meħtieġa biex l-OLAF iwettaq il-funzjoni investigattiva tiegħu, dwar il-prijoritajiet investigattivi u dwar iż-żmien tal-investigazzjoni; — billi jippreżenta l-osservazzjonijiet tiegħu (inkluż, fejn xieraq, ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet) fuq il-linji gwida dwar il-proċeduri ta' investigazzjoni (u kull modifika għalihom) adottati mid-Direttur Ġenerali skont l-Artikolu 17(8) tar-Regolament.

— Il-KS huwa msieħeb fid-djalogu tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE, li lilhom jirrapporta l-attivitajiet tiegħu, li meta dawn jitolbuh jagħti l-opinjonijiet tiegħu u li magħhom jagħmel skambju ta' opinjonijiet fil-livell politiku, biex b'hekk jipprovdi lill-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE kompetenza unika bbażata fuq l-esperjenza tiegħu ta' monitoraġġ.

KELMTEJN QABEL MILL-PRESIDENT

Bħala President tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza tal-Uffiċċju Ewropew Kontra l-Frodi, huwa pjaċir tiegħi li nippreżenta r-Rapport Annwali tal-Attività tal-kumitat tagħna, skont l-Artikolu 15(9) tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013.

Dan huwa t-tieni Rapport tal-Attività tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza kurrenti u jipprovdi ħarsa ġenerali fuq l-attivitajiet ewlenin li twettqu matul il-perjodu ta' rappurtar, mill-1 ta' Frar 2013 sal-31 ta' Jannar 2014.

Il-Kapitoli 1 u 2 joffru deskrizzjoni komprensiva tal-attivitajiet ta' monitoraġġ tal-KS. Huma jiffukaw fuq il-monitoraġġ ta' kif l-OLAF jimplimenta l-funzjoni investigattiva tiegħu u fuq il-ġestjoni tal-OLAF rigward il-funzjoni investigattiva tiegħu. Il-Kapitoli 3 u 4 jirrigwardaw ir-relazzjonijiet mal-OLAF, kif ukoll mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE u ma' partijiet ikkonċernati oħra. Il-Kapitoli 5 u 6 jagħtu ħarsa ġenerali fuq il-metodi ta' ħidma tal-Kumitat, fuq id-dokumenti ta' politika adottati mill-Kumitat u kunsiderazzjonijiet rigward is-Segretarjat tiegħu.

Fi tmiem il-perjodu ta' rapportar wieħed mill-Membri tal-KS, is-Sur Jens Madsen, ħalla l-Kumitat biex jieħu pożizzjoni ġdida u ta' sfida fl-amministrazzjoni nazzjonali tiegħu. Nixtieq nieħu l-opportunità ta' dan ir-rapport biex inroddlu ħajr għall-kontribut prezzjuż lil ta għall-ħidma tal-Kumitat, u biex nilqa' lil Membru ġdid, is-Sur Dimitrios Zimianitis, mill-1 ta' Frar 2014.

Fl-aħħar nett nixtieq nesprimi grazzi speċjali lill-persunal tas-Segretarjat tagħna, għall-appoġġ imprezzabbli tagħhom u għax-xogħol ta' kwalità għolja tagħhom, li ta kontribut mhux ftit għall-effikaċja tal-monitoraġġ tagħna tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF.

Brussell, it-12 ta' Marzu 2014. Johan DENOLF

ĦARSA ĠENERALI

Attivitajiet ta' monitoraġġ

Analiżi u valutazzjoni ta':

— 56 każ li jeħtieġu li xi informazzjoni tintbagħat lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali;

— 186 rapport ta' disa' xhur;

— 293 opinjoni dwar selezzjoni ta' każijiet;

— 14-il ilment u talba mingħand individwi;

— ilment wieħed minn istituzzjoni tal-UE;

— 2 talbiet għal aċċess publliku għal dokument tal-KS;

— talba waħda għal kooperazzjoni mingħand awtorità ġudizzjarja nazzjonali.

Opinjonijiet u rapporti

— 4 opinjonijiet rigward l-implimentazzjoni u l-ġestjoni tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF: — Opinjoni Nru 1/2013: Abbozz preliminari tal-baġit tal-OLAF għall-2014; — Opinjoni Nru 2/2013: It-twaqqif ta' proċedura interna tal-OLAF għall-ilmenti; — Opinjoni Nru 1/2014: Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni tal-OLAF; — Opinjoni Nru 2/2014: Selezzjoni tad-dossiers fl-OLAF

— Rapport Annwali tal-Attività għall-2012.

Dokumenti ta' pożizzjoni u ta' politika

— Dokument ta' pożizzjoni dwar “It-tisħiħ tas-salvagwardji proċedurali fl-OLAF”;

— Osservazzjonijiet dwar il-proċeduri investigattivi fl-OLAF;

— Dokument dwar il-missjoni u kompetenzi tal-KS fid-dawl tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 u l-istrateġija ta' nofs it-terminu;

— Linji gwida dwar il-monitoraġġ (fl-andament);

— Emenda tar-Regoli ta' proċedura (fl-andament).

Kooperazzjoni

— Arranġamenti ta' ħidma ġodda mal-OLAF.

1. MONITORAĠĠ TAL-INVESTIGAZZJONIJIET TAL-OLAF

1. Il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza tal-OLAF (KS) jagħmel monitoraġġ ta' aspetti diversi tal-attivitajiet investigattivi tal-OLAF abbażi ta' informazzjoni li d-Direttur Ġenerali tal-OLAF (DĠ tal-OLAF) huwa obbligat li jipprovdi u ta' informazzjoni mitluba mill-KS fuq inizjattiva tagħha stess.

(L-Artikolu 15(1), it-tielet paragrafu tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013) Il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza għandu jindirizza opinjonijiet lid-Direttur Ġenerali, inkluż meta xieraq, rakkomandazzjonijiet dwar fost l-oħrajn ir-riżorsi meħtieġa biex titwettaq il-funzjoni investigattiva tal-Uffiċċju, dwar il-prijoritajiet investigattivi tal-Uffiċċju u dwar it-tul tal-investigazzjonijiet. Dawk l-opinjonijiet jistgħu jingħataw fuq inizjattiva tiegħu stess, fuq talba tad-Direttur Ġenerali jew fuq talba ta' istituzzjoni, korp, uffiċċju jew aġenzija, madanakollu mingħajr ma jfixklu t-twettiq tal-investigazzjonijiet li jkunu għaddejja.

Struzzjonijiet lill-Persunal dwar Proċeduri Investigattivi

2. Fis-7 ta' Frar 2013, id-DĠ tal-OLAF ipprovda lill-KS kopja ta' verżjoni emendata tal-Istruzzjonijiet lill-Persunal dwar il-Proċeduri Investigattivi (IPPI). Fil-5 ta' Lulju 2013, huwa pprovda lill-KS it-tieni verżjoni emendata tal-IPPI, bil-għan li l-proċeduri investigattivi tal-OLAF jiġu allinjati mad-dispożizzjonijiet ġodda previsti mill-abbozz tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013. IFil-31 ta' Lulju 2013, id-DĠ tal-OLAF informa lill-KS dwar l-intenzjoni tiegħu li jadotta l-IPPI emedat.

3. Filwaqt li enfasizza li ma jistax iwettaq analiżi fil-fond tal-IPPI emendat f'perjodu daqshekk qasir, fit-30 ta' Lulju 2013 il-KS ipprovda għadd ta' osservazzjonijiet u mistoqsijiet dwar l-IPPI emendat (3). Il-KS eżamina, b'mod partikolari, id-dispożizzjonijiet rigward il-proċedura ta' selezzjoni u l-mod kif titmexxa l-investigazzjoni u l-koordinazzjoni tad-dossiers.

4. Il-KS ikkunsidra li l-IPPI emendat għandu, inter alia: — espliċitament isemmi l-kunċett ta' “biżżejjed suspett”, kif previst fir-Regolament, bħala prekundizzjoni biex tinfetaħ investigazzjoni; — jistruttura b'mod ċar is-separazzjoni bejn dawk li jagħmlu s-selezzjoni u dawk li jagħmlu l-analiżi fl-Unità tas-Selezzjoni u l-Analiżi tal-Investigazzjonijiet; — iżomm distinzjoni ċara bejn l-investigazzjonijiet interni u dawk esterni, minħabba li s-setgħat ta' investigazzjoni tal-OLAF huma differenti; — jinkludi dispożizzjonijiet għall-organizzazzjoni ta' kontroll intern usa' tal-kontroll tal-legalità, mhux biss tal-attivitajiet investigattivi msemmijin fl-IPPI, iżda wkoll ta' dawk li mhumiex speċifikament previsti fl-IPPI iżda li jistgħu potenzjalment jirriżultaw f'interferenza mad-drittijiet tal-persuni kkonċernati.

5. Fil-5 ta' Settembru 2013, fuq talba tal-KS, id-DĠ tal-OLAF ta l-kummenti tiegħu u informazzjoni addizzjonali dwar kwistjonijiet li qajjem il-KS. Huwa informa wkoll lill-KS dwar it-tlestija tal-emendi għall-IPPI li ħadu kont tal-kummenti tal-KS u ppreżenta lill-KS l-aħħar abbozz tal-Linji Gwida l-ġodda dwar il-Proċeduri Investigattivi għall-Persunal tal-OLAF, li kien jissostitwixxi l-IPPI.

Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni

6. L-Opinjoni Nru 1/2014 ivvalutat il-Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni tal-OLAF (PPI) stabbiliti, fuq bażi annwali, mid-DĠ tal-OLAF u ppubblikati fil-Pjan ta' Ġestjoni Annwali (4).

7. Il-KS qabbel il-PPI għall-2012 u 2013 mal-abbozz tal-PPI għall-2014 u laqa' d-definizzjoni mtejba ta' dawn tal-aħħar bħala riżultat tal-kummenti li esprima l-KS matul il-laqgħat tekniċi mad-DĠ tal-OLAF, fis-sens li l-PPI ma għandhomx jinkludu prinċipji ġenerali (li għandhom dejjem jiġu kkunsidrati meta jkun qed jiġi deċiż jekk tinfetaħx investigazzjoni jew le), iżda biss oqsma jew tipi ta' frodi speċifiċi li l-OLAF għandu jindirizza bħala kwistjoni ta' prijorità

8. Il-KS sab li l-indikaturi finanzjarji, li fis-snin ta' qabel kienu esaġerati, ġew kompletament esklużi mill-abbozz tal-PPI għall-2014. Il-KS enfasizza li indikaturi bħal dawn għandhom ikunu relevanti għall-valutazzjoni ta' kemm hu serju r-riskju tal-frodi involut u jistgħu jkunu utli bħala element ta' referenza u bħala linji gwida interni għall-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipju tal-proporzjonalità. Il-KS ġibed ukoll l-attenzjoni għall-ħtieġa li terġa tiġi kkunsidrata l-politika dwar is-sussidjarjetà/valur miżjud u li tiġi applikata b'kawtela, kif ukoll il-ħtieġa għal valutazzjoni regolari tal-PPI.

9. Il-KS ġibed l-attenzjoni għall-bżonn li l-PPI jiġu ċċarati u rrakkomanda li d-DĠ tal-OLAF joħroġ linji gwida dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipji ta' selezzjoni stabbiliti mir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 u jidħol fi djalogu kostruttiv mal-partijiet ikkonċernati dwar id-determinazzjoni u l-implimentazzjoni tal-PPI, b'mod partikolari rigward l-indikaturi finanzjarji u s-segwitu possibbli ta' każijiet imwarrba meta l-valutazzjoni tagħhom twassal għall-konklużjoni li hemm biżżejjed suspetti ta' frodi. F'dan l-istadju, jibqa' diffiċli għall-KS li japprezza l-prestazzjoni tal-OLAF fl-oqsma koperti mill-PPI, minħabba li l-OLAF innifsu ma wettaqx valutazzjoni tal-impatt tal-PPI. Il-KS għaldaqstant talab li d-DĠ tal-OLAF jipprovdi valutazzjoni tar-riżultati tal-implimentazzjoni tal-PPI għall-2012 u l-2013 f'kull qasam prijoritizzat, flimkien ma' taqsira tal-feedback li taw il-partijiet ikkonċernati.

Selezzjoni tad-dossiers fl-OLAF

10. L-Opinjoni Nru 2/2014 dwar is-Selezzjoni tad-dossiers fl-OLAF (5) ivvalutat l-effiċjenza, il-kwalità ut-trasparenza tal-proċess ta' selezzjoni fl-OLAF. Il-valutazzjoni tal-KS saret abbażi ta', inter alia, analiżi ta' kampjun ta' 293 opinjoni tal-Unità tas-Selezzjoni u l-Analiżi tal-Investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF (ISRU) li kienu jirrakkomandaw li jiġu mwarrba każijiet jew li jinfetħu każijiet ta' investigazzjoni/koordinazzjoni.

11. Il-KS l-ewwel ivvaluta l-effiċjenza tal-funzjoni ta' selezzjoni billi eżamina r-riżorsi li kienu disponibbli għall-ISRU biex twettaq il-kompiti tagħha u r-riżultati konkreti miksuba fl-2012 u l-2013. il-KS sab li l-kompetenzi tekniċi, investigattivi u ta' lingwi kienu xi drabi nieqsa jew insuffiċjenti; l-analiżi legali ma ntwerietx biżżejjed; iż-żmien allokat għas-selezzjonijiet (perjodu obbligatorju ta' xahrejn) ma jidhirx adegwat f'xi każijiet; kienet meħtieġa wkoll proċedura ċara għat-trattament tal-informaturi.

12. Il-KS imbagħad evalwa l-kwalità tal-opinjonijiet fid-dawl tal-konformità tagħhom mal-kriterji ta' selezzjoni stabbiliti mid-DĠ tal-OLAF. Il-KS sab li l-istruzzjonijiet dwar l-implimentazzjoni tal-kriterji ta' selezzjoni ma ġewx segwiti b'mod strett: ingħatat ftit kunsiderazzjoni għall-istrumenti legali relevanti meta ġiet ivvalutata l-kompetenza ta' OLAF li jaġixxi; dawk li jagħmlu s-selezzjoni ma kellhomx indikaturi preċiżi biex jevalwaw is-suffiċjenza tal-informazzjoni; meta tali indikaturi kienu preżenti, ma kinux użati kostantement u b'mod konsistenti; spiss kienu użati dikjarazzjonijiet mhux sostanzjati.

13. Fl-aħħar nett, it-trasparenza tal-proċess ta' selezzjoni ġie skrutinizzat billi ngħatat ħarsa lejn il-fluss tal-informazzjoni matul il-proċess ta' selezzjoni, b'mod partikolari rigward il-kooperazzjoni bejn l-ISRU u l-unitajiet ta' investigazzjoni.

14. Il-KS ħareġ għadd ta' rakkomandazzjonijiet lid-DĠ tal-OLAF, immirati biex titjieb il-funzjoni tas-selezzjoni tal-ISRU. bħala konklużjoni ġenerali għall-valutazzjoni tiegħu, il-KS ħareġ rakkomandazzjoni finali li l-OLAF iwettaq evalwazzjoni interna tal-attivitajiet tal-ISRU immirata biex tistabbilixxi, inter alia, il-livell tar-riżorsi meħtieġa, is-saħħiet u d-dgħufijiet tal-unità u r-“rata ta' żbalji” għall-każijiet evalwati. Il-KS talab ukoll li d-DĠ jinformaha dwar is-segwitu mogħti lir-rakkomandazzjonijiet ta' din l-opinjoni sena wara l-adozzjoni tagħha.

It-tul tal-investigazzjonijiet

L-Artikolu 11(7) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1073/1999: Meta investigazzjoni tkun ilha għaddejja għal aktar minn disa' xhur, id-Direttur għandu jinforma lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza bir-raġunijiet li minħabba fihom ma kienx possibbli li tingħalaq l-investigazzjoni, u biż-żmien meta huwa mistenni li titlesta. L-Artikolu 7(8) tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013: Jekk investigazzjoni ma tkunx tista' tingħalaq fi żmien 12-il xahar wara li tkun infetħet, id-Direttur Ġenerali għandu jirrapporta, malli jiskadi dak il-perjodu ta' 12-il xahar u f'intervalli ta' sitt xhur wara dan, lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza, filwaqt li jindika r-raġunijiet u l-miżuri ta' rimedju previsti bil-ħsieb li titħaffef l-investigazzjoni.

15. Il-KS għamel monitoraġġ ta' kemm ħadu żmien l-investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF billi uża, bħala sors ta' informazzjoni, ir-rapporti ta' disa' xhur (6) u r-rapporti li saru fil-każijiet trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali ppreżentati mill-OLAF skont l-eks Regolament (KE) Nru 1073/1999, kif ukoll dokumenti oħra relatati mal-każijiet meta ingħata aċċess għas-sistema ta' Ġestjoni ta' Każijiet tal-OLAF (CMS).

16. Il-KS beda janalizza r-raġunijiet li pprovda l-OLAF biex jispjega ż-żmien li ħadu l-każijiet li damu aktar minn disa' xhur: il-kumplessità tal-materja li kienet qed tiġi investigata, nuqqas ta' riżorsi, prijorità baxxa ta' każ, nuqqas ta' kooperazzjoni. il-KS innota diverġenza bejn id-direttorati tal-investigazzjoni u l-unitajiet tagħhom rigward l-akkuratezza tal-ispjegazzjonijiet li ngħtaw. l-analiżi tal-KS għadha għaddejja.

17. Ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 introduċa żewġ tibdiliet importanti mmirati biex jippermettu li l-KS jagħmel monitoraġġ aħjar taż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet: ir-rapporti ta' tnax-il xahar issostitwew lil dawk ta' disa' xhur (li jikkorrispondu aħjar mar-realtà, minħabba li l-maġġoranza tal-investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF idumu aktar minn 12-il xahar), u l-obbligu l-ġdid li l-OLAF jirrapporta regolarment kull sitt xhur, biex b'hekk il-KS ikun jista' jsegwi ċ-ċiklu komplet tal-investigazzjoni.

18. Fil-31 ta' Jannar 2014, il-KS irċieva, għall-ewwel darba, 83 rapport ta' tnax-il xahar minn 243 każ li damu aktar minn 12-il xahar. Il-KS innota bi tħassib li, filwaqt li l-formola ta' ħidma użata għal dawn ir-rapporti kienet riveduta mill-OLAF skont il-ħtiġijiet tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013, ir-rapporti l-ġodda mibgħuta lill-KS ma kienx fihom biżżejjed informazzjoni, b'mod partikolari rigward elementi li kienu jippermettu lill-KS jivverifika l-eżistenza potenzjali ta' dewmien indebitu fl-investigazzjonijiet. Pereżempju, 33 mit-83 rapport f'każijiet li ħadu aktar minn 12-il xahar jagħtu r-raġunijiet u l-miżuri ta' rimedju previsti sabiex l-investigazzjoni titħaffef mingħajr, però, ma jipprovdu ebda informazzjoni fattwali (jiġifieri deskrizzjoni tal-fatti, il-passi investigattivi meħuda mill-OLAF u l-kronoloġija tagħhom, il-perjodi potenzjali ta' inattività, it-tip ta' frodi, l-impatt finanzjarju, kunsiderazzjonijiet dwar preskrizzjoni, eċċ.) li mingħajrhom huwa impossibbli li l-KS jagħmel valutazzjoni sħiħa taż-żmien meħud minn investigazzjoni. Filwaqt li r-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 saħħaħ ir-rwol tal-KS fil-kontroll taż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet, l-OLAF mhux qed jipprovdi, fuq inizjattiva tiegħu, biżżejjed informazzjoni biex il-KS iwettaq dik il-missjoni. Il-KS qajjem din il-kwistjoni f'laqgħa mad-DĠ tal-OLAF u jistenna li r-rapporti li jiġu ppreżentati fil-futur ikunu iżjed deskrittivi.

19. Matul laqgħa teknika, il-KS kien infurmat mill-OLAF bl-għodod użati mill-OLAF għall-monitoraġġ taż-żmien li jieħdu l-każijiet, li jikkonsistu primarjament f'sistema ta' sinjalar fis-CMS li jfakkar li wasal iż-żmien għar-rapporti ta' tnax-il xahar u sitt xhur. L-OLAF waqqaf ukoll struttura ġdida ta' ġestjoni ta' grad inqas (junior management) fl-unitajiet investigattivi, li inter alia huma inkarigati mill-monitoraġġ taż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet. Il-KS jilqa' l-isforzi li qed isiru mill-OLAF u r-rieda tiegħu li jtejjeb is-sensibilizzazzjoni tal-investigaturi rigward il-limitazzjonijiet taż-żmien. Fl-istess ħin, il-KS jenfasizza li r-rapporti ta' tnax-il xahar u ta' sitt xhur li ġew ippreżentati lill-KS jistgħu jkunu għodda utli ta' ġestjoni għall-OLAF innfisu biex jagħmel monitoraġġ taż-żmien li jieħdu l-investigazzjonijiet, iżda dan huwa impossibbli minħabba n-nuqqas ta' kontenut sostanzjali fil-maġġoranza tagħhom. Dan huwa partikolarment importanti għall-każijiet fejn dewmien prolongat jista' jkollu effett negattiv fuq ir-reputazzjoni u l-ħajja professjonali tal-persuni kkonċernati jew jistgħu jirriżultaw fi preskrizzjoni tal-proċeduri nazzjonali legali sussegwenti.

Każi trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali

L-Artikolu 11(7) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1073/1999: Id-Direttur għandu jinforma lill-kumitat dwar każijiet li jkunu jeħtieġu li xi informazzjoni tintbagħat lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji ta' Stat Membru. (L-Artikolu 17(5) it-tielet paragrafu tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013) Id-Direttur Ġenerali għandu jinforma lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza perjodikament: (…) (b) dwar każijiet li fihom l-informazzjoni tkun intbagħtet lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji tal-Istati Membri;

20. Ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 introduċa tibdil importanti rigward il-każijiet li l-OLAF għandu l-ħsieb li jgħaddi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali: l-OLAF ma għandux għalfejn jinforma lill-KS b'dawn il-każijiet qabelit-trażmissjoni (bħal ma kien obbligat skont l-eks Regolament (KE) Nru 1073/1999), iżda bissperjodikament, wara t-trażmissjoni.

21. Bejn l-1 ta' Frar 2013 u t-30 ta' Settembru 2013 (sakemm daħal fis-seħħ ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013), il-KS irċieva 567 każ (7) li kienu jeħtieġu li informazzjoni tiġi trażmessa lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali. Ingħata aċċess sħiħ fis-CMS għad-dokumenti relatati mal-każijiet, meta ntalab mill-KS, fi 18-il każ.

22. Il-KS ma setax, madankollu, jeżmina bir-reqqa dawk il-każijiet qabel ma ġew trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali, minħabba l-fatt li kien jirċievi aċċess għal fajls tal-każijiet fis-CMS biss wara li jkun skada l-perjodu ta' ħamest ijiem previst fi ftehimiet preċedenti mal-OLAF. Il-valutazzjoni tal-KS dwar kif l-OLAF japplika l-garanziji proċedurali hija bbażata l-aktar fuq l-informazzjoni inkluża fl-Opijonijiet dwar ir-rapporti finali jew interim u r-rakkomandazzjonijiet li għamel l-ISRU (8) u, meta ingħata l-aċċess għall-każijiet, dwar dokumenti relatati mal-każijiet irreġistrati fis-CMS. il-KS jinnota li skont l-opinjonijiet kollha tal-ISRU l-attivitajiet investigattivi kollha twettqu skont in-normi ġuridiċi applikabbli. Abbażi ta' dawn l-opinjonijiet u ta' dokumenti oħra li ġew eżaminati, il-KS identifika biss problemi iżolati rigward ir-rispett tal-OLAF tal-garanziji proċedurali (pereżempju nuqqas ta' informazzjoni lill-persuna kkonċernata rigward it-tlestija tal-investigazzjoni f'każ wieħed u nuqqas ta' awtorizzazzjoni bil-miktub biex il-persuna kkonċernata tiġi intervistata f'każ ieħor (9)).

23. F'każ wieħed, il-persuna kkonċernata rraportat lill-KS ksur serju allegat imwettaq mill-OLAf rigward ir-rekwiżit ta' kunfidenzjalità. Madankollu, il-KS, minħabba li ma għandux għodod adegwati ta' inkjesta (l-inċident ma ssemmiex fil-fajl tal-każ tal-OLAF), seta' biss jirreferi l-ilment lid-DĠ tal-OLAF li ċaħad l-ezistenza ta' tali ksur.

24. Fil-31 ta' Jannar 2014, il-KS irċieva informazzjoni dwar 17-il każ addizzjonali fejn informazzjoni ġiet trażmessa lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji tal-Istati Membri sa mill-1 ta' Ottubru 2013 (sa mid-dħul fis-seħħ tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013). Minħabba li din l-informazzjoni waslet fl-aħħar jum tal-perjodu kopert minn dan ir-rapport ta' attività, il-KS se jitlob informazzjoni addizzjonali u se jeżamina dawn il-każijiet aktar tard fl-2014.

Deċiżjonijiet biex l-informazzjoni lill-istituzzjoni, il-korp, uffiċċju u aġenzija tiġi differita

L-Artikolu 4(6) tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013: Meta l-investigazzjonijiet interni jiżvelaw (li) uffiċjal, aġent ieħor, membru ta' istituzzjoni jew korp, kap ta' uffiċċju jew aġenzija, jew membru tal-persunal jista' jkun persuna kkonċernata, l-istituzzjoni, il-korp, l-uffiċċju jew l-aġenzija li tappartjeni għaliha dik il-persuna għandha tiġi infurmata. (…) F'każijiet eċċezzjonali, l-għoti ta' informazzjoni bħal din jista' jiġi diferit abbażi ta' deċiżjoni raġunata mid-Direttur Ġenerali, li għandha tintbagħat lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza wara l-għeluq tal-investigazzjoni.

25. Ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 introduċa, għall-ewwel darba, l-obbligu li d-DĠ tal-OLAF jittrażmetti lill-KS, wara li tkun ingħalqet investigazzjoni, id-deċiżjoni motivata tiegħu għad-diferiment tal-informazzjoni lil istituzzjoni, korp, uffiċċju jew aġenzija li tappartjeni għaliha dik il-persuna kkonċernata mill-investigazzjoni. fil-31 ta' Jannar 2014 il-KS kien infurmat mill-OLAf li ma kienx hemm diferimenti bħal dawn minn mindu daħal fis-seħħ ir-Regolament.

Rakkomandazzjonijiet magħmula mid-Direttur Ġenerali tal-OLAF

L-Artikolu 11(7) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1073/1999: Id-Direttur għandu jinforma lill-Kumitat dwar każijiet fejn l-istituzzjoni, korp, uffiċċju jew aġenzija inkwistjoni jkunu naqsu milli jaġixxu fuq ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet magħmula minnu. (it-tielet paragrafu tal-Artikolu 17(5) tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013: Id-Direttur Ġenerali għandu jinforma lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza perjodikament: (a) dwar każijiet li fihom ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet magħmula mid-Direttur Ġenerali ma jkunux ġew segwiti (…).

26. Matul dan il-perjodu ta' rapportar u fil-fatt mill-bidu tal-mandat tiegħu, il-KS irċieva informazzjoni limitata ħafna dwar każijiet fejn ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet magħmula mid-Direttur Ġenerali ma ġewx segwiti. L-inkjesta tal-KS stess twassalha għall-konklużjoni li, bħal fis-snin ta' qabel, għadd sinifikanti ta' rakkomandazzjonijiet bħal dawn ma ġewx segwiti. Fir-rapporti ta' attività preċedenti l-KS enfasizza li l-OLAF innifsu jidher li, fil-passat, ma kellux għodod ta' monitoraġġ xierqa li jippermettulu jsegwi l-implimentazzjoni tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali u tal-UE.

27. Wara r-riorganizzazzjoni tal-OLAF fl-2012, il-monitoraġġ tal-implimentazzjoni tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu ġew deċentralizzati għal unitajiet investigattivi. Bħalissa l-OLAF qed jaħdem biex jiżviluppa u jimplimenta għodod ġodda ta' monitoraġġ li jippermettulu jsegwi aħjar ir-riżultati u l-impatt tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu. Il-KS innota li l-OLAF għamel diġà sforz sinifikanti biex ikejjel l-implimentazzjoni tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu, b'mod partikolari dawk ġudizzjarji u finanzjarji. Pereżempju, l-OLAF qed jeżamina aktar minn 600 każ magħluqa b'rakkomandazzjonijiet ġudizzjarji. Il-KS innota b'interess il-grilja għall-evalwazzjoni użata għal din l-analiżi, li abbażi tagħha ġie kkontrollat is-segwitu li għamlu l-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet li sarulhom fil-konfront ta' stadju importanti fil-proċedimenti ġudizzjarji nazzjonali (il-ftuħ ta' investigazzjoni kriminali, deċiżjonijiet ta' akkuża jew ċaħda, deċiżjonijiet ta' liberazzjoni jew kundanna, eċċ.). Rigward is-segwitu finanzjarju, l-OLAF ifittex li jtejjeb il-proċeduri tiegħu biex ikun jista' jistabbilixxi l-ammonti effettivament irkuprati għall-baġit tal-UE.

28. Il-KS jirrikonoxxi l-kumplesstià ta' dan l-eżerċizzju li għadu għaddej u jilqa' r-rieda tal-OLAF li jtejjeb l-għodod ta' segwitu tiegħu. F'dan l-istadju, madankollu, u fin-nuqqas ta' informazzjoni relevanti, huwa prematur għall-KS li japprezza l-impatt tat-tibdil li ġiebet ir-riorganizzazzjoni fuq l-effikaċja tax-xogħol ta' monitoraġġ tal-OLAF. Il-KS jistenna informazzjoni aħjar mill-OLAF fil-futur, ladarba jiġu implimentati għodod xierqa ta' monitoraġġ.

Il-proċeduri tal-OLAF fit-trattament tal-ilmenti

29. Fl-Opinjoni Nru 2/2013 (It-twaqqif ta' proċedura interna tal-OLAF għall-ilmenti) adottata f'Diċembru 2013 (10), il-KS eżamina l-opzjonijiet ta' rimedju miftuħa għal persuni involuti fl-investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF rigward vjolazzjonijiet potenzjali tad-drittijiet u l-garanziji proċedurali tagħhom. Il-KS sab li dawn il-persuni ma kellhomx rimedji biżżejjed u immedjati biex jirrimedjaw ksur potenzjali kemm permezz ta' mekkaniżmu estern (qorti tal-UE jew nazzjonali, l-Ombudsman Ewropew jew il-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Dejta) jew intern (l-OLAF innifsu).

30. Il-KS enfasizza li r-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 il-ġdid dwar investigazzjonijiet immexxija mill-OLAF ma jirriżolvix il-problema, minħabba li ma jintroduċix mekkaniżmu biex jittratta l-ilmenti individwali. Il-KS esprima l-opinjoni li d-disparità leġiżlattiva attwali tista' tissewwa permezz ta' proċedura formalizzata għall-ilmenti fl-IOLAF, b'mod partikolari rigward ksur allegat ta' drittijiet fundamentali u garanziji proċedurali fl-andament ta' investigazzjoni tal-OLAF.

31. Il-KS għaldaqstant jirrakkomanda li d-DĠ tal-OLAF jistabbilixxi u jippubblika tali proċedura interna wara li jikkonsulta mal-KS dwar id-dettalji. Il-KS esprima x-xewqa tiegħu li d-DĠ tal-OLAF jirrapporta regolarment lill-KS dwar l-ilmenti li jirċievi l-OLAF u s-segwitu li jsirilhom.

32. F'Jannar 2014, l-OLAF ippubblika fuq il-websajt tiegħu deskrizzjoni tal-passi li jittieħdu fl-OLAF fit-trattament tal-ilmenti. Wara talba mill-KS biex jara d-deċiżjoni bil-miktub rigward it-twaqqif ta' proċedura relevanti, id-DĠ tal-OLAF wieġeb permezz ta' ittra fis-17 ta' Frar 2014 fejn ikkonferma li huwa jikkonsidra l-pubblikazzjoni fuq il-websajt bħala l-formalizzazzjoni tal-proċeduri eżistenti u għalhekk ma kienx hemm il-ħtieġa ta' deċiżjoni formali bil-miktub min-naħa tiegħu.

33. Bħala riżultat ta' dan, il-KS irid jikkonkludi li r-rakkomandazzjoni tiegħu ma ġietx implimentata. Il-KS jinsab imħasseb mill-periklu li dan jista' jqarraq lil ċittadini li jkunu jixtiequ jippreżentaw ilment mal-OLAF. Dawn jistgħu jaħsbu li t-test ippreżentat fuq il-websajt tal-OLAF jipprovdilhom qafas ġuridiku għall-ilment filwaqt li fil-fatt il-proċedura relevanti (għall-ilmenti rigward il-garanziji proċedurali) formalment ma teżistix, minħabba li ma hemm l-ebda att legali li jikkostitwixxi bażi ġuridika għal proċedura bħal din.

Ilmenti u talbiet indirizzati lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza

34. Matul il-perjodu ta' rapportar, il-KS irċieva 14-il ilment u talba mingħand individwi. Dan jirrappreżenta żieda ta' 100 % meta mqabbel mas-sena preċedenti. L-ilmenti jikkonċernaw, inter alia, allegat nuqqas ta' rispett tad-drittijiet fundamentali u tal-garanziji proċedurali, ksur tal-kunfidenzjalità tal-investigazzjonijiet, dewmien eċċessiv tal-investigazzjonijiet u allegat għeluq abbużiv ta' każijiet mingħajr rakkomandazzjonijiet. L-ilmenti ġew l-aktar minn persuni kkonċernati minn investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF, iżda wkoll mingħand informaturi li ma kinux kuntenti bid-deċiżjonijiet li ħa l-OLAF wara li huma kienu rrapportaw l-allegat frodi.

35. Il-KS wieġeb lill-ilmentaturi billi enfasizza li fil-qafas tar-Regolament attwali, il-KS mhuwiex imfassal bħala korp għall-ilmenti. Madankollu, il-KS ikkunsidra dawn l-ilmenti fil-qafas tal-monitoraġġ sistemiku tiegħu tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF u talab, fejn ikkunsidra li hu xieraq, għal aktar informazzjoni u spjegazzjoni mill-OLAF u/jew aċċess sħiħ għall-fajls tal-każijiet fis-CMS.

36. F'Jannar 2014 il-KS irċieva notifika formali minn Istituzzjoni tal-UE, li esprimiet tħassib dwar allegata interferenza mhux ġustifikata mill-OLAF fid-dritt għall-protezzjoni tad-dejta personali tal-uffiċjali ta' dik l-istituzzjoni. Fit-tweġiba tiegħu, il-KS enfasizza li din l-allegazzjoni kienet tirrigwarda investigazzjoni li kienet għaddejja fejn il-KS ma għandux permess jintervjeni. Il-KS indika wkoll li l-awtorità kompetenti biex tittratta ilment bħal dan huwa l-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Dejta u li l-KS ikollu jistenna t-tweġiba tiegħu.

37. Il-KS irċieva żewġ talbiet għal aċċess għall-Opinjoni Nru 2/2012 tiegħu. Il-KS ikkunsidra li d-dokument mitlub kien kopert mill-eċċezzjonijiet stabbiliti fl-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1049/2001 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (11), b'mod partikolari fit-tieni u t-tielet inċiż tal-Artikolu 4(2) u fl-Artikolu 4(1)(b) u għaldaqstant ma setax jiġi divulgat pubblikament f'dak iż-żmien. Madankollu, il-KS esprima r-rieda tiegħu li jipprovdi dan id-dokument, jekk mitlub, fil-qafas ta' proċedimenti għaddejjin fil-qorti.

38. Fl-aħħar nett, awtorità ġudizzjarja nazzjonali talbet li titneħħa l-invjolabbiltà tal-arkivji tal-KS rigward l-Opinjoni Nru 2/2012 kif ukoll l-obbligu tar-riżerva (jiġifieri l-obbligu li wieħed ma jiddivulgax informazzjoni kunfidenzjali li jkun kiseb fit-twettiq tal-professjoni tiegħu) tal-membri tiegħu, għall-finijiet ta' proċediment nazzjonali. Il-KS ta tweġiba favorevoli għal din it-talba.

39. Ir-Regolamenti tal-Persunal tal-uffiċjali tal-UE kif ukoll il-Kondizzjonijiet tal-Impjieg applikabbli għall-aġenti l-oħra tal-UE jipprevedu li kull uffiċjal jew aġent ieħor li jsir jaf b'xi fatti li joħolqu supposizzjoni għall-eżistenza ta' attività possibbilment illegali, jew ta' kondotta relatata mat-twettiq tad-dmirijiet professjonali li jistgħu jikkostitwixxu nuqqas serju biex iħarsu l-obbligi tal-uffiċjali tal-Unjoni, għandhu mingħajr dewmien javża jew lis-superjur ta' fuqu eżatt jew id-Direttur Ġenerali tiegħu jew, jekk jaħseb li tkun utli, lis-Segretarju Ġenerali jew l-OLAF (12). Dawn ir-regoli huma applikabbli ugwalment għall-OLAF, li jfisser li l-membri tal-persunal tal-OLAF huma obbligati li jirrapportaw għand wieħed mis-superjuri ġerarkiċi tagħhom fl-OLAF jew, jekk jikkunsidraw li jkun xieraq, direttament lis-Segretarju Ġenerali tal-Kummissjoni kull informazzjoni u evidenza fattwali dwar attività possibbilment illegali jew kondotta professjonali ħażina fl-OLAF li jsiru jafu biha. Biex tiġi kkunsidrata l-qagħda partikolari tal-persunal fl-OLAF li jkun jixtieq jirrapporta għemil possibbilment ħażin fl-OLAF, sar qbil (13) mal-KS li kwistjonijiet bħal dawn jistgħu jiġu rrapportati lill-President tiegħu.

40. Il-KS qatt ma rċieva rapport bħal dan. Jista' jkun li l-proċedura ma ġietx ikkomunikata b'mod adegwat lill-persunal tal-OLAF, iżda aktar importanti minn hekk, il-KS ma ngħatax għodod biex isegwi ilmenti possibbli bħal dawn u biex jiżgura inkjesta u rimedju effikaċi.

2. MONITORAĠĠ TAL-ĠESTJONI TAL-FUNZJONI INVESTIGATTIVA TAL-OLAF

L-Artikolu 6(2) tad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni li tistabbilixxi l-OLAF, kif emendata mid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2013/478/UE (14) : Id-Direttur-Ġenerali, wara li jikkonsulta l-Kumitat ta' Superviżjoni, jibgħat lid-Direttur Ġenerali tal-Baġit abbozz preliminari tal-baġit li għandu jiddaħħal fl-anness li jikkonċerna lill-Uffiċċju tat-taqsima tal-Kummissjoni tal-baġit ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. (it-tielet paragrafu tal-Artikolu 15(1) tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013: Il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza għandu jindirizza opinjonijiet lid-Direttur Ġenerali, inkluż meta xieraq, rakkomandazzjonijiet dwar fost l-oħrajn ir-riżorsi meħtieġa biex titwettaq il-funzjoni investigattiva tal-Uffiċċju(…).

Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit għall-2014

41. Biex ikun żgurat li l-baġit tal-OLAF jagħti l-kunsiderazzjoni dovuta lill-indipendenza tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF u li l-OLAF ikollu biżżejjed riżorsi biex jiffunzjona b'mod effikaċi u effiċjenti bħala servizz interistituzzjonali biex jintensifika l-ġlieda kontra l-fordi, il-KS adotta l-Opinjoni Nru 1/2013 dwar l-Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit tal-OLAF għall-2014 (15).

42. Il-KS eżmina l-allokazzjoni tar-riżorsi għall-attivitajiet prijoritarji u l-istrateġija tar-riżorsi umani. Ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet tal-KS kienu jiffukaw fuq is-segwitu tal-investigazzjonijiet u fuq l-iżvilupp ta' indikaturi għall-effiċjenza u l-kwalità tal-funzjoni investigattiva skont il-politika tal-UE ta' kontra l-frodi u l-istrateġija tal-Kummissjoni ta' kontra l-frodi. Kien irrakkomandat ukoll li l-OLAF jiffoka fuq it-taħriġ, l-iżvilupp tal-karriera, l-ippjanar tas-suċċessjoni kif ukoll fuq bilanċ xieraq bejn is-servizzi ta' appoġġ u l-investigaturi.

43. Il-KS enfasizza l-importanza li l-KS jiġi kkkonsultat permezz ta' skambju reali u sostantiv ta' opinjonijiet bejn id-DĠ tal-OLAF u l-KS qabel ma l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit jintbagħat lid-Direttur Ġenerali għall-Baġit fi kwalunkwe forma.

44. Fl-aħħar nett, il-KS irrakkomanda l-introduzzjoni ta' entrata baġitarja separata, fil-baġit tal-OLAF, għall-KS kif ukoll għas-Segretarjat tiegħu, sabiex ikunu ċċarati l-kosti tal-funzjoni tal-KS u biex ikun enfasizzat b'mod trasparenti l-karattru interistituzzjonali tal-KS u tas-Segretarjat tiegħu. Barra minn hekk, il-KS enfasizza l-importanza li d-DĠ jalloka biżżejjed riżorsi lis-Segretarjat tal-KS u jiżgura l-funzjonament indipendenti tiegħu.

45. Il-KS appoġġa l-Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit għall-2014 bil-kundizzjoni li jiġu kkunsidrati r-rakkomandazzjonijiet li għamel fl-Opinjoni tiegħu.

Ir-riorganizzazzjoni tal-OLAF u Stħarriġ ta' Sodisfazzjoni tal-Persunal

46. L-istħarriġ li sar fl-2013 madwar il-Kummissjoni kollha, segwit minn stħarriġ intern fl-OLAF, wera livell baxx ta' sodisfazzjon tal-persunal rigward l-ambjent professjonali tagħhom. Il-KS huwa partikolarment ikkonċernat minn tliet elementi, minħabba l-impatt potenzjali li għandhom fuq l-effiċjenza tal-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF: — skont il-persunal tal-OLAF, ir-riorganizzazzjoni massiva tal-Uffiċċju ma naqqsitx il-piż amministrattiv fuq l-investigaturi jew tejbet it-trasparenza tal-proċeduri interni; — il-persunal ma jikkunsidrax li l-maniġment superjuri tal-OLAF jikkomunika biżżejjed magħhom jew jagħti l-attenzjoni meħtieġa għall-feedback tagħhom; — wara r-riorganizzazzjoni tal-OLAf fl-2012, il-maniġers superjuri kollha u aktar minn 75 % tal-maniġers medji inħatru mill-ġdid għall-unitajiet/direttorati attwali tagħhom, ħafna membri tal-persunal telqu u aktar minn kwart ta' dawk li baqgħu ikkunsidraw li jitilqu, li, globalment iqajjem tħassib rigward il-kontinwità tal-kompetenzi fl-Uffiċċju.

47. Bħala konsegwenza ta' dan, il-KS talab li d-DĠ tal-OLAF jinfurmah b'mod regolari dwar il-miżuri previsti jew implimentati biex jiġu indirizzati dawn il-kwistjonijiet.

3. KOOPERAZZJONI MAL-OLAF

Segwitu mill-OLAF tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet li għamel il-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza

48. Fl-2012, il-KS ħareġ għadd ta' rakkomandazzjonijiet lid-DĠ tal-OLAF, b'mod partikolari rigward id-drittijiet fundamentali u l-garanziji proċedurali (16). L-analiżi inizjali tal-KS tindika li l-implimentazzjoni tal-maġġoranza tar-rakkomandazzjonijiet mill-2012 ma kinitx sodisfaċenti. Mit-tweġibiet li ġew mingħand id-DĠ tal-OLAF jew ma kienx hemm ġustifikazzjoni biżżejjed għan-nonimplimentazzjoni jew ma kienx hemm informazzjoni sostantiva dwar kif ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet suppost li ġew implimentati. Il-KS għalhekk se janalizza din il-kwistjoni f'Opinjoni separata li għandha titwassal fl-2014.

Arranġamenti ta' ħidma mal-OLAF

49. Matul il-perjodu ta' rapportar, il-KS kellu diskussjonijiet estensivi u twal mad-DĠ tal-OLAF dwar l-aċċess tal-KS għal informazzjoni relatata mal-każijiet. Ir-riżultat ta' dawn id-diskussjonijiet huwa rifless fl-Arranġamenti ta' Ħidma (17) ffirmati mid-DĠ tal-OLAF u mill-President tal-KS fl-14 ta' Jannar 2014. L-arranġamenti stipulaw (i) l-ambitu tal-informazzjoni dwar l-attivitajiet investigattivi tal-OLAF li għandha tiġu pprovduta lill-KS, (ii) il-metodoloġija biex tiġi pprovduta l-informazzjoni u (iii) l-iskeda ta' żmien. Dawn għandhom l-għan li jistabbilixxu bilanċ bejn id-dover tal-OLAF li jipproteġi l-kunfidenzjalità tal-informazzjoni relatata mal-investigazzjonijiet tiegħu u l-ħtiġijiet tal-KS ta' monitoraġġ.

50. Rigward każijiet trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali, il-KS esprima x-xewqa li tingħatalu kopja tal-opinjonijiet maħruġa mill-ISRU lid-DĠ tal-OLAF dwar ir-Rapport finali u r-Rakkomandazzjonijiet, sabiex ikun jista' jagħmel monitoraġġ tal-iżviluppi li jikkonċernaw l-applikazzjoni tal-garanziji proċedurali. Minħabba li dan id-dokument jista' jinkludi dejta personali, il-KS qabel mal-OLAF li l-ewwel jitlob l-opinjoni tal-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Dejta rigward il-kwistjoni. Din l-opinjoni bħalissa tinsab pendenti.

51. L-ewwel trażmissjoni skont l-Arranġamenti ta' Ħidma tal-informazzjoni li d-DĠ tal-OLAF huwa obbligat jibgħat lill-KS fuq bażi regolari seħħet fil-31 ta' Jannar 2014, l-aħħar jum tal-perjodu ta' rapportar għal dan ir-rapport. Bħala konsegwenza ta' dan, valutazzjoni aktar dettaljata tal-implimentazzjoni tal-arranġamenti se tiġi ppreżentata fir-rapport li jmiss.

52. Filwaqt li jikkunsidra li l-Arranġamenti ta' ħidma jirrappreżentaw kisba importanti, il-KS issa jinsisti li l-implimentazzjoni tagħhom trid tittejjeb, b'mod partikolari rigward il-kontenut tal-informazzjoni li l-OLAF jipprovdi lill-KS. Jekk ma jsirx dan, il-KS ma jkunx jista' jeżegwixxi l-funzjonijiet tal-monitoraġġ tiegħu.

4. KOOPERAZZJONI MAL-PARTIJIET IKKONĊERNATI

Laqgħat mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE

53. Bejn Mejju u Lulju 2013 il-KS ġie mistieden jippreżenta l-konklużjonijiet mir-Rapport ta' Attività tiegħu għall-2012 lill-Parlament (il-Kumitat tal-Kontroll Baġitarju), lill-Kunsill (il-Grupp ta' Ħidma għall Ġlieda kontra l-Frodi) u lill-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri.

54. F'diversi laqgħat oħra mal-Kumitat tal-Kontroll Baġitarju u mal-Kummisarju Šemeta, il-KS irrapporta dwar ir-riżultati tal-investigazzjonijiet tal-OLAF u r-rispett tad-drittijiet fundamentali. Huwa ppreżenta wkoll il-konklużjonijiet tiegħu dwar l-effikaċja tas-superviżjoni tal-OLAF, ir-riforma tar-Regolament tal-OLAF u struttura ġdida ta' superviżjoni għall-OLAF kif propost fil-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissarju dwar It-titjib tal-governanza tal-OLAF u t-tisħiħ tas-salvagwardji proċedurali fl-investigazzjonijiet (18).

55. F'Novembru 2013 il-KS organizza skambju informali ta' opinjonijiet dwar l-isfidi li jaffaċċa l-OLAF u l-KS tiegħu wara d-dħul fis-seħħ tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013.

Skambju ta' fehmiet mal-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE

56. F'Awwissu 2013 il-KS beda t-tħejjijiet għal skambju formalizzat ta' opinjonijiet dwar il-politika relatata mal-attivitajiet tal-OLAF mal-Kummissjoni, il-Parlament, il-Kunsill u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri, kif previst mill-Artikolu 16 tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013. Il-KS ippropona li l-ewwel jiffoka fuq il-qafas ta' superviżjoni għall-OLAf kif riformat. B'dispjaċir, l-amministrazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni organizzat il-laqgħat preparatorji fejn inkludiet il-parteċipanti l-oħra kollha iżda ħalliet barra lill-KS. Għaldaqstant wieħed għad irid jara jekk l-ewwel skambju ta' opinjonijiet huwiex se jissodisfa l-objettivi stipulati mir-Regolament.

Is-smigħ pubbliku tal-Parlament Ewropew rigward il-garanziji proċedurali

57. F'Ottubru 2013, il-KS adotta, abbażi tal-esperjenza tiegħu ta' monitoraġġ, dokument ta' pożizzjon dwar It-tisħiħ tas-salvagwardji proċedurali fl-OLAF (19). Il-pożizzjoni tal-KS dwar emendi leġiżlattivi possibbli għar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013, kif propost mill-Kummissjoni fil-Komunikazzjoni, ġiet ippreżentata waqt smigħ pubbliku organizzat mill-Parlament (20).

58. Il-KS laqa' l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni, iżda rrimarka li għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati xi soluzzjonijiet strutturali b'attenzjoni partikolari fuq l-indipendenza tal-OLAF u tal-KS. B'mod partikolari, kull kunflitt potenzjali ta' kompetenzi u duplikazzjoni ta' xogħol bejn l-istrutturi ta' superviżjoni preżenti u previsti għadhom jiġu evitati. Il-KS ippropona soluzzjonijiet alternattivi li jżommu l-istrumenti utli proposti mill-Kummissjoni, iżda li, fl-istess ħin, jinkorporawhom f'mekkaniżmu komprensiv ta' superviżjoni.

Is-soċjetà ċivili

59. L-Uffiċċju tal-UE ta' Transparency International (TI-UE) iddeċieda li jagħmel valutazzjoni tas-sistema ta' integrità tal-UE (21). F'Jannar 2014, il-President tal-KS u membri tas-Segretarjat tal-KS iltaqgħu ma' rappreżentanti ta' TI-UE u ddiskutew kwistjonijiet bħar-relazzjoni bejn l-OLAF u l-KS, ir-responsabbiltà u l-indipendenza tal-OLAF u r-regoli ta' integrità li jiggvernaw lill-KS innifsu.

5. IL-GOVERNANZA TAL-KUMITAT TA' SORVELVANZA

Ir-rwol tal-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza skont ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013

60. Ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 introduċa għadd ta' tibdiliet fl-irwol tal-KS u fl-għodod tiegħu ta' monitoraġġ. Il-parti l-kbira tal-laqgħat tal-KS għalhekk kienu ddedikati għal diskussjonijiet dwar l-impatt tagħhom fuq l-attivitajiet tal-KS.

61. Il-KS mexxa analiżi bir-reqqa tat-tibdiliet li jikkonċernaw il-missjoni u r-rwol tiegħu, il-kompiti ewlenin, l-għdod ta' monitoraġġ u rapportar. Id-dokument tal-KS dwar il-Missjoni, kompetenzi u objettivi tal-KS (22)fid-dawl tar-Regolament il-ġdid tal-OLAG jispjega dawn it-tibdiliet, il-formula ta' monitoraġġ tal-KS u r-rwol tas-Segretarjat tiegħu, li l-funzjonament indipendenti tiegħu huwa garanzija tal-indipendenza tal-KS innifsu.

Prijoritajiet u objettivi

62. Il-KS iddefinixxa l-objettivi u l-prijoritajiet strateġiċi tiegħu għall-perjodu li jmiss tal-mandat tiegħu bil-għan li jżid l-effikaċja u l-impatt tal-attivitajiet ewlenin tiegħu u bħala riżultat l-appoġġ għall-funzjoni investigattiva tal-OLAF u t-tisħiħ tal-indipendenza tal-OLAF. Il-KS iddefinixxa l-objettivi strateġiċi li ġejjin: (i) l-iżvilupp ta' għodod ta' monitoraġġ effikaċi u prammatiċi; (ii) titjib fil-kooperazzjoni mal-OLAf u d-Direttur Ġenerali tiegħu; (iii) jaġixxi bħala parti kkonċernata fl-implimentazzjoni tal-politika tal-ġlieda kontra l-frodi; (iv) tiżdied il-viżibilità tal-KS fost l-istituzzjonijiet tal-UE u l-Istati Membri; (v) jiġu żviluppati l-metodi ta' ħidma tal-KS; (vi) jitħares il-funzjonament indipendenti tal-KS u tas-Segretarjat tiegħu; (vii) jagħti kontribut għall-proposta leġiżlattiva biex tissaħħaħ is-superviżjoni tal-OLAF. Biex jitwettqu dawn l-objettivi, il-KS identifika għadd ta' prijoritajiet, li huma ppreżentati wkoll fid-dokument dwar il-Missjonijiet, kompetenzi u objettivi tal-KS, li tirrappreżenta fl-istess ħin l-istrateġija ta' nofs it-terminu tal-KS.

Kodiċi ta' kondotta

63. Fid-9 ta' Ottubru 2013, il-KS adotta Kodiċi ta' kondotta flimkien ma' Memorandum ta' Spjegazzjoni dwar is-Salvagwardji tal-imparzjalità u r-riskji tal-kunflitt ta' interess fl-eżerċizzju tal-funzjonijiet tal-monitoraġġ (23). Il-KS enfasizza li l-Membri tiegħu ġeneralment ikollhom funzjonijiet importanti fis-sistema ġudizzjarja jew fl-amministrazzjoni nazzjonali tagħhom, li tippermettilhom jaġixxu bħala kontroparti/imsieħeb tal-OLAF fil-livell nazzjonali fi kwalunkwe stadju ta' każ tal-OLAF. Fl-istess ħin, huma regolament jimmonitorjaw il-każijiet tal-OLAF, b'mod partikolari, dawk li jeħtieġu t-trażmissjoni ta' informazzjoni lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali. Għaldaqstant jistgħu jinqalgħu sitwazzjonijiet fejn jiġu affaċċati bl-istess każ tal-OLAF kemm fil-qafas tad-doveri nazzjonali tagħhom kif ukoll bħala Membri tal-KS. Huwa għalhekk essenzjali li jkun żgurat li t-trattament ta' każ f'din il-kapaċità doppja ma jwassalx għal kunflitti ta' interess attwali jew potenzjali li jipperikolaw il-fiduċja pubblika fl-imparzjalità u oġġettività tal-ħidma tagħhom. Il-KS ta ħarsa ġenerali lejn dawn il-kompiti speċifiċi tal-Membri tal-KS li jistgħu possibbilment iwasslu għal sitwazzjonijiet ta' kunflitt ta' interess, segwita minn inventarju ta' sitwazzjonijiet konkreti fejn jista' jkun hemm kunflitt ta' interess. Il-kodiċi ta' kondotta jipprevedi proċedura ċara dwar kif jiġu ġestiti sitwazzjonijiet ta' kunflitt ta' interess.

64. Sabiex jiġu stabbiliti din il-politika u kodiċi ta' kondotta f'termini legali ċari, il-KS ikkunsidra xieraq li jemenda r-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu. Ix-xogħol dwar dan jinsab għaddej.

Metodi ta' ħidma

65. F'Marzu 2013, il-KS laqa' Membru ġdid, is-Sur Tuomas PÖYSTI. Matul il-laqgħa ta' Ottubru 2013, il-KS ħatar lis-Sur Johan DENOLF bħala President għal sena oħra.

66. Minn Frar 2013 sa Jannar 2014 inklużi, il-KS għamel 11-il laqgħa plenarja fi Brussell u fil-Lussemburgu. Il-President, ir-relaturi u l-membri tas-Segretarjat iltaqgħu wkoll b'mod regolari biex jaħdmu fuq kwistjonijiet partikolari kif ukoll fuq il-preparazzjoni tal-laqgħat plenarji u s-segwitu tagħhom.

67. Għal kull kwistjoni importanti eżaminata, il-KS ħatar relatur. Dan kien il-każ b'mod partikolari għall-baġit tal-OLAF, l-analiżi tal-proċeduri tal-OLAF għat-trattament tal-ilmenti, l-istruzzjonijiet tal-DĠ lill-Persunal dwar il-Proċeduri Investigattivi, il-Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni tal-OLAF u l-analiżi tal-proċess ta' selezzjoni fl-OLAF. Ir-relaturi ħadmu mas-Segretarjat tal-KS biex jipprepara l-abbozz tal-opinjonijiet jew id-dokumenti biex jiġu diskussi fil-laqgħat plenarji.

68. Matul il-laqgħa plenarja ta' Frar 2013, is-Segretarjat tal-KS ippreżenta lill-maniġment superjuri tal-OLAF il-metodi ta' ħidma tal-KS b'mod partikolari rigward każijiet li l-OLAF jeħtieġ jittrażmetti lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali. Ġie spjegat ukoll liema informazzjoni kienet meħtieġa mill-KS sabiex twettaq il-kompiti tagħha kif suppost. Din il-preżentazzjoni serviet bħala bażi għall-KS sabiex tiżviluppa sett ta' linji gwida ta' monitoraġġ. Wara d-dħul fis-seħħ tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013, il-KS jinsab fil-proċess li jistabbilixxi linji gwida ta' monitoraġġ ġodda.

6. IS-SEGRETARJAT TAL-KUMITAT TA' SORVELVANZA

69. Is-Segretarjat tal-KS jikkonsisti f'avukati, investigaturi u assistenti li jiżguraw il-monitoraġġ ta' kuljum tal-attivitajiet investigattivi tal-OLAF u jassistu lill-Membri tal-KS fit-twettiq tal-kompiti tagħhom. Is-Segretarjat jirċievi l-informazzjoni kollha li tiġi pprovduta lill-KS u jagħmel l-istudju inizjali. Is-Segretarjat huwa responsabbli wkoll mit-tħejjija tal-pariri legali għall-Membri tal-KS.

70. Il-KS jixtieq jenfasizza li s-Segretarjat tiegħu jrid ikun jista' jgħin lill-KS fl-implimentazzjoni tal-funzjonijiet ta' monitoraġġ tiegħu b'mod leali u effiċjenti mingħajr ma jiġi espost għar-riskju ta' kunflitti potenzjali ta' interess bħala persunal tal-OLAF li huwa subordinat għad-DĠ tal-OLAF. Matul dawn l-aħħar ftit snin, il-KS konsistentement enfasizza l-importanza tal-funzjonament indipendenti u effikaċi tiegħu li jeħtieġ Segretarjat indipendenti u b'persunal adegwat li, filwaqt li jkun parti mill-istruttura tal-OLAF, jiffunzjona b'mod indipendenti u taħt struzzjonijiet esklussivi tal-KS. Il-KS huwa sodisfatt li l-funzjonament indipendenti tas-Segretarjat tiegħu issa huwa ggarantit permezz tar-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 (24).

71. Il-KS identifika erba' kundizzjonijiet bażiċi li jiżguraw il-funzjonament indipendenti tas-Segretarjat: (i) reklutaġġ, evalwazzjoni u promozzjoni tal-Kap tas-Segretarjat abbażi tad-deċiżjonijiet tal-KS; (ii) riklassifikazzjoni tal-Kap tas-Segretarjat bħala maniġer superjuri; (iii) reklutaġġ, evalwazzjoni u promozzjoni tal-persunal tas-Segretarjat mill-Kap tiegħu; (iv) sottodelega tal-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit tas-Segretarjat lill-Kap tiegħu; Il-KS beda diskussjonijiet mad-DĠ tal-OLAF dwar l-implimentazzjoni ta' dan ir-rekwiżit regolatorju ġdid, li bħalissa jinsab għaddej.

72. Il-KS huwa wkoll sodisfatt li d-DĠ tal-OLAF stabbilixxa mill-ġdid l-għadd ta' karigi allokati lis-Segretarjat għal tmienja, kif kien il-każ qabel ir-riorganizzazzjoni tal-OLAf fl-2012.

Kif tikkuntattja lill-Kumitat ta' Sorveljanza

Is-Segretarjat tal-KS:

Bil-posta J30 13/62, Rue Joseph II, 30, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË Bit-telefown +32 22984022 Bil-posta elettronika OLAF-FMB-supervisory-committee@ec.europa.eu Bil-faks +32 22959776 Websajt http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/supervisory-committee/index_en.htm

(1) Ir-Regolament (UE, Euratom) Nru 883/2013 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta' Settembru 2013 dwar investigazzjonijiet immexxija mill-Uffiċċju Ewropew Kontra l-Frodi (OLAF) u li jħassar ir-Regolament tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1073/1999 u r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (Euratom) Nru 1074/1999 (ĠU L 248, 18.9.2013, p.1).

(2) L-Artikolu 15.

(3) Ara l-Anness 5.

(4) Ara l-Anness 3.

(5) Ara l-Anness 4. Minkejja li din l-Opinjoni ġiet adottata f'Marzu 2014, il-KS iddeċieda li jagħmilha anness ma' dan ir-Rapport ta' Attività, minħabba li kważi x-xogħol kollu fuq l-opinjoni twettaq matul dan il-perjodu ta' rapportar.

(6) Fl-2013, il-KS irċieva 186 rapport ta' disa' xhur.

(7) Sar rapport dwar 21 każ fir-Rapport Annwali ta' Attività tal-KS għall-2012 li kienu jeħtieġu li informazzjoni tiġi trażmessa lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali li l-OLAF għadda lill-KS f'Jannar 2013. L-għadd totali ta' każijiet li ġew riċevuti fl-2013 kien ta' 77.

(8) L-OLAF bagħat lill-KS l-Opinjonijiet dwar ir-rapport finali/interim u r-rakkomandazzjonijiet fi 72 minn 77 każ li ġew trażmessi lill-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji nazzjonali fl-2013.

(9) Fil-każ ta' dan tal-aħħar, l-intervista tal-persuna kkonċernata tmexxiet skont ir-regoli tal-Manwal preċedenti tal-OLAF.

(10) Ara l-Anness 2.

(11) ĠU L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.

(12) L-Artikolu 22a tar-Regolamenti tal-Persunal u l-Artikolu 11 tal-Kondizzjonijiet tal-Impjieg applikabbli għall-aġenti l-oħra tal-UE.

(13) Wara konsultazzjoni mas-Servizz Legali tal-Kummissjoni — ara n-nota tad-DĠ tal-OLAF tal-10 ta' Novembru 2008 lill-membri tal-persunal tal-OLAF.

(14) ĠU L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19.

(15) Ara l-Anness 1.

(16) Ara s-sommarju fl-Anness 7.

(17) Ara l-Anness 10.

(18) COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013.

(19) Ara l-Anness 6.

(20) Is-smigħ pubbliku tat-3 ta' Ottubru 2013“L-OLAF u d-drittijiet tal-persuni kkonċernati”.

(21) Ara http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/european-union-integrity-system-study/.

(22) Ara l-Anness 8.

(23) Ara l-Anness 9.

(24) Il-premessa 40.

ANNESSI 1. Opinjoni Nru 1/2013: Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit tal-OLAF għall-2014 2. Opinjoni Nru 2/2013: It-twaqqif ta' proċedura interna tal-OLAF għall-ilmenti; 3. Opinjoni Nru 1/2014: Prijoritajiet tal-Politika ta' Investigazzjoni tal-OLAF 4. Opinjoni Nru 2/2014: Selezzjoni tad-dossiers fl-OLAF 5. Osservazzjonijiet tal-KS dwar il-proċeduri investigattivi fl-OLAF 6. Dokument dwar “It-tisħiħ tas-salvagwardji proċedurali fl-OLAF” 7. Ir-Rakkomandazzjonijiet tal-KS għall-2012 8. Missjonijiet, kompetenzi u objettivi tal-KS: Strateġija ta' nofs it-terminu 9. Kodiċi ta' kondotta tal-Membri tal-KS u Memorandum ta' spjegazzjoni dwar is-salvagwardji tal-imparzjalità u r-riskji tal-kunflitt ta' interess fit-twettiq tal-funzjonijiet tal-monitoraġġ 10. Arranġamenti ta' ħidma mal-OLAF

ANNESS 1 OPINION No 1/2013 OLAF's preliminary draft budget for 2014 Brussels, 16 July 2013 INTRODUCTION At the meetings of 27 February and 16 July, 2013, OLAF's Supervisory Committee examined OLAF's preliminary budget for 2014 and adopted the following opinion. In accordance with the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1) and Article 3 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom (2), the European Anti-Fraud Office (hereinafter OLAF) shall have full independence to exercise its investigative function in all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by or on the basis of the Treaty on the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Euratom Treaty. To do this and to ensure that OLAF is able to function in an efficient and effective manner and contribute in the best possible way to the Union's objectives of the fight against fraud defined in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a specific budget line within the Commission budget (European Commission section of the general budget of the European Union) is created for OLAF. (3) In accordance with Article 11 of the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the mission of the OLAF Supervisory Committee (SC) is to reinforce the independence of OLAF in the exercise of OLAF's investigative function. In the reform of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2013, the role of the SC has been strengthened as guardian of the independence of OLAF in its investigative function and in the supervision of the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this context, and with a view to the powers conferred by the Commission on the SC (4), the SC has considered OLAF's preliminary draft budget (PDB) and the Commission draft budget for 2014 concerning OLAF and delivers the following Opinion. The objective of the procedure in which the SC adopts an Opinion on OLAF's preliminary draft budget and draft budget is to give assurance that the draft budget duly takes into account the independence of the investigative function of OLAF and that OLAF is resourced to function effectively and efficiently as an inter-institutional service in stepping up the fight against fraud as foreseen by the Union legislator in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. The SC Opinion on the preliminary draft budget also creates a documented forum of the SC advice to the Director-General of OLAF and to the Budgetary Authority of the Union and other Institutions of the Union on the prerequisites for efficient allocation and use of resources to and within OLAF. In this way the SC Opinion contributes to the attainment of value for money, legal certainty and efficient anti-fraud policy in the European Union. The Opinion of the SC is not therefore limited only to commenting on the budget line on the SC of the OLAF. I. RESOURCES In the draft budget presented by the Commission on 26 June 2013, the OLAF budget will be increased by approximately 1,5 % with a total expenditure of EUR 58 523 000. The increase comes principally from the transfer of an additional 6 posts from headquarters budget line ‘Expenditure related to officials and temporary staff working with the institution to OLAF’. If the impact of the EU enlargement to include Croatia is taken into account, the increase in the OLAF expenditure is 0,7 %. In the draft budget presented by the Commission the general increase in the Commission's administrative expenditure is 0,1 % and 0,8 % when taking into account the expenditure resulting from the enlargement to Croatia. The OLAF Budget has not been subject to the same strict savings measures as those within the Commission services in general. The SC notes this with satisfaction and considers that this line on resources provides the conditions necessary to continue the fight against fraud as one of the important priorities of the European Union. The budget line concerning buildings and IT has been kept on zero growth in accordance with the general orientation of the Commission. The SC observes that a well-organised and up-to-date ICT support and infrastructure are necessary conditions for a cost-effective fraud investigation function. The SC has no objection to the general orientation in the Commission draft budget but SC would stress the need to keep both OLAF's Case Management, ICT analytics and other information systems up to date in order to enable OLAF to function efficiently. Allocation of resources to priority activities The SC has regularly recommended to OLAF in its previous opinions on the budget to allocate more staff to OLAF's core business — investigations — by shifting them from the support units. In addition, the SC has proposed clarification of the distinction between investigative and operational activities of OLAF. The SC notes the reorganisation of OLAF put in place on 1 February 2012 in which resources at the organisational level were increasingly concentrated on investigations. As a result of this, in the OLAF Report of 2012, the distribution of staff in the units dealing with the fight against fraud, OLAF policy strategy and coordination and administrative support is reported separately. This goes in the direction of clarification of the distinction between investigative and other operational activities of OLAF in line with the SC's earlier recommendations. However, the SC considers that clarification between investigation and investigation support functions, anti-fraud policy functions and other operational activities of OLAF should go still further. Opening and follow up of the investigations The SC would mention that consistent application over the years of the investigative policy priorities in line with Union's anti-fraud policy and the Commission's anti-fraud strategy is a core issue in the resources management of OLAF and in the performance of its investigative function. The SC notes that in the OLAF Management Plan the alignment with the investigative policy priorities is defined as one of the performance indicators for OLAF. (5) The SC underlines the importance of transparent and reliable follow-up of the investigative policy priorities. The SC would refer to its earlier observations and statistics as presented by the European Court of Auditors in the Special Report No 2/2011 (6) on the low number of OLAF investigations leading to convictions by Member States judicial authorities. (7) The SC considers that the rate of OLAF reports leading to convictions is one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative function requiring close and open attention. The SC recognises that the reasons why OLAF reports do not lead to conviction may, in some instances lie outside OLAF's control, however, the impact of such external factors should be carefully analysed and transparently reported. The SC therefore encourages OLAF to continue to develop indicators and report on them in a transparent and reliable manner in order to show an example of value for money and to demonstrate the positive impact that contribution of additional resources to OLAF has in the fight against fraud in the European Union, appropriate follow-up thus ensuring that the ultimate results of investigations are achieved. Without this OLAF risks carrying out good, hard work which may ultimately not produce the required results. HR strategy The reorganisation of the Office resulted in significant shifts of staff and modifications in their job description or even a completely new allocation of tasks. In such circumstances the SC reiterates its earlier position that it is essential to have an appropriate human resources strategy built on the identified and real needs of the organisation and its priorities, with the aim of giving direction and maximising the use of existing resources. The SC draws particular attention to OLAF's ability to recruit and maintain high quality professionals in its investigative functions as a focal point of cost-effective anti-fraud service at the Union level. A crucial element of the human resources strategy should continue to be the continuous training related to internal mobility and overall restructuring. It should address the optimum balance between administrators and staff members with administrative professional background performing core investigative tasks and assistants providing support services. Recommendations: — Effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured and results of the investigations reported with timely and reliable indicators — OLAF shall continue to develop indicators describing the efficiency and quality of its investigative function and on the alignment with the anti-fraud policy of the European Union and anti-fraud strategy of the European Commission — A human resources strategy based on a needs assessment of OLAF's current activities should be developed and focus given to training, career development, succession planning and appropriate balance between assistants providing support services and administrators performing core investigative tasks. II. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE The Commission Decision establishing OLAF is clear that the SC must be consulted on the PDB of OLAF before it is sent to the Director-General for Budgets (8). Up to now the Director-General of OLAF has transmitted the PDB to the Committee after ‘technical’ meetings/arrangements with DG Budget. In 2013 the SC was presented with the preliminary draft budget in February and informed in June with regard to the Commission Decision on the draft budget for 2014. The SC believes that to provide an effective opinion on the PDB is one of its core tasks and would remind the Director-General of OLAF to undertake a substantive consultation with the SC prior to budget negotiations with DG Budget. Furthermore, the SC would encourage the Director-General to consult the SC on the OLAF Annual Management plan in order to have independent support and feed-back based on the follow-up of the investigative function by the SC. Conclusion: — The Director-General of OLAF shall ensure that the SC be effectively consulted regarding the next PDB by means of a real and substantive exchange of opinions between the Director-General and the Committee before the PDB is sent to the Director-General for Budget in any form. III. THE SC AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SC The SC expenditure The SC notes that the budget line of the expenditure related to the SC is not changed in 2014 draft budget. The SC draws attention to the fact that with the extended responsibilities attributed to the SC by the Union legislator, the performance of the duties of the SC requires the devotion of a considerable amount of time by its Members who, by definition, do so on a part time bases. The Resources of the Secretariat of the SC In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the SC has a crucial role to play in the monitoring of OLAF's investigative function. Moreover, the SC has a specific inter-institutional character. In the discharge of its duties assigned by the legislator, the SC is dependent on its Secretariat. The SC would like to point out that the role of the Secretariat is primarily not to assist in the organisation and documentation of the meeting of the SC. In practice, the SC Secretariat performs an overall, regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF. This results from the fact that it is the SC Secretariat which has access, in accordance with the established access arrangements, to the OLAF Case Management System. The data protection rules de facto require that access to case information by the SC is implemented via the SC secretariat. An adequately staffed Secretariat with high quality personnel is thus a vital condition for the SC in the discharge of its duties as stipulated by the legislator. The SC considers that the 2014 draft budget creates conditions for appropriate resourcing of the SC Secretariat. The SC would point out the general principle of sincere cooperation between Institutions and bodies of the European Union, which is a general principle of the Union law, specifically that Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 sets out further requirements on the sincere cooperation between the Director-General of OLAF and the SC. The Director-General of OLAF shall, in the spirit of sincere cooperation, consult the SC on all issues which relate to the staffing, promotion of personnel and resources of the SC Secretariat. To be fully informative and representative of the total cost of supervision, the budget entry for the SC should incorporate the total cost of operations stemming from the duties stipulated in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999, that is, all the SC Members' expenditure as well as that of its Secretariat which includes their salaries, training, travel etc. OLAF has the privilege of transferring its funds freely from one line item to another. By joining up the total cost of the SC's function in a separate budget entry it is ensured that funds targeted for use by the SC are actually used for the supervisory function. However, funds remaining unused could be redeployed to other headings within the OLAF budget. Such redeployment should only be possible with prior notification to the SC and its approval. The Head of the SC Secretariat should be sub-delegated as the authorising officer to manage the total fund allocation for the SC's operations under the control of the Committee. Having one budget line which incorporates all expenditure will facilitate the management and efficiencies of the supervisory framework whilst, at the same time, any unused funds are passed on to other OLAF budget lines by the Director-General upon the approval of the SC. A separate budget line has the benefit of transparency and reflects also the independence of the SC in line with the Regulation. At the same time, this separate budget line will inform the three institutions appointing the SC regarding the resources specifically allocated to the supervisory function. Secretariat Staff The SC maintains its position, as expressed in its previous opinions on the OLAF budget, on the minimum requirement of eight Secretariat staff, which is equivalent to the current needs of the SC. This represents about 2 % of OLAF staff (9) which the SC deems the minimum number required for it to carry out its monitoring function efficiently. (10) The SC would point out that the legal duties of the SC require a small, but high quality staff in Secretariat. The SC has noted with satisfaction the intention of the OLAF Director-General to allocate additional posts to the Secretariat. The SC expects a fluid and rapid implementation of the announced intention. Furthermore, the SC is of the opinion that, with regard to the appointment of the Head of the Secretariat and other staff for its Secretariat, including internal transfers, there should be close consultation with the Committee, as indicated in its Rules of Procedure (11) reflecting the principle of cooperation stipulated in the Regulation. The SC acknowledges that the Commission staff rules and the appraisal and promotion system do not currently permit the SC Members to evaluate the performance of the staff of the Secretariat directly. The SC also notes that nothing in the Commission staff rules and appraisal and promotion system excludes the consultation of the SC and that some Institutions have developed consultation systems for situations in which a member of staff is effectively working for another directorate or body than the one which is legally responsible for the appraisal and promotion. Therefore the SC considers that even though the appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion are ultimately decided by the Director-General of OLAF, he should make these decisions on the basis of the opinions of the Committee under whose direct authority the Secretariat works, as it is foreseen in the SC's Rules of Procedure (12). This will ensure the continuous independence of the Secretariat in their day to day functions. Recommendations: — Separate budget line for both the SC and Secretariat should be considered to clearly indicate the costs of the SC function and to highlight in a transparent manner the inter-institutional character of the SC and its Secretariat. — The Director-General of OLAF shall, in sincere and close cooperation with the SC, ensure that appropriate resources and staff members are allocated to the SC Secretariat in line with the intention expressed by the Director-General. — Regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF and SC access to information depend on a small but high quality Secretariat. The Secretariat should have eight members of staff. — Appointments, appraisal and promotion of the SC Secretariat staff should only be made following the approval of the SC, thus ensuring full independence of the SC Secretariat in the performance of its duties. — Appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion should be decided by the Director-General on the basis of the SC's opinion. IV. CONCLUSION The SC supports OLAF's draft budget for 2014 with the provision that the above recommendations be taken into consideration. In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999, the Opinion should be transmitted to the Budgetary Authority by OLAF. Furthermore, the SC invites the Director-General of OLAF to update the SC regularly on measures taken by OLAF towards implementation of the recommendations in this Opinion. Adopted in Brussels, on 16 July 2013 For the Supervisory Committee, Johan DENOLF Chairman (1) Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1). (2) Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20). (3) See Art. 13 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 (Art. 18 of the Regulation amended as of 1 October 2013). (4) Article 6 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom. (5) See OLAF Annual Activity Report 2012 final, Ares (2013) 509786 — 26.3.2013: chapter 1.3, Specific objectives for ‘fight against fraud’: investigative and coordination activities, p. 5. (6) Special Report No 2/2011, ‘Follow-up of Special Report No 1/2005 concerning the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office’. (7) See the SC Opinion 1/2012 of the 2013 OLAF draft budget, reproduced as Annex 2 of the SC Annual Report of 2012. (8) Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom cited above provides: ‘After consulting the Surveillance Committee, the Director shall send the Director-General for Budgets a preliminary draft budget to be entered in the special heading for the Office in the annual general budget’. (9) According to the OLAF report for 2011, there are 437 staff in the Office. (10) For the detailed analysis of the SC workload and consequently of the necessary SC Secretariat resources, see the note of the Head of the SC Secretariat of 21 March 2013. In view of the incoming amendments to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 entrusting additional tasks to the SC, the resources of the SC Secretariat may require reinforcement in the year 2014. (11) Article 11(3) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘In any case, the Head of the Secretariat shall inform the SC about the candidates for membership of the Secretariat. Once the applications are known, the Committee shall discuss in the plenary session whether they meet the Committee's working needs with a view to submitting a proposal for their appointment to OLAF's Director-General’ (OJ L 308, 24.11.2011, p. 114). (12) Article 11(5) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘The Supervisory Committee shall periodically evaluate the work of the Head of the Secretariat and of the Secretariat members’.

ANNESS 2 OPINION No 2/2013 on establishing an internal OLAF procedure for complaints The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the options for redress open to persons involved in OLAF's investigations regarding potential violations of their rights and procedural guarantees. The Committee found that such persons do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations either through an external (an EU or national court, the European Ombudsman or the European Data Protection Supervisor) or internal mechanism (OLAF itself). The Committee believes that the new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF has not resolved the problem, since it does not introduce a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints. The Committee expressed the opinion that the current legislative gap could be closed by putting in place a transparent and efficient complaints procedure within OLAF, to deal with complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in the course of an OLAF investigation. The Committee therefore recommended that the Director-General of OLAF institute such an internal procedure and put forward concrete suggestions with regard to its implementation. INTRODUCTION 1. OLAF has been given far-reaching powers of investigation in order to efficiently carry out its mission to protect the financial interests of the EU. The exercise of these powers is very likely to touch upon the fundamental rights of persons concerned by investigations (1), and therefore their respect by OLAF is essential. It contributes — as the SC has already emphasised (2) — not only to ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF's investigative activities, but also to consolidating its reputation, credibility and ultimately its independence. 2. OLAF is obliged to ensure the protection of fundamental rights by safeguarding the procedural guarantees as listed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (3). In addition, the EU legislator decided to enhance OLAF's accountability for its investigative activities by reforming its legal framework (4) which resulted in the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (5) (hereinafter, the Regulation). 3. The SC welcomes the changes brought by the Regulation but would like, nevertheless, to point out that the mechanisms put in place to enforce the procedural guarantees need further improvement. The Regulation provides for a legality check (6) and a monitoring mechanism (7), but does not establish a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints which would be, in the SC's view, indispensable for ensuring effective protection of fundamental rights. 4. In the SC's opinion, persons involved in OLAF investigations do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations of their rights and the recent reform of the legal framework has not solved that problem. Therefore, the SC takes the view that the Director-General of OLAF ((hereinafter, the DG) should swiftly establish a transparent and stable internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. I. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EXISTING REDRESS MECHANISMS 5. Persons considering that, in the course of an investigation, OLAF breached their fundamental rights and wishing to complain, have at their disposal various means of judicial and non-judicial review which, however, may be insufficient, for the reasons stated below. 6. Firstly, they may seek the direct judicial review by an EU Court (action for annulment, action for damages and request for interim relief) or indirectjudicial review by EU and national courts (preliminary ruling procedure). (8) However, it should be noted that these actions are governed by rather strict rules on admissibility (9) and must fulfil a number of conditions to trigger a right to reparation (10). Even when an action is successful, ‘Judicial protection is obtained long after the contested investigative act and the act as such is not affected by the EU court's ruling; only compensation for the prejudice created by that act is obtained’ (11). 7. Secondly, persons wishing to complain may address themselves to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who is specifically entrusted (12) with the competence of hearing and investigating complaints lodged by persons whose personal data are processed by OLAF. However, the material scope of his review is limited to the protection of personal data and privacy. 8. Thirdly, the European Ombudsman (EO) is competent to investigate complaints regarding maladministration (13) against OLAF, namely failure to act in accordance with the law, to respect the principles of good administration, or breaches of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, it is the EO's view — which the SC fully shares — that an institution ‘in frequent contact with people who may have reason to complain should provide for a first line complaints mechanism allowing for their problems to be addressed and solved rapidly, before, in the event that resolution is not successful, having to turn to other redress mechanisms, such as Ombudsmen and courts’ (14). The SC considers that this statement also applies to OLAF. 9. Fourthly, the SC itself — as the OLAF's supervisory body — is quite often the addressee of individual complaints which it takes into consideration as a valuable source of information concerning OLAF's investigations and thus triggering the SC's monitoring activity. The SC's role, as emphasised by a ruling of the EU General Court (15) and confirmed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to monitor developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (16) which cannot be carried out without examination of individual cases. However, the SC was not established as a complaints body and its supervision takes place only ex post, since the SC cannot intervene in ongoing investigations. Furthermore, the SC regrets the lack of appropriate monitoring tools at its disposal and the absence of a specific reporting obligation for the DG to inform the SC of complaints addressed to him and, in particular, on the way they were dealt with. 10. In addition to the external mechanisms, the SC notes that an internal mechanism for dealing with individual complaints is not completely absent from the legal framework governing OLAF's investigations. Any official or other servant of the EU who is the subject of an internal investigation has the right to submit to the DG a complaint against an act adversely affecting him in connection with investigations by OLAF (17). However, according to the existing EU case-law, OLAF's investigative acts do not constitute acts adversely affecting the persons concerned within the meaning of Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and therefore are not challengeable acts (18). 11. Moreover, the SC would point out that OLAF staff who are aware of possible illegal activities or serious violations of professional duties that might trigger potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within an investigation have the additional possibility to report wrongdoing within OLAF to the President of the SC, on the basis of Article 22a of the Staff Regulations and of the agreement between the DG and the SC (19). II. LACK OF A COMPLAINT PROCEDURE IN REGULATION (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 12. The SC notes that the intention of the EU legislator was to strengthen the protection of procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations (a) by inserting in the Regulation detailed provisions concerning the procedural guarantees and (b) by enforcing them by means of an enhanced review. As a result, Article 9 of the Regulation contains now explicit procedural guarantees and thus defines and clarifies the contents of those foreseen in the Charter. On the other hand, although the EU institutions involved in the legislative process all agreed on the need for a review of potential violation of fundamental rights and put forward various proposals aimed at establishing both an ex ante legality check (relating, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation, during all stages of the investigation) and an ex post review procedure for handling individual complaints (20), it seems that no consensus was finally reached, since the Regulation does not explicitly put in place any such procedure. 13. The SC would point out that in the past, via its internal rules, OLAF put in place a review procedure open to all persons concerned in internal and external investigations in which procedural guarantees were allegedly not respected in a manner possibly having an impact on the conclusions of the investigation (21). This procedure evolved under the influence of interinstitutional discussions on reforming the OLAF legal framework. Since the Commission's proposal of 17 March 2011 contained provisions on a review procedure (22), the Instructions to Staff on Investigation Procedures (ISIP) (23) adopted by the OLAF DG as of 1 February 2012 anticipated the forthcoming legislative changes with the setting up of a procedure for dealing with complaints concerning an alleged failure to respect procedural guarantees (24). However, that Commission's proposal, which was subject to negotiations during the legislative process, was ultimately not maintained. Therefore, when the ISIP were replaced by the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures (GIP), which entered into force on the same day as the new OLAF Regulation (1 October 2013), this internal procedure disappeared. 14. As a result, neither the Regulation nor OLAF's internal rules foresee any formal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Therefore, the objective of improving the mechanisms for redressing potential breaches by OLAF of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation has not been achieved. The SC would point out that the recent Communication from the Commission on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations (25) supports the SC's view and its repeated recommendations (26) concerning the introduction of transparent and stable procedures for an internal legality check and for an independent review of complaints. This Communication also confirms the need for further improvements to the Regulation, by establishing of the office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguards’. 15. With its longstanding experience in monitoring OLAF's investigative function and thereby compliance by OLAF with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, the SC is therefore concerned by the lack of a transparent procedure for dealing with individual complaints and takes the view that, at least during the transitional period, until further amendments to the Regulation are adopted, the current gap should be closed by the DG re-establishing an internal procedure for complaint in OLAF. III. THE WAY FORWARD: AN INTERNAL PROCEDURE FOR COMPLAINTS 16. In OLAF's view, the notion of ‘complaints’ covers (i) complaints concerning procedural guarantees in the context of investigative actions, (ii) complaints against a reply by OLAF to a request for access to personal data and (iii) complaints from whistle-blowers (concerning either OLAF's obligation to inform them on the action taken following their fraud reporting or the protection of their identity) (27). According to information provided by OLAF, in the last three years there were 25 complaints concerning OLAF's investigation activity, of which 13 were addressed to the EO (28), 8 were addressed to the EDPS (29) and 4 were requests for review addressed to OLAF (30). OLAF is also aware of other complaints, addressed to other bodies (e.g. to the SC), but it does not have any systemic overview, register or statistics related to them. 17. Taking into account the number of cases opened by OLAF (718 in 2012 (31)) and the fact that complaints against OLAF are addressed, in particular, to the EDPS, the EO and the SC (32), the small number of complaints addressed to OLAF itself may lead to the conclusion that the absence of a transparent and independent procedure for handling complaints in OLAF effectively deters potential complainants from exercising their rights. 18. The SC notes, from its monitoring experience, that in the previous years the handling of complaints appeared to be carried out on a case-by-case basis rather than through a stable and consistent procedure. The SC shares the EO's view that a case-by-case approach is not ‘the best way to ensure the efficient and transparent handling of complaints’ (33) and that without a proper complaint procedure ‘compliance [with fundamental rights] cannot ultimately be effective’ (34). Such a procedure is a key element of OLAF's accountability and legitimacy, because protecting fundamental rights ‘is not only to the benefit of persons under investigation but also of OLAF, whose legitimacy can only increase when fundamental rights are (seen to be) effectively protected’ (35). 19. The SC considers that, from the OLAF perspective, a complaint procedure would help (i) the detection by OLAF of any breach of its own legal obligations, thus allowing for a prompt reaction, (ii) monitoring by OLAF of compliance with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees by its own staff, (iii) avoiding the risk of discriminatory treatment of persons concerned, (iv) settling possible disputes before they aggravate (36). 20. In the SC's opinion, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (37) (right to good administration) would offer a sufficient legal basis for establishing an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Complainants are entitled to expect from OLAF that their ‘affairs’ are ‘handled’ — according to the principles defined by the Charter. 21. The SC therefore believes that the DG should put in place a transparent and efficient internal procedure for dealing with all the types of complaints related to OLAF investigative activities, including not only complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights in the course of an OLAF investigation, but also those concerning duration of investigations, legality of OLAF's acts, breaches of confidentiality, refusals to provide information. The following practical recommendations are without prejudice to the forthcoming legislative proposals (38) or to the SC's position as expressed in its paper on Reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF — in view of the monitoring experience of the Supervisory Committee (39) — they should be regarded as transitional measures until the current legal framework is improved. 22. The SC would firstly point out that it is for the DG to establish and define the exact scope and content of rules on handling of complaints in OLAF. In so doing, the DG should take into consideration a number of requirements triggered by the right to good administration. Recommendations by the EO and the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour should be also taken into account. Without establishing an exhaustive list, the SC would point to the following requirements: — fairness and impartiality, including, inter alia, the requirement that a complaint should be treated by a person not related to the investigation or not in the direct line of hierarchy of the person(s) related to the investigation (40) and the necessity to set out a minimum level of guarantees ensuring the functional independence of the person handling a given complaint, — the requirement to state reasons for the decisions taken following a complaint (41); — a reasonable time-limit for handling a complaint (42), — the right of access to one's file (subject to limitations explicitly foreseen in the Charter (43), — the right to address OLAF in one of the EU official languages and to have an answer in the same language (44), — the requirement to inform the complainant of any possible alternative forms of redress (45). 23. Secondly, with regard to the person entrusted with the handling of complaints, he should have the appropriate competencies, qualifications and experience. Such person should have well defined tasks and benefit from access to appropriate resources. He should have access to all relevant case-related information and OLAF staff should fully cooperate with him. 24. Regarding particularly the requirement of independence, the SC would stress that any effective internal complaint procedure, which would necessarily imply the handling of a complaint by an OLAF (senior) official, requires that this person act, when carrying out his review duties, in full independence of the DG. This is a key element in ensuring external credibility and public trust. The SC acknowledges the difficulty of implementing such a requirement, since this person should report to the DG on his findings while the latter remains the appointing authority deciding on the career progress of all OLAF officials (46). 25. The SC would indicate three possible solutions to that problem. (i) Firstly, the SC Secretariat being the only part of OLAF with regulatory guarantees of independent functioning with regard to the DG (47), the most logical solution would be to place the (senior) official entrusted with handling complaints under the Head of the SC Secretariat, but without involving him in any regular work of the SC. (ii) Secondly, the official could be nominated as a ‘complaint’ advisor to the DG, but his functional independence should be safeguarded by the right to inform the SC whenever he considers that a measure taken by the Director-General puts his independence into question (48) and by the obligation to report on all his findings related to the complaints not only to the Director-General, but also to the SC (49). (iii) Thirdly, the task could be entrusted to the OLAF Legal Advice Unit, but then its Head should have equal safeguards as a ‘complaint advisor’ — in his capacity of the handler of complaints. 26. Finally, the SC considers that information on how to address complaints to OLAF, together with a description of the procedure for handling them, should be published on OLAF's website, for the sake of transparency and legal certainty. Moreover, the SC should be regularly informed of the complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled, this allowing it to properly perform its role of monitoring developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations. SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS In the light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee: (1) Recommends that the Director-General set up an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints concerning OLAF investigations; (2) Invites the Director-General to consult the details of the procedure with the SC, before its adoption; (3) Recommends that the Director-General publish the procedure on OLAF's website after its adoption; (4) Expects the Director-General to report regularly to the SC on complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled. Adopted in Brussels, December 2013 For the Supervisory Committee Johan DENOLF Chairman (1) Although little consideration was given to this aspect when OLAF was created, the few procedural guarantees defined in the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 were developed by the case-law of the EU General Court. (2) See the SC's Opinion No 5/2010 on Respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office, point 3. (3) See in particular Article 41 of the Charter. (4) One of the objectives of the reform was to reinforce the protection of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within OLAF's investigations. (5) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1). (6) The legality check relates, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of persons concerned (Article 17(7)). (7) Article 15(1). (8) For a thorough overview of the different kinds of judicial review of OLAF's investigative acts, see J.F.H. Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) — An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor's Office, Europa Law Publishing, 2011, p. 203. See also X. Groussot, Z. Popov, What's wrong with OLAF? Accountability, due process and criminal justice in European anti-fraud policy, Common Market Law Review 47, 2010, p. 605-643. (9) For example, the actions for annulment introduced against OLAF investigative acts have constantly been declared inadmissible on the grounds that none of such acts has to date been deemed to bring about a distinct change in the applicant's legal position. (10) In actions for damages, there are three conditions to be met in order to trigger a right to reparation: the infringement of a rule of law intended to confer rights on persons; a sufficiently serious breach of this rule; the existence of a direct causal link between the breach of the rule of law and the damage allegedly suffered by the complainant. (11) J.F.H. Inghelram, Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance, Common Market Law Review 49, 2012, p. 601-628. (12) Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1). (13) According to the definition given by the EO, ‘Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it’ (see the EO's Annual Report 1997, p. 23). (14) See the Special Report of the EO in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning FRONTEX, 12 November 2013, point 43. (15) Franchet and Byk v Commission (No 2),8 July 2008, Case T-48/05. (16) Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. (17) See Article 14 of the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. Its content has been included in Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and as a consequence has been deleted from Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. (18) See Commission v Antonello Violetti and Others and Nadine Schmit, 20 May 2010, Case T-261/09. (19) See the note of the Director-General to OLAF staff (I/011472 of 10 November 2008) and the note JUR(2008)45321 of 1 April 2008 of the Commission's Legal Service. (20) During the legislative process, the EU institutions put forward various proposals: an independent Review Adviser with the participation of the SC, a Review Panel consisting of senior officials of OLAF and of the Commission's Legal Service, two separate procedures (legality check by legal experts of OLAF and complaints to the Review Adviser via the SC), a review procedure to be set up by the DG within the Office. (21) See the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures, version July 2011, point 5.1.6. (22) Article 7b: this procedure aimed at dealing with requests from persons concerned by an investigation, to have an independent opinion regarding the respect of the procedural guarantees provided for in the Regulation. (23) Replacing the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures. (24) Article 23 of the ISIP — ‘23.1 Where a natural person concerned by an investigation has requested a review of the handling of his procedural guarantees, the Director-General appoints a member of OLAF staff not connected with the investigation, to conduct such a review. 23.2 The person entrusted with the review must act independently in his review of the complaint and report his findings to the Director-General. 23.3 The Director-General may take appropriate action in respect of any failure to respect procedural guarantees and will inform the complainant’. (25) COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013. (26) See the SC's Annual Activity Report 2012, specifically Section 2 of Annex III. (27) OLAF does not count as ‘complaint’ the applications for access to documents (including ‘confirmatory applications’), the requests for access to personal data, staff complaints (Art. 90 of Staff Regulations), motions to courts, complaints addressed to the Commission which do not concern directly OLAF, letters from informants/whistle-blowers unhappy with OLAF's decision to dismiss a case. (28) 7 complaints in 2013, 3 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011. (29) 5 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011. (30) 1 request in 2013, 2 requests in 2012 and 1 request in 2011. (31) See the OLAF 2012 Activity Report. (32) See the Annual Activity Reports of the EDPS and the EO. The SC itself received 7 complaints in 2012 and 14 complaints in 2013, concerning, inter alia, alleged failure to respect fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, breach of confidentiality of investigations, duration of investigations. (33) See the EO's Decision closing his inquiry into complaint 3072/2009/MHZ against the Commission, 5 April 2011, point 27. (34) See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (