2008D0163 — MT — 24.01.2013 — 002.001

Dan id-dokument ġie magħmul bil-ħsieb li jintuża bħala għodda ta’ dokumentazzjoni u l-istituzzjonijiet ma jassumu l-ebda responsabbiltà għall-kontenut tiegħu

►B DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI tal-20 ta' Diċembru 2007 dwar speċifikazzjoni teknika għall-interoperabbiltà (STI) rigward “is-sikurezza fil-mini ferrovjarji” fis-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea konvenzjonali u ta' veloċità għolja (innotifikata taħt dokument numru K(2007) 6450) (Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE) (2008/163/KE) (ĠU L 064, 7.3.2008, p.1)

Emendat bi:









▼B

DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI

tal-20 ta' Diċembru 2007

dwar speċifikazzjoni teknika għall-interoperabbiltà (STI) rigward “is-sikurezza fil-mini ferrovjarji” fis-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea konvenzjonali u ta' veloċità għolja

(innotifikata taħt dokument numru K(2007) 6450)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2008/163/KE)







IL-KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ, Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea, Wara li kkunsidrat id-Direttiva 2001/16/KE tad-19 ta' Marzu 2001 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fuq l-interoperabbiltà tas-sistema ferrovjarja konvenzjonali trans-Ewropea ( 1 ), u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 6(1) tagħha, Wara li kkunsidrat id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/48/KE tat-23 ta' Lulju 1996 fuq l-interoperabbiltà tas-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea ta' veloċità għolja ( 2 ), u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 6(1) tagħha, Billi, (1) Skond l-Artikolu 5(1) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE, u l-Artikolu 5(1) tad-Direttiva 96/48/KE, kull subsistema għandha tkun koperta bi speċifikazzjoni teknika għall-interoperabbiltà (STI) waħda. Fejn ikun meħtieġ, subsistema tista' tkun koperta minn bosta STI, u STI waħda tista' tkopri diversi subsistemi. Id-deċiżjoni li tiġi żviluppata jew riveduta STI, kif ukoll l-għażla ta' l-ambitu tekniku u ġeografiku ta' dan, tirrikjedi mandat skond l-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE u l-Artikolu 6(1) ta' 96/48/KE. (2) L-ewwel pass fl-istabbiliment ta' STI huwa li l-Assoċjazzjoni Ewropea għall-Interoperabbiltà Ferrovjarja (AEIF), li nħatret bħala l-korp konġunt rappreżentattiv, tfassal abbozz ta' STI. (3) L-AEIF ingħatat mandat biex tfassal abbozz ta' STI għas-“sikurezza fil-mini ferrovjarji” skond l-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE. (4) L-abbozz ta' STI kien eżaminat mill-Kumitat stabbilit bid-Direttiva 96/48/KE dwar l-interoperabbiltà tas-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea ta' veloċità għolja u msemmi fl-Artikolu 21 tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE. (5) Id-Direttivi 2001/16/KE u 96/48/KE u l-STI japplikaw għal rinnovamenti, iżda mhux għal sostituzzjonijiet konnessi mal-manutenzjoni. Madankollu, l-Istati Membri huma mħeġġa, meta jistgħu jagħmlu hekk u meta dan ikun ġustifikat mill-kobor tax-xogħol relatat mal-manutenzjoni, japplikaw l-STI għas-sostituzzjonijiet marbuta mal-manutenzjoni. (6) Fil-verżjoni attwali tagħha, l-STI ma tittrattax għal kollox ir-rekwiżiti essenzjali kollha. F'konformità ma' l-Artikolu 17 tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE u ma' l-Artikolu 17 tad-Direttiva 96/48/KE, l-aspetti tekniċi li mhumiex koperti huma identifikati bħala “Punti Mhux Konklużi” fl-Anness C għal din l-STI. (7) Skond l-Artikolu 17 tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE u l-Artikolu 17 tad-Direttiva 96/48/KE, l-Istati Membri individwali għandhom jgħarrfu lill-Istati Membri l-oħra u lill-Kummissjoni bir-regoli tekniċi nazzjonali użati għall-implimentazzjoni ta' rekwiżiti essenzjali relatati ma' dawn il-“punti mhux konklużi”, kif ukoll bil-korpi li jaħtru għat-twettiq tal-proċedura ta' valutazzjoni tal-konformità jew adegwatezza għall-użu, kif ukoll bil-proċedura li tintuża għall-verifka ta' l-interoperabbiltà tas-subsistemi fit-tifsira ta' l-Artikolu 16(2) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE. Għal dan il-għan ta' l-aħħar, l-Istati Membri għandhom, kemm jista' jkun, japplikaw il-prinċipji u l-kriterji pprovduti bid-Direttivi 2001/16/KE u 96/48/KE. Kulfejn ikun possibbli, l-Istati Membri għandhom jużaw il-korpi notifikati skond l-Artikolu 20 tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE u l-Artikolu 20 ta' 96/48/KE. Il-Kumissjoni għandha tanalizza l-informazzjoni mogħtija mill-Istati Membri, fis-sura ta' regoli nazzjonali, proċeduri, korpi responsabbli għall-proċeduri ta' implimentazzjoni, u t-tul ta' dawn il-proċeduri u, fejn dan ikun f'loku, tiddiskuti mal-Kumitat dwar il-ħtieġa għall-adozzjoni ta' kwalunkwe miżura. (8) L-STI kkonċernata ma għandhiex tirrikjedi l-użu ta' teknoloġiji jew soluzzjonijiet tekniċi speċifiċi għajr fejn dan ikun strettament meħtieġ għall-interoperabbiltà tas-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea konvenzjonali. (9) L-STI tissejjes fuq l-aħjar għarfien espert disponibbli fi żmien it-tfassil ta' l-abbozz rilevanti. Żviluppi teknoloġiċi jew rekwiżiti operattivi, ta' sikurezza jew soċjali jistgħu jikkawżaw il-ħtieġa li din l-STI tiġi emendata jew supplimentata. Fejn applikabbli, għandha tinbeda proċedura ta' reviżjoni jew aġġornament skond l- Artikolu 6(3) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE, jew l-Artikolu 6(3) ta' 96/48/KE. (10) Sew biex tiġi inkoraġġita l-innovazzjoni, kif ukoll biex titqies l-esperjenza miksuba, l-STI annessa għandha tkun suġġetta għal reviżjoni kull tant żmien. (11) Fejn ikunu proposti soluzzjonijiet innovattivi, il-manifattur jew l-entità kontraenti għandu/ha jiddikjara/tiddikjara d-devjazzjoni mis-sezzjoni rilevanti ta' l-STI. L-Aġenzija Ewropea għall-Ferroviji ser tiffinalizza l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet adegwati funzjonali u ta' ’interface’ tas-soluzzjoni, u tiżviluppa l-metodi ta' valutazzjoni. (12) Il-mandat talab li l-STI “sikurezza fil-mini ferrovjarji” tkopri l-prevenzjoni u t-taffija ta' aċċidenti u inċidenti fil-mini, speċjalment dawk ikkawżati minn perikli tan-nirien. Ir-riskji kollha potenzjali kellhom ikunu indirizzati f'dan il-kuntest, inklużi dawk relatati mal-qbiż mill-binarji, il-ħbit, in-nar u r-rilaxx ta' sustanzi perikolużi. Madankollu dawn il-miri u r-riskji kellhom jitqiesu biss safejn kellhom impatt fuq is-subsistemi kif deskritti fid-Direttivi, u sakemm l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet riżultanti setgħu jkunu assoċjati ma' rekwiżiti essenzjali rilevanti. Kellhom jitqiesu bosta subsistemi, l-aktar: infrastruttura, vetturi ferrovjarji, l-operat u l-maniġġar tat-traffiku, manutenzjoni, deskritti fl-Anness II għad-Direttivi. (13) Esperti dwar il-mini ferrovjarji mill-Unjoni Ferrovjarja Internazzjonali (UIC) u l-Kummissjoni tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti għall-Ewropa (UNECE) ivvalutaw u ġabru flimkien, fil-perjodu 2000-2003, l-aħjar miżuri li attwalment huma applikati fl-Ewropa biex jiżguraw is-sikurezza f'mini ġodda u f'dawk eżistenti. L-esperti mill-Ġestjonarji ta' l-Infrastruttura, l-Impriżi Ferrovjarji, manufatturi ta' vetturi ferrovjarji u xjenzati miġbura fil-grupp ta' ħidma ta' l-STI fil-perjodu 2003-2005 bdew is-selezzjoni tagħhom billi kkunsidraw dawn ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet ta' l-aqwa prattika. Bħall-esperti mill-UIC u l-UNECE, dawk ta' l-AEIF kienu tal-fehma li s-saħħa tal-ferroviji tinsab fil-prevenzjoni ta' l-inċidenti. Il-miżuri preventivi ġeneralment għandhom aktar effikaċja għan-nefqa min dawk ta' taffija jew ta' salvataġġ. Għadd ta' miżuri meħudin flimkien, ta' natura preventiva jew ta' taffija kkompletati b'miżuri ta' awtosalvataġġ u salvataġġ, għandhom jaqdu bl-aħjar mod il-mira ta' sikurezza ottimali bi spejjeż raġonevoli. (14) L-għan ewlieni tad-Direttivi sottostanti 96/48/KE u 2001/16/KE huwa l-interoperabbiltà. L-għan kien li jarmonizzaw il-miżuri ta' sikurezza u regoli tekniċi attwalment imħaddma, biex jippermettu l-interoperabbiltà u joffru approċċ simili għas-sikurezza u l-miżuri ta' sikurezza għall-passiġġieri fl-Ewropa kollha kemm hi. Barra minn hekk, tren li jikkonforma ma' din l-STI (u ma' l-STI tal-vetturi ferrovjarji) għandu jkun aċċettat, b'mod ġenerali, fil-mini kollha fix-xibka trans-Ewropea. (15) Il-livelli tas-sikurezza fis-sistema ferrovjarja Komunitarja ġeneralment huma għoljin, imqabbla mat-trasport bit-triq. Il-mini terġa' huma aktar sikuri, mil-lat statistiku, mill-bqija tax-xibka. Madankollu, huwa importanti li s-sikurezza tinżamm talanqas matul il-fażi kurrenti tar-ristrutturar tal-ferroviji, li sejra tifred il-funzjonijiet ta' kumpaniji ferrovjarji li qabel kienu integrati u s-settur ferrovjarju tkompli tmexxih mill-awtoregolazzjoni lejn ir-regolazzjoni pubblika. Dan kien il-mottiv ewlieni għad-Direttiva 2004/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-29 ta' April 2004 fuq is-sigurtà [sikurezza] tal-linji tal-ferrovija tal-Komunità u li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 95/18/KE fuq l-għoti tal-liċenzji ta' l-impriżi tal-linji tal-ferrovija u d-Direttiva 2001/14/KE fuq l-allokazzjoni tal-kapaċità ta' l-infrastruttura tal-linji tal-ferrovija u l-intaxxar tal-piżijiet għall-użu ta' l-infrastruttura tal-linji tal-ferrovija u ċ-ċertifikazzjoni tas-sigurtà [sikurezza] (Id-Direttiva tas-Sigurtà [Sikurezza] Tal-Linji tal-Ferrovija) ( 3 ); is-sikurezza għandha tittejjeb aktar, meta dan ikun raġonevolment prattikabbli u bil-qies tal-kompetittività tal-mod ta' trasport ferrovjarju. (16) L-għan ta' din l-STI kien li tiggwida l-progress tekniku fis-sikurezza tal-mini lejn miżuri armonizzati u ta' nefqa effikaċi; safejn dan ikun raġħonevolment prattikabbli, għandhom ikunu l-istess madwar l-Ewropa kollha kemm hi. (17) Din l-STI tapplika sew għall-mini fil-kampanja b'volum żgħir ta' traffiku kif ukoll għal dawk fil-qalba taż-żoni urbani b'għadd kbir ta' treni u passiġġieri. L-STI tippreskrivi biss rekwiżiti minimi. Il-konformità ma' l-STI ma tikkostitwixxix minna nfisha garanzija għat-tqegħid sikur fl-operat u l-operat sikur. Il-partijiet kollha involuti fil-ħidma fuq kwistjonijiet tas-sikurezza għandhom jikkooperaw biex jilħqu livell adegwat ta' sikurezza għall-mina kkonċernata, skond id-dispożizzjonijiet f'din l-STI u d-direttivi dwar l-interoperabbiltà. L-Istati Membri huma mistiedna jivverifikaw, kulmeta jiftħu mina ġdida, jew meta treni interoperabbli jkunu deħlin f'mini eżistenti, jekk iċ-ċirkustanzi lokali (inklużi t-tip u d-densità tat-traffiku) jirrikjedux miżuri addizzjonali barra minn dawk speċifikati f'din l-STI. Dan jistgħu jagħmluh permezz ta' analiżi tar-riskju, jew kwalunkwe metodoloġija oħra aġġornata. Dawn il-verifiki huma parti mill-proċessi taċ-ċertifikazzjoni tas-sikurezza u ta' l-awtorizzazzjoni pprovduti bl-Artikoli 10 u 11 tad-Direttiva dwar is-Sikurezza Ferrovjarja. (18) Xi Stati Membri diġà għandhom miżuri ta' sikurezza implimentati li jesiġu livell ogħla ta' sikurezza minn dak stipulat f'din l-STI. Regoli eżistenti ta' dan it-tip għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati fil-kuntest ta' l-Artikolu 8 tad-Direttiva dwar is-Sikurezza Ferrovjarja. Barra minn dan, skond l-Artikolu 4 ta' l-istess Direttiva, l-Istati Membri għandhom jiżguraw li s-sikurezza ferrovjarja tinżamm b'mod ġenerali, u kulfejn dan ikun raġonevolment prattikabbli, bil-qies ta' l-iżvilupp tal-leġiżlazzjoni Komunitarja u l-progress tekniku u xjentifiku, u filwaqt li jagħtu l-prijorità lill-prevenzjoni ta' inċidenti serji. (19) Għal sitwazzjonijiet speċifiċi, l-Istati Membri huma fil-libertà li jitolbu miżuri aktar stretti, sakemm dawk il-miżuri ma jtellfux l-interoperabbiltà. L-Artikolu 8 tad-Direttiva dwar is-Sikurezza Ferrovjarja u l-klawżola 1.1.6 ta' din l-STI jipprovdu għal din il-possibbiltà. Rekwiżiti ta' dan it-tip jistgħu jissejsu fuq analiżi tax-xenarji u tar-riskji, u jistgħu jikkonċernaw is-subsistemi “infrastruttura”, “enerġija” u “operat”. L-Istati Membri mistennija jqisu rekwiżiti aktar stretti bħal dawn fid-dawl tal-vijabbiltà ekonomika tal-ferrovija, u wara li jikkonsultaw lill-Ġestjonarji ta' l-Infrastruttura, l-Impriżi Ferrovjarji u s-servizzi tas-salvataġġ ikkonċernati. (20) Biex jiġu definiti l-miżuri li għandhom jittieħdu għall-mina u għat-tren, ġie definit għadd ristrett ta' tipi ta' inċidenti. Ġew identifikati miżuri rilevanti, li sejrin jeliminaw jew inaqqsu b'mod sinifikanti r-riskji li joħorġu minn dawn it-tipi ta' inċidenti. Ġew żviluppati, fil-kategoriji prevenzjoni, taffija, evakwazzjoni u salvataġġ. L-Anness D għal din l-STI juri r-relazzjoni kwalitattiva bejn it-tipi ta' inċidenti u l-miżuri, bl-indikazzjoni ta' liema miżuri jittrattaw kull waħda mill-klassijiet ta' inċidenti. B'konsegwenza ta' dan, l-applikazzjoni ta' din l-STI ma tiggarantixxix assenza ta' riskji ta' mwiet. (21) Rigward ir-rwol u r-responsabbiltà tas-servizzi tas-sikurezza, l-awtoritajiet nazzjonali għandhom il-kompetenza li jiddefinixxu dan. Il-miżuri speċifikati f'din l-STI fil-kamp tas-salvataġġ huma bbażati fuq il-preżunzjoni li s-servizzi ta' salvataġġ li jintervjenu f'inċident f'mina għandhom jipproteġu l-ħajjiet, mhux il-valuri materjali bħall-vetturi u l-istrutturi. Din l-STI kompliet tispeċifika l-kompitu mistenni tas-servizzi ta' salvataġġ għal kull tip ta' inċident. (22) Id-dispożizzjonijiet ta' din id-Deċiżjoni huma konformi ma' l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat stabbilit bl-Artikolu 21 tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/48/KE, Billi, ADOTTAT DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI:







Artikolu 1

A. Speċifikazzjoni Teknika għall-Interoperabbiltà (“STI”) relatata ma' “sikurezza fil-mini ferrovjarji” b'dan hija adottata mill-Kummissjoni fis-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea konvenzjonali msemmija fl-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE u fis-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea ta' veloċità għolja msemmija fl-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 96/48/KE.

L-STI għandha tkun kif jidher fl-Anness għal din id-Deċiżjoni.

L-STI għandha tkun għal kollox applikabbli għas-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea konvenzjonali kif definita fl-Anness I għad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE, u s-sistema ferrovjarja trans-Ewropea ta' veloċità għolja kif definita l-Anness I għad-Direttiva 96/48/KE, bil-qies ta' l-Artikolu 2 ta' din id-Deċiżjoni.

Artikolu 2

1. Fir-rigward ta' dawk il-kwistjonijiet li jkunu kklassifikati bħala “Punti Mhux Konklużi” fl-Anness C għall-STI, il-kundizzjonijiet li għandhom ikunu sodisfatti għall-verifika ta' l-interoperabbiltà skond l-Artikolu 16(2) tad-Direttiva 96/48/KE u l-Artikolu 16(2) tad-Direttiva 2001/16/KE għandhom ikunu dawk ir-regoli tekniċi applikabbli li jintużaw fl-Istat Membru li jawtorizza t-tqegħid fis-servizz tas-subsistemi koperti b'din id-Deċiżjoni.

2. Kull Stat Membru għandu jinnotifika lill-Istati Membri l-oħra u lill-Kummissjoni fi żmien sitt xhur min-notifika ta' din id-Deċiżjoni:

(a) il-lista ta' regoli tekniċi applikabbli msemmija fil-paragrafu 1;

(b) il-valutazzjoni tal-konformità u l-proċeduri ta' eżami li għandhom jiġu applikati rigward l-applikazzjoni ta' dawn ir-regoli;

(ċ) il-korpi li jaħtar biex iwettqu dawk il-proċeduri ta' valutazzjoni tal-konformità u ta' eżami.

Artikolu 3

Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tapplika mill-1 ta' Lulju 2008.

Artikolu 4

Din id-Deċiżjoni hija indirizzata lill-Istati Membri.









ANNEX

DIRECTIVE 2001/16/EC — INTEROPERABILITY OF THE TRANS-EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL RAIL SYSTEM

DIRECTIVE 96/48/EC ON THE INTEROPERABILITY OF THE TRANS-EUROPEAN HIGH-SPEED RAIL SYSTEM

▼M2

SPEĊIFIKAZZJONI TEKNIKA GĦALL-INTEROPERABBILTÀ

▼B

Subsystems: ‘Infrastucture’, ‘Energy’, ‘Operations and traffic management’, ‘Control-Command and signalling’, ‘Rolling Stock’

Aspect: ‘Safety in railway tunnels’

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. Technical scope 1.1.1. Tunnel safety as a part of general safety 1.1.2. Tunnel length 1.1.3. Fire safety categories of passenger rolling stock 1.1.3.1. Rolling stock for tunnels up to 5 km in length 1.1.3.2. Rolling stock for all tunnels 1.1.3.3 Rolling stock in tunnels with underground stations 1.1.4. Underground stations 1.1.5. Dangerous goods 1.1.6. Particular safety requirements in member states 1.1.7. Risk scope, risks that are not covered by this TSI 1.2. Geographical scope 1.3. Content of this TSI 2. DEFINITION OF ASPECT/SCOPE 2.1. General 2.2. The risk scenarios 2.2.1. ‘Hot’ incidents: Fire, explosion followed by fire, emission of toxic smoke or gases. 2.2.2. ‘Cold’ incidents: collision, derailment 2.2.3. Prolonged stop 2.2.4. Exclusions 2.3. The role of rescue services 3. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS 3.1. Essential requirements as set out in Directive 2001/16/EC 3.2. Detailed essential requirements related to tunnel safety 4. CHARACTERISATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Functional and technical specifications of the subsystems 4.2.1. Overview of the specifications 4.2.2. Subsystem Infrastructure 4.2.2.1. Installation of switches and crossings 4.2.2.2. Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms 4.2.2.3. Fire protection requirements for structures 4.2.2.4. Fire safety requirements for building material 4.2.2.5. Fire detection 4.2.2.6. Facilities for self-rescue, evacuation and rescue in the event of an incident 4.2.2.6.1. Definition of safe area 4.2.2.6.2. General 4.2.2.6.3. Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface. 4.2.2.6.4. Cross-passages to the other tube 4.2.2.6.5. Alternative technical solutions 4.2.2.7. Escape walkways 4.2.2.8. Emergency lighting on escape routes 4.2.2.9. Escape signage 4.2.2.10. Emergency communication 4.2.2.11. Access for rescue services 4.2.2.12. Rescue areas outside tunnels 4.2.2.13. Water supply 4.2.3. Subsystem Energy 4.2.3.1. Segmentation of overhead line or conductor rails 4.2.3.2. Overhead line or conductor rail earthing 4.2.3.3. Electricity supply 4.2.3.4. Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels 4.2.3.5. Reliability of electrical installations 4.2.4. Subsystem control-command and signalling 4.2.4.1. Hot axle box detectors 4.2.5. Subsystem rolling stock 4.2.5.1. Material properties for rolling stock 4.2.5.2. Fire extinguishers for passenger rolling stock 4.2.5.3. Fire protection for freight trains 4.2.5.3.1. Running capability 4.2.5.3.2. Driver's protection 4.2.5.3.3. Fire protection for trains with passengers and freight or road vehicles 4.2.5.4. Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock 4.2.5.5. Additional measures for running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board: 4.2.5.5.1. General objectives and required running capability for passenger trains 4.2.5.5.2. Requirements for brakes 4.2.5.5.3. Requirement for traction 4.2.5.6. On board fire detectors 4.2.5.7. Communication means on trains 4.2.5.8. Emergency brake override 4.2.5.9. Sistema ta’ dwal ta’ emerġenza fil-ferrovija 4.2.5.10. Switching off of air conditioning in the train 4.2.5.11. Escape design of passenger rolling stock 4.2.5.11.1. Passengers' emergency exits 4.2.5.11.2. Passenger access door 4.2.5.12. Rescue service's information and access 4.3. Functional and technical specifications of the interfaces 4.3.1. General 4.3.2. Interfaces with the Infrastructure subsystem 4.3.2.1. Passaġġi ta’ ħruġ 4.3.2.2. Inspection of tunnel condition 4.3.3. Interfaces with the Energy subsystem 4.3.3.1. Sectioning of traction energy supply systems 4.3.4. Interfaces with the Control-Command-Signalling subsystem 4.3.5. Interfaces with the Traffic Management and Operation subsystem 4.3.5.1. Tunnel emergency plan and exercises 4.3.5.2. Route book 4.3.5.3. Provisions of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers 4.3.5.4. Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff 4.3.6. Interfaces with the rolling stock subsystem 4.3.6.1. Material properties for rolling stock 4.3.6.2. Other rolling stock specifications 4.3.7. Interfaces with the PRM subsystem 4.3.7.1. Escape walkways 4.4. Operating rules 4.4.1. Checking the condition of trains and appropriate actions 4.4.1.1. Before the train commences its service. 4.4.1.2. While the train is running 4.4.1.2.1. Safety-relevant equipment 4.4.1.2.2. Hot axle box incidents 4.4.2. Emergency rule 4.4.3. Tunnel emergency plan and exercises 4.4.3.1. Content 4.4.3.2. Identification 4.4.3.3. Exercises 4.4.4. Earthing procedures 4.4.5. Route Book 4.4.6. Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers 4.4.7. Co-ordination between tunnel control centres 4.5. Maintenance rules 4.5.1. Inspection of tunnel condition 4.5.2. Maintenance of rolling stock 4.5.2.1. Passenger rolling stock 4.5.2.2. Freight rolling stock 4.6. Professional qualifications 4.6.1. Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff 4.7. Health and safety conditions 4.7.1. Self-rescue device 4.8. Reġistru tal-infrastruttura u reġistru Ewropew tat-tipi ta’ vetturi awtorizzati 4.8.1. Register of infrastructure 4.8.2. Rolling Stock Register 5. INTEROPERABILITY CONSTITUENTS 6. ASSESSMENT OF CONFORMITY AND/OR SUITABILITY FOR USE OF THE CONSTITUENTS AND VERIFICATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM 6.1. Interoperability constituents 6.2. Subsystems 6.2.1. Conformity assessment (general) 6.2.2. Conformity assessment procedures (modules) 6.2.3. Existing solutions 6.2.4. Innovative solutions 6.2.5. Assessment of maintenance 6.2.6. Assessment of operational rules 6.2.7. Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the IM 6.2.7.1. Installation of switches and crossings 6.2.7.2. Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms 6.2.7.3. Fire protection requirements for structures 6.2.7.4. Facilities for self-rescue, rescue and evacuation in the event of an incident 6.2.7.5. Access and equipment for rescue services 6.2.7.6. Reliability of electrical installations 6.2.7.7. Hot axle box detectors 6.2.8. Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the RU 6.2.8.1. Rescue service's information and access 6.2.8.2. Self-rescue device 7. IMPLEMENTATION 7.1. Application of this TSI to subsystems to be put into service 7.1.1. General 7.1.2. Newly built rolling stock constructed to an existing design 7.1.3. Existing rolling stock intended to run in new tunnels 7.2. Application of this TSI to subsystems already in service 7.2.1. Introduction 7.2.2. Upgrade and renewal measures for tunnels of more than 1 km, subsystems INS and ENE 7.2.2.1. INS 7.2.2.2. ENE 7.2.3. Upgrade and renewal measures for the subsystems CCS, OPE, RST 7.2.3.1. CCS: no measure required 7.2.3.2. OPE: 7.2.3.3. RST (Passenger rolling stock) 7.2.4. Other existing tunnels 7.3. TSI revision 7.4. Exceptions for national, bilateral, multilateral or multinational agreements 7.4.1. Existing agreements 7.4.2. Future agreements or modification of existing agreements 7.5. Specific cases 7.5.1. Introduction 7.5.2. List of specific cases ANNEX C – OPEN POINTS ANNEX D – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCIDENT TYPES AND MEASURES ANNEX E – ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBSYSTEMS ANNEX F – MODULES FOR THE EC VERIFICATION OF SUBSYSTEMS ANNEX G – GLOSSARY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Technical scope

1.1.1. Tunnel safety as a part of general safety This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded subsystems. It concerns the following subsystems mentioned Annex II to Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC, as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC: infrastructure (‘INF’), energy (‘ENE’), control-command (‘CCS’), operation (‘OPE’) and rolling stock (‘RST’). Safety in tunnels is influenced by general railway safety measures (such as signalling), which are not specified in this TSI. Only specific measures, designed to reduce specific tunnel risks, are prescribed here. General railway safety measures: Risks related to pure railway operation, such as derailment and collision with other trains, are addressed by general railway safety measures. The influence of the tunnel environment and therefore some of the corresponding countermeasures are addressed in this TSI to the extent that they influence safety in railway tunnels. Tunnel-specific measures: The purpose of this TSI is to define a coherent set of measures for the infrastructure, energy, command-control & signalling, rolling stock and traffic operation & management subsystems, thus delivering an optimal level of safety in tunnels in the most cost-efficient way. It shall permit free movement of trains complying with Directives 96/48/EC (on high speed lines) and 2001/16/EC (on conventional lines) under harmonised safety conditions in railway tunnels on the trans-European rail system.

1.1.2. Tunnel length — All specifications in this TSI apply to tunnels of more than 1 km in length, unless stated otherwise. — Tunnels of more than 20 km in length require a special safety investigation that may lead to the specification of additional safety measures not included in this TSI in order to admit interoperable trains (trains complying with the relevant TSIs) in an acceptable fire-safety environment. — Successive tunnels are NOT considered as one tunnel, if the two following requirements are fulfilled: — (A) the separation between them in open air is longer than 500 m (B) there is an access/egress facility to a safe area within the open section

1.1.3. Fire safety categories of passenger rolling stock Rolling stock admitted in tunnels shall belong to either of the following two fire safety categories A and B (the following definitions are harmonised with HS RST TSI 4.2.7.2.1 and prEN45545 part 1):

1.1.3.1. Rolling stock for tunnels up to 5 km in length Rolling stock which is designed and built to operate on underground sections and tunnels of not more than 5 km in length, with side evacuation available is defined as category A. In the event of activation of a fire alarm, the train will continue to a safe area (see definition in 4.2.2.6.1), not more than 4 minutes running time away, assuming the train is able to run at 80 km/h. At the safe area, passengers and staff can evacuate the train. If it is not possible for the train to continue, it will be evacuated using the infrastructure facilities in the tunnels.

1.1.3.2. Rolling stock for all tunnels Rolling stock which is designed and built to operate in all tunnels of the trans-European Network is defined as category B. Fire barriers are provided to facilitate the protection of passengers and staff from the effects of heat and smoke on board a burning train for 15 minutes. The fire barriers and additional measures for running capability would permit such trains to leave a 20 km long tunnel and reach a safe area, assuming the train is able to run at 80 km/h. If it is not possible for the train to leave the tunnel, it will be evacuated using the infrastructure facilities provided for the tunnel.

1.1.3.3 Rolling stock in tunnels with underground stations If there are underground stations as defined in 1.1.4 which are specified as locations for evacuation in the emergency plan and if the distances between consecutive underground stations and the nearest underground station to the portal are less than 5 km, the trains shall fulfil the requirements of category A.

1.1.4. Underground stations In respect of railway subsystems, stations that are in tunnels shall fulfil the relevant specifications of this TSI. In addition, parts of the station open to the public shall be in conformity with the national fire safety rules. If these two conditions are fulfilled, then an underground station can be considered as a safe area as specified in 4.2.2.6.1.

1.1.5. Dangerous goods The general safety measures concerning the carriage of dangerous goods are defined in OPE TSI and RID. No tunnel specific measure is prescribed in this TSI. The Relevant National Authority may prescribe specific measures according to clause 1.1.6.

1.1.6. Particular safety requirements in member states Generally, the specifications of this TSI are harmonised requirements. The existing safety level shall not be reduced in a country as stipulated in Directive 2004/49/EC Article 4.1 (Safety Directive). Member states can retain more stringent requirements, as long as these requirements do not prevent the operation of trains complying with Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC. They can prescribe new and more stringent requirements in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC (Safety Directive) Art 8; such requirements shall be notified to the Commission before they are introduced. Such higher requirements must be based on a risk analysis and must be justified by a particular risk situation. They shall be the result of a consultation of the IM and of the relevant authorities for rescue, and they shall be subject to a cost-benefit assessment.

1.1.7. Risk scope, risks that are not covered by this TSI This TSI covers specific risks to the safety of passengers and on-board staff in tunnels for the subsystems above. Risks not covered by this TSI are as follows: — Terrorism, as a deliberate and premeditated act which is designed to cause wanton destruction, injury and loss of life. — health and safety of staff involved in the maintenance of the fixed installations in tunnels. — financial loss due to damage to structures and trains. — trespass into the tunnel — impact of a derailed train on the tunnel structure: according to expert judgment, the impact of a derailed train will not be sufficient to reduce the load carrying capacity of the tunnel structure. — safety problems caused by aerodynamic effects of passing trains are not addressed within this TSI (see HS INS TSI)

1.2. Geographical scope

The geographical scope of this TSI is the trans-European conventional rail system as described in Annex I to Directive 2001/16/EC and the trans-European High-Speed rail system as described in Annex I to Directive 96/48/EC.

1.3. Content of this TSI

In accordance with Article 5(3) of 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC, this TSI:

(a) indicates its intended scope (part of the network or rolling stock referred to in Annex I to the Directive; subsystem or part of subsystem referred to in Annex II to the Directive) — Chapter 2;

(b) lays down essential requirements for each subsystem concerned and its interfaces vis-à-vis other subsystems — Chapter 3;

(c) establishes the functional and technical specifications to be met by the subsystem and its interfaces vis-à-vis other subsystems. If necessary, these specifications may vary according to the use of the subsystem, for example according to the categories of line, hub and/or rolling stock provided for in Annex I to the Directive — Chapter 4;

(d) determines the interoperability constituents and interfaces covered by European specifications, including European standards, which are necessary to achieve interoperability within the trans-European conventional rail system — Chapter 5;

(e) states, in each case under consideration, the procedures for the assessment of conformity or suitability for use. This includes in particular the modules defined in Decision 93/465/EEC or, where appropriate, the specific procedures to be used to assess either the conformity or the suitability for use of interoperability constituents and ‘EC’ verification of subsystems — Chapter 6;

(f) indicates the strategy for implementing the TSI. In particular, it is necessary to specify the stages to be completed in order to make a gradual transition from the existing situation to the final situation in which compliance with the TSI shall be the norm — Chapter 7;

(g) indicates, for the staff concerned, the professional qualifications for the operation of the subsystem concerned, as well as for the implementation of the TSI — Chapter 4.

Moreover, in accordance with Article 5(5), provision may be made for specific cases for each TSI; these are indicated in Chapter 7.

Lastly, this TSI also comprises, as detailed in Chapter 4, the operating and maintenance rules specific to the scope indicated in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 above.

2. DEFINITION OF ASPECT/SCOPE

2.1. General

The TSI ‘Safety in Railway Tunnels’ extends to all parts of the railway system relevant for the safety of passengers and on-board staff in railway tunnels during operation. The subsystems concerned have been defined in section 1.1 Technical scope; it is also stated there that only tunnel specific safety measures are addressed in this TSI. Chapter 2.2 deals with the risk scenarios in tunnels.

The line of defence for the promotion of safety in tunnels comprises four successive layers: Prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue. The largest contribution is in the area of prevention followed by mitigation and so on. A major feature of railways is their inherent ability to prevent accidents through the traffic running on a guide-way and being controlled and regulated using a signalling system. The layers of safety combine to produce a low level of residual risk.

2.2. The risk scenarios

This TSI assumes that the pure ‘railway risks’ are covered by appropriate measures, deriving generally from the safety standards applying in the rail industry, and reinforced by the other TSIs which are being finalised or will be mandated to the European Railway Agency (ERA). However this TSI will also look at measures which could offset or mitigate the difficulty of evacuation or rescue operations following a railway accident.

Relevant measures have been identified, which will suppress or significantly reduce the risks arising from these scenarios. They have been developed, in the categories prevention/mitigation/evacuation/rescue; however they do not appear under these headings in this TSI but under the headings of the concerned subsystems concerned.

The measures prescribed can be considered as a response to the following three types of incidents

2.2.1. ‘Hot’ incidents: Fire, explosion followed by fire, emission of toxic smoke or gases. The main danger is fire. It is assumed that the fire starts in one passenger train or power-unit and is fully developed 15 minutes after ignition. It is discovered and the alarm is raised during these first 15 minutes. Whenever possible the train leaves the tunnel. If the train comes to a stop, passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area.

2.2.2. ‘Cold’ incidents: collision, derailment The tunnel specific measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the intervention of rescue forces. The difference with the hot scenarios is that there is no time constraint due to the presence of a hostile environment created by a fire.

2.2.3. Prolonged stop Prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without a fire on board, for longer than 10 minutes) is not, by itself, a threat to passengers and staff. However it may lead to panic and to spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment. Measures shall be provided to keep such a situation under control.

2.2.4. Exclusions The scenarios that have not been dealt with are listed in section 1.1.7.

2.3. The role of rescue services

The definition of the role of the rescue services is a matter for the Relevant National Authority. The measures specified in this TSI for rescue are based on the assumption that rescue services intervening in a tunnel accident shall protect lives as a first priority and not material values such as vehicles or structures. It is assumed that they are expected to:

In a ‘hot’ incident type

— Try to rescue people unable to reach a safe area

— Provide initial medical support to evacuees

— Fight a fire insofar as required to protect themselves and people caught in the accident

— Conduct evacuation from safe areas inside the tunnel to open air

In a ‘cold’ incident type

— Provide initial help to people with critical injuries

— Free trapped people

— Evacuate people

No demands on time or performance requirements are included in this TSI. Considering that accidents in railway tunnels involving multiple fatalities are rare, it is implicit that there might be events, with an extremely low probability, against which even well equipped rescue services would be powerless, such as a major fire involving a freight train.

Detailed scenarios adapted to local conditions shall be developed for the emergency plans to be approved by the Relevant National Authority. If the expectations of the rescue services expressed in those plans go beyond the assumptions described above, then additional appropriate measures or equipment can be provided.

Annex D shows the qualitative relationship between the incident types and the measures. In addition Annex D gives a full description how the measures contribute to the four layers of defence mentioned in 2.1: prevention, mitigation, evacuation and rescue.

3. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

This chapter lays down the essential requirements in Annex III to the Directive which apply to the subsystem, part of the subsystem or aspect concerned.

For each of these essential requirements, details are provided on how they are taken into account by the TSI, for example through a functional or technical specification, an operating rule or a condition relating to the level of staff competence.

3.1. Essential requirements as set out in Directive 2001/16/EC

Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC sets out, in annex III, the following essential requirements to be met on the trans-European conventional system:

— Safety

— Reliability and Availability

— Health

— Environmental Protection

— Technical compatibility.

Safety and Technical compatibility are considered relevant for this TSI. (Reliability and Availability can be considered as a prerequisite for safety and should not be diminished as a result of the provisions of this TSI. Health and Environmental Protection involve the same detailed essential requirements in Annex III to the Directive).

3.2. Detailed essential requirements related to tunnel safety

The detailed essential requirements listed in Annex III of Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC, which are relevant for tunnel safety, are quoted below in italics.

Section 1.1.1 of Annex III (General): The design, construction or assembly, maintenance and monitoring of safety-critical components and, more particularly, of the components involved in train movements must be such as to guarantee safety at the level corresponding to the aims laid down for the network, including those for specific degraded situations.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specification in sections 4.2 Functional and technical specifications of the subsystems, 4.5 Maintenance rules.

Section 1.1.4 of Annex III (General): The design of fixed installations and rolling stock and the choice of the materials must be aimed at limiting the generation, propagation and effects of fire and smoke in the event of fire.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.2.2.3 Fire protection requirements for structures 4.2.2.4 Fire safety requirements for building material and 4.2.5.1 Material properties for rolling stock

Section 2.1.1 of Annex III (Infrastructure): Appropriate steps must be taken to prevent access to or undesirable intrusions into installations.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in section 4.2.2.2 Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms.

Appropriate provisions must be laid down to take account of the particular safety conditions in very long tunnels

This essential requirement is satisfied by this TSI as a whole; it applies to tunnels with a length between 1 and 20 km. For tunnels longer than 20 km see 1.1.2

Section 2.2.1 of Annex III (Energy): Operation of the energy-supply system must not impair the safety either of trains or of persons (users, operating staff, trackside dwellers and third parties).

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.2.3.1 Segmentation of overhead line or conductor lines, 4.2.3.2 Overhead line or conductor rail earthing, 4.2.3.5 Reliability of electrical installations and 4.2.3.4 Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels.

Section 2.4.1 of Annex III (Rolling Stock) In the event of danger, devices must enable passengers to inform the driver and permit accompanying staff to contact him.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in section 4.2.5.3 of the HS RST TSI Passenger alarm. The present SRT TSI refers to this essential requirement in sections 4.2.5.7 Communication means on trains and 4.2.5.8 Emergency brake override.

Emergency exits must be provided and indicated.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.4.6 Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers and 4.2.5.11 Escape design of passenger rolling stock.

Appropriate provisions must be laid down to take account of the particular safety conditions in very long tunnels.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.2.5.3 Fire protection for freight trains, 4.2.5.4 Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock 4.2.5.5 Additional measures for running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board, 4.2.5.6 On-board fire detectors.

An emergency lighting system of sufficient intensity and duration is compulsory on board trains.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in section 4.2.5.9 Emergency lighting system in the train.

Trains must be equipped with a public address system, which provides a means of communication to the public from on-board staff and ground control.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.2.5.7 Communication means on trains.

Section 2.6.1 of Annex III (Operation and traffic management): Alignment of the network operating rules and the qualifications of drivers and on-board staff and of the staff in the control centres must be such as to ensure safe operation, bearing in mind the different requirements of cross-border and domestic services.

The maintenance operation and intervals, the training and qualifications of the maintenance and control centre staff and the quality insurance system set up by the operators concerned in the control and maintenance centres must be such as to ensure a high level of safety.

This essential requirement is satisfied by the functional and technical specifications in sections 4.4.1 Checking the conditions of trains and appropriate actions, 4.4.2 Emergency rule, 4.4.5 Route book, 4.4.3 Tunnel emergency plan and exercises and 4.6.1 Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff.

4. CHARACTERISATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM

4.1. Introduction

The trans-European conventional rail system, to which Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC applies and of which the subsystems are parts, is an integrated system for which the consistency must be verified. This consistency has been checked in relation to the development of the specifications within this TSI, its interfaces with respect to the systems in which it is integrated and also the operating and maintenance rules for the railway.

Taking account of all the applicable essential requirements, the aspect of safety in railway tunnels of the subsystems CR INS/ENE/CCS/OPE/RST is characterised by the provisions of chapter 4.2.

This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded subsystems (infrastructure, energy, control-command and signalling, operation, rolling stock) in tunnels. The conditions of application for renewed and upgraded subsystems are defined in art 14.3 of Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC, and an implementation strategy is outlined in chapter 7. The requirements for upgrade or renewal (described in chapter 7) may be less extensive than those for the target subsystems (described in chapter 4).

The functional and technical specifications of the domain and its interfaces, described in sections 4.2 and 4.3, shall not impose the use of specific technologies or technical solutions, except where this is strictly necessary for the interoperability of the trans-European High Speed rail network. Innovative solutions, which do not fulfil the requirements, specified in this TSI and/or which are not assessable as stated in this TSI require new specifications and/or new assessment methods. In order to allow technological innovation, these specifications and assessment methods shall be developed by the process described in clause 6.2.4.

4.2. Functional and technical specifications of the subsystems

In the light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the functional and technical specifications of those aspects specific to tunnel safety in the above-mentioned subsystems are as follows:

4.2.1. Overview of the specifications Subsystem Infrastructure Installation of switches and crossings Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms Fire protection requirements for structures Fire safety requirements for building material Fire detection Facilities for self-rescue, evacuation and rescue in the event of an incident Definition of safe area General Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface. Cross-passages to the other tube Alternative technical solutions Escape walkways Emergency lighting on escape routes Emergency communication Access for rescue services Rescue areas outside tunnels Water supply Subsystem Energy Segmentation of overhead line or conductor rails Overhead line or conductor rail earthing Electricity supply Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels Reliability of electrical installations Subsystem control-command and signalling Hot axle box detectors Subsystem rolling stock Material properties for rolling stock Fire extinguishers for passenger rolling stock Fire protection for freight trains Running capability Driver's protection Fire protection of trains with passengers and freight or road vehicles Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock Additional measures for running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board General objectives and required running capability for passenger trains Requirements for brakes Requirement for traction On board fire detectors Communication means on trains Emergency brake override Emergency lighting system in the train Switching off of air conditioning in the train Escape design of passenger rolling stock Passengers' emergency exits Passenger access door Rescue service's information and access Operating Rules Checking the condition of trains and appropriate actions Before the train commences its service While the train is running Safety-relevant equipment Hot axle box incidents Emergency rule Tunnel emergency plan and exercises Content Identification Exercises Earthing procedures Route Book Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers Co-ordination between tunnel control centres Maintenance Rules Inspection of tunnel condition Maintenance of rolling stock Passenger rolling stock Freight rolling stock Professional Qualifications Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff Health and Safety Conditions Self-rescue device

4.2.2. Subsystem Infrastructure For the installation of safety equipment in tunnels, allowance shall be made for the actions of aerodynamic effects produced by passing trains.

4.2.2.1. Installation of switches and crossings The infrastructure manager shall ensure that only the minimum number of switch and crossing layouts is installed in accordance with the design, safety and operational requirements.

4.2.2.2. Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms For equipment rooms and emergency exits, physical systems, e.g. locks, shall be used to prevent unauthorised access from outside; from inside, it shall always be possible to open the doors for evacuation.

4.2.2.3. Fire protection requirements for structures This specification applies to all tunnels, irrespective of their length. The integrity of the structure shall be maintained, in the event of fire, for a period of time sufficiently long to permit self-rescue and evacuation of passengers and staff and the intervention of rescue services without the risk of structural collapse. The fire performance of the finished tunnel surface, whether in situ rock or concrete lining, has to be assessed. It shall withstand the temperature of the fire for a particular duration of time. The specified ‘temperature-time curve’ (EUREKA-curve) is given in the following figure. It is to be used for the design of concrete structures only.

4.2.2.4. Fire safety requirements for building material This specification applies to all tunnels, irrespective of their length. This specification applies to building material and installations inside tunnels other than structures, which are covered in 4.2.2.3. They shall have low flammability, be non-flammable or protected, depending on the design requirements. The material for tunnel substructure shall fulfil the requirements of classification A2 of EN 13501-1:2002. Non-structural panels and other equipment shall fulfil the requirements of classification B of EN 13501-1:2002.

4.2.2.5. Fire detection Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or outside the tunnel with safety installations which are necessary for the following functions: self rescue and evacuation, emergency communication, rescue and fire fighting and traction power supply. They shall be equipped with detectors which alert the infrastructure manager in case of fire.

4.2.2.6. Facilities for self-rescue, evacuation and rescue in the event of an incident

4.2.2.6.1. Definition of safe area Definition: a safe area is a place inside or outside a tunnel where all of the following criteria apply — Conditions are survivable — Access for people is possible aided and unaided — People may accomplish self-rescue if the opportunity is available, or may wait to be rescued by the rescue services using procedures detailed in the emergency plan — Communication shall be possible, either by mobile phone or by fixed connection to the control centre of the IM.

4.2.2.6.2. General The design of a tunnel shall take into account the need for provision of facilities to allow the self-rescue and evacuation of train passengers and staff and allow the rescue services to rescue people in the event of an incident in a tunnel. The technical solutions described in 4.2.2.6.3 to 4.2.2.6.5 fulfil this requirement and one of them shall be selected

4.2.2.6.3. Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface. These exits shall be provided at least every 1 000 m. The minimum dimensions of lateral and or vertical emergency exits to the surface shall be 1,50 m wide and 2,25 m high. The minimum dimensions of the doors opening shall be 1,40 m wide × 2,00 m high. Requirements for exits that function as main access routes for rescue services are described in 4.2.2.11. Access for rescue services. All exits shall be equipped with lighting and signs.

4.2.2.6.4. Cross-passages to the other tube Cross-passages between adjacent independent tunnels enable the adjacent tunnel to be employed as a safe area. They must be equipped with lights and signs. Minimum dimensions of the cross-passage are 2,25 m height × 1,50 m width. The minimum dimensions of the doors are 2,00 m height and 1,40 m width. Cross-passages in conformity with these requirements shall be provided at least every 500 m.

4.2.2.6.5. Alternative technical solutions Alternative technical solutions providing a safe area with a minimum equivalent safety level are permitted. A technical study shall be undertaken to justify the alternative solution which must be agreed by the Relevant National Authority.

4.2.2.7. Escape walkways This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 500 m in length. Walkways shall be constructed in a single track tunnel on at least one side of the track and in a double track tunnel on both sides of the tunnel. In wider tunnels with more than two tracks access to a walkway shall be possible from each track. The width of the walkway shall be a minimum of 0,75 m. The minimum vertical clearance above the walkway shall be 2,25 m. The minimum level of the walkway shall be within the height of the rail. Local constrictions caused by obstacles in the escape area shall be avoided. The presence of obstacles shall not reduce the minimum width to less than 0,7 m, and the length of the obstacle shall not exceed 2 m. Handrails shall be installed approximately 1 m above walkway providing a route to a safe area. Handrails shall be placed outside the required minimum clearance of the walkway. Handrails shall be angled at 30o to 40o to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel at the entrance to and exit from an obstacle.

4.2.2.8. Emergency lighting on escape routes This specification applies to all continuous tunnels of more than 500 m length. Emergency lighting shall be provided to guide passengers and staff to a safe area in the event of emergency. Illumination by means other than electricity is acceptable, provided that it fulfils the intended function. Illumination is required as follows: Single-track tube: one side (same as walkway) Double-track tube: both sides. Position of lights: above walkway, as low as possible, not to interfere with the free space for the passage of persons, or built-in into handrails. The luminance shall be at least 1 lux at walkway level. Autonomy and reliability: guaranteed power supply for emergency or other requirements to ensure availability for at least 90 minutes. If the emergency light is switched off under normal operating conditions, it shall be possible to switch it on by both of the following means — manually from inside the tunnel at intervals of 250 m — by the tunnel operator using remote control

4.2.2.9. Escape signage This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 100 m length. The escape signage indicates the emergency exits, the distance and the direction to a safe area. All signs shall be designed according to the requirements of Directive 92/58/EC of 24 June 1992 concerning the provision of health and/or safety signs at work and to ISO 3864-1. Escape signs shall be installed on the sidewalls. The maximum distance between escape signs shall be 50 m. Signs shall be provided in the tunnel to indicate the position of emergency equipment, where such equipment is present.

4.2.2.10. Emergency communication Radio communication between the train and the control centre shall be provided in each tunnel with GSM-R. There is no need for additional communication systems such as emergency telephones. Radio continuity shall be provided for permitting the rescue services to communicate with their on-site command facilities. The system shall allow the rescue services to use their own communication equipment.

4.2.2.11. Access for rescue services Rescue services shall be able to enter the tunnel in the case of an incident, via the tunnel portals and/or appropriate emergency exits (see 4.2.2.6.3). These access routes shall be at least 2,25 m wide and 2,25 m high. The IM shall describe in the emergency plan those facilities dedicated as access routes. If road accessibility is required in the emergency plan, it should be as close as possible to the planned rescue area. Alternative means of access shall be described in the emergency plan.

4.2.2.12. Rescue areas outside tunnels Rescue areas of minimum 500 m2 shall be provided near the tunnel at the access roads. Existing roads can be considered as rescue areas. If road access is not reasonably practicable, alternative solutions shall be provided in consultation with the rescue services

4.2.2.13. Water supply Water supply shall be provided at access points to the tunnel in consultation with the rescue services. The capacity shall be minimum 800 litres per minute for two hours. The water source can be a hydrant or any water supply of minimum 100 m3 such as a basin, river or other means. The method for bringing the water to the site of the incident shall be described in the emergency plan.

4.2.3. Subsystem Energy This section applies to the infrastructure part of the subsystem Energy.

4.2.3.1. Segmentation of overhead line or conductor rails This specification applies to tunnels of more than 5 km in length. The traction energy supply system in tunnels shall be divided up into sections, each not exceeding 5 km. This specification applies only if the signalling system permits the presence of more than one train in the tunnel on each track simultaneously. The location of the switches shall be arranged in accordance with the requirements of the tunnel emergency plan, and so that the number of switches in the tunnel is minimised. Remote control and switching of each ‘switching section’ shall be provided. A means of communication means and lighting shall be provided at the switching location to enable safe manual operation and maintenance of the switching equipment.

4.2.3.2. Overhead line or conductor rail earthing Earthing devices shall be provided at tunnel access points and close to the separation points between sections (see 4.2.3.1). These shall be either fitted manually or remote controlled fixed installations. Communication and lighting means necessary for earthing operations shall be provided. Procedures and responsibilities for earthing shall be defined between the infrastructure manager (IM) and the rescue services in the emergency plan (See 4.4.4 Earthing procedures)

4.2.3.3. Electricity supply The electricity power distribution system in the tunnel shall be suitable for rescue services' equipment in accordance with the emergency plan for the tunnel. Some national rescue services groups may be self sufficient in relation to power supply. In this case, the option of not providing power supply facilities for the use of such groups may be appropriate. Such a decision, however, must be described in the emergency plan.

4.2.3.4. Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels In case of fire, exposed cables shall have the characteristics of low flammability, low fire spread, low toxicity and low smoke density. These requirements are fulfilled by compatibility of the cables with EN 50267-2-1 (1998), EN 50267-2-2 (1998) and EN 50268-2 (1999)

4.2.3.5. Reliability of electrical installations Electrical installations relevant for safety (Fire detection, emergency lighting, emergency communication and any other system identified by the Infrastructure Manager or contracting entity as vital to the safety of passengers in the tunnel) shall be protected against damage arising from mechanical impact, heat or fire. The distribution system shall be designed to enable the system to tolerate unavoidable damage by (for example) energizing alternative links. The electrical supply shall be capable of full operation in the event of the loss of any one major element. Emergency lights and communication systems shall be provided with 90 minutes backup.

4.2.4. Subsystem control-command and signalling This section applies to the trackside part of the CCS Subsystem.

4.2.4.1. Hot axle box detectors Line-side hot axle box detection or predictive equipments shall be installed on networks with tunnels at strategic positions so that there is a high probability tof detecting a hot axle box before the train enters a tunnel and that a defective train can be stopped ahead of the tunnel(s). L-IM (Infrastructure Manager) għandu jagħżel rilevaturi tal-kaxxa ta’ fus jaħraq maġenb il-linja ferrovjarja u l-post tagħhom. L-RU (Railway Undertaing) għandha tinkludi tagħrif dwar dawn fil-Ktieb tar-Rotta.

4.2.5. Subsystem rolling stock

4.2.5.1. Material properties for rolling stock The selection of materials and components shall take into account the fire behaviour properties. Passenger rolling stock: clause 4.2.7.2.2 of HS RST TSI applies also to CR rolling stock. In addition, the requirements of clause 4.2.10.2 (Material requirements) of the CR LOC&PAS TSI shall apply to CR rolling stock. [l-Anness mhux disponibbli bil-Malti] Freight rolling stock: See clause 4.2.7.2.2.4 of CR RST TSI (freight wagons, version EN07 dated 5.1.2005) Material requirement

4.2.5.2. Fire extinguishers for passenger rolling stock The provisions of clause 4.2.7.2.3.2 of HS RST TSI apply also for CR passenger rolling stock.

4.2.5.3. Fire protection for freight trains

4.2.5.3.1. Running capability No specific running capability with a fire on board is requested for freight traction units or wagons (in addition to the specifications of CR RST TSI freight wagons) although the objective of bringing the train out of the tunnel also applies to freight trains. On board fire detectors shall be specified for freight traction units as for passenger power units (4.2.5.6).

4.2.5.3.2. Driver's protection Minimum requirement for fire protection of the driver: Traction units shall have a fire barrier to protect the driver's cab. The fire barriers shall satisfy requirements for integrity for a minimum of 15 minutes. The fire performance test shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements of EN 1363-1 partition test. (Remark: protection of the driver see also 4.7.1)

4.2.5.3.3. Fire protection for trains with passengers and freight or road vehicles In trains transporting passengers and freight or road vehicles, the passenger coaches shall fulfil the relevant prescriptions of chapter 4.2.5 of this TSI. National laws can specify additional requirements in the field of operation, in order to account for the additional risk of such trains, as long as these requirements do not prevent the running of trains complying with Directive 2001/16/EC as amended by Directive 2004/50/EC. (Exceptions for national, bilateral, multilateral or multinational agreements are listed in chapter 7.4)). Traction units shall fulfil the requirements for passenger locomotives. For freight wagons, the relevant TSIs apply.

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4.2.5.4. Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock — The requirements of clause 4.2.7.2.3.3 (Fire resistance) of the high speed RST TSI apply to HS rolling stock. — The requirements of clause 4.2.7.2.3.3 (Fire resistance) of the high speed RST TSI and the requirements of clause 4.2.10.5 (Fire barriers) of the conventional LOC&PAS TSI apply to CR rolling stock. [l-Anness mhux disponibbli bil-Malti]

▼B

4.2.5.5. Additional measures for running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board:

4.2.5.5.1. General objectives and required running capability for passenger trains This section includes measures which shall be achieved to improve the probability that a passenger train with a fire on board will continue to operate for: — 4 minutes for rolling stock in fire safety category A according to 1.1.3.1. This shall be deemed to be satisfied by fulfilment of the requirements for brakes (4.2.5.5.2) — 15 minutes for rolling stock in fire safety category B according to 1.1.3.2. This shall be deemed to be satisfied by fulfilment of the requirements for brakes and traction (4.2.5.5.2 and 4.2.5.5.3) For tunnels longer than 20 km, the need for additional infrastructure and operations safety measures shall be considered. A fire safety category B train complying with the requirements of the relevant TSIs shall not be prevented from operating in tunnels longer than 20 km.

4.2.5.5.2. Requirements for brakes The requirements for brakes in clause 4.2.7.2.4 of the HS RST TSI shall apply also to CR rolling stock of fire safety categories A and B.

4.2.5.5.3. Requirement for traction The requirements for traction in clause 4.2.7.2.4 of the HS RST TSI shall apply also to CR rolling stock of fire safety category B.

4.2.5.6. On board fire detectors The requirements of clause 4.2.7.2.3.1 of the HS RST TSI apply also to CR rolling stock.

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4.2.5.7. Communication means on trains — The requirements of clause 4.2.5.1 (Public address system) of the high speed RST TSI apply to HS rolling stock. — The requirements of clause 4.2.5.2 (Public address system: audible communication system) of the conventional LOC&PAS TSI apply to CR rolling stock. [l-Anness mhux disponibbli bil-Malti]

4.2.5.8. Emergency brake override — The requirements in clause 4.2.5.3 (Passenger alarm) of the high speed RST TSI apply to HS rolling stock. — The requirements in clause 4.2.5.3 (Passenger alarm: functional requirements) of the conventional LOC&PAS TSI apply to CR rolling stock. [l-Anness mhux disponibbli bil-Malti]

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4.2.5.9. Sistema ta’ dwal ta’ emerġenza fil-ferrovija Id-dispożizzjonijiet fil-Klawżola 4.2.7.12 “Dwal ta’ emerġenza” tal-HS RST TSI japplikaw anki għall-vetturi ferrovjarji tal-passiġġieri konvenzjonali, ħlief li hija meħtieġa awtonomija ta’ 90 minuta wara l-provvista ewlenija tal-enerġija tkun falliet.

▼B

4.2.5.10. Switching off of air conditioning in the train The provisions in clause 4.2.7.12.1 HS RST TSI ‘Passenger and train crew areas equipped with air conditioning’ apply also to CR passenger rolling stock

4.2.5.11. Escape design of passenger rolling stock

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4.2.5.11.1. Passengers' emergency exits — The requirements in clause 4.2.7.1.1 (Passengers' emergency exits) of the high speed RST TSI apply to HS rolling stock. — The requirements in clause 4.2.10.4 (Passenger evacuation) of the conventional LOC&PAS TSI apply to CR rolling stock. [l-Anness mhux disponibbli bil-Malti]

▼B

4.2.5.11.2. Passenger access door The doors shall be provided with an individual internal and external emergency-opening device in conformity with clause 4.2.2.4.2.1, letter g, of the HS RST TSI.

4.2.5.12. Rescue service's information and access The rescue services shall be provided with a description of rolling stock to permit them to handle emergencies. In particular information should be provided on how to obtain access to the interior of the rolling stock.

4.3. Functional and technical specifications of the interfaces

4.3.1. General The SRT TSI being a transverse TSI specifies measures relating to several other subsystems in one of the following ways: — Simply referring to a specific clause in the other subsystem — Referring to a specific clause in the other subsystem and completing it with particular requirements for railway tunnels (e.g. clause 4.5.1 Inspection of tunnel condition) — Referring to a specific clause in the other subsystem and declaring that this clause shall also apply to a subsystem for which currently no TSI exists (e.g. clause 4.2.5.2 ‘Fire extinguishers for passenger rolling stock’ refers to HS RST TSI 4.2.7.2.3.2 and states that it shall apply also for CR rolling stock). The list of interfaces is given below. References to clauses in other TSIs have to be considered as recommendations for the CR TSIs that are referred to.

4.3.2. Interfaces with the Infrastructure subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ HS INS TSI 4.2.2.7 Escape walkways 4.2.23.2 Emergency walkways in tunnels 4.5.1. Inspection of tunnel condition 4.5.1 Maintenance plan The references of interfaces to CR INS are to be specified at a later stage, when the CR INS TSI is available

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4.3.2.1. Passaġġi ta’ ħruġ Id-definizzjoni ta’ passaġġi ta’ ħruġ hija spjegata fit-taqsima 4.2.2.7 ta’ din it-TSI.

▼B

4.3.2.2. Inspection of tunnel condition The inspection of tunnel condition is based on the general specifications of the maintenance plan in clause 4.5.1 of HS TSI INS and of the future CR TSI INS with the additional requirements described in clause 4.5.1. of this TSI.

4.3.3. Interfaces with the Energy subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ HS ENE TSI 4.2.3.1 Segmentation of over head line or conductor rails 4.2.7. Continuity of power supply in case of disturbances The references of interfaces to CR ENE are to be specified at a later stage, when the CR ENE TSI is available

4.3.3.1. Sectioning of traction energy supply systems The SRT clause 4.2.3.1 Segmentation of overhead line or conductor rails and the HS ENE TSI clause 4.2.7 deal with the same issues: sectioning of the overhead contact line system and continuity of operation. They are linked.

4.3.4. Interfaces with the Control-Command-Signalling subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ HS CCS TSI CR CCS TSI 4.2.4.1 Detectors for hot axle boxes 4.2.4.1 The hot axle box detectors have to be able to detect a hot axle box. The SRT TSI defines no subsystem specification, only the location of the hot axle box detectors.

4.3.5. Interfaces with the Traffic Management and Operation subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ HS OPE TSI CR OPE TSI 4.4.1 Checking the condition of trains and appropriate actions 4.2.2.7.1 4.2.3.3 4.2.3.3.2 4.2.3.6.3 4.2.3.7 4.4.3 Tunnel emergency plan and exercises 4.2.3.7 4.4.5 Route book 4.2.1.2.2 4.4.6 Provisions of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers 4.2.3.7 4.6.1 Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff 4.6 and annexes H and J

4.3.5.1. Tunnel emergency plan and exercises In addition to the requirements for the management of emergency situations as described in clause 4.2.3.7 of the CR OPE TSI, the specific requirements for a tunnel emergency plan are described in clause 4.4.3 of this TSI.

4.3.5.2. Route book On lines with tunnels the Route Book has to specify in addition to the requirements described in clause 4.2.1.2.2 of CR OPE TSI, the requirements described in clause 4.4.5 of this TSI.

4.3.5.3. Provisions of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers In addition to the requirements for management of the emergency situations as described in clause 4.2.3.7 of the CR OPE TSI, the tunnel safety specific requirements are described in clause 4.4.6 of this TSI.

4.3.5.4. Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff In addition to the requirements of CR OPE TSI 4.6 dealing with the professional and linguistic competency and the assessment process required for staff to attain this competency, the SRT TSI clause 4.6.1 specifies the competences required to manage degraded situations in tunnels.

4.3.6. Interfaces with the rolling stock subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ HS RST TSI CR WAG TSI 4.2.5.1 Material properties for rolling stock 4.2.7.2.2 4.2.7.2.1 4.2.5.2 Fire extinguishers for rolling stock 4.2.7.2.3.2 4.2.5.3 Fire protection for freight trains 4.2.5.4 Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock 4.2.7.2.3.3 4.2.5.5 Additional measures to improve running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board 4.2.7.2.4 4.2.5.6 On board fire detectors 4.2.7.2.3.1 4.2.5.7 Communication means on trains 4.2.5.1 4.2.5.8 Emergency brake override 4.2.5.3 ▼M2 4.2.5.9 Sistema ta’ dwal ta’ emerġenza fil-ferrovija 4.2.7.12 4.2.5.10 It-tifi tal-arja kundizzjonata fil-ferrovija 4.2.7.11.1 ▼B 4.2.5.11 Escape design of passenger rolling stock 4.2.7.1.1 A-C 4.2.2.4.2.1 g The references to interfaces with CR RST other than freight wagons are to be specified at a later stage, when the relevant CR RST TSI is available.

4.3.6.1. Material properties for rolling stock Clause 4.2.5.1 specifies the fire behaviour properties of materials and components. It requires the same properties for CR passenger rolling stock as for HS rolling stock and therefore refers to clause 4.2.7.2.2 of the HS RST TSI. For CR freight rolling stock, the relevant properties are defined in clause 4.2.7.2.1 of the CR WAG TSI.

4.3.6.2. Other rolling stock specifications The specifications 4.2.5.2, 4.2.5.4 to 4.2.5.11 of the SRT TSI for CR rolling stock are the same as those for HS rolling stock.

4.3.7. Interfaces with the PRM subsystem



►M2 SRT TSI ◄ PRM TSI 4.2.2.7 Escape walkways 4.2.2.3 Wheelchair spaces

4.3.7.1. Escape walkways The dimensions for escape walkways are chosen in relation to the CR PRM TSI, where a width of 0,75 m is requested for the use of wheelchairs.

4.4. Operating rules

The following operating rules do not form any part of the assessment of the subsystems.

In light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the operating rules specific to tunnel safety in the subsystems concerned by this TSI are as follows:

4.4.1. Checking the condition of trains and appropriate actions The condition of safety relevant equipment on the train shall be checked — During maintenance of rolling stock, by the RU or by the entity responsible for the maintenance of the rolling stock (See section 4.5.2) — Before the train begins its service, by the RU, — While the train is running, by the RU. This requirement completes CR OPE TSI 4.2.2.7

4.4.1.1. Before the train commences its service. The requirement of CR OPE TSI 4.2.3.3 is important for SRT

4.4.1.2. While the train is running The requirements of CR OPE TSI 4.2.3.3.2, 4.2.3.6.3 and 4.2.3.7 are important for SRT

4.4.1.2.1. Safety-relevant equipment If one of the following items of equipment is found to be defective while the train is running: — Public address system, — Emergency lighting, — Door unlocking system — Emergency brake override system — Fire detection — Train radio The RU shall have plans for continuation of safe operation of trains under the resulting degraded conditions or to stop. The IM shall be informed immediately by the train crew.

4.4.1.2.2. Hot axle box incidents If a hot axle box is detected: — The defective train shall stop as soon as possible at an appropriate place ahead of the tunnel(s). — The IM shall be informed of the location where the train stops immediately — The defective parts shall be checked by the train crew — The RU shall have rules to permit safe operation to continue under the resulting degraded conditions.

4.4.2. Emergency rule The IM's operation rules shall adopt and develop in more detail, if necessary, the principle that in case of an incident (except a derailment, that requires an immediate stop) — The train shall be brought to a halt before entering a tunnel, or driven out of a tunnel. — In tunnels with underground stations, the train may be evacuated at an underground platform. The procedures for this situation shall be developed by the IM and the RU and be detailed in the emergency plan In all cases, the IM shall be informed immediately by the train crew and no additional scheduled train shall be permitted to enter the tunnel.

4.4.3. Tunnel emergency plan and exercises An emergency plan shall be developed under the direction of the Infrastructure Manager, in co-operation, where appropriate, with the railway undertakings, the rescue services and the relevant authorities for each tunnel. It shall fulfil the requirements of CR OPE TSI 4.2.3.7 ‘Managing an emergency situation’ and meet the following additional specifications. If the tunnels on the route are similar, the emergency plan may be generic.

4.4.3.1. Content The emergency plan shall be consistent with the self-rescue, evacuation and rescue facilities provided. The emergency plan shall contain as a minimum: — The tasks, the names, the addresses and telephone numbers of all relevant organisations; any changes in this respect shall be reported immediately and the emergency plan updated accordingly by the IM. — The identification of the tunnel must be unique, and a precise description and plan of the access routes for the rescue services — The measures provided and the strategy for evacuation of passengers from the tunnel in the event of an incident in the tunnel. In the event of a prolonged stop (defined in 2.2 Risk scenarios), it shall be possible to make a decision and to start an appropriate course of action leading to evacuation of passengers (start real evacuation or have an appropriate evacuation train set in movement) within 60 minutes after the train has come to a rest. The decision must be based on an assessment of the relative risks of the passengers remaining on board the train or being moved to a safe area. — Isolation and Earthing procedures (see 4.4.4)

4.4.3.2. Identification All doors leading to emergency exits or cross-passages (see 4.2.2.6.) are to be uniquely defined and marked on both sides. This identification shall be defined in the emergency plan and in the Route Book and shall be used in all communications between railway undertakings, the infrastructure manager and the rescue services. Any relevant change in this respect must be reported immediately; the emergency plan has to be updated appropriately by the IM and the Route book by the RU according to clause 4.2.1.2.2.2 CR OPE TSI.

4.4.3.3. Exercises Prior to opening of a single tunnel or a series of tunnels, a full-scale exercise comprising evacuation and rescue procedures, involving all categories of personnel defined within the emergency plan, shall take place. The emergency plan shall define how all organisations involved can be familiarised with the infrastructure and how often visits to the tunnel and table top or other exercises have to take place.

4.4.4. Isolation and Earthing procedures If the rescue services require disconnection of the traction power supply, they shall receive a guarantee that the relevant sections of catenaries or conductor rails have been disconnected before entering the tunnel or a section of the tunnel. It is the responsibility of the infrastructure manager to disconnect the traction power supply. The responsibility for earthing shall be defined in the emergency plan. Provision shall be made for isolation of the section in which the incident has taken place.

4.4.5. Route Book The Route Book defined in CR OPE TSI 4.2.1.2.2.1 shall indicate the relevant safety information for tunnels.

4.4.6. Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers As specified in the CR OPE TSI 4.2.3.7 the RUs shall have processes to inform passengers of on board emergency and safety procedures in tunnels. Such information shall be provided in the language of the country the train is running in as a minimum, plus English. As far as possible, visual information (pictograms) shall be used. The core content and minimum requirement for information should be: — Keep corridors, doors, emergency exits and fire extinguishers free of luggage, bicycles etc — In case of fire, and if you are able to do so, try to extinguish the fire by using the on-board extinguishers — Alert the train crew. — If there is no immediate danger, await instructions from the train crew. — If necessary or if instructed move to another coach — Once the train is stationary, follow the instructions given by the train crew. — If leaving the train in the event of an emergency follow the emergency exit signs — Beware of trains travelling on adjacent tracks

4.4.7. Co-ordination between tunnel control centres Co-ordination procedures between the relevant control centres (e.g. energy, operations, tunnel installations) involved shall be in accordance with the requirements of the emergency plan.

4.5. Maintenance rules

In light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the maintenance rules specific to tunnel safety in the subsystems concerned by this TSI are as follows:

4.5.1. Inspection of tunnel condition This specification applies to all tunnels, independently of their length. In the maintenance plan, established by the HS INS TSI 4.5.1 and also by the future CR INS TSI, the following additional inspection rules have to be taken into account: — annual visual inspections carried out by the IM — detailed inspections according to the IM's maintenance plan — special inspections after accidents, natural events that may have affected the tunnel condition — after and during implementation of renewal and/or upgrading works and before restoring train operation in a tunnel, an inspection has to be undertaken, with appropriate means, to ensure that the stability of the structure is guaranteed and that there are no infringements of the gauge.

4.5.2. Maintenance of rolling stock

4.5.2.1. Passenger rolling stock The maintenance plan for rolling stock used to form a passenger train shall specifically include checking the following safety related equipment: — Public address system — Emergency lighting — Door unlocking system — Emergency brake override system — Switching off of air conditioning — Train radio — On-board fire detectors (when installed) test of functioning. — Escape design

4.5.2.2. Freight rolling stock The maintenance plan for traction units used to form a freight train shall specifically include checking the presence of at least one self-rescue device on a traction unit.

4.6. Professional qualifications

The professional qualifications of staff required for the operation specific to tunnel safety in the subsystems concerned by this TSI and in accordance with the operating rules in clause 4.4. of this TSI are as follows:

4.6.1. Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff All professional staff driving and accompanying a train, as well as staff that authorise train movements, shall have the knowledge and the ability to apply that knowledge to manage degraded situations in the event of an incident. For staff undertaking the tasks of driving and/or accompanying trains, the general requirements are specified in CR OPE TSI 4.6 ‘Professional qualifications’ and annexes H (Minimum elements relevant to professional qualification for the task of driving a train) and J (Minimum elements relevant to professional qualification for the tasks associated with accompanying trains). All train crew shall have knowledge of the appropriate safety behaviour in tunnels and in particular be able to evacuate a train in a tunnel. This involves instructing the passengers to go to the next coach or to exit the train, and to lead them outside the train to a safe place. Auxiliary train staff (e.g. catering, cleaning), who do not form part of the train crew as defined below shall, in addition to their basic instruction, be trained to support the actions of the train crew ( 4 ). Professional training of engineers and managers responsible for maintaining and operating the subsystems shall include the subject of safety in railway tunnels.

4.7. Health and safety conditions

The health and safety conditions of staff required for operation specific to tunnel safety in the subsystems concerned by this TSI and for the implementation of the TSI are as follows:

4.7.1. Self-rescue device Manned traction units of freight trains shall be equipped with a self-rescue device for the driver and other persons on board, satisfying the specifications of one of the two standards EN 402:2003 or 403:2004. The RU has to choose one out of the two different solutions defined in these standards

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4.8. Reġistru tal-infrastruttura u reġistru Ewropew tat-tipi ta’ vetturi awtorizzati

Id-dejta li trid tiġi pprovduta għar-reġistri speċifikati fl-Artikoli 34 u 35 tad-Direttiva 2008/57/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill ( 5 ) hija dik indikata fid-Deċiżjoni ta Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2011/633/UE tal-15 ta’ Settembru 2011 dwar l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet komuni tar-reġistru tal-infrastruttura ferrovjarja ( 6 ) u d-Deċiżjoni ta’ Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2011/665/UE tal-4 ta’ Ottubru 2011 dwar ir-reġistru Ewropew tat-tipi ta’ vetturi ferrovjarji awtorizzati ( 7 ).

▼B

5. INTEROPERABILITY CONSTITUENTS

There are no interoperability constituent defined in the SRT TSI.

6. ASSESSMENT OF CONFORMITY AND/OR SUITABILITY FOR USE OF THE CONSTITUENTS AND VERIFICATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM

6.1. Interoperability constituents

Not applicable, since no interoperability constituent has been defined in SRT TSI.

6.2. Subsystems

6.2.1. Conformity assessment (general) The contracting entity such as a railway undertaking, an infrastructure manager, a rolling stock manufacturer or an authorised representative established within the community shall lodge an application for assessment of conformity of the Rolling Stock or Energy or Control-Command and Signalling or Infrastructure subsystems with a Notified Body of its choice At the moment, a distinction has to be made between: — the subsystems for which a TSI already exists: CR CCS, CR OPE, CR RST (wagons) — the subsystems for which a TSI does not already exist: CR RST other than wagons, CR ENE, CR INS For the first situation, the assessment against the SRT TSI has to be made within the framework of the assessment of the relevant subsystem against its specific TSI. For the second situation (CR RST other than wagons, CR INS and CR ENE), the assessment is either described in this chapter or in the relevant chapters of the existing HS TSIs (RST, INS, ENE). Where the specification in ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ chapter 4 is adequate, no further information for assessment is provided in this chapter. The reference is made in the following table.



Specification Reference 4.2.2.1. Installation of switches and crossings ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.1 4.2.2.2 Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.2 4.2.2.3 Fire protection requirements for structures ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.3 4.2.2.4 Fire safety requirements for building material ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.2.4 4.2.2.5 Fire detection ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.2.5 4.2.2.6 Facilities for self-rescue, evacuation and rescue in the event of an incident ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.4 4.2.2.7 Escape walkways ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.2.7 4.2.2.8 Emergency lighting on escape routes ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.2.8 4.2.2.9 Escape signage ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.2.9 4.2.2.10 Emergency communication ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.2.11 Access for rescue services ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.2.12 Rescue areas outside tunnels ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.2.13 Water supply ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.3.1 Segmentation of overhead line or conductor rails ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.3.1 4.2.3.2 Overhead line or conductor rail earthing ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.3.3 Electricity supply ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.5 4.2.3.4 Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.3.4 4.2.3.5 Reliability of electrical installations ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.6 4.2.4.1 Hot axle box detectors ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.7.7 4.2.5.1 Material properties for rolling stock HS RST TSI/CR WAG TSI 4.2.5.2 Fire extinguishers for passenger rolling stock HS RST TSI 4.2.5.3 Fire protection for freight trains ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.5.3 4.2.5.4 Fire barriers for passenger rolling stock HS RST TSI 4.2.5.5 Additional measures for running capability of passenger rolling stock with a fire on board: ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.5.5 4.2.5.6 On board fire detectors HS RST TSI 4.2.5.7 Communication means on trains HS RST TSI 4.2.5.8 Emergency brake override ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.5.8 4.2.5.9 Emergency lighting system in the train ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.5.9 4.2.5.10 Switching off of air conditioning in the train HS RST TSI 4.2.5.11 Escape design of passenger rolling stock ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.2.5.11 4.2.5.12 Rescue service's information and access ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.8.1 4.4.1 Checking the condition of trains and appropriate actions CR OPE TSI 4.4.2 Emergency rule CR OPE TSI 4.4.3 Tunnel emergency plan and exercises CR OPE TSI 4.4.4 Earthing procedures CR OPE TSI 4.4.5 Route Book CR OPE TSI 4.4.6 Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers CR OPE TSI 4.4.7 Co-ordination between tunnel control centres CR OPE TSI 4.5.1 Inspection of tunnel condition ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.5 4.5.2 Maintenance of Rolling Stock ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.5 4.6.1. Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 4.6.1 4.7.1. Self-rescue device ►M2 SRT TSI ◄ 6.2.8.2 This Notified Body shall have been authorised: — Either to assess each of the subsystems mentioned above — Or to assess one of the subsystems only, but, in such a case, it shall contract arrangements with other notified bodies notified for assessment of the other subsystems for the assessment of the relevant requirements concerning the other subsystems (see section 4.2 of this TSI) The EC declaration(s) of verification in accordance with Article 18(1) and Annex VI of Directive 2001/16/EC modified by Directive 2004/50/EC, related to the subsystem(s) concerned shall be drawn up by the applicant(s). The EC declaration(s) of verification is/are required to obtain authorisation to place the subsystem(s) into service. The conformity assessment of a Subsystem shall be performed according to one or a combination of the following modules according to clause 6.2.2 and Annex E of this TSI: Modules for the EC verification of subsystems (see Annex F) Module SB: Type examination for design and development phases Module SD: Product quality management system for production phase Module SF: Product verification for production phase Module SG: Unit verification Module SH2: Full quality management system with design examination for design, development and production phases The approval process and the contents of the assessment shall be defined between the applicant and a Notified Body according to the requirements defined in this TSI and in conformance with the rules set out in section 7 of this TSI.

6.2.2. Conformity assessment procedures (modules) The applicant shall choose one of the modules or module combinations indicated in the following table.



Table Assessment procedures Subsystem to be assessed Module SB+SD Module SB+SF Module SG Module SH2 Rolling Stock Subsystem X X X Energy subsystem X X X X Infrastructure subsystem X X Control-Command and Signalling X X The characteristics of the subsystem to be assessed during the relevant phases are indicated in Annex E. The applicant shall confirm that each subsystem produced complies with the type. An ‘X’ in column 4 of table E in Annex E indicates that the relevant characteristics shall be verified by testing each single subsystem. The assessment of the maintenance subsystem is described in clause 6.2.5.

6.2.3. Existing solutions If an existing solution is already assessed for an application under comparable conditions and in service, then the following process applies: The applicant shall demonstrate that results of tests and verifications for the previous assessment of the application are in conformity with the requirements of this TSI. In this case the previous type assessment of the subsystem related characteristics shall remain valid in the new application.

6.2.4. Innovative solutions If a subsystem includes an innovative solution as defined in section 4.1, the manufacturer or the contracting entity shall state the deviation from the relevant clause of the TSI and submit them to the European Railway Agency (ERA). The ERA shall produce and finalise the appropriate functional and interface specifications of this solution and develop the assessment methods. The appropriate functional and interface specifications and assessment methods shall be incorporated in the TSI by the revision process. After entry into force of a decision of the Commission, taken in accordance with Article 21(2) of Directive 2001/16/EC, as modified by Directive 2004/50/EC, the innovative solution is permitted to be used before being incorporated into the TSI.

6.2.5. Assessment of maintenance According to article 18.3 of Directive 2001/16/EC as modified by Directive 2004/50/EC, the Notified Body shall compile the Technical File, which includes the Maintenance File. That means in particular that the Notified Body shall verify: — the existence of the maintenance file, — the existence for rolling stock inside the maintenance file of the items detailed in clause 4.2.10.2 of the HS RST TSI, but it does not have to check the validity of the content of the maintenance file. The conformity assessment of maintenance is the responsibility the Relevant National Authority.

6.2.6. Assessment of operational rules The Railway Undertaking or Infrastructure Manager shall demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this TSI. They can do this as part of the Safety Management System as described in Directive 2004/49/EC. Compliance with operation rules of this TSI do not require separate assessment by a Notified Body, unless required by the OPE TSI. The relevant Competent Authority shall carry out an assessment of any new or amended operational procedures and processes, prior to implementation, before granting a new or revised safety authorisation/certificate. This assessment shall be a part of the process for granting the safety certificate/authorisation.

6.2.7. Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the IM

6.2.7.1. Installation of switches and crossings The Notified body shall check the existence in the technical file of a technical study justifying the location of switches and crossings in the tunnel and confirming that only the minimum number of switch and crossing layouts has been installed in accordance with the requirements of 4.2.2.1.

6.2.7.2. Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms The assessment shall confirm that: — Emergency exit doors to the surface and doors to equipment rooms are provided with suitable locks — The locks provided are consistent with the overall strategy for security for the tunnel and adjacent infrastructure — Emergency exits are not lockable from the inside and may be opened by an evacuating passenger — Access arrangements are in place for the rescue services

6.2.7.3. Fire protection requirements for structures The Notified Body shall assess conformity with the fire protection requirements for structures, defined in 4.2.2.3, by using the results of calculations made by the Infrastructure Manager or the contracting entity.

6.2.7.4. Facilities for self-rescue, rescue and evacuation in the event of an incident The Notified Body shall check that the solution adopted is clearly identified by a statement in the technical file and is in conformity with the requirements of 4.2.2.6. In the case of 4.2.2.6.5 Alternative technical solution the Notified Body shall check that the appropriate technical study has been carried out and was subsequently approved by the Relevant National Authority.

6.2.7.5. Access and equipment for rescue services The Notified Body shall confirm, by verification of the technical file and also considering evidence of consultation with the rescue services, that the requirements in the following clauses have been met: — 4.2.2.10 Emergency communication — 4.2.2.11 Access for rescue services — 4.2.2.12 Rescue areas outside tunnels — 4.2.2.13 Water supply — 4.2.3.2 Overhead line or conductor rail earthing — 4.2.3.3 Electricity supply

6.2.7.6. Reliability of electrical installations The Notified Body shall confirm only that a failure mode assessment complying with the functional requirements of 4.2.3.5 has been carried out.

6.2.7.7. Hot axle box detectors The Notified body shall confirm that hot axle box detectors or predictive equipment has been provided in accordance with the requirements of clause 4.2.4.1 and that the Infrastructure Manager has established procedures for action following alarm which prevent suspect rolling stock from entering or stopping in a tunnel.

6.2.8. Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the RU The specifications for CR RST made in this TSI are the same as those described in the HS RST TSI. Therefore the assessment for rolling stock specifications has to be undertaken in accordance with the assessment specifications in HS RST TSI chapter 6, except the following clauses where additional requirements and information is provided: 4.2.5.3 Fire protection for freight trains 4.2.5.12 Rescue services information and access

6.2.8.1. Rescue service's information and access The Notified Body shall check by evidence of consultation with the rescue services that the requirements of 4.2.5.12 are satisfied.

6.2.8.2. Self-rescue device The conformity assessment is described in EN401:1994, EN402:2003, EN403:2004.

7. IMPLEMENTATION

This SRT TSI specifies the basic parameters required either in new, renewed and upgraded tunnels (on conventional lines) or new, renewed and upgraded CR rolling stock, in order to harmonise the current level of overall safety in tunnels throughout Europe. This can be achieved mainly through an optimal combination of safety requirements applied to the infrastructure, rolling stock and operation subsystems. In order to make a gradual transition from the existing situation to the final situation in which compliance with the TSI shall be the norm, this chapter defines the implementation strategy for the SRT TSI.

7.1. Application of this TSI to subsystems to be put into service

7.1.1. General Chapters 4 to 6 apply in full to the subsystems falling within the geographical scope of this TSI (cf. paragraph 1.2) which will be put into service after this TSI enters into force In particular they refer both to new tunnels and new tunnel projects. For projects at an advanced stage of development, and for contracts already awarded see Art 7(a) of Directive 2001/16/EC.

7.1.2. Newly built rolling stock constructed to an existing design Newly built rolling stock constructed to a design existing before entry into force of this TSI and already authorised by one or more Member States, for operation on defined lines is permitted to be placed into service within four years after this TSI enters into force without an assessment of conformity with the SRT TSI, as long as the train remains on its defined lines of operation. However, if this rolling stock is intended to run on lines with tunnels > 1 km in length, it shall be equipped with an emergency brake override device in conformity with clause 4.2.5.8 of this TSI

7.1.3. Existing rolling stock intended to run in new tunnels Unless it would lower the overall level of safety defined by notified national rules, no restriction shall be placed upon the operation of existing trains in respect of TSI compliant tunnels.

7.2. Application of this TSI to subsystems already in service

7.2.1. Introduction Subsystems already in service will be upgraded and renewed in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 14(3) of the Directive 2001/16/EC. In this particular context, the migration strategy (see 7.2.2) indicates the manner in which each existing subsystem inside the tunnel undergoing renewal or to upgrading processes shall be adapted to meet the requirements of the TSI. Upgrading and renewal are defined in Directive 2001/16EC Art 2, alineas l, m, and n. However, the measures prescribed thereafter all apply to both upgrading and renewal actions. To enable a proactive implementation of this TSI, Member States are encouraged to promote and support the implementation strategy. Whenever subsystems of a tunnel section or of rolling stock already in service are to be upgraded or renewed, the opportunity to include other parts that are not included within the plans for upgrade and renewal, but that can be brought into conformity with this TSI, should be considered, particularly where there are significant safety benefits and improvement can be achieved at limited additional cost. In the event that a subsystem relevant to tunnel safety is re-assessed against any other TSI as a result of renewal or upgrading works it shall only require re-assessment against this TSI in respect of those systems and components directly affected by the works.

7.2.2. Upgrade and renewal measures for tunnels of more than 1 km, subsystems INS and ENE When upgrading or renewal of parts of the following subsystems affecting tunnel safety are undertaken, then the following measures shall be implemented. Assemblies and components that are not included in the scope of a particular upgrade or renewal programme do not have to be made compliant at the time of such a programme.

7.2.2.1. INS — 4.5.1 Inspection of tunnel condition (responsible entity: IM) — 4.2.2.2 Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and equipment rooms (responsible entity: IM) — 4.2.2.4 Fire safety requirements for building materials (only for the new material to be installed. Responsible entity: IM, procurement entity) — 4.2.2.9 Escape signage (responsible entity: IM) — 4.2.2.10 Emergency communication (responsible entity: IM)

7.2.2.2. ENE 4.2.3.4 Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels, when replacing cables (responsible entity: IM)

7.2.3. Upgrade and renewal measures for the subsystems CCS, OPE, RST When upgrading or renewal of parts of the following subsystems affecting tunnel safety are undertaken, then the following measures shall be implemented. Assemblies and components that are not included in the scope of a particular upgrade or renewal programme do not have to be made compliant at the time of such a programme.

7.2.3.1. CCS: no measure required

7.2.3.2. OPE: OPE measures sh