Uzaicinājums saskaņā ar EBTA valstu Nolīguma par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu iesniegt piezīmes par valsts atbalstu saistībā ar Asker pašvaldības īstenoto zemes pārdošanu uzņēmumam Brygge AS

2010/C 184/06

Ar 2009. gada 16. decembra Lēmumu Nr. 538/09/COL, kas autentiskajā valodā pievienots šim kopsavilkumam, EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde uzsāka procedūru saskaņā ar 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu EBTA valstu Nolīgumā par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi. Norvēģijas iestādes tika informētas, nosūtot tām lēmuma kopiju.

EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde ar šo paziņo EBTA valstīm, ES dalībvalstīm un ieinteresētajām personām par iespēju iesniegt savas piezīmes par attiecīgo pasākumu viena mēneša laikā no šā paziņojuma publicēšanas dienas, nosūtot tās uz šādu adresi:

Piezīmes tiks nosūtītas Norvēģijas iestādēm. Ieinteresētā persona, kas iesniedz piezīmes, var rakstveidā pieprasīt, lai tās identitāte netiktu atklāta, norādot šāda pieprasījuma iemeslus.

KOPSAVILKUMS

Ar vēstuli, kuru Iestāde saņēma 2009. gada 13. februārī, Norvēģijas iestādes paziņoja par Asker pašvaldības īstenoto zemes gabala pārdošanu uzņēmumam Asker Brygge AS.

Asker pašvaldība un Asker Brygge 2001. gadā noslēdza līgumu, saskaņā ar kuru Asker Brygge tika sniegta iespēja līdz 2009. gada 31. decembrim pirkt zemi par fiksētu summu NOK 8 miljonu apmērā, kas pielāgota patēriņa cenu indeksam. 2005. gadā Asker Brygge izmantoja šo iespēju pirkt zemi. Pēc sarunām puses vienojās par pārdošanas cenu NOK 8 727 462 un 2007. gada 21. martā noslēdza pārdošanas līgumu. Tajā pašā dienā zemes gabalu nodeva Asker Brygge īpašumā, kaut gan pārdošanas summa bija jāsamaksā divos maksājumos, kā bija noteikts jau 2001. gadā noslēgtajā iespējas līgumā. Otrais maksājums veido 70 % no pārdošanas summas (NOK 6 109 223) un ir jāveic vēlākais līdz 2011. gada 31. decembrim. Asker pašvaldība neiekasēs procentus par šo otro maksājumu.

Iestādei ir šaubas, vai darījumu zemes gabala pārdošanas nolūkā veica saskaņā ar tirgus ekonomikas ieguldītāja principu. Vēlākās pārdošanas nosacījumi bija noteikti 2001. gadā parakstītajā iespējas līgumā. Tādēļ Iestāde ir novērtējusi, vai 2001. gada iespējas līgumu noslēdza saskaņā ar tirgus noteikumiem. Iestāde apšauba, ka Asker Brygge ir samaksājis par iespēju kā tādu un ka labvēlīgos pircējam piedāvātos nosacījumus līdzsvaroja atbilstoši pircēja pienākumi vai pārdevēja tiesības. Ar iespējas līgumu uzņēmumam Asker Brygge piešķīra ne tikai tiesības iegādāties īpašumu jebkurā brīdī turpmākajos gados, bet arī noteica šāda vēlāka darījuma cenu. Tādējādi šis līgums sniedza Asker Brygge iespēju novērot zemes cenu attīstību vairāku gadu gaitā, izmantot līgumā paredzēto iespēju un pirkt īpašumu par cenu, par ko vienošanās bija panākta 2001. gadā. No otras puses, pašvaldībai bija liegta iespēja pārdot īpašumu šajā laikā kādam citam. Turklāt uz iespējas līguma pamata Asker Brygge varēja aktīvi iedarboties uz pašvaldību, lai panāktu tādu regulējumu, kura rezultātā palielinātos īpašuma tirgus vērtība. Turklāt pašvaldība nesaņemtu nekādus maksājumus gadījumā, ja pārdošana nenotiktu.

Iespējas līgumā bija iekļauti arī citi elementi, kas, šķiet, ir piemēroti, lai palielinātu iespējas vērtību, proti, cita starpā uzņēmumam Asker Brygge bija tiesības pieprasīt jaunas sarunas par cenu tad, ja zemes cenas ievērojami samazinātos, savukārt pašvaldībai nebija atbilstošas tiesības pieprasīt jaunas sarunas; cena tika pielāgota patēriņa cenu indeksam, lai gan šis indekss neaptver nekustamo īpašumu cenas; Asker pašvaldība piekrita, ka 70 % no sarunu ceļā panāktās pārdošanas cenas tiks samaksāti vēlāk, nesaņemot procentus par šo termiņa atlikšanu, kaut arī zeme tika nekavējoties nodota pilnā pircēja īpašumā.

Šo iemeslu dēļ Iestādei ir šaubas, vai privāts uzņēmums būtu noslēdzis uz līdzīgiem nosacījumiem kā Asker pašvaldība tik ilgu iespējas līgumu, neprasot atlīdzību par iespējas piešķiršanu un labvēlīgiem nosacījumiem kā tādiem.

Tā kā šajā posmā nav iespējams konstatēt, vai iespējas līgums atbilda tirgus ekonomikas ieguldītāja principam, Iestādei ir sīkāk jāpārbauda, vai īpašumu nodeva par cenu, kas 2007. gadā, t. i., laikā, kad pārdošana patiešām notika, bija zemāka par tirgus vērtību, un vai Asker Brygge tādējādi saņēma valsts atbalstu EEZ līguma 61. panta nozīmē. Iestāde ir salīdzinājusi Asker Brygge samaksāto cenu NOK 8 727 462 ar pieejamo informāciju par zemes gabala tirgus vērtību pārdošanas laikā. Norvēģijas iestādes iesniedza trīs novērtējumus par zemes gabala vērtību. Pirmajā, 2006. gada 30. jūnija ziņojumā zemes gabala vērtība 2001. gadā, t. i., iespējas līguma noslēgšanas laikā, tika lēsta NOK 9,6 miljonu apmērā ar iespējamo novirzi +/– 15 %. Otrajā, 2008. gada 18. janvāra ziņojumā tika secināts, ka zemes gabala vērtība 2007. gadā bija NOK 26 miljoni, kas atbilst NOK 17 miljoniem 2001. gadā. Trešajā, 2008. gada 16. jūnija ziņojumā, ko izstrādāja tie paši vērtētāji, zemes gabala vērtība tika koriģēta uz NOK 14 miljoniem 2007. gadā un NOK 8 miljoniem 2001. gadā, ņemot vērā vērtības samazināšanos, kuras iemesls bija Asker Brygge uzliktais papildu pienākums, kas saistīts ar zemes gabala daļas izmantošanu uzņēmuma Slependen Båtforening AS vajadzībām.

Iestādei ir šaubas par to, kurā ziņojumā – un vai vispār kādā no tiem – ir pareizi noteikta zemes gabala (zemesgrāmatas Nr. 32/17) vērtība, un tā šaubās, vai par zemes gabalu tika samaksāta tirgus cena un vai privāts tirgus ieguldītājs būtu piekritis tam, ka, maksājot pārdošanas summu, maksājums tiek atlikts, nesaņemot procentus.

Atbalsta pasākumi, uz kuriem attiecas EEZ līguma 61. panta 1. punkts, parasti nav saderīgi ar EEZ līguma darbību, ja vien tie neatbilst EEZ līguma 61. panta 2. vai 3. punktā noteiktajiem izņēmumiem. Tomēr Iestāde apšauba, ka novērtējamo darījumu var pamatot ar EEZ līguma noteikumiem par valsts atbalstu.

Secinājums

Ņemot vērā minētos apsvērumus, Iestāde nolēma uzsākt oficiālās izmeklēšanas procedūru saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 1. panta 2. punktu. Ieinteresētās personas tiek aicinātas iesniegt savas piezīmes viena mēneša laikā no šā lēmuma publicēšanas Eiropas Savienības Oficiālajā Vēstnesī.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 538/09/COL

of 16 December 2009

to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the notification of sale of land in the municipality of Asker

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (1),

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (2), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26 thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (3), in particular to Article 24 thereof,

Having regard to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (4),

Having regard to the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement (5), and in particular the chapter on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by public authorities (6),

Having regard to the Authority’s Decision of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (7),

Whereas:

I. FACTS

1. Procedure

By letter of 15 December 2008 (Event No 508884), received by the Authority on 13 February 2009, the Norwegian authorities notified a sale of land by the municipality of Asker, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

By letter dated 8 April 2009 (Event No 512188), the Authority requested additional information. The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 May 2009 (Event No 518079).

By letter of 7 July 2009 (Event No 521778), the Authority sent a second request for information. The Norwegian authorities responded by letter dated 14 August 2009 (Event No 527555).

2. Description of the notification

The Norwegian authorities have notified a sale of a plot of land by the municipality of Asker to the company Asker Brygge AS (hereinafter referred to as Asker Brygge).

The municipality of Asker and Asker Brygge entered into an agreement in 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the option agreement), according to which Asker Brygge was granted an option, lasting until 31 December 2009, to buy land for a fixed sum of NOK 8 million, adjusted according to the consumer price index. According to the option agreement the municipality intended to give Asker Brygge the option to buy the property at market price provided that Asker Brygge undertook extensive planning and research with the aim of obtaining a reregulation of the property and then developing the property.

In 2004 the option agreement was renewed, and the validity of the option was extended until 31 December 2014 under similar conditions regarding the progress of the reregulation work. In 2005, Asker Brygge called upon the option to buy the land. The property is registered in the Norwegian property register as Nesøyveien 8, gnr. 32 bnr. 17 in the municipality of Asker and is approximately 9 700 m2. After negotiations the parties agreed to a sales price of NOK 8 727 462 and entered into a sales agreement on 21 March 2007. The land was transferred to Asker Brygge on the same date although the sales sum was to be paid in two instalments. The first instalment of 30 % of the sales sum was paid in 2007 on the date of the transfer of the property. The second and largest instalment, 70 % of the sales sum (NOK 6 109 223), is due at the latest 31 December 2011. The municipality of Asker will not charge any interest rate on the second instalment.

The municipality of Asker and Asker Brygge are of the opinion that the sales contract does not entail any State aid because the sales price reflects the market value. The Norwegian authorities have nonetheless decided to notify the transaction for reasons of legal certainty.

II. ASSESSMENT

1. The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA Agreement

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’.

1.1. Market investor principle

1.1.1. Introduction

If the transaction was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e. if the municipality sold the land for its market value and the conditions of the transaction would have been acceptable for a private seller, the transaction would not involve the grant of State aid.

In the following the Authority will assess whether the municipality of Asker has granted illegal State aid to Asker Brygge in connection with the sale of the plot of land gbnr 32/17. The sale of land could qualify as State aid if the sale was not carried out at market price. As a point of departure, the assessment of whether a property has been sold at market value should be assessed at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The circumstances of this sale of land are somewhat particular in the sense that there exists several agreements concerning the sale: An option agreement from 2001, an extended option agreement from 2004 and a sales agreement from 2007.

The option agreement not only gave Asker Brygge a right to acquire the property at any given time over the years to come but also fixed the price for a later transfer. The option thereby entailed a possibility for Asker Brygge to observe the development of property prices over a number of years, thereafter to take up the option to buy the property for the price agreed in 2001. While the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities also to operate in a market on commercial terms, it nevertheless finds reason to consider carefully whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market operator. The Authority will in that regard consider whether Asker Brygge paid for the option as such, and whether the favourable conditions for the buyer appear to be balanced by corresponding obligations for the buyer or rights for the seller.

If the option agreement as such cannot be said to comply with the private market investor principle, the Authority will assess whether the property was transferred at market value when the sales agreement was concluded in 2007. Thus, the Authority will in the following firstly assess the option agreement of 2001 (and the extension signed in 2004) and, secondly, whether the actual sale of land in 2007 was accomplished at market price.

1.1.2. The market price of the option agreement signed in 2001

As regards the option agreement, it has to be examined whether a private investor operating in a market economy would have chosen to enter into a similar agreement regarding the price and terms as the one signed between the municipality of Asker and Asker Brygge in 2001. In making that assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the seller of the plot of land, must enjoy a margin of judgement. There can be a number of commercially sound reasons to enter into an agreement under given conditions. When there is no plausible explanation for the municipality’s choice the measure could qualify as State aid.

On the basis of the information available to the Authority, the conditions for the later sale were laid down in the option agreement signed in 2001. This agreement gave Asker Brygge a right, but not an obligation, to buy the property on predetermined conditions at any given time until 31 December 2009. On the other hand, the municipality was barred from selling the property to someone else in the same period. The main features of the option agreement which are relevant for the State aid assessment are (i) the agreed price of NOK 8 million, adjusted in accordance with the consumer price index, (ii) the right of renegotiation agreed for Asker Brygge in case property prices should decrease considerably before the option was invoked (there was no corresponding right of renegotiation for the municipality should the property prices increase considerably), (iii) the payment in two instalments, whereby 70 % of the sales price would be paid before 31 December 2011 at the latest, but no interest would be charged for this delay. In 2004 the municipality and Asker Brygge prolonged the option agreement until 2014, but did not modify any of the other conditions for the transaction.

According to the information available to the Authority, the municipality carried out no value assessment of the property before it entered into the agreement with Asker Brygge in 2001. Thus, it is not clear to the Authority on which basis the municipality arrived at the agreed price of NOK 8 million for the sale of land gbnr 32/17. In the information presented to the Authority, Asker municipality nevertheless appears to argue that this amount was indeed the market value of the property in 2001.

Even if it is assumed that NOK 8 million represented the market price for the property as such in 2001, the Authority questions whether the market value of the option agreement only corresponds to the value of the property or whether the market value of the other elements agreed upon should be taken into account. In the Authority’s view, if only the market value for the property had to be considered, that would entail that Asker Brygge got the option as such for free. As mentioned above, this option enabled the company to observe the development of property prices for a number of years. Statistically, property prices tend to increase over time. Furthermore, Asker is located close to Oslo and has experienced a continuous growth in population, something that would usually influence property prices positively.

The option agreement barred the municipality from selling the property to another buyer, and thus tied up capital for which the municipality could have found alternative uses or received interest. Indeed, the extension in 2004 prolonged the option with an additional five years without remuneration. It enabled Asker Brygge to actively approach the municipality in order to reregulate the property for purposes that would increase the market value. Moreover, the municipality would not receive any payment in case of no subsequent sale.

Under the option agreement, some aspects of a possible future sales contract were also agreed upon. In particular, regarding the reregulation of the area, Asker Brygge had an obligation to finish the preparatory works that would lead to the reregulation process. If this condition was not met, the municipality of Asker could terminate the contract. The Norwegian authorities argue that there is an uncertainty or risk connected to the reregulation process. Nevertheless, the option agreement gave Asker Brygge the opportunity to work on it for several years before deciding to buy the property, which in the opinion of the Authority reduced the risk considerably. In addition, if the property was reregulated, this would increase the value of the property. Hence, the option agreement did not entail any real risk for Asker Brygge.

In the Authority’s preliminary view, that option itself, independent of whether it was exercised or not, had a value in 2001 when the agreement was concluded. From the documentation and explanations the Authority has received so far, there is no information that the buyer paid for the option as such.

The option agreement also included other elements that appear to be capable of increasing the value of the option. The first element concerns the mechanism to regulate the price. Asker Brygge had the right to request renegotiations of the price if property prices in Asker should decrease considerably before the option was invoked. As mentioned above, the agreement did not provide a corresponding right of renegotiation for the municipality should the property prices increase considerably. According to the Norwegian authorities, the background for including a right for Asker Brygge to renegotiate the agreement was that the municipality of Asker considered the property to be difficult to develop, inter alia due to the short distance to the highway (E-18), and the transaction would therefore involve substantial economic risk. The Authority however, has doubts as to whether a private market investor would have entered into such an agreement without a mutual right to adjustment if property prices should increase or decrease considerably. In this regard, the right for the municipality to adjust the price in accordance with the consumer price index appears not to be sufficient to compensate for the lack of a corresponding right of renegotiation.

In addition, the Authority doubts that the consumer price index would be the correct index to use when adjusting for changes in property prices. The consumer price index is a measure estimating the change in the average price of consumer goods and services purchased by households, and does not reflect the price movements of the property market. Property prices develop at a different pattern than other prices, and real estate prices are therefore normally not taken into account when determining the consumer price index.

In addition, the municipality of Asker agreed to postpone the payment of 70 % of the agreed sales price until 31 December 2011 at the latest (8) without charging any interest for this deferral. According to the Norwegian authorities, the postponement of full payment without any interest was accepted because the property was considered difficult to develop. The Authority doubts that a private operator would have agreed to postpone the payment over such a long period of time without requiring any interest payments. Moreover, it doubts whether a private operator would have transferred full ownership of the property before full payment had been received.

For these reasons, the Authority doubts that a private operator would have entered into such a long option agreement, on similar conditions as the municipality of Asker without requiring remuneration for the option and the favourable conditions as such. By simply requiring a remuneration corresponding to the value of the property in 2001, the municipality of Asker ran the risk of granting State aid later if property prices should increase. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the property was transferred at a price below market value in 2007 and whether Asker Brygge thereby received State aid within the meaning of Article 61 EEA. The Authority will therefore in the following assess the available information regarding the market value in 2007.

1.1.3. The market value of the property at the time of the sales agreement

In 2005, Asker Brygge called upon the option and negotiations started with the municipality. Although the conditions for the sale were laid down in the 2001 option agreement, the sales contract was concluded in 2007.

In the following, the Authority will therefore compare the price of NOK 8 727 462 paid by Asker Brygge with the market value of the property at the time of the sale.

1.1.3.1. The value of the plot of land gbnr 32/17

According to the Authority's State Aid Guidelines on sale of land, a sale of land and buildings following a sufficiently well-publicised and unconditional bidding procedure, comparable to an auction, accepting the best or only bid, is by definition at market value and consequently does not contain State aid. Alternatively, to exclude the existence of aid when a sale of land is conducted without an unconditional bidding procedure, an independent valuation should be carried out by one or more independent asset valuers prior to sales negotiations in order to establish the market value on the basis of generally accepted market indicators and valuation standards. The valuer should be independent in the execution of his tasks, i.e. public authorities should not be entitled to issue orders as regards the result of the valuation. In the case at hand, the municipality of Asker did not arrange for an unconditional bidding procedure nor collect an independent expert evaluation before entering into the agreement. Thus, the existence of State aid cannot automatically be excluded.

In the notification, the Norwegian authorities have submitted three value assessments of the property in question. None of the value assessments were conducted before the option agreement was entered into in 2001.

The first report dated 30 June 2006 was conducted by licensed property surveyors of Verditaskt AS, Takst Senteret and Agdestein (9). According to this report the estimated value of the land in 2001, the time the option contract was entered into, was NOK 9,6 million, with a possible variation of +/– 15 %. However, this appears to be a very approximate estimation.

The Norwegian authorities enclosed with the notification two additional value assessments which TJB Eiendomstaksering — Ek & Mosveen AS — Bjørn Aarvik had carried out on behalf of the municipality. In the first report dated 18 January 2008 (10), the market value of the land in 2007 was estimated at NOK 26 million. As the contract between the municipality and Asker Brygge was entered into in 2001, this price was discounted to 2001 values. The discounted value of NOK 26 million of 2007 using a rate of 5,5 % over 7,5 years was NOK 17 million in 2001.

In the second report dated 16 June 2008 (11), TJB Eiendomstaksering — Ek & Mosveen AS — Bjørn Aarvik estimated the market value of the land in 2007 at NOK 12 million. The discounted value of NOK 12 million of 2007 using the same discount rate as before (i.e. 5,5 % over 7,5 years) corresponded to NOK 8 million in 2001. Thus, the discrepancy between the two reports is NOK 9 million for the value of the property in 2001 and NOK 14 million for the value of the property in 2007.

The Norwegian authorities have explained that this difference is based on the estimated value reduction of an additional obligation put upon Asker Brygge with regard to the use of part of the property by Slependen Båtforening AS (12). The option agreement of 2001 includes a clause saying that a part of the property is let to Slependen Båtforening as a marina for small boats and that Asker Brygge would have to compensate for their right to a small-boat marina/compensation vis-à-vis the municipality of Asker if development of the property started before the rental contract expires. The rental contract expired in June 2009. Furthermore, in clause 3 of the option agreement it is stated that Asker Brygge will, together with the municipality of Asker, reach a satisfying solution regarding the needs of Slependen Båtforening within the scope of the activity at the time of the agreement.

When the option agreement was entered into in 2001, Slependen Båtforening paid an annual lease of NOK 19 500 to the municipality of Asker (13). Although it was difficult to state the exact economic consequence of the obligation for Asker Brygge at the time the option agreement was entered into, Asker Brygge and Slependen Båtforening signed an agreement on 1 June 2006 according to which the latter was to pay NOK 850 000 (cf. clause 2.4 in the agreement). According to the explanations provided by the Norwegian authorities, the value assessment from January 2008 was based on an incorrect interpretation of an agreement between Asker Brygge and Slependen Båtforening since it did not reflect the obligation to pay NOK 850 000. The asset valuers interpreted the clause in the option agreement in such a way that Slependen Båtforening would have had the right to rent or buy the boat places at market price after the expiry of the rental contract. However, the Norwegian authorities are of the opinion that the sum of NOK 850 000, which represents the fulfilment of the obligation towards Slependen Båtforening, had to be taken into consideration when the market value of the property was assessed for 2001 and 2007. Thus, the municipality of Asker instructed TJB Eiendomstaksering — Ek & Mosveen AS — Bjørn Aarvik to use NOK 850 000 as the basis for the value estimation of Slependen Båtforenings's 65 boat places in their assessment dated 16 June 2008. The Authority considers that this sum is relevant for the assessment of the 2007 property value, as this was known information at the time.

The Authority has doubts as to which of the reports correctly determine the value of the property gbnr 32/17. Furthermore, the Authority notes that the estimations of the different value assessments are not only very different but are also more uncertain due to the fact that they were carried out several years after the option agreement was entered into, and two of them, the year after the sales agreement was entered into. The latest value assessment, the second report, dated 16 June 2008 (14), carried out by TJB Eiendomstaksering — Ek & Mosveen AS — Bjørn Aarvik, estimated the market value of the land in 2007 at NOK 12 million, which is NOK 3 272 538 more than the price paid. This is an indication that the sale was not carried out at market price and also that the consumer price index was not the correct adjustment index. Thus, the Authority questions whether market price was paid for the property.

1.1.3.2. The value of the interest advantage of the soft loan

According to the Norwegian authorities the interest rate advantage is taken into consideration by the property surveyors in the report of 2006. However, as far as the Authority can see, the interest rate advantage is not mentioned or discussed in the report referred to, nor is it mentioned in any of the other reports.

In the opinion of the Authority, the municipality might have therefore forgone interest payments that a private market player would normally have required. Thus, the Authority has doubts as to whether a private market investor would have accepted the long deferral of payment without interest.

1.1.4. Conclusion on the market investor principle

For the above mentioned reasons, the Authority has doubts regarding the price agreed upon in the option agreement and whether it corresponded to the market price for such an agreement, which should reflect the property value at the time of the agreement combined with the value of the option and the special arrangements granted to the buyer. Moreover, the Authority has doubts regarding the actual price agreed upon in the sales agreement and whether it corresponded to the market price of the property at the time the sales agreement was concluded. Therefore, on the basis of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority cannot conclude that the sale of the concerned plot of land gbnr 32/17 to Asker Brygge AS for the sales price of NOK 8 727 462 was carried out in accordance with the market investor principle.

1.2. State resources

In order to qualify as State aid, the measure must be granted by the State or through State resources. The concept of State does not only refer to the central government but embraces all levels of the state administration (including municipalities) as well as public undertakings.

If the municipality sold the land below its market price, it would have foregone income. In such circumstances, Asker Brygge should have paid more for the land and therefore there is a transfer of resources from the municipality.

For these reasons, the Authority considers that if the sale did not take place in accordance with market conditions, State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement would be involved.

1.3. Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

First, the measure must confer on Asker Brygge advantages that relieve the undertaking of charges that are normally borne from its budget. If the transaction was carried out under favourable terms, in the sense that Asker Brygge would most likely have had to pay a higher price for the property if the sale of land had been conducted according to the market investor principle, and to have paid market interest rates for the loan if it was to borrow the same amount from a bank, the company would have received an advantage within the meaning of the State aid rules.

Second, the measure must be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. There is only one possible beneficiary of the measure under assessment, i.e. Asker Brygge. The measure is thus selective.

1.4. Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

The aid must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement.

A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of Asker Brygge vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of real estate and property development. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled.

1.5. Conclusion

For the above mentioned reasons, the Authority has doubts as to whether or not the transaction concerning the sale of the plot of land gbnr 32/17 to Asker Brygge as laid down in the option agreement signed in 2001 and later agreements entail the grant of State aid.

2. Procedural requirements

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. […] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

The Norwegian authorities submitted a notification of the sale of land on 13 February 2009 (Event No 508884). However, the municipality had, in 2001, already entered into an option agreement which determined the future conditions for the sale in March 2007. Moreover, the property was transferred and a soft loan granted to Asker Brygge in March 2007, when the sales agreement was signed, the transaction accomplished and the payment in instalments was agreed. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

3. Compatibility of the aid

Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation in Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement.

The derogation of Article 61(2) is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement apply to the case at hand. Further, the area where the property is located cannot benefit from any regional aid within the meaning of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

4. Conclusion

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has doubts as to whether or not Asker Brygge has received unlawful State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement in the context of the transaction regarding the sale of a plot of land.

The Authority has moreover doubts that this State aid can be regarded as complying with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

In light of the foregoing considerations, within one month of receipt of this decision, the Authority request the Norwegian authorities to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the said transaction.

It invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Asker Brygge immediately.

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to the general principal of law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The EFTA Surveillance Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 against Norway regarding the transaction concerning the sale of the plot of land gbnr 32/17 to the company Asker Brygge AS by the municipality of Asker.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English version is authentic.